instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void comps_mrtree_set(COMPS_MRTree * rt, char * key, void * data)
{
__comps_mrtree_set(rt, key, strlen(key), data);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 14,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hci_send_to_control(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *skip_sk)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct hlist_node *node;
BT_DBG("len %d", skb->len);
read_lock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
sk_for_each(sk, node, &hci_sk_list.head) {
struct sk_buff *nskb;
/* Skip the original socket */
if (sk == skip_sk)
continue;
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND)
continue;
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel != HCI_CHANNEL_CONTROL)
continue;
nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!nskb)
continue;
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, nskb))
kfree_skb(nskb);
}
read_unlock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)
The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two
bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the
structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 5,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TypedUrlModelAssociator::IsAssociated(const std::string& typed_url) {
DCHECK(expected_loop_ == MessageLoop::current());
return id_map_.find(typed_url) != id_map_.end();
}
Commit Message: Now ignores obsolete sync nodes without visit transitions.
Also removed assertion that was erroneously triggered by obsolete sync nodes.
BUG=none
TEST=run chrome against a database that contains obsolete typed url sync nodes.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7129069
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88846 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Point RenderView::GetScrollOffset() {
WebSize scroll_offset = webview()->mainFrame()->scrollOffset();
return gfx::Point(scroll_offset.width, scroll_offset.height);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTStream *HTMLToC(HTPresentation *pres GCC_UNUSED,
HTParentAnchor *anchor,
HTStream *sink)
{
HTStructured *html;
if (sink)
(*sink->isa->put_string) (sink, "/* "); /* Before even title */
html = HTML_new(anchor, WWW_PLAINTEXT, sink);
html->comment_start = "/* ";
html->comment_end = " */\n"; /* Must start in col 1 for cpp */
if (!sink)
HTML_put_string(html, html->comment_start);
CTRACE((tfp, "HTMLToC calling CacheThru_new\n"));
return CacheThru_new(anchor,
SGML_new(&HTML_dtd, anchor, html));
}
Commit Message: snapshot of project "lynx", label v2-8-9dev_15b
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void JNI_OfflinePageDownloadBridge_StartDownload(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jclass>& clazz,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& j_tab,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& j_origin) {
TabAndroid* tab = TabAndroid::GetNativeTab(env, j_tab);
if (!tab)
return;
content::WebContents* web_contents = tab->web_contents();
if (!web_contents)
return;
std::string origin = ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, j_origin);
ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject> j_tab_ref(env, j_tab);
content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter web_contents_getter =
GetWebContentsGetter(web_contents);
DownloadControllerBase::Get()->AcquireFileAccessPermission(
web_contents_getter,
base::Bind(&OnOfflinePageAcquireFileAccessPermissionDone,
web_contents_getter, j_tab_ref, origin));
}
Commit Message: Open Offline Pages in CCT from Downloads Home.
When the respective feature flag is enabled, offline pages opened from
the Downloads Home will use CCT instead of normal tabs.
Bug: 824807
Change-Id: I6d968b8b0c51aaeb7f26332c7ada9f927e151a65
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/977321
Commit-Queue: Carlos Knippschild <carlosk@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ted Choc <tedchoc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernhard Bauer <bauerb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#546545}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cipso_v4_delopt(struct ip_options **opt_ptr)
{
int hdr_delta = 0;
struct ip_options *opt = *opt_ptr;
if (opt->srr || opt->rr || opt->ts || opt->router_alert) {
u8 cipso_len;
u8 cipso_off;
unsigned char *cipso_ptr;
int iter;
int optlen_new;
cipso_off = opt->cipso - sizeof(struct iphdr);
cipso_ptr = &opt->__data[cipso_off];
cipso_len = cipso_ptr[1];
if (opt->srr > opt->cipso)
opt->srr -= cipso_len;
if (opt->rr > opt->cipso)
opt->rr -= cipso_len;
if (opt->ts > opt->cipso)
opt->ts -= cipso_len;
if (opt->router_alert > opt->cipso)
opt->router_alert -= cipso_len;
opt->cipso = 0;
memmove(cipso_ptr, cipso_ptr + cipso_len,
opt->optlen - cipso_off - cipso_len);
/* determining the new total option length is tricky because of
* the padding necessary, the only thing i can think to do at
* this point is walk the options one-by-one, skipping the
* padding at the end to determine the actual option size and
* from there we can determine the new total option length */
iter = 0;
optlen_new = 0;
while (iter < opt->optlen)
if (opt->__data[iter] != IPOPT_NOP) {
iter += opt->__data[iter + 1];
optlen_new = iter;
} else
iter++;
hdr_delta = opt->optlen;
opt->optlen = (optlen_new + 3) & ~3;
hdr_delta -= opt->optlen;
} else {
/* only the cipso option was present on the socket so we can
* remove the entire option struct */
*opt_ptr = NULL;
hdr_delta = opt->optlen;
kfree(opt);
}
return hdr_delta;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 29,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderProcessHostImpl::IsProcessBackgrounded() const {
return priority_.background;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 26,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcRenderFillRectangles (ClientPtr client)
{
PicturePtr pDst;
int things;
REQUEST(xRenderFillRectanglesReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE (xRenderFillRectanglesReq);
if (!PictOpValid (stuff->op))
{
client->errorValue = stuff->op;
return BadValue;
}
VERIFY_PICTURE (pDst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (!pDst->pDrawable)
return BadDrawable;
things = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xRenderFillRectanglesReq);
if (things & 4)
return BadLength;
things >>= 3;
CompositeRects (stuff->op,
pDst,
&stuff->color,
things,
(xRectangle *) &stuff[1]);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const GDataDirectory* GDataEntry::AsGDataDirectoryConst() const {
return const_cast<GDataEntry*>(this)->AsGDataDirectory();
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_GC( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
FT_ULong L;
FT_F26Dot6 R;
L = (FT_ULong)args[0];
if ( BOUNDSL( L, exc->zp2.n_points ) )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
R = 0;
}
else
{
if ( exc->opcode & 1 )
R = FAST_DUALPROJ( &exc->zp2.org[L] );
else
R = FAST_PROJECT( &exc->zp2.cur[L] );
}
args[0] = R;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 1,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct priv *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk w;
blkcipher_walk_init(&w, dst, src, nbytes);
return crypt(desc, &w, ctx,
crypto_cipher_alg(ctx->child)->cia_decrypt);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nl80211_send_sta_del_event(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct net_device *dev, const u8 *mac_addr,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct sk_buff *msg;
void *hdr;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, gfp);
if (!msg)
return;
hdr = nl80211hdr_put(msg, 0, 0, 0, NL80211_CMD_DEL_STATION);
if (!hdr) {
nlmsg_free(msg);
return;
}
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_IFINDEX, dev->ifindex);
NLA_PUT(msg, NL80211_ATTR_MAC, ETH_ALEN, mac_addr);
if (genlmsg_end(msg, hdr) < 0) {
nlmsg_free(msg);
return;
}
genlmsg_multicast_netns(wiphy_net(&rdev->wiphy), msg, 0,
nl80211_mlme_mcgrp.id, gfp);
return;
nla_put_failure:
genlmsg_cancel(msg, hdr);
nlmsg_free(msg);
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: KURL Document::openSearchDescriptionURL()
{
static const char* const openSearchMIMEType = "application/opensearchdescription+xml";
static const char* const openSearchRelation = "search";
if (!frame() || frame()->tree()->parent())
return KURL();
if (frame()->loader()->state() != FrameStateComplete)
return KURL();
if (!head())
return KURL();
RefPtr<HTMLCollection> children = head()->children();
for (unsigned i = 0; Node* child = children->item(i); i++) {
if (!child->hasTagName(linkTag))
continue;
HTMLLinkElement* linkElement = static_cast<HTMLLinkElement*>(child);
if (!equalIgnoringCase(linkElement->type(), openSearchMIMEType) || !equalIgnoringCase(linkElement->rel(), openSearchRelation))
continue;
if (linkElement->href().isEmpty())
continue;
return linkElement->href();
}
return KURL();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __init void reserve_ibft_region(void)
{
unsigned long addr, size = 0;
addr = find_ibft_region(&size);
if (size)
memblock_reserve(addr, size);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void OverloadedMethodNMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
scheduler::CooperativeSchedulingManager::Instance()->Safepoint();
bool is_arity_error = false;
switch (std::min(1, info.Length())) {
case 1:
if (V8TestInterface::HasInstance(info[0], info.GetIsolate())) {
OverloadedMethodN1Method(info);
return;
}
if (info[0]->IsObject()) {
OverloadedMethodN2Method(info);
return;
}
break;
default:
is_arity_error = true;
}
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "overloadedMethodN");
if (is_arity_error) {
if (info.Length() < 1) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
}
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("No function was found that matched the signature provided.");
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int page_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int buflen)
{
DEFINE_DELAYED_CALL(done);
int res = readlink_copy(buffer, buflen,
page_get_link(dentry, d_inode(dentry),
&done));
do_delayed_call(&done);
return res;
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 26,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit MockScreenshotManager(content::NavigationControllerImpl* owner)
: content::NavigationEntryScreenshotManager(owner),
encoding_screenshot_in_progress_(false) {
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 9,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
size_t nmatch;
TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
CERT *c = s->cert;
unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
if (c->shared_sigalgs)
{
OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
}
/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
{
conf = c->client_sigalgs;
conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
}
else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
{
conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
}
else
conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
{
pref = conf;
preflen = conflen;
allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
}
else
{
allow = conf;
allowlen = conflen;
pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
}
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
if (!nmatch)
return 1;
salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
if (!salgs)
return 0;
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void extension_and_user_data(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb, int id)
{
uint32_t startcode;
uint8_t extension_type;
startcode = show_bits_long(gb, 32);
if (startcode == USER_DATA_STARTCODE || startcode == EXT_STARTCODE) {
if ((id == 2 || id == 4) && startcode == EXT_STARTCODE) {
skip_bits_long(gb, 32);
extension_type = get_bits(gb, 4);
if (extension_type == QUANT_MATRIX_EXT_ID)
read_quant_matrix_ext(s, gb);
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 18,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_get_client_info(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void __user *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_client *cptr;
struct snd_seq_client_info client_info;
if (copy_from_user(&client_info, arg, sizeof(client_info)))
return -EFAULT;
/* requested client number */
cptr = snd_seq_client_use_ptr(client_info.client);
if (cptr == NULL)
return -ENOENT; /* don't change !!! */
get_client_info(cptr, &client_info);
snd_seq_client_unlock(cptr);
if (copy_to_user(arg, &client_info, sizeof(client_info)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vhost_get_vq_desc(struct vhost_dev *dev, struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
struct iovec iov[], unsigned int iov_size,
unsigned int *out_num, unsigned int *in_num,
struct vhost_log *log, unsigned int *log_num)
{
struct vring_desc desc;
unsigned int i, head, found = 0;
u16 last_avail_idx;
int ret;
/* Check it isn't doing very strange things with descriptor numbers. */
last_avail_idx = vq->last_avail_idx;
if (unlikely(__get_user(vq->avail_idx, &vq->avail->idx))) {
vq_err(vq, "Failed to access avail idx at %p\n",
&vq->avail->idx);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (unlikely((u16)(vq->avail_idx - last_avail_idx) > vq->num)) {
vq_err(vq, "Guest moved used index from %u to %u",
last_avail_idx, vq->avail_idx);
return -EFAULT;
}
/* If there's nothing new since last we looked, return invalid. */
if (vq->avail_idx == last_avail_idx)
return vq->num;
/* Only get avail ring entries after they have been exposed by guest. */
smp_rmb();
/* Grab the next descriptor number they're advertising, and increment
* the index we've seen. */
if (unlikely(__get_user(head,
&vq->avail->ring[last_avail_idx % vq->num]))) {
vq_err(vq, "Failed to read head: idx %d address %p\n",
last_avail_idx,
&vq->avail->ring[last_avail_idx % vq->num]);
return -EFAULT;
}
/* If their number is silly, that's an error. */
if (unlikely(head >= vq->num)) {
vq_err(vq, "Guest says index %u > %u is available",
head, vq->num);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* When we start there are none of either input nor output. */
*out_num = *in_num = 0;
if (unlikely(log))
*log_num = 0;
i = head;
do {
unsigned iov_count = *in_num + *out_num;
if (unlikely(i >= vq->num)) {
vq_err(vq, "Desc index is %u > %u, head = %u",
i, vq->num, head);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (unlikely(++found > vq->num)) {
vq_err(vq, "Loop detected: last one at %u "
"vq size %u head %u\n",
i, vq->num, head);
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = __copy_from_user(&desc, vq->desc + i, sizeof desc);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
vq_err(vq, "Failed to get descriptor: idx %d addr %p\n",
i, vq->desc + i);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (desc.flags & VRING_DESC_F_INDIRECT) {
ret = get_indirect(dev, vq, iov, iov_size,
out_num, in_num,
log, log_num, &desc);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
vq_err(vq, "Failure detected "
"in indirect descriptor at idx %d\n", i);
return ret;
}
continue;
}
ret = translate_desc(dev, desc.addr, desc.len, iov + iov_count,
iov_size - iov_count);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
vq_err(vq, "Translation failure %d descriptor idx %d\n",
ret, i);
return ret;
}
if (desc.flags & VRING_DESC_F_WRITE) {
/* If this is an input descriptor,
* increment that count. */
*in_num += ret;
if (unlikely(log)) {
log[*log_num].addr = desc.addr;
log[*log_num].len = desc.len;
++*log_num;
}
} else {
/* If it's an output descriptor, they're all supposed
* to come before any input descriptors. */
if (unlikely(*in_num)) {
vq_err(vq, "Descriptor has out after in: "
"idx %d\n", i);
return -EINVAL;
}
*out_num += ret;
}
} while ((i = next_desc(&desc)) != -1);
/* On success, increment avail index. */
vq->last_avail_idx++;
/* Assume notifications from guest are disabled at this point,
* if they aren't we would need to update avail_event index. */
BUG_ON(!(vq->used_flags & VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY));
return head;
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::shouldBypassContentSecurityPolicy(
const KURL& url,
SchemeRegistry::PolicyAreas area) {
if (SecurityOrigin::shouldUseInnerURL(url)) {
return SchemeRegistry::schemeShouldBypassContentSecurityPolicy(
SecurityOrigin::extractInnerURL(url).protocol(), area);
} else {
return SchemeRegistry::schemeShouldBypassContentSecurityPolicy(
url.protocol(), area);
}
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WaitForHistory() {
BlockUntilHistoryProcessesPendingRequests(history_service());
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void h263_h_loop_filter_c(uint8_t *src, int stride, int qscale){
if(CONFIG_H263_DECODER || CONFIG_H263_ENCODER) {
int y;
const int strength= ff_h263_loop_filter_strength[qscale];
for(y=0; y<8; y++){
int d1, d2, ad1;
int p0= src[y*stride-2];
int p1= src[y*stride-1];
int p2= src[y*stride+0];
int p3= src[y*stride+1];
int d = (p0 - p3 + 4*(p2 - p1)) / 8;
if (d<-2*strength) d1= 0;
else if(d<- strength) d1=-2*strength - d;
else if(d< strength) d1= d;
else if(d< 2*strength) d1= 2*strength - d;
else d1= 0;
p1 += d1;
p2 -= d1;
if(p1&256) p1= ~(p1>>31);
if(p2&256) p2= ~(p2>>31);
src[y*stride-1] = p1;
src[y*stride+0] = p2;
ad1= FFABS(d1)>>1;
d2= av_clip((p0-p3)/4, -ad1, ad1);
src[y*stride-2] = p0 - d2;
src[y*stride+1] = p3 + d2;
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::restoreFormControlState(const FormControlState& state)
{
if (!m_dateTimeEditElement)
return;
DateTimeFieldsState dateTimeFieldsState = DateTimeFieldsState::restoreFormControlState(state);
m_dateTimeEditElement->setValueAsDateTimeFieldsState(dateTimeFieldsState);
element()->setValueInternal(sanitizeValue(m_dateTimeEditElement->value()), DispatchNoEvent);
updateClearButtonVisibility();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOL region16_intersect_rect(REGION16* dst, const REGION16* src, const RECTANGLE_16* rect)
{
REGION16_DATA* newItems;
const RECTANGLE_16* srcPtr, *endPtr, *srcExtents;
RECTANGLE_16* dstPtr;
UINT32 nbRects, usedRects;
RECTANGLE_16 common, newExtents;
assert(src);
assert(src->data);
srcPtr = region16_rects(src, &nbRects);
if (!nbRects)
{
region16_clear(dst);
return TRUE;
}
srcExtents = region16_extents(src);
if (nbRects == 1)
{
BOOL intersects = rectangles_intersection(srcExtents, rect, &common);
region16_clear(dst);
if (intersects)
return region16_union_rect(dst, dst, &common);
return TRUE;
}
newItems = allocateRegion(nbRects);
if (!newItems)
return FALSE;
dstPtr = (RECTANGLE_16*)(&newItems[1]);
usedRects = 0;
ZeroMemory(&newExtents, sizeof(newExtents));
/* accumulate intersecting rectangles, the final region16_simplify_bands() will
* do all the bad job to recreate correct rectangles
*/
for (endPtr = srcPtr + nbRects; (srcPtr < endPtr) && (rect->bottom > srcPtr->top); srcPtr++)
{
if (rectangles_intersection(srcPtr, rect, &common))
{
*dstPtr = common;
usedRects++;
dstPtr++;
if (rectangle_is_empty(&newExtents))
{
/* Check if the existing newExtents is empty. If it is empty, use
* new common directly. We do not need to check common rectangle
* because the rectangles_intersection() ensures that it is not empty.
*/
newExtents = common;
}
else
{
newExtents.top = MIN(common.top, newExtents.top);
newExtents.left = MIN(common.left, newExtents.left);
newExtents.bottom = MAX(common.bottom, newExtents.bottom);
newExtents.right = MAX(common.right, newExtents.right);
}
}
}
newItems->nbRects = usedRects;
newItems->size = sizeof(REGION16_DATA) + (usedRects * sizeof(RECTANGLE_16));
if ((dst->data->size > 0) && (dst->data != &empty_region))
free(dst->data);
dst->data = realloc(newItems, newItems->size);
if (!dst->data)
{
free(newItems);
return FALSE;
}
dst->extents = newExtents;
return region16_simplify_bands(dst);
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 1 | 14,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::SendNavigateMessage(
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const StartNavigationParams& start_params,
const RequestNavigationParams& request_params) {
RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::OnBeforeNavigation(
frame_tree_node_->current_frame_host(), this);
Send(new FrameMsg_Navigate(
routing_id_, common_params, start_params, request_params));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 4,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const HTMLElement& toHTMLElement(const FormAssociatedElement& associatedElement)
{
if (associatedElement.isFormControlElement())
return toHTMLFormControlElement(associatedElement);
return toHTMLObjectElement(associatedElement);
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash when a form control is in a past naems map of a demoted form element.
Note that we wanted to add the protector in FormAssociatedElement::setForm(),
but we couldn't do it because it is called from the constructor.
BUG=326854
TEST=automated.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/105693013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@163680 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 23,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOL update_read_refresh_rect(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s)
{
int index;
BYTE numberOfAreas;
RECTANGLE_16* areas;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 4)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT8(s, numberOfAreas);
Stream_Seek(s, 3); /* pad3Octects */
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < ((size_t) numberOfAreas * 4 * 2))
return FALSE;
areas = (RECTANGLE_16*) calloc(numberOfAreas, sizeof(RECTANGLE_16));
if (!areas)
return FALSE;
for (index = 0; index < numberOfAreas; index++)
{
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, areas[index].left);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, areas[index].top);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, areas[index].right);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, areas[index].bottom);
}
if (update->context->settings->RefreshRect)
IFCALL(update->RefreshRect, update->context, numberOfAreas, areas);
else
WLog_Print(update->log, WLOG_WARN, "ignoring refresh rect request from client");
free(areas);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nautilus_file_operations_unmount_mount_full (GtkWindow *parent_window,
GMount *mount,
GMountOperation *mount_operation,
gboolean eject,
gboolean check_trash,
NautilusUnmountCallback callback,
gpointer callback_data)
{
UnmountData *data;
int response;
data = g_new0 (UnmountData, 1);
data->callback = callback;
data->callback_data = callback_data;
if (parent_window)
{
data->parent_window = parent_window;
g_object_add_weak_pointer (G_OBJECT (data->parent_window),
(gpointer *) &data->parent_window);
}
if (mount_operation)
{
data->mount_operation = g_object_ref (mount_operation);
}
data->eject = eject;
data->mount = g_object_ref (mount);
if (check_trash && has_trash_files (mount))
{
response = prompt_empty_trash (parent_window);
if (response == GTK_RESPONSE_ACCEPT)
{
GTask *task;
EmptyTrashJob *job;
job = op_job_new (EmptyTrashJob, parent_window);
job->should_confirm = FALSE;
job->trash_dirs = get_trash_dirs_for_mount (mount);
job->done_callback = empty_trash_for_unmount_done;
job->done_callback_data = data;
task = g_task_new (NULL, NULL, empty_trash_task_done, job);
g_task_set_task_data (task, job, NULL);
g_task_run_in_thread (task, empty_trash_thread_func);
g_object_unref (task);
return;
}
else if (response == GTK_RESPONSE_CANCEL)
{
if (callback)
{
callback (callback_data);
}
unmount_data_free (data);
return;
}
}
do_unmount (data);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::gt4_gram_client_job_destroy(const char * job_contact)
{
static const char* command = "GT4_GRAM_JOB_DESTROY";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!job_contact) job_contact=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
int x = sprintf(reqline,"%s",escapeGahpString(job_contact));
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,normal_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 3) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
if ( strcasecmp(result->argv[2], NULLSTRING) ) {
error_string = result->argv[2];
} else {
error_string = "";
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct vmw_private *dev_priv = vmw_priv(dev);
struct vmw_user_surface *user_srf;
struct vmw_surface *srf;
struct vmw_resource *res;
struct vmw_resource *tmp;
union drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_arg *arg =
(union drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_arg *)data;
struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_req *req = &arg->req;
struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_rep *rep = &arg->rep;
struct ttm_object_file *tfile = vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile;
int ret;
uint32_t size;
uint32_t backup_handle;
if (req->multisample_count != 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (req->mip_levels > DRM_VMW_MAX_MIP_LEVELS)
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(vmw_user_surface_size == 0))
vmw_user_surface_size = ttm_round_pot(sizeof(*user_srf)) +
128;
size = vmw_user_surface_size + 128;
/* Define a surface based on the parameters. */
ret = vmw_surface_gb_priv_define(dev,
size,
req->svga3d_flags,
req->format,
req->drm_surface_flags & drm_vmw_surface_flag_scanout,
req->mip_levels,
req->multisample_count,
req->array_size,
req->base_size,
&srf);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
user_srf = container_of(srf, struct vmw_user_surface, srf);
if (drm_is_primary_client(file_priv))
user_srf->master = drm_master_get(file_priv->master);
ret = ttm_read_lock(&dev_priv->reservation_sem, true);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
res = &user_srf->srf.res;
if (req->buffer_handle != SVGA3D_INVALID_ID) {
ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup(tfile, req->buffer_handle,
&res->backup,
&user_srf->backup_base);
if (ret == 0 && res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE <
res->backup_size) {
DRM_ERROR("Surface backup buffer is too small.\n");
vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&res->backup);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else if (req->drm_surface_flags & drm_vmw_surface_flag_create_buffer)
ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_alloc(dev_priv, tfile,
res->backup_size,
req->drm_surface_flags &
drm_vmw_surface_flag_shareable,
&backup_handle,
&res->backup,
&user_srf->backup_base);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
goto out_unlock;
}
tmp = vmw_resource_reference(res);
ret = ttm_prime_object_init(tfile, res->backup_size, &user_srf->prime,
req->drm_surface_flags &
drm_vmw_surface_flag_shareable,
VMW_RES_SURFACE,
&vmw_user_surface_base_release, NULL);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
vmw_resource_unreference(&tmp);
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
goto out_unlock;
}
rep->handle = user_srf->prime.base.hash.key;
rep->backup_size = res->backup_size;
if (res->backup) {
rep->buffer_map_handle =
drm_vma_node_offset_addr(&res->backup->base.vma_node);
rep->buffer_size = res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
rep->buffer_handle = backup_handle;
} else {
rep->buffer_map_handle = 0;
rep->buffer_size = 0;
rep->buffer_handle = SVGA3D_INVALID_ID;
}
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
out_unlock:
ttm_read_unlock(&dev_priv->reservation_sem);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@insomniasec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 9,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void disable_interrupts( struct airo_info *ai ) {
OUT4500( ai, EVINTEN, 0 );
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void do_remove_conflicting_framebuffers(struct apertures_struct *a,
const char *name, bool primary)
{
int i;
/* check all firmware fbs and kick off if the base addr overlaps */
for (i = 0 ; i < FB_MAX; i++) {
struct apertures_struct *gen_aper;
if (!registered_fb[i])
continue;
if (!(registered_fb[i]->flags & FBINFO_MISC_FIRMWARE))
continue;
gen_aper = registered_fb[i]->apertures;
if (fb_do_apertures_overlap(gen_aper, a) ||
(primary && gen_aper && gen_aper->count &&
gen_aper->ranges[0].base == VGA_FB_PHYS)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "fb: conflicting fb hw usage "
"%s vs %s - removing generic driver\n",
name, registered_fb[i]->fix.id);
do_unregister_framebuffer(registered_fb[i]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: vm: convert fb_mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helper
This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The
fb_mmap() case is a good example because it is a bit more complicated
than some: fb_mmap() mmaps one of two different memory areas depending
on the page offset of the mmap (but happily there is never any mixing of
the two, so the helper function still works).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 8,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int mailimf_comment_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx)
{
size_t cur_token;
int r;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_oparenth_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
while (1) {
r = mailimf_comment_fws_ccontent_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
if (r == MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE)
break;
else
return r;
}
}
r = mailimf_fws_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if ((r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) && (r != MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE))
return r;
r = mailimf_cparenth_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 25,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::isSecureContext(String& errorMessage, const SecureContextCheck privilegeContextCheck) const
{
return isSecureContextImpl(&errorMessage, privilegeContextCheck);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct bio *bio_alloc_bioset(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int nr_iovecs,
struct bio_set *bs)
{
gfp_t saved_gfp = gfp_mask;
unsigned front_pad;
unsigned inline_vecs;
struct bio_vec *bvl = NULL;
struct bio *bio;
void *p;
if (!bs) {
if (nr_iovecs > UIO_MAXIOV)
return NULL;
p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bio) +
nr_iovecs * sizeof(struct bio_vec),
gfp_mask);
front_pad = 0;
inline_vecs = nr_iovecs;
} else {
/* should not use nobvec bioset for nr_iovecs > 0 */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!bs->bvec_pool && nr_iovecs > 0))
return NULL;
/*
* generic_make_request() converts recursion to iteration; this
* means if we're running beneath it, any bios we allocate and
* submit will not be submitted (and thus freed) until after we
* return.
*
* This exposes us to a potential deadlock if we allocate
* multiple bios from the same bio_set() while running
* underneath generic_make_request(). If we were to allocate
* multiple bios (say a stacking block driver that was splitting
* bios), we would deadlock if we exhausted the mempool's
* reserve.
*
* We solve this, and guarantee forward progress, with a rescuer
* workqueue per bio_set. If we go to allocate and there are
* bios on current->bio_list, we first try the allocation
* without __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM; if that fails, we punt those
* bios we would be blocking to the rescuer workqueue before
* we retry with the original gfp_flags.
*/
if (current->bio_list &&
(!bio_list_empty(¤t->bio_list[0]) ||
!bio_list_empty(¤t->bio_list[1])) &&
bs->rescue_workqueue)
gfp_mask &= ~__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM;
p = mempool_alloc(bs->bio_pool, gfp_mask);
if (!p && gfp_mask != saved_gfp) {
punt_bios_to_rescuer(bs);
gfp_mask = saved_gfp;
p = mempool_alloc(bs->bio_pool, gfp_mask);
}
front_pad = bs->front_pad;
inline_vecs = BIO_INLINE_VECS;
}
if (unlikely(!p))
return NULL;
bio = p + front_pad;
bio_init(bio, NULL, 0);
if (nr_iovecs > inline_vecs) {
unsigned long idx = 0;
bvl = bvec_alloc(gfp_mask, nr_iovecs, &idx, bs->bvec_pool);
if (!bvl && gfp_mask != saved_gfp) {
punt_bios_to_rescuer(bs);
gfp_mask = saved_gfp;
bvl = bvec_alloc(gfp_mask, nr_iovecs, &idx, bs->bvec_pool);
}
if (unlikely(!bvl))
goto err_free;
bio->bi_flags |= idx << BVEC_POOL_OFFSET;
} else if (nr_iovecs) {
bvl = bio->bi_inline_vecs;
}
bio->bi_pool = bs;
bio->bi_max_vecs = nr_iovecs;
bio->bi_io_vec = bvl;
return bio;
err_free:
mempool_free(p, bs->bio_pool);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 6,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: StartFileUploadParams(const FilePath& in_local_file_path,
const FilePath& in_remote_file_path,
const FileOperationCallback& in_callback)
: local_file_path(in_local_file_path),
remote_file_path(in_remote_file_path),
callback(in_callback) {}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::RegisterLocalStatePrefs(
PrefRegistrySimple* registry) {
registry->RegisterStringPref(prefs::kIsolateOrigins, std::string());
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kSitePerProcess, false);
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kTabLifecyclesEnabled, true);
registry->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kWebDriverOverridesIncompatiblePolicies,
false);
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InterstitialPageImpl::InterstitialPageRVHDelegateView::GotFocus() {
WebContents* web_contents = interstitial_page_->web_contents();
if (web_contents)
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(web_contents)->NotifyWebContentsFocused();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleBeginQueryEXT(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::BeginQueryEXT& c) {
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLuint client_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.id);
int32 sync_shm_id = static_cast<int32>(c.sync_data_shm_id);
uint32 sync_shm_offset = static_cast<uint32>(c.sync_data_shm_offset);
switch (target) {
case GL_COMMANDS_ISSUED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_LATENCY_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
case GL_ASYNC_PIXEL_UNPACK_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_ASYNC_PIXEL_PACK_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
case GL_GET_ERROR_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
break;
case GL_COMMANDS_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
if (!features().chromium_sync_query) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBeginQueryEXT",
"not enabled for commands completed queries");
return error::kNoError;
}
break;
default:
if (!features().occlusion_query_boolean) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBeginQueryEXT",
"not enabled for occlusion queries");
return error::kNoError;
}
break;
}
if (state_.current_queries.find(target) != state_.current_queries.end()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBeginQueryEXT", "query already in progress");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (client_id == 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBeginQueryEXT", "id is 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
QueryManager::Query* query = query_manager_->GetQuery(client_id);
if (!query) {
if (!query_manager_->IsValidQuery(client_id)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glBeginQueryEXT",
"id not made by glGenQueriesEXT");
return error::kNoError;
}
query = query_manager_->CreateQuery(
target, client_id, sync_shm_id, sync_shm_offset);
}
if (query->target() != target) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glBeginQueryEXT", "target does not match");
return error::kNoError;
} else if (query->shm_id() != sync_shm_id ||
query->shm_offset() != sync_shm_offset) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Shared memory used by query not the same as before";
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
if (!query_manager_->BeginQuery(query)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
state_.current_queries[target] = query;
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,518 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::setXMLVersion(const String& version, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (!implementation()->hasFeature("XML", String())) {
ec = NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
if (!XMLDocumentParser::supportsXMLVersion(version)) {
ec = NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
m_xmlVersion = version;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 16,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sctp_cmp_addr_exact(const union sctp_addr *ss1,
const union sctp_addr *ss2)
{
struct sctp_af *af;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(ss1->sa.sa_family);
if (unlikely(!af))
return 0;
return af->cmp_addr(ss1, ss2);
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::PlatformFileError SystemToPlatformError(int error) {
switch (error) {
case 0:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK;
case EACCES:
case EISDIR:
case EROFS:
case EPERM:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
case ETXTBSY:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_IN_USE;
case EEXIST:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_EXISTS;
case ENOENT:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
case EMFILE:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_TOO_MANY_OPENED;
case ENOMEM:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
case ENOSPC:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NO_SPACE;
case ENOTDIR:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_A_DIRECTORY;
case EINTR:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_ABORT;
default:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_FAILED;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs41_lock_expired(struct nfs4_state *state, struct file_lock *request)
{
int status;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
status = nfs41_test_stateid(server, state);
if (status == NFS_OK)
return 0;
nfs41_free_stateid(server, state);
return nfs4_lock_expired(state, request);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 8,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int XfrmController::fillNlAttrXfrmEncapTmpl(const XfrmSaInfo& record, nlattr_encap_tmpl* tmpl) {
if (record.encap.type == XfrmEncapType::NONE) {
return 0;
}
int len = NLA_HDRLEN + sizeof(xfrm_encap_tmpl);
tmpl->tmpl.encap_type = static_cast<uint16_t>(record.encap.type);
tmpl->tmpl.encap_sport = htons(record.encap.srcPort);
tmpl->tmpl.encap_dport = htons(record.encap.dstPort);
fillXfrmNlaHdr(&tmpl->hdr, XFRMA_ENCAP, len);
return len;
}
Commit Message: Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
CWE ID: CWE-909 | 0 | 26,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int piv_process_discovery(sc_card_t *card)
{
int r;
u8 * rbuf = NULL;
size_t rbuflen = 0;
r = piv_get_cached_data(card, PIV_OBJ_DISCOVERY, &rbuf, &rbuflen);
/* Note rbuf and rbuflen are now pointers into cache */
if (r < 0)
goto err;
sc_log(card->ctx, "Discovery = %p:%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", rbuf,
rbuflen);
/* the object is now cached, see what we have */
r = piv_parse_discovery(card, rbuf, rbuflen, 0);
err:
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void next_entry(struct ctl_table_header **phead, struct ctl_table **pentry)
{
struct ctl_table_header *head = *phead;
struct ctl_table *entry = *pentry;
struct ctl_node *ctl_node = &head->node[entry - head->ctl_table];
spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
unuse_table(head);
ctl_node = first_usable_entry(rb_next(&ctl_node->node));
spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
head = NULL;
if (ctl_node) {
head = ctl_node->header;
entry = &head->ctl_table[ctl_node - head->node];
}
*phead = head;
*pentry = entry;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Reinst *emit(Reprog *prog, int opcode)
{
Reinst *inst = prog->end++;
inst->opcode = opcode;
inst->n = 0;
inst->c = 0;
inst->cc = NULL;
inst->x = inst->y = NULL;
return inst;
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 15,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation,
int broadcast_flags, struct sock *one_sk,
struct net *net)
{
struct netns_pfkey *net_pfkey = net_generic(net, pfkey_net_id);
struct sock *sk;
struct hlist_node *node;
struct sk_buff *skb2 = NULL;
int err = -ESRCH;
/* XXX Do we need something like netlink_overrun? I think
* XXX PF_KEY socket apps will not mind current behavior.
*/
if (!skb)
return -ENOMEM;
rcu_read_lock();
sk_for_each_rcu(sk, node, &net_pfkey->table) {
struct pfkey_sock *pfk = pfkey_sk(sk);
int err2;
/* Yes, it means that if you are meant to receive this
* pfkey message you receive it twice as promiscuous
* socket.
*/
if (pfk->promisc)
pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, allocation, sk);
/* the exact target will be processed later */
if (sk == one_sk)
continue;
if (broadcast_flags != BROADCAST_ALL) {
if (broadcast_flags & BROADCAST_PROMISC_ONLY)
continue;
if ((broadcast_flags & BROADCAST_REGISTERED) &&
!pfk->registered)
continue;
if (broadcast_flags & BROADCAST_ONE)
continue;
}
err2 = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, allocation, sk);
/* Error is cleare after succecful sending to at least one
* registered KM */
if ((broadcast_flags & BROADCAST_REGISTERED) && err)
err = err2;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (one_sk != NULL)
err = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, allocation, one_sk);
kfree_skb(skb2);
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DetachOffloadGPU(ScreenPtr slave)
{
assert(slave->isGPU);
xorg_list_del(&slave->offload_head);
slave->current_master = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 18,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vrend_set_blend_color(struct vrend_context *ctx,
struct pipe_blend_color *color)
{
ctx->sub->blend_color = *color;
glBlendColor(color->color[0], color->color[1], color->color[2],
color->color[3]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 6,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DRMExtractor::~DRMExtractor() {
}
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability in libstagefright
bug: 28175045
Change-Id: Icee6c7eb5b761da4aa3e412fb71825508d74d38f
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HevcParameterSets::findParam32(uint32_t key, uint32_t *param) {
return findParam(key, param, mParams);
}
Commit Message: Validate lengths in HEVC metadata parsing
Add code to validate the size parameter passed to
HecvParameterSets::addNalUnit(). Previously vulnerable
to decrementing an unsigned past 0, yielding a huge result value.
Bug: 35467107
Test: ran POC, no crash, emitted new "bad length" log entry
Change-Id: Ia169b9edc1e0f7c5302e3c68aa90a54e8863d79e
(cherry picked from commit e0dcf097cc029d056926029a29419e1650cbdf1b)
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 28,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_close_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata = data;
struct nfs4_state *state = calldata->state;
struct inode *inode = calldata->inode;
bool is_rdonly, is_wronly, is_rdwr;
int call_close = 0;
dprintk("%s: begin!\n", __func__);
if (nfs_wait_on_sequence(calldata->arg.seqid, task) != 0)
goto out_wait;
task->tk_msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_OPEN_DOWNGRADE];
spin_lock(&state->owner->so_lock);
is_rdwr = test_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
is_rdonly = test_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
is_wronly = test_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
nfs4_stateid_copy(&calldata->arg.stateid, &state->open_stateid);
/* Calculate the change in open mode */
calldata->arg.fmode = 0;
if (state->n_rdwr == 0) {
if (state->n_rdonly == 0)
call_close |= is_rdonly;
else if (is_rdonly)
calldata->arg.fmode |= FMODE_READ;
if (state->n_wronly == 0)
call_close |= is_wronly;
else if (is_wronly)
calldata->arg.fmode |= FMODE_WRITE;
} else if (is_rdwr)
calldata->arg.fmode |= FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE;
if (calldata->arg.fmode == 0)
call_close |= is_rdwr;
if (!nfs4_valid_open_stateid(state))
call_close = 0;
spin_unlock(&state->owner->so_lock);
if (!call_close) {
/* Note: exit _without_ calling nfs4_close_done */
goto out_no_action;
}
if (calldata->arg.fmode == 0) {
task->tk_msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CLOSE];
if (calldata->roc &&
pnfs_roc_drain(inode, &calldata->roc_barrier, task)) {
nfs_release_seqid(calldata->arg.seqid);
goto out_wait;
}
}
calldata->arg.share_access =
nfs4_map_atomic_open_share(NFS_SERVER(inode),
calldata->arg.fmode, 0);
nfs_fattr_init(calldata->res.fattr);
calldata->timestamp = jiffies;
if (nfs4_setup_sequence(NFS_SERVER(inode),
&calldata->arg.seq_args,
&calldata->res.seq_res,
task) != 0)
nfs_release_seqid(calldata->arg.seqid);
dprintk("%s: done!\n", __func__);
return;
out_no_action:
task->tk_action = NULL;
out_wait:
nfs4_sequence_done(task, &calldata->res.seq_res);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_echo(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
struct smb2_echo_req *req;
int rc = 0;
struct kvec iov[1];
struct smb_rqst rqst = { .rq_iov = iov,
.rq_nvec = 1 };
unsigned int total_len;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "In echo request\n");
if (server->tcpStatus == CifsNeedNegotiate) {
/* No need to send echo on newly established connections */
queue_delayed_work(cifsiod_wq, &server->reconnect, 0);
return rc;
}
rc = smb2_plain_req_init(SMB2_ECHO, NULL, (void **)&req, &total_len);
if (rc)
return rc;
req->sync_hdr.CreditRequest = cpu_to_le16(1);
iov[0].iov_len = total_len;
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
rc = cifs_call_async(server, &rqst, NULL, smb2_echo_callback, NULL,
server, CIFS_ECHO_OP, NULL);
if (rc)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Echo request failed: %d\n", rc);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 5,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int propagate_mnt(struct mount *dest_mnt, struct mountpoint *dest_mp,
struct mount *source_mnt, struct hlist_head *tree_list)
{
struct mount *m, *n;
int ret = 0;
/*
* we don't want to bother passing tons of arguments to
* propagate_one(); everything is serialized by namespace_sem,
* so globals will do just fine.
*/
user_ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns;
last_dest = dest_mnt;
last_source = source_mnt;
mp = dest_mp;
list = tree_list;
dest_master = dest_mnt->mnt_master;
/* all peers of dest_mnt, except dest_mnt itself */
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/* all slave groups */
for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m;
m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) {
/* everything in that slave group */
n = m;
do {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
n = next_peer(n);
} while (n != m);
}
out:
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(n, tree_list, mnt_hash) {
m = n->mnt_parent;
if (m->mnt_master != dest_mnt->mnt_master)
CLEAR_MNT_MARK(m->mnt_master);
}
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave
When the first propgated copy was a slave the following oops would result:
> BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
> IP: [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> PGD bacd4067 PUD bac66067 PMD 0
> Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 1 PID: 824 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.6.0-rc5userns+ #1523
> Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
> task: ffff8800bb0a8000 ti: ffff8800bac3c000 task.ti: ffff8800bac3c000
> RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811fba4e>] [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> RSP: 0018:ffff8800bac3fd38 EFLAGS: 00010283
> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800bb77ec00 RCX: 0000000000000010
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8800bb58c000 RDI: ffff8800bb58c480
> RBP: ffff8800bac3fd48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000001ca1 R11: 0000000000001c9d R12: 0000000000000000
> R13: ffff8800ba713800 R14: ffff8800bac3fda0 R15: ffff8800bb77ec00
> FS: 00007f3c0cd9b7e0(0000) GS:ffff8800bfb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 00000000bb79d000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
> Stack:
> ffff8800bb77ec00 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fd88 ffffffff811fbf85
> ffff8800bac3fd98 ffff8800bb77f080 ffff8800ba713800 ffff8800bb262b40
> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fdd8 ffffffff811f1da0
> Call Trace:
> [<ffffffff811fbf85>] propagate_mnt+0x105/0x140
> [<ffffffff811f1da0>] attach_recursive_mnt+0x120/0x1e0
> [<ffffffff811f1ec3>] graft_tree+0x63/0x70
> [<ffffffff811f1f6b>] do_add_mount+0x9b/0x100
> [<ffffffff811f2c1a>] do_mount+0x2aa/0xdf0
> [<ffffffff8117efbe>] ? strndup_user+0x4e/0x70
> [<ffffffff811f3a45>] SyS_mount+0x75/0xc0
> [<ffffffff8100242b>] do_syscall_64+0x4b/0xa0
> [<ffffffff81988f3c>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
> Code: 00 00 75 ec 48 89 0d 02 22 22 01 8b 89 10 01 00 00 48 89 05 fd 21 22 01 39 8e 10 01 00 00 0f 84 e0 00 00 00 48 8b 80 d8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 50 10 48 89 05 df 21 22 01 48 89 15 d0 21 22 01 8b 53 30
> RIP [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> RSP <ffff8800bac3fd38>
> CR2: 0000000000000010
> ---[ end trace 2725ecd95164f217 ]---
This oops happens with the namespace_sem held and can be triggered by
non-root users. An all around not pleasant experience.
To avoid this scenario when finding the appropriate source mount to
copy stop the walk up the mnt_master chain when the first source mount
is encountered.
Further rewrite the walk up the last_source mnt_master chain so that
it is clear what is going on.
The reason why the first source mount is special is that it it's
mnt_parent is not a mount in the dest_mnt propagation tree, and as
such termination conditions based up on the dest_mnt mount propgation
tree do not make sense.
To avoid other kinds of confusion last_dest is not changed when
computing last_source. last_dest is only used once in propagate_one
and that is above the point of the code being modified, so changing
the global variable is meaningless and confusing.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
fixes: f2ebb3a921c1ca1e2ddd9242e95a1989a50c4c68 ("smarter propagate_mnt()")
Reported-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: | 1 | 29,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _gnutls_server_find_pk_algos_in_ciphersuites (const opaque *
data, int datalen)
{
int j;
gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo = GNUTLS_PK_NONE, prev_algo = 0;
gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx;
cipher_suite_st cs;
if (datalen % 2 != 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH;
}
for (j = 0; j < datalen; j += 2)
{
memcpy (&cs.suite, &data[j], 2);
kx = _gnutls_cipher_suite_get_kx_algo (&cs);
if (_gnutls_map_kx_get_cred (kx, 1) == GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE)
{
algo = _gnutls_map_pk_get_pk (kx);
if (algo != prev_algo && prev_algo != 0)
return GNUTLS_PK_ANY;
prev_algo = algo;
}
}
return algo;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 6,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const wchar_t* _cmsMLUgetWide(const cmsMLU* mlu,
cmsUInt32Number *len,
cmsUInt16Number LanguageCode, cmsUInt16Number CountryCode,
cmsUInt16Number* UsedLanguageCode, cmsUInt16Number* UsedCountryCode)
{
int i;
int Best = -1;
_cmsMLUentry* v;
if (mlu == NULL) return NULL;
if (mlu -> AllocatedEntries <= 0) return NULL;
for (i=0; i < mlu ->UsedEntries; i++) {
v = mlu ->Entries + i;
if (v -> Language == LanguageCode) {
if (Best == -1) Best = i;
if (v -> Country == CountryCode) {
if (UsedLanguageCode != NULL) *UsedLanguageCode = v ->Language;
if (UsedCountryCode != NULL) *UsedCountryCode = v ->Country;
if (len != NULL) *len = v ->Len;
return (wchar_t*) ((cmsUInt8Number*) mlu ->MemPool + v -> StrW); // Found exact match
}
}
}
if (Best == -1)
Best = 0;
v = mlu ->Entries + Best;
if (UsedLanguageCode != NULL) *UsedLanguageCode = v ->Language;
if (UsedCountryCode != NULL) *UsedCountryCode = v ->Country;
if (len != NULL) *len = v ->Len;
return(wchar_t*) ((cmsUInt8Number*) mlu ->MemPool + v ->StrW);
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __releases(key_serial_lock)
{
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm(struct pt_regs *iregs)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct debug_store *ds = cpuc->ds;
struct pebs_record_nhm *at, *top;
struct perf_event *event = NULL;
u64 status = 0;
int bit, n;
if (!x86_pmu.pebs_active)
return;
at = (struct pebs_record_nhm *)(unsigned long)ds->pebs_buffer_base;
top = (struct pebs_record_nhm *)(unsigned long)ds->pebs_index;
ds->pebs_index = ds->pebs_buffer_base;
n = top - at;
if (n <= 0)
return;
/*
* Should not happen, we program the threshold at 1 and do not
* set a reset value.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(n > MAX_PEBS_EVENTS);
for ( ; at < top; at++) {
for_each_set_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&at->status, MAX_PEBS_EVENTS) {
event = cpuc->events[bit];
if (!test_bit(bit, cpuc->active_mask))
continue;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!event);
if (!event->attr.precise_ip)
continue;
if (__test_and_set_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&status))
continue;
break;
}
if (!event || bit >= MAX_PEBS_EVENTS)
continue;
__intel_pmu_pebs_event(event, iregs, at);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 4,789 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vrend_create_sampler_view(struct vrend_context *ctx,
uint32_t handle,
uint32_t res_handle, uint32_t format,
uint32_t val0, uint32_t val1, uint32_t swizzle_packed)
{
struct vrend_sampler_view *view;
struct vrend_resource *res;
int ret_handle;
res = vrend_renderer_ctx_res_lookup(ctx, res_handle);
if (!res) {
report_context_error(ctx, VIRGL_ERROR_CTX_ILLEGAL_RESOURCE, res_handle);
return EINVAL;
}
view = CALLOC_STRUCT(vrend_sampler_view);
if (!view)
return ENOMEM;
pipe_reference_init(&view->reference, 1);
view->format = format;
view->val0 = val0;
view->val1 = val1;
view->swizzle_r = swizzle_packed & 0x7;
view->swizzle_g = (swizzle_packed >> 3) & 0x7;
view->swizzle_b = (swizzle_packed >> 6) & 0x7;
view->swizzle_a = (swizzle_packed >> 9) & 0x7;
view->cur_base = -1;
view->cur_max = 10000;
vrend_resource_reference(&view->texture, res);
view->srgb_decode = GL_DECODE_EXT;
if (view->format != view->texture->base.format) {
if (util_format_is_srgb(view->texture->base.format) &&
!util_format_is_srgb(view->format))
view->srgb_decode = GL_SKIP_DECODE_EXT;
}
view->gl_swizzle_a = to_gl_swizzle(view->swizzle_a);
view->gl_swizzle_r = to_gl_swizzle(view->swizzle_r);
view->gl_swizzle_g = to_gl_swizzle(view->swizzle_g);
view->gl_swizzle_b = to_gl_swizzle(view->swizzle_b);
if (!(util_format_has_alpha(format) || util_format_is_depth_or_stencil(format))) {
if (view->gl_swizzle_a == GL_ALPHA)
view->gl_swizzle_a = GL_ONE;
if (view->gl_swizzle_r == GL_ALPHA)
view->gl_swizzle_r = GL_ONE;
if (view->gl_swizzle_g == GL_ALPHA)
view->gl_swizzle_g = GL_ONE;
if (view->gl_swizzle_b == GL_ALPHA)
view->gl_swizzle_b = GL_ONE;
}
if (tex_conv_table[format].flags & VREND_BIND_NEED_SWIZZLE) {
view->gl_swizzle_r = to_gl_swizzle(tex_conv_table[format].swizzle[0]);
view->gl_swizzle_g = to_gl_swizzle(tex_conv_table[format].swizzle[1]);
view->gl_swizzle_b = to_gl_swizzle(tex_conv_table[format].swizzle[2]);
view->gl_swizzle_a = to_gl_swizzle(tex_conv_table[format].swizzle[3]);
}
ret_handle = vrend_renderer_object_insert(ctx, view, sizeof(*view), handle, VIRGL_OBJECT_SAMPLER_VIEW);
if (ret_handle == 0) {
FREE(view);
return ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 3,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fetch_tempfile(char *line, void *data)
{
FILE *fp = data;
if (!line)
rewind(fp);
else if (fputs(line, fp) == EOF || fputc('\n', fp) == EOF)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Add alloc fail check in nntp_fetch_headers
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SearchBuffer::prependContext(const UChar*, size_t)
{
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_home_var ()
{
SHELL_VAR *temp_var;
temp_var = find_variable ("HOME");
if (temp_var == 0)
temp_var = bind_variable ("HOME", sh_get_home_dir (), 0);
#if 0
VSETATTR (temp_var, att_exported);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static NOINLINE double my_SQRT(double X)
{
union {
float f;
int32_t i;
} v;
double invsqrt;
double Xhalf = X * 0.5;
/* Fast and good approximation to 1/sqrt(X), black magic */
v.f = X;
/*v.i = 0x5f3759df - (v.i >> 1);*/
v.i = 0x5f375a86 - (v.i >> 1); /* - this constant is slightly better */
invsqrt = v.f; /* better than 0.2% accuracy */
/* Refining it using Newton's method: x1 = x0 - f(x0)/f'(x0)
* f(x) = 1/(x*x) - X (f==0 when x = 1/sqrt(X))
* f'(x) = -2/(x*x*x)
* f(x)/f'(x) = (X - 1/(x*x)) / (2/(x*x*x)) = X*x*x*x/2 - x/2
* x1 = x0 - (X*x0*x0*x0/2 - x0/2) = 1.5*x0 - X*x0*x0*x0/2 = x0*(1.5 - (X/2)*x0*x0)
*/
invsqrt = invsqrt * (1.5 - Xhalf * invsqrt * invsqrt); /* ~0.05% accuracy */
/* invsqrt = invsqrt * (1.5 - Xhalf * invsqrt * invsqrt); 2nd iter: ~0.0001% accuracy */
/* With 4 iterations, more than half results will be exact,
* at 6th iterations result stabilizes with about 72% results exact.
* We are well satisfied with 0.05% accuracy.
*/
return X * invsqrt; /* X * 1/sqrt(X) ~= sqrt(X) */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_algs(camellia_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(camellia_algs));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct regulator *regulator_get_optional(struct device *dev, const char *id)
{
return _regulator_get(dev, id, false, false);
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 5,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void no_tty(void)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
tty_lock();
disassociate_ctty(0);
tty_unlock();
proc_clear_tty(tsk);
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
{
unsigned long old_cr0 = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
unsigned long update_bits = X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_WP |
X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_NW;
cr0 |= X86_CR0_ET;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (cr0 & 0xffffffff00000000UL)
return 1;
#endif
cr0 &= ~CR0_RESERVED_BITS;
if ((cr0 & X86_CR0_NW) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_CD))
return 1;
if ((cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PE))
return 1;
if (!is_paging(vcpu) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if ((vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME)) {
int cs_db, cs_l;
if (!is_pae(vcpu))
return 1;
kvm_x86_ops->get_cs_db_l_bits(vcpu, &cs_db, &cs_l);
if (cs_l)
return 1;
} else
#endif
if (is_pae(vcpu) && !load_pdptrs(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu,
kvm_read_cr3(vcpu)))
return 1;
}
kvm_x86_ops->set_cr0(vcpu, cr0);
if ((cr0 ^ old_cr0) & X86_CR0_PG) {
kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue(vcpu);
kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(vcpu);
}
if ((cr0 ^ old_cr0) & update_bits)
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DeactivatePointerGrab(DeviceIntPtr mouse)
{
GrabPtr grab = mouse->deviceGrab.grab;
DeviceIntPtr dev;
Bool wasPassive = mouse->deviceGrab.fromPassiveGrab;
Bool wasImplicit = (mouse->deviceGrab.fromPassiveGrab &&
mouse->deviceGrab.implicitGrab);
XID grab_resource = grab->resource;
int i;
/* If an explicit grab was deactivated, we must remove it from the head of
* all the touches' listener lists. */
for (i = 0; !wasPassive && mouse->touch && i < mouse->touch->num_touches; i++) {
TouchPointInfoPtr ti = mouse->touch->touches + i;
if (ti->active && TouchResourceIsOwner(ti, grab_resource)) {
int mode = XIRejectTouch;
/* Rejecting will generate a TouchEnd, but we must not
emulate a ButtonRelease here. So pretend the listener
already has the end event */
if (grab->grabtype == CORE || grab->grabtype == XI ||
!xi2mask_isset(mouse->deviceGrab.grab->xi2mask, mouse, XI_TouchBegin)) {
mode = XIAcceptTouch;
/* NOTE: we set the state here, but
* ProcessTouchOwnershipEvent() will still call
* TouchEmitTouchEnd for this listener. The other half of
* this hack is in DeliverTouchEndEvent */
ti->listeners[0].state = LISTENER_HAS_END;
}
TouchListenerAcceptReject(mouse, ti, 0, mode);
}
}
TouchRemovePointerGrab(mouse);
mouse->valuator->motionHintWindow = NullWindow;
mouse->deviceGrab.grab = NullGrab;
mouse->deviceGrab.sync.state = NOT_GRABBED;
mouse->deviceGrab.fromPassiveGrab = FALSE;
for (dev = inputInfo.devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
if (dev->deviceGrab.sync.other == grab)
dev->deviceGrab.sync.other = NullGrab;
}
DoEnterLeaveEvents(mouse, mouse->id, grab->window,
mouse->spriteInfo->sprite->win, NotifyUngrab);
if (grab->confineTo)
ConfineCursorToWindow(mouse, GetCurrentRootWindow(mouse), FALSE, FALSE);
PostNewCursor(mouse);
if (!wasImplicit && grab->grabtype == XI2)
ReattachToOldMaster(mouse);
ComputeFreezes();
FreeGrab(grab);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsTestObjContentDocument(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
return shouldAllowAccessToNode(exec, impl->contentDocument()) ? toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(impl->contentDocument())) : jsNull();
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_abs_value(struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval, int val)
{
if (val < 0)
return cval->min;
if (!cval->res)
cval->res = 1;
val *= cval->res;
val += cval->min;
if (val > cval->max)
return cval->max;
return val;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 27,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLTextAreaElement::setRows(int rows)
{
setIntegralAttribute(rowsAttr, rows);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: print_octets(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
u_int i;
for (i=0; i<length; i++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *dat++));
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 8,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: encode_restorefh(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct compound_hdr *hdr)
{
__be32 *p;
p = reserve_space(xdr, 4);
*p = cpu_to_be32(OP_RESTOREFH);
hdr->nops++;
hdr->replen += decode_restorefh_maxsz;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 4,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CLASS kodak_65000_load_raw()
{
short buf[256];
int row, col, len, pred[2], ret, i;
for (row=0; row < height; row++)
for (col=0; col < width; col+=256) {
pred[0] = pred[1] = 0;
len = MIN (256, width-col);
ret = kodak_65000_decode (buf, len);
for (i=0; i < len; i++)
if ((BAYER(row,col+i) = curve[ret ? buf[i] :
(pred[i & 1] += buf[i])]) >> 12) derror();
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 2,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::setContextFeatures(PassRefPtr<ContextFeatures> features)
{
m_contextFeatures = features;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ath_tx_node_cleanup(struct ath_softc *sc, struct ath_node *an)
{
struct ath_atx_ac *ac;
struct ath_atx_tid *tid;
struct ath_txq *txq;
int tidno;
for (tidno = 0, tid = &an->tid[tidno];
tidno < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; tidno++, tid++) {
ac = tid->ac;
txq = ac->txq;
ath_txq_lock(sc, txq);
if (tid->sched) {
list_del(&tid->list);
tid->sched = false;
}
if (ac->sched) {
list_del(&ac->list);
tid->ac->sched = false;
}
ath_tid_drain(sc, txq, tid);
tid->active = false;
ath_txq_unlock(sc, txq);
}
}
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 12,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dn_confirm_accept(struct sock *sk, long *timeo, gfp_t allocation)
{
struct dn_scp *scp = DN_SK(sk);
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
int err;
if (scp->state != DN_CR)
return -EINVAL;
scp->state = DN_CC;
scp->segsize_loc = dst_metric_advmss(__sk_dst_get(sk));
dn_send_conn_conf(sk, allocation);
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
for(;;) {
release_sock(sk);
if (scp->state == DN_CC)
*timeo = schedule_timeout(*timeo);
lock_sock(sk);
err = 0;
if (scp->state == DN_RUN)
break;
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
break;
err = sock_intr_errno(*timeo);
if (signal_pending(current))
break;
err = -EAGAIN;
if (!*timeo)
break;
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
}
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
if (err == 0) {
sk->sk_socket->state = SS_CONNECTED;
} else if (scp->state != DN_CC) {
sk->sk_socket->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::SetRendererBlinkPlatformImplForTesting(
RendererBlinkPlatformImpl* blink_platform_impl) {
g_current_blink_platform_impl_for_testing = blink_platform_impl;
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 20,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vga_common_init(VGACommonState *s, Object *obj, bool global_vmstate)
{
int i, j, v, b;
for(i = 0;i < 256; i++) {
v = 0;
for(j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
v |= ((i >> j) & 1) << (j * 4);
}
expand4[i] = v;
v = 0;
for(j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
v |= ((i >> (2 * j)) & 3) << (j * 4);
}
expand2[i] = v;
}
for(i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
v = 0;
for(j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
b = ((i >> j) & 1);
v |= b << (2 * j);
v |= b << (2 * j + 1);
}
expand4to8[i] = v;
}
s->vram_size_mb = uint_clamp(s->vram_size_mb, 1, 512);
s->vram_size_mb = pow2ceil(s->vram_size_mb);
s->vram_size = s->vram_size_mb << 20;
if (!s->vbe_size) {
s->vbe_size = s->vram_size;
}
s->is_vbe_vmstate = 1;
memory_region_init_ram(&s->vram, obj, "vga.vram", s->vram_size,
&error_fatal);
vmstate_register_ram(&s->vram, global_vmstate ? NULL : DEVICE(obj));
xen_register_framebuffer(&s->vram);
s->vram_ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(&s->vram);
s->get_bpp = vga_get_bpp;
s->get_offsets = vga_get_offsets;
s->get_resolution = vga_get_resolution;
s->hw_ops = &vga_ops;
switch (vga_retrace_method) {
case VGA_RETRACE_DUMB:
s->retrace = vga_dumb_retrace;
s->update_retrace_info = vga_dumb_update_retrace_info;
break;
case VGA_RETRACE_PRECISE:
s->retrace = vga_precise_retrace;
s->update_retrace_info = vga_precise_update_retrace_info;
break;
}
/*
* Set default fb endian based on target, could probably be turned
* into a device attribute set by the machine/platform to remove
* all target endian dependencies from this file.
*/
#ifdef TARGET_WORDS_BIGENDIAN
s->default_endian_fb = true;
#else
s->default_endian_fb = false;
#endif
vga_dirty_log_start(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 6,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SmartScheduleTimer (int sig)
{
SmartScheduleTime += SmartScheduleInterval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 9,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texSubImage2D(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
HTMLCanvasElement* canvas,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texSubImage2D",
"a buffer is bound to PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
WebGLRenderingContextBase::texSubImage2D(execution_context, target, level,
xoffset, yoffset, format, type,
canvas, exception_state);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rdp_send_confirm_active(void)
{
STREAM s;
uint32 sec_flags = g_encryption ? (RDP5_FLAG | SEC_ENCRYPT) : RDP5_FLAG;
uint16 caplen =
RDP_CAPLEN_GENERAL +
RDP_CAPLEN_BITMAP +
RDP_CAPLEN_ORDER +
RDP_CAPLEN_COLCACHE +
RDP_CAPLEN_ACTIVATE +
RDP_CAPLEN_CONTROL +
RDP_CAPLEN_SHARE +
RDP_CAPLEN_BRUSHCACHE +
RDP_CAPLEN_INPUT +
RDP_CAPLEN_FONT +
RDP_CAPLEN_SOUND +
RDP_CAPLEN_GLYPHCACHE +
RDP_CAPLEN_MULTIFRAGMENTUPDATE +
RDP_CAPLEN_LARGE_POINTER + 4 /* w2k fix, sessionid */ ;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "%s()", __func__);
if (g_rdp_version >= RDP_V5)
{
caplen += RDP_CAPLEN_BMPCACHE2;
caplen += RDP_CAPLEN_NEWPOINTER;
}
else
{
caplen += RDP_CAPLEN_BMPCACHE;
caplen += RDP_CAPLEN_POINTER;
}
s = sec_init(sec_flags, 6 + 14 + caplen + sizeof(RDP_SOURCE));
out_uint16_le(s, 2 + 14 + caplen + sizeof(RDP_SOURCE));
out_uint16_le(s, (RDP_PDU_CONFIRM_ACTIVE | 0x10)); /* Version 1 */
out_uint16_le(s, (g_mcs_userid + 1001));
out_uint32_le(s, g_rdp_shareid);
out_uint16_le(s, 0x3ea); /* userid */
out_uint16_le(s, sizeof(RDP_SOURCE));
out_uint16_le(s, caplen);
out_uint8p(s, RDP_SOURCE, sizeof(RDP_SOURCE));
out_uint16_le(s, 16); /* num_caps */
out_uint8s(s, 2); /* pad */
rdp_out_ts_general_capabilityset(s);
rdp_out_ts_bitmap_capabilityset(s);
rdp_out_ts_order_capabilityset(s);
if (g_rdp_version >= RDP_V5)
{
rdp_out_bmpcache2_caps(s);
rdp_out_newpointer_caps(s);
}
else
{
rdp_out_bmpcache_caps(s);
rdp_out_pointer_caps(s);
}
rdp_out_colcache_caps(s);
rdp_out_activate_caps(s);
rdp_out_control_caps(s);
rdp_out_share_caps(s);
rdp_out_brushcache_caps(s);
rdp_out_ts_input_capabilityset(s);
rdp_out_ts_sound_capabilityset(s);
rdp_out_ts_font_capabilityset(s);
rdp_out_ts_glyphcache_capabilityset(s);
rdp_out_ts_multifragmentupdate_capabilityset(s);
rdp_out_ts_large_pointer_capabilityset(s);
s_mark_end(s);
sec_send(s, sec_flags);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppListControllerDelegateWin::ActivateApp(
Profile* profile, const extensions::Extension* extension, int event_flags) {
LaunchApp(profile, extension, event_flags);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DialogNotification::DialogNotification(Type type,
const base::string16& display_text)
: type_(type),
display_text_(display_text),
checked_(false) {
std::vector<base::string16> pieces;
base::SplitStringDontTrim(display_text, kRangeSeparator, &pieces);
if (pieces.size() > 1) {
size_t start = pieces[0].size();
size_t end = start + pieces[1].size();
link_range_ = gfx::Range(start, end);
display_text_ = JoinString(pieces, base::string16());
}
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool vrend_compile_shader(struct vrend_context *ctx,
struct vrend_shader *shader)
{
GLint param;
glShaderSource(shader->id, 1, (const char **)&shader->glsl_prog, NULL);
glCompileShader(shader->id);
glGetShaderiv(shader->id, GL_COMPILE_STATUS, ¶m);
if (param == GL_FALSE) {
char infolog[65536];
int len;
glGetShaderInfoLog(shader->id, 65536, &len, infolog);
report_context_error(ctx, VIRGL_ERROR_CTX_ILLEGAL_SHADER, 0);
fprintf(stderr,"shader failed to compile\n%s\n", infolog);
fprintf(stderr,"GLSL:\n%s\n", shader->glsl_prog);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 4,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: content::WebContents* GetTabsAPIDefaultWebContents(
UIThreadExtensionFunction* function,
int tab_id,
std::string* error) {
content::WebContents* web_contents = nullptr;
if (tab_id != -1) {
GetTabById(tab_id, function->browser_context(),
function->include_incognito_information(),
nullptr /* ignore Browser* output */,
nullptr /* ignore TabStripModel* output */, &web_contents,
nullptr /* ignore int tab_index output */, error);
} else {
Browser* browser =
ChromeExtensionFunctionDetails(function).GetCurrentBrowser();
if (!browser)
*error = tabs_constants::kNoCurrentWindowError;
else if (!ExtensionTabUtil::GetDefaultTab(browser, &web_contents, nullptr))
*error = tabs_constants::kNoSelectedTabError;
}
return web_contents;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabContents* Browser::AddRestoredTab(
const std::vector<TabNavigation>& navigations,
int tab_index,
int selected_navigation,
const std::string& extension_app_id,
bool select,
bool pin,
bool from_last_session,
SessionStorageNamespace* session_storage_namespace) {
TabContentsWrapper* wrapper = TabContentsFactory(profile(), NULL,
MSG_ROUTING_NONE,
GetSelectedTabContents(),
session_storage_namespace);
TabContents* new_tab = wrapper->tab_contents();
wrapper->extension_tab_helper()->SetExtensionAppById(extension_app_id);
new_tab->controller().RestoreFromState(navigations, selected_navigation,
from_last_session);
int add_types = select ? TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE :
TabStripModel::ADD_NONE;
if (pin) {
tab_index = std::min(tab_index, tabstrip_model()->IndexOfFirstNonMiniTab());
add_types |= TabStripModel::ADD_PINNED;
}
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->InsertTabContentsAt(tab_index, wrapper,
add_types);
if (select) {
window_->Activate();
} else {
new_tab->view()->SizeContents(window_->GetRestoredBounds().size());
new_tab->HideContents();
}
if (profile_->HasSessionService()) {
SessionService* session_service = profile_->GetSessionService();
if (session_service)
session_service->TabRestored(&new_tab->controller(), pin);
}
return new_tab;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int smaps_rollup_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct proc_maps_private *priv = seq->private;
if (priv->mm)
mmdrop(priv->mm);
kfree(priv);
return single_release(inode, file);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 13,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MockPrinter::SetDefaultPrintSettings(const PrintMsg_Print_Params& params) {
dpi_ = params.dpi;
max_shrink_ = params.max_shrink;
min_shrink_ = params.min_shrink;
desired_dpi_ = params.desired_dpi;
selection_only_ = params.selection_only;
page_size_ = params.page_size;
printable_size_ = params.printable_size;
margin_left_ = params.margin_left;
margin_top_ = params.margin_top;
display_header_footer_ = params.display_header_footer;
date_ = params.date;
title_ = params.title;
url_ = params.url;
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SimulateMonitorDeviceChangeReceived(uint32_t callback_id) {
PpapiHostMsg_DeviceEnumeration_MonitorDeviceChange msg(callback_id);
ppapi::proxy::ResourceMessageCallParams call_params(
resource_host_.pp_resource(), 123);
ppapi::host::HostMessageContext context(call_params);
int32_t result = PP_ERROR_FAILED;
ASSERT_TRUE(
device_enumeration_.HandleResourceMessage(msg, &context, &result));
EXPECT_EQ(PP_OK, result);
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tipc_wait_for_rcvmsg(struct socket *sock, long *timeop)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
long timeo = *timeop;
int err;
for (;;) {
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (timeo && skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
if (sock->state == SS_DISCONNECTING) {
err = -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo);
lock_sock(sk);
}
err = 0;
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))
break;
err = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
break;
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
if (signal_pending(current))
break;
}
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
*timeop = timeo;
return err;
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int alloc_kmem_cache_cpus(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags)
{
int cpu;
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
struct kmem_cache_cpu *c = get_cpu_slab(s, cpu);
if (c)
continue;
c = alloc_kmem_cache_cpu(s, cpu, flags);
if (!c) {
free_kmem_cache_cpus(s);
return 0;
}
s->cpu_slab[cpu] = c;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool QuotaThreadTask::RunOnTargetThreadAsync() {
RunOnTargetThread();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Quota double-delete fix
BUG=142310
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10832407
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152532 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebRtcConstraintsBrowserTest() : user_media_(GetParam()) {}
Commit Message: Add tests for closing a frame within the scope of a getusermedia callback.
BUG=472617, 474370
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1073783003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#324633}
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::regionBasedColumnsEnabled() const
{
return settings() && settings()->regionBasedColumnsEnabled();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *usb_cache_string(struct usb_device *udev, int index)
{
char *buf;
char *smallbuf = NULL;
int len;
if (index <= 0)
return NULL;
buf = kmalloc(MAX_USB_STRING_SIZE, GFP_NOIO);
if (buf) {
len = usb_string(udev, index, buf, MAX_USB_STRING_SIZE);
if (len > 0) {
smallbuf = kmalloc(++len, GFP_NOIO);
if (!smallbuf)
return buf;
memcpy(smallbuf, buf, len);
}
kfree(buf);
}
return smallbuf;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,767 |
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