instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OmniboxViewViews::OnBeforePossibleChange() {
GetState(&state_before_change_);
ime_composing_before_change_ = IsIMEComposing();
ClearAccessibilityLabel();
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 14,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VerifyDidPreviewPage(bool generate_draft_pages, int page_number) {
bool msg_found = false;
size_t msg_count = render_thread_->sink().message_count();
for (size_t i = 0; i < msg_count; ++i) {
const IPC::Message* msg = render_thread_->sink().GetMessageAt(i);
if (msg->type() == PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage::ID) {
PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage::Param page_param;
PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage::Read(msg, &page_param);
if (page_param.a.page_number == page_number) {
msg_found = true;
if (generate_draft_pages)
EXPECT_NE(0U, page_param.a.data_size);
else
EXPECT_EQ(0U, page_param.a.data_size);
break;
}
}
}
ASSERT_EQ(generate_draft_pages, msg_found);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 26,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FilePath SavePackage::EnsureHtmlExtension(const FilePath& name) {
FilePath::StringType ext = name.Extension();
if (!ext.empty())
ext.erase(ext.begin()); // Erase preceding '.'.
std::string mime_type;
if (!net::GetMimeTypeFromExtension(ext, &mime_type) ||
!CanSaveAsComplete(mime_type)) {
return FilePath(name.value() + FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".") +
kDefaultHtmlExtension);
}
return name;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,353
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char* get_signame(int sig) {
switch(sig) {
case SIGABRT: return "SIGABRT";
case SIGBUS: return "SIGBUS";
case SIGFPE: return "SIGFPE";
case SIGILL: return "SIGILL";
case SIGPIPE: return "SIGPIPE";
case SIGSEGV: return "SIGSEGV";
#if defined(SIGSTKFLT)
case SIGSTKFLT: return "SIGSTKFLT";
#endif
case SIGSTOP: return "SIGSTOP";
case SIGTRAP: return "SIGTRAP";
default: return "?";
}
}
Commit Message: Don't create tombstone directory.
Partial backport of cf79748.
Bug: http://b/26403620
Change-Id: Ib877ab6cfab6aef079830c5a50ba81141ead35ee
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cac_add_object_to_list(list_t *list, const cac_object_t *object)
{
if (list_append(list, object) < 0)
return SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 26,065
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tst_QQuickWebView::init()
{
m_window.reset(new TestWindow(newWebView()));
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 13,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::EnableOrDisable(GLenum capability,
bool enable) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (enable)
ContextGL()->Enable(capability);
else
ContextGL()->Disable(capability);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_cleanup_inode(
struct inode *dir,
struct inode *inode,
struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct xfs_name teardown;
/* Oh, the horror.
* If we can't add the ACL or we fail in
* xfs_init_security we must back out.
* ENOSPC can hit here, among other things.
*/
xfs_dentry_to_name(&teardown, dentry);
xfs_remove(XFS_I(dir), &teardown, XFS_I(inode));
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix missing ILOCK unlock when xfs_setattr_nonsize fails due to EDQUOT
Benjamin Moody reported to Debian that XFS partially wedges when a chgrp
fails on account of being out of disk quota. I ran his reproducer
script:
# adduser dummy
# adduser dummy plugdev
# dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=100 of=test.img
# mkfs.xfs test.img
# mount -t xfs -o gquota test.img /mnt
# mkdir -p /mnt/dummy
# chown -c dummy /mnt/dummy
# xfs_quota -xc 'limit -g bsoft=100k bhard=100k plugdev' /mnt
(and then as user dummy)
$ dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1M count=50 of=/mnt/dummy/foo
$ chgrp plugdev /mnt/dummy/foo
and saw:
================================================
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
5.3.0-rc5 #rc5 Tainted: G W
------------------------------------------------
chgrp/47006 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by chgrp/47006:
#0: 000000006664ea2d (&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}, at: xfs_ilock+0xd2/0x290 [xfs]
...which is clearly caused by xfs_setattr_nonsize failing to unlock the
ILOCK after the xfs_qm_vop_chown_reserve call fails. Add the missing
unlock.
Reported-by: benjamin.moody@gmail.com
Fixes: 253f4911f297 ("xfs: better xfs_trans_alloc interface")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char print_fat_dirty_state(void)
{
printf("Dirty bit is set. Fs was not properly unmounted and"
" some data may be corrupt.\n");
if (interactive) {
printf("1) Remove dirty bit\n" "2) No action\n");
return get_key("12", "?");
} else
printf(" Automatically removing dirty bit.\n");
return '1';
}
Commit Message: read_boot(): Handle excessive FAT size specifications
The variable used for storing the FAT size (in bytes) was an unsigned
int. Since the size in sectors read from the BPB was not sufficiently
checked, this could end up being zero after multiplying it with the
sector size while some offsets still stayed excessive. Ultimately it
would cause segfaults when accessing FAT entries for which no memory
was allocated.
Make it more robust by changing the types used to store FAT size to
off_t and abort if there is no room for data clusters. Additionally
check that FAT size is not specified as zero.
Fixes #25 and fixes #26.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <aeb@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean webkit_web_view_real_console_message(WebKitWebView* webView, const gchar* message, unsigned int line, const gchar* sourceId)
{
g_message("console message: %s @%d: %s\n", sourceId, line, message);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,814
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::ScheduleEvent(const AtomicString& event_name) {
ScheduleEvent(Event::CreateCancelable(event_name));
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 26,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AutocompleteEditModel::DoInstant(const AutocompleteMatch& match,
string16* suggested_text) {
DCHECK(suggested_text);
if (in_revert_)
return false;
InstantController* instant = controller_->GetInstant();
if (!instant)
return false;
TabContentsWrapper* tab = controller_->GetTabContentsWrapper();
if (!tab)
return false;
if (user_input_in_progress_ && popup_->IsOpen()) {
return instant->Update(tab, match, view_->GetText(), UseVerbatimInstant(),
suggested_text);
}
instant->Hide();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct crypto_larval *crypto_larval_alloc(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
struct crypto_larval *larval;
larval = kzalloc(sizeof(*larval), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!larval)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
larval->mask = mask;
larval->alg.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL | type;
larval->alg.cra_priority = -1;
larval->alg.cra_destroy = crypto_larval_destroy;
strlcpy(larval->alg.cra_name, name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
init_completion(&larval->completion);
return larval;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void inet_hash_remove(struct in_ifaddr *ifa)
{
ASSERT_RTNL();
hlist_del_init_rcu(&ifa->hash);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,734
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGenMailboxCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::GenMailboxCHROMIUM& c) {
MailboxName name;
mailbox_manager()->GenerateMailboxName(&name);
uint32 bucket_id = static_cast<uint32>(c.bucket_id);
Bucket* bucket = CreateBucket(bucket_id);
bucket->SetSize(GL_MAILBOX_SIZE_CHROMIUM);
bucket->SetData(&name, 0, GL_MAILBOX_SIZE_CHROMIUM);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 25,415
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int extract_rates(char *rates, int ratelen, const char *request)
{
const char *p;
for (p = request; *p && *p != '\r' && *p != '\n'; ) {
if (av_strncasecmp(p, "Pragma:", 7) == 0) {
const char *q = p + 7;
while (*q && *q != '\n' && av_isspace(*q))
q++;
if (av_strncasecmp(q, "stream-switch-entry=", 20) == 0) {
int stream_no;
int rate_no;
q += 20;
memset(rates, 0xff, ratelen);
while (1) {
while (*q && *q != '\n' && *q != ':')
q++;
if (sscanf(q, ":%d:%d", &stream_no, &rate_no) != 2)
break;
stream_no--;
if (stream_no < ratelen && stream_no >= 0)
rates[stream_no] = rate_no;
while (*q && *q != '\n' && !av_isspace(*q))
q++;
}
return 1;
}
}
p = strchr(p, '\n');
if (!p)
break;
p++;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, loadPhar)
{
char *fname, *alias = NULL, *error;
size_t fname_len, alias_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|s!", &fname, &fname_len, &alias, &alias_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
phar_request_initialize();
RETVAL_BOOL(phar_open_from_filename(fname, fname_len, alias, alias_len, REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, &error) == SUCCESS);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto string Phar::apiVersion()
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 12,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ITextDocument* OmniboxViewWin::GetTextObjectModel() const {
if (!text_object_model_) {
base::win::ScopedComPtr<IRichEditOle, NULL> ole_interface;
ole_interface.Attach(GetOleInterface());
if (ole_interface) {
ole_interface.QueryInterface(
__uuidof(ITextDocument),
reinterpret_cast<void**>(&text_object_model_));
}
}
return text_object_model_;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mknod, const char __user *, filename, int, mode, unsigned, dev)
{
return sys_mknodat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode, dev);
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int uvesafb_vbe_init(struct fb_info *info)
{
struct uvesafb_ktask *task = NULL;
struct uvesafb_par *par = info->par;
int err;
task = uvesafb_prep();
if (!task)
return -ENOMEM;
err = uvesafb_vbe_getinfo(task, par);
if (err)
goto out;
err = uvesafb_vbe_getmodes(task, par);
if (err)
goto out;
par->nocrtc = nocrtc;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
par->pmi_setpal = pmi_setpal;
par->ypan = ypan;
if (par->pmi_setpal || par->ypan) {
if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX) {
par->pmi_setpal = par->ypan = 0;
pr_warn("NX protection is active, better not use the PMI\n");
} else {
uvesafb_vbe_getpmi(task, par);
}
}
#else
/* The protected mode interface is not available on non-x86. */
par->pmi_setpal = par->ypan = 0;
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&info->modelist);
uvesafb_vbe_getmonspecs(task, info);
uvesafb_vbe_getstatesize(task, par);
out: uvesafb_free(task);
return err;
}
Commit Message: video: uvesafb: Fix integer overflow in allocation
cmap->len can get close to INT_MAX/2, allowing for an integer overflow in
allocation. This uses kmalloc_array() instead to catch the condition.
Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8bdb3a2d7df48 ("uvesafb: the driver core")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 10,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnZipAnalysisFinished(const zip_analyzer::Results& results) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK_EQ(ClientDownloadRequest::ZIPPED_EXECUTABLE, type_);
if (!service_)
return;
if (results.success) {
zipped_executable_ = results.has_executable;
archived_binary_.CopyFrom(results.archived_binary);
DVLOG(1) << "Zip analysis finished for " << item_->GetFullPath().value()
<< ", has_executable=" << results.has_executable
<< " has_archive=" << results.has_archive;
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "Zip analysis failed for " << item_->GetFullPath().value();
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("SBClientDownload.ZipFileHasExecutable",
zipped_executable_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("SBClientDownload.ZipFileHasArchiveButNoExecutable",
results.has_archive && !zipped_executable_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("SBClientDownload.ExtractZipFeaturesTime",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - zip_analysis_start_time_);
for (const auto& file_extension : results.archived_archive_filetypes)
RecordArchivedArchiveFileExtensionType(file_extension);
if (!zipped_executable_ && !results.has_archive) {
PostFinishTask(UNKNOWN, REASON_ARCHIVE_WITHOUT_BINARIES);
return;
}
if (!zipped_executable_ && results.has_archive)
type_ = ClientDownloadRequest::ZIPPED_ARCHIVE;
OnFileFeatureExtractionDone();
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 7,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs3svc_decode_mknodargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_mknodargs *args)
{
if (!(p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh))
|| !(p = decode_filename(p, &args->name, &args->len)))
return 0;
args->ftype = ntohl(*p++);
if (args->ftype == NF3BLK || args->ftype == NF3CHR
|| args->ftype == NF3SOCK || args->ftype == NF3FIFO)
p = decode_sattr3(p, &args->attrs);
if (args->ftype == NF3BLK || args->ftype == NF3CHR) {
args->major = ntohl(*p++);
args->minor = ntohl(*p++);
}
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 29,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType AutoLevelImage(Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
return(MinMaxStretchImage(image,0.0,0.0,1.0,exception));
}
Commit Message: Evaluate lazy pixel cache morphology to prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim M. El-Sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 25,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::OnTargetPathSelected(const FilePath& target_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK_EQ(TARGET_DISPOSITION_PROMPT, target_disposition_);
target_path_ = target_path;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: string_has_highlight (const char *string, const char *highlight_words)
{
char *msg, *highlight, *match, *match_pre, *match_post, *msg_pos;
char *pos, *pos_end, *ptr_str, *ptr_string_ref;
int end, length, startswith, endswith, wildcard_start, wildcard_end, flags;
if (!string || !string[0] || !highlight_words || !highlight_words[0])
return 0;
msg = strdup (string);
if (!msg)
return 0;
string_tolower (msg);
highlight = strdup (highlight_words);
if (!highlight)
{
free (msg);
return 0;
}
string_tolower (highlight);
pos = highlight;
end = 0;
while (!end)
{
ptr_string_ref = (char *)string;
flags = 0;
pos = (char *)string_regex_flags (pos, REG_ICASE, &flags);
pos_end = strchr (pos, ',');
if (!pos_end)
{
pos_end = strchr (pos, '\0');
end = 1;
}
/* error parsing string! */
if (!pos_end)
{
free (msg);
free (highlight);
return 0;
}
if (flags & REG_ICASE)
{
for (ptr_str = pos; ptr_str < pos_end; ptr_str++)
{
if ((ptr_str[0] >= 'A') && (ptr_str[0] <= 'Z'))
ptr_str[0] += ('a' - 'A');
}
ptr_string_ref = msg;
}
length = pos_end - pos;
pos_end[0] = '\0';
if (length > 0)
{
if ((wildcard_start = (pos[0] == '*')))
{
pos++;
length--;
}
if ((wildcard_end = (*(pos_end - 1) == '*')))
{
*(pos_end - 1) = '\0';
length--;
}
}
if (length > 0)
{
msg_pos = ptr_string_ref;
/* highlight found! */
while ((match = strstr (msg_pos, pos)) != NULL)
{
match_pre = utf8_prev_char (ptr_string_ref, match);
if (!match_pre)
match_pre = match - 1;
match_post = match + length;
startswith = ((match == ptr_string_ref) || (!string_is_word_char (match_pre)));
endswith = ((!match_post[0]) || (!string_is_word_char (match_post)));
if ((wildcard_start && wildcard_end) ||
(!wildcard_start && !wildcard_end &&
startswith && endswith) ||
(wildcard_start && endswith) ||
(wildcard_end && startswith))
{
free (msg);
free (highlight);
return 1;
}
msg_pos = match_post;
}
}
if (!end)
pos = pos_end + 1;
}
free (msg);
free (highlight);
/* no highlight found */
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: process_new_pointer_pdu(STREAM s)
{
int xor_bpp;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "%s()", __func__);
in_uint16_le(s, xor_bpp);
process_colour_pointer_common(s, xor_bpp);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::destroy()
{
disableWebInspector();
d->m_backingStore->d->suspendBackingStoreUpdates();
d->m_backingStore->d->suspendScreenUpdates();
d->m_page->backForward()->close();
pageCache()->releaseAutoreleasedPagesNow();
FrameLoader* loader = d->m_mainFrame->loader();
d->m_mainFrame = 0;
if (loader)
loader->detachFromParent();
deleteGuardedObject(this);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::NamedPropertySetterCallback(
v8::Local<v8::Name> name,
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value,
const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_NamedPropertySetter");
if (!name->IsString())
return;
const AtomicString& property_name = ToCoreAtomicString(name.As<v8::String>());
test_object_v8_internal::NamedPropertySetter(property_name, v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void port_outl(const struct si_sm_io *io, unsigned int offset,
unsigned char b)
{
unsigned int addr = io->addr_data;
outl(b << io->regshift, addr+(offset * io->regspacing));
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 22,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: spawn_sh_sync(WebKitWebView *web_view, GArray *argv, GString *result) {
(void)web_view; (void)result;
if (!uzbl.behave.shell_cmd) {
g_printerr ("spawn_sh_sync: shell_cmd is not set!\n");
return;
}
guint i;
gchar *spacer = g_strdup("");
g_array_insert_val(argv, 1, spacer);
gchar **cmd = split_quoted(uzbl.behave.shell_cmd, TRUE);
for (i = 1; i < g_strv_length(cmd); i++)
g_array_prepend_val(argv, cmd[i]);
if (cmd) run_command(cmd[0], g_strv_length(cmd) + 1, (const gchar **) argv->data,
TRUE, &uzbl.comm.sync_stdout);
g_free (spacer);
g_strfreev (cmd);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillDialogViews::EraseInvalidViewsInGroup(const DetailsGroup* group) {
std::map<views::View*, base::string16>::iterator it = validity_map_.begin();
while (it != validity_map_.end()) {
if (GroupForView(it->first) == group)
validity_map_.erase(it++);
else
++it;
}
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_parse_cache_flavor(char *value, struct smb_vol *vol)
{
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
switch (match_token(value, cifs_cacheflavor_tokens, args)) {
case Opt_cache_loose:
vol->direct_io = false;
vol->strict_io = false;
break;
case Opt_cache_strict:
vol->direct_io = false;
vol->strict_io = true;
break;
case Opt_cache_none:
vol->direct_io = true;
vol->strict_io = false;
break;
default:
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad cache= option: %s\n", value);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 18,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::ExtensionDevToolsClientHost(
Profile* profile,
DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
const std::string& extension_id,
const std::string& extension_name,
const Debuggee& debuggee)
: profile_(profile),
agent_host_(agent_host),
extension_id_(extension_id),
last_request_id_(0),
infobar_(nullptr),
detach_reason_(api::debugger::DETACH_REASON_TARGET_CLOSED),
extension_registry_observer_(this) {
CopyDebuggee(&debuggee_, debuggee);
g_attached_client_hosts.Get().insert(this);
extension_registry_observer_.Add(ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_));
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_APP_TERMINATING,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
agent_host_->AttachClient(this);
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
::switches::kSilentDebuggerExtensionAPI)) {
return;
}
const Extension* extension =
ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile)->enabled_extensions().GetByID(
extension_id);
if (extension && Manifest::IsPolicyLocation(extension->location()))
return;
infobar_ = ExtensionDevToolsInfoBar::Create(
extension_id, extension_name, this,
base::Bind(&ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::InfoBarDismissed,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 29,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tee_mmu_rem_rwmem(struct user_ta_ctx *utc, struct mobj *mobj, vaddr_t va)
{
struct vm_region *reg;
TAILQ_FOREACH(reg, &utc->vm_info->regions, link) {
if (reg->mobj == mobj && reg->va == va) {
free_pgt(utc, reg->va, reg->size);
umap_remove_region(utc->vm_info, reg);
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: core: tee_mmu_check_access_rights() check all pages
Prior to this patch tee_mmu_check_access_rights() checks an address in
each page of a supplied range. If both the start and length of that
range is unaligned the last page in the range is sometimes not checked.
With this patch the first address of each page in the range is checked
to simplify the logic of checking each page and the range and also to
cover the last page under all circumstances.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0005: "tee_mmu_check_access_rights does not check
final page of TA buffer"
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,679
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<AccessibilityTextMarker> AccessibilityUIElement::previousTextMarker(AccessibilityTextMarker* textMarker)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: INST_HANDLER (jmp) { // JMP k
op->jump = (buf[2] << 1)
| (buf[3] << 9)
| (buf[1] & 0x01) << 23
| (buf[0] & 0x01) << 17
| (buf[0] & 0xf0) << 14;
op->cycles = 3;
ESIL_A ("%"PFMT64d",pc,=,", op->jump); // jump!
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 20,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ContentsZoomChange(bool zoom_in) {
ExecuteCommand(zoom_in ? IDC_ZOOM_PLUS : IDC_ZOOM_MINUS);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentUtilityClient::OnAnalyzeZipFileForDownloadProtection(
const IPC::PlatformFileForTransit& zip_file,
const IPC::PlatformFileForTransit& temp_file) {
safe_browsing::zip_analyzer::Results results;
safe_browsing::zip_analyzer::AnalyzeZipFile(
IPC::PlatformFileForTransitToFile(zip_file),
IPC::PlatformFileForTransitToFile(temp_file), &results);
Send(new ChromeUtilityHostMsg_AnalyzeZipFileForDownloadProtection_Finished(
results));
ReleaseProcessIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::popupOpened(PagePopupBlackBerry* webPopup)
{
ASSERT(!d->m_selectPopup);
d->m_selectPopup = webPopup;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,940
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::Init() {
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("RenderThreadImpl::Init", 0, "");
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_ANDROID)
WebKit::WebView::setUseExternalPopupMenus(true);
#endif
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(this);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (RenderProcessImpl::InProcessPlugins())
initialize_com_.reset(new base::win::ScopedCOMInitializer());
#endif
ChildProcess::current()->set_main_thread(this);
suspend_webkit_shared_timer_ = true;
notify_webkit_of_modal_loop_ = true;
plugin_refresh_allowed_ = true;
widget_count_ = 0;
hidden_widget_count_ = 0;
idle_notification_delay_in_ms_ = kInitialIdleHandlerDelayMs;
idle_notifications_to_skip_ = 0;
compositor_initialized_ = false;
appcache_dispatcher_.reset(new AppCacheDispatcher(Get()));
main_thread_indexed_db_dispatcher_.reset(
IndexedDBDispatcher::ThreadSpecificInstance());
media_stream_center_ = NULL;
db_message_filter_ = new DBMessageFilter();
AddFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
vc_manager_ = new VideoCaptureImplManager();
AddFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
audio_input_message_filter_ = new AudioInputMessageFilter();
AddFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = new AudioMessageFilter();
AddFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
devtools_agent_message_filter_ = new DevToolsAgentFilter();
AddFilter(devtools_agent_message_filter_.get());
AddFilter(new IndexedDBMessageFilter);
content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->RenderThreadStarted();
FilePath media_path;
PathService::Get(content::DIR_MEDIA_LIBS, &media_path);
if (!media_path.empty())
media::InitializeMediaLibrary(media_path);
TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("RenderThreadImpl::Init", 0, "");
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestCanvas() : SkNoDrawCanvas(100, 100) {}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 6,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual skia::PlatformCanvas* GetDrawingCanvas(TransportDIB** memory,
const gfx::Rect& rect) { return NULL; }
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void DoSetUp() {
RenderViewImplTest::SetUp();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 21,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_false(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
return mrb_false_value();
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void debug_hdr(const char *dir, struct session *s, const char *start, const char *end)
{
int max;
chunk_printf(&trash, "%08x:%s.%s[%04x:%04x]: ", s->uniq_id, s->be->id,
dir,
objt_conn(s->req->prod->end) ? (unsigned short)objt_conn(s->req->prod->end)->t.sock.fd : -1,
objt_conn(s->req->cons->end) ? (unsigned short)objt_conn(s->req->cons->end)->t.sock.fd : -1);
for (max = 0; start + max < end; max++)
if (start[max] == '\r' || start[max] == '\n')
break;
UBOUND(max, trash.size - trash.len - 3);
trash.len += strlcpy2(trash.str + trash.len, start, max + 1);
trash.str[trash.len++] = '\n';
shut_your_big_mouth_gcc(write(1, trash.str, trash.len));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_write_amr_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
avio_wb32(pb, 0x11); /* size */
if (track->mode == MODE_MOV) ffio_wfourcc(pb, "samr");
else ffio_wfourcc(pb, "damr");
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "FFMP");
avio_w8(pb, 0); /* decoder version */
avio_wb16(pb, 0x81FF); /* Mode set (all modes for AMR_NB) */
avio_w8(pb, 0x00); /* Mode change period (no restriction) */
avio_w8(pb, 0x01); /* Frames per sample */
return 0x11;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 3,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sf_strerror (SNDFILE *sndfile)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf = NULL ;
int errnum ;
if (sndfile == NULL)
{ errnum = sf_errno ;
if (errnum == SFE_SYSTEM && sf_syserr [0])
return sf_syserr ;
}
else
{ psf = (SF_PRIVATE *) sndfile ;
if (psf->Magick != SNDFILE_MAGICK)
return "sf_strerror : Bad magic number." ;
errnum = psf->error ;
if (errnum == SFE_SYSTEM && psf->syserr [0])
return psf->syserr ;
} ;
return sf_error_number (errnum) ;
} /* sf_strerror */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleCompressedTexImage2DBucket(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::CompressedTexImage2DBucket& c) {
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLenum internal_format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.internalformat);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLint border = static_cast<GLint>(c.border);
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(c.bucket_id);
if (!bucket) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
uint32 data_size = bucket->size();
GLsizei imageSize = data_size;
const void* data = bucket->GetData(0, data_size);
if (!data) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
return DoCompressedTexImage2D(
target, level, internal_format, width, height, border,
imageSize, data);
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 27,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteSelectToMark(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
const EphemeralRange mark =
frame.GetEditor().Mark().ToNormalizedEphemeralRange();
EphemeralRange selection = frame.GetEditor().SelectedRange();
if (mark.IsNull() || selection.IsNull())
return false;
frame.Selection().SetSelection(
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(UnionEphemeralRanges(mark, selection))
.Build(),
FrameSelection::kCloseTyping);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,243
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool is_version_0 (void *opaque, int version_id)
{
return version_id == 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool check_bytes(const ut8 *buf, ut64 length) {
return buf && length > 4 && memcmp (buf, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) == 0
&& buf[4] != 2;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 8,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OxideQQuickWebView::goForward() {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
if (!d->proxy_) {
return;
}
d->proxy_->goForward();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool MediaControlDownloadButtonElement::shouldDisplayDownloadButton() {
const KURL& url = mediaElement().currentSrc();
if (document().page() && document().page()->settings().getHideDownloadUI())
return false;
if (url.isNull() || url.isEmpty())
return false;
if (url.isLocalFile() || url.protocolIs("blob"))
return false;
if (HTMLMediaElement::isMediaStreamURL(url.getString()))
return false;
if (HTMLMediaSource::lookup(url))
return false;
if (HTMLMediaElement::isHLSURL(url))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,683
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform3iv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
Vector<GLint>& v,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateUniformParameters("uniform3iv", location, v.data(), v.size(), 3,
src_offset, src_length))
return;
ContextGL()->Uniform3iv(
location->Location(),
(src_length ? src_length : (v.size() - src_offset)) / 3,
v.data() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_ints_fini(struct tg3 *tp)
{
if (tg3_flag(tp, USING_MSIX))
pci_disable_msix(tp->pdev);
else if (tg3_flag(tp, USING_MSI))
pci_disable_msi(tp->pdev);
tg3_flag_clear(tp, USING_MSI);
tg3_flag_clear(tp, USING_MSIX);
tg3_flag_clear(tp, ENABLE_RSS);
tg3_flag_clear(tp, ENABLE_TSS);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void SetUpCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) {
EnableDOMAutomation();
InProcessBrowserTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
if (!command_line->HasSwitch("enable-gpu")) {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
CHECK(test_launcher_utils::OverrideGLImplementation(
command_line, gfx::kGLImplementationOSMesaName)) <<
"kUseGL must not be set by test framework code!";
#endif
}
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisablePopupBlocking);
}
Commit Message: Revert 124346 - Add basic threaded compositor test to gpu_feature_browsertest.cc
BUG=113159
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9509001
TBR=jbates@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9561011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@124356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 23,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestUnpin(
const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
base::PlatformFileError expected_error,
int expected_cache_state,
GDataRootDirectory::CacheSubDirectoryType expected_sub_dir_type) {
expected_error_ = expected_error;
expected_cache_state_ = expected_cache_state;
expected_sub_dir_type_ = expected_sub_dir_type;
file_system_->Unpin(resource_id, md5,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystemTest::VerifyCacheFileState,
base::Unretained(this)));
RunAllPendingForIO();
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t WritePSDChannel(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const QuantumType quantum_type, unsigned char *compact_pixels,
MagickOffsetType size_offset,const MagickBooleanType separate)
{
int
y;
MagickBooleanType
monochrome;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count,
length;
unsigned char
*pixels;
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
#define CHUNK 16384
int
flush,
level;
unsigned char
*compressed_pixels;
z_stream
stream;
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
flush=Z_NO_FLUSH;
#endif
count=0;
if (separate != MagickFalse)
{
size_offset=TellBlob(image)+2;
count+=WriteCompressionStart(psd_info,image,next_image,1);
}
if (next_image->depth > 8)
next_image->depth=16;
monochrome=IsMonochromeImage(image,&image->exception) && (image->depth == 1)
? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
return(0);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
compressed_pixels=AcquireQuantumMemory(CHUNK,sizeof(*compressed_pixels));
if (compressed_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
ResetMagickMemory(&stream,0,sizeof(stream));
stream.data_type=Z_BINARY;
level=Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
if ((image_info->quality > 0 && image_info->quality < 10))
level=(int) image_info->quality;
if (deflateInit(&stream,level) != Z_OK)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
}
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next_image,0,y,next_image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(next_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
if (monochrome != MagickFalse)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
pixels[i]=(~pixels[i]);
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
length=PSDPackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,compact_pixels);
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compact_pixels);
size_offset+=WritePSDOffset(psd_info,image,length,size_offset);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
else if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
stream.avail_in=(uInt) length;
stream.next_in=(Bytef *) pixels;
if (y == (ssize_t) next_image->rows-1)
flush=Z_FINISH;
do {
stream.avail_out=(uInt) CHUNK;
stream.next_out=(Bytef *) compressed_pixels;
if (deflate(&stream,flush) == Z_STREAM_ERROR)
break;
length=(size_t) CHUNK-stream.avail_out;
if (length > 0)
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compressed_pixels);
} while (stream.avail_out == 0);
}
#endif
else
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
(void) deflateEnd(&stream);
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compressed_pixels);
}
#endif
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(count);
}
Commit Message: Fixed memory leak.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 14,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs3svc_decode_mknodargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_mknodargs *args)
{
if (!(p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh))
|| !(p = decode_filename(p, &args->name, &args->len)))
return 0;
args->ftype = ntohl(*p++);
if (args->ftype == NF3BLK || args->ftype == NF3CHR
|| args->ftype == NF3SOCK || args->ftype == NF3FIFO)
p = decode_sattr3(p, &args->attrs);
if (args->ftype == NF3BLK || args->ftype == NF3CHR) {
args->major = ntohl(*p++);
args->minor = ntohl(*p++);
}
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 18,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct nfs_open_context *alloc_nfs_open_context(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
struct nfs_open_context *ctx;
ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (ctx != NULL) {
ctx->path.dentry = dget(dentry);
ctx->path.mnt = mntget(mnt);
ctx->cred = get_rpccred(cred);
ctx->state = NULL;
ctx->lockowner = current->files;
ctx->flags = 0;
ctx->error = 0;
ctx->dir_cookie = 0;
atomic_set(&ctx->count, 1);
}
return ctx;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long ContentEncoding::GetCompressionCount() const {
const ptrdiff_t count = compression_entries_end_ - compression_entries_;
assert(count >= 0);
return static_cast<unsigned long>(count);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::cssRegionsEnabled() const
{
return RuntimeEnabledFeatures::cssRegionsEnabled();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,352
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void find_best_method(BlurMethod *blur, double r2)
{
static const int index[][4] = {
{ 1, 2, 3, 4 },
{ 1, 2, 3, 5 },
{ 1, 2, 4, 6 },
};
double mu[5];
if (r2 < 1.9) {
blur->level = blur->prefilter = blur->filter = 0;
if (r2 < 0.5) {
mu[2] = 0.085 * r2 * r2 * r2;
mu[1] = 0.5 * r2 - 4 * mu[2];
mu[3] = mu[4] = 0;
} else {
calc_gauss(mu, 4, r2);
}
} else {
double mul = 1;
if (r2 < 6.693) {
blur->level = 0;
if (r2 < 2.8)
blur->prefilter = 1;
else if (r2 < 4.4)
blur->prefilter = 2;
else
blur->prefilter = 3;
blur->filter = blur->prefilter - 1;
} else {
frexp((r2 + 0.7) / 26.5, &blur->level);
blur->level = (blur->level + 3) >> 1;
mul = pow(0.25, blur->level);
r2 *= mul;
if (r2 < 3.15 - 1.5 * mul)
blur->prefilter = 0;
else if (r2 < 5.3 - 5.2 * mul)
blur->prefilter = 1;
else
blur->prefilter = 2;
blur->filter = blur->prefilter;
}
calc_coeff(mu + 1, index[blur->filter], blur->prefilter, r2, mul);
}
for (int i = 1; i <= 4; ++i)
blur->coeff[i - 1] = (int)(0x10000 * mu[i] + 0.5);
}
Commit Message: Fix blur coefficient calculation buffer overflow
Found by fuzzer test case id:000082,sig:11,src:002579,op:havoc,rep:8.
Correctness should be checked, but this fixes the overflow for good.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSValue jsTestNamedConstructorConstructor(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestNamedConstructor* domObject = jsCast<JSTestNamedConstructor*>(asObject(slotBase));
return JSTestNamedConstructor::getConstructor(exec, domObject->globalObject());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,579
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pmcraid_eh_target_reset_handler(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd)
{
scmd_printk(KERN_INFO, scmd,
"Doing target reset due to an I/O command timeout.\n");
return pmcraid_reset_device(scmd,
PMCRAID_INTERNAL_TIMEOUT,
RESET_DEVICE_TARGET);
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 61
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err fiin_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
FDItemInformationBox *ptr = (FDItemInformationBox *) a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "FDItemInformationBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (ptr->partition_entries)
gf_isom_box_array_dump(ptr->partition_entries, trace);
if (ptr->session_info)
gf_isom_box_dump(ptr->session_info, trace);
if (ptr->group_id_to_name)
gf_isom_box_dump(ptr->group_id_to_name, trace);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("FDItemInformationBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 22,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int r_bin_dwarf_expand_cu(RBinDwarfCompUnit *cu) {
RBinDwarfDIE *tmp;
if (!cu || cu->capacity == 0 || cu->capacity != cu->length) {
return -EINVAL;
}
tmp = (RBinDwarfDIE*)realloc(cu->dies,
cu->capacity * 2 * sizeof(RBinDwarfDIE));
if (!tmp) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset ((ut8*)tmp + cu->capacity, 0, cu->capacity);
cu->dies = tmp;
cu->capacity *= 2;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 29,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __init int enable_stacktrace(char *str)
{
if (strncmp(str, "_filter=", 8) == 0)
strncpy(stack_trace_filter_buf, str+8, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
stack_tracer_enabled = 1;
last_stack_tracer_enabled = 1;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t HevcParameterSets::makeHvcc(uint8_t *hvcc, size_t *hvccSize,
size_t nalSizeLength) {
if (hvcc == NULL || hvccSize == NULL
|| (nalSizeLength != 4 && nalSizeLength != 2)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
size_t size = 23; // 23 bytes in the header
size_t numOfArrays = 0;
const size_t numNalUnits = getNumNalUnits();
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kHevcNalUnitTypes); ++i) {
uint8_t type = kHevcNalUnitTypes[i];
size_t numNalus = getNumNalUnitsOfType(type);
if (numNalus == 0) {
continue;
}
++numOfArrays;
size += 3;
for (size_t j = 0; j < numNalUnits; ++j) {
if (getType(j) != type) {
continue;
}
size += 2 + getSize(j);
}
}
uint8_t generalProfileSpace, generalTierFlag, generalProfileIdc;
if (!findParam8(kGeneralProfileSpace, &generalProfileSpace)
|| !findParam8(kGeneralTierFlag, &generalTierFlag)
|| !findParam8(kGeneralProfileIdc, &generalProfileIdc)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t compatibilityFlags;
uint64_t constraintIdcFlags;
if (!findParam32(kGeneralProfileCompatibilityFlags, &compatibilityFlags)
|| !findParam64(kGeneralConstraintIndicatorFlags, &constraintIdcFlags)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t generalLevelIdc;
if (!findParam8(kGeneralLevelIdc, &generalLevelIdc)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t chromaFormatIdc, bitDepthLumaMinus8, bitDepthChromaMinus8;
if (!findParam8(kChromaFormatIdc, &chromaFormatIdc)
|| !findParam8(kBitDepthLumaMinus8, &bitDepthLumaMinus8)
|| !findParam8(kBitDepthChromaMinus8, &bitDepthChromaMinus8)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > *hvccSize) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
*hvccSize = size;
uint8_t *header = hvcc;
header[0] = 1;
header[1] = (kGeneralProfileSpace << 6) | (kGeneralTierFlag << 5) | kGeneralProfileIdc;
header[2] = (compatibilityFlags >> 24) & 0xff;
header[3] = (compatibilityFlags >> 16) & 0xff;
header[4] = (compatibilityFlags >> 8) & 0xff;
header[5] = compatibilityFlags & 0xff;
header[6] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 40) & 0xff;
header[7] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 32) & 0xff;
header[8] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 24) & 0xff;
header[9] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 16) & 0xff;
header[10] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 8) & 0xff;
header[11] = constraintIdcFlags & 0xff;
header[12] = generalLevelIdc;
header[13] = 0xf0;
header[14] = 0;
header[15] = 0xfc;
header[16] = 0xfc | chromaFormatIdc;
header[17] = 0xf8 | bitDepthLumaMinus8;
header[18] = 0xf8 | bitDepthChromaMinus8;
header[19] = 0;
header[20] = 0;
header[21] = nalSizeLength - 1;
header[22] = numOfArrays;
header += 23;
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kHevcNalUnitTypes); ++i) {
uint8_t type = kHevcNalUnitTypes[i];
size_t numNalus = getNumNalUnitsOfType(type);
if (numNalus == 0) {
continue;
}
header[0] = type;
header[1] = (numNalus >> 8) & 0xff;
header[2] = numNalus & 0xff;
header += 3;
for (size_t j = 0; j < numNalUnits; ++j) {
if (getType(j) != type) {
continue;
}
header[0] = (getSize(j) >> 8) & 0xff;
header[1] = getSize(j) & 0xff;
if (!write(j, header + 2, size - (header - (uint8_t *)hvcc))) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
header += (2 + getSize(j));
}
}
CHECK_EQ(header - size, hvcc);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Validate lengths in HEVC metadata parsing
Add code to validate the size parameter passed to
HecvParameterSets::addNalUnit(). Previously vulnerable
to decrementing an unsigned past 0, yielding a huge result value.
Bug: 35467107
Test: ran POC, no crash, emitted new "bad length" log entry
Change-Id: Ia169b9edc1e0f7c5302e3c68aa90a54e8863d79e
(cherry picked from commit e0dcf097cc029d056926029a29419e1650cbdf1b)
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 8,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Plugin::LoadNaClModuleContinuationIntern(ErrorInfo* error_info) {
if (using_ipc_proxy_)
return true;
if (!main_subprocess_.StartSrpcServices()) {
error_info->SetReport(ERROR_SRPC_CONNECTION_FAIL,
"SRPC connection failure for " +
main_subprocess_.description());
return false;
}
if (!main_subprocess_.StartJSObjectProxy(this, error_info)) {
return false;
}
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::LoadNaClModule (%s)\n",
main_subprocess_.detailed_description().c_str()));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 420
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SVGImage::~SVGImage()
{
if (m_page) {
OwnPtr<Page> currentPage = m_page.release();
currentPage->mainFrame()->loader().frameDetached(); // Break both the loader and view references to the frame
}
ASSERT(!m_chromeClient || !m_chromeClient->image());
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when resizing a view destroys the render tree
This is a simple fix for not holding a renderer across FrameView
resizes. Calling view->resize() can destroy renderers so this patch
updates SVGImage::setContainerSize to query the renderer after the
resize is complete. A similar issue does not exist for the dom tree
which is not destroyed.
BUG=344492
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/178043006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168113 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PushMessagingServiceImpl::IsPermissionSet(const GURL& origin) {
return GetPermissionStatus(origin, true /* user_visible */) ==
blink::kWebPushPermissionStatusGranted;
}
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int emulator_set_dr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int dr,
unsigned long value)
{
return __kvm_set_dr(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), dr, value);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Plugin::StreamAsFile(const nacl::string& url,
PP_CompletionCallback callback) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::StreamAsFile (url='%s')\n", url.c_str()));
FileDownloader* downloader = new FileDownloader();
downloader->Initialize(this);
url_downloaders_.insert(downloader);
pp::CompletionCallback open_callback = callback_factory_.NewCallback(
&Plugin::UrlDidOpenForStreamAsFile, downloader, callback);
CHECK(url_util_ != NULL);
pp::Var resolved_url =
url_util_->ResolveRelativeToURL(pp::Var(plugin_base_url()), url);
if (!resolved_url.is_string()) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::StreamAsFile: "
"could not resolve url \"%s\" relative to plugin \"%s\".",
url.c_str(),
plugin_base_url().c_str()));
return false;
}
return downloader->Open(url,
DOWNLOAD_TO_FILE,
open_callback,
&UpdateDownloadProgress);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int restore_mixer_value(struct usb_mixer_elem_list *list)
{
struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval = (struct usb_mixer_elem_info *)list;
int c, err, idx;
if (cval->cmask) {
idx = 0;
for (c = 0; c < MAX_CHANNELS; c++) {
if (!(cval->cmask & (1 << c)))
continue;
if (cval->cached & (1 << (c + 1))) {
err = snd_usb_set_cur_mix_value(cval, c + 1, idx,
cval->cache_val[idx]);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
idx++;
}
} else {
/* master */
if (cval->cached) {
err = snd_usb_set_cur_mix_value(cval, 0, 0, *cval->cache_val);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 11,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void overloadedPerWorldMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::overloadedPerWorldMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmci_transport_notify_send_pre_block(
struct vsock_sock *vsk,
struct vsock_transport_send_notify_data *data)
{
return vmci_trans(vsk)->notify_ops->send_pre_block(
&vsk->sk,
(struct vmci_transport_send_notify_data *)data);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 23,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::styleResolverMayHaveChanged()
{
styleResolverChanged(hasNodesWithPlaceholderStyle() ? FullStyleUpdate : AnalyzedStyleUpdate);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sk_buff **inet_gro_receive(struct sk_buff **head,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct net_offload *ops;
struct sk_buff **pp = NULL;
struct sk_buff *p;
const struct iphdr *iph;
unsigned int hlen;
unsigned int off;
unsigned int id;
int flush = 1;
int proto;
off = skb_gro_offset(skb);
hlen = off + sizeof(*iph);
iph = skb_gro_header_fast(skb, off);
if (skb_gro_header_hard(skb, hlen)) {
iph = skb_gro_header_slow(skb, hlen, off);
if (unlikely(!iph))
goto out;
}
proto = iph->protocol;
rcu_read_lock();
ops = rcu_dereference(inet_offloads[proto]);
if (!ops || !ops->callbacks.gro_receive)
goto out_unlock;
if (*(u8 *)iph != 0x45)
goto out_unlock;
if (unlikely(ip_fast_csum((u8 *)iph, 5)))
goto out_unlock;
id = ntohl(*(__be32 *)&iph->id);
flush = (u16)((ntohl(*(__be32 *)iph) ^ skb_gro_len(skb)) | (id & ~IP_DF));
id >>= 16;
for (p = *head; p; p = p->next) {
struct iphdr *iph2;
if (!NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow)
continue;
iph2 = (struct iphdr *)(p->data + off);
/* The above works because, with the exception of the top
* (inner most) layer, we only aggregate pkts with the same
* hdr length so all the hdrs we'll need to verify will start
* at the same offset.
*/
if ((iph->protocol ^ iph2->protocol) |
((__force u32)iph->saddr ^ (__force u32)iph2->saddr) |
((__force u32)iph->daddr ^ (__force u32)iph2->daddr)) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow = 0;
continue;
}
/* All fields must match except length and checksum. */
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->flush |=
(iph->ttl ^ iph2->ttl) |
(iph->tos ^ iph2->tos) |
((iph->frag_off ^ iph2->frag_off) & htons(IP_DF));
/* Save the IP ID check to be included later when we get to
* the transport layer so only the inner most IP ID is checked.
* This is because some GSO/TSO implementations do not
* correctly increment the IP ID for the outer hdrs.
*/
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->flush_id =
((u16)(ntohs(iph2->id) + NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->count) ^ id);
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->flush |= flush;
}
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush |= flush;
skb_set_network_header(skb, off);
/* The above will be needed by the transport layer if there is one
* immediately following this IP hdr.
*/
/* Note : No need to call skb_gro_postpull_rcsum() here,
* as we already checked checksum over ipv4 header was 0
*/
skb_gro_pull(skb, sizeof(*iph));
skb_set_transport_header(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb));
pp = ops->callbacks.gro_receive(head, skb);
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush |= flush;
return pp;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void set_wcv_resize_insets(const gfx::Size& wcv_resize_insets) {
wcv_resize_insets_ = wcv_resize_insets;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ExtensionRegistry::RemoveDisabled(const std::string& id) {
return disabled_extensions_.Remove(id);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static StringFileInfo* Pe_r_bin_pe_parse_string_file_info(struct PE_(r_bin_pe_obj_t)* bin, PE_DWord* curAddr) {
StringFileInfo* stringFileInfo = calloc (1, sizeof(*stringFileInfo));
if (!stringFileInfo) {
bprintf ("Warning: calloc (StringFileInfo)\n");
return NULL;
}
PE_DWord startAddr = *curAddr;
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, *curAddr, (ut8*) &stringFileInfo->wLength, sizeof(stringFileInfo->wLength)) != sizeof(stringFileInfo->wLength)) {
bprintf ("Warning: read (StringFileInfo wLength)\n");
free_StringFileInfo (stringFileInfo);
return NULL;
}
*curAddr += sizeof(stringFileInfo->wLength);
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, *curAddr, (ut8*) &stringFileInfo->wValueLength, sizeof(stringFileInfo->wValueLength)) != sizeof(stringFileInfo->wValueLength)) {
bprintf ("Warning: read (StringFileInfo wValueLength)\n");
free_StringFileInfo (stringFileInfo);
return NULL;
}
*curAddr += sizeof(stringFileInfo->wValueLength);
if (stringFileInfo->wValueLength) {
bprintf ("Warning: check (StringFileInfo wValueLength)\n");
free_StringFileInfo (stringFileInfo);
return NULL;
}
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, *curAddr, (ut8*) &stringFileInfo->wType, sizeof(stringFileInfo->wType)) != sizeof(stringFileInfo->wType)) {
bprintf ("Warning: read (StringFileInfo wType)\n");
free_StringFileInfo (stringFileInfo);
return NULL;
}
*curAddr += sizeof(stringFileInfo->wType);
if (stringFileInfo->wType && stringFileInfo->wType != 1) {
bprintf ("Warning: check (StringFileInfo wType)\n");
free_StringFileInfo (stringFileInfo);
return NULL;
}
stringFileInfo->szKey = (ut16*) malloc (UT16_ALIGN (STRINGFILEINFO_UTF_16_LEN)); //L"StringFileInfo"
if (!stringFileInfo->szKey) {
bprintf ("Warning: malloc (StringFileInfo szKey)\n");
free_StringFileInfo (stringFileInfo);
return NULL;
}
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, *curAddr, (ut8*) stringFileInfo->szKey, STRINGFILEINFO_UTF_16_LEN) != STRINGFILEINFO_UTF_16_LEN) {
bprintf ("Warning: read (StringFileInfo szKey)\n");
free_StringFileInfo (stringFileInfo);
return NULL;
}
*curAddr += STRINGFILEINFO_UTF_16_LEN;
if (memcmp (stringFileInfo->szKey, STRINGFILEINFO_UTF_16, STRINGFILEINFO_UTF_16_LEN) != 0) {
bprintf ("Warning: check (StringFileInfo szKey)\n");
free_StringFileInfo (stringFileInfo);
return NULL;
}
align32 (*curAddr);
while (startAddr + stringFileInfo->wLength > *curAddr) {
StringTable** tmp = (StringTable**) realloc (stringFileInfo->Children, (stringFileInfo->numOfChildren + 1) * sizeof(*stringFileInfo->Children));
if (!tmp) {
bprintf ("Warning: realloc (StringFileInfo Children)\n");
free_StringFileInfo (stringFileInfo);
return NULL;
}
stringFileInfo->Children = tmp;
if (!(stringFileInfo->Children[stringFileInfo->numOfChildren] = Pe_r_bin_pe_parse_string_table (bin, curAddr))) {
bprintf ("Warning: bad parsing StringTable\n");
free_StringFileInfo (stringFileInfo);
return NULL;
}
stringFileInfo->numOfChildren++;
align32 (*curAddr);
}
if (!stringFileInfo->numOfChildren) {
bprintf ("Warning: check (StringFileInfo numOfChildren)\n");
free_StringFileInfo (stringFileInfo);
return NULL;
}
return stringFileInfo;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in pe
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 9,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BookmarkManagerView::OnTreeViewSelectionChanged(
views::TreeView* tree_view) {
TreeModelNode* node = tree_view_->GetSelectedNode();
BookmarkTableModel* new_table_model = NULL;
BookmarkNode* table_parent_node = NULL;
bool is_search = false;
if (node) {
switch (tree_model_->GetNodeType(node)) {
case BookmarkFolderTreeModel::BOOKMARK:
table_parent_node = tree_model_->TreeNodeAsBookmarkNode(node);
new_table_model =
BookmarkTableModel::CreateBookmarkTableModelForFolder(
profile_->GetBookmarkModel(),
table_parent_node);
break;
case BookmarkFolderTreeModel::RECENTLY_BOOKMARKED:
new_table_model = BookmarkTableModel::CreateRecentlyBookmarkedModel(
profile_->GetBookmarkModel());
break;
case BookmarkFolderTreeModel::SEARCH:
is_search = true;
search_factory_.RevokeAll();
new_table_model = CreateSearchTableModel();
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
SetTableModel(new_table_model, table_parent_node, is_search);
}
Commit Message: Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::allowFontFromSource(
const KURL& url,
RedirectStatus redirectStatus,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reportingPolicy) const {
return isAllowedByAll<&CSPDirectiveList::allowFontFromSource>(
m_policies, url, redirectStatus, reportingPolicy);
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintTabBackground(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
bool active,
int fill_id,
int y_inset,
const SkPath* clip) const {
DCHECK(!y_inset || fill_id);
const SkColor active_color =
tab_->controller()->GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_ACTIVE);
const SkColor inactive_color =
tab_->GetThemeProvider()->GetDisplayProperty(
ThemeProperties::SHOULD_FILL_BACKGROUND_TAB_COLOR)
? tab_->controller()->GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_INACTIVE)
: SK_ColorTRANSPARENT;
const SkColor stroke_color =
tab_->controller()->GetToolbarTopSeparatorColor();
const bool paint_hover_effect = !active && IsHoverActive();
const float stroke_thickness = GetStrokeThickness(active);
PaintTabBackgroundFill(canvas, active, paint_hover_effect, active_color,
inactive_color, fill_id, y_inset);
if (stroke_thickness > 0) {
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(clip ? canvas : nullptr);
if (clip)
canvas->sk_canvas()->clipPath(*clip, SkClipOp::kDifference, true);
PaintBackgroundStroke(canvas, active, stroke_color);
}
PaintSeparators(canvas);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 9,185
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void perf_bp_event(struct perf_event *bp, void *data)
{
struct perf_sample_data sample;
struct pt_regs *regs = data;
perf_sample_data_init(&sample, bp->attr.bp_addr);
if (!bp->hw.state && !perf_exclude_event(bp, regs))
perf_swevent_event(bp, 1, 1, &sample, regs);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 16,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::ReloadIgnoringCache(bool check_for_repost) {
ReloadInternal(check_for_repost, RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE);
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebDevToolsAgent* WebLocalFrameImpl::DevToolsAgent() {
return dev_tools_agent_.Get();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 16,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int balance_nonroot(
MemPage *pParent, /* Parent page of siblings being balanced */
int iParentIdx, /* Index of "the page" in pParent */
u8 *aOvflSpace, /* page-size bytes of space for parent ovfl */
int isRoot, /* True if pParent is a root-page */
int bBulk /* True if this call is part of a bulk load */
){
BtShared *pBt; /* The whole database */
int nMaxCells = 0; /* Allocated size of apCell, szCell, aFrom. */
int nNew = 0; /* Number of pages in apNew[] */
int nOld; /* Number of pages in apOld[] */
int i, j, k; /* Loop counters */
int nxDiv; /* Next divider slot in pParent->aCell[] */
int rc = SQLITE_OK; /* The return code */
u16 leafCorrection; /* 4 if pPage is a leaf. 0 if not */
int leafData; /* True if pPage is a leaf of a LEAFDATA tree */
int usableSpace; /* Bytes in pPage beyond the header */
int pageFlags; /* Value of pPage->aData[0] */
int iSpace1 = 0; /* First unused byte of aSpace1[] */
int iOvflSpace = 0; /* First unused byte of aOvflSpace[] */
int szScratch; /* Size of scratch memory requested */
MemPage *apOld[NB]; /* pPage and up to two siblings */
MemPage *apNew[NB+2]; /* pPage and up to NB siblings after balancing */
u8 *pRight; /* Location in parent of right-sibling pointer */
u8 *apDiv[NB-1]; /* Divider cells in pParent */
int cntNew[NB+2]; /* Index in b.paCell[] of cell after i-th page */
int cntOld[NB+2]; /* Old index in b.apCell[] */
int szNew[NB+2]; /* Combined size of cells placed on i-th page */
u8 *aSpace1; /* Space for copies of dividers cells */
Pgno pgno; /* Temp var to store a page number in */
u8 abDone[NB+2]; /* True after i'th new page is populated */
Pgno aPgno[NB+2]; /* Page numbers of new pages before shuffling */
Pgno aPgOrder[NB+2]; /* Copy of aPgno[] used for sorting pages */
u16 aPgFlags[NB+2]; /* flags field of new pages before shuffling */
CellArray b; /* Parsed information on cells being balanced */
memset(abDone, 0, sizeof(abDone));
b.nCell = 0;
b.apCell = 0;
pBt = pParent->pBt;
assert( sqlite3_mutex_held(pBt->mutex) );
assert( sqlite3PagerIswriteable(pParent->pDbPage) );
#if 0
TRACE(("BALANCE: begin page %d child of %d\n", pPage->pgno, pParent->pgno));
#endif
/* At this point pParent may have at most one overflow cell. And if
** this overflow cell is present, it must be the cell with
** index iParentIdx. This scenario comes about when this function
** is called (indirectly) from sqlite3BtreeDelete().
*/
assert( pParent->nOverflow==0 || pParent->nOverflow==1 );
assert( pParent->nOverflow==0 || pParent->aiOvfl[0]==iParentIdx );
if( !aOvflSpace ){
return SQLITE_NOMEM_BKPT;
}
/* Find the sibling pages to balance. Also locate the cells in pParent
** that divide the siblings. An attempt is made to find NN siblings on
** either side of pPage. More siblings are taken from one side, however,
** if there are fewer than NN siblings on the other side. If pParent
** has NB or fewer children then all children of pParent are taken.
**
** This loop also drops the divider cells from the parent page. This
** way, the remainder of the function does not have to deal with any
** overflow cells in the parent page, since if any existed they will
** have already been removed.
*/
i = pParent->nOverflow + pParent->nCell;
if( i<2 ){
nxDiv = 0;
}else{
assert( bBulk==0 || bBulk==1 );
if( iParentIdx==0 ){
nxDiv = 0;
}else if( iParentIdx==i ){
nxDiv = i-2+bBulk;
}else{
nxDiv = iParentIdx-1;
}
i = 2-bBulk;
}
nOld = i+1;
if( (i+nxDiv-pParent->nOverflow)==pParent->nCell ){
pRight = &pParent->aData[pParent->hdrOffset+8];
}else{
pRight = findCell(pParent, i+nxDiv-pParent->nOverflow);
}
pgno = get4byte(pRight);
while( 1 ){
rc = getAndInitPage(pBt, pgno, &apOld[i], 0, 0);
if( rc ){
memset(apOld, 0, (i+1)*sizeof(MemPage*));
goto balance_cleanup;
}
nMaxCells += 1+apOld[i]->nCell+apOld[i]->nOverflow;
if( (i--)==0 ) break;
if( pParent->nOverflow && i+nxDiv==pParent->aiOvfl[0] ){
apDiv[i] = pParent->apOvfl[0];
pgno = get4byte(apDiv[i]);
szNew[i] = pParent->xCellSize(pParent, apDiv[i]);
pParent->nOverflow = 0;
}else{
apDiv[i] = findCell(pParent, i+nxDiv-pParent->nOverflow);
pgno = get4byte(apDiv[i]);
szNew[i] = pParent->xCellSize(pParent, apDiv[i]);
/* Drop the cell from the parent page. apDiv[i] still points to
** the cell within the parent, even though it has been dropped.
** This is safe because dropping a cell only overwrites the first
** four bytes of it, and this function does not need the first
** four bytes of the divider cell. So the pointer is safe to use
** later on.
**
** But not if we are in secure-delete mode. In secure-delete mode,
** the dropCell() routine will overwrite the entire cell with zeroes.
** In this case, temporarily copy the cell into the aOvflSpace[]
** buffer. It will be copied out again as soon as the aSpace[] buffer
** is allocated. */
if( pBt->btsFlags & BTS_SECURE_DELETE ){
int iOff;
iOff = SQLITE_PTR_TO_INT(apDiv[i]) - SQLITE_PTR_TO_INT(pParent->aData);
if( (iOff+szNew[i])>(int)pBt->usableSize ){
rc = SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
memset(apOld, 0, (i+1)*sizeof(MemPage*));
goto balance_cleanup;
}else{
memcpy(&aOvflSpace[iOff], apDiv[i], szNew[i]);
apDiv[i] = &aOvflSpace[apDiv[i]-pParent->aData];
}
}
dropCell(pParent, i+nxDiv-pParent->nOverflow, szNew[i], &rc);
}
}
/* Make nMaxCells a multiple of 4 in order to preserve 8-byte
** alignment */
nMaxCells = (nMaxCells + 3)&~3;
/*
** Allocate space for memory structures
*/
szScratch =
nMaxCells*sizeof(u8*) /* b.apCell */
+ nMaxCells*sizeof(u16) /* b.szCell */
+ pBt->pageSize; /* aSpace1 */
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-28375-38319 SQLite will never request a scratch buffer
** that is more than 6 times the database page size. */
assert( szScratch<=6*(int)pBt->pageSize );
b.apCell = sqlite3ScratchMalloc( szScratch );
if( b.apCell==0 ){
rc = SQLITE_NOMEM_BKPT;
goto balance_cleanup;
}
b.szCell = (u16*)&b.apCell[nMaxCells];
aSpace1 = (u8*)&b.szCell[nMaxCells];
assert( EIGHT_BYTE_ALIGNMENT(aSpace1) );
/*
** Load pointers to all cells on sibling pages and the divider cells
** into the local b.apCell[] array. Make copies of the divider cells
** into space obtained from aSpace1[]. The divider cells have already
** been removed from pParent.
**
** If the siblings are on leaf pages, then the child pointers of the
** divider cells are stripped from the cells before they are copied
** into aSpace1[]. In this way, all cells in b.apCell[] are without
** child pointers. If siblings are not leaves, then all cell in
** b.apCell[] include child pointers. Either way, all cells in b.apCell[]
** are alike.
**
** leafCorrection: 4 if pPage is a leaf. 0 if pPage is not a leaf.
** leafData: 1 if pPage holds key+data and pParent holds only keys.
*/
b.pRef = apOld[0];
leafCorrection = b.pRef->leaf*4;
leafData = b.pRef->intKeyLeaf;
for(i=0; i<nOld; i++){
MemPage *pOld = apOld[i];
int limit = pOld->nCell;
u8 *aData = pOld->aData;
u16 maskPage = pOld->maskPage;
u8 *piCell = aData + pOld->cellOffset;
u8 *piEnd;
/* Verify that all sibling pages are of the same "type" (table-leaf,
** table-interior, index-leaf, or index-interior).
*/
if( pOld->aData[0]!=apOld[0]->aData[0] ){
rc = SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
goto balance_cleanup;
}
/* Load b.apCell[] with pointers to all cells in pOld. If pOld
** constains overflow cells, include them in the b.apCell[] array
** in the correct spot.
**
** Note that when there are multiple overflow cells, it is always the
** case that they are sequential and adjacent. This invariant arises
** because multiple overflows can only occurs when inserting divider
** cells into a parent on a prior balance, and divider cells are always
** adjacent and are inserted in order. There is an assert() tagged
** with "NOTE 1" in the overflow cell insertion loop to prove this
** invariant.
**
** This must be done in advance. Once the balance starts, the cell
** offset section of the btree page will be overwritten and we will no
** long be able to find the cells if a pointer to each cell is not saved
** first.
*/
memset(&b.szCell[b.nCell], 0, sizeof(b.szCell[0])*(limit+pOld->nOverflow));
if( pOld->nOverflow>0 ){
limit = pOld->aiOvfl[0];
for(j=0; j<limit; j++){
b.apCell[b.nCell] = aData + (maskPage & get2byteAligned(piCell));
piCell += 2;
b.nCell++;
}
for(k=0; k<pOld->nOverflow; k++){
assert( k==0 || pOld->aiOvfl[k-1]+1==pOld->aiOvfl[k] );/* NOTE 1 */
b.apCell[b.nCell] = pOld->apOvfl[k];
b.nCell++;
}
}
piEnd = aData + pOld->cellOffset + 2*pOld->nCell;
while( piCell<piEnd ){
assert( b.nCell<nMaxCells );
b.apCell[b.nCell] = aData + (maskPage & get2byteAligned(piCell));
piCell += 2;
b.nCell++;
}
cntOld[i] = b.nCell;
if( i<nOld-1 && !leafData){
u16 sz = (u16)szNew[i];
u8 *pTemp;
assert( b.nCell<nMaxCells );
b.szCell[b.nCell] = sz;
pTemp = &aSpace1[iSpace1];
iSpace1 += sz;
assert( sz<=pBt->maxLocal+23 );
assert( iSpace1 <= (int)pBt->pageSize );
memcpy(pTemp, apDiv[i], sz);
b.apCell[b.nCell] = pTemp+leafCorrection;
assert( leafCorrection==0 || leafCorrection==4 );
b.szCell[b.nCell] = b.szCell[b.nCell] - leafCorrection;
if( !pOld->leaf ){
assert( leafCorrection==0 );
assert( pOld->hdrOffset==0 );
/* The right pointer of the child page pOld becomes the left
** pointer of the divider cell */
memcpy(b.apCell[b.nCell], &pOld->aData[8], 4);
}else{
assert( leafCorrection==4 );
while( b.szCell[b.nCell]<4 ){
/* Do not allow any cells smaller than 4 bytes. If a smaller cell
** does exist, pad it with 0x00 bytes. */
assert( b.szCell[b.nCell]==3 || CORRUPT_DB );
assert( b.apCell[b.nCell]==&aSpace1[iSpace1-3] || CORRUPT_DB );
aSpace1[iSpace1++] = 0x00;
b.szCell[b.nCell]++;
}
}
b.nCell++;
}
}
/*
** Figure out the number of pages needed to hold all b.nCell cells.
** Store this number in "k". Also compute szNew[] which is the total
** size of all cells on the i-th page and cntNew[] which is the index
** in b.apCell[] of the cell that divides page i from page i+1.
** cntNew[k] should equal b.nCell.
**
** Values computed by this block:
**
** k: The total number of sibling pages
** szNew[i]: Spaced used on the i-th sibling page.
** cntNew[i]: Index in b.apCell[] and b.szCell[] for the first cell to
** the right of the i-th sibling page.
** usableSpace: Number of bytes of space available on each sibling.
**
*/
usableSpace = pBt->usableSize - 12 + leafCorrection;
for(i=0; i<nOld; i++){
MemPage *p = apOld[i];
szNew[i] = usableSpace - p->nFree;
for(j=0; j<p->nOverflow; j++){
szNew[i] += 2 + p->xCellSize(p, p->apOvfl[j]);
}
cntNew[i] = cntOld[i];
}
k = nOld;
for(i=0; i<k; i++){
int sz;
while( szNew[i]>usableSpace ){
if( i+1>=k ){
k = i+2;
if( k>NB+2 ){ rc = SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT; goto balance_cleanup; }
szNew[k-1] = 0;
cntNew[k-1] = b.nCell;
}
sz = 2 + cachedCellSize(&b, cntNew[i]-1);
szNew[i] -= sz;
if( !leafData ){
if( cntNew[i]<b.nCell ){
sz = 2 + cachedCellSize(&b, cntNew[i]);
}else{
sz = 0;
}
}
szNew[i+1] += sz;
cntNew[i]--;
}
while( cntNew[i]<b.nCell ){
sz = 2 + cachedCellSize(&b, cntNew[i]);
if( szNew[i]+sz>usableSpace ) break;
szNew[i] += sz;
cntNew[i]++;
if( !leafData ){
if( cntNew[i]<b.nCell ){
sz = 2 + cachedCellSize(&b, cntNew[i]);
}else{
sz = 0;
}
}
szNew[i+1] -= sz;
}
if( cntNew[i]>=b.nCell ){
k = i+1;
}else if( cntNew[i] <= (i>0 ? cntNew[i-1] : 0) ){
rc = SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
goto balance_cleanup;
}
}
/*
** The packing computed by the previous block is biased toward the siblings
** on the left side (siblings with smaller keys). The left siblings are
** always nearly full, while the right-most sibling might be nearly empty.
** The next block of code attempts to adjust the packing of siblings to
** get a better balance.
**
** This adjustment is more than an optimization. The packing above might
** be so out of balance as to be illegal. For example, the right-most
** sibling might be completely empty. This adjustment is not optional.
*/
for(i=k-1; i>0; i--){
int szRight = szNew[i]; /* Size of sibling on the right */
int szLeft = szNew[i-1]; /* Size of sibling on the left */
int r; /* Index of right-most cell in left sibling */
int d; /* Index of first cell to the left of right sibling */
r = cntNew[i-1] - 1;
d = r + 1 - leafData;
(void)cachedCellSize(&b, d);
do{
assert( d<nMaxCells );
assert( r<nMaxCells );
(void)cachedCellSize(&b, r);
if( szRight!=0
&& (bBulk || szRight+b.szCell[d]+2 > szLeft-(b.szCell[r]+(i==k-1?0:2)))){
break;
}
szRight += b.szCell[d] + 2;
szLeft -= b.szCell[r] + 2;
cntNew[i-1] = r;
r--;
d--;
}while( r>=0 );
szNew[i] = szRight;
szNew[i-1] = szLeft;
if( cntNew[i-1] <= (i>1 ? cntNew[i-2] : 0) ){
rc = SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
goto balance_cleanup;
}
}
/* Sanity check: For a non-corrupt database file one of the follwing
** must be true:
** (1) We found one or more cells (cntNew[0])>0), or
** (2) pPage is a virtual root page. A virtual root page is when
** the real root page is page 1 and we are the only child of
** that page.
*/
assert( cntNew[0]>0 || (pParent->pgno==1 && pParent->nCell==0) || CORRUPT_DB);
TRACE(("BALANCE: old: %d(nc=%d) %d(nc=%d) %d(nc=%d)\n",
apOld[0]->pgno, apOld[0]->nCell,
nOld>=2 ? apOld[1]->pgno : 0, nOld>=2 ? apOld[1]->nCell : 0,
nOld>=3 ? apOld[2]->pgno : 0, nOld>=3 ? apOld[2]->nCell : 0
));
/*
** Allocate k new pages. Reuse old pages where possible.
*/
pageFlags = apOld[0]->aData[0];
for(i=0; i<k; i++){
MemPage *pNew;
if( i<nOld ){
pNew = apNew[i] = apOld[i];
apOld[i] = 0;
rc = sqlite3PagerWrite(pNew->pDbPage);
nNew++;
if( rc ) goto balance_cleanup;
}else{
assert( i>0 );
rc = allocateBtreePage(pBt, &pNew, &pgno, (bBulk ? 1 : pgno), 0);
if( rc ) goto balance_cleanup;
zeroPage(pNew, pageFlags);
apNew[i] = pNew;
nNew++;
cntOld[i] = b.nCell;
/* Set the pointer-map entry for the new sibling page. */
if( ISAUTOVACUUM ){
ptrmapPut(pBt, pNew->pgno, PTRMAP_BTREE, pParent->pgno, &rc);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ){
goto balance_cleanup;
}
}
}
}
/*
** Reassign page numbers so that the new pages are in ascending order.
** This helps to keep entries in the disk file in order so that a scan
** of the table is closer to a linear scan through the file. That in turn
** helps the operating system to deliver pages from the disk more rapidly.
**
** An O(n^2) insertion sort algorithm is used, but since n is never more
** than (NB+2) (a small constant), that should not be a problem.
**
** When NB==3, this one optimization makes the database about 25% faster
** for large insertions and deletions.
*/
for(i=0; i<nNew; i++){
aPgOrder[i] = aPgno[i] = apNew[i]->pgno;
aPgFlags[i] = apNew[i]->pDbPage->flags;
for(j=0; j<i; j++){
if( aPgno[j]==aPgno[i] ){
/* This branch is taken if the set of sibling pages somehow contains
** duplicate entries. This can happen if the database is corrupt.
** It would be simpler to detect this as part of the loop below, but
** we do the detection here in order to avoid populating the pager
** cache with two separate objects associated with the same
** page number. */
assert( CORRUPT_DB );
rc = SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
goto balance_cleanup;
}
}
}
for(i=0; i<nNew; i++){
int iBest = 0; /* aPgno[] index of page number to use */
for(j=1; j<nNew; j++){
if( aPgOrder[j]<aPgOrder[iBest] ) iBest = j;
}
pgno = aPgOrder[iBest];
aPgOrder[iBest] = 0xffffffff;
if( iBest!=i ){
if( iBest>i ){
sqlite3PagerRekey(apNew[iBest]->pDbPage, pBt->nPage+iBest+1, 0);
}
sqlite3PagerRekey(apNew[i]->pDbPage, pgno, aPgFlags[iBest]);
apNew[i]->pgno = pgno;
}
}
TRACE(("BALANCE: new: %d(%d nc=%d) %d(%d nc=%d) %d(%d nc=%d) "
"%d(%d nc=%d) %d(%d nc=%d)\n",
apNew[0]->pgno, szNew[0], cntNew[0],
nNew>=2 ? apNew[1]->pgno : 0, nNew>=2 ? szNew[1] : 0,
nNew>=2 ? cntNew[1] - cntNew[0] - !leafData : 0,
nNew>=3 ? apNew[2]->pgno : 0, nNew>=3 ? szNew[2] : 0,
nNew>=3 ? cntNew[2] - cntNew[1] - !leafData : 0,
nNew>=4 ? apNew[3]->pgno : 0, nNew>=4 ? szNew[3] : 0,
nNew>=4 ? cntNew[3] - cntNew[2] - !leafData : 0,
nNew>=5 ? apNew[4]->pgno : 0, nNew>=5 ? szNew[4] : 0,
nNew>=5 ? cntNew[4] - cntNew[3] - !leafData : 0
));
assert( sqlite3PagerIswriteable(pParent->pDbPage) );
put4byte(pRight, apNew[nNew-1]->pgno);
/* If the sibling pages are not leaves, ensure that the right-child pointer
** of the right-most new sibling page is set to the value that was
** originally in the same field of the right-most old sibling page. */
if( (pageFlags & PTF_LEAF)==0 && nOld!=nNew ){
MemPage *pOld = (nNew>nOld ? apNew : apOld)[nOld-1];
memcpy(&apNew[nNew-1]->aData[8], &pOld->aData[8], 4);
}
/* Make any required updates to pointer map entries associated with
** cells stored on sibling pages following the balance operation. Pointer
** map entries associated with divider cells are set by the insertCell()
** routine. The associated pointer map entries are:
**
** a) if the cell contains a reference to an overflow chain, the
** entry associated with the first page in the overflow chain, and
**
** b) if the sibling pages are not leaves, the child page associated
** with the cell.
**
** If the sibling pages are not leaves, then the pointer map entry
** associated with the right-child of each sibling may also need to be
** updated. This happens below, after the sibling pages have been
** populated, not here.
*/
if( ISAUTOVACUUM ){
MemPage *pNew = apNew[0];
u8 *aOld = pNew->aData;
int cntOldNext = pNew->nCell + pNew->nOverflow;
int usableSize = pBt->usableSize;
int iNew = 0;
int iOld = 0;
for(i=0; i<b.nCell; i++){
u8 *pCell = b.apCell[i];
if( i==cntOldNext ){
MemPage *pOld = (++iOld)<nNew ? apNew[iOld] : apOld[iOld];
cntOldNext += pOld->nCell + pOld->nOverflow + !leafData;
aOld = pOld->aData;
}
if( i==cntNew[iNew] ){
pNew = apNew[++iNew];
if( !leafData ) continue;
}
/* Cell pCell is destined for new sibling page pNew. Originally, it
** was either part of sibling page iOld (possibly an overflow cell),
** or else the divider cell to the left of sibling page iOld. So,
** if sibling page iOld had the same page number as pNew, and if
** pCell really was a part of sibling page iOld (not a divider or
** overflow cell), we can skip updating the pointer map entries. */
if( iOld>=nNew
|| pNew->pgno!=aPgno[iOld]
|| !SQLITE_WITHIN(pCell,aOld,&aOld[usableSize])
){
if( !leafCorrection ){
ptrmapPut(pBt, get4byte(pCell), PTRMAP_BTREE, pNew->pgno, &rc);
}
if( cachedCellSize(&b,i)>pNew->minLocal ){
ptrmapPutOvflPtr(pNew, pCell, &rc);
}
if( rc ) goto balance_cleanup;
}
}
}
/* Insert new divider cells into pParent. */
for(i=0; i<nNew-1; i++){
u8 *pCell;
u8 *pTemp;
int sz;
MemPage *pNew = apNew[i];
j = cntNew[i];
assert( j<nMaxCells );
assert( b.apCell[j]!=0 );
pCell = b.apCell[j];
sz = b.szCell[j] + leafCorrection;
pTemp = &aOvflSpace[iOvflSpace];
if( !pNew->leaf ){
memcpy(&pNew->aData[8], pCell, 4);
}else if( leafData ){
/* If the tree is a leaf-data tree, and the siblings are leaves,
** then there is no divider cell in b.apCell[]. Instead, the divider
** cell consists of the integer key for the right-most cell of
** the sibling-page assembled above only.
*/
CellInfo info;
j--;
pNew->xParseCell(pNew, b.apCell[j], &info);
pCell = pTemp;
sz = 4 + putVarint(&pCell[4], info.nKey);
pTemp = 0;
}else{
pCell -= 4;
/* Obscure case for non-leaf-data trees: If the cell at pCell was
** previously stored on a leaf node, and its reported size was 4
** bytes, then it may actually be smaller than this
** (see btreeParseCellPtr(), 4 bytes is the minimum size of
** any cell). But it is important to pass the correct size to
** insertCell(), so reparse the cell now.
**
** This can only happen for b-trees used to evaluate "IN (SELECT ...)"
** and WITHOUT ROWID tables with exactly one column which is the
** primary key.
*/
if( b.szCell[j]==4 ){
assert(leafCorrection==4);
sz = pParent->xCellSize(pParent, pCell);
}
}
iOvflSpace += sz;
assert( sz<=pBt->maxLocal+23 );
assert( iOvflSpace <= (int)pBt->pageSize );
insertCell(pParent, nxDiv+i, pCell, sz, pTemp, pNew->pgno, &rc);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ) goto balance_cleanup;
assert( sqlite3PagerIswriteable(pParent->pDbPage) );
}
/* Now update the actual sibling pages. The order in which they are updated
** is important, as this code needs to avoid disrupting any page from which
** cells may still to be read. In practice, this means:
**
** (1) If cells are moving left (from apNew[iPg] to apNew[iPg-1])
** then it is not safe to update page apNew[iPg] until after
** the left-hand sibling apNew[iPg-1] has been updated.
**
** (2) If cells are moving right (from apNew[iPg] to apNew[iPg+1])
** then it is not safe to update page apNew[iPg] until after
** the right-hand sibling apNew[iPg+1] has been updated.
**
** If neither of the above apply, the page is safe to update.
**
** The iPg value in the following loop starts at nNew-1 goes down
** to 0, then back up to nNew-1 again, thus making two passes over
** the pages. On the initial downward pass, only condition (1) above
** needs to be tested because (2) will always be true from the previous
** step. On the upward pass, both conditions are always true, so the
** upwards pass simply processes pages that were missed on the downward
** pass.
*/
for(i=1-nNew; i<nNew; i++){
int iPg = i<0 ? -i : i;
assert( iPg>=0 && iPg<nNew );
if( abDone[iPg] ) continue; /* Skip pages already processed */
if( i>=0 /* On the upwards pass, or... */
|| cntOld[iPg-1]>=cntNew[iPg-1] /* Condition (1) is true */
){
int iNew;
int iOld;
int nNewCell;
/* Verify condition (1): If cells are moving left, update iPg
** only after iPg-1 has already been updated. */
assert( iPg==0 || cntOld[iPg-1]>=cntNew[iPg-1] || abDone[iPg-1] );
/* Verify condition (2): If cells are moving right, update iPg
** only after iPg+1 has already been updated. */
assert( cntNew[iPg]>=cntOld[iPg] || abDone[iPg+1] );
if( iPg==0 ){
iNew = iOld = 0;
nNewCell = cntNew[0];
}else{
iOld = iPg<nOld ? (cntOld[iPg-1] + !leafData) : b.nCell;
iNew = cntNew[iPg-1] + !leafData;
nNewCell = cntNew[iPg] - iNew;
}
rc = editPage(apNew[iPg], iOld, iNew, nNewCell, &b);
if( rc ) goto balance_cleanup;
abDone[iPg]++;
apNew[iPg]->nFree = usableSpace-szNew[iPg];
assert( apNew[iPg]->nOverflow==0 );
assert( apNew[iPg]->nCell==nNewCell );
}
}
/* All pages have been processed exactly once */
assert( memcmp(abDone, "\01\01\01\01\01", nNew)==0 );
assert( nOld>0 );
assert( nNew>0 );
if( isRoot && pParent->nCell==0 && pParent->hdrOffset<=apNew[0]->nFree ){
/* The root page of the b-tree now contains no cells. The only sibling
** page is the right-child of the parent. Copy the contents of the
** child page into the parent, decreasing the overall height of the
** b-tree structure by one. This is described as the "balance-shallower"
** sub-algorithm in some documentation.
**
** If this is an auto-vacuum database, the call to copyNodeContent()
** sets all pointer-map entries corresponding to database image pages
** for which the pointer is stored within the content being copied.
**
** It is critical that the child page be defragmented before being
** copied into the parent, because if the parent is page 1 then it will
** by smaller than the child due to the database header, and so all the
** free space needs to be up front.
*/
assert( nNew==1 || CORRUPT_DB );
rc = defragmentPage(apNew[0]);
testcase( rc!=SQLITE_OK );
assert( apNew[0]->nFree ==
(get2byte(&apNew[0]->aData[5])-apNew[0]->cellOffset-apNew[0]->nCell*2)
|| rc!=SQLITE_OK
);
copyNodeContent(apNew[0], pParent, &rc);
freePage(apNew[0], &rc);
}else if( ISAUTOVACUUM && !leafCorrection ){
/* Fix the pointer map entries associated with the right-child of each
** sibling page. All other pointer map entries have already been taken
** care of. */
for(i=0; i<nNew; i++){
u32 key = get4byte(&apNew[i]->aData[8]);
ptrmapPut(pBt, key, PTRMAP_BTREE, apNew[i]->pgno, &rc);
}
}
assert( pParent->isInit );
TRACE(("BALANCE: finished: old=%d new=%d cells=%d\n",
nOld, nNew, b.nCell));
/* Free any old pages that were not reused as new pages.
*/
for(i=nNew; i<nOld; i++){
freePage(apOld[i], &rc);
}
#if 0
if( ISAUTOVACUUM && rc==SQLITE_OK && apNew[0]->isInit ){
/* The ptrmapCheckPages() contains assert() statements that verify that
** all pointer map pages are set correctly. This is helpful while
** debugging. This is usually disabled because a corrupt database may
** cause an assert() statement to fail. */
ptrmapCheckPages(apNew, nNew);
ptrmapCheckPages(&pParent, 1);
}
#endif
/*
** Cleanup before returning.
*/
balance_cleanup:
sqlite3ScratchFree(b.apCell);
for(i=0; i<nOld; i++){
releasePage(apOld[i]);
}
for(i=0; i<nNew; i++){
releasePage(apNew[i]);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmx_get_vmx_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
switch (msr_index) {
case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC:
*pdata = vmx->nested.nested_vmx_basic;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS:
*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_high);
if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS)
*pdata |= PIN_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS:
*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_high);
if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS)
*pdata |= CPU_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS:
*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_high);
if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS)
*pdata |= VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS:
*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_high);
if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS)
*pdata |= VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC:
*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_misc_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_misc_high);
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0:
*pdata = vmx->nested.nested_vmx_cr0_fixed0;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1:
*pdata = vmx->nested.nested_vmx_cr0_fixed1;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0:
*pdata = vmx->nested.nested_vmx_cr4_fixed0;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1:
*pdata = vmx->nested.nested_vmx_cr4_fixed1;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMCS_ENUM:
*pdata = vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vmcs_enum;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2:
*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high);
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP:
*pdata = vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps |
((u64)vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vpid_caps << 32);
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
*pdata = vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vmfunc_controls;
break;
default:
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hns_gmac_get_port_mode(void *mac_drv, enum hns_port_mode *port_mode)
{
struct mac_driver *drv = (struct mac_driver *)mac_drv;
*port_mode = (enum hns_port_mode)dsaf_get_dev_field(
drv, GMAC_PORT_MODE_REG, GMAC_PORT_MODE_M, GMAC_PORT_MODE_S);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bat_socket_add_packet(struct socket_client *socket_client,
struct icmp_packet_rr *icmp_packet,
size_t icmp_len)
{
struct socket_packet *socket_packet;
socket_packet = kmalloc(sizeof(*socket_packet), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!socket_packet)
return;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&socket_packet->list);
memcpy(&socket_packet->icmp_packet, icmp_packet, icmp_len);
socket_packet->icmp_len = icmp_len;
spin_lock_bh(&socket_client->lock);
/* while waiting for the lock the socket_client could have been
* deleted */
if (!socket_client_hash[icmp_packet->uid]) {
spin_unlock_bh(&socket_client->lock);
kfree(socket_packet);
return;
}
list_add_tail(&socket_packet->list, &socket_client->queue_list);
socket_client->queue_len++;
if (socket_client->queue_len > 100) {
socket_packet = list_first_entry(&socket_client->queue_list,
struct socket_packet, list);
list_del(&socket_packet->list);
kfree(socket_packet);
socket_client->queue_len--;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&socket_client->lock);
wake_up(&socket_client->queue_wait);
}
Commit Message: batman-adv: Only write requested number of byte to user buffer
Don't write more than the requested number of bytes of an batman-adv icmp
packet to the userspace buffer. Otherwise unrelated userspace memory might get
overridden by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <lindner_marek@yahoo.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::willSendRequest(
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
unsigned identifier,
blink::WebURLRequest& request,
const blink::WebURLResponse& redirect_response) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
if (request.url().isEmpty())
return;
WebFrame* top_frame = frame->top();
if (!top_frame)
top_frame = frame;
WebDataSource* provisional_data_source = top_frame->provisionalDataSource();
WebDataSource* top_data_source = top_frame->dataSource();
WebDataSource* data_source =
provisional_data_source ? provisional_data_source : top_data_source;
PageTransition transition_type = PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK;
DocumentState* document_state = DocumentState::FromDataSource(data_source);
DCHECK(document_state);
InternalDocumentStateData* internal_data =
InternalDocumentStateData::FromDocumentState(document_state);
NavigationState* navigation_state = document_state->navigation_state();
transition_type = navigation_state->transition_type();
GURL request_url(request.url());
GURL new_url;
if (GetContentClient()->renderer()->WillSendRequest(
frame,
transition_type,
request_url,
request.firstPartyForCookies(),
&new_url)) {
request.setURL(WebURL(new_url));
}
if (internal_data->is_cache_policy_override_set())
request.setCachePolicy(internal_data->cache_policy_override());
WebString custom_user_agent;
bool was_after_preconnect_request = false;
if (request.extraData()) {
RequestExtraData* old_extra_data =
static_cast<RequestExtraData*>(
request.extraData());
custom_user_agent = old_extra_data->custom_user_agent();
was_after_preconnect_request =
old_extra_data->was_after_preconnect_request();
if (!custom_user_agent.isNull()) {
if (custom_user_agent.isEmpty())
request.clearHTTPHeaderField("User-Agent");
else
request.setHTTPHeaderField("User-Agent", custom_user_agent);
}
}
bool should_replace_current_entry = false;
if (navigation_state->is_content_initiated()) {
should_replace_current_entry = data_source->replacesCurrentHistoryItem();
} else {
should_replace_current_entry =
navigation_state->should_replace_current_entry();
}
int provider_id = kInvalidServiceWorkerProviderId;
if (request.targetType() == blink::WebURLRequest::TargetIsMainFrame ||
request.targetType() == blink::WebURLRequest::TargetIsSubframe) {
if (frame->provisionalDataSource()) {
ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider* provider =
ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider::FromDocumentState(
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->provisionalDataSource()));
provider_id = provider->provider_id();
}
} else if (frame->dataSource()) {
ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider* provider =
ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider::FromDocumentState(
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->dataSource()));
provider_id = provider->provider_id();
}
int parent_routing_id = frame->parent() ?
FromWebFrame(frame->parent())->GetRoutingID() : -1;
RequestExtraData* extra_data = new RequestExtraData();
extra_data->set_visibility_state(render_view_->visibilityState());
extra_data->set_custom_user_agent(custom_user_agent);
extra_data->set_was_after_preconnect_request(was_after_preconnect_request);
extra_data->set_render_frame_id(routing_id_);
extra_data->set_is_main_frame(frame == top_frame);
extra_data->set_frame_origin(
GURL(frame->document().securityOrigin().toString()));
extra_data->set_parent_is_main_frame(frame->parent() == top_frame);
extra_data->set_parent_render_frame_id(parent_routing_id);
extra_data->set_allow_download(navigation_state->allow_download());
extra_data->set_transition_type(transition_type);
extra_data->set_should_replace_current_entry(should_replace_current_entry);
extra_data->set_transferred_request_child_id(
navigation_state->transferred_request_child_id());
extra_data->set_transferred_request_request_id(
navigation_state->transferred_request_request_id());
extra_data->set_service_worker_provider_id(provider_id);
request.setExtraData(extra_data);
DocumentState* top_document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(top_data_source);
if (top_document_state) {
if (request.targetType() == WebURLRequest::TargetIsPrefetch)
top_document_state->set_was_prefetcher(true);
if (was_after_preconnect_request)
top_document_state->set_was_after_preconnect_request(true);
}
request.setRequestorID(render_view_->GetRoutingID());
request.setHasUserGesture(WebUserGestureIndicator::isProcessingUserGesture());
if (!navigation_state->extra_headers().empty()) {
for (net::HttpUtil::HeadersIterator i(
navigation_state->extra_headers().begin(),
navigation_state->extra_headers().end(), "\n");
i.GetNext(); ) {
if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(i.name(), "referer")) {
WebString referrer = WebSecurityPolicy::generateReferrerHeader(
blink::WebReferrerPolicyDefault,
request.url(),
WebString::fromUTF8(i.values()));
request.setHTTPReferrer(referrer, blink::WebReferrerPolicyDefault);
} else {
request.setHTTPHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8(i.name()),
WebString::fromUTF8(i.values()));
}
}
}
if (!render_view_->renderer_preferences_.enable_referrers)
request.setHTTPReferrer(WebString(), blink::WebReferrerPolicyDefault);
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 22,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodArrayBufferArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodArrayBufferArg", "TestObjectPython", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(ArrayBuffer*, arrayBufferArg, info[0]->IsArrayBuffer() ? V8ArrayBuffer::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::ArrayBuffer>::Cast(info[0])) : 0);
imp->voidMethodArrayBufferArg(arrayBufferArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 10,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: flatpak_proxy_client_update_unique_id_policy_from_name (FlatpakProxyClient *client,
const char *unique_id,
const char *as_name)
{
flatpak_proxy_client_update_unique_id_policy (client,
unique_id,
flatpak_proxy_get_policy (client->proxy, as_name));
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436
| 0
| 10,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ReadableStream::didSourceStart()
{
m_isStarted = true;
callPullIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VOID ixheaacd_dct2_64(WORD32 *x, WORD32 *X,
ia_qmf_dec_tables_struct *qmf_dec_tables_ptr,
WORD16 *filter_states) {
ixheaacd_pretwdct2(x, X);
ixheaacd_sbr_imdct_using_fft(qmf_dec_tables_ptr->w1024, 32, X, x,
qmf_dec_tables_ptr->dig_rev_table2_128,
qmf_dec_tables_ptr->dig_rev_table2_128,
qmf_dec_tables_ptr->dig_rev_table2_128,
qmf_dec_tables_ptr->dig_rev_table2_128);
ixheaacd_fftposttw(x, qmf_dec_tables_ptr);
ixheaacd_posttwdct2(x, filter_states, qmf_dec_tables_ptr);
return;
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 4,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *av_malloc(size_t size)
{
void *ptr = NULL;
#if CONFIG_MEMALIGN_HACK
long diff;
#endif
/* let's disallow possible ambiguous cases */
if (size > (max_alloc_size - 32))
return NULL;
#if CONFIG_MEMALIGN_HACK
ptr = malloc(size + ALIGN);
if (!ptr)
return ptr;
diff = ((~(long)ptr)&(ALIGN - 1)) + 1;
ptr = (char *)ptr + diff;
((char *)ptr)[-1] = diff;
#elif HAVE_POSIX_MEMALIGN
if (size) //OS X on SDK 10.6 has a broken posix_memalign implementation
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, ALIGN, size))
ptr = NULL;
#elif HAVE_ALIGNED_MALLOC
ptr = _aligned_malloc(size, ALIGN);
#elif HAVE_MEMALIGN
#ifndef __DJGPP__
ptr = memalign(ALIGN, size);
#else
ptr = memalign(size, ALIGN);
#endif
/* Why 64?
* Indeed, we should align it:
* on 4 for 386
* on 16 for 486
* on 32 for 586, PPro - K6-III
* on 64 for K7 (maybe for P3 too).
* Because L1 and L2 caches are aligned on those values.
* But I don't want to code such logic here!
*/
/* Why 32?
* For AVX ASM. SSE / NEON needs only 16.
* Why not larger? Because I did not see a difference in benchmarks ...
*/
/* benchmarks with P3
* memalign(64) + 1 3071, 3051, 3032
* memalign(64) + 2 3051, 3032, 3041
* memalign(64) + 4 2911, 2896, 2915
* memalign(64) + 8 2545, 2554, 2550
* memalign(64) + 16 2543, 2572, 2563
* memalign(64) + 32 2546, 2545, 2571
* memalign(64) + 64 2570, 2533, 2558
*
* BTW, malloc seems to do 8-byte alignment by default here.
*/
#else
ptr = malloc(size);
#endif
if(!ptr && !size) {
size = 1;
ptr= av_malloc(1);
}
#if CONFIG_MEMORY_POISONING
if (ptr)
memset(ptr, FF_MEMORY_POISON, size);
#endif
return ptr;
}
Commit Message: avutil/mem: Fix flipped condition
Fixes return code and later null pointer dereference
Found-by: Laurent Butti <laurentb@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cdrom_load_unload(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi, int slot)
{
struct packet_command cgc;
cd_dbg(CD_CHANGER, "entering cdrom_load_unload()\n");
if (cdi->sanyo_slot && slot < 0)
return 0;
init_cdrom_command(&cgc, NULL, 0, CGC_DATA_NONE);
cgc.cmd[0] = GPCMD_LOAD_UNLOAD;
cgc.cmd[4] = 2 + (slot >= 0);
cgc.cmd[8] = slot;
cgc.timeout = 60 * HZ;
/* The Sanyo 3 CD changer uses byte 7 of the
GPCMD_TEST_UNIT_READY to command to switch CDs instead of
using the GPCMD_LOAD_UNLOAD opcode. */
if (cdi->sanyo_slot && -1 < slot) {
cgc.cmd[0] = GPCMD_TEST_UNIT_READY;
cgc.cmd[7] = slot;
cgc.cmd[4] = cgc.cmd[8] = 0;
cdi->sanyo_slot = slot ? slot : 3;
}
return cdi->ops->generic_packet(cdi, &cgc);
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 475
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void compute_bitreverse(int n, uint16 *rev)
{
int ld = ilog(n) - 1; // ilog is off-by-one from normal definitions
int i, n8 = n >> 3;
for (i=0; i < n8; ++i)
rev[i] = (bit_reverse(i) >> (32-ld+3)) << 2;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,896
|
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