instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
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int64 0
30k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::DisableAutoResizeForTesting(const gfx::Size& new_size) {
OnDisableAutoResize(new_size);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,849
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::Form_OutputSelectedRect(FPDF_FORMFILLINFO* param,
FPDF_PAGE page,
double left,
double top,
double right,
double bottom) {
PDFiumEngine* engine = static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(param);
int page_index = engine->GetVisiblePageIndex(page);
if (page_index == -1) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
pp::Rect rect = engine->pages_[page_index]->PageToScreen(
engine->GetVisibleRect().point(), engine->current_zoom_, left, top, right,
bottom, engine->current_rotation_);
engine->form_highlights_.push_back(rect);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 5,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fit(peer_t *p, double rd)
{
if ((p->reachable_bits & (p->reachable_bits-1)) == 0) {
/* One or zero bits in reachable_bits */
VERB4 bb_error_msg("peer %s unfit for selection: unreachable", p->p_dotted);
return 0;
}
#if 0 /* we filter out such packets earlier */
if ((p->lastpkt_status & LI_ALARM) == LI_ALARM
|| p->lastpkt_stratum >= MAXSTRAT
) {
VERB4 bb_error_msg("peer %s unfit for selection: bad status/stratum", p->p_dotted);
return 0;
}
#endif
/* rd is root_distance(p) */
if (rd > MAXDIST + FREQ_TOLERANCE * (1 << G.poll_exp)) {
VERB4 bb_error_msg("peer %s unfit for selection: root distance too high", p->p_dotted);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mem_cgroup_sockets_init(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, struct cgroup_subsys *ss)
{
struct proto *proto;
int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&proto_list_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(proto, &proto_list, node) {
if (proto->init_cgroup) {
ret = proto->init_cgroup(memcg, ss);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&proto_list_mutex);
return ret;
out:
list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(proto, &proto_list, node)
if (proto->destroy_cgroup)
proto->destroy_cgroup(memcg);
mutex_unlock(&proto_list_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool omx_video::omx_c2d_conv::open(unsigned int height,unsigned int width,
ColorConvertFormat src, ColorConvertFormat dest,unsigned int src_stride)
{
bool status = false;
pthread_mutex_lock(&c_lock);
if (!c2dcc) {
c2dcc = mConvertOpen(width, height, width, height,
src,dest,0,src_stride);
if (c2dcc) {
src_format = src;
status = true;
} else
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("mConvertOpen failed");
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c_lock);
return status;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 14,193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserWindowGtk::IsFullscreenBubbleVisible() const {
return fullscreen_exit_bubble_ != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int llcp_sock_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock,
int flags)
{
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
struct sock *sk = sock->sk, *new_sk;
long timeo;
int ret = 0;
pr_debug("parent %p\n", sk);
lock_sock_nested(sk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
if (sk->sk_state != LLCP_LISTEN) {
ret = -EBADFD;
goto error;
}
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & O_NONBLOCK);
/* Wait for an incoming connection. */
add_wait_queue_exclusive(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
while (!(new_sk = nfc_llcp_accept_dequeue(sk, newsock))) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (!timeo) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
ret = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo);
lock_sock_nested(sk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
if (ret)
goto error;
newsock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
pr_debug("new socket %p\n", new_sk);
error:
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFC: llcp: fix info leaks via msg_name in llcp_sock_recvmsg()
The code in llcp_sock_recvmsg() does not initialize all the members of
struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp when filling the sockaddr info. Nor does it
initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by the compiler
for alignment.
Also, if the socket is in state LLCP_CLOSED or is shutting down during
receive the msg_namelen member is not updated to 0 while otherwise
returning with 0, i.e. "success". The msg_namelen update is also
missing for stream and seqpacket sockets which don't fill the sockaddr
info.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info
with memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early.
It will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 14,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContentsImpl::GetLastCommittedNavigationEntryForRenderManager() {
return controller_.GetLastCommittedEntry();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Resource::CachedMetadataHandlerImpl::SendToPlatform() {
if (cached_metadata_) {
const Vector<char>& serialized_data = cached_metadata_->SerializedData();
Platform::Current()->CacheMetadata(response_url_, response_time_,
serialized_data.data(),
serialized_data.size());
} else {
Platform::Current()->CacheMetadata(response_url_, response_time_, nullptr,
0);
}
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::MediaMutedStatusChanged(
const WebContentsObserver::MediaPlayerId& id,
bool muted) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.MediaMutedStatusChanged(id, muted);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 13,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int is_disabled(void)
{
u64 vm_cr;
rdmsrl(MSR_VM_CR, vm_cr);
if (vm_cr & (1 << SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DISABLE))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iasecc_select_aid(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_aid *aid, unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char apdu_resp[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
int rv;
/* Select application (deselect previously selected application) */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x00);
apdu.lc = aid->len;
apdu.data = aid->value;
apdu.datalen = aid->len;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(apdu_resp);
apdu.resp = apdu_resp;
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "Cannot select AID");
if (*out_len < apdu.resplen)
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, "Cannot select AID");
memcpy(out, apdu.resp, apdu.resplen);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 22,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int expandRegular(rpmfi fi, const char *dest, rpmpsm psm, int nodigest, int nocontent)
{
FD_t wfd = NULL;
int rc = 0;
/* Create the file with 0200 permissions (write by owner). */
{
mode_t old_umask = umask(0577);
wfd = Fopen(dest, "w.ufdio");
umask(old_umask);
}
if (Ferror(wfd)) {
rc = RPMERR_OPEN_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
if (!nocontent)
rc = rpmfiArchiveReadToFilePsm(fi, wfd, nodigest, psm);
exit:
if (wfd) {
int myerrno = errno;
Fclose(wfd);
errno = myerrno;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Don't follow symlinks on file creation (CVE-2017-7501)
Open newly created files with O_EXCL to prevent symlink tricks.
When reopening hardlinks for writing the actual content, use append
mode instead. This is compatible with the write-only permissions but
is not destructive in case we got redirected to somebody elses file,
verify the target before actually writing anything.
As these are files with the temporary suffix, errors mean a local
user with sufficient privileges to break the installation of the package
anyway is trying to goof us on purpose, don't bother trying to mend it
(we couldn't fix the hardlink case anyhow) but just bail out.
Based on a patch by Florian Festi.
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 1
| 9,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void write_response(ESPState *s)
{
trace_esp_write_response(s->status);
s->ti_buf[0] = s->status;
s->ti_buf[1] = 0;
if (s->dma) {
s->dma_memory_write(s->dma_opaque, s->ti_buf, 2);
s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] = STAT_TC | STAT_ST;
s->rregs[ESP_RINTR] = INTR_BS | INTR_FC;
s->rregs[ESP_RSEQ] = SEQ_CD;
} else {
s->ti_size = 2;
s->ti_rptr = 0;
s->ti_wptr = 2;
s->rregs[ESP_RFLAGS] = 2;
}
esp_raise_irq(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 3,241
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Plugin::StartProxiedExecution(NaClSrpcChannel* srpc_channel,
ErrorInfo* error_info) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::StartProxiedExecution (srpc_channel=%p)\n",
static_cast<void*>(srpc_channel)));
HistogramStartupTimeMedium(
"NaCl.Perf.StartupTime.NaClOverhead",
static_cast<float>(NaClGetTimeOfDayMicroseconds() - init_time_)
/ NACL_MICROS_PER_MILLI);
NaClSrpcService* client_service = srpc_channel->client;
if (NaClSrpcServiceMethodIndex(client_service,
"PPP_InitializeModule:ihs:i") ==
kNaClSrpcInvalidMethodIndex) {
error_info->SetReport(
ERROR_START_PROXY_CHECK_PPP,
"could not find PPP_InitializeModule() - toolchain version mismatch?");
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::StartProxiedExecution (%s)\n",
error_info->message().c_str()));
return false;
}
nacl::scoped_ptr<BrowserPpp> ppapi_proxy(new BrowserPpp(srpc_channel, this));
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::StartProxiedExecution (ppapi_proxy=%p)\n",
static_cast<void*>(ppapi_proxy.get())));
if (ppapi_proxy.get() == NULL) {
error_info->SetReport(ERROR_START_PROXY_ALLOC,
"could not allocate proxy memory.");
return false;
}
pp::Module* module = pp::Module::Get();
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::StartProxiedExecution (module=%p)\n",
static_cast<void*>(module)));
CHECK(module != NULL); // We could not have gotten past init stage otherwise.
int32_t pp_error =
ppapi_proxy->InitializeModule(module->pp_module(),
module->get_browser_interface());
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::StartProxiedExecution (pp_error=%"
NACL_PRId32")\n", pp_error));
if (pp_error != PP_OK) {
error_info->SetReport(ERROR_START_PROXY_MODULE,
"could not initialize module.");
return false;
}
const PPP_Instance* instance_interface =
ppapi_proxy->ppp_instance_interface();
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::StartProxiedExecution (ppp_instance=%p)\n",
static_cast<const void*>(instance_interface)));
CHECK(instance_interface != NULL); // Verified on module initialization.
PP_Bool did_create = instance_interface->DidCreate(
pp_instance(),
argc(),
const_cast<const char**>(argn()),
const_cast<const char**>(argv()));
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::StartProxiedExecution (did_create=%d)\n",
did_create));
if (did_create == PP_FALSE) {
error_info->SetReport(ERROR_START_PROXY_INSTANCE,
"could not create instance.");
return false;
}
ppapi_proxy_ = ppapi_proxy.release();
find_adapter_.reset(new FindAdapter(this));
mouse_lock_adapter_.reset(new MouseLockAdapter(this));
printing_adapter_.reset(new PrintingAdapter(this));
selection_adapter_.reset(new SelectionAdapter(this));
widget_client_adapter_.reset(new WidgetClientAdapter(this));
zoom_adapter_.reset(new ZoomAdapter(this));
if (!view_to_replay_.is_null()) {
DidChangeView(view_to_replay_);
view_to_replay_ = pp::View();
}
if (!document_load_to_replay_.is_null()) {
HandleDocumentLoad(document_load_to_replay_);
document_load_to_replay_ = pp::URLLoader();
}
bool is_valid_proxy = BrowserPpp::is_valid(ppapi_proxy_);
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::StartProxiedExecution (is_valid_proxy=%d)\n",
is_valid_proxy));
if (!is_valid_proxy) {
error_info->SetReport(ERROR_START_PROXY_CRASH,
"instance crashed after creation.");
}
return is_valid_proxy;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_oxms(struct ofpbuf *payload, bool loose,
struct mf_bitmap *exactp, struct mf_bitmap *maskedp)
{
struct mf_bitmap exact = MF_BITMAP_INITIALIZER;
struct mf_bitmap masked = MF_BITMAP_INITIALIZER;
while (payload->size > 0) {
const struct mf_field *field;
enum ofperr error;
bool hasmask;
error = nx_pull_header(payload, NULL, &field, &hasmask);
if (!error) {
bitmap_set1(hasmask ? masked.bm : exact.bm, field->id);
} else if (error != OFPERR_OFPBMC_BAD_FIELD || !loose) {
return error;
}
}
if (exactp) {
*exactp = exact;
} else if (!bitmap_is_all_zeros(exact.bm, MFF_N_IDS)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBMC_BAD_MASK;
}
if (maskedp) {
*maskedp = masked;
} else if (!bitmap_is_all_zeros(masked.bm, MFF_N_IDS)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBMC_BAD_MASK;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 8,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int gtco_input_open(struct input_dev *inputdev)
{
struct gtco *device = input_get_drvdata(inputdev);
device->urbinfo->dev = device->usbdev;
if (usb_submit_urb(device->urbinfo, GFP_KERNEL))
return -EIO;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: gtco - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The gtco driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given malicious
descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints, it will crash in
the probe function. Ensure there is at least one endpoint on the interface
before using it.
Also let's fix a minor coding style issue.
The full correct report of this issue can be found in the public
Red Hat Bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1283385
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LiveSyncTest::TearDownLocalTestServer() {
if (test_server_handle_ != base::kNullProcessHandle) {
EXPECT_TRUE(base::KillProcess(test_server_handle_, 0, false))
<< "Could not stop local test server.";
base::CloseProcessHandle(test_server_handle_);
test_server_handle_ = base::kNullProcessHandle;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct kvm_vcpu *svm_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm;
struct page *page;
struct page *msrpm_pages;
struct page *hsave_page;
struct page *nested_msrpm_pages;
int err;
svm = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!svm) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
svm->tsc_ratio = TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT;
err = kvm_vcpu_init(&svm->vcpu, kvm, id);
if (err)
goto free_svm;
err = -ENOMEM;
page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
goto uninit;
msrpm_pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
if (!msrpm_pages)
goto free_page1;
nested_msrpm_pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
if (!nested_msrpm_pages)
goto free_page2;
hsave_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hsave_page)
goto free_page3;
svm->nested.hsave = page_address(hsave_page);
svm->msrpm = page_address(msrpm_pages);
svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(svm->msrpm);
svm->nested.msrpm = page_address(nested_msrpm_pages);
svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(svm->nested.msrpm);
svm->vmcb = page_address(page);
clear_page(svm->vmcb);
svm->vmcb_pa = page_to_pfn(page) << PAGE_SHIFT;
svm->asid_generation = 0;
init_vmcb(svm);
svm->vcpu.arch.apic_base = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE |
MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE;
if (kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(&svm->vcpu))
svm->vcpu.arch.apic_base |= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP;
svm_init_osvw(&svm->vcpu);
return &svm->vcpu;
free_page3:
__free_pages(nested_msrpm_pages, MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
free_page2:
__free_pages(msrpm_pages, MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
free_page1:
__free_page(page);
uninit:
kvm_vcpu_uninit(&svm->vcpu);
free_svm:
kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm);
out:
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int am_postdir_cleanup(request_rec *r)
{
am_mod_cfg_rec *mod_cfg;
apr_dir_t *postdir;
apr_status_t rv;
char error_buffer[64];
apr_finfo_t afi;
char *fname;
int count;
apr_time_t expire_before;
mod_cfg = am_get_mod_cfg(r->server);
/* The oldes file we should keep. Delete files that are older. */
expire_before = apr_time_now() - mod_cfg->post_ttl * APR_USEC_PER_SEC;
/*
* Open our POST directory or create it.
*/
rv = apr_dir_open(&postdir, mod_cfg->post_dir, r->pool);
if (rv != 0) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Unable to open MellonPostDirectory \"%s\": %s",
mod_cfg->post_dir,
apr_strerror(rv, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)));
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
/*
* Purge outdated items
*/
count = 0;
do {
rv = apr_dir_read(&afi, APR_FINFO_NAME|APR_FINFO_CTIME, postdir);
if (rv != OK)
break;
/* Skip dot_files */
if (afi.name[0] == '.')
continue;
if (afi.ctime < expire_before) {
fname = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "%s/%s", mod_cfg->post_dir, afi.name);
(void)apr_file_remove(fname , r->pool);
} else {
count++;
}
} while (1 /* CONSTCOND */);
(void)apr_dir_close(postdir);
if (count >= mod_cfg->post_count) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Too many saved POST sessions. "
"Increase MellonPostCount directive.");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601
| 0
| 5,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_wait_for_connect(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p)
{
struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
int err = 0;
long current_timeo = *timeo_p;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
pr_debug("%s: asoc:%p, timeo:%ld\n", __func__, asoc, *timeo_p);
/* Increment the association's refcnt. */
sctp_association_hold(asoc);
for (;;) {
prepare_to_wait_exclusive(&asoc->wait, &wait,
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (!*timeo_p)
goto do_nonblock;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
break;
if (sk->sk_err || asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING ||
asoc->base.dead)
goto do_error;
if (signal_pending(current))
goto do_interrupted;
if (sctp_state(asoc, ESTABLISHED))
break;
/* Let another process have a go. Since we are going
* to sleep anyway.
*/
release_sock(sk);
current_timeo = schedule_timeout(current_timeo);
lock_sock(sk);
*timeo_p = current_timeo;
}
out:
finish_wait(&asoc->wait, &wait);
/* Release the association's refcnt. */
sctp_association_put(asoc);
return err;
do_error:
if (asoc->init_err_counter + 1 > asoc->max_init_attempts)
err = -ETIMEDOUT;
else
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
goto out;
do_interrupted:
err = sock_intr_errno(*timeo_p);
goto out;
do_nonblock:
err = -EINPROGRESS;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 10,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs_read(struct device_d *dev, FILE *file, void *buf, size_t insize)
{
struct file_priv *priv = file->priv;
if (insize > 1024)
insize = 1024;
if (insize && !kfifo_len(priv->fifo)) {
int ret = nfs_read_req(priv, file->pos, insize);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return kfifo_get(priv->fifo, buf, insize);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,856
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: string_strncasecmp_range (const char *string1, const char *string2, int max,
int range)
{
int count, diff;
if (!string1 || !string2)
return (string1) ? 1 : ((string2) ? -1 : 0);
count = 0;
while ((count < max) && string1[0] && string2[0])
{
diff = utf8_charcasecmp_range (string1, string2, range);
if (diff != 0)
return diff;
string1 = utf8_next_char (string1);
string2 = utf8_next_char (string2);
count++;
}
if (count >= max)
return 0;
else
return (string1[0]) ? 1 : ((string2[0]) ? -1 : 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLSelectElement::recalcListItems(bool updateSelectedStates) const
{
m_listItems.clear();
m_shouldRecalcListItems = false;
HTMLOptionElement* foundSelected = 0;
HTMLOptionElement* firstOption = 0;
for (Element* currentElement = ElementTraversal::firstWithin(this); currentElement; ) {
if (!currentElement->isHTMLElement()) {
currentElement = ElementTraversal::nextSkippingChildren(currentElement, this);
continue;
}
HTMLElement* current = toHTMLElement(currentElement);
if (isHTMLOptGroupElement(current)) {
m_listItems.append(current);
if (Element* nextElement = ElementTraversal::firstWithin(current)) {
currentElement = nextElement;
continue;
}
}
if (current->hasTagName(optionTag)) {
m_listItems.append(current);
if (updateSelectedStates && !m_multiple) {
HTMLOptionElement* option = toHTMLOptionElement(current);
if (!firstOption)
firstOption = option;
if (option->selected()) {
if (foundSelected)
foundSelected->setSelectedState(false);
foundSelected = option;
} else if (m_size <= 1 && !foundSelected && !option->isDisabledFormControl()) {
foundSelected = option;
foundSelected->setSelectedState(true);
}
}
}
if (current->hasTagName(hrTag))
m_listItems.append(current);
currentElement = ElementTraversal::nextSkippingChildren(currentElement, this);
}
if (!foundSelected && m_size <= 1 && firstOption && !firstOption->selected())
firstOption->setSelectedState(true);
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 2,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_connection_info(int populate, int use_dns)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
static struct connection_info ci;
if (!populate)
return &ci;
ci.host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
ci.address = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
ci.laddress = ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh);
ci.lport = ssh_local_port(ssh);
return &ci;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_get_frame_dimensions(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl,
void *pv_api_ip,
void *pv_api_op)
{
ih264d_ctl_get_frame_dimensions_ip_t *ps_ip;
ih264d_ctl_get_frame_dimensions_op_t *ps_op;
dec_struct_t *ps_dec = dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle;
UWORD32 disp_wd, disp_ht, buffer_wd, buffer_ht, x_offset, y_offset;
ps_ip = (ih264d_ctl_get_frame_dimensions_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_op = (ih264d_ctl_get_frame_dimensions_op_t *)pv_api_op;
UNUSED(ps_ip);
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_is_valid)))
{
disp_wd = ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
disp_ht = ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
buffer_wd = disp_wd;
buffer_ht = disp_ht;
}
else
{
buffer_wd = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y;
buffer_ht = ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_y;
}
}
else
{
disp_wd = 0;
disp_ht = 0;
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
buffer_wd = disp_wd;
buffer_ht = disp_ht;
}
else
{
buffer_wd = ALIGN16(disp_wd) + (PAD_LEN_Y_H << 1);
buffer_ht = ALIGN16(disp_ht) + (PAD_LEN_Y_V << 2);
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disp_width > buffer_wd)
buffer_wd = ps_dec->u4_app_disp_width;
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
x_offset = 0;
y_offset = 0;
}
else
{
y_offset = (PAD_LEN_Y_V << 1);
x_offset = PAD_LEN_Y_H;
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_is_valid))
&& (0 != ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_y))
{
y_offset += ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_y / ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y;
x_offset += ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_y % ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y;
}
}
ps_op->u4_disp_wd[0] = disp_wd;
ps_op->u4_disp_ht[0] = disp_ht;
ps_op->u4_buffer_wd[0] = buffer_wd;
ps_op->u4_buffer_ht[0] = buffer_ht;
ps_op->u4_x_offset[0] = x_offset;
ps_op->u4_y_offset[0] = y_offset;
ps_op->u4_disp_wd[1] = ps_op->u4_disp_wd[2] = ((ps_op->u4_disp_wd[0] + 1)
>> 1);
ps_op->u4_disp_ht[1] = ps_op->u4_disp_ht[2] = ((ps_op->u4_disp_ht[0] + 1)
>> 1);
ps_op->u4_buffer_wd[1] = ps_op->u4_buffer_wd[2] = (ps_op->u4_buffer_wd[0]
>> 1);
ps_op->u4_buffer_ht[1] = ps_op->u4_buffer_ht[2] = (ps_op->u4_buffer_ht[0]
>> 1);
ps_op->u4_x_offset[1] = ps_op->u4_x_offset[2] =
(ps_op->u4_x_offset[0] >> 1);
ps_op->u4_y_offset[1] = ps_op->u4_y_offset[2] =
(ps_op->u4_y_offset[0] >> 1);
if((ps_dec->u1_chroma_format == IV_YUV_420SP_UV)
|| (ps_dec->u1_chroma_format == IV_YUV_420SP_VU))
{
ps_op->u4_disp_wd[2] = 0;
ps_op->u4_disp_ht[2] = 0;
ps_op->u4_buffer_wd[2] = 0;
ps_op->u4_buffer_ht[2] = 0;
ps_op->u4_x_offset[2] = 0;
ps_op->u4_y_offset[2] = 0;
ps_op->u4_disp_wd[1] <<= 1;
ps_op->u4_buffer_wd[1] <<= 1;
ps_op->u4_x_offset[1] <<= 1;
}
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fixed error concealment when no MBs are decoded in the current pic
Bug: 29493002
Change-Id: I3fae547ddb0616b4e6579580985232bd3d65881e
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 19,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 avc_emulation_bytes_remove_count(const char *buffer, u32 nal_size)
{
u32 i = 0, emulation_bytes_count = 0;
u8 num_zero = 0;
while (i < nal_size)
{
/*ISO 14496-10: "Within the NAL unit, any four-byte sequence that starts with 0x000003
other than the following sequences shall not occur at any byte-aligned position:
\96 0x00000300
\96 0x00000301
\96 0x00000302
\96 0x00000303"
*/
if (num_zero == 2
&& buffer[i] == 0x03
&& i+1 < nal_size /*next byte is readable*/
&& buffer[i+1] < 0x04)
{
/*emulation code found*/
num_zero = 0;
emulation_bytes_count++;
i++;
}
if (!buffer[i])
num_zero++;
else
num_zero = 0;
i++;
}
return emulation_bytes_count;
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,053
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gdImageHLine(gdImagePtr im, int y, int x1, int x2, int col)
{
if (im->thick > 1) {
int thickhalf = im->thick >> 1;
_gdImageFilledHRectangle(im, x1, y - thickhalf, x2, y + im->thick - thickhalf - 1, col);
} else {
if (x2 < x1) {
int t = x2;
x2 = x1;
x1 = t;
}
for (; x1 <= x2; x1++) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x1, y, col);
}
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jas_matrix_asl(jas_matrix_t *matrix, int n)
{
int i;
int j;
jas_seqent_t *rowstart;
int rowstep;
jas_seqent_t *data;
if (jas_matrix_numrows(matrix) > 0 && jas_matrix_numcols(matrix) > 0) {
assert(matrix->rows_);
rowstep = jas_matrix_rowstep(matrix);
for (i = matrix->numrows_, rowstart = matrix->rows_[0]; i > 0; --i,
rowstart += rowstep) {
for (j = matrix->numcols_, data = rowstart; j > 0; --j,
++data) {
*data = jas_seqent_asl(*data, n);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 3,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf14_rgbspot_get_color_mapping_procs(const gx_device * dev)
{
return &pdf14_DeviceRGBspot_procs;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 4,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sock *ax25_find_listener(ax25_address *addr, int digi,
struct net_device *dev, int type)
{
ax25_cb *s;
spin_lock(&ax25_list_lock);
ax25_for_each(s, &ax25_list) {
if ((s->iamdigi && !digi) || (!s->iamdigi && digi))
continue;
if (s->sk && !ax25cmp(&s->source_addr, addr) &&
s->sk->sk_type == type && s->sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
/* If device is null we match any device */
if (s->ax25_dev == NULL || s->ax25_dev->dev == dev) {
sock_hold(s->sk);
spin_unlock(&ax25_list_lock);
return s->sk;
}
}
}
spin_unlock(&ax25_list_lock);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ax25: fix info leak via msg_name in ax25_recvmsg()
When msg_namelen is non-zero the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Additionally the
msg_namelen value is updated to sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25) but is
not always filled up to this size.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,352
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int add_index_stringl(zval *arg, ulong index, const char *str, uint length, int duplicate) /* {{{ */
{
zval *tmp;
if (UNEXPECTED(length > INT_MAX)) {
zend_error_noreturn(E_ERROR, "String overflow, max size is %d", INT_MAX);
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(tmp, str, length, duplicate);
return zend_hash_index_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(arg), index, (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 6,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(copy)
{
char *source, *target;
int source_len, target_len;
zval *zcontext = NULL;
php_stream_context *context;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "pp|r", &source, &source_len, &target, &target_len, &zcontext) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(source TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
context = php_stream_context_from_zval(zcontext, 0);
if (php_copy_file_ctx(source, target, 0, context TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 21,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String Location::toString() const {
USVStringOrTrustedURL result;
href(result);
DCHECK(result.IsUSVString());
return result.GetAsUSVString();
}
Commit Message: Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <acomminos@fb.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dn_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err;
lock_sock(sk);
err = __dn_setsockopt(sock, level, optname, optval, optlen, 0);
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int netlink_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
unsigned int val = 0;
int err;
if (level != SOL_NETLINK)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (optlen >= sizeof(int) &&
get_user(val, (unsigned int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
switch (optname) {
case NETLINK_PKTINFO:
if (val)
nlk->flags |= NETLINK_RECV_PKTINFO;
else
nlk->flags &= ~NETLINK_RECV_PKTINFO;
err = 0;
break;
case NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP:
case NETLINK_DROP_MEMBERSHIP: {
if (!netlink_capable(sock, NL_NONROOT_RECV))
return -EPERM;
err = netlink_realloc_groups(sk);
if (err)
return err;
if (!val || val - 1 >= nlk->ngroups)
return -EINVAL;
netlink_table_grab();
netlink_update_socket_mc(nlk, val,
optname == NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP);
netlink_table_ungrab();
if (nlk->netlink_bind)
nlk->netlink_bind(val);
err = 0;
break;
}
case NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR:
if (val)
nlk->flags |= NETLINK_BROADCAST_SEND_ERROR;
else
nlk->flags &= ~NETLINK_BROADCAST_SEND_ERROR;
err = 0;
break;
case NETLINK_NO_ENOBUFS:
if (val) {
nlk->flags |= NETLINK_RECV_NO_ENOBUFS;
clear_bit(0, &nlk->state);
wake_up_interruptible(&nlk->wait);
} else {
nlk->flags &= ~NETLINK_RECV_NO_ENOBUFS;
}
err = 0;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 7,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseTryOrFinish(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int terminate) {
int ret = 0;
int avail, tlen;
xmlChar cur, next;
const xmlChar *lastlt, *lastgt;
if (ctxt->input == NULL)
return(0);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
switch (ctxt->instate) {
case XML_PARSER_EOF:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try EOF\n"); break;
case XML_PARSER_START:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try START\n"); break;
case XML_PARSER_MISC:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try MISC\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_COMMENT:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try COMMENT\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_PROLOG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try PROLOG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_START_TAG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try START_TAG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_CONTENT:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try CONTENT\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try CDATA_SECTION\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_END_TAG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try END_TAG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_DECL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try ENTITY_DECL\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try ENTITY_VALUE\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try ATTRIBUTE_VALUE\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_DTD:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try DTD\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_EPILOG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try EPILOG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_PI:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try PI\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_IGNORE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try IGNORE\n");break;
}
#endif
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base > 4096)) {
xmlSHRINK(ctxt);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
}
xmlParseGetLasts(ctxt, &lastlt, &lastgt);
while (1) {
if ((ctxt->errNo != XML_ERR_OK) && (ctxt->disableSAX == 1))
return(0);
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
if (ctxt->input == NULL) break;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else {
/*
* If we are operating on converted input, try to flush
* remainng chars to avoid them stalling in the non-converted
* buffer.
*/
if ((ctxt->input->buf->raw != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf->raw->use > 0)) {
int base = ctxt->input->base -
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content;
int current = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
xmlParserInputBufferPush(ctxt->input->buf, 0, "");
ctxt->input->base = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content + base;
ctxt->input->cur = ctxt->input->base + current;
ctxt->input->end =
&ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content[
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use];
}
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
}
if (avail < 1)
goto done;
switch (ctxt->instate) {
case XML_PARSER_EOF:
/*
* Document parsing is done !
*/
goto done;
case XML_PARSER_START:
if (ctxt->charset == XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlChar start[4];
xmlCharEncoding enc;
/*
* Very first chars read from the document flow.
*/
if (avail < 4)
goto done;
/*
* Get the 4 first bytes and decode the charset
* if enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE
* plug some encoding conversion routines,
* else xmlSwitchEncoding will set to (default)
* UTF8.
*/
start[0] = RAW;
start[1] = NXT(1);
start[2] = NXT(2);
start[3] = NXT(3);
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(start, 4);
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
break;
}
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if (cur == 0) {
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData,
&xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering EOF\n");
#endif
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
/* PI or XML decl */
if (avail < 5) return(ret);
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
return(ret);
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData,
&xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
if ((ctxt->input->cur[2] == 'x') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == 'm') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[4] == 'l') &&
(IS_BLANK_CH(ctxt->input->cur[5]))) {
ret += 5;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing XML Decl\n");
#endif
xmlParseXMLDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right
* here
*/
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
return(0);
}
ctxt->standalone = ctxt->input->standalone;
if ((ctxt->encoding == NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->encoding != NULL))
ctxt->encoding = xmlStrdup(ctxt->input->encoding);
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering MISC\n");
#endif
} else {
ctxt->version = xmlCharStrdup(XML_DEFAULT_VERSION);
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering MISC\n");
#endif
}
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData,
&xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
ctxt->version = xmlCharStrdup(XML_DEFAULT_VERSION);
if (ctxt->version == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
break;
}
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering MISC\n");
#endif
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_START_TAG: {
const xmlChar *name;
const xmlChar *prefix = NULL;
const xmlChar *URI = NULL;
int nsNr = ctxt->nsNr;
if ((avail < 2) && (ctxt->inputNr == 1))
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
if (cur != '<') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
if (!terminate) {
if (ctxt->progressive) {
/* > can be found unescaped in attribute values */
if ((lastgt == NULL) || (ctxt->input->cur >= lastgt))
goto done;
} else if (xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '>', 0, 0) < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
if (ctxt->spaceNr == 0)
spacePush(ctxt, -1);
else if (*ctxt->space == -2)
spacePush(ctxt, -1);
else
spacePush(ctxt, *ctxt->space);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
if (ctxt->sax2)
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
name = xmlParseStartTag2(ctxt, &prefix, &URI, &tlen);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
name = xmlParseStartTag(ctxt);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
goto done;
if (name == NULL) {
spacePop(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
#ifdef LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED
/*
* [ VC: Root Element Type ]
* The Name in the document type declaration must match
* the element type of the root element.
*/
if (ctxt->validate && ctxt->wellFormed && ctxt->myDoc &&
ctxt->node && (ctxt->node == ctxt->myDoc->children))
ctxt->valid &= xmlValidateRoot(&ctxt->vctxt, ctxt->myDoc);
#endif /* LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED */
/*
* Check for an Empty Element.
*/
if ((RAW == '/') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
if (ctxt->sax2) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->endElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElementNs(ctxt->userData, name,
prefix, URI);
if (ctxt->nsNr - nsNr > 0)
nsPop(ctxt, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->endElement != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElement(ctxt->userData, name);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
}
spacePop(ctxt);
if (ctxt->nameNr == 0) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
}
break;
}
if (RAW == '>') {
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED,
"Couldn't find end of Start Tag %s\n",
name);
nodePop(ctxt);
spacePop(ctxt);
}
if (ctxt->sax2)
nameNsPush(ctxt, name, prefix, URI, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
namePush(ctxt, name);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_CONTENT: {
const xmlChar *test;
unsigned int cons;
if ((avail < 2) && (ctxt->inputNr == 1))
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
test = CUR_PTR;
cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '/')) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_END_TAG;
break;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next != '!')) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
break;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
int term;
if (avail < 4)
goto done;
ctxt->input->cur += 4;
term = xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>');
ctxt->input->cur -= 4;
if ((!terminate) && (term < 0))
goto done;
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (ctxt->input->cur[1] == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '[') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == 'C') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[4] == 'D') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[5] == 'A') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[6] == 'T') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[7] == 'A') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[8] == '[')) {
SKIP(9);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION;
break;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 9)) {
goto done;
} else if (cur == '&') {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, ';', 0, 0) < 0))
goto done;
xmlParseReference(ctxt);
} else {
/* TODO Avoid the extra copy, handle directly !!! */
/*
* Goal of the following test is:
* - minimize calls to the SAX 'character' callback
* when they are mergeable
* - handle an problem for isBlank when we only parse
* a sequence of blank chars and the next one is
* not available to check against '<' presence.
* - tries to homogenize the differences in SAX
* callbacks between the push and pull versions
* of the parser.
*/
if ((ctxt->inputNr == 1) &&
(avail < XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE)) {
if (!terminate) {
if (ctxt->progressive) {
if ((lastlt == NULL) ||
(ctxt->input->cur > lastlt))
goto done;
} else if (xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt,
'<', 0, 0) < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
}
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
xmlParseCharData(ctxt, 0);
}
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
if ((cons == ctxt->input->consumed) && (test == CUR_PTR)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"detected an error in element content\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
break;
}
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_END_TAG:
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
if (!terminate) {
if (ctxt->progressive) {
/* > can be found unescaped in attribute values */
if ((lastgt == NULL) || (ctxt->input->cur >= lastgt))
goto done;
} else if (xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '>', 0, 0) < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
if (ctxt->sax2) {
xmlParseEndTag2(ctxt,
(void *) ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3 - 3],
(void *) ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3 - 2], 0,
(int) (long) ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3 - 1], 0);
nameNsPop(ctxt);
}
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
xmlParseEndTag1(ctxt, 0);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
/* Nothing */
} else if (ctxt->nameNr == 0) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION: {
/*
* The Push mode need to have the SAX callback for
* cdataBlock merge back contiguous callbacks.
*/
int base;
base = xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, ']', ']', '>');
if (base < 0) {
if (avail >= XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE + 2) {
int tmp;
tmp = xmlCheckCdataPush(ctxt->input->cur,
XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE);
if (tmp < 0) {
tmp = -tmp;
ctxt->input->cur += tmp;
goto encoding_error;
}
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL)
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, tmp);
else if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, tmp);
}
SKIPL(tmp);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
}
goto done;
} else {
int tmp;
tmp = xmlCheckCdataPush(ctxt->input->cur, base);
if ((tmp < 0) || (tmp != base)) {
tmp = -tmp;
ctxt->input->cur += tmp;
goto encoding_error;
}
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (base == 0) &&
(ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
/*
* Special case to provide identical behaviour
* between pull and push parsers on enpty CDATA
* sections
*/
if ((ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base >= 9) &&
(!strncmp((const char *)&ctxt->input->cur[-9],
"<![CDATA[", 9)))
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData,
BAD_CAST "", 0);
} else if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (base > 0) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL)
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, base);
else if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, base);
}
SKIPL(base + 3);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering CONTENT\n");
#endif
}
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_MISC:
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing PI\n");
#endif
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>') < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing Comment\n");
#endif
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == 'D') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == 'O') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[4] == 'C') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[5] == 'T') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[6] == 'Y') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[7] == 'P') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[8] == 'E')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '>', 0, 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing internal subset\n");
#endif
ctxt->inSubset = 1;
xmlParseDocTypeDecl(ctxt);
if (RAW == '[') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
} else {
/*
* Create and update the external subset.
*/
ctxt->inSubset = 2;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->externalSubset != NULL))
ctxt->sax->externalSubset(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->intSubName, ctxt->extSubSystem,
ctxt->extSubURI);
ctxt->inSubset = 0;
xmlCleanSpecialAttr(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering PROLOG\n");
#endif
}
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 9)) {
goto done;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
ctxt->progressive = 1;
xmlParseGetLasts(ctxt, &lastlt, &lastgt);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_PROLOG:
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing PI\n");
#endif
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') && (ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>') < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing Comment\n");
#endif
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 4)) {
goto done;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
if (ctxt->progressive == 0)
ctxt->progressive = 1;
xmlParseGetLasts(ctxt, &lastlt, &lastgt);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_EPILOG:
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing PI\n");
#endif
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') && (ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>') < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing Comment\n");
#endif
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 4)) {
goto done;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_END, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering EOF\n");
#endif
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_DTD: {
/*
* Sorry but progressive parsing of the internal subset
* is not expected to be supported. We first check that
* the full content of the internal subset is available and
* the parsing is launched only at that point.
* Internal subset ends up with "']' S? '>'" in an unescaped
* section and not in a ']]>' sequence which are conditional
* sections (whoever argued to keep that crap in XML deserve
* a place in hell !).
*/
int base, i;
xmlChar *buf;
xmlChar quote = 0;
base = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
if (base < 0) return(0);
if (ctxt->checkIndex > base)
base = ctxt->checkIndex;
buf = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content;
for (;(unsigned int) base < ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use;
base++) {
if (quote != 0) {
if (buf[base] == quote)
quote = 0;
continue;
}
if ((quote == 0) && (buf[base] == '<')) {
int found = 0;
/* special handling of comments */
if (((unsigned int) base + 4 <
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use) &&
(buf[base + 1] == '!') &&
(buf[base + 2] == '-') &&
(buf[base + 3] == '-')) {
for (;(unsigned int) base + 3 <
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use; base++) {
if ((buf[base] == '-') &&
(buf[base + 1] == '-') &&
(buf[base + 2] == '>')) {
found = 1;
base += 2;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "unfinished comment\n");
#endif
break; /* for */
}
continue;
}
}
if (buf[base] == '"') {
quote = '"';
continue;
}
if (buf[base] == '\'') {
quote = '\'';
continue;
}
if (buf[base] == ']') {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "%c%c%c%c: ", buf[base],
buf[base + 1], buf[base + 2], buf[base + 3]);
#endif
if ((unsigned int) base +1 >=
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use)
break;
if (buf[base + 1] == ']') {
/* conditional crap, skip both ']' ! */
base++;
continue;
}
for (i = 1;
(unsigned int) base + i < ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use;
i++) {
if (buf[base + i] == '>') {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "found\n");
#endif
goto found_end_int_subset;
}
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(buf[base + i])) {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "not found\n");
#endif
goto not_end_of_int_subset;
}
}
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "end of stream\n");
#endif
break;
}
not_end_of_int_subset:
continue; /* for */
}
/*
* We didn't found the end of the Internal subset
*/
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
if (next == 0)
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: lookup of int subset end filed\n");
#endif
goto done;
found_end_int_subset:
xmlParseInternalSubset(ctxt);
ctxt->inSubset = 2;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->externalSubset != NULL))
ctxt->sax->externalSubset(ctxt->userData, ctxt->intSubName,
ctxt->extSubSystem, ctxt->extSubURI);
ctxt->inSubset = 0;
xmlCleanSpecialAttr(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering PROLOG\n");
#endif
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_COMMENT:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == COMMENT\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering CONTENT\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_IGNORE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == IGNORE");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_PI:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == PI\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering CONTENT\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_DECL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == ENTITY_DECL\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == ENTITY_VALUE\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == ATTRIBUTE_VALUE\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_SYSTEM_LITERAL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == SYSTEM_LITERAL\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_PUBLIC_LITERAL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == PUBLIC_LITERAL\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
break;
}
}
done:
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "PP: done %d\n", ret);
#endif
return(ret);
encoding_error:
{
char buffer[150];
snprintf(buffer, 149, "Bytes: 0x%02X 0x%02X 0x%02X 0x%02X\n",
ctxt->input->cur[0], ctxt->input->cur[1],
ctxt->input->cur[2], ctxt->input->cur[3]);
__xmlErrEncoding(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"Input is not proper UTF-8, indicate encoding !\n%s",
BAD_CAST buffer, NULL);
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Add a check to prevent len from going negative in xmlParseAttValueComplex.
BUG=158249
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11343029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@164867 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,154
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: use_polling_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
if (!strvec)
return;
global_data->linkbeat_use_polling = true;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 9,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vrend_renderer_get_cap_set(uint32_t cap_set, uint32_t *max_ver,
uint32_t *max_size)
{
if (cap_set != VREND_CAP_SET) {
*max_ver = 0;
*max_size = 0;
return;
}
*max_ver = 1;
*max_size = sizeof(union virgl_caps);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 4,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::OneQuarterTest() {
memset(src_, 255, block_size_);
const int half = block_size_ / 2;
memset(ref_, 255, half);
memset(ref_ + half, 0, half);
unsigned int sse;
unsigned int var;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse));
const unsigned int expected = block_size_ * 255 * 255 / 4;
EXPECT_EQ(expected, var);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 15,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static xmlEntityPtr SVGGetParameterEntity(void *context,const xmlChar *name)
{
SVGInfo
*svg_info;
/*
Get a parameter entity by name.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" SAX.getParameterEntity(%s)",name);
svg_info=(SVGInfo *) context;
return(xmlGetParameterEntity(svg_info->document,name));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
key_perm_t perm)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka;
const struct cred *cred;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
int ret;
try_again:
cred = get_current_cred();
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
switch (id) {
case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
if (!cred->thread_keyring) {
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
goto error;
ret = install_thread_keyring();
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
goto reget_creds;
}
key = cred->thread_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
if (!cred->process_keyring) {
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
goto error;
ret = install_process_keyring();
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
goto reget_creds;
}
key = cred->process_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
if (!cred->session_keyring) {
/* always install a session keyring upon access if one
* doesn't exist yet */
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)
ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
else
ret = install_session_keyring(
cred->user->session_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto reget_creds;
} else if (cred->session_keyring ==
cred->user->session_keyring &&
lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {
ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto reget_creds;
}
rcu_read_lock();
key = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring);
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
rcu_read_unlock();
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
if (!cred->user->uid_keyring) {
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
key = cred->user->uid_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
if (!cred->user->session_keyring) {
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
key = cred->user->session_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:
/* group keyrings are not yet supported */
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
goto error;
case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
key = cred->request_key_auth;
if (!key)
goto error;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
if (!cred->request_key_auth)
goto error;
down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
&cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
key = NULL;
} else {
rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
key = rka->dest_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
}
up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (!key)
goto error;
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
default:
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (id < 1)
goto error;
key = key_lookup(id);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
goto error;
}
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
/* check to see if we possess the key */
skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
lookup_user_key_possessed,
cred);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_put(key);
key_ref = skey_ref;
}
break;
}
/* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all
* the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */
if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {
ret = 0;
goto error;
}
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {
ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
switch (ret) {
case -ERESTARTSYS:
goto invalid_key;
default:
if (perm)
goto invalid_key;
case 0:
break;
}
} else if (perm) {
ret = key_validate(key);
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
}
ret = -EIO;
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
goto invalid_key;
/* check the permissions */
ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
error:
put_cred(cred);
return key_ref;
invalid_key:
key_ref_put(key_ref);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
/* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new
* creds to be installed */
reget_creds:
put_cred(cred);
goto try_again;
}
Commit Message: keys: fix race with concurrent install_user_keyrings()
This fixes CVE-2013-1792.
There is a race in install_user_keyrings() that can cause a NULL pointer
dereference when called concurrently for the same user if the uid and
uid-session keyrings are not yet created. It might be possible for an
unprivileged user to trigger this by calling keyctl() from userspace in
parallel immediately after logging in.
Assume that we have two threads both executing lookup_user_key(), both
looking for KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING.
THREAD A THREAD B
=============================== ===============================
==>call install_user_keyrings();
if (!cred->user->session_keyring)
==>call install_user_keyrings()
...
user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
if (user->uid_keyring)
return 0;
<==
key = cred->user->session_keyring [== NULL]
user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage); [oops]
At the point thread A dereferences cred->user->session_keyring, thread B
hasn't updated user->session_keyring yet, but thread A assumes it is
populated because install_user_keyrings() returned ok.
The race window is really small but can be exploited if, for example,
thread B is interrupted or preempted after initializing uid_keyring, but
before doing setting session_keyring.
This couldn't be reproduced on a stock kernel. However, after placing
systemtap probe on 'user->session_keyring = session_keyring;' that
introduced some delay, the kernel could be crashed reliably.
Fix this by checking both pointers before deciding whether to return.
Alternatively, the test could be done away with entirely as it is checked
inside the mutex - but since the mutex is global, that may not be the best
way.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 17,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static OPJ_OFF_T JP2SkipHandler(OPJ_OFF_T offset,void *context)
{
Image
*image;
image=(Image *) context;
return(SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_CUR) < 0 ? -1 : offset);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/501
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsWindow::Observe(int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
DCHECK_EQ(chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_THEME_CHANGED, type);
UpdateTheme();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 10,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Reset(double delta_x, double delta_y) {
message_loop_runner_ = new content::MessageLoopRunner;
remaining_delta_x_ = delta_x;
remaining_delta_y_ = delta_y;
scroll_end_received_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 18,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(struct iso_directory_record *de,
struct inode *inode, int flags)
{
int symlink_len = 0;
int cnt, sig;
unsigned int reloc_block;
struct inode *reloc;
struct rock_ridge *rr;
int rootflag;
struct rock_state rs;
int ret = 0;
if (!ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock)
return 0;
init_rock_state(&rs, inode);
setup_rock_ridge(de, inode, &rs);
if (flags & RR_REGARD_XA) {
rs.chr += 14;
rs.len -= 14;
if (rs.len < 0)
rs.len = 0;
}
repeat:
while (rs.len > 2) { /* There may be one byte for padding somewhere */
rr = (struct rock_ridge *)rs.chr;
/*
* Ignore rock ridge info if rr->len is out of range, but
* don't return -EIO because that would make the file
* invisible.
*/
if (rr->len < 3)
goto out; /* Something got screwed up here */
sig = isonum_721(rs.chr);
if (rock_check_overflow(&rs, sig))
goto eio;
rs.chr += rr->len;
rs.len -= rr->len;
/*
* As above, just ignore the rock ridge info if rr->len
* is bogus.
*/
if (rs.len < 0)
goto out; /* Something got screwed up here */
switch (sig) {
#ifndef CONFIG_ZISOFS /* No flag for SF or ZF */
case SIG('R', 'R'):
if ((rr->u.RR.flags[0] &
(RR_PX | RR_TF | RR_SL | RR_CL)) == 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif
case SIG('S', 'P'):
if (check_sp(rr, inode))
goto out;
break;
case SIG('C', 'E'):
rs.cont_extent = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.extent);
rs.cont_offset = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.offset);
rs.cont_size = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.size);
break;
case SIG('E', 'R'):
ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock = 1;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "ISO 9660 Extensions: ");
{
int p;
for (p = 0; p < rr->u.ER.len_id; p++)
printk("%c", rr->u.ER.data[p]);
}
printk("\n");
break;
case SIG('P', 'X'):
inode->i_mode = isonum_733(rr->u.PX.mode);
set_nlink(inode, isonum_733(rr->u.PX.n_links));
i_uid_write(inode, isonum_733(rr->u.PX.uid));
i_gid_write(inode, isonum_733(rr->u.PX.gid));
break;
case SIG('P', 'N'):
{
int high, low;
high = isonum_733(rr->u.PN.dev_high);
low = isonum_733(rr->u.PN.dev_low);
/*
* The Rock Ridge standard specifies that if
* sizeof(dev_t) <= 4, then the high field is
* unused, and the device number is completely
* stored in the low field. Some writers may
* ignore this subtlety,
* and as a result we test to see if the entire
* device number is
* stored in the low field, and use that.
*/
if ((low & ~0xff) && high == 0) {
inode->i_rdev =
MKDEV(low >> 8, low & 0xff);
} else {
inode->i_rdev =
MKDEV(high, low);
}
}
break;
case SIG('T', 'F'):
/*
* Some RRIP writers incorrectly place ctime in the
* TF_CREATE field. Try to handle this correctly for
* either case.
*/
/* Rock ridge never appears on a High Sierra disk */
cnt = 0;
if (rr->u.TF.flags & TF_CREATE) {
inode->i_ctime.tv_sec =
iso_date(rr->u.TF.times[cnt++].time,
0);
inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec = 0;
}
if (rr->u.TF.flags & TF_MODIFY) {
inode->i_mtime.tv_sec =
iso_date(rr->u.TF.times[cnt++].time,
0);
inode->i_mtime.tv_nsec = 0;
}
if (rr->u.TF.flags & TF_ACCESS) {
inode->i_atime.tv_sec =
iso_date(rr->u.TF.times[cnt++].time,
0);
inode->i_atime.tv_nsec = 0;
}
if (rr->u.TF.flags & TF_ATTRIBUTES) {
inode->i_ctime.tv_sec =
iso_date(rr->u.TF.times[cnt++].time,
0);
inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec = 0;
}
break;
case SIG('S', 'L'):
{
int slen;
struct SL_component *slp;
struct SL_component *oldslp;
slen = rr->len - 5;
slp = &rr->u.SL.link;
inode->i_size = symlink_len;
while (slen > 1) {
rootflag = 0;
switch (slp->flags & ~1) {
case 0:
inode->i_size +=
slp->len;
break;
case 2:
inode->i_size += 1;
break;
case 4:
inode->i_size += 2;
break;
case 8:
rootflag = 1;
inode->i_size += 1;
break;
default:
printk("Symlink component flag "
"not implemented\n");
}
slen -= slp->len + 2;
oldslp = slp;
slp = (struct SL_component *)
(((char *)slp) + slp->len + 2);
if (slen < 2) {
if (((rr->u.SL.
flags & 1) != 0)
&&
((oldslp->
flags & 1) == 0))
inode->i_size +=
1;
break;
}
/*
* If this component record isn't
* continued, then append a '/'.
*/
if (!rootflag
&& (oldslp->flags & 1) == 0)
inode->i_size += 1;
}
}
symlink_len = inode->i_size;
break;
case SIG('R', 'E'):
printk(KERN_WARNING "Attempt to read inode for "
"relocated directory\n");
goto out;
case SIG('C', 'L'):
if (flags & RR_RELOC_DE) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"ISOFS: Recursive directory relocation "
"is not supported\n");
goto eio;
}
reloc_block = isonum_733(rr->u.CL.location);
if (reloc_block == ISOFS_I(inode)->i_iget5_block &&
ISOFS_I(inode)->i_iget5_offset == 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"ISOFS: Directory relocation points to "
"itself\n");
goto eio;
}
ISOFS_I(inode)->i_first_extent = reloc_block;
reloc = isofs_iget_reloc(inode->i_sb, reloc_block, 0);
if (IS_ERR(reloc)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(reloc);
goto out;
}
inode->i_mode = reloc->i_mode;
set_nlink(inode, reloc->i_nlink);
inode->i_uid = reloc->i_uid;
inode->i_gid = reloc->i_gid;
inode->i_rdev = reloc->i_rdev;
inode->i_size = reloc->i_size;
inode->i_blocks = reloc->i_blocks;
inode->i_atime = reloc->i_atime;
inode->i_ctime = reloc->i_ctime;
inode->i_mtime = reloc->i_mtime;
iput(reloc);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_ZISOFS
case SIG('Z', 'F'): {
int algo;
if (ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_nocompress)
break;
algo = isonum_721(rr->u.ZF.algorithm);
if (algo == SIG('p', 'z')) {
int block_shift =
isonum_711(&rr->u.ZF.parms[1]);
if (block_shift > 17) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "isofs: "
"Can't handle ZF block "
"size of 2^%d\n",
block_shift);
} else {
/*
* Note: we don't change
* i_blocks here
*/
ISOFS_I(inode)->i_file_format =
isofs_file_compressed;
/*
* Parameters to compression
* algorithm (header size,
* block size)
*/
ISOFS_I(inode)->i_format_parm[0] =
isonum_711(&rr->u.ZF.parms[0]);
ISOFS_I(inode)->i_format_parm[1] =
isonum_711(&rr->u.ZF.parms[1]);
inode->i_size =
isonum_733(rr->u.ZF.
real_size);
}
} else {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"isofs: Unknown ZF compression "
"algorithm: %c%c\n",
rr->u.ZF.algorithm[0],
rr->u.ZF.algorithm[1]);
}
break;
}
#endif
default:
break;
}
}
ret = rock_continue(&rs);
if (ret == 0)
goto repeat;
if (ret == 1)
ret = 0;
out:
kfree(rs.buffer);
return ret;
eio:
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries
Rock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which
define where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs
image can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one
containing loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when
traversing these entries.
Limit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space
to store all the Rock Ridge data.
Reported-by: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void writeGenerateFreshObject()
{
append(GenerateFreshObjectTag);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,371
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void limitedWithEmptyMissingInvalidAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::limitedWithEmptyMissingInvalidAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 4,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int policy_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct mempolicy *new)
{
int err = 0;
struct mempolicy *old = vma->vm_policy;
pr_debug("vma %lx-%lx/%lx vm_ops %p vm_file %p set_policy %p\n",
vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_pgoff,
vma->vm_ops, vma->vm_file,
vma->vm_ops ? vma->vm_ops->set_policy : NULL);
if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->set_policy)
err = vma->vm_ops->set_policy(vma, new);
if (!err) {
mpol_get(new);
vma->vm_policy = new;
mpol_put(old);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlobStorageContext::RunOnConstructionBegin(
const std::string& uuid,
const BlobStatusCallback& done) {
BlobEntry* entry = registry_.GetEntry(uuid);
DCHECK(entry);
if (entry->status() == BlobStatus::PENDING_CONSTRUCTION) {
entry->building_state_->build_started_callbacks.push_back(done);
return;
}
done.Run(entry->status());
}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,273
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8Console::CommandLineAPIScope::accessorGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::Name> name, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
CommandLineAPIScope* scope = static_cast<CommandLineAPIScope*>(info.Data().As<v8::External>()->Value());
DCHECK(scope);
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = info.GetIsolate()->GetCurrentContext();
if (scope->m_cleanup) {
bool removed = info.Holder()->Delete(context, name).FromMaybe(false);
DCHECK(removed);
return;
}
v8::Local<v8::Object> commandLineAPI = scope->m_commandLineAPI;
v8::Local<v8::Value> value;
if (!commandLineAPI->Get(context, name).ToLocal(&value))
return;
if (isCommandLineAPIGetter(toProtocolStringWithTypeCheck(name))) {
DCHECK(value->IsFunction());
v8::MicrotasksScope microtasks(info.GetIsolate(), v8::MicrotasksScope::kDoNotRunMicrotasks);
if (value.As<v8::Function>()->Call(context, commandLineAPI, 0, nullptr).ToLocal(&value))
info.GetReturnValue().Set(value);
} else {
info.GetReturnValue().Set(value);
}
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 25,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int numa_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return do_maps_open(inode, file, &proc_pid_numa_maps_op);
}
Commit Message: proc: fix oops on invalid /proc/<pid>/maps access
When m_start returns an error, the seq_file logic will still call m_stop
with that error entry, so we'd better make sure that we check it before
using it as a vma.
Introduced by commit ec6fd8a4355c ("report errors in /proc/*/*map*
sanely"), which replaced NULL with various ERR_PTR() cases.
(On ia64, you happen to get a unaligned fault instead of a page fault,
since the address used is generally some random error code like -EPERM)
Reported-by: Anca Emanuel <anca.emanuel@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Américo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OmniboxEditModel::SetSuggestionToPrefetch(
const InstantSuggestion& suggestion) {
delegate_->SetSuggestionToPrefetch(suggestion);
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 3,596
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void CL_Cache_EndGather_f( void ) {
int i, j, handle, cachePass;
char filename[MAX_QPATH];
cachePass = (int)floor( (float)cacheIndex * CACHE_HIT_RATIO );
for ( i = 0; i < CACHE_NUMGROUPS; i++ ) {
Q_strncpyz( filename, cacheGroups[i].name, MAX_QPATH );
Q_strcat( filename, MAX_QPATH, ".cache" );
handle = FS_FOpenFileWrite( filename );
for ( j = 0; j < MAX_CACHE_ITEMS; j++ ) {
if ( cacheItems[i][j].hits >= cachePass && strstr( cacheItems[i][j].name, "/" ) ) {
FS_Write( cacheItems[i][j].name, strlen( cacheItems[i][j].name ), handle );
FS_Write( "\n", 1, handle );
}
}
FS_FCloseFile( handle );
}
Cvar_Set( "cl_cacheGathering", "0" );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 5,026
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dev_unicast_flush(struct net_device *dev)
{
netif_addr_lock_bh(dev);
__hw_addr_flush(&dev->uc);
netif_addr_unlock_bh(dev);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 10,193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SoundPool::unload(int sampleID)
{
ALOGV("unload: sampleID=%d", sampleID);
Mutex::Autolock lock(&mLock);
return mSamples.removeItem(sampleID);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BrowserPolicyConnector::BrowserPolicyConnector()
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(method_factory_(this)) {
managed_platform_provider_.reset(CreateManagedPlatformProvider());
recommended_platform_provider_.reset(CreateRecommendedPlatformProvider());
managed_cloud_provider_.reset(new CloudPolicyProviderImpl(
ConfigurationPolicyPrefStore::GetChromePolicyDefinitionList(),
CloudPolicyCacheBase::POLICY_LEVEL_MANDATORY));
recommended_cloud_provider_.reset(new CloudPolicyProviderImpl(
ConfigurationPolicyPrefStore::GetChromePolicyDefinitionList(),
CloudPolicyCacheBase::POLICY_LEVEL_RECOMMENDED));
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
InitializeDevicePolicy();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xt_replace_table(struct xt_table *table,
unsigned int num_counters,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
int *error)
{
struct xt_table_info *private;
int ret;
ret = xt_jumpstack_alloc(newinfo);
if (ret < 0) {
*error = ret;
return NULL;
}
/* Do the substitution. */
local_bh_disable();
private = table->private;
/* Check inside lock: is the old number correct? */
if (num_counters != private->number) {
pr_debug("num_counters != table->private->number (%u/%u)\n",
num_counters, private->number);
local_bh_enable();
*error = -EAGAIN;
return NULL;
}
newinfo->initial_entries = private->initial_entries;
/*
* Ensure contents of newinfo are visible before assigning to
* private.
*/
smp_wmb();
table->private = newinfo;
/*
* Even though table entries have now been swapped, other CPU's
* may still be using the old entries. This is okay, because
* resynchronization happens because of the locking done
* during the get_counters() routine.
*/
local_bh_enable();
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
if (audit_enabled) {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG);
if (ab) {
audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u",
table->name, table->af,
private->number);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
}
#endif
return private;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GDataDirectory::TakeEntry(GDataEntry* entry) {
DCHECK(entry);
DCHECK(entry->parent());
entry->parent()->RemoveChild(entry);
AddEntry(entry);
return true;
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void smbXcli_req_cleanup(struct tevent_req *req,
enum tevent_req_state req_state)
{
struct smbXcli_req_state *state =
tevent_req_data(req,
struct smbXcli_req_state);
TALLOC_FREE(state->write_req);
switch (req_state) {
case TEVENT_REQ_RECEIVED:
/*
* Make sure we really remove it from
* the pending array on destruction.
*/
state->smb1.mid = 0;
smbXcli_req_unset_pending(req);
return;
default:
return;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ldm_parse_tocblock (const u8 *data, struct tocblock *toc)
{
BUG_ON (!data || !toc);
if (MAGIC_TOCBLOCK != get_unaligned_be64(data)) {
ldm_crit ("Cannot find TOCBLOCK, database may be corrupt.");
return false;
}
strncpy (toc->bitmap1_name, data + 0x24, sizeof (toc->bitmap1_name));
toc->bitmap1_name[sizeof (toc->bitmap1_name) - 1] = 0;
toc->bitmap1_start = get_unaligned_be64(data + 0x2E);
toc->bitmap1_size = get_unaligned_be64(data + 0x36);
if (strncmp (toc->bitmap1_name, TOC_BITMAP1,
sizeof (toc->bitmap1_name)) != 0) {
ldm_crit ("TOCBLOCK's first bitmap is '%s', should be '%s'.",
TOC_BITMAP1, toc->bitmap1_name);
return false;
}
strncpy (toc->bitmap2_name, data + 0x46, sizeof (toc->bitmap2_name));
toc->bitmap2_name[sizeof (toc->bitmap2_name) - 1] = 0;
toc->bitmap2_start = get_unaligned_be64(data + 0x50);
toc->bitmap2_size = get_unaligned_be64(data + 0x58);
if (strncmp (toc->bitmap2_name, TOC_BITMAP2,
sizeof (toc->bitmap2_name)) != 0) {
ldm_crit ("TOCBLOCK's second bitmap is '%s', should be '%s'.",
TOC_BITMAP2, toc->bitmap2_name);
return false;
}
ldm_debug ("Parsed TOCBLOCK successfully.");
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix for buffer overflow in ldm_frag_add not sufficient
As Ben Hutchings discovered [1], the patch for CVE-2011-1017 (buffer
overflow in ldm_frag_add) is not sufficient. The original patch in
commit c340b1d64000 ("fs/partitions/ldm.c: fix oops caused by corrupted
partition table") does not consider that, for subsequent fragments,
previously allocated memory is used.
[1] http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/5/6/407
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SMB2_query_directory(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid, int index,
struct cifs_search_info *srch_inf)
{
struct smb2_query_directory_req *req;
struct smb2_query_directory_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct kvec iov[2];
struct kvec rsp_iov;
int rc = 0;
int len;
int resp_buftype = CIFS_NO_BUFFER;
unsigned char *bufptr;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
struct cifs_ses *ses = tcon->ses;
__le16 asteriks = cpu_to_le16('*');
char *end_of_smb;
unsigned int output_size = CIFSMaxBufSize;
size_t info_buf_size;
int flags = 0;
if (ses && (ses->server))
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_QUERY_DIRECTORY, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (encryption_required(tcon))
flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ;
switch (srch_inf->info_level) {
case SMB_FIND_FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO:
req->FileInformationClass = FILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION;
info_buf_size = sizeof(FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO) - 1;
break;
case SMB_FIND_FILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO:
req->FileInformationClass = FILEID_FULL_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION;
info_buf_size = sizeof(SEARCH_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO) - 1;
break;
default:
cifs_dbg(VFS, "info level %u isn't supported\n",
srch_inf->info_level);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto qdir_exit;
}
req->FileIndex = cpu_to_le32(index);
req->PersistentFileId = persistent_fid;
req->VolatileFileId = volatile_fid;
len = 0x2;
bufptr = req->Buffer;
memcpy(bufptr, &asteriks, len);
req->FileNameOffset =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct smb2_query_directory_req) - 1 - 4);
req->FileNameLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
/*
* BB could be 30 bytes or so longer if we used SMB2 specific
* buffer lengths, but this is safe and close enough.
*/
output_size = min_t(unsigned int, output_size, server->maxBuf);
output_size = min_t(unsigned int, output_size, 2 << 15);
req->OutputBufferLength = cpu_to_le32(output_size);
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for RFC1001 length and 1 for Buffer */
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4 - 1;
iov[1].iov_base = (char *)(req->Buffer);
iov[1].iov_len = len;
inc_rfc1001_len(req, len - 1 /* Buffer */);
rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, 2, &resp_buftype, flags, &rsp_iov);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
rsp = (struct smb2_query_directory_rsp *)rsp_iov.iov_base;
if (rc) {
if (rc == -ENODATA &&
rsp->hdr.sync_hdr.Status == STATUS_NO_MORE_FILES) {
srch_inf->endOfSearch = true;
rc = 0;
}
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_QUERY_DIRECTORY_HE);
goto qdir_exit;
}
rc = validate_buf(le16_to_cpu(rsp->OutputBufferOffset),
le32_to_cpu(rsp->OutputBufferLength), &rsp->hdr,
info_buf_size);
if (rc)
goto qdir_exit;
srch_inf->unicode = true;
if (srch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start) {
if (srch_inf->smallBuf)
cifs_small_buf_release(srch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start);
else
cifs_buf_release(srch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start);
}
srch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start = (char *)rsp;
srch_inf->srch_entries_start = srch_inf->last_entry = 4 /* rfclen */ +
(char *)&rsp->hdr + le16_to_cpu(rsp->OutputBufferOffset);
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field */
end_of_smb = get_rfc1002_length(rsp) + 4 + (char *)&rsp->hdr;
srch_inf->entries_in_buffer =
num_entries(srch_inf->srch_entries_start, end_of_smb,
&srch_inf->last_entry, info_buf_size);
srch_inf->index_of_last_entry += srch_inf->entries_in_buffer;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "num entries %d last_index %lld srch start %p srch end %p\n",
srch_inf->entries_in_buffer, srch_inf->index_of_last_entry,
srch_inf->srch_entries_start, srch_inf->last_entry);
if (resp_buftype == CIFS_LARGE_BUFFER)
srch_inf->smallBuf = false;
else if (resp_buftype == CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER)
srch_inf->smallBuf = true;
else
cifs_dbg(VFS, "illegal search buffer type\n");
return rc;
qdir_exit:
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 14,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_attr_leaf_lasthash(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
int *count)
{
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entries;
struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_target->bt_mount;
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(mp->m_attr_geo, &ichdr, bp->b_addr);
entries = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(bp->b_addr);
if (count)
*count = ichdr.count;
if (!ichdr.count)
return 0;
return be32_to_cpu(entries[ichdr.count - 1].hashval);
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp
xfs_attr3_leaf_create may have errored out before instantiating a buffer,
for example if the blkno is out of range. In that case there is no work
to do to remove it, and in fact xfs_da_shrink_inode will lead to an oops
if we try.
This also seems to fix a flaw where the original error from
xfs_attr3_leaf_create gets overwritten in the cleanup case, and it
removes a pointless assignment to bp which isn't used after this.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199969
Reported-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 1,383
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void detach_mnt(struct mount *mnt, struct path *old_path)
{
old_path->dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
old_path->mnt = &mnt->mnt_parent->mnt;
mnt->mnt_parent = mnt;
mnt->mnt_mountpoint = mnt->mnt.mnt_root;
list_del_init(&mnt->mnt_child);
hlist_del_init_rcu(&mnt->mnt_hash);
put_mountpoint(mnt->mnt_mp);
mnt->mnt_mp = NULL;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 25,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::SetSurface(
const scoped_refptr<gl::GLSurface>& surface) {
DCHECK(context_->IsCurrent(nullptr));
DCHECK(surface_.get());
surface_ = surface;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 22,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_bad(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Revert "arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions"
This reverts commit bc07c2c6e9ed125d362af0214b6313dca180cb08.
While the aim is increased security for --x memory maps, it does not
protect against kernel level reads. Until SECCOMP is implemented for
arm64, revert this patch to avoid giving a false idea of execute-only
mappings.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 10,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string TestURLLoader::ReadEntireFile(pp::FileIO* file_io,
std::string* data) {
TestCompletionCallback callback(instance_->pp_instance(), callback_type());
char buf[256];
int64_t offset = 0;
for (;;) {
callback.WaitForResult(file_io->Read(offset, buf, sizeof(buf),
callback.GetCallback()));
if (callback.result() < 0)
return ReportError("FileIO::Read", callback.result());
if (callback.result() == 0)
break;
offset += callback.result();
data->append(buf, callback.result());
}
PASS();
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 472
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::OpenEmptyWindow(Profile* profile) {
Browser* browser = Browser::Create(profile);
browser->AddBlankTab(true);
browser->window()->Show();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vmxnet3_on_tx_done_update_stats(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx,
Vmxnet3PktStatus status)
{
size_t tot_len = net_tx_pkt_get_total_len(s->tx_pkt);
struct UPT1_TxStats *stats = &s->txq_descr[qidx].txq_stats;
switch (status) {
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_OK:
switch (net_tx_pkt_get_packet_type(s->tx_pkt)) {
case ETH_PKT_BCAST:
stats->bcastPktsTxOK++;
stats->bcastBytesTxOK += tot_len;
break;
case ETH_PKT_MCAST:
stats->mcastPktsTxOK++;
stats->mcastBytesTxOK += tot_len;
break;
case ETH_PKT_UCAST:
stats->ucastPktsTxOK++;
stats->ucastBytesTxOK += tot_len;
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
if (s->offload_mode == VMXNET3_OM_TSO) {
/*
* According to VMWARE headers this statistic is a number
* of packets after segmentation but since we don't have
* this information in QEMU model, the best we can do is to
* provide number of non-segmented packets
*/
stats->TSOPktsTxOK++;
stats->TSOBytesTxOK += tot_len;
}
break;
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_DISCARD:
stats->pktsTxDiscard++;
break;
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_ERROR:
stats->pktsTxError++;
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 26,207
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: generic_file_direct_write(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *iov,
unsigned long *nr_segs, loff_t pos, loff_t *ppos,
size_t count, size_t ocount)
{
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
ssize_t written;
if (count != ocount)
*nr_segs = iov_shorten((struct iovec *)iov, *nr_segs, count);
written = generic_file_direct_IO(WRITE, iocb, iov, pos, *nr_segs);
if (written > 0) {
loff_t end = pos + written;
if (end > i_size_read(inode) && !S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) {
i_size_write(inode, end);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
}
*ppos = end;
}
/*
* Sync the fs metadata but not the minor inode changes and
* of course not the data as we did direct DMA for the IO.
* i_mutex is held, which protects generic_osync_inode() from
* livelocking. AIO O_DIRECT ops attempt to sync metadata here.
*/
if ((written >= 0 || written == -EIOCBQUEUED) &&
((file->f_flags & O_SYNC) || IS_SYNC(inode))) {
int err = generic_osync_inode(inode, mapping, OSYNC_METADATA);
if (err < 0)
written = err;
}
return written;
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void assertLayoutTreeUpdated(Node& root)
{
for (Node& node : NodeTraversal::inclusiveDescendantsOf(root)) {
if (!node.isElementNode()
&& !node.isTextNode()
&& !node.isShadowRoot()
&& !node.isDocumentNode())
continue;
ASSERT(!node.needsStyleRecalc());
ASSERT(!node.childNeedsStyleRecalc());
ASSERT(!node.childNeedsDistributionRecalc());
ASSERT(!node.needsStyleInvalidation());
ASSERT(!node.childNeedsStyleInvalidation());
for (ShadowRoot* shadowRoot = node.youngestShadowRoot(); shadowRoot; shadowRoot = shadowRoot->olderShadowRoot())
assertLayoutTreeUpdated(*shadowRoot);
}
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::scheduleSVGFilterLayerUpdateHack(Element& element)
{
if (element.styleChangeType() == NeedsReattachStyleChange)
return;
element.setSVGFilterNeedsLayerUpdate();
m_layerUpdateSVGFilterElements.add(&element);
scheduleLayoutTreeUpdateIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void VoidMethodPromiseArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("voidMethodPromiseArg", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())));
return;
}
ScriptPromise promise_arg;
promise_arg = ScriptPromise::Cast(ScriptState::Current(info.GetIsolate()), info[0]);
if (!promise_arg.IsUndefinedOrNull() && !promise_arg.IsObject()) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("voidMethodPromiseArg", "TestObject", "parameter 1 ('promiseArg') is not an object."));
return;
}
impl->voidMethodPromiseArg(promise_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sched_copy_attr(struct sched_attr __user *uattr,
struct sched_attr *attr)
{
u32 size;
int ret;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uattr, SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* zero the full structure, so that a short copy will be nice.
*/
memset(attr, 0, sizeof(*attr));
ret = get_user(size, &uattr->size);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (size > PAGE_SIZE) /* silly large */
goto err_size;
if (!size) /* abi compat */
size = SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0;
if (size < SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0)
goto err_size;
/*
* If we're handed a bigger struct than we know of,
* ensure all the unknown bits are 0 - i.e. new
* user-space does not rely on any kernel feature
* extensions we dont know about yet.
*/
if (size > sizeof(*attr)) {
unsigned char __user *addr;
unsigned char __user *end;
unsigned char val;
addr = (void __user *)uattr + sizeof(*attr);
end = (void __user *)uattr + size;
for (; addr < end; addr++) {
ret = get_user(val, addr);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (val)
goto err_size;
}
size = sizeof(*attr);
}
ret = copy_from_user(attr, uattr, size);
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
/*
* XXX: do we want to be lenient like existing syscalls; or do we want
* to be strict and return an error on out-of-bounds values?
*/
attr->sched_nice = clamp(attr->sched_nice, -20, 19);
out:
return ret;
err_size:
put_user(sizeof(*attr), &uattr->size);
ret = -E2BIG;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 2,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint64_t skipped_mig_pages_transferred(void)
{
return acct_info.skipped_pages;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,265
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fbCombineDisjointOutReverseC (CARD32 *dest, CARD32 *src, CARD32 *mask, int width)
{
fbCombineDisjointGeneralC (dest, src, mask, width, CombineBOut);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 3,135
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: selGetName(SEL *sel)
{
PROCNAME("selGetName");
if (!sel)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sel not defined", procName, NULL);
return sel->name;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserPpapiHostImpl::IsPotentiallySecurePluginContext(
PP_Instance instance) {
auto it = instance_map_.find(instance);
if (it == instance_map_.end())
return false;
return it->second->renderer_data.is_potentially_secure_plugin_context;
}
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,643
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool nfsd4_cb_channel_good(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
if (clp->cl_cb_state == NFSD4_CB_UP)
return true;
/*
* In the sessions case, since we don't have to establish a
* separate connection for callbacks, we assume it's OK
* until we hear otherwise:
*/
return clp->cl_minorversion && clp->cl_cb_state == NFSD4_CB_UNKNOWN;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 25,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CParaNdisTX::CParaNdisTX()
{ }
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *EnhanceImage(const Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define EnhanceImageTag "Enhance/Image"
#define EnhancePixel(weight) \
mean=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelRed(image,r)+pixel.red)/2.0; \
distance=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelRed(image,r)-pixel.red); \
distance_squared=(4.0+mean)*distance*distance; \
mean=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelGreen(image,r)+pixel.green)/2.0; \
distance=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelGreen(image,r)-pixel.green); \
distance_squared+=(7.0-mean)*distance*distance; \
mean=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelBlue(image,r)+pixel.blue)/2.0; \
distance=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelBlue(image,r)-pixel.blue); \
distance_squared+=(5.0-mean)*distance*distance; \
mean=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelBlack(image,r)+pixel.black)/2.0; \
distance=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelBlack(image,r)-pixel.black); \
distance_squared+=(5.0-mean)*distance*distance; \
mean=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelAlpha(image,r)+pixel.alpha)/2.0; \
distance=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelAlpha(image,r)-pixel.alpha); \
distance_squared+=(5.0-mean)*distance*distance; \
if (distance_squared < 0.069) \
{ \
aggregate.red+=(weight)*GetPixelRed(image,r); \
aggregate.green+=(weight)*GetPixelGreen(image,r); \
aggregate.blue+=(weight)*GetPixelBlue(image,r); \
aggregate.black+=(weight)*GetPixelBlack(image,r); \
aggregate.alpha+=(weight)*GetPixelAlpha(image,r); \
total_weight+=(weight); \
} \
r+=GetPixelChannels(image);
CacheView
*enhance_view,
*image_view;
Image
*enhance_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Initialize enhanced image attributes.
*/
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
enhance_image=CloneImage(image,image->columns,image->rows,MagickTrue,
exception);
if (enhance_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(enhance_image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
enhance_image=DestroyImage(enhance_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Enhance image.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
enhance_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(enhance_image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(progress,status) \
magick_threads(image,enhance_image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
PixelInfo
pixel;
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
center;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,-2,y-2,image->columns+4,5,exception);
q=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(enhance_view,0,y,enhance_image->columns,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
center=(ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image)*(2*(image->columns+4)+2);
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
double
distance,
distance_squared,
mean,
total_weight;
PixelInfo
aggregate;
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict r;
if (GetPixelWriteMask(image,p) == 0)
{
SetPixelBackgoundColor(enhance_image,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(enhance_image);
continue;
}
GetPixelInfo(image,&aggregate);
total_weight=0.0;
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,p+center,&pixel);
r=p;
EnhancePixel(5.0); EnhancePixel(8.0); EnhancePixel(10.0);
EnhancePixel(8.0); EnhancePixel(5.0);
r=p+GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+4);
EnhancePixel(8.0); EnhancePixel(20.0); EnhancePixel(40.0);
EnhancePixel(20.0); EnhancePixel(8.0);
r=p+2*GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+4);
EnhancePixel(10.0); EnhancePixel(40.0); EnhancePixel(80.0);
EnhancePixel(40.0); EnhancePixel(10.0);
r=p+3*GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+4);
EnhancePixel(8.0); EnhancePixel(20.0); EnhancePixel(40.0);
EnhancePixel(20.0); EnhancePixel(8.0);
r=p+4*GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+4);
EnhancePixel(5.0); EnhancePixel(8.0); EnhancePixel(10.0);
EnhancePixel(8.0); EnhancePixel(5.0);
pixel.red=((aggregate.red+total_weight/2.0)/total_weight);
pixel.green=((aggregate.green+total_weight/2.0)/total_weight);
pixel.blue=((aggregate.blue+total_weight/2.0)/total_weight);
pixel.black=((aggregate.black+total_weight/2.0)/total_weight);
pixel.alpha=((aggregate.alpha+total_weight/2.0)/total_weight);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,&pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(enhance_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(enhance_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_EnhanceImage)
#endif
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,EnhanceImageTag,progress++,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
enhance_view=DestroyCacheView(enhance_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
enhance_image=DestroyImage(enhance_image);
return(enhance_image);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/663
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/655
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AXTree::DestroyNodeAndSubtree(AXNode* node,
AXTreeUpdateState* update_state) {
AXNodeData empty_data;
empty_data.id = node->id();
UpdateReverseRelations(node, empty_data);
const auto& table_info_entry = table_info_map_.find(node->id());
if (table_info_entry != table_info_map_.end()) {
delete table_info_entry->second;
table_info_map_.erase(node->id());
}
for (AXTreeObserver& observer : observers_) {
if (!update_state || !update_state->IsChangedNode(node))
observer.OnNodeWillBeDeleted(this, node);
else
observer.OnNodeWillBeReparented(this, node);
}
id_map_.erase(node->id());
for (int i = 0; i < node->child_count(); ++i)
DestroyNodeAndSubtree(node->ChildAtIndex(i), update_state);
if (update_state) {
update_state->pending_nodes.erase(node);
update_state->removed_node_ids.insert(node->id());
}
if (update_state && update_state->IsChangedNode(node)) {
update_state->reparented_node_id_to_data.insert(
std::make_pair(node->id(), node->TakeData()));
}
node->Destroy();
}
Commit Message: Position info (item n of m) incorrect if hidden focusable items in list
Bug: 836997
Change-Id: I971fa7076f72d51829b36af8e379260d48ca25ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450235
Commit-Queue: Aaron Leventhal <aleventhal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nektarios Paisios <nektar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628890}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 11,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnCopy() {
AutoResetMember<bool> handling_select_range(
this, &RenderFrameImpl::handling_select_range_, true);
frame_->ExecuteCommand(WebString::FromUTF8("Copy"));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string GetDocumentMetadata(FPDF_DOCUMENT doc, const std::string& key) {
size_t size = FPDF_GetMetaText(doc, key.c_str(), nullptr, 0);
if (size == 0)
return std::string();
base::string16 value;
PDFiumAPIStringBufferSizeInBytesAdapter<base::string16> string_adapter(
&value, size, false);
string_adapter.Close(
FPDF_GetMetaText(doc, key.c_str(), string_adapter.GetData(), size));
return base::UTF16ToUTF8(value);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SendCommandDebuggerFunction::SendResponseBody(
DictionaryValue* dictionary) {
Value* error_body;
if (dictionary->Get("error", &error_body)) {
base::JSONWriter::Write(error_body, false, &error_);
SendResponse(false);
return;
}
Value* result_body;
if (dictionary->Get("result", &result_body))
result_.reset(result_body->DeepCopy());
else
result_.reset(new DictionaryValue());
SendResponse(true);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 10,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long set_instruction_bp(struct task_struct *child,
struct ppc_hw_breakpoint *bp_info)
{
int slot;
int slot1_in_use = ((child->thread.debug.dbcr0 & DBCR0_IAC1) != 0);
int slot2_in_use = ((child->thread.debug.dbcr0 & DBCR0_IAC2) != 0);
int slot3_in_use = ((child->thread.debug.dbcr0 & DBCR0_IAC3) != 0);
int slot4_in_use = ((child->thread.debug.dbcr0 & DBCR0_IAC4) != 0);
if (dbcr_iac_range(child) & DBCR_IAC12MODE)
slot2_in_use = 1;
if (dbcr_iac_range(child) & DBCR_IAC34MODE)
slot4_in_use = 1;
if (bp_info->addr >= TASK_SIZE)
return -EIO;
if (bp_info->addr_mode != PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_EXACT) {
/* Make sure range is valid. */
if (bp_info->addr2 >= TASK_SIZE)
return -EIO;
/* We need a pair of IAC regsisters */
if ((!slot1_in_use) && (!slot2_in_use)) {
slot = 1;
child->thread.debug.iac1 = bp_info->addr;
child->thread.debug.iac2 = bp_info->addr2;
child->thread.debug.dbcr0 |= DBCR0_IAC1;
if (bp_info->addr_mode ==
PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_RANGE_EXCLUSIVE)
dbcr_iac_range(child) |= DBCR_IAC12X;
else
dbcr_iac_range(child) |= DBCR_IAC12I;
#if CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_IACS > 2
} else if ((!slot3_in_use) && (!slot4_in_use)) {
slot = 3;
child->thread.debug.iac3 = bp_info->addr;
child->thread.debug.iac4 = bp_info->addr2;
child->thread.debug.dbcr0 |= DBCR0_IAC3;
if (bp_info->addr_mode ==
PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_RANGE_EXCLUSIVE)
dbcr_iac_range(child) |= DBCR_IAC34X;
else
dbcr_iac_range(child) |= DBCR_IAC34I;
#endif
} else
return -ENOSPC;
} else {
/* We only need one. If possible leave a pair free in
* case a range is needed later
*/
if (!slot1_in_use) {
/*
* Don't use iac1 if iac1-iac2 are free and either
* iac3 or iac4 (but not both) are free
*/
if (slot2_in_use || (slot3_in_use == slot4_in_use)) {
slot = 1;
child->thread.debug.iac1 = bp_info->addr;
child->thread.debug.dbcr0 |= DBCR0_IAC1;
goto out;
}
}
if (!slot2_in_use) {
slot = 2;
child->thread.debug.iac2 = bp_info->addr;
child->thread.debug.dbcr0 |= DBCR0_IAC2;
#if CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_IACS > 2
} else if (!slot3_in_use) {
slot = 3;
child->thread.debug.iac3 = bp_info->addr;
child->thread.debug.dbcr0 |= DBCR0_IAC3;
} else if (!slot4_in_use) {
slot = 4;
child->thread.debug.iac4 = bp_info->addr;
child->thread.debug.dbcr0 |= DBCR0_IAC4;
#endif
} else
return -ENOSPC;
}
out:
child->thread.debug.dbcr0 |= DBCR0_IDM;
child->thread.regs->msr |= MSR_DE;
return slot;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CreateAppListShortcuts(
const base::FilePath& user_data_dir,
const string16& app_model_id,
const ShellIntegration::ShortcutLocations& creation_locations) {
DCHECK(content::BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(content::BrowserThread::FILE));
std::vector<base::FilePath> shortcut_paths =
web_app::internals::GetShortcutPaths(creation_locations);
bool pin_to_taskbar = creation_locations.in_quick_launch_bar &&
(base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN7);
if (pin_to_taskbar)
shortcut_paths.push_back(user_data_dir);
bool success = true;
base::FilePath chrome_exe;
if (!PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &chrome_exe)) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
string16 app_list_shortcut_name = GetAppListShortcutName();
string16 wide_switches(GetAppListCommandLine().GetArgumentsString());
base::win::ShortcutProperties shortcut_properties;
shortcut_properties.set_target(chrome_exe);
shortcut_properties.set_working_dir(chrome_exe.DirName());
shortcut_properties.set_arguments(wide_switches);
shortcut_properties.set_description(app_list_shortcut_name);
shortcut_properties.set_icon(chrome_exe, GetAppListIconIndex());
shortcut_properties.set_app_id(app_model_id);
for (size_t i = 0; i < shortcut_paths.size(); ++i) {
base::FilePath shortcut_file =
shortcut_paths[i].Append(app_list_shortcut_name).
AddExtension(installer::kLnkExt);
if (!file_util::PathExists(shortcut_file.DirName()) &&
!file_util::CreateDirectory(shortcut_file.DirName())) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
success = success && base::win::CreateOrUpdateShortcutLink(
shortcut_file, shortcut_properties,
base::win::SHORTCUT_CREATE_ALWAYS);
}
if (success && pin_to_taskbar) {
base::FilePath shortcut_to_pin =
user_data_dir.Append(app_list_shortcut_name).
AddExtension(installer::kLnkExt);
success = base::win::TaskbarPinShortcutLink(
shortcut_to_pin.value().c_str()) && success;
}
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_default_send_param(struct sock *sk,
int len, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_sndrcvinfo info;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (len != sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&info, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo)))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, info.sinfo_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && info.sinfo_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
if (asoc) {
info.sinfo_stream = asoc->default_stream;
info.sinfo_flags = asoc->default_flags;
info.sinfo_ppid = asoc->default_ppid;
info.sinfo_context = asoc->default_context;
info.sinfo_timetolive = asoc->default_timetolive;
} else {
info.sinfo_stream = sp->default_stream;
info.sinfo_flags = sp->default_flags;
info.sinfo_ppid = sp->default_ppid;
info.sinfo_context = sp->default_context;
info.sinfo_timetolive = sp->default_timetolive;
}
if (copy_to_user(optval, &info, sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void fuse_force_forget(struct file *file, u64 nodeid)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
struct fuse_req *req;
struct fuse_forget_in inarg;
memset(&inarg, 0, sizeof(inarg));
inarg.nlookup = 1;
req = fuse_get_req_nofail_nopages(fc, file);
req->in.h.opcode = FUSE_FORGET;
req->in.h.nodeid = nodeid;
req->in.numargs = 1;
req->in.args[0].size = sizeof(inarg);
req->in.args[0].value = &inarg;
__clear_bit(FR_ISREPLY, &req->flags);
__fuse_request_send(fc, req);
/* ignore errors */
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 6,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cirrus_vga_write_sr(CirrusVGAState * s, uint32_t val)
{
switch (s->vga.sr_index) {
case 0x00: // Standard VGA
case 0x01: // Standard VGA
case 0x02: // Standard VGA
case 0x03: // Standard VGA
case 0x04: // Standard VGA
s->vga.sr[s->vga.sr_index] = val & sr_mask[s->vga.sr_index];
if (s->vga.sr_index == 1)
s->vga.update_retrace_info(&s->vga);
break;
case 0x06: // Unlock Cirrus extensions
val &= 0x17;
if (val == 0x12) {
s->vga.sr[s->vga.sr_index] = 0x12;
} else {
s->vga.sr[s->vga.sr_index] = 0x0f;
}
break;
case 0x10:
case 0x30:
case 0x50:
case 0x70: // Graphics Cursor X
case 0x90:
case 0xb0:
case 0xd0:
case 0xf0: // Graphics Cursor X
s->vga.sr[0x10] = val;
s->vga.hw_cursor_x = (val << 3) | (s->vga.sr_index >> 5);
break;
case 0x11:
case 0x31:
case 0x51:
case 0x71: // Graphics Cursor Y
case 0x91:
case 0xb1:
case 0xd1:
case 0xf1: // Graphics Cursor Y
s->vga.sr[0x11] = val;
s->vga.hw_cursor_y = (val << 3) | (s->vga.sr_index >> 5);
break;
case 0x07: // Extended Sequencer Mode
cirrus_update_memory_access(s);
case 0x08: // EEPROM Control
case 0x09: // Scratch Register 0
case 0x0a: // Scratch Register 1
case 0x0b: // VCLK 0
case 0x0c: // VCLK 1
case 0x0d: // VCLK 2
case 0x0e: // VCLK 3
case 0x0f: // DRAM Control
case 0x13: // Graphics Cursor Pattern Address
case 0x14: // Scratch Register 2
case 0x15: // Scratch Register 3
case 0x16: // Performance Tuning Register
case 0x18: // Signature Generator Control
case 0x19: // Signature Generator Result
case 0x1a: // Signature Generator Result
case 0x1b: // VCLK 0 Denominator & Post
case 0x1c: // VCLK 1 Denominator & Post
case 0x1d: // VCLK 2 Denominator & Post
case 0x1e: // VCLK 3 Denominator & Post
case 0x1f: // BIOS Write Enable and MCLK select
s->vga.sr[s->vga.sr_index] = val;
#ifdef DEBUG_CIRRUS
printf("cirrus: handled outport sr_index %02x, sr_value %02x\n",
s->vga.sr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case 0x12: // Graphics Cursor Attribute
s->vga.sr[0x12] = val;
s->vga.force_shadow = !!(val & CIRRUS_CURSOR_SHOW);
#ifdef DEBUG_CIRRUS
printf("cirrus: cursor ctl SR12=%02x (force shadow: %d)\n",
val, s->vga.force_shadow);
#endif
break;
case 0x17: // Configuration Readback and Extended Control
s->vga.sr[s->vga.sr_index] = (s->vga.sr[s->vga.sr_index] & 0x38)
| (val & 0xc7);
cirrus_update_memory_access(s);
break;
default:
#ifdef DEBUG_CIRRUS
printf("cirrus: outport sr_index %02x, sr_value %02x\n",
s->vga.sr_index, val);
#endif
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 21,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BTM_SecSetConnectFilterCallback (tBTM_FILTER_CB *p_callback)
{
btm_cb.p_conn_filter_cb = p_callback;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,151
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, decompressFiles)
{
char *error;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0,
"Phar is readonly, cannot change compression");
return;
}
if (!pharobj_cancompress(&phar_obj->archive->manifest)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0,
"Cannot decompress all files, some are compressed as bzip2 or gzip and cannot be decompressed");
return;
}
if (phar_obj->archive->is_tar) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
if (phar_obj->archive->is_persistent && FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->archive))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
pharobj_set_compression(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_NONE);
}
phar_obj->archive->is_modified = 1;
phar_flush(phar_obj->archive, 0, 0, 0, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,911
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_default_script_user(const char *username, const char *groupname)
{
if (!default_script_uid_set || username) {
/* Even if we fail to set it, there is no point in trying again */
default_script_uid_set = true;
if (set_uid_gid(username, groupname, &default_script_uid, &default_script_gid, true)) {
if (username || script_security)
default_user_fail = true;
}
else
default_user_fail = false;
}
return default_user_fail;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 23,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DebuggerFunction::DebuggerFunction()
: client_host_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 15,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InputHandler::openSelectPopup(HTMLSelectElement* select)
{
if (!select || select->disabled())
return false;
if (!select->document()->view())
return false;
if (isActiveTextEdit())
clearCurrentFocusElement();
m_currentFocusElement = select;
m_currentFocusElementType = SelectPopup;
const WTF::Vector<HTMLElement*>& listItems = select->listItems();
int size = listItems.size();
bool multiple = select->multiple();
ScopeArray<BlackBerry::Platform::String> labels;
labels.reset(new BlackBerry::Platform::String[size]);
m_webPage->m_page->chrome()->client()->closePagePopup(0);
bool* enableds = 0;
int* itemTypes = 0;
bool* selecteds = 0;
if (size) {
enableds = new bool[size];
itemTypes = new int[size];
selecteds = new bool[size];
for (int i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if (listItems[i]->hasTagName(HTMLNames::optionTag)) {
HTMLOptionElement* option = static_cast<HTMLOptionElement*>(listItems[i]);
labels[i] = option->textIndentedToRespectGroupLabel();
enableds[i] = option->disabled() ? 0 : 1;
selecteds[i] = option->selected();
itemTypes[i] = option->parentNode() && option->parentNode()->hasTagName(HTMLNames::optgroupTag) ? TypeOptionInGroup : TypeOption;
} else if (listItems[i]->hasTagName(HTMLNames::optgroupTag)) {
HTMLOptGroupElement* optGroup = static_cast<HTMLOptGroupElement*>(listItems[i]);
labels[i] = optGroup->groupLabelText();
enableds[i] = optGroup->disabled() ? 0 : 1;
selecteds[i] = false;
itemTypes[i] = TypeGroup;
} else if (listItems[i]->hasTagName(HTMLNames::hrTag)) {
enableds[i] = false;
selecteds[i] = false;
itemTypes[i] = TypeSeparator;
}
}
}
SelectPopupClient* selectClient = new SelectPopupClient(multiple, size, labels, enableds, itemTypes, selecteds, m_webPage, select);
WebCore::IntRect elementRectInRootView = select->document()->view()->contentsToRootView(enclosingIntRect(select->getRect()));
if (!m_webPage->m_page->chrome()->client()->openPagePopup(selectClient, elementRectInRootView))
m_webPage->m_client->openPopupList(multiple, size, labels, enableds, itemTypes, selecteds);
delete[] enableds;
delete[] itemTypes;
delete[] selecteds;
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,064
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_pmu_nop_void(struct pmu *pmu)
{
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 10,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool NavigatorImpl::NavigateToPendingEntry(
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
const FrameNavigationEntry& frame_entry,
ReloadType reload_type,
bool is_same_document_history_load) {
return NavigateToEntry(frame_tree_node, frame_entry,
*controller_->GetPendingEntry(), reload_type,
is_same_document_history_load, false, true, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 8,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int clearCell(
MemPage *pPage, /* The page that contains the Cell */
unsigned char *pCell, /* First byte of the Cell */
CellInfo *pInfo /* Size information about the cell */
){
BtShared *pBt = pPage->pBt;
Pgno ovflPgno;
int rc;
int nOvfl;
u32 ovflPageSize;
assert( sqlite3_mutex_held(pPage->pBt->mutex) );
pPage->xParseCell(pPage, pCell, pInfo);
if( pInfo->nLocal==pInfo->nPayload ){
return SQLITE_OK; /* No overflow pages. Return without doing anything */
}
if( pCell+pInfo->nSize-1 > pPage->aData+pPage->maskPage ){
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT; /* Cell extends past end of page */
}
ovflPgno = get4byte(pCell + pInfo->nSize - 4);
assert( pBt->usableSize > 4 );
ovflPageSize = pBt->usableSize - 4;
nOvfl = (pInfo->nPayload - pInfo->nLocal + ovflPageSize - 1)/ovflPageSize;
assert( nOvfl>0 ||
(CORRUPT_DB && (pInfo->nPayload + ovflPageSize)<ovflPageSize)
);
while( nOvfl-- ){
Pgno iNext = 0;
MemPage *pOvfl = 0;
if( ovflPgno<2 || ovflPgno>btreePagecount(pBt) ){
/* 0 is not a legal page number and page 1 cannot be an
** overflow page. Therefore if ovflPgno<2 or past the end of the
** file the database must be corrupt. */
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
}
if( nOvfl ){
rc = getOverflowPage(pBt, ovflPgno, &pOvfl, &iNext);
if( rc ) return rc;
}
if( ( pOvfl || ((pOvfl = btreePageLookup(pBt, ovflPgno))!=0) )
&& sqlite3PagerPageRefcount(pOvfl->pDbPage)!=1
){
/* There is no reason any cursor should have an outstanding reference
** to an overflow page belonging to a cell that is being deleted/updated.
** So if there exists more than one reference to this page, then it
** must not really be an overflow page and the database must be corrupt.
** It is helpful to detect this before calling freePage2(), as
** freePage2() may zero the page contents if secure-delete mode is
** enabled. If this 'overflow' page happens to be a page that the
** caller is iterating through or using in some other way, this
** can be problematic.
*/
rc = SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
}else{
rc = freePage2(pBt, pOvfl, ovflPgno);
}
if( pOvfl ){
sqlite3PagerUnref(pOvfl->pDbPage);
}
if( rc ) return rc;
ovflPgno = iNext;
}
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,350
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FilePath DownloadItemImpl::GetFileNameToReportUser() const {
if (!display_name_.empty())
return display_name_;
return target_path_.BaseName();
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::string16 GetExternalDisplayName(int64_t external_display_id) {
DCHECK(!display::Display::IsInternalDisplayId(external_display_id));
display::DisplayManager* display_manager = GetDisplayManager();
DCHECK(!display_manager->IsInMirrorMode());
if (external_display_id == display::kInvalidDisplayId)
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_DISPLAY_NAME_UNKNOWN);
base::string16 name = GetDisplayName(external_display_id);
const display::ManagedDisplayInfo& display_info =
display_manager->GetDisplayInfo(external_display_id);
if (display_info.GetActiveRotation() != display::Display::ROTATE_0 ||
display_info.configured_ui_scale() != 1.0f ||
!display_info.overscan_insets_in_dip().IsEmpty()) {
name =
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ANNOTATED_NAME,
name, GetDisplaySize(external_display_id));
} else if (display_info.overscan_insets_in_dip().IsEmpty() &&
display_info.has_overscan()) {
name = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ANNOTATED_NAME, name,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ANNOTATION_OVERSCAN));
}
return name;
}
Commit Message: Avoid Showing rotation change notification when source is accelerometer
BUG=717252
TEST=Manually rotate device with accelerometer and observe there's no notification
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2853113005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469058}
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 7,252
|
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