instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: format_timestamp(uint32_t timestamp)
{
static char buffer[32];
if ((timestamp & 0xff000000) == 0xff000000)
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "boot + %us", timestamp &
0x00ffffff);
else
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%us", timestamp);
return buffer;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 16,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void zend_accel_shared_protect(int mode)
{
#ifdef HAVE_MPROTECT
int i;
if (mode) {
mode = PROT_READ;
} else {
mode = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
}
for (i = 0; i < ZSMMG(shared_segments_count); i++) {
mprotect(ZSMMG(shared_segments)[i]->p, ZSMMG(shared_segments)[i]->size, mode);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 10,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::formAction(USVStringOrTrustedURL& result) const {
const AtomicString& action = FastGetAttribute(kFormactionAttr);
if (action.IsEmpty()) {
result.SetUSVString(GetDocument().Url());
return;
}
result.SetUSVString(
GetDocument().CompleteURL(StripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(action)));
}
Commit Message: autofocus: Fix a crash with an autofocus element in a document without browsing context.
ShouldAutofocus() should check existence of the browsing context.
Otherwise, doc.TopFrameOrigin() returns null.
Before crrev.com/695830, ShouldAutofocus() was called only for
rendered elements. That is to say, the document always had
browsing context.
Bug: 1003228
Change-Id: I2a941c34e9707d44869a6d7585dc7fb9f06e3bf4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1800902
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keishi Hattori <keishi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#696291}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 13,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void linf_dump(GF_LHVCLayerInformation *ptr, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i, count;
if (!ptr) {
fprintf(trace, "<LayerInformation num_layers=\"\">\n");
fprintf(trace, "<LayerInfoItem layer_id=\"\" min_temporalId=\"\" max_temporalId=\"\" sub_layer_presence_flags=\"\"/>\n");
fprintf(trace, "</LayerInformation>\n");
return;
}
count = gf_list_count(ptr->num_layers_in_track);
fprintf(trace, "<LayerInformation num_layers=\"%d\">\n", count );
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
LHVCLayerInfoItem *li = (LHVCLayerInfoItem *)gf_list_get(ptr->num_layers_in_track, i);
fprintf(trace, "<LayerInfoItem layer_id=\"%d\" min_temporalId=\"%d\" max_temporalId=\"%d\" sub_layer_presence_flags=\"%d\"/>\n", li->layer_id, li->min_TemporalId, li->max_TemporalId, li->sub_layer_presence_flags);
}
fprintf(trace, "</LayerInformation>\n");
return;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 21,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DragFromCenterBy(aura::Window* window, int dx, int dy) {
ui::test::EventGenerator generator(Shell::GetPrimaryRootWindow(), window);
generator.DragMouseBy(dx, dy);
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __attribute__((no_instrument_function)) __cyg_profile_func_enter(
void *func_ptr, void *caller)
{
if (trace_enabled) {
int func;
trace_swap_gd();
add_ftrace(func_ptr, caller, FUNCF_ENTRY);
func = func_ptr_to_num(func_ptr);
if (func < hdr->func_count) {
hdr->call_accum[func]++;
hdr->call_count++;
} else {
hdr->untracked_count++;
}
hdr->depth++;
if (hdr->depth > hdr->depth_limit)
hdr->max_depth = hdr->depth;
trace_swap_gd();
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 18,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExecuteScriptAndCheckPDFNavigation(
RenderFrameHost* rfh,
const std::string& javascript,
ExpectedNavigationStatus expected_navigation_status) {
const GURL original_url(shell()->web_contents()->GetLastCommittedURL());
const std::string expected_message =
(expected_navigation_status == NAVIGATION_ALLOWED)
? std::string()
: kDataUrlBlockedPattern;
std::unique_ptr<ConsoleObserverDelegate> console_delegate;
if (!expected_message.empty()) {
console_delegate.reset(new ConsoleObserverDelegate(
shell()->web_contents(), expected_message));
shell()->web_contents()->SetDelegate(console_delegate.get());
}
TestNavigationObserver navigation_observer(shell()->web_contents());
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScript(rfh, javascript));
if (console_delegate) {
console_delegate->Wait();
shell()->web_contents()->SetDelegate(nullptr);
}
switch (expected_navigation_status) {
case NAVIGATION_ALLOWED:
navigation_observer.Wait();
EXPECT_TRUE(shell()->web_contents()->GetLastCommittedURL().SchemeIs(
url::kDataScheme));
EXPECT_TRUE(navigation_observer.last_navigation_url().SchemeIs(
url::kDataScheme));
EXPECT_TRUE(navigation_observer.last_navigation_succeeded());
break;
case NAVIGATION_BLOCKED:
EXPECT_EQ(original_url, shell()->web_contents()->GetLastCommittedURL());
EXPECT_FALSE(navigation_observer.last_navigation_succeeded());
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int avcodec_decode_subtitle2(AVCodecContext *avctx, AVSubtitle *sub,
int *got_sub_ptr,
AVPacket *avpkt)
{
int i, ret = 0;
if (!avpkt->data && avpkt->size) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid packet: NULL data, size != 0\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
if (!avctx->codec)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
if (avctx->codec->type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_SUBTITLE) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid media type for subtitles\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
*got_sub_ptr = 0;
get_subtitle_defaults(sub);
if ((avctx->codec->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_DELAY) || avpkt->size) {
AVPacket pkt_recoded;
AVPacket tmp = *avpkt;
int did_split = av_packet_split_side_data(&tmp);
if (did_split) {
/* FFMIN() prevents overflow in case the packet wasn't allocated with
* proper padding.
* If the side data is smaller than the buffer padding size, the
* remaining bytes should have already been filled with zeros by the
* original packet allocation anyway. */
memset(tmp.data + tmp.size, 0,
FFMIN(avpkt->size - tmp.size, AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE));
}
pkt_recoded = tmp;
ret = recode_subtitle(avctx, &pkt_recoded, &tmp);
if (ret < 0) {
*got_sub_ptr = 0;
} else {
avctx->internal->pkt = &pkt_recoded;
if (avctx->pkt_timebase.num && avpkt->pts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
sub->pts = av_rescale_q(avpkt->pts,
avctx->pkt_timebase, AV_TIME_BASE_Q);
ret = avctx->codec->decode(avctx, sub, got_sub_ptr, &pkt_recoded);
av_assert1((ret >= 0) >= !!*got_sub_ptr &&
!!*got_sub_ptr >= !!sub->num_rects);
#if FF_API_ASS_TIMING
if (avctx->sub_text_format == FF_SUB_TEXT_FMT_ASS_WITH_TIMINGS
&& *got_sub_ptr && sub->num_rects) {
const AVRational tb = avctx->pkt_timebase.num ? avctx->pkt_timebase
: avctx->time_base;
int err = convert_sub_to_old_ass_form(sub, avpkt, tb);
if (err < 0)
ret = err;
}
#endif
if (sub->num_rects && !sub->end_display_time && avpkt->duration &&
avctx->pkt_timebase.num) {
AVRational ms = { 1, 1000 };
sub->end_display_time = av_rescale_q(avpkt->duration,
avctx->pkt_timebase, ms);
}
for (i = 0; i < sub->num_rects; i++) {
if (sub->rects[i]->ass && !utf8_check(sub->rects[i]->ass)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Invalid UTF-8 in decoded subtitles text; "
"maybe missing -sub_charenc option\n");
avsubtitle_free(sub);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
if (tmp.data != pkt_recoded.data) { // did we recode?
/* prevent from destroying side data from original packet */
pkt_recoded.side_data = NULL;
pkt_recoded.side_data_elems = 0;
av_packet_unref(&pkt_recoded);
}
if (avctx->codec_descriptor->props & AV_CODEC_PROP_BITMAP_SUB)
sub->format = 0;
else if (avctx->codec_descriptor->props & AV_CODEC_PROP_TEXT_SUB)
sub->format = 1;
avctx->internal->pkt = NULL;
}
if (did_split) {
av_packet_free_side_data(&tmp);
if(ret == tmp.size)
ret = avpkt->size;
}
if (*got_sub_ptr)
avctx->frame_number++;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 15,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void catc_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *netdev)
{
struct catc *catc = netdev_priv(netdev);
struct netdev_hw_addr *ha;
u8 broadcast[ETH_ALEN];
u8 rx = RxEnable | RxPolarity | RxMultiCast;
eth_broadcast_addr(broadcast);
memset(catc->multicast, 0, 64);
catc_multicast(broadcast, catc->multicast);
catc_multicast(netdev->dev_addr, catc->multicast);
if (netdev->flags & IFF_PROMISC) {
memset(catc->multicast, 0xff, 64);
rx |= (!catc->is_f5u011) ? RxPromisc : AltRxPromisc;
}
if (netdev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI) {
memset(catc->multicast, 0xff, 64);
} else {
netdev_for_each_mc_addr(ha, netdev) {
u32 crc = ether_crc_le(6, ha->addr);
if (!catc->is_f5u011) {
catc->multicast[(crc >> 3) & 0x3f] |= 1 << (crc & 7);
} else {
catc->multicast[7-(crc >> 29)] |= 1 << ((crc >> 26) & 7);
}
}
}
if (!catc->is_f5u011) {
catc_set_reg_async(catc, RxUnit, rx);
catc_write_mem_async(catc, 0xfa80, catc->multicast, 64);
} else {
f5u011_mchash_async(catc, catc->multicast);
if (catc->rxmode[0] != rx) {
catc->rxmode[0] = rx;
netdev_dbg(catc->netdev,
"Setting RX mode to %2.2X %2.2X\n",
catc->rxmode[0], catc->rxmode[1]);
f5u011_rxmode_async(catc, catc->rxmode);
}
}
}
Commit Message: catc: Use heap buffer for memory size test
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PlatformSensorLinux::PlatformSensorLinux(
mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
PlatformSensorProvider* provider,
const SensorInfoLinux* sensor_device,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> polling_thread_task_runner)
: PlatformSensor(type, std::move(mapping), provider),
default_configuration_(
PlatformSensorConfiguration(sensor_device->device_frequency)),
reporting_mode_(sensor_device->reporting_mode),
polling_thread_task_runner_(std::move(polling_thread_task_runner)),
weak_factory_(this) {
sensor_reader_ = SensorReader::Create(
sensor_device, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), task_runner_);
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 1 | 28,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int update_process_messages(rdpUpdate* update)
{
return update_message_queue_process_pending_messages(update);
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t fuse_dev_splice_read(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
int total, ret;
int page_nr = 0;
struct pipe_buffer *bufs;
struct fuse_copy_state cs;
struct fuse_dev *fud = fuse_get_dev(in);
if (!fud)
return -EPERM;
bufs = kvmalloc_array(pipe->buffers, sizeof(struct pipe_buffer),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bufs)
return -ENOMEM;
fuse_copy_init(&cs, 1, NULL);
cs.pipebufs = bufs;
cs.pipe = pipe;
ret = fuse_dev_do_read(fud, in, &cs, len);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
if (pipe->nrbufs + cs.nr_segs > pipe->buffers) {
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
for (ret = total = 0; page_nr < cs.nr_segs; total += ret) {
/*
* Need to be careful about this. Having buf->ops in module
* code can Oops if the buffer persists after module unload.
*/
bufs[page_nr].ops = &nosteal_pipe_buf_ops;
bufs[page_nr].flags = 0;
ret = add_to_pipe(pipe, &bufs[page_nr++]);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
break;
}
if (total)
ret = total;
out:
for (; page_nr < cs.nr_segs; page_nr++)
put_page(bufs[page_nr].page);
kvfree(bufs);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int spl_fit_get_image_name(const void *fit, int images,
const char *type, int index,
const char **outname)
{
struct udevice *board;
const char *name, *str;
__maybe_unused int node;
int conf_node;
int len, i;
bool found = true;
conf_node = fit_find_config_node(fit);
if (conf_node < 0) {
#ifdef CONFIG_SPL_LIBCOMMON_SUPPORT
printf("No matching DT out of these options:\n");
for (node = fdt_first_subnode(fit, conf_node);
node >= 0;
node = fdt_next_subnode(fit, node)) {
name = fdt_getprop(fit, node, "description", &len);
printf(" %s\n", name);
}
#endif
return conf_node;
}
name = fdt_getprop(fit, conf_node, type, &len);
if (!name) {
debug("cannot find property '%s': %d\n", type, len);
return -EINVAL;
}
str = name;
for (i = 0; i < index; i++) {
str = strchr(str, '\0') + 1;
if (!str || (str - name >= len)) {
found = false;
break;
}
}
if (!found && !board_get(&board)) {
int rc;
/*
* no string in the property for this index. Check if the board
* level code can supply one.
*/
rc = board_get_fit_loadable(board, index - i - 1, type, &str);
if (rc && rc != -ENOENT)
return rc;
if (!rc) {
/*
* The board provided a name for a loadable.
* Try to match it against the description properties
* first. If no matching node is found, use it as a
* node name.
*/
int node;
int images = fdt_path_offset(fit, FIT_IMAGES_PATH);
node = find_node_from_desc(fit, images, str);
if (node > 0)
str = fdt_get_name(fit, node, NULL);
found = true;
}
}
if (!found) {
debug("no string for index %d\n", index);
return -E2BIG;
}
*outname = str;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 20,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vhost_scsi_write_pending_status(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int async_chainiv_givencrypt(struct skcipher_givcrypt_request *req)
{
struct crypto_ablkcipher *geniv = skcipher_givcrypt_reqtfm(req);
struct async_chainiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(geniv);
struct ablkcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_givcrypt_reqctx(req);
ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, skcipher_geniv_cipher(geniv));
ablkcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, req->creq.base.flags,
req->creq.base.complete,
req->creq.base.data);
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->creq.src, req->creq.dst,
req->creq.nbytes, req->creq.info);
if (test_and_set_bit(CHAINIV_STATE_INUSE, &ctx->state))
goto postpone;
if (ctx->queue.qlen) {
clear_bit(CHAINIV_STATE_INUSE, &ctx->state);
goto postpone;
}
return async_chainiv_givencrypt_tail(req);
postpone:
return async_chainiv_postpone_request(req);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 11,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
return (value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList &&
value.string_list_value.size() == 1 &&
chromeos::input_method::IsKeyboardLayout(
value.string_list_value[0]));
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 11,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: copy_attr_quote (struct error_context *ctx, char const *str)
{
return quotearg (str);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 7,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::CloseTab() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("CloseTab_Accelerator"),
profile_);
if (CanCloseTab())
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->CloseSelectedTabs();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void init_special_inode(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode, dev_t rdev)
{
inode->i_mode = mode;
if (S_ISCHR(mode)) {
inode->i_fop = &def_chr_fops;
inode->i_rdev = rdev;
} else if (S_ISBLK(mode)) {
inode->i_fop = &def_blk_fops;
inode->i_rdev = rdev;
} else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
inode->i_fop = &pipefifo_fops;
else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
inode->i_fop = &bad_sock_fops;
else
printk(KERN_DEBUG "init_special_inode: bogus i_mode (%o) for"
" inode %s:%lu\n", mode, inode->i_sb->s_id,
inode->i_ino);
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void x25_destroy_timer(unsigned long data)
{
x25_destroy_socket_from_timer((struct sock *)data);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string_has_highlight_regex_compiled (const char *string, regex_t *regex)
{
int rc, startswith, endswith;
regmatch_t regex_match;
const char *match_pre;
if (!string || !regex)
return 0;
while (string && string[0])
{
rc = regexec (regex, string, 1, ®ex_match, 0);
if ((rc != 0) || (regex_match.rm_so < 0) || (regex_match.rm_eo < 0))
break;
startswith = (regex_match.rm_so == 0);
if (!startswith)
{
match_pre = utf8_prev_char (string, string + regex_match.rm_so);
startswith = !string_is_word_char (match_pre);
}
endswith = 0;
if (startswith)
{
endswith = ((regex_match.rm_eo == (int)strlen (string))
|| !string_is_word_char (string + regex_match.rm_eo));
}
if (startswith && endswith)
return 1;
string += regex_match.rm_eo;
}
/* no highlight found */
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BuildTestPacket(uint16_t id, uint16_t off, int mf, const char content,
int content_len)
{
Packet *p = NULL;
int hlen = 20;
int ttl = 64;
uint8_t *pcontent;
IPV4Hdr ip4h;
p = SCCalloc(1, sizeof(*p) + default_packet_size);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return NULL;
PACKET_INITIALIZE(p);
gettimeofday(&p->ts, NULL);
ip4h.ip_verhl = 4 << 4;
ip4h.ip_verhl |= hlen >> 2;
ip4h.ip_len = htons(hlen + content_len);
ip4h.ip_id = htons(id);
ip4h.ip_off = htons(off);
if (mf)
ip4h.ip_off = htons(IP_MF | off);
else
ip4h.ip_off = htons(off);
ip4h.ip_ttl = ttl;
ip4h.ip_proto = IPPROTO_ICMP;
ip4h.s_ip_src.s_addr = 0x01010101; /* 1.1.1.1 */
ip4h.s_ip_dst.s_addr = 0x02020202; /* 2.2.2.2 */
/* copy content_len crap, we need full length */
PacketCopyData(p, (uint8_t *)&ip4h, sizeof(ip4h));
p->ip4h = (IPV4Hdr *)GET_PKT_DATA(p);
SET_IPV4_SRC_ADDR(p, &p->src);
SET_IPV4_DST_ADDR(p, &p->dst);
pcontent = SCCalloc(1, content_len);
if (unlikely(pcontent == NULL))
return NULL;
memset(pcontent, content, content_len);
PacketCopyDataOffset(p, hlen, pcontent, content_len);
SET_PKT_LEN(p, hlen + content_len);
SCFree(pcontent);
p->ip4h->ip_csum = IPV4CalculateChecksum((uint16_t *)GET_PKT_DATA(p), hlen);
/* Self test. */
if (IPV4_GET_VER(p) != 4)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_HLEN(p) != hlen)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(p) != hlen + content_len)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPID(p) != id)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPOFFSET(p) != off)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_MF(p) != mf)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPTTL(p) != ttl)
goto error;
if (IPV4_GET_IPPROTO(p) != IPPROTO_ICMP)
goto error;
return p;
error:
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | 1 | 16,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err hmhd_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_HintMediaHeaderBox *ptr = (GF_HintMediaHeaderBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u16(bs, ptr->maxPDUSize);
gf_bs_write_u16(bs, ptr->avgPDUSize);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->maxBitrate);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->avgBitrate);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->slidingAverageBitrate);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 10,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_lock_reclaim(struct nfs4_state *state, struct file_lock *request)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
/* Cache the lock if possible... */
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags) != 0)
return 0;
err = _nfs4_do_setlk(state, F_SETLK, request, NFS_LOCK_RECLAIM);
if (err != -NFS4ERR_DELAY)
break;
nfs4_handle_exception(server, err, &exception);
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 22,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContextState::SetMaxWindowRectangles(size_t max) {
window_rectangles_ = std::vector<GLint>(max * 4, 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mailimf_ignore_field_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx)
{
int has_field;
size_t cur_token;
int state;
size_t terminal;
has_field = FALSE;
cur_token = * indx;
terminal = cur_token;
state = UNSTRUCTURED_START;
/* check if this is not a beginning CRLF */
if (cur_token >= length)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
switch (message[cur_token]) {
case '\r':
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
case '\n':
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
}
while (state != UNSTRUCTURED_OUT) {
switch(state) {
case UNSTRUCTURED_START:
if (cur_token >= length)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
switch(message[cur_token]) {
case '\r':
state = UNSTRUCTURED_CR;
break;
case '\n':
state = UNSTRUCTURED_LF;
break;
case ':':
has_field = TRUE;
state = UNSTRUCTURED_START;
break;
default:
state = UNSTRUCTURED_START;
break;
}
break;
case UNSTRUCTURED_CR:
if (cur_token >= length)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
switch(message[cur_token]) {
case '\n':
state = UNSTRUCTURED_LF;
break;
case ':':
has_field = TRUE;
state = UNSTRUCTURED_START;
break;
default:
state = UNSTRUCTURED_START;
break;
}
break;
case UNSTRUCTURED_LF:
if (cur_token >= length) {
terminal = cur_token;
state = UNSTRUCTURED_OUT;
break;
}
switch(message[cur_token]) {
case '\t':
case ' ':
state = UNSTRUCTURED_WSP;
break;
default:
terminal = cur_token;
state = UNSTRUCTURED_OUT;
break;
}
break;
case UNSTRUCTURED_WSP:
if (cur_token >= length)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
switch(message[cur_token]) {
case '\r':
state = UNSTRUCTURED_CR;
break;
case '\n':
state = UNSTRUCTURED_LF;
break;
case ':':
has_field = TRUE;
state = UNSTRUCTURED_START;
break;
default:
state = UNSTRUCTURED_START;
break;
}
break;
}
cur_token ++;
}
if (!has_field)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
* indx = terminal;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 24,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::InstrumentDidBeginFrame() {
if (!webview())
return;
if (!webview()->devToolsAgent())
return;
webview()->devToolsAgent()->didComposite();
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 3,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *m_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
struct proc_mounts *p = proc_mounts(m);
down_read(&namespace_sem);
return seq_list_start(&p->ns->list, *pos);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ff_amf_get_field_value(const uint8_t *data, const uint8_t *data_end,
const uint8_t *name, uint8_t *dst, int dst_size)
{
int namelen = strlen(name);
int len;
while (*data != AMF_DATA_TYPE_OBJECT && data < data_end) {
len = ff_amf_tag_size(data, data_end);
if (len < 0)
len = data_end - data;
data += len;
}
if (data_end - data < 3)
return -1;
data++;
for (;;) {
int size = bytestream_get_be16(&data);
if (!size)
break;
if (size < 0 || size >= data_end - data)
return -1;
data += size;
if (size == namelen && !memcmp(data-size, name, namelen)) {
switch (*data++) {
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_NUMBER:
snprintf(dst, dst_size, "%g", av_int2double(AV_RB64(data)));
break;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_BOOL:
snprintf(dst, dst_size, "%s", *data ? "true" : "false");
break;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_STRING:
len = bytestream_get_be16(&data);
av_strlcpy(dst, data, FFMIN(len+1, dst_size));
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
len = ff_amf_tag_size(data, data_end);
if (len < 0 || len >= data_end - data)
return -1;
data += len;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rtmppkt: Check for packet size mismatches
Fixes out of array access
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
{
unsigned char *pl;
unsigned short hbtype;
unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
p, length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Read type and payload length */
if (HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(0) > length)
return 0; /* silently discard */
if (length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
if (HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) > length)
return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
pl = p;
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
unsigned int write_length = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding);
int r;
if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0;
/* Allocate memory for the response. */
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
if (buffer == NULL)
return -1;
bp = buffer;
/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
*bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
s2n(payload, bp);
memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
bp += payload;
/* Random padding */
if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
return -1;
}
r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
unsigned int seq;
/*
* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
* random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
*/
n2s(pl, seq);
if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltDebugDumpExtModulesCallback(void *function ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
FILE * output, const xmlChar * URI,
const xmlChar * not_used ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const xmlChar * not_used2 ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
if (!URI)
return;
fprintf(output, "%s\n", URI);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ciedefgvalidate(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, ref *space, float *values, int num_comps)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
int i;
if (num_comps < 4)
return_error(gs_error_stackunderflow);
op -= 3;
for (i=0;i < 4;i++) {
if (!r_has_type(op, t_integer) && !r_has_type(op, t_real))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
op++;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptPromise ImageCapture::takePhoto(ScriptState* script_state) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::Create(script_state);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->Promise();
if (TrackIsInactive(*stream_track_)) {
resolver->Reject(DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "The associated Track is in an invalid state."));
return promise;
}
if (!service_) {
resolver->Reject(DOMException::Create(kNotFoundError, kNoServiceError));
return promise;
}
service_requests_.insert(resolver);
service_->TakePhoto(stream_track_->Component()->Source()->Id(),
ConvertToBaseCallback(WTF::Bind(
&ImageCapture::OnMojoTakePhoto, WrapPersistent(this),
WrapPersistent(resolver))));
return promise;
}
Commit Message: Convert MediaTrackConstraints to a ScriptValue
IDLDictionaries such as MediaTrackConstraints should not be stored on
the heap which would happen when binding one as a parameter to a
callback. This change converts the object to a ScriptValue ahead of
time. This is fine because the value will be passed to a
ScriptPromiseResolver that will converted it to a V8 value if it
isn't already.
Bug: 759457
Change-Id: I3009a0f7711cc264aeaae07a36c18a6db8c915c8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/701358
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507177}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int udf_get_filename(struct super_block *sb, uint8_t *sname, uint8_t *dname,
int flen)
{
struct ustr *filename, *unifilename;
int len = 0;
filename = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ustr), GFP_NOFS);
if (!filename)
return 0;
unifilename = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ustr), GFP_NOFS);
if (!unifilename)
goto out1;
if (udf_build_ustr_exact(unifilename, sname, flen))
goto out2;
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_UTF8)) {
if (!udf_CS0toUTF8(filename, unifilename)) {
udf_debug("Failed in udf_get_filename: sname = %s\n",
sname);
goto out2;
}
} else if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_NLS_MAP)) {
if (!udf_CS0toNLS(UDF_SB(sb)->s_nls_map, filename,
unifilename)) {
udf_debug("Failed in udf_get_filename: sname = %s\n",
sname);
goto out2;
}
} else
goto out2;
len = udf_translate_to_linux(dname, filename->u_name, filename->u_len,
unifilename->u_name, unifilename->u_len);
out2:
kfree(unifilename);
out1:
kfree(filename);
return len;
}
Commit Message: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 1 | 8,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_new(SSL *s)
{
SSL3_STATE *s3;
if ((s3=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *s3)) == NULL) goto err;
memset(s3,0,sizeof *s3);
memset(s3->rrec.seq_num,0,sizeof(s3->rrec.seq_num));
memset(s3->wrec.seq_num,0,sizeof(s3->wrec.seq_num));
s->s3=s3;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s);
#endif
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
return(1);
err:
return(0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 11,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaymentRequest::AreRequestedMethodsSupportedCallback(
bool methods_supported) {
if (methods_supported) {
if (SatisfiesSkipUIConstraints()) {
skipped_payment_request_ui_ = true;
Pay();
}
} else {
journey_logger_.SetNotShown(
JourneyLogger::NOT_SHOWN_REASON_NO_SUPPORTED_PAYMENT_METHOD);
client_->OnError(mojom::PaymentErrorReason::NOT_SUPPORTED);
if (observer_for_testing_)
observer_for_testing_->OnNotSupportedError();
OnConnectionTerminated();
}
}
Commit Message: [Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 3,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned char readuchar(FILE * f)
{
unsigned char c1;
if (!fread(&c1, 1, 1, f)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
return 0;
}
return c1;
}
Commit Message: pgxtoimage(): fix write stack buffer overflow (#997)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 20,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int xmlThrDefDoValidityCheckingDefaultValue(int v) {
int ret;
xmlMutexLock(xmlThrDefMutex);
ret = xmlDoValidityCheckingDefaultValueThrDef;
xmlDoValidityCheckingDefaultValueThrDef = v;
xmlMutexUnlock(xmlThrDefMutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 16,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t GraphicBuffer::initCheck() const {
return mInitCheck;
}
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 13,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
{
char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret;
size_t maxlen;
struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
int ktype;
u_int i;
/* Find all hostkeys for this hostname */
get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, hostaddr, port, &hostname, NULL);
hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfiles[i]);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]);
oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
first = xmalloc(maxlen);
last = xmalloc(maxlen);
*first = *last = '\0';
#define ALG_APPEND(to, from) \
do { \
if (*to != '\0') \
strlcat(to, ",", maxlen); \
strlcat(to, from, maxlen); \
} while (0)
while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg);
if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL))
ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
else
ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
}
#undef ALG_APPEND
xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first,
(*first == '\0' || *last == '\0') ? "" : ",", last);
if (*first != '\0')
debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first);
free(first);
free(last);
free(hostname);
free(oavail);
free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_if_modified(
cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Client connection */
struct stat *filestats) /* I - File information */
{
const char *ptr; /* Pointer into field */
time_t date; /* Time/date value */
off_t size; /* Size/length value */
size = 0;
date = 0;
ptr = httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_IF_MODIFIED_SINCE);
if (*ptr == '\0')
return (1);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "check_if_modified: filestats=%p(" CUPS_LLFMT ", %d)) If-Modified-Since=\"%s\"", filestats, CUPS_LLCAST filestats->st_size, (int)filestats->st_mtime, ptr);
while (*ptr != '\0')
{
while (isspace(*ptr) || *ptr == ';')
ptr ++;
if (_cups_strncasecmp(ptr, "length=", 7) == 0)
{
ptr += 7;
size = strtoll(ptr, NULL, 10);
while (isdigit(*ptr))
ptr ++;
}
else if (isalpha(*ptr))
{
date = httpGetDateTime(ptr);
while (*ptr != '\0' && *ptr != ';')
ptr ++;
}
else
ptr ++;
}
return ((size != filestats->st_size && size != 0) ||
(date < filestats->st_mtime && date != 0) ||
(size == 0 && date == 0));
}
Commit Message: Don't treat "localhost.localdomain" as an allowed replacement for localhost, since it isn't.
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 27,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ui::Clipboard* ClipboardMessageFilter::GetClipboard() {
static ui::Clipboard* clipboard = ui::Clipboard::GetForCurrentThread();
return clipboard;
}
Commit Message: Refactor ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap sanitization in ClipboardMsgFilter.
BUG=352395
R=tony@chromium.org
TBR=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/200523004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@257164 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_handlereq_to_dentry(
struct file *parfilp,
xfs_fsop_handlereq_t *hreq)
{
return xfs_handle_to_dentry(parfilp, hreq->ihandle, hreq->ihandlen);
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 5,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int len, padding_len;
unsigned char *d;
len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
d[4] = len;
memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
d[5 + len] = padding_len;
memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
s->init_off = 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 1,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pmcraid_free_sglist(struct pmcraid_sglist *sglist)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sglist->num_sg; i++)
__free_pages(sg_page(&(sglist->scatterlist[i])),
sglist->order);
kfree(sglist);
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: psh_glyph_compute_extrema( PSH_Glyph glyph )
{
FT_UInt n;
/* first of all, compute all local extrema */
for ( n = 0; n < glyph->num_contours; n++ )
{
PSH_Point first = glyph->contours[n].start;
PSH_Point point, before, after;
if ( glyph->contours[n].count == 0 )
continue;
point = first;
before = point;
after = point;
do
{
before = before->prev;
if ( before == first )
goto Skip;
} while ( before->org_u == point->org_u );
first = point = before->next;
for (;;)
{
after = point;
do
{
after = after->next;
if ( after == first )
goto Next;
} while ( after->org_u == point->org_u );
if ( before->org_u < point->org_u )
{
if ( after->org_u < point->org_u )
{
/* local maximum */
goto Extremum;
}
}
else /* before->org_u > point->org_u */
{
if ( after->org_u > point->org_u )
{
/* local minimum */
Extremum:
do
{
psh_point_set_extremum( point );
point = point->next;
} while ( point != after );
}
}
before = after->prev;
point = after;
} /* for */
Next:
;
}
/* for each extremum, determine its direction along the */
/* orthogonal axis */
for ( n = 0; n < glyph->num_points; n++ )
{
PSH_Point point, before, after;
point = &glyph->points[n];
before = point;
after = point;
if ( psh_point_is_extremum( point ) )
{
do
{
before = before->prev;
if ( before == point )
goto Skip;
} while ( before->org_v == point->org_v );
do
{
after = after->next;
if ( after == point )
goto Skip;
} while ( after->org_v == point->org_v );
}
if ( before->org_v < point->org_v &&
after->org_v > point->org_v )
{
psh_point_set_positive( point );
}
else if ( before->org_v > point->org_v &&
after->org_v < point->org_v )
{
psh_point_set_negative( point );
}
Skip:
;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_ofp14_async_config_prop_by_oam(enum ofputil_async_msg_type oam,
bool master)
{
FOR_EACH_ASYNC_PROP (ap) {
if (ap->oam == oam && ap->master == master) {
return ap;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 25,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t buffer_size() const { return buffer_size_; }
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 21,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AudioHandler::PropagatesSilence() const {
return last_non_silent_time_ + LatencyTime() + TailTime() <
Context()->currentTime();
}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int try_get_ioctx(struct kioctx *kioctx)
{
return atomic_inc_not_zero(&kioctx->users);
}
Commit Message: Unused iocbs in a batch should not be accounted as active.
commit 69e4747ee9727d660b88d7e1efe0f4afcb35db1b upstream.
Since commit 080d676de095 ("aio: allocate kiocbs in batches") iocbs are
allocated in a batch during processing of first iocbs. All iocbs in a
batch are automatically added to ctx->active_reqs list and accounted in
ctx->reqs_active.
If one (not the last one) of iocbs submitted by an user fails, further
iocbs are not processed, but they are still present in ctx->active_reqs
and accounted in ctx->reqs_active. This causes process to stuck in a D
state in wait_for_all_aios() on exit since ctx->reqs_active will never
go down to zero. Furthermore since kiocb_batch_free() frees iocb
without removing it from active_reqs list the list become corrupted
which may cause oops.
Fix this by removing iocb from ctx->active_reqs and updating
ctx->reqs_active in kiocb_batch_free().
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void devinet_sysctl_unregister(struct in_device *idev)
{
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold int decode_init(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
FFV1Context *f = avctx->priv_data;
int ret;
if ((ret = ffv1_common_init(avctx)) < 0)
return ret;
if (avctx->extradata && (ret = read_extra_header(f)) < 0)
return ret;
if ((ret = ffv1_init_slice_contexts(f)) < 0)
return ret;
avctx->internal->allocate_progress = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ffv1dec: Check bits_per_raw_sample and colorspace for equality in ver 0/1 headers
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_array_put_drop(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, int i, pdf_obj *item)
{
pdf_array_put(ctx, obj, i, item);
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, item);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 12,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::AllowSetCookie(
const GURL& url,
const GURL& first_party,
const std::string& cookie_line,
content::ResourceContext* context,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
net::CookieOptions* options) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
ProfileIOData* io_data = ProfileIOData::FromResourceContext(context);
CookieSettings* cookie_settings = io_data->GetCookieSettings();
bool allow = cookie_settings->IsSettingCookieAllowed(url, first_party);
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&TabSpecificContentSettings::CookieChanged, render_process_id,
render_view_id, url, first_party, cookie_line, *options,
!allow));
return allow;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_initmsg(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sctp_initmsg sinit;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_initmsg))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&sinit, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (sinit.sinit_num_ostreams)
sp->initmsg.sinit_num_ostreams = sinit.sinit_num_ostreams;
if (sinit.sinit_max_instreams)
sp->initmsg.sinit_max_instreams = sinit.sinit_max_instreams;
if (sinit.sinit_max_attempts)
sp->initmsg.sinit_max_attempts = sinit.sinit_max_attempts;
if (sinit.sinit_max_init_timeo)
sp->initmsg.sinit_max_init_timeo = sinit.sinit_max_init_timeo;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::Form_OnChange(FPDF_FORMFILLINFO* param) {
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hns_nic_uc_sync(struct net_device *netdev, const unsigned char *addr)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev);
struct hnae_handle *h = priv->ae_handle;
if (h->dev->ops->add_uc_addr)
return h->dev->ops->add_uc_addr(h, addr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 8,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jas_image_readcmptsample(jas_image_t *image, int cmptno, int x, int y)
{
jas_image_cmpt_t *cmpt;
uint_fast32_t v;
int k;
int c;
cmpt = image->cmpts_[cmptno];
if (jas_stream_seek(cmpt->stream_, (cmpt->width_ * y + x) * cmpt->cps_,
SEEK_SET) < 0) {
return -1;
}
v = 0;
for (k = cmpt->cps_; k > 0; --k) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(cmpt->stream_)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
v = (v << 8) | (c & 0xff);
}
return bitstoint(v, cmpt->prec_, cmpt->sgnd_);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 13,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: new_files_state_unref (NewFilesState *state)
{
state->count--;
if (state->count == 0)
{
if (state->directory)
{
state->directory->details->new_files_in_progress =
g_list_remove (state->directory->details->new_files_in_progress,
state);
}
g_object_unref (state->cancellable);
g_free (state);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(addEmptyDir)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *this = getThis();
char *dirname;
int dirname_len;
int idx;
struct zip_stat sb;
char *s;
if (!this) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&dirname, &dirname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (dirname_len<1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (dirname[dirname_len-1] != '/') {
s=(char *)emalloc(dirname_len+2);
strcpy(s, dirname);
s[dirname_len] = '/';
s[dirname_len+1] = '\0';
} else {
s = dirname;
}
idx = zip_stat(intern, s, 0, &sb);
if (idx >= 0) {
RETVAL_FALSE;
} else {
if (zip_add_dir(intern, (const char *)s) == -1) {
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
if (s != dirname) {
efree(s);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 14,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string MockGetHostName() {
return ntlm::test::kHostnameAscii;
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GetReceiversAndActivitiesCallback(
const ash::CastConfigDelegate::ReceiversAndActivitesCallback& callback,
const base::Value* value) {
ash::CastConfigDelegate::ReceiversAndActivites receiver_activites;
const base::ListValue* ra_list = nullptr;
if (value->GetAsList(&ra_list)) {
for (auto i = ra_list->begin(); i != ra_list->end(); ++i) {
const base::DictionaryValue* ra_dict = nullptr;
if ((*i)->GetAsDictionary(&ra_dict)) {
const base::DictionaryValue* receiver_dict(nullptr),
*activity_dict(nullptr);
ash::CastConfigDelegate::ReceiverAndActivity receiver_activity;
if (ra_dict->GetDictionary("receiver", &receiver_dict)) {
receiver_dict->GetString("name", &receiver_activity.receiver.name);
receiver_dict->GetString("id", &receiver_activity.receiver.id);
}
if (ra_dict->GetDictionary("activity", &activity_dict) &&
!activity_dict->empty()) {
activity_dict->GetString("id", &receiver_activity.activity.id);
activity_dict->GetString("title", &receiver_activity.activity.title);
activity_dict->GetString("activityType",
&receiver_activity.activity.activity_type);
activity_dict->GetBoolean("allowStop",
&receiver_activity.activity.allow_stop);
activity_dict->GetInteger("tabId",
&receiver_activity.activity.tab_id);
}
receiver_activites[receiver_activity.receiver.id] = receiver_activity;
}
}
}
callback.Run(receiver_activites);
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 16,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t PPB_URLLoader_Impl::Open(PP_Resource request_id,
scoped_refptr<TrackedCallback> callback) {
if (main_document_loader_)
return PP_ERROR_INPROGRESS;
EnterResourceNoLock<PPB_URLRequestInfo_API> enter_request(request_id, true);
if (enter_request.failed()) {
Log(PP_LOGLEVEL_ERROR,
"PPB_URLLoader.Open: invalid request resource ID. (Hint to C++ wrapper"
" users: use the ResourceRequest constructor that takes an instance or"
" else the request will be null.)");
return PP_ERROR_BADARGUMENT;
}
PPB_URLRequestInfo_Impl* request = static_cast<PPB_URLRequestInfo_Impl*>(
enter_request.object());
int32_t rv = ValidateCallback(callback);
if (rv != PP_OK)
return rv;
if (request->RequiresUniversalAccess() && !has_universal_access_) {
Log(PP_LOGLEVEL_ERROR, "PPB_URLLoader.Open: The URL you're requesting is "
" on a different security origin than your plugin. To request "
" cross-origin resources, see "
" PP_URLREQUESTPROPERTY_ALLOWCROSSORIGINREQUESTS.");
return PP_ERROR_NOACCESS;
}
if (loader_.get())
return PP_ERROR_INPROGRESS;
WebFrame* frame = GetFrameForResource(this);
if (!frame)
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
WebURLRequest web_request;
if (!request->ToWebURLRequest(frame, &web_request))
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
request_data_ = request->GetData();
WebURLLoaderOptions options;
if (has_universal_access_) {
options.allowCredentials = true;
options.crossOriginRequestPolicy =
WebURLLoaderOptions::CrossOriginRequestPolicyAllow;
} else {
options.untrustedHTTP = true;
if (request_data_.allow_cross_origin_requests) {
options.allowCredentials = request_data_.allow_credentials;
options.crossOriginRequestPolicy =
WebURLLoaderOptions::CrossOriginRequestPolicyUseAccessControl;
} else {
options.allowCredentials = true;
}
}
is_asynchronous_load_suspended_ = false;
loader_.reset(frame->createAssociatedURLLoader(options));
if (!loader_.get())
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
loader_->loadAsynchronously(web_request, this);
RegisterCallback(callback);
return PP_OK_COMPLETIONPENDING;
}
Commit Message: Remove possibility of stale user_buffer_ member in PPB_URLLoader_Impl when FinishedLoading() is called.
BUG=137778
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10797037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@147914 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t nr_hugepages_mempolicy_store(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
return nr_hugepages_store_common(true, kobj, attr, buf, len);
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::ImageSkia GetBookmarkSupervisedFolderIcon(SkColor text_color) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
return *ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetImageSkiaNamed(
IDR_BOOKMARK_BAR_FOLDER_SUPERVISED);
#else
return GetFolderIcon(gfx::VectorIconId::FOLDER_SUPERVISED, text_color);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Prevent interpretating userinfo as url scheme when editing bookmarks
Chrome's Edit Bookmark dialog formats urls for display such that a
url of http://javascript:scripttext@host.com is later converted to a
javascript url scheme, allowing persistence of a script injection
attack within the user's bookmarks.
This fix prevents such misinterpretations by always showing the
scheme when a userinfo component is present within the url.
BUG=639126
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2368593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#422467}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 23,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XMLRPC_Callback XMLRPC_ServerFindMethod(XMLRPC_SERVER server, const char* callName) {
if(server && callName) {
q_iter qi = Q_Iter_Head_F(&server->methodlist);
while( qi ) {
server_method* sm = Q_Iter_Get_F(qi);
if(sm && !strcmp(sm->name, callName)) {
return sm->method;
}
qi = Q_Iter_Next_F(qi);
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned WebMediaPlayerImpl::DecodedFrameCount() const {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
return GetPipelineStatistics().video_frames_decoded;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 18,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ProfileChooserView::WindowClosing() {
DCHECK_EQ(profile_bubble_, this);
if (anchor_button_)
anchor_button_->AnimateInkDrop(views::InkDropState::DEACTIVATED, nullptr);
profile_bubble_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, bottom)
{
zval *value;
spl_dllist_object *intern;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(getThis());
value = spl_ptr_llist_first(intern->llist);
if (value == NULL || Z_ISUNDEF_P(value)) {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_RuntimeException, "Can't peek at an empty datastructure", 0);
return;
}
ZVAL_DEREF(value);
ZVAL_COPY(return_value, value);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 18,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainMigratePrepareTunnel3(virConnectPtr conn,
virStreamPtr st,
const char *cookiein,
int cookieinlen,
char **cookieout,
int *cookieoutlen,
unsigned long flags,
const char *dname,
unsigned long bandwidth,
const char *dom_xml)
{
VIR_DEBUG("conn=%p, stream=%p, cookiein=%p, cookieinlen=%d, cookieout=%p, "
"cookieoutlen=%p, flags=%lx, dname=%s, bandwidth=%lu, "
"dom_xml=%s",
conn, st, cookiein, cookieinlen, cookieout, cookieoutlen, flags,
NULLSTR(dname), bandwidth, NULLSTR(dom_xml));
virResetLastError();
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, -1);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn != st->conn) {
virReportInvalidArg(conn, "%s",
_("conn must match stream connection"));
goto error;
}
if (conn->driver->domainMigratePrepareTunnel3) {
int rv = conn->driver->domainMigratePrepareTunnel3(conn, st,
cookiein, cookieinlen,
cookieout, cookieoutlen,
flags, dname,
bandwidth, dom_xml);
if (rv < 0)
goto error;
return rv;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 9,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void treatReturnedNullStringAsNullStringMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::treatReturnedNullStringAsNullStringMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static noinline void async_cow_start(struct btrfs_work *work)
{
struct async_cow *async_cow;
int num_added = 0;
async_cow = container_of(work, struct async_cow, work);
compress_file_range(async_cow->inode, async_cow->locked_page,
async_cow->start, async_cow->end, async_cow,
&num_added);
if (num_added == 0) {
btrfs_add_delayed_iput(async_cow->inode);
async_cow->inode = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 1,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutomationInternalCustomBindings::GetSchemaAdditions(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> additions = v8::Object::New(GetIsolate());
additions->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(GetIsolate(), "EventType"),
ToEnumObject(GetIsolate(), ui::AX_EVENT_NONE, ui::AX_EVENT_LAST));
additions->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(GetIsolate(), "RoleType"),
ToEnumObject(GetIsolate(), ui::AX_ROLE_NONE, ui::AX_ROLE_LAST));
additions->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(GetIsolate(), "StateType"),
ToEnumObject(GetIsolate(), ui::AX_STATE_NONE, ui::AX_STATE_LAST));
additions->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(GetIsolate(), "TreeChangeType"),
ToEnumObject(GetIsolate(), ui::AX_MUTATION_NONE, ui::AX_MUTATION_LAST));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(additions);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,753 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rt_mutex_setprio(struct task_struct *p, int prio)
{
int oldprio, queued, running, queue_flag = DEQUEUE_SAVE | DEQUEUE_MOVE;
const struct sched_class *prev_class;
struct rq_flags rf;
struct rq *rq;
BUG_ON(prio > MAX_PRIO);
rq = __task_rq_lock(p, &rf);
/*
* Idle task boosting is a nono in general. There is one
* exception, when PREEMPT_RT and NOHZ is active:
*
* The idle task calls get_next_timer_interrupt() and holds
* the timer wheel base->lock on the CPU and another CPU wants
* to access the timer (probably to cancel it). We can safely
* ignore the boosting request, as the idle CPU runs this code
* with interrupts disabled and will complete the lock
* protected section without being interrupted. So there is no
* real need to boost.
*/
if (unlikely(p == rq->idle)) {
WARN_ON(p != rq->curr);
WARN_ON(p->pi_blocked_on);
goto out_unlock;
}
trace_sched_pi_setprio(p, prio);
oldprio = p->prio;
if (oldprio == prio)
queue_flag &= ~DEQUEUE_MOVE;
prev_class = p->sched_class;
queued = task_on_rq_queued(p);
running = task_current(rq, p);
if (queued)
dequeue_task(rq, p, queue_flag);
if (running)
put_prev_task(rq, p);
/*
* Boosting condition are:
* 1. -rt task is running and holds mutex A
* --> -dl task blocks on mutex A
*
* 2. -dl task is running and holds mutex A
* --> -dl task blocks on mutex A and could preempt the
* running task
*/
if (dl_prio(prio)) {
struct task_struct *pi_task = rt_mutex_get_top_task(p);
if (!dl_prio(p->normal_prio) ||
(pi_task && dl_entity_preempt(&pi_task->dl, &p->dl))) {
p->dl.dl_boosted = 1;
queue_flag |= ENQUEUE_REPLENISH;
} else
p->dl.dl_boosted = 0;
p->sched_class = &dl_sched_class;
} else if (rt_prio(prio)) {
if (dl_prio(oldprio))
p->dl.dl_boosted = 0;
if (oldprio < prio)
queue_flag |= ENQUEUE_HEAD;
p->sched_class = &rt_sched_class;
} else {
if (dl_prio(oldprio))
p->dl.dl_boosted = 0;
if (rt_prio(oldprio))
p->rt.timeout = 0;
p->sched_class = &fair_sched_class;
}
p->prio = prio;
if (running)
p->sched_class->set_curr_task(rq);
if (queued)
enqueue_task(rq, p, queue_flag);
check_class_changed(rq, p, prev_class, oldprio);
out_unlock:
preempt_disable(); /* avoid rq from going away on us */
__task_rq_unlock(rq, &rf);
balance_callback(rq);
preempt_enable();
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE &&
!vcpu->arch.apf.halted)
|| !list_empty_careful(&vcpu->async_pf.done)
|| vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_SIPI_RECEIVED
|| vcpu->arch.nmi_pending ||
(kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(vcpu) &&
kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(vcpu));
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 2,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~SocketStreamTest() {}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileSystemManagerImpl::DidWrite(OperationListenerID listener_id,
base::File::Error result,
int64_t bytes,
bool complete) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
blink::mojom::FileSystemOperationListener* listener =
GetOpListener(listener_id);
if (!listener)
return;
if (result == base::File::FILE_OK) {
listener->DidWrite(bytes, complete);
if (complete)
RemoveOpListener(listener_id);
} else {
listener->ErrorOccurred(result);
RemoveOpListener(listener_id);
}
}
Commit Message: Disable FileSystemManager::CreateWriter if WritableFiles isn't enabled.
Bug: 922677
Change-Id: Ib16137cbabb2ec07f1ffc0484722f1d9cc533404
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1416570
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623552}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 10,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaControlsHeaderView::MediaControlsHeaderView() {
SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::BoxLayout>(
views::BoxLayout::Orientation::kHorizontal, kMediaControlsHeaderInsets,
kMediaControlsHeaderChildSpacing));
auto app_icon_view = std::make_unique<views::ImageView>();
app_icon_view->SetImageSize(gfx::Size(kIconSize, kIconSize));
app_icon_view->SetVerticalAlignment(views::ImageView::Alignment::kLeading);
app_icon_view->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::ImageView::Alignment::kLeading);
app_icon_view->SetBorder(views::CreateEmptyBorder(kIconPadding));
app_icon_view->SetBackground(
views::CreateRoundedRectBackground(SK_ColorWHITE, kIconCornerRadius));
app_icon_view_ = AddChildView(std::move(app_icon_view));
gfx::Font default_font;
int font_size_delta = kHeaderTextFontSize - default_font.GetFontSize();
gfx::Font font = default_font.Derive(font_size_delta, gfx::Font::NORMAL,
gfx::Font::Weight::NORMAL);
gfx::FontList font_list(font);
auto app_name_view = std::make_unique<views::Label>();
app_name_view->SetFontList(font_list);
app_name_view->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
app_name_view->SetEnabledColor(SK_ColorWHITE);
app_name_view->SetAutoColorReadabilityEnabled(false);
app_name_view_ = AddChildView(std::move(app_name_view));
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 12,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_code_range_to_buf0(BBuf** pbuf, ScanEnv* env, OnigCodePoint from, OnigCodePoint to,
int checkdup)
{
int r, inc_n, pos;
OnigCodePoint low, high, bound, x;
OnigCodePoint n, *data;
BBuf* bbuf;
if (from > to) {
n = from; from = to; to = n;
}
if (IS_NULL(*pbuf)) {
r = new_code_range(pbuf);
if (r) return r;
bbuf = *pbuf;
n = 0;
}
else {
bbuf = *pbuf;
GET_CODE_POINT(n, bbuf->p);
}
data = (OnigCodePoint* )(bbuf->p);
data++;
bound = (from == 0) ? 0 : n;
for (low = 0; low < bound; ) {
x = (low + bound) >> 1;
if (from - 1 > data[x*2 + 1])
low = x + 1;
else
bound = x;
}
high = (to == ONIG_LAST_CODE_POINT) ? n : low;
for (bound = n; high < bound; ) {
x = (high + bound) >> 1;
if (to + 1 >= data[x*2])
high = x + 1;
else
bound = x;
}
/* data[(low-1)*2+1] << from <= data[low*2]
* data[(high-1)*2+1] <= to << data[high*2]
*/
inc_n = low + 1 - high;
if (n + inc_n > ONIG_MAX_MULTI_BYTE_RANGES_NUM)
return ONIGERR_TOO_MANY_MULTI_BYTE_RANGES;
if (inc_n != 1) {
if (checkdup && from <= data[low*2+1]
&& (data[low*2] <= from || data[low*2+1] <= to))
CC_DUP_WARN(env, from, to);
if (from > data[low*2])
from = data[low*2];
if (to < data[(high - 1)*2 + 1])
to = data[(high - 1)*2 + 1];
}
if (inc_n != 0) {
int from_pos = SIZE_CODE_POINT * (1 + high * 2);
int to_pos = SIZE_CODE_POINT * (1 + (low + 1) * 2);
if (inc_n > 0) {
if (high < n) {
int size = (n - high) * 2 * SIZE_CODE_POINT;
BBUF_MOVE_RIGHT(bbuf, from_pos, to_pos, size);
}
}
else {
BBUF_MOVE_LEFT_REDUCE(bbuf, from_pos, to_pos);
}
}
pos = SIZE_CODE_POINT * (1 + low * 2);
BBUF_ENSURE_SIZE(bbuf, pos + SIZE_CODE_POINT * 2);
BBUF_WRITE_CODE_POINT(bbuf, pos, from);
BBUF_WRITE_CODE_POINT(bbuf, pos + SIZE_CODE_POINT, to);
n += inc_n;
BBUF_WRITE_CODE_POINT(bbuf, 0, n);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #134 from k-takata/fix-segv-in-error-str
Fix SEGV in onig_error_code_to_str() (Fix #132)
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 29,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tgr160_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 * out)
{
u8 D[64];
tgr192_final(desc, D);
memcpy(out, D, TGR160_DIGEST_SIZE);
memzero_explicit(D, TGR192_DIGEST_SIZE);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_port)
{
php_pgsql_get_link_info(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU,PHP_PG_PORT);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t color_string_to_rgba(const char *p, int len)
{
uint32_t ret = 0xFF000000;
const ColorEntry *entry;
char color_name[100];
if (*p == '#') {
p++;
len--;
if (len == 3) {
ret |= (hex_char_to_number(p[2]) << 4) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[1]) << 12) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[0]) << 20);
} else if (len == 4) {
ret = (hex_char_to_number(p[3]) << 4) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[2]) << 12) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[1]) << 20) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[0]) << 28);
} else if (len == 6) {
ret |= hex_char_to_number(p[5]) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[4]) << 4) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[3]) << 8) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[2]) << 12) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[1]) << 16) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[0]) << 20);
} else if (len == 8) {
ret = hex_char_to_number(p[7]) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[6]) << 4) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[5]) << 8) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[4]) << 12) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[3]) << 16) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[2]) << 20) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[1]) << 24) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[0]) << 28);
}
} else {
strncpy(color_name, p, len);
color_name[len] = '\0';
entry = bsearch(color_name,
color_table,
FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(color_table),
sizeof(ColorEntry),
color_table_compare);
if (!entry)
return ret;
ret = entry->rgb_color;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/xpmdec: Fix multiple pointer/memory issues
Most of these were found through code review in response to
fixing 1466/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5961584419536896
There is thus no testcase for most of this.
The initial issue was Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
if (IS_ERR(mm))
return PTR_ERR(mm);
file->private_data = mm;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 7,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void treatReturnedNullStringAsNullStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::treatReturnedNullStringAsNullStringAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RList *classes(RBinFile *arch) {
RBinDexObj *bin;
if (!arch || !arch->o || !arch->o->bin_obj) {
return NULL;
}
bin = (RBinDexObj*) arch->o->bin_obj;
if (!bin->classes_list) {
dex_loadcode (arch, bin);
}
return bin->classes_list;
}
Commit Message: fix #6872
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 9,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int do_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *p,
bool group)
{
unsigned long flags;
int ret = -ESRCH;
if (lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) {
ret = send_signal(sig, info, p, group);
unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: flatpak_proxy_init (FlatpakProxy *proxy)
{
proxy->policy = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, NULL);
proxy->filters = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, (GDestroyNotify)filter_list_free);
proxy->wildcard_policy = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, NULL);
flatpak_proxy_add_policy (proxy, "org.freedesktop.DBus", FLATPAK_POLICY_TALK);
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 23,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string GetAuthErrorAccountId(Profile* profile) {
const SigninErrorController* error =
SigninErrorControllerFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
if (!error)
return std::string();
return error->error_account_id();
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tipc_sk_send_ack(struct tipc_sock *tsk)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(&tsk->sk);
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
struct tipc_msg *msg;
u32 peer_port = tsk_peer_port(tsk);
u32 dnode = tsk_peer_node(tsk);
if (!tsk->connected)
return;
skb = tipc_msg_create(CONN_MANAGER, CONN_ACK, INT_H_SIZE, 0,
dnode, tsk_own_node(tsk), peer_port,
tsk->portid, TIPC_OK);
if (!skb)
return;
msg = buf_msg(skb);
msg_set_conn_ack(msg, tsk->rcv_unacked);
tsk->rcv_unacked = 0;
/* Adjust to and advertize the correct window limit */
if (tsk->peer_caps & TIPC_BLOCK_FLOWCTL) {
tsk->rcv_win = tsk_adv_blocks(tsk->sk.sk_rcvbuf);
msg_set_adv_win(msg, tsk->rcv_win);
}
tipc_node_xmit_skb(net, skb, dnode, msg_link_selector(msg));
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int modbus_write_bits(modbus_t *ctx, int addr, int nb, const uint8_t *src)
{
int rc;
int i;
int byte_count;
int req_length;
int bit_check = 0;
int pos = 0;
uint8_t req[MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH];
if (ctx == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
if (nb > MODBUS_MAX_WRITE_BITS) {
if (ctx->debug) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR Writing too many bits (%d > %d)\n",
nb, MODBUS_MAX_WRITE_BITS);
}
errno = EMBMDATA;
return -1;
}
req_length = ctx->backend->build_request_basis(ctx,
MODBUS_FC_WRITE_MULTIPLE_COILS,
addr, nb, req);
byte_count = (nb / 8) + ((nb % 8) ? 1 : 0);
req[req_length++] = byte_count;
for (i = 0; i < byte_count; i++) {
int bit;
bit = 0x01;
req[req_length] = 0;
while ((bit & 0xFF) && (bit_check++ < nb)) {
if (src[pos++])
req[req_length] |= bit;
else
req[req_length] &=~ bit;
bit = bit << 1;
}
req_length++;
}
rc = send_msg(ctx, req, req_length);
if (rc > 0) {
uint8_t rsp[MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH];
rc = _modbus_receive_msg(ctx, rsp, MSG_CONFIRMATION);
if (rc == -1)
return -1;
rc = check_confirmation(ctx, req, rsp, rc);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 9,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_ShutdownAll(qboolean shutdownRef)
{
if(CL_VideoRecording())
CL_CloseAVI();
if(clc.demorecording)
CL_StopRecord_f();
#ifdef USE_CURL
CL_cURL_Shutdown();
#endif
S_DisableSounds();
CL_ShutdownCGame();
CL_ShutdownUI();
if(shutdownRef)
CL_ShutdownRef();
else if(re.Shutdown)
re.Shutdown(qfalse); // don't destroy window or context
cls.uiStarted = qfalse;
cls.cgameStarted = qfalse;
cls.rendererStarted = qfalse;
cls.soundRegistered = qfalse;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 22,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __devexit airo_pci_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct net_device *dev = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
airo_print_info(dev->name, "Unregistering...");
stop_airo_card(dev, 1);
pci_disable_device(pdev);
pci_set_drvdata(pdev, NULL);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void giveup_altivec_maybe_transactional(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/*
* If we are saving the current thread's registers, and the
* thread is in a transactional state, set the TIF_RESTORE_TM
* bit so that we know to restore the registers before
* returning to userspace.
*/
if (tsk == current && tsk->thread.regs &&
MSR_TM_ACTIVE(tsk->thread.regs->msr) &&
!test_thread_flag(TIF_RESTORE_TM)) {
tsk->thread.ckpt_regs.msr = tsk->thread.regs->msr;
set_thread_flag(TIF_RESTORE_TM);
}
giveup_altivec(tsk);
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Check for already reclaimed tasks
Currently we can hit a scenario where we'll tm_reclaim() twice. This
results in a TM bad thing exception because the second reclaim occurs
when not in suspend mode.
The scenario in which this can happen is the following. We attempt to
deliver a signal to userspace. To do this we need obtain the stack
pointer to write the signal context. To get this stack pointer we
must tm_reclaim() in case we need to use the checkpointed stack
pointer (see get_tm_stackpointer()). Normally we'd then return
directly to userspace to deliver the signal without going through
__switch_to().
Unfortunatley, if at this point we get an error (such as a bad
userspace stack pointer), we need to exit the process. The exit will
result in a __switch_to(). __switch_to() will attempt to save the
process state which results in another tm_reclaim(). This
tm_reclaim() now causes a TM Bad Thing exception as this state has
already been saved and the processor is no longer in TM suspend mode.
Whee!
This patch checks the state of the MSR to ensure we are TM suspended
before we attempt the tm_reclaim(). If we've already saved the state
away, we should no longer be in TM suspend mode. This has the
additional advantage of checking for a potential TM Bad Thing
exception.
Found using syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: fb09692e71f1 ("powerpc: Add reclaim and recheckpoint functions for context switching transactional memory processes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 23,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VOID ixheaacd_hbe_xprod_proc_4(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer,
WORD32 qmf_band_idx, WORD32 qmf_col_idx,
FLOAT32 p, WORD32 pitch_in_bins_idx) {
WORD32 k;
WORD32 inp_band_idx = qmf_band_idx >> 1;
WORD32 tr, n1, n2, max_trans_fac, max_n1, max_n2;
FLOAT64 temp_fac;
FLOAT32 max_mag_value, mag_zero_band, mag_n1_band, mag_n2_band, temp;
FLOAT32 temp_r, temp_i;
FLOAT32 mag_cmplx_gain = 2.0f;
FLOAT32 *qmf_in_buf_ri =
ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[qmf_col_idx + HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX];
mag_zero_band =
qmf_in_buf_ri[2 * inp_band_idx] * qmf_in_buf_ri[2 * inp_band_idx] +
qmf_in_buf_ri[2 * inp_band_idx + 1] * qmf_in_buf_ri[2 * inp_band_idx + 1];
max_mag_value = 0;
max_n1 = max_n2 = max_trans_fac = 0;
for (tr = 1; tr < 4; tr++) {
temp_fac = (2.0f * qmf_band_idx + 1 - tr * p) * 0.25;
n1 = ((WORD32)(temp_fac)) << 1;
n2 = ((WORD32)(temp_fac + p)) << 1;
mag_n1_band = qmf_in_buf_ri[n1] * qmf_in_buf_ri[n1] +
qmf_in_buf_ri[n1 + 1] * qmf_in_buf_ri[n1 + 1];
mag_n2_band = qmf_in_buf_ri[n2] * qmf_in_buf_ri[n2] +
qmf_in_buf_ri[n2 + 1] * qmf_in_buf_ri[n2 + 1];
temp = min(mag_n1_band, mag_n2_band);
if (temp > max_mag_value) {
max_mag_value = temp;
max_trans_fac = tr;
max_n1 = n1;
max_n2 = n2;
}
}
if (max_mag_value > mag_zero_band && max_n1 >= 0 &&
max_n2 < TWICE_QMF_SYNTH_CHANNELS_NUM) {
FLOAT32 vec_y_r[2], vec_y_i[2], vec_o_r[2], vec_o_i[2];
FLOAT32 d1, d2;
WORD32 mid_trans_fac, idx;
FLOAT32 x_zero_band_r;
FLOAT32 x_zero_band_i;
FLOAT64 base = 1e-17;
FLOAT32 mag_scaling_fac = 0.0f;
x_zero_band_r = 0;
x_zero_band_i = 0;
mid_trans_fac = 4 - max_trans_fac;
if (max_trans_fac == 1) {
d1 = 0;
d2 = 2;
x_zero_band_r = qmf_in_buf_ri[max_n1];
x_zero_band_i = qmf_in_buf_ri[max_n1 + 1];
for (k = 0; k < 2; k++) {
vec_y_r[k] =
ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[qmf_col_idx + HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX +
2 * (k - 1)][max_n2];
vec_y_i[k] =
ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[qmf_col_idx + HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX +
2 * (k - 1)][max_n2 + 1];
}
} else if (max_trans_fac == 2) {
d1 = 0;
d2 = 1;
x_zero_band_r = qmf_in_buf_ri[max_n1];
x_zero_band_i = qmf_in_buf_ri[max_n1 + 1];
for (k = 0; k < 2; k++) {
vec_y_r[k] =
ptr_hbe_txposer
->qmf_in_buf[qmf_col_idx + HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX + (k - 1)][max_n2];
vec_y_i[k] =
ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[qmf_col_idx + HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX +
(k - 1)][max_n2 + 1];
}
} else {
d1 = 2;
d2 = 0;
mid_trans_fac = max_trans_fac;
max_trans_fac = 4 - max_trans_fac;
x_zero_band_r = qmf_in_buf_ri[max_n2];
x_zero_band_i = qmf_in_buf_ri[max_n2 + 1];
for (k = 0; k < 2; k++) {
vec_y_r[k] =
ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[qmf_col_idx + HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX +
2 * (k - 1)][max_n1];
vec_y_i[k] =
ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[qmf_col_idx + HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX +
2 * (k - 1)][max_n1 + 1];
}
}
base = 1e-17;
base = base + x_zero_band_r * x_zero_band_r;
base = base + x_zero_band_i * x_zero_band_i;
{
temp = (FLOAT32)sqrt(sqrt(base));
mag_scaling_fac = temp * (FLOAT32)(sqrt(temp));
mag_scaling_fac = 1 / mag_scaling_fac;
}
x_zero_band_r *= mag_scaling_fac;
x_zero_band_i *= mag_scaling_fac;
for (k = 0; k < 2; k++) {
base = 1e-17;
base = base + vec_y_r[k] * vec_y_r[k];
base = base + vec_y_i[k] * vec_y_i[k];
{
temp = (FLOAT32)sqrt(sqrt(base));
mag_scaling_fac = temp * (FLOAT32)(sqrt(temp));
mag_scaling_fac = 1 / mag_scaling_fac;
}
vec_y_r[k] *= mag_scaling_fac;
vec_y_i[k] *= mag_scaling_fac;
}
temp_r = x_zero_band_r;
temp_i = x_zero_band_i;
for (idx = 0; idx < mid_trans_fac - 1; idx++) {
FLOAT32 tmp = x_zero_band_r;
x_zero_band_r = x_zero_band_r * temp_r - x_zero_band_i * temp_i;
x_zero_band_i = tmp * temp_i + x_zero_band_i * temp_r;
}
for (k = 0; k < 2; k++) {
temp_r = vec_y_r[k];
temp_i = vec_y_i[k];
for (idx = 0; idx < max_trans_fac - 1; idx++) {
FLOAT32 tmp = vec_y_r[k];
vec_y_r[k] = vec_y_r[k] * temp_r - vec_y_i[k] * temp_i;
vec_y_i[k] = tmp * temp_i + vec_y_i[k] * temp_r;
}
}
for (k = 0; k < 2; k++) {
vec_o_r[k] = vec_y_r[k] * x_zero_band_r - vec_y_i[k] * x_zero_band_i;
vec_o_i[k] = vec_y_r[k] * x_zero_band_i + vec_y_i[k] * x_zero_band_r;
}
{
FLOAT32 cos_theta;
FLOAT32 sin_theta;
if (d2 == 1) {
cos_theta =
ixheaacd_hbe_x_prod_cos_table_trans_4_1[(pitch_in_bins_idx << 1) +
0];
sin_theta =
ixheaacd_hbe_x_prod_cos_table_trans_4_1[(pitch_in_bins_idx << 1) +
1];
} else {
cos_theta =
ixheaacd_hbe_x_prod_cos_table_trans_4[(pitch_in_bins_idx << 1) + 0];
sin_theta =
ixheaacd_hbe_x_prod_cos_table_trans_4[(pitch_in_bins_idx << 1) + 1];
if (d2 < d1) {
sin_theta = -sin_theta;
}
}
temp_r = vec_o_r[0];
temp_i = vec_o_i[0];
vec_o_r[0] = (FLOAT32)(cos_theta * temp_r - sin_theta * temp_i);
vec_o_i[0] = (FLOAT32)(cos_theta * temp_i + sin_theta * temp_r);
}
for (k = 0; k < 2; k++) {
ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_out_buf[qmf_col_idx * 2 + (k + HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX -
1)][2 * qmf_band_idx] +=
(FLOAT32)(mag_cmplx_gain * vec_o_r[k]);
ptr_hbe_txposer
->qmf_out_buf[qmf_col_idx * 2 + (k + HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX - 1)]
[2 * qmf_band_idx + 1] +=
(FLOAT32)(mag_cmplx_gain * vec_o_i[k]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 6,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reweight_entity(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se,
unsigned long weight, unsigned long runnable)
{
if (se->on_rq) {
/* commit outstanding execution time */
if (cfs_rq->curr == se)
update_curr(cfs_rq);
account_entity_dequeue(cfs_rq, se);
dequeue_runnable_load_avg(cfs_rq, se);
}
dequeue_load_avg(cfs_rq, se);
se->runnable_weight = runnable;
update_load_set(&se->load, weight);
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
do {
u32 divider = LOAD_AVG_MAX - 1024 + se->avg.period_contrib;
se->avg.load_avg = div_u64(se_weight(se) * se->avg.load_sum, divider);
se->avg.runnable_load_avg =
div_u64(se_runnable(se) * se->avg.runnable_load_sum, divider);
} while (0);
#endif
enqueue_load_avg(cfs_rq, se);
if (se->on_rq) {
account_entity_enqueue(cfs_rq, se);
enqueue_runnable_load_avg(cfs_rq, se);
}
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 26,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_start_shutdown(
struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *reply;
/* Once all its outstanding data has been acknowledged, the
* endpoint shall send a SHUTDOWN chunk to its peer including
* in the Cumulative TSN Ack field the last sequential TSN it
* has received from the peer.
*/
reply = sctp_make_shutdown(asoc, NULL);
if (!reply)
goto nomem;
/* Set the transport for the SHUTDOWN chunk and the timeout for the
* T2-shutdown timer.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SETUP_T2, SCTP_CHUNK(reply));
/* It shall then start the T2-shutdown timer */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T2_SHUTDOWN));
/* RFC 4960 Section 9.2
* The sender of the SHUTDOWN MAY also start an overall guard timer
* 'T5-shutdown-guard' to bound the overall time for shutdown sequence.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_RESTART,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T5_SHUTDOWN_GUARD));
if (asoc->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_AUTOCLOSE])
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_AUTOCLOSE));
/* and enter the SHUTDOWN-SENT state. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_SENT));
/* sctp-implguide 2.10 Issues with Heartbeating and failover
*
* HEARTBEAT ... is discontinued after sending either SHUTDOWN
* or SHUTDOWN-ACK.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_HB_TIMERS_STOP, SCTP_NULL());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(reply));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
nomem:
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,000 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(accept4, int, fd, struct sockaddr __user *, upeer_sockaddr,
int __user *, upeer_addrlen, int, flags)
{
struct socket *sock, *newsock;
struct file *newfile;
int err, len, newfd, fput_needed;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
if (flags & ~(SOCK_CLOEXEC | SOCK_NONBLOCK))
return -EINVAL;
if (SOCK_NONBLOCK != O_NONBLOCK && (flags & SOCK_NONBLOCK))
flags = (flags & ~SOCK_NONBLOCK) | O_NONBLOCK;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
err = -ENFILE;
newsock = sock_alloc();
if (!newsock)
goto out_put;
newsock->type = sock->type;
newsock->ops = sock->ops;
/*
* We don't need try_module_get here, as the listening socket (sock)
* has the protocol module (sock->ops->owner) held.
*/
__module_get(newsock->ops->owner);
newfd = sock_alloc_file(newsock, &newfile, flags);
if (unlikely(newfd < 0)) {
err = newfd;
sock_release(newsock);
goto out_put;
}
err = security_socket_accept(sock, newsock);
if (err)
goto out_fd;
err = sock->ops->accept(sock, newsock, sock->file->f_flags);
if (err < 0)
goto out_fd;
if (upeer_sockaddr) {
if (newsock->ops->getname(newsock, (struct sockaddr *)&address,
&len, 2) < 0) {
err = -ECONNABORTED;
goto out_fd;
}
err = move_addr_to_user((struct sockaddr *)&address,
len, upeer_sockaddr, upeer_addrlen);
if (err < 0)
goto out_fd;
}
/* File flags are not inherited via accept() unlike another OSes. */
fd_install(newfd, newfile);
err = newfd;
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
out_fd:
fput(newfile);
put_unused_fd(newfd);
goto out_put;
}
Commit Message: sendmmsg/sendmsg: fix unsafe user pointer access
Dereferencing a user pointer directly from kernel-space without going
through the copy_from_user family of functions is a bad idea. Two of
such usages can be found in the sendmsg code path called from sendmmsg,
added by
commit c71d8ebe7a4496fb7231151cb70a6baa0cb56f9a upstream.
commit 5b47b8038f183b44d2d8ff1c7d11a5c1be706b34 in the 3.0-stable tree.
Usages are performed through memcmp() and memcpy() directly. Fix those
by using the already copied msg_sys structure instead of the __user *msg
structure. Note that msg_sys can be set to NULL by verify_compat_iovec()
or verify_iovec(), which requires additional NULL pointer checks.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
CC: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
CC: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool checkPermission(const char* permissionString) {
if (getpid() == IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingPid()) return true;
bool ok = checkCallingPermission(String16(permissionString));
if (!ok) ALOGE("Request requires %s", permissionString);
return ok;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 16,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vm_insert_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long pfn)
{
int ret;
pgprot_t pgprot = vma->vm_page_prot;
/*
* Technically, architectures with pte_special can avoid all these
* restrictions (same for remap_pfn_range). However we would like
* consistency in testing and feature parity among all, so we should
* try to keep these invariants in place for everybody.
*/
BUG_ON(!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_PFNMAP|VM_MIXEDMAP)));
BUG_ON((vma->vm_flags & (VM_PFNMAP|VM_MIXEDMAP)) ==
(VM_PFNMAP|VM_MIXEDMAP));
BUG_ON((vma->vm_flags & VM_PFNMAP) && is_cow_mapping(vma->vm_flags));
BUG_ON((vma->vm_flags & VM_MIXEDMAP) && pfn_valid(pfn));
if (addr < vma->vm_start || addr >= vma->vm_end)
return -EFAULT;
if (track_pfn_vma_new(vma, &pgprot, pfn, PAGE_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
ret = insert_pfn(vma, addr, pfn, pgprot);
if (ret)
untrack_pfn_vma(vma, pfn, PAGE_SIZE);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 9,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppListControllerDelegate::SetExtensionLaunchType(
Profile* profile,
const std::string& extension_id,
extensions::LaunchType launch_type) {
extensions::SetLaunchType(profile, extension_id, launch_type);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,686 |
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