instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY EnumerateSecurityPackagesW(ULONG* pcPackages, PSecPkgInfoW* ppPackageInfo)
{
int index;
size_t size;
UINT32 cPackages;
SecPkgInfoW* pPackageInfo;
cPackages = sizeof(SecPkgInfoW_LIST) / sizeof(*(SecPkgInfoW_LIST));
size = sizeof(SecPkgInfoW) * cPackages;
pPackageInfo = (SecPkgInfoW*) sspi_ContextBufferAlloc(EnumerateSecurityPackagesIndex, size);
for (index = 0; index < (int) cPackages; index++)
{
pPackageInfo[index].fCapabilities = SecPkgInfoW_LIST[index]->fCapabilities;
pPackageInfo[index].wVersion = SecPkgInfoW_LIST[index]->wVersion;
pPackageInfo[index].wRPCID = SecPkgInfoW_LIST[index]->wRPCID;
pPackageInfo[index].cbMaxToken = SecPkgInfoW_LIST[index]->cbMaxToken;
pPackageInfo[index].Name = _wcsdup(SecPkgInfoW_LIST[index]->Name);
pPackageInfo[index].Comment = _wcsdup(SecPkgInfoW_LIST[index]->Comment);
}
*(pcPackages) = cPackages;
*(ppPackageInfo) = pPackageInfo;
return SEC_E_OK;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 11,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::UnmapTexSubImage2DCHROMIUM(const void* mem) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glUnmapTexSubImage2DCHROMIUM("
<< mem << ")");
MappedTextureMap::iterator it = mapped_textures_.find(mem);
if (it == mapped_textures_.end()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "UnmapTexSubImage2DCHROMIUM",
"texture not mapped");
return;
}
const MappedTexture& mt = it->second;
helper_->TexSubImage2D(mt.target, mt.level, mt.xoffset, mt.yoffset, mt.width,
mt.height, mt.format, mt.type, mt.shm_id,
mt.shm_offset, GL_FALSE);
mapped_memory_->FreePendingToken(mt.shm_memory, helper_->InsertToken());
mapped_textures_.erase(it);
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 14,350
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 secondary_exec_ctl = vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx);
if (vmx_rdtscp_supported()) {
bool rdtscp_enabled = guest_cpuid_has_rdtscp(vcpu);
if (!rdtscp_enabled)
secondary_exec_ctl &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
if (nested) {
if (rdtscp_enabled)
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
else
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &=
~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
}
}
/* Exposing INVPCID only when PCID is exposed */
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x7, 0);
if (vmx_invpcid_supported() &&
(!best || !(best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) ||
!guest_cpuid_has_pcid(vcpu))) {
secondary_exec_ctl &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
if (best)
best->ebx &= ~bit(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
}
vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(secondary_exec_ctl);
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCOMMIT) && nested) {
if (guest_cpuid_has_pcommit(vcpu))
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_PCOMMIT;
else
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &=
~SECONDARY_EXEC_PCOMMIT;
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,508
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HeapAllocator::expandVectorBacking(void* address, size_t newSize) {
return backingExpand(address, newSize);
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_handle_sRGB(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
png_byte intent;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_sRGB");
if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR) == 0)
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "missing IHDR");
else if ((png_ptr->mode & (PNG_HAVE_IDAT|PNG_HAVE_PLTE)) != 0)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "out of place");
return;
}
if (length != 1)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "invalid");
return;
}
png_crc_read(png_ptr, &intent, 1);
if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0) != 0)
return;
/* If a colorspace error has already been output skip this chunk */
if ((png_ptr->colorspace.flags & PNG_COLORSPACE_INVALID) != 0)
return;
/* Only one sRGB or iCCP chunk is allowed, use the HAVE_INTENT flag to detect
* this.
*/
if ((png_ptr->colorspace.flags & PNG_COLORSPACE_HAVE_INTENT) != 0)
{
png_ptr->colorspace.flags |= PNG_COLORSPACE_INVALID;
png_colorspace_sync(png_ptr, info_ptr);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "too many profiles");
return;
}
(void)png_colorspace_set_sRGB(png_ptr, &png_ptr->colorspace, intent);
png_colorspace_sync(png_ptr, info_ptr);
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 2,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int preallocate(BlockDriverState *bs)
{
uint64_t nb_sectors;
uint64_t offset;
uint64_t host_offset = 0;
int num;
int ret;
QCowL2Meta *meta;
nb_sectors = bdrv_getlength(bs) >> BDRV_SECTOR_BITS;
offset = 0;
while (nb_sectors) {
num = MIN(nb_sectors, INT_MAX >> BDRV_SECTOR_BITS);
ret = qcow2_alloc_cluster_offset(bs, offset, &num,
&host_offset, &meta);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
if (meta != NULL) {
ret = qcow2_alloc_cluster_link_l2(bs, meta);
if (ret < 0) {
qcow2_free_any_clusters(bs, meta->alloc_offset,
meta->nb_clusters, QCOW2_DISCARD_NEVER);
return ret;
}
/* There are no dependent requests, but we need to remove our
* request from the list of in-flight requests */
QLIST_REMOVE(meta, next_in_flight);
}
/* TODO Preallocate data if requested */
nb_sectors -= num;
offset += num << BDRV_SECTOR_BITS;
}
/*
* It is expected that the image file is large enough to actually contain
* all of the allocated clusters (otherwise we get failing reads after
* EOF). Extend the image to the last allocated sector.
*/
if (host_offset != 0) {
uint8_t buf[BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE];
memset(buf, 0, BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
ret = bdrv_write(bs->file, (host_offset >> BDRV_SECTOR_BITS) + num - 1,
buf, 1);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 6,578
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsSession::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
process_ = process_host;
host_ = frame_host;
for (auto& pair : handlers_)
pair.second->SetRenderer(process_, host_);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 5,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sfile_write(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, char *buf, int cnt)
{
FILE *fp;
size_t n;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("sfile_write(%p, %p, %d)\n", obj, buf, cnt));
fp = JAS_CAST(FILE *, obj);
n = fwrite(buf, 1, cnt, fp);
return (n != JAS_CAST(size_t, cnt)) ? (-1) : cnt;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 21,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ossl_cipher_set_auth_tag(VALUE self, VALUE vtag)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
unsigned char *tag;
int tag_len;
StringValue(vtag);
tag = (unsigned char *) RSTRING_PTR(vtag);
tag_len = RSTRING_LENINT(vtag);
GetCipher(self, ctx);
if (!(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags(ctx) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
ossl_raise(eCipherError, "authentication tag not supported by this cipher");
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, tag_len, tag))
ossl_raise(eCipherError, "unable to set AEAD tag");
return vtag;
}
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 23,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t ProCamera2Client::deleteStream(int streamId) {
ATRACE_CALL();
ALOGV("%s (streamId = 0x%x)", __FUNCTION__, streamId);
status_t res;
if ( (res = checkPid(__FUNCTION__) ) != OK) return res;
Mutex::Autolock icl(mBinderSerializationLock);
if (!mDevice.get()) return DEAD_OBJECT;
mDevice->clearStreamingRequest();
status_t code;
if ((code = mDevice->waitUntilDrained()) != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: waitUntilDrained failed with code 0x%x", __FUNCTION__, code);
}
return mDevice->deleteStream(streamId);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_default_prinfo(struct sock *sk,
char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sctp_default_prinfo info;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
int retval = -EINVAL;
if (optlen != sizeof(info))
goto out;
if (copy_from_user(&info, optval, sizeof(info))) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (info.pr_policy & ~SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK)
goto out;
if (info.pr_policy == SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE)
info.pr_value = 0;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, info.pr_assoc_id);
if (asoc) {
SCTP_PR_SET_POLICY(asoc->default_flags, info.pr_policy);
asoc->default_timetolive = info.pr_value;
} else if (!info.pr_assoc_id) {
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
SCTP_PR_SET_POLICY(sp->default_flags, info.pr_policy);
sp->default_timetolive = info.pr_value;
} else {
goto out;
}
retval = 0;
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 19,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LocalDOMWindow::RemovePostMessageTimer(PostMessageTimer* timer) {
post_message_timers_.erase(timer);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,552
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Cluster::EOS() const
//// long long element_size)
{
return (m_pSegment == NULL);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 14,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOLEAN btif_hl_find_app_idx_using_mdepId(UINT8 mdep_id, UINT8 *p_app_idx){
BOOLEAN found=FALSE;
UINT8 i;
*p_app_idx = 0;
for (i=0; i < BTA_HL_NUM_APPS ; i ++)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_find_app_idx_using_mdepId: MDEP-ID = %d",
btif_hl_cb.acb[i].sup_feature.mdep[0].mdep_id);
if (btif_hl_cb.acb[i].in_use &&
(btif_hl_cb.acb[i].sup_feature.mdep[0].mdep_id == mdep_id))
{
found = TRUE;
*p_app_idx = i;
break;
}
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s found=%d app_idx=%d", __FUNCTION__, found, i );
return found;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 12,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texImage3D(
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLsizei depth,
GLint border,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
MaybeShared<DOMArrayBufferView> pixels,
GLuint src_offset) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texImage3D",
"a buffer is bound to PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
if (unpack_flip_y_ || unpack_premultiply_alpha_) {
DCHECK(pixels);
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texImage3D",
"FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA isn't allowed for uploading 3D textures");
return;
}
TexImageHelperDOMArrayBufferView(
kTexImage3D, target, level, internalformat, width, height, depth, border,
format, type, 0, 0, 0, pixels.View(), kNullNotReachable, src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,687
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PaymentRequestState::GeneratePaymentResponse() {
DCHECK(is_ready_to_pay());
response_helper_ = std::make_unique<PaymentResponseHelper>(
app_locale_, spec_, selected_instrument_, payment_request_delegate_,
selected_shipping_profile_, selected_contact_profile_, this);
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 5,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void transit_finish(void)
{
hash_clean(transit_hash, (void (*)(void *))transit_free);
hash_free(transit_hash);
transit_hash = NULL;
}
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,517
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantWebUIBindings(int child_id,
int bindings) {
CHECK(bindings & kWebUIBindingsPolicyMask);
CHECK_EQ(0, bindings & ~kWebUIBindingsPolicyMask);
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
if (state == security_state_.end())
return;
state->second->GrantBindings(bindings);
state->second->GrantRequestScheme(kChromeUIScheme);
state->second->GrantRequestScheme(url::kFileScheme);
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::suspendScheduledTasks(ActiveDOMObject::ReasonForSuspension reason)
{
ASSERT(!m_scheduledTasksAreSuspended);
suspendScriptedAnimationControllerCallbacks();
suspendActiveDOMObjects(reason);
scriptRunner()->suspend();
m_pendingTasksTimer.stop();
if (m_parser)
m_parser->suspendScheduledTasks();
m_scheduledTasksAreSuspended = true;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 alpha(struct illinois *ca, u32 da, u32 dm)
{
u32 d1 = dm / 100; /* Low threshold */
if (da <= d1) {
/* If never got out of low delay zone, then use max */
if (!ca->rtt_above)
return ALPHA_MAX;
/* Wait for 5 good RTT's before allowing alpha to go alpha max.
* This prevents one good RTT from causing sudden window increase.
*/
if (++ca->rtt_low < theta)
return ca->alpha;
ca->rtt_low = 0;
ca->rtt_above = 0;
return ALPHA_MAX;
}
ca->rtt_above = 1;
/*
* Based on:
*
* (dm - d1) amin amax
* k1 = -------------------
* amax - amin
*
* (dm - d1) amin
* k2 = ---------------- - d1
* amax - amin
*
* k1
* alpha = ----------
* k2 + da
*/
dm -= d1;
da -= d1;
return (dm * ALPHA_MAX) /
(dm + (da * (ALPHA_MAX - ALPHA_MIN)) / ALPHA_MIN);
}
Commit Message: net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,910
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pndisc_is_router(const void *pkey,
struct net_device *dev)
{
struct pneigh_entry *n;
int ret = -1;
read_lock_bh(&nd_tbl.lock);
n = __pneigh_lookup(&nd_tbl, dev_net(dev), pkey, dev);
if (n)
ret = !!(n->flags & NTF_ROUTER);
read_unlock_bh(&nd_tbl.lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <ljungmark@modio.se>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 20,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_fetch_assoc)
{
/* pg_fetch_assoc() is added from PHP 4.3.0. It should raise error, when
there is 3rd parameter */
if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() > 2)
WRONG_PARAM_COUNT;
php_pgsql_fetch_hash(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, PGSQL_ASSOC, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExpectStreamsClosed() {
EXPECT_EQ(0u, client_peer_->quic_transport()->GetNumActiveStreams());
EXPECT_TRUE(client_peer_->quic_transport()->IsClosedStream(
client_peer()->stream_id()));
EXPECT_EQ(0u, server_peer_->quic_transport()->GetNumActiveStreams());
EXPECT_TRUE(server_peer()->quic_transport()->IsClosedStream(
server_peer()->stream_id()));
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 15,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int br_mdb_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb,
struct net_device *dev)
{
struct net_bridge *br = netdev_priv(dev);
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
struct nlattr *nest, *nest2;
int i, err = 0;
int idx = 0, s_idx = cb->args[1];
if (br->multicast_disabled)
return 0;
mdb = rcu_dereference(br->mdb);
if (!mdb)
return 0;
nest = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB);
if (nest == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
for (i = 0; i < mdb->max; i++) {
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct net_bridge_port_group *p, **pp;
struct net_bridge_port *port;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(mp, &mdb->mhash[i], hlist[mdb->ver]) {
if (idx < s_idx)
goto skip;
nest2 = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB_ENTRY);
if (nest2 == NULL) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
}
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = rcu_dereference(*pp)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
port = p->port;
if (port) {
struct br_mdb_entry e;
e.ifindex = port->dev->ifindex;
e.state = p->state;
if (p->addr.proto == htons(ETH_P_IP))
e.addr.u.ip4 = p->addr.u.ip4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (p->addr.proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
e.addr.u.ip6 = p->addr.u.ip6;
#endif
e.addr.proto = p->addr.proto;
if (nla_put(skb, MDBA_MDB_ENTRY_INFO, sizeof(e), &e)) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, nest2);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
}
}
}
nla_nest_end(skb, nest2);
skip:
idx++;
}
}
out:
cb->args[1] = idx;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
return err;
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix mdb info leaks
The bridging code discloses heap and stack bytes via the RTM_GETMDB
netlink interface and via the notify messages send to group RTNLGRP_MDB
afer a successful add/del.
Fix both cases by initializing all unset members/padding bytes with
memset(0).
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 15,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool spd_can_coalesce(const struct splice_pipe_desc *spd,
struct page *page,
unsigned int offset)
{
return spd->nr_pages &&
spd->pages[spd->nr_pages - 1] == page &&
(spd->partial[spd->nr_pages - 1].offset +
spd->partial[spd->nr_pages - 1].len == offset);
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 1,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ping_v4_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk, struct pingfakehdr *pfh,
struct flowi4 *fl4)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_write_queue);
pfh->wcheck = csum_partial((char *)&pfh->icmph,
sizeof(struct icmphdr), pfh->wcheck);
pfh->icmph.checksum = csum_fold(pfh->wcheck);
memcpy(icmp_hdr(skb), &pfh->icmph, sizeof(struct icmphdr));
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
return ip_push_pending_frames(sk, fl4);
}
Commit Message: ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int RenderThreadImpl::PostTaskToAllWebWorkers(const base::Closure& closure) {
return WorkerTaskRunner::Instance()->PostTaskToAllThreads(closure);
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 3,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int i2d_PKCS7_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS7 *p7)
{
return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), fp, p7);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 6,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GfxFunctionShading *GfxFunctionShading::parse(Dict *dict) {
GfxFunctionShading *shading;
double x0A, y0A, x1A, y1A;
double matrixA[6];
Function *funcsA[gfxColorMaxComps];
int nFuncsA;
Object obj1, obj2;
int i;
x0A = y0A = 0;
x1A = y1A = 1;
if (dict->lookup("Domain", &obj1)->isArray() &&
obj1.arrayGetLength() == 4) {
x0A = obj1.arrayGet(0, &obj2)->getNum();
obj2.free();
x1A = obj1.arrayGet(1, &obj2)->getNum();
obj2.free();
y0A = obj1.arrayGet(2, &obj2)->getNum();
obj2.free();
y1A = obj1.arrayGet(3, &obj2)->getNum();
obj2.free();
}
obj1.free();
matrixA[0] = 1; matrixA[1] = 0;
matrixA[2] = 0; matrixA[3] = 1;
matrixA[4] = 0; matrixA[5] = 0;
if (dict->lookup("Matrix", &obj1)->isArray() &&
obj1.arrayGetLength() == 6) {
matrixA[0] = obj1.arrayGet(0, &obj2)->getNum();
obj2.free();
matrixA[1] = obj1.arrayGet(1, &obj2)->getNum();
obj2.free();
matrixA[2] = obj1.arrayGet(2, &obj2)->getNum();
obj2.free();
matrixA[3] = obj1.arrayGet(3, &obj2)->getNum();
obj2.free();
matrixA[4] = obj1.arrayGet(4, &obj2)->getNum();
obj2.free();
matrixA[5] = obj1.arrayGet(5, &obj2)->getNum();
obj2.free();
}
obj1.free();
dict->lookup("Function", &obj1);
if (obj1.isArray()) {
nFuncsA = obj1.arrayGetLength();
if (nFuncsA > gfxColorMaxComps) {
error(-1, "Invalid Function array in shading dictionary");
goto err1;
}
for (i = 0; i < nFuncsA; ++i) {
obj1.arrayGet(i, &obj2);
if (!(funcsA[i] = Function::parse(&obj2))) {
goto err2;
}
obj2.free();
}
} else {
nFuncsA = 1;
if (!(funcsA[0] = Function::parse(&obj1))) {
goto err1;
}
}
obj1.free();
shading = new GfxFunctionShading(x0A, y0A, x1A, y1A, matrixA,
funcsA, nFuncsA);
if (!shading->init(dict)) {
delete shading;
return NULL;
}
return shading;
err2:
obj2.free();
err1:
obj1.free();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 22,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sig_channel_destroyed(CHANNEL_REC *channel)
{
g_return_if_fail(IS_CHANNEL(channel));
g_hash_table_foreach(channel->nicks,
(GHFunc) nicklist_remove_hash, channel);
g_hash_table_destroy(channel->nicks);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 25,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintPages() {
WebFrame* frame;
if (GetPrintFrame(&frame))
Print(frame, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,015
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserNonClientFrameViewAura::PaintToolbarBackground(
gfx::Canvas* canvas) {
gfx::Rect toolbar_bounds(browser_view()->GetToolbarBounds());
if (toolbar_bounds.IsEmpty())
return;
gfx::Point toolbar_origin(toolbar_bounds.origin());
ConvertPointToView(browser_view(), this, &toolbar_origin);
toolbar_bounds.set_origin(toolbar_origin);
int x = toolbar_bounds.x();
int w = toolbar_bounds.width();
int y = toolbar_bounds.y();
int h = toolbar_bounds.height();
int split_point = kFrameShadowThickness * 2;
int bottom_y = y + split_point;
ui::ThemeProvider* tp = GetThemeProvider();
SkBitmap* theme_toolbar = tp->GetBitmapNamed(IDR_THEME_TOOLBAR);
int bottom_edge_height = std::min(theme_toolbar->height(), h) - split_point;
canvas->FillRect(gfx::Rect(x, bottom_y, w, bottom_edge_height),
tp->GetColor(ThemeService::COLOR_TOOLBAR));
bool restored = !frame()->IsMaximized();
canvas->TileImageInt(
*theme_toolbar,
x, bottom_y - GetHorizontalTabStripVerticalOffset(restored),
x, bottom_y,
w, theme_toolbar->height());
SkBitmap* toolbar_center =
tp->GetBitmapNamed(IDR_CONTENT_TOP_CENTER);
canvas->TileImageInt(*toolbar_center,
0, 0,
x, y,
w, split_point);
canvas->FillRect(gfx::Rect(x + kClientEdgeThickness,
toolbar_bounds.bottom() - kClientEdgeThickness,
w - (2 * kClientEdgeThickness),
kClientEdgeThickness),
ThemeService::GetDefaultColor(ThemeService::COLOR_TOOLBAR_SEPARATOR));
}
Commit Message: Ash: Fix fullscreen window bounds
I was computing the non-client frame top border height incorrectly for fullscreen windows, so it was trying to draw a few pixels of transparent non-client border.
BUG=118774
TEST=visual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9810014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@128014 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_release_dquot(struct dquot *dquot)
{
int ret, err;
handle_t *handle;
handle = ext4_journal_start(dquot_to_inode(dquot),
EXT4_QUOTA_DEL_BLOCKS(dquot->dq_sb));
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
/* Release dquot anyway to avoid endless cycle in dqput() */
dquot_release(dquot);
return PTR_ERR(handle);
}
ret = dquot_release(dquot);
err = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (!ret)
ret = err;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 10,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t macvtap_get_user(struct macvtap_queue *q, struct msghdr *m,
const struct iovec *iv, unsigned long total_len,
size_t count, int noblock)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct macvlan_dev *vlan;
unsigned long len = total_len;
int err;
struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr = { 0 };
int vnet_hdr_len = 0;
int copylen;
bool zerocopy = false;
if (q->flags & IFF_VNET_HDR) {
vnet_hdr_len = q->vnet_hdr_sz;
err = -EINVAL;
if (len < vnet_hdr_len)
goto err;
len -= vnet_hdr_len;
err = memcpy_fromiovecend((void *)&vnet_hdr, iv, 0,
sizeof(vnet_hdr));
if (err < 0)
goto err;
if ((vnet_hdr.flags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM) &&
vnet_hdr.csum_start + vnet_hdr.csum_offset + 2 >
vnet_hdr.hdr_len)
vnet_hdr.hdr_len = vnet_hdr.csum_start +
vnet_hdr.csum_offset + 2;
err = -EINVAL;
if (vnet_hdr.hdr_len > len)
goto err;
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(len < ETH_HLEN))
goto err;
if (m && m->msg_control && sock_flag(&q->sk, SOCK_ZEROCOPY))
zerocopy = true;
if (zerocopy) {
/* There are 256 bytes to be copied in skb, so there is enough
* room for skb expand head in case it is used.
* The rest buffer is mapped from userspace.
*/
copylen = vnet_hdr.hdr_len;
if (!copylen)
copylen = GOODCOPY_LEN;
} else
copylen = len;
skb = macvtap_alloc_skb(&q->sk, NET_IP_ALIGN, copylen,
vnet_hdr.hdr_len, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto err;
if (zerocopy)
err = zerocopy_sg_from_iovec(skb, iv, vnet_hdr_len, count);
else
err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iovec(skb, 0, iv, vnet_hdr_len,
len);
if (err)
goto err_kfree;
skb_set_network_header(skb, ETH_HLEN);
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb->protocol = eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto;
if (vnet_hdr_len) {
err = macvtap_skb_from_vnet_hdr(skb, &vnet_hdr);
if (err)
goto err_kfree;
}
rcu_read_lock_bh();
vlan = rcu_dereference_bh(q->vlan);
/* copy skb_ubuf_info for callback when skb has no error */
if (zerocopy) {
skb_shinfo(skb)->destructor_arg = m->msg_control;
skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags |= SKBTX_DEV_ZEROCOPY;
}
if (vlan)
macvlan_start_xmit(skb, vlan->dev);
else
kfree_skb(skb);
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return total_len;
err_kfree:
kfree_skb(skb);
err:
rcu_read_lock_bh();
vlan = rcu_dereference_bh(q->vlan);
if (vlan)
vlan->dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return err;
}
Commit Message: macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb
There're several reasons that the vectors need to be validated:
- Return error when caller provides vectors whose num is greater than UIO_MAXIOV.
- Linearize part of skb when userspace provides vectors grater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
- Return error when userspace provides vectors whose total length may exceed
- MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 26,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TestRenderWidgetHostView::HasFocus() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 26,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name)
{
int error = 0;
if (!name)
return -EFAULT;
down_read(&uts_sem);
if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof(*name)))
error = -EFAULT;
up_read(&uts_sem);
if (!error && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
error = -EFAULT;
if (!error && override_architecture(name))
error = -EFAULT;
return error;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,708
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fmov_reg_dec(struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fregs, struct pt_regs *regs, int m,
int n)
{
if (FPSCR_SZ) {
FMOV_EXT(m);
Rn -= 8;
WRITE(FRm, Rn + 4);
m++;
WRITE(FRm, Rn);
} else {
Rn -= 4;
WRITE(FRm, Rn);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 1,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::UpdateStyleInvalidationIfNeeded() {
DCHECK(IsActive());
ScriptForbiddenScope forbid_script;
if (!ChildNeedsStyleInvalidation() && !NeedsStyleInvalidation())
return;
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "Document::updateStyleInvalidationIfNeeded");
SCOPED_BLINK_UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMER_HIGHRES("Style.InvalidationTime");
GetStyleEngine().InvalidateStyle();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sysfs_slab_add(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
int err;
const char *name;
int unmergeable;
if (slab_state < SYSFS)
/* Defer until later */
return 0;
unmergeable = slab_unmergeable(s);
if (unmergeable) {
/*
* Slabcache can never be merged so we can use the name proper.
* This is typically the case for debug situations. In that
* case we can catch duplicate names easily.
*/
sysfs_remove_link(&slab_kset->kobj, s->name);
name = s->name;
} else {
/*
* Create a unique name for the slab as a target
* for the symlinks.
*/
name = create_unique_id(s);
}
s->kobj.kset = slab_kset;
err = kobject_init_and_add(&s->kobj, &slab_ktype, NULL, name);
if (err) {
kobject_put(&s->kobj);
return err;
}
err = sysfs_create_group(&s->kobj, &slab_attr_group);
if (err)
return err;
kobject_uevent(&s->kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
if (!unmergeable) {
/* Setup first alias */
sysfs_slab_alias(s, s->name);
kfree(name);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 4,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_resetep(struct usb_dev_state *ps, void __user *arg)
{
unsigned int ep;
int ret;
if (get_user(ep, (unsigned int __user *)arg))
return -EFAULT;
ret = findintfep(ps->dev, ep);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
ret = checkintf(ps, ret);
if (ret)
return ret;
check_reset_of_active_ep(ps->dev, ep, "RESETEP");
usb_reset_endpoint(ps->dev, ep);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 5,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ptaAddPt(PTA *pta,
l_float32 x,
l_float32 y)
{
l_int32 n;
PROCNAME("ptaAddPt");
if (!pta)
return ERROR_INT("pta not defined", procName, 1);
n = pta->n;
if (n >= pta->nalloc)
ptaExtendArrays(pta);
pta->x[n] = x;
pta->y[n] = y;
pta->n++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool cs_ss_rpl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_segment cs, ss;
vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
return ((cs.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK) ==
(ss.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK));
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsTabDiscarded(content::WebContents* content) {
return TabLifecycleUnitExternal::FromWebContents(content)->IsDiscarded();
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,096
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cm_format_path_from_lap(struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv,
struct ib_sa_path_rec *path,
struct cm_lap_msg *lap_msg)
{
memset(path, 0, sizeof *path);
path->dgid = lap_msg->alt_local_gid;
path->sgid = lap_msg->alt_remote_gid;
path->dlid = lap_msg->alt_local_lid;
path->slid = lap_msg->alt_remote_lid;
path->flow_label = cm_lap_get_flow_label(lap_msg);
path->hop_limit = lap_msg->alt_hop_limit;
path->traffic_class = cm_lap_get_traffic_class(lap_msg);
path->reversible = 1;
path->pkey = cm_id_priv->pkey;
path->sl = cm_lap_get_sl(lap_msg);
path->mtu_selector = IB_SA_EQ;
path->mtu = cm_id_priv->path_mtu;
path->rate_selector = IB_SA_EQ;
path->rate = cm_lap_get_packet_rate(lap_msg);
path->packet_life_time_selector = IB_SA_EQ;
path->packet_life_time = cm_lap_get_local_ack_timeout(lap_msg);
path->packet_life_time -= (path->packet_life_time > 0);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const gfx::Size& GetPreferredSize() {
view()->UpdatePreferredSize();
return view()->preferred_size_;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 11,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *sockfs_dname(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, int buflen)
{
return dynamic_dname(dentry, buffer, buflen, "socket:[%lu]",
dentry->d_inode->i_ino);
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int rds_notify_queue_get(struct rds_sock *rs, struct msghdr *msghdr)
{
struct rds_notifier *notifier;
struct rds_rdma_notify cmsg = { 0 }; /* fill holes with zero */
unsigned int count = 0, max_messages = ~0U;
unsigned long flags;
LIST_HEAD(copy);
int err = 0;
/* put_cmsg copies to user space and thus may sleep. We can't do this
* with rs_lock held, so first grab as many notifications as we can stuff
* in the user provided cmsg buffer. We don't try to copy more, to avoid
* losing notifications - except when the buffer is so small that it wouldn't
* even hold a single notification. Then we give him as much of this single
* msg as we can squeeze in, and set MSG_CTRUNC.
*/
if (msghdr) {
max_messages = msghdr->msg_controllen / CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(cmsg));
if (!max_messages)
max_messages = 1;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
while (!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue) && count < max_messages) {
notifier = list_entry(rs->rs_notify_queue.next,
struct rds_notifier, n_list);
list_move(¬ifier->n_list, ©);
count++;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
if (!count)
return 0;
while (!list_empty(©)) {
notifier = list_entry(copy.next, struct rds_notifier, n_list);
if (msghdr) {
cmsg.user_token = notifier->n_user_token;
cmsg.status = notifier->n_status;
err = put_cmsg(msghdr, SOL_RDS, RDS_CMSG_RDMA_STATUS,
sizeof(cmsg), &cmsg);
if (err)
break;
}
list_del_init(¬ifier->n_list);
kfree(notifier);
}
/* If we bailed out because of an error in put_cmsg,
* we may be left with one or more notifications that we
* didn't process. Return them to the head of the list. */
if (!list_empty(©)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
list_splice(©, &rs->rs_notify_queue);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: rds: set correct msg_namelen
Jay Fenlason (fenlason@redhat.com) found a bug,
that recvfrom() on an RDS socket can return the contents of random kernel
memory to userspace if it was called with a address length larger than
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in).
rds_recvmsg() also fails to set the addr_len paramater properly before
returning, but that's just a bug.
There are also a number of cases wher recvfrom() can return an entirely bogus
address. Anything in rds_recvmsg() that returns a non-negative value but does
not go through the "sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;" code path
at the end of the while(1) loop will return up to 128 bytes of kernel memory
to userspace.
And I write two test programs to reproduce this bug, you will see that in
rds_server, fromAddr will be overwritten and the following sock_fd will be
destroyed.
Yes, it is the programmer's fault to set msg_namelen incorrectly, but it is
better to make the kernel copy the real length of address to user space in
such case.
How to run the test programs ?
I test them on 32bit x86 system, 3.5.0-rc7.
1 compile
gcc -o rds_client rds_client.c
gcc -o rds_server rds_server.c
2 run ./rds_server on one console
3 run ./rds_client on another console
4 you will see something like:
server is waiting to receive data...
old socket fd=3
server received data from client:data from client
msg.msg_namelen=32
new socket fd=-1067277685
sendmsg()
: Bad file descriptor
/***************** rds_client.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
struct sockaddr_in toAddr;
char recvBuffer[128] = "data from client";
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if (sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(1);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4001);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
memset(&toAddr, 0, sizeof(toAddr));
toAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
toAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
toAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = strlen(recvBuffer) + 1;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendto() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("client send data:%s\n", recvBuffer);
memset(recvBuffer, '\0', 128);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("receive data from server:%s\n", recvBuffer);
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
/***************** rds_server.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
struct sockaddr_in fromAddr;
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
unsigned int addrLen;
char recvBuffer[128];
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if(sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(0);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server is waiting to receive data...\n");
msg.msg_name = &fromAddr;
/*
* I add 16 to sizeof(fromAddr), ie 32,
* and pay attention to the definition of fromAddr,
* recvmsg() will overwrite sock_fd,
* since kernel will copy 32 bytes to userspace.
*
* If you just use sizeof(fromAddr), it works fine.
* */
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr) + 16;
/* msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr); */
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
while (1) {
printf("old socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server received data from client:%s\n", recvBuffer);
printf("msg.msg_namelen=%d\n", msg.msg_namelen);
printf("new socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
strcat(recvBuffer, "--data from server");
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendmsg()\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
}
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Weiping Pan <wpan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 10,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs_callback_down_net(u32 minorversion, struct svc_serv *serv, struct net *net)
{
struct nfs_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfs_net_id);
if (--nn->cb_users[minorversion])
return;
dprintk("NFS: destroy per-net callback data; net=%p\n", net);
svc_shutdown_net(serv, net);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 6,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_default_smtp_connection_timeout(data_t * data)
{
data->smtp_connection_to = DEFAULT_SMTP_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 27,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool login_as_unix_peer(PgSocket *client)
{
if (!pga_is_unix(&client->remote_addr))
goto fail;
if (!check_unix_peer_name(sbuf_socket(&client->sbuf), client->auth_user->name))
goto fail;
return finish_client_login(client);
fail:
disconnect_client(client, true, "unix socket login rejected");
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove too early set of auth_user
When query returns 0 rows (user not found),
this user stays as login user...
Should fix #69.
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 7,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: av_cold int avcodec_close(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
int i;
if (!avctx)
return 0;
if (avcodec_is_open(avctx)) {
FramePool *pool = avctx->internal->pool;
if (CONFIG_FRAME_THREAD_ENCODER &&
avctx->internal->frame_thread_encoder && avctx->thread_count > 1) {
ff_frame_thread_encoder_free(avctx);
}
if (HAVE_THREADS && avctx->internal->thread_ctx)
ff_thread_free(avctx);
if (avctx->codec && avctx->codec->close)
avctx->codec->close(avctx);
avctx->internal->byte_buffer_size = 0;
av_freep(&avctx->internal->byte_buffer);
av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->to_free);
av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->buffer_frame);
av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->buffer_pkt);
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(pool->pools); i++)
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&pool->pools[i]);
av_freep(&avctx->internal->pool);
if (avctx->hwaccel && avctx->hwaccel->uninit)
avctx->hwaccel->uninit(avctx);
av_freep(&avctx->internal->hwaccel_priv_data);
av_freep(&avctx->internal);
}
for (i = 0; i < avctx->nb_coded_side_data; i++)
av_freep(&avctx->coded_side_data[i].data);
av_freep(&avctx->coded_side_data);
avctx->nb_coded_side_data = 0;
av_buffer_unref(&avctx->hw_frames_ctx);
if (avctx->priv_data && avctx->codec && avctx->codec->priv_class)
av_opt_free(avctx->priv_data);
av_opt_free(avctx);
av_freep(&avctx->priv_data);
if (av_codec_is_encoder(avctx->codec)) {
av_freep(&avctx->extradata);
#if FF_API_CODED_FRAME
FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
av_frame_free(&avctx->coded_frame);
FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
#endif
}
avctx->codec = NULL;
avctx->active_thread_type = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 7,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebTextCheckClient* LocalFrameClientImpl::GetTextCheckerClient() const {
return web_frame_->GetTextCheckerClient();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 23,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ext3_orphan_cleanup (struct super_block * sb,
struct ext3_super_block * es)
{
unsigned int s_flags = sb->s_flags;
int nr_orphans = 0, nr_truncates = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
int i;
#endif
if (!es->s_last_orphan) {
jbd_debug(4, "no orphan inodes to clean up\n");
return;
}
if (bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev)) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: write access "
"unavailable, skipping orphan cleanup.");
return;
}
/* Check if feature set allows readwrite operations */
if (EXT3_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~EXT3_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_SUPP)) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "Skipping orphan cleanup due to "
"unknown ROCOMPAT features");
return;
}
if (EXT3_SB(sb)->s_mount_state & EXT3_ERROR_FS) {
/* don't clear list on RO mount w/ errors */
if (es->s_last_orphan && !(s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
jbd_debug(1, "Errors on filesystem, "
"clearing orphan list.\n");
es->s_last_orphan = 0;
}
jbd_debug(1, "Skipping orphan recovery on fs with errors.\n");
return;
}
if (s_flags & MS_RDONLY) {
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "orphan cleanup on readonly fs");
sb->s_flags &= ~MS_RDONLY;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
/* Needed for iput() to work correctly and not trash data */
sb->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
/* Turn on quotas so that they are updated correctly */
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++) {
if (EXT3_SB(sb)->s_qf_names[i]) {
int ret = ext3_quota_on_mount(sb, i);
if (ret < 0)
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"error: cannot turn on journaled "
"quota: %d", ret);
}
}
#endif
while (es->s_last_orphan) {
struct inode *inode;
inode = ext3_orphan_get(sb, le32_to_cpu(es->s_last_orphan));
if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
es->s_last_orphan = 0;
break;
}
list_add(&EXT3_I(inode)->i_orphan, &EXT3_SB(sb)->s_orphan);
dquot_initialize(inode);
if (inode->i_nlink) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG
"%s: truncating inode %lu to %Ld bytes\n",
__func__, inode->i_ino, inode->i_size);
jbd_debug(2, "truncating inode %lu to %Ld bytes\n",
inode->i_ino, inode->i_size);
ext3_truncate(inode);
nr_truncates++;
} else {
printk(KERN_DEBUG
"%s: deleting unreferenced inode %lu\n",
__func__, inode->i_ino);
jbd_debug(2, "deleting unreferenced inode %lu\n",
inode->i_ino);
nr_orphans++;
}
iput(inode); /* The delete magic happens here! */
}
#define PLURAL(x) (x), ((x)==1) ? "" : "s"
if (nr_orphans)
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "%d orphan inode%s deleted",
PLURAL(nr_orphans));
if (nr_truncates)
ext3_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "%d truncate%s cleaned up",
PLURAL(nr_truncates));
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
/* Turn quotas off */
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++) {
if (sb_dqopt(sb)->files[i])
dquot_quota_off(sb, i);
}
#endif
sb->s_flags = s_flags; /* Restore MS_RDONLY status */
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nf_tables_expr_parse(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
const struct nlattr *nla,
struct nft_expr_info *info)
{
const struct nft_expr_type *type;
const struct nft_expr_ops *ops;
struct nlattr *tb[NFTA_EXPR_MAX + 1];
int err;
err = nla_parse_nested(tb, NFTA_EXPR_MAX, nla, nft_expr_policy);
if (err < 0)
return err;
type = nft_expr_type_get(ctx->afi->family, tb[NFTA_EXPR_NAME]);
if (IS_ERR(type))
return PTR_ERR(type);
if (tb[NFTA_EXPR_DATA]) {
err = nla_parse_nested(info->tb, type->maxattr,
tb[NFTA_EXPR_DATA], type->policy);
if (err < 0)
goto err1;
} else
memset(info->tb, 0, sizeof(info->tb[0]) * (type->maxattr + 1));
if (type->select_ops != NULL) {
ops = type->select_ops(ctx,
(const struct nlattr * const *)info->tb);
if (IS_ERR(ops)) {
err = PTR_ERR(ops);
goto err1;
}
} else
ops = type->ops;
info->ops = ops;
return 0;
err1:
module_put(type->owner);
return err;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 17,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SpdyProxyClientSocket::WasEverUsed() const {
return was_ever_used_ || (spdy_stream_.get() && spdy_stream_->WasEverUsed());
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 11,685
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static sent_status_t send_data_to_app(int fd, BT_HDR *p_buf) {
if (p_buf->len == 0)
return SENT_ALL;
ssize_t sent = send(fd, p_buf->data + p_buf->offset, p_buf->len, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (sent == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)
return SENT_NONE;
LOG_ERROR("%s error writing RFCOMM data back to app: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return SENT_FAILED;
}
if (sent == 0)
return SENT_FAILED;
if (sent == p_buf->len)
return SENT_ALL;
p_buf->offset += sent;
p_buf->len -= sent;
return SENT_PARTIAL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 7,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __br_multicast_enable_port(struct net_bridge_port *port)
{
port->multicast_startup_queries_sent = 0;
if (try_to_del_timer_sync(&port->multicast_query_timer) >= 0 ||
del_timer(&port->multicast_query_timer))
mod_timer(&port->multicast_query_timer, jiffies);
}
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int use_local_access( const char *file )
{
return
!strcmp(file,"/dev/null") ||
!strcmp(file,"/dev/zero") ||
attr_list_has_file( ATTR_LOCAL_FILES, file );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 23,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::EndIdlePeriod() {
if (main_thread_only().in_idle_period_for_testing)
return;
TRACE_EVENT0(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("renderer.scheduler"),
"RendererSchedulerImpl::EndIdlePeriod");
helper_.CheckOnValidThread();
idle_helper_.EndIdlePeriod();
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,449
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l2tp_ip_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int rc;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
struct flowi4 *fl4;
int connected = 0;
__be32 daddr;
lock_sock(sk);
rc = -ENOTCONN;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
goto out;
/* Get and verify the address. */
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_l2tpip *lip = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip *) msg->msg_name;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*lip))
goto out;
if (lip->l2tp_family != AF_INET) {
rc = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (lip->l2tp_family != AF_UNSPEC)
goto out;
}
daddr = lip->l2tp_addr.s_addr;
} else {
rc = -EDESTADDRREQ;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
connected = 1;
}
/* Allocate a socket buffer */
rc = -ENOMEM;
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk, 2 + NET_SKB_PAD + sizeof(struct iphdr) +
4 + len, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
goto error;
/* Reserve space for headers, putting IP header on 4-byte boundary. */
skb_reserve(skb, 2 + NET_SKB_PAD);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb_reserve(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr));
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
/* Insert 0 session_id */
*((__be32 *) skb_put(skb, 4)) = 0;
/* Copy user data into skb */
rc = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len);
if (rc < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
}
fl4 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip4;
if (connected)
rt = (struct rtable *) __sk_dst_check(sk, 0);
rcu_read_lock();
if (rt == NULL) {
const struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
inet_opt = rcu_dereference(inet->inet_opt);
/* Use correct destination address if we have options. */
if (inet_opt && inet_opt->opt.srr)
daddr = inet_opt->opt.faddr;
/* If this fails, retransmit mechanism of transport layer will
* keep trying until route appears or the connection times
* itself out.
*/
rt = ip_route_output_ports(sock_net(sk), fl4, sk,
daddr, inet->inet_saddr,
inet->inet_dport, inet->inet_sport,
sk->sk_protocol, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto no_route;
if (connected) {
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
} else {
skb_dst_set(skb, &rt->dst);
goto xmit;
}
}
/* We dont need to clone dst here, it is guaranteed to not disappear.
* __dev_xmit_skb() might force a refcount if needed.
*/
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rt->dst);
xmit:
/* Queue the packet to IP for output */
rc = ip_queue_xmit(skb, &inet->cork.fl);
rcu_read_unlock();
error:
if (rc >= 0)
rc = len;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
no_route:
rcu_read_unlock();
IP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
kfree_skb(skb);
rc = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 7,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int in_set_sample_rate(struct audio_stream *stream, uint32_t rate)
{
(void)stream;
(void)rate;
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 3,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: user_change_icon_file_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
User *user,
GDBusMethodInvocation *context,
gpointer data)
{
g_autofree gchar *filename = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) file = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFileInfo) info = NULL;
guint32 mode;
GFileType type;
guint64 size;
filename = g_strdup (data);
if (filename == NULL ||
*filename == '\0') {
g_autofree gchar *dest_path = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) dest = NULL;
g_autoptr(GError) error = NULL;
g_clear_pointer (&filename, g_free);
dest_path = g_build_filename (ICONDIR, accounts_user_get_user_name (ACCOUNTS_USER (user)), NULL);
dest = g_file_new_for_path (dest_path);
if (!g_file_delete (dest, NULL, &error) &&
!g_error_matches (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_FOUND)) {
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "failed to remove user icon, %s", error->message);
return;
}
goto icon_saved;
}
file = g_file_new_for_path (filename);
info = g_file_query_info (file, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_SIZE,
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 1
| 22,159
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pkinit_fini_identity_crypto(pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx)
{
if (idctx == NULL)
return;
pkiDebug("%s: freeing ctx at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, idctx);
if (idctx->deferred_ids != NULL)
pkinit_free_deferred_ids(idctx->deferred_ids);
free(idctx->identity);
pkinit_fini_certs(idctx);
pkinit_fini_pkcs11(idctx);
free(idctx);
}
Commit Message: Fix PKINIT cert matching data construction
Rewrite X509_NAME_oneline_ex() and its call sites to use dynamic
allocation and to perform proper error checking.
ticket: 8617
target_version: 1.16
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rfcomm_tty_set_termios(struct tty_struct *tty, struct ktermios *old)
{
struct ktermios *new = tty->termios;
int old_baud_rate = tty_termios_baud_rate(old);
int new_baud_rate = tty_termios_baud_rate(new);
u8 baud, data_bits, stop_bits, parity, x_on, x_off;
u16 changes = 0;
struct rfcomm_dev *dev = (struct rfcomm_dev *) tty->driver_data;
BT_DBG("tty %p termios %p", tty, old);
if (!dev || !dev->dlc || !dev->dlc->session)
return;
/* Handle turning off CRTSCTS */
if ((old->c_cflag & CRTSCTS) && !(new->c_cflag & CRTSCTS))
BT_DBG("Turning off CRTSCTS unsupported");
/* Parity on/off and when on, odd/even */
if (((old->c_cflag & PARENB) != (new->c_cflag & PARENB)) ||
((old->c_cflag & PARODD) != (new->c_cflag & PARODD))) {
changes |= RFCOMM_RPN_PM_PARITY;
BT_DBG("Parity change detected.");
}
/* Mark and space parity are not supported! */
if (new->c_cflag & PARENB) {
if (new->c_cflag & PARODD) {
BT_DBG("Parity is ODD");
parity = RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_ODD;
} else {
BT_DBG("Parity is EVEN");
parity = RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_EVEN;
}
} else {
BT_DBG("Parity is OFF");
parity = RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_NONE;
}
/* Setting the x_on / x_off characters */
if (old->c_cc[VSTOP] != new->c_cc[VSTOP]) {
BT_DBG("XOFF custom");
x_on = new->c_cc[VSTOP];
changes |= RFCOMM_RPN_PM_XON;
} else {
BT_DBG("XOFF default");
x_on = RFCOMM_RPN_XON_CHAR;
}
if (old->c_cc[VSTART] != new->c_cc[VSTART]) {
BT_DBG("XON custom");
x_off = new->c_cc[VSTART];
changes |= RFCOMM_RPN_PM_XOFF;
} else {
BT_DBG("XON default");
x_off = RFCOMM_RPN_XOFF_CHAR;
}
/* Handle setting of stop bits */
if ((old->c_cflag & CSTOPB) != (new->c_cflag & CSTOPB))
changes |= RFCOMM_RPN_PM_STOP;
/* POSIX does not support 1.5 stop bits and RFCOMM does not
* support 2 stop bits. So a request for 2 stop bits gets
* translated to 1.5 stop bits */
if (new->c_cflag & CSTOPB)
stop_bits = RFCOMM_RPN_STOP_15;
else
stop_bits = RFCOMM_RPN_STOP_1;
/* Handle number of data bits [5-8] */
if ((old->c_cflag & CSIZE) != (new->c_cflag & CSIZE))
changes |= RFCOMM_RPN_PM_DATA;
switch (new->c_cflag & CSIZE) {
case CS5:
data_bits = RFCOMM_RPN_DATA_5;
break;
case CS6:
data_bits = RFCOMM_RPN_DATA_6;
break;
case CS7:
data_bits = RFCOMM_RPN_DATA_7;
break;
case CS8:
data_bits = RFCOMM_RPN_DATA_8;
break;
default:
data_bits = RFCOMM_RPN_DATA_8;
break;
}
/* Handle baudrate settings */
if (old_baud_rate != new_baud_rate)
changes |= RFCOMM_RPN_PM_BITRATE;
switch (new_baud_rate) {
case 2400:
baud = RFCOMM_RPN_BR_2400;
break;
case 4800:
baud = RFCOMM_RPN_BR_4800;
break;
case 7200:
baud = RFCOMM_RPN_BR_7200;
break;
case 9600:
baud = RFCOMM_RPN_BR_9600;
break;
case 19200:
baud = RFCOMM_RPN_BR_19200;
break;
case 38400:
baud = RFCOMM_RPN_BR_38400;
break;
case 57600:
baud = RFCOMM_RPN_BR_57600;
break;
case 115200:
baud = RFCOMM_RPN_BR_115200;
break;
case 230400:
baud = RFCOMM_RPN_BR_230400;
break;
default:
/* 9600 is standard accordinag to the RFCOMM specification */
baud = RFCOMM_RPN_BR_9600;
break;
}
if (changes)
rfcomm_send_rpn(dev->dlc->session, 1, dev->dlc->dlci, baud,
data_bits, stop_bits, parity,
RFCOMM_RPN_FLOW_NONE, x_on, x_off, changes);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.
Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 24,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const std::string& GetExtensionIdForMutedTab(content::WebContents* contents) {
DCHECK_EQ(GetTabAudioMutedReason(contents) != TabMutedReason::EXTENSION,
LastMuteMetadata::FromWebContents(contents)->extension_id.empty());
return LastMuteMetadata::FromWebContents(contents)->extension_id;
}
Commit Message: Fix nullptr crash in IsSiteMuted
This CL adds a nullptr check in IsSiteMuted to prevent a crash on Mac.
Bug: 797647
Change-Id: Ic36f0fb39f2dbdf49d2bec9e548a4a6e339dc9a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/848245
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuri Wiitala <miu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Tommy Steimel <steimel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526825}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fb_rotate_logo_cw(const u8 *in, u8 *out, u32 width, u32 height)
{
int i, j, h = height - 1;
for (i = 0; i < height; i++)
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
out[height * j + h - i] = *in++;
}
Commit Message: vm: convert fb_mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helper
This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The
fb_mmap() case is a good example because it is a bit more complicated
than some: fb_mmap() mmaps one of two different memory areas depending
on the page offset of the mmap (but happily there is never any mixing of
the two, so the helper function still works).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 25,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int modbus_read_input_bits(modbus_t *ctx, int addr, int nb, uint8_t *dest)
{
int rc;
if (ctx == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
if (nb > MODBUS_MAX_READ_BITS) {
if (ctx->debug) {
fprintf(stderr,
"ERROR Too many discrete inputs requested (%d > %d)\n",
nb, MODBUS_MAX_READ_BITS);
}
errno = EMBMDATA;
return -1;
}
rc = read_io_status(ctx, MODBUS_FC_READ_DISCRETE_INPUTS, addr, nb, dest);
if (rc == -1)
return -1;
else
return nb;
}
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lua_set_cookie(lua_State *L)
{
const char *key, *value, *out, *path = "", *domain = "";
const char *strexpires = "", *strdomain = "", *strpath = "";
int secure = 0, expires = 0, httponly = 0;
char cdate[APR_RFC822_DATE_LEN+1];
apr_status_t rv;
request_rec *r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
/* New >= 2.4.8 method: */
if (lua_istable(L, 2)) {
/* key */
lua_pushstring(L, "key");
lua_gettable(L, -2);
key = luaL_checkstring(L, -1);
lua_pop(L, 1);
/* value */
lua_pushstring(L, "value");
lua_gettable(L, -2);
value = luaL_checkstring(L, -1);
lua_pop(L, 1);
/* expiry */
lua_pushstring(L, "expires");
lua_gettable(L, -2);
expires = luaL_optint(L, -1, 0);
lua_pop(L, 1);
/* secure */
lua_pushstring(L, "secure");
lua_gettable(L, -2);
if (lua_isboolean(L, -1)) {
secure = lua_toboolean(L, -1);
}
lua_pop(L, 1);
/* httponly */
lua_pushstring(L, "httponly");
lua_gettable(L, -2);
if (lua_isboolean(L, -1)) {
httponly = lua_toboolean(L, -1);
}
lua_pop(L, 1);
/* path */
lua_pushstring(L, "path");
lua_gettable(L, -2);
path = luaL_optstring(L, -1, "/");
lua_pop(L, 1);
/* domain */
lua_pushstring(L, "domain");
lua_gettable(L, -2);
domain = luaL_optstring(L, -1, "");
lua_pop(L, 1);
}
/* Old <= 2.4.7 method: */
else {
key = luaL_checkstring(L, 2);
value = luaL_checkstring(L, 3);
secure = 0;
if (lua_isboolean(L, 4)) {
secure = lua_toboolean(L, 4);
}
expires = luaL_optinteger(L, 5, 0);
}
/* Calculate expiry if set */
if (expires > 0) {
rv = apr_rfc822_date(cdate, apr_time_from_sec(expires));
if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
strexpires = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "Expires=%s;", cdate);
}
}
/* Create path segment */
if (path != NULL && strlen(path) > 0) {
strpath = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "Path=%s;", path);
}
/* Create domain segment */
if (domain != NULL && strlen(domain) > 0) {
/* Domain does NOT like quotes in most browsers, so let's avoid that */
strdomain = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "Domain=%s;", domain);
}
/* URL-encode key/value */
value = ap_escape_urlencoded(r->pool, value);
key = ap_escape_urlencoded(r->pool, key);
/* Create the header */
out = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "%s=%s; %s %s %s %s %s", key, value,
secure ? "Secure;" : "",
expires ? strexpires : "",
httponly ? "HttpOnly;" : "",
strlen(strdomain) ? strdomain : "",
strlen(strpath) ? strpath : "");
apr_table_add(r->err_headers_out, "Set-Cookie", out);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BaseShadow::publishShadowAttrs( ClassAd* ad )
{
MyString tmp;
tmp = ATTR_SHADOW_IP_ADDR;
tmp += "=\"";
tmp += daemonCore->InfoCommandSinfulString();
tmp += '"';
ad->Insert( tmp.Value() );
tmp = ATTR_SHADOW_VERSION;
tmp += "=\"";
tmp += CondorVersion();
tmp += '"';
ad->Insert( tmp.Value() );
char* my_uid_domain = param( "UID_DOMAIN" );
if( my_uid_domain ) {
tmp = ATTR_UID_DOMAIN;
tmp += "=\"";
tmp += my_uid_domain;
tmp += '"';
ad->Insert( tmp.Value() );
free( my_uid_domain );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 1,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Textfield::MoveCursorTo(const gfx::Point& point, bool select) {
if (model_->MoveCursorTo(point, select))
UpdateAfterChange(false, true);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void xmlInitGlobals(void)
{
if (xmlThrDefMutex == NULL)
xmlThrDefMutex = xmlNewMutex();
}
Commit Message: Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 22,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SendKeyPress(ui::KeyboardCode key_code, int flags) {
event_generator_->PressKey(key_code, flags);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GenerateEvents(aura::Window* window) {
ui::test::EventGenerator event_generator(Shell::GetPrimaryRootWindow(),
window);
event_generator.ClickLeftButton();
event_generator.ScrollSequence(window->bounds().CenterPoint(),
base::TimeDelta(), 0, 10, 1, 2);
event_generator.PressTouch();
event_generator.ReleaseTouch();
event_generator.GestureTapAt(window->bounds().CenterPoint());
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: remove_from_menu(GArray *argv, guint context) {
GUI *g = &uzbl.gui;
MenuItem *mi;
gchar *name = NULL;
guint i=0;
if(!g->menu_items)
return;
if(!argv_idx(argv, 0))
return;
else
name = argv_idx(argv, 0);
for(i=0; i < g->menu_items->len; i++) {
mi = g_ptr_array_index(g->menu_items, i);
if((context == mi->context) && !strcmp(name, mi->name)) {
g_free(mi->name);
g_free(mi->cmd);
g_free(mi);
g_ptr_array_remove_index(g->menu_items, i);
}
}
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 17,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int finish_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER)
{
if (*((*p)++) == '}')
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
{
ssl3_free(s);
dtls1_clear_queues(s);
pqueue_free(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
pqueue_free(s->d1->processed_rcds.q);
pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages);
pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages);
pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
s->d1 = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::RemoveFocusedElementOfSubtree(Node& node,
bool among_children_only) {
if (!focused_element_)
return;
if (!node.isConnected())
return;
bool contains =
node.IsShadowIncludingInclusiveAncestorOf(focused_element_.Get());
if (contains && (focused_element_ != &node || !among_children_only))
ClearFocusedElement();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 26,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rpl_daoack_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
const struct nd_rpl_daoack *daoack = (const struct nd_rpl_daoack *)bp;
const char *dagid_str = "<elided>";
ND_TCHECK2(*daoack, ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN);
if (length < ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN)
goto tooshort;
bp += ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN;
length -= ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN;
if(RPL_DAOACK_D(daoack->rpl_flags)) {
ND_TCHECK2(daoack->rpl_dagid, DAGID_LEN);
if (length < DAGID_LEN)
goto tooshort;
dagid_str = ip6addr_string (ndo, daoack->rpl_dagid);
bp += DAGID_LEN;
length -= DAGID_LEN;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [dagid:%s,seq:%u,instance:%u,status:%u]",
dagid_str,
daoack->rpl_daoseq,
daoack->rpl_instanceid,
daoack->rpl_status));
/* no officially defined options for DAOACK, but print any we find */
if(ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const struct rpl_dio_genoption *opt = (const struct rpl_dio_genoption *)bp;
rpl_dio_printopt(ndo, opt, length);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|dao-truncated]"));
return;
tooshort:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|dao-length too short]"));
return;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13041/ICMP6: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kim Gwan Yeong.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 26,096
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dump_xml_attr(xmlAttrPtr attr, int options, char **buffer, int *offset, int *max)
{
char *p_value = NULL;
const char *p_name = NULL;
CRM_ASSERT(buffer != NULL);
if (attr == NULL || attr->children == NULL) {
return;
}
p_name = (const char *)attr->name;
p_value = crm_xml_escape((const char *)attr->children->content);
buffer_print(*buffer, *max, *offset, " %s=\"%s\"", p_name, p_value);
free(p_value);
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TextInputType InputMethodBase::GetTextInputType() const {
TextInputClient* client = GetTextInputClient();
return client ? client->GetTextInputType() : TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_NONE;
}
Commit Message: cleanup: Use IsTextInputTypeNone() in OnInputMethodChanged().
BUG=None
TEST=None
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8986010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116461 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 1,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: remove_pid_dir(void)
{
if (rmdir(pid_directory) && errno != ENOTEMPTY && errno != EBUSY)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "unlink of %s failed - error (%d) '%s'", pid_directory, errno, strerror(errno));
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 12,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual status_t decrypt(Vector<uint8_t> const &sessionId,
Vector<uint8_t> const &keyId,
Vector<uint8_t> const &input,
Vector<uint8_t> const &iv,
Vector<uint8_t> &output) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IDrm::getInterfaceDescriptor());
writeVector(data, sessionId);
writeVector(data, keyId);
writeVector(data, input);
writeVector(data, iv);
status_t status = remote()->transact(DECRYPT, data, &reply);
if (status != OK) {
return status;
}
readVector(reply, output);
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: Fix info leak vulnerability of IDrm
bug: 26323455
Change-Id: I25bb30d3666ab38d5150496375ed2f55ecb23ba8
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoUniform2iv(
GLint location,
GLsizei count,
const volatile GLint* v) {
api()->glUniform2ivFn(location, count, const_cast<const GLint*>(v));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 10,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CachedShapingResults::CachedShapingResults(hb_buffer_t* harfBuzzBuffer, const Font* fontData, hb_direction_t dirData, const String& newLocale)
: buffer(harfBuzzBuffer)
, font(*fontData)
, dir(dirData)
, locale(newLocale)
{
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Fatal( const char* message )
{
FTDemo_Display_Done( display );
FTDemo_Done( handle );
PanicZ( message );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerMS::SetPreload(WebMediaPlayer::Preload preload) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 12,239
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageProcessorClient::Process(const Image& input_image,
const Image& output_image) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(test_main_thread_checker_);
auto input_frame = CreateInputFrame(input_image);
ASSERT_TRUE(input_frame);
auto output_frame = CreateOutputFrame(output_image);
ASSERT_TRUE(output_frame);
image_processor_client_thread_.task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&ImageProcessorClient::ProcessTask, base::Unretained(this),
std::move(input_frame), std::move(output_frame)));
}
Commit Message: media/gpu/test: ImageProcessorClient: Use bytes for width and height in libyuv::CopyPlane()
|width| is in bytes in libyuv::CopyPlane(). We formerly pass width in pixels.
This should matter when a pixel format is used whose pixel is composed of
more than one bytes.
Bug: None
Test: image_processor_test
Change-Id: I98e90be70c8d0128319172d4d19f3a8017b65d78
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1553129
Commit-Queue: Hirokazu Honda <hiroh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#648117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,429
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AviaryScheddPlugin::processDirtyJobs()
{
BeginTransaction();
while (!dirtyJobs->empty()) {
DirtyJobEntry entry = dirtyJobs->front(); dirtyJobs->pop_front();
string key = entry.first;
string name = entry.second.first;
int value = entry.second.second;
processJob(key.c_str(), name.c_str(), value);
}
CommitTransaction();
isHandlerRegistered = false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FolderHeaderView::ItemIsInstallingChanged() {
}
Commit Message: Enforce the maximum length of the folder name in UI.
BUG=355797
R=xiyuan@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/203863005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260156 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DidAllocateLocalSurfaceIdForAutoResize(
uint64_t sequence_number) {
if (!view_ || !sequence_number ||
last_auto_resize_request_number_ != sequence_number) {
return;
}
DCHECK(!view_->IsLocalSurfaceIdAllocationSuppressed());
viz::LocalSurfaceId local_surface_id(view_->GetLocalSurfaceId());
if (local_surface_id.is_valid()) {
ScreenInfo screen_info;
view_->GetScreenInfo(&screen_info);
Send(new ViewMsg_SetLocalSurfaceIdForAutoResize(
routing_id_, sequence_number, min_size_for_auto_resize_,
max_size_for_auto_resize_, screen_info, current_content_source_id_,
local_surface_id));
}
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ExecuteScriptWithUserGestureControl(RenderFrameHost* frame,
const std::string& script,
bool user_gesture) {
std::string expected_response = "ExecuteScript-" + base::GenerateGUID();
std::string new_script = base::StringPrintf(
R"( %s; // Original script.
window.domAutomationController.send('%s'); )",
script.c_str(), expected_response.c_str());
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> value;
if (!ExecuteScriptHelper(frame, new_script, user_gesture, &value) ||
!value.get()) {
return false;
}
DCHECK_EQ(base::Value::Type::STRING, value->type());
std::string actual_response;
if (value->GetAsString(&actual_response))
DCHECK_EQ(expected_response, actual_response);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void MismatchHook(const vpx_image_t *img1,
const vpx_image_t *img2) {
double mismatch_psnr = compute_psnr(img1, img2);
mismatch_psnr_ += mismatch_psnr;
++mismatch_nframes_;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ipip6_tunnel_del_prl(struct ip_tunnel *t, struct ip_tunnel_prl *a)
{
struct ip_tunnel_prl_entry *x;
struct ip_tunnel_prl_entry __rcu **p;
int err = 0;
ASSERT_RTNL();
if (a && a->addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY)) {
for (p = &t->prl;
(x = rtnl_dereference(*p)) != NULL;
p = &x->next) {
if (x->addr == a->addr) {
*p = x->next;
kfree_rcu(x, rcu_head);
t->prl_count--;
goto out;
}
}
err = -ENXIO;
} else {
x = rtnl_dereference(t->prl);
if (x) {
t->prl_count = 0;
call_rcu(&x->rcu_head, prl_list_destroy_rcu);
t->prl = NULL;
}
}
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: sit: fix memory leak in sit_init_net()
If register_netdev() is failed to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev,
it will go to err_reg_dev and forget to free netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev).
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888378daad00 (size 512):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 4006, jiffies 4295121142 (age 16.115s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 e6 ed c0 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:577 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:585 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] netif_alloc_netdev_queues net/core/dev.c:8380 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x600/0xcc0 net/core/dev.c:8970
[<00000000867e172f>] sit_init_net+0x295/0xa40 net/ipv6/sit.c:1848
[<00000000871019fa>] ops_init+0xad/0x3e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:129
[<00000000319507f6>] setup_net+0x2ba/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:314
[<0000000087db4f96>] copy_net_ns+0x1dc/0x330 net/core/net_namespace.c:437
[<0000000057efc651>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0x730 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
[<00000000676f83de>] copy_namespaces+0x2ed/0x3d0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
[<0000000030b74bac>] copy_process.part.27+0x231e/0x6db0 kernel/fork.c:1919
[<00000000fff78746>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1713 [inline]
[<00000000fff78746>] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xe90 kernel/fork.c:2224
[<000000001c2e0d1c>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000ec48bd44>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<0000000039acff8a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 17,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static opj_pi_iterator_t * opj_pi_create(const opj_image_t *image,
const opj_cp_t *cp,
OPJ_UINT32 tileno)
{
/* loop*/
OPJ_UINT32 pino, compno;
/* number of poc in the p_pi*/
OPJ_UINT32 l_poc_bound;
/* pointers to tile coding parameters and components.*/
opj_pi_iterator_t *l_pi = 00;
opj_tcp_t *tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t *tccp = 00;
/* current packet iterator being allocated*/
opj_pi_iterator_t *l_current_pi = 00;
/* preconditions in debug*/
assert(cp != 00);
assert(image != 00);
assert(tileno < cp->tw * cp->th);
/* initializations*/
tcp = &cp->tcps[tileno];
l_poc_bound = tcp->numpocs + 1;
/* memory allocations*/
l_pi = (opj_pi_iterator_t*) opj_calloc((l_poc_bound),
sizeof(opj_pi_iterator_t));
if (!l_pi) {
return NULL;
}
l_current_pi = l_pi;
for (pino = 0; pino < l_poc_bound ; ++pino) {
l_current_pi->comps = (opj_pi_comp_t*) opj_calloc(image->numcomps,
sizeof(opj_pi_comp_t));
if (! l_current_pi->comps) {
opj_pi_destroy(l_pi, l_poc_bound);
return NULL;
}
l_current_pi->numcomps = image->numcomps;
for (compno = 0; compno < image->numcomps; ++compno) {
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = &l_current_pi->comps[compno];
tccp = &tcp->tccps[compno];
comp->resolutions = (opj_pi_resolution_t*) opj_calloc(tccp->numresolutions,
sizeof(opj_pi_resolution_t));
if (!comp->resolutions) {
opj_pi_destroy(l_pi, l_poc_bound);
return 00;
}
comp->numresolutions = tccp->numresolutions;
}
++l_current_pi;
}
return l_pi;
}
Commit Message: Avoid division by zero in opj_pi_next_rpcl, opj_pi_next_pcrl and opj_pi_next_cprl (#938)
Fixes issues with id:000026,sig:08,src:002419,op:int32,pos:60,val:+32 and
id:000019,sig:08,src:001098,op:flip1,pos:49
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 28,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: spl_SplObjectStorageElement *spl_object_storage_attach(spl_SplObjectStorage *intern, zval *this, zval *obj, zval *inf) /* {{{ */
{
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *pelement, element;
zend_string *hash = spl_object_storage_get_hash(intern, this, obj);
if (!hash) {
return NULL;
}
pelement = spl_object_storage_get(intern, hash);
if (pelement) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pelement->inf);
if (inf) {
ZVAL_COPY(&pelement->inf, inf);
} else {
ZVAL_NULL(&pelement->inf);
}
spl_object_storage_free_hash(intern, hash);
return pelement;
}
ZVAL_COPY(&element.obj, obj);
if (inf) {
ZVAL_COPY(&element.inf, inf);
} else {
ZVAL_NULL(&element.inf);
}
pelement = zend_hash_update_mem(&intern->storage, hash, &element, sizeof(spl_SplObjectStorageElement));
spl_object_storage_free_hash(intern, hash);
return pelement;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct vm_area_struct *find_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
{
struct rb_node *rb_node;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
/* Check the cache first. */
vma = vmacache_find(mm, addr);
if (likely(vma))
return vma;
rb_node = mm->mm_rb.rb_node;
while (rb_node) {
struct vm_area_struct *tmp;
tmp = rb_entry(rb_node, struct vm_area_struct, vm_rb);
if (tmp->vm_end > addr) {
vma = tmp;
if (tmp->vm_start <= addr)
break;
rb_node = rb_node->rb_left;
} else
rb_node = rb_node->rb_right;
}
if (vma)
vmacache_update(addr, vma);
return vma;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 14,714
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int codeEqualityTerm(
Parse *pParse, /* The parsing context */
WhereTerm *pTerm, /* The term of the WHERE clause to be coded */
WhereLevel *pLevel, /* The level of the FROM clause we are working on */
int iEq, /* Index of the equality term within this level */
int bRev, /* True for reverse-order IN operations */
int iTarget /* Attempt to leave results in this register */
){
Expr *pX = pTerm->pExpr;
Vdbe *v = pParse->pVdbe;
int iReg; /* Register holding results */
assert( pLevel->pWLoop->aLTerm[iEq]==pTerm );
assert( iTarget>0 );
if( pX->op==TK_EQ || pX->op==TK_IS ){
iReg = sqlite3ExprCodeTarget(pParse, pX->pRight, iTarget);
}else if( pX->op==TK_ISNULL ){
iReg = iTarget;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Null, 0, iReg);
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_SUBQUERY
}else{
int eType = IN_INDEX_NOOP;
int iTab;
struct InLoop *pIn;
WhereLoop *pLoop = pLevel->pWLoop;
int i;
int nEq = 0;
int *aiMap = 0;
if( (pLoop->wsFlags & WHERE_VIRTUALTABLE)==0
&& pLoop->u.btree.pIndex!=0
&& pLoop->u.btree.pIndex->aSortOrder[iEq]
){
testcase( iEq==0 );
testcase( bRev );
bRev = !bRev;
}
assert( pX->op==TK_IN );
iReg = iTarget;
for(i=0; i<iEq; i++){
if( pLoop->aLTerm[i] && pLoop->aLTerm[i]->pExpr==pX ){
disableTerm(pLevel, pTerm);
return iTarget;
}
}
for(i=iEq;i<pLoop->nLTerm; i++){
if( ALWAYS(pLoop->aLTerm[i]) && pLoop->aLTerm[i]->pExpr==pX ) nEq++;
}
if( (pX->flags & EP_xIsSelect)==0 || pX->x.pSelect->pEList->nExpr==1 ){
eType = sqlite3FindInIndex(pParse, pX, IN_INDEX_LOOP, 0, 0);
}else{
Select *pSelect = pX->x.pSelect;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
u16 savedDbOptFlags = db->dbOptFlags;
ExprList *pOrigRhs = pSelect->pEList;
ExprList *pOrigLhs = pX->pLeft->x.pList;
ExprList *pRhs = 0; /* New Select.pEList for RHS */
ExprList *pLhs = 0; /* New pX->pLeft vector */
for(i=iEq;i<pLoop->nLTerm; i++){
if( pLoop->aLTerm[i]->pExpr==pX ){
int iField = pLoop->aLTerm[i]->iField - 1;
Expr *pNewRhs = sqlite3ExprDup(db, pOrigRhs->a[iField].pExpr, 0);
Expr *pNewLhs = sqlite3ExprDup(db, pOrigLhs->a[iField].pExpr, 0);
pRhs = sqlite3ExprListAppend(pParse, pRhs, pNewRhs);
pLhs = sqlite3ExprListAppend(pParse, pLhs, pNewLhs);
}
}
if( !db->mallocFailed ){
Expr *pLeft = pX->pLeft;
if( pSelect->pOrderBy ){
/* If the SELECT statement has an ORDER BY clause, zero the
** iOrderByCol variables. These are set to non-zero when an
** ORDER BY term exactly matches one of the terms of the
** result-set. Since the result-set of the SELECT statement may
** have been modified or reordered, these variables are no longer
** set correctly. Since setting them is just an optimization,
** it's easiest just to zero them here. */
ExprList *pOrderBy = pSelect->pOrderBy;
for(i=0; i<pOrderBy->nExpr; i++){
pOrderBy->a[i].u.x.iOrderByCol = 0;
}
}
/* Take care here not to generate a TK_VECTOR containing only a
** single value. Since the parser never creates such a vector, some
** of the subroutines do not handle this case. */
if( pLhs->nExpr==1 ){
pX->pLeft = pLhs->a[0].pExpr;
}else{
pLeft->x.pList = pLhs;
aiMap = (int*)sqlite3DbMallocZero(pParse->db, sizeof(int) * nEq);
testcase( aiMap==0 );
}
pSelect->pEList = pRhs;
db->dbOptFlags |= SQLITE_QueryFlattener;
eType = sqlite3FindInIndex(pParse, pX, IN_INDEX_LOOP, 0, aiMap);
db->dbOptFlags = savedDbOptFlags;
testcase( aiMap!=0 && aiMap[0]!=0 );
pSelect->pEList = pOrigRhs;
pLeft->x.pList = pOrigLhs;
pX->pLeft = pLeft;
}
sqlite3ExprListDelete(pParse->db, pLhs);
sqlite3ExprListDelete(pParse->db, pRhs);
}
if( eType==IN_INDEX_INDEX_DESC ){
testcase( bRev );
bRev = !bRev;
}
iTab = pX->iTable;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, bRev ? OP_Last : OP_Rewind, iTab, 0);
VdbeCoverageIf(v, bRev);
VdbeCoverageIf(v, !bRev);
assert( (pLoop->wsFlags & WHERE_MULTI_OR)==0 );
pLoop->wsFlags |= WHERE_IN_ABLE;
if( pLevel->u.in.nIn==0 ){
pLevel->addrNxt = sqlite3VdbeMakeLabel(v);
}
i = pLevel->u.in.nIn;
pLevel->u.in.nIn += nEq;
pLevel->u.in.aInLoop =
sqlite3DbReallocOrFree(pParse->db, pLevel->u.in.aInLoop,
sizeof(pLevel->u.in.aInLoop[0])*pLevel->u.in.nIn);
pIn = pLevel->u.in.aInLoop;
if( pIn ){
int iMap = 0; /* Index in aiMap[] */
pIn += i;
for(i=iEq;i<pLoop->nLTerm; i++){
if( pLoop->aLTerm[i]->pExpr==pX ){
int iOut = iReg + i - iEq;
if( eType==IN_INDEX_ROWID ){
testcase( nEq>1 ); /* Happens with a UNIQUE index on ROWID */
pIn->addrInTop = sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Rowid, iTab, iOut);
}else{
int iCol = aiMap ? aiMap[iMap++] : 0;
pIn->addrInTop = sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v,OP_Column,iTab, iCol, iOut);
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_IsNull, iOut); VdbeCoverage(v);
if( i==iEq ){
pIn->iCur = iTab;
pIn->eEndLoopOp = bRev ? OP_PrevIfOpen : OP_NextIfOpen;
}else{
pIn->eEndLoopOp = OP_Noop;
}
pIn++;
}
}
}else{
pLevel->u.in.nIn = 0;
}
sqlite3DbFree(pParse->db, aiMap);
#endif
}
disableTerm(pLevel, pTerm);
return iReg;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,012
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sc_asn1_sig_value_rs_to_sequence(struct sc_context *ctx, unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
unsigned char **buf, size_t *buflen)
{
struct sc_asn1_entry asn1_sig_value[C_ASN1_SIG_VALUE_SIZE];
struct sc_asn1_entry asn1_sig_value_coefficients[C_ASN1_SIG_VALUE_COEFFICIENTS_SIZE];
unsigned char *r = in, *s = in + inlen/2;
size_t r_len = inlen/2, s_len = inlen/2;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
/* R/S are filled up with zeroes, we do not want that in sequence format */
while(r_len > 1 && *r == 0x00) {
r++;
r_len--;
}
while(s_len > 1 && *s == 0x00) {
s++;
s_len--;
}
sc_copy_asn1_entry(c_asn1_sig_value, asn1_sig_value);
sc_format_asn1_entry(asn1_sig_value + 0, asn1_sig_value_coefficients, NULL, 1);
sc_copy_asn1_entry(c_asn1_sig_value_coefficients, asn1_sig_value_coefficients);
sc_format_asn1_entry(asn1_sig_value_coefficients + 0, r, &r_len, 1);
sc_format_asn1_entry(asn1_sig_value_coefficients + 1, s, &s_len, 1);
rv = sc_asn1_encode(ctx, asn1_sig_value, buf, buflen);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "ASN.1 encoding ECDSA-SIg-Value failed");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 19,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: store_message(png_store *ps, png_const_structp pp, char *buffer, size_t bufsize,
size_t pos, PNG_CONST char *msg)
{
if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pread)
{
/* Reading a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "read: ");
if (ps->current != NULL)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->current->name);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
}
else if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pwrite)
{
/* Writing a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "write: ");
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->wname);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
else
{
/* Neither reading nor writing (or a memory error in struct delete) */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "pngvalid: ");
}
if (ps->test[0] != 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->test);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, msg);
return pos;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 27,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsShowingAccountChooser() {
return PasswordsModelDelegateFromWebContents(WebContents())->GetState() ==
password_manager::ui::CREDENTIAL_REQUEST_STATE;
}
Commit Message: Fix Credential Management API Store() for existing Credentials
This changes fixes the Credential Management API to correctly handle
storing of already existing credentials. In the previous version
`preferred_match()` was updated, which is not necessarily the credential
selected by the user.
Bug: 795878
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I269f465861f44cdd784f0ce077e755191d3bd7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/843022
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Kolosovskiy <kolos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526313}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,876
|
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