instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int vfs_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int buflen, const char *link)
{
int len;
len = PTR_ERR(link);
if (IS_ERR(link))
goto out;
len = strlen(link);
if (len > (unsigned) buflen)
len = buflen;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, link, len))
len = -EFAULT;
out:
return len;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,817
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int padlock_sha1_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
u8 buf[4];
return padlock_sha1_finup(desc, buf, 0, out);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int asf_read_ext_content_desc(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t size)
{
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int desc_count, i, ret;
desc_count = avio_rl16(pb);
for (i = 0; i < desc_count; i++) {
int name_len, value_type, value_len;
char name[1024];
name_len = avio_rl16(pb);
if (name_len % 2) // must be even, broken lavf versions wrote len-1
name_len += 1;
if ((ret = avio_get_str16le(pb, name_len, name, sizeof(name))) < name_len)
avio_skip(pb, name_len - ret);
value_type = avio_rl16(pb);
value_len = avio_rl16(pb);
if (!value_type && value_len % 2)
value_len += 1;
/* My sample has that stream set to 0 maybe that mean the container.
* ASF stream count starts at 1. I am using 0 to the container value
* since it's unused. */
if (!strcmp(name, "AspectRatioX"))
asf->dar[0].num = get_value(s->pb, value_type, 32);
else if (!strcmp(name, "AspectRatioY"))
asf->dar[0].den = get_value(s->pb, value_type, 32);
else
get_tag(s, name, value_type, value_len, 32);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Texture::Destroy() {
if (id_ != 0) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(decoder_);
glDeleteTextures(1, &id_);
id_ = 0;
memory_tracker_.UpdateMemRepresented(0);
TRACE_BACKBUFFER_MEMORY_TOTAL(decoder_);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 6,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodShortArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodShortArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodShortArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = aacParams->nBitRate;
mNumChannels = aacParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = aacParams->nSampleRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 21,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_create_text_node)
{
zval *id;
xmlNode *node;
xmlDocPtr docp;
int ret, value_len;
dom_object *intern;
char *value;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "Os", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &value, &value_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
node = xmlNewDocText(docp, (xmlChar *) value);
if (!node) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
DOM_RET_OBJ(node, &ret, intern);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 20,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: put_prentries(struct prentry *tentry, prentries *bulkentries)
{
struct prlistentries *entry;
if (bulkentries->prentries_val == 0) {
bulkentries->prentries_len = 0;
bulkentries->prentries_val =
(struct prlistentries *)malloc(PR_MAXENTRIES *
sizeof(struct prentry));
if (!bulkentries->prentries_val) {
return (PRNOMEM);
}
}
if (bulkentries->prentries_len >= PR_MAXENTRIES) {
return (-1);
}
entry = (struct prlistentries *)bulkentries->prentries_val;
entry += bulkentries->prentries_len;
entry->flags = tentry->flags >> PRIVATE_SHIFT;
if (entry->flags == 0) {
entry->flags =
((tentry->
flags & PRGRP) ? prp_group_default : prp_user_default) >>
PRIVATE_SHIFT;
}
entry->owner = tentry->owner;
entry->id = tentry->id;
entry->creator = tentry->creator;
entry->ngroups = tentry->ngroups;
entry->nusers = tentry->nusers;
entry->count = tentry->count;
strncpy(entry->name, tentry->name, PR_MAXNAMELEN);
memset(entry->reserved, 0, sizeof(entry->reserved));
bulkentries->prentries_len++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 14,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nested_svm_unmap(struct page *page)
{
kunmap(page);
kvm_release_page_dirty(page);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void start_apic_timer(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
{
ktime_t now;
atomic_set(&apic->lapic_timer.pending, 0);
if (apic_lvtt_period(apic) || apic_lvtt_oneshot(apic)) {
/* lapic timer in oneshot or periodic mode */
now = apic->lapic_timer.timer.base->get_time();
apic->lapic_timer.period = (u64)kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT)
* APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS * apic->divide_count;
if (!apic->lapic_timer.period)
return;
/*
* Do not allow the guest to program periodic timers with small
* interval, since the hrtimers are not throttled by the host
* scheduler.
*/
if (apic_lvtt_period(apic)) {
s64 min_period = min_timer_period_us * 1000LL;
if (apic->lapic_timer.period < min_period) {
pr_info_ratelimited(
"kvm: vcpu %i: requested %lld ns "
"lapic timer period limited to %lld ns\n",
apic->vcpu->vcpu_id,
apic->lapic_timer.period, min_period);
apic->lapic_timer.period = min_period;
}
}
hrtimer_start(&apic->lapic_timer.timer,
ktime_add_ns(now, apic->lapic_timer.period),
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
apic_debug("%s: bus cycle is %" PRId64 "ns, now 0x%016"
PRIx64 ", "
"timer initial count 0x%x, period %lldns, "
"expire @ 0x%016" PRIx64 ".\n", __func__,
APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS, ktime_to_ns(now),
kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT),
apic->lapic_timer.period,
ktime_to_ns(ktime_add_ns(now,
apic->lapic_timer.period)));
} else if (apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic)) {
/* lapic timer in tsc deadline mode */
u64 guest_tsc, tscdeadline = apic->lapic_timer.tscdeadline;
u64 ns = 0;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
unsigned long this_tsc_khz = vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz;
unsigned long flags;
if (unlikely(!tscdeadline || !this_tsc_khz))
return;
local_irq_save(flags);
now = apic->lapic_timer.timer.base->get_time();
guest_tsc = kvm_x86_ops->read_l1_tsc(vcpu, native_read_tsc());
if (likely(tscdeadline > guest_tsc)) {
ns = (tscdeadline - guest_tsc) * 1000000ULL;
do_div(ns, this_tsc_khz);
}
hrtimer_start(&apic->lapic_timer.timer,
ktime_add_ns(now, ns), HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ColorChooserWin::OnColorChosen(SkColor color) {
if (web_contents_)
web_contents_->DidChooseColorInColorChooser(color);
}
Commit Message: ColorChooserWin::End should act like the dialog has closed
This is only a problem on Windows.
When the page closes itself while the color chooser dialog is open,
ColorChooserDialog::DidCloseDialog was called after the listener has been destroyed.
ColorChooserWin::End() will not actually close the color chooser dialog (because we can't) but act like it did so we can do the necessary cleanup.
BUG=279263
R=jschuh@chromium.org, pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/23785003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@220639 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 10,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SendErrorNotifications(const AppCacheErrorDetails& details) {
DCHECK(!details.message.empty());
for (NotifyHostMap::iterator it = hosts_to_notify.begin();
it != hosts_to_notify.end(); ++it) {
AppCacheFrontend* frontend = it->first;
frontend->OnErrorEventRaised(it->second, details);
}
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_sockop_cast(php_stream *stream, int castas, void **ret)
{
php_netstream_data_t *sock = (php_netstream_data_t*)stream->abstract;
if (!sock) {
return FAILURE;
}
switch(castas) {
case PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO:
if (ret) {
*(FILE**)ret = fdopen(sock->socket, stream->mode);
if (*ret)
return SUCCESS;
return FAILURE;
}
return SUCCESS;
case PHP_STREAM_AS_FD_FOR_SELECT:
case PHP_STREAM_AS_FD:
case PHP_STREAM_AS_SOCKETD:
if (ret)
*(php_socket_t *)ret = sock->socket;
return SUCCESS;
default:
return FAILURE;
}
}
Commit Message: Detect invalid port in xp_socket parse ip address
For historical reasons, fsockopen() accepts the port and hostname
separately: fsockopen('127.0.0.1', 80)
However, with the introdcution of stream transports in PHP 4.3,
it became possible to include the port in the hostname specifier:
fsockopen('127.0.0.1:80')
Or more formally: fsockopen('tcp://127.0.0.1:80')
Confusing results when these two forms are combined, however.
fsockopen('127.0.0.1:80', 443) results in fsockopen() attempting
to connect to '127.0.0.1:80:443' which any reasonable stack would
consider invalid.
Unfortunately, PHP parses the address looking for the first colon
(with special handling for IPv6, don't worry) and calls atoi()
from there. atoi() in turn, simply stops parsing at the first
non-numeric character and returns the value so far.
The end result is that the explicitly supplied port is treated
as ignored garbage, rather than producing an error.
This diff replaces atoi() with strtol() and inspects the
stop character. If additional "garbage" of any kind is found,
it fails and returns an error.
CWE ID: CWE-918
| 0
| 19,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __sleep_on_page_lock(void *word)
{
io_schedule();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,312
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void RaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kGetterContext, "TestObject", "raisesExceptionLongAttribute");
int32_t cpp_value(impl->raisesExceptionLongAttribute(exception_state));
if (UNLIKELY(exception_state.HadException()))
return;
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
{
DTLS1_STATE *d1;
if (!ssl3_new(s))
return (0);
if ((d1 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *d1)) == NULL)
return (0);
memset(d1, 0, sizeof *d1);
/* d1->handshake_epoch=0; */
d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
d1->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new();
d1->sent_messages = pqueue_new();
d1->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new();
if (s->server) {
d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
}
d1->link_mtu = 0;
d1->mtu = 0;
if (!d1->unprocessed_rcds.q || !d1->processed_rcds.q
|| !d1->buffered_messages || !d1->sent_messages
|| !d1->buffered_app_data.q) {
if (d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)
pqueue_free(d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (d1->processed_rcds.q)
pqueue_free(d1->processed_rcds.q);
if (d1->buffered_messages)
pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);
if (d1->sent_messages)
pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages);
if (d1->buffered_app_data.q)
pqueue_free(d1->buffered_app_data.q);
OPENSSL_free(d1);
return (0);
}
s->d1 = d1;
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataEntry::FromProto(const GDataEntryProto& proto) {
ConvertProtoToPlatformFileInfo(proto.file_info(), &file_info_);
title_ = proto.title();
resource_id_ = proto.resource_id();
parent_resource_id_ = proto.parent_resource_id();
edit_url_ = GURL(proto.edit_url());
content_url_ = GURL(proto.content_url());
SetFileNameFromTitle();
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AudioNode::AudioNode(BaseAudioContext& context)
: context_(context), handler_(nullptr) {}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 12,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: flatpak_proxy_get_property (GObject *object,
guint prop_id,
GValue *value,
GParamSpec *pspec)
{
FlatpakProxy *proxy = FLATPAK_PROXY (object);
switch (prop_id)
{
case PROP_DBUS_ADDRESS:
g_value_set_string (value, proxy->dbus_address);
break;
case PROP_SOCKET_PATH:
g_value_set_string (value, proxy->socket_path);
break;
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID (object, prop_id, pspec);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436
| 0
| 16,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_run_sh(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, const char *name, fz_shade *shade)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_show_shade(ctx, pr, shade);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 5,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::createPlaceholderTracksIfNecessary() {
if (!mediaTracksEnabledInternally())
return;
if (hasAudio() && !audioTracks().length()) {
addAudioTrack("audio", WebMediaPlayerClient::AudioTrackKindMain,
"Audio Track", "", false);
}
if (hasVideo() && !videoTracks().length()) {
addVideoTrack("video", WebMediaPlayerClient::VideoTrackKindMain,
"Video Track", "", false);
}
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,552
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::Minimize() {
gtk_window_iconify(window_);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ACodec::describeDefaultColorFormat(DescribeColorFormatParams ¶ms) {
MediaImage &image = params.sMediaImage;
memset(&image, 0, sizeof(image));
image.mType = MediaImage::MEDIA_IMAGE_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
image.mNumPlanes = 0;
const OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE fmt = params.eColorFormat;
image.mWidth = params.nFrameWidth;
image.mHeight = params.nFrameHeight;
if (fmt != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar &&
fmt != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420PackedPlanar &&
fmt != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar &&
fmt != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420PackedSemiPlanar &&
fmt != HAL_PIXEL_FORMAT_YV12) {
ALOGW("do not know color format 0x%x = %d", fmt, fmt);
return false;
}
if (params.nStride != 0 && params.nSliceHeight == 0) {
ALOGW("using sliceHeight=%u instead of what codec advertised (=0)",
params.nFrameHeight);
params.nSliceHeight = params.nFrameHeight;
}
if (params.nStride == 0 || params.nSliceHeight == 0) {
ALOGW("cannot describe color format 0x%x = %d with stride=%u and sliceHeight=%u",
fmt, fmt, params.nStride, params.nSliceHeight);
return false;
}
image.mType = MediaImage::MEDIA_IMAGE_TYPE_YUV;
image.mNumPlanes = 3;
image.mBitDepth = 8;
image.mPlane[image.Y].mOffset = 0;
image.mPlane[image.Y].mColInc = 1;
image.mPlane[image.Y].mRowInc = params.nStride;
image.mPlane[image.Y].mHorizSubsampling = 1;
image.mPlane[image.Y].mVertSubsampling = 1;
switch ((int)fmt) {
case HAL_PIXEL_FORMAT_YV12:
if (params.bUsingNativeBuffers) {
size_t ystride = align(params.nStride, 16);
size_t cstride = align(params.nStride / 2, 16);
image.mPlane[image.Y].mRowInc = ystride;
image.mPlane[image.V].mOffset = ystride * params.nSliceHeight;
image.mPlane[image.V].mColInc = 1;
image.mPlane[image.V].mRowInc = cstride;
image.mPlane[image.V].mHorizSubsampling = 2;
image.mPlane[image.V].mVertSubsampling = 2;
image.mPlane[image.U].mOffset = image.mPlane[image.V].mOffset
+ (cstride * params.nSliceHeight / 2);
image.mPlane[image.U].mColInc = 1;
image.mPlane[image.U].mRowInc = cstride;
image.mPlane[image.U].mHorizSubsampling = 2;
image.mPlane[image.U].mVertSubsampling = 2;
break;
} else {
}
case OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar:
case OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420PackedPlanar:
image.mPlane[image.U].mOffset = params.nStride * params.nSliceHeight;
image.mPlane[image.U].mColInc = 1;
image.mPlane[image.U].mRowInc = params.nStride / 2;
image.mPlane[image.U].mHorizSubsampling = 2;
image.mPlane[image.U].mVertSubsampling = 2;
image.mPlane[image.V].mOffset = image.mPlane[image.U].mOffset
+ (params.nStride * params.nSliceHeight / 4);
image.mPlane[image.V].mColInc = 1;
image.mPlane[image.V].mRowInc = params.nStride / 2;
image.mPlane[image.V].mHorizSubsampling = 2;
image.mPlane[image.V].mVertSubsampling = 2;
break;
case OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar:
case OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420PackedSemiPlanar:
image.mPlane[image.U].mOffset = params.nStride * params.nSliceHeight;
image.mPlane[image.U].mColInc = 2;
image.mPlane[image.U].mRowInc = params.nStride;
image.mPlane[image.U].mHorizSubsampling = 2;
image.mPlane[image.U].mVertSubsampling = 2;
image.mPlane[image.V].mOffset = image.mPlane[image.U].mOffset + 1;
image.mPlane[image.V].mColInc = 2;
image.mPlane[image.V].mRowInc = params.nStride;
image.mPlane[image.V].mHorizSubsampling = 2;
image.mPlane[image.V].mVertSubsampling = 2;
break;
default:
TRESPASS();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,920
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int raw_cmd_copyin(int cmd, void __user *param,
struct floppy_raw_cmd **rcmd)
{
struct floppy_raw_cmd *ptr;
int ret;
int i;
*rcmd = NULL;
loop:
ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct floppy_raw_cmd), GFP_USER);
if (!ptr)
return -ENOMEM;
*rcmd = ptr;
ret = copy_from_user(ptr, param, sizeof(*ptr));
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
ptr->next = NULL;
ptr->buffer_length = 0;
param += sizeof(struct floppy_raw_cmd);
if (ptr->cmd_count > 33)
/* the command may now also take up the space
* initially intended for the reply & the
* reply count. Needed for long 82078 commands
* such as RESTORE, which takes ... 17 command
* bytes. Murphy's law #137: When you reserve
* 16 bytes for a structure, you'll one day
* discover that you really need 17...
*/
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
ptr->reply[i] = 0;
ptr->resultcode = 0;
ptr->kernel_data = NULL;
if (ptr->flags & (FD_RAW_READ | FD_RAW_WRITE)) {
if (ptr->length <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
ptr->kernel_data = (char *)fd_dma_mem_alloc(ptr->length);
fallback_on_nodma_alloc(&ptr->kernel_data, ptr->length);
if (!ptr->kernel_data)
return -ENOMEM;
ptr->buffer_length = ptr->length;
}
if (ptr->flags & FD_RAW_WRITE) {
ret = fd_copyin(ptr->data, ptr->kernel_data, ptr->length);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (ptr->flags & FD_RAW_MORE) {
rcmd = &(ptr->next);
ptr->rate &= 0x43;
goto loop;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: floppy: ignore kernel-only members in FDRAWCMD ioctl input
Always clear out these floppy_raw_cmd struct members after copying the
entire structure from userspace so that the in-kernel version is always
valid and never left in an interdeterminate state.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 19,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::scheduleTextTrackResourceLoad() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "scheduleTextTrackResourceLoad(" << (void*)this << ")";
m_pendingActionFlags |= LoadTextTrackResource;
if (!m_loadTimer.isActive())
m_loadTimer.startOneShot(0, BLINK_FROM_HERE);
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::suppressLoadEvent()
{
if (!loadEventFinished())
m_loadEventProgress = LoadEventCompleted;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dup_fctx(struct userfaultfd_fork_ctx *fctx)
{
struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx = fctx->orig;
struct userfaultfd_wait_queue ewq;
msg_init(&ewq.msg);
ewq.msg.event = UFFD_EVENT_FORK;
ewq.msg.arg.reserved.reserved1 = (unsigned long)fctx->new;
userfaultfd_event_wait_completion(ctx, &ewq);
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas
After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has
VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration. This way we inherit all
common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and
hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY.
The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless
it's a MAP_PRIVATE.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-4-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static WebURLRequest::RequestContext DetermineRequestContextFromNavigationType(
const NavigationType navigation_type) {
switch (navigation_type) {
case kNavigationTypeLinkClicked:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextHyperlink;
case kNavigationTypeOther:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextLocation;
case kNavigationTypeFormResubmitted:
case kNavigationTypeFormSubmitted:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextForm;
case kNavigationTypeBackForward:
case kNavigationTypeReload:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextInternal;
}
NOTREACHED();
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextHyperlink;
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 1,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SMB2_auth_kerberos(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
{
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Kerberos negotiated but upcall support disabled!\n");
sess_data->result = -EOPNOTSUPP;
sess_data->func = NULL;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 19,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::android::ScopedJavaLocalRef<jbyteArray> AwContents::GetCertificate(
JNIEnv* env,
jobject obj) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
content::NavigationEntry* entry =
web_contents_->GetController().GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (!entry)
return ScopedJavaLocalRef<jbyteArray>();
int cert_id = entry->GetSSL().cert_id;
scoped_refptr<net::X509Certificate> cert;
bool ok = content::CertStore::GetInstance()->RetrieveCert(cert_id, &cert);
if (!ok)
return ScopedJavaLocalRef<jbyteArray>();
std::string der_string;
net::X509Certificate::GetDEREncoded(cert->os_cert_handle(), &der_string);
return base::android::ToJavaByteArray(env,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8*>(der_string.data()), der_string.length());
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 9,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Textfield::IsTextEditCommandEnabled(ui::TextEditCommand command) const {
base::string16 result;
bool editable = !read_only();
bool readable = text_input_type_ != ui::TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_PASSWORD;
switch (command) {
case ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_BACKWARD:
case ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_FORWARD:
case ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_TO_BEGINNING_OF_LINE:
case ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_TO_BEGINNING_OF_PARAGRAPH:
case ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_TO_END_OF_LINE:
case ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_TO_END_OF_PARAGRAPH:
case ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_WORD_BACKWARD:
case ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_WORD_FORWARD:
return editable;
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_BACKWARD:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_BACKWARD_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_FORWARD:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_FORWARD_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_LEFT:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_LEFT_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_RIGHT:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_RIGHT_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_BEGINNING_OF_DOCUMENT:
case ui::TextEditCommand::
MOVE_TO_BEGINNING_OF_DOCUMENT_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_BEGINNING_OF_LINE:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_BEGINNING_OF_LINE_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_BEGINNING_OF_PARAGRAPH:
case ui::TextEditCommand::
MOVE_TO_BEGINNING_OF_PARAGRAPH_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_END_OF_DOCUMENT:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_END_OF_DOCUMENT_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_END_OF_LINE:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_END_OF_LINE_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_END_OF_PARAGRAPH:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_END_OF_PARAGRAPH_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_PARAGRAPH_FORWARD_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_PARAGRAPH_BACKWARD_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_BACKWARD:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_BACKWARD_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_FORWARD:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_FORWARD_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_LEFT:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_LEFT_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_RIGHT:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_RIGHT_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
return true;
case ui::TextEditCommand::UNDO:
return editable && model_->CanUndo();
case ui::TextEditCommand::REDO:
return editable && model_->CanRedo();
case ui::TextEditCommand::CUT:
return editable && readable && model_->HasSelection();
case ui::TextEditCommand::COPY:
return readable && model_->HasSelection();
case ui::TextEditCommand::PASTE:
ui::Clipboard::GetForCurrentThread()->ReadText(
ui::CLIPBOARD_TYPE_COPY_PASTE, &result);
return editable && !result.empty();
case ui::TextEditCommand::SELECT_ALL:
return !text().empty() && GetSelectedRange().length() != text().length();
case ui::TextEditCommand::TRANSPOSE:
return editable && !model_->HasSelection() &&
!model_->HasCompositionText();
case ui::TextEditCommand::YANK:
return editable;
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_DOWN:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_DOWN_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_PAGE_DOWN:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_PAGE_DOWN_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_PAGE_UP:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_PAGE_UP_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_UP:
case ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_UP_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION:
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
return true;
#else
return false;
#endif
case ui::TextEditCommand::INSERT_TEXT:
case ui::TextEditCommand::SET_MARK:
case ui::TextEditCommand::UNSELECT:
case ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND:
return false;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u64 walk_shadow_page_get_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr)
{
struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator iterator;
u64 spte = 0ull;
walk_shadow_page_lockless_begin(vcpu);
for_each_shadow_entry_lockless(vcpu, addr, iterator, spte)
if (!is_shadow_present_pte(spte))
break;
walk_shadow_page_lockless_end(vcpu);
return spte;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::ProcessDied(bool already_dead,
RendererClosedDetails* known_details) {
DCHECK(!within_process_died_observer_);
DCHECK(!deleting_soon_);
base::TerminationStatus status = base::TERMINATION_STATUS_NORMAL_TERMINATION;
int exit_code = 0;
if (known_details) {
status = known_details->status;
exit_code = known_details->exit_code;
} else if (child_process_launcher_.get()) {
status = child_process_launcher_->GetChildTerminationStatus(already_dead,
&exit_code);
if (already_dead && status == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING) {
status = base::TERMINATION_STATUS_PROCESS_CRASHED;
}
}
RendererClosedDetails details(status, exit_code);
child_process_launcher_.reset();
is_dead_ = true;
if (route_provider_binding_.is_bound())
route_provider_binding_.Close();
associated_interfaces_.reset();
process_resource_coordinator_.reset();
ResetChannelProxy();
UpdateProcessPriority();
within_process_died_observer_ = true;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_CLOSED, Source<RenderProcessHost>(this),
Details<RendererClosedDetails>(&details));
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.RenderProcessExited(this, status, exit_code);
within_process_died_observer_ = false;
RemoveUserData(kSessionStorageHolderKey);
base::IDMap<IPC::Listener*>::iterator iter(&listeners_);
while (!iter.IsAtEnd()) {
iter.GetCurrentValue()->OnMessageReceived(FrameHostMsg_RenderProcessGone(
iter.GetCurrentKey(), static_cast<int>(status), exit_code));
iter.Advance();
}
EnableSendQueue();
if (delayed_cleanup_needed_)
Cleanup();
frame_sink_provider_.Unbind();
if (renderer_host_binding_.is_bound())
renderer_host_binding_.Unbind();
compositing_mode_reporter_.reset();
shared_bitmap_allocation_notifier_impl_.ChildDied();
HistogramController::GetInstance()->NotifyChildDied<RenderProcessHost>(this);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 25,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(http_params)
{
zend_class_entry ce = {0};
INIT_NS_CLASS_ENTRY(ce, "http", "Params", php_http_params_methods);
php_http_params_class_entry = zend_register_internal_class(&ce TSRMLS_CC);
php_http_params_class_entry->create_object = php_http_params_object_new;
zend_class_implements(php_http_params_class_entry TSRMLS_CC, 1, zend_ce_arrayaccess);
zend_declare_class_constant_stringl(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("DEF_PARAM_SEP"), ZEND_STRL(",") TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_class_constant_stringl(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("DEF_ARG_SEP"), ZEND_STRL(";") TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_class_constant_stringl(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("DEF_VAL_SEP"), ZEND_STRL("=") TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_class_constant_stringl(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("COOKIE_PARAM_SEP"), ZEND_STRL("") TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_class_constant_long(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("PARSE_RAW"), PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_RAW TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_class_constant_long(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("PARSE_ESCAPED"), PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_ESCAPED TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_class_constant_long(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("PARSE_URLENCODED"), PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_URLENCODED TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_class_constant_long(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("PARSE_DIMENSION"), PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_DIMENSION TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_class_constant_long(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("PARSE_RFC5987"), PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_RFC5987 TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_class_constant_long(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("PARSE_RFC5988"), PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_RFC5988 TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_class_constant_long(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("PARSE_DEFAULT"), PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_DEFAULT TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_class_constant_long(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("PARSE_QUERY"), PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_QUERY TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_property_null(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("params"), ZEND_ACC_PUBLIC TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_property_stringl(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("param_sep"), ZEND_STRL(","), ZEND_ACC_PUBLIC TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_property_stringl(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("arg_sep"), ZEND_STRL(";"), ZEND_ACC_PUBLIC TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_property_stringl(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("val_sep"), ZEND_STRL("="), ZEND_ACC_PUBLIC TSRMLS_CC);
zend_declare_property_long(php_http_params_class_entry, ZEND_STRL("flags"), PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_DEFAULT, ZEND_ACC_PUBLIC TSRMLS_CC);
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fix bug #73055
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 28,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cib_remote_register_notification(cib_t * cib, const char *callback, int enabled)
{
xmlNode *notify_msg = create_xml_node(NULL, "cib_command");
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
crm_xml_add(notify_msg, F_CIB_OPERATION, T_CIB_NOTIFY);
crm_xml_add(notify_msg, F_CIB_NOTIFY_TYPE, callback);
crm_xml_add_int(notify_msg, F_CIB_NOTIFY_ACTIVATE, enabled);
crm_send_remote_msg(private->callback.session, notify_msg, private->callback.encrypted);
free_xml(notify_msg);
return pcmk_ok;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::FinishedLoading(TimeTicks finish_time) {
DCHECK(frame_->Loader().StateMachine()->CreatingInitialEmptyDocument() ||
!frame_->GetPage()->Paused() ||
MainThreadDebugger::Instance()->IsPaused());
TimeTicks response_end_time = finish_time;
if (response_end_time.is_null())
response_end_time = time_of_last_data_received_;
if (response_end_time.is_null())
response_end_time = CurrentTimeTicks();
GetTiming().SetResponseEnd(response_end_time);
if (!MaybeCreateArchive()) {
if (state_ == kProvisional)
CommitData(nullptr, 0);
}
if (!frame_)
return;
application_cache_host_->FinishedLoadingMainResource();
if (parser_) {
if (parser_blocked_count_) {
finished_loading_ = true;
} else {
parser_->Finish();
parser_.Clear();
}
}
ClearResource();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,687
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void pmcraid_return_cmd(struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd)
{
struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance = cmd->drv_inst;
unsigned long lock_flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&pinstance->free_pool_lock, lock_flags);
list_add_tail(&cmd->free_list, &pinstance->free_cmd_pool);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pinstance->free_pool_lock, lock_flags);
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 26,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_journalled_set_page_dirty(struct page *page)
{
SetPageChecked(page);
return __set_page_dirty_nobuffers(page);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 5,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType IsVICAR(const unsigned char *magick,
const size_t length)
{
if (length < 14)
return(MagickFalse);
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) magick,"LBLSIZE",7) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) magick,"NJPL1I",6) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) magick,"PDS_VERSION_ID",14) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exsltDateDayAbbreviationFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs)
{
xmlChar *dt = NULL;
const xmlChar *ret;
if ((nargs < 0) || (nargs > 1)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs == 1) {
dt = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
if (xmlXPathCheckError(ctxt)) {
xmlXPathSetTypeError(ctxt);
return;
}
}
ret = exsltDateDayAbbreviation(dt);
if (dt != NULL)
xmlFree(dt);
if (ret == NULL)
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
else
xmlXPathReturnString(ctxt, xmlStrdup(ret));
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,610
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
int ok, al;
unsigned long resplen, n;
const unsigned char *p;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (n < 4) {
/* need at least status type + length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
n2l3(p, resplen);
if (resplen + 4 != n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
int ret;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (ret == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
goto f_err;
}
if (ret < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
Commit Message: Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 29,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void setJSTestObjMutablePoint(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setMutablePoint(toSVGPoint(value));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_fond( char* fond_data,
short* have_sfnt,
ResID* sfnt_id,
Str255 lwfn_file_name,
short face_index )
{
AsscEntry* assoc;
AsscEntry* base_assoc;
FamRec* fond;
*sfnt_id = 0;
*have_sfnt = 0;
lwfn_file_name[0] = 0;
fond = (FamRec*)fond_data;
assoc = (AsscEntry*)( fond_data + sizeof ( FamRec ) + 2 );
base_assoc = assoc;
/* the maximum faces in a FOND is 48, size of StyleTable.indexes[] */
if ( 47 < face_index )
return;
/* Let's do a little range checking before we get too excited here */
if ( face_index < count_faces_sfnt( fond_data ) )
{
assoc += face_index; /* add on the face_index! */
/* if the face at this index is not scalable,
fall back to the first one (old behavior) */
if ( EndianS16_BtoN( assoc->fontSize ) == 0 )
{
*have_sfnt = 1;
*sfnt_id = EndianS16_BtoN( assoc->fontID );
}
else if ( base_assoc->fontSize == 0 )
{
*have_sfnt = 1;
*sfnt_id = EndianS16_BtoN( base_assoc->fontID );
}
}
if ( EndianS32_BtoN( fond->ffStylOff ) )
{
unsigned char* p = (unsigned char*)fond_data;
StyleTable* style;
unsigned short string_count;
char ps_name[256];
unsigned char* names[64];
int i;
p += EndianS32_BtoN( fond->ffStylOff );
style = (StyleTable*)p;
p += sizeof ( StyleTable );
string_count = EndianS16_BtoN( *(short*)(p) );
p += sizeof ( short );
for ( i = 0; i < string_count && i < 64; i++ )
{
names[i] = p;
p += names[i][0];
}
{
size_t ps_name_len = (size_t)names[0][0];
if ( ps_name_len != 0 )
{
ft_memcpy(ps_name, names[0] + 1, ps_name_len);
ps_name[ps_name_len] = 0;
ps_name[ps_name_len] = 0;
}
if ( style->indexes[face_index] > 1 &&
style->indexes[face_index] <= FT_MIN( string_count, 64 ) )
{
unsigned char* suffixes = names[style->indexes[face_index] - 1];
for ( i = 1; i <= suffixes[0]; i++ )
{
unsigned char* s;
size_t j = suffixes[i] - 1;
if ( j < string_count && ( s = names[j] ) != NULL )
{
size_t s_len = (size_t)s[0];
if ( s_len != 0 && ps_name_len + s_len < sizeof ( ps_name ) )
{
ft_memcpy( ps_name + ps_name_len, s + 1, s_len );
ps_name_len += s_len;
ps_name[ps_name_len] = 0;
}
}
}
}
}
create_lwfn_name( ps_name, lwfn_file_name );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 3,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: remove_addr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *opt, u_int opt_len, u_char flags _U_)
{
const struct mp_remove_addr *remove_addr = (const struct mp_remove_addr *) opt;
const uint8_t *addr_id = &remove_addr->addrs_id;
if (opt_len < 4)
return 0;
opt_len -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " id"));
while (opt_len--)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", *addr_id++));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13040/MPTCP: Clean up printing DSS suboption.
Do the length checking inline; that means we print stuff up to the point
at which we run out of option data.
First check to make sure we have at least 4 bytes of option, so we have
flags to check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kim Gwan Yeong.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 29,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sg_get_version(int __user *p)
{
static const int sg_version_num = 30527;
return put_user(sg_version_num, p);
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 15,953
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void svm_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
dt->size = svm->vmcb->save.idtr.limit;
dt->address = svm->vmcb->save.idtr.base;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsSureError(const autofill::ValidityMessage& message) {
return message.sure && !message.text.empty();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 4,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rpc_call_async(struct rpc_clnt *clnt, const struct rpc_message *msg, int flags,
const struct rpc_call_ops *tk_ops, void *data)
{
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = clnt,
.rpc_message = msg,
.callback_ops = tk_ops,
.callback_data = data,
.flags = flags|RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
rpc_put_task(task);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hash_init( hashtable* ht,
FT_Memory memory )
{
int sz = INITIAL_HT_SIZE;
FT_Error error = BDF_Err_Ok;
ht->size = sz;
ht->limit = sz / 3;
ht->used = 0;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( ht->table, sz ) )
goto Exit;
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_da_get_block_prep(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
struct buffer_head *bh, int create)
{
struct ext4_map_blocks map;
int ret = 0;
BUG_ON(create == 0);
BUG_ON(bh->b_size != inode->i_sb->s_blocksize);
map.m_lblk = iblock;
map.m_len = 1;
/*
* first, we need to know whether the block is allocated already
* preallocated blocks are unmapped but should treated
* the same as allocated blocks.
*/
ret = ext4_da_map_blocks(inode, iblock, &map, bh);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
map_bh(bh, inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk);
bh->b_state = (bh->b_state & ~EXT4_MAP_FLAGS) | map.m_flags;
if (buffer_unwritten(bh)) {
/* A delayed write to unwritten bh should be marked
* new and mapped. Mapped ensures that we don't do
* get_block multiple times when we write to the same
* offset and new ensures that we do proper zero out
* for partial write.
*/
set_buffer_new(bh);
set_buffer_mapped(bh);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 13,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void addLengthDistance(uivector* values, size_t length, size_t distance)
{
/*values in encoded vector are those used by deflate:
0-255: literal bytes
256: end
257-285: length/distance pair (length code, followed by extra length bits, distance code, extra distance bits)
286-287: invalid*/
unsigned length_code = (unsigned)searchCodeIndex(LENGTHBASE, 29, length);
unsigned extra_length = (unsigned)(length - LENGTHBASE[length_code]);
unsigned dist_code = (unsigned)searchCodeIndex(DISTANCEBASE, 30, distance);
unsigned extra_distance = (unsigned)(distance - DISTANCEBASE[dist_code]);
uivector_push_back(values, length_code + FIRST_LENGTH_CODE_INDEX);
uivector_push_back(values, extra_length);
uivector_push_back(values, dist_code);
uivector_push_back(values, extra_distance);
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 3,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: isofs_export_encode_fh(struct inode *inode,
__u32 *fh32,
int *max_len,
struct inode *parent)
{
struct iso_inode_info * ei = ISOFS_I(inode);
int len = *max_len;
int type = 1;
__u16 *fh16 = (__u16*)fh32;
/*
* WARNING: max_len is 5 for NFSv2. Because of this
* limitation, we use the lower 16 bits of fh32[1] to hold the
* offset of the inode and the upper 16 bits of fh32[1] to
* hold the offset of the parent.
*/
if (parent && (len < 5)) {
*max_len = 5;
return 255;
} else if (len < 3) {
*max_len = 3;
return 255;
}
len = 3;
fh32[0] = ei->i_iget5_block;
fh16[2] = (__u16)ei->i_iget5_offset; /* fh16 [sic] */
fh32[2] = inode->i_generation;
if (parent) {
struct iso_inode_info *eparent;
eparent = ISOFS_I(parent);
fh32[3] = eparent->i_iget5_block;
fh16[3] = (__u16)eparent->i_iget5_offset; /* fh16 [sic] */
fh32[4] = parent->i_generation;
len = 5;
type = 2;
}
*max_len = len;
return type;
}
Commit Message: isofs: avoid info leak on export
For type 1 the parent_offset member in struct isofs_fid gets copied
uninitialized to userland. Fix this by initializing it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 27,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: server_request_session(void)
{
Channel *c;
debug("input_session_request");
packet_check_eom();
if (no_more_sessions) {
packet_disconnect("Possible attack: attempt to open a session "
"after additional sessions disabled");
}
/*
* A server session has no fd to read or write until a
* CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to
* SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL. Additionally, a callback for handling all
* CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered.
*/
c = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
-1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "server-session", 1);
if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
channel_free(c);
return NULL;
}
channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0);
return c;
}
Commit Message: disable Unix-domain socket forwarding when privsep is disabled
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::pair<int, int> FrameSelection::LayoutSelectionStartEnd() {
return layout_selection_->SelectionStartEnd();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void qeth_clean_channel(struct qeth_channel *channel)
{
int cnt;
QETH_DBF_TEXT(SETUP, 2, "freech");
for (cnt = 0; cnt < QETH_CMD_BUFFER_NO; cnt++)
kfree(channel->iob[cnt].data);
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: person_free(person_t* person)
{
int i, j;
person_activate(person, PERSON_SCRIPT_ON_DESTROY, NULL, true);
for (i = 0; i < s_num_persons; ++i) {
if (s_persons[i]->leader == person)
s_persons[i]->leader = NULL;
}
detach_person(person);
for (i = 0; i < s_num_persons; ++i) {
if (s_persons[i] == person) {
for (j = i; j < s_num_persons - 1; ++j)
s_persons[j] = s_persons[j + 1];
--s_num_persons;
--i;
}
}
vector_free(person->ignore_list);
free_person(person);
sort_persons();
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 26,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs4_set_lock_task_retry(unsigned long timeout)
{
freezable_schedule_timeout_killable(timeout);
timeout <<= 1;
if (timeout > NFS4_LOCK_MAXTIMEOUT)
return NFS4_LOCK_MAXTIMEOUT;
return timeout;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 22,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
{
PACKET extensions = *packet;
size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
int ret = 0;
/* First pass: count the extensions. */
while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
unsigned int type;
PACKET extension;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
goto done;
}
num_extensions++;
}
if (num_extensions <= 1)
return 1;
extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
if (extension_types == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto done;
}
/* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
extensions = *packet;
for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
PACKET extension;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
/* This should not happen. */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto done;
}
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto done;
}
/* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
goto done;
}
ret = 1;
done:
OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Gfx::~Gfx() {
while (stateGuards.size()) {
popStateGuard();
}
while (state->hasSaves()) {
error(-1, "Found state under last state guard. Popping.");
restoreState();
}
if (!subPage) {
out->endPage();
}
while (res) {
popResources();
}
if (state) {
delete state;
}
while (mcStack) {
popMarkedContent();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::RestartInputEventAckTimeoutIfNecessary() {
if (input_event_ack_timeout_ && in_flight_event_count_ > 0 && !is_hidden_)
input_event_ack_timeout_->Restart(hung_renderer_delay_);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PermissionsData::UpdateTabSpecificPermissions(
int tab_id,
const PermissionSet& permissions) const {
AutoLockOnValidThread lock(runtime_lock_, thread_checker_.get());
CHECK_GE(tab_id, 0);
TabPermissionsMap::const_iterator iter =
tab_specific_permissions_.find(tab_id);
std::unique_ptr<const PermissionSet> new_permissions =
PermissionSet::CreateUnion(
iter == tab_specific_permissions_.end()
? static_cast<const PermissionSet&>(PermissionSet())
: *iter->second,
permissions);
tab_specific_permissions_[tab_id] = std::move(new_permissions);
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RTCPeerConnectionHandler::CreateNativeSessionDescription(
const std::string& sdp, const std::string& type,
webrtc::SdpParseError* error) {
webrtc::SessionDescriptionInterface* native_desc =
dependency_factory_->CreateSessionDescription(type, sdp, error);
LOG_IF(ERROR, !native_desc) << "Failed to create native session description."
<< " Type: " << type << " SDP: " << sdp;
return native_desc;
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 7,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterNULLImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("NULL");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadNULLImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteNULLImage;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->format_type=ImplicitFormatType;
entry->description=ConstantString("Constant image of uniform color");
entry->module=ConstantString("NULL");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::writeUnpadded(const void* data, size_t len)
{
size_t end = mDataPos + len;
if (end < mDataPos) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (end <= mDataCapacity) {
restart_write:
memcpy(mData+mDataPos, data, len);
return finishWrite(len);
}
status_t err = growData(len);
if (err == NO_ERROR) goto restart_write;
return err;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_memslots_updated(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memslots *slots)
{
/*
* memslots->generation has been incremented.
* mmio generation may have reached its maximum value.
*/
kvm_mmu_invalidate_mmio_sptes(kvm, slots);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main (int argc, char **argv) {
int c;
bool lock_memory = false;
bool do_daemonize = false;
bool preallocate = false;
int maxcore = 0;
char *username = NULL;
char *pid_file = NULL;
struct passwd *pw;
struct rlimit rlim;
char *buf;
char unit = '\0';
int size_max = 0;
int retval = EXIT_SUCCESS;
/* listening sockets */
static int *l_socket = NULL;
/* udp socket */
static int *u_socket = NULL;
bool protocol_specified = false;
bool tcp_specified = false;
bool udp_specified = false;
bool start_lru_maintainer = false;
bool start_lru_crawler = false;
enum hashfunc_type hash_type = JENKINS_HASH;
uint32_t tocrawl;
uint32_t slab_sizes[MAX_NUMBER_OF_SLAB_CLASSES];
bool use_slab_sizes = false;
char *slab_sizes_unparsed = NULL;
bool slab_chunk_size_changed = false;
char *subopts, *subopts_orig;
char *subopts_value;
enum {
MAXCONNS_FAST = 0,
HASHPOWER_INIT,
SLAB_REASSIGN,
SLAB_AUTOMOVE,
TAIL_REPAIR_TIME,
HASH_ALGORITHM,
LRU_CRAWLER,
LRU_CRAWLER_SLEEP,
LRU_CRAWLER_TOCRAWL,
LRU_MAINTAINER,
HOT_LRU_PCT,
WARM_LRU_PCT,
HOT_MAX_AGE,
WARM_MAX_FACTOR,
TEMPORARY_TTL,
IDLE_TIMEOUT,
WATCHER_LOGBUF_SIZE,
WORKER_LOGBUF_SIZE,
SLAB_SIZES,
SLAB_CHUNK_MAX,
TRACK_SIZES,
NO_INLINE_ASCII_RESP,
MODERN
};
char *const subopts_tokens[] = {
[MAXCONNS_FAST] = "maxconns_fast",
[HASHPOWER_INIT] = "hashpower",
[SLAB_REASSIGN] = "slab_reassign",
[SLAB_AUTOMOVE] = "slab_automove",
[TAIL_REPAIR_TIME] = "tail_repair_time",
[HASH_ALGORITHM] = "hash_algorithm",
[LRU_CRAWLER] = "lru_crawler",
[LRU_CRAWLER_SLEEP] = "lru_crawler_sleep",
[LRU_CRAWLER_TOCRAWL] = "lru_crawler_tocrawl",
[LRU_MAINTAINER] = "lru_maintainer",
[HOT_LRU_PCT] = "hot_lru_pct",
[WARM_LRU_PCT] = "warm_lru_pct",
[HOT_MAX_AGE] = "hot_max_age",
[WARM_MAX_FACTOR] = "warm_max_factor",
[TEMPORARY_TTL] = "temporary_ttl",
[IDLE_TIMEOUT] = "idle_timeout",
[WATCHER_LOGBUF_SIZE] = "watcher_logbuf_size",
[WORKER_LOGBUF_SIZE] = "worker_logbuf_size",
[SLAB_SIZES] = "slab_sizes",
[SLAB_CHUNK_MAX] = "slab_chunk_max",
[TRACK_SIZES] = "track_sizes",
[NO_INLINE_ASCII_RESP] = "no_inline_ascii_resp",
[MODERN] = "modern",
NULL
};
if (!sanitycheck()) {
return EX_OSERR;
}
/* handle SIGINT and SIGTERM */
signal(SIGINT, sig_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, sig_handler);
/* init settings */
settings_init();
/* Run regardless of initializing it later */
init_lru_crawler();
init_lru_maintainer();
/* set stderr non-buffering (for running under, say, daemontools) */
setbuf(stderr, NULL);
/* process arguments */
while (-1 != (c = getopt(argc, argv,
"a:" /* access mask for unix socket */
"A" /* enable admin shutdown commannd */
"p:" /* TCP port number to listen on */
"s:" /* unix socket path to listen on */
"U:" /* UDP port number to listen on */
"m:" /* max memory to use for items in megabytes */
"M" /* return error on memory exhausted */
"c:" /* max simultaneous connections */
"k" /* lock down all paged memory */
"hiV" /* help, licence info, version */
"r" /* maximize core file limit */
"v" /* verbose */
"d" /* daemon mode */
"l:" /* interface to listen on */
"u:" /* user identity to run as */
"P:" /* save PID in file */
"f:" /* factor? */
"n:" /* minimum space allocated for key+value+flags */
"t:" /* threads */
"D:" /* prefix delimiter? */
"L" /* Large memory pages */
"R:" /* max requests per event */
"C" /* Disable use of CAS */
"b:" /* backlog queue limit */
"B:" /* Binding protocol */
"I:" /* Max item size */
"S" /* Sasl ON */
"F" /* Disable flush_all */
"X" /* Disable dump commands */
"o:" /* Extended generic options */
))) {
switch (c) {
case 'A':
/* enables "shutdown" command */
settings.shutdown_command = true;
break;
case 'a':
/* access for unix domain socket, as octal mask (like chmod)*/
settings.access= strtol(optarg,NULL,8);
break;
case 'U':
settings.udpport = atoi(optarg);
udp_specified = true;
break;
case 'p':
settings.port = atoi(optarg);
tcp_specified = true;
break;
case 's':
settings.socketpath = optarg;
break;
case 'm':
settings.maxbytes = ((size_t)atoi(optarg)) * 1024 * 1024;
break;
case 'M':
settings.evict_to_free = 0;
break;
case 'c':
settings.maxconns = atoi(optarg);
if (settings.maxconns <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Maximum connections must be greater than 0\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case 'h':
usage();
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
case 'i':
usage_license();
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
case 'V':
printf(PACKAGE " " VERSION "\n");
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
case 'k':
lock_memory = true;
break;
case 'v':
settings.verbose++;
break;
case 'l':
if (settings.inter != NULL) {
if (strstr(settings.inter, optarg) != NULL) {
break;
}
size_t len = strlen(settings.inter) + strlen(optarg) + 2;
char *p = malloc(len);
if (p == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate memory\n");
return 1;
}
snprintf(p, len, "%s,%s", settings.inter, optarg);
free(settings.inter);
settings.inter = p;
} else {
settings.inter= strdup(optarg);
}
break;
case 'd':
do_daemonize = true;
break;
case 'r':
maxcore = 1;
break;
case 'R':
settings.reqs_per_event = atoi(optarg);
if (settings.reqs_per_event == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Number of requests per event must be greater than 0\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case 'u':
username = optarg;
break;
case 'P':
pid_file = optarg;
break;
case 'f':
settings.factor = atof(optarg);
if (settings.factor <= 1.0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Factor must be greater than 1\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case 'n':
settings.chunk_size = atoi(optarg);
if (settings.chunk_size == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Chunk size must be greater than 0\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case 't':
settings.num_threads = atoi(optarg);
if (settings.num_threads <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Number of threads must be greater than 0\n");
return 1;
}
/* There're other problems when you get above 64 threads.
* In the future we should portably detect # of cores for the
* default.
*/
if (settings.num_threads > 64) {
fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Setting a high number of worker"
"threads is not recommended.\n"
" Set this value to the number of cores in"
" your machine or less.\n");
}
break;
case 'D':
if (! optarg || ! optarg[0]) {
fprintf(stderr, "No delimiter specified\n");
return 1;
}
settings.prefix_delimiter = optarg[0];
settings.detail_enabled = 1;
break;
case 'L' :
if (enable_large_pages() == 0) {
preallocate = true;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot enable large pages on this system\n"
"(There is no Linux support as of this version)\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case 'C' :
settings.use_cas = false;
break;
case 'b' :
settings.backlog = atoi(optarg);
break;
case 'B':
protocol_specified = true;
if (strcmp(optarg, "auto") == 0) {
settings.binding_protocol = negotiating_prot;
} else if (strcmp(optarg, "binary") == 0) {
settings.binding_protocol = binary_prot;
} else if (strcmp(optarg, "ascii") == 0) {
settings.binding_protocol = ascii_prot;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid value for binding protocol: %s\n"
" -- should be one of auto, binary, or ascii\n", optarg);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
break;
case 'I':
buf = strdup(optarg);
unit = buf[strlen(buf)-1];
if (unit == 'k' || unit == 'm' ||
unit == 'K' || unit == 'M') {
buf[strlen(buf)-1] = '\0';
size_max = atoi(buf);
if (unit == 'k' || unit == 'K')
size_max *= 1024;
if (unit == 'm' || unit == 'M')
size_max *= 1024 * 1024;
settings.item_size_max = size_max;
} else {
settings.item_size_max = atoi(buf);
}
free(buf);
if (settings.item_size_max < 1024) {
fprintf(stderr, "Item max size cannot be less than 1024 bytes.\n");
return 1;
}
if (settings.item_size_max > (settings.maxbytes / 4)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot set item size limit higher than 1/4 of memory max.\n");
return 1;
}
if (settings.item_size_max > (1024 * 1024 * 1024)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot set item size limit higher than a gigabyte.\n");
return 1;
}
if (settings.item_size_max > 1024 * 1024) {
if (!slab_chunk_size_changed) {
settings.slab_chunk_size_max = 524288;
}
}
break;
case 'S': /* set Sasl authentication to true. Default is false */
#ifndef ENABLE_SASL
fprintf(stderr, "This server is not built with SASL support.\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
#endif
settings.sasl = true;
break;
case 'F' :
settings.flush_enabled = false;
break;
case 'X' :
settings.dump_enabled = false;
break;
case 'o': /* It's sub-opts time! */
subopts_orig = subopts = strdup(optarg); /* getsubopt() changes the original args */
while (*subopts != '\0') {
switch (getsubopt(&subopts, subopts_tokens, &subopts_value)) {
case MAXCONNS_FAST:
settings.maxconns_fast = true;
break;
case HASHPOWER_INIT:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing numeric argument for hashpower\n");
return 1;
}
settings.hashpower_init = atoi(subopts_value);
if (settings.hashpower_init < 12) {
fprintf(stderr, "Initial hashtable multiplier of %d is too low\n",
settings.hashpower_init);
return 1;
} else if (settings.hashpower_init > 64) {
fprintf(stderr, "Initial hashtable multiplier of %d is too high\n"
"Choose a value based on \"STAT hash_power_level\" from a running instance\n",
settings.hashpower_init);
return 1;
}
break;
case SLAB_REASSIGN:
settings.slab_reassign = true;
break;
case SLAB_AUTOMOVE:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
settings.slab_automove = 1;
break;
}
settings.slab_automove = atoi(subopts_value);
if (settings.slab_automove < 0 || settings.slab_automove > 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "slab_automove must be between 0 and 2\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case TAIL_REPAIR_TIME:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing numeric argument for tail_repair_time\n");
return 1;
}
settings.tail_repair_time = atoi(subopts_value);
if (settings.tail_repair_time < 10) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot set tail_repair_time to less than 10 seconds\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case HASH_ALGORITHM:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing hash_algorithm argument\n");
return 1;
};
if (strcmp(subopts_value, "jenkins") == 0) {
hash_type = JENKINS_HASH;
} else if (strcmp(subopts_value, "murmur3") == 0) {
hash_type = MURMUR3_HASH;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown hash_algorithm option (jenkins, murmur3)\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case LRU_CRAWLER:
start_lru_crawler = true;
break;
case LRU_CRAWLER_SLEEP:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing lru_crawler_sleep value\n");
return 1;
}
settings.lru_crawler_sleep = atoi(subopts_value);
if (settings.lru_crawler_sleep > 1000000 || settings.lru_crawler_sleep < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "LRU crawler sleep must be between 0 and 1 second\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case LRU_CRAWLER_TOCRAWL:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing lru_crawler_tocrawl value\n");
return 1;
}
if (!safe_strtoul(subopts_value, &tocrawl)) {
fprintf(stderr, "lru_crawler_tocrawl takes a numeric 32bit value\n");
return 1;
}
settings.lru_crawler_tocrawl = tocrawl;
break;
case LRU_MAINTAINER:
start_lru_maintainer = true;
settings.lru_segmented = true;
break;
case HOT_LRU_PCT:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing hot_lru_pct argument\n");
return 1;
}
settings.hot_lru_pct = atoi(subopts_value);
if (settings.hot_lru_pct < 1 || settings.hot_lru_pct >= 80) {
fprintf(stderr, "hot_lru_pct must be > 1 and < 80\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case WARM_LRU_PCT:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing warm_lru_pct argument\n");
return 1;
}
settings.warm_lru_pct = atoi(subopts_value);
if (settings.warm_lru_pct < 1 || settings.warm_lru_pct >= 80) {
fprintf(stderr, "warm_lru_pct must be > 1 and < 80\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case HOT_MAX_AGE:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing hot_max_age argument\n");
return 1;
}
if (!safe_strtoul(subopts_value, &settings.hot_max_age)) {
fprintf(stderr, "invalid argument to hot_max_age\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case WARM_MAX_FACTOR:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing warm_max_factor argument\n");
return 1;
}
settings.warm_max_factor = atof(subopts_value);
if (settings.warm_max_factor <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "warm_max_factor must be > 0\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case TEMPORARY_TTL:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing temporary_ttl argument\n");
return 1;
}
settings.temp_lru = true;
settings.temporary_ttl = atoi(subopts_value);
break;
case IDLE_TIMEOUT:
settings.idle_timeout = atoi(subopts_value);
break;
case WATCHER_LOGBUF_SIZE:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing watcher_logbuf_size argument\n");
return 1;
}
if (!safe_strtoul(subopts_value, &settings.logger_watcher_buf_size)) {
fprintf(stderr, "could not parse argument to watcher_logbuf_size\n");
return 1;
}
settings.logger_watcher_buf_size *= 1024; /* kilobytes */
break;
case WORKER_LOGBUF_SIZE:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing worker_logbuf_size argument\n");
return 1;
}
if (!safe_strtoul(subopts_value, &settings.logger_buf_size)) {
fprintf(stderr, "could not parse argument to worker_logbuf_size\n");
return 1;
}
settings.logger_buf_size *= 1024; /* kilobytes */
case SLAB_SIZES:
slab_sizes_unparsed = subopts_value;
break;
case SLAB_CHUNK_MAX:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing slab_chunk_max argument\n");
}
if (!safe_strtol(subopts_value, &settings.slab_chunk_size_max)) {
fprintf(stderr, "could not parse argument to slab_chunk_max\n");
}
slab_chunk_size_changed = true;
break;
case TRACK_SIZES:
item_stats_sizes_init();
break;
case NO_INLINE_ASCII_RESP:
settings.inline_ascii_response = false;
break;
case MODERN:
/* Modernized defaults. Need to add equivalent no_* flags
* before making truly default. */
if (!slab_chunk_size_changed) {
settings.slab_chunk_size_max = 524288;
}
settings.slab_reassign = true;
settings.slab_automove = 1;
settings.maxconns_fast = true;
settings.inline_ascii_response = false;
settings.lru_segmented = true;
hash_type = MURMUR3_HASH;
start_lru_crawler = true;
start_lru_maintainer = true;
break;
default:
printf("Illegal suboption \"%s\"\n", subopts_value);
return 1;
}
}
free(subopts_orig);
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Illegal argument \"%c\"\n", c);
return 1;
}
}
if (settings.slab_chunk_size_max > settings.item_size_max) {
fprintf(stderr, "slab_chunk_max (bytes: %d) cannot be larger than -I (item_size_max %d)\n",
settings.slab_chunk_size_max, settings.item_size_max);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
if (settings.item_size_max % settings.slab_chunk_size_max != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "-I (item_size_max: %d) must be evenly divisible by slab_chunk_max (bytes: %d)\n",
settings.item_size_max, settings.slab_chunk_size_max);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
if (settings.slab_page_size % settings.slab_chunk_size_max != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "slab_chunk_max (bytes: %d) must divide evenly into %d (slab_page_size)\n",
settings.slab_chunk_size_max, settings.slab_page_size);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
/*if (settings.slab_chunk_size_max == 16384 && settings.factor == 1.25) {
settings.factor = 1.08;
}*/
if (slab_sizes_unparsed != NULL) {
if (_parse_slab_sizes(slab_sizes_unparsed, slab_sizes)) {
use_slab_sizes = true;
} else {
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
}
if (settings.hot_lru_pct + settings.warm_lru_pct > 80) {
fprintf(stderr, "hot_lru_pct + warm_lru_pct cannot be more than 80%% combined\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
if (settings.temp_lru && !start_lru_maintainer) {
fprintf(stderr, "temporary_ttl requires lru_maintainer to be enabled\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
if (hash_init(hash_type) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialize hash_algorithm!\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
/*
* Use one workerthread to serve each UDP port if the user specified
* multiple ports
*/
if (settings.inter != NULL && strchr(settings.inter, ',')) {
settings.num_threads_per_udp = 1;
} else {
settings.num_threads_per_udp = settings.num_threads;
}
if (settings.sasl) {
if (!protocol_specified) {
settings.binding_protocol = binary_prot;
} else {
if (settings.binding_protocol != binary_prot) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: You cannot allow the ASCII protocol while using SASL.\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
}
}
if (tcp_specified && !udp_specified) {
settings.udpport = settings.port;
} else if (udp_specified && !tcp_specified) {
settings.port = settings.udpport;
}
if (maxcore != 0) {
struct rlimit rlim_new;
/*
* First try raising to infinity; if that fails, try bringing
* the soft limit to the hard.
*/
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) == 0) {
rlim_new.rlim_cur = rlim_new.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim_new)!= 0) {
/* failed. try raising just to the old max */
rlim_new.rlim_cur = rlim_new.rlim_max = rlim.rlim_max;
(void)setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim_new);
}
}
/*
* getrlimit again to see what we ended up with. Only fail if
* the soft limit ends up 0, because then no core files will be
* created at all.
*/
if ((getrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) != 0) || rlim.rlim_cur == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to ensure corefile creation\n");
exit(EX_OSERR);
}
}
/*
* If needed, increase rlimits to allow as many connections
* as needed.
*/
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to getrlimit number of files\n");
exit(EX_OSERR);
} else {
rlim.rlim_cur = settings.maxconns;
rlim.rlim_max = settings.maxconns;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to set rlimit for open files. Try starting as root or requesting smaller maxconns value.\n");
exit(EX_OSERR);
}
}
/* lose root privileges if we have them */
if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
if (username == 0 || *username == '\0') {
fprintf(stderr, "can't run as root without the -u switch\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
if ((pw = getpwnam(username)) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "can't find the user %s to switch to\n", username);
exit(EX_NOUSER);
}
if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0 || setuid(pw->pw_uid) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to assume identity of user %s\n", username);
exit(EX_OSERR);
}
}
/* Initialize Sasl if -S was specified */
if (settings.sasl) {
init_sasl();
}
/* daemonize if requested */
/* if we want to ensure our ability to dump core, don't chdir to / */
if (do_daemonize) {
if (sigignore(SIGHUP) == -1) {
perror("Failed to ignore SIGHUP");
}
if (daemonize(maxcore, settings.verbose) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to daemon() in order to daemonize\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
/* lock paged memory if needed */
if (lock_memory) {
#ifdef HAVE_MLOCKALL
int res = mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE);
if (res != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "warning: -k invalid, mlockall() failed: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
}
#else
fprintf(stderr, "warning: -k invalid, mlockall() not supported on this platform. proceeding without.\n");
#endif
}
/* initialize main thread libevent instance */
main_base = event_init();
/* initialize other stuff */
logger_init();
stats_init();
assoc_init(settings.hashpower_init);
conn_init();
slabs_init(settings.maxbytes, settings.factor, preallocate,
use_slab_sizes ? slab_sizes : NULL);
/*
* ignore SIGPIPE signals; we can use errno == EPIPE if we
* need that information
*/
if (sigignore(SIGPIPE) == -1) {
perror("failed to ignore SIGPIPE; sigaction");
exit(EX_OSERR);
}
/* start up worker threads if MT mode */
memcached_thread_init(settings.num_threads);
if (start_assoc_maintenance_thread() == -1) {
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (start_lru_crawler && start_item_crawler_thread() != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to enable LRU crawler thread\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (start_lru_maintainer && start_lru_maintainer_thread() != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to enable LRU maintainer thread\n");
return 1;
}
if (settings.slab_reassign &&
start_slab_maintenance_thread() == -1) {
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (settings.idle_timeout && start_conn_timeout_thread() == -1) {
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* initialise clock event */
clock_handler(0, 0, 0);
/* create unix mode sockets after dropping privileges */
if (settings.socketpath != NULL) {
errno = 0;
if (server_socket_unix(settings.socketpath,settings.access)) {
vperror("failed to listen on UNIX socket: %s", settings.socketpath);
exit(EX_OSERR);
}
}
/* create the listening socket, bind it, and init */
if (settings.socketpath == NULL) {
const char *portnumber_filename = getenv("MEMCACHED_PORT_FILENAME");
char *temp_portnumber_filename = NULL;
size_t len;
FILE *portnumber_file = NULL;
if (portnumber_filename != NULL) {
len = strlen(portnumber_filename)+4+1;
temp_portnumber_filename = malloc(len);
snprintf(temp_portnumber_filename,
len,
"%s.lck", portnumber_filename);
portnumber_file = fopen(temp_portnumber_filename, "a");
if (portnumber_file == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open \"%s\": %s\n",
temp_portnumber_filename, strerror(errno));
}
}
errno = 0;
if (settings.port && server_sockets(settings.port, tcp_transport,
portnumber_file)) {
vperror("failed to listen on TCP port %d", settings.port);
exit(EX_OSERR);
}
/*
* initialization order: first create the listening sockets
* (may need root on low ports), then drop root if needed,
* then daemonise if needed, then init libevent (in some cases
* descriptors created by libevent wouldn't survive forking).
*/
/* create the UDP listening socket and bind it */
errno = 0;
if (settings.udpport && server_sockets(settings.udpport, udp_transport,
portnumber_file)) {
vperror("failed to listen on UDP port %d", settings.udpport);
exit(EX_OSERR);
}
if (portnumber_file) {
fclose(portnumber_file);
rename(temp_portnumber_filename, portnumber_filename);
free(temp_portnumber_filename);
}
}
/* Give the sockets a moment to open. I know this is dumb, but the error
* is only an advisory.
*/
usleep(1000);
if (stats_state.curr_conns + stats_state.reserved_fds >= settings.maxconns - 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Maxconns setting is too low, use -c to increase.\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (pid_file != NULL) {
save_pid(pid_file);
}
/* Drop privileges no longer needed */
drop_privileges();
/* Initialize the uriencode lookup table. */
uriencode_init();
/* enter the event loop */
if (event_base_loop(main_base, 0) != 0) {
retval = EXIT_FAILURE;
}
stop_assoc_maintenance_thread();
/* remove the PID file if we're a daemon */
if (do_daemonize)
remove_pidfile(pid_file);
/* Clean up strdup() call for bind() address */
if (settings.inter)
free(settings.inter);
if (l_socket)
free(l_socket);
if (u_socket)
free(u_socket);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 21,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_sync_sh (void) {
parse_cmd_line("sync_sh 'echo Test echo.'", NULL);
g_assert_cmpstr("Test echo.\n", ==, uzbl.comm.sync_stdout);
/* clean up after ourselves */
uzbl.comm.sync_stdout = strfree(uzbl.comm.sync_stdout);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 25,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct vfsmount *collect_mounts(struct path *path)
{
struct mount *tree;
down_write(&namespace_sem);
tree = copy_tree(real_mount(path->mnt), path->dentry,
CL_COPY_ALL | CL_PRIVATE);
up_write(&namespace_sem);
if (IS_ERR(tree))
return NULL;
return &tree->mnt;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 12,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
int val, valbool;
int retv = -ENOPROTOOPT;
bool needs_rtnl = setsockopt_needs_rtnl(optname);
if (!optval)
val = 0;
else {
if (optlen >= sizeof(int)) {
if (get_user(val, (int __user *) optval))
return -EFAULT;
} else
val = 0;
}
valbool = (val != 0);
if (ip6_mroute_opt(optname))
return ip6_mroute_setsockopt(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
if (needs_rtnl)
rtnl_lock();
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_ADDRFORM:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val == PF_INET) {
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct sk_buff *pktopt;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW)
break;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP ||
sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDPLITE) {
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
if (up->pending == AF_INET6) {
retv = -EBUSY;
break;
}
} else if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
break;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
retv = -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
if (ipv6_only_sock(sk) ||
!ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)) {
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
break;
}
fl6_free_socklist(sk);
ipv6_sock_mc_close(sk);
/*
* Sock is moving from IPv6 to IPv4 (sk_prot), so
* remove it from the refcnt debug socks count in the
* original family...
*/
sk_refcnt_debug_dec(sk);
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) {
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
local_bh_disable();
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, sk->sk_prot, -1);
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, &tcp_prot, 1);
local_bh_enable();
sk->sk_prot = &tcp_prot;
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &ipv4_specific;
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_stream_ops;
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
tcp_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
} else {
struct proto *prot = &udp_prot;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDPLITE)
prot = &udplite_prot;
local_bh_disable();
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, sk->sk_prot, -1);
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, prot, 1);
local_bh_enable();
sk->sk_prot = prot;
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
}
opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL);
if (opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
pktopt = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
kfree_skb(pktopt);
sk->sk_destruct = inet_sock_destruct;
/*
* ... and add it to the refcnt debug socks count
* in the new family. -acme
*/
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(sk);
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
retv = 0;
break;
}
goto e_inval;
case IPV6_V6ONLY:
if (optlen < sizeof(int) ||
inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
goto e_inval;
sk->sk_ipv6only = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVPKTINFO:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292PKTINFO:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPLIMIT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVRTHDR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.srcrt = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292RTHDR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.osrcrt = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVHOPOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.hopopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.ohopopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVDSTOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.dstopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_2292DSTOPTS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.odstopts = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_TCLASS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val < -1 || val > 0xff)
goto e_inval;
/* RFC 3542, 6.5: default traffic class of 0x0 */
if (val == -1)
val = 0;
np->tclass = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVTCLASS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxtclass = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWINFO:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxflow = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVPATHMTU:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_TRANSPARENT:
if (valbool && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
retv = -EPERM;
break;
}
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
/* we don't have a separate transparent bit for IPV6 we use the one in the IPv4 socket */
inet_sk(sk)->transparent = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVORIGDSTADDR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->rxopt.bits.rxorigdstaddr = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_HOPOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDR:
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
{
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
/* remove any sticky options header with a zero option
* length, per RFC3542.
*/
if (optlen == 0)
optval = NULL;
else if (!optval)
goto e_inval;
else if (optlen < sizeof(struct ipv6_opt_hdr) ||
optlen & 0x7 || optlen > 8 * 255)
goto e_inval;
/* hop-by-hop / destination options are privileged option */
retv = -EPERM;
if (optname != IPV6_RTHDR && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
break;
opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, np->opt, optname,
(struct ipv6_opt_hdr __user *)optval,
optlen);
if (IS_ERR(opt)) {
retv = PTR_ERR(opt);
break;
}
/* routing header option needs extra check */
retv = -EINVAL;
if (optname == IPV6_RTHDR && opt && opt->srcrt) {
struct ipv6_rt_hdr *rthdr = opt->srcrt;
switch (rthdr->type) {
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6)
case IPV6_SRCRT_TYPE_2:
if (rthdr->hdrlen != 2 ||
rthdr->segments_left != 1)
goto sticky_done;
break;
#endif
default:
goto sticky_done;
}
}
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
sticky_done:
if (opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
break;
}
case IPV6_PKTINFO:
{
struct in6_pktinfo pkt;
if (optlen == 0)
goto e_inval;
else if (optlen < sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo) || !optval)
goto e_inval;
if (copy_from_user(&pkt, optval, sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo))) {
retv = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && pkt.ipi6_ifindex != sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
goto e_inval;
np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex = pkt.ipi6_ifindex;
np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_addr = pkt.ipi6_addr;
retv = 0;
break;
}
case IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS:
{
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct msghdr msg;
struct flowi6 fl6;
int junk;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (optlen == 0)
goto update;
/* 1K is probably excessive
* 1K is surely not enough, 2K per standard header is 16K.
*/
retv = -EINVAL;
if (optlen > 64*1024)
break;
opt = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*opt) + optlen, GFP_KERNEL);
retv = -ENOBUFS;
if (!opt)
break;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt) + optlen;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(opt+1, optval, optlen))
goto done;
msg.msg_controllen = optlen;
msg.msg_control = (void *)(opt+1);
retv = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(net, sk, &msg, &fl6, opt, &junk,
&junk, &junk);
if (retv)
goto done;
update:
retv = 0;
opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt);
done:
if (opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
break;
}
case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val > 255 || val < -1)
goto e_inval;
np->hop_limit = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS:
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
break;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val > 255 || val < -1)
goto e_inval;
np->mcast_hops = (val == -1 ? IPV6_DEFAULT_MCASTHOPS : val);
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_MULTICAST_LOOP:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val != valbool)
goto e_inval;
np->mc_loop = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_UNICAST_IF:
{
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int ifindex;
if (optlen != sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
ifindex = (__force int)ntohl((__force __be32)val);
if (ifindex == 0) {
np->ucast_oif = 0;
retv = 0;
break;
}
dev = dev_get_by_index(net, ifindex);
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!dev)
break;
dev_put(dev);
retv = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
break;
np->ucast_oif = ifindex;
retv = 0;
break;
}
case IPV6_MULTICAST_IF:
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
break;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val) {
struct net_device *dev;
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && sk->sk_bound_dev_if != val)
goto e_inval;
dev = dev_get_by_index(net, val);
if (!dev) {
retv = -ENODEV;
break;
}
dev_put(dev);
}
np->mcast_oif = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP:
case IPV6_DROP_MEMBERSHIP:
{
struct ipv6_mreq mreq;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EPROTO;
if (inet_sk(sk)->is_icsk)
break;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&mreq, optval, sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq)))
break;
if (optname == IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP)
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_join(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
else
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_drop(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
break;
}
case IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST:
case IPV6_LEAVE_ANYCAST:
{
struct ipv6_mreq mreq;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&mreq, optval, sizeof(struct ipv6_mreq)))
break;
if (optname == IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST)
retv = ipv6_sock_ac_join(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_acaddr);
else
retv = ipv6_sock_ac_drop(sk, mreq.ipv6mr_ifindex, &mreq.ipv6mr_acaddr);
break;
}
case MCAST_JOIN_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_GROUP:
{
struct group_req greq;
struct sockaddr_in6 *psin6;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct group_req))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&greq, optval, sizeof(struct group_req)))
break;
if (greq.gr_group.ss_family != AF_INET6) {
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
break;
}
psin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&greq.gr_group;
if (optname == MCAST_JOIN_GROUP)
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_join(sk, greq.gr_interface,
&psin6->sin6_addr);
else
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_drop(sk, greq.gr_interface,
&psin6->sin6_addr);
break;
}
case MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE:
case MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE:
{
struct group_source_req greqs;
int omode, add;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct group_source_req))
goto e_inval;
if (copy_from_user(&greqs, optval, sizeof(greqs))) {
retv = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (greqs.gsr_group.ss_family != AF_INET6 ||
greqs.gsr_source.ss_family != AF_INET6) {
retv = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
break;
}
if (optname == MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE) {
omode = MCAST_EXCLUDE;
add = 1;
} else if (optname == MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE) {
omode = MCAST_EXCLUDE;
add = 0;
} else if (optname == MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP) {
struct sockaddr_in6 *psin6;
psin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&greqs.gsr_group;
retv = ipv6_sock_mc_join(sk, greqs.gsr_interface,
&psin6->sin6_addr);
/* prior join w/ different source is ok */
if (retv && retv != -EADDRINUSE)
break;
omode = MCAST_INCLUDE;
add = 1;
} else /* MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP */ {
omode = MCAST_INCLUDE;
add = 0;
}
retv = ip6_mc_source(add, omode, sk, &greqs);
break;
}
case MCAST_MSFILTER:
{
struct group_filter *gsf;
if (optlen < GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(0))
goto e_inval;
if (optlen > sysctl_optmem_max) {
retv = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
gsf = kmalloc(optlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!gsf) {
retv = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
retv = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(gsf, optval, optlen)) {
kfree(gsf);
break;
}
/* numsrc >= (4G-140)/128 overflow in 32 bits */
if (gsf->gf_numsrc >= 0x1ffffffU ||
gsf->gf_numsrc > sysctl_mld_max_msf) {
kfree(gsf);
retv = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
if (GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(gsf->gf_numsrc) > optlen) {
kfree(gsf);
retv = -EINVAL;
break;
}
retv = ip6_mc_msfilter(sk, gsf);
kfree(gsf);
break;
}
case IPV6_ROUTER_ALERT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
retv = ip6_ra_control(sk, val);
break;
case IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val < IPV6_PMTUDISC_DONT || val > IPV6_PMTUDISC_OMIT)
goto e_inval;
np->pmtudisc = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_MTU:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val && val < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
goto e_inval;
np->frag_size = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVERR:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->recverr = valbool;
if (!val)
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_error_queue);
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWINFO_SEND:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
np->sndflow = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR:
retv = ipv6_flowlabel_opt(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY:
case IPV6_XFRM_POLICY:
retv = -EPERM;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
retv = xfrm_user_policy(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
break;
case IPV6_ADDR_PREFERENCES:
{
unsigned int pref = 0;
unsigned int prefmask = ~0;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
retv = -EINVAL;
/* check PUBLIC/TMP/PUBTMP_DEFAULT conflicts */
switch (val & (IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC|
IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP|
IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBTMP_DEFAULT)) {
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC:
pref |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC;
break;
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP:
pref |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP;
break;
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBTMP_DEFAULT:
break;
case 0:
goto pref_skip_pubtmp;
default:
goto e_inval;
}
prefmask &= ~(IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC|
IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP);
pref_skip_pubtmp:
/* check HOME/COA conflicts */
switch (val & (IPV6_PREFER_SRC_HOME|IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA)) {
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_HOME:
break;
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA:
pref |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA;
case 0:
goto pref_skip_coa;
default:
goto e_inval;
}
prefmask &= ~IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA;
pref_skip_coa:
/* check CGA/NONCGA conflicts */
switch (val & (IPV6_PREFER_SRC_CGA|IPV6_PREFER_SRC_NONCGA)) {
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_CGA:
case IPV6_PREFER_SRC_NONCGA:
case 0:
break;
default:
goto e_inval;
}
np->srcprefs = (np->srcprefs & prefmask) | pref;
retv = 0;
break;
}
case IPV6_MINHOPCOUNT:
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
if (val < 0 || val > 255)
goto e_inval;
np->min_hopcount = val;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_DONTFRAG:
np->dontfrag = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
case IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL:
np->autoflowlabel = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
if (needs_rtnl)
rtnl_unlock();
return retv;
e_inval:
release_sock(sk);
if (needs_rtnl)
rtnl_unlock();
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 23,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void alloc_objects(unsigned int cnt)
{
struct object_entry_pool *b;
b = xmalloc(sizeof(struct object_entry_pool)
+ cnt * sizeof(struct object_entry));
b->next_pool = blocks;
b->next_free = b->entries;
b->end = b->entries + cnt;
blocks = b;
alloc_count += cnt;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MetricsWebContentsObserver::NotifyPageEndAllLoads(
PageEndReason page_end_reason,
UserInitiatedInfo user_initiated_info) {
NotifyPageEndAllLoadsWithTimestamp(page_end_reason, user_initiated_info,
base::TimeTicks::Now(), true);
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 23,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(ptrace, long, request, long, pid, unsigned long, addr,
unsigned long, data)
{
struct task_struct *child;
long ret;
if (request == PTRACE_TRACEME) {
ret = ptrace_traceme();
if (!ret)
arch_ptrace_attach(current);
goto out;
}
child = find_get_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!child) {
ret = -ESRCH;
goto out;
}
if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH || request == PTRACE_SEIZE) {
ret = ptrace_attach(child, request, addr, data);
/*
* Some architectures need to do book-keeping after
* a ptrace attach.
*/
if (!ret)
arch_ptrace_attach(child);
goto out_put_task_struct;
}
ret = ptrace_check_attach(child, request == PTRACE_KILL ||
request == PTRACE_INTERRUPT);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_put_task_struct;
ret = arch_ptrace(child, request, addr, data);
if (ret || request != PTRACE_DETACH)
ptrace_unfreeze_traced(child);
out_put_task_struct:
put_task_struct(child);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ptrace: Fix ->ptracer_cred handling for PTRACE_TRACEME
Fix two issues:
When called for PTRACE_TRACEME, ptrace_link() would obtain an RCU
reference to the parent's objective credentials, then give that pointer
to get_cred(). However, the object lifetime rules for things like
struct cred do not permit unconditionally turning an RCU reference into
a stable reference.
PTRACE_TRACEME records the parent's credentials as if the parent was
acting as the subject, but that's not the case. If a malicious
unprivileged child uses PTRACE_TRACEME and the parent is privileged, and
at a later point, the parent process becomes attacker-controlled
(because it drops privileges and calls execve()), the attacker ends up
with control over two processes with a privileged ptrace relationship,
which can be abused to ptrace a suid binary and obtain root privileges.
Fix both of these by always recording the credentials of the process
that is requesting the creation of the ptrace relationship:
current_cred() can't change under us, and current is the proper subject
for access control.
This change is theoretically userspace-visible, but I am not aware of
any code that it will actually break.
Fixes: 64b875f7ac8a ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs4_setup_sequence(const struct nfs_server *server,
struct nfs4_sequence_args *args,
struct nfs4_sequence_res *res,
int cache_reply,
struct rpc_task *task)
{
struct nfs4_session *session = nfs4_get_session(server);
int ret = 0;
if (session == NULL) {
args->sa_session = NULL;
res->sr_session = NULL;
goto out;
}
dprintk("--> %s clp %p session %p sr_slot %td\n",
__func__, session->clp, session, res->sr_slot ?
res->sr_slot - session->fc_slot_table.slots : -1);
ret = nfs41_setup_sequence(session, args, res, cache_reply,
task);
out:
dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 18,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(timer_gettime, timer_t, timer_id,
struct itimerspec __user *, setting)
{
struct itimerspec64 cur_setting;
int ret = do_timer_gettime(timer_id, &cur_setting);
if (!ret) {
if (put_itimerspec64(&cur_setting, setting))
ret = -EFAULT;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 9,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestWCDelegateForDialogsAndFullscreen()
: is_fullscreen_(false), message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 7,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::fill(const String& winding_rule_string) {
DrawPathInternal(path_, CanvasRenderingContext2DState::kFillPaintType,
ParseWinding(winding_rule_string));
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 23,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: onig_print_statistics(FILE* f)
{
int r;
int i;
r = fprintf(f, " count prev time\n");
if (r < 0) return -1;
for (i = 0; OnigOpInfo[i].opcode >= 0; i++) {
r = fprintf(f, "%8d: %8d: %10ld: %s\n",
OpCounter[i], OpPrevCounter[i], OpTime[i], OnigOpInfo[i].name);
if (r < 0) return -1;
}
r = fprintf(f, "\nmax stack depth: %d\n", MaxStackDepth);
if (r < 0) return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 2,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::CanBookmarkAllTabs() const {
BookmarkModel* model = profile()->GetBookmarkModel();
return (model && model->IsLoaded() && (tab_count() > 1));
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int json_object_clear(json_t *json)
{
json_object_t *object;
if(!json_is_object(json))
return -1;
object = json_to_object(json);
hashtable_clear(&object->hashtable);
object->serial = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 6,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int realloc_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int stack_size,
int refs_size, bool copy_old)
{
int err = realloc_reference_state(state, refs_size, copy_old);
if (err)
return err;
return realloc_stack_state(state, stack_size, copy_old);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 11,911
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsAutofillCreditCardAssistEnabled() {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID) && !defined(OS_IOS)
return false;
#else
return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kAutofillCreditCardAssist);
#endif
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 17,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xml_remove_prop(xmlNode * obj, const char *name)
{
if(__xml_acl_check(obj, NULL, xpf_acl_write) == FALSE) {
crm_trace("Cannot remove %s from %s", name, obj->name);
} else if(TRACKING_CHANGES(obj)) {
/* Leave in place (marked for removal) until after the diff is calculated */
xml_private_t *p = NULL;
xmlAttr *attr = xmlHasProp(obj, (const xmlChar *)name);
p = attr->_private;
set_parent_flag(obj, xpf_dirty);
p->flags |= xpf_deleted;
/* crm_trace("Setting flag %x due to %s[@id=%s].%s", xpf_dirty, obj->name, ID(obj), name); */
} else {
xmlUnsetProp(obj, (const xmlChar *)name);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 10,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnRenderViewHostDeleted(int child_id,
int route_id) {
auto* host = ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get();
if (host && host->scheduler_) {
host->scheduler_->OnClientDeleted(child_id, route_id);
}
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 29,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ContextMenuFilter::ContextMenuFilter()
: content::BrowserMessageFilter(FrameMsgStart),
message_loop_runner_(new content::MessageLoopRunner),
handled_(false) {}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentClient::CanHandleWhileSwappedOut(
const IPC::Message& msg) {
switch (msg.type()) {
case ChromeViewHostMsg_Snapshot::ID:
return true;
default:
break;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void destroy_device_list(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_ndevs; i++) {
blkdev_put(FDEV(i).bdev, FMODE_EXCL);
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED
kfree(FDEV(i).blkz_type);
#endif
}
kfree(sbi->devs);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check checkpoint segno and blkoff
Make sure segno and blkoff read from raw image are valid.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
[Jaegeuk Kim: adjust minor coding style]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-129
| 0
| 387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dcbnl_pgtx_setcfg(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return __dcbnl_pg_setcfg(netdev, nlh, seq, tb, skb, 0);
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 1,537
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err flxs_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_AdobeFlashAccessParamsBox *ptr = (GF_AdobeFlashAccessParamsBox *)a;
if (!a) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "AdobeFlashAccessParamsBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (ptr->metadata)
fprintf(trace, "<FmrmsV2Metadata=\"%s\"/>\n", ptr->metadata);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("AdobeFlashAccessParamsBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 22,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Camera3Device::RequestThread::requestExit() {
Thread::requestExit();
mDoPauseSignal.signal();
mRequestSignal.signal();
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rose_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int reason, int cause, int diagnostic)
{
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk);
rose_stop_timer(sk);
rose_stop_idletimer(sk);
rose_clear_queues(sk);
rose->lci = 0;
rose->state = ROSE_STATE_0;
if (cause != -1)
rose->cause = cause;
if (diagnostic != -1)
rose->diagnostic = diagnostic;
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
sk->sk_err = reason;
sk->sk_shutdown |= SEND_SHUTDOWN;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD);
}
}
Commit Message: ROSE: prevent heap corruption with bad facilities
When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for
a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in
heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and
abort facilities parsing on failure.
Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length
of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a
kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than
20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities
parsing on these invalid length values.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSC::JSValue toJS(JSC::ExecState* exec, JSDOMGlobalObject* globalObject, TestEventTarget* impl)
{
return wrap<JSTestEventTarget>(exec, globalObject, impl);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct inode *ext2_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext2_inode_info *ei;
ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ext2_inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ei)
return NULL;
ei->i_block_alloc_info = NULL;
ei->vfs_inode.i_version = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
memset(&ei->i_dquot, 0, sizeof(ei->i_dquot));
#endif
return &ei->vfs_inode;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 25,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CustomElementRegistry* LocalDOMWindow::customElements(
ScriptState* script_state) const {
if (!script_state->World().IsMainWorld())
return nullptr;
return customElements();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UpdateProviderPolicy(const PolicyMap& policy) {
PolicyMap policy_with_defaults;
policy_with_defaults.CopyFrom(policy);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
SetEnterpriseUsersDefaults(&policy_with_defaults);
#endif
provider_.UpdateChromePolicy(policy_with_defaults);
DCHECK(base::MessageLoopCurrent::Get());
base::RunLoop loop;
loop.RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OpenDevToolsWindowForSharedWorker(WorkerData* worker_data) {
Profile* profile = browser()->profile();
window_ = DevToolsWindow::CreateDevToolsWindowForWorker(profile);
window_->Show(DevToolsToggleAction::Show());
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> agent_host(
DevToolsAgentHost::GetForWorker(
worker_data->worker_process_id,
worker_data->worker_route_id));
DevToolsManager::GetInstance()->RegisterDevToolsClientHostFor(
agent_host.get(), window_->GetDevToolsClientHostForTest());
RenderViewHost* client_rvh = window_->GetRenderViewHost();
WebContents* client_contents = WebContents::FromRenderViewHost(client_rvh);
if (client_contents->IsLoading()) {
content::WindowedNotificationObserver observer(
content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_STOP,
content::Source<NavigationController>(
&client_contents->GetController()));
observer.Wait();
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void megasas_copy_sense(MegasasCmd *cmd)
{
uint8_t sense_buf[SCSI_SENSE_BUF_SIZE];
uint8_t sense_len;
sense_len = scsi_req_get_sense(cmd->req, sense_buf,
SCSI_SENSE_BUF_SIZE);
megasas_build_sense(cmd, sense_buf, sense_len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 8,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::CreateDownloadHandlerForNavigation(
base::WeakPtr<DownloadManagerImpl> download_manager,
ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter web_contents_getter,
std::unique_ptr<ResourceRequest> resource_request,
std::vector<GURL> url_chain,
scoped_refptr<ResourceResponse> response,
net::CertStatus cert_status,
mojom::URLLoaderClientEndpointsPtr url_loader_client_endpoints) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
std::unique_ptr<ResourceDownloader> resource_downloader =
ResourceDownloader::InterceptNavigationResponse(
download_manager, std::move(resource_request),
std::move(web_contents_getter), std::move(url_chain),
std::move(response), std::move(cert_status),
std::move(url_loader_client_endpoints));
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DownloadManagerImpl::AddUrlDownloadHandler,
download_manager,
DownloadManagerImpl::UniqueUrlDownloadHandlerPtr(
resource_downloader.release())));
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nl80211_wiphy_netns(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = info->user_ptr[0];
struct net *net;
int err;
u32 pid;
if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_PID])
return -EINVAL;
pid = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_PID]);
net = get_net_ns_by_pid(pid);
if (IS_ERR(net))
return PTR_ERR(net);
err = 0;
/* check if anything to do */
if (!net_eq(wiphy_net(&rdev->wiphy), net))
err = cfg80211_switch_netns(rdev, net);
put_net(net);
return err;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ReadableStreamReader::releaseLock(ExceptionState& es)
{
if (!isActive())
return;
if (m_stream->hasPendingReads()) {
es.throwTypeError("The stream has pending read operations.");
return;
}
releaseLock();
}
Commit Message: Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,736
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Camera3Device::RequestThread::RequestThread(wp<Camera3Device> parent,
sp<StatusTracker> statusTracker,
camera3_device_t *hal3Device,
bool aeLockAvailable) :
Thread(/*canCallJava*/false),
mParent(parent),
mStatusTracker(statusTracker),
mHal3Device(hal3Device),
mId(getId(parent)),
mReconfigured(false),
mDoPause(false),
mPaused(true),
mFrameNumber(0),
mLatestRequestId(NAME_NOT_FOUND),
mCurrentAfTriggerId(0),
mCurrentPreCaptureTriggerId(0),
mRepeatingLastFrameNumber(NO_IN_FLIGHT_REPEATING_FRAMES),
mAeLockAvailable(aeLockAvailable) {
mStatusId = statusTracker->addComponent();
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,966
|
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