instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncBackendHost::AddExperimentalTypes() {
CHECK(initialized());
Experiments experiments;
if (core_->sync_manager()->ReceivedExperiment(&experiments))
frontend_->OnExperimentsChanged(experiments);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 16,675
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QuotaManager::GetGlobalUsage(StorageType type,
const GlobalUsageCallback& callback) {
LazyInitialize();
GetUsageTracker(type)->GetGlobalUsage(callback);
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 15,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType RandomThresholdImage(Image *image,
const char *thresholds,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
status=RandomThresholdImageChannel(image,DefaultChannels,thresholds,
exception);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1609
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 23,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_date(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int localtime)
{
char *format;
int format_len;
long ts;
char *string;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|l", &format, &format_len, &ts) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() == 1) {
ts = time(NULL);
}
string = php_format_date(format, format_len, ts, localtime TSRMLS_CC);
RETVAL_STRING(string, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool omx_vdec::release_output_done(void)
{
bool bRet = false;
unsigned i=0,j=0;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Value of m_out_mem_ptr %p",m_inp_mem_ptr);
if (m_out_mem_ptr) {
for (; j < drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount ; j++) {
if (BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_out_bm_count,j)) {
break;
}
}
if (j == drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount) {
m_out_bm_count = 0;
bRet = true;
}
} else {
m_out_bm_count = 0;
bRet = true;
}
return bRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Do not allow changing theactual buffer count while still
holding allocation (Client can technically negotiate
buffer count on a free/disabled port)
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Security Vulnerability - Heap Overflow and Possible Local
Privilege Escalation in MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #3)
Bug: 27532282 27661749
Change-Id: I06dd680d43feaef3efdc87311e8a6703e234b523
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 12,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _WM_do_sysex_roland_drum_track(struct _mdi *mdi, struct _event_data *data) {
uint8_t ch = data->channel;
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__,ch, data->data.value);
if (data->data.value > 0) {
mdi->channel[ch].isdrum = 1;
mdi->channel[ch].patch = NULL;
} else {
mdi->channel[ch].isdrum = 0;
mdi->channel[ch].patch = _WM_get_patch_data(mdi, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 4,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserRenderProcessHost::CreateMessageFilters() {
scoped_refptr<RenderMessageFilter> render_message_filter(
new RenderMessageFilter(
id(),
PluginService::GetInstance(),
profile(),
profile()->GetRequestContextForRenderProcess(id()),
widget_helper_));
channel_->AddFilter(render_message_filter);
ResourceMessageFilter* resource_message_filter = new ResourceMessageFilter(
id(), ChildProcessInfo::RENDER_PROCESS,
&profile()->GetResourceContext(),
new RendererURLRequestContextSelector(profile(), id()),
content::GetContentClient()->browser()->GetResourceDispatcherHost());
channel_->AddFilter(resource_message_filter);
channel_->AddFilter(new AudioInputRendererHost());
channel_->AddFilter(new AudioRendererHost(&profile()->GetResourceContext()));
channel_->AddFilter(new VideoCaptureHost());
channel_->AddFilter(
new AppCacheDispatcherHost(&profile()->GetResourceContext(), id()));
channel_->AddFilter(new ClipboardMessageFilter());
channel_->AddFilter(
new DOMStorageMessageFilter(id(), profile()->GetWebKitContext()));
channel_->AddFilter(
new IndexedDBDispatcherHost(id(), profile()->GetWebKitContext()));
channel_->AddFilter(
GeolocationDispatcherHost::New(
id(), profile()->GetGeolocationPermissionContext()));
channel_->AddFilter(new GpuMessageFilter(id(), widget_helper_.get()));
channel_->AddFilter(new media_stream::MediaStreamDispatcherHost(id()));
channel_->AddFilter(new PepperFileMessageFilter(id(), profile()));
channel_->AddFilter(
new PepperMessageFilter(&profile()->GetResourceContext()));
channel_->AddFilter(new speech_input::SpeechInputDispatcherHost(id()));
channel_->AddFilter(
new FileSystemDispatcherHost(&profile()->GetResourceContext()));
channel_->AddFilter(new device_orientation::MessageFilter());
channel_->AddFilter(
new BlobMessageFilter(id(), profile()->GetBlobStorageContext()));
channel_->AddFilter(new FileUtilitiesMessageFilter(id()));
channel_->AddFilter(new MimeRegistryMessageFilter());
channel_->AddFilter(new DatabaseMessageFilter(
profile()->GetDatabaseTracker()));
SocketStreamDispatcherHost* socket_stream_dispatcher_host =
new SocketStreamDispatcherHost(
new RendererURLRequestContextSelector(profile(), id()),
&profile()->GetResourceContext());
channel_->AddFilter(socket_stream_dispatcher_host);
channel_->AddFilter(
new WorkerMessageFilter(
id(),
&profile()->GetResourceContext(),
content::GetContentClient()->browser()->GetResourceDispatcherHost(),
NewCallbackWithReturnValue(
widget_helper_.get(), &RenderWidgetHelper::GetNextRoutingID)));
#if defined(ENABLE_P2P_APIS)
channel_->AddFilter(new P2PSocketDispatcherHost());
#endif
channel_->AddFilter(new TraceMessageFilter());
channel_->AddFilter(new ResolveProxyMsgHelper(NULL));
channel_->AddFilter(new QuotaDispatcherHost(
id(), profile()->GetQuotaManager(),
content::GetContentClient()->browser()->CreateQuotaPermissionContext()));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int btreeRead(struct READER *reader, struct BTREE *btree) {
char buf[4];
/* read signature */
if (fread(buf, 1, 4, reader->fhd) != 4 || strncmp(buf, "BTHD", 4)) {
log("cannot read signature of BTHD\n");
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
} log("%08lX %.4s\n", (uint64_t )ftell(reader->fhd) - 4, buf);
if (fgetc(reader->fhd) != 0) {
log("object BTHD must have version 0\n");
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
btree->type = (uint8_t)fgetc(reader->fhd);
btree->node_size = (uint32_t)readValue(reader, 4);
btree->record_size = (uint16_t)readValue(reader, 2);
btree->depth = (uint16_t)readValue(reader, 2);
btree->split_percent = (uint8_t)fgetc(reader->fhd);
btree->merge_percent = (uint8_t)fgetc(reader->fhd);
btree->root_node_address = (uint64_t)readValue(reader,
reader->superblock.size_of_offsets);
btree->number_of_records = (uint16_t)readValue(reader, 2);
if(btree->number_of_records>0x1000)
return MYSOFA_UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT;
btree->total_number = (uint64_t)readValue(reader, reader->superblock.size_of_lengths);
/* fseek(reader->fhd, 4, SEEK_CUR); skip checksum */
if(btree->total_number > 0x10000000)
return MYSOFA_NO_MEMORY;
btree->records = malloc(sizeof(btree->records[0]) * btree->total_number);
if (!btree->records)
return MYSOFA_NO_MEMORY;
memset(btree->records, 0, sizeof(btree->records[0]) * btree->total_number);
/* read records */
if(fseek(reader->fhd, btree->root_node_address, SEEK_SET)<0)
return errno;
return readBTLF(reader, btree, btree->number_of_records, btree->records);
}
Commit Message: Fixed security issue 1
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void v_block_filter(ERContext *s, uint8_t *dst, int w, int h,
ptrdiff_t stride, int is_luma)
{
int b_x, b_y;
ptrdiff_t mvx_stride, mvy_stride;
const uint8_t *cm = ff_crop_tab + MAX_NEG_CROP;
set_mv_strides(s, &mvx_stride, &mvy_stride);
mvx_stride >>= is_luma;
mvy_stride *= mvx_stride;
for (b_y = 0; b_y < h - 1; b_y++) {
for (b_x = 0; b_x < w; b_x++) {
int x;
int top_status = s->error_status_table[(b_x >> is_luma) + (b_y >> is_luma) * s->mb_stride];
int bottom_status = s->error_status_table[(b_x >> is_luma) + ((b_y + 1) >> is_luma) * s->mb_stride];
int top_intra = IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[(b_x >> is_luma) + ( b_y >> is_luma) * s->mb_stride]);
int bottom_intra = IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[(b_x >> is_luma) + ((b_y + 1) >> is_luma) * s->mb_stride]);
int top_damage = top_status & ER_MB_ERROR;
int bottom_damage = bottom_status & ER_MB_ERROR;
int offset = b_x * 8 + b_y * stride * 8;
int16_t *top_mv = s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mvy_stride * b_y + mvx_stride * b_x];
int16_t *bottom_mv = s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mvy_stride * (b_y + 1) + mvx_stride * b_x];
if (!(top_damage || bottom_damage))
continue; // both undamaged
if ((!top_intra) && (!bottom_intra) &&
FFABS(top_mv[0] - bottom_mv[0]) +
FFABS(top_mv[1] + bottom_mv[1]) < 2)
continue;
for (x = 0; x < 8; x++) {
int a, b, c, d;
a = dst[offset + x + 7 * stride] - dst[offset + x + 6 * stride];
b = dst[offset + x + 8 * stride] - dst[offset + x + 7 * stride];
c = dst[offset + x + 9 * stride] - dst[offset + x + 8 * stride];
d = FFABS(b) - ((FFABS(a) + FFABS(c) + 1) >> 1);
d = FFMAX(d, 0);
if (b < 0)
d = -d;
if (d == 0)
continue;
if (!(top_damage && bottom_damage))
d = d * 16 / 9;
if (top_damage) {
dst[offset + x + 7 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 7 * stride] + ((d * 7) >> 4)];
dst[offset + x + 6 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 6 * stride] + ((d * 5) >> 4)];
dst[offset + x + 5 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 5 * stride] + ((d * 3) >> 4)];
dst[offset + x + 4 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 4 * stride] + ((d * 1) >> 4)];
}
if (bottom_damage) {
dst[offset + x + 8 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 8 * stride] - ((d * 7) >> 4)];
dst[offset + x + 9 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 9 * stride] - ((d * 5) >> 4)];
dst[offset + x + 10 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 10 * stride] - ((d * 3) >> 4)];
dst[offset + x + 11 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 11 * stride] - ((d * 1) >> 4)];
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 11,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
{
int ret;
ret = wait_on_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT,
intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (ret)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
smp_rmb();
return key->reject_error;
}
return key_validate(key);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 18,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: log2vis_utf8 (PyObject * string, int unicode_length,
FriBidiParType base_direction, int clean, int reordernsm)
{
FriBidiChar *logical = NULL; /* input fribidi unicode buffer */
FriBidiChar *visual = NULL; /* output fribidi unicode buffer */
char *visual_utf8 = NULL; /* output fribidi UTF-8 buffer */
FriBidiStrIndex new_len = 0; /* length of the UTF-8 buffer */
PyObject *result = NULL; /* failure */
/* Allocate fribidi unicode buffers */
logical = PyMem_New (FriBidiChar, unicode_length + 1);
if (logical == NULL)
{
PyErr_SetString (PyExc_MemoryError,
"failed to allocate unicode buffer");
goto cleanup;
}
visual = PyMem_New (FriBidiChar, unicode_length + 1);
if (visual == NULL)
{
PyErr_SetString (PyExc_MemoryError,
"failed to allocate unicode buffer");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Convert to unicode and order visually */
fribidi_set_reorder_nsm(reordernsm);
fribidi_utf8_to_unicode (PyString_AS_STRING (string),
PyString_GET_SIZE (string), logical);
if (!fribidi_log2vis (logical, unicode_length, &base_direction, visual,
NULL, NULL, NULL))
{
PyErr_SetString (PyExc_RuntimeError,
"fribidi failed to order string");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Cleanup the string if requested */
if (clean)
fribidi_remove_bidi_marks (visual, unicode_length, NULL, NULL, NULL);
/* Allocate fribidi UTF-8 buffer */
visual_utf8 = PyMem_New(char, (unicode_length * 4)+1);
if (visual_utf8 == NULL)
{
PyErr_SetString (PyExc_MemoryError,
"failed to allocate UTF-8 buffer");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Encode the reordered string and create result string */
new_len = fribidi_unicode_to_utf8 (visual, unicode_length, visual_utf8);
result = PyString_FromStringAndSize (visual_utf8, new_len);
if (result == NULL)
/* XXX does it raise any error? */
goto cleanup;
cleanup:
/* Delete unicode buffers */
PyMem_Del (logical);
PyMem_Del (visual);
PyMem_Del (visual_utf8);
return result;
}
Commit Message: refactor pyfribidi.c module
pyfribidi.c is now compiled as _pyfribidi. This module only handles
unicode internally and doesn't use the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode
function (which can't handle 4 byte utf-8 sequences). This fixes the
buffer overflow in issue #2.
The code is now also much simpler: pyfribidi.c is down from 280 to 130
lines of code.
We now ship a pure python pyfribidi that handles the case when
non-unicode strings are passed in.
We now also adapt the size of the output string if clean=True is
passed.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 14,659
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteBMPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
BMPInfo
bmp_info;
const char
*value;
const StringInfo
*profile;
MagickBooleanType
have_color_info,
status;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
type;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*bmp_data,
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
type=4;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"BMP2") == 0)
type=2;
else
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"BMP3") == 0)
type=3;
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"bmp:format");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format=%s",value);
if (LocaleCompare(value,"bmp2") == 0)
type=2;
if (LocaleCompare(value,"bmp3") == 0)
type=3;
if (LocaleCompare(value,"bmp4") == 0)
type=4;
}
scene=0;
do
{
/*
Initialize BMP raster file header.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&bmp_info,0,sizeof(bmp_info));
bmp_info.file_size=14+12;
if (type > 2)
bmp_info.file_size+=28;
bmp_info.offset_bits=bmp_info.file_size;
bmp_info.compression=BI_RGB;
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) && (image->colors > 256))
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
{
/*
Colormapped BMP raster.
*/
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
if (image->colors <= 2)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=1;
else
if (image->colors <= 16)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=4;
else
if (image->colors <= 256)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
if (image_info->compression == RLECompression)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
bmp_info.number_colors=1U << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
else
if ((size_t) bmp_info.number_colors < image->colors)
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
else
{
bmp_info.file_size+=3*(1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
bmp_info.offset_bits+=3*(1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
if (type > 2)
{
bmp_info.file_size+=(1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
bmp_info.offset_bits+=(1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
{
/*
Full color BMP raster.
*/
bmp_info.number_colors=0;
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=(unsigned short)
((type > 3) && (image->matte != MagickFalse) ? 32 : 24);
bmp_info.compression=(unsigned int) ((type > 3) &&
(image->matte != MagickFalse) ? BI_BITFIELDS : BI_RGB);
}
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*bmp_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
have_color_info=(image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent) ||
(profile != (StringInfo *) NULL) || (image->gamma != 0.0) ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse;
if (type == 2)
bmp_info.size=12;
else
if ((type == 3) || ((image->matte == MagickFalse) &&
(have_color_info == MagickFalse)))
{
type=3;
bmp_info.size=40;
}
else
{
int
extra_size;
bmp_info.size=108;
extra_size=68;
if ((image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent) ||
(profile != (StringInfo *) NULL))
{
bmp_info.size=124;
extra_size+=16;
}
bmp_info.file_size+=extra_size;
bmp_info.offset_bits+=extra_size;
}
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) image->columns;
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) image->rows;
bmp_info.planes=1;
bmp_info.image_size=(unsigned int) (bytes_per_line*image->rows);
bmp_info.file_size+=bmp_info.image_size;
bmp_info.x_pixels=75*39;
bmp_info.y_pixels=75*39;
switch (image->units)
{
case UndefinedResolution:
case PixelsPerInchResolution:
{
bmp_info.x_pixels=(unsigned int) (100.0*image->x_resolution/2.54);
bmp_info.y_pixels=(unsigned int) (100.0*image->y_resolution/2.54);
break;
}
case PixelsPerCentimeterResolution:
{
bmp_info.x_pixels=(unsigned int) (100.0*image->x_resolution);
bmp_info.y_pixels=(unsigned int) (100.0*image->y_resolution);
break;
}
}
bmp_info.colors_important=bmp_info.number_colors;
/*
Convert MIFF to BMP raster pixels.
*/
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) bmp_info.image_size,
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(pixels,0,(size_t) bmp_info.image_size);
switch (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
size_t
bit,
byte;
/*
Convert PseudoClass image to a BMP monochrome image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=1;
byte|=GetPixelIndex(indexes+x) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) byte;
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
}
if (bit != 0)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (byte << (8-bit));
x++;
}
for (x=(ssize_t) (image->columns+7)/8; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_line; x++)
*q++=0x00;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
size_t
nibble,
byte;
/*
Convert PseudoClass image to a BMP monochrome image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
nibble=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=4;
byte|=((size_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x) & 0x0f);
nibble++;
if (nibble == 2)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) byte;
nibble=0;
byte=0;
}
}
if (nibble != 0)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (byte << 4);
x++;
}
for (x=(ssize_t) (image->columns+1)/2; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_line; x++)
*q++=0x00;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoClass packet to BMP pixel.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
for ( ; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_line; x++)
*q++=0x00;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
{
/*
Convert DirectClass packet to BMP BGR888.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
p++;
}
for (x=3L*(ssize_t) image->columns; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_line; x++)
*q++=0x00;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
/*
Convert DirectClass packet to ARGB8888 pixel.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelAlpha(p));
p++;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
}
if ((type > 2) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 8))
if (image_info->compression != NoCompression)
{
MemoryInfo
*rle_info;
/*
Convert run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
rle_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) (2*(bytes_per_line+2)+2),
(image->rows+2)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (rle_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
bmp_data=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(rle_info);
bmp_info.file_size-=bmp_info.image_size;
bmp_info.image_size=(unsigned int) EncodeImage(image,bytes_per_line,
pixels,bmp_data);
bmp_info.file_size+=bmp_info.image_size;
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
pixel_info=rle_info;
pixels=bmp_data;
bmp_info.compression=BI_RLE8;
}
/*
Write BMP for Windows, all versions, 14-byte header.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing BMP version %.20g datastream",(double) type);
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Storage class=DirectClass");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Storage class=PseudoClass");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image depth=%.20g",(double) image->depth);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Matte=True");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Matte=MagickFalse");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" BMP bits_per_pixel=%.20g",(double) bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
switch ((int) bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression=BI_RGB");
break;
}
case BI_RLE8:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression=BI_RLE8");
break;
}
case BI_BITFIELDS:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression=BI_BITFIELDS");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression=UNKNOWN (%u)",bmp_info.compression);
break;
}
}
if (bmp_info.number_colors == 0)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Number_colors=unspecified");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Number_colors=%u",bmp_info.number_colors);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) "BM");
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.file_size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.ba_offset); /* always 0 */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.offset_bits);
if (type == 2)
{
/*
Write 12-byte version 2 bitmap header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bmp_info.width);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bmp_info.height);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,bmp_info.planes);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
}
else
{
/*
Write 40-byte version 3+ bitmap header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) bmp_info.width);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) bmp_info.height);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,bmp_info.planes);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.compression);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.image_size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.x_pixels);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.y_pixels);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.number_colors);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.colors_important);
}
if ((type > 3) && ((image->matte != MagickFalse) ||
(have_color_info != MagickFalse)))
{
/*
Write the rest of the 108-byte BMP Version 4 header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00ff0000U); /* Red mask */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x0000ff00U); /* Green mask */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x000000ffU); /* Blue mask */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0xff000000U); /* Alpha mask */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x73524742U); /* sRGB */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.red_primary.y*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
((1.000f-(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x+
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y))*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.green_primary.x*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.green_primary.y*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
((1.000f-(image->chromaticity.green_primary.x+
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y))*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
((1.000f-(image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x+
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y))*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(bmp_info.gamma_scale.x*0x10000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(bmp_info.gamma_scale.y*0x10000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(bmp_info.gamma_scale.z*0x10000));
if ((image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent) ||
(profile != (StringInfo *) NULL))
{
ssize_t
intent;
switch ((int) image->rendering_intent)
{
case SaturationIntent:
{
intent=LCS_GM_BUSINESS;
break;
}
case RelativeIntent:
{
intent=LCS_GM_GRAPHICS;
break;
}
case PerceptualIntent:
{
intent=LCS_GM_IMAGES;
break;
}
case AbsoluteIntent:
{
intent=LCS_GM_ABS_COLORIMETRIC;
break;
}
default:
{
intent=0;
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) intent);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00); /* dummy profile data */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00); /* dummy profile length */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00); /* reserved */
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
unsigned char
*bmp_colormap;
/*
Dump colormap to file.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Colormap: %.20g entries",(double) image->colors);
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (1UL <<
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel),4*sizeof(*bmp_colormap));
if (bmp_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
q=bmp_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) image->colors,(ssize_t) bmp_info.number_colors); i++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red);
if (type > 2)
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x0;
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) (1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel); i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
if (type > 2)
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
}
if (type <= 2)
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (3*(1L << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)),
bmp_colormap);
else
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (4*(1L << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)),
bmp_colormap);
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Pixels: %u bytes",bmp_info.image_size);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) bmp_info.image_size,pixels);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" File_size: %u bytes",bmp_info.file_size);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static TRBCCode xhci_configure_slot(XHCIState *xhci, unsigned int slotid,
uint64_t pictx, bool dc)
{
dma_addr_t ictx, octx;
uint32_t ictl_ctx[2];
uint32_t slot_ctx[4];
uint32_t islot_ctx[4];
uint32_t ep_ctx[5];
int i;
TRBCCode res;
trace_usb_xhci_slot_configure(slotid);
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
ictx = xhci_mask64(pictx);
octx = xhci->slots[slotid-1].ctx;
DPRINTF("xhci: input context at "DMA_ADDR_FMT"\n", ictx);
DPRINTF("xhci: output context at "DMA_ADDR_FMT"\n", octx);
if (dc) {
for (i = 2; i <= 31; i++) {
if (xhci->slots[slotid-1].eps[i-1]) {
xhci_disable_ep(xhci, slotid, i);
}
}
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, octx, slot_ctx, sizeof(slot_ctx));
slot_ctx[3] &= ~(SLOT_STATE_MASK << SLOT_STATE_SHIFT);
slot_ctx[3] |= SLOT_ADDRESSED << SLOT_STATE_SHIFT;
DPRINTF("xhci: output slot context: %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
slot_ctx[0], slot_ctx[1], slot_ctx[2], slot_ctx[3]);
xhci_dma_write_u32s(xhci, octx, slot_ctx, sizeof(slot_ctx));
return CC_SUCCESS;
}
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, ictx, ictl_ctx, sizeof(ictl_ctx));
if ((ictl_ctx[0] & 0x3) != 0x0 || (ictl_ctx[1] & 0x3) != 0x1) {
DPRINTF("xhci: invalid input context control %08x %08x\n",
ictl_ctx[0], ictl_ctx[1]);
return CC_TRB_ERROR;
}
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, ictx+32, islot_ctx, sizeof(islot_ctx));
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, octx, slot_ctx, sizeof(slot_ctx));
if (SLOT_STATE(slot_ctx[3]) < SLOT_ADDRESSED) {
DPRINTF("xhci: invalid slot state %08x\n", slot_ctx[3]);
return CC_CONTEXT_STATE_ERROR;
}
xhci_free_device_streams(xhci, slotid, ictl_ctx[0] | ictl_ctx[1]);
for (i = 2; i <= 31; i++) {
if (ictl_ctx[0] & (1<<i)) {
xhci_disable_ep(xhci, slotid, i);
}
if (ictl_ctx[1] & (1<<i)) {
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, ictx+32+(32*i), ep_ctx, sizeof(ep_ctx));
DPRINTF("xhci: input ep%d.%d context: %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
i/2, i%2, ep_ctx[0], ep_ctx[1], ep_ctx[2],
ep_ctx[3], ep_ctx[4]);
xhci_disable_ep(xhci, slotid, i);
res = xhci_enable_ep(xhci, slotid, i, octx+(32*i), ep_ctx);
if (res != CC_SUCCESS) {
return res;
}
DPRINTF("xhci: output ep%d.%d context: %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
i/2, i%2, ep_ctx[0], ep_ctx[1], ep_ctx[2],
ep_ctx[3], ep_ctx[4]);
xhci_dma_write_u32s(xhci, octx+(32*i), ep_ctx, sizeof(ep_ctx));
}
}
res = xhci_alloc_device_streams(xhci, slotid, ictl_ctx[1]);
if (res != CC_SUCCESS) {
for (i = 2; i <= 31; i++) {
if (ictl_ctx[1] & (1 << i)) {
xhci_disable_ep(xhci, slotid, i);
}
}
return res;
}
slot_ctx[3] &= ~(SLOT_STATE_MASK << SLOT_STATE_SHIFT);
slot_ctx[3] |= SLOT_CONFIGURED << SLOT_STATE_SHIFT;
slot_ctx[0] &= ~(SLOT_CONTEXT_ENTRIES_MASK << SLOT_CONTEXT_ENTRIES_SHIFT);
slot_ctx[0] |= islot_ctx[0] & (SLOT_CONTEXT_ENTRIES_MASK <<
SLOT_CONTEXT_ENTRIES_SHIFT);
DPRINTF("xhci: output slot context: %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
slot_ctx[0], slot_ctx[1], slot_ctx[2], slot_ctx[3]);
xhci_dma_write_u32s(xhci, octx, slot_ctx, sizeof(slot_ctx));
return CC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int StreamTcpPacketStateSynRecv(ThreadVars *tv, Packet *p,
StreamTcpThread *stt, TcpSession *ssn, PacketQueue *pq)
{
if (ssn == NULL)
return -1;
if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_RST) {
if (!StreamTcpValidateRst(ssn, p))
return -1;
uint8_t reset = TRUE;
/* After receiveing the RST in SYN_RECV state and if detection
evasion flags has been set, then the following operating
systems will not closed the connection. As they consider the
packet as stray packet and not belonging to the current
session, for more information check
http://www.packetstan.com/2010/06/recently-ive-been-on-campaign-to-make.html */
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_DETECTION_EVASION_ATTEMPT) {
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
if ((ssn->server.os_policy == OS_POLICY_LINUX) ||
(ssn->server.os_policy == OS_POLICY_OLD_LINUX) ||
(ssn->server.os_policy == OS_POLICY_SOLARIS))
{
reset = FALSE;
SCLogDebug("Detection evasion has been attempted, so"
" not resetting the connection !!");
}
} else {
if ((ssn->client.os_policy == OS_POLICY_LINUX) ||
(ssn->client.os_policy == OS_POLICY_OLD_LINUX) ||
(ssn->client.os_policy == OS_POLICY_SOLARIS))
{
reset = FALSE;
SCLogDebug("Detection evasion has been attempted, so"
" not resetting the connection !!");
}
}
}
if (reset == TRUE) {
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_CLOSED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: Reset received and state changed to "
"TCP_CLOSED", ssn);
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
}
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_FIN) {
/* FIN is handled in the same way as in TCP_ESTABLISHED case */;
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
if (!StreamTcpValidateTimestamp(ssn, p))
return -1;
}
if ((StreamTcpHandleFin(tv, stt, ssn, p, pq)) == -1)
return -1;
/* SYN/ACK */
} else if ((p->tcph->th_flags & (TH_SYN|TH_ACK)) == (TH_SYN|TH_ACK)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN/ACK packet on state SYN_RECV. resent", ssn);
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN/ACK-pkt to server in SYN_RECV state", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_SYNACK_TOSERVER_ON_SYN_RECV);
return -1;
}
/* Check if the SYN/ACK packets ACK matches the earlier
* received SYN/ACK packet. */
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->client.last_ack))) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: ACK mismatch, packet ACK %" PRIu32 " != "
"%" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn, TCP_GET_ACK(p),
ssn->client.isn + 1);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_SYNACK_RESEND_WITH_DIFFERENT_ACK);
return -1;
}
/* Check if the SYN/ACK packet SEQ the earlier
* received SYN/ACK packet, server resend with different ISN. */
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->server.isn))) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %" PRIu32 " != "
"%" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn, TCP_GET_SEQ(p),
ssn->client.isn);
if (StreamTcp3whsQueueSynAck(ssn, p) == -1)
return -1;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: queued different SYN/ACK", ssn);
}
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_SYN) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN packet on state SYN_RECV... resent", ssn);
if (PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN-pkt to client in SYN_RECV state", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_SYN_TOCLIENT_ON_SYN_RECV);
return -1;
}
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.isn))) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN with different SEQ on SYN_RECV state", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_SYN_RESEND_DIFF_SEQ_ON_SYN_RECV);
return -1;
}
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_ACK) {
if (ssn->queue_len) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: checking ACK against queued SYN/ACKs", ssn);
TcpStateQueue *q = StreamTcp3whsFindSynAckByAck(ssn, p);
if (q != NULL) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: here we update state against queued SYN/ACK", ssn);
StreamTcp3whsSynAckUpdate(ssn, p, /* using queue to update state */q);
} else {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: none found, now checking ACK against original SYN/ACK (state)", ssn);
}
}
/* If the timestamp option is enabled for both the streams, then
* validate the received packet timestamp value against the
* stream->last_ts. If the timestamp is valid then process the
* packet normally otherwise the drop the packet (RFC 1323)*/
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
if (!(StreamTcpValidateTimestamp(ssn, p))) {
return -1;
}
}
if ((ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS) && PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: ACK received on 4WHS session",ssn);
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->server.next_seq))) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS wrong seq nr on packet", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_4WHS_WRONG_SEQ);
return -1;
}
if (StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->client, p) == -1) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS invalid ack nr on packet", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_4WHS_INVALID_ACK);
return -1;
}
SCLogDebug("4WHS normal pkt");
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt (%" PRIu32 ") is to client: SEQ "
"%" PRIu32 ", ACK %" PRIu32 "", ssn, p->payload_len,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), TCP_GET_ACK(p));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->client, TCP_GET_ACK(p));
StreamTcpUpdateNextSeq(ssn, &ssn->server, (ssn->server.next_seq + p->payload_len));
ssn->client.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->client.wscale;
ssn->client.next_win = ssn->client.last_ack + ssn->client.window;
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ ssn state is now TCP_ESTABLISHED", ssn);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, p, pq);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: ssn->client.next_win %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->client.last_ack %"PRIu32"", ssn,
ssn->client.next_win, ssn->client.last_ack);
return 0;
}
bool ack_indicates_missed_3whs_ack_packet = false;
/* Check if the ACK received is in right direction. But when we have
* picked up a mid stream session after missing the initial SYN pkt,
* in this case the ACK packet can arrive from either client (normal
* case) or from server itself (asynchronous streams). Therefore
* the check has been avoided in this case */
if (PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p)) {
/* special case, handle 4WHS, so SYN/ACK in the opposite
* direction */
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_MIDSTREAM_SYNACK) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: ACK received on midstream SYN/ACK "
"pickup session",ssn);
/* fall through */
} else {
/* if we missed traffic between the S/SA and the current
* 'wrong direction' ACK, we could end up here. In IPS
* reject it. But in IDS mode we continue.
*
* IPS rejects as it should see all packets, so pktloss
* should lead to retransmissions. As this can also be
* pattern for MOTS/MITM injection attacks, we need to be
* careful.
*/
if (StreamTcpInlineMode()) {
if (p->payload_len > 0 &&
SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->client.last_ack) &&
SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->server.next_seq)) {
/* packet loss is possible but unlikely here */
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: possible data injection", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_ACK_DATA_INJECT);
return -1;
}
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: ACK received in the wrong direction",
ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_ACK_IN_WRONG_DIR);
return -1;
}
ack_indicates_missed_3whs_ack_packet = true;
}
}
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt (%" PRIu32 ") is to server: SEQ %" PRIu32 ""
", ACK %" PRIu32 "", ssn, p->payload_len, TCP_GET_SEQ(p),
TCP_GET_ACK(p));
/* Check both seq and ack number before accepting the packet and
changing to ESTABLISHED state */
if ((SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_seq)) &&
SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->server.next_seq)) {
SCLogDebug("normal pkt");
/* process the packet normal, No Async streams :) */
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->server, TCP_GET_ACK(p));
StreamTcpUpdateNextSeq(ssn, &ssn->client, (ssn->client.next_seq + p->payload_len));
ssn->server.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->server.wscale;
ssn->server.next_win = ssn->server.last_ack + ssn->server.window;
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_MIDSTREAM) {
ssn->client.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->client.wscale;
ssn->client.next_win = ssn->client.last_ack + ssn->client.window;
ssn->server.next_win = ssn->server.last_ack +
ssn->server.window;
if (!(ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_MIDSTREAM_SYNACK)) {
/* window scaling for midstream pickups, we can't do much
* other than assume that it's set to the max value: 14 */
ssn->server.wscale = TCP_WSCALE_MAX;
ssn->client.wscale = TCP_WSCALE_MAX;
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_SACKOK;
}
}
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ ssn state is now TCP_ESTABLISHED", ssn);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, p, pq);
/* If asynchronous stream handling is allowed then set the session,
if packet's seq number is equal the expected seq no.*/
} else if (stream_config.async_oneside == TRUE &&
(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->server.next_seq)))
{
/*set the ASYNC flag used to indicate the session as async stream
and helps in relaxing the windows checks.*/
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC;
ssn->server.next_seq += p->payload_len;
ssn->server.last_ack = TCP_GET_SEQ(p);
ssn->client.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->client.wscale;
ssn->client.last_ack = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_MIDSTREAM) {
ssn->server.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p);
ssn->client.next_win = ssn->server.last_ack +
ssn->server.window;
/* window scaling for midstream pickups, we can't do much
* other than assume that it's set to the max value: 14 */
ssn->server.wscale = TCP_WSCALE_MAX;
ssn->client.wscale = TCP_WSCALE_MAX;
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_SACKOK;
}
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: synrecv => Asynchronous stream, packet SEQ"
" %" PRIu32 ", payload size %" PRIu32 " (%" PRIu32 "), "
"ssn->server.next_seq %" PRIu32 "\n"
, ssn, TCP_GET_SEQ(p), p->payload_len, TCP_GET_SEQ(p)
+ p->payload_len, ssn->server.next_seq);
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ ssn state is now TCP_ESTABLISHED", ssn);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, p, pq);
/* Upon receiving the packet with correct seq number and wrong
ACK number, it causes the other end to send RST. But some target
system (Linux & solaris) does not RST the connection, so it is
likely to avoid the detection */
} else if (SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_seq)){
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_DETECTION_EVASION_ATTEMPT;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: wrong ack nr on packet, possible evasion!!",
ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_RIGHT_SEQ_WRONG_ACK_EVASION);
return -1;
/* if we get a packet with a proper ack, but a seq that is beyond
* next_seq but in-window, we probably missed some packets */
} else if (SEQ_GT(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_seq) &&
SEQ_LEQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p),ssn->client.next_win) &&
SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->server.next_seq))
{
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: ACK for missing data", ssn);
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->server, TCP_GET_ACK(p));
ssn->client.next_seq = TCP_GET_SEQ(p) + p->payload_len;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: ACK for missing data: ssn->client.next_seq %u", ssn, ssn->client.next_seq);
ssn->server.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->server.wscale;
ssn->server.next_win = ssn->server.last_ack + ssn->server.window;
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_MIDSTREAM) {
ssn->client.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p);
ssn->server.next_win = ssn->server.last_ack +
ssn->server.window;
/* window scaling for midstream pickups, we can't do much
* other than assume that it's set to the max value: 14 */
ssn->server.wscale = TCP_WSCALE_MAX;
ssn->client.wscale = TCP_WSCALE_MAX;
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_SACKOK;
}
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ ssn state is now TCP_ESTABLISHED", ssn);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, p, pq);
/* toclient packet: after having missed the 3whs's final ACK */
} else if (ack_indicates_missed_3whs_ack_packet &&
SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->client.last_ack) &&
SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->server.next_seq))
{
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: packet fits perfectly after a missed 3whs-ACK", ssn);
StreamTcpUpdateNextSeq(ssn, &ssn->server, (TCP_GET_SEQ(p) + p->payload_len));
ssn->server.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->server.wscale;
ssn->server.next_win = ssn->server.last_ack + ssn->server.window;
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ ssn state is now TCP_ESTABLISHED", ssn);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, p, pq);
} else {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: wrong seq nr on packet", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_WRONG_SEQ_WRONG_ACK);
return -1;
}
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: ssn->server.next_win %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->server.last_ack %"PRIu32"", ssn,
ssn->server.next_win, ssn->server.last_ack);
} else {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: default case", ssn);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void drm_mode_config_init(struct drm_device *dev)
{
mutex_init(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
mutex_init(&dev->mode_config.idr_mutex);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->mode_config.fb_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->mode_config.crtc_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->mode_config.connector_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->mode_config.encoder_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->mode_config.property_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->mode_config.property_blob_list);
idr_init(&dev->mode_config.crtc_idr);
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
drm_mode_create_standard_connector_properties(dev);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
/* Just to be sure */
dev->mode_config.num_fb = 0;
dev->mode_config.num_connector = 0;
dev->mode_config.num_crtc = 0;
dev->mode_config.num_encoder = 0;
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 25,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScreenSaverHandle(ScreenPtr pScreen, int xstate, Bool force)
{
int state = 0;
Bool ret = FALSE;
ScreenSaverScreenPrivatePtr pPriv;
switch (xstate) {
case SCREEN_SAVER_ON:
state = ScreenSaverOn;
ret = CreateSaverWindow(pScreen);
break;
case SCREEN_SAVER_OFF:
state = ScreenSaverOff;
ret = DestroySaverWindow(pScreen);
break;
case SCREEN_SAVER_CYCLE:
state = ScreenSaverCycle;
pPriv = GetScreenPrivate(pScreen);
if (pPriv && pPriv->hasWindow)
ret = TRUE;
}
#ifdef PANORAMIX
if (noPanoramiXExtension || !pScreen->myNum)
#endif
SendScreenSaverNotify(pScreen, state, force);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cac_read_file(sc_card_t *card, int file_type, u8 **out_buf, size_t *out_len)
{
u8 params[2];
u8 count[2];
u8 *out = NULL;
u8 *out_ptr;
size_t offset = 0;
size_t size = 0;
size_t left = 0;
size_t len;
int r;
params[0] = file_type;
params[1] = 2;
/* get the size */
len = sizeof(count);
out_ptr = count;
r = cac_apdu_io(card, CAC_INS_READ_FILE, 0, 0, ¶ms[0], sizeof(params), &out_ptr, &len);
if (len == 0) {
r = SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
left = size = lebytes2ushort(count);
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,
"got %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u bytes out_ptr=%p count&=%p count[0]=0x%02x count[1]=0x%02x, len=0x%04"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"x (%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u)",
len, out_ptr, &count, count[0], count[1], size, size);
out = out_ptr = malloc(size);
if (out == NULL) {
r = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto fail;
}
for (offset += 2; left > 0; offset += len, left -= len, out_ptr += len) {
len = MIN(left, CAC_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE);
params[1] = len;
r = cac_apdu_io(card, CAC_INS_READ_FILE, HIGH_BYTE_OF_SHORT(offset), LOW_BYTE_OF_SHORT(offset),
¶ms[0], sizeof(params), &out_ptr, &len);
/* if there is no data, assume there is no file */
if (len == 0) {
r = SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
if (r < 0) {
goto fail;
}
}
*out_len = size;
*out_buf = out;
return SC_SUCCESS;
fail:
if (out)
free(out);
*out_len = 0;
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 9,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nf_ct_frag6_expire(unsigned long data)
{
struct nf_ct_frag6_queue *fq;
fq = container_of((struct inet_frag_queue *)data,
struct nf_ct_frag6_queue, q);
spin_lock(&fq->q.lock);
if (fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_COMPLETE)
goto out;
fq_kill(fq);
out:
spin_unlock(&fq->q.lock);
fq_put(fq);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: properly handle packets fragmented into a single fragment
When an ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG message is received with a MTU below 1280,
all further packets include a fragment header.
Unlike regular defragmentation, conntrack also needs to "reassemble"
those fragments in order to obtain a packet without the fragment
header for connection tracking. Currently nf_conntrack_reasm checks
whether a fragment has either IP6_MF set or an offset != 0, which
makes it ignore those fragments.
Remove the invalid check and make reassembly handle fragment queues
containing only a single fragment.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ulrich Weber <uweber@astaro.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int readpng2_decode_data(mainprog_info *mainprog_ptr, uch *rawbuf, ulg length)
{
png_structp png_ptr = (png_structp)mainprog_ptr->png_ptr;
png_infop info_ptr = (png_infop)mainprog_ptr->info_ptr;
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a PNG-reading
* libpng function */
if (setjmp(mainprog_ptr->jmpbuf)) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
mainprog_ptr->png_ptr = NULL;
mainprog_ptr->info_ptr = NULL;
return 2;
}
/* hand off the next chunk of input data to libpng for decoding */
png_process_data(png_ptr, info_ptr, rawbuf, length);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::DidDeleteFileSystem(
int request_id,
base::PlatformFileError result) {
if (result == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK)
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidSucceed(request_id));
else
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidFail(request_id, result));
}
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XFixesSetGCClipRegion (Display *dpy, GC gc,
int clip_x_origin, int clip_y_origin,
XserverRegion region)
{
XFixesExtDisplayInfo *info = XFixesFindDisplay (dpy);
xXFixesSetGCClipRegionReq *req;
XFixesSimpleCheckExtension (dpy, info);
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq (XFixesSetGCClipRegion, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->xfixesReqType = X_XFixesSetGCClipRegion;
req->gc = gc->gid;
req->region = region;
req->xOrigin = clip_x_origin;
req->yOrigin = clip_y_origin;
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::vector<uint8_t> GetTestAttestedCredentialDataBytes() {
auto test_attested_data =
fido_parsing_utils::Materialize(kTestAttestedCredentialDataPrefix);
fido_parsing_utils::Append(&test_attested_data,
test_data::kTestECPublicKeyCOSE);
return test_attested_data;
}
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 25,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t SpdyProxyClientSocket::PopulateUserReadBuffer(char* data, size_t len) {
return read_buffer_queue_.Dequeue(data, len);
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 13,579
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum gro_result dev_gro_receive(struct napi_struct *napi, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sk_buff **pp = NULL;
struct packet_offload *ptype;
__be16 type = skb->protocol;
struct list_head *head = &offload_base;
int same_flow;
enum gro_result ret;
int grow;
if (!(skb->dev->features & NETIF_F_GRO))
goto normal;
if (skb_is_gso(skb) || skb_has_frag_list(skb) || skb->csum_bad)
goto normal;
gro_list_prepare(napi, skb);
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptype, head, list) {
if (ptype->type != type || !ptype->callbacks.gro_receive)
continue;
skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb));
skb_reset_mac_len(skb);
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->same_flow = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->udp_mark = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->gro_remcsum_start = 0;
/* Setup for GRO checksum validation */
switch (skb->ip_summed) {
case CHECKSUM_COMPLETE:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum = skb->csum;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_valid = 1;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_cnt = 0;
break;
case CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_cnt = skb->csum_level + 1;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_valid = 0;
break;
default:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_cnt = 0;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_valid = 0;
}
pp = ptype->callbacks.gro_receive(&napi->gro_list, skb);
break;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (&ptype->list == head)
goto normal;
same_flow = NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->same_flow;
ret = NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free ? GRO_MERGED_FREE : GRO_MERGED;
if (pp) {
struct sk_buff *nskb = *pp;
*pp = nskb->next;
nskb->next = NULL;
napi_gro_complete(nskb);
napi->gro_count--;
}
if (same_flow)
goto ok;
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush)
goto normal;
if (unlikely(napi->gro_count >= MAX_GRO_SKBS)) {
struct sk_buff *nskb = napi->gro_list;
/* locate the end of the list to select the 'oldest' flow */
while (nskb->next) {
pp = &nskb->next;
nskb = *pp;
}
*pp = NULL;
nskb->next = NULL;
napi_gro_complete(nskb);
} else {
napi->gro_count++;
}
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->count = 1;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->age = jiffies;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->last = skb;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = skb_gro_len(skb);
skb->next = napi->gro_list;
napi->gro_list = skb;
ret = GRO_HELD;
pull:
grow = skb_gro_offset(skb) - skb_headlen(skb);
if (grow > 0)
gro_pull_from_frag0(skb, grow);
ok:
return ret;
normal:
ret = GRO_NORMAL;
goto pull;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 1
| 18,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContentSearchCallback(MessageLoop* message_loop,
base::PlatformFileError error,
scoped_ptr<gdata::GDataDirectoryProto> dir_proto) {
ASSERT_EQ(base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK, error);
ASSERT_TRUE(dir_proto.get());
ASSERT_EQ(1, dir_proto->child_files_size());
EXPECT_EQ("file:2_file_resouce_id.SubDirectory File 1.txt",
dir_proto->child_files(0).gdata_entry().file_name());
ASSERT_EQ(1, dir_proto->child_directories_size());
EXPECT_EQ("folder:1_folder_resource_id.Directory 1",
dir_proto->child_directories(0).gdata_entry().file_name());
message_loop->Quit();
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_read_start_xref(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc)
{
unsigned char buf[1024];
size_t i, n;
int64_t t;
fz_seek(ctx, doc->file, 0, SEEK_END);
doc->file_size = fz_tell(ctx, doc->file);
t = fz_maxi64(0, doc->file_size - (int64_t)sizeof buf);
fz_seek(ctx, doc->file, t, SEEK_SET);
n = fz_read(ctx, doc->file, buf, sizeof buf);
if (n < 9)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "cannot find startxref");
i = n - 9;
do
{
if (memcmp(buf + i, "startxref", 9) == 0)
{
i += 9;
while (i < n && iswhite(buf[i]))
i ++;
doc->startxref = 0;
while (i < n && buf[i] >= '0' && buf[i] <= '9')
{
if (doc->startxref >= INT64_MAX/10)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "startxref too large");
doc->startxref = doc->startxref * 10 + (buf[i++] - '0');
}
if (doc->startxref != 0)
return;
break;
}
} while (i-- > 0);
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "cannot find startxref");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeBinaryExpression(JsVar *a, unsigned int lastPrecedence) {
/* This one's a bit strange. Basically all the ops have their own precedence, it's not
* like & and | share the same precedence. We don't want to recurse for each one,
* so instead we do this.
*
* We deal with an expression in recursion ONLY if it's of higher precedence
* than the current one, otherwise we stick in the while loop.
*/
unsigned int precedence = jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(lex->tk);
while (precedence && precedence>lastPrecedence) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
if (op==LEX_ANDAND || op==LEX_OROR) {
bool aValue = jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(a));
if ((!aValue && op==LEX_ANDAND) ||
(aValue && op==LEX_OROR)) {
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(__jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence));
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
} else {
jsvUnLock(a);
a = __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence);
}
} else { // else it's a more 'normal' logical expression - just use Maths
JsVar *b = __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence);
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
if (op==LEX_R_IN) {
JsVar *av = jsvSkipName(a); // needle
JsVar *bv = jsvSkipName(b); // haystack
if (jsvIsArray(bv) || jsvIsObject(bv)) { // search keys, NOT values
av = jsvAsArrayIndexAndUnLock(av);
JsVar *varFound = jspGetVarNamedField( bv, av, true);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = jsvNewFromBool(varFound!=0);
jsvUnLock(varFound);
} else {// else it will be undefined
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Cannot use 'in' operator to search a %t", bv);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = 0;
}
jsvUnLock2(av, bv);
} else if (op==LEX_R_INSTANCEOF) {
bool inst = false;
JsVar *av = jsvSkipName(a);
JsVar *bv = jsvSkipName(b);
if (!jsvIsFunction(bv)) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Expecting a function on RHS in instanceof check, got %t", bv);
} else {
if (jsvIsObject(av) || jsvIsFunction(av)) {
JsVar *bproto = jspGetNamedField(bv, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, false);
JsVar *proto = jsvObjectGetChild(av, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0);
while (proto) {
if (proto == bproto) inst=true;
JsVar *childProto = jsvObjectGetChild(proto, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0);
jsvUnLock(proto);
proto = childProto;
}
if (jspIsConstructor(bv, "Object")) inst = true;
jsvUnLock(bproto);
}
if (!inst) {
const char *name = jswGetBasicObjectName(av);
if (name) {
inst = jspIsConstructor(bv, name);
}
if (!inst && (jsvIsArray(av) || jsvIsArrayBuffer(av)) &&
jspIsConstructor(bv, "Object"))
inst = true;
}
}
jsvUnLock3(av, bv, a);
a = jsvNewFromBool(inst);
} else { // --------------------------------------------- NORMAL
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(a, b, op);
jsvUnLock(a); a = res;
}
}
jsvUnLock(b);
}
precedence = jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(lex->tk);
}
return a;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 1,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int net_get_monitor(struct wif *wi)
{
return net_cmd(wi_priv(wi), NET_GET_MONITOR, NULL, 0);
}
Commit Message: OSdep: Fixed segmentation fault that happens with a malicious server sending a negative length (Closes #16 on GitHub).
git-svn-id: http://svn.aircrack-ng.org/trunk@2419 28c6078b-6c39-48e3-add9-af49d547ecab
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long snd_compr_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct snd_compr_file *data = f->private_data;
struct snd_compr_stream *stream;
int retval = -ENOTTY;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!data))
return -EFAULT;
stream = &data->stream;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!stream))
return -EFAULT;
mutex_lock(&stream->device->lock);
switch (_IOC_NR(cmd)) {
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_IOCTL_VERSION):
retval = put_user(SNDRV_COMPRESS_VERSION,
(int __user *)arg) ? -EFAULT : 0;
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_CAPS):
retval = snd_compr_get_caps(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_CODEC_CAPS):
retval = snd_compr_get_codec_caps(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_PARAMS):
retval = snd_compr_set_params(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_PARAMS):
retval = snd_compr_get_params(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_METADATA):
retval = snd_compr_set_metadata(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_METADATA):
retval = snd_compr_get_metadata(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_TSTAMP):
retval = snd_compr_tstamp(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_AVAIL):
retval = snd_compr_ioctl_avail(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_PAUSE):
retval = snd_compr_pause(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_RESUME):
retval = snd_compr_resume(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_START):
retval = snd_compr_start(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_STOP):
retval = snd_compr_stop(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_DRAIN):
retval = snd_compr_drain(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_PARTIAL_DRAIN):
retval = snd_compr_partial_drain(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_NEXT_TRACK):
retval = snd_compr_next_track(stream);
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&stream->device->lock);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: array_to_json_pretty(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
Datum array = PG_GETARG_DATUM(0);
bool use_line_feeds = PG_GETARG_BOOL(1);
StringInfo result;
result = makeStringInfo();
array_to_json_internal(array, result, use_line_feeds);
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text_with_len(result->data, result->len));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,798
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodDefaultByteStringArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodDefaultByteStringArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodDefaultByteStringArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SettingLevelBubble::UpdateWithoutShowingBubble(double percent,
bool enabled) {
UpdateTargetPercent(percent);
if (view_)
view_->SetEnabled(enabled);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool lmp_version_below(const RawAddress& bda, uint8_t version) {
tACL_CONN* acl = btm_bda_to_acl(bda, BT_TRANSPORT_LE);
if (acl == NULL || acl->lmp_version == 0) {
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s cannot retrieve LMP version...", __func__);
return false;
}
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s LMP version %d < %d", __func__, acl->lmp_version,
version);
return acl->lmp_version < version;
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,444
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DevToolsWindow::PreHandleKeyboardEvent(
content::WebContents* source,
const content::NativeWebKeyboardEvent& event,
bool* is_keyboard_shortcut) {
if (IsDocked()) {
BrowserWindow* inspected_window = GetInspectedBrowserWindow();
if (inspected_window) {
return inspected_window->PreHandleKeyboardEvent(event,
is_keyboard_shortcut);
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int WebSocketJob::TrySpdyStream() {
if (!socket_.get())
return ERR_FAILED;
if (!websocket_over_spdy_enabled_)
return OK;
HttpTransactionFactory* factory =
socket_->context()->http_transaction_factory();
if (!factory)
return OK;
scoped_refptr<HttpNetworkSession> session = factory->GetSession();
if (!session.get())
return OK;
SpdySessionPool* spdy_pool = session->spdy_session_pool();
const HostPortProxyPair pair(HostPortPair::FromURL(socket_->url()),
socket_->proxy_server());
if (!spdy_pool->HasSession(pair))
return OK;
scoped_refptr<SpdySession> spdy_session =
spdy_pool->Get(pair, *socket_->net_log());
SSLInfo ssl_info;
bool was_npn_negotiated;
bool use_ssl = spdy_session->GetSSLInfo(&ssl_info, &was_npn_negotiated);
if (socket_->is_secure() && !use_ssl)
return OK;
spdy_websocket_stream_.reset(new SpdyWebSocketStream(spdy_session, this));
int result = spdy_websocket_stream_->InitializeStream(
socket_->url(), MEDIUM, *socket_->net_log());
if (result == OK) {
OnConnected(socket_, kMaxPendingSendAllowed);
return ERR_PROTOCOL_SWITCHED;
}
if (result != ERR_IO_PENDING) {
spdy_websocket_stream_.reset();
return OK;
}
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool cancel_composition_called() const { return cancel_composition_called_; }
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int compat_table_info(const struct xt_table_info *info,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo)
{
struct ipt_entry *iter;
const void *loc_cpu_entry;
int ret;
if (!newinfo || !info)
return -EINVAL;
/* we dont care about newinfo->entries */
memcpy(newinfo, info, offsetof(struct xt_table_info, entries));
newinfo->initial_entries = 0;
loc_cpu_entry = info->entries;
xt_compat_init_offsets(AF_INET, info->number);
xt_entry_foreach(iter, loc_cpu_entry, info->size) {
ret = compat_calc_entry(iter, info, loc_cpu_entry, newinfo);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: node_has_ipv6_addr(const node_t *node)
{
/* Don't check the ORPort or DirPort, as this function isn't port-specific,
* and the node might have a valid IPv6 address, yet have a zero
* ORPort or DirPort.
*/
if (node->ri && tor_addr_is_valid(&node->ri->ipv6_addr, 0))
return 1;
if (node->rs && tor_addr_is_valid(&node->rs->ipv6_addr, 0))
return 1;
if (node->md && tor_addr_is_valid(&node->md->ipv6_addr, 0))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 4,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecolorclosestalpha)
{
zval *IM;
long red, green, blue, alpha;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rllll", &IM, &red, &green, &blue, &alpha) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
RETURN_LONG(gdImageColorClosestAlpha(im, red, green, blue, alpha));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 7,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fifo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
bool is_pipe = inode->i_sb->s_magic == PIPEFS_MAGIC;
int ret;
filp->f_version = 0;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
if (inode->i_pipe) {
pipe = inode->i_pipe;
pipe->files++;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
} else {
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
pipe = alloc_pipe_info();
if (!pipe)
return -ENOMEM;
pipe->files = 1;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
if (unlikely(inode->i_pipe)) {
inode->i_pipe->files++;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
free_pipe_info(pipe);
pipe = inode->i_pipe;
} else {
inode->i_pipe = pipe;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
}
filp->private_data = pipe;
/* OK, we have a pipe and it's pinned down */
__pipe_lock(pipe);
/* We can only do regular read/write on fifos */
filp->f_mode &= (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE);
switch (filp->f_mode) {
case FMODE_READ:
/*
* O_RDONLY
* POSIX.1 says that O_NONBLOCK means return with the FIFO
* opened, even when there is no process writing the FIFO.
*/
pipe->r_counter++;
if (pipe->readers++ == 0)
wake_up_partner(pipe);
if (!is_pipe && !pipe->writers) {
if ((filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)) {
/* suppress POLLHUP until we have
* seen a writer */
filp->f_version = pipe->w_counter;
} else {
if (wait_for_partner(pipe, &pipe->w_counter))
goto err_rd;
}
}
break;
case FMODE_WRITE:
/*
* O_WRONLY
* POSIX.1 says that O_NONBLOCK means return -1 with
* errno=ENXIO when there is no process reading the FIFO.
*/
ret = -ENXIO;
if (!is_pipe && (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) && !pipe->readers)
goto err;
pipe->w_counter++;
if (!pipe->writers++)
wake_up_partner(pipe);
if (!is_pipe && !pipe->readers) {
if (wait_for_partner(pipe, &pipe->r_counter))
goto err_wr;
}
break;
case FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE:
/*
* O_RDWR
* POSIX.1 leaves this case "undefined" when O_NONBLOCK is set.
* This implementation will NEVER block on a O_RDWR open, since
* the process can at least talk to itself.
*/
pipe->readers++;
pipe->writers++;
pipe->r_counter++;
pipe->w_counter++;
if (pipe->readers == 1 || pipe->writers == 1)
wake_up_partner(pipe);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
/* Ok! */
__pipe_unlock(pipe);
return 0;
err_rd:
if (!--pipe->readers)
wake_up_interruptible(&pipe->wait);
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto err;
err_wr:
if (!--pipe->writers)
wake_up_interruptible(&pipe->wait);
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto err;
err:
__pipe_unlock(pipe);
put_pipe_info(inode, pipe);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 21,252
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _handel_muc_user(xmpp_stanza_t *const stanza)
{
xmpp_ctx_t *ctx = connection_get_ctx();
xmpp_stanza_t *xns_muc_user = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_ns(stanza, STANZA_NS_MUC_USER);
const char *room = xmpp_stanza_get_from(stanza);
if (!room) {
log_warning("Message received with no from attribute, ignoring");
return;
}
xmpp_stanza_t *invite = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_name(xns_muc_user, STANZA_NAME_INVITE);
if (!invite) {
return;
}
const char *invitor_jid = xmpp_stanza_get_from(invite);
if (!invitor_jid) {
log_warning("Chat room invite received with no from attribute");
return;
}
Jid *jidp = jid_create(invitor_jid);
if (!jidp) {
return;
}
char *invitor = jidp->barejid;
char *reason = NULL;
xmpp_stanza_t *reason_st = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_name(invite, STANZA_NAME_REASON);
if (reason_st) {
reason = xmpp_stanza_get_text(reason_st);
}
char *password = NULL;
xmpp_stanza_t *password_st = xmpp_stanza_get_child_by_name(xns_muc_user, STANZA_NAME_PASSWORD);
if (password_st) {
password = xmpp_stanza_get_text(password_st);
}
sv_ev_room_invite(INVITE_MEDIATED, invitor, room, reason, password);
jid_destroy(jidp);
if (reason) {
xmpp_free(ctx, reason);
}
if (password) {
xmpp_free(ctx, password);
}
}
Commit Message: Add carbons from check
CWE ID: CWE-346
| 0
| 6,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ObjectBackedNativeHandler::DeletePrivate(v8::Local<v8::Object> obj,
const char* key) {
DeletePrivate(context_->v8_context(), obj, key);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 20,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sg_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table * wait)
{
__poll_t res = 0;
Sg_device *sdp;
Sg_fd *sfp;
Sg_request *srp;
int count = 0;
unsigned long iflags;
sfp = filp->private_data;
if (!sfp)
return EPOLLERR;
sdp = sfp->parentdp;
if (!sdp)
return EPOLLERR;
poll_wait(filp, &sfp->read_wait, wait);
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
/* if any read waiting, flag it */
if ((0 == res) && (1 == srp->done) && (!srp->sg_io_owned))
res = EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
++count;
}
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
res |= EPOLLHUP;
else if (!sfp->cmd_q) {
if (0 == count)
res |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
} else if (count < SG_MAX_QUEUE)
res |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
"sg_poll: res=0x%x\n", (__force u32) res));
return res;
}
Commit Message: scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in sg_build_indirect()
This shall help avoid copying uninitialized memory to the userspace when
calling ioctl(fd, SG_IO) with an empty command.
Reported-by: syzbot+7d26fc1eea198488deab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid::OnFindResultAvailable(
WebContents* web_contents,
const FindNotificationDetails* find_result) {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> obj = GetJavaDelegate(env);
if (obj.is_null())
return;
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> selection_rect = CreateJavaRect(
env, find_result->selection_rect());
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> details_object =
Java_ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid_createFindNotificationDetails(
env,
find_result->number_of_matches(),
selection_rect.obj(),
find_result->active_match_ordinal(),
find_result->final_update());
Java_ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid_onFindResultAvailable(
env,
obj.obj(),
details_object.obj());
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
TBR=tedchoc@chromium.org,jbudorick@chromium.org,sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FillDataContainsFillableUsername(const PasswordFormFillData& fill_data) {
return !fill_data.username_field.name.empty() &&
(!fill_data.additional_logins.empty() ||
!fill_data.username_field.value.empty());
}
Commit Message: Remove WeakPtrFactory from PasswordAutofillAgent
Unlike in AutofillAgent, the factory is no longer used in PAA.
R=dvadym@chromium.org
BUG=609010,609007,608100,608101,433486
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1945723003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391475}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockRenderWidgetHostDelegate* render_widget_host_delegate() const {
return delegates_.back().get();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len)
{
int err = 0;
struct sctp_af *af;
lock_sock(sk);
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p, sockaddr:%p, addr_len:%d\n", __func__, sk,
addr, addr_len);
/* Validate addr_len before calling common connect/connectx routine. */
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->sa_family);
if (!af || addr_len < af->sockaddr_len) {
err = -EINVAL;
} else {
/* Pass correct addr len to common routine (so it knows there
* is only one address being passed.
*/
err = __sctp_connect(sk, addr, af->sockaddr_len, NULL);
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 13,610
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char* gethostname_malloc(void) {
struct utsname u;
assert_se(uname(&u) >= 0);
if (u.nodename[0])
return strdup(u.nodename);
return strdup(u.sysname);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 17,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CairoOutputDev::drawImageMask(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height, GBool invert,
GBool inlineImg) {
/* FIXME: Doesn't the image mask support any colorspace? */
cairo_set_source (cairo, fill_pattern);
/* work around a cairo bug when scaling 1x1 surfaces */
if (width == 1 && height == 1) {
cairo_save (cairo);
cairo_rectangle (cairo, 0., 0., width, height);
cairo_fill (cairo);
cairo_restore (cairo);
if (cairo_shape) {
cairo_save (cairo_shape);
cairo_rectangle (cairo_shape, 0., 0., width, height);
cairo_fill (cairo_shape);
cairo_restore (cairo_shape);
}
return;
}
/* shape is 1.0 for painted areas, 0.0 for unpainted ones */
cairo_matrix_t matrix;
cairo_get_matrix (cairo, &matrix);
if (!printing && prescaleImages && matrix.xy == 0.0 && matrix.yx == 0.0) {
drawImageMaskPrescaled(state, ref, str, width, height, invert, inlineImg);
} else {
drawImageMaskRegular(state, ref, str, width, height, invert, inlineImg);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decode_NXAST_RAW_REG_MOVE(const struct nx_action_reg_move *narm,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map,
uint64_t *tlv_bitmap, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts)
{
struct ofpact_reg_move *move = ofpact_put_REG_MOVE(ofpacts);
enum ofperr error;
move->ofpact.raw = NXAST_RAW_REG_MOVE;
move->src.ofs = ntohs(narm->src_ofs);
move->src.n_bits = ntohs(narm->n_bits);
move->dst.ofs = ntohs(narm->dst_ofs);
move->dst.n_bits = ntohs(narm->n_bits);
struct ofpbuf b = ofpbuf_const_initializer(narm, ntohs(narm->len));
ofpbuf_pull(&b, sizeof *narm);
error = mf_vl_mff_nx_pull_header(&b, vl_mff_map, &move->src.field, NULL,
tlv_bitmap);
if (error) {
return error;
}
error = mf_vl_mff_nx_pull_header(&b, vl_mff_map, &move->dst.field, NULL,
tlv_bitmap);
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (!is_all_zeros(b.data, b.size)) {
return OFPERR_NXBRC_MUST_BE_ZERO;
}
return nxm_reg_move_check(move, NULL);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bt_status_t btif_storage_set_remote_addr_type(bt_bdaddr_t *remote_bd_addr,
UINT8 addr_type)
{
bdstr_t bdstr;
bdaddr_to_string(remote_bd_addr, bdstr, sizeof(bdstr));
int ret = btif_config_set_int(bdstr, "AddrType", (int)addr_type);
btif_config_save();
return ret ? BT_STATUS_SUCCESS : BT_STATUS_FAIL;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CloseDevToolsWindow() {
Browser* browser = window_->browser();
browser->tab_strip_model()->CloseAllTabs();
BrowserClosedObserver close_observer(browser);
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::Show() {
window_->Show();
if (!host_->is_hidden())
return;
bool has_saved_frame =
delegated_frame_host_ ? delegated_frame_host_->HasSavedFrame() : false;
ui::LatencyInfo renderer_latency_info, browser_latency_info;
if (has_saved_frame) {
browser_latency_info.AddLatencyNumber(
ui::TAB_SHOW_COMPONENT, host_->GetLatencyComponentId(), 0);
} else {
renderer_latency_info.AddLatencyNumber(
ui::TAB_SHOW_COMPONENT, host_->GetLatencyComponentId(), 0);
}
host_->WasShown(renderer_latency_info);
aura::Window* root = window_->GetRootWindow();
if (root) {
aura::client::CursorClient* cursor_client =
aura::client::GetCursorClient(root);
if (cursor_client)
NotifyRendererOfCursorVisibilityState(cursor_client->IsCursorVisible());
}
if (delegated_frame_host_)
delegated_frame_host_->WasShown(browser_latency_info);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
UpdateLegacyWin();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 18,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs_wcc_update_inode(struct inode *inode, struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(inode);
if ((fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_WCC_V4) != 0 &&
nfsi->change_attr == fattr->pre_change_attr) {
nfsi->change_attr = fattr->change_attr;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
nfsi->cache_validity |= NFS_INO_INVALID_DATA;
}
/* If we have atomic WCC data, we may update some attributes */
if ((fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_WCC) != 0) {
if (timespec_equal(&inode->i_ctime, &fattr->pre_ctime))
memcpy(&inode->i_ctime, &fattr->ctime, sizeof(inode->i_ctime));
if (timespec_equal(&inode->i_mtime, &fattr->pre_mtime)) {
memcpy(&inode->i_mtime, &fattr->mtime, sizeof(inode->i_mtime));
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
nfsi->cache_validity |= NFS_INO_INVALID_DATA;
}
if (i_size_read(inode) == nfs_size_to_loff_t(fattr->pre_size) &&
nfsi->npages == 0)
i_size_write(inode, nfs_size_to_loff_t(fattr->size));
}
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SoftMPEG4Encoder::SoftMPEG4Encoder(
const char *name,
const char *componentRole,
OMX_VIDEO_CODINGTYPE codingType,
const char *mime,
const CodecProfileLevel *profileLevels,
size_t numProfileLevels,
const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component)
: SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent(
name, componentRole, codingType,
profileLevels, numProfileLevels,
176 /* width */, 144 /* height */,
callbacks, appData, component),
mEncodeMode(COMBINE_MODE_WITH_ERR_RES),
mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec(1),
mNumInputFrames(-1),
mStarted(false),
mSawInputEOS(false),
mSignalledError(false),
mHandle(new tagvideoEncControls),
mEncParams(new tagvideoEncOptions),
mInputFrameData(NULL) {
if (codingType == OMX_VIDEO_CodingH263) {
mEncodeMode = H263_MODE;
}
const size_t kOutputBufferSize = 256 * 1024;
initPorts(kNumBuffers, kNumBuffers, kOutputBufferSize, mime);
ALOGI("Construct SoftMPEG4Encoder");
}
Commit Message: SoftMPEG4: Check the buffer size before writing the reference frame.
Also prevent overflow in SoftMPEG4 and division by zero in SoftMPEG4Encoder.
Bug: 30033990
Change-Id: I7701f5fc54c2670587d122330e5dc851f64ed3c2
(cherry picked from commit 695123195034402ca76169b195069c28c30342d3)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SafeSock::SafeSock(const SafeSock & orig)
: Sock(orig)
{
init();
char *buf = NULL;
buf = orig.serialize(); // get state from orig sock
ASSERT(buf);
serialize(buf); // put the state into the new sock
delete [] buf;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 5,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ipmi_smi_watcher_register(struct ipmi_smi_watcher *watcher)
{
struct ipmi_smi *intf;
int index;
mutex_lock(&smi_watchers_mutex);
list_add(&watcher->link, &smi_watchers);
index = srcu_read_lock(&ipmi_interfaces_srcu);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(intf, &ipmi_interfaces, link) {
int intf_num = READ_ONCE(intf->intf_num);
if (intf_num == -1)
continue;
watcher->new_smi(intf_num, intf->si_dev);
}
srcu_read_unlock(&ipmi_interfaces_srcu, index);
mutex_unlock(&smi_watchers_mutex);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 5,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseArena::TakeSnapshot(const String& dump_base_name,
ThreadState::GCSnapshotInfo& info) {
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* allocator_dump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CreateMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(dump_base_name);
size_t page_count = 0;
BasePage::HeapSnapshotInfo heap_info;
for (BasePage* page = first_unswept_page_; page; page = page->Next()) {
String dump_name = dump_base_name +
String::Format("/pages/page_%lu",
static_cast<unsigned long>(page_count++));
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* page_dump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CreateMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(dump_name);
page->TakeSnapshot(page_dump, info, heap_info);
}
allocator_dump->AddScalar("blink_page_count", "objects", page_count);
allocator_dump->AddScalar("free_size", "bytes", heap_info.free_size);
allocator_dump->AddScalar("free_count", "objects", heap_info.free_count);
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,239
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::vector<BookmarkNode*> BookmarkManagerView::GetSelectedTableNodes() {
std::vector<BookmarkNode*> nodes;
for (views::TableView::iterator i = table_view_->SelectionBegin();
i != table_view_->SelectionEnd(); ++i) {
nodes.push_back(table_model_->GetNodeForRow(*i));
}
std::reverse(nodes.begin(), nodes.end());
return nodes;
}
Commit Message: Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vp8_decode_mv_mb_modes(AVCodecContext *avctx, VP8Frame *cur_frame,
VP8Frame *prev_frame)
{
vp78_decode_mv_mb_modes(avctx, cur_frame, prev_frame, IS_VP8);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InFlightBackendIO::OpenNextEntry(Rankings::Iterator* iterator,
Entry** next_entry,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback) {
scoped_refptr<BackendIO> operation(new BackendIO(this, backend_, callback));
operation->OpenNextEntry(iterator, next_entry);
PostOperation(FROM_HERE, operation.get());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ListValue* ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabList(
const Browser* browser,
const Extension* extension) {
ListValue* tab_list = new ListValue();
TabStripModel* tab_strip = browser->tab_strip_model();
for (int i = 0; i < tab_strip->count(); ++i) {
tab_list->Append(CreateTabValue(tab_strip->GetWebContentsAt(i),
tab_strip,
i,
extension));
}
return tab_list;
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _out_sx_callback(sx_t s, sx_event_t e, void *data, void *arg) {
conn_t out = (conn_t) arg;
sx_buf_t buf = (sx_buf_t) data;
int len, ns, elem, starttls = 0;
sx_error_t *sxe;
nad_t nad;
switch(e) {
case event_WANT_READ:
log_debug(ZONE, "want read");
mio_read(out->s2s->mio, out->fd);
break;
case event_WANT_WRITE:
log_debug(ZONE, "want write");
mio_write(out->s2s->mio, out->fd);
break;
case event_READ:
log_debug(ZONE, "reading from %d", out->fd->fd);
/* do the read */
len = recv(out->fd->fd, buf->data, buf->len, 0);
if(len < 0) {
if(MIO_WOULDBLOCK) {
buf->len = 0;
return 0;
}
log_write(out->s2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "[%d] [%s, port=%d] read error: %s (%d)", out->fd->fd, out->ip, out->port, MIO_STRERROR(MIO_ERROR), MIO_ERROR);
if (!out->online) {
_out_dns_mark_bad(out);
}
sx_kill(s);
return -1;
}
else if(len == 0) {
/* they went away */
sx_kill(s);
return -1;
}
log_debug(ZONE, "read %d bytes", len);
buf->len = len;
return len;
case event_WRITE:
log_debug(ZONE, "writing to %d", out->fd->fd);
len = send(out->fd->fd, buf->data, buf->len, 0);
if(len >= 0) {
log_debug(ZONE, "%d bytes written", len);
return len;
}
if(MIO_WOULDBLOCK)
return 0;
log_write(out->s2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "[%d] [%s, port=%d] write error: %s (%d)", out->fd->fd, out->ip, out->port, MIO_STRERROR(MIO_ERROR), MIO_ERROR);
if (!out->online) {
_out_dns_mark_bad(out);
}
sx_kill(s);
return -1;
case event_ERROR:
sxe = (sx_error_t *) data;
log_write(out->s2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "[%d] [%s, port=%d] error: %s (%s)", out->fd->fd, out->ip, out->port, sxe->generic, sxe->specific);
/* mark as bad if we did not manage to connect or there is unrecoverable stream error */
if (!out->online ||
(sxe->code == SX_ERR_STREAM &&
(strstr(sxe->specific, "host-gone") || /* it's not there now */
strstr(sxe->specific, "host-unknown") || /* they do not service the host */
strstr(sxe->specific, "not-authorized") || /* they do not want us there */
strstr(sxe->specific, "see-other-host") || /* we do not support redirections yet */
strstr(sxe->specific, "system-shutdown") || /* they are going down */
strstr(sxe->specific, "policy-violation") || /* they do not want us there */
strstr(sxe->specific, "remote-connection-failed") || /* the required remote entity is gone */
strstr(sxe->specific, "unsupported-encoding") || /* they do not like our encoding */
strstr(sxe->specific, "undefined-condition") || /* something bad happend */
strstr(sxe->specific, "internal-server-error") || /* that server is broken */
strstr(sxe->specific, "unsupported-version") /* they do not support our stream version */
))) {
_out_dns_mark_bad(out);
}
sx_kill(s);
return -1;
case event_OPEN:
log_debug(ZONE, "OPEN event for %s", out->key);
break;
case event_STREAM:
/* check stream version - NULl = pre-xmpp (some jabber1 servers) */
log_debug(ZONE, "STREAM event for %s stream version is %s", out->key, out->s->res_version);
/* first time, bring them online */
if(!out->online) {
log_debug(ZONE, "outgoing conn to %s is online", out->key);
/* if no stream version from either side, kick off dialback for each route, */
/* otherwise wait for stream features */
if (((out->s->res_version==NULL) || (out->s2s->sx_ssl == NULL)) && out->s2s->require_tls == 0) {
log_debug(ZONE, "no stream version, sending dialbacks for %s immediately", out->key);
out->online = 1;
send_dialbacks(out);
} else
log_debug(ZONE, "outgoing conn to %s - waiting for STREAM features", out->key);
}
break;
case event_PACKET:
/* we're counting packets */
out->packet_count++;
out->s2s->packet_count++;
nad = (nad_t) data;
/* watch for the features packet - STARTTLS and/or SASL*/
if ((out->s->res_version!=NULL)
&& NAD_NURI_L(nad, NAD_ENS(nad, 0)) == strlen(uri_STREAMS)
&& strncmp(uri_STREAMS, NAD_NURI(nad, NAD_ENS(nad, 0)), strlen(uri_STREAMS)) == 0
&& NAD_ENAME_L(nad, 0) == 8 && strncmp("features", NAD_ENAME(nad, 0), 8) == 0) {
log_debug(ZONE, "got the stream features packet");
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
/* starttls if we can */
if(out->s2s->sx_ssl != NULL && s->ssf == 0) {
ns = nad_find_scoped_namespace(nad, uri_TLS, NULL);
if(ns >= 0) {
elem = nad_find_elem(nad, 0, ns, "starttls", 1);
if(elem >= 0) {
log_debug(ZONE, "got STARTTLS in stream features");
if(sx_ssl_client_starttls(out->s2s->sx_ssl, s, out->s2s->local_pemfile) == 0) {
starttls = 1;
nad_free(nad);
return 0;
}
log_write(out->s2s->log, LOG_ERR, "unable to establish encrypted session with peer");
}
}
}
/* If we're not establishing a starttls connection, send dialbacks */
if (!starttls) {
if (out->s2s->require_tls == 0 || s->ssf > 0) {
log_debug(ZONE, "No STARTTLS, sending dialbacks for %s", out->key);
out->online = 1;
send_dialbacks(out);
} else {
log_debug(ZONE, "No STARTTLS, dialbacks disabled for non-TLS connections, cannot complete negotiation");
}
}
#else
if (out->s2s->require_tls == 0) {
out->online = 1;
send_dialbacks(out);
}
#endif
}
/* we only accept dialback packets */
if(NAD_ENS(nad, 0) < 0 || NAD_NURI_L(nad, NAD_ENS(nad, 0)) != uri_DIALBACK_L || strncmp(uri_DIALBACK, NAD_NURI(nad, NAD_ENS(nad, 0)), uri_DIALBACK_L) != 0) {
log_debug(ZONE, "got a non-dialback packet on an outgoing conn, dropping it");
nad_free(nad);
return 0;
}
/* and then only result and verify */
if(NAD_ENAME_L(nad, 0) == 6) {
if(strncmp("result", NAD_ENAME(nad, 0), 6) == 0) {
_out_result(out, nad);
return 0;
}
if(strncmp("verify", NAD_ENAME(nad, 0), 6) == 0) {
_out_verify(out, nad);
return 0;
}
}
log_debug(ZONE, "unknown dialback packet, dropping it");
nad_free(nad);
return 0;
case event_CLOSED:
if (out->fd != NULL) {
mio_close(out->s2s->mio, out->fd);
out->fd = NULL;
}
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed possibility of Unsolicited Dialback Attacks
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WasmCompileStreamingImpl(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(args);
v8::Local<v8::Function> compile_callback =
v8::Function::New(isolate, CompileFromResponseCallback);
V8SetReturnValue(args, ScriptPromise::Cast(script_state, args[0])
.Then(compile_callback)
.V8Value());
}
Commit Message: [wasm] Use correct bindings APIs
Use ScriptState::ForCurrentRealm in static methods, instead of
ForRelevantRealm().
Bug: chromium:788453
Change-Id: I63bd25e3f5a4e8d7cbaff945da8df0d71aa65527
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/795096
Commit-Queue: Mircea Trofin <mtrofin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#520174}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 1
| 28,308
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: id_to_sid(unsigned int cid, uint sidtype, struct cifs_sid *ssid)
{
int rc;
struct key *sidkey;
struct cifs_sid *ksid;
unsigned int ksid_size;
char desc[3 + 10 + 1]; /* 3 byte prefix + 10 bytes for value + NULL */
const struct cred *saved_cred;
rc = snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%ci:%u",
sidtype == SIDOWNER ? 'o' : 'g', cid);
if (rc >= sizeof(desc))
return -EINVAL;
rc = 0;
saved_cred = override_creds(root_cred);
sidkey = request_key(&cifs_idmap_key_type, desc, "");
if (IS_ERR(sidkey)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Can't map %cid %u to a SID\n",
__func__, sidtype == SIDOWNER ? 'u' : 'g', cid);
goto out_revert_creds;
} else if (sidkey->datalen < CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE) {
rc = -EIO;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%hu)\n",
__func__, sidkey->datalen);
goto invalidate_key;
}
/*
* A sid is usually too large to be embedded in payload.value, but if
* there are no subauthorities and the host has 8-byte pointers, then
* it could be.
*/
ksid = sidkey->datalen <= sizeof(sidkey->payload) ?
(struct cifs_sid *)&sidkey->payload.value :
(struct cifs_sid *)sidkey->payload.data;
ksid_size = CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + (ksid->num_subauth * sizeof(__le32));
if (ksid_size > sidkey->datalen) {
rc = -EIO;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%hu, ksid_size=%u)\n",
__func__, sidkey->datalen, ksid_size);
goto invalidate_key;
}
cifs_copy_sid(ssid, ksid);
out_key_put:
key_put(sidkey);
out_revert_creds:
revert_creds(saved_cred);
return rc;
invalidate_key:
key_invalidate(sidkey);
goto out_key_put;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 29,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int MemBackendImpl::DoomEntry(const std::string& key,
const CompletionCallback& callback) {
EntryMap::iterator it = entries_.find(key);
if (it == entries_.end())
return net::ERR_FAILED;
it->second->Doom();
return net::OK;
}
Commit Message: [MemCache] Fix bug while iterating LRU list in eviction
It was possible to reanalyze a previously doomed entry.
Bug: 827492
Change-Id: I5d34d2ae87c96e0d2099e926e6eb2c1b30b01d63
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/987919
Commit-Queue: Josh Karlin <jkarlin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547236}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void linear_map_bio(struct dm_target *ti, struct bio *bio)
{
struct linear_c *lc = ti->private;
bio->bi_bdev = lc->dev->bdev;
if (bio_sectors(bio))
bio->bi_sector = linear_map_sector(ti, bio->bi_sector);
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ContentEncoding::ContentEncryption::~ContentEncryption() {
delete[] key_id;
delete[] signature;
delete[] sig_key_id;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl_handshake_init( ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl->transform_negotiate )
ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform_negotiate );
else
ssl->transform_negotiate = malloc( sizeof(ssl_transform) );
if( ssl->session_negotiate )
ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate );
else
ssl->session_negotiate = malloc( sizeof(ssl_session) );
if( ssl->handshake )
ssl_handshake_free( ssl->handshake );
else
ssl->handshake = malloc( sizeof(ssl_handshake_params) );
if( ssl->handshake == NULL ||
ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL ||
ssl->session_negotiate == NULL )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "malloc() of ssl sub-contexts failed" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED );
}
memset( ssl->handshake, 0, sizeof(ssl_handshake_params) );
memset( ssl->transform_negotiate, 0, sizeof(ssl_transform) );
memset( ssl->session_negotiate, 0, sizeof(ssl_session) );
md5_starts( &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 );
sha1_starts( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 );
sha2_starts( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha2, 0 );
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA4_C)
sha4_starts( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha4, 1 );
#endif
ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_start;
ssl->handshake->sig_alg = SSL_HASH_SHA1;
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,913
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void user_enable_single_step(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = task->thread.regs;
if (regs != NULL) {
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS
task->thread.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_BT;
task->thread.dbcr0 |= DBCR0_IDM | DBCR0_IC;
regs->msr |= MSR_DE;
#else
regs->msr &= ~MSR_BE;
regs->msr |= MSR_SE;
#endif
}
set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SINGLESTEP);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 24,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void set_reg_data_seg(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg *dseg,
struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr,
struct mlx5_ib_pd *pd)
{
int bcount = mr->desc_size * mr->ndescs;
dseg->addr = cpu_to_be64(mr->desc_map);
dseg->byte_count = cpu_to_be32(ALIGN(bcount, 64));
dseg->lkey = cpu_to_be32(pd->ibpd.local_dma_lkey);
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t lbs_lowrssi_write(struct file *file, const char __user *userbuf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
return lbs_threshold_write(TLV_TYPE_RSSI_LOW, CMD_SUBSCRIBE_RSSI_LOW,
file, userbuf, count, ppos);
}
Commit Message: libertas: potential oops in debugfs
If we do a zero size allocation then it will oops. Also we can't be
sure the user passes us a NUL terminated string so I've added a
terminator.
This code can only be triggered by root.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 25,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reply_spnego_negotiate(struct smb_request *req,
uint16 vuid,
DATA_BLOB blob1,
AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE **auth_ntlmssp_state)
{
DATA_BLOB secblob;
DATA_BLOB chal;
char *kerb_mech = NULL;
NTSTATUS status;
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = smbd_server_conn;
status = parse_spnego_mechanisms(blob1, &secblob, &kerb_mech);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
DEBUG(3,("reply_spnego_negotiate: Got secblob of size %lu\n",
(unsigned long)secblob.length));
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
if (kerb_mech && ((lp_security()==SEC_ADS) ||
USE_KERBEROS_KEYTAB) ) {
bool destroy_vuid = True;
reply_spnego_kerberos(req, &secblob, kerb_mech,
vuid, &destroy_vuid);
data_blob_free(&secblob);
if (destroy_vuid) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
}
SAFE_FREE(kerb_mech);
return;
}
#endif
if (*auth_ntlmssp_state) {
auth_ntlmssp_end(auth_ntlmssp_state);
}
if (kerb_mech) {
data_blob_free(&secblob);
/* The mechtoken is a krb5 ticket, but
* we need to fall back to NTLM. */
reply_spnego_downgrade_to_ntlmssp(req, vuid);
SAFE_FREE(kerb_mech);
return;
}
status = auth_ntlmssp_start(auth_ntlmssp_state);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
status = auth_ntlmssp_update(*auth_ntlmssp_state,
secblob, &chal);
data_blob_free(&secblob);
reply_spnego_ntlmssp(req, vuid, auth_ntlmssp_state,
&chal, status, OID_NTLMSSP, true);
data_blob_free(&chal);
/* already replied */
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TabsUpdateFunction::RunAsync() {
std::unique_ptr<tabs::Update::Params> params(
tabs::Update::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
int tab_id = -1;
WebContents* contents = NULL;
if (!params->tab_id.get()) {
Browser* browser = ChromeExtensionFunctionDetails(this).GetCurrentBrowser();
if (!browser) {
error_ = keys::kNoCurrentWindowError;
return false;
}
contents = browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
if (!contents) {
error_ = keys::kNoSelectedTabError;
return false;
}
tab_id = SessionTabHelper::IdForTab(contents).id();
} else {
tab_id = *params->tab_id;
}
int tab_index = -1;
TabStripModel* tab_strip = NULL;
Browser* browser = nullptr;
if (!GetTabById(tab_id, browser_context(), include_incognito(), &browser,
&tab_strip, &contents, &tab_index, &error_)) {
return false;
}
if (!ExtensionTabUtil::BrowserSupportsTabs(browser)) {
error_ = keys::kNoCurrentWindowError;
return false;
}
web_contents_ = contents;
bool is_async = false;
if (params->update_properties.url.get()) {
std::string updated_url = *params->update_properties.url;
if (browser->profile()->GetProfileType() == Profile::INCOGNITO_PROFILE &&
!IsURLAllowedInIncognito(GURL(updated_url), browser->profile())) {
error_ = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kURLsNotAllowedInIncognitoError, updated_url);
return false;
}
if (!UpdateURL(updated_url, tab_id, &is_async))
return false;
}
bool active = false;
if (params->update_properties.selected.get())
active = *params->update_properties.selected;
if (params->update_properties.active.get())
active = *params->update_properties.active;
if (active) {
if (tab_strip->active_index() != tab_index) {
tab_strip->ActivateTabAt(tab_index, false);
DCHECK_EQ(contents, tab_strip->GetActiveWebContents());
}
}
if (params->update_properties.highlighted.get()) {
bool highlighted = *params->update_properties.highlighted;
if (highlighted != tab_strip->IsTabSelected(tab_index))
tab_strip->ToggleSelectionAt(tab_index);
}
if (params->update_properties.pinned.get()) {
bool pinned = *params->update_properties.pinned;
tab_strip->SetTabPinned(tab_index, pinned);
tab_index = tab_strip->GetIndexOfWebContents(contents);
}
if (params->update_properties.muted.get()) {
TabMutedResult tab_muted_result = chrome::SetTabAudioMuted(
contents, *params->update_properties.muted,
TabMutedReason::EXTENSION, extension()->id());
switch (tab_muted_result) {
case TabMutedResult::SUCCESS:
break;
case TabMutedResult::FAIL_NOT_ENABLED:
error_ = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kCannotUpdateMuteDisabled, base::IntToString(tab_id),
switches::kEnableTabAudioMuting);
return false;
case TabMutedResult::FAIL_TABCAPTURE:
error_ = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(keys::kCannotUpdateMuteCaptured,
base::IntToString(tab_id));
return false;
}
}
if (params->update_properties.opener_tab_id.get()) {
int opener_id = *params->update_properties.opener_tab_id;
WebContents* opener_contents = NULL;
if (opener_id == tab_id) {
error_ = "Cannot set a tab's opener to itself.";
return false;
}
if (!ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabById(opener_id, browser_context(),
include_incognito(), nullptr, nullptr,
&opener_contents, nullptr))
return false;
if (tab_strip->GetIndexOfWebContents(opener_contents) ==
TabStripModel::kNoTab) {
error_ = "Tab opener must be in the same window as the updated tab.";
return false;
}
tab_strip->SetOpenerOfWebContentsAt(tab_index, opener_contents);
}
if (params->update_properties.auto_discardable.get()) {
bool state = *params->update_properties.auto_discardable;
g_browser_process->GetTabManager()->SetTabAutoDiscardableState(contents,
state);
}
if (!is_async) {
PopulateResult();
SendResponse(true);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,242
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void build_mixer_unit_ctl(struct mixer_build *state,
struct uac_mixer_unit_descriptor *desc,
int in_pin, int in_ch, int unitid,
struct usb_audio_term *iterm)
{
struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval;
unsigned int num_outs = uac_mixer_unit_bNrChannels(desc);
unsigned int i, len;
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
const struct usbmix_name_map *map;
map = find_map(state, unitid, 0);
if (check_ignored_ctl(map))
return;
cval = kzalloc(sizeof(*cval), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cval)
return;
snd_usb_mixer_elem_init_std(&cval->head, state->mixer, unitid);
cval->control = in_ch + 1; /* based on 1 */
cval->val_type = USB_MIXER_S16;
for (i = 0; i < num_outs; i++) {
__u8 *c = uac_mixer_unit_bmControls(desc, state->mixer->protocol);
if (check_matrix_bitmap(c, in_ch, i, num_outs)) {
cval->cmask |= (1 << i);
cval->channels++;
}
}
/* get min/max values */
get_min_max(cval, 0);
kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&usb_feature_unit_ctl, cval);
if (!kctl) {
usb_audio_err(state->chip, "cannot malloc kcontrol\n");
kfree(cval);
return;
}
kctl->private_free = snd_usb_mixer_elem_free;
len = check_mapped_name(map, kctl->id.name, sizeof(kctl->id.name));
if (!len)
len = get_term_name(state, iterm, kctl->id.name,
sizeof(kctl->id.name), 0);
if (!len)
len = sprintf(kctl->id.name, "Mixer Source %d", in_ch + 1);
append_ctl_name(kctl, " Volume");
usb_audio_dbg(state->chip, "[%d] MU [%s] ch = %d, val = %d/%d\n",
cval->head.id, kctl->id.name, cval->channels, cval->min, cval->max);
snd_usb_mixer_add_control(&cval->head, kctl);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 14,756
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::loadString(const BlackBerry::Platform::String& string, const BlackBerry::Platform::String& baseURL, const BlackBerry::Platform::String& contentType, const BlackBerry::Platform::String& failingURL)
{
KURL kurl = parseUrl(baseURL);
ResourceRequest request(kurl);
WTF::RefPtr<SharedBuffer> buffer
= SharedBuffer::create(string.c_str(), string.length());
SubstituteData substituteData(buffer,
extractMIMETypeFromMediaType(contentType),
extractCharsetFromMediaType(contentType),
!failingURL.empty() ? parseUrl(failingURL) : KURL());
m_mainFrame->loader()->load(FrameLoadRequest(m_mainFrame, request, substituteData));
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void snd_timer_proc_read(struct snd_info_entry *entry,
struct snd_info_buffer *buffer)
{
struct snd_timer *timer;
struct snd_timer_instance *ti;
mutex_lock(®ister_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(timer, &snd_timer_list, device_list) {
switch (timer->tmr_class) {
case SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_GLOBAL:
snd_iprintf(buffer, "G%i: ", timer->tmr_device);
break;
case SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_CARD:
snd_iprintf(buffer, "C%i-%i: ",
timer->card->number, timer->tmr_device);
break;
case SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_PCM:
snd_iprintf(buffer, "P%i-%i-%i: ", timer->card->number,
timer->tmr_device, timer->tmr_subdevice);
break;
default:
snd_iprintf(buffer, "?%i-%i-%i-%i: ", timer->tmr_class,
timer->card ? timer->card->number : -1,
timer->tmr_device, timer->tmr_subdevice);
}
snd_iprintf(buffer, "%s :", timer->name);
if (timer->hw.resolution)
snd_iprintf(buffer, " %lu.%03luus (%lu ticks)",
timer->hw.resolution / 1000,
timer->hw.resolution % 1000,
timer->hw.ticks);
if (timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_SLAVE)
snd_iprintf(buffer, " SLAVE");
snd_iprintf(buffer, "\n");
list_for_each_entry(ti, &timer->open_list_head, open_list)
snd_iprintf(buffer, " Client %s : %s\n",
ti->owner ? ti->owner : "unknown",
ti->flags & (SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_START |
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING)
? "running" : "stopped");
}
mutex_unlock(®ister_mutex);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Harden slave timer list handling
A slave timer instance might be still accessible in a racy way while
operating the master instance as it lacks of locking. Since the
master operation is mostly protected with timer->lock, we should cope
with it while changing the slave instance, too. Also, some linked
lists (active_list and ack_list) of slave instances aren't unlinked
immediately at stopping or closing, and this may lead to unexpected
accesses.
This patch tries to address these issues. It adds spin lock of
timer->lock (either from master or slave, which is equivalent) in a
few places. For avoiding a deadlock, we ensure that the global
slave_active_lock is always locked at first before each timer lock.
Also, ack and active_list of slave instances are properly unlinked at
snd_timer_stop() and snd_timer_close().
Last but not least, remove the superfluous call of _snd_timer_stop()
at removing slave links. This is a noop, and calling it may confuse
readers wrt locking. Further cleanup will follow in a later patch.
Actually we've got reports of use-after-free by syzkaller fuzzer, and
this hopefully fixes these issues.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xfrm_del_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct xfrm_state *x;
int err = -ESRCH;
struct km_event c;
struct xfrm_usersa_id *p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
uid_t loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
u32 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
u32 sid;
x = xfrm_user_state_lookup(net, p, attrs, &err);
if (x == NULL)
return err;
if ((err = security_xfrm_state_delete(x)) != 0)
goto out;
if (xfrm_state_kern(x)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
err = xfrm_state_delete(x);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.pid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
km_state_notify(x, &c);
out:
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
xfrm_audit_state_delete(x, err ? 0 : 1, loginuid, sessionid, sid);
xfrm_state_put(x);
return err;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *m_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
struct proc_mounts *p = proc_mounts(m);
return seq_list_next(v, &p->ns->list, pos);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_get_int_32(png_bytep buf)
{
png_int_32 i = ((png_int_32)(*buf) << 24) +
((png_int_32)(*(buf + 1)) << 16) +
((png_int_32)(*(buf + 2)) << 8) +
(png_int_32)(*(buf + 3));
return (i);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 24,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void perf_event_free_task(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
struct perf_event *event, *tmp;
int ctxn;
for_each_task_context_nr(ctxn) {
ctx = task->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn];
if (!ctx)
continue;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
again:
list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &ctx->pinned_groups,
group_entry)
perf_free_event(event, ctx);
list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &ctx->flexible_groups,
group_entry)
perf_free_event(event, ctx);
if (!list_empty(&ctx->pinned_groups) ||
!list_empty(&ctx->flexible_groups))
goto again;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
put_ctx(ctx);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: convert_initialized_extent(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
struct ext4_ext_path **ppath,
unsigned int allocated)
{
struct ext4_ext_path *path = *ppath;
struct ext4_extent *ex;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
unsigned int ee_len;
int depth;
int err = 0;
/*
* Make sure that the extent is no bigger than we support with
* unwritten extent
*/
if (map->m_len > EXT_UNWRITTEN_MAX_LEN)
map->m_len = EXT_UNWRITTEN_MAX_LEN / 2;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
ext_debug("%s: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u\n", __func__, inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long)ee_block, ee_len);
if (ee_block != map->m_lblk || ee_len > map->m_len) {
err = ext4_split_convert_extents(handle, inode, map, ppath,
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT_UNWRITTEN);
if (err < 0)
return err;
path = ext4_find_extent(inode, map->m_lblk, ppath, 0);
if (IS_ERR(path))
return PTR_ERR(path);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
if (!ex) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "unexpected hole at %lu",
(unsigned long) map->m_lblk);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
}
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
return err;
/* first mark the extent as unwritten */
ext4_ext_mark_unwritten(ex);
/* note: ext4_ext_correct_indexes() isn't needed here because
* borders are not changed
*/
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
/* Mark modified extent as dirty */
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
if (err)
return err;
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
err = check_eofblocks_fl(handle, inode, map->m_lblk, path, map->m_len);
if (err)
return err;
map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_UNWRITTEN;
if (allocated > map->m_len)
allocated = map->m_len;
map->m_len = allocated;
return allocated;
}
Commit Message: ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 16,548
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool kvm_arch_can_inject_async_page_present(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!(vcpu->arch.apf.msr_val & KVM_ASYNC_PF_ENABLED))
return true;
else
return !kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu) &&
kvm_x86_ops->interrupt_allowed(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void simplify_merges(struct rev_info *revs)
{
struct commit_list *list, *next;
struct commit_list *yet_to_do, **tail;
struct commit *commit;
if (!revs->prune)
return;
/* feed the list reversed */
yet_to_do = NULL;
for (list = revs->commits; list; list = next) {
commit = list->item;
next = list->next;
/*
* Do not free(list) here yet; the original list
* is used later in this function.
*/
commit_list_insert(commit, &yet_to_do);
}
while (yet_to_do) {
list = yet_to_do;
yet_to_do = NULL;
tail = &yet_to_do;
while (list) {
commit = pop_commit(&list);
tail = simplify_one(revs, commit, tail);
}
}
/* clean up the result, removing the simplified ones */
list = revs->commits;
revs->commits = NULL;
tail = &revs->commits;
while (list) {
struct merge_simplify_state *st;
commit = pop_commit(&list);
st = locate_simplify_state(revs, commit);
if (st->simplified == commit)
tail = &commit_list_insert(commit, tail)->next;
}
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void PromiseAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ScriptPromise cpp_value = ScriptPromise::Cast(ScriptState::Current(info.GetIsolate()), v8_value);
impl->setPromiseAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *paramid;
param = calloc(1, sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM));
if (param == NULL)
return NULL;
paramid = calloc (1, sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID));
if (paramid == NULL) {
free(param);
return NULL;
}
param->id = paramid;
x509_verify_param_zero(param);
return param;
}
Commit Message: Call strlen() if name length provided is 0, like OpenSSL does.
Issue notice by Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>
ok deraadt@ jsing@
CWE ID: CWE-295
| 0
| 18,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::SetValueFromRenderer(const String& value) {
DCHECK_NE(type(), InputTypeNames::file);
TextControlElement::SetSuggestedValue(String());
DCHECK(value == input_type_->SanitizeUserInputValue(value) ||
input_type_->SanitizeUserInputValue(value).IsEmpty());
DCHECK(!value.IsNull());
SetValueBeforeFirstUserEditIfNotSet();
non_attribute_value_ = value;
has_dirty_value_ = true;
needs_to_update_view_value_ = false;
CheckIfValueWasReverted(value);
if (!IsTextField())
DispatchInputEvent();
NotifyFormStateChanged();
SetNeedsValidityCheck();
SetAutofilled(false);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hrtick_clear(struct rq *rq)
{
if (hrtimer_active(&rq->hrtick_timer))
hrtimer_cancel(&rq->hrtick_timer);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OperationID FileSystemOperationRunner::MoveFileLocal(
const FileSystemURL& src_url,
const FileSystemURL& dest_url,
CopyOrMoveOption option,
StatusCallback callback) {
base::File::Error error = base::File::FILE_OK;
std::unique_ptr<FileSystemOperation> operation = base::WrapUnique(
file_system_context_->CreateFileSystemOperation(src_url, &error));
FileSystemOperation* operation_raw = operation.get();
OperationID id = BeginOperation(std::move(operation));
base::AutoReset<bool> beginning(&is_beginning_operation_, true);
if (!operation_raw) {
DidFinish(id, std::move(callback), error);
return id;
}
PrepareForWrite(id, src_url);
PrepareForWrite(id, dest_url);
operation_raw->MoveFileLocal(
src_url, dest_url, option,
base::BindOnce(&FileSystemOperationRunner::DidFinish, weak_ptr_, id,
std::move(callback)));
return id;
}
Commit Message: [FileSystem] Harden against overflows of OperationID a bit better.
Rather than having a UAF when OperationID overflows instead overwrite
the old operation with the new one. Can still cause weirdness, but at
least won't result in UAF. Also update OperationID to uint64_t to
make sure we don't overflow to begin with.
Bug: 925864
Change-Id: Ifdf3fa0935ab5ea8802d91bba39601f02b0dbdc9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1441498
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#627115}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 25,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned char WavpackGetFileFormat (WavpackContext *wpc)
{
return wpc->file_format;
}
Commit Message: fixes for 4 fuzz failures posted to SourceForge mailing list
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 28,438
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rpki_rtr_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *pptr, register u_int len)
{
u_int tlen, pdu_type, pdu_len;
const u_char *tptr;
const rpki_rtr_pdu *pdu_header;
tptr = pptr;
tlen = len;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RPKI-RTR"));
return;
}
while (tlen >= sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu));
pdu_header = (const rpki_rtr_pdu *)tptr;
pdu_type = pdu_header->pdu_type;
pdu_len = EXTRACT_32BITS(pdu_header->length);
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, pdu_len);
/* infinite loop check */
if (!pdu_type || !pdu_len) {
break;
}
if (tlen < pdu_len) {
goto trunc;
}
/*
* Print the PDU.
*/
if (rpki_rtr_pdu_print(ndo, tptr, 8))
goto trunc;
tlen -= pdu_len;
tptr += pdu_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13050/RPKI-Router: fix a few bugs
The decoder didn't properly check that the PDU length stored in the PDU
header is correct. The only check in place was in rpki_rtr_print() and it
tested whether the length is zero but that is not sufficient. Make all
necessary length and bounds checks, both generic and type-specific, in
rpki_rtr_pdu_print() and reduce rpki_rtr_print() to a simple loop.
This also fixes a minor bug and PDU type 0 (Serial Notify from RFC 6810
Section 5.2) is valid again.
In rpki_rtr_pdu_print() any protocol version was considered version 0,
fix it to skip the rest of input if the PDU protocol version is unknown.
Ibid, the PDU type 10 (Error Report from RFC 6810 Section 5.10) case
block didn't consider the "Length of Error Text" data element mandatory,
put it right.
Ibid, when printing an encapsulated PDU, give itself (via recursion)
respective buffer length to make it possible to tell whether the
encapsulated PDU fits. Do not recurse deeper than 2nd level.
Update prior RPKI-Router test cases that now stop to decode earlier
because of the stricter checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 10,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VirtualAuthenticator::GetUniqueId(GetUniqueIdCallback callback) {
std::move(callback).Run(unique_id_);
}
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 19,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String Location::toString() const {
USVStringOrTrustedURL result;
href(result);
DCHECK(result.IsUSVString());
return result.GetAsUSVString();
}
Commit Message: Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <acomminos@fb.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: send_set_info(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid, u32 pid, u8 info_class,
u8 info_type, u32 additional_info, unsigned int num,
void **data, unsigned int *size)
{
struct smb_rqst rqst;
struct smb2_set_info_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct kvec *iov;
struct kvec rsp_iov;
int rc = 0;
int resp_buftype;
struct cifs_ses *ses = tcon->ses;
int flags = 0;
if (!ses || !(ses->server))
return -EIO;
if (!num)
return -EINVAL;
if (smb3_encryption_required(tcon))
flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ;
iov = kmalloc_array(num, sizeof(struct kvec), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iov)
return -ENOMEM;
memset(&rqst, 0, sizeof(struct smb_rqst));
rqst.rq_iov = iov;
rqst.rq_nvec = num;
rc = SMB2_set_info_init(tcon, &rqst, persistent_fid, volatile_fid, pid,
info_class, info_type, additional_info,
data, size);
if (rc) {
kfree(iov);
return rc;
}
rc = cifs_send_recv(xid, ses, &rqst, &resp_buftype, flags,
&rsp_iov);
SMB2_set_info_free(&rqst);
rsp = (struct smb2_set_info_rsp *)rsp_iov.iov_base;
if (rc != 0) {
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_SET_INFO_HE);
trace_smb3_set_info_err(xid, persistent_fid, tcon->tid,
ses->Suid, info_class, (__u32)info_type, rc);
}
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
kfree(iov);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 7,643
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int CLASS fscanf(FILE *stream, const char *format, void *ptr) {
int count = ::fscanf(stream, format, ptr);
if ( count != 1 )
dcraw_message(DCRAW_WARNING, "%s: fscanf %d != 1\n",
ifname_display, count);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 17,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dbpageDisconnect(sqlite3_vtab *pVtab){
sqlite3_free(pVtab);
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 2,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jpc_streamlist_insert(jpc_streamlist_t *streamlist, int streamno,
jas_stream_t *stream)
{
jas_stream_t **newstreams;
int newmaxstreams;
int i;
/* Grow the array of streams if necessary. */
if (streamlist->numstreams >= streamlist->maxstreams) {
newmaxstreams = streamlist->maxstreams + 1024;
if (!(newstreams = jas_realloc2(streamlist->streams,
(newmaxstreams + 1024), sizeof(jas_stream_t *)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = streamlist->numstreams; i < streamlist->maxstreams; ++i) {
streamlist->streams[i] = 0;
}
streamlist->maxstreams = newmaxstreams;
streamlist->streams = newstreams;
}
if (streamno != streamlist->numstreams) {
/* Can only handle insertion at start of list. */
return -1;
}
streamlist->streams[streamno] = stream;
++streamlist->numstreams;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 3,385
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int wc_ecc_shared_secret_gen(ecc_key* private_key, ecc_point* point,
byte* out, word32 *outlen)
{
int err;
DECLARE_CURVE_SPECS(2)
if (private_key == NULL || point == NULL || out == NULL ||
outlen == NULL) {
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}
/* load curve info */
err = wc_ecc_curve_load(private_key->dp, &curve,
(ECC_CURVE_FIELD_PRIME | ECC_CURVE_FIELD_AF));
if (err != MP_OKAY)
return err;
#if defined(WOLFSSL_ASYNC_CRYPT) && defined(WC_ASYNC_ENABLE_ECC)
if (private_key->asyncDev.marker == WOLFSSL_ASYNC_MARKER_ECC) {
err = wc_ecc_shared_secret_gen_async(private_key, point,
out, outlen, curve);
}
else
#endif
{
err = wc_ecc_shared_secret_gen_sync(private_key, point,
out, outlen, curve);
}
wc_ecc_curve_free(curve);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irc_ctcp_recv_dcc (struct t_irc_server *server, const char *nick,
const char *arguments, char *message)
{
char *dcc_args, *pos, *pos_file, *pos_addr, *pos_port, *pos_size;
char *pos_start_resume, *filename;
struct t_infolist *infolist;
struct t_infolist_item *item;
char charset_modifier[256];
if (!arguments || !arguments[0])
return;
if (strncmp (arguments, "SEND ", 5) == 0)
{
arguments += 5;
while (arguments[0] == ' ')
{
arguments++;
}
dcc_args = strdup (arguments);
if (!dcc_args)
{
weechat_printf (
server->buffer,
_("%s%s: not enough memory for \"%s\" command"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, "privmsg");
return;
}
/* DCC filename */
pos_file = dcc_args;
while (pos_file[0] == ' ')
{
pos_file++;
}
/* look for file size */
pos_size = strrchr (pos_file, ' ');
if (!pos_size)
{
weechat_printf (
server->buffer,
_("%s%s: cannot parse \"%s\" command"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, "privmsg");
free (dcc_args);
return;
}
pos = pos_size;
pos_size++;
while (pos[0] == ' ')
{
pos--;
}
pos[1] = '\0';
/* look for DCC port */
pos_port = strrchr (pos_file, ' ');
if (!pos_port)
{
weechat_printf (
server->buffer,
_("%s%s: cannot parse \"%s\" command"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, "privmsg");
free (dcc_args);
return;
}
pos = pos_port;
pos_port++;
while (pos[0] == ' ')
{
pos--;
}
pos[1] = '\0';
/* look for DCC IP address */
pos_addr = strrchr (pos_file, ' ');
if (!pos_addr)
{
weechat_printf (
server->buffer,
_("%s%s: cannot parse \"%s\" command"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, "privmsg");
free (dcc_args);
return;
}
pos = pos_addr;
pos_addr++;
while (pos[0] == ' ')
{
pos--;
}
pos[1] = '\0';
/* remove double quotes around filename */
filename = irc_ctcp_dcc_filename_without_quotes (pos_file);
/* add DCC file via xfer plugin */
infolist = weechat_infolist_new ();
if (infolist)
{
item = weechat_infolist_new_item (infolist);
if (item)
{
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "plugin_name", weechat_plugin->name);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "plugin_id", server->name);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "type_string", "file_recv");
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "protocol_string", "dcc");
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "remote_nick", nick);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "local_nick", server->nick);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "filename",
(filename) ? filename : pos_file);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "size", pos_size);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "proxy",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_PROXY));
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "remote_address", pos_addr);
weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (item, "port", atoi (pos_port));
(void) weechat_hook_signal_send ("xfer_add",
WEECHAT_HOOK_SIGNAL_POINTER,
infolist);
}
weechat_infolist_free (infolist);
}
(void) weechat_hook_signal_send ("irc_dcc",
WEECHAT_HOOK_SIGNAL_STRING,
message);
if (filename)
free (filename);
free (dcc_args);
}
else if (strncmp (arguments, "RESUME ", 7) == 0)
{
arguments += 7;
while (arguments[0] == ' ')
{
arguments++;
}
dcc_args = strdup (arguments);
if (!dcc_args)
{
weechat_printf (
server->buffer,
_("%s%s: not enough memory for \"%s\" command"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, "privmsg");
return;
}
/* DCC filename */
pos_file = dcc_args;
while (pos_file[0] == ' ')
{
pos_file++;
}
/* look for resume start position */
pos_start_resume = strrchr (pos_file, ' ');
if (!pos_start_resume)
{
weechat_printf (
server->buffer,
_("%s%s: cannot parse \"%s\" command"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, "privmsg");
free (dcc_args);
return;
}
pos = pos_start_resume;
pos_start_resume++;
while (pos[0] == ' ')
{
pos--;
}
pos[1] = '\0';
/* look for DCC port */
pos_port = strrchr (pos_file, ' ');
if (!pos_port)
{
weechat_printf (
server->buffer,
_("%s%s: cannot parse \"%s\" command"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, "privmsg");
free (dcc_args);
return;
}
pos = pos_port;
pos_port++;
while (pos[0] == ' ')
{
pos--;
}
pos[1] = '\0';
/* remove double quotes around filename */
filename = irc_ctcp_dcc_filename_without_quotes (pos_file);
/* accept resume via xfer plugin */
infolist = weechat_infolist_new ();
if (infolist)
{
item = weechat_infolist_new_item (infolist);
if (item)
{
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "plugin_name", weechat_plugin->name);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "plugin_id", server->name);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "type_string", "file_recv");
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "filename",
(filename) ? filename : pos_file);
weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (item, "port", atoi (pos_port));
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "start_resume", pos_start_resume);
(void) weechat_hook_signal_send ("xfer_accept_resume",
WEECHAT_HOOK_SIGNAL_POINTER,
infolist);
}
weechat_infolist_free (infolist);
}
(void) weechat_hook_signal_send ("irc_dcc",
WEECHAT_HOOK_SIGNAL_STRING,
message);
if (filename)
free (filename);
free (dcc_args);
}
else if (strncmp (arguments, "ACCEPT ", 7) == 0)
{
arguments += 7;
while (arguments[0] == ' ')
{
arguments++;
}
dcc_args = strdup (arguments);
if (!dcc_args)
{
weechat_printf (
server->buffer,
_("%s%s: not enough memory for \"%s\" command"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, "privmsg");
return;
}
/* DCC filename */
pos_file = dcc_args;
while (pos_file[0] == ' ')
{
pos_file++;
}
/* look for resume start position */
pos_start_resume = strrchr (pos_file, ' ');
if (!pos_start_resume)
{
weechat_printf (
server->buffer,
_("%s%s: cannot parse \"%s\" command"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, "privmsg");
free (dcc_args);
return;
}
pos = pos_start_resume;
pos_start_resume++;
while (pos[0] == ' ')
{
pos--;
}
pos[1] = '\0';
/* look for DCC port */
pos_port = strrchr (pos_file, ' ');
if (!pos_port)
{
weechat_printf (
server->buffer,
_("%s%s: cannot parse \"%s\" command"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, "privmsg");
free (dcc_args);
return;
}
pos = pos_port;
pos_port++;
while (pos[0] == ' ')
{
pos--;
}
pos[1] = '\0';
/* remove double quotes around filename */
filename = irc_ctcp_dcc_filename_without_quotes (pos_file);
/* resume file via xfer plugin */
infolist = weechat_infolist_new ();
if (infolist)
{
item = weechat_infolist_new_item (infolist);
if (item)
{
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "plugin_name", weechat_plugin->name);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "plugin_id", server->name);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "type_string", "file_recv");
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "filename",
(filename) ? filename : pos_file);
weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (item, "port", atoi (pos_port));
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "start_resume", pos_start_resume);
(void) weechat_hook_signal_send ("xfer_start_resume",
WEECHAT_HOOK_SIGNAL_POINTER,
infolist);
}
weechat_infolist_free (infolist);
}
(void) weechat_hook_signal_send ("irc_dcc",
WEECHAT_HOOK_SIGNAL_STRING,
message);
if (filename)
free (filename);
free (dcc_args);
}
else if (strncmp (arguments, "CHAT ", 5) == 0)
{
arguments += 5;
while (arguments[0] == ' ')
{
arguments++;
}
dcc_args = strdup (arguments);
if (!dcc_args)
{
weechat_printf (
server->buffer,
_("%s%s: not enough memory for \"%s\" command"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, "privmsg");
return;
}
/* CHAT type */
pos_file = dcc_args;
while (pos_file[0] == ' ')
{
pos_file++;
}
/* DCC IP address */
pos_addr = strchr (pos_file, ' ');
if (!pos_addr)
{
weechat_printf (
server->buffer,
_("%s%s: cannot parse \"%s\" command"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, "privmsg");
free (dcc_args);
return;
}
pos_addr[0] = '\0';
pos_addr++;
while (pos_addr[0] == ' ')
{
pos_addr++;
}
/* look for DCC port */
pos_port = strchr (pos_addr, ' ');
if (!pos_port)
{
weechat_printf (
server->buffer,
_("%s%s: cannot parse \"%s\" command"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, "privmsg");
free (dcc_args);
return;
}
pos_port[0] = '\0';
pos_port++;
while (pos_port[0] == ' ')
{
pos_port++;
}
if (weechat_strcasecmp (pos_file, "chat") != 0)
{
weechat_printf (
server->buffer,
_("%s%s: unknown DCC CHAT type received from %s%s%s: \"%s\""),
weechat_prefix ("error"),
IRC_PLUGIN_NAME,
irc_nick_color_for_msg (server, 0, NULL, nick),
nick,
IRC_COLOR_RESET,
pos_file);
free (dcc_args);
return;
}
/* add DCC chat via xfer plugin */
infolist = weechat_infolist_new ();
if (infolist)
{
item = weechat_infolist_new_item (infolist);
if (item)
{
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "plugin_name", weechat_plugin->name);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "plugin_id", server->name);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "type_string", "chat_recv");
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "remote_nick", nick);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "local_nick", server->nick);
snprintf (charset_modifier, sizeof (charset_modifier),
"irc.%s.%s", server->name, nick);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "charset_modifier", charset_modifier);
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "proxy",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_PROXY));
weechat_infolist_new_var_string (item, "remote_address", pos_addr);
weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (item, "port", atoi (pos_port));
(void) weechat_hook_signal_send ("xfer_add",
WEECHAT_HOOK_SIGNAL_POINTER,
infolist);
}
weechat_infolist_free (infolist);
}
(void) weechat_hook_signal_send ("irc_dcc",
WEECHAT_HOOK_SIGNAL_STRING,
message);
free (dcc_args);
}
}
Commit Message: irc: fix parsing of DCC filename
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,489
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QStringList Smb4KGlobal::whitelistedMountArguments()
{
return p->whitelistedMountArguments;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,262
|
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