instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int scoop_init(SysBusDevice *sbd)
{
DeviceState *dev = DEVICE(sbd);
ScoopInfo *s = SCOOP(dev);
s->status = 0x02;
qdev_init_gpio_out(dev, s->handler, 16);
qdev_init_gpio_in(dev, scoop_gpio_set, 16);
memory_region_init_io(&s->iomem, OBJECT(s), &scoop_ops, s, "scoop", 0x1000);
sysbus_init_mmio(sbd, &s->iomem);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void BROTLI_NOINLINE DecodeLiteralBlockSwitch(BrotliState* s) {
DecodeLiteralBlockSwitchInternal(0, s);
}
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_CINDEX( INS_ARG )
{
DO_CINDEX
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int fpm_log_open(int reopen) /* {{{ */
{
struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp;
int ret = 1;
int fd;
for (wp = fpm_worker_all_pools; wp; wp = wp->next) {
if (!wp->config->access_log) {
continue;
}
ret = 0;
fd = open(wp->config->access_log, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
if (0 > fd) {
zlog(ZLOG_SYSERROR, "failed to open access log (%s)", wp->config->access_log);
return -1;
} else {
zlog(ZLOG_DEBUG, "open access log (%s)", wp->config->access_log);
}
if (reopen) {
dup2(fd, wp->log_fd);
close(fd);
fd = wp->log_fd;
fpm_pctl_kill_all(SIGQUIT);
} else {
wp->log_fd = fd;
}
if (0 > fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, fcntl(fd, F_GETFD) | FD_CLOEXEC)) {
zlog(ZLOG_WARNING, "failed to change attribute of access_log");
}
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed bug #70755: fpm_log.c memory leak and buffer overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ShellContentUtilityClient::~ShellContentUtilityClient() {
}
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <jcivelli@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntSize PaintLayerScrollableArea::PixelSnappedContentsSize(
const LayoutPoint& paint_offset) const {
return PixelSnappedIntSize(overflow_rect_.Size(), paint_offset);
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 20,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: qboolean FS_idPak(char *pak, char *base, int numPaks)
{
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < NUM_ID_PAKS; i++ ) {
if ( !FS_FilenameCompare( pak, va( "%s/pak%d", base, i ) ) ) {
break;
}
if ( !FS_FilenameCompare( pak, va( "%s/mp_pak%d",base,i ) ) ) {
break;
}
if ( !FS_FilenameCompare( pak, va( "%s/sp_pak%d",base,i + 1) ) ) {
break;
}
}
if ( i < numPaks ) {
return qtrue;
}
return qfalse;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 14,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGenMailboxCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::GenMailboxCHROMIUM& c) {
MailboxName name;
mailbox_manager()->GenerateMailboxName(&name);
uint32 bucket_id = static_cast<uint32>(c.bucket_id);
Bucket* bucket = CreateBucket(bucket_id);
bucket->SetSize(GL_MAILBOX_SIZE_CHROMIUM);
bucket->SetData(&name, 0, GL_MAILBOX_SIZE_CHROMIUM);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int unix_may_send(struct sock *sk, struct sock *osk)
{
return unix_peer(osk) == NULL || unix_our_peer(sk, osk);
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 29,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::didRecalcStyle(StyleChange)
{
ASSERT(hasCustomStyleCallbacks());
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static noinline int record_one_backref(u64 inum, u64 offset, u64 root_id,
void *ctx)
{
struct btrfs_file_extent_item *extent;
struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info;
struct old_sa_defrag_extent *old = ctx;
struct new_sa_defrag_extent *new = old->new;
struct btrfs_path *path = new->path;
struct btrfs_key key;
struct btrfs_root *root;
struct sa_defrag_extent_backref *backref;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct inode *inode = new->inode;
int slot;
int ret;
u64 extent_offset;
u64 num_bytes;
if (BTRFS_I(inode)->root->root_key.objectid == root_id &&
inum == btrfs_ino(inode))
return 0;
key.objectid = root_id;
key.type = BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY;
key.offset = (u64)-1;
fs_info = BTRFS_I(inode)->root->fs_info;
root = btrfs_read_fs_root_no_name(fs_info, &key);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
if (PTR_ERR(root) == -ENOENT)
return 0;
WARN_ON(1);
pr_debug("inum=%llu, offset=%llu, root_id=%llu\n",
inum, offset, root_id);
return PTR_ERR(root);
}
key.objectid = inum;
key.type = BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY;
if (offset > (u64)-1 << 32)
key.offset = 0;
else
key.offset = offset;
ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, &key, path, 0, 0);
if (WARN_ON(ret < 0))
return ret;
ret = 0;
while (1) {
cond_resched();
leaf = path->nodes[0];
slot = path->slots[0];
if (slot >= btrfs_header_nritems(leaf)) {
ret = btrfs_next_leaf(root, path);
if (ret < 0) {
goto out;
} else if (ret > 0) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
continue;
}
path->slots[0]++;
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, slot);
if (key.objectid > inum)
goto out;
if (key.objectid < inum || key.type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY)
continue;
extent = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot,
struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
if (btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf, extent) != old->bytenr)
continue;
/*
* 'offset' refers to the exact key.offset,
* NOT the 'offset' field in btrfs_extent_data_ref, ie.
* (key.offset - extent_offset).
*/
if (key.offset != offset)
continue;
extent_offset = btrfs_file_extent_offset(leaf, extent);
num_bytes = btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, extent);
if (extent_offset >= old->extent_offset + old->offset +
old->len || extent_offset + num_bytes <=
old->extent_offset + old->offset)
continue;
break;
}
backref = kmalloc(sizeof(*backref), GFP_NOFS);
if (!backref) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
backref->root_id = root_id;
backref->inum = inum;
backref->file_pos = offset;
backref->num_bytes = num_bytes;
backref->extent_offset = extent_offset;
backref->generation = btrfs_file_extent_generation(leaf, extent);
backref->old = old;
backref_insert(&new->root, backref);
old->count++;
out:
btrfs_release_path(path);
WARN_ON(ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string16 GetAppListShortcutName() {
chrome::VersionInfo::Channel channel = chrome::VersionInfo::GetChannel();
if (channel == chrome::VersionInfo::CHANNEL_CANARY)
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_APP_LIST_SHORTCUT_NAME_CANARY);
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_APP_LIST_SHORTCUT_NAME);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static sector_t ocfs2_bmap(struct address_space *mapping, sector_t block)
{
sector_t status;
u64 p_blkno = 0;
int err = 0;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
trace_ocfs2_bmap((unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno,
(unsigned long long)block);
/*
* The swap code (ab-)uses ->bmap to get a block mapping and then
* bypasseѕ the file system for actual I/O. We really can't allow
* that on refcounted inodes, so we have to skip out here. And yes,
* 0 is the magic code for a bmap error..
*/
if (ocfs2_is_refcount_inode(inode))
return 0;
/* We don't need to lock journal system files, since they aren't
* accessed concurrently from multiple nodes.
*/
if (!INODE_JOURNAL(inode)) {
err = ocfs2_inode_lock(inode, NULL, 0);
if (err) {
if (err != -ENOENT)
mlog_errno(err);
goto bail;
}
down_read(&OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_alloc_sem);
}
if (!(OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL))
err = ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks(inode, block, &p_blkno, NULL,
NULL);
if (!INODE_JOURNAL(inode)) {
up_read(&OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 0);
}
if (err) {
mlog(ML_ERROR, "get_blocks() failed, block = %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)block);
mlog_errno(err);
goto bail;
}
bail:
status = err ? 0 : p_blkno;
return status;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 16,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RedirectNotificationObserver::Observe(
int type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
source_ = source;
details_ = details;
seen_twice_ = seen_;
seen_ = true;
if (!running_)
return;
message_loop_runner_->Quit();
running_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Avoid sharing process for blob URLs with null origin.
Previously, when a frame with a unique origin, such as from a data
URL, created a blob URL, the blob URL looked like blob:null/guid and
resulted in a site URL of "blob:" when navigated to. This incorrectly
allowed all such blob URLs to share a process, even if they were
created by different sites.
This CL changes the site URL assigned in such cases to be the full
blob URL, which includes the GUID. This avoids process sharing for
all blob URLs with unique origins.
This fix is conservative in the sense that it would also isolate
different blob URLs created by the same unique origin from each other.
This case isn't expected to be common, so it's unlikely to affect
process count. There's ongoing work to maintain a GUID for unique
origins, so longer-term, we could try using that to track down the
creator and potentially use that GUID in the site URL instead of the
blob URL's GUID, to avoid unnecessary process isolation in scenarios
like this.
Note that as part of this, we discovered a bug where data URLs aren't
able to script blob URLs that they create: https://crbug.com/865254.
This scripting bug should be fixed independently of this CL, and as
far as we can tell, this CL doesn't regress scripting cases like this
further.
Bug: 863623
Change-Id: Ib50407adbba3d5ee0cf6d72d3df7f8d8f24684ee
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142389
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576318}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 10,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Type_XYZ_Free(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, void *Ptr)
{
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, Ptr);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform1ui(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
GLuint v0) {
if (isContextLost() || !location)
return;
if (location->Program() != current_program_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "uniform1ui",
"location not for current program");
return;
}
ContextGL()->Uniform1ui(location->Location(), v0);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nested_ept_init_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r = kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.mmu,
nested_vmx_ept_caps & VMX_EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY_BIT);
vcpu->arch.mmu.set_cr3 = vmx_set_cr3;
vcpu->arch.mmu.get_cr3 = nested_ept_get_cr3;
vcpu->arch.mmu.inject_page_fault = nested_ept_inject_page_fault;
vcpu->arch.walk_mmu = &vcpu->arch.nested_mmu;
return r;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pp::Instance* PDFiumEngine::GetPluginInstance() {
return client_->GetPluginInstance();
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lookup_protoid(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *pi)
{
register u_int i, j;
struct protoidmem *tp;
/* 5 octets won't be aligned */
i = (((pi[0] << 8) + pi[1]) << 8) + pi[2];
j = (pi[3] << 8) + pi[4];
/* XXX should be endian-insensitive, but do big-endian testing XXX */
tp = &protoidtable[(i ^ j) & (HASHNAMESIZE-1)];
while (tp->p_nxt)
if (tp->p_oui == i && tp->p_proto == j)
return tp;
else
tp = tp->p_nxt;
tp->p_oui = i;
tp->p_proto = j;
tp->p_nxt = (struct protoidmem *)calloc(1, sizeof(*tp));
if (tp->p_nxt == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "lookup_protoid: calloc");
return tp;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldInsertNode(Node* node, Range* range, EditorInsertAction insertAction)
{
if (m_webPagePrivate->m_dumpRenderTree)
return m_webPagePrivate->m_dumpRenderTree->shouldInsertNode(node, range, static_cast<int>(insertAction));
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: device_filesystem_check (Device *device,
char **options,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
daemon_local_check_auth (device->priv->daemon,
device,
device->priv->device_is_system_internal ?
"org.freedesktop.udisks.filesystem-check-system-internal" :
"org.freedesktop.udisks.filesystem-check",
"FilesystemCheck",
TRUE,
device_filesystem_check_authorized_cb,
context,
1,
g_strdupv (options),
g_strfreev);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void InstallV8TestObjectTemplate(
v8::Isolate* isolate,
const DOMWrapperWorld& world,
v8::Local<v8::FunctionTemplate> interface_template) {
V8DOMConfiguration::InitializeDOMInterfaceTemplate(isolate, interface_template, V8TestObject::GetWrapperTypeInfo()->interface_name, v8::Local<v8::FunctionTemplate>(), V8TestObject::kInternalFieldCount);
v8::Local<v8::Signature> signature = v8::Signature::New(isolate, interface_template);
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(signature);
v8::Local<v8::ObjectTemplate> instance_template = interface_template->InstanceTemplate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(instance_template);
v8::Local<v8::ObjectTemplate> prototype_template = interface_template->PrototypeTemplate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(prototype_template);
V8DOMConfiguration::InstallConstantWithGetter(
isolate, interface_template, prototype_template,
"highEntropyConstant", V8TestObject::HighEntropyConstantConstantGetterCallback);
V8DOMConfiguration::InstallConstantWithGetter(
isolate, interface_template, prototype_template,
"highEntropyConstant", V8TestObject::HighEntropyConstantConstantGetterCallback);
static constexpr V8DOMConfiguration::AttributeConfiguration
kAttributeConfigurations[] = {
{ "testInterfaceEmptyConstructorAttribute", V8TestObject::TestInterfaceEmptyConstructorAttributeConstructorGetterCallback, nullptr, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::DontEnum), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnInstance, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kReplaceWithDataProperty, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "testInterfaceEmptyConstructorAttribute", V8TestObject::TestInterfaceEmptyConstructorAttributeConstructorGetterCallback, nullptr, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::DontEnum), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnInstance, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "measureAsFeatureNameTestInterfaceEmptyConstructorAttribute", V8TestObject::MeasureAsFeatureNameTestInterfaceEmptyConstructorAttributeConstructorGetterCallback, nullptr, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::DontEnum), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnInstance, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
};
V8DOMConfiguration::InstallAttributes(
isolate, world, instance_template, prototype_template,
kAttributeConfigurations, base::size(kAttributeConfigurations));
static constexpr V8DOMConfiguration::AccessorConfiguration
kAccessorConfigurations[] = {
{ "stringifierAttribute", V8TestObject::StringifierAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::StringifierAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "readonlyStringAttribute", V8TestObject::ReadonlyStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "readonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttribute", V8TestObject::ReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "readonlyLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ReadonlyLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "stringAttribute", V8TestObject::StringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::StringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "byteStringAttribute", V8TestObject::ByteStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ByteStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "usvStringAttribute", V8TestObject::UsvStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::UsvStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "domTimeStampAttribute", V8TestObject::DOMTimeStampAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::DOMTimeStampAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "booleanAttribute", V8TestObject::BooleanAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::BooleanAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "byteAttribute", V8TestObject::ByteAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ByteAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "doubleAttribute", V8TestObject::DoubleAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::DoubleAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "floatAttribute", V8TestObject::FloatAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::FloatAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "longAttribute", V8TestObject::LongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::LongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "longLongAttribute", V8TestObject::LongLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::LongLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "octetAttribute", V8TestObject::OctetAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::OctetAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "shortAttribute", V8TestObject::ShortAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ShortAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "unrestrictedDoubleAttribute", V8TestObject::UnrestrictedDoubleAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::UnrestrictedDoubleAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "unrestrictedFloatAttribute", V8TestObject::UnrestrictedFloatAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::UnrestrictedFloatAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "unsignedLongAttribute", V8TestObject::UnsignedLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::UnsignedLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "unsignedLongLongAttribute", V8TestObject::UnsignedLongLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::UnsignedLongLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "unsignedShortAttribute", V8TestObject::UnsignedShortAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::UnsignedShortAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "testInterfaceEmptyAttribute", V8TestObject::TestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::TestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "testObjectAttribute", V8TestObject::TestObjectAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::TestObjectAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "cssAttribute", V8TestObject::CSSAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::CSSAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "imeAttribute", V8TestObject::ImeAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ImeAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "svgAttribute", V8TestObject::SVGAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::SVGAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "xmlAttribute", V8TestObject::XmlAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::XmlAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "nodeFilterAttribute", V8TestObject::NodeFilterAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "serializedScriptValueAttribute", V8TestObject::SerializedScriptValueAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::SerializedScriptValueAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "anyAttribute", V8TestObject::AnyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::AnyAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "promiseAttribute", V8TestObject::PromiseAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::PromiseAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kDoNotCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "windowAttribute", V8TestObject::WindowAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::WindowAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "documentAttribute", V8TestObject::DocumentAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::DocumentAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "documentFragmentAttribute", V8TestObject::DocumentFragmentAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::DocumentFragmentAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "documentTypeAttribute", V8TestObject::DocumentTypeAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::DocumentTypeAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "elementAttribute", V8TestObject::ElementAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ElementAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "nodeAttribute", V8TestObject::NodeAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::NodeAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "shadowRootAttribute", V8TestObject::ShadowRootAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ShadowRootAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "arrayBufferAttribute", V8TestObject::ArrayBufferAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ArrayBufferAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "float32ArrayAttribute", V8TestObject::Float32ArrayAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::Float32ArrayAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "uint8ArrayAttribute", V8TestObject::Uint8ArrayAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::Uint8ArrayAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "self", V8TestObject::SelfAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "readonlyEventTargetAttribute", V8TestObject::ReadonlyEventTargetAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "readonlyEventTargetOrNullAttribute", V8TestObject::ReadonlyEventTargetOrNullAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "readonlyWindowAttribute", V8TestObject::ReadonlyWindowAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "htmlCollectionAttribute", V8TestObject::HTMLCollectionAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "htmlElementAttribute", V8TestObject::HTMLElementAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "stringFrozenArrayAttribute", V8TestObject::StringFrozenArrayAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::StringFrozenArrayAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "testInterfaceEmptyFrozenArrayAttribute", V8TestObject::TestInterfaceEmptyFrozenArrayAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::TestInterfaceEmptyFrozenArrayAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "booleanOrNullAttribute", V8TestObject::BooleanOrNullAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::BooleanOrNullAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "stringOrNullAttribute", V8TestObject::StringOrNullAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::StringOrNullAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "longOrNullAttribute", V8TestObject::LongOrNullAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::LongOrNullAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "testInterfaceOrNullAttribute", V8TestObject::TestInterfaceOrNullAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::TestInterfaceOrNullAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "testEnumAttribute", V8TestObject::TestEnumAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::TestEnumAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "testEnumOrNullAttribute", V8TestObject::TestEnumOrNullAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::TestEnumOrNullAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "staticStringAttribute", V8TestObject::StaticStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::StaticStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnInterface, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "staticLongAttribute", V8TestObject::StaticLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::StaticLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnInterface, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "eventHandlerAttribute", V8TestObject::EventHandlerAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::EventHandlerAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "doubleOrStringAttribute", V8TestObject::DoubleOrStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::DoubleOrStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "doubleOrStringOrNullAttribute", V8TestObject::DoubleOrStringOrNullAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::DoubleOrStringOrNullAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "doubleOrNullStringAttribute", V8TestObject::DoubleOrNullStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::DoubleOrNullStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "stringOrStringSequenceAttribute", V8TestObject::StringOrStringSequenceAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::StringOrStringSequenceAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "testEnumOrDoubleAttribute", V8TestObject::TestEnumOrDoubleAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::TestEnumOrDoubleAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "unrestrictedDoubleOrStringAttribute", V8TestObject::UnrestrictedDoubleOrStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::UnrestrictedDoubleOrStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "nestedUnionAtribute", V8TestObject::NestedUnionAtributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::NestedUnionAtributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "activityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "activityLoggingGetterForAllWorldsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingGetterForAllWorldsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingGetterForAllWorldsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "activityLoggingSetterForAllWorldsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingSetterForAllWorldsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingSetterForAllWorldsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "cachedAttributeAnyAttribute", V8TestObject::CachedAttributeAnyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::CachedAttributeAnyAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "cachedArrayAttribute", V8TestObject::CachedArrayAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::CachedArrayAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "readonlyCachedAttribute", V8TestObject::ReadonlyCachedAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "cachedStringOrNoneAttribute", V8TestObject::CachedStringOrNoneAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::CachedStringOrNoneAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "callWithExecutionContextAnyAttribute", V8TestObject::CallWithExecutionContextAnyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::CallWithExecutionContextAnyAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "callWithScriptStateAnyAttribute", V8TestObject::CallWithScriptStateAnyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::CallWithScriptStateAnyAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "callWithExecutionContextAndScriptStateAndIsolateAnyAttribute", V8TestObject::CallWithExecutionContextAndScriptStateAndIsolateAnyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::CallWithExecutionContextAndScriptStateAndIsolateAnyAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "checkSecurityForNodeReadonlyDocumentAttribute", V8TestObject::CheckSecurityForNodeReadonlyDocumentAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "customObjectAttribute", V8TestObject::CustomObjectAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::CustomObjectAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "customGetterLongAttribute", V8TestObject::CustomGetterLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::CustomGetterLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "customGetterReadonlyObjectAttribute", V8TestObject::CustomGetterReadonlyObjectAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "customSetterLongAttribute", V8TestObject::CustomSetterLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::CustomSetterLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "deprecatedLongAttribute", V8TestObject::DeprecatedLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::DeprecatedLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "enforceRangeLongAttribute", V8TestObject::EnforceRangeLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::EnforceRangeLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "implementedAsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "customImplementedAsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::CustomImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::CustomImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "customGetterImplementedAsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::CustomGetterImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::CustomGetterImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "customSetterImplementedAsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::CustomSetterImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::CustomSetterImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "measureAsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::MeasureAsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::MeasureAsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "notEnumerableLongAttribute", V8TestObject::NotEnumerableLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::NotEnumerableLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::DontEnum), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttribute", V8TestObject::PerWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterCallbackForMainWorld, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kMainWorld },
{ "perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttribute", V8TestObject::PerWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kNonMainWorlds },
{ "activityLoggingAccessPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingAccessPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallbackForMainWorld, V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingAccessPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallbackForMainWorld, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kMainWorld },
{ "activityLoggingAccessPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingAccessPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingAccessPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kNonMainWorlds },
{ "activityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallbackForMainWorld, V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallbackForMainWorld, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kMainWorld },
{ "activityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kNonMainWorlds },
{ "activityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallbackForMainWorld, V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallbackForMainWorld, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kMainWorld },
{ "activityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kNonMainWorlds },
{ "activityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallbackForMainWorld, V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallbackForMainWorld, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kMainWorld },
{ "activityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kNonMainWorlds },
{ "location", V8TestObject::LocationAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::LocationAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "locationWithException", V8TestObject::LocationWithExceptionAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::LocationWithExceptionAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "locationWithCallWith", V8TestObject::LocationWithCallWithAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::LocationWithCallWithAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "locationByteString", V8TestObject::LocationByteStringAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::LocationByteStringAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "locationWithPerWorldBindings", V8TestObject::LocationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeGetterCallbackForMainWorld, V8TestObject::LocationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeSetterCallbackForMainWorld, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kMainWorld },
{ "locationWithPerWorldBindings", V8TestObject::LocationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::LocationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kNonMainWorlds },
{ "raisesExceptionLongAttribute", V8TestObject::RaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::RaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "raisesExceptionGetterLongAttribute", V8TestObject::RaisesExceptionGetterLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::RaisesExceptionGetterLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "setterRaisesExceptionLongAttribute", V8TestObject::SetterRaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::SetterRaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "raisesExceptionTestInterfaceEmptyAttribute", V8TestObject::RaisesExceptionTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::RaisesExceptionTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "cachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttribute", V8TestObject::CachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::CachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "reflectTestInterfaceAttribute", V8TestObject::ReflectTestInterfaceAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ReflectTestInterfaceAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "reflectReflectedNameAttributeTestAttribute", V8TestObject::ReflectReflectedNameAttributeTestAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ReflectReflectedNameAttributeTestAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "reflectBooleanAttribute", V8TestObject::ReflectBooleanAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ReflectBooleanAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "reflectLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ReflectLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ReflectLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "reflectUnsignedShortAttribute", V8TestObject::ReflectUnsignedShortAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ReflectUnsignedShortAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "reflectUnsignedLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ReflectUnsignedLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ReflectUnsignedLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "id", V8TestObject::IdAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::IdAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "name", V8TestObject::NameAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::NameAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "class", V8TestObject::ClassAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ClassAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "reflectedId", V8TestObject::ReflectedIdAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ReflectedIdAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "reflectedName", V8TestObject::ReflectedNameAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ReflectedNameAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "reflectedClass", V8TestObject::ReflectedClassAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ReflectedClassAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "limitedToOnlyOneAttribute", V8TestObject::LimitedToOnlyOneAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::LimitedToOnlyOneAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "limitedToOnlyAttribute", V8TestObject::LimitedToOnlyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::LimitedToOnlyAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "limitedToOnlyOtherAttribute", V8TestObject::LimitedToOnlyOtherAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::LimitedToOnlyOtherAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "limitedWithMissingDefaultAttribute", V8TestObject::LimitedWithMissingDefaultAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::LimitedWithMissingDefaultAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "limitedWithInvalidMissingDefaultAttribute", V8TestObject::LimitedWithInvalidMissingDefaultAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::LimitedWithInvalidMissingDefaultAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "corsSettingAttribute", V8TestObject::CorsSettingAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "limitedWithEmptyMissingInvalidAttribute", V8TestObject::LimitedWithEmptyMissingInvalidAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "RuntimeCallStatsCounterAttribute", V8TestObject::RuntimeCallStatsCounterAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::RuntimeCallStatsCounterAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "RuntimeCallStatsCounterReadOnlyAttribute", V8TestObject::RuntimeCallStatsCounterReadOnlyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "replaceableReadonlyLongAttribute", V8TestObject::ReplaceableReadonlyLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::ReplaceableReadonlyLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "locationPutForwards", V8TestObject::LocationPutForwardsAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::LocationPutForwardsAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "setterCallWithExecutionContextStringAttribute", V8TestObject::SetterCallWithExecutionContextStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::SetterCallWithExecutionContextStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "treatNullAsEmptyStringStringAttribute", V8TestObject::TreatNullAsEmptyStringStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::TreatNullAsEmptyStringStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "urlStringAttribute", V8TestObject::UrlStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::UrlStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "urlStringAttribute", V8TestObject::UrlStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::UrlStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "unforgeableLongAttribute", V8TestObject::UnforgeableLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::UnforgeableLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::DontDelete), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnInstance, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "measuredLongAttribute", V8TestObject::MeasuredLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::MeasuredLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "sameObjectAttribute", V8TestObject::SameObjectAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "saveSameObjectAttribute", V8TestObject::SaveSameObjectAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "staticSaveSameObjectAttribute", V8TestObject::StaticSaveSameObjectAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnInterface, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "unscopableLongAttribute", V8TestObject::UnscopableLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::UnscopableLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "highEntropyAttributeWithMeasure", V8TestObject::HighEntropyAttributeWithMeasureAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::HighEntropyAttributeWithMeasureAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "highEntropyReadonlyAttributeWithMeasure", V8TestObject::HighEntropyReadonlyAttributeWithMeasureAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "highEntropyAttributeWithMeasureAs", V8TestObject::HighEntropyAttributeWithMeasureAsAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::HighEntropyAttributeWithMeasureAsAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "highEntropyReadonlyAttributeWithMeasureAs", V8TestObject::HighEntropyReadonlyAttributeWithMeasureAsAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "testInterfaceAttribute", V8TestObject::TestInterfaceAttributeAttributeGetterCallback, V8TestObject::TestInterfaceAttributeAttributeSetterCallback, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
{ "size", V8TestObject::SizeAttributeGetterCallback, nullptr, V8PrivateProperty::kNoCachedAccessor, static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::DontEnum | v8::ReadOnly), V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAlwaysCallGetter, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds },
};
V8DOMConfiguration::InstallAccessors(
isolate, world, instance_template, prototype_template, interface_template,
signature, kAccessorConfigurations,
base::size(kAccessorConfigurations));
V8DOMConfiguration::InstallMethods(
isolate, world, instance_template, prototype_template, interface_template,
signature, kV8TestObjectMethods, base::size(kV8TestObjectMethods));
v8::IndexedPropertyHandlerConfiguration indexedPropertyHandlerConfig(
V8TestObject::IndexedPropertyGetterCallback,
V8TestObject::IndexedPropertySetterCallback,
V8TestObject::IndexedPropertyDescriptorCallback,
V8TestObject::IndexedPropertyDeleterCallback,
IndexedPropertyEnumerator<TestObject>,
V8TestObject::IndexedPropertyDefinerCallback,
v8::Local<v8::Value>(),
v8::PropertyHandlerFlags::kNone);
instance_template->SetHandler(indexedPropertyHandlerConfig);
v8::NamedPropertyHandlerConfiguration namedPropertyHandlerConfig(V8TestObject::NamedPropertyGetterCallback, V8TestObject::NamedPropertySetterCallback, V8TestObject::NamedPropertyQueryCallback, V8TestObject::NamedPropertyDeleterCallback, V8TestObject::NamedPropertyEnumeratorCallback, v8::Local<v8::Value>(), static_cast<v8::PropertyHandlerFlags>(int(v8::PropertyHandlerFlags::kOnlyInterceptStrings) | int(v8::PropertyHandlerFlags::kNonMasking)));
instance_template->SetHandler(namedPropertyHandlerConfig);
static const V8DOMConfiguration::SymbolKeyedMethodConfiguration
kSymbolKeyedIteratorConfiguration = {
v8::Symbol::GetIterator,
"entries",
V8TestObject::IteratorMethodCallback,
0,
v8::DontEnum,
V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype,
V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder,
V8DOMConfiguration::kDoNotCheckAccess,
V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect
};
V8DOMConfiguration::InstallMethod(
isolate, world, prototype_template, signature,
kSymbolKeyedIteratorConfiguration);
{
constexpr V8DOMConfiguration::MethodConfiguration kConfigurations[] = {
{"partiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod", V8TestObject::PartiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethodMethodCallback, test_object_v8_internal::PartiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethodMethodLength(), v8::None, V8DOMConfiguration::kOnPrototype, V8DOMConfiguration::kCheckHolder, V8DOMConfiguration::kDoNotCheckAccess, V8DOMConfiguration::kHasSideEffect, V8DOMConfiguration::kAllWorlds}
};
for (const auto& config : kConfigurations) {
V8DOMConfiguration::InstallMethod(
isolate, world, instance_template, prototype_template,
interface_template, signature, config);
}
}
V8TestObject::InstallRuntimeEnabledFeaturesOnTemplate(
isolate, world, interface_template);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AtomicString& HTMLDocument::vlinkColor() const
{
return bodyAttributeValue(vlinkAttr);
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ut64 addr_to_offset(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin, ut64 addr) {
ut64 segment_base, segment_size;
int i;
if (!bin->segs) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsegs; i++) {
segment_base = (ut64)bin->segs[i].vmaddr;
segment_size = (ut64)bin->segs[i].vmsize;
if (addr >= segment_base && addr < segment_base + segment_size) {
return bin->segs[i].fileoff + (addr - segment_base);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 2,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned char lodepng_chunk_safetocopy(const unsigned char* chunk)
{
return((chunk[7] & 32) != 0);
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 14,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __init parse_floppy_cfg_string(char *cfg)
{
char *ptr;
while (*cfg) {
ptr = cfg;
while (*cfg && *cfg != ' ' && *cfg != '\t')
cfg++;
if (*cfg) {
*cfg = '\0';
cfg++;
}
if (*ptr)
floppy_setup(ptr);
}
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FlushHighlighterControllerMojo() {
framework_service_->GetHighlighterClientForTesting()->FlushMojoForTesting();
}
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <muyuanli@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 21,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerMS::RepaintInternal() {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
get_client()->Repaint();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 8,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter()
{
if (!document().styleEngine()->usesFirstLetterRules())
return;
if (style()->styleType() == FIRST_LETTER)
return;
RenderObject* firstLetterBlock = findFirstLetterBlock(this);
if (!firstLetterBlock)
return;
RenderObject* currChild = firstLetterBlock->firstChild();
unsigned length = 0;
while (currChild) {
if (currChild->isText()) {
length = firstLetterLength(toRenderText(currChild)->originalText());
if (length)
break;
currChild = currChild->nextSibling();
} else if (currChild->isListMarker()) {
currChild = currChild->nextSibling();
} else if (currChild->isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned()) {
if (currChild->style()->styleType() == FIRST_LETTER) {
currChild = currChild->firstChild();
break;
}
currChild = currChild->nextSibling();
} else if (currChild->isReplaced() || currChild->isRenderButton() || currChild->isMenuList())
break;
else if (currChild->style()->hasPseudoStyle(FIRST_LETTER) && currChild->canHaveGeneratedChildren()) {
firstLetterBlock = currChild;
currChild = currChild->firstChild();
} else
currChild = currChild->firstChild();
}
if (!currChild)
return;
if (currChild->parent()->style()->styleType() == FIRST_LETTER) {
updateFirstLetterStyle(firstLetterBlock, currChild);
return;
}
if (!currChild->isText() || currChild->isBR() || toRenderText(currChild)->isWordBreak())
return;
LayoutStateDisabler layoutStateDisabler(*this);
createFirstLetterRenderer(firstLetterBlock, currChild, length);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_reg_data_seg(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg *dseg,
struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr,
struct mlx5_ib_pd *pd)
{
int bcount = mr->desc_size * mr->ndescs;
dseg->addr = cpu_to_be64(mr->desc_map);
dseg->byte_count = cpu_to_be32(ALIGN(bcount, 64));
dseg->lkey = cpu_to_be32(pd->ibpd.local_dma_lkey);
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::logExceptionToConsole(const String& errorMessage, const String& sourceURL, int lineNumber, PassRefPtr<ScriptCallStack> callStack)
{
addMessage(JSMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel, errorMessage, sourceURL, lineNumber, callStack);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pvscsi_on_cmd_setup_rings(PVSCSIState *s)
{
PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *rc =
(PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *) s->curr_cmd_data;
trace_pvscsi_on_cmd_arrived("PVSCSI_CMD_SETUP_RINGS");
if (!rc->reqRingNumPages
|| rc->reqRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES
|| !rc->cmpRingNumPages
|| rc->cmpRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES) {
return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_FAILED;
}
pvscsi_dbg_dump_tx_rings_config(rc);
pvscsi_ring_init_data(&s->rings, rc);
s->rings_info_valid = TRUE;
return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_SUCCEEDED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t freeBuffer(
node_id node, OMX_U32 port_index, buffer_id buffer) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32(port_index);
data.writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
remote()->transact(FREE_BUFFER, data, &reply);
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: Fix size check for OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits
since it doesn't follow the OMX convention. And remove support
for the kClientNeedsFrameBuffer flag.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: Ia2c119e2456ebf9e2f4e1de5104ef9032a212255
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsWindow::ScheduleAction(const DevToolsToggleAction& action) {
action_on_load_ = action;
if (is_loaded_)
DoAction();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SessionService::SetTabWindow(const SessionID& window_id,
const SessionID& tab_id) {
if (!ShouldTrackChangesToWindow(window_id))
return;
ScheduleCommand(CreateSetTabWindowCommand(window_id, tab_id));
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void read_boot(DOS_FS * fs)
{
struct boot_sector b;
unsigned total_sectors;
unsigned short logical_sector_size, sectors;
unsigned fat_length;
unsigned total_fat_entries;
off_t data_size;
fs_read(0, sizeof(b), &b);
logical_sector_size = GET_UNALIGNED_W(b.sector_size);
if (!logical_sector_size)
die("Logical sector size is zero.");
/* This was moved up because it's the first thing that will fail */
/* if the platform needs special handling of unaligned multibyte accesses */
/* but such handling isn't being provided. See GET_UNALIGNED_W() above. */
if (logical_sector_size & (SECTOR_SIZE - 1))
die("Logical sector size (%d bytes) is not a multiple of the physical "
"sector size.", logical_sector_size);
fs->cluster_size = b.cluster_size * logical_sector_size;
if (!fs->cluster_size)
die("Cluster size is zero.");
if (b.fats != 2 && b.fats != 1)
die("Currently, only 1 or 2 FATs are supported, not %d.\n", b.fats);
fs->nfats = b.fats;
sectors = GET_UNALIGNED_W(b.sectors);
total_sectors = sectors ? sectors : le32toh(b.total_sect);
if (verbose)
printf("Checking we can access the last sector of the filesystem\n");
/* Can't access last odd sector anyway, so round down */
fs_test((off_t)((total_sectors & ~1) - 1) * logical_sector_size,
logical_sector_size);
fat_length = le16toh(b.fat_length) ?
le16toh(b.fat_length) : le32toh(b.fat32_length);
fs->fat_start = (off_t)le16toh(b.reserved) * logical_sector_size;
fs->root_start = ((off_t)le16toh(b.reserved) + b.fats * fat_length) *
logical_sector_size;
fs->root_entries = GET_UNALIGNED_W(b.dir_entries);
fs->data_start = fs->root_start + ROUND_TO_MULTIPLE(fs->root_entries <<
MSDOS_DIR_BITS,
logical_sector_size);
data_size = (off_t)total_sectors * logical_sector_size - fs->data_start;
fs->data_clusters = data_size / fs->cluster_size;
fs->root_cluster = 0; /* indicates standard, pre-FAT32 root dir */
fs->fsinfo_start = 0; /* no FSINFO structure */
fs->free_clusters = -1; /* unknown */
if (!b.fat_length && b.fat32_length) {
fs->fat_bits = 32;
fs->root_cluster = le32toh(b.root_cluster);
if (!fs->root_cluster && fs->root_entries)
/* M$ hasn't specified this, but it looks reasonable: If
* root_cluster is 0 but there is a separate root dir
* (root_entries != 0), we handle the root dir the old way. Give a
* warning, but convertig to a root dir in a cluster chain seems
* to complex for now... */
printf("Warning: FAT32 root dir not in cluster chain! "
"Compatibility mode...\n");
else if (!fs->root_cluster && !fs->root_entries)
die("No root directory!");
else if (fs->root_cluster && fs->root_entries)
printf("Warning: FAT32 root dir is in a cluster chain, but "
"a separate root dir\n"
" area is defined. Cannot fix this easily.\n");
if (fs->data_clusters < FAT16_THRESHOLD)
printf("Warning: Filesystem is FAT32 according to fat_length "
"and fat32_length fields,\n"
" but has only %lu clusters, less than the required "
"minimum of %d.\n"
" This may lead to problems on some systems.\n",
(unsigned long)fs->data_clusters, FAT16_THRESHOLD);
check_fat_state_bit(fs, &b);
fs->backupboot_start = le16toh(b.backup_boot) * logical_sector_size;
check_backup_boot(fs, &b, logical_sector_size);
read_fsinfo(fs, &b, logical_sector_size);
} else if (!atari_format) {
/* On real MS-DOS, a 16 bit FAT is used whenever there would be too
* much clusers otherwise. */
fs->fat_bits = (fs->data_clusters >= FAT12_THRESHOLD) ? 16 : 12;
if (fs->data_clusters >= FAT16_THRESHOLD)
die("Too many clusters (%lu) for FAT16 filesystem.", fs->data_clusters);
check_fat_state_bit(fs, &b);
} else {
/* On Atari, things are more difficult: GEMDOS always uses 12bit FATs
* on floppies, and always 16 bit on harddisks. */
fs->fat_bits = 16; /* assume 16 bit FAT for now */
/* If more clusters than fat entries in 16-bit fat, we assume
* it's a real MSDOS FS with 12-bit fat. */
if (fs->data_clusters + 2 > fat_length * logical_sector_size * 8 / 16 ||
/* if it has one of the usual floppy sizes -> 12bit FAT */
(total_sectors == 720 || total_sectors == 1440 ||
total_sectors == 2880))
fs->fat_bits = 12;
}
/* On FAT32, the high 4 bits of a FAT entry are reserved */
fs->eff_fat_bits = (fs->fat_bits == 32) ? 28 : fs->fat_bits;
fs->fat_size = fat_length * logical_sector_size;
fs->label = calloc(12, sizeof(uint8_t));
if (fs->fat_bits == 12 || fs->fat_bits == 16) {
struct boot_sector_16 *b16 = (struct boot_sector_16 *)&b;
if (b16->extended_sig == 0x29)
memmove(fs->label, b16->label, 11);
else
fs->label = NULL;
} else if (fs->fat_bits == 32) {
if (b.extended_sig == 0x29)
memmove(fs->label, &b.label, 11);
else
fs->label = NULL;
}
total_fat_entries = (uint64_t)fs->fat_size * 8 / fs->fat_bits;
if (fs->data_clusters > total_fat_entries - 2)
die("Filesystem has %u clusters but only space for %u FAT entries.",
fs->data_clusters, total_fat_entries - 2);
if (!fs->root_entries && !fs->root_cluster)
die("Root directory has zero size.");
if (fs->root_entries & (MSDOS_DPS - 1))
die("Root directory (%d entries) doesn't span an integral number of "
"sectors.", fs->root_entries);
if (logical_sector_size & (SECTOR_SIZE - 1))
die("Logical sector size (%d bytes) is not a multiple of the physical "
"sector size.", logical_sector_size);
#if 0 /* linux kernel doesn't check that either */
/* ++roman: On Atari, these two fields are often left uninitialized */
if (!atari_format && (!b.secs_track || !b.heads))
die("Invalid disk format in boot sector.");
#endif
if (verbose)
dump_boot(fs, &b, logical_sector_size);
}
Commit Message: read_boot(): Handle excessive FAT size specifications
The variable used for storing the FAT size (in bytes) was an unsigned
int. Since the size in sectors read from the BPB was not sufficiently
checked, this could end up being zero after multiplying it with the
sector size while some offsets still stayed excessive. Ultimately it
would cause segfaults when accessing FAT entries for which no memory
was allocated.
Make it more robust by changing the types used to store FAT size to
off_t and abort if there is no room for data clusters. Additionally
check that FAT size is not specified as zero.
Fixes #25 and fixes #26.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <aeb@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 14,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
struct iov_iter *from,
key_serial_t ringid)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct request_key_auth *rka;
struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
size_t plen = from ? iov_iter_count(from) : 0;
void *payload;
long ret;
kenter("%d,,%zu,%d", id, plen, ringid);
if (!plen)
from = NULL;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
goto error;
/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
* assumed before calling this */
ret = -EPERM;
instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
if (!instkey)
goto error;
rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
goto error;
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
payload = NULL;
if (from) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload) {
if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
goto error;
payload = vmalloc(plen);
if (!payload)
goto error;
}
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_iter(payload, plen, from) != plen)
goto error2;
}
/* find the destination keyring amongst those belonging to the
* requesting task */
ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error2;
/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(rka->target_key, payload, plen,
dest_keyring, instkey);
key_put(dest_keyring);
/* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
* instantiation of the key */
if (ret == 0)
keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
error2:
kvfree(payload);
error:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
semaphore instead of before.
I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <pthread.h>
void *thr0(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
keyctl_revoke(key);
return 0;
}
void *thr1(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
char buffer[16];
keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
return 0;
}
int main()
{
key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
pthread_t th[5];
pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_join(th[0], 0);
pthread_join(th[1], 0);
pthread_join(th[2], 0);
pthread_join(th[3], 0);
return 0;
}
Build as:
cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
Run as:
while keyctl-race; do :; done
as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
summarised as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
[<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
[<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 12,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int remove_suid(struct dentry *dentry)
{
int killsuid = should_remove_suid(dentry);
int killpriv = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
int error = 0;
if (killpriv < 0)
return killpriv;
if (killpriv)
error = security_inode_killpriv(dentry);
if (!error && killsuid)
error = __remove_suid(dentry, killsuid);
return error;
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorAgentRegistry::discardAgents()
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_agents.size(); i++)
m_agents[i]->discardAgent();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_load_5701_a0_firmware_fix(struct tg3 *tp)
{
struct fw_info info;
const __be32 *fw_data;
int err, i;
fw_data = (void *)tp->fw->data;
/* Firmware blob starts with version numbers, followed by
start address and length. We are setting complete length.
length = end_address_of_bss - start_address_of_text.
Remainder is the blob to be loaded contiguously
from start address. */
info.fw_base = be32_to_cpu(fw_data[1]);
info.fw_len = tp->fw->size - 12;
info.fw_data = &fw_data[3];
err = tg3_load_firmware_cpu(tp, RX_CPU_BASE,
RX_CPU_SCRATCH_BASE, RX_CPU_SCRATCH_SIZE,
&info);
if (err)
return err;
err = tg3_load_firmware_cpu(tp, TX_CPU_BASE,
TX_CPU_SCRATCH_BASE, TX_CPU_SCRATCH_SIZE,
&info);
if (err)
return err;
/* Now startup only the RX cpu. */
tw32(RX_CPU_BASE + CPU_STATE, 0xffffffff);
tw32_f(RX_CPU_BASE + CPU_PC, info.fw_base);
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
if (tr32(RX_CPU_BASE + CPU_PC) == info.fw_base)
break;
tw32(RX_CPU_BASE + CPU_STATE, 0xffffffff);
tw32(RX_CPU_BASE + CPU_MODE, CPU_MODE_HALT);
tw32_f(RX_CPU_BASE + CPU_PC, info.fw_base);
udelay(1000);
}
if (i >= 5) {
netdev_err(tp->dev, "%s fails to set RX CPU PC, is %08x "
"should be %08x\n", __func__,
tr32(RX_CPU_BASE + CPU_PC), info.fw_base);
return -ENODEV;
}
tw32(RX_CPU_BASE + CPU_STATE, 0xffffffff);
tw32_f(RX_CPU_BASE + CPU_MODE, 0x00000000);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long kvm_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int r;
struct kvm_fpu *fpu = NULL;
struct kvm_sregs *kvm_sregs = NULL;
if (vcpu->kvm->mm != current->mm)
return -EIO;
#if defined(CONFIG_S390) || defined(CONFIG_PPC) || defined(CONFIG_MIPS)
/*
* Special cases: vcpu ioctls that are asynchronous to vcpu execution,
* so vcpu_load() would break it.
*/
if (ioctl == KVM_S390_INTERRUPT || ioctl == KVM_INTERRUPT)
return kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(filp, ioctl, arg);
#endif
r = vcpu_load(vcpu);
if (r)
return r;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_RUN:
r = -EINVAL;
if (arg)
goto out;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(vcpu, vcpu->run);
trace_kvm_userspace_exit(vcpu->run->exit_reason, r);
break;
case KVM_GET_REGS: {
struct kvm_regs *kvm_regs;
r = -ENOMEM;
kvm_regs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_regs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kvm_regs)
goto out;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_regs(vcpu, kvm_regs);
if (r)
goto out_free1;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, kvm_regs, sizeof(struct kvm_regs)))
goto out_free1;
r = 0;
out_free1:
kfree(kvm_regs);
break;
}
case KVM_SET_REGS: {
struct kvm_regs *kvm_regs;
r = -ENOMEM;
kvm_regs = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*kvm_regs));
if (IS_ERR(kvm_regs)) {
r = PTR_ERR(kvm_regs);
goto out;
}
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_regs(vcpu, kvm_regs);
kfree(kvm_regs);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_SREGS: {
kvm_sregs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_sregs), GFP_KERNEL);
r = -ENOMEM;
if (!kvm_sregs)
goto out;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_sregs(vcpu, kvm_sregs);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, kvm_sregs, sizeof(struct kvm_sregs)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_SREGS: {
kvm_sregs = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*kvm_sregs));
if (IS_ERR(kvm_sregs)) {
r = PTR_ERR(kvm_sregs);
kvm_sregs = NULL;
goto out;
}
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs(vcpu, kvm_sregs);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_MP_STATE: {
struct kvm_mp_state mp_state;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate(vcpu, &mp_state);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &mp_state, sizeof mp_state))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_MP_STATE: {
struct kvm_mp_state mp_state;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&mp_state, argp, sizeof mp_state))
goto out;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_mpstate(vcpu, &mp_state);
break;
}
case KVM_TRANSLATE: {
struct kvm_translation tr;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&tr, argp, sizeof tr))
goto out;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_translate(vcpu, &tr);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &tr, sizeof tr))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG: {
struct kvm_guest_debug dbg;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&dbg, argp, sizeof dbg))
goto out;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug(vcpu, &dbg);
break;
}
case KVM_SET_SIGNAL_MASK: {
struct kvm_signal_mask __user *sigmask_arg = argp;
struct kvm_signal_mask kvm_sigmask;
sigset_t sigset, *p;
p = NULL;
if (argp) {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&kvm_sigmask, argp,
sizeof kvm_sigmask))
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
if (kvm_sigmask.len != sizeof sigset)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&sigset, sigmask_arg->sigset,
sizeof sigset))
goto out;
p = &sigset;
}
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_sigmask(vcpu, p);
break;
}
case KVM_GET_FPU: {
fpu = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_fpu), GFP_KERNEL);
r = -ENOMEM;
if (!fpu)
goto out;
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_fpu(vcpu, fpu);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, fpu, sizeof(struct kvm_fpu)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_FPU: {
fpu = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*fpu));
if (IS_ERR(fpu)) {
r = PTR_ERR(fpu);
fpu = NULL;
goto out;
}
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_fpu(vcpu, fpu);
break;
}
default:
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(filp, ioctl, arg);
}
out:
vcpu_put(vcpu);
kfree(fpu);
kfree(kvm_sregs);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sd_read_block_limits(struct scsi_disk *sdkp)
{
unsigned int sector_sz = sdkp->device->sector_size;
const int vpd_len = 64;
unsigned char *buffer = kmalloc(vpd_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer ||
/* Block Limits VPD */
scsi_get_vpd_page(sdkp->device, 0xb0, buffer, vpd_len))
goto out;
blk_queue_io_min(sdkp->disk->queue,
get_unaligned_be16(&buffer[6]) * sector_sz);
blk_queue_io_opt(sdkp->disk->queue,
get_unaligned_be32(&buffer[12]) * sector_sz);
if (buffer[3] == 0x3c) {
unsigned int lba_count, desc_count;
sdkp->max_ws_blocks =
(u32) min_not_zero(get_unaligned_be64(&buffer[36]),
(u64)0xffffffff);
if (!sdkp->lbpme)
goto out;
lba_count = get_unaligned_be32(&buffer[20]);
desc_count = get_unaligned_be32(&buffer[24]);
if (lba_count && desc_count)
sdkp->max_unmap_blocks = lba_count;
sdkp->unmap_granularity = get_unaligned_be32(&buffer[28]);
if (buffer[32] & 0x80)
sdkp->unmap_alignment =
get_unaligned_be32(&buffer[32]) & ~(1 << 31);
if (!sdkp->lbpvpd) { /* LBP VPD page not provided */
if (sdkp->max_unmap_blocks)
sd_config_discard(sdkp, SD_LBP_UNMAP);
else
sd_config_discard(sdkp, SD_LBP_WS16);
} else { /* LBP VPD page tells us what to use */
if (sdkp->lbpu && sdkp->max_unmap_blocks)
sd_config_discard(sdkp, SD_LBP_UNMAP);
else if (sdkp->lbpws)
sd_config_discard(sdkp, SD_LBP_WS16);
else if (sdkp->lbpws10)
sd_config_discard(sdkp, SD_LBP_WS10);
else
sd_config_discard(sdkp, SD_LBP_DISABLE);
}
}
out:
kfree(buffer);
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::IndexingTotalWorkCalculated(
int request_id,
const std::string& file_system_path,
int total_work) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
base::FundamentalValue request_id_value(request_id);
base::StringValue file_system_path_value(file_system_path);
base::FundamentalValue total_work_value(total_work);
CallClientFunction("DevToolsAPI.indexingTotalWorkCalculated",
&request_id_value, &file_system_path_value,
&total_work_value);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 23,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_mod_const_set(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value mod)
{
mrb_sym id;
mrb_value value;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "no", &id, &value);
check_const_name_sym(mrb, id);
mrb_const_set(mrb, mod, id, value);
return value;
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vop_virtio_add_device(struct vop_vdev *vdev,
struct mic_device_desc *argp)
{
struct vop_info *vi = vdev->vi;
struct vop_device *vpdev = vi->vpdev;
struct mic_device_desc *dd = NULL;
struct mic_vqconfig *vqconfig;
int vr_size, i, j, ret;
u8 type = 0;
s8 db = -1;
char irqname[16];
struct mic_bootparam *bootparam;
u16 num;
dma_addr_t vr_addr;
bootparam = vpdev->hw_ops->get_dp(vpdev);
init_waitqueue_head(&vdev->waitq);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vdev->list);
vdev->vpdev = vpdev;
ret = vop_copy_dp_entry(vdev, argp, &type, &dd);
if (ret) {
dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret);
kfree(vdev);
return ret;
}
vop_init_device_ctrl(vdev, dd);
vdev->dd = dd;
vdev->virtio_id = type;
vqconfig = mic_vq_config(dd);
INIT_WORK(&vdev->virtio_bh_work, vop_bh_handler);
for (i = 0; i < dd->num_vq; i++) {
struct vop_vringh *vvr = &vdev->vvr[i];
struct mic_vring *vr = &vdev->vvr[i].vring;
num = le16_to_cpu(vqconfig[i].num);
mutex_init(&vvr->vr_mutex);
vr_size = PAGE_ALIGN(vring_size(num, MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN) +
sizeof(struct _mic_vring_info));
vr->va = (void *)
__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO,
get_order(vr_size));
if (!vr->va) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret);
goto err;
}
vr->len = vr_size;
vr->info = vr->va + vring_size(num, MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN);
vr->info->magic = cpu_to_le32(MIC_MAGIC + vdev->virtio_id + i);
vr_addr = dma_map_single(&vpdev->dev, vr->va, vr_size,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
if (dma_mapping_error(&vpdev->dev, vr_addr)) {
free_pages((unsigned long)vr->va, get_order(vr_size));
ret = -ENOMEM;
dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret);
goto err;
}
vqconfig[i].address = cpu_to_le64(vr_addr);
vring_init(&vr->vr, num, vr->va, MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN);
ret = vringh_init_kern(&vvr->vrh,
*(u32 *)mic_vq_features(vdev->dd),
num, false, vr->vr.desc, vr->vr.avail,
vr->vr.used);
if (ret) {
dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret);
goto err;
}
vringh_kiov_init(&vvr->riov, NULL, 0);
vringh_kiov_init(&vvr->wiov, NULL, 0);
vvr->head = USHRT_MAX;
vvr->vdev = vdev;
vvr->vrh.notify = _vop_notify;
dev_dbg(&vpdev->dev,
"%s %d index %d va %p info %p vr_size 0x%x\n",
__func__, __LINE__, i, vr->va, vr->info, vr_size);
vvr->buf = (void *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL,
get_order(VOP_INT_DMA_BUF_SIZE));
vvr->buf_da = dma_map_single(&vpdev->dev,
vvr->buf, VOP_INT_DMA_BUF_SIZE,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
}
snprintf(irqname, sizeof(irqname), "vop%dvirtio%d", vpdev->index,
vdev->virtio_id);
vdev->virtio_db = vpdev->hw_ops->next_db(vpdev);
vdev->virtio_cookie = vpdev->hw_ops->request_irq(vpdev,
_vop_virtio_intr_handler, irqname, vdev,
vdev->virtio_db);
if (IS_ERR(vdev->virtio_cookie)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(vdev->virtio_cookie);
dev_dbg(&vpdev->dev, "request irq failed\n");
goto err;
}
vdev->dc->c2h_vdev_db = vdev->virtio_db;
/*
* Order the type update with previous stores. This write barrier
* is paired with the corresponding read barrier before the uncached
* system memory read of the type, on the card while scanning the
* device page.
*/
smp_wmb();
dd->type = type;
argp->type = type;
if (bootparam) {
db = bootparam->h2c_config_db;
if (db != -1)
vpdev->hw_ops->send_intr(vpdev, db);
}
dev_dbg(&vpdev->dev, "Added virtio id %d db %d\n", dd->type, db);
return 0;
err:
vqconfig = mic_vq_config(dd);
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
struct vop_vringh *vvr = &vdev->vvr[j];
dma_unmap_single(&vpdev->dev, le64_to_cpu(vqconfig[j].address),
vvr->vring.len, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
free_pages((unsigned long)vvr->vring.va,
get_order(vvr->vring.len));
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: misc: mic: Fix for double fetch security bug in VOP driver
The MIC VOP driver does two successive reads from user space to read a
variable length data structure. Kernel memory corruption can result if
the data structure changes between the two reads. This patch disallows
the chance of this happening.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116651
Reported by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Dutt <sudeep.dutt@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseSessionService::ScheduleCommand(SessionCommand* command) {
DCHECK(command);
commands_since_reset_++;
pending_commands_.push_back(command);
StartSaveTimer();
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void filter_build_regex(struct filter_pred *pred)
{
struct regex *r = &pred->regex;
char *search;
enum regex_type type = MATCH_FULL;
if (pred->op == OP_GLOB) {
type = filter_parse_regex(r->pattern, r->len, &search, &pred->not);
r->len = strlen(search);
memmove(r->pattern, search, r->len+1);
}
switch (type) {
case MATCH_FULL:
r->match = regex_match_full;
break;
case MATCH_FRONT_ONLY:
r->match = regex_match_front;
break;
case MATCH_MIDDLE_ONLY:
r->match = regex_match_middle;
break;
case MATCH_END_ONLY:
r->match = regex_match_end;
break;
case MATCH_GLOB:
r->match = regex_match_glob;
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 13,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetIgnoreCount(const GURL& url, ContentSettingsType permission) {
return autoblocker_->GetIgnoreCount(url, permission);
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 27,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: getParameterEntityDebug(void *ctx ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, const xmlChar *name)
{
callbacks++;
if (quiet)
return(NULL);
fprintf(SAXdebug, "SAX.getParameterEntity(%s)\n", name);
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType DecodeImage(Image *image,const size_t compression,
unsigned char *pixels,const size_t number_pixels)
{
int
byte,
count;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p,
*q;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(pixels != (unsigned char *) NULL);
(void) memset(pixels,0,number_pixels*sizeof(*pixels));
byte=0;
x=0;
p=pixels;
q=pixels+number_pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; )
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
if ((p < pixels) || (p > q))
break;
count=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (count == EOF)
break;
if (count > 0)
{
/*
Encoded mode.
*/
count=(int) MagickMin((ssize_t) count,(ssize_t) (q-p));
byte=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (byte == EOF)
break;
if (compression == BI_RLE8)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
*p++=(unsigned char) byte;
}
else
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
*p++=(unsigned char)
((i & 0x01) != 0 ? (byte & 0x0f) : ((byte >> 4) & 0x0f));
}
x+=count;
}
else
{
/*
Escape mode.
*/
count=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (count == EOF)
break;
if (count == 0x01)
return(MagickTrue);
switch (count)
{
case 0x00:
{
/*
End of line.
*/
x=0;
y++;
p=pixels+y*image->columns;
break;
}
case 0x02:
{
/*
Delta mode.
*/
x+=ReadBlobByte(image);
y+=ReadBlobByte(image);
p=pixels+y*image->columns+x;
break;
}
default:
{
/*
Absolute mode.
*/
count=(int) MagickMin((ssize_t) count,(ssize_t) (q-p));
if (compression == BI_RLE8)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
{
byte=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (byte == EOF)
break;
*p++=(unsigned char) byte;
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
{
if ((i & 0x01) == 0)
{
byte=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (byte == EOF)
break;
}
*p++=(unsigned char)
((i & 0x01) != 0 ? (byte & 0x0f) : ((byte >> 4) & 0x0f));
}
x+=count;
/*
Read pad byte.
*/
if (compression == BI_RLE8)
{
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
}
else
if (((count & 0x03) == 1) || ((count & 0x03) == 2))
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
break;
}
}
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /* end of line */
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
return(y < (ssize_t) image->rows ? MagickFalse : MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Prevent infinite loop
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXObjectCache* Document::existingAXObjectCache() const
{
if (!AXObjectCache::accessibilityEnabled())
return 0;
if (!topDocument()->renderer())
return 0;
return topDocument()->m_axObjectCache.get();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcXvPutImage(ClientPtr client)
{
DrawablePtr pDraw;
XvPortPtr pPort;
XvImagePtr pImage = NULL;
GCPtr pGC;
int status, i, size;
CARD16 width, height;
REQUEST(xvPutImageReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xvPutImageReq);
VALIDATE_DRAWABLE_AND_GC(stuff->drawable, pDraw, DixWriteAccess);
VALIDATE_XV_PORT(stuff->port, pPort, DixReadAccess);
if (!(pPort->pAdaptor->type & XvImageMask) ||
!(pPort->pAdaptor->type & XvInputMask)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->port;
return BadMatch;
}
status = XvdiMatchPort(pPort, pDraw);
if (status != Success) {
return status;
}
for (i = 0; i < pPort->pAdaptor->nImages; i++) {
if (pPort->pAdaptor->pImages[i].id == stuff->id) {
pImage = &(pPort->pAdaptor->pImages[i]);
break;
}
}
if (!pImage)
return BadMatch;
width = stuff->width;
height = stuff->height;
size = (*pPort->pAdaptor->ddQueryImageAttributes) (pPort, pImage, &width,
&height, NULL, NULL);
size += sizeof(xvPutImageReq);
size = bytes_to_int32(size);
if ((width < stuff->width) || (height < stuff->height))
return BadValue;
if (client->req_len < size)
return BadLength;
return XvdiPutImage(client, pDraw, pPort, pGC, stuff->src_x, stuff->src_y,
stuff->src_w, stuff->src_h, stuff->drw_x, stuff->drw_y,
stuff->drw_w, stuff->drw_h, pImage,
(unsigned char *) (&stuff[1]), FALSE,
stuff->width, stuff->height);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int skcipher_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
{
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(private);
ctx = sock_kmalloc(sk, len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
ctx->iv = sock_kmalloc(sk, crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(private),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->iv) {
sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset(ctx->iv, 0, crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(private));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->tsgl);
ctx->len = len;
ctx->used = 0;
ctx->more = 0;
ctx->merge = 0;
ctx->enc = 0;
af_alg_init_completion(&ctx->completion);
ask->private = ctx;
ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(&ctx->req, private);
ablkcipher_request_set_callback(&ctx->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
af_alg_complete, &ctx->completion);
sk->sk_destruct = skcipher_sock_destruct;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif - suppress sending source address information in recvmsg
The current code does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local sockaddr_storage variable to userland
-- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.38
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 17,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResetScreenHandler::ResetScreenHandler()
: BaseScreenHandler(kJsScreenPath),
delegate_(NULL),
show_on_init_(false),
restart_required_(true),
reboot_was_requested_(false),
rollback_available_(false),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
}
Commit Message: Rollback option put behind the flag.
BUG=368860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/267393011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269753 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 23,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fuse_copy_pages(struct fuse_copy_state *cs, unsigned nbytes,
int zeroing)
{
unsigned i;
struct fuse_req *req = cs->req;
for (i = 0; i < req->num_pages && (nbytes || zeroing); i++) {
int err;
unsigned offset = req->page_descs[i].offset;
unsigned count = min(nbytes, req->page_descs[i].length);
err = fuse_copy_page(cs, &req->pages[i], offset, count,
zeroing);
if (err)
return err;
nbytes -= count;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 4,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DownloadManagerImpl::IsManagerInitialized() const {
return initialized_;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ask_char(char *ret, const char *replies, const char *fmt, ...) {
int r;
assert(ret);
assert(replies);
assert(fmt);
for (;;) {
va_list ap;
char c;
bool need_nl = true;
if (colors_enabled())
fputs(ANSI_HIGHLIGHT, stdout);
putchar('\r');
va_start(ap, fmt);
vprintf(fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (colors_enabled())
fputs(ANSI_NORMAL, stdout);
fflush(stdout);
r = read_one_char(stdin, &c, DEFAULT_ASK_REFRESH_USEC, &need_nl);
if (r < 0) {
if (r == -ETIMEDOUT)
continue;
if (r == -EBADMSG) {
puts("Bad input, please try again.");
continue;
}
putchar('\n');
return r;
}
if (need_nl)
putchar('\n');
if (strchr(replies, c)) {
*ret = c;
return 0;
}
puts("Read unexpected character, please try again.");
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | 0 | 9,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FLTIsFeatureIdFilterType(const char *pszValue)
{
if (pszValue && (strcasecmp(pszValue, "FeatureId") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(pszValue, "GmlObjectId") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(pszValue, "ResourceId") == 0))
return MS_TRUE;
return MS_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContentBrowserClient::IsSuitableHost(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
const GURL& site_url) {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BluetoothOptionsHandler::~BluetoothOptionsHandler() {
if (!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()
->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableBluetooth)) {
return;
}
chromeos::BluetoothManager* bluetooth_manager =
chromeos::BluetoothManager::GetInstance();
DCHECK(bluetooth_manager);
chromeos::BluetoothAdapter* default_adapter =
bluetooth_manager->DefaultAdapter();
if (default_adapter != NULL) {
default_adapter->RemoveObserver(this);
}
bluetooth_manager->RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Texture::AllocateStorage(const gfx::Size& size, GLenum format) {
DCHECK_NE(id_, 0u);
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(decoder_);
ScopedTexture2DBinder binder(decoder_, id_);
glTexImage2D(GL_TEXTURE_2D,
0, // mip level
format,
size.width(),
size.height(),
0, // border
format,
GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE,
NULL);
size_ = size;
return glGetError() == GL_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StorageHandler::NotifyIndexedDBListChanged(const std::string& origin) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
frontend_->IndexedDBListUpdated(origin);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OverrideThreadForMessage(
const IPC::Message& message, BrowserThread::ID* thread) {
switch (message.type()) {
case ChromeViewHostMsg_ResourceTypeStats::ID:
case ExtensionHostMsg_AddListener::ID:
case ExtensionHostMsg_RemoveListener::ID:
case ExtensionHostMsg_AddLazyListener::ID:
case ExtensionHostMsg_RemoveLazyListener::ID:
case ExtensionHostMsg_CloseChannel::ID:
case ExtensionHostMsg_ShouldUnloadAck::ID:
case ExtensionHostMsg_UnloadAck::ID:
case ChromeViewHostMsg_UpdatedCacheStats::ID:
*thread = BrowserThread::UI;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ft_var_apply_tuple( GX_Blend blend,
FT_UShort tupleIndex,
FT_Fixed* tuple_coords,
FT_Fixed* im_start_coords,
FT_Fixed* im_end_coords )
{
FT_UInt i;
FT_Fixed apply;
FT_Fixed temp;
apply = 0x10000L;
for ( i = 0; i < blend->num_axis; ++i )
{
if ( tuple_coords[i] == 0 )
/* It's not clear why (for intermediate tuples) we don't need */
/* to check against start/end -- the documentation says we don't. */
/* Similarly, it's unclear why we don't need to scale along the */
/* axis. */
continue;
else if ( blend->normalizedcoords[i] == 0 ||
( blend->normalizedcoords[i] < 0 && tuple_coords[i] > 0 ) ||
( blend->normalizedcoords[i] > 0 && tuple_coords[i] < 0 ) )
{
apply = 0;
break;
}
else if ( !( tupleIndex & GX_TI_INTERMEDIATE_TUPLE ) )
/* not an intermediate tuple */
apply = FT_MulDiv( apply,
blend->normalizedcoords[i] > 0
? blend->normalizedcoords[i]
: -blend->normalizedcoords[i],
0x10000L );
else if ( blend->normalizedcoords[i] <= im_start_coords[i] ||
blend->normalizedcoords[i] >= im_end_coords[i] )
{
apply = 0;
break;
}
else if ( blend->normalizedcoords[i] < tuple_coords[i] )
{
temp = FT_MulDiv( blend->normalizedcoords[i] - im_start_coords[i],
0x10000L,
tuple_coords[i] - im_start_coords[i]);
apply = FT_MulDiv( apply, temp, 0x10000L );
}
else
{
temp = FT_MulDiv( im_end_coords[i] - blend->normalizedcoords[i],
0x10000L,
im_end_coords[i] - tuple_coords[i] );
apply = FT_MulDiv( apply, temp, 0x10000L );
}
}
return apply;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void net_tx_pkt_update_ip_checksums(struct NetTxPkt *pkt)
{
uint16_t csum;
uint32_t cntr, cso;
assert(pkt);
uint8_t gso_type = pkt->virt_hdr.gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN;
void *ip_hdr = pkt->vec[NET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG].iov_base;
if (pkt->payload_len + pkt->vec[NET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG].iov_len >
ETH_MAX_IP_DGRAM_LEN) {
return;
}
if (gso_type == VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 ||
gso_type == VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP) {
/* Calculate IP header checksum */
net_tx_pkt_update_ip_hdr_checksum(pkt);
/* Calculate IP pseudo header checksum */
cntr = eth_calc_ip4_pseudo_hdr_csum(ip_hdr, pkt->payload_len, &cso);
csum = cpu_to_be16(~net_checksum_finish(cntr));
} else if (gso_type == VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6) {
/* Calculate IP pseudo header checksum */
cntr = eth_calc_ip6_pseudo_hdr_csum(ip_hdr, pkt->payload_len,
IP_PROTO_TCP, &cso);
csum = cpu_to_be16(~net_checksum_finish(cntr));
} else {
return;
}
iov_from_buf(&pkt->vec[NET_TX_PKT_PL_START_FRAG], pkt->payload_frags,
pkt->virt_hdr.csum_offset, &csum, sizeof(csum));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 10,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gpa_t translate_nested_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u32 access)
{
gpa_t t_gpa;
struct x86_exception exception;
BUG_ON(!mmu_is_nested(vcpu));
/* NPT walks are always user-walks */
access |= PFERR_USER_MASK;
t_gpa = vcpu->arch.mmu.gva_to_gpa(vcpu, gpa, access, &exception);
return t_gpa;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_decode_release_lockowner(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_release_lockowner *rlockowner)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
if (argp->minorversion >= 1)
return nfserr_notsupp;
READ_BUF(12);
COPYMEM(&rlockowner->rl_clientid, sizeof(clientid_t));
rlockowner->rl_owner.len = be32_to_cpup(p++);
READ_BUF(rlockowner->rl_owner.len);
READMEM(rlockowner->rl_owner.data, rlockowner->rl_owner.len);
if (argp->minorversion && !zero_clientid(&rlockowner->rl_clientid))
return nfserr_inval;
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 20,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HB_Error HB_Done_GPOS_Table( HB_GPOSHeader* gpos )
{
_HB_OPEN_Free_LookupList( &gpos->LookupList, HB_Type_GPOS );
_HB_OPEN_Free_FeatureList( &gpos->FeatureList );
_HB_OPEN_Free_ScriptList( &gpos->ScriptList );
FREE( gpos );
return HB_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPagePrivate::setLoadState(LoadState state)
{
if (m_loadState == state)
return;
bool isFirstLoad = m_loadState == None;
if (state == Finished && m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->document())
m_mainFrame->document()->updateStyleIfNeeded();
m_backingStore->d->setWebPageBackgroundColor(m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->view()
? m_mainFrame->view()->documentBackgroundColor()
: m_webSettings->backgroundColor());
m_loadState = state;
#if DEBUG_WEBPAGE_LOAD
BBLOG(Platform::LogLevelInfo, "WebPagePrivate::setLoadState %d", state);
#endif
switch (m_loadState) {
case Provisional:
if (isFirstLoad) {
if (m_backingStore->d->renderVisibleContents() && !m_backingStore->d->isSuspended() && !m_backingStore->d->shouldDirectRenderingToWindow())
m_backingStore->d->blitVisibleContents();
}
break;
case Committed:
{
#if ENABLE(ACCELERATED_2D_CANVAS)
if (m_page->settings()->canvasUsesAcceleratedDrawing()) {
SharedGraphicsContext3D::get()->makeContextCurrent();
GrContext* grContext = Platform::Graphics::getGrContext();
grContext->freeGpuResources();
}
#endif
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
releaseLayerResources();
#endif
m_backingStore->d->suspendBackingStoreUpdates();
m_backingStore->d->suspendScreenUpdates();
m_previousContentsSize = IntSize();
m_backingStore->d->resetRenderQueue();
m_backingStore->d->resetTiles();
m_backingStore->d->setScrollingOrZooming(false, false /* shouldBlit */);
m_shouldZoomToInitialScaleAfterLoadFinished = false;
m_userPerformedManualZoom = false;
m_userPerformedManualScroll = false;
m_shouldUseFixedDesktopMode = false;
m_forceRespectViewportArguments = false;
if (m_resetVirtualViewportOnCommitted) // For DRT.
m_virtualViewportSize = IntSize();
if (m_webSettings->viewportWidth() > 0)
m_virtualViewportSize = IntSize(m_webSettings->viewportWidth(), m_defaultLayoutSize.height());
static ViewportArguments defaultViewportArguments;
bool documentHasViewportArguments = false;
if (m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->document() && m_mainFrame->document()->viewportArguments() != defaultViewportArguments)
documentHasViewportArguments = true;
if (!(m_didRestoreFromPageCache && documentHasViewportArguments)) {
m_viewportArguments = ViewportArguments();
m_userScalable = m_webSettings->isUserScalable();
resetScales();
dispatchViewportPropertiesDidChange(m_userViewportArguments);
if (m_userViewportArguments != defaultViewportArguments)
m_forceRespectViewportArguments = true;
} else {
Platform::IntSize virtualViewport = recomputeVirtualViewportFromViewportArguments();
m_webPage->setVirtualViewportSize(virtualViewport);
}
#if ENABLE(EVENT_MODE_METATAGS)
didReceiveCursorEventMode(ProcessedCursorEvents);
didReceiveTouchEventMode(ProcessedTouchEvents);
#endif
resetBlockZoom();
#if ENABLE(VIEWPORT_REFLOW)
toggleTextReflowIfEnabledForBlockZoomOnly();
#endif
m_inputHandler->setInputModeEnabled(false);
setScrollPosition(IntPoint::zero());
notifyTransformedScrollChanged();
m_backingStore->d->resumeBackingStoreUpdates();
m_backingStore->d->resumeScreenUpdates(BackingStore::None);
if (m_backingStore->d->renderVisibleContents() && !m_backingStore->d->isSuspended() && !m_backingStore->d->shouldDirectRenderingToWindow())
m_backingStore->d->blitVisibleContents();
updateCursor();
break;
}
case Finished:
case Failed:
m_client->scaleChanged();
m_backingStore->d->updateTiles(true /* updateVisible */, false /* immediate */);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void irc_servers_setup_deinit(void)
{
signal_remove("server setup fill reconn", (SIGNAL_FUNC) sig_server_setup_fill_reconn);
signal_remove("server setup fill connect", (SIGNAL_FUNC) sig_server_setup_fill_connect);
signal_remove("server setup fill chatnet", (SIGNAL_FUNC) sig_server_setup_fill_chatnet);
signal_remove("server setup read", (SIGNAL_FUNC) sig_server_setup_read);
signal_remove("server setup saved", (SIGNAL_FUNC) sig_server_setup_saved);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1058 from ailin-nemui/sasl-reconnect
copy sasl username and password values
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 12,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: krb5_gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
OM_uint32 major_status;
major_status = kg_seal_iov(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag,
qop_req, conf_state,
iov, iov_count, KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG);
return major_status;
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLElement* HTMLInputElement::list() const
{
return dataList();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void codec_parameters_reset(AVCodecParameters *par)
{
av_freep(&par->extradata);
memset(par, 0, sizeof(*par));
par->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
par->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_NONE;
par->format = -1;
par->field_order = AV_FIELD_UNKNOWN;
par->color_range = AVCOL_RANGE_UNSPECIFIED;
par->color_primaries = AVCOL_PRI_UNSPECIFIED;
par->color_trc = AVCOL_TRC_UNSPECIFIED;
par->color_space = AVCOL_SPC_UNSPECIFIED;
par->chroma_location = AVCHROMA_LOC_UNSPECIFIED;
par->sample_aspect_ratio = (AVRational){ 0, 1 };
par->profile = FF_PROFILE_UNKNOWN;
par->level = FF_LEVEL_UNKNOWN;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 15,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OneClickSigninHelper::LogConfirmHistogramValue(int action) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.OneClickConfirmation", action,
one_click_signin::HISTOGRAM_CONFIRM_MAX);
}
Commit Message: During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, getSupportedCompression)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
if (PHAR_G(has_zlib)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "GZ", 2, 1);
}
if (PHAR_G(has_bz2)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "BZIP2", 5, 1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 9,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool CheckMpeg4BitStream(const uint8_t* buffer, int buffer_size) {
RCHECK(buffer_size > 4);
int offset = 0;
int sequence_start_count = 0;
int sequence_end_count = 0;
int visual_object_count = 0;
int vop_count = 0;
while (true) {
if (!AdvanceToStartCode(buffer, buffer_size, &offset, 6, 24, 1)) {
return (sequence_start_count > 0 && visual_object_count > 0);
}
BitReader reader(buffer + offset, 6);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 24) == 1);
int start_code = ReadBits(&reader, 8);
RCHECK(start_code < 0x30 || start_code > 0xaf); // 30..AF and
RCHECK(start_code < 0xb7 || start_code > 0xb9); // B7..B9 reserved
switch (start_code) {
case VISUAL_OBJECT_SEQUENCE_START_CODE: {
++sequence_start_count;
int profile = ReadBits(&reader, 8);
RCHECK(profile > 0);
RCHECK(profile < 0x04 || profile > 0x10);
RCHECK(profile < 0x13 || profile > 0x20);
RCHECK(profile < 0x23 || profile > 0x31);
RCHECK(profile < 0x35 || profile > 0x41);
RCHECK(profile < 0x43 || profile > 0x60);
RCHECK(profile < 0x65 || profile > 0x70);
RCHECK(profile < 0x73 || profile > 0x80);
RCHECK(profile < 0x83 || profile > 0x90);
RCHECK(profile < 0x95 || profile > 0xa0);
RCHECK(profile < 0xa4 || profile > 0xb0);
RCHECK(profile < 0xb5 || profile > 0xc0);
RCHECK(profile < 0xc3 || profile > 0xd0);
RCHECK(profile < 0xe4);
break;
}
case VISUAL_OBJECT_SEQUENCE_END_CODE:
RCHECK(++sequence_end_count == sequence_start_count);
break;
case VISUAL_OBJECT_START_CODE: {
++visual_object_count;
if (ReadBits(&reader, 1) == 1) {
int visual_object_verid = ReadBits(&reader, 4);
RCHECK(visual_object_verid > 0 && visual_object_verid < 3);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 3) != 0);
}
int visual_object_type = ReadBits(&reader, 4);
RCHECK(visual_object_type > 0 && visual_object_type < 6);
break;
}
case VOP_START_CODE:
RCHECK(++vop_count <= visual_object_count);
break;
}
offset += 6;
}
}
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 20,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t SmushXGap(const Image *smush_image,const Image *images,
const ssize_t offset,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*left_view,
*right_view;
const Image
*left_image,
*right_image;
RectangleInfo
left_geometry,
right_geometry;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
y;
size_t
gap;
ssize_t
x;
if (images->previous == (Image *) NULL)
return(0);
right_image=images;
SetGeometry(smush_image,&right_geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(right_image->columns,right_image->rows,
right_image->gravity,&right_geometry);
left_image=images->previous;
SetGeometry(smush_image,&left_geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(left_image->columns,left_image->rows,
left_image->gravity,&left_geometry);
gap=right_image->columns;
left_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(left_image,exception);
right_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(right_image,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) smush_image->rows; y++)
{
for (x=(ssize_t) left_image->columns-1; x > 0; x--)
{
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(left_view,x,left_geometry.y+y,1,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(GetPixelOpacity(p) != TransparentOpacity) ||
((left_image->columns-x-1) >= gap))
break;
}
i=(ssize_t) left_image->columns-x-1;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) right_image->columns; x++)
{
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(right_view,x,right_geometry.y+y,1,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(GetPixelOpacity(p) != TransparentOpacity) ||
((x+i) >= (ssize_t) gap))
break;
}
if ((x+i) < (ssize_t) gap)
gap=(size_t) (x+i);
}
right_view=DestroyCacheView(right_view);
left_view=DestroyCacheView(left_view);
if (y < (ssize_t) smush_image->rows)
return(offset);
return((ssize_t) gap-offset);
}
Commit Message: Fixed incorrect call to DestroyImage reported in #491.
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 12,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int zend_delete_global_variable(zend_string *name) /* {{{ */
{
return zend_hash_del_ind(&EG(symbol_table), name);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __init int ftrace_init_dyn_debugfs(struct dentry *d_tracer)
{
trace_create_file("available_filter_functions", 0444,
d_tracer, NULL, &ftrace_avail_fops);
trace_create_file("enabled_functions", 0444,
d_tracer, NULL, &ftrace_enabled_fops);
trace_create_file("set_ftrace_filter", 0644, d_tracer,
NULL, &ftrace_filter_fops);
trace_create_file("set_ftrace_notrace", 0644, d_tracer,
NULL, &ftrace_notrace_fops);
#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
trace_create_file("set_graph_function", 0444, d_tracer,
NULL,
&ftrace_graph_fops);
#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::SearchUsingPDFium(const base::string16& term,
bool case_sensitive,
bool first_search,
int character_to_start_searching_from,
int current_page) {
unsigned long flags = case_sensitive ? FPDF_MATCHCASE : 0;
FPDF_SCHHANDLE find =
FPDFText_FindStart(pages_[current_page]->GetTextPage(),
reinterpret_cast<const unsigned short*>(term.c_str()),
flags, character_to_start_searching_from);
while (FPDFText_FindNext(find)) {
PDFiumRange result(pages_[current_page].get(),
FPDFText_GetSchResultIndex(find),
FPDFText_GetSchCount(find));
if (!first_search && last_character_index_to_search_ != -1 &&
result.page_index() == last_page_to_search_ &&
result.char_index() >= last_character_index_to_search_) {
break;
}
AddFindResult(result);
}
FPDFText_FindClose(find);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const wchar_t* default_channel() const { return mode_->default_channel_name; }
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
R=wfh@chromium.org
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 1,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType InsertRow(int bpp,unsigned char *p,ssize_t y,
Image *image)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
int
bit;
ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
IndexPacket
index;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
exception=(&image->exception);
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
switch (bpp)
{
case 1: /* Convert bitmap scanline. */
{
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
p++;
}
break;
}
case 2: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
if ((image->storage_class != PseudoClass) ||
(indexes == (IndexPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-3); x+=4)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 4) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
if ((image->columns % 4) > 1)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
if ((image->columns % 4) > 2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
}
p++;
}
break;
}
case 4: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
break;
}
case 8: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
}
break;
case 24: /* Convert DirectColor scanline. */
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
break;
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1599
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OomInterventionTabHelper::AcceptIntervention() {
RecordInterventionUserDecision(true);
intervention_state_ = InterventionState::ACCEPTED;
}
Commit Message: OomIntervention opt-out should work properly with 'show original'
OomIntervention should not be re-triggered on the same page if the user declines the intervention once.
This CL fixes the bug.
Bug: 889131, 887119
Change-Id: Idb9eebb2bb9f79756b63f0e010fe018ba5c490e8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245019
Commit-Queue: Yuzu Saijo <yuzus@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594574}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebPlugin* WebLocalFrameImpl::FocusedPluginIfInputMethodSupported() {
WebPluginContainerImpl* container = GetFrame()->GetWebPluginContainer();
if (container && container->SupportsInputMethod())
return container->Plugin();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 11,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::ChangeMediaStreamSourceFromBrowser(
const std::string& label) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DeviceRequest* request = FindRequest(label);
if (!request)
return;
SetUpDesktopCaptureChangeSourceRequest(request, label);
IncrementDesktopCaptureCounter(DESKTOP_CAPTURE_NOTIFICATION_CHANGE_SOURCE);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 2,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_pbase_path(unsigned hash)
{
int pos = (!done_pbase_paths) ? -1 : done_pbase_path_pos(hash);
if (0 <= pos)
return 1;
pos = -pos - 1;
ALLOC_GROW(done_pbase_paths,
done_pbase_paths_num + 1,
done_pbase_paths_alloc);
done_pbase_paths_num++;
if (pos < done_pbase_paths_num)
memmove(done_pbase_paths + pos + 1,
done_pbase_paths + pos,
(done_pbase_paths_num - pos - 1) * sizeof(unsigned));
done_pbase_paths[pos] = hash;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct crypto_shash *mcryptd_ahash_child(struct mcryptd_ahash *tfm)
{
struct mcryptd_hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(&tfm->base);
return ctx->child;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ShouldFrameShareParentSiteInstanceDespiteTopDocumentIsolation(
const GURL& subframe_url,
content::SiteInstance* parent_site_instance) {
const Extension* extension =
ExtensionRegistry::Get(parent_site_instance->GetBrowserContext())
->enabled_extensions()
.GetExtensionOrAppByURL(parent_site_instance->GetSiteURL());
return extension && extension->is_hosted_app();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static i32 ComparePictures(const void *ptr1, const void *ptr2)
{
/* Variables */
dpbPicture_t *pic1, *pic2;
/* Code */
ASSERT(ptr1);
ASSERT(ptr2);
pic1 = (dpbPicture_t*)ptr1;
pic2 = (dpbPicture_t*)ptr2;
/* both are non-reference pictures, check if needed for display */
if (!IS_REFERENCE(*pic1) && !IS_REFERENCE(*pic2))
{
if (pic1->toBeDisplayed && !pic2->toBeDisplayed)
return(-1);
else if (!pic1->toBeDisplayed && pic2->toBeDisplayed)
return(1);
else
return(0);
}
/* only pic 1 needed for reference -> greater */
else if (!IS_REFERENCE(*pic2))
return(-1);
/* only pic 2 needed for reference -> greater */
else if (!IS_REFERENCE(*pic1))
return(1);
/* both are short term reference pictures -> check picNum */
else if (IS_SHORT_TERM(*pic1) && IS_SHORT_TERM(*pic2))
{
if (pic1->picNum > pic2->picNum)
return(-1);
else if (pic1->picNum < pic2->picNum)
return(1);
else
return(0);
}
/* only pic 1 is short term -> greater */
else if (IS_SHORT_TERM(*pic1))
return(-1);
/* only pic 2 is short term -> greater */
else if (IS_SHORT_TERM(*pic2))
return(1);
/* both are long term reference pictures -> check picNum (contains the
* longTermPicNum */
else
{
if (pic1->picNum > pic2->picNum)
return(1);
else if (pic1->picNum < pic2->picNum)
return(-1);
else
return(0);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix potential overflow
Bug: 28533562
Change-Id: I798ab24caa4c81f3ba564cad7c9ee019284fb702
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned readUint16(JOCTET* data, bool isBigEndian)
{
if (isBigEndian)
return (GETJOCTET(data[0]) << 8) | GETJOCTET(data[1]);
return (GETJOCTET(data[1]) << 8) | GETJOCTET(data[0]);
}
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpServer::DeleteMe()
{
m_deleteMeTid = TIMER_UNSET;
if ( m_reference_count <= 0 ) {
delete this;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 20,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: X11SurfaceFactory::GetAllowedGLImplementations() {
std::vector<gl::GLImplementation> impls;
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2);
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationDesktopGL);
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationOSMesaGL);
return impls;
}
Commit Message: Add ThreadChecker for Ozone X11 GPU.
Ensure Ozone X11 tests the same thread constraints we have in Ozone GBM.
BUG=none
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2366643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421817}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 23,971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ieee80211_tx(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
struct sk_buff *skb, bool txpending,
enum ieee80211_band band)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
struct ieee80211_tx_data tx;
ieee80211_tx_result res_prepare;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
bool result = true;
int led_len;
if (unlikely(skb->len < 10)) {
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return true;
}
/* initialises tx */
led_len = skb->len;
res_prepare = ieee80211_tx_prepare(sdata, &tx, skb);
if (unlikely(res_prepare == TX_DROP)) {
ieee80211_free_txskb(&local->hw, skb);
return true;
} else if (unlikely(res_prepare == TX_QUEUED)) {
return true;
}
info->band = band;
/* set up hw_queue value early */
if (!(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_TX_OFFCHAN) ||
!(local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_QUEUE_CONTROL))
info->hw_queue =
sdata->vif.hw_queue[skb_get_queue_mapping(skb)];
if (!invoke_tx_handlers(&tx))
result = __ieee80211_tx(local, &tx.skbs, led_len,
tx.sta, txpending);
return result;
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void inet_netconf_notify_devconf(struct net *net, int type, int ifindex,
struct ipv4_devconf *devconf)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err = -ENOBUFS;
skb = nlmsg_new(inet_netconf_msgsize_devconf(type), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
goto errout;
err = inet_netconf_fill_devconf(skb, ifindex, devconf, 0, 0,
RTM_NEWNETCONF, 0, type);
if (err < 0) {
/* -EMSGSIZE implies BUG in inet_netconf_msgsize_devconf() */
WARN_ON(err == -EMSGSIZE);
kfree_skb(skb);
goto errout;
}
rtnl_notify(skb, net, 0, RTNLGRP_IPV4_NETCONF, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
return;
errout:
if (err < 0)
rtnl_set_sk_err(net, RTNLGRP_IPV4_NETCONF, err);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int s390_compat_regs_set(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
int rc = 0;
if (target == current)
save_access_regs(target->thread.acrs);
if (kbuf) {
const compat_ulong_t *k = kbuf;
while (count > 0 && !rc) {
rc = __poke_user_compat(target, pos, *k++);
count -= sizeof(*k);
pos += sizeof(*k);
}
} else {
const compat_ulong_t __user *u = ubuf;
while (count > 0 && !rc) {
compat_ulong_t word;
rc = __get_user(word, u++);
if (rc)
break;
rc = __poke_user_compat(target, pos, word);
count -= sizeof(*u);
pos += sizeof(*u);
}
}
if (rc == 0 && target == current)
restore_access_regs(target->thread.acrs);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the address-space-control bit combination for home space.
Fixes CVE-2014-3534
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_focus_get_data (struct t_hashtable *hashtable_focus1,
struct t_hashtable *hashtable_focus2)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook, *next_hook;
struct t_hashtable *hashtable1, *hashtable2, *hashtable_ret;
const char *focus1_chat, *focus1_bar_item_name, *keys;
char **list_keys, *new_key;
int num_keys, i, length, focus1_is_chat;
if (!hashtable_focus1)
return NULL;
focus1_chat = hashtable_get (hashtable_focus1, "_chat");
focus1_is_chat = (focus1_chat && (strcmp (focus1_chat, "1") == 0));
focus1_bar_item_name = hashtable_get (hashtable_focus1, "_bar_item_name");
hashtable1 = hashtable_dup (hashtable_focus1);
if (!hashtable1)
return NULL;
hashtable2 = (hashtable_focus2) ? hashtable_dup (hashtable_focus2) : NULL;
hook_exec_start ();
ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_FOCUS];
while (ptr_hook)
{
next_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook;
if (!ptr_hook->deleted
&& !ptr_hook->running
&& ((focus1_is_chat
&& (strcmp (HOOK_FOCUS(ptr_hook, area), "chat") == 0))
|| (focus1_bar_item_name && focus1_bar_item_name[0]
&& (strcmp (HOOK_FOCUS(ptr_hook, area), focus1_bar_item_name) == 0))))
{
/* run callback for focus #1 */
ptr_hook->running = 1;
hashtable_ret = (HOOK_FOCUS(ptr_hook, callback))
(ptr_hook->callback_data, hashtable1);
ptr_hook->running = 0;
if (hashtable_ret)
{
if (hashtable_ret != hashtable1)
{
/*
* add keys of hashtable_ret into hashtable1
* and destroy it
*/
hashtable_map (hashtable_ret,
&hook_focus_hashtable_map_cb,
hashtable1);
hashtable_free (hashtable_ret);
}
}
/* run callback for focus #2 */
if (hashtable2)
{
ptr_hook->running = 1;
hashtable_ret = (HOOK_FOCUS(ptr_hook, callback))
(ptr_hook->callback_data, hashtable2);
ptr_hook->running = 0;
if (hashtable_ret)
{
if (hashtable_ret != hashtable2)
{
/*
* add keys of hashtable_ret into hashtable2
* and destroy it
*/
hashtable_map (hashtable_ret,
&hook_focus_hashtable_map_cb,
hashtable2);
hashtable_free (hashtable_ret);
}
}
}
}
ptr_hook = next_hook;
}
if (hashtable2)
{
hashtable_map (hashtable2, &hook_focus_hashtable_map2_cb, hashtable1);
hashtable_free (hashtable2);
}
else
{
keys = hashtable_get_string (hashtable1, "keys");
if (keys)
{
list_keys = string_split (keys, ",", 0, 0, &num_keys);
if (list_keys)
{
for (i = 0; i < num_keys; i++)
{
length = strlen (list_keys[i]) + 1 + 1;
new_key = malloc (length);
if (new_key)
{
snprintf (new_key, length, "%s2", list_keys[i]);
hashtable_set (hashtable1, new_key,
hashtable_get (hashtable1,
list_keys[i]));
free (new_key);
}
}
string_free_split (list_keys);
}
}
}
hook_exec_end ();
return hashtable1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: count_node_types(cmap_splay *node, void *arg)
{
int *counts = (int *)arg;
if (node->many)
counts[2]++;
else if (node->low <= 0xffff && node->high <= 0xFFFF && node->out <= 0xFFFF)
counts[0]++;
else
counts[1]++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 20,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gdImageFill(gdImagePtr im, int x, int y, int nc)
{
int l, x1, x2, dy;
int oc; /* old pixel value */
int wx2,wy2;
int alphablending_bak;
/* stack of filled segments */
/* struct seg stack[FILL_MAX],*sp = stack;; */
struct seg *stack = NULL;
struct seg *sp;
if (!im->trueColor && nc > (im->colorsTotal -1)) {
return;
}
alphablending_bak = im->alphaBlendingFlag;
im->alphaBlendingFlag = 0;
if (nc==gdTiled){
_gdImageFillTiled(im,x,y,nc);
im->alphaBlendingFlag = alphablending_bak;
return;
}
wx2=im->sx;wy2=im->sy;
oc = gdImageGetPixel(im, x, y);
if (oc==nc || x<0 || x>wx2 || y<0 || y>wy2) {
im->alphaBlendingFlag = alphablending_bak;
return;
}
/* Do not use the 4 neighbors implementation with
* small images
*/
if (im->sx < 4) {
int ix = x, iy = y, c;
do {
do {
c = gdImageGetPixel(im, ix, iy);
if (c != oc) {
goto done;
}
gdImageSetPixel(im, ix, iy, nc);
} while(ix++ < (im->sx -1));
ix = x;
} while(iy++ < (im->sy -1));
goto done;
}
stack = (struct seg *)safe_emalloc(sizeof(struct seg), ((int)(im->sy*im->sx)/4), 1);
sp = stack;
/* required! */
FILL_PUSH(y,x,x,1);
/* seed segment (popped 1st) */
FILL_PUSH(y+1, x, x, -1);
while (sp>stack) {
FILL_POP(y, x1, x2, dy);
for (x=x1; x>=0 && gdImageGetPixel(im,x, y)==oc; x--) {
gdImageSetPixel(im,x, y, nc);
}
if (x>=x1) {
goto skip;
}
l = x+1;
/* leak on left? */
if (l<x1) {
FILL_PUSH(y, l, x1-1, -dy);
}
x = x1+1;
do {
for (; x<=wx2 && gdImageGetPixel(im,x, y)==oc; x++) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y, nc);
}
FILL_PUSH(y, l, x-1, dy);
/* leak on right? */
if (x>x2+1) {
FILL_PUSH(y, x2+1, x-1, -dy);
}
skip: for (x++; x<=x2 && (gdImageGetPixel(im, x, y)!=oc); x++);
l = x;
} while (x<=x2);
}
efree(stack);
done:
im->alphaBlendingFlag = alphablending_bak;
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 28,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_init_blkcipher_ops(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
struct blkcipher_alg *alg = &tfm->__crt_alg->cra_blkcipher;
if (alg->ivsize > PAGE_SIZE / 8)
return -EINVAL;
if ((mask & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK)
return crypto_init_blkcipher_ops_sync(tfm);
else
return crypto_init_blkcipher_ops_async(tfm);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 22,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CStarter::ShutdownFast( void )
{
bool jobRunning = false;
UserProc *job;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "ShutdownFast all jobs.\n");
if ( this->deferral_tid != -1 ) {
this->removeDeferredJobs();
}
m_job_list.Rewind();
while ((job = m_job_list.Next()) != NULL) {
if ( job->ShutdownFast() ) {
m_job_list.DeleteCurrent();
delete job;
} else {
jobRunning = true;
}
}
ShuttingDown = TRUE;
if (!jobRunning) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,
"Got ShutdownFast when no jobs running.\n");
return ( this->allJobsDone() );
}
return ( false );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 5,705 |
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