instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int ohci_read_td(OHCIState *ohci,
dma_addr_t addr, struct ohci_td *td)
{
return get_dwords(ohci, addr, (uint32_t *)td, sizeof(*td) >> 2);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 26,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SchedulerObject::hold(std::string key, std::string &reason, std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster < 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Hold: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
if (!holdJob(id.cluster,
id.proc,
reason.c_str(),
true, // Always perform this action within a transaction
true, // Always notify the shadow of the hold
false, // Do not email the user about this action
false, // Do not email admin about this action
false // This is not a system related (internal) hold
)) {
text = "Failed to hold job";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 27,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Size Browser::EnterPictureInPicture(const viz::SurfaceId& surface_id,
const gfx::Size& natural_size) {
return PictureInPictureWindowManager::GetInstance()->EnterPictureInPicture(
tab_strip_model_->GetActiveWebContents(), surface_id, natural_size);
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SProcRenderReferenceGlyphSet (ClientPtr client)
{
register int n;
REQUEST(xRenderReferenceGlyphSetReq);
swaps(&stuff->length, n);
swapl(&stuff->gsid, n);
swapl(&stuff->existing, n);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int SocketStream::DoReadWrite(int result) {
if (result < OK) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return result;
}
if (!socket_.get() || !socket_->IsConnected()) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED;
}
if (closing_ && !current_write_buf_.get() && pending_write_bufs_.empty()) {
socket_->Disconnect();
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return OK;
}
next_state_ = STATE_READ_WRITE;
if (!server_closed_) {
if (!read_buf_.get()) {
read_buf_ = new IOBuffer(kReadBufferSize);
result = socket_->Read(
read_buf_.get(),
kReadBufferSize,
base::Bind(&SocketStream::OnReadCompleted, base::Unretained(this)));
if (result > 0) {
return DidReceiveData(result);
} else if (result == 0) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
server_closed_ = true;
return ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED;
}
if (result != ERR_IO_PENDING) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
server_closed_ = true;
return result;
}
}
DCHECK(read_buf_.get());
}
if (waiting_for_write_completion_)
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
if (!current_write_buf_.get()) {
if (pending_write_bufs_.empty()) {
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
current_write_buf_ = new DrainableIOBuffer(
pending_write_bufs_.front().get(), pending_write_bufs_.front()->size());
pending_write_bufs_.pop_front();
}
result = socket_->Write(
current_write_buf_.get(),
current_write_buf_->BytesRemaining(),
base::Bind(&SocketStream::OnWriteCompleted, base::Unretained(this)));
if (result == ERR_IO_PENDING) {
waiting_for_write_completion_ = true;
} else if (result < 0) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
} else if (result > 0) {
DidSendData(result);
result = OK;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 15,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: event_grid_translate( int dx, int dy )
{
status.x_origin += 32*dx;
status.y_origin += 32*dy;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method)
{
if (method == NULL)
return 0;
/* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */
if (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0)
return 0;
/* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */
if (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void calc_load_migrate(struct rq *rq)
{
long delta = calc_load_fold_active(rq);
if (delta)
atomic_long_add(delta, &calc_load_tasks);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int seq_timing_event(unsigned char *event_rec)
{
unsigned char cmd = event_rec[1];
unsigned int parm = *(int *) &event_rec[4];
if (seq_mode == SEQ_2)
{
int ret;
if ((ret = tmr->event(tmr_no, event_rec)) == TIMER_ARMED)
if ((SEQ_MAX_QUEUE - qlen) >= output_threshold)
wake_up(&seq_sleeper);
return ret;
}
switch (cmd)
{
case TMR_WAIT_REL:
parm += prev_event_time;
/*
* NOTE! No break here. Execution of TMR_WAIT_REL continues in the
* next case (TMR_WAIT_ABS)
*/
case TMR_WAIT_ABS:
if (parm > 0)
{
long time;
time = parm;
prev_event_time = time;
seq_playing = 1;
request_sound_timer(time);
if ((SEQ_MAX_QUEUE - qlen) >= output_threshold)
wake_up(&seq_sleeper);
return TIMER_ARMED;
}
break;
case TMR_START:
seq_time = jiffies;
prev_input_time = 0;
prev_event_time = 0;
break;
case TMR_STOP:
break;
case TMR_CONTINUE:
break;
case TMR_TEMPO:
break;
case TMR_ECHO:
if (seq_mode == SEQ_2)
seq_copy_to_input(event_rec, 8);
else
{
parm = (parm << 8 | SEQ_ECHO);
seq_copy_to_input((unsigned char *) &parm, 4);
}
break;
default:;
}
return TIMER_NOT_ARMED;
}
Commit Message: sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 16,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MATCHER(CompareMetricsIgnoringMillisecondsSinceFormParsed, "") {
const auto& lhs = ::testing::get<0>(arg);
const std::pair<const char*, int64_t>& rhs = ::testing::get<1>(arg);
return lhs.first == base::HashMetricName(rhs.first) &&
(lhs.second == rhs.second ||
(lhs.second > 0 &&
rhs.first ==
UkmSuggestionFilledType::kMillisecondsSinceFormParsedName));
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int wait_task_zombie(struct task_struct *p, int options,
struct siginfo __user *infop,
int __user *stat_addr, struct rusage __user *ru)
{
unsigned long state;
int retval, status, traced;
pid_t pid = task_pid_vnr(p);
if (!likely(options & WEXITED))
return 0;
if (unlikely(options & WNOWAIT)) {
uid_t uid = p->uid;
int exit_code = p->exit_code;
int why, status;
get_task_struct(p);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
if ((exit_code & 0x7f) == 0) {
why = CLD_EXITED;
status = exit_code >> 8;
} else {
why = (exit_code & 0x80) ? CLD_DUMPED : CLD_KILLED;
status = exit_code & 0x7f;
}
return wait_noreap_copyout(p, pid, uid, why,
status, infop, ru);
}
/*
* Try to move the task's state to DEAD
* only one thread is allowed to do this:
*/
state = xchg(&p->exit_state, EXIT_DEAD);
if (state != EXIT_ZOMBIE) {
BUG_ON(state != EXIT_DEAD);
return 0;
}
traced = ptrace_reparented(p);
if (likely(!traced)) {
struct signal_struct *psig;
struct signal_struct *sig;
struct task_cputime cputime;
/*
* The resource counters for the group leader are in its
* own task_struct. Those for dead threads in the group
* are in its signal_struct, as are those for the child
* processes it has previously reaped. All these
* accumulate in the parent's signal_struct c* fields.
*
* We don't bother to take a lock here to protect these
* p->signal fields, because they are only touched by
* __exit_signal, which runs with tasklist_lock
* write-locked anyway, and so is excluded here. We do
* need to protect the access to p->parent->signal fields,
* as other threads in the parent group can be right
* here reaping other children at the same time.
*
* We use thread_group_cputime() to get times for the thread
* group, which consolidates times for all threads in the
* group including the group leader.
*/
spin_lock_irq(&p->parent->sighand->siglock);
psig = p->parent->signal;
sig = p->signal;
thread_group_cputime(p, &cputime);
psig->cutime =
cputime_add(psig->cutime,
cputime_add(cputime.utime,
sig->cutime));
psig->cstime =
cputime_add(psig->cstime,
cputime_add(cputime.stime,
sig->cstime));
psig->cgtime =
cputime_add(psig->cgtime,
cputime_add(p->gtime,
cputime_add(sig->gtime,
sig->cgtime)));
psig->cmin_flt +=
p->min_flt + sig->min_flt + sig->cmin_flt;
psig->cmaj_flt +=
p->maj_flt + sig->maj_flt + sig->cmaj_flt;
psig->cnvcsw +=
p->nvcsw + sig->nvcsw + sig->cnvcsw;
psig->cnivcsw +=
p->nivcsw + sig->nivcsw + sig->cnivcsw;
psig->cinblock +=
task_io_get_inblock(p) +
sig->inblock + sig->cinblock;
psig->coublock +=
task_io_get_oublock(p) +
sig->oublock + sig->coublock;
task_io_accounting_add(&psig->ioac, &p->ioac);
task_io_accounting_add(&psig->ioac, &sig->ioac);
spin_unlock_irq(&p->parent->sighand->siglock);
}
/*
* Now we are sure this task is interesting, and no other
* thread can reap it because we set its state to EXIT_DEAD.
*/
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
retval = ru ? getrusage(p, RUSAGE_BOTH, ru) : 0;
status = (p->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)
? p->signal->group_exit_code : p->exit_code;
if (!retval && stat_addr)
retval = put_user(status, stat_addr);
if (!retval && infop)
retval = put_user(SIGCHLD, &infop->si_signo);
if (!retval && infop)
retval = put_user(0, &infop->si_errno);
if (!retval && infop) {
int why;
if ((status & 0x7f) == 0) {
why = CLD_EXITED;
status >>= 8;
} else {
why = (status & 0x80) ? CLD_DUMPED : CLD_KILLED;
status &= 0x7f;
}
retval = put_user((short)why, &infop->si_code);
if (!retval)
retval = put_user(status, &infop->si_status);
}
if (!retval && infop)
retval = put_user(pid, &infop->si_pid);
if (!retval && infop)
retval = put_user(p->uid, &infop->si_uid);
if (!retval)
retval = pid;
if (traced) {
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/* We dropped tasklist, ptracer could die and untrace */
ptrace_unlink(p);
/*
* If this is not a detached task, notify the parent.
* If it's still not detached after that, don't release
* it now.
*/
if (!task_detached(p)) {
do_notify_parent(p, p->exit_signal);
if (!task_detached(p)) {
p->exit_state = EXIT_ZOMBIE;
p = NULL;
}
}
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
}
if (p != NULL)
release_task(p);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,398
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OVS_EXCLUDED(ofproto_mutex)
{
/* Reject flow mods that do not look like they were generated by a learn
* action. */
if (fm->command != OFPFC_MODIFY_STRICT || fm->table_id == OFPTT_ALL
|| fm->flags & OFPUTIL_FF_RESET_COUNTS
|| fm->buffer_id != UINT32_MAX) {
return OFPERR_OFPFMFC_UNKNOWN;
}
/* Check if the rule already exists, and we can get a reference to it. */
struct oftable *table = &ofproto->tables[fm->table_id];
struct rule *rule;
rule = rule_from_cls_rule(classifier_find_match_exactly(
&table->cls, &fm->match, fm->priority,
OVS_VERSION_MAX));
if (rule) {
/* Check if the rule's attributes match as well. */
const struct rule_actions *actions;
ovs_mutex_lock(&rule->mutex);
actions = rule_get_actions(rule);
if (rule->idle_timeout == fm->idle_timeout
&& rule->hard_timeout == fm->hard_timeout
&& rule->importance == fm->importance
&& rule->flags == (fm->flags & OFPUTIL_FF_STATE)
&& (!fm->modify_cookie || (fm->new_cookie == rule->flow_cookie))
&& ofpacts_equal(fm->ofpacts, fm->ofpacts_len,
actions->ofpacts, actions->ofpacts_len)) {
/* Rule already exists and need not change, except for the modified
* timestamp. Get a reference to the existing rule. */
ovs_mutex_unlock(&rule->mutex);
if (!ofproto_rule_try_ref(rule)) {
rule = NULL; /* Pretend it did not exist. */
}
} else {
ovs_mutex_unlock(&rule->mutex);
rule = NULL;
}
}
return ofproto_flow_mod_init(ofproto, ofm, fm, rule);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 29,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NormalPageArena::promptlyFreeObject(HeapObjectHeader* header) {
ASSERT(!getThreadState()->sweepForbidden());
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
Address address = reinterpret_cast<Address>(header);
Address payload = header->payload();
size_t size = header->size();
size_t payloadSize = header->payloadSize();
ASSERT(size > 0);
ASSERT(pageFromObject(address) == findPageFromAddress(address));
{
ThreadState::SweepForbiddenScope forbiddenScope(getThreadState());
header->finalize(payload, payloadSize);
if (address + size == m_currentAllocationPoint) {
m_currentAllocationPoint = address;
setRemainingAllocationSize(m_remainingAllocationSize + size);
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(address, size);
return;
}
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(payload, payloadSize);
header->markPromptlyFreed();
}
m_promptlyFreedSize += size;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 13,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void red_channel_apply_clients(RedChannel *channel, channel_client_callback cb)
{
RingItem *link;
RingItem *next;
RedChannelClient *rcc;
RING_FOREACH_SAFE(link, next, &channel->clients) {
rcc = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link);
cb(rcc);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const ContentEncoding* Track::GetContentEncodingByIndex(
unsigned long idx) const {
const ptrdiff_t count =
content_encoding_entries_end_ - content_encoding_entries_;
assert(count >= 0);
if (idx >= static_cast<unsigned long>(count))
return NULL;
return content_encoding_entries_[idx];
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,882
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int lookup_last(struct nameidata *nd)
{
if (nd->last_type == LAST_NORM && nd->last.name[nd->last.len])
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
return walk_component(nd,
nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW
? nd->depth
? WALK_PUT | WALK_GET
: WALK_GET
: 0);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 10,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofport_install(struct ofproto *p,
struct netdev *netdev, const struct ofputil_phy_port *pp)
{
const char *netdev_name = netdev_get_name(netdev);
struct ofport *ofport;
int error;
/* Create ofport. */
ofport = p->ofproto_class->port_alloc();
if (!ofport) {
error = ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
ofport->ofproto = p;
ofport->netdev = netdev;
ofport->change_seq = netdev_get_change_seq(netdev);
ofport->pp = *pp;
ofport->ofp_port = pp->port_no;
ofport->created = time_msec();
/* Add port to 'p'. */
hmap_insert(&p->ports, &ofport->hmap_node,
hash_ofp_port(ofport->ofp_port));
shash_add(&p->port_by_name, netdev_name, ofport);
update_mtu(p, ofport);
/* Let the ofproto_class initialize its private data. */
error = p->ofproto_class->port_construct(ofport);
if (error) {
goto error;
}
connmgr_send_port_status(p->connmgr, NULL, pp, OFPPR_ADD);
return 0;
error:
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "%s: could not add port %s (%s)",
p->name, netdev_name, ovs_strerror(error));
if (ofport) {
ofport_destroy__(ofport);
} else {
netdev_close(netdev);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 17,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __init init_mount_tree(void)
{
struct vfsmount *mnt;
struct mnt_namespace *ns;
struct path root;
struct file_system_type *type;
type = get_fs_type("rootfs");
if (!type)
panic("Can't find rootfs type");
mnt = vfs_kern_mount(type, 0, "rootfs", NULL);
put_filesystem(type);
if (IS_ERR(mnt))
panic("Can't create rootfs");
ns = create_mnt_ns(mnt);
if (IS_ERR(ns))
panic("Can't allocate initial namespace");
init_task.nsproxy->mnt_ns = ns;
get_mnt_ns(ns);
root.mnt = mnt;
root.dentry = mnt->mnt_root;
set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &root);
set_fs_root(current->fs, &root);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HttpAuthFilterWhitelist::IsValid(const GURL& url,
HttpAuth::Target target) const {
if ((target != HttpAuth::AUTH_SERVER) && (target != HttpAuth::AUTH_PROXY))
return false;
if (target == HttpAuth::AUTH_PROXY)
return true;
return rules_.Matches(url);
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int inotify_update_watch(struct fsnotify_group *group, struct inode *inode, u32 arg)
{
int ret = 0;
retry:
/* try to update and existing watch with the new arg */
ret = inotify_update_existing_watch(group, inode, arg);
/* no mark present, try to add a new one */
if (ret == -ENOENT)
ret = inotify_new_watch(group, inode, arg);
/*
* inotify_new_watch could race with another thread which did an
* inotify_new_watch between the update_existing and the add watch
* here, go back and try to update an existing mark again.
*/
if (ret == -EEXIST)
goto retry;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure
If inotify_init is unable to allocate a new file for the new inotify
group we leak the new group. This patch drops the reference on the
group on file allocation failure.
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ExtensionTabUtil::GetWindowIdOfTab(const WebContents* web_contents) {
return SessionID::IdForWindowContainingTab(web_contents);
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 11,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int map_cpu_event(struct perf_event *event,
const unsigned (*event_map)[PERF_COUNT_HW_MAX],
const unsigned (*cache_map)
[PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX]
[PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX]
[PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX],
u32 raw_event_mask)
{
u64 config = event->attr.config;
switch (event->attr.type) {
case PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE:
return armpmu_map_event(event_map, config);
case PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE:
return armpmu_map_cache_event(cache_map, config);
case PERF_TYPE_RAW:
return armpmu_map_raw_event(raw_event_mask, config);
}
return -ENOENT;
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 13,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const BIGNUM *g,
const BIGNUM *N)
{
vinfo->N = N;
vinfo->g = g;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hfsplus_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
return hfsplus_mknod(dir, dentry, mode | S_IFDIR, 0);
}
Commit Message: hfsplus: Fix potential buffer overflows
Commit ec81aecb2966 ("hfs: fix a potential buffer overflow") fixed a few
potential buffer overflows in the hfs filesystem. But as Timo Warns
pointed out, these changes also need to be made on the hfsplus
filesystem as well.
Reported-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleSystem::ModuleSystem(ScriptContext* context, SourceMap* source_map)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context),
context_(context),
source_map_(source_map),
natives_enabled_(0),
exception_handler_(new DefaultExceptionHandler(context)),
weak_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction(
"require",
base::Bind(&ModuleSystem::RequireForJs, base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"requireNative",
base::Bind(&ModuleSystem::RequireNative, base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"requireAsync",
base::Bind(&ModuleSystem::RequireAsync, base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("privates",
base::Bind(&ModuleSystem::Private, base::Unretained(this)));
v8::Local<v8::Object> global(context->v8_context()->Global());
v8::Isolate* isolate = context->isolate();
global->SetHiddenValue(ToV8StringUnsafe(isolate, kModulesField),
v8::Object::New(isolate));
global->SetHiddenValue(ToV8StringUnsafe(isolate, kModuleSystem),
v8::External::New(isolate, this));
gin::ModuleRegistry::From(context->v8_context())->AddObserver(this);
if (context_->GetRenderFrame()) {
context_->GetRenderFrame()->EnsureMojoBuiltinsAreAvailable(
context->isolate(), context->v8_context());
}
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestPreconnectManagerObserver* preconnect_manager_observer() {
return preconnect_manager_observer_.get();
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jas_image_t *jas_image_copy(jas_image_t *image)
{
jas_image_t *newimage;
int cmptno;
if (!(newimage = jas_image_create0())) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_image_growcmpts(newimage, image->numcmpts_)) {
goto error;
}
for (cmptno = 0; cmptno < image->numcmpts_; ++cmptno) {
if (!(newimage->cmpts_[cmptno] = jas_image_cmpt_copy(image->cmpts_[cmptno]))) {
goto error;
}
++newimage->numcmpts_;
}
jas_image_setbbox(newimage);
if (image->cmprof_) {
if (!(newimage->cmprof_ = jas_cmprof_copy(image->cmprof_)))
goto error;
}
return newimage;
error:
if (newimage) {
jas_image_destroy(newimage);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 2,133
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_free_lock_stateid(stateid_t *stateid, struct nfs4_stid *s)
{
struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp = openlockstateid(s);
__be32 ret;
mutex_lock(&stp->st_mutex);
ret = check_stateid_generation(stateid, &s->sc_stateid, 1);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = nfserr_locks_held;
if (check_for_locks(stp->st_stid.sc_file,
lockowner(stp->st_stateowner)))
goto out;
release_lock_stateid(stp);
ret = nfs_ok;
out:
mutex_unlock(&stp->st_mutex);
nfs4_put_stid(s);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 15,321
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exsltDateTime (const xmlChar *dateTime)
{
exsltDateValPtr dt = NULL;
xmlChar *ret = NULL;
if (dateTime == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_TIME
dt = exsltDateCurrent();
if (dt == NULL)
#endif
return NULL;
} else {
dt = exsltDateParse(dateTime);
if (dt == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((dt->type != XS_DATETIME) && (dt->type != XS_TIME)) {
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return NULL;
}
}
ret = exsltDateFormatTime(&(dt->value.date));
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
{
/* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
switch (nid) {
case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
return 1;
case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
return 2;
case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
return 3;
case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
return 4;
case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
return 5;
case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
return 6;
case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
return 7;
case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
return 8;
case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
return 9;
case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
return 10;
case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
return 11;
case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
return 12;
case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
return 13;
case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
return 14;
case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
return 15;
case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
return 16;
case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
return 17;
case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
return 18;
case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
return 19;
case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
return 20;
case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
return 21;
case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
return 22;
case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
return 23;
case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
return 24;
case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
return 25;
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 22,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, struct fscrypt_info *ci)
{
struct fscrypt_info *prev;
if (ci == NULL)
ci = ACCESS_ONCE(inode->i_crypt_info);
if (ci == NULL)
return;
prev = cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, ci, NULL);
if (prev != ci)
return;
put_crypt_info(ci);
}
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 27,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewHandler::SendPrinterCapabilities(
const DictionaryValue& settings_info) {
VLOG(1) << "Get printer capabilities finished";
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> settings(settings_info.DeepCopy());
if (GetStickySettings()->color_model() != printing::UNKNOWN_COLOR_MODEL) {
settings->SetBoolean(
printing::kSettingSetColorAsDefault,
printing::isColorModelSelected(
GetStickySettings()->color_model()));
}
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("updateWithPrinterCapabilities",
*settings);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 14,958
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: check_table_height(struct table *t)
{
int i, j, k;
struct {
short *row;
short *rowspan;
short *indexarray;
short maxcell;
short size;
short *height;
} cell;
int space = 0;
cell.size = 0;
cell.maxcell = -1;
for (j = 0; j <= t->maxrow; j++) {
if (!t->tabattr[j])
continue;
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++) {
int t_dep, rowspan;
if (t->tabattr[j][i] & (HTT_X | HTT_Y))
continue;
if (t->tabdata[j][i] == NULL)
t_dep = 0;
else
t_dep = t->tabdata[j][i]->nitem;
rowspan = table_rowspan(t, j, i);
if (rowspan > 1) {
int c = cell.maxcell + 1;
k = bsearch_2short(rowspan, cell.rowspan,
j, cell.row, t->maxrow + 1, cell.indexarray,
c);
if (k <= cell.maxcell) {
int idx = cell.indexarray[k];
if (cell.row[idx] == j && cell.rowspan[idx] == rowspan)
c = idx;
}
if (c >= MAXROWCELL)
continue;
if (c >= cell.size) {
if (cell.size == 0) {
cell.size = max(MAXCELL, c + 1);
cell.row = NewAtom_N(short, cell.size);
cell.rowspan = NewAtom_N(short, cell.size);
cell.indexarray = NewAtom_N(short, cell.size);
cell.height = NewAtom_N(short, cell.size);
}
else {
cell.size = max(cell.size + MAXCELL, c + 1);
cell.row = New_Reuse(short, cell.row, cell.size);
cell.rowspan = New_Reuse(short, cell.rowspan,
cell.size);
cell.indexarray = New_Reuse(short, cell.indexarray,
cell.size);
cell.height = New_Reuse(short, cell.height, cell.size);
}
}
if (c > cell.maxcell) {
cell.maxcell++;
cell.row[cell.maxcell] = j;
cell.rowspan[cell.maxcell] = rowspan;
cell.height[cell.maxcell] = 0;
if (cell.maxcell > k) {
int ii;
for (ii = cell.maxcell; ii > k; ii--)
cell.indexarray[ii] = cell.indexarray[ii - 1];
}
cell.indexarray[k] = cell.maxcell;
}
if (cell.height[c] < t_dep)
cell.height[c] = t_dep;
continue;
}
if (t->tabheight[j] < t_dep)
t->tabheight[j] = t_dep;
}
}
switch (t->border_mode) {
case BORDER_THIN:
case BORDER_THICK:
case BORDER_NOWIN:
space = 1;
break;
case BORDER_NONE:
space = 0;
}
check_cell_width(t->tabheight, cell.height, cell.row, cell.rowspan,
cell.maxcell, cell.indexarray, space, 1);
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 14,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jbig2_release_page(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Image *image)
{
int index;
/* find the matching page struct and mark it released */
for (index = 0; index < ctx->max_page_index; index++) {
if (ctx->pages[index].image == image) {
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
ctx->pages[index].state = JBIG2_PAGE_RELEASED;
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, -1, "page %d released by the client", ctx->pages[index].number);
return 0;
}
}
/* no matching pages */
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, -1, "jbig2_release_page called on unknown page");
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Performance::NotifyObserversOfEntries(PerformanceEntryVector& entries) {
for (const auto& entry : entries) {
NotifyObserversOfEntry(*entry.Get());
}
}
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <tdresser@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 20,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GahpClient::unicore_job_start(const char * job_contact)
{
static const char* command = "UNICORE_JOB_START";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!job_contact) job_contact=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
int x = sprintf(reqline,"%s",escapeGahpString(job_contact));
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,normal_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 3) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = 1;
if ( result->argv[1][0] == 'S' ) {
rc = 0;
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 17,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mknod, const char __user *, filename, int, mode, unsigned, dev)
{
return sys_mknodat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode, dev);
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,242
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct nfs_fattr fattr;
int error;
nfs_inc_stats(inode, NFSIOS_VFSSETATTR);
/* skip mode change if it's just for clearing setuid/setgid */
if (attr->ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID))
attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_MODE;
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || attr->ia_size == i_size_read(inode))
attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_SIZE;
}
/* Optimization: if the end result is no change, don't RPC */
attr->ia_valid &= NFS_VALID_ATTRS;
if ((attr->ia_valid & ~ATTR_FILE) == 0)
return 0;
/* Write all dirty data */
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
nfs_wb_all(inode);
}
/*
* Return any delegations if we're going to change ACLs
*/
if ((attr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE|ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID)) != 0)
nfs_inode_return_delegation(inode);
error = NFS_PROTO(inode)->setattr(dentry, &fattr, attr);
if (error == 0)
nfs_refresh_inode(inode, &fattr);
return error;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void btif_rc_upstreams_rsp_evt(UINT16 event, tAVRC_RESPONSE *pavrc_resp, UINT8 ctype, UINT8 label)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s pdu: %s handle: 0x%x ctype:%x label:%x", __FUNCTION__,
dump_rc_pdu(pavrc_resp->pdu), btif_rc_cb.rc_handle, ctype, label);
#if (AVRC_ADV_CTRL_INCLUDED == TRUE)
switch (event)
{
case AVRC_PDU_REGISTER_NOTIFICATION:
{
if(AVRC_RSP_CHANGED==ctype)
btif_rc_cb.rc_volume=pavrc_resp->reg_notif.param.volume;
HAL_CBACK(bt_rc_callbacks, volume_change_cb, pavrc_resp->reg_notif.param.volume,ctype)
}
break;
case AVRC_PDU_SET_ABSOLUTE_VOLUME:
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Set absolute volume change event received: volume %d,ctype %d",
pavrc_resp->volume.volume,ctype);
if(AVRC_RSP_ACCEPT==ctype)
btif_rc_cb.rc_volume=pavrc_resp->volume.volume;
HAL_CBACK(bt_rc_callbacks,volume_change_cb,pavrc_resp->volume.volume,ctype)
}
break;
default:
return;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 16,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::OnPathReservationAvailable(
int32 download_id,
const content::DownloadTargetCallback& callback,
bool should_prompt,
content::DownloadDangerType danger_type,
const FilePath& reserved_path,
bool reserved_path_verified) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DownloadItem* download =
download_manager_->GetDownload(download_id);
if (!download || (download->GetState() != DownloadItem::IN_PROGRESS))
return;
if (should_prompt || !reserved_path_verified) {
ChooseDownloadPath(
download, reserved_path,
base::Bind(&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::OnTargetPathDetermined,
this, download_id, callback,
DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_PROMPT, danger_type));
} else {
OnTargetPathDetermined(download_id, callback,
DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_OVERWRITE,
danger_type, reserved_path);
}
}
Commit Message: For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void daemonize(const char *name, ...)
{
va_list args;
sigset_t blocked;
va_start(args, name);
vsnprintf(current->comm, sizeof(current->comm), name, args);
va_end(args);
/*
* If we were started as result of loading a module, close all of the
* user space pages. We don't need them, and if we didn't close them
* they would be locked into memory.
*/
exit_mm(current);
/*
* We don't want to have TIF_FREEZE set if the system-wide hibernation
* or suspend transition begins right now.
*/
current->flags |= (PF_NOFREEZE | PF_KTHREAD);
if (current->nsproxy != &init_nsproxy) {
get_nsproxy(&init_nsproxy);
switch_task_namespaces(current, &init_nsproxy);
}
set_special_pids(&init_struct_pid);
proc_clear_tty(current);
/* Block and flush all signals */
sigfillset(&blocked);
sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &blocked, NULL);
flush_signals(current);
/* Become as one with the init task */
daemonize_fs_struct();
exit_files(current);
current->files = init_task.files;
atomic_inc(¤t->files->count);
reparent_to_kthreadd();
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void flush_current_bio_list(struct blk_plug_cb *cb, bool from_schedule)
{
struct dm_offload *o = container_of(cb, struct dm_offload, cb);
struct bio_list list;
struct bio *bio;
int i;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&o->cb.list);
if (unlikely(!current->bio_list))
return;
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
list = current->bio_list[i];
bio_list_init(¤t->bio_list[i]);
while ((bio = bio_list_pop(&list))) {
struct bio_set *bs = bio->bi_pool;
if (unlikely(!bs) || bs == fs_bio_set ||
!bs->rescue_workqueue) {
bio_list_add(¤t->bio_list[i], bio);
continue;
}
spin_lock(&bs->rescue_lock);
bio_list_add(&bs->rescue_list, bio);
queue_work(bs->rescue_workqueue, &bs->rescue_work);
spin_unlock(&bs->rescue_lock);
}
}
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 10,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PPB_URLLoader_Impl::FinishLoading(int32_t done_status) {
done_status_ = done_status;
if (TrackedCallback::IsPending(pending_callback_))
RunCallback(done_status_);
}
Commit Message: Remove possibility of stale user_buffer_ member in PPB_URLLoader_Impl when FinishedLoading() is called.
BUG=137778
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10797037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@147914 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 10,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit LoadCommittedDetailsObserver(WebContents* web_contents)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
navigation_type_(NAVIGATION_TYPE_UNKNOWN),
is_same_document_(false),
is_main_frame_(false),
did_replace_entry_(false) {}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 2,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mapi_attr_dump (MAPI_Attr* attr)
{
char *name = get_mapi_name_str (attr->name);
char *type = get_mapi_type_str (attr->type);
size_t i;
fprintf (stdout, "(MAPI) %s [type: %s] [num_values = %lu] = \n",
name, type, (unsigned long)attr->num_values);
if (attr->guid)
{
fprintf (stdout, "\tGUID: ");
write_guid (stdout, attr->guid);
fputc ('\n', stdout);
}
for (i = 0; i < attr->num_names; i++)
fprintf (stdout, "\tname #%d: '%s'\n", (int)i, attr->names[i].data);
for (i = 0; i < attr->num_values; i++)
{
fprintf (stdout, "\t#%lu [len: %lu] = ",
(unsigned long)i,
(unsigned long)attr->values[i].len);
switch (attr->type)
{
case szMAPI_NULL:
fprintf (stdout, "NULL");
break;
case szMAPI_SHORT:
write_int16 (stdout, (int16)attr->values[i].data.bytes2);
break;
case szMAPI_INT:
write_int32 (stdout, (int32)attr->values[i].data.bytes4);
break;
case szMAPI_FLOAT:
case szMAPI_DOUBLE:
write_float (stdout, (float)attr->values[i].data.bytes4);
break;
case szMAPI_BOOLEAN:
write_boolean (stdout, attr->values[i].data.bytes4);
break;
case szMAPI_STRING:
case szMAPI_UNICODE_STRING:
write_string (stdout, (char*)attr->values[i].data.buf);
break;
case szMAPI_SYSTIME:
case szMAPI_CURRENCY:
case szMAPI_INT8BYTE:
case szMAPI_APPTIME:
write_uint64 (stdout, attr->values[i].data.bytes8);
break;
case szMAPI_ERROR:
write_uint32 (stdout, attr->values[i].data.bytes4);
break;
case szMAPI_CLSID:
write_guid (stdout, &attr->values[i].data.guid);
break;
case szMAPI_OBJECT:
case szMAPI_BINARY:
{
size_t x;
for (x = 0; x < attr->values[i].len; x++)
{
write_byte (stdout, (uint8)attr->values[i].data.buf[x]);
fputc (' ', stdout);
}
}
break;
default:
fprintf (stdout, "<unknown type>");
break;
}
fprintf (stdout, "\n");
}
fflush( NULL );
}
Commit Message: Use asserts on lengths to prevent invalid reads/writes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 12,817
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_rdtsc(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u64 cr4 = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4);
if (cr4 & X86_CR4_TSD && ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt))
return emulate_ud(ctxt);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err mfra_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_MovieFragmentRandomAccessBox *ptr = (GF_MovieFragmentRandomAccessBox *)s;
if (ptr->mfro) {
e = gf_isom_box_size((GF_Box *)ptr->mfro);
if (e) return e;
ptr->size += ptr->mfro->size;
}
return gf_isom_box_array_size(s, ptr->tfra_list);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_index(struct iowarrior *dev)
{
int intr_idx, read_idx;
read_idx = atomic_read(&dev->read_idx);
intr_idx = atomic_read(&dev->intr_idx);
return (read_idx == intr_idx ? -1 : read_idx);
}
Commit Message: USB: iowarrior: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The iowarrior driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given
malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints,
it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least
one endpoint on the interface before using it.
The full report of this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/87
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int WMFReadBlob(void *image)
{
return(ReadBlobByte((Image *) image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecreatefromgif)
{
_php_image_create_from(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GIF, "GIF", gdImageCreateFromGif, gdImageCreateFromGifCtx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 14,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XFreeExtensionList (char **list)
{
if (list != NULL) {
Xfree (list[0]-1);
Xfree (list);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 26,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int lh_ptr_equal(const void *k1, const void *k2)
{
return (k1 == k2);
}
Commit Message: Patch to address the following issues:
* CVE-2013-6371: hash collision denial of service
* CVE-2013-6370: buffer overflow if size_t is larger than int
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 2,117
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QuotaTask::QuotaTask(QuotaTaskObserver* observer)
: observer_(observer),
original_task_runner_(base::MessageLoopProxy::current()) {
}
Commit Message: Quota double-delete fix
BUG=142310
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10832407
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152532 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 27,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnSetZoomLevelForLoadingURL(const GURL& url,
double zoom_level) {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
host_zoom_levels_[url] = zoom_level;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: number_of_args ()
{
register WORD_LIST *list;
int n;
for (n = 0; n < 9 && dollar_vars[n+1]; n++)
;
for (list = rest_of_args; list; list = list->next)
n++;
return n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,659
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidChangeActiveSchedulerTrackedFeatures(
uint64_t features_mask) {
GetFrameHost()->UpdateActiveSchedulerTrackedFeatures(features_mask);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::rangeForLine(int line)
{
return JSStringCreateWithCharacters(0, 0);
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnUserGesture(WebContentsImpl* contents) {
last_user_gesture_time_ = TimeTicks::Now();
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,353
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int omninet_write_room(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = tty->driver_data;
struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;
struct usb_serial_port *wport = serial->port[1];
int room = 0; /* Default: no room */
if (test_bit(0, &wport->write_urbs_free))
room = wport->bulk_out_size - OMNINET_HEADERLEN;
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - returns %d\n", __func__, room);
return room;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: omninet: fix reference leaks at open
This driver needlessly took another reference to the tty on open, a
reference which was then never released on close. This lead to not just
a leak of the tty, but also a driver reference leak that prevented the
driver from being unloaded after a port had once been opened.
Fixes: 4a90f09b20f4 ("tty: usb-serial krefs")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.28
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 26,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void free_netdev(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct napi_struct *p, *n;
release_net(dev_net(dev));
kfree(dev->_tx);
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
kfree(dev->_rx);
#endif
kfree(rcu_dereference_raw(dev->ingress_queue));
/* Flush device addresses */
dev_addr_flush(dev);
/* Clear ethtool n-tuple list */
ethtool_ntuple_flush(dev);
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, &dev->napi_list, dev_list)
netif_napi_del(p);
free_percpu(dev->pcpu_refcnt);
dev->pcpu_refcnt = NULL;
/* Compatibility with error handling in drivers */
if (dev->reg_state == NETREG_UNINITIALIZED) {
kfree((char *)dev - dev->padded);
return;
}
BUG_ON(dev->reg_state != NETREG_UNREGISTERED);
dev->reg_state = NETREG_RELEASED;
/* will free via device release */
put_device(&dev->dev);
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tracing_snapshot_cond_disable(struct trace_array *tr)
{
return false;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 27,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void o2nm_undepend_this_node(void)
{
struct o2nm_node *local_node;
local_node = o2nm_get_node_by_num(o2nm_this_node());
BUG_ON(!local_node);
o2nm_undepend_item(&local_node->nd_item);
o2nm_node_put(local_node);
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 11,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct cluster_list *cluster_intern(struct cluster_list *cluster)
{
struct cluster_list *find;
find = hash_get(cluster_hash, cluster, cluster_hash_alloc);
find->refcnt++;
return find;
}
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::RemoteServerGetPrimaryServicesImpl(
const WebBluetoothDeviceId& device_id,
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
const base::Optional<BluetoothUUID>& services_uuid,
RemoteServerGetPrimaryServicesCallback callback,
device::BluetoothDevice* device) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!device->IsGattConnected()) {
RecordGetPrimaryServicesOutcome(
quantity, UMAGetPrimaryServiceOutcome::DEVICE_DISCONNECTED);
std::move(callback).Run(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::NO_SERVICES_FOUND,
base::nullopt /* services */);
return;
}
DCHECK(device->IsGattServicesDiscoveryComplete());
std::vector<device::BluetoothRemoteGattService*> services =
services_uuid ? device->GetPrimaryServicesByUUID(services_uuid.value())
: device->GetPrimaryServices();
std::vector<blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTServicePtr> response_services;
for (device::BluetoothRemoteGattService* service : services) {
if (!allowed_devices().IsAllowedToAccessService(device_id,
service->GetUUID())) {
continue;
}
std::string service_instance_id = service->GetIdentifier();
const std::string& device_address = device->GetAddress();
auto insert_result = service_id_to_device_address_.insert(
make_pair(service_instance_id, device_address));
if (!insert_result.second)
DCHECK_EQ(insert_result.first->second, device_address);
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTServicePtr service_ptr =
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTService::New();
service_ptr->instance_id = service_instance_id;
service_ptr->uuid = service->GetUUID();
response_services.push_back(std::move(service_ptr));
if (quantity == blink::mojom::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity::SINGLE) {
break;
}
}
if (!response_services.empty()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Services found in device.";
RecordGetPrimaryServicesOutcome(quantity,
UMAGetPrimaryServiceOutcome::SUCCESS);
std::move(callback).Run(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SUCCESS,
std::move(response_services));
return;
}
DVLOG(1) << "Services not found in device.";
RecordGetPrimaryServicesOutcome(
quantity, services_uuid ? UMAGetPrimaryServiceOutcome::NOT_FOUND
: UMAGetPrimaryServiceOutcome::NO_SERVICES);
std::move(callback).Run(
services_uuid ? blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SERVICE_NOT_FOUND
: blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::NO_SERVICES_FOUND,
base::nullopt /* services */);
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 22,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::SetBrowserContext(
BrowserContext* browser_context) {
browser_context_ = browser_context;
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void si_swapinfo(struct sysinfo *val)
{
unsigned int type;
unsigned long nr_to_be_unused = 0;
spin_lock(&swap_lock);
for (type = 0; type < nr_swapfiles; type++) {
struct swap_info_struct *si = swap_info[type];
if ((si->flags & SWP_USED) && !(si->flags & SWP_WRITEOK))
nr_to_be_unused += si->inuse_pages;
}
val->freeswap = nr_swap_pages + nr_to_be_unused;
val->totalswap = total_swap_pages + nr_to_be_unused;
spin_unlock(&swap_lock);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void enqueue_huge_page(struct hstate *h, struct page *page)
{
int nid = page_to_nid(page);
list_move(&page->lru, &h->hugepage_freelists[nid]);
h->free_huge_pages++;
h->free_huge_pages_node[nid]++;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_notify_master_rx_lower_pri(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
if (vrrp->script_master_rx_lower_pri) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s) notify_master_rx_lower_pri script already specified - ignoring %s", vrrp->iname, FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec,1));
return;
}
vrrp->script_master_rx_lower_pri = set_vrrp_notify_script(strvec, 0);
vrrp->notify_exec = true;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 8,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::NodeChildrenWillBeRemoved(ContainerNode& container) {
EventDispatchForbiddenScope assert_no_event_dispatch;
for (Range* range : ranges_)
range->NodeChildrenWillBeRemoved(container);
for (NodeIterator* ni : node_iterators_) {
for (Node& n : NodeTraversal::ChildrenOf(container))
ni->NodeWillBeRemoved(n);
}
NotifyNodeChildrenWillBeRemoved(container);
if (ContainsV1ShadowTree()) {
for (Node& n : NodeTraversal::ChildrenOf(container))
n.CheckSlotChangeBeforeRemoved();
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 2,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::string16 FormatViewSourceUrl(
const GURL& url,
FormatUrlTypes format_types,
net::UnescapeRule::Type unescape_rules,
url::Parsed* new_parsed,
size_t* prefix_end,
base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustments* adjustments) {
DCHECK(new_parsed);
const char kViewSource[] = "view-source:";
const size_t kViewSourceLength = arraysize(kViewSource) - 1;
const std::string& url_str(url.possibly_invalid_spec());
adjustments->clear();
base::string16 result(
base::ASCIIToUTF16(kViewSource) +
FormatUrlWithAdjustments(GURL(url_str.substr(kViewSourceLength)),
format_types, unescape_rules, new_parsed,
prefix_end, adjustments));
for (base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustments::iterator it = adjustments->begin();
it != adjustments->end(); ++it)
it->original_offset += kViewSourceLength;
if (new_parsed->scheme.is_nonempty()) {
new_parsed->scheme.len += kViewSourceLength;
} else {
new_parsed->scheme.begin = 0;
new_parsed->scheme.len = kViewSourceLength - 1;
}
AdjustAllComponentsButScheme(kViewSourceLength, new_parsed);
if (prefix_end)
*prefix_end += kViewSourceLength;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::DidFinishLoading(ResourceLoader* loader) {
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = loader->GetRequestInfo();
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RequestComplete(loader->request());
RemovePendingRequest(info->GetChildID(), info->GetRequestID());
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 14,648
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int flush_pending_x87_faults(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
bool fault = false;
ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt);
asm volatile("1: fwait \n\t"
"2: \n\t"
".pushsection .fixup,\"ax\" \n\t"
"3: \n\t"
"movb $1, %[fault] \n\t"
"jmp 2b \n\t"
".popsection \n\t"
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b)
: [fault]"+qm"(fault));
ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt);
if (unlikely(fault))
return emulate_exception(ctxt, MF_VECTOR, 0, false);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 22,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pit_get_gate(struct kvm *kvm, int channel)
{
WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock));
return kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels[channel].gate;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Improve thread safety in pit
There's a race condition in the PIT emulation code in KVM. In
__kvm_migrate_pit_timer the pit_timer object is accessed without
synchronization. If the race condition occurs at the wrong time this
can crash the host kernel.
This fixes CVE-2014-3611.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 1,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PathIsWritable(const FilePath& path) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
return access(path.value().c_str(), W_OK) == 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 5,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool jsvIsArray(const JsVar *v) { return v && (v->flags&JSV_VARTYPEMASK)==JSV_ARRAY; }
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AddHost(AppCacheHost* host) {
hosts_to_notify_.insert(host->frontend());
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnPaste() {
base::AutoReset<bool> handling_select_range(&handling_select_range_, true);
frame_->executeCommand(WebString::fromUTF8("Paste"), GetFocusedElement());
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int StopInfoCompare(const void *x,const void *y)
{
StopInfo
*stop_1,
*stop_2;
stop_1=(StopInfo *) x;
stop_2=(StopInfo *) y;
if (stop_1->offset > stop_2->offset)
return(1);
if (fabs(stop_1->offset-stop_2->offset) <= MagickEpsilon)
return(0);
return(-1);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,765
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(socketcall, int, call, unsigned long __user *, args)
{
unsigned long a[AUDITSC_ARGS];
unsigned long a0, a1;
int err;
unsigned int len;
if (call < 1 || call > SYS_SENDMMSG)
return -EINVAL;
len = nargs[call];
if (len > sizeof(a))
return -EINVAL;
/* copy_from_user should be SMP safe. */
if (copy_from_user(a, args, len))
return -EFAULT;
err = audit_socketcall(nargs[call] / sizeof(unsigned long), a);
if (err)
return err;
a0 = a[0];
a1 = a[1];
switch (call) {
case SYS_SOCKET:
err = __sys_socket(a0, a1, a[2]);
break;
case SYS_BIND:
err = __sys_bind(a0, (struct sockaddr __user *)a1, a[2]);
break;
case SYS_CONNECT:
err = __sys_connect(a0, (struct sockaddr __user *)a1, a[2]);
break;
case SYS_LISTEN:
err = __sys_listen(a0, a1);
break;
case SYS_ACCEPT:
err = __sys_accept4(a0, (struct sockaddr __user *)a1,
(int __user *)a[2], 0);
break;
case SYS_GETSOCKNAME:
err =
__sys_getsockname(a0, (struct sockaddr __user *)a1,
(int __user *)a[2]);
break;
case SYS_GETPEERNAME:
err =
__sys_getpeername(a0, (struct sockaddr __user *)a1,
(int __user *)a[2]);
break;
case SYS_SOCKETPAIR:
err = __sys_socketpair(a0, a1, a[2], (int __user *)a[3]);
break;
case SYS_SEND:
err = __sys_sendto(a0, (void __user *)a1, a[2], a[3],
NULL, 0);
break;
case SYS_SENDTO:
err = __sys_sendto(a0, (void __user *)a1, a[2], a[3],
(struct sockaddr __user *)a[4], a[5]);
break;
case SYS_RECV:
err = __sys_recvfrom(a0, (void __user *)a1, a[2], a[3],
NULL, NULL);
break;
case SYS_RECVFROM:
err = __sys_recvfrom(a0, (void __user *)a1, a[2], a[3],
(struct sockaddr __user *)a[4],
(int __user *)a[5]);
break;
case SYS_SHUTDOWN:
err = __sys_shutdown(a0, a1);
break;
case SYS_SETSOCKOPT:
err = __sys_setsockopt(a0, a1, a[2], (char __user *)a[3],
a[4]);
break;
case SYS_GETSOCKOPT:
err =
__sys_getsockopt(a0, a1, a[2], (char __user *)a[3],
(int __user *)a[4]);
break;
case SYS_SENDMSG:
err = __sys_sendmsg(a0, (struct user_msghdr __user *)a1,
a[2], true);
break;
case SYS_SENDMMSG:
err = __sys_sendmmsg(a0, (struct mmsghdr __user *)a1, a[2],
a[3], true);
break;
case SYS_RECVMSG:
err = __sys_recvmsg(a0, (struct user_msghdr __user *)a1,
a[2], true);
break;
case SYS_RECVMMSG:
err = do_sys_recvmmsg(a0, (struct mmsghdr __user *)a1, a[2],
a[3], (struct timespec __user *)a[4]);
break;
case SYS_ACCEPT4:
err = __sys_accept4(a0, (struct sockaddr __user *)a1,
(int __user *)a[2], a[3]);
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 2,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LogLuv24toXYZ(uint32 p, float XYZ[3])
{
int Ce;
double L, u, v, s, x, y;
/* decode luminance */
L = LogL10toY(p>>14 & 0x3ff);
if (L <= 0.) {
XYZ[0] = XYZ[1] = XYZ[2] = 0.;
return;
}
/* decode color */
Ce = p & 0x3fff;
if (uv_decode(&u, &v, Ce) < 0) {
u = U_NEU; v = V_NEU;
}
s = 1./(6.*u - 16.*v + 12.);
x = 9.*u * s;
y = 4.*v * s;
/* convert to XYZ */
XYZ[0] = (float)(x/y * L);
XYZ[1] = (float)L;
XYZ[2] = (float)((1.-x-y)/y * L);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 24,717
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int follow_managed(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct vfsmount *mnt = path->mnt; /* held by caller, must be left alone */
unsigned managed;
bool need_mntput = false;
int ret = 0;
/* Given that we're not holding a lock here, we retain the value in a
* local variable for each dentry as we look at it so that we don't see
* the components of that value change under us */
while (managed = ACCESS_ONCE(path->dentry->d_flags),
managed &= DCACHE_MANAGED_DENTRY,
unlikely(managed != 0)) {
/* Allow the filesystem to manage the transit without i_mutex
* being held. */
if (managed & DCACHE_MANAGE_TRANSIT) {
BUG_ON(!path->dentry->d_op);
BUG_ON(!path->dentry->d_op->d_manage);
ret = path->dentry->d_op->d_manage(path->dentry, false);
if (ret < 0)
break;
}
/* Transit to a mounted filesystem. */
if (managed & DCACHE_MOUNTED) {
struct vfsmount *mounted = lookup_mnt(path);
if (mounted) {
dput(path->dentry);
if (need_mntput)
mntput(path->mnt);
path->mnt = mounted;
path->dentry = dget(mounted->mnt_root);
need_mntput = true;
continue;
}
/* Something is mounted on this dentry in another
* namespace and/or whatever was mounted there in this
* namespace got unmounted before lookup_mnt() could
* get it */
}
/* Handle an automount point */
if (managed & DCACHE_NEED_AUTOMOUNT) {
ret = follow_automount(path, nd, &need_mntput);
if (ret < 0)
break;
continue;
}
/* We didn't change the current path point */
break;
}
if (need_mntput && path->mnt == mnt)
mntput(path->mnt);
if (ret == -EISDIR)
ret = 0;
if (need_mntput)
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
path_put_conditional(path, nd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 27,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void my_init_destination_fn(j_compress_ptr cinfo)
{
struct iwjpegwcontext *wctx = (struct iwjpegwcontext*)cinfo->dest;
wctx->pub.next_output_byte = wctx->buffer;
wctx->pub.free_in_buffer = wctx->buffer_len;
}
Commit Message: Fixed invalid memory access bugs when decoding JPEG Exif data
Fixes issues #22, #23, #24, #25
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 24,276
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _exsltDateDifference (exsltDateValPtr x, exsltDateValPtr y, int flag)
{
exsltDateValPtr ret;
if ((x == NULL) || (y == NULL))
return NULL;
if (((x->type < XS_GYEAR) || (x->type > XS_DATETIME)) ||
((y->type < XS_GYEAR) || (y->type > XS_DATETIME)))
return NULL;
exsltDateNormalize(x);
exsltDateNormalize(y);
/*
* the operand with the most specific format must be converted to
* the same type as the operand with the least specific format.
*/
if (x->type != y->type) {
if (x->type < y->type) {
_exsltDateTruncateDate(y, x->type);
} else {
_exsltDateTruncateDate(x, y->type);
}
}
ret = exsltDateCreateDate(XS_DURATION);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
if (((x->type == XS_GYEAR) || (x->type == XS_GYEARMONTH)) && (!flag)) {
/* compute the difference in months */
ret->value.dur.mon = ((y->value.date.year * 12) + y->value.date.mon) -
((x->value.date.year * 12) + x->value.date.mon);
/* The above will give a wrong result if x and y are on different sides
of the September 1752. Resolution is welcome :-) */
} else {
ret->value.dur.day = _exsltDateCastYMToDays(y) -
_exsltDateCastYMToDays(x);
ret->value.dur.day += y->value.date.day - x->value.date.day;
ret->value.dur.sec = TIME_TO_NUMBER(y) - TIME_TO_NUMBER(x);
if (ret->value.dur.day > 0.0 && ret->value.dur.sec < 0.0) {
ret->value.dur.day -= 1;
ret->value.dur.sec = ret->value.dur.sec + SECS_PER_DAY;
} else if (ret->value.dur.day < 0.0 && ret->value.dur.sec > 0.0) {
ret->value.dur.day += 1;
ret->value.dur.sec = ret->value.dur.sec - SECS_PER_DAY;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 870
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __perf_event_output_stop(struct perf_event *event, void *data)
{
struct perf_event *parent = event->parent;
struct remote_output *ro = data;
struct ring_buffer *rb = ro->rb;
struct stop_event_data sd = {
.event = event,
};
if (!has_aux(event))
return;
if (!parent)
parent = event;
/*
* In case of inheritance, it will be the parent that links to the
* ring-buffer, but it will be the child that's actually using it.
*
* We are using event::rb to determine if the event should be stopped,
* however this may race with ring_buffer_attach() (through set_output),
* which will make us skip the event that actually needs to be stopped.
* So ring_buffer_attach() has to stop an aux event before re-assigning
* its rb pointer.
*/
if (rcu_dereference(parent->rb) == rb)
ro->err = __perf_event_stop(&sd);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 8,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext3D::setErrorMessageCallback(PassOwnPtr<ErrorMessageCallback>)
{
}
Commit Message: [Qt] Remove an unnecessary masking from swapBgrToRgb()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103630
Reviewed by Zoltan Herczeg.
Get rid of a masking command in swapBgrToRgb() to speed up a little bit.
* platform/graphics/qt/GraphicsContext3DQt.cpp:
(WebCore::swapBgrToRgb):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@136375 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnReplaceMisspelling(const base::string16& text) {
if (!frame_->hasSelection())
return;
frame_->replaceMisspelledRange(text);
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::pluginLoadingTimerFired(Timer<Document>*)
{
updateLayout();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 17,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hns_gmac_config_loopback(void *mac_drv, enum hnae_loop loop_mode,
u8 enable)
{
struct mac_driver *drv = (struct mac_driver *)mac_drv;
switch (loop_mode) {
case MAC_INTERNALLOOP_MAC:
dsaf_set_dev_bit(drv, GMAC_LOOP_REG, GMAC_LP_REG_CF2MI_LP_EN_B,
!!enable);
break;
default:
dev_err(drv->dev, "loop_mode error\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int acm_set_control(struct acm *acm, int control)
{
if (acm->quirks & QUIRK_CONTROL_LINE_STATE)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return acm_ctrl_msg(acm, USB_CDC_REQ_SET_CONTROL_LINE_STATE,
control, NULL, 0);
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checking
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,566
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
{
if (type)
return -EINVAL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head);
/* Reserve bit 0 of irq_sources_bitmap for userspace irq source */
set_bit(KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID, &kvm->arch.irq_sources_bitmap);
/* Reserve bit 1 of irq_sources_bitmap for irqfd-resampler */
set_bit(KVM_IRQFD_RESAMPLE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID,
&kvm->arch.irq_sources_bitmap);
raw_spin_lock_init(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock);
mutex_init(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
spin_lock_init(&kvm->arch.pvclock_gtod_sync_lock);
pvclock_update_vm_gtod_copy(kvm);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnChildFrameProcessGone() {
if (compositing_helper_)
compositing_helper_->ChildFrameGone();
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameFetchContext::RecordLoadingActivity(
const ResourceRequest& request,
Resource::Type type,
const AtomicString& fetch_initiator_name) {
if (!document_loader_ || document_loader_->Fetcher()->Archive() ||
!request.Url().IsValid())
return;
V8DOMActivityLogger* activity_logger = nullptr;
if (fetch_initiator_name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::xmlhttprequest) {
activity_logger = V8DOMActivityLogger::CurrentActivityLogger();
} else {
activity_logger =
V8DOMActivityLogger::CurrentActivityLoggerIfIsolatedWorld();
}
if (activity_logger) {
Vector<String> argv;
argv.push_back(Resource::ResourceTypeToString(type, fetch_initiator_name));
argv.push_back(request.Url());
activity_logger->LogEvent("blinkRequestResource", argv.size(), argv.data());
}
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 9,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int srpt_init_ch_qp(struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch, struct ib_qp *qp)
{
struct ib_qp_attr *attr;
int ret;
attr = kzalloc(sizeof *attr, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!attr)
return -ENOMEM;
attr->qp_state = IB_QPS_INIT;
attr->qp_access_flags = IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE | IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_READ |
IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_WRITE;
attr->port_num = ch->sport->port;
attr->pkey_index = 0;
ret = ib_modify_qp(qp, attr,
IB_QP_STATE | IB_QP_ACCESS_FLAGS | IB_QP_PORT |
IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX);
kfree(attr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::queryCommandState(const String& commandName)
{
return command(this, commandName).state() == TrueTriState;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,267
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vmxnet3_inc_tx_consumption_counter(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx)
{
vmxnet3_ring_inc(&s->txq_descr[qidx].tx_ring);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 1,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init hugetlb_init(void)
{
int i;
if (!hugepages_supported())
return 0;
if (!size_to_hstate(default_hstate_size)) {
if (default_hstate_size != 0) {
pr_err("HugeTLB: unsupported default_hugepagesz %lu. Reverting to %lu\n",
default_hstate_size, HPAGE_SIZE);
}
default_hstate_size = HPAGE_SIZE;
if (!size_to_hstate(default_hstate_size))
hugetlb_add_hstate(HUGETLB_PAGE_ORDER);
}
default_hstate_idx = hstate_index(size_to_hstate(default_hstate_size));
if (default_hstate_max_huge_pages) {
if (!default_hstate.max_huge_pages)
default_hstate.max_huge_pages = default_hstate_max_huge_pages;
}
hugetlb_init_hstates();
gather_bootmem_prealloc();
report_hugepages();
hugetlb_sysfs_init();
hugetlb_register_all_nodes();
hugetlb_cgroup_file_init();
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
num_fault_mutexes = roundup_pow_of_two(8 * num_possible_cpus());
#else
num_fault_mutexes = 1;
#endif
hugetlb_fault_mutex_table =
kmalloc(sizeof(struct mutex) * num_fault_mutexes, GFP_KERNEL);
BUG_ON(!hugetlb_fault_mutex_table);
for (i = 0; i < num_fault_mutexes; i++)
mutex_init(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[i]);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PNET_BUFFER_LIST CParaNdisTX::ProcessWaitingList()
{
PNET_BUFFER_LIST CompletedNBLs = nullptr;
m_WaitingList.ForEachDetachedIf([](CNBL* NBL) { return NBL->IsSendDone(); },
[&](CNBL* NBL)
{
NBL->SetStatus(NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS);
auto RawNBL = NBL->DetachInternalObject();
NBL->Release();
NET_BUFFER_LIST_NEXT_NBL(RawNBL) = CompletedNBLs;
CompletedNBLs = RawNBL;
});
return CompletedNBLs;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long mem_cgroup_nr_lru_pages(struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
unsigned int lru_mask)
{
int nid;
u64 total = 0;
for_each_node_state(nid, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
total += mem_cgroup_node_nr_lru_pages(memcg, nid, lru_mask);
return total;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DataReductionProxyConfig::UpdateConfigForTesting(
bool enabled,
bool secure_proxies_allowed,
bool insecure_proxies_allowed) {
enabled_by_user_ = enabled;
network_properties_manager_->ResetWarmupURLFetchMetrics();
network_properties_manager_->SetIsSecureProxyDisallowedByCarrier(
!secure_proxies_allowed);
if (!insecure_proxies_allowed !=
network_properties_manager_->HasWarmupURLProbeFailed(
false /* secure_proxy */, false /* is_core_proxy */) ||
!insecure_proxies_allowed !=
network_properties_manager_->HasWarmupURLProbeFailed(
false /* secure_proxy */, true /* is_core_proxy */)) {
network_properties_manager_->SetHasWarmupURLProbeFailed(
false /* secure_proxy */, false /* is_core_proxy */,
!insecure_proxies_allowed);
network_properties_manager_->SetHasWarmupURLProbeFailed(
false /* secure_proxy */, true /* is_core_proxy */,
!insecure_proxies_allowed);
}
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: string16 OmniboxViewWin::GetClipboardText() const {
ui::Clipboard* clipboard = g_browser_process->clipboard();
if (clipboard->IsFormatAvailable(ui::Clipboard::GetPlainTextWFormatType(),
ui::Clipboard::BUFFER_STANDARD)) {
string16 text;
clipboard->ReadText(ui::Clipboard::BUFFER_STANDARD, &text);
return StripJavascriptSchemas(CollapseWhitespace(text, true));
}
if (clipboard->IsFormatAvailable(ui::Clipboard::GetUrlWFormatType(),
ui::Clipboard::BUFFER_STANDARD)) {
std::string url_str;
clipboard->ReadBookmark(NULL, &url_str);
GURL url(url_str);
if (url.is_valid())
return StripJavascriptSchemas(UTF8ToUTF16(url.spec()));
}
return string16();
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,853
|
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