instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContentsImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetCreatedWindow(int route_id) {
PendingContents::iterator iter = pending_contents_.find(route_id);
if (iter == pending_contents_.end()) {
return NULL;
}
WebContentsImpl* new_contents = iter->second;
pending_contents_.erase(route_id);
RemoveDestructionObserver(new_contents);
if (BrowserPluginGuest::IsGuest(new_contents))
return new_contents;
if (!new_contents->GetRenderProcessHost()->HasConnection() ||
!new_contents->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget()->GetView())
return NULL;
return new_contents;
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void wbinvd_ipi(void *garbage)
{
wbinvd();
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perform_renew(void)
{
bb_error_msg("performing DHCP renew");
switch (state) {
case BOUND:
change_listen_mode(LISTEN_KERNEL);
case RENEWING:
case REBINDING:
state = RENEW_REQUESTED;
break;
case RENEW_REQUESTED: /* impatient are we? fine, square 1 */
udhcp_run_script(NULL, "deconfig");
case REQUESTING:
case RELEASED:
change_listen_mode(LISTEN_RAW);
state = INIT_SELECTING;
break;
case INIT_SELECTING:
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 11,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_escape_literal)
{
php_pgsql_escape_internal(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void btsnoop_net_write(const void *data, size_t length) {
#if (!defined(BT_NET_DEBUG) || (BT_NET_DEBUG != TRUE))
return; // Disable using network sockets for security reasons
#endif
pthread_mutex_lock(&client_socket_lock_);
if (client_socket_ != -1) {
if (send(client_socket_, data, length, 0) == -1 && errno == ECONNRESET) {
safe_close_(&client_socket_);
}
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&client_socket_lock_);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 3,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebGLImageConversion::ExtractImageData(
const uint8_t* image_data,
DataFormat source_data_format,
const IntSize& image_data_size,
const IntRect& source_image_sub_rectangle,
int depth,
int unpack_image_height,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
bool flip_y,
bool premultiply_alpha,
Vector<uint8_t>& data) {
if (!image_data)
return false;
int width = image_data_size.Width();
int height = image_data_size.Height();
unsigned packed_size;
PixelStoreParams params;
params.alignment = 1;
if (ComputeImageSizeInBytes(format, type, source_image_sub_rectangle.Width(),
source_image_sub_rectangle.Height(), depth,
params, &packed_size, nullptr,
nullptr) != GL_NO_ERROR)
return false;
data.resize(packed_size);
if (!PackPixels(image_data, source_data_format, width, height,
source_image_sub_rectangle, depth, 0, unpack_image_height,
format, type,
premultiply_alpha ? kAlphaDoPremultiply : kAlphaDoNothing,
data.data(), flip_y))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 8,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::mediaVolumeDidChange()
{
HashSet<Element*>::iterator end = m_mediaVolumeCallbackElements.end();
for (HashSet<Element*>::iterator i = m_mediaVolumeCallbackElements.begin(); i != end; ++i)
(*i)->mediaVolumeDidChange();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 23,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: update_validation(xmlNode ** xml_blob, int *best, int max, gboolean transform, gboolean to_logs)
{
xmlNode *xml = NULL;
char *value = NULL;
int max_stable_schemas = xml_latest_schema_index();
int lpc = 0, match = -1, rc = pcmk_ok;
CRM_CHECK(best != NULL, return -EINVAL);
CRM_CHECK(xml_blob != NULL, return -EINVAL);
CRM_CHECK(*xml_blob != NULL, return -EINVAL);
*best = 0;
xml = *xml_blob;
value = crm_element_value_copy(xml, XML_ATTR_VALIDATION);
if (value != NULL) {
match = get_schema_version(value);
lpc = match;
if (lpc >= 0 && transform == FALSE) {
lpc++;
} else if (lpc < 0) {
crm_debug("Unknown validation type");
lpc = 0;
}
}
if (match >= max_stable_schemas) {
/* nothing to do */
free(value);
*best = match;
return pcmk_ok;
}
while(lpc <= max_stable_schemas) {
gboolean valid = TRUE;
crm_debug("Testing '%s' validation (%d of %d)",
known_schemas[lpc].name ? known_schemas[lpc].name : "<unset>",
lpc, max_stable_schemas);
valid = validate_with(xml, lpc, to_logs);
if (valid) {
*best = lpc;
} else {
crm_trace("%s validation failed", known_schemas[lpc].name ? known_schemas[lpc].name : "<unset>");
}
if (valid && transform) {
xmlNode *upgrade = NULL;
int next = known_schemas[lpc].after_transform;
if (next < 0) {
crm_trace("Stopping at %s", known_schemas[lpc].name);
break;
} else if (max > 0 && lpc == max) {
crm_trace("Upgrade limit reached at %s (lpc=%d, next=%d, max=%d)",
known_schemas[lpc].name, lpc, next, max);
break;
} else if (max > 0 && next > max) {
crm_debug("Upgrade limit reached at %s (lpc=%d, next=%d, max=%d)",
known_schemas[lpc].name, lpc, next, max);
break;
} else if (known_schemas[lpc].transform == NULL) {
crm_notice("%s-style configuration is also valid for %s",
known_schemas[lpc].name, known_schemas[next].name);
if (validate_with(xml, next, to_logs)) {
crm_debug("Configuration valid for schema: %s", known_schemas[next].name);
lpc = next;
*best = next;
rc = pcmk_ok;
} else {
crm_info("Configuration not valid for schema: %s", known_schemas[next].name);
}
} else {
crm_debug("Upgrading %s-style configuration to %s with %s",
known_schemas[lpc].name, known_schemas[next].name,
known_schemas[lpc].transform ? known_schemas[lpc].transform : "no-op");
#if HAVE_LIBXSLT
upgrade = apply_transformation(xml, known_schemas[lpc].transform);
#endif
if (upgrade == NULL) {
crm_err("Transformation %s failed", known_schemas[lpc].transform);
rc = -pcmk_err_transform_failed;
} else if (validate_with(upgrade, next, to_logs)) {
crm_info("Transformation %s successful", known_schemas[lpc].transform);
lpc = next;
*best = next;
free_xml(xml);
xml = upgrade;
rc = pcmk_ok;
} else {
crm_err("Transformation %s did not produce a valid configuration",
known_schemas[lpc].transform);
crm_log_xml_info(upgrade, "transform:bad");
free_xml(upgrade);
rc = -pcmk_err_schema_validation;
}
}
}
}
if (*best > match) {
crm_info("%s the configuration from %s to %s",
transform?"Transformed":"Upgraded",
value ? value : "<none>", known_schemas[*best].name);
crm_xml_add(xml, XML_ATTR_VALIDATION, known_schemas[*best].name);
}
*xml_blob = xml;
free(value);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 11,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ip_options *ip_options_get_alloc(const int optlen)
{
return kzalloc(sizeof(struct ip_options) + ((optlen + 3) & ~3),
GFP_KERNEL);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 18,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ChunkedUploadDataStream::ReadChunk(IOBuffer* buf, int buf_len) {
int bytes_read = 0;
while (read_index_ < upload_data_.size() && bytes_read < buf_len) {
std::vector<char>* data = upload_data_[read_index_].get();
size_t bytes_to_read =
std::min(static_cast<size_t>(buf_len - bytes_read),
data->size() - read_offset_);
memcpy(buf->data() + bytes_read, data->data() + read_offset_,
bytes_to_read);
bytes_read += bytes_to_read;
read_offset_ += bytes_to_read;
if (read_offset_ == data->size()) {
read_index_++;
read_offset_ = 0;
}
}
DCHECK_LE(bytes_read, buf_len);
if (bytes_read == 0 && !all_data_appended_)
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
if (read_index_ == upload_data_.size() && all_data_appended_)
SetIsFinalChunk();
return bytes_read;
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 24,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int patterncomponent(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, int *n)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
int n_comps, code;
const gs_color_space * pcs = gs_currentcolorspace(igs);
gs_client_color cc;
/* check for a pattern color space */
if ((n_comps = cs_num_components(pcs)) < 0) {
n_comps = -n_comps;
if (r_has_type(op, t_dictionary)) {
ref *pImpl, pPatInst;
code = dict_find_string(op, "Implementation", &pImpl);
if (code > 0) {
code = array_get(imemory, pImpl, 0, &pPatInst);
if (code < 0)
return code;
cc.pattern = r_ptr(&pPatInst, gs_pattern_instance_t);
if (pattern_instance_uses_base_space(cc.pattern))
*n = n_comps;
else
*n = 1;
} else
*n = 1;
} else
*n = 1;
} else
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 8,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnAdjustSelectionByCharacterOffset(
int start_adjust,
int end_adjust,
bool show_selection_menu) {
WebRange range = frame_->GetInputMethodController()->GetSelectionOffsets();
if (range.IsNull())
return;
if (start_adjust - end_adjust > range.length() ||
range.StartOffset() + start_adjust < 0)
return;
AutoResetMember<bool> handling_select_range(
this, &RenderFrameImpl::handling_select_range_, true);
frame_->SelectRange(WebRange(range.StartOffset() + start_adjust,
range.length() + end_adjust - start_adjust),
WebLocalFrame::kPreserveHandleVisibility,
show_selection_menu ? SelectionMenuBehavior::kShow
: SelectionMenuBehavior::kHide);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ucma_migrate_id(struct ucma_file *new_file,
const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_migrate_id cmd;
struct rdma_ucm_migrate_resp resp;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
struct fd f;
struct ucma_file *cur_file;
int ret = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Get current fd to protect against it being closed */
f = fdget(cmd.fd);
if (!f.file)
return -ENOENT;
/* Validate current fd and prevent destruction of id. */
ctx = ucma_get_ctx(f.file->private_data, cmd.id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(ctx);
goto file_put;
}
cur_file = ctx->file;
if (cur_file == new_file) {
resp.events_reported = ctx->events_reported;
goto response;
}
/*
* Migrate events between fd's, maintaining order, and avoiding new
* events being added before existing events.
*/
ucma_lock_files(cur_file, new_file);
mutex_lock(&mut);
list_move_tail(&ctx->list, &new_file->ctx_list);
ucma_move_events(ctx, new_file);
ctx->file = new_file;
resp.events_reported = ctx->events_reported;
mutex_unlock(&mut);
ucma_unlock_files(cur_file, new_file);
response:
if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd.response),
&resp, sizeof(resp)))
ret = -EFAULT;
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
file_put:
fdput(f);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@beyondsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 25,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void BROTLI_NOINLINE DecodeDistanceBlockSwitch(BrotliState* s) {
DecodeDistanceBlockSwitchInternal(0, s);
}
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AcpiDsCreateOperand (
ACPI_WALK_STATE *WalkState,
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Arg,
UINT32 ArgIndex)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status = AE_OK;
char *NameString;
UINT32 NameLength;
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT *ObjDesc;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *ParentOp;
UINT16 Opcode;
ACPI_INTERPRETER_MODE InterpreterMode;
const ACPI_OPCODE_INFO *OpInfo;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE_PTR (DsCreateOperand, Arg);
/* A valid name must be looked up in the namespace */
if ((Arg->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_INT_NAMEPATH_OP) &&
(Arg->Common.Value.String) &&
!(Arg->Common.Flags & ACPI_PARSEOP_IN_STACK))
{
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_DISPATCH, "Getting a name: Arg=%p\n", Arg));
/* Get the entire name string from the AML stream */
Status = AcpiExGetNameString (ACPI_TYPE_ANY,
Arg->Common.Value.Buffer, &NameString, &NameLength);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
/* All prefixes have been handled, and the name is in NameString */
/*
* Special handling for BufferField declarations. This is a deferred
* opcode that unfortunately defines the field name as the last
* parameter instead of the first. We get here when we are performing
* the deferred execution, so the actual name of the field is already
* in the namespace. We don't want to attempt to look it up again
* because we may be executing in a different scope than where the
* actual opcode exists.
*/
if ((WalkState->DeferredNode) &&
(WalkState->DeferredNode->Type == ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER_FIELD) &&
(ArgIndex == (UINT32)
((WalkState->Opcode == AML_CREATE_FIELD_OP) ? 3 : 2)))
{
ObjDesc = ACPI_CAST_PTR (
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT, WalkState->DeferredNode);
Status = AE_OK;
}
else /* All other opcodes */
{
/*
* Differentiate between a namespace "create" operation
* versus a "lookup" operation (IMODE_LOAD_PASS2 vs.
* IMODE_EXECUTE) in order to support the creation of
* namespace objects during the execution of control methods.
*/
ParentOp = Arg->Common.Parent;
OpInfo = AcpiPsGetOpcodeInfo (ParentOp->Common.AmlOpcode);
if ((OpInfo->Flags & AML_NSNODE) &&
(ParentOp->Common.AmlOpcode != AML_INT_METHODCALL_OP) &&
(ParentOp->Common.AmlOpcode != AML_REGION_OP) &&
(ParentOp->Common.AmlOpcode != AML_INT_NAMEPATH_OP))
{
/* Enter name into namespace if not found */
InterpreterMode = ACPI_IMODE_LOAD_PASS2;
}
else
{
/* Return a failure if name not found */
InterpreterMode = ACPI_IMODE_EXECUTE;
}
Status = AcpiNsLookup (WalkState->ScopeInfo, NameString,
ACPI_TYPE_ANY, InterpreterMode,
ACPI_NS_SEARCH_PARENT | ACPI_NS_DONT_OPEN_SCOPE, WalkState,
ACPI_CAST_INDIRECT_PTR (ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE, &ObjDesc));
/*
* The only case where we pass through (ignore) a NOT_FOUND
* error is for the CondRefOf opcode.
*/
if (Status == AE_NOT_FOUND)
{
if (ParentOp->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_CONDITIONAL_REF_OF_OP)
{
/*
* For the Conditional Reference op, it's OK if
* the name is not found; We just need a way to
* indicate this to the interpreter, set the
* object to the root
*/
ObjDesc = ACPI_CAST_PTR (
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT, AcpiGbl_RootNode);
Status = AE_OK;
}
else if (ParentOp->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_EXTERNAL_OP)
{
/*
* This opcode should never appear here. It is used only
* by AML disassemblers and is surrounded by an If(0)
* by the ASL compiler.
*
* Therefore, if we see it here, it is a serious error.
*/
Status = AE_AML_BAD_OPCODE;
}
else
{
/*
* We just plain didn't find it -- which is a
* very serious error at this point
*/
Status = AE_AML_NAME_NOT_FOUND;
}
}
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
ACPI_ERROR_NAMESPACE (NameString, Status);
}
}
/* Free the namestring created above */
ACPI_FREE (NameString);
/* Check status from the lookup */
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
/* Put the resulting object onto the current object stack */
Status = AcpiDsObjStackPush (ObjDesc, WalkState);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
AcpiDbDisplayArgumentObject (ObjDesc, WalkState);
}
else
{
/* Check for null name case */
if ((Arg->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_INT_NAMEPATH_OP) &&
!(Arg->Common.Flags & ACPI_PARSEOP_IN_STACK))
{
/*
* If the name is null, this means that this is an
* optional result parameter that was not specified
* in the original ASL. Create a Zero Constant for a
* placeholder. (Store to a constant is a Noop.)
*/
Opcode = AML_ZERO_OP; /* Has no arguments! */
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_DISPATCH,
"Null namepath: Arg=%p\n", Arg));
}
else
{
Opcode = Arg->Common.AmlOpcode;
}
/* Get the object type of the argument */
OpInfo = AcpiPsGetOpcodeInfo (Opcode);
if (OpInfo->ObjectType == ACPI_TYPE_INVALID)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
}
if ((OpInfo->Flags & AML_HAS_RETVAL) ||
(Arg->Common.Flags & ACPI_PARSEOP_IN_STACK))
{
/*
* Use value that was already previously returned
* by the evaluation of this argument
*/
Status = AcpiDsResultPop (&ObjDesc, WalkState);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
/*
* Only error is underflow, and this indicates
* a missing or null operand!
*/
ACPI_EXCEPTION ((AE_INFO, Status,
"Missing or null operand"));
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
}
else
{
/* Create an ACPI_INTERNAL_OBJECT for the argument */
ObjDesc = AcpiUtCreateInternalObject (OpInfo->ObjectType);
if (!ObjDesc)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_NO_MEMORY);
}
/* Initialize the new object */
Status = AcpiDsInitObjectFromOp (
WalkState, Arg, Opcode, &ObjDesc);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
AcpiUtDeleteObjectDesc (ObjDesc);
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
}
/* Put the operand object on the object stack */
Status = AcpiDsObjStackPush (ObjDesc, WalkState);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
AcpiDbDisplayArgumentObject (ObjDesc, WalkState);
}
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_OK);
}
Commit Message: acpi: acpica: fix acpi operand cache leak in dswstate.c
I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case.
When early termination occurs due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates
ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.585957] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.587218] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.588530] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.589790] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.591534] ACPI Error: Illegal I/O port address/length above 64K: C806E00000004002/0x2 (20170303/hwvalid-155)
>[ 0.594351] ACPI Exception: AE_LIMIT, Unable to initialize fixed events (20170303/evevent-88)
>[ 0.597858] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.599162] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.601836] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects
>[ 0.603556] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 #26
>[ 0.605159] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.609177] Call Trace:
>[ 0.610063] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
>[ 0.611118] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
>[ 0.612632] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.613906] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
>[ 0.617986] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.619293] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
>[ 0.620394] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
>[ 0.621616] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.623412] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
>[ 0.624585] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.625861] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
>[ 0.627513] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f
>[ 0.628972] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.630043] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.631084] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
>[ 0.633343] vgaarb: loaded
>[ 0.635036] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0
>[ 0.638601] PCI: Probing PCI hardware
>[ 0.639833] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00
>[ 0.641031] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [io 0x0000-0xffff]
> ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ...
I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_
delete() function miscalculated the top of the stack. acpi_ds_obj_stack_push()
function uses walk_state->operand_index for start position of the top, but
acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_delete() function considers index 0 for it.
Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak.
This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_pal_call(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
{
struct exit_ctl_data *p;
p = kvm_get_exit_data(vcpu);
if (p->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_PAL_CALL)
return kvm_pal_emul(vcpu, kvm_run);
else {
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
kvm_run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = 2;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE &&
!vcpu->arch.apf.halted)
|| !list_empty_careful(&vcpu->async_pf.done)
|| vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_SIPI_RECEIVED
|| atomic_read(&vcpu->arch.nmi_queued) ||
(kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(vcpu) &&
kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(vcpu));
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 4,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tpm_continue_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
u8 data[] = {
0, 193, /* TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND */
0, 0, 0, 10, /* length */
0, 0, 0, 83, /* TPM_ORD_GetCapability */
};
tpm_transmit(chip, data, sizeof(data));
}
Commit Message: char/tpm: Fix unitialized usage of data buffer
This patch fixes information leakage to the userspace by initializing
the data buffer to zero.
Reported-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Selhorst <m.selhorst@sirrix.com>
[ Also removed the silly "* sizeof(u8)". If that isn't 1, we have way
deeper problems than a simple multiplication can fix. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 27,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AddAllUsers() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kTestAccounts); ++i)
AddUser(kTestAccounts[i], i >= SECONDARY_ACCOUNT_INDEX_START);
}
Commit Message: Add paste menu item to the gear menu.
Test: browser_tests --gtest_filter=GearMenu*
Bug: 796815
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: Iab214e1e4e991518e8c8c02a37ebd7a5c93e93f3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/841962
Commit-Queue: Tatsuhisa Yamaguchi <yamaguchi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Naoki Fukino <fukino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531484}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::RunScriptsAtDocumentIdle() {
if (web_frame_->Client())
web_frame_->Client()->RunScriptsAtDocumentIdle();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 19,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawArrays(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::DrawArrays& c) {
GLenum mode = static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode);
GLint first = static_cast<GLint>(c.first);
GLsizei count = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.count);
if (!validators_->draw_mode.IsValid(mode)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glDrawArrays: mode GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: count < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckFramebufferComplete("glDrawArrays")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (first < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: first < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint max_vertex_accessed = first + count - 1;
if (IsDrawValid(max_vertex_accessed)) {
bool simulated_attrib_0 = SimulateAttrib0(max_vertex_accessed);
bool simulated_fixed_attribs = false;
if (SimulateFixedAttribs(max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_fixed_attribs)) {
bool textures_set = SetBlackTextureForNonRenderableTextures();
ApplyDirtyState();
glDrawArrays(mode, first, count);
if (textures_set) {
RestoreStateForNonRenderableTextures();
}
if (simulated_fixed_attribs) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedFixedAttribs();
}
}
if (simulated_attrib_0) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedAttrib0();
}
if (WasContextLost()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Context lost during DrawArrays.";
return error::kLostContext;
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 10,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLCanvasElement* Document::getCSSCanvasElement(const String& name)
{
RefPtr<HTMLCanvasElement>& element = m_cssCanvasElements.add(name, 0).iterator->value;
if (!element)
element = HTMLCanvasElement::create(this);
return element.get();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ProfileSyncService::ActivateDataType(
syncable::ModelType type, browser_sync::ModelSafeGroup group,
ChangeProcessor* change_processor) {
if (!backend_.get()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
DCHECK(backend_initialized_);
backend_->ActivateDataType(type, group, change_processor);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 13,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetOverrideEncoding(const std::string& encoding) {
SetEncoding(encoding);
Send(new ViewMsg_SetPageEncoding(GetRoutingID(), encoding));
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parsefh(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const uint32_t *dp, int v3)
{
u_int len;
if (v3) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp) / 4;
dp++;
} else
len = NFSX_V2FH / 4;
if (ND_TTEST2(*dp, len * sizeof(*dp))) {
nfs_printfh(ndo, dp, len);
return (dp + len);
}
trunc:
return (NULL);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13005/NFS: Add two bounds checks before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 8,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dvcman_free(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, IWTSVirtualChannelManager* pChannelMgr)
{
int i;
IWTSPlugin* pPlugin;
DVCMAN_LISTENER* listener;
DVCMAN* dvcman = (DVCMAN*) pChannelMgr;
UINT error;
ArrayList_Free(dvcman->channels);
for (i = 0; i < dvcman->num_listeners; i++)
{
listener = (DVCMAN_LISTENER*) dvcman->listeners[i];
free(listener->channel_name);
free(listener);
}
dvcman->num_listeners = 0;
for (i = 0; i < dvcman->num_plugins; i++)
{
pPlugin = dvcman->plugins[i];
if (pPlugin->Terminated)
if ((error = pPlugin->Terminated(pPlugin)))
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Terminated failed with error %"PRIu32"!", error);
}
dvcman->num_plugins = 0;
StreamPool_Free(dvcman->pool);
free(dvcman);
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_recover_proc_open(struct nfs4_opendata *data)
{
struct inode *dir = data->dir->d_inode;
struct nfs_openres *o_res = &data->o_res;
int status;
status = nfs4_run_open_task(data, 1);
if (status != 0 || !data->rpc_done)
return status;
nfs_fattr_map_and_free_names(NFS_SERVER(dir), &data->f_attr);
if (o_res->rflags & NFS4_OPEN_RESULT_CONFIRM) {
status = _nfs4_proc_open_confirm(data);
if (status != 0)
return status;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsDataSource::StartDataRequest(
const std::string& path,
const content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& wc_getter,
const content::URLDataSource::GotDataCallback& callback) {
std::string bundled_path_prefix(chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsBundledPath);
bundled_path_prefix += "/";
if (base::StartsWith(path, bundled_path_prefix,
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
StartBundledDataRequest(path.substr(bundled_path_prefix.length()),
callback);
return;
}
std::string remote_path_prefix(chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsRemotePath);
remote_path_prefix += "/";
if (base::StartsWith(path, remote_path_prefix,
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
StartRemoteDataRequest(path.substr(remote_path_prefix.length()),
callback);
return;
}
std::string custom_frontend_url =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kCustomDevtoolsFrontend);
if (custom_frontend_url.empty()) {
callback.Run(NULL);
return;
}
std::string custom_path_prefix(chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsCustomPath);
custom_path_prefix += "/";
if (base::StartsWith(path, custom_path_prefix,
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
GURL url = GURL(custom_frontend_url +
path.substr(custom_path_prefix.length()));
StartCustomDataRequest(url, callback);
return;
}
callback.Run(NULL);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 25,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __net_init sit_init_net(struct net *net)
{
struct sit_net *sitn = net_generic(net, sit_net_id);
struct ip_tunnel *t;
int err;
sitn->tunnels[0] = sitn->tunnels_wc;
sitn->tunnels[1] = sitn->tunnels_l;
sitn->tunnels[2] = sitn->tunnels_r;
sitn->tunnels[3] = sitn->tunnels_r_l;
if (!net_has_fallback_tunnels(net))
return 0;
sitn->fb_tunnel_dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(struct ip_tunnel), "sit0",
NET_NAME_UNKNOWN,
ipip6_tunnel_setup);
if (!sitn->fb_tunnel_dev) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_alloc_dev;
}
dev_net_set(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev, net);
sitn->fb_tunnel_dev->rtnl_link_ops = &sit_link_ops;
/* FB netdevice is special: we have one, and only one per netns.
* Allowing to move it to another netns is clearly unsafe.
*/
sitn->fb_tunnel_dev->features |= NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL;
err = register_netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev);
if (err)
goto err_reg_dev;
ipip6_tunnel_clone_6rd(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev, sitn);
ipip6_fb_tunnel_init(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev);
t = netdev_priv(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev);
strcpy(t->parms.name, sitn->fb_tunnel_dev->name);
return 0;
err_reg_dev:
ipip6_dev_free(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev);
err_alloc_dev:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: sit: fix memory leak in sit_init_net()
If register_netdev() is failed to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev,
it will go to err_reg_dev and forget to free netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev).
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888378daad00 (size 512):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 4006, jiffies 4295121142 (age 16.115s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 e6 ed c0 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:577 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:585 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] netif_alloc_netdev_queues net/core/dev.c:8380 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x600/0xcc0 net/core/dev.c:8970
[<00000000867e172f>] sit_init_net+0x295/0xa40 net/ipv6/sit.c:1848
[<00000000871019fa>] ops_init+0xad/0x3e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:129
[<00000000319507f6>] setup_net+0x2ba/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:314
[<0000000087db4f96>] copy_net_ns+0x1dc/0x330 net/core/net_namespace.c:437
[<0000000057efc651>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0x730 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
[<00000000676f83de>] copy_namespaces+0x2ed/0x3d0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
[<0000000030b74bac>] copy_process.part.27+0x231e/0x6db0 kernel/fork.c:1919
[<00000000fff78746>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1713 [inline]
[<00000000fff78746>] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xe90 kernel/fork.c:2224
[<000000001c2e0d1c>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000ec48bd44>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<0000000039acff8a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 1 | 25,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline gl::GLApi* BackRenderbuffer::api() const {
return decoder_->api();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 28,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64_t position() { return position_; }
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 9,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::NativeViewAccessible WebContentsImpl::GetParentNativeViewAccessible() {
return accessible_parent_;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u8 fr_lmi_nextseq(u8 x)
{
x++;
return x ? x : 1;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Transform Translation(SkMScalar x, SkMScalar y) {
gfx::Transform transform;
transform.Translate(x, y);
return transform;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: am_get_service_url(request_rec *r, LassoProfile *profile, char *service_name)
{
LassoProvider *provider;
gchar *url;
provider = lasso_server_get_provider(profile->server,
profile->remote_providerID);
if (LASSO_IS_PROVIDER(provider) == FALSE) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r,
"Cannot find provider service %s, no provider.",
service_name);
return NULL;
}
url = lasso_provider_get_metadata_one(provider, service_name);
if (url == NULL) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r,
"Cannot find provider service %s from metadata.",
service_name);
return NULL;
}
return url;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 21,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err padb_Read(GF_Box *s,GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 i;
GF_PaddingBitsBox *ptr = (GF_PaddingBitsBox *)s;
ptr->SampleCount = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->padbits = (u8 *)gf_malloc(sizeof(u8)*ptr->SampleCount);
for (i=0; i<ptr->SampleCount; i += 2) {
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
if (i+1 < ptr->SampleCount) {
ptr->padbits[i+1] = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3);
} else {
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3);
}
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
ptr->padbits[i] = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 7,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int hiddev_connect(struct hid_device *hid, unsigned int force)
{
struct hiddev *hiddev;
struct usbhid_device *usbhid = hid->driver_data;
int retval;
if (!force) {
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < hid->maxcollection; i++)
if (hid->collection[i].type ==
HID_COLLECTION_APPLICATION &&
!IS_INPUT_APPLICATION(hid->collection[i].usage))
break;
if (i == hid->maxcollection)
return -1;
}
if (!(hiddev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct hiddev), GFP_KERNEL)))
return -1;
init_waitqueue_head(&hiddev->wait);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hiddev->list);
spin_lock_init(&hiddev->list_lock);
mutex_init(&hiddev->existancelock);
hid->hiddev = hiddev;
hiddev->hid = hid;
hiddev->exist = 1;
retval = usb_register_dev(usbhid->intf, &hiddev_class);
if (retval) {
hid_err(hid, "Not able to get a minor for this device\n");
hid->hiddev = NULL;
kfree(hiddev);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: HID: hiddev: validate num_values for HIDIOCGUSAGES, HIDIOCSUSAGES commands
This patch validates the num_values parameter from userland during the
HIDIOCGUSAGES and HIDIOCSUSAGES commands. Previously, if the report id was set
to HID_REPORT_ID_UNKNOWN, we would fail to validate the num_values parameter
leading to a heap overflow.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void setup_sysctl_set(struct ctl_table_set *p,
struct ctl_table_set *parent,
int (*is_seen)(struct ctl_table_set *))
{
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->list);
p->parent = parent ? parent : &sysctl_table_root.default_set;
p->is_seen = is_seen;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: incomplete_line (void)
{
FILE *fp = pfp;
int c;
file_offset line_beginning = file_tell (fp);
if (getc (fp) == '\\')
{
while ((c = getc (fp)) != '\n' && c != EOF)
/* do nothing */ ;
return true;
}
else
{
/* We don't trust ungetc. */
Fseek (pfp, line_beginning, SEEK_SET);
return false;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 24,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct priority_group *alloc_priority_group(void)
{
struct priority_group *pg;
pg = kzalloc(sizeof(*pg), GFP_KERNEL);
if (pg)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pg->pgpaths);
return pg;
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 ieee80211_idle_on(struct ieee80211_local *local)
{
if (local->hw.conf.flags & IEEE80211_CONF_IDLE)
return 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_VERBOSE_DEBUG
wiphy_debug(local->hw.wiphy, "device now idle\n");
#endif
drv_flush(local, false);
local->hw.conf.flags |= IEEE80211_CONF_IDLE;
return IEEE80211_CONF_CHANGE_IDLE;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 16,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct vm_area_struct *find_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
{
struct rb_node *rb_node;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
/* Check the cache first. */
vma = vmacache_find(mm, addr);
if (likely(vma))
return vma;
rb_node = mm->mm_rb.rb_node;
while (rb_node) {
struct vm_area_struct *tmp;
tmp = rb_entry(rb_node, struct vm_area_struct, vm_rb);
if (tmp->vm_end > addr) {
vma = tmp;
if (tmp->vm_start <= addr)
break;
rb_node = rb_node->rb_left;
} else
rb_node = rb_node->rb_right;
}
if (vma)
vmacache_update(addr, vma);
return vma;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 7,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AutofillPopupRowView::OnMousePressed(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 19,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnOpenFile(
int request_id, const GURL& path, int file_flags) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
base::PlatformFileError error;
const int open_permissions = base::PLATFORM_FILE_OPEN |
(file_flags & kOpenFilePermissions);
FileSystemURL url(path);
if (!HasPermissionsForFile(url, open_permissions, &error)) {
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidFail(request_id, error));
return;
}
FileSystemOperation* operation = GetNewOperation(url, request_id);
if (!operation)
return;
operation->OpenFile(
url, file_flags, peer_handle(),
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidOpenFile, this, request_id, path));
}
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 3,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wc_ecc_copy_point(ecc_point* p, ecc_point *r)
{
int ret;
/* prevents null arguments */
if (p == NULL || r == NULL)
return ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
ret = mp_copy(p->x, r->x);
if (ret != MP_OKAY)
return ret;
ret = mp_copy(p->y, r->y);
if (ret != MP_OKAY)
return ret;
ret = mp_copy(p->z, r->z);
if (ret != MP_OKAY)
return ret;
return MP_OKAY;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 20,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *rvcc_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_RVCConfigurationBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_RVCC);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 7,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: delete_file_recursively (GFile *file,
GCancellable *cancellable,
DeleteCallback callback,
gpointer callback_data)
{
gboolean success;
g_autoptr (GError) error = NULL;
do
{
g_autoptr (GFileEnumerator) enumerator = NULL;
success = g_file_delete (file, cancellable, &error);
if (success ||
!g_error_matches (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_EMPTY))
{
break;
}
g_clear_error (&error);
enumerator = g_file_enumerate_children (file,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_NAME,
G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NONE,
cancellable, &error);
if (enumerator)
{
GFileInfo *info;
success = TRUE;
info = g_file_enumerator_next_file (enumerator,
cancellable,
&error);
while (info != NULL)
{
g_autoptr (GFile) child = NULL;
child = g_file_enumerator_get_child (enumerator, info);
success = success && delete_file_recursively (child,
cancellable,
callback,
callback_data);
g_object_unref (info);
info = g_file_enumerator_next_file (enumerator,
cancellable,
&error);
}
}
if (error != NULL)
{
success = FALSE;
}
}
while (success);
if (callback)
{
callback (file, error, callback_data);
}
return success;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pp::Var Instance::CallScriptableMethod(const pp::Var& method,
const std::vector<pp::Var>& args,
pp::Var* exception) {
std::string method_str = method.AsString();
if (method_str == kJSGrayscale) {
if (args.size() == 1 && args[0].is_bool()) {
engine_->SetGrayscale(args[0].AsBool());
paint_manager_.InvalidateRect(pp::Rect(pp::Point(), plugin_size_));
#ifdef ENABLE_THUMBNAILS
if (thumbnails_.visible())
thumbnails_.Show(true, true);
#endif
return pp::Var(true);
}
return pp::Var(false);
}
if (method_str == kJSOnLoad) {
if (args.size() == 1 && args[0].is_string()) {
on_load_callback_ = args[0];
return pp::Var(true);
}
return pp::Var(false);
}
if (method_str == kJSOnScroll) {
if (args.size() == 1 && args[0].is_string()) {
on_scroll_callback_ = args[0];
return pp::Var(true);
}
return pp::Var(false);
}
if (method_str == kJSOnPluginSizeChanged) {
if (args.size() == 1 && args[0].is_string()) {
on_plugin_size_changed_callback_ = args[0];
return pp::Var(true);
}
return pp::Var(false);
}
if (method_str == kJSReload) {
document_load_state_ = LOAD_STATE_LOADING;
if (!full_)
LoadUrl(url_);
preview_engine_.reset();
print_preview_page_count_ = 0;
engine_.reset(PDFEngine::Create(this));
engine_->New(url_.c_str());
#ifdef ENABLE_THUMBNAILS
thumbnails_.ResetEngine(engine_.get());
#endif
return pp::Var();
}
if (method_str == kJSResetPrintPreviewUrl) {
if (args.size() == 1 && args[0].is_string()) {
url_ = args[0].AsString();
preview_pages_info_ = std::queue<PreviewPageInfo>();
preview_document_load_state_ = LOAD_STATE_COMPLETE;
}
return pp::Var();
}
if (method_str == kJSZoomFitToHeight) {
SetZoom(ZOOM_FIT_TO_PAGE, 0);
return pp::Var();
}
if (method_str == kJSZoomFitToWidth) {
SetZoom(ZOOM_FIT_TO_WIDTH, 0);
return pp::Var();
}
if (method_str == kJSZoomIn) {
SetZoom(ZOOM_SCALE, CalculateZoom(kZoomInButtonId));
return pp::Var();
}
if (method_str == kJSZoomOut) {
SetZoom(ZOOM_SCALE, CalculateZoom(kZoomOutButtonId));
return pp::Var();
}
if (method_str == kJSSetZoomLevel) {
if (args.size() == 1 && args[0].is_number())
SetZoom(ZOOM_SCALE, args[0].AsDouble());
return pp::Var();
}
if (method_str == kJSGetZoomLevel) {
return pp::Var(zoom_);
}
if (method_str == kJSGetHeight) {
return pp::Var(plugin_size_.height());
}
if (method_str == kJSGetWidth) {
return pp::Var(plugin_size_.width());
}
if (method_str == kJSGetHorizontalScrollbarThickness) {
return pp::Var(
h_scrollbar_.get() ? GetScrollbarReservedThickness() : 0);
}
if (method_str == kJSGetVerticalScrollbarThickness) {
return pp::Var(
v_scrollbar_.get() ? GetScrollbarReservedThickness() : 0);
}
if (method_str == kJSDocumentLoadComplete) {
return pp::Var((document_load_state_ != LOAD_STATE_LOADING));
}
if (method_str == kJSPageYOffset) {
return pp::Var(static_cast<int32_t>(
v_scrollbar_.get() ? v_scrollbar_->GetValue() : 0));
}
if (method_str == kJSSetPageYOffset) {
if (args.size() == 1 && args[0].is_number() && v_scrollbar_.get())
ScrollToY(GetScaled(args[0].AsInt()));
return pp::Var();
}
if (method_str == kJSPageXOffset) {
return pp::Var(static_cast<int32_t>(
h_scrollbar_.get() ? h_scrollbar_->GetValue() : 0));
}
if (method_str == kJSSetPageXOffset) {
if (args.size() == 1 && args[0].is_number() && h_scrollbar_.get())
ScrollToX(GetScaled(args[0].AsInt()));
return pp::Var();
}
if (method_str == kJSRemovePrintButton) {
CreateToolbar(kPrintPreviewToolbarButtons,
arraysize(kPrintPreviewToolbarButtons));
UpdateToolbarPosition(false);
Invalidate(pp::Rect(plugin_size_));
return pp::Var();
}
if (method_str == kJSGoToPage) {
if (args.size() == 1 && args[0].is_string()) {
ScrollToPage(atoi(args[0].AsString().c_str()));
}
return pp::Var();
}
if (method_str == kJSAccessibility) {
if (args.size() == 0) {
base::DictionaryValue node;
node.SetInteger(kAccessibleNumberOfPages, engine_->GetNumberOfPages());
node.SetBoolean(kAccessibleLoaded,
document_load_state_ != LOAD_STATE_LOADING);
bool has_permissions =
engine_->HasPermission(PDFEngine::PERMISSION_COPY) ||
engine_->HasPermission(PDFEngine::PERMISSION_COPY_ACCESSIBLE);
node.SetBoolean(kAccessibleCopyable, has_permissions);
std::string json;
base::JSONWriter::Write(&node, &json);
return pp::Var(json);
} else if (args[0].is_number()) {
return pp::Var(engine_->GetPageAsJSON(args[0].AsInt()));
}
}
if (method_str == kJSPrintPreviewPageCount) {
if (args.size() == 1 && args[0].is_number())
SetPrintPreviewMode(args[0].AsInt());
return pp::Var();
}
if (method_str == kJSLoadPreviewPage) {
if (args.size() == 2 && args[0].is_string() && args[1].is_number())
ProcessPreviewPageInfo(args[0].AsString(), args[1].AsInt());
return pp::Var();
}
if (method_str == kJSGetPageLocationNormalized) {
const size_t kMaxLength = 30;
char location_info[kMaxLength];
int page_idx = engine_->GetMostVisiblePage();
if (page_idx < 0)
return pp::Var(std::string());
pp::Rect rect = engine_->GetPageContentsRect(page_idx);
int v_scrollbar_reserved_thickness =
v_scrollbar_.get() ? GetScaled(GetScrollbarReservedThickness()) : 0;
rect.set_x(rect.x() + ((plugin_size_.width() -
v_scrollbar_reserved_thickness - available_area_.width()) / 2));
base::snprintf(location_info,
kMaxLength,
"%0.4f;%0.4f;%0.4f;%0.4f;",
rect.x() / static_cast<float>(plugin_size_.width()),
rect.y() / static_cast<float>(plugin_size_.height()),
rect.width() / static_cast<float>(plugin_size_.width()),
rect.height()/ static_cast<float>(plugin_size_.height()));
return pp::Var(std::string(location_info));
}
if (method_str == kJSSetPageNumbers) {
if (args.size() != 1 || !args[0].is_string())
return pp::Var();
const int num_pages_signed = engine_->GetNumberOfPages();
if (num_pages_signed <= 0)
return pp::Var();
scoped_ptr<base::ListValue> page_ranges(static_cast<base::ListValue*>(
base::JSONReader::Read(args[0].AsString(), false)));
const size_t num_pages = static_cast<size_t>(num_pages_signed);
if (!page_ranges.get() || page_ranges->GetSize() != num_pages)
return pp::Var();
std::vector<int> print_preview_page_numbers;
for (size_t index = 0; index < num_pages; ++index) {
int page_number = 0; // |page_number| is 1-based.
if (!page_ranges->GetInteger(index, &page_number) || page_number < 1)
return pp::Var();
print_preview_page_numbers.push_back(page_number);
}
print_preview_page_numbers_ = print_preview_page_numbers;
page_indicator_.set_current_page(GetPageNumberToDisplay());
return pp::Var();
}
if (method_str == kJSSendKeyEvent) {
if (args.size() == 1 && args[0].is_number()) {
pp::KeyboardInputEvent event(
this, // instance
PP_INPUTEVENT_TYPE_KEYDOWN, // HandleInputEvent only care about this.
0, // timestamp, not used for kbd events.
0, // no modifiers.
args[0].AsInt(), // keycode.
pp::Var()); // no char text needed.
HandleInputEvent(event);
}
}
return pp::Var();
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void btrfs_run_delayed_iputs(struct btrfs_root *root)
{
LIST_HEAD(list);
struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = root->fs_info;
struct delayed_iput *delayed;
int empty;
spin_lock(&fs_info->delayed_iput_lock);
empty = list_empty(&fs_info->delayed_iputs);
spin_unlock(&fs_info->delayed_iput_lock);
if (empty)
return;
down_read(&fs_info->delayed_iput_sem);
spin_lock(&fs_info->delayed_iput_lock);
list_splice_init(&fs_info->delayed_iputs, &list);
spin_unlock(&fs_info->delayed_iput_lock);
while (!list_empty(&list)) {
delayed = list_entry(list.next, struct delayed_iput, list);
list_del(&delayed->list);
iput(delayed->inode);
kfree(delayed);
}
up_read(&root->fs_info->delayed_iput_sem);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum test_return test_binary_appendq(void) {
return test_binary_concat_impl("test_binary_appendq",
PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_APPENDQ);
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int put_words(OHCIState *ohci,
dma_addr_t addr, uint16_t *buf, int num)
{
int i;
addr += ohci->localmem_base;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++, buf++, addr += sizeof(*buf)) {
uint16_t tmp = cpu_to_le16(*buf);
if (dma_memory_write(ohci->as, addr, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 9,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CWD_API int php_sys_readlink(const char *link, char *target, size_t target_len){ /* {{{ */
HINSTANCE kernel32;
HANDLE hFile;
DWORD dwRet;
typedef BOOL (WINAPI *gfpnh_func)(HANDLE, LPTSTR, DWORD, DWORD);
gfpnh_func pGetFinalPathNameByHandle;
kernel32 = LoadLibrary("kernel32.dll");
if (kernel32) {
pGetFinalPathNameByHandle = (gfpnh_func)GetProcAddress(kernel32, "GetFinalPathNameByHandleA");
if (pGetFinalPathNameByHandle == NULL) {
return -1;
}
} else {
return -1;
}
hFile = CreateFile(link, // file to open
GENERIC_READ, // open for reading
FILE_SHARE_READ, // share for reading
NULL, // default security
OPEN_EXISTING, // existing file only
FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS, // normal file
NULL); // no attr. template
if( hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
return -1;
}
dwRet = pGetFinalPathNameByHandle(hFile, target, MAXPATHLEN, VOLUME_NAME_DOS);
if(dwRet >= MAXPATHLEN || dwRet == 0) {
return -1;
}
CloseHandle(hFile);
if(dwRet > 4) {
/* Skip first 4 characters if they are "\??\" */
if(target[0] == '\\' && target[1] == '\\' && target[2] == '?' && target[3] == '\\') {
char tmp[MAXPATHLEN];
unsigned int offset = 4;
dwRet -= 4;
/* \??\UNC\ */
if (dwRet > 7 && target[4] == 'U' && target[5] == 'N' && target[6] == 'C') {
offset += 2;
dwRet -= 2;
target[offset] = '\\';
}
memcpy(tmp, target + offset, dwRet);
memcpy(target, tmp, dwRet);
}
}
target[dwRet] = '\0';
return dwRet;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 29,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: side_get_n_unix_fds (ProxySide *side, int n_fds)
{
GList *res = NULL;
while (side->control_messages != NULL)
{
GSocketControlMessage *control_message = side->control_messages->data;
if (G_IS_UNIX_FD_MESSAGE (control_message))
{
GUnixFDMessage *fd_message = G_UNIX_FD_MESSAGE (control_message);
GUnixFDList *fd_list = g_unix_fd_message_get_fd_list (fd_message);
int len = g_unix_fd_list_get_length (fd_list);
/* I believe that socket control messages are never merged, and
the sender side sends only one unix-fd-list per message, so
at this point there should always be one full fd list
per requested number of fds */
if (len != n_fds)
{
g_warning ("Not right nr of fds in socket message");
return NULL;
}
side->control_messages = g_list_delete_link (side->control_messages, side->control_messages);
return g_list_append (NULL, control_message);
}
g_object_unref (control_message);
side->control_messages = g_list_delete_link (side->control_messages, side->control_messages);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 21,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static spl_ptr_heap *spl_ptr_heap_clone(spl_ptr_heap *from TSRMLS_DC) { /* {{{ */
int i;
spl_ptr_heap *heap = emalloc(sizeof(spl_ptr_heap));
heap->dtor = from->dtor;
heap->ctor = from->ctor;
heap->cmp = from->cmp;
heap->max_size = from->max_size;
heap->count = from->count;
heap->flags = from->flags;
heap->elements = safe_emalloc(sizeof(spl_ptr_heap_element),from->max_size,0);
memcpy(heap->elements, from->elements, sizeof(spl_ptr_heap_element)*from->max_size);
for (i=0; i < heap->count; ++i) {
heap->ctor(heap->elements[i] TSRMLS_CC);
}
return heap;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int virtio_gpu_save(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, size_t size,
VMStateField *field, QJSON *vmdesc)
{
VirtIOGPU *g = opaque;
struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res;
int i;
/* in 2d mode we should never find unprocessed commands here */
assert(QTAILQ_EMPTY(&g->cmdq));
QTAILQ_FOREACH(res, &g->reslist, next) {
qemu_put_be32(f, res->resource_id);
qemu_put_be32(f, res->width);
qemu_put_be32(f, res->height);
qemu_put_be32(f, res->format);
qemu_put_be32(f, res->iov_cnt);
for (i = 0; i < res->iov_cnt; i++) {
qemu_put_be64(f, res->addrs[i]);
qemu_put_be32(f, res->iov[i].iov_len);
}
qemu_put_buffer(f, (void *)pixman_image_get_data(res->image),
pixman_image_get_stride(res->image) * res->height);
}
qemu_put_be32(f, 0); /* end of list */
vmstate_save_state(f, &vmstate_virtio_gpu_scanouts, g, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderLayerScrollableArea::hitTestOverflowControls(HitTestResult& result, const IntPoint& localPoint)
{
if (!hasScrollbar() && !box().canResize())
return false;
IntRect resizeControlRect;
if (box().style()->resize() != RESIZE_NONE) {
resizeControlRect = resizerCornerRect(box().pixelSnappedBorderBoxRect(), ResizerForPointer);
if (resizeControlRect.contains(localPoint))
return true;
}
int resizeControlSize = max(resizeControlRect.height(), 0);
if (m_vBar && m_vBar->shouldParticipateInHitTesting()) {
LayoutRect vBarRect(verticalScrollbarStart(0, box().width()),
box().borderTop(),
m_vBar->width(),
box().height() - (box().borderTop() + box().borderBottom()) - (m_hBar ? m_hBar->height() : resizeControlSize));
if (vBarRect.contains(localPoint)) {
result.setScrollbar(m_vBar.get());
return true;
}
}
resizeControlSize = max(resizeControlRect.width(), 0);
if (m_hBar && m_hBar->shouldParticipateInHitTesting()) {
LayoutRect hBarRect(horizontalScrollbarStart(0),
box().height() - box().borderBottom() - m_hBar->height(),
box().width() - (box().borderLeft() + box().borderRight()) - (m_vBar ? m_vBar->width() : resizeControlSize),
m_hBar->height());
if (hBarRect.contains(localPoint)) {
result.setScrollbar(m_hBar.get());
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 26,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ap_interrupts_available(void)
{
return test_facility(2) && test_facility(65);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btreeDropTable(Btree *p, Pgno iTable, int *piMoved){
int rc;
MemPage *pPage = 0;
BtShared *pBt = p->pBt;
assert( sqlite3BtreeHoldsMutex(p) );
assert( p->inTrans==TRANS_WRITE );
assert( iTable>=2 );
rc = btreeGetPage(pBt, (Pgno)iTable, &pPage, 0);
if( rc ) return rc;
rc = sqlite3BtreeClearTable(p, iTable, 0);
if( rc ){
releasePage(pPage);
return rc;
}
*piMoved = 0;
#ifdef SQLITE_OMIT_AUTOVACUUM
freePage(pPage, &rc);
releasePage(pPage);
#else
if( pBt->autoVacuum ){
Pgno maxRootPgno;
sqlite3BtreeGetMeta(p, BTREE_LARGEST_ROOT_PAGE, &maxRootPgno);
if( iTable==maxRootPgno ){
/* If the table being dropped is the table with the largest root-page
** number in the database, put the root page on the free list.
*/
freePage(pPage, &rc);
releasePage(pPage);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ){
return rc;
}
}else{
/* The table being dropped does not have the largest root-page
** number in the database. So move the page that does into the
** gap left by the deleted root-page.
*/
MemPage *pMove;
releasePage(pPage);
rc = btreeGetPage(pBt, maxRootPgno, &pMove, 0);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ){
return rc;
}
rc = relocatePage(pBt, pMove, PTRMAP_ROOTPAGE, 0, iTable, 0);
releasePage(pMove);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ){
return rc;
}
pMove = 0;
rc = btreeGetPage(pBt, maxRootPgno, &pMove, 0);
freePage(pMove, &rc);
releasePage(pMove);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ){
return rc;
}
*piMoved = maxRootPgno;
}
/* Set the new 'max-root-page' value in the database header. This
** is the old value less one, less one more if that happens to
** be a root-page number, less one again if that is the
** PENDING_BYTE_PAGE.
*/
maxRootPgno--;
while( maxRootPgno==PENDING_BYTE_PAGE(pBt)
|| PTRMAP_ISPAGE(pBt, maxRootPgno) ){
maxRootPgno--;
}
assert( maxRootPgno!=PENDING_BYTE_PAGE(pBt) );
rc = sqlite3BtreeUpdateMeta(p, 4, maxRootPgno);
}else{
freePage(pPage, &rc);
releasePage(pPage);
}
#endif
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int WriteRiffHeader (FILE *outfile, WavpackContext *wpc, int64_t total_samples, int qmode)
{
int do_rf64 = 0, write_junk = 1, table_length = 0;
ChunkHeader ds64hdr, datahdr, fmthdr;
RiffChunkHeader riffhdr;
DS64Chunk ds64_chunk;
CS64Chunk cs64_chunk;
JunkChunk junkchunk;
WaveHeader wavhdr;
uint32_t bcount;
int64_t total_data_bytes, total_riff_bytes;
int num_channels = WavpackGetNumChannels (wpc);
int32_t channel_mask = WavpackGetChannelMask (wpc);
int32_t sample_rate = WavpackGetSampleRate (wpc);
int bytes_per_sample = WavpackGetBytesPerSample (wpc);
int bits_per_sample = WavpackGetBitsPerSample (wpc);
int format = WavpackGetFloatNormExp (wpc) ? 3 : 1;
int wavhdrsize = 16;
if (format == 3 && WavpackGetFloatNormExp (wpc) != 127) {
error_line ("can't create valid RIFF wav header for non-normalized floating data!");
return FALSE;
}
if (total_samples == -1)
total_samples = 0x7ffff000 / (bytes_per_sample * num_channels);
total_data_bytes = total_samples * bytes_per_sample * num_channels;
if (total_data_bytes > 0xff000000) {
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("total_data_bytes = %lld, so rf64", total_data_bytes);
write_junk = 0;
do_rf64 = 1;
}
else if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("total_data_bytes = %lld, so riff", total_data_bytes);
CLEAR (wavhdr);
wavhdr.FormatTag = format;
wavhdr.NumChannels = num_channels;
wavhdr.SampleRate = sample_rate;
wavhdr.BytesPerSecond = sample_rate * num_channels * bytes_per_sample;
wavhdr.BlockAlign = bytes_per_sample * num_channels;
wavhdr.BitsPerSample = bits_per_sample;
if (num_channels > 2 || channel_mask != 0x5 - num_channels) {
wavhdrsize = sizeof (wavhdr);
wavhdr.cbSize = 22;
wavhdr.ValidBitsPerSample = bits_per_sample;
wavhdr.SubFormat = format;
wavhdr.ChannelMask = channel_mask;
wavhdr.FormatTag = 0xfffe;
wavhdr.BitsPerSample = bytes_per_sample * 8;
wavhdr.GUID [4] = 0x10;
wavhdr.GUID [6] = 0x80;
wavhdr.GUID [9] = 0xaa;
wavhdr.GUID [11] = 0x38;
wavhdr.GUID [12] = 0x9b;
wavhdr.GUID [13] = 0x71;
}
strncpy (riffhdr.ckID, do_rf64 ? "RF64" : "RIFF", sizeof (riffhdr.ckID));
strncpy (riffhdr.formType, "WAVE", sizeof (riffhdr.formType));
total_riff_bytes = sizeof (riffhdr) + wavhdrsize + sizeof (datahdr) + ((total_data_bytes + 1) & ~(int64_t)1);
if (do_rf64) total_riff_bytes += sizeof (ds64hdr) + sizeof (ds64_chunk);
total_riff_bytes += table_length * sizeof (CS64Chunk);
if (write_junk) total_riff_bytes += sizeof (junkchunk);
strncpy (fmthdr.ckID, "fmt ", sizeof (fmthdr.ckID));
strncpy (datahdr.ckID, "data", sizeof (datahdr.ckID));
fmthdr.ckSize = wavhdrsize;
if (write_junk) {
CLEAR (junkchunk);
strncpy (junkchunk.ckID, "junk", sizeof (junkchunk.ckID));
junkchunk.ckSize = sizeof (junkchunk) - 8;
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&junkchunk, ChunkHeaderFormat);
}
if (do_rf64) {
strncpy (ds64hdr.ckID, "ds64", sizeof (ds64hdr.ckID));
ds64hdr.ckSize = sizeof (ds64_chunk) + (table_length * sizeof (CS64Chunk));
CLEAR (ds64_chunk);
ds64_chunk.riffSize64 = total_riff_bytes;
ds64_chunk.dataSize64 = total_data_bytes;
ds64_chunk.sampleCount64 = total_samples;
ds64_chunk.tableLength = table_length;
riffhdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) -1;
datahdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) -1;
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&ds64hdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&ds64_chunk, DS64ChunkFormat);
}
else {
riffhdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) total_riff_bytes;
datahdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) total_data_bytes;
}
if (table_length) {
strncpy (cs64_chunk.ckID, "dmmy", sizeof (cs64_chunk.ckID));
cs64_chunk.chunkSize64 = 12345678;
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&cs64_chunk, CS64ChunkFormat);
}
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&riffhdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&fmthdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&wavhdr, WaveHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&datahdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
if (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &riffhdr, sizeof (riffhdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (riffhdr) ||
(do_rf64 && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &ds64hdr, sizeof (ds64hdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (ds64hdr))) ||
(do_rf64 && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &ds64_chunk, sizeof (ds64_chunk), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (ds64_chunk)))) {
error_line ("can't write .WAV data, disk probably full!");
return FALSE;
}
while (table_length--)
if (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &cs64_chunk, sizeof (cs64_chunk), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (cs64_chunk)) {
error_line ("can't write .WAV data, disk probably full!");
return FALSE;
}
if ((write_junk && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &junkchunk, sizeof (junkchunk), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (junkchunk))) ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &fmthdr, sizeof (fmthdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (fmthdr) ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &wavhdr, wavhdrsize, &bcount) || bcount != wavhdrsize ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &datahdr, sizeof (datahdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (datahdr)) {
error_line ("can't write .WAV data, disk probably full!");
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: issue #33, sanitize size of unknown chunks before malloc()
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 11,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::ScheduleLayoutTreeUpdate() {
DCHECK(!HasPendingVisualUpdate());
DCHECK(ShouldScheduleLayoutTreeUpdate());
DCHECK(NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate());
if (!View()->CanThrottleRendering())
GetPage()->Animator().ScheduleVisualUpdate(GetFrame());
lifecycle_.EnsureStateAtMost(DocumentLifecycle::kVisualUpdatePending);
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("devtools.timeline"),
"ScheduleStyleRecalculation", TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD,
"data",
inspector_recalculate_styles_event::Data(GetFrame()));
++style_version_;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 5,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebKitTestController::SendTestConfiguration() {
RenderViewHost* render_view_host =
main_window_->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost();
ShellTestConfiguration params;
params.current_working_directory = current_working_directory_;
params.temp_path = temp_path_;
params.test_url = test_url_;
params.enable_pixel_dumping = enable_pixel_dumping_;
params.allow_external_pages =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kAllowExternalPages);
params.expected_pixel_hash = expected_pixel_hash_;
params.initial_size = initial_size_;
render_view_host->Send(new ShellViewMsg_SetTestConfiguration(
render_view_host->GetRoutingID(), params));
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hmac_sha256_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
{
int ret2, ret1;
ret1 = hmac_sha256_init(req);
if (ret1)
goto out;
ret1 = ahash_update(req);
ret2 = ahash_final(req);
out:
return ret1 ? ret1 : ret2;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintNode(const blink::WebNode& node) {
if (node.isNull() || !node.document().frame()) {
return;
}
if (print_node_in_progress_) {
return;
}
print_node_in_progress_ = true;
if (!g_is_preview_enabled_) {
blink::WebNode duplicate_node(node);
Print(duplicate_node.document().frame(), duplicate_node, false);
} else {
print_preview_context_.InitWithNode(node);
RequestPrintPreview(PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_CONTEXT_NODE);
}
print_node_in_progress_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int igmp_mcf_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct ip_sf_list *psf = (struct ip_sf_list *)v;
struct igmp_mcf_iter_state *state = igmp_mcf_seq_private(seq);
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_printf(seq,
"%3s %6s "
"%10s %10s %6s %6s\n", "Idx",
"Device", "MCA",
"SRC", "INC", "EXC");
} else {
seq_printf(seq,
"%3d %6.6s 0x%08x "
"0x%08x %6lu %6lu\n",
state->dev->ifindex, state->dev->name,
ntohl(state->im->multiaddr),
ntohl(psf->sf_inaddr),
psf->sf_count[MCAST_INCLUDE],
psf->sf_count[MCAST_EXCLUDE]);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vrend_decode_set_scissor_state(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, int length)
{
struct pipe_scissor_state ss[PIPE_MAX_VIEWPORTS];
uint32_t temp;
uint32_t num_scissor, start_slot;
int s;
if (length < 1)
return EINVAL;
if ((length - 1) % 2)
return EINVAL;
num_scissor = (length - 1) / 2;
if (num_scissor > PIPE_MAX_VIEWPORTS)
return EINVAL;
start_slot = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_SET_SCISSOR_START_SLOT);
for (s = 0; s < num_scissor; s++) {
temp = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_SET_SCISSOR_MINX_MINY(s));
ss[s].minx = temp & 0xffff;
ss[s].miny = (temp >> 16) & 0xffff;
temp = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_SET_SCISSOR_MAXX_MAXY(s));
ss[s].maxx = temp & 0xffff;
ss[s].maxy = (temp >> 16) & 0xffff;
}
vrend_set_scissor_state(ctx->grctx, start_slot, num_scissor, ss);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 8,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_proc_master_id(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
tBTM_LE_PENC_KEYS le_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_update_key_mask(p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, true);
STREAM_TO_UINT16(le_key.ediv, p);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(le_key.rand, p, BT_OCTET8_LEN);
/* store the encryption keys from peer device */
memcpy(le_key.ltk, p_cb->ltk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
le_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
le_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size;
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) &&
(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_PENC,
(tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE*)&le_key, true);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Add packet length check in smp_proc_master_id
Bug: 111937027
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1144c9879e84fa79d68ad9d5fece4f58e2a3b075
(cherry picked from commit c8294662d07a98e9b8b1cab1ab681ec0805ce4e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 3,034 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: futex_wake(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, int nr_wake, u32 bitset)
{
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
int ret;
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, VERIFY_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
hb = hash_futex(&key);
/* Make sure we really have tasks to wakeup */
if (!hb_waiters_pending(hb))
goto out_put_key;
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb->chain, list) {
if (match_futex (&this->key, &key)) {
if (this->pi_state || this->rt_waiter) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* Check if one of the bits is set in both bitsets */
if (!(this->bitset & bitset))
continue;
wake_futex(this);
if (++ret >= nr_wake)
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
out_put_key:
put_futex_key(&key);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt::AppendRatingStars(
StarAppender appender, void* data) const {
CHECK(appender);
CHECK(AllowWebstoreData(type_));
int rating_integer = floor(average_rating_);
double rating_fractional = average_rating_ - rating_integer;
if (rating_fractional > 0.66) {
rating_integer++;
}
if (rating_fractional < 0.33 || rating_fractional > 0.66) {
rating_fractional = 0;
}
ResourceBundle& rb = ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
int i;
for (i = 0; i < rating_integer; i++) {
appender(rb.GetImageSkiaNamed(IDR_EXTENSIONS_RATING_STAR_ON), data);
}
if (rating_fractional) {
appender(rb.GetImageSkiaNamed(IDR_EXTENSIONS_RATING_STAR_HALF_LEFT), data);
i++;
}
for (; i < kMaxExtensionRating; i++) {
appender(rb.GetImageSkiaNamed(IDR_EXTENSIONS_RATING_STAR_OFF), data);
}
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 27,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned int GetVaFormatForVideoCodecProfile(VideoCodecProfile profile) {
if (profile == VP9PROFILE_PROFILE2 || profile == VP9PROFILE_PROFILE3)
return VA_RT_FORMAT_YUV420_10BPP;
return VA_RT_FORMAT_YUV420;
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 3,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_real_init(HashTable *ht, zend_bool packed)
{
IS_CONSISTENT(ht);
HT_ASSERT(GC_REFCOUNT(ht) == 1);
zend_hash_real_init_ex(ht, packed);
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 7,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args)
{
const size_t SIZE = 256;
char buffer[SIZE];
String8 result;
SortedVector< sp<Client> > clients; //to serialise the mutex unlock & client destruction.
SortedVector< sp<MediaRecorderClient> > mediaRecorderClients;
if (checkCallingPermission(String16("android.permission.DUMP")) == false) {
snprintf(buffer, SIZE, "Permission Denial: "
"can't dump MediaPlayerService from pid=%d, uid=%d\n",
IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingPid(),
IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid());
result.append(buffer);
} else {
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
for (int i = 0, n = mClients.size(); i < n; ++i) {
sp<Client> c = mClients[i].promote();
if (c != 0) c->dump(fd, args);
clients.add(c);
}
if (mMediaRecorderClients.size() == 0) {
result.append(" No media recorder client\n\n");
} else {
for (int i = 0, n = mMediaRecorderClients.size(); i < n; ++i) {
sp<MediaRecorderClient> c = mMediaRecorderClients[i].promote();
if (c != 0) {
snprintf(buffer, 255, " MediaRecorderClient pid(%d)\n", c->mPid);
result.append(buffer);
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
result = "\n";
c->dump(fd, args);
mediaRecorderClients.add(c);
}
}
}
result.append(" Files opened and/or mapped:\n");
snprintf(buffer, SIZE, "/proc/%d/maps", getpid());
FILE *f = fopen(buffer, "r");
if (f) {
while (!feof(f)) {
fgets(buffer, SIZE, f);
if (strstr(buffer, " /storage/") ||
strstr(buffer, " /system/sounds/") ||
strstr(buffer, " /data/") ||
strstr(buffer, " /system/media/")) {
result.append(" ");
result.append(buffer);
}
}
fclose(f);
} else {
result.append("couldn't open ");
result.append(buffer);
result.append("\n");
}
snprintf(buffer, SIZE, "/proc/%d/fd", getpid());
DIR *d = opendir(buffer);
if (d) {
struct dirent *ent;
while((ent = readdir(d)) != NULL) {
if (strcmp(ent->d_name,".") && strcmp(ent->d_name,"..")) {
snprintf(buffer, SIZE, "/proc/%d/fd/%s", getpid(), ent->d_name);
struct stat s;
if (lstat(buffer, &s) == 0) {
if ((s.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK) {
char linkto[256];
int len = readlink(buffer, linkto, sizeof(linkto));
if(len > 0) {
if(len > 255) {
linkto[252] = '.';
linkto[253] = '.';
linkto[254] = '.';
linkto[255] = 0;
} else {
linkto[len] = 0;
}
if (strstr(linkto, "/storage/") == linkto ||
strstr(linkto, "/system/sounds/") == linkto ||
strstr(linkto, "/data/") == linkto ||
strstr(linkto, "/system/media/") == linkto) {
result.append(" ");
result.append(buffer);
result.append(" -> ");
result.append(linkto);
result.append("\n");
}
}
} else {
result.append(" unexpected type for ");
result.append(buffer);
result.append("\n");
}
}
}
}
closedir(d);
} else {
result.append("couldn't open ");
result.append(buffer);
result.append("\n");
}
gLooperRoster.dump(fd, args);
bool dumpMem = false;
bool unreachableMemory = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < args.size(); i++) {
if (args[i] == String16("-m")) {
dumpMem = true;
} else if (args[i] == String16("--unreachable")) {
unreachableMemory = true;
}
}
if (dumpMem) {
result.append("\nDumping memory:\n");
std::string s = dumpMemoryAddresses(100 /* limit */);
result.append(s.c_str(), s.size());
}
if (unreachableMemory) {
result.append("\nDumping unreachable memory:\n");
std::string s = GetUnreachableMemoryString(true /* contents */, 10000 /* limit */);
result.append(s.c_str(), s.size());
}
}
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LargeObjectPage::checkAndMarkPointer(Visitor* visitor, Address address) {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(contains(address));
#endif
if (!containedInObjectPayload(address))
return;
markPointer(visitor, heapObjectHeader());
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserInit::LaunchWithProfile::AddBadFlagsInfoBarIfNecessary(
TabContentsWrapper* tab) {
static const char* kBadFlags[] = {
switches::kSingleProcess,
switches::kNoSandbox,
switches::kInProcessWebGL,
NULL
};
const char* bad_flag = NULL;
for (const char** flag = kBadFlags; *flag; ++flag) {
if (command_line_.HasSwitch(*flag)) {
bad_flag = *flag;
break;
}
}
if (bad_flag) {
tab->infobar_tab_helper()->AddInfoBar(
new SimpleAlertInfoBarDelegate(
tab->infobar_tab_helper(), NULL,
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_BAD_FLAGS_WARNING_MESSAGE,
UTF8ToUTF16(std::string("--") + bad_flag)),
false));
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
{
struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->trees) {
ctx->trees = p;
return 0;
}
if (p)
p->next = ctx->trees;
else
ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
ctx->tree_count = 31;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 8,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sas_check_eeds(struct domain_device *child,
struct ex_phy *parent_phy,
struct ex_phy *child_phy)
{
int res = 0;
struct domain_device *parent = child->parent;
if (SAS_ADDR(parent->port->disc.fanout_sas_addr) != 0) {
res = -ENODEV;
SAS_DPRINTK("edge ex %016llx phy S:0x%x <--> edge ex %016llx "
"phy S:0x%x, while there is a fanout ex %016llx\n",
SAS_ADDR(parent->sas_addr),
parent_phy->phy_id,
SAS_ADDR(child->sas_addr),
child_phy->phy_id,
SAS_ADDR(parent->port->disc.fanout_sas_addr));
} else if (SAS_ADDR(parent->port->disc.eeds_a) == 0) {
memcpy(parent->port->disc.eeds_a, parent->sas_addr,
SAS_ADDR_SIZE);
memcpy(parent->port->disc.eeds_b, child->sas_addr,
SAS_ADDR_SIZE);
} else if (((SAS_ADDR(parent->port->disc.eeds_a) ==
SAS_ADDR(parent->sas_addr)) ||
(SAS_ADDR(parent->port->disc.eeds_a) ==
SAS_ADDR(child->sas_addr)))
&&
((SAS_ADDR(parent->port->disc.eeds_b) ==
SAS_ADDR(parent->sas_addr)) ||
(SAS_ADDR(parent->port->disc.eeds_b) ==
SAS_ADDR(child->sas_addr))))
;
else {
res = -ENODEV;
SAS_DPRINTK("edge ex %016llx phy 0x%x <--> edge ex %016llx "
"phy 0x%x link forms a third EEDS!\n",
SAS_ADDR(parent->sas_addr),
parent_phy->phy_id,
SAS_ADDR(child->sas_addr),
child_phy->phy_id);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: fix memory leak in sas_smp_get_phy_events()
We've got a memory leak with the following producer:
while true;
do cat /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-1:0:12/invalid_dword_count >/dev/null;
done
The buffer req is allocated and not freed after we return. Fix it.
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: chenqilin <chenqilin2@huawei.com>
CC: chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 3,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tst_QQuickWebView::scrollRequest()
{
webView()->setSize(QSizeF(300, 400));
webView()->setUrl(QUrl::fromLocalFile(QLatin1String(TESTS_SOURCE_DIR "/html/scroll.html")));
QVERIFY(waitForLoadSucceeded(webView()));
int y = qRound(50 * webView()->page()->contentsScale());
QVERIFY(webView()->experimental()->contentY() == y);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SocketStream::set_addresses(const AddressList& addresses) {
addresses_ = addresses;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nl80211_get_power_save(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = info->user_ptr[0];
enum nl80211_ps_state ps_state;
struct wireless_dev *wdev;
struct net_device *dev = info->user_ptr[1];
struct sk_buff *msg;
void *hdr;
int err;
wdev = dev->ieee80211_ptr;
if (!rdev->ops->set_power_mgmt)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg)
return -ENOMEM;
hdr = nl80211hdr_put(msg, info->snd_pid, info->snd_seq, 0,
NL80211_CMD_GET_POWER_SAVE);
if (!hdr) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto free_msg;
}
if (wdev->ps)
ps_state = NL80211_PS_ENABLED;
else
ps_state = NL80211_PS_DISABLED;
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_PS_STATE, ps_state);
genlmsg_end(msg, hdr);
return genlmsg_reply(msg, info);
nla_put_failure:
err = -ENOBUFS;
free_msg:
nlmsg_free(msg);
return err;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::DispatchUnloadEvent() {
if (!GetFrame())
return;
SubframeLoadingDisabler disabler(GetFrame()->GetDocument());
GetFrame()->Loader().DispatchUnloadEvent();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 14,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CacheMemoryRegions() {
std::string contents;
if (!ReadProcMaps(&contents)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read /proc/self/maps";
return false;
}
if (!ParseProcMaps(contents, ®ions_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to parse the contents of /proc/self/maps";
return false;
}
is_initialized_ = true;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 25,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXObject* AXObjectCacheImpl::get(AbstractInlineTextBox* inlineTextBox) {
if (!inlineTextBox)
return 0;
AXID axID = m_inlineTextBoxObjectMapping.at(inlineTextBox);
DCHECK(!HashTraits<AXID>::isDeletedValue(axID));
if (!axID)
return 0;
return m_objects.at(axID);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 10,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void put_tpel_pixels_mc20_c(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, int stride, int width, int height){
int i,j;
for (i=0; i < height; i++) {
for (j=0; j < width; j++) {
dst[j] = (683*(src[j] + 2*src[j+1] + 1)) >> 11;
}
src += stride;
dst += stride;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 10,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int udf_compute_nr_groups(struct super_block *sb, u32 partition)
{
struct udf_part_map *map = &UDF_SB(sb)->s_partmaps[partition];
return DIV_ROUND_UP(map->s_partition_len +
(sizeof(struct spaceBitmapDesc) << 3),
sb->s_blocksize * 8);
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int walk_component(struct nameidata *nd, int flags)
{
struct path path;
struct inode *inode;
unsigned seq;
int err;
/*
* "." and ".." are special - ".." especially so because it has
* to be able to know about the current root directory and
* parent relationships.
*/
if (unlikely(nd->last_type != LAST_NORM)) {
err = handle_dots(nd, nd->last_type);
if (flags & WALK_PUT)
put_link(nd);
return err;
}
err = lookup_fast(nd, &path, &inode, &seq);
if (unlikely(err)) {
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = lookup_slow(nd, &path);
if (err < 0)
return err;
inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
seq = 0; /* we are already out of RCU mode */
err = -ENOENT;
if (d_is_negative(path.dentry))
goto out_path_put;
}
if (flags & WALK_PUT)
put_link(nd);
err = should_follow_link(nd, &path, flags & WALK_GET, inode, seq);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
path_to_nameidata(&path, nd);
nd->inode = inode;
nd->seq = seq;
return 0;
out_path_put:
path_to_nameidata(&path, nd);
return err;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 20,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::SetMemoryAllocationChangedCallback(
const base::Callback<void(const GpuMemoryAllocationForRenderer&)>&
callback) {
memory_allocation_changed_callback_ = callback;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::WidgetWillClose() {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.WidgetWillClose();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 4,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_method_missing(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_sym name, mrb_value self, mrb_value args)
{
mrb_no_method_error(mrb, name, args, "undefined method '%S'", mrb_sym2str(mrb, name));
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 22,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void hwsim_clear_sta_magic(struct ieee80211_sta *sta)
{
struct hwsim_sta_priv *sp = (void *)sta->drv_priv;
sp->magic = 0;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 15,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: prot_reply_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, int length, int32_t opcode)
{
const struct rx_header *rxh;
unsigned long i;
if (length < (int)sizeof(struct rx_header))
return;
rxh = (const struct rx_header *) bp;
/*
* Print out the afs call we're invoking. The table used here was
* gleaned from ptserver/ptint.xg. Check to see if it's a
* Ubik call, however.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pt"));
if (is_ubik(opcode)) {
ubik_reply_print(ndo, bp, length, opcode);
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " reply %s", tok2str(pt_req, "op#%d", opcode)));
bp += sizeof(struct rx_header);
/*
* If it was a data packet, interpret the response
*/
if (rxh->type == RX_PACKET_TYPE_DATA)
switch (opcode) {
case 504: /* Name to ID */
{
unsigned long j;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ids:"));
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
i = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
INTOUT();
if (j == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <none!>"));
}
break;
case 505: /* ID to name */
{
unsigned long j;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
/*
* Who designed this chicken-shit protocol?
*
* Each character is stored as a 32-bit
* integer!
*/
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
VECOUT(PRNAMEMAX);
}
if (j == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <none!>"));
}
break;
case 508: /* Get CPS */
case 514: /* List elements */
case 517: /* List owned */
case 518: /* Get CPS2 */
case 519: /* Get host CPS */
{
unsigned long j;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
INTOUT();
}
if (j == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <none!>"));
}
break;
case 510: /* List max */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " maxuid"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " maxgid"));
INTOUT();
break;
default:
;
}
else {
/*
* Otherwise, just print out the return code
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " errcode"));
INTOUT();
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|pt]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13049/Rx: add a missing bounds check for Ubik
One of the case blocks in ubik_print() didn't check bounds before
fetching 32 bits of packet data and could overread past the captured
packet data by that amount.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 11,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t regulator_print_opmode(char *buf, int mode)
{
switch (mode) {
case REGULATOR_MODE_FAST:
return sprintf(buf, "fast\n");
case REGULATOR_MODE_NORMAL:
return sprintf(buf, "normal\n");
case REGULATOR_MODE_IDLE:
return sprintf(buf, "idle\n");
case REGULATOR_MODE_STANDBY:
return sprintf(buf, "standby\n");
}
return sprintf(buf, "unknown\n");
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 1,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMP3::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSamplingRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioMp3:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_MP3TYPE *mp3Params =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_MP3TYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(mp3Params)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (mp3Params->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mp3Params->nChannels = mNumChannels;
mp3Params->nBitRate = 0 /* unknown */;
mp3Params->nSampleRate = mSamplingRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: SoftMP3: memset safely
Bug: 29422022
Change-Id: I70c9e33269d16bf8c163815706ac24e18e34fe97
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OmniboxEditModel::MaybeAcceptKeywordBySpace(
const base::string16& new_text) {
size_t keyword_length = new_text.length() - 1;
return (paste_state_ == NONE) && is_keyword_hint_ && !keyword_.empty() &&
inline_autocomplete_text_.empty() &&
(keyword_.length() == keyword_length) &&
IsSpaceCharForAcceptingKeyword(new_text[keyword_length]) &&
!new_text.compare(0, keyword_length, keyword_, 0, keyword_length) &&
AcceptKeyword(ENTERED_KEYWORD_MODE_VIA_SPACE_AT_END);
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 17,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_rotate_context(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = NULL;
int rotate = 0, remove = 1;
if (cpuctx->ctx.nr_events) {
remove = 0;
if (cpuctx->ctx.nr_events != cpuctx->ctx.nr_active)
rotate = 1;
}
ctx = cpuctx->task_ctx;
if (ctx && ctx->nr_events) {
remove = 0;
if (ctx->nr_events != ctx->nr_active)
rotate = 1;
}
if (!rotate)
goto done;
perf_ctx_lock(cpuctx, cpuctx->task_ctx);
perf_pmu_disable(cpuctx->ctx.pmu);
cpu_ctx_sched_out(cpuctx, EVENT_FLEXIBLE);
if (ctx)
ctx_sched_out(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_FLEXIBLE);
rotate_ctx(&cpuctx->ctx);
if (ctx)
rotate_ctx(ctx);
perf_event_sched_in(cpuctx, ctx, current);
perf_pmu_enable(cpuctx->ctx.pmu);
perf_ctx_unlock(cpuctx, cpuctx->task_ctx);
done:
if (remove)
list_del_init(&cpuctx->rotation_list);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LoadingPredictorConfig CreateConfig() {
LoadingPredictorConfig config;
PopulateTestConfig(&config);
return config;
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 7,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err mdia_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_MediaBox *ptr = (GF_MediaBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
if (ptr->mediaHeader) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->mediaHeader, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->handler) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->handler, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->information) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->information, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *stbl_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_SampleTableBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STBL);
tmp->MaxSamplePerChunk = 10;
tmp->groupID = 1;
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_set_IHDR(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_uint_32 width, png_uint_32 height, int bit_depth,
int color_type, int interlace_type, int compression_type,
int filter_type)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "IHDR");
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL)
return;
info_ptr->width = width;
info_ptr->height = height;
info_ptr->bit_depth = (png_byte)bit_depth;
info_ptr->color_type = (png_byte)color_type;
info_ptr->compression_type = (png_byte)compression_type;
info_ptr->filter_type = (png_byte)filter_type;
info_ptr->interlace_type = (png_byte)interlace_type;
png_check_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr->width, info_ptr->height,
info_ptr->bit_depth, info_ptr->color_type, info_ptr->interlace_type,
info_ptr->compression_type, info_ptr->filter_type);
if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
info_ptr->channels = 1;
else if (info_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
info_ptr->channels = 3;
else
info_ptr->channels = 1;
if (info_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA)
info_ptr->channels++;
info_ptr->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(info_ptr->channels * info_ptr->bit_depth);
/* Check for potential overflow */
if (width > (PNG_UINT_32_MAX
>> 3) /* 8-byte RGBA pixels */
- 64 /* bigrowbuf hack */
- 1 /* filter byte */
- 7*8 /* rounding of width to multiple of 8 pixels */
- 8) /* extra max_pixel_depth pad */
info_ptr->rowbytes = (png_size_t)0;
else
info_ptr->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(info_ptr->pixel_depth, width);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 18,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestNavigationManager::DidStartNavigation(NavigationHandle* handle) {
if (!ShouldMonitorNavigation(handle))
return;
handle_ = handle;
std::unique_ptr<NavigationThrottle> throttle(
new TestNavigationManagerThrottle(
handle_, base::Bind(&TestNavigationManager::OnWillStartRequest,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
base::Bind(&TestNavigationManager::OnWillProcessResponse,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
handle_->RegisterThrottleForTesting(std::move(throttle));
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Element* Document::CreateElementForBinding(const AtomicString& name,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (!IsValidElementName(this, name)) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidCharacterError,
"The tag name provided ('" + name + "') is not a valid name.");
return nullptr;
}
if (IsXHTMLDocument() || IsHTMLDocument()) {
AtomicString local_name = ConvertLocalName(name);
if (CustomElement::ShouldCreateCustomElement(local_name)) {
return CustomElement::CreateCustomElement(
*this,
QualifiedName(g_null_atom, local_name, html_names::xhtmlNamespaceURI),
CreateElementFlags::ByCreateElement());
}
if (auto* element = HTMLElementFactory::Create(
local_name, *this, CreateElementFlags::ByCreateElement()))
return element;
QualifiedName q_name(g_null_atom, local_name,
html_names::xhtmlNamespaceURI);
if (RegistrationContext() && V0CustomElement::IsValidName(local_name))
return RegistrationContext()->CreateCustomTagElement(*this, q_name);
return HTMLUnknownElement::Create(q_name, *this);
}
return Element::Create(QualifiedName(g_null_atom, name, g_null_atom), this);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 28,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
{
if (user_pwd == NULL)
return;
BN_free(user_pwd->s);
BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 21,440 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.