instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool PrecisionMeetsSpecForHighpFloat(GLint rangeMin,
GLint rangeMax,
GLint precision) {
return (rangeMin >= 62) && (rangeMax >= 62) && (precision >= 16);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* message_thread(void *input)
{
omx_vdec* omx = reinterpret_cast<omx_vdec*>(input);
unsigned char id;
int n;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("omx_vdec: message thread start");
prctl(PR_SET_NAME, (unsigned long)"VideoDecMsgThread", 0, 0, 0);
while (1) {
n = read(omx->m_pipe_in, &id, 1);
if (0 == n) {
break;
}
if (1 == n) {
omx->process_event_cb(omx, id);
}
if ((n < 0) && (errno != EINTR)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ERROR: read from pipe failed, ret %d errno %d", n, errno);
break;
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("omx_vdec: message thread stop");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
Buffer m;
u_int i;
int ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, &m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, &m);
ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret);
*name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
*info = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
*num = buffer_get_int(&m);
if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
fatal("%s: recieved %u PAM messages, expected <= %u",
__func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG);
*prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *));
*echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int));
for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) {
(*prompts)[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
(*echo_on)[i] = buffer_get_int(&m);
}
buffer_free(&m);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::GetInterface(
const std::string& interface_name,
mojo::ScopedMessagePipeHandle interface_pipe) {
if (!registry_ ||
!registry_->TryBindInterface(interface_name, &interface_pipe)) {
delegate_->OnInterfaceRequest(this, interface_name, &interface_pipe);
if (interface_pipe->is_valid() &&
!TryBindFrameInterface(interface_name, &interface_pipe, this)) {
GetContentClient()->browser()->BindInterfaceRequestFromFrame(
this, interface_name, std::move(interface_pipe));
}
}
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContentBrowserClient::AllowSetCookie(const GURL& url,
const GURL& first_party,
const std::string& cookie_line,
ResourceContext* context,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
net::CookieOptions* options) {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void userfaultfd_ctx_get(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx)
{
if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&ctx->refcount))
BUG();
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas
After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has
VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration. This way we inherit all
common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and
hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY.
The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless
it's a MAP_PRIVATE.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-4-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Smb4KGlobal::clearHostsList()
{
mutex.lock();
while ( !p->hostsList.isEmpty() )
{
delete p->hostsList.takeFirst();
}
mutex.unlock();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kiocb_cancel(struct kioctx *ctx, struct kiocb *kiocb)
{
kiocb_cancel_fn *old, *cancel;
/*
* Don't want to set kiocb->ki_cancel = KIOCB_CANCELLED unless it
* actually has a cancel function, hence the cmpxchg()
*/
cancel = ACCESS_ONCE(kiocb->ki_cancel);
do {
if (!cancel || cancel == KIOCB_CANCELLED)
return -EINVAL;
old = cancel;
cancel = cmpxchg(&kiocb->ki_cancel, old, KIOCB_CANCELLED);
} while (cancel != old);
return cancel(kiocb);
}
Commit Message: aio: prevent double free in ioctx_alloc
ioctx_alloc() calls aio_setup_ring() to allocate a ring. If aio_setup_ring()
fails to do so it would call aio_free_ring() before returning, but
ioctx_alloc() would call aio_free_ring() again causing a double free of
the ring.
This is easily reproducible from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int StreamTcpTest24(void)
{
StreamTcpThread stt;
TcpSession ssn;
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
FAIL_IF (p == NULL);
Flow f;
TCPHdr tcph;
uint8_t packet[1460] = "";
ThreadVars tv;
PacketQueue pq;
memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue));
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
StreamTcpUTSetupSession(&ssn);
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
memset(&f, 0, sizeof (Flow));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars));
memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof (TCPHdr));
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
ssn.client.os_policy = OS_POLICY_BSD;
f.protoctx = &ssn;
p->src.family = AF_INET;
p->dst.family = AF_INET;
p->proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
p->flow = &f;
tcph.th_win = 5480;
tcph.th_flags = TH_PUSH | TH_ACK;
p->tcph = &tcph;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
p->payload = packet;
SET_ISN(&ssn.client, 3184324453UL);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(3184324455UL);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(3373419621UL);
p->payload_len = 4;
FAIL_IF (StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(&tv, stt.ra_ctx, &ssn, &ssn.client, p, &pq) == -1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(3184324459UL);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(3373419633UL);
p->payload_len = 2;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(&tv, stt.ra_ctx, &ssn, &ssn.client, p, &pq) == -1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(3184324459UL);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(3373419657UL);
p->payload_len = 4;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(&tv, stt.ra_ctx, &ssn, &ssn.client, p, &pq) == -1);
FAIL_IF(ssn.client.seg_list_tail == NULL);
FAIL_IF(TCP_SEG_LEN(ssn.client.seg_list_tail) != 4);
StreamTcpUTClearSession(&ssn);
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
FAIL_IF(SC_ATOMIC_GET(st_memuse) > 0);
PASS;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_set_shared_msr(unsigned slot, u64 value, u64 mask)
{
unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct kvm_shared_msrs *smsr = per_cpu_ptr(shared_msrs, cpu);
int err;
if (((value ^ smsr->values[slot].curr) & mask) == 0)
return 0;
smsr->values[slot].curr = value;
err = wrmsrl_safe(shared_msrs_global.msrs[slot], value);
if (err)
return 1;
if (!smsr->registered) {
smsr->urn.on_user_return = kvm_on_user_return;
user_return_notifier_register(&smsr->urn);
smsr->registered = true;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void Bar() {}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 28,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_large_pte(u64 pte)
{
return pte & PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect LayerTreeHostImpl::DeviceViewport() const {
if (external_viewport_.IsEmpty())
return gfx::Rect(device_viewport_size_);
return external_viewport_;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 26,340 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: V8InspectorImpl* unwrapInspector(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
DCHECK(!info.Data().IsEmpty());
DCHECK(info.Data()->IsExternal());
V8InspectorImpl* inspector = static_cast<V8InspectorImpl*>(info.Data().As<v8::External>()->Value());
DCHECK(inspector);
return inspector;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 20,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l2tp_ip6_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock,
int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *lsa = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied = 0;
int err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (addr_len)
*addr_len = sizeof(*lsa);
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (lsa) {
lsa->l2tp_family = AF_INET6;
lsa->l2tp_unused = 0;
lsa->l2tp_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
lsa->l2tp_flowinfo = 0;
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = 0;
if (ipv6_addr_type(&lsa->l2tp_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = IP6CB(skb)->iif;
}
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
copied = skb->len;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err ? err : copied;
}
Commit Message: l2tp: fix info leak in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg()
The L2TP code for IPv6 fails to initialize the l2tp_conn_id member of
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 and therefore leaks four bytes kernel stack
in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg() in case msg_name is set.
Initialize l2tp_conn_id with 0 to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 20,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void setJSTestObjStringAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setStringAttr(ustringToString(value.isEmpty() ? UString() : value.toString(exec)->value(exec)));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_PGSQL_API int php_pgsql_result2array(PGresult *pg_result, zval *ret_array)
{
zval row;
char *field_name;
size_t num_fields;
int pg_numrows, pg_row;
uint i;
assert(Z_TYPE_P(ret_array) == IS_ARRAY);
if ((pg_numrows = PQntuples(pg_result)) <= 0) {
return FAILURE;
}
for (pg_row = 0; pg_row < pg_numrows; pg_row++) {
array_init(&row);
for (i = 0, num_fields = PQnfields(pg_result); i < num_fields; i++) {
if (PQgetisnull(pg_result, pg_row, i)) {
field_name = PQfname(pg_result, i);
add_assoc_null(&row, field_name);
} else {
char *element = PQgetvalue(pg_result, pg_row, i);
if (element) {
const size_t element_len = strlen(element);
field_name = PQfname(pg_result, i);
add_assoc_stringl(&row, field_name, element, element_len);
}
}
}
add_index_zval(ret_array, pg_row, &row);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: local size_t num(char *arg)
{
char *str = arg;
size_t val = 0;
if (*str == 0)
bail("internal error: empty parameter", "");
do {
if (*str < '0' || *str > '9' ||
(val && ((~(size_t)0) - (*str - '0')) / val < 10))
bail("invalid numeric parameter: ", arg);
val = val * 10 + (*str - '0');
} while (*++str);
return val;
}
Commit Message: When decompressing with -N or -NT, strip any path from header name.
This uses the path of the compressed file combined with the name
from the header as the name of the decompressed output file. Any
path information in the header name is stripped. This avoids a
possible vulnerability where absolute or descending paths are put
in the gzip header.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 19,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String Location::protocol() const {
return DOMURLUtilsReadOnly::protocol(Url());
}
Commit Message: Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <acomminos@fb.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip_route_input_common(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
u8 tos, struct net_device *dev, bool noref)
{
struct rtable * rth;
unsigned hash;
int iif = dev->ifindex;
struct net *net;
int res;
net = dev_net(dev);
rcu_read_lock();
if (!rt_caching(net))
goto skip_cache;
tos &= IPTOS_RT_MASK;
hash = rt_hash(daddr, saddr, iif, rt_genid(net));
for (rth = rcu_dereference(rt_hash_table[hash].chain); rth;
rth = rcu_dereference(rth->dst.rt_next)) {
if ((((__force u32)rth->rt_key_dst ^ (__force u32)daddr) |
((__force u32)rth->rt_key_src ^ (__force u32)saddr) |
(rth->rt_iif ^ iif) |
rth->rt_oif |
(rth->rt_key_tos ^ tos)) == 0 &&
rth->rt_mark == skb->mark &&
net_eq(dev_net(rth->dst.dev), net) &&
!rt_is_expired(rth)) {
if (noref) {
dst_use_noref(&rth->dst, jiffies);
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rth->dst);
} else {
dst_use(&rth->dst, jiffies);
skb_dst_set(skb, &rth->dst);
}
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_hit);
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_hlist_search);
}
skip_cache:
/* Multicast recognition logic is moved from route cache to here.
The problem was that too many Ethernet cards have broken/missing
hardware multicast filters :-( As result the host on multicasting
network acquires a lot of useless route cache entries, sort of
SDR messages from all the world. Now we try to get rid of them.
Really, provided software IP multicast filter is organized
reasonably (at least, hashed), it does not result in a slowdown
comparing with route cache reject entries.
Note, that multicast routers are not affected, because
route cache entry is created eventually.
*/
if (ipv4_is_multicast(daddr)) {
struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
if (in_dev) {
int our = ip_check_mc_rcu(in_dev, daddr, saddr,
ip_hdr(skb)->protocol);
if (our
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
||
(!ipv4_is_local_multicast(daddr) &&
IN_DEV_MFORWARD(in_dev))
#endif
) {
int res = ip_route_input_mc(skb, daddr, saddr,
tos, dev, our);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EINVAL;
}
res = ip_route_input_slow(skb, daddr, saddr, tos, dev);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static tBTA_AV_CODE bta_av_op_supported(tBTA_AV_RC rc_id, bool is_inquiry) {
tBTA_AV_CODE ret_code = AVRC_RSP_NOT_IMPL;
if (p_bta_av_rc_id) {
if (is_inquiry) {
if (p_bta_av_rc_id[rc_id >> 4] & (1 << (rc_id & 0x0F))) {
ret_code = AVRC_RSP_IMPL_STBL;
}
} else {
if (p_bta_av_rc_id[rc_id >> 4] & (1 << (rc_id & 0x0F))) {
ret_code = AVRC_RSP_ACCEPT;
} else if ((p_bta_av_cfg->rc_pass_rsp == AVRC_RSP_INTERIM) &&
p_bta_av_rc_id_ac) {
if (p_bta_av_rc_id_ac[rc_id >> 4] & (1 << (rc_id & 0x0F))) {
ret_code = AVRC_RSP_INTERIM;
}
}
}
}
return ret_code;
}
Commit Message: Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 24,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit LayoutBlockFlow::logicalLeftFloatOffsetForLine(LayoutUnit logicalTop, LayoutUnit fixedOffset, LayoutUnit logicalHeight) const
{
if (m_floatingObjects && m_floatingObjects->hasLeftObjects())
return m_floatingObjects->logicalLeftOffset(fixedOffset, logicalTop, logicalHeight);
return fixedOffset;
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 24,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t GetMaxParallelPreload() {
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(media::kLimitParallelMediaPreloading))
return kMaxParallelPreload;
return std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 9,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ath_buf *ath_tx_get_buffer(struct ath_softc *sc)
{
struct ath_buf *bf = NULL;
spin_lock_bh(&sc->tx.txbuflock);
if (unlikely(list_empty(&sc->tx.txbuf))) {
spin_unlock_bh(&sc->tx.txbuflock);
return NULL;
}
bf = list_first_entry(&sc->tx.txbuf, struct ath_buf, list);
list_del(&bf->list);
spin_unlock_bh(&sc->tx.txbuflock);
return bf;
}
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 13,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteIPLImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
IPLInfo
ipl_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
scene=0;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info, image);
if ((quantum_info->format == UndefinedQuantumFormat) &&
(IsHighDynamicRangeImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
switch(quantum_info->depth){
case 8:
ipl_info.byteType = 0;
break;
case 16:
if(quantum_info->format == SignedQuantumFormat){
ipl_info.byteType = 2;
}
else{
ipl_info.byteType = 1;
}
break;
case 32:
if(quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat){
ipl_info.byteType = 3;
}
else{
ipl_info.byteType = 4;
}
break;
case 64:
ipl_info.byteType = 10;
break;
default:
ipl_info.byteType = 2;
break;
}
ipl_info.z = (unsigned int) GetImageListLength(image);
/* There is no current method for detecting whether we have T or Z stacks */
ipl_info.time = 1;
ipl_info.width = (unsigned int) image->columns;
ipl_info.height = (unsigned int) image->rows;
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if(IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) { ipl_info.colors = 3; }
else{ ipl_info.colors = 1; }
ipl_info.size = (unsigned int) (28 +
((image->depth)/8)*ipl_info.height*ipl_info.width*ipl_info.colors*ipl_info.z);
/* Ok! Calculations are done. Lets write this puppy down! */
/*
Write IPL header.
*/
/* Shockingly (maybe not if you have used IPLab), IPLab itself CANNOT read MSBEndian
files! The reader above can, but they cannot. For compatability reasons, I will leave
the code in here, but it is all but useless if you want to use IPLab. */
if(image_info->endian == MSBEndian)
(void) WriteBlob(image, 4, (const unsigned char *) "mmmm");
else{
image->endian = LSBEndian;
(void) WriteBlob(image, 4, (const unsigned char *) "iiii");
}
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, 4);
(void) WriteBlob(image, 4, (const unsigned char *) "100f");
(void) WriteBlob(image, 4, (const unsigned char *) "data");
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, ipl_info.size);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, ipl_info.width);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, ipl_info.height);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, ipl_info.colors);
if(image_info->adjoin == MagickFalse)
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, 1);
else
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, ipl_info.z);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, ipl_info.time);
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, ipl_info.byteType);
exception=(&image->exception);
do
{
/*
Convert MIFF to IPL raster pixels.
*/
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
if(ipl_info.colors == 1){
/* Red frame */
for(y = 0; y < (ssize_t) ipl_info.height; y++){
p=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL, quantum_info,
GrayQuantum, pixels,&image->exception);
(void) WriteBlob(image, image->columns*image->depth/8, pixels);
}
}
if(ipl_info.colors == 3){
/* Red frame */
for(y = 0; y < (ssize_t) ipl_info.height; y++){
p=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL, quantum_info,
RedQuantum, pixels,&image->exception);
(void) WriteBlob(image, image->columns*image->depth/8, pixels);
}
/* Green frame */
for(y = 0; y < (ssize_t) ipl_info.height; y++){
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL, quantum_info,
GreenQuantum, pixels,&image->exception);
(void) WriteBlob(image, image->columns*image->depth/8, pixels);
}
/* Blue frame */
for(y = 0; y < (ssize_t) ipl_info.height; y++){
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL, quantum_info,
BlueQuantum, pixels,&image->exception);
(void) WriteBlob(image, image->columns*image->depth/8, pixels);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) WriteBlob(image, 4, (const unsigned char *) "fini");
(void) WriteBlobLong(image, 0);
CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::DidFlushPaint() {
pepper_helper_->ViewFlushedPaint();
if (!webview())
return;
WebFrame* main_frame = webview()->mainFrame();
if (!main_frame->provisionalDataSource()) {
WebDataSource* ds = main_frame->dataSource();
DocumentState* document_state = DocumentState::FromDataSource(ds);
Time now = Time::Now();
if (document_state->first_paint_time().is_null()) {
document_state->set_first_paint_time(now);
}
if (document_state->first_paint_after_load_time().is_null() &&
!document_state->finish_load_time().is_null()) {
document_state->set_first_paint_after_load_time(now);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 16,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::DestroyGpuMemoryBuffer(gfx::GpuMemoryBufferId id,
int client_id,
const gpu::SyncToken& sync_token) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHost::DestroyGpuMemoryBuffer");
gpu_service_ptr_->DestroyGpuMemoryBuffer(id, client_id, sync_token);
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *retrieve_id_from_card_name(const char *name)
{
const char *spos = name;
while (*name) {
if (isspace(*name) && isalnum(name[1]))
spos = name + 1;
name++;
}
return spos;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 24,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int putreg32(struct task_struct *child, unsigned regno, u32 value)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
switch (regno) {
SEG32(cs);
SEG32(ds);
SEG32(es);
SEG32(fs);
SEG32(gs);
SEG32(ss);
R32(ebx, bx);
R32(ecx, cx);
R32(edx, dx);
R32(edi, di);
R32(esi, si);
R32(ebp, bp);
R32(eax, ax);
R32(eip, ip);
R32(esp, sp);
case offsetof(struct user32, regs.orig_eax):
/*
* A 32-bit debugger setting orig_eax means to restore
* the state of the task restarting a 32-bit syscall.
* Make sure we interpret the -ERESTART* codes correctly
* in case the task is not actually still sitting at the
* exit from a 32-bit syscall with TS_COMPAT still set.
*/
regs->orig_ax = value;
if (syscall_get_nr(child, regs) >= 0)
task_thread_info(child)->status |= TS_COMPAT;
break;
case offsetof(struct user32, regs.eflags):
return set_flags(child, value);
case offsetof(struct user32, u_debugreg[0]) ...
offsetof(struct user32, u_debugreg[7]):
regno -= offsetof(struct user32, u_debugreg[0]);
return ptrace_set_debugreg(child, regno / 4, value);
default:
if (regno > sizeof(struct user32) || (regno & 3))
return -EIO;
/*
* Other dummy fields in the virtual user structure
* are ignored
*/
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void check_reg_overflow(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
if (reg->max_value > BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
reg->max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
if (reg->min_value < BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE ||
reg->min_value > BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
}
Commit Message: bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool classStringHasClassName(const CharacterType* characters, unsigned length)
{
ASSERT(length > 0);
unsigned i = 0;
do {
if (isNotHTMLSpace(characters[i]))
break;
++i;
} while (i < length);
return i < length;
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_get_elements_by_tag_name_ns)
{
zval *id;
xmlDocPtr docp;
int uri_len, name_len;
dom_object *intern, *namednode;
char *uri, *name;
xmlChar *local, *nsuri;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "Oss", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &uri, &uri_len, &name, &name_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
php_dom_create_interator(return_value, DOM_NODELIST TSRMLS_CC);
namednode = (dom_object *)zend_objects_get_address(return_value TSRMLS_CC);
local = xmlCharStrndup(name, name_len);
nsuri = xmlCharStrndup(uri, uri_len);
dom_namednode_iter(intern, 0, namednode, NULL, local, nsuri TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 4,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SyncBackendHost::RequestClearServerData() {
sync_thread_.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SyncBackendHost::Core::DoRequestClearServerData,
core_.get()));
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void test_at()
{
assert_true_rule(
"rule test { \
strings: $a = \"ssi\" \
condition: $a at 2 and $a at 5 }",
"mississippi");
assert_true_rule(
"rule test { \
strings: $a = \"mis\" \
condition: $a at ~0xFF & 0xFF }",
"mississippi");
assert_true_rule_blob(
"rule test { \
strings: $a = { 00 00 00 00 ?? 74 65 78 74 } \
condition: $a at 308}",
PE32_FILE);
}
Commit Message: Fix heap overflow (reported by Jurriaan Bremer)
When setting a new array item with yr_object_array_set_item() the array size is doubled if the index for the new item is larger than the already allocated ones. No further checks were made to ensure that the index fits into the array after doubling its capacity. If the array capacity was for example 64, and a new object is assigned to an index larger than 128 the overflow occurs. As yr_object_array_set_item() is usually invoked with indexes that increase monotonically by one, this bug never triggered before. But the new "dotnet" module has the potential to allow the exploitation of this bug by scanning a specially crafted .NET binary.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ieee80211_csa_finish(struct ieee80211_vif *vif)
{
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
ieee80211_queue_work(&sdata->local->hw,
&sdata->csa_finalize_work);
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 18,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
int32_t pitch, int32_t addr)
{
if (!pitch) {
return true;
}
if (pitch < 0) {
int64_t min = addr
+ ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height-1) * pitch;
int32_t max = addr
+ s->cirrus_blt_width;
if (min < 0 || max > s->vga.vram_size) {
return true;
}
} else {
int64_t max = addr
+ ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height-1) * pitch
+ s->cirrus_blt_width;
if (max > s->vga.vram_size) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 27,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_free_vcpu_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int r;
r = vcpu_load(vcpu);
BUG_ON(r);
vmx_load_vmcs01(vcpu);
free_nested(vmx);
vcpu_put(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 11,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void inode_sb_list_add(struct inode *inode)
{
spin_lock(&inode->i_sb->s_inode_list_lock);
list_add(&inode->i_sb_list, &inode->i_sb->s_inodes);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_sb->s_inode_list_lock);
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 3,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mq_getsetattr, mqd_t, mqdes,
const struct compat_mq_attr __user *, u_mqstat,
struct compat_mq_attr __user *, u_omqstat)
{
int ret;
struct mq_attr mqstat, omqstat;
struct mq_attr *new = NULL, *old = NULL;
if (u_mqstat) {
new = &mqstat;
if (get_compat_mq_attr(new, u_mqstat))
return -EFAULT;
}
if (u_omqstat)
old = &omqstat;
ret = do_mq_getsetattr(mqdes, new, old);
if (ret || !old)
return ret;
if (put_compat_mq_attr(old, u_omqstat))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mqueue: fix a use-after-free in sys_mq_notify()
The retry logic for netlink_attachskb() inside sys_mq_notify()
is nasty and vulnerable:
1) The sock refcnt is already released when retry is needed
2) The fd is controllable by user-space because we already
release the file refcnt
so we when retry but the fd has been just closed by user-space
during this small window, we end up calling netlink_detachskb()
on the error path which releases the sock again, later when
the user-space closes this socket a use-after-free could be
triggered.
Setting 'sock' to NULL here should be sufficient to fix it.
Reported-by: GeneBlue <geneblue.mail@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GBool FlateStream::readDynamicCodes() {
int numCodeLenCodes;
int numLitCodes;
int numDistCodes;
int codeLenCodeLengths[flateMaxCodeLenCodes];
FlateHuffmanTab codeLenCodeTab;
int len, repeat, code;
int i;
codeLenCodeTab.codes = NULL;
if ((numLitCodes = getCodeWord(5)) == EOF) {
goto err;
}
numLitCodes += 257;
if ((numDistCodes = getCodeWord(5)) == EOF) {
goto err;
}
numDistCodes += 1;
if ((numCodeLenCodes = getCodeWord(4)) == EOF) {
goto err;
}
numCodeLenCodes += 4;
if (numLitCodes > flateMaxLitCodes ||
numDistCodes > flateMaxDistCodes ||
numCodeLenCodes > flateMaxCodeLenCodes) {
goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i < flateMaxCodeLenCodes; ++i) {
codeLenCodeLengths[i] = 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < numCodeLenCodes; ++i) {
if ((codeLenCodeLengths[codeLenCodeMap[i]] = getCodeWord(3)) == -1) {
goto err;
}
}
compHuffmanCodes(codeLenCodeLengths, flateMaxCodeLenCodes, &codeLenCodeTab);
len = 0;
repeat = 0;
i = 0;
while (i < numLitCodes + numDistCodes) {
if ((code = getHuffmanCodeWord(&codeLenCodeTab)) == EOF) {
goto err;
}
if (code == 16) {
if ((repeat = getCodeWord(2)) == EOF) {
goto err;
}
repeat += 3;
if (i + repeat > numLitCodes + numDistCodes) {
goto err;
}
for (; repeat > 0; --repeat) {
codeLengths[i++] = len;
}
} else if (code == 17) {
if ((repeat = getCodeWord(3)) == EOF) {
goto err;
}
repeat += 3;
if (i + repeat > numLitCodes + numDistCodes) {
goto err;
}
len = 0;
for (; repeat > 0; --repeat) {
codeLengths[i++] = 0;
}
} else if (code == 18) {
if ((repeat = getCodeWord(7)) == EOF) {
goto err;
}
repeat += 11;
if (i + repeat > numLitCodes + numDistCodes) {
goto err;
}
len = 0;
for (; repeat > 0; --repeat) {
codeLengths[i++] = 0;
}
} else {
codeLengths[i++] = len = code;
}
}
compHuffmanCodes(codeLengths, numLitCodes, &litCodeTab);
compHuffmanCodes(codeLengths + numLitCodes, numDistCodes, &distCodeTab);
gfree(codeLenCodeTab.codes);
return gTrue;
err:
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(), "Bad dynamic code table in flate stream");
gfree(codeLenCodeTab.codes);
return gFalse;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void check_panic_on_oom(struct oom_control *oc,
enum oom_constraint constraint)
{
if (likely(!sysctl_panic_on_oom))
return;
if (sysctl_panic_on_oom != 2) {
/*
* panic_on_oom == 1 only affects CONSTRAINT_NONE, the kernel
* does not panic for cpuset, mempolicy, or memcg allocation
* failures.
*/
if (constraint != CONSTRAINT_NONE)
return;
}
/* Do not panic for oom kills triggered by sysrq */
if (is_sysrq_oom(oc))
return;
dump_header(oc, NULL);
panic("Out of memory: %s panic_on_oom is enabled\n",
sysctl_panic_on_oom == 2 ? "compulsory" : "system-wide");
}
Commit Message: mm, oom_reaper: gather each vma to prevent leaking TLB entry
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1) means gathering the whole virtual memory
space. In this case, tlb->fullmm is true. Some archs like arm64
doesn't flush TLB when tlb->fullmm is true:
commit 5a7862e83000 ("arm64: tlbflush: avoid flushing when fullmm == 1").
Which causes leaking of tlb entries.
Will clarifies his patch:
"Basically, we tag each address space with an ASID (PCID on x86) which
is resident in the TLB. This means we can elide TLB invalidation when
pulling down a full mm because we won't ever assign that ASID to
another mm without doing TLB invalidation elsewhere (which actually
just nukes the whole TLB).
I think that means that we could potentially not fault on a kernel
uaccess, because we could hit in the TLB"
There could be a window between complete_signal() sending IPI to other
cores and all threads sharing this mm are really kicked off from cores.
In this window, the oom reaper may calls tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly() to
flush TLB then frees pages. However, due to the above problem, the TLB
entries are not really flushed on arm64. Other threads are possible to
access these pages through TLB entries. Moreover, a copy_to_user() can
also write to these pages without generating page fault, causes
use-after-free bugs.
This patch gathers each vma instead of gathering full vm space. In this
case tlb->fullmm is not true. The behavior of oom reaper become similar
to munmapping before do_exit, which should be safe for all archs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171107095453.179940-1-wangnan0@huawei.com
Fixes: aac453635549 ("mm, oom: introduce oom reaper")
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Bob Liu <liubo95@huawei.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,034 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tsize_t t2p_write_pdf_stream_dict(tsize_t len, uint32 number, TIFF* output){
tsize_t written=0;
char buffer[32];
int buflen=0;
written += t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) "/Length ", 8);
if(len!=0){
written += t2p_write_pdf_stream_length(len, output);
} else {
buflen=snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%lu", (unsigned long)number);
check_snprintf_ret((T2P*)NULL, buflen, buffer);
written += t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, buflen);
written += t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) " 0 R \n", 6);
}
return(written);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 5,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RList *r_bin_wasm_get_sections_by_id (RList *sections, ut8 id) {
RBinWasmSection *sec = NULL;
RList *ret = NULL;
RListIter *iter = NULL;
if (!(ret = r_list_new ())) {
return NULL;
}
r_list_foreach (sections, iter, sec) {
if (sec->id == id) {
r_list_append(ret, sec);
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in fuzzed wasm r2_hoobr_consume_init_expr
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 15,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t khugepaged_defrag_show(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return single_flag_show(kobj, attr, buf,
TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_DEFRAG_KHUGEPAGED_FLAG);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: format_SET_TUNNEL(const struct ofpact_tunnel *a, struct ds *s)
{
ds_put_format(s, "%sset_tunnel%s:%s%#"PRIx64, colors.param,
(a->tun_id > UINT32_MAX
|| a->ofpact.raw == NXAST_RAW_SET_TUNNEL64 ? "64" : ""),
colors.end, a->tun_id);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pkinit_server_return_padata(krb5_context context,
krb5_pa_data * padata,
krb5_data *req_pkt,
krb5_kdc_req * request,
krb5_kdc_rep * reply,
krb5_keyblock * encrypting_key,
krb5_pa_data ** send_pa,
krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb,
krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock,
krb5_kdcpreauth_moddata moddata,
krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq modreq)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_data scratch = {0, 0, NULL};
krb5_pa_pk_as_req *reqp = NULL;
krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9 *reqp9 = NULL;
int i = 0;
unsigned char *subjectPublicKey = NULL;
unsigned char *dh_pubkey = NULL, *server_key = NULL;
unsigned int subjectPublicKey_len = 0;
unsigned int server_key_len = 0, dh_pubkey_len = 0;
krb5_kdc_dh_key_info dhkey_info;
krb5_data *encoded_dhkey_info = NULL;
krb5_pa_pk_as_rep *rep = NULL;
krb5_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9 *rep9 = NULL;
krb5_data *out_data = NULL;
krb5_data secret;
krb5_enctype enctype = -1;
krb5_reply_key_pack *key_pack = NULL;
krb5_reply_key_pack_draft9 *key_pack9 = NULL;
krb5_data *encoded_key_pack = NULL;
pkinit_kdc_context plgctx;
pkinit_kdc_req_context reqctx;
int fixed_keypack = 0;
*send_pa = NULL;
if (padata->pa_type == KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX) {
return return_pkinit_kx(context, request, reply,
encrypting_key, send_pa);
}
if (padata->length <= 0 || padata->contents == NULL)
return 0;
if (modreq == NULL) {
pkiDebug("missing request context \n");
return EINVAL;
}
plgctx = pkinit_find_realm_context(context, moddata, request->server);
if (plgctx == NULL) {
pkiDebug("Unable to locate correct realm context\n");
return ENOENT;
}
pkiDebug("pkinit_return_padata: entered!\n");
reqctx = (pkinit_kdc_req_context)modreq;
if (encrypting_key->contents) {
free(encrypting_key->contents);
encrypting_key->length = 0;
encrypting_key->contents = NULL;
}
for(i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
enctype = request->ktype[i];
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(enctype))
continue;
else {
pkiDebug("KDC picked etype = %d\n", enctype);
break;
}
}
if (i == request->nktypes) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
switch((int)reqctx->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
init_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep(&rep);
if (rep == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* let's assume it's RSA. we'll reset it to DH if needed */
rep->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_encKeyPack;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
init_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9(&rep9);
if (rep9 == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
rep9->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9_encKeyPack;
break;
default:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
if (reqctx->rcv_auth_pack != NULL &&
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
subjectPublicKey = (unsigned char *)
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->clientPublicValue->subjectPublicKey.data;
subjectPublicKey_len =
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->clientPublicValue->subjectPublicKey.length;
rep->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo;
} else if (reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9 != NULL &&
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
subjectPublicKey = (unsigned char *)
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9->clientPublicValue->subjectPublicKey.data;
subjectPublicKey_len =
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9->clientPublicValue->subjectPublicKey.length;
rep9->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9_dhSignedData;
}
/* if this DH, then process finish computing DH key */
if (rep != NULL && (rep->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo ||
rep->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9_dhSignedData)) {
pkiDebug("received DH key delivery AS REQ\n");
retval = server_process_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, subjectPublicKey,
subjectPublicKey_len, &dh_pubkey, &dh_pubkey_len,
&server_key, &server_key_len);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to process/create dh paramters\n");
goto cleanup;
}
}
if ((rep9 != NULL &&
rep9->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9_dhSignedData) ||
(rep != NULL && rep->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo)) {
/*
* This is DH, so don't generate the key until after we
* encode the reply, because the encoded reply is needed
* to generate the key in some cases.
*/
dhkey_info.subjectPublicKey.length = dh_pubkey_len;
dhkey_info.subjectPublicKey.data = (char *)dh_pubkey;
dhkey_info.nonce = request->nonce;
dhkey_info.dhKeyExpiration = 0;
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info(&dhkey_info,
&encoded_dhkey_info);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("encode_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)encoded_dhkey_info->data,
encoded_dhkey_info->length,
"/tmp/kdc_dh_key_info");
#endif
switch ((int)padata->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
retval = cms_signeddata_create(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_SERVER, 1,
(unsigned char *)
encoded_dhkey_info->data,
encoded_dhkey_info->length,
(unsigned char **)
&rep->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.data,
&rep->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.length);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 signed data\n");
goto cleanup;
}
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
retval = cms_signeddata_create(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9, 1,
(unsigned char *)
encoded_dhkey_info->data,
encoded_dhkey_info->length,
(unsigned char **)
&rep9->u.dhSignedData.data,
&rep9->u.dhSignedData.length);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 signed data\n");
goto cleanup;
}
break;
}
} else {
pkiDebug("received RSA key delivery AS REQ\n");
retval = krb5_c_make_random_key(context, enctype, encrypting_key);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("unable to make a session key\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* check if PA_TYPE of KRB5_PADATA_AS_CHECKSUM (132) is present which
* means the client is requesting that a checksum is send back instead
* of the nonce.
*/
for (i = 0; request->padata[i] != NULL; i++) {
pkiDebug("%s: Checking pa_type 0x%08x\n",
__FUNCTION__, request->padata[i]->pa_type);
if (request->padata[i]->pa_type == KRB5_PADATA_AS_CHECKSUM)
fixed_keypack = 1;
}
pkiDebug("%s: return checksum instead of nonce = %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, fixed_keypack);
/* if this is an RFC reply or draft9 client requested a checksum
* in the reply instead of the nonce, create an RFC-style keypack
*/
if ((int)padata->pa_type == KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ || fixed_keypack) {
init_krb5_reply_key_pack(&key_pack);
if (key_pack == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, 0,
encrypting_key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM,
req_pkt, &key_pack->asChecksum);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("unable to calculate AS REQ checksum\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_CKSUM
pkiDebug("calculating checksum on buf size = %d\n", req_pkt->length);
print_buffer(req_pkt->data, req_pkt->length);
pkiDebug("checksum size = %d\n", key_pack->asChecksum.length);
print_buffer(key_pack->asChecksum.contents,
key_pack->asChecksum.length);
pkiDebug("encrypting key (%d)\n", encrypting_key->length);
print_buffer(encrypting_key->contents, encrypting_key->length);
#endif
krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, encrypting_key,
&key_pack->replyKey);
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_reply_key_pack(key_pack,
&encoded_key_pack);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode reply_key_pack\n");
goto cleanup;
}
}
switch ((int)padata->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
rep->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_encKeyPack;
retval = cms_envelopeddata_create(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, padata->pa_type, 1,
(unsigned char *)
encoded_key_pack->data,
encoded_key_pack->length,
(unsigned char **)
&rep->u.encKeyPack.data,
&rep->u.encKeyPack.length);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
/* if the request is from the broken draft9 client that
* expects back a nonce, create it now
*/
if (!fixed_keypack) {
init_krb5_reply_key_pack_draft9(&key_pack9);
if (key_pack9 == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
key_pack9->nonce = reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9->pkAuthenticator.nonce;
krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, encrypting_key,
&key_pack9->replyKey);
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_reply_key_pack_draft9(key_pack9,
&encoded_key_pack);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode reply_key_pack\n");
goto cleanup;
}
}
rep9->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9_encKeyPack;
retval = cms_envelopeddata_create(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, padata->pa_type, 1,
(unsigned char *)
encoded_key_pack->data,
encoded_key_pack->length,
(unsigned char **)
&rep9->u.encKeyPack.data, &rep9->u.encKeyPack.length);
break;
}
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 enveloped data: %s\n",
error_message(retval));
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)encoded_key_pack->data,
encoded_key_pack->length,
"/tmp/kdc_key_pack");
switch ((int)padata->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
print_buffer_bin(rep->u.encKeyPack.data,
rep->u.encKeyPack.length,
"/tmp/kdc_enc_key_pack");
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
print_buffer_bin(rep9->u.encKeyPack.data,
rep9->u.encKeyPack.length,
"/tmp/kdc_enc_key_pack");
break;
}
#endif
}
if ((rep != NULL && rep->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo) &&
((reqctx->rcv_auth_pack != NULL &&
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->supportedKDFs != NULL))) {
/* If using the alg-agility KDF, put the algorithm in the reply
* before encoding it.
*/
if (reqctx->rcv_auth_pack != NULL &&
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->supportedKDFs != NULL) {
retval = pkinit_pick_kdf_alg(context, reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->supportedKDFs,
&(rep->u.dh_Info.kdfID));
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_pick_kdf_alg failed: %s\n",
error_message(retval));
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
switch ((int)padata->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep(rep, &out_data);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9(rep9, &out_data);
break;
}
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode AS_REP\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
if (out_data != NULL)
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)out_data->data, out_data->length,
"/tmp/kdc_as_rep");
#endif
/* If this is DH, we haven't computed the key yet, so do it now. */
if ((rep9 != NULL &&
rep9->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9_dhSignedData) ||
(rep != NULL && rep->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo)) {
/* If we're not doing draft 9, and mutually supported KDFs were found,
* use the algorithm agility KDF. */
if (rep != NULL && rep->u.dh_Info.kdfID) {
secret.data = (char *)server_key;
secret.length = server_key_len;
retval = pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(context, &secret,
rep->u.dh_Info.kdfID,
request->client, request->server,
enctype, req_pkt, out_data,
encrypting_key);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_alg_agility_kdf failed: %s\n",
error_message(retval));
goto cleanup;
}
/* Otherwise, use the older octetstring2key() function */
} else {
retval = pkinit_octetstring2key(context, enctype, server_key,
server_key_len, encrypting_key);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_octetstring2key failed: %s\n",
error_message(retval));
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
*send_pa = malloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data));
if (*send_pa == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
free(out_data->data);
free(out_data);
out_data = NULL;
goto cleanup;
}
(*send_pa)->magic = KV5M_PA_DATA;
switch ((int)padata->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
(*send_pa)->pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
(*send_pa)->pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD;
break;
}
(*send_pa)->length = out_data->length;
(*send_pa)->contents = (krb5_octet *) out_data->data;
cleanup:
pkinit_fini_kdc_req_context(context, reqctx);
free(scratch.data);
free(out_data);
if (encoded_dhkey_info != NULL)
krb5_free_data(context, encoded_dhkey_info);
if (encoded_key_pack != NULL)
krb5_free_data(context, encoded_key_pack);
free(dh_pubkey);
free(server_key);
switch ((int)padata->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_req(&reqp);
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep(&rep);
free_krb5_reply_key_pack(&key_pack);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9(&reqp9);
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep_draft9(&rep9);
if (!fixed_keypack)
free_krb5_reply_key_pack_draft9(&key_pack9);
else
free_krb5_reply_key_pack(&key_pack);
break;
}
if (retval)
pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata failure");
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Prevent requires_preauth bypass [CVE-2015-2694]
In the OTP kdcpreauth module, don't set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH bit until
the request is successfully verified. In the PKINIT kdcpreauth
module, don't respond with code 0 on empty input or an unconfigured
realm. Together these bugs could cause the KDC preauth framework to
erroneously treat a request as pre-authenticated.
CVE-2015-2694:
In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, when the KDC is configured with PKINIT
support, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the
requires_preauth flag on a client principal and obtain a ciphertext
encrypted in the principal's long-term key. This ciphertext could be
used to conduct an off-line dictionary attack against the user's
password.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8160 (new)
target_version: 1.13.2
tags: pullup
subject: requires_preauth bypass in PKINIT-enabled KDC [CVE-2015-2694]
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const btav_sink_interface_t* btif_av_get_sink_interface(void) {
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
return &bt_av_sink_interface;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 27,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long video_ioctl2(struct file *file,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
char sbuf[128];
void *mbuf = NULL;
void *parg = (void *)arg;
long err = -EINVAL;
bool has_array_args;
size_t array_size = 0;
void __user *user_ptr = NULL;
void **kernel_ptr = NULL;
/* Copy arguments into temp kernel buffer */
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) != _IOC_NONE) {
if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) <= sizeof(sbuf)) {
parg = sbuf;
} else {
/* too big to allocate from stack */
mbuf = kmalloc(_IOC_SIZE(cmd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (NULL == mbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
parg = mbuf;
}
err = -EFAULT;
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
unsigned long n = cmd_input_size(cmd);
if (copy_from_user(parg, (void __user *)arg, n))
goto out;
/* zero out anything we don't copy from userspace */
if (n < _IOC_SIZE(cmd))
memset((u8 *)parg + n, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd) - n);
} else {
/* read-only ioctl */
memset(parg, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
}
}
err = check_array_args(cmd, parg, &array_size, &user_ptr, &kernel_ptr);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
has_array_args = err;
if (has_array_args) {
/*
* When adding new types of array args, make sure that the
* parent argument to ioctl (which contains the pointer to the
* array) fits into sbuf (so that mbuf will still remain
* unused up to here).
*/
mbuf = kmalloc(array_size, GFP_KERNEL);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (NULL == mbuf)
goto out_array_args;
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(mbuf, user_ptr, array_size))
goto out_array_args;
*kernel_ptr = mbuf;
}
/* Handles IOCTL */
err = __video_do_ioctl(file, cmd, parg);
if (err == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
err = -EINVAL;
if (has_array_args) {
*kernel_ptr = user_ptr;
if (copy_to_user(user_ptr, mbuf, array_size))
err = -EFAULT;
goto out_array_args;
}
if (err < 0)
goto out;
out_array_args:
/* Copy results into user buffer */
switch (_IOC_DIR(cmd)) {
case _IOC_READ:
case (_IOC_WRITE | _IOC_READ):
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, parg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
out:
kfree(mbuf);
return err;
}
Commit Message: [media] v4l: Share code between video_usercopy and video_ioctl2
The two functions are mostly identical. They handle the copy_from_user
and copy_to_user operations related with V4L2 ioctls and call the real
ioctl handler.
Create a __video_usercopy function that implements the core of
video_usercopy and video_ioctl2, and call that function from both.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 5,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_dict_getsa(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, const char *key, const char *abbrev)
{
pdf_obj *v;
v = pdf_dict_gets(ctx, obj, key);
if (v)
return v;
return pdf_dict_gets(ctx, obj, abbrev);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltDefaultProcessOneNode(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xsltStackElemPtr params) {
xmlNodePtr copy;
xmlNodePtr delete = NULL, cur;
int nbchild = 0, oldSize;
int childno = 0, oldPos;
xsltTemplatePtr template;
CHECK_STOPPED;
/*
* Handling of leaves
*/
switch (node->type) {
case XML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
break;
case XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy CDATA %s\n",
node->content));
#endif
copy = xsltCopyText(ctxt, ctxt->insert, node, 0);
if (copy == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: cdata copy failed\n");
}
return;
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
if (node->content == NULL) {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy empty text\n"));
return;
} else {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy text %s\n",
node->content));
}
#endif
copy = xsltCopyText(ctxt, ctxt->insert, node, 0);
if (copy == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: text copy failed\n");
}
return;
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
cur = node->children;
while ((cur != NULL) && (cur->type != XML_TEXT_NODE))
cur = cur->next;
if (cur == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: no text for attribute\n");
} else {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
if (cur->content == NULL) {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy empty text\n"));
} else {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy text %s\n",
cur->content));
}
#endif
copy = xsltCopyText(ctxt, ctxt->insert, cur, 0);
if (copy == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: text copy failed\n");
}
}
return;
default:
return;
}
/*
* Handling of Elements: first pass, cleanup and counting
*/
cur = node->children;
while (cur != NULL) {
switch (cur->type) {
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
case XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
case XML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
case XML_PI_NODE:
case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
nbchild++;
break;
case XML_DTD_NODE:
/* Unlink the DTD, it's still reachable using doc->intSubset */
if (cur->next != NULL)
cur->next->prev = cur->prev;
if (cur->prev != NULL)
cur->prev->next = cur->next;
break;
default:
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: skipping node type %d\n",
cur->type));
#endif
delete = cur;
}
cur = cur->next;
if (delete != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: removing ignorable blank node\n"));
#endif
xmlUnlinkNode(delete);
xmlFreeNode(delete);
delete = NULL;
}
}
if (delete != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: removing ignorable blank node\n"));
#endif
xmlUnlinkNode(delete);
xmlFreeNode(delete);
delete = NULL;
}
/*
* Handling of Elements: second pass, actual processing
*/
oldSize = ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize;
oldPos = ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition;
cur = node->children;
while (cur != NULL) {
childno++;
switch (cur->type) {
case XML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize = nbchild;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition = childno;
xsltProcessOneNode(ctxt, cur, params);
break;
case XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
template = xsltGetTemplate(ctxt, cur, NULL);
if (template) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: applying template for CDATA %s\n",
cur->content));
#endif
/*
* Instantiate the xsl:template.
*/
xsltApplyXSLTTemplate(ctxt, cur, template->content,
template, params);
} else /* if (ctxt->mode == NULL) */ {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy CDATA %s\n",
cur->content));
#endif
copy = xsltCopyText(ctxt, ctxt->insert, cur, 0);
if (copy == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, cur,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: cdata copy failed\n");
}
}
break;
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
template = xsltGetTemplate(ctxt, cur, NULL);
if (template) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: applying template for text %s\n",
cur->content));
#endif
ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize = nbchild;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition = childno;
/*
* Instantiate the xsl:template.
*/
xsltApplyXSLTTemplate(ctxt, cur, template->content,
template, params);
} else /* if (ctxt->mode == NULL) */ {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
if (cur->content == NULL) {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy empty text\n"));
} else {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy text %s\n",
cur->content));
}
#endif
copy = xsltCopyText(ctxt, ctxt->insert, cur, 0);
if (copy == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, cur,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: text copy failed\n");
}
}
break;
case XML_PI_NODE:
case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
template = xsltGetTemplate(ctxt, cur, NULL);
if (template) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
if (cur->type == XML_PI_NODE) {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: template found for PI %s\n",
cur->name));
} else if (cur->type == XML_COMMENT_NODE) {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: template found for comment\n"));
}
#endif
ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize = nbchild;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition = childno;
/*
* Instantiate the xsl:template.
*/
xsltApplyXSLTTemplate(ctxt, cur, template->content,
template, params);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
cur = cur->next;
}
ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize = oldSize;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition = oldPos;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fetch_named_backref_token(OnigCodePoint c, OnigToken* tok, UChar** src,
UChar* end, ScanEnv* env)
{
int r, num;
const OnigSyntaxType* syn = env->syntax;
UChar* prev;
UChar* p = *src;
UChar* name_end;
int* backs;
int back_num;
prev = p;
# ifdef USE_BACKREF_WITH_LEVEL
name_end = NULL_UCHARP; /* no need. escape gcc warning. */
r = fetch_name_with_level(c, &p, end, &name_end,
env, &back_num, &tok->u.backref.level);
if (r == 1) tok->u.backref.exist_level = 1;
else tok->u.backref.exist_level = 0;
# else
r = fetch_name(&p, end, &name_end, env, &back_num, 1);
# endif
if (r < 0) return r;
if (back_num != 0) {
if (back_num < 0) {
back_num = BACKREF_REL_TO_ABS(back_num, env);
if (back_num <= 0)
return ONIGERR_INVALID_BACKREF;
}
if (IS_SYNTAX_BV(syn, ONIG_SYN_STRICT_CHECK_BACKREF)) {
if (back_num > env->num_mem ||
IS_NULL(SCANENV_MEM_NODES(env)[back_num]))
return ONIGERR_INVALID_BACKREF;
}
tok->type = TK_BACKREF;
tok->u.backref.by_name = 0;
tok->u.backref.num = 1;
tok->u.backref.ref1 = back_num;
}
else {
num = onig_name_to_group_numbers(env->reg, prev, name_end, &backs);
if (num <= 0) {
onig_scan_env_set_error_string(env,
ONIGERR_UNDEFINED_NAME_REFERENCE, prev, name_end);
return ONIGERR_UNDEFINED_NAME_REFERENCE;
}
if (IS_SYNTAX_BV(syn, ONIG_SYN_STRICT_CHECK_BACKREF)) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
if (backs[i] > env->num_mem ||
IS_NULL(SCANENV_MEM_NODES(env)[backs[i]]))
return ONIGERR_INVALID_BACKREF;
}
}
tok->type = TK_BACKREF;
tok->u.backref.by_name = 1;
if (num == 1 || IS_SYNTAX_BV(syn, ONIG_SYN_USE_LEFT_MOST_NAMED_GROUP)) {
tok->u.backref.num = 1;
tok->u.backref.ref1 = backs[0];
}
else {
tok->u.backref.num = num;
tok->u.backref.refs = backs;
}
}
*src = p;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #134 from k-takata/fix-segv-in-error-str
Fix SEGV in onig_error_code_to_str() (Fix #132)
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 24,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init kmem_cache_init(void)
{
int i;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(((struct page *)NULL)->lru) <
sizeof(struct rcu_head));
kmem_cache = &kmem_cache_boot;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) || num_possible_nodes() == 1)
use_alien_caches = 0;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_INIT_LISTS; i++)
kmem_cache_node_init(&init_kmem_cache_node[i]);
/*
* Fragmentation resistance on low memory - only use bigger
* page orders on machines with more than 32MB of memory if
* not overridden on the command line.
*/
if (!slab_max_order_set && totalram_pages > (32 << 20) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
slab_max_order = SLAB_MAX_ORDER_HI;
/* Bootstrap is tricky, because several objects are allocated
* from caches that do not exist yet:
* 1) initialize the kmem_cache cache: it contains the struct
* kmem_cache structures of all caches, except kmem_cache itself:
* kmem_cache is statically allocated.
* Initially an __init data area is used for the head array and the
* kmem_cache_node structures, it's replaced with a kmalloc allocated
* array at the end of the bootstrap.
* 2) Create the first kmalloc cache.
* The struct kmem_cache for the new cache is allocated normally.
* An __init data area is used for the head array.
* 3) Create the remaining kmalloc caches, with minimally sized
* head arrays.
* 4) Replace the __init data head arrays for kmem_cache and the first
* kmalloc cache with kmalloc allocated arrays.
* 5) Replace the __init data for kmem_cache_node for kmem_cache and
* the other cache's with kmalloc allocated memory.
* 6) Resize the head arrays of the kmalloc caches to their final sizes.
*/
/* 1) create the kmem_cache */
/*
* struct kmem_cache size depends on nr_node_ids & nr_cpu_ids
*/
create_boot_cache(kmem_cache, "kmem_cache",
offsetof(struct kmem_cache, node) +
nr_node_ids * sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node *),
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN);
list_add(&kmem_cache->list, &slab_caches);
slab_state = PARTIAL;
/*
* Initialize the caches that provide memory for the kmem_cache_node
* structures first. Without this, further allocations will bug.
*/
kmalloc_caches[INDEX_NODE] = create_kmalloc_cache("kmalloc-node",
kmalloc_size(INDEX_NODE), ARCH_KMALLOC_FLAGS);
slab_state = PARTIAL_NODE;
setup_kmalloc_cache_index_table();
slab_early_init = 0;
/* 5) Replace the bootstrap kmem_cache_node */
{
int nid;
for_each_online_node(nid) {
init_list(kmem_cache, &init_kmem_cache_node[CACHE_CACHE + nid], nid);
init_list(kmalloc_caches[INDEX_NODE],
&init_kmem_cache_node[SIZE_NODE + nid], nid);
}
}
create_kmalloc_caches(ARCH_KMALLOC_FLAGS);
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sf_open_fd (int fd, int mode, SF_INFO *sfinfo, int close_desc)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
if ((SF_CONTAINER (sfinfo->format)) == SF_FORMAT_SD2)
{ sf_errno = SFE_SD2_FD_DISALLOWED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
if ((psf = calloc (1, sizeof (SF_PRIVATE))) == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf_init_files (psf) ;
copy_filename (psf, "") ;
psf->file.mode = mode ;
psf_set_file (psf, fd) ;
psf->is_pipe = psf_is_pipe (psf) ;
psf->fileoffset = psf_ftell (psf) ;
if (! close_desc)
psf->file.do_not_close_descriptor = SF_TRUE ;
return psf_open_file (psf, sfinfo) ;
} /* sf_open_fd */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 1,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: minimum_cellspacing(int border_mode)
{
switch (border_mode) {
case BORDER_THIN:
case BORDER_THICK:
case BORDER_NOWIN:
return RULE_WIDTH;
case BORDER_NONE:
return 1;
default:
/* not reached */
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 4,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void imdct_step3_inner_s_loop_ld654(int n, float *e, int i_off, float *A, int base_n)
{
int a_off = base_n >> 3;
float A2 = A[0+a_off];
float *z = e + i_off;
float *base = z - 16 * n;
while (z > base) {
float k00,k11;
k00 = z[-0] - z[-8];
k11 = z[-1] - z[-9];
z[-0] = z[-0] + z[-8];
z[-1] = z[-1] + z[-9];
z[-8] = k00;
z[-9] = k11 ;
k00 = z[ -2] - z[-10];
k11 = z[ -3] - z[-11];
z[ -2] = z[ -2] + z[-10];
z[ -3] = z[ -3] + z[-11];
z[-10] = (k00+k11) * A2;
z[-11] = (k11-k00) * A2;
k00 = z[-12] - z[ -4]; // reverse to avoid a unary negation
k11 = z[ -5] - z[-13];
z[ -4] = z[ -4] + z[-12];
z[ -5] = z[ -5] + z[-13];
z[-12] = k11;
z[-13] = k00;
k00 = z[-14] - z[ -6]; // reverse to avoid a unary negation
k11 = z[ -7] - z[-15];
z[ -6] = z[ -6] + z[-14];
z[ -7] = z[ -7] + z[-15];
z[-14] = (k00+k11) * A2;
z[-15] = (k00-k11) * A2;
iter_54(z);
iter_54(z-8);
z -= 16;
}
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int midi_setup_noteon(struct _mdi *mdi, uint8_t channel,
uint8_t note, uint8_t velocity) {
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__,channel, note);
_WM_CheckEventMemoryPool(mdi);
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].do_event = *_WM_do_note_on;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].event_data.channel = channel;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].event_data.data.value = (note << 8) | velocity;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].samples_to_next = 0;
mdi->event_count++;
if (mdi->channel[channel].isdrum)
_WM_load_patch(mdi, ((mdi->channel[channel].bank << 8) | (note | 0x80)));
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 15,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int LvmBundle_process(LVM_INT16 *pIn,
LVM_INT16 *pOut,
int frameCount,
EffectContext *pContext){
LVM_ControlParams_t ActiveParams; /* Current control Parameters */
LVM_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus = LVM_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
LVM_INT16 *pOutTmp;
if (pContext->config.outputCfg.accessMode == EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_WRITE){
pOutTmp = pOut;
} else if (pContext->config.outputCfg.accessMode == EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_ACCUMULATE){
if (pContext->pBundledContext->frameCount != frameCount) {
if (pContext->pBundledContext->workBuffer != NULL) {
free(pContext->pBundledContext->workBuffer);
}
pContext->pBundledContext->workBuffer =
(LVM_INT16 *)calloc(frameCount, sizeof(LVM_INT16) * 2);
if (pContext->pBundledContext->workBuffer == NULL) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->frameCount = frameCount;
}
pOutTmp = pContext->pBundledContext->workBuffer;
} else {
ALOGV("LVM_ERROR : LvmBundle_process invalid access mode");
return -EINVAL;
}
#ifdef LVM_PCM
fwrite(pIn, frameCount*sizeof(LVM_INT16)*2, 1, pContext->pBundledContext->PcmInPtr);
fflush(pContext->pBundledContext->PcmInPtr);
#endif
/* Process the samples */
LvmStatus = LVM_Process(pContext->pBundledContext->hInstance, /* Instance handle */
pIn, /* Input buffer */
pOutTmp, /* Output buffer */
(LVM_UINT16)frameCount, /* Number of samples to read */
0); /* Audo Time */
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVM_Process", "LvmBundle_process")
if(LvmStatus != LVM_SUCCESS) return -EINVAL;
#ifdef LVM_PCM
fwrite(pOutTmp, frameCount*sizeof(LVM_INT16)*2, 1, pContext->pBundledContext->PcmOutPtr);
fflush(pContext->pBundledContext->PcmOutPtr);
#endif
if (pContext->config.outputCfg.accessMode == EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_ACCUMULATE){
for (int i=0; i<frameCount*2; i++){
pOut[i] = clamp16((LVM_INT32)pOut[i] + (LVM_INT32)pOutTmp[i]);
}
}
return 0;
} /* end LvmBundle_process */
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Equalizer command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32247948
Bug: 32438598
Bug: 32436341
Test: use POC on bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I91bd6aadb6c7410163e03101f365db767f4cd2a3
(cherry picked from commit 0872b65cff9129633471945431b9a5a28418049c)
(cherry picked from commit e981cca9fff3608af22bdf8fc1acef5470e25663)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ConsumesTouchMovesDelegate() : consume_touch_move_(true) {}
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,789 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sa_fini(sa_handle_t handle)
{
sa_handle_impl_t impl_handle = (sa_handle_impl_t)handle;
sa_share_impl_t impl_share, next;
sa_share_impl_t *pcurr;
if (impl_handle == NULL)
return;
/*
* clean up shares which don't have a non-NULL dataset property,
* which means they're in sharetab but we couldn't find their
* ZFS dataset.
*/
pcurr = &(impl_handle->shares);
impl_share = *pcurr;
while (impl_share != NULL) {
next = impl_share->next;
if (impl_share->dataset == NULL) {
/* remove item from the linked list */
*pcurr = next;
sa_disable_share(impl_share, NULL);
free_share(impl_share);
} else {
pcurr = &(impl_share->next);
}
impl_share = next;
}
update_sharetab(impl_handle);
if (impl_handle->zfs_libhandle != NULL)
libzfs_fini(impl_handle->zfs_libhandle);
impl_share = impl_handle->shares;
while (impl_share != NULL) {
next = impl_share->next;
free_share(impl_share);
impl_share = next;
}
free(impl_handle);
}
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 27,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InputEventAckNotificationObserver::~InputEventAckNotificationObserver() {}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void TraceArcPath(PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,const PointInfo start,
const PointInfo end,const PointInfo arc,const double angle,
const MagickBooleanType large_arc,const MagickBooleanType sweep)
{
double
alpha,
beta,
delta,
factor,
gamma,
theta;
PointInfo
center,
points[3],
radii;
register double
cosine,
sine;
register PrimitiveInfo
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
arc_segments;
if ((fabs(start.x-end.x) < DrawEpsilon) &&
(fabs(start.y-end.y) < DrawEpsilon))
{
TracePoint(primitive_info,end);
return;
}
radii.x=fabs(arc.x);
radii.y=fabs(arc.y);
if ((fabs(radii.x) < DrawEpsilon) || (fabs(radii.y) < DrawEpsilon))
{
TraceLine(primitive_info,start,end);
return;
}
cosine=cos(DegreesToRadians(fmod((double) angle,360.0)));
sine=sin(DegreesToRadians(fmod((double) angle,360.0)));
center.x=(double) (cosine*(end.x-start.x)/2+sine*(end.y-start.y)/2);
center.y=(double) (cosine*(end.y-start.y)/2-sine*(end.x-start.x)/2);
delta=(center.x*center.x)/(radii.x*radii.x)+(center.y*center.y)/
(radii.y*radii.y);
if (delta < DrawEpsilon)
{
TraceLine(primitive_info,start,end);
return;
}
if (delta > 1.0)
{
radii.x*=sqrt((double) delta);
radii.y*=sqrt((double) delta);
}
points[0].x=(double) (cosine*start.x/radii.x+sine*start.y/radii.x);
points[0].y=(double) (cosine*start.y/radii.y-sine*start.x/radii.y);
points[1].x=(double) (cosine*end.x/radii.x+sine*end.y/radii.x);
points[1].y=(double) (cosine*end.y/radii.y-sine*end.x/radii.y);
alpha=points[1].x-points[0].x;
beta=points[1].y-points[0].y;
factor=PerceptibleReciprocal(alpha*alpha+beta*beta)-0.25;
if (factor <= 0.0)
factor=0.0;
else
{
factor=sqrt((double) factor);
if (sweep == large_arc)
factor=(-factor);
}
center.x=(double) ((points[0].x+points[1].x)/2-factor*beta);
center.y=(double) ((points[0].y+points[1].y)/2+factor*alpha);
alpha=atan2(points[0].y-center.y,points[0].x-center.x);
theta=atan2(points[1].y-center.y,points[1].x-center.x)-alpha;
if ((theta < 0.0) && (sweep != MagickFalse))
theta+=2.0*MagickPI;
else
if ((theta > 0.0) && (sweep == MagickFalse))
theta-=2.0*MagickPI;
arc_segments=(size_t) ceil(fabs((double) (theta/(0.5*MagickPI+
DrawEpsilon))));
p=primitive_info;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) arc_segments; i++)
{
beta=0.5*((alpha+(i+1)*theta/arc_segments)-(alpha+i*theta/arc_segments));
gamma=(8.0/3.0)*sin(fmod((double) (0.5*beta),DegreesToRadians(360.0)))*
sin(fmod((double) (0.5*beta),DegreesToRadians(360.0)))/
sin(fmod((double) beta,DegreesToRadians(360.0)));
points[0].x=(double) (center.x+cos(fmod((double) (alpha+(double) i*theta/
arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0)))-gamma*sin(fmod((double) (alpha+
(double) i*theta/arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
points[0].y=(double) (center.y+sin(fmod((double) (alpha+(double) i*theta/
arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0)))+gamma*cos(fmod((double) (alpha+
(double) i*theta/arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
points[2].x=(double) (center.x+cos(fmod((double) (alpha+(double) (i+1)*
theta/arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
points[2].y=(double) (center.y+sin(fmod((double) (alpha+(double) (i+1)*
theta/arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
points[1].x=(double) (points[2].x+gamma*sin(fmod((double) (alpha+(double)
(i+1)*theta/arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
points[1].y=(double) (points[2].y-gamma*cos(fmod((double) (alpha+(double)
(i+1)*theta/arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
p->point.x=(p == primitive_info) ? start.x : (p-1)->point.x;
p->point.y=(p == primitive_info) ? start.y : (p-1)->point.y;
(p+1)->point.x=(double) (cosine*radii.x*points[0].x-sine*radii.y*
points[0].y);
(p+1)->point.y=(double) (sine*radii.x*points[0].x+cosine*radii.y*
points[0].y);
(p+2)->point.x=(double) (cosine*radii.x*points[1].x-sine*radii.y*
points[1].y);
(p+2)->point.y=(double) (sine*radii.x*points[1].x+cosine*radii.y*
points[1].y);
(p+3)->point.x=(double) (cosine*radii.x*points[2].x-sine*radii.y*
points[2].y);
(p+3)->point.y=(double) (sine*radii.x*points[2].x+cosine*radii.y*
points[2].y);
if (i == (ssize_t) (arc_segments-1))
(p+3)->point=end;
TraceBezier(p,4);
p+=p->coordinates;
}
primitive_info->coordinates=(size_t) (p-primitive_info);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) primitive_info->coordinates; i++)
{
p->primitive=primitive_info->primitive;
p--;
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringCustomURLAttrAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringCustomURLAttrAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 15,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SVGElement* SVGElement::viewportElement() const {
ContainerNode* n = ParentOrShadowHostNode();
while (n) {
if (IsSVGSVGElement(*n) || IsSVGImageElement(*n) || IsSVGSymbolElement(*n))
return ToSVGElement(n);
n = n->ParentOrShadowHostNode();
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 28,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::didAddTrackElement(HTMLTrackElement* trackElement) {
TextTrack* textTrack = trackElement->track();
if (!textTrack)
return;
textTracks()->append(textTrack);
if (isFinishedParsingChildren())
scheduleTextTrackResourceLoad();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiH264Accelerator::FillVARefFramesFromDPB(
const H264DPB& dpb,
VAPictureH264* va_pics,
int num_pics) {
H264Picture::Vector::const_reverse_iterator rit;
int i;
for (rit = dpb.rbegin(), i = 0; rit != dpb.rend() && i < num_pics; ++rit) {
if ((*rit)->ref)
FillVAPicture(&va_pics[i++], *rit);
}
return i;
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 6,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_left_available(WORD16 *pi2_coeff_block,
UWORD32 u4_sub_block_strd,
UWORD32 u4_isdc,
dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
UWORD8 *pu1_top_nnz,
UWORD8 *pu1_left_nnz,
UWORD8 u1_tran_form8x8,
UWORD8 u1_mb_field_decodingflag,
UWORD32 *pu4_csbp)
{
UWORD32 u4_num_coeff, u4_n, u4_subblock_coded;
UWORD32 u4_top0, u4_top1;
UWORD32 *pu4_dummy;
WORD32 (**pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff)(WORD16 *pi2_coeff_block,
UWORD32 u4_isdc,
WORD32 u4_n,
struct _DecStruct *ps_dec,
UWORD32 *pu4_dummy) =
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff;
UWORD32 u4_idx = 0;
UWORD8 *puc_temp;
WORD32 ret;
*pu4_csbp = 0;
puc_temp = ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan;
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Residual 4x4 decoding: SubBlock 0 */
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
if(u1_tran_form8x8)
{
if(!u1_mb_field_decodingflag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_prog8x8_cavlc[0];
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_int8x8_cavlc[0];
}
}
u4_n = pu1_left_nnz[0];
ret = pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[(u4_n > 7)](pi2_coeff_block, u4_isdc,
u4_n, ps_dec, &u4_num_coeff);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
u4_top0 = u4_num_coeff;
u4_subblock_coded = (u4_num_coeff != 0);
INSERT_BIT(*pu4_csbp, u4_idx, u4_subblock_coded);
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Residual 4x4 decoding: SubBlock 1 */
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_idx++;
if(u1_tran_form8x8)
{
if(!u1_mb_field_decodingflag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_prog8x8_cavlc[1];
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_int8x8_cavlc[1];
}
}
else
{
pi2_coeff_block += NUM_COEFFS_IN_4x4BLK;
}
u4_n = u4_num_coeff;
ret = pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[(u4_n > 7)](pi2_coeff_block, u4_isdc,
u4_n, ps_dec, &u4_num_coeff);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
u4_top1 = pu1_left_nnz[0] = u4_num_coeff;
u4_subblock_coded = (u4_num_coeff != 0);
INSERT_BIT(*pu4_csbp, u4_idx, u4_subblock_coded);
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Residual 4x4 decoding: SubBlock 2 */
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_idx += (u4_sub_block_strd - 1);
if(u1_tran_form8x8)
{
if(!u1_mb_field_decodingflag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_prog8x8_cavlc[2];
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_int8x8_cavlc[2];
}
}
else
{
pi2_coeff_block += ((u4_sub_block_strd - 1) * NUM_COEFFS_IN_4x4BLK);
}
u4_n = (u4_top0 + pu1_left_nnz[1] + 1) >> 1;
ret = pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[(u4_n > 7)](pi2_coeff_block, u4_isdc,
u4_n, ps_dec, &u4_num_coeff);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
pu1_top_nnz[0] = u4_num_coeff;
u4_subblock_coded = (u4_num_coeff != 0);
INSERT_BIT(*pu4_csbp, u4_idx, u4_subblock_coded);
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Residual 4x4 decoding: SubBlock 3 */
/*------------------------------------------------------*/
u4_idx++;
if(u1_tran_form8x8)
{
if(!u1_mb_field_decodingflag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_prog8x8_cavlc[3];
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan =
(UWORD8*)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_int8x8_cavlc[3];
}
}
else
{
pi2_coeff_block += NUM_COEFFS_IN_4x4BLK;
}
u4_n = (u4_top1 + u4_num_coeff + 1) >> 1;
ret = pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[(u4_n > 7)](pi2_coeff_block, u4_isdc,
u4_n, ps_dec, &u4_num_coeff);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
pu1_top_nnz[1] = pu1_left_nnz[1] = u4_num_coeff;
u4_subblock_coded = (u4_num_coeff != 0);
INSERT_BIT(*pu4_csbp, u4_idx, u4_subblock_coded);
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = puc_temp;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix stack underflow in CAVLC 4x4 parse functions
Bug: 26399350
Change-Id: Id768751672a7b093ab6e53d4fc0b3188d470920e
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBlock::logicalRightSelectionOffset(RenderBlock* rootBlock, LayoutUnit position)
{
if (rootBlock != this)
return containingBlock()->logicalRightSelectionOffset(rootBlock, position + logicalTop());
return logicalRightOffsetForContent();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void convert2Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("convert2", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(TestNode*, value, V8TestNode::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[0]));
imp->convert2(value);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
if (options.compression) {
/* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
}
}
Commit Message: set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free
Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised.
Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HashTable* spl_array_get_debug_info(zval *obj, int *is_temp TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(obj TSRMLS_CC);
zval *tmp, *storage;
int name_len;
char *zname;
zend_class_entry *base;
*is_temp = 0;
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
if (HASH_OF(intern->array) == intern->std.properties) {
return intern->std.properties;
} else {
if (intern->debug_info == NULL) {
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(intern->debug_info);
ZEND_INIT_SYMTABLE_EX(intern->debug_info, zend_hash_num_elements(intern->std.properties) + 1, 0);
}
if (intern->debug_info->nApplyCount == 0) {
zend_hash_clean(intern->debug_info);
zend_hash_copy(intern->debug_info, intern->std.properties, (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *));
storage = intern->array;
zval_add_ref(&storage);
base = (Z_OBJ_HT_P(obj) == &spl_handler_ArrayIterator) ? spl_ce_ArrayIterator : spl_ce_ArrayObject;
zname = spl_gen_private_prop_name(base, "storage", sizeof("storage")-1, &name_len TSRMLS_CC);
zend_symtable_update(intern->debug_info, zname, name_len+1, &storage, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
efree(zname);
}
return intern->debug_info;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed ##72433: Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vol_prc_lib_create(const effect_uuid_t *uuid,
int32_t session_id,
int32_t io_id,
effect_handle_t *p_handle)
{
int itt = 0;
vol_listener_context_t *context = NULL;
ALOGV("volume_prc_lib_create .. called ..");
if (lib_init() != 0) {
return init_status;
}
if (p_handle == NULL || uuid == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: %s is NULL", __func__, (p_handle == NULL) ? "p_handle" : "uuid");
return -EINVAL;
}
context = (vol_listener_context_t *)calloc(1, sizeof(vol_listener_context_t));
if (context == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: failed to allocate for context .. oops !!", __func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
for (itt = 0; descriptors[itt] != NULL; itt++) {
if (memcmp(uuid, &descriptors[itt]->uuid, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0) {
context->desc = descriptors[itt];
context->stream_type = itt;
PRINT_STREAM_TYPE(itt)
break;
}
}
if (descriptors[itt] == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s .. couldnt find passed uuid, something wrong", __func__);
free(context);
return -EINVAL;
}
ALOGV("%s CREATED_CONTEXT %p", __func__, context);
context->itfe = &effect_interface;
context->state = VOL_LISTENER_STATE_INITIALIZED;
context->dev_id = AUDIO_DEVICE_NONE;
context->session_id = session_id;
pthread_mutex_lock(&vol_listner_init_lock);
list_add_tail(&vol_effect_list, &context->effect_list_node);
if (dumping_enabled) {
dump_list_l();
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&vol_listner_init_lock);
*p_handle = (effect_handle_t)context;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: post proc : volume listener : fix effect release crash
Fix access to deleted effect context in vol_prc_lib_release()
Bug: 25753245.
Change-Id: I64ca99e4d5d09667be4c8c605f66700b9ae67949
(cherry picked from commit 93ab6fdda7b7557ccb34372670c30fa6178f8426)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(int) iw_parse_int(const char *s)
{
double result;
int charsread;
iw_parse_number_internal(s, &result, &charsread);
return iw_round_to_int(result);
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682 | 0 | 19,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RELOC_PTRS_WITH(device_reloc_ptrs, gx_device *dev)
{
dev->parent = gx_device_reloc_ptr(dev->parent, gcst);
dev->child = gx_device_reloc_ptr(dev->child, gcst);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 12,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* RendererSchedulerImpl::VirtualTimePolicyToString(
VirtualTimePolicy virtual_time_policy) {
switch (virtual_time_policy) {
case VirtualTimePolicy::kAdvance:
return "ADVANCE";
case VirtualTimePolicy::kPause:
return "PAUSE";
case VirtualTimePolicy::kDeterministicLoading:
return "DETERMINISTIC_LOADING";
default:
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cma_init_ud_qp(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv, struct ib_qp *qp)
{
struct ib_qp_attr qp_attr;
int qp_attr_mask, ret;
qp_attr.qp_state = IB_QPS_INIT;
ret = rdma_init_qp_attr(&id_priv->id, &qp_attr, &qp_attr_mask);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = ib_modify_qp(qp, &qp_attr, qp_attr_mask);
if (ret)
return ret;
qp_attr.qp_state = IB_QPS_RTR;
ret = ib_modify_qp(qp, &qp_attr, IB_QP_STATE);
if (ret)
return ret;
qp_attr.qp_state = IB_QPS_RTS;
qp_attr.sq_psn = 0;
ret = ib_modify_qp(qp, &qp_attr, IB_QP_STATE | IB_QP_SQ_PSN);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: free_pixmap_pattern(
gs_memory_t * pmem,
void * pvpinst,
client_name_t cname
)
{
gs_pattern1_instance_t *pinst = (gs_pattern1_instance_t *)pvpinst;
pixmap_info *ppmap = pinst->templat.client_data;
ppmap->free_proc(pmem, pvpinst, cname);
gs_free_object(pmem, ppmap, cname);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 27,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err gf_isom_lhvc_config_update(GF_ISOFile *the_file, u32 trackNumber, u32 DescriptionIndex, GF_HEVCConfig *cfg, GF_ISOMLHEVCTrackType track_type)
{
if (cfg) cfg->is_lhvc = GF_TRUE;
switch (track_type) {
case GF_ISOM_LEHVC_ONLY:
return gf_isom_hevc_config_update_ex(the_file, trackNumber, DescriptionIndex, cfg, GF_ISOM_HVCC_SET_LHVC);
case GF_ISOM_LEHVC_WITH_BASE:
return gf_isom_hevc_config_update_ex(the_file, trackNumber, DescriptionIndex, cfg, GF_ISOM_HVCC_SET_LHVC_WITH_BASE);
case GF_ISOM_LEHVC_WITH_BASE_BACKWARD:
return gf_isom_hevc_config_update_ex(the_file, trackNumber, DescriptionIndex, cfg, GF_ISOM_HVCC_SET_LHVC_WITH_BASE_BACKWARD);
default:
return GF_BAD_PARAM;
}
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fx_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
fpstate_init(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.state);
if (cpu_has_xsaves)
vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.state.xsave.header.xcomp_bv =
host_xcr0 | XSTATE_COMPACTION_ENABLED;
/*
* Ensure guest xcr0 is valid for loading
*/
vcpu->arch.xcr0 = XFEATURE_MASK_FP;
vcpu->arch.cr0 |= X86_CR0_ET;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PPB_Widget_Impl::~PPB_Widget_Impl() {
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void webkit_web_view_real_undo(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
Frame* frame = core(webView)->focusController()->focusedOrMainFrame();
frame->editor()->command("Undo").execute();
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: drive_detach_completed_cb (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
gboolean job_was_cancelled,
int status,
const char *stderr,
const char *stdout,
gpointer user_data)
{
if (WEXITSTATUS (status) == 0 && !job_was_cancelled)
{
/* TODO: probably wait for has_media to change to FALSE */
dbus_g_method_return (context);
}
else
{
if (job_was_cancelled)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_CANCELLED, "Job was cancelled");
}
else
{
throw_error (context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error detaching: helper exited with exit code %d: %s",
WEXITSTATUS (status),
stderr);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ImportSingleTIFF_SShort ( const TIFF_Manager::TagInfo & tagInfo, const bool nativeEndian,
SXMPMeta * xmp, const char * xmpNS, const char * xmpProp )
{
try { // Don't let errors with one stop the others.
XMP_Int16 binValue = *((XMP_Int16*)tagInfo.dataPtr);
if ( ! nativeEndian ) Flip2 ( &binValue );
char strValue[20];
snprintf ( strValue, sizeof(strValue), "%hd", binValue ); // AUDIT: Using sizeof(strValue) is safe.
xmp->SetProperty ( xmpNS, xmpProp, strValue );
} catch ( ... ) {
}
} // ImportSingleTIFF_SShort
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 18,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> classMethodCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.classMethod");
TestObj::classMethod();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::SetForceShaderNameHashingForTest(bool force) {
force_shader_name_hashing_for_test = force;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::PreHandleGestureEvent(
const blink::WebGestureEvent& event) {
return delegate_ && delegate_->PreHandleGestureEvent(this, event);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::OpenClearBrowsingDataDialog() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("ClearBrowsingData_ShowDlg"));
ShowOptionsTab(chrome::kClearBrowserDataSubPage);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ocfs2_dio_end_io(struct kiocb *iocb,
loff_t offset,
ssize_t bytes,
void *private)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
int level;
int ret = 0;
/* this io's submitter should not have unlocked this before we could */
BUG_ON(!ocfs2_iocb_is_rw_locked(iocb));
if (bytes > 0 && private)
ret = ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(inode, private, offset, bytes);
ocfs2_iocb_clear_rw_locked(iocb);
level = ocfs2_iocb_rw_locked_level(iocb);
ocfs2_rw_unlock(inode, level);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void php_mysqlnd_greet_free_mem(void * _packet, zend_bool stack_allocation TSRMLS_DC)
{
MYSQLND_PACKET_GREET *p= (MYSQLND_PACKET_GREET *) _packet;
if (p->server_version) {
efree(p->server_version);
p->server_version = NULL;
}
if (p->auth_plugin_data && p->auth_plugin_data != p->intern_auth_plugin_data) {
efree(p->auth_plugin_data);
p->auth_plugin_data = NULL;
}
if (p->auth_protocol) {
efree(p->auth_protocol);
p->auth_protocol = NULL;
}
if (!stack_allocation) {
mnd_pefree(p, p->header.persistent);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72293 - Heap overflow in mysqlnd related to BIT fields
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int test_lshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *a_)
{
BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d;
int i;
b = BN_new();
c = BN_new();
d = BN_new();
BN_one(c);
if (a_)
a = a_;
else {
a = BN_new();
BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0);
a->neg = rand_neg();
}
for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
BN_lshift(b, a, i + 1);
BN_add(c, c, c);
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
BN_print(bp, c);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
BN_print(bp, b);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
BN_mul(d, a, c, ctx);
BN_sub(d, d, b);
if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Left shift test failed!\n");
fprintf(stderr, "a=");
BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
fprintf(stderr, "\nb=");
BN_print_fp(stderr, b);
fprintf(stderr, "\nc=");
BN_print_fp(stderr, c);
fprintf(stderr, "\nd=");
BN_print_fp(stderr, d);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
BN_free(d);
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 7,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DOMPatchSupport::patchDocument(const String& markup)
{
RefPtr<HTMLDocument> newDocument = HTMLDocument::create(0, KURL());
RefPtr<DocumentParser> parser = HTMLDocumentParser::create(newDocument.get(), false);
parser->insert(markup); // Use insert() so that the parser will not yield.
parser->finish();
parser->detach();
OwnPtr<Digest> oldInfo = createDigest(m_document->documentElement(), 0);
OwnPtr<Digest> newInfo = createDigest(newDocument->documentElement(), &m_unusedNodesMap);
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
if (!innerPatchNode(oldInfo.get(), newInfo.get(), ec)) {
m_document->write(markup);
m_document->close();
}
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::setActiveElement(PassRefPtr<Element> newActiveElement)
{
if (!newActiveElement) {
m_activeElement.clear();
return;
}
m_activeElement = newActiveElement;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vmw_surface_gb_priv_define(struct drm_device *dev,
uint32_t user_accounting_size,
uint32_t svga3d_flags,
SVGA3dSurfaceFormat format,
bool for_scanout,
uint32_t num_mip_levels,
uint32_t multisample_count,
uint32_t array_size,
struct drm_vmw_size size,
struct vmw_surface **srf_out)
{
struct vmw_private *dev_priv = vmw_priv(dev);
struct vmw_user_surface *user_srf;
struct vmw_surface *srf;
int ret;
u32 num_layers;
*srf_out = NULL;
if (for_scanout) {
uint32_t max_width, max_height;
if (!svga3dsurface_is_screen_target_format(format)) {
DRM_ERROR("Invalid Screen Target surface format.");
return -EINVAL;
}
max_width = min(dev_priv->texture_max_width,
dev_priv->stdu_max_width);
max_height = min(dev_priv->texture_max_height,
dev_priv->stdu_max_height);
if (size.width > max_width || size.height > max_height) {
DRM_ERROR("%ux%u\n, exeeds max surface size %ux%u",
size.width, size.height,
max_width, max_height);
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
const struct svga3d_surface_desc *desc;
desc = svga3dsurface_get_desc(format);
if (unlikely(desc->block_desc == SVGA3DBLOCKDESC_NONE)) {
DRM_ERROR("Invalid surface format.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* array_size must be null for non-GL3 host. */
if (array_size > 0 && !dev_priv->has_dx) {
DRM_ERROR("Tried to create DX surface on non-DX host.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = ttm_read_lock(&dev_priv->reservation_sem, true);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
ret = ttm_mem_global_alloc(vmw_mem_glob(dev_priv),
user_accounting_size, false, true);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
if (ret != -ERESTARTSYS)
DRM_ERROR("Out of graphics memory for surface"
" creation.\n");
goto out_unlock;
}
user_srf = kzalloc(sizeof(*user_srf), GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!user_srf)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_no_user_srf;
}
*srf_out = &user_srf->srf;
user_srf->size = user_accounting_size;
user_srf->prime.base.shareable = false;
user_srf->prime.base.tfile = NULL;
srf = &user_srf->srf;
srf->flags = svga3d_flags;
srf->format = format;
srf->scanout = for_scanout;
srf->mip_levels[0] = num_mip_levels;
srf->num_sizes = 1;
srf->sizes = NULL;
srf->offsets = NULL;
srf->base_size = size;
srf->autogen_filter = SVGA3D_TEX_FILTER_NONE;
srf->array_size = array_size;
srf->multisample_count = multisample_count;
if (array_size)
num_layers = array_size;
else if (svga3d_flags & SVGA3D_SURFACE_CUBEMAP)
num_layers = SVGA3D_MAX_SURFACE_FACES;
else
num_layers = 1;
srf->res.backup_size =
svga3dsurface_get_serialized_size(srf->format,
srf->base_size,
srf->mip_levels[0],
num_layers);
if (srf->flags & SVGA3D_SURFACE_BIND_STREAM_OUTPUT)
srf->res.backup_size += sizeof(SVGA3dDXSOState);
if (dev_priv->active_display_unit == vmw_du_screen_target &&
for_scanout)
srf->flags |= SVGA3D_SURFACE_SCREENTARGET;
/*
* From this point, the generic resource management functions
* destroy the object on failure.
*/
ret = vmw_surface_init(dev_priv, srf, vmw_user_surface_free);
ttm_read_unlock(&dev_priv->reservation_sem);
return ret;
out_no_user_srf:
ttm_mem_global_free(vmw_mem_glob(dev_priv), user_accounting_size);
out_unlock:
ttm_read_unlock(&dev_priv->reservation_sem);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@insomniasec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 18,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QuotaTaskObserver::RegisterTask(QuotaTask* task) {
running_quota_tasks_.insert(task);
}
Commit Message: Quota double-delete fix
BUG=142310
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10832407
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152532 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PPB_ImageData_API* PPB_ImageData_Impl::AsPPB_ImageData_API() {
return this;
}
Commit Message: Security fix: integer overflow on checking image size
Test is left in another CL (codereview.chromiu,.org/11274036) to avoid conflict there. Hope it's fine.
BUG=160926
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11410081
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167882 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 14,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLImportsController::Dispose() {
for (const auto& loader : loaders_)
loader->Dispose();
loaders_.clear();
if (root_) {
root_->Dispose();
root_.Clear();
}
}
Commit Message: Speculative fix for crashes in HTMLImportsController::Dispose().
Copy the loaders_ vector before iterating it.
This CL has no tests because we don't know stable reproduction.
Bug: 843151
Change-Id: I3d5e184657cbce56dcfca0c717d7a0c464e20efe
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245017
Reviewed-by: Keishi Hattori <keishi@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594226}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 8,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __init int alloc_kvm_area(void)
{
int cpu;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct vmcs *vmcs;
vmcs = alloc_vmcs_cpu(cpu);
if (!vmcs) {
free_kvm_area();
return -ENOMEM;
}
per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu) = vmcs;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int move_iovec_hdr(struct iovec *from, struct iovec *to,
size_t len, int iov_count)
{
int seg = 0;
size_t size;
while (len && seg < iov_count) {
size = min(from->iov_len, len);
to->iov_base = from->iov_base;
to->iov_len = size;
from->iov_len -= size;
from->iov_base += size;
len -= size;
++from;
++to;
++seg;
}
return seg;
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 15,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct device_node *of_get_regulator(struct device *dev, const char *supply)
{
struct device_node *regnode = NULL;
char prop_name[32]; /* 32 is max size of property name */
dev_dbg(dev, "Looking up %s-supply from device tree\n", supply);
snprintf(prop_name, 32, "%s-supply", supply);
regnode = of_parse_phandle(dev->of_node, prop_name, 0);
if (!regnode) {
dev_dbg(dev, "Looking up %s property in node %s failed",
prop_name, dev->of_node->full_name);
return NULL;
}
return regnode;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WorkerThread::stopInternal()
{
MutexLocker lock(m_threadStateMutex);
if (m_terminated)
return;
m_terminated = true;
if (m_shutdownEvent)
m_shutdownEvent->signal();
if (m_shutdown)
return;
if (!m_workerGlobalScope) {
m_terminationEvent->signal();
return;
}
terminateV8Execution();
InspectorInstrumentation::didKillAllExecutionContextTasks(m_workerGlobalScope.get());
m_debuggerMessageQueue.kill();
backingThread().postTask(FROM_HERE, new Task(threadSafeBind(&WorkerThread::shutdown, AllowCrossThreadAccess(this))));
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 26,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static boolean ReadComment(j_decompress_ptr jpeg_info)
{
ErrorManager
*error_manager;
Image
*image;
register unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
length;
StringInfo
*comment;
/*
Determine length of comment.
*/
error_manager=(ErrorManager *) jpeg_info->client_data;
image=error_manager->image;
length=(size_t) ((size_t) GetCharacter(jpeg_info) << 8);
length+=GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
if (length <= 2)
return(TRUE);
length-=2;
comment=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
if (comment == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return(FALSE);
}
/*
Read comment.
*/
error_manager->profile=comment;
p=GetStringInfoDatum(comment);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(comment); i++)
*p++=(unsigned char) GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
*p='\0';
error_manager->profile=NULL;
p=GetStringInfoDatum(comment);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",(const char *) p);
comment=DestroyStringInfo(comment);
return(TRUE);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,480 |
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