instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cypress_read_int_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = urb->context;
struct cypress_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
struct device *dev = &urb->dev->dev;
struct tty_struct *tty;
unsigned char *data = urb->transfer_buffer;
unsigned long flags;
char tty_flag = TTY_NORMAL;
int havedata = 0;
int bytes = 0;
int result;
int i = 0;
int status = urb->status;
switch (status) {
case 0: /* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* precursor to disconnect so just go away */
return;
case -EPIPE:
/* Can't call usb_clear_halt while in_interrupt */
/* FALLS THROUGH */
default:
/* something ugly is going on... */
dev_err(dev, "%s - unexpected nonzero read status received: %d\n",
__func__, status);
cypress_set_dead(port);
return;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
if (priv->rx_flags & THROTTLED) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - now throttling\n", __func__);
priv->rx_flags |= ACTUALLY_THROTTLED;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
return;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
tty = tty_port_tty_get(&port->port);
if (!tty) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - bad tty pointer - exiting\n", __func__);
return;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
result = urb->actual_length;
switch (priv->pkt_fmt) {
default:
case packet_format_1:
/* This is for the CY7C64013... */
priv->current_status = data[0] & 0xF8;
bytes = data[1] + 2;
i = 2;
if (bytes > 2)
havedata = 1;
break;
case packet_format_2:
/* This is for the CY7C63743... */
priv->current_status = data[0] & 0xF8;
bytes = (data[0] & 0x07) + 1;
i = 1;
if (bytes > 1)
havedata = 1;
break;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
if (result < bytes) {
dev_dbg(dev,
"%s - wrong packet size - received %d bytes but packet said %d bytes\n",
__func__, result, bytes);
goto continue_read;
}
usb_serial_debug_data(&port->dev, __func__, urb->actual_length, data);
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
/* check to see if status has changed */
if (priv->current_status != priv->prev_status) {
u8 delta = priv->current_status ^ priv->prev_status;
if (delta & UART_MSR_MASK) {
if (delta & UART_CTS)
port->icount.cts++;
if (delta & UART_DSR)
port->icount.dsr++;
if (delta & UART_RI)
port->icount.rng++;
if (delta & UART_CD)
port->icount.dcd++;
wake_up_interruptible(&port->port.delta_msr_wait);
}
priv->prev_status = priv->current_status;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
/* hangup, as defined in acm.c... this might be a bad place for it
* though */
if (tty && !C_CLOCAL(tty) && !(priv->current_status & UART_CD)) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - calling hangup\n", __func__);
tty_hangup(tty);
goto continue_read;
}
/* There is one error bit... I'm assuming it is a parity error
* indicator as the generic firmware will set this bit to 1 if a
* parity error occurs.
* I can not find reference to any other error events. */
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
if (priv->current_status & CYP_ERROR) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
tty_flag = TTY_PARITY;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Parity Error detected\n", __func__);
} else
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
/* process read if there is data other than line status */
if (bytes > i) {
tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag(&port->port, data + i,
tty_flag, bytes - i);
tty_flip_buffer_push(&port->port);
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
/* control and status byte(s) are also counted */
priv->bytes_in += bytes;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
continue_read:
tty_kref_put(tty);
/* Continue trying to always read */
if (priv->comm_is_ok) {
usb_fill_int_urb(port->interrupt_in_urb, port->serial->dev,
usb_rcvintpipe(port->serial->dev,
port->interrupt_in_endpointAddress),
port->interrupt_in_urb->transfer_buffer,
port->interrupt_in_urb->transfer_buffer_length,
cypress_read_int_callback, port,
priv->read_urb_interval);
result = usb_submit_urb(port->interrupt_in_urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (result && result != -EPERM) {
dev_err(dev, "%s - failed resubmitting read urb, error %d\n",
__func__, result);
cypress_set_dead(port);
}
}
} /* cypress_read_int_callback */
Commit Message: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: acpi_os_install_interrupt_handler(u32 gsi, acpi_osd_handler handler,
void *context)
{
unsigned int irq;
acpi_irq_stats_init();
/*
* ACPI interrupts different from the SCI in our copy of the FADT are
* not supported.
*/
if (gsi != acpi_gbl_FADT.sci_interrupt)
return AE_BAD_PARAMETER;
if (acpi_irq_handler)
return AE_ALREADY_ACQUIRED;
if (acpi_gsi_to_irq(gsi, &irq) < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR PREFIX "SCI (ACPI GSI %d) not registered\n",
gsi);
return AE_OK;
}
acpi_irq_handler = handler;
acpi_irq_context = context;
if (request_irq(irq, acpi_irq, IRQF_SHARED, "acpi", acpi_irq)) {
printk(KERN_ERR PREFIX "SCI (IRQ%d) allocation failed\n", irq);
acpi_irq_handler = NULL;
return AE_NOT_ACQUIRED;
}
acpi_sci_irq = irq;
return AE_OK;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsSession::SendResponse(
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> response) {
std::string json;
base::JSONWriter::Write(*response.get(), &json);
client_->DispatchProtocolMessage(agent_host_, json);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Chapters::Atom::GetDisplayCount() const { return m_displays_count; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouter::OnSecurityInterstitialShown(
const GURL& url,
const std::string& reason,
int net_error_code) {
api::safe_browsing_private::InterstitialInfo params;
params.url = url.spec();
params.reason = reason;
if (net_error_code < 0) {
params.net_error_code =
std::make_unique<std::string>(base::NumberToString(net_error_code));
}
params.user_name = GetProfileUserName();
if (event_router_) {
auto event_value = std::make_unique<base::ListValue>();
event_value->Append(params.ToValue());
auto extension_event = std::make_unique<Event>(
events::SAFE_BROWSING_PRIVATE_ON_SECURITY_INTERSTITIAL_SHOWN,
api::safe_browsing_private::OnSecurityInterstitialShown::kEventName,
std::move(event_value));
event_router_->BroadcastEvent(std::move(extension_event));
}
if (client_) {
base::Value event(base::Value::Type::DICTIONARY);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyUrl, params.url);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyReason, params.reason);
event.SetIntKey(kKeyNetErrorCode, net_error_code);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyProfileUserName, params.user_name);
event.SetBoolKey(kKeyClickedThrough, false);
ReportRealtimeEvent(kKeyInterstitialEvent, std::move(event));
}
}
Commit Message: Add reporting for DLP deep scanning
For each triggered rule in the DLP response, we report the download as
violating that rule.
This also implements the UnsafeReportingEnabled enterprise policy, which
controls whether or not we do any reporting.
Bug: 980777
Change-Id: I48100cfb4dd5aa92ed80da1f34e64a6e393be2fa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1772381
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691371}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcRenderCreateGlyphSet (ClientPtr client)
{
register int n;
REQUEST(xRenderCreateGlyphSetReq);
swaps(&stuff->length, n);
swapl(&stuff->gsid, n);
swapl(&stuff->format, n);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void do_unhandled_exception(int trapnr, int signr, char *str, char *fn_name,
unsigned long error_code, struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
show_excp_regs(fn_name, trapnr, signr, regs);
tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
tsk->thread.trap_no = trapnr;
if (user_mode(regs))
force_sig(signr, tsk);
die_if_no_fixup(str, regs, error_code);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int dl_bw_cpus(int i)
{
struct root_domain *rd = cpu_rq(i)->rd;
int cpus = 0;
RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_read_lock_sched_held(),
"sched RCU must be held");
for_each_cpu_and(i, rd->span, cpu_active_mask)
cpus++;
return cpus;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioInputRendererHost::DeleteEntry(AudioEntry* entry) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
scoped_ptr<AudioEntry> entry_deleter(entry);
audio_entries_.erase(entry->stream_id);
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 5,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void lockdep_softirq_end(bool in_hardirq)
{
lockdep_softirq_exit();
if (in_hardirq)
trace_hardirq_enter();
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 17,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<VertexAttribManager> CreateVertexAttribManager(
GLuint client_id,
GLuint service_id,
bool client_visible) {
return vertex_array_manager()->CreateVertexAttribManager(
client_id, service_id, group_->max_vertex_attribs(), client_visible);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document* LocalFrame::DocumentAtPoint(const LayoutPoint& point_in_root_frame) {
if (!View())
return nullptr;
LayoutPoint pt = View()->ConvertFromRootFrame(point_in_root_frame);
if (!ContentLayoutObject())
return nullptr;
HitTestResult result = GetEventHandler().HitTestResultAtPoint(
pt, HitTestRequest::kReadOnly | HitTestRequest::kActive);
return result.InnerNode() ? &result.InnerNode()->GetDocument() : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 13,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedTexture2DBinder::ScopedTexture2DBinder(GLES2DecoderImpl* decoder,
GLuint id)
: decoder_(decoder) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(decoder_);
glActiveTexture(GL_TEXTURE0);
glBindTexture(GL_TEXTURE_2D, id);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void test_stateMachine() {
int retval;
my_Context_t aliceClientData, bobClientData;
uint64_t initialTime;
uint8_t pingPacketString[ZRTP_PACKET_OVERHEAD+ZRTP_PINGMESSAGE_FIXED_LENGTH]; /* there is no builder for ping packet and it is 24 bytes long(12 bytes of message header, 12 of data + packet overhead*/
uint32_t CRC;
uint8_t *CRCbuffer;
my_Context_t aliceSecondChannelClientData, bobSecondChannelClientData;
bzrtpCallbacks_t cbs={0} ;
/* Create zrtp Context */
bzrtpContext_t *contextAlice = bzrtp_createBzrtpContext(0x12345678); /* Alice's SSRC of main channel is 12345678 */
bzrtpContext_t *contextBob = bzrtp_createBzrtpContext(0x87654321); /* Bob's SSRC of main channel is 87654321 */
/* set the cache related callback functions */
cbs.bzrtp_loadCache=floadAlice;
cbs.bzrtp_writeCache=fwriteAlice;
cbs.bzrtp_sendData=bzrtp_sendData;
bzrtp_setCallbacks(contextAlice, &cbs);
cbs.bzrtp_loadCache=floadBob;
cbs.bzrtp_writeCache=fwriteBob;
cbs.bzrtp_sendData=bzrtp_sendData;
bzrtp_setCallbacks(contextBob, &cbs);
/* create the client Data and associate them to the channel contexts */
memcpy(aliceClientData.nom, "Alice", 6);
memcpy(bobClientData.nom, "Bob", 4);
aliceClientData.peerContext = contextBob;
aliceClientData.peerChannelContext = contextBob->channelContext[0];
bobClientData.peerContext = contextAlice;
bobClientData.peerChannelContext = contextAlice->channelContext[0];
strcpy(aliceClientData.zidFilename, "./ZIDAlice.txt");
strcpy(bobClientData.zidFilename, "./ZIDBob.txt");
retval = bzrtp_setClientData(contextAlice, 0x12345678, (void *)&aliceClientData);
retval += bzrtp_setClientData(contextBob, 0x87654321, (void *)&bobClientData);
bzrtp_message("Set client data return %x\n", retval);
/* run the init */
bzrtp_initBzrtpContext(contextAlice);
bzrtp_initBzrtpContext(contextBob);
/* now start the engine */
initialTime = getCurrentTimeInMs();
retval = bzrtp_startChannelEngine(contextAlice, 0x12345678);
bzrtp_message ("Alice starts return %x\n", retval);
retval = bzrtp_startChannelEngine(contextBob, 0x87654321);
bzrtp_message ("Bob starts return %x\n", retval);
/* now start infinite loop until we reach secure state */
while ((contextAlice->isSecure == 0 || contextBob->isSecure == 0) && (getCurrentTimeInMs()-initialTime<5000)){
int i;
/* first check the message queue */
for (i=0; i<aliceQueueIndex; i++) {
bzrtp_message("Process a message for Alice\n");
retval = bzrtp_processMessage(contextAlice, 0x12345678, aliceQueue[i].packetString, aliceQueue[i].packetLength);
bzrtp_message("Alice processed message %.8s of %d bytes and return %04x\n\n", aliceQueue[i].packetString+16, aliceQueue[i].packetLength, retval);
memset(aliceQueue[i].packetString, 0, 1000); /* destroy the packet after sending it to the ZRTP engine */
}
aliceQueueIndex = 0;
for (i=0; i<bobQueueIndex; i++) {
bzrtp_message("Process a message for Bob\n");
retval = bzrtp_processMessage(contextBob, 0x87654321, bobQueue[i].packetString, bobQueue[i].packetLength);
bzrtp_message("Bob processed message %.8s of %d bytes and return %04x\n\n", bobQueue[i].packetString+16, bobQueue[i].packetLength, retval);
memset(bobQueue[i].packetString, 0, 1000); /* destroy the packet after sending it to the ZRTP engine */
}
bobQueueIndex = 0;
/* send the actual time to the zrtpContext */
bzrtp_iterate(contextAlice, 0x12345678, getCurrentTimeInMs());
bzrtp_iterate(contextBob, 0x87654321, getCurrentTimeInMs());
/* sleep for 10 ms */
sleepMs(10);
}
/* compare SAS and check we are in secure mode */
if ((contextAlice->isSecure == 1) && (contextBob->isSecure == 1)) { /* don't compare sas if we're not secure at we may not have it */
CU_ASSERT_TRUE((memcmp(contextAlice->channelContext[0]->srtpSecrets.sas, contextBob->channelContext[0]->srtpSecrets.sas, 4) == 0));
/* call the set verified Sas function */
bzrtp_SASVerified(contextAlice);
bzrtp_SASVerified(contextBob);
} else {
CU_FAIL("Unable to reach secure state");
}
/*** Send alice a ping message from Bob ***/
/* set packet header and CRC */
/* preambule */
pingPacketString[0] = 0x10;
pingPacketString[1] = 0x00;
/* Sequence number */
pingPacketString[2] = (uint8_t)((contextBob->channelContext[0]->selfSequenceNumber>>8)&0x00FF);
pingPacketString[3] = (uint8_t)(contextBob->channelContext[0]->selfSequenceNumber&0x00FF);
/* ZRTP magic cookie */
pingPacketString[4] = (uint8_t)((ZRTP_MAGIC_COOKIE>>24)&0xFF);
pingPacketString[5] = (uint8_t)((ZRTP_MAGIC_COOKIE>>16)&0xFF);
pingPacketString[6] = (uint8_t)((ZRTP_MAGIC_COOKIE>>8)&0xFF);
pingPacketString[7] = (uint8_t)(ZRTP_MAGIC_COOKIE&0xFF);
/* Source Identifier : insert bob's one: 0x87654321 */
pingPacketString[8] = 0x87;
pingPacketString[9] = 0x65;
pingPacketString[10] = 0x43;
pingPacketString[11] = 0x21;
/* message header */
pingPacketString[12] = 0x50;
pingPacketString[13] = 0x5a;
/* length in 32 bits words */
pingPacketString[14] = 0x00;
pingPacketString[15] = 0x06;
/* message type "Ping " */
memcpy(pingPacketString+16, "Ping ",8);
/* Version on 4 bytes is "1.10" */
memcpy(pingPacketString+24, "1.10", 4);
/* a endPointHash, use the first 8 bytes of Bob's ZID */
memcpy(pingPacketString+28, contextBob->selfZID, 8);
/* CRC */
CRC = bzrtp_CRC32(pingPacketString, ZRTP_PINGMESSAGE_FIXED_LENGTH+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH);
CRCbuffer = pingPacketString+ZRTP_PINGMESSAGE_FIXED_LENGTH+ZRTP_PACKET_HEADER_LENGTH;
*CRCbuffer = (uint8_t)((CRC>>24)&0xFF);
CRCbuffer++;
*CRCbuffer = (uint8_t)((CRC>>16)&0xFF);
CRCbuffer++;
*CRCbuffer = (uint8_t)((CRC>>8)&0xFF);
CRCbuffer++;
*CRCbuffer = (uint8_t)(CRC&0xFF);
bzrtp_message("Process a PING message for Alice\n");
retval = bzrtp_processMessage(contextAlice, 0x12345678, pingPacketString, ZRTP_PACKET_OVERHEAD+ZRTP_PINGMESSAGE_FIXED_LENGTH);
bzrtp_message("Alice processed PING message and return %04x\n\n", retval);
/*** now add a second channel ***/
retval = bzrtp_addChannel(contextAlice, 0x34567890);
bzrtp_message("Add a channel to Alice context, return %x\n", retval);
retval = bzrtp_addChannel(contextBob, 0x09876543);
bzrtp_message("Add a channel to Bob context, return %x\n", retval);
/* create the client Data and associate them to the channel contexts */
memcpy(aliceSecondChannelClientData.nom, "Alice", 6);
memcpy(bobSecondChannelClientData.nom, "Bob", 4);
aliceSecondChannelClientData.peerContext = contextBob;
aliceSecondChannelClientData.peerChannelContext = contextBob->channelContext[1];
bobSecondChannelClientData.peerContext = contextAlice;
bobSecondChannelClientData.peerChannelContext = contextAlice->channelContext[1];
retval = bzrtp_setClientData(contextAlice, 0x34567890, (void *)&aliceSecondChannelClientData);
retval += bzrtp_setClientData(contextBob, 0x09876543, (void *)&bobSecondChannelClientData);
bzrtp_message("Set client data return %x\n", retval);
/* start the channels */
retval = bzrtp_startChannelEngine(contextAlice, 0x34567890);
bzrtp_message ("Alice starts return %x\n", retval);
retval = bzrtp_startChannelEngine(contextBob, 0x09876543);
bzrtp_message ("Bob starts return %x\n", retval);
/* now start infinite loop until we reach secure state */
while ((getCurrentTimeInMs()-initialTime<2000)){
int i;
/* first check the message queue */
for (i=0; i<aliceQueueIndex; i++) {
bzrtp_message("Process a message for Alice\n");
retval = bzrtp_processMessage(contextAlice, 0x34567890, aliceQueue[i].packetString, aliceQueue[i].packetLength);
bzrtp_message("Alice processed message %.8s of %d bytes and return %04x\n\n", aliceQueue[i].packetString+16, aliceQueue[i].packetLength, retval);
memset(aliceQueue[i].packetString, 0, 1000); /* destroy the packet after sending it to the ZRTP engine */
}
aliceQueueIndex = 0;
for (i=0; i<bobQueueIndex; i++) {
bzrtp_message("Process a message for Bob\n");
retval = bzrtp_processMessage(contextBob, 0x09876543, bobQueue[i].packetString, bobQueue[i].packetLength);
bzrtp_message("Bob processed message %.8s of %d bytes and return %04x\n\n", bobQueue[i].packetString+16, bobQueue[i].packetLength, retval);
memset(bobQueue[i].packetString, 0, 1000); /* destroy the packet after sending it to the ZRTP engine */
}
bobQueueIndex = 0;
/* send the actual time to the zrtpContext */
bzrtp_iterate(contextAlice, 0x34567890, getCurrentTimeInMs());
bzrtp_iterate(contextBob, 0x09876543, getCurrentTimeInMs());
/* sleep for 10 ms */
sleepMs(10);
}
CU_ASSERT_TRUE((memcmp(contextAlice->channelContext[1]->srtpSecrets.selfSrtpKey, contextBob->channelContext[1]->srtpSecrets.peerSrtpKey, 16) == 0) && (contextAlice->isSecure == 1) && (contextBob->isSecure == 1));
dumpContext("\nAlice", contextAlice);
dumpContext("\nBob", contextBob);
bzrtp_message("Destroy the contexts\n");
/* destroy the context */
bzrtp_destroyBzrtpContext(contextAlice, 0x34567890);
bzrtp_destroyBzrtpContext(contextBob, 0x09876543);
bzrtp_message("Destroy the contexts last channel\n");
bzrtp_destroyBzrtpContext(contextBob, 0x87654321);
bzrtp_destroyBzrtpContext(contextAlice, 0x12345678);
}
Commit Message: Add ZRTP Commit packet hvi check on DHPart2 packet reception
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 12,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::didDestroyScriptContext(WebFrame* frame) {
content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->DidDestroyScriptContext(frame);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebUIBidiCheckerBrowserTestRTL::SetUpOnMainThread() {
WebUIBidiCheckerBrowserTest::SetUpOnMainThread();
FilePath pak_path;
app_locale_ = base::i18n::GetConfiguredLocale();
ASSERT_TRUE(PathService::Get(base::FILE_MODULE, &pak_path));
pak_path = pak_path.DirName();
pak_path = pak_path.AppendASCII("pseudo_locales");
pak_path = pak_path.AppendASCII("fake-bidi");
pak_path = pak_path.ReplaceExtension(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("pak"));
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().OverrideLocalePakForTest(pak_path);
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().ReloadLocaleResources("he");
base::i18n::SetICUDefaultLocale("he");
#if defined(OS_POSIX) && defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
gtk_widget_set_default_direction(GTK_TEXT_DIR_RTL);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Disable WebUIBidiCheckerBrowserTestRTL.TestSettingsFramePasswords for being flaky on all platforms.
TBR=jeremy@chromium.org.
BUG=95425
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10447119
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139814 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FaviconWebUIHandler::OnFaviconDataAvailable(
FaviconService::Handle request_handle,
history::FaviconData favicon) {
FaviconService* favicon_service =
web_ui_->GetProfile()->GetFaviconService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
int id = consumer_.GetClientData(favicon_service, request_handle);
if (favicon.is_valid()) {
FundamentalValue id_value(id);
color_utils::GridSampler sampler;
SkColor color =
color_utils::CalculateKMeanColorOfPNG(favicon.image_data, 100, 665,
sampler);
std::string css_color = base::StringPrintf("rgb(%d, %d, %d)",
SkColorGetR(color),
SkColorGetG(color),
SkColorGetB(color));
StringValue color_value(css_color);
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction("ntp4.setFaviconDominantColor",
id_value, color_value);
}
}
Commit Message: ntp4: show larger favicons in most visited page
extend favicon source to provide larger icons. For now, larger means at most 32x32. Also, the only icon we actually support at this resolution is the default (globe).
BUG=none
TEST=manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7300017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91517 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 20,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::ProcessAckedTouchEvent(
const WebKit::WebTouchEvent& touch_event, InputEventAckState ack_result) {
if (content_view_core_)
content_view_core_->ConfirmTouchEvent(ack_result);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cms_envelopeddata_create(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
krb5_preauthtype pa_type,
int include_certchain,
unsigned char *key_pack,
unsigned int key_pack_len,
unsigned char **out,
unsigned int *out_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
BIO *in = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *signed_data = NULL, *enc_data = NULL;
int signed_data_len = 0, enc_data_len = 0, flags = PKCS7_BINARY;
STACK_OF(X509) *encerts = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
int cms_msg_type;
/* create the PKCS7 SignedData portion of the PKCS7 EnvelopedData */
switch ((int)pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
cms_msg_type = CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
cms_msg_type = CMS_ENVEL_SERVER;
break;
default:
goto cleanup;
}
retval = cms_signeddata_create(context, plgctx, reqctx, idctx,
cms_msg_type, include_certchain, key_pack, key_pack_len,
&signed_data, (unsigned int *)&signed_data_len);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 signed data\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* check we have client's certificate */
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
encerts = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(encerts, reqctx->received_cert);
cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
switch (pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
prepare_enc_data(signed_data, signed_data_len, &enc_data,
&enc_data_len);
retval = BIO_write(in, enc_data, enc_data_len);
if (retval != enc_data_len) {
pkiDebug("BIO_write only wrote %d\n", retval);
goto cleanup;
}
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
retval = BIO_write(in, signed_data, signed_data_len);
if (retval != signed_data_len) {
pkiDebug("BIO_write only wrote %d\n", retval);
goto cleanup;
}
break;
default:
retval = -1;
goto cleanup;
}
p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(encerts, in, cipher, flags);
if (p7 == NULL) {
pkiDebug("failed to encrypt PKCS7 object\n");
retval = -1;
goto cleanup;
}
switch (pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type =
OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type =
OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
break;
break;
break;
break;
}
*out_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
if (!*out_len || (p = *out = malloc(*out_len)) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
if (!retval) {
pkiDebug("unable to write pkcs7 object\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(*out, *out_len, "/tmp/kdc_enveloped_data");
#endif
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
if (in != NULL)
BIO_free(in);
free(signed_data);
free(enc_data);
if (encerts != NULL)
sk_X509_free(encerts);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t provideProvisionResponse(Vector<uint8_t> const &response,
Vector<uint8_t> &certificate,
Vector<uint8_t> &wrappedKey) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IDrm::getInterfaceDescriptor());
writeVector(data, response);
status_t status = remote()->transact(PROVIDE_PROVISION_RESPONSE, data, &reply);
if (status != OK) {
return status;
}
readVector(reply, certificate);
readVector(reply, wrappedKey);
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: Fix info leak vulnerability of IDrm
bug: 26323455
Change-Id: I25bb30d3666ab38d5150496375ed2f55ecb23ba8
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLMediaElement::HTMLMediaElement(const QualifiedName& tag_name,
Document& document)
: HTMLElement(tag_name, document),
PausableObject(&document),
load_timer_(document.GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalMedia),
this,
&HTMLMediaElement::LoadTimerFired),
progress_event_timer_(
document.GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kMediaElementEvent),
this,
&HTMLMediaElement::ProgressEventTimerFired),
playback_progress_timer_(document.GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalMedia),
this,
&HTMLMediaElement::PlaybackProgressTimerFired),
audio_tracks_timer_(document.GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalMedia),
this,
&HTMLMediaElement::AudioTracksTimerFired),
check_viewport_intersection_timer_(
document.GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalMedia),
this,
&HTMLMediaElement::CheckViewportIntersectionTimerFired),
removed_from_document_timer_(
document.GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalMedia),
this,
&HTMLMediaElement::OnRemovedFromDocumentTimerFired),
played_time_ranges_(),
async_event_queue_(EventQueue::Create(GetExecutionContext(),
TaskType::kMediaElementEvent)),
playback_rate_(1.0f),
default_playback_rate_(1.0f),
network_state_(kNetworkEmpty),
ready_state_(kHaveNothing),
ready_state_maximum_(kHaveNothing),
volume_(1.0f),
last_seek_time_(0),
previous_progress_time_(std::numeric_limits<double>::max()),
duration_(std::numeric_limits<double>::quiet_NaN()),
last_time_update_event_media_time_(
std::numeric_limits<double>::quiet_NaN()),
default_playback_start_position_(0),
load_state_(kWaitingForSource),
deferred_load_state_(kNotDeferred),
deferred_load_timer_(document.GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalMedia),
this,
&HTMLMediaElement::DeferredLoadTimerFired),
cc_layer_(nullptr),
display_mode_(kUnknown),
official_playback_position_(0),
official_playback_position_needs_update_(true),
fragment_end_time_(std::numeric_limits<double>::quiet_NaN()),
pending_action_flags_(0),
playing_(false),
should_delay_load_event_(false),
have_fired_loaded_data_(false),
can_autoplay_(true),
muted_(false),
paused_(true),
seeking_(false),
sent_stalled_event_(false),
ignore_preload_none_(false),
text_tracks_visible_(false),
should_perform_automatic_track_selection_(true),
tracks_are_ready_(true),
processing_preference_change_(false),
playing_remotely_(false),
mostly_filling_viewport_(false),
was_always_muted_(true),
audio_tracks_(AudioTrackList::Create(*this)),
video_tracks_(VideoTrackList::Create(*this)),
audio_source_node_(nullptr),
autoplay_policy_(new AutoplayPolicy(this)),
remote_playback_client_(nullptr),
media_controls_(nullptr),
controls_list_(HTMLMediaElementControlsList::Create(this)),
lazy_load_visibility_observer_(nullptr) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "HTMLMediaElement(" << (void*)this << ")";
LocalFrame* frame = document.GetFrame();
if (frame) {
remote_playback_client_ =
frame->Client()->CreateWebRemotePlaybackClient(*this);
}
SetHasCustomStyleCallbacks();
AddElementToDocumentMap(this, &document);
UseCounter::Count(document, WebFeature::kHTMLMediaElement);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 16,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SelectionController::HandlePasteGlobalSelection(
const WebMouseEvent& mouse_event) {
if (mouse_event.GetType() != WebInputEvent::kMouseUp)
return false;
if (!frame_->GetPage())
return false;
Frame* focus_frame =
frame_->GetPage()->GetFocusController().FocusedOrMainFrame();
if (frame_ == focus_frame &&
frame_->GetEditor().Behavior().SupportsGlobalSelection())
return frame_->GetEditor().CreateCommand("PasteGlobalSelection").Execute();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __kvm_set_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long val)
{
switch (dr) {
case 0 ... 3:
vcpu->arch.db[dr] = val;
if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
vcpu->arch.eff_db[dr] = val;
break;
case 4:
if (kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_DE))
return 1; /* #UD */
/* fall through */
case 6:
if (val & 0xffffffff00000000ULL)
return -1; /* #GP */
vcpu->arch.dr6 = (val & DR6_VOLATILE) | DR6_FIXED_1;
break;
case 5:
if (kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_DE))
return 1; /* #UD */
/* fall through */
default: /* 7 */
if (val & 0xffffffff00000000ULL)
return -1; /* #GP */
vcpu->arch.dr7 = (val & DR7_VOLATILE) | DR7_FIXED_1;
if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) {
kvm_x86_ops->set_dr7(vcpu, vcpu->arch.dr7);
vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs = (val & DR7_BP_EN_MASK);
}
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(kill, pid_t, pid, int, sig)
{
struct siginfo info;
info.si_signo = sig;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = SI_USER;
info.si_pid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
info.si_uid = current_uid();
return kill_something_info(sig, &info, pid);
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::UpdateCredentials(const SyncCredentials& credentials) {
core_thread_.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(core_.get(),
&SyncBackendHost::Core::DoUpdateCredentials,
credentials));
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<ListValue>::Write(Message* m, const param_type& p) {
WriteValue(m, &p, 0);
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Instance::ConfigurePageIndicator() {
pp::ImageData background =
CreateResourceImage(PP_RESOURCEIMAGE_PDF_PAGE_INDICATOR_BACKGROUND);
page_indicator_.Configure(pp::Point(), background);
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool assoc_array_insert_in_empty_tree(struct assoc_array_edit *edit)
{
struct assoc_array_node *new_n0;
pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
new_n0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_n0)
return false;
edit->new_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[0];
edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
edit->set[0].ptr = &edit->array->root;
edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [no root]\n", __func__);
return true;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix termination condition in assoc array garbage collection
This fixes CVE-2014-3631.
It is possible for an associative array to end up with a shortcut node at the
root of the tree if there are more than fan-out leaves in the tree, but they
all crowd into the same slot in the lowest level (ie. they all have the same
first nibble of their index keys).
When assoc_array_gc() returns back up the tree after scanning some leaves, it
can fall off of the root and crash because it assumes that the back pointer
from a shortcut (after label ascend_old_tree) must point to a normal node -
which isn't true of a shortcut node at the root.
Should we find we're ascending rootwards over a shortcut, we should check to
see if the backpointer is zero - and if it is, we have completed the scan.
This particular bug cannot occur if the root node is not a shortcut - ie. if
you have fewer than 17 keys in a keyring or if you have at least two keys that
sit into separate slots (eg. a keyring and a non keyring).
This can be reproduced by:
ring=`keyctl newring bar @s`
for ((i=1; i<=18; i++)); do last_key=`keyctl newring foo$i $ring`; done
keyctl timeout $last_key 2
Doing this:
echo 3 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay
first will speed things up.
If we do fall off of the top of the tree, we get the following oops:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
IP: [<ffffffff8136cea7>] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
PGD dae15067 PUD cfc24067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: xt_nat xt_mark nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT xt_conntrack ebtable_nat ebtable_broute bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_ni
CPU: 0 PID: 26011 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 3.14.9-200.fc20.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
task: ffff8800918bd580 ti: ffff8800aac14000 task.ti: ffff8800aac14000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8136cea7>] [<ffffffff8136cea7>] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
RSP: 0018:ffff8800aac15d40 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8800aaecacc0
RDX: ffff8800daecf440 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8800aadc2bc0
RBP: ffff8800aac15da8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: ffffffff8136ccc7 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000070 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 00000000db10d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
ffff8800aac15d50 0000000000000011 ffff8800aac15db8 ffffffff812e2a70
ffff880091a00600 0000000000000000 ffff8800aadc2bc3 00000000cd42c987
ffff88003702df20 ffff88003702dfa0 0000000053b65c09 ffff8800aac15fd8
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff812e2a70>] ? keyring_detect_cycle_iterator+0x30/0x30
[<ffffffff812e3e75>] keyring_gc+0x75/0x80
[<ffffffff812e1424>] key_garbage_collector+0x154/0x3c0
[<ffffffff810a67b6>] process_one_work+0x176/0x430
[<ffffffff810a744b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0
[<ffffffff810a7330>] ? rescuer_thread+0x3b0/0x3b0
[<ffffffff810ae1a8>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
[<ffffffff810ae0d0>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
[<ffffffff816ffb7c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[<ffffffff810ae0d0>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
Code: 08 4c 8b 22 0f 84 bf 00 00 00 41 83 c7 01 49 83 e4 fc 41 83 ff 0f 4c 89 65 c0 0f 8f 5a fe ff ff 48 8b 45 c0 4d 63 cf 49 83 c1 02 <4e> 8b 34 c8 4d 85 f6 0f 84 be 00 00 00 41 f6 c6 01 0f 84 92
RIP [<ffffffff8136cea7>] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
RSP <ffff8800aac15d40>
CR2: 0000000000000018
---[ end trace 1129028a088c0cbd ]---
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void blk_start_queue(struct request_queue *q)
{
lockdep_assert_held(q->queue_lock);
WARN_ON_ONCE(q->mq_ops);
queue_flag_clear(QUEUE_FLAG_STOPPED, q);
__blk_run_queue(q);
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 10,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlIsNameChar(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int c) {
if ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10) == 0) {
/*
* Use the new checks of production [4] [4a] amd [5] of the
* Update 5 of XML-1.0
*/
if ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* accelerators */
(((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'z')) ||
((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) ||
((c >= '0') && (c <= '9')) || /* !start */
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
(c == '-') || (c == '.') || (c == 0xB7) || /* !start */
((c >= 0xC0) && (c <= 0xD6)) ||
((c >= 0xD8) && (c <= 0xF6)) ||
((c >= 0xF8) && (c <= 0x2FF)) ||
((c >= 0x300) && (c <= 0x36F)) || /* !start */
((c >= 0x370) && (c <= 0x37D)) ||
((c >= 0x37F) && (c <= 0x1FFF)) ||
((c >= 0x200C) && (c <= 0x200D)) ||
((c >= 0x203F) && (c <= 0x2040)) || /* !start */
((c >= 0x2070) && (c <= 0x218F)) ||
((c >= 0x2C00) && (c <= 0x2FEF)) ||
((c >= 0x3001) && (c <= 0xD7FF)) ||
((c >= 0xF900) && (c <= 0xFDCF)) ||
((c >= 0xFDF0) && (c <= 0xFFFD)) ||
((c >= 0x10000) && (c <= 0xEFFFF))))
return(1);
} else {
if ((IS_LETTER(c)) || (IS_DIGIT(c)) ||
(c == '.') || (c == '-') ||
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
(IS_COMBINING(c)) ||
(IS_EXTENDER(c)))
return(1);
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 3,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AtomicString Document::contentType() const {
if (!mime_type_.IsEmpty())
return mime_type_;
if (DocumentLoader* document_loader = Loader())
return document_loader->MimeType();
String mime_type = SuggestedMIMEType();
if (!mime_type.IsEmpty())
return AtomicString(mime_type);
return AtomicString("application/xml");
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 16,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VirtQueue *virtio_add_queue_aio(VirtIODevice *vdev, int queue_size,
VirtIOHandleOutput handle_output)
{
return virtio_add_queue_internal(vdev, queue_size, handle_output, true);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void process_bin_flush(conn *c) {
time_t exptime = 0;
protocol_binary_request_flush* req = binary_get_request(c);
if (c->binary_header.request.extlen == sizeof(req->message.body)) {
exptime = ntohl(req->message.body.expiration);
}
set_current_time();
if (exptime > 0) {
settings.oldest_live = realtime(exptime) - 1;
} else {
settings.oldest_live = current_time - 1;
}
item_flush_expired();
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.flush_cmds++;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
write_bin_response(c, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pseudo_get_job_info(ClassAd *&ad, bool &delete_ad)
{
ClassAd * the_ad;
delete_ad = false;
the_ad = thisRemoteResource->getJobAd();
ASSERT( the_ad );
thisRemoteResource->filetrans.Init( the_ad, false, PRIV_USER, false );
std::string file;
if ( the_ad->LookupString( ATTR_JOB_OUTPUT, file ) &&
strcmp( file.c_str(), StdoutRemapName ) ) {
thisRemoteResource->filetrans.AddDownloadFilenameRemap( StdoutRemapName, file.c_str() );
}
if ( the_ad->LookupString( ATTR_JOB_ERROR, file ) &&
strcmp( file.c_str(), StderrRemapName ) ) {
thisRemoteResource->filetrans.AddDownloadFilenameRemap( StderrRemapName, file.c_str() );
}
Shadow->publishShadowAttrs( the_ad );
ad = the_ad;
const CondorVersionInfo *vi = syscall_sock->get_peer_version();
if ( vi && !vi->built_since_version(7,7,2) ) {
std::string value;
ad->LookupString( ATTR_SHOULD_TRANSFER_FILES, value );
ShouldTransferFiles_t should_transfer = getShouldTransferFilesNum( value.c_str() );
if ( should_transfer == STF_IF_NEEDED || should_transfer == STF_YES ) {
ad = new ClassAd( *ad );
delete_ad = true;
bool stream;
std::string stdout_name;
std::string stderr_name;
ad->LookupString( ATTR_JOB_OUTPUT, stdout_name );
ad->LookupString( ATTR_JOB_ERROR, stderr_name );
if ( ad->LookupBool( ATTR_STREAM_OUTPUT, stream ) && !stream &&
!nullFile( stdout_name.c_str() ) ) {
ad->Assign( ATTR_JOB_OUTPUT, StdoutRemapName );
}
if ( ad->LookupBool( ATTR_STREAM_ERROR, stream ) && !stream &&
!nullFile( stderr_name.c_str() ) ) {
if ( stdout_name == stderr_name ) {
ad->Assign( ATTR_JOB_ERROR, StdoutRemapName );
} else {
ad->Assign( ATTR_JOB_ERROR, StderrRemapName );
}
}
} else if ( should_transfer != STF_NO ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "pseudo_get_job_info(): Unexpected value for %s: %s (%d)!\n",
ATTR_SHOULD_TRANSFER_FILES, value.c_str(),
should_transfer );
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 7,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebViewPrivate::loadProgressDidChange(int loadProgress)
{
Q_Q(QQuickWebView);
m_loadProgress = loadProgress;
emit q->loadProgressChanged();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebNode RenderView::GetFocusedNode() const {
if (!webview())
return WebNode();
WebFrame* focused_frame = webview()->focusedFrame();
if (focused_frame) {
WebDocument doc = focused_frame->document();
if (!doc.isNull())
return doc.focusedNode();
}
return WebNode();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OneClickSigninSyncStarter::SigninFailed(
const GoogleServiceAuthError& error) {
FinishProfileSyncServiceSetup();
if (confirmation_required_ == CONFIRM_AFTER_SIGNIN) {
switch (error.state()) {
case GoogleServiceAuthError::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE:
DisplayFinalConfirmationBubble(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_SYNC_UNRECOVERABLE_ERROR));
break;
case GoogleServiceAuthError::REQUEST_CANCELED:
break;
default:
DisplayFinalConfirmationBubble(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_SYNC_ERROR_SIGNING_IN));
break;
}
}
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int lxc_clear_environment(struct lxc_conf *c)
{
struct lxc_list *it,*next;
lxc_list_for_each_safe(it, &c->environment, next) {
lxc_list_del(it);
free(it->elem);
free(it);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 20,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler(
blink::WebRTCPeerConnectionHandlerClient* client,
PeerConnectionDependencyFactory* dependency_factory,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner)
: id_(base::ToUpperASCII(base::UnguessableToken::Create().ToString())),
initialize_called_(false),
client_(client),
is_closed_(false),
dependency_factory_(dependency_factory),
track_adapter_map_(
new WebRtcMediaStreamTrackAdapterMap(dependency_factory_,
task_runner)),
task_runner_(std::move(task_runner)),
weak_factory_(this) {
CHECK(client_);
GetPeerConnectionHandlers()->insert(this);
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 4,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String HTMLFormControlElement::formAction() const {
const AtomicString& action = fastGetAttribute(formactionAttr);
if (action.isEmpty())
return document().url();
return document().completeURL(stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(action));
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021 | 0 | 18,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsFloat64Number xpow10(int n)
{
return pow(10, (cmsFloat64Number) n);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 3,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLElement::setOuterText(const String &text, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (ieForbidsInsertHTML()) {
ec = NO_MODIFICATION_ALLOWED_ERR;
return;
}
if (hasLocalName(colTag) || hasLocalName(colgroupTag) || hasLocalName(framesetTag) ||
hasLocalName(headTag) || hasLocalName(htmlTag) || hasLocalName(tableTag) ||
hasLocalName(tbodyTag) || hasLocalName(tfootTag) || hasLocalName(theadTag) ||
hasLocalName(trTag)) {
ec = NO_MODIFICATION_ALLOWED_ERR;
return;
}
ContainerNode* parent = parentNode();
if (!parent) {
ec = NO_MODIFICATION_ALLOWED_ERR;
return;
}
RefPtr<Node> prev = previousSibling();
RefPtr<Node> next = nextSibling();
RefPtr<Node> newChild;
ec = 0;
if (text.contains('\r') || text.contains('\n'))
newChild = textToFragment(text, ec);
else
newChild = Text::create(document(), text);
if (!this || !parentNode())
ec = HIERARCHY_REQUEST_ERR;
if (ec)
return;
parent->replaceChild(newChild.release(), this, ec);
RefPtr<Node> node = next ? next->previousSibling() : 0;
if (!ec && node && node->isTextNode())
mergeWithNextTextNode(node.release(), ec);
if (!ec && prev && prev->isTextNode())
mergeWithNextTextNode(prev.release(), ec);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pfkey_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
if (!sk)
return 0;
pfkey_remove(sk);
sock_orphan(sk);
sock->sk = NULL;
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
synchronize_rcu();
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TEE_Result syscall_set_ta_time(const TEE_Time *mytime)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_ta_session *s = NULL;
TEE_Time t;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&s);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(&t, mytime, sizeof(t));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
return tee_time_set_ta_time((const void *)&s->ctx->uuid, &t);
}
Commit Message: core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OfflinePageModelTaskified::OnClearCachedPagesDone(
base::Time start_time,
size_t deleted_page_count,
ClearStorageResult result) {
last_clear_cached_pages_time_ = start_time;
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 10,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_init_mmu_notifier(struct kvm *kvm)
{
kvm->mmu_notifier.ops = &kvm_mmu_notifier_ops;
return mmu_notifier_register(&kvm->mmu_notifier, current->mm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 5,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void d_shrink_add(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list)
{
D_FLAG_VERIFY(dentry, 0);
list_add(&dentry->d_lru, list);
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_SHRINK_LIST | DCACHE_LRU_LIST;
this_cpu_inc(nr_dentry_unused);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 8,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::DidLoseCompositorFrameSink() {
if (resource_provider_)
resource_provider_->DidLoseContextProvider();
has_valid_compositor_frame_sink_ = false;
client_->DidLoseCompositorFrameSinkOnImplThread();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 16,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mark_stack_slot_read(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int slot)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *parent = state->parent;
while (parent) {
/* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */
if (state->stack[slot].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)
break;
/* ... then we depend on parent's value */
parent->stack[slot].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
state = parent;
parent = state->parent;
}
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: apply_transformation(xmlNode * xml, const char *transform)
{
char *xform = NULL;
xmlNode *out = NULL;
xmlDocPtr res = NULL;
xmlDocPtr doc = NULL;
xsltStylesheet *xslt = NULL;
CRM_CHECK(xml != NULL, return FALSE);
doc = getDocPtr(xml);
xform = get_schema_path(NULL, transform);
xmlLoadExtDtdDefaultValue = 1;
xmlSubstituteEntitiesDefault(1);
xslt = xsltParseStylesheetFile((const xmlChar *)xform);
CRM_CHECK(xslt != NULL, goto cleanup);
res = xsltApplyStylesheet(xslt, doc, NULL);
CRM_CHECK(res != NULL, goto cleanup);
out = xmlDocGetRootElement(res);
cleanup:
if (xslt) {
xsltFreeStylesheet(xslt);
}
free(xform);
return out;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabAnimationDelegate::AnimationProgressed(
const gfx::Animation* animation) {
tab_->SetVisible(tab_strip_->ShouldTabBeVisible(tab_));
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: request_submit(struct request *const req) {
struct evdns_base *base = req->base;
ASSERT_LOCKED(base);
ASSERT_VALID_REQUEST(req);
if (req->ns) {
/* if it has a nameserver assigned then this is going */
/* straight into the inflight queue */
evdns_request_insert(req, &REQ_HEAD(base, req->trans_id));
base->global_requests_inflight++;
req->ns->requests_inflight++;
evdns_request_transmit(req);
} else {
evdns_request_insert(req, &base->req_waiting_head);
base->global_requests_waiting++;
}
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ReflectUnsignedShortAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V0CustomElementProcessingStack::CallbackDeliveryScope delivery_scope;
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "reflectUnsignedShortAttribute");
uint16_t cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLUnsignedShort>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setAttribute(html_names::kReflectunsignedshortattributeAttr, cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: megasas_mgmt_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
switch (cmd) {
case MEGASAS_IOC_FIRMWARE32:
return megasas_mgmt_compat_ioctl_fw(file, arg);
case MEGASAS_IOC_GET_AEN:
return megasas_mgmt_ioctl_aen(file, arg);
}
return -ENOTTY;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 8,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static LocalFrame* FrameForExecutionContext(ExecutionContext* context) {
LocalFrame* frame = nullptr;
if (context->IsDocument())
frame = ToDocument(context)->GetFrame();
return frame;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xdr_krb5_string_attr(XDR *xdrs, krb5_string_attr *objp)
{
if (!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &objp->key))
return FALSE;
if (!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &objp->value))
return FALSE;
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_DECODE &&
(objp->key == NULL || objp->value == NULL))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProactiveTabFreezeAndDiscardParams GetTestProactiveDiscardParams() {
ProactiveTabFreezeAndDiscardParams params = {};
params.should_proactively_discard = true;
params.low_occluded_timeout = kLowOccludedTimeout;
params.moderate_occluded_timeout = kModerateOccludedTimeout;
params.high_occluded_timeout = kHighOccludedTimeout;
params.low_loaded_tab_count = kLowLoadedTabCount;
params.moderate_loaded_tab_count = kModerateLoadedTabCount;
params.high_loaded_tab_count = kHighLoadedTabCount;
params.freeze_timeout = kFreezeTimeout;
return params;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dev_change_flags(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int flags)
{
int ret;
unsigned int changes, old_flags = dev->flags, old_gflags = dev->gflags;
ret = __dev_change_flags(dev, flags);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
changes = (old_flags ^ dev->flags) | (old_gflags ^ dev->gflags);
__dev_notify_flags(dev, old_flags, changes);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 18,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xhci_ep_kick_timer(void *opaque)
{
XHCIEPContext *epctx = opaque;
xhci_kick_epctx(epctx, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Writer()
: m_position(0)
{
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HRESULT WaitForLoginUIAndGetResult(
CGaiaCredentialBase::UIProcessInfo* uiprocinfo,
std::string* json_result,
DWORD* exit_code,
BSTR* status_text) {
LOGFN(INFO);
DCHECK(uiprocinfo);
DCHECK(json_result);
DCHECK(exit_code);
DCHECK(status_text);
const int kBufferSize = 4096;
std::vector<char> output_buffer(kBufferSize, '\0');
base::ScopedClosureRunner zero_buffer_on_exit(
base::BindOnce(base::IgnoreResult(&RtlSecureZeroMemory),
&output_buffer[0], kBufferSize));
HRESULT hr = WaitForProcess(uiprocinfo->procinfo.process_handle(),
uiprocinfo->parent_handles, exit_code,
&output_buffer[0], kBufferSize);
LOGFN(INFO) << "exit_code=" << exit_code;
if (*exit_code == kUiecAbort) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Aborted hr=" << putHR(hr);
return E_ABORT;
} else if (*exit_code != kUiecSuccess) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Error hr=" << putHR(hr);
*status_text =
CGaiaCredentialBase::AllocErrorString(IDS_INVALID_UI_RESPONSE_BASE);
return E_FAIL;
}
*json_result = std::string(&output_buffer[0]);
return S_OK;
}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 8,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: on_ps_internal(Point *pt, LSEG *lseg)
{
return FPeq(point_dt(pt, &lseg->p[0]) + point_dt(pt, &lseg->p[1]),
point_dt(&lseg->p[0], &lseg->p[1]));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 16,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageLoader::dispatchPendingErrorEvents() {
errorEventSender().dispatchPendingEvents();
}
Commit Message: Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927}
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold void uninit(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
BoxBlurContext *s = ctx->priv;
av_freep(&s->temp[0]);
av_freep(&s->temp[1]);
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __be16 ipx_first_free_socketnum(struct ipx_interface *intrfc)
{
unsigned short socketNum = intrfc->if_sknum;
spin_lock_bh(&intrfc->if_sklist_lock);
if (socketNum < IPX_MIN_EPHEMERAL_SOCKET)
socketNum = IPX_MIN_EPHEMERAL_SOCKET;
while (__ipxitf_find_socket(intrfc, htons(socketNum)))
if (socketNum > IPX_MAX_EPHEMERAL_SOCKET)
socketNum = IPX_MIN_EPHEMERAL_SOCKET;
else
socketNum++;
spin_unlock_bh(&intrfc->if_sklist_lock);
intrfc->if_sknum = socketNum;
return htons(socketNum);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftMPEG2::setDecodeArgs(
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip,
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader,
size_t timeStampIx) {
size_t sizeY = outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight();
size_t sizeUV;
uint8_t *pBuf;
ps_dec_ip->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t);
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
ps_dec_ip->e_cmd = IVD_CMD_VIDEO_DECODE;
/* When in flush and after EOS with zero byte input,
* inHeader is set to zero. Hence check for non-null */
if (inHeader) {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = timeStampIx;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer = inHeader->pBuffer
+ inHeader->nOffset;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = inHeader->nFilledLen;
} else {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = 0;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer = NULL;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = 0;
}
if (outHeader) {
pBuf = outHeader->pBuffer;
} else {
pBuf = mFlushOutBuffer;
}
sizeUV = sizeY / 4;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[0] = sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[1] = sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[2] = sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0] = pBuf;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1] = pBuf + sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2] = pBuf + sizeY + sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs = 3;
return;
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 19,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::Form_UploadTo(FPDF_FORMFILLINFO* param,
FPDF_FILEHANDLER* file_handle,
int file_flag,
FPDF_WIDESTRING to) {
std::string to_str =
base::UTF16ToUTF8(reinterpret_cast<const base::char16*>(to));
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int handle_volume_down_count() const {
return handle_volume_down_count_;
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool is_invalid_opcode(u32 intr_info)
{
return (intr_info & (INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK | INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK |
INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK)) ==
(INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION | UD_VECTOR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmx_check_nested_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool external_intr)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
unsigned long exit_qual;
if (kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu))
return -EBUSY;
if (vcpu->arch.exception.pending &&
nested_vmx_check_exception(vcpu, &exit_qual)) {
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
return -EBUSY;
nested_vmx_inject_exception_vmexit(vcpu, exit_qual);
vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
return 0;
}
if (nested_cpu_has_preemption_timer(get_vmcs12(vcpu)) &&
vmx->nested.preemption_timer_expired) {
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
return -EBUSY;
nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER, 0, 0);
return 0;
}
if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending && nested_exit_on_nmi(vcpu)) {
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
return -EBUSY;
nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI,
NMI_VECTOR | INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR |
INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK, 0);
/*
* The NMI-triggered VM exit counts as injection:
* clear this one and block further NMIs.
*/
vcpu->arch.nmi_pending = 0;
vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, true);
return 0;
}
if ((kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(vcpu) || external_intr) &&
nested_exit_on_intr(vcpu)) {
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
return -EBUSY;
nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT, 0, 0);
return 0;
}
vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int _yr_emit_inst(
RE_EMIT_CONTEXT* emit_context,
uint8_t opcode,
uint8_t** instruction_addr,
int* code_size)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&opcode,
sizeof(uint8_t),
(void**) instruction_addr));
*code_size = sizeof(uint8_t);
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #646 (#648)
* Fix issue #646 and some edge cases with wide regexps using \b and \B
* Rename function IS_WORD_CHAR to _yr_re_is_word_char
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 7,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct smbXcli_session *smbXcli_session_copy(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct smbXcli_session *src)
{
struct smbXcli_session *session;
session = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct smbXcli_session);
if (session == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
session->smb2 = talloc_zero(session, struct smb2cli_session);
if (session->smb2 == NULL) {
talloc_free(session);
return NULL;
}
session->conn = src->conn;
*session->smb2 = *src->smb2;
session->smb2_channel = src->smb2_channel;
session->disconnect_expired = src->disconnect_expired;
DLIST_ADD_END(src->conn->sessions, session, struct smbXcli_session *);
talloc_set_destructor(session, smbXcli_session_destructor);
return session;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPage::clearCookies()
{
clearCookieCache();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const struct cpumask *sd_numa_mask(int cpu)
{
return sched_domains_numa_masks[sched_domains_curr_level][cpu_to_node(cpu)];
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_attr_space_used(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, uint64_t *used)
{
__be32 *p;
int ret = 0;
*used = 0;
if (unlikely(bitmap[1] & (FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_USED - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_USED)) {
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 8);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
xdr_decode_hyper(p, used);
bitmap[1] &= ~FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_USED;
ret = NFS_ATTR_FATTR_SPACE_USED;
}
dprintk("%s: space used=%Lu\n", __func__,
(unsigned long long)*used);
return ret;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 6,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_arg0_string (Buffer *buffer)
{
GDBusMessage *message = g_dbus_message_new_from_blob (buffer->data, buffer->size, 0, NULL);
GVariant *body;
g_autoptr(GVariant) arg0 = NULL;
char *name = NULL;
if (message != NULL &&
(body = g_dbus_message_get_body (message)) != NULL &&
(arg0 = g_variant_get_child_value (body, 0)) != NULL &&
g_variant_is_of_type (arg0, G_VARIANT_TYPE_STRING))
name = g_variant_dup_string (arg0, NULL);
g_object_unref (message);
return name;
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 2,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void freeStream(stream *s) {
raxFreeWithCallback(s->rax,(void(*)(void*))lpFree);
if (s->cgroups)
raxFreeWithCallback(s->cgroups,(void(*)(void*))streamFreeCG);
zfree(s);
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 26,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IPC::SyncMessageFilter* RenderThreadImpl::GetSyncMessageFilter() {
return sync_message_filter();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tty_wakeup(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct tty_ldisc *ld;
if (test_bit(TTY_DO_WRITE_WAKEUP, &tty->flags)) {
ld = tty_ldisc_ref(tty);
if (ld) {
if (ld->ops->write_wakeup)
ld->ops->write_wakeup(tty);
tty_ldisc_deref(ld);
}
}
wake_up_interruptible_poll(&tty->write_wait, POLLOUT);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 26,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs_read(struct device_d *dev, FILE *file, void *buf, size_t insize)
{
struct file_priv *priv = file->priv;
if (insize > 1024)
insize = 1024;
if (insize && !kfifo_len(priv->fifo)) {
int ret = nfs_read_req(priv, file->pos, insize);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return kfifo_get(priv->fifo, buf, insize);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CaptivePortalDetector::CaptivePortalDetector(
const scoped_refptr<net::URLRequestContextGetter>& request_context)
: request_context_(request_context) {
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 29,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::ShouldScheduleLayout() const {
if (!IsActive())
return false;
if (HaveRenderBlockingResourcesLoaded() && body())
return true;
if (documentElement() && !IsHTMLHtmlElement(*documentElement()))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dump_icc_buffer(int buffersize, char filename[],byte *Buffer)
{
char full_file_name[50];
FILE *fid;
gs_sprintf(full_file_name,"%d)%s_debug.icc",global_icc_index,filename);
fid = gp_fopen(full_file_name,"wb");
fwrite(Buffer,sizeof(unsigned char),buffersize,fid);
fclose(fid);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void xen_netbk_add_xenvif(struct xenvif *vif)
{
int i;
int min_netfront_count;
int min_group = 0;
struct xen_netbk *netbk;
min_netfront_count = atomic_read(&xen_netbk[0].netfront_count);
for (i = 0; i < xen_netbk_group_nr; i++) {
int netfront_count = atomic_read(&xen_netbk[i].netfront_count);
if (netfront_count < min_netfront_count) {
min_group = i;
min_netfront_count = netfront_count;
}
}
netbk = &xen_netbk[min_group];
vif->netbk = netbk;
atomic_inc(&netbk->netfront_count);
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameSequence_gif::FrameSequence_gif(Stream* stream) :
mLoopCount(1), mBgColor(TRANSPARENT), mPreservedFrames(NULL), mRestoringFrames(NULL) {
mGif = DGifOpen(stream, streamReader, NULL);
if (!mGif) {
ALOGW("Gif load failed");
return;
}
if (DGifSlurp(mGif) != GIF_OK) {
ALOGW("Gif slurp failed");
DGifCloseFile(mGif, NULL);
mGif = NULL;
return;
}
long durationMs = 0;
int lastUnclearedFrame = -1;
mPreservedFrames = new bool[mGif->ImageCount];
mRestoringFrames = new int[mGif->ImageCount];
GraphicsControlBlock gcb;
for (int i = 0; i < mGif->ImageCount; i++) {
const SavedImage& image = mGif->SavedImages[i];
for (int j = 0; (j + 1) < image.ExtensionBlockCount; j++) {
ExtensionBlock* eb1 = image.ExtensionBlocks + j;
ExtensionBlock* eb2 = image.ExtensionBlocks + j + 1;
if (eb1->Function == APPLICATION_EXT_FUNC_CODE
&& eb1->ByteCount == 11
&& !memcmp((const char*)(eb1->Bytes), "NETSCAPE2.0", 11)
&& eb2->Function == CONTINUE_EXT_FUNC_CODE
&& eb2->ByteCount == 3
&& eb2->Bytes[0] == 1) {
mLoopCount = (int)(eb2->Bytes[2] << 8) + (int)(eb2->Bytes[1]);
}
}
DGifSavedExtensionToGCB(mGif, i, &gcb);
durationMs += getDelayMs(gcb);
mPreservedFrames[i] = false;
mRestoringFrames[i] = -1;
if (gcb.DisposalMode == DISPOSE_PREVIOUS && lastUnclearedFrame >= 0) {
mPreservedFrames[lastUnclearedFrame] = true;
mRestoringFrames[i] = lastUnclearedFrame;
}
if (!willBeCleared(gcb)) {
lastUnclearedFrame = i;
}
}
#if GIF_DEBUG
ALOGD("FrameSequence_gif created with size %d %d, frames %d dur %ld",
mGif->SWidth, mGif->SHeight, mGif->ImageCount, durationMs);
for (int i = 0; i < mGif->ImageCount; i++) {
DGifSavedExtensionToGCB(mGif, i, &gcb);
ALOGD(" Frame %d - must preserve %d, restore point %d, trans color %d",
i, mPreservedFrames[i], mRestoringFrames[i], gcb.TransparentColor);
}
#endif
if (mGif->SColorMap) {
GraphicsControlBlock gcb;
DGifSavedExtensionToGCB(mGif, 0, &gcb);
if (gcb.TransparentColor == NO_TRANSPARENT_COLOR) {
mBgColor = gifColorToColor8888(mGif->SColorMap->Colors[mGif->SBackGroundColor]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Skip composition of frames lacking a color map
Bug:68399117
Change-Id: I32f1d6856221b8a60130633edb69da2d2986c27c
(cherry picked from commit 0dc887f70eeea8d707cb426b96c6756edd1c607d)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UsbTabHelper::IncrementConnectionCount(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
auto it = frame_usb_services_.find(render_frame_host);
DCHECK(it != frame_usb_services_.end());
it->second->device_connection_count_++;
NotifyTabStateChanged();
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Browser::CreateParams Browser::CreateParams::CreateForDevTools(
Profile* profile) {
CreateParams params(TYPE_POPUP, profile, true);
params.app_name = DevToolsWindow::kDevToolsApp;
params.trusted_source = true;
return params;
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,753 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gx_device_init(gx_device * dev, const gx_device * proto, gs_memory_t * mem,
bool internal)
{
memcpy(dev, proto, proto->params_size);
dev->memory = mem;
dev->retained = !internal;
rc_init(dev, mem, (internal ? 0 : 1));
rc_increment(dev->icc_struct);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 23,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: drop_all_caps (bool keep_requested_caps)
{
struct __user_cap_header_struct hdr = { _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, 0 };
struct __user_cap_data_struct data[2] = { { 0 } };
if (keep_requested_caps)
{
/* Avoid calling capset() unless we need to; currently
* systemd-nspawn at least is known to install a seccomp
* policy denying capset() for dubious reasons.
* <https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap/pull/122>
*/
if (!opt_cap_add_or_drop_used && real_uid == 0)
{
assert (!is_privileged);
return;
}
data[0].effective = requested_caps[0];
data[0].permitted = requested_caps[0];
data[0].inheritable = requested_caps[0];
data[1].effective = requested_caps[1];
data[1].permitted = requested_caps[1];
data[1].inheritable = requested_caps[1];
}
if (capset (&hdr, data) < 0)
{
/* While the above logic ensures we don't call capset() for the primary
* process unless configured to do so, we still try to drop privileges for
* the init process unconditionally. Since due to the systemd seccomp
* filter that will fail, let's just ignore it.
*/
if (errno == EPERM && real_uid == 0 && !is_privileged)
return;
else
die_with_error ("capset failed");
}
}
Commit Message: Don't create our own temporary mount point for pivot_root
An attacker could pre-create /tmp/.bubblewrap-$UID and make it a
non-directory, non-symlink (in which case mounting our tmpfs would fail,
causing denial of service), or make it a symlink under their control
(potentially allowing bad things if the protected_symlinks sysctl is
not enabled).
Instead, temporarily mount the tmpfs on a directory that we are sure
exists and is not attacker-controlled. /tmp (the directory itself, not
a subdirectory) will do.
Fixes: #304
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=923557
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
Closes: #305
Approved by: cgwalters
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::CreateSkSurfaceCharacterization(
const gfx::Size& surface_size,
ResourceFormat format,
bool mipmap,
sk_sp<SkColorSpace> color_space) {
auto gr_context_thread_safe = impl_on_gpu_->GetGrContextThreadSafeProxy();
auto cache_max_resource_bytes = impl_on_gpu_->max_resource_cache_bytes();
SkSurfaceProps surface_props(0 /*flags */,
SkSurfaceProps::kLegacyFontHost_InitType);
auto color_type =
ResourceFormatToClosestSkColorType(true /* gpu_compositing */, format);
auto image_info =
SkImageInfo::Make(surface_size.width(), surface_size.height(), color_type,
kPremul_SkAlphaType, std::move(color_space));
auto backend_format = gr_context_thread_safe->defaultBackendFormat(
color_type, GrRenderable::kYes);
DCHECK(backend_format.isValid());
auto characterization = gr_context_thread_safe->createCharacterization(
cache_max_resource_bytes, image_info, backend_format, 0 /* sampleCount */,
kTopLeft_GrSurfaceOrigin, surface_props, mipmap);
DCHECK(characterization.isValid());
return characterization;
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct request *blk_get_request(struct request_queue *q, unsigned int op,
blk_mq_req_flags_t flags)
{
struct request *req;
WARN_ON_ONCE(op & REQ_NOWAIT);
WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & ~(BLK_MQ_REQ_NOWAIT | BLK_MQ_REQ_PREEMPT));
if (q->mq_ops) {
req = blk_mq_alloc_request(q, op, flags);
if (!IS_ERR(req) && q->mq_ops->initialize_rq_fn)
q->mq_ops->initialize_rq_fn(req);
} else {
req = blk_old_get_request(q, op, flags);
if (!IS_ERR(req) && q->initialize_rq_fn)
q->initialize_rq_fn(req);
}
return req;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 6,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceWorkerContextCore::OnRegistrationFinishedForCheckHasServiceWorker(
ServiceWorkerContext::CheckHasServiceWorkerCallback callback,
scoped_refptr<ServiceWorkerRegistration> registration) {
if (!registration->active_version() && !registration->waiting_version()) {
std::move(callback).Run(ServiceWorkerCapability::NO_SERVICE_WORKER);
return;
}
CheckFetchHandlerOfInstalledServiceWorker(std::move(callback), registration);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 28,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int select_idle_sibling(struct task_struct *p, int prev, int target)
{
struct sched_domain *sd;
int i, recent_used_cpu;
if (available_idle_cpu(target))
return target;
/*
* If the previous CPU is cache affine and idle, don't be stupid:
*/
if (prev != target && cpus_share_cache(prev, target) && available_idle_cpu(prev))
return prev;
/* Check a recently used CPU as a potential idle candidate: */
recent_used_cpu = p->recent_used_cpu;
if (recent_used_cpu != prev &&
recent_used_cpu != target &&
cpus_share_cache(recent_used_cpu, target) &&
available_idle_cpu(recent_used_cpu) &&
cpumask_test_cpu(p->recent_used_cpu, &p->cpus_allowed)) {
/*
* Replace recent_used_cpu with prev as it is a potential
* candidate for the next wake:
*/
p->recent_used_cpu = prev;
return recent_used_cpu;
}
sd = rcu_dereference(per_cpu(sd_llc, target));
if (!sd)
return target;
i = select_idle_core(p, sd, target);
if ((unsigned)i < nr_cpumask_bits)
return i;
i = select_idle_cpu(p, sd, target);
if ((unsigned)i < nr_cpumask_bits)
return i;
i = select_idle_smt(p, sd, target);
if ((unsigned)i < nr_cpumask_bits)
return i;
return target;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 14,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DidFinishNavigation(NavigationHandle* handle) {
if (handle->GetFrameTreeNodeId() != frame_tree_node_id_)
return;
if (!handle->HasCommitted())
return;
if (handle->GetRenderFrameHost()->GetSiteInstance() != parent_site_instance_)
return;
if (!handle->GetURL().IsAboutBlank())
return;
if (!handle->GetRenderFrameHost()->PrepareForInnerWebContentsAttach()) {
filter_->ResumeAttachOrDestroy(element_instance_id_,
MSG_ROUTING_NONE /* no plugin frame */);
}
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(&ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::ResumeAttachOrDestroy,
filter_, element_instance_id_,
handle->GetRenderFrameHost()->GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 15,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RecordingImageBufferSurfaceTest()
{
OwnPtr<MockSurfaceFactory> surfaceFactory = adoptPtr(new MockSurfaceFactory());
m_surfaceFactory = surfaceFactory.get();
OwnPtr<RecordingImageBufferSurface> testSurface = adoptPtr(new RecordingImageBufferSurface(IntSize(10, 10), surfaceFactory.release()));
m_testSurface = testSurface.get();
m_imageBuffer = ImageBuffer::create(testSurface.release());
EXPECT_FALSE(!m_imageBuffer);
m_fakeImageBufferClient = adoptPtr(new FakeImageBufferClient(m_imageBuffer.get()));
m_imageBuffer->setClient(m_fakeImageBufferClient.get());
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 27,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void GetMagickMemoryMethods(
AcquireMemoryHandler *acquire_memory_handler,
ResizeMemoryHandler *resize_memory_handler,
DestroyMemoryHandler *destroy_memory_handler)
{
assert(acquire_memory_handler != (AcquireMemoryHandler *) NULL);
assert(resize_memory_handler != (ResizeMemoryHandler *) NULL);
assert(destroy_memory_handler != (DestroyMemoryHandler *) NULL);
*acquire_memory_handler=memory_methods.acquire_memory_handler;
*resize_memory_handler=memory_methods.resize_memory_handler;
*destroy_memory_handler=memory_methods.destroy_memory_handler;
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void discard_dirty_segmap(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
enum dirty_type dirty_type)
{
struct dirty_seglist_info *dirty_i = DIRTY_I(sbi);
mutex_lock(&dirty_i->seglist_lock);
kvfree(dirty_i->dirty_segmap[dirty_type]);
dirty_i->nr_dirty[dirty_type] = 0;
mutex_unlock(&dirty_i->seglist_lock);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 27,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int buffer_needs_copy(PadContext *s, AVFrame *frame, AVBufferRef *buf)
{
int planes[4] = { -1, -1, -1, -1}, *p = planes;
int i, j;
/* get all planes in this buffer */
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(planes) && frame->data[i]; i++) {
if (av_frame_get_plane_buffer(frame, i) == buf)
*p++ = i;
}
/* for each plane in this buffer, check that it can be padded without
* going over buffer bounds or other planes */
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(planes) && planes[i] >= 0; i++) {
int hsub = s->draw.hsub[planes[i]];
int vsub = s->draw.vsub[planes[i]];
uint8_t *start = frame->data[planes[i]];
uint8_t *end = start + (frame->height >> vsub) *
frame->linesize[planes[i]];
/* amount of free space needed before the start and after the end
* of the plane */
ptrdiff_t req_start = (s->x >> hsub) * s->draw.pixelstep[planes[i]] +
(s->y >> vsub) * frame->linesize[planes[i]];
ptrdiff_t req_end = ((s->w - s->x - frame->width) >> hsub) *
s->draw.pixelstep[planes[i]] +
(s->y >> vsub) * frame->linesize[planes[i]];
if (frame->linesize[planes[i]] < (s->w >> hsub) * s->draw.pixelstep[planes[i]])
return 1;
if (start - buf->data < req_start ||
(buf->data + buf->size) - end < req_end)
return 1;
for (j = 0; j < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(planes) && planes[j] >= 0; j++) {
int vsub1 = s->draw.vsub[planes[j]];
uint8_t *start1 = frame->data[planes[j]];
uint8_t *end1 = start1 + (frame->height >> vsub1) *
frame->linesize[planes[j]];
if (i == j)
continue;
if (FFSIGN(start - end1) != FFSIGN(start - end1 - req_start) ||
FFSIGN(end - start1) != FFSIGN(end - start1 + req_end))
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mp_update_termios(struct sb_uart_state *state)
{
struct tty_struct *tty = state->info->tty;
struct sb_uart_port *port = state->port;
if (!(tty->flags & (1 << TTY_IO_ERROR))) {
mp_change_speed(state, NULL);
if (tty->termios.c_cflag & CBAUD)
uart_set_mctrl(port, TIOCM_DTR | TIOCM_RTS);
}
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 4,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int coroutine_fn copy_sectors(BlockDriverState *bs,
uint64_t start_sect,
uint64_t cluster_offset,
int n_start, int n_end)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
QEMUIOVector qiov;
struct iovec iov;
int n, ret;
/*
* If this is the last cluster and it is only partially used, we must only
* copy until the end of the image, or bdrv_check_request will fail for the
* bdrv_read/write calls below.
*/
if (start_sect + n_end > bs->total_sectors) {
n_end = bs->total_sectors - start_sect;
}
n = n_end - n_start;
if (n <= 0) {
return 0;
}
iov.iov_len = n * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE;
iov.iov_base = qemu_blockalign(bs, iov.iov_len);
qemu_iovec_init_external(&qiov, &iov, 1);
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_COW_READ);
if (!bs->drv) {
return -ENOMEDIUM;
}
/* Call .bdrv_co_readv() directly instead of using the public block-layer
* interface. This avoids double I/O throttling and request tracking,
* which can lead to deadlock when block layer copy-on-read is enabled.
*/
ret = bs->drv->bdrv_co_readv(bs, start_sect + n_start, n, &qiov);
if (ret < 0) {
goto out;
}
if (s->crypt_method) {
qcow2_encrypt_sectors(s, start_sect + n_start,
iov.iov_base, iov.iov_base, n, 1,
&s->aes_encrypt_key);
}
ret = qcow2_pre_write_overlap_check(bs, 0,
cluster_offset + n_start * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE, n * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
goto out;
}
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_COW_WRITE);
ret = bdrv_co_writev(bs->file, (cluster_offset >> 9) + n_start, n, &qiov);
if (ret < 0) {
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
out:
qemu_vfree(iov.iov_base);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 10,759 |
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