instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::CreateLoginDelegate(
net::AuthChallengeInfo* auth_info,
content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter web_contents_getter,
const content::GlobalRequestID& request_id,
bool is_request_for_main_frame,
const GURL& url,
scoped_refptr<net::HttpResponseHeaders> response_headers,
bool first_auth_attempt,
LoginAuthRequiredCallback auth_required_callback) {
return CreateLoginPrompt(
auth_info, web_contents_getter, request_id, is_request_for_main_frame,
url, std::move(response_headers), std::move(auth_required_callback));
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 15,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool pdptrs_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 pdpte[ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->pdptrs)];
bool changed = true;
int offset;
gfn_t gfn;
int r;
if (is_long_mode(vcpu) || !is_pae(vcpu))
return false;
if (!test_bit(VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR,
(unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail))
return true;
gfn = (vcpu->arch.cr3 & ~31u) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
offset = (vcpu->arch.cr3 & ~31u) & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
r = kvm_read_nested_guest_page(vcpu, gfn, pdpte, offset, sizeof(pdpte),
PFERR_USER_MASK | PFERR_WRITE_MASK);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
changed = memcmp(pdpte, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->pdptrs, sizeof(pdpte)) != 0;
out:
return changed;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 13,583
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ff_thread_release_buffer(AVCodecContext *avctx, ThreadFrame *f)
{
if (f->f)
av_frame_unref(f->f);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 12,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BlackBerry::Platform::String WebPage::renderTreeAsText()
{
return externalRepresentation(d->m_mainFrame);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *MeanShiftImage(const Image *image,const size_t width,
const size_t height,const double color_distance,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MaxMeanShiftIterations 100
#define MeanShiftImageTag "MeanShift/Image"
CacheView
*image_view,
*mean_view,
*pixel_view;
Image
*mean_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
mean_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (mean_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(mean_image,DirectClass) == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&mean_image->exception);
mean_image=DestroyImage(mean_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
pixel_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
mean_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(mean_image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(status,progress) \
magick_number_threads(mean_image,mean_image,mean_image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) mean_image->rows; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(mean_view,0,y,mean_image->columns,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) || (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
indexes=GetCacheViewVirtualIndexQueue(image_view);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) mean_image->columns; x++)
{
MagickPixelPacket
mean_pixel,
previous_pixel;
PointInfo
mean_location,
previous_location;
register ssize_t
i;
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&mean_pixel);
SetMagickPixelPacket(image,p,indexes+x,&mean_pixel);
mean_location.x=(double) x;
mean_location.y=(double) y;
for (i=0; i < MaxMeanShiftIterations; i++)
{
double
distance,
gamma;
MagickPixelPacket
sum_pixel;
PointInfo
sum_location;
ssize_t
count,
v;
sum_location.x=0.0;
sum_location.y=0.0;
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&sum_pixel);
previous_location=mean_location;
previous_pixel=mean_pixel;
count=0;
for (v=(-((ssize_t) height/2)); v <= (((ssize_t) height/2)); v++)
{
ssize_t
u;
for (u=(-((ssize_t) width/2)); u <= (((ssize_t) width/2)); u++)
{
if ((v*v+u*u) <= (ssize_t) ((width/2)*(height/2)))
{
PixelPacket
pixel;
status=GetOneCacheViewVirtualPixel(pixel_view,(ssize_t)
MagickRound(mean_location.x+u),(ssize_t) MagickRound(
mean_location.y+v),&pixel,exception);
distance=(mean_pixel.red-pixel.red)*(mean_pixel.red-pixel.red)+
(mean_pixel.green-pixel.green)*(mean_pixel.green-pixel.green)+
(mean_pixel.blue-pixel.blue)*(mean_pixel.blue-pixel.blue);
if (distance <= (color_distance*color_distance))
{
sum_location.x+=mean_location.x+u;
sum_location.y+=mean_location.y+v;
sum_pixel.red+=pixel.red;
sum_pixel.green+=pixel.green;
sum_pixel.blue+=pixel.blue;
sum_pixel.opacity+=pixel.opacity;
count++;
}
}
}
}
gamma=1.0/count;
mean_location.x=gamma*sum_location.x;
mean_location.y=gamma*sum_location.y;
mean_pixel.red=gamma*sum_pixel.red;
mean_pixel.green=gamma*sum_pixel.green;
mean_pixel.blue=gamma*sum_pixel.blue;
mean_pixel.opacity=gamma*sum_pixel.opacity;
distance=(mean_location.x-previous_location.x)*
(mean_location.x-previous_location.x)+
(mean_location.y-previous_location.y)*
(mean_location.y-previous_location.y)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.red-previous_pixel.red)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.red-previous_pixel.red)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.green-previous_pixel.green)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.green-previous_pixel.green)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.blue-previous_pixel.blue)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.blue-previous_pixel.blue);
if (distance <= 3.0)
break;
}
q->red=ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.red);
q->green=ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.green);
q->blue=ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.blue);
q->opacity=ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.opacity);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(mean_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,MeanShiftImageTag,progress,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
mean_view=DestroyCacheView(mean_view);
pixel_view=DestroyCacheView(pixel_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(mean_image);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1552
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 1
| 14,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: enqueue_waiting_conn(conn c)
{
tube t;
size_t i;
global_stat.waiting_ct++;
c->type |= CONN_TYPE_WAITING;
for (i = 0; i < c->watch.used; i++) {
t = c->watch.items[i];
t->stat.waiting_ct++;
ms_append(&t->waiting, c);
}
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void StreamTcpSessionPoolCleanup(void *s)
{
if (s != NULL) {
StreamTcpSessionCleanup(s);
/** \todo not very clean, as the memory is not freed here */
StreamTcpDecrMemuse((uint64_t)sizeof(TcpSession));
}
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vfat_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
return fat_fill_super(sb, data, silent, 1, setup);
}
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t ZSTD_CCtxParams_init_advanced(ZSTD_CCtx_params* cctxParams, ZSTD_parameters params)
{
if (!cctxParams) { return ERROR(GENERIC); }
CHECK_F( ZSTD_checkCParams(params.cParams) );
memset(cctxParams, 0, sizeof(*cctxParams));
cctxParams->cParams = params.cParams;
cctxParams->fParams = params.fParams;
cctxParams->compressionLevel = ZSTD_CLEVEL_DEFAULT; /* should not matter, as all cParams are presumed properly defined */
assert(!ZSTD_checkCParams(params.cParams));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 21,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DocumentParser* Document::ImplicitOpen(
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parser_sync_policy) {
RemoveChildren();
DCHECK(!focused_element_);
SetCompatibilityMode(kNoQuirksMode);
if (!ThreadedParsingEnabledForTesting()) {
parser_sync_policy = kForceSynchronousParsing;
} else if (parser_sync_policy == kAllowAsynchronousParsing &&
IsPrefetchOnly()) {
parser_sync_policy = kForceSynchronousParsing;
}
DetachParser();
parser_sync_policy_ = parser_sync_policy;
parser_ = CreateParser();
DocumentParserTiming::From(*this).MarkParserStart();
SetParsingState(kParsing);
SetReadyState(kLoading);
if (load_event_progress_ != kLoadEventInProgress &&
PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() == kNoDismissal) {
load_event_progress_ = kLoadEventNotRun;
}
return parser_;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 25,334
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static stb_vorbis * vorbis_alloc(stb_vorbis *f)
{
stb_vorbis *p = (stb_vorbis *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(*p));
return p;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dump_list_l()
{
struct listnode *node;
vol_listener_context_t *context;
ALOGW("DUMP_START :: ===========");
list_for_each(node, &vol_effect_list) {
context = node_to_item(node, struct vol_listener_context_s, effect_list_node);
ALOGW("%s: streamType [%s] Device [%d] state [%d] sessionID [%d] volume (L/R) [%f / %f] ",
__func__,
context->stream_type == MUSIC ? "MUSIC" :
context->stream_type == RING ? "RING" :
context->stream_type == ALARM ? "ALARM" :
context->stream_type == VOICE_CALL ? "VOICE_CALL" :
context->stream_type == NOTIFICATION ? "NOTIFICATION" : "--INVALID--",
context->dev_id, context->state, context->session_id, context->left_vol,context->right_vol);
}
ALOGW("DUMP_END :: ===========");
}
Commit Message: post proc : volume listener : fix effect release crash
Fix access to deleted effect context in vol_prc_lib_release()
Bug: 25753245.
Change-Id: I64ca99e4d5d09667be4c8c605f66700b9ae67949
(cherry picked from commit 93ab6fdda7b7557ccb34372670c30fa6178f8426)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static png_uint_32 png_log8bit(unsigned x)
{
if (x > 0)
return (png_uint_32)floor(.5-log(x/255.)*L2INV);
return 0xffffffff;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PushMessagingServiceImpl::Shutdown() {
GetGCMDriver()->RemoveAppHandler(kPushMessagingAppIdentifierPrefix);
HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
reasons = *preasons;
crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
if (crl_score > best_score) {
best_crl = crl;
best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
best_score = crl_score;
best_reasons = reasons;
}
}
if (best_crl) {
if (*pcrl)
X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
*pcrl = best_crl;
*pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
*pscore = best_score;
*preasons = best_reasons;
CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
if (*pdcrl) {
X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
*pdcrl = NULL;
}
get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
}
if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 27,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: profCallgraphAdd(xsltTemplatePtr templ, xsltTemplatePtr parent)
{
int i;
if (templ->templMax == 0) {
templ->templMax = 4;
templ->templCalledTab =
(xsltTemplatePtr *) xmlMalloc(templ->templMax *
sizeof(templ->templCalledTab[0]));
templ->templCountTab =
(int *) xmlMalloc(templ->templMax *
sizeof(templ->templCountTab[0]));
if (templ->templCalledTab == NULL || templ->templCountTab == NULL) {
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "malloc failed !\n");
return;
}
}
else if (templ->templNr >= templ->templMax) {
templ->templMax *= 2;
templ->templCalledTab =
(xsltTemplatePtr *) xmlRealloc(templ->templCalledTab,
templ->templMax *
sizeof(templ->templCalledTab[0]));
templ->templCountTab =
(int *) xmlRealloc(templ->templCountTab,
templ->templMax *
sizeof(templ->templCountTab[0]));
if (templ->templCalledTab == NULL || templ->templCountTab == NULL) {
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "realloc failed !\n");
return;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < templ->templNr; i++) {
if (templ->templCalledTab[i] == parent) {
templ->templCountTab[i]++;
break;
}
}
if (i == templ->templNr) {
/* not found, add new one */
templ->templCalledTab[templ->templNr] = parent;
templ->templCountTab[templ->templNr] = 1;
templ->templNr++;
}
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 995
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _setup_step_complete_msg(slurm_msg_t *msg, void *data)
{
slurm_msg_t_init(msg);
msg->msg_type = REQUEST_STEP_COMPLETE;
msg->data = data;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 19,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_bfd_thread(thread_t * thread)
{
bfd_event_t evt;
bfd_thread = thread_add_read(master, vrrp_bfd_thread, NULL,
thread->u.fd, TIMER_NEVER);
if (thread->type != THREAD_READY_FD)
return 0;
while (read(thread->u.fd, &evt, sizeof(bfd_event_t)) != -1)
vrrp_handle_bfd_event(&evt);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 6,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~OpenChannelToPpapiBrokerCallback() {}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 28,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void arcmsr_hbaA_stop_bgrb(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
struct MessageUnit_A __iomem *reg = acb->pmuA;
acb->acb_flags &= ~ACB_F_MSG_START_BGRB;
writel(ARCMSR_INBOUND_MESG0_STOP_BGRB, ®->inbound_msgaddr0);
if (!arcmsr_hbaA_wait_msgint_ready(acb)) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE
"arcmsr%d: wait 'stop adapter background rebulid' timeout\n"
, acb->host->host_no);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void xmlwriter_free_resource_ptr(xmlwriter_object *intern TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (intern) {
if (intern->ptr) {
xmlFreeTextWriter(intern->ptr);
intern->ptr = NULL;
}
if (intern->output) {
xmlBufferFree(intern->output);
intern->output = NULL;
}
efree(intern);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 2,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptValue WebGL2RenderingContextBase::getFramebufferAttachmentParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
GLenum target,
GLenum attachment,
GLenum pname) {
const char kFunctionName[] = "getFramebufferAttachmentParameter";
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateGetFramebufferAttachmentParameterFunc(
kFunctionName, target, attachment))
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
WebGLFramebuffer* framebuffer_binding = GetFramebufferBinding(target);
DCHECK(!framebuffer_binding || framebuffer_binding->Object());
if (!framebuffer_binding) {
bool has_depth = CreationAttributes().depth;
bool has_stencil = CreationAttributes().stencil;
bool has_alpha = CreationAttributes().alpha;
bool missing_image = (attachment == GL_DEPTH && !has_depth) ||
(attachment == GL_STENCIL && !has_stencil);
if (missing_image) {
switch (pname) {
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_OBJECT_TYPE:
return WebGLAny(script_state, GL_NONE);
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, kFunctionName,
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_OBJECT_TYPE:
return WebGLAny(script_state, GL_FRAMEBUFFER_DEFAULT);
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_RED_SIZE:
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_BLUE_SIZE:
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_GREEN_SIZE: {
GLint value = attachment == GL_BACK ? 8 : 0;
return WebGLAny(script_state, value);
}
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_ALPHA_SIZE: {
GLint value = (attachment == GL_BACK && has_alpha) ? 8 : 0;
return WebGLAny(script_state, value);
}
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_DEPTH_SIZE: {
GLint value = attachment == GL_DEPTH ? 24 : 0;
return WebGLAny(script_state, value);
}
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_STENCIL_SIZE: {
GLint value = attachment == GL_STENCIL ? 8 : 0;
return WebGLAny(script_state, value);
}
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_COMPONENT_TYPE:
return WebGLAny(script_state, GL_UNSIGNED_NORMALIZED);
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_COLOR_ENCODING:
return WebGLAny(script_state, GL_LINEAR);
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, kFunctionName,
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
WebGLSharedObject* attachment_object = nullptr;
if (attachment == GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT) {
WebGLSharedObject* depth_attachment =
framebuffer_binding->GetAttachmentObject(GL_DEPTH_ATTACHMENT);
WebGLSharedObject* stencil_attachment =
framebuffer_binding->GetAttachmentObject(GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT);
if (depth_attachment != stencil_attachment) {
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, kFunctionName,
"different objects bound to DEPTH_ATTACHMENT and STENCIL_ATTACHMENT");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
attachment_object = depth_attachment;
} else {
attachment_object = framebuffer_binding->GetAttachmentObject(attachment);
}
if (!attachment_object) {
switch (pname) {
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_OBJECT_TYPE:
return WebGLAny(script_state, GL_NONE);
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_OBJECT_NAME:
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, kFunctionName,
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
DCHECK(attachment_object->IsTexture() || attachment_object->IsRenderbuffer());
switch (pname) {
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_OBJECT_TYPE:
if (attachment_object->IsTexture())
return WebGLAny(script_state, GL_TEXTURE);
return WebGLAny(script_state, GL_RENDERBUFFER);
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_OBJECT_NAME:
return WebGLAny(script_state, attachment_object);
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_FACE:
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_TEXTURE_LAYER:
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_TEXTURE_LEVEL:
if (!attachment_object->IsTexture())
break;
FALLTHROUGH;
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_RED_SIZE:
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_GREEN_SIZE:
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_BLUE_SIZE:
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_ALPHA_SIZE:
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_DEPTH_SIZE:
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_STENCIL_SIZE: {
GLint value = 0;
ContextGL()->GetFramebufferAttachmentParameteriv(target, attachment,
pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, value);
}
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_COMPONENT_TYPE:
if (attachment == GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT) {
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, kFunctionName,
"COMPONENT_TYPE can't be queried for DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
FALLTHROUGH;
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_COLOR_ENCODING: {
GLint value = 0;
ContextGL()->GetFramebufferAttachmentParameteriv(target, attachment,
pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<unsigned>(value));
}
default:
break;
}
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, kFunctionName, "invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Compute_Funcs( EXEC_OP )
{
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_UNPATENTED_HINTING
if ( CUR.face->unpatented_hinting )
{
/* If both vectors point rightwards along the x axis, set */
/* `both-x-axis' true, otherwise set it false. The x values only */
/* need be tested because the vector has been normalised to a unit */
/* vector of length 0x4000 = unity. */
CUR.GS.both_x_axis = (FT_Bool)( CUR.GS.projVector.x == 0x4000 &&
CUR.GS.freeVector.x == 0x4000 );
/* Throw away projection and freedom vector information */
/* because the patents don't allow them to be stored. */
/* The relevant US Patents are 5155805 and 5325479. */
CUR.GS.projVector.x = 0;
CUR.GS.projVector.y = 0;
CUR.GS.freeVector.x = 0;
CUR.GS.freeVector.y = 0;
if ( CUR.GS.both_x_axis )
{
CUR.func_project = Project_x;
CUR.func_move = Direct_Move_X;
CUR.func_move_orig = Direct_Move_Orig_X;
}
else
{
CUR.func_project = Project_y;
CUR.func_move = Direct_Move_Y;
CUR.func_move_orig = Direct_Move_Orig_Y;
}
if ( CUR.GS.dualVector.x == 0x4000 )
CUR.func_dualproj = Project_x;
else
{
if ( CUR.GS.dualVector.y == 0x4000 )
CUR.func_dualproj = Project_y;
else
CUR.func_dualproj = Dual_Project;
}
/* Force recalculation of cached aspect ratio */
CUR.tt_metrics.ratio = 0;
return;
}
#endif /* TT_CONFIG_OPTION_UNPATENTED_HINTING */
if ( CUR.GS.freeVector.x == 0x4000 )
CUR.F_dot_P = CUR.GS.projVector.x * 0x10000L;
else
{
if ( CUR.GS.freeVector.y == 0x4000 )
CUR.F_dot_P = CUR.GS.projVector.y * 0x10000L;
else
CUR.F_dot_P = (FT_Long)CUR.GS.projVector.x * CUR.GS.freeVector.x * 4 +
(FT_Long)CUR.GS.projVector.y * CUR.GS.freeVector.y * 4;
}
if ( CUR.GS.projVector.x == 0x4000 )
CUR.func_project = (TT_Project_Func)Project_x;
else
{
if ( CUR.GS.projVector.y == 0x4000 )
CUR.func_project = (TT_Project_Func)Project_y;
else
CUR.func_project = (TT_Project_Func)Project;
}
if ( CUR.GS.dualVector.x == 0x4000 )
CUR.func_dualproj = (TT_Project_Func)Project_x;
else
{
if ( CUR.GS.dualVector.y == 0x4000 )
CUR.func_dualproj = (TT_Project_Func)Project_y;
else
CUR.func_dualproj = (TT_Project_Func)Dual_Project;
}
CUR.func_move = (TT_Move_Func)Direct_Move;
CUR.func_move_orig = (TT_Move_Func)Direct_Move_Orig;
if ( CUR.F_dot_P == 0x40000000L )
{
if ( CUR.GS.freeVector.x == 0x4000 )
{
CUR.func_move = (TT_Move_Func)Direct_Move_X;
CUR.func_move_orig = (TT_Move_Func)Direct_Move_Orig_X;
}
else
{
if ( CUR.GS.freeVector.y == 0x4000 )
{
CUR.func_move = (TT_Move_Func)Direct_Move_Y;
CUR.func_move_orig = (TT_Move_Func)Direct_Move_Orig_Y;
}
}
}
/* at small sizes, F_dot_P can become too small, resulting */
/* in overflows and `spikes' in a number of glyphs like `w'. */
if ( FT_ABS( CUR.F_dot_P ) < 0x4000000L )
CUR.F_dot_P = 0x40000000L;
/* Disable cached aspect ratio */
CUR.tt_metrics.ratio = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,149
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int handle_next_ime_count() const {
return handle_next_ime_count_;
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 17,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::BufferPresented(
const gfx::PresentationFeedback& feedback) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(client_);
client_->DidReceivePresentationFeedback(feedback);
if (update_vsync_parameters_callback_ &&
feedback.flags & gfx::PresentationFeedback::kVSync) {
update_vsync_parameters_callback_.Run(
feedback.timestamp, feedback.interval.is_zero()
? BeginFrameArgs::DefaultInterval()
: feedback.interval);
}
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 18,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderProcessHostImpl::Init() {
if (channel_.get())
return true;
CommandLine::StringType renderer_prefix;
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
renderer_prefix =
browser_command_line.GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kRendererCmdPrefix);
#endif // defined(OS_POSIX)
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
int flags = renderer_prefix.empty() ? ChildProcessHost::CHILD_ALLOW_SELF :
ChildProcessHost::CHILD_NORMAL;
#else
int flags = ChildProcessHost::CHILD_NORMAL;
#endif
FilePath renderer_path = ChildProcessHost::GetChildPath(flags);
if (renderer_path.empty())
return false;
const std::string channel_id =
IPC::Channel::GenerateVerifiedChannelID(std::string());
channel_.reset(
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableWebViewSynchronousAPIs) ?
new IPC::SyncChannel(
channel_id, IPC::Channel::MODE_SERVER, this,
BrowserThread::GetMessageLoopProxyForThread(BrowserThread::IO),
true, &dummy_shutdown_event_) :
#endif
new IPC::ChannelProxy(
channel_id, IPC::Channel::MODE_SERVER, this,
BrowserThread::GetMessageLoopProxyForThread(BrowserThread::IO)));
GetContentClient()->browser()->RenderProcessHostCreated(this);
CreateMessageFilters();
if (run_renderer_in_process()) {
in_process_renderer_.reset(new RendererMainThread(channel_id));
base::Thread::Options options;
#if !defined(TOOLKIT_GTK) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
options.message_loop_type = MessageLoop::TYPE_UI;
#else
options.message_loop_type = MessageLoop::TYPE_DEFAULT;
#endif
in_process_renderer_->StartWithOptions(options);
OnProcessLaunched(); // Fake a callback that the process is ready.
} else {
CommandLine* cmd_line = new CommandLine(renderer_path);
if (!renderer_prefix.empty())
cmd_line->PrependWrapper(renderer_prefix);
AppendRendererCommandLine(cmd_line);
cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kProcessChannelID, channel_id);
child_process_launcher_.reset(new ChildProcessLauncher(
#if defined(OS_WIN)
FilePath(),
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
renderer_prefix.empty(),
base::EnvironmentVector(),
channel_->TakeClientFileDescriptor(),
#endif
cmd_line,
GetID(),
this));
fast_shutdown_started_ = false;
}
is_initialized_ = true;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vhost_attach_cgroups_work(struct vhost_work *work)
{
struct vhost_attach_cgroups_struct *s;
s = container_of(work, struct vhost_attach_cgroups_struct, work);
s->ret = cgroup_attach_task_all(s->owner, current);
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,807
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestTransactionConsumer::OnIOComplete(int result) {
switch (state_) {
case STARTING:
DidStart(result);
break;
case READING:
DidRead(result);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,623
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SVGStyleElement::ParseAttribute(
const AttributeModificationParams& params) {
if (params.name == SVGNames::titleAttr) {
if (sheet_ && IsInDocumentTree())
sheet_->SetTitle(params.new_value);
return;
}
SVGElement::ParseAttribute(params);
}
Commit Message: Do not crash while reentrantly appending to style element.
When a node is inserted into a container, it is notified via
::InsertedInto. However, a node may request a second notification via
DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, which occurs after all the children
have been notified as well. *StyleElement is currently using this
second notification.
This causes a problem, because *ScriptElement is using the same mechanism,
which in turn means that scripts can execute before the state of
*StyleElements are properly updated.
This patch avoids ::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, and instead
processes the stylesheet in ::InsertedInto. The original reason for using
::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument in the first place appears to be
invalid now, as the test case is still passing.
R=futhark@chromium.org, hayato@chromium.org
Bug: 853709, 847570
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel
Change-Id: Ic0b5fa611044c78c5745cf26870a747f88920a14
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1104347
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568368}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 10,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t mptsas_config_manufacturing_3(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
PCIDeviceClass *pcic = PCI_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(s);
return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(3, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_MANUFACTURING, 0x00,
"wb*b*l",
pcic->device_id, pcic->revision);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t ASessionDescription::countTracks() const {
return mTracks.size();
}
Commit Message: Fix corruption via buffer overflow in mediaserver
change unbound sprintf() to snprintf() so network-provided values
can't overflow the buffers.
Applicable to all K/L/M/N branches.
Bug: 25747670
Change-Id: Id6a5120c2d08a6fbbd47deffb680ecf82015f4f6
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 23,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Disconnect() {
ServiceProcessControl::GetInstance()->Disconnect();
}
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 2,353
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DGAStealButtonEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int index, int button, int is_down)
{
DGAScreenPtr pScreenPriv;
DGAEvent event;
if (!DGAScreenKeyRegistered) /* no DGA */
return FALSE;
pScreenPriv = DGA_GET_SCREEN_PRIV(screenInfo.screens[index]);
if (!pScreenPriv || !pScreenPriv->grabMouse)
return FALSE;
event = (DGAEvent) {
.header = ET_Internal,
.type = ET_DGAEvent,
.length = sizeof(event),
.time = GetTimeInMillis(),
.subtype = (is_down ? ET_ButtonPress : ET_ButtonRelease),
.detail = button,
.dx = 0,
.dy = 0
};
mieqEnqueue(dev, (InternalEvent *) &event);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,814
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void rpc_set_waitqueue_owner(struct rpc_wait_queue *queue, pid_t pid)
{
queue->owner = pid;
queue->nr = RPC_BATCH_COUNT;
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplHeap, key)
{
spl_heap_object *intern = (spl_heap_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(intern->heap->count - 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lou_translateString(const char *tableList, const widechar *inbufx, int *inlen,
widechar *outbuf, int *outlen, formtype *typeform, char *spacing, int mode) {
return lou_translate(tableList, inbufx, inlen, outbuf, outlen, typeform, spacing,
NULL, NULL, NULL, mode);
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow
Fixes #635
Thanks to HongxuChen for reporting it
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 6,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoSetEnableDCLayersCHROMIUM(GLboolean enable) {
Framebuffer* framebuffer = GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER);
if (framebuffer) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glSetEnableDCLayersCHROMIUM",
"framebuffer must not be bound");
return;
}
if (!supports_dc_layers_) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glSetEnableDCLayersCHROMIUM",
"surface doesn't support SetDrawRectangle");
return;
}
if (!surface_->SetEnableDCLayers(!!enable)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glSetEnableDCLayersCHROMIUM",
"failed on surface");
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: core_dump_init(void)
{
struct rlimit orig_rlim, rlim;
if (set_core_dump_pattern) {
/* If we set the core_pattern here, we will attempt to restore it when we
* exit. This will be fine if it is a child of ours that core dumps,
* but if we ourself core dump, then the core_pattern will not be restored */
update_core_dump_pattern(core_dump_pattern);
}
if (create_core_dump) {
rlim.rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
rlim.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &orig_rlim) == -1)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Failed to get core file size");
else if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) == -1)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Failed to set core file size");
else
set_child_rlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &orig_rlim);
}
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 7,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_PGSQL_API int php_pgsql_result2array(PGresult *pg_result, zval *ret_array TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval *row;
char *field_name;
size_t num_fields;
int pg_numrows, pg_row;
uint i;
assert(Z_TYPE_P(ret_array) == IS_ARRAY);
if ((pg_numrows = PQntuples(pg_result)) <= 0) {
return FAILURE;
}
for (pg_row = 0; pg_row < pg_numrows; pg_row++) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(row);
array_init(row);
add_index_zval(ret_array, pg_row, row);
for (i = 0, num_fields = PQnfields(pg_result); i < num_fields; i++) {
if (PQgetisnull(pg_result, pg_row, i)) {
field_name = PQfname(pg_result, i);
add_assoc_null(row, field_name);
} else {
char *element = PQgetvalue(pg_result, pg_row, i);
if (element) {
char *data;
size_t data_len;
const size_t element_len = strlen(element);
data = safe_estrndup(element, element_len);
data_len = element_len;
field_name = PQfname(pg_result, i);
add_assoc_stringl(row, field_name, data, data_len, 0);
}
}
}
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 25,064
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TestNavigationManager::WaitForResponse() {
desired_state_ = NavigationState::RESPONSE;
return WaitForDesiredState();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL LinkDoctorBaseURL() {
if (gUseMockLinkDoctorBaseURLForTesting)
return GURL("http://mock.linkdoctor.url/for?testing");
return GURL(LINKDOCTOR_SERVER_REQUEST_URL);
}
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int not_unsigned(const char *str) {
int rv = 0;
const char *ptr = str;
while (*ptr != ' ' && *ptr != '\t' && *ptr != '\0') {
if (!isdigit(*ptr)) {
rv = 1;
break;
}
ptr++;
}
return rv;
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 14,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_vm_page_mkwrite(
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
return block_page_mkwrite(vma, vmf, xfs_get_blocks);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void networt_send_buffer_plain (sockent_t *se, /* {{{ */
const char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
int status;
while (42)
{
status = sockent_client_connect (se);
if (status != 0)
return;
status = sendto (se->data.client.fd, buffer, buffer_size,
/* flags = */ 0,
(struct sockaddr *) se->data.client.addr,
se->data.client.addrlen);
if (status < 0)
{
char errbuf[1024];
if ((errno == EINTR) || (errno == EAGAIN))
continue;
ERROR ("network plugin: sendto failed: %s. Closing sending socket.",
sstrerror (errno, errbuf, sizeof (errbuf)));
sockent_client_disconnect (se);
return;
}
break;
} /* while (42) */
} /* }}} void networt_send_buffer_plain */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int license_recv(rdpLicense* license, wStream* s)
{
BYTE flags;
BYTE bMsgType;
UINT16 wMsgSize;
UINT16 length;
UINT16 channelId;
UINT16 securityFlags;
if (!rdp_read_header(license->rdp, s, &length, &channelId))
{
fprintf(stderr, "Incorrect RDP header.\n");
return -1;
}
if (!rdp_read_security_header(s, &securityFlags))
return -1;
if (securityFlags & SEC_ENCRYPT)
{
if (!rdp_decrypt(license->rdp, s, length - 4, securityFlags))
{
fprintf(stderr, "rdp_decrypt failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
if (!(securityFlags & SEC_LICENSE_PKT))
{
int status;
if (!(securityFlags & SEC_ENCRYPT))
Stream_Rewind(s, RDP_SECURITY_HEADER_LENGTH);
status = rdp_recv_out_of_sequence_pdu(license->rdp, s);
if (status < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected license packet.\n");
return status;
}
return 0;
}
if (!license_read_preamble(s, &bMsgType, &flags, &wMsgSize)) /* preamble (4 bytes) */
return -1;
DEBUG_LICENSE("Receiving %s Packet", LICENSE_MESSAGE_STRINGS[bMsgType & 0x1F]);
switch (bMsgType)
{
case LICENSE_REQUEST:
if (!license_read_license_request_packet(license, s))
return -1;
license_send_new_license_request_packet(license);
break;
case PLATFORM_CHALLENGE:
if (!license_read_platform_challenge_packet(license, s))
return -1;
license_send_platform_challenge_response_packet(license);
break;
case NEW_LICENSE:
license_read_new_license_packet(license, s);
break;
case UPGRADE_LICENSE:
license_read_upgrade_license_packet(license, s);
break;
case ERROR_ALERT:
if (!license_read_error_alert_packet(license, s))
return -1;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "invalid bMsgType:%d\n", bMsgType);
return FALSE;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible integer overflow in license_read_scope_list()
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hyp_init_cpu_notify(struct notifier_block *self,
unsigned long action, void *cpu)
{
switch (action) {
case CPU_STARTING:
case CPU_STARTING_FROZEN:
cpu_init_hyp_mode(NULL);
break;
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::updateContentsSize(const QSizeF& size)
{
ASSERT(flickProvider);
if (!userDidOverrideContentWidth)
flickProvider->setContentWidth(size.width());
if (!userDidOverrideContentHeight)
flickProvider->setContentHeight(size.height());
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TEE_Result syscall_cryp_obj_restrict_usage(unsigned long obj,
unsigned long usage)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
struct tee_obj *o;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto exit;
res = tee_obj_get(to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx),
tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(obj), &o);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto exit;
o->info.objectUsage &= usage;
exit:
return res;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserPolicyConnector::DeviceStopAutoRetry() {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (device_cloud_policy_subsystem_.get())
device_cloud_policy_subsystem_->StopAutoRetry();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 16,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vcbprintf(
vcbprintf_callback user_callback, //!< Unknown
void *user_data, //!< Unknown
const char *fmt, //!< The format specified
va_list argp //!< List of parameter values
) {
char buf[32];
while (*fmt) {
if (*fmt == '%') {
fmt++;
char fmtChar = *fmt++;
switch (fmtChar) {
case '0':
case '1':
case '2':
case '3':
case '4':
case '5':
case '6':
case '7':
case '8':
case '9':
{
const char *pad = " ";
if (fmtChar=='0') {
pad = "0";
fmtChar = *fmt++;
}
int digits = fmtChar - '0';
int v = va_arg(argp, int);
if (*fmt=='x') itostr_extra(v, buf, false, 16);
else { assert('d' == *fmt); itostr(v, buf, 10); }
fmt++; // skip over 'd'
int len = (int)strlen(buf);
while (len < digits) {
user_callback(pad,user_data);
len++;
}
user_callback(buf,user_data);
break;
}
case 'd': itostr(va_arg(argp, int), buf, 10); user_callback(buf,user_data); break;
case 'x': itostr_extra(va_arg(argp, int), buf, false, 16); user_callback(buf,user_data); break;
case 'L': {
unsigned int rad = 10;
bool signedVal = true;
if (*fmt=='x') { rad=16; fmt++; signedVal = false; }
itostr_extra(va_arg(argp, JsVarInt), buf, signedVal, rad); user_callback(buf,user_data);
} break;
case 'f': ftoa_bounded(va_arg(argp, JsVarFloat), buf, sizeof(buf)); user_callback(buf,user_data); break;
case 's': user_callback(va_arg(argp, char *), user_data); break;
case 'c': buf[0]=(char)va_arg(argp, int/*char*/);buf[1]=0; user_callback(buf, user_data); break;
case 'q':
case 'v': {
bool quoted = fmtChar=='q';
if (quoted) user_callback("\"",user_data);
JsVar *v = jsvAsString(va_arg(argp, JsVar*), false/*no unlock*/);
buf[1] = 0;
if (jsvIsString(v)) {
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&it, v, 0);
while (jsvStringIteratorHasChar(&it)) {
buf[0] = jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&it);
if (quoted) {
user_callback(escapeCharacter(buf[0]), user_data);
} else {
user_callback(buf,user_data);
}
jsvStringIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
jsvUnLock(v);
}
if (quoted) user_callback("\"",user_data);
} break;
case 'j': {
JsVar *v = va_arg(argp, JsVar*);
jsfGetJSONWithCallback(v, JSON_SOME_NEWLINES | JSON_PRETTY | JSON_SHOW_DEVICES, 0, user_callback, user_data);
break;
}
case 't': {
JsVar *v = va_arg(argp, JsVar*);
const char *n = jsvIsNull(v)?"null":jswGetBasicObjectName(v);
if (!n) n = jsvGetTypeOf(v);
user_callback(n, user_data);
break;
}
case 'p': jshGetPinString(buf, (Pin)va_arg(argp, int/*Pin*/)); user_callback(buf, user_data); break;
default: assert(0); return; // eep
}
} else {
buf[0] = *(fmt++);
buf[1] = 0;
user_callback(&buf[0], user_data);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 25,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::TimeDelta WebMediaPlayerImpl::GetPipelineMediaDuration() const {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
return pipeline_media_duration_for_test_.value_or(
pipeline_controller_.GetMediaDuration());
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 26,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmxnet3_get_ring_from_file(QEMUFile *f, Vmxnet3Ring *r)
{
r->pa = qemu_get_be64(f);
r->size = qemu_get_be32(f);
r->cell_size = qemu_get_be32(f);
r->next = qemu_get_be32(f);
r->gen = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 13,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sha256_sparc64_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int partial = sctx->count % SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE;
/* Handle the fast case right here */
if (partial + len < SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) {
sctx->count += len;
memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, data, len);
} else
__sha256_sparc64_update(sctx, data, len, partial);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlBufShrink(xmlBufPtr buf, size_t len) {
if ((buf == NULL) || (buf->error != 0)) return(0);
CHECK_COMPAT(buf)
if (len == 0) return(0);
if (len > buf->use) return(0);
buf->use -= len;
if ((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE) ||
((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO) && (buf->contentIO != NULL))) {
/*
* we just move the content pointer, but also make sure
* the perceived buffer size has shrinked accordingly
*/
buf->content += len;
buf->size -= len;
/*
* sometimes though it maybe be better to really shrink
* on IO buffers
*/
if ((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO) && (buf->contentIO != NULL)) {
size_t start_buf = buf->content - buf->contentIO;
if (start_buf >= buf->size) {
memmove(buf->contentIO, &buf->content[0], buf->use);
buf->content = buf->contentIO;
buf->content[buf->use] = 0;
buf->size += start_buf;
}
}
} else {
memmove(buf->content, &buf->content[len], buf->use);
buf->content[buf->use] = 0;
}
UPDATE_COMPAT(buf)
return(len);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 4,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AffineTransform SVGElement::LocalCoordinateSpaceTransform(CTMScope) const {
return AffineTransform();
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 16,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ScrollStateIsUnknown() const {
return scroll_state() == OverscrollController::ScrollState::NONE;
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,605
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _xml_xmlcharlen(const XML_Char *s)
{
int len = 0;
while (*s) {
len++;
s++;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,802
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PanoramiXRenderTriFan(ClientPtr client)
{
PanoramiXRes *src, *dst;
int result = Success, j;
REQUEST(xRenderTriFanReq);
char *extra;
int extra_len;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderTriFanReq);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE(src, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE(dst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
extra_len = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xRenderTriFanReq);
if (extra_len && (extra = (char *) malloc(extra_len))) {
memcpy(extra, stuff + 1, extra_len);
FOR_NSCREENS_FORWARD(j) {
if (j)
memcpy(stuff + 1, extra, extra_len);
if (dst->u.pict.root) {
int x_off = screenInfo.screens[j]->x;
int y_off = screenInfo.screens[j]->y;
if (x_off || y_off) {
xPointFixed *fixed = (xPointFixed *) (stuff + 1);
int i = extra_len / sizeof(xPointFixed);
while (i--) {
fixed->x -= x_off;
fixed->y -= y_off;
fixed++;
}
}
}
stuff->src = src->info[j].id;
stuff->dst = dst->info[j].id;
result = (*PanoramiXSaveRenderVector[X_RenderTriFan]) (client);
if (result != Success)
break;
}
free(extra);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sysapi_uname_arch(void)
{
return sysapi_condor_arch();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 3,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrepareTabstripForSelectionTest(TabStripModel* model,
int tab_count,
int pinned_count,
const std::string& selected_tabs) {
for (int i = 0; i < tab_count; ++i) {
TabContentsWrapper* contents = CreateTabContents();
SetID(contents->tab_contents(), i);
model->AppendTabContents(contents, true);
}
for (int i = 0; i < pinned_count; ++i)
model->SetTabPinned(i, true);
TabStripSelectionModel selection_model;
std::vector<std::string> selection;
base::SplitStringAlongWhitespace(selected_tabs, &selection);
for (size_t i = 0; i < selection.size(); ++i) {
int value;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::StringToInt(selection[i], &value));
selection_model.AddIndexToSelection(value);
}
selection_model.set_active(selection_model.selected_indices()[0]);
model->SetSelectionFromModel(selection_model);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderLayerScrollableArea::isPointInResizeControl(const IntPoint& absolutePoint, ResizerHitTestType resizerHitTestType) const
{
if (!box().canResize())
return false;
IntPoint localPoint = roundedIntPoint(box().absoluteToLocal(absolutePoint, UseTransforms));
IntRect localBounds(0, 0, box().pixelSnappedWidth(), box().pixelSnappedHeight());
return resizerCornerRect(localBounds, resizerHitTestType).contains(localPoint);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct inode *new_simple_dir(struct super_block *s,
struct btrfs_key *key,
struct btrfs_root *root)
{
struct inode *inode = new_inode(s);
if (!inode)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
BTRFS_I(inode)->root = root;
memcpy(&BTRFS_I(inode)->location, key, sizeof(*key));
set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_DUMMY, &BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags);
inode->i_ino = BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID;
inode->i_op = &btrfs_dir_ro_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR | S_IXUGO;
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
return inode;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 12,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlobStorageContext::OnEnoughSpaceForCopies(const std::string& uuid,
bool success) {
if (!success) {
CancelBuildingBlob(uuid, BlobStatus::ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
BlobEntry* entry = registry_.GetEntry(uuid);
if (!entry)
return;
if (entry->CanFinishBuilding())
FinishBuilding(entry);
}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xcrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_xcrs *guest_xcrs)
{
int i, r = 0;
if (!cpu_has_xsave)
return -EINVAL;
if (guest_xcrs->nr_xcrs > KVM_MAX_XCRS || guest_xcrs->flags)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < guest_xcrs->nr_xcrs; i++)
/* Only support XCR0 currently */
if (guest_xcrs->xcrs[i].xcr == XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK) {
r = __kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK,
guest_xcrs->xcrs[i].value);
break;
}
if (r)
r = -EINVAL;
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FixedPolicySubresourceFilter(LoadPolicy policy, int* filtered_load_counter)
: policy_(policy), filtered_load_counter_(filtered_load_counter) {}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void lock_two_nondirectories(struct inode *inode1, struct inode *inode2)
{
if (inode1 > inode2)
swap(inode1, inode2);
if (inode1 && !S_ISDIR(inode1->i_mode))
mutex_lock(&inode1->i_mutex);
if (inode2 && !S_ISDIR(inode2->i_mode) && inode2 != inode1)
mutex_lock_nested(&inode2->i_mutex, I_MUTEX_NONDIR2);
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,529
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void undoReadTag()
{
if (m_position > 0)
--m_position;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *FlopImage(const Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define FlopImageTag "Flop/Image"
CacheView
*flop_view,
*image_view;
Image
*flop_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
RectangleInfo
page;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
flop_image=CloneImage(image,image->columns,image->rows,MagickTrue,exception);
if (flop_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
/*
Flop each row.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
page=image->page;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
flop_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(flop_image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
magick_threads(image,flop_image,1,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) flop_image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*restrict q;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
q=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(flop_view,0,y,flop_image->columns,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(flop_image)*flop_image->columns;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) flop_image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
q-=GetPixelChannels(flop_image);
if (GetPixelReadMask(image,p) == 0)
{
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
PixelTrait flop_traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(flop_image,channel);
if ((traits == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(flop_traits == UndefinedPixelTrait))
continue;
SetPixelChannel(flop_image,channel,p[i],q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(flop_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_FlopImage)
#endif
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,FlopImageTag,progress++,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
flop_view=DestroyCacheView(flop_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
flop_image->type=image->type;
if (page.width != 0)
page.x=(ssize_t) (page.width-flop_image->columns-page.x);
flop_image->page=page;
if (status == MagickFalse)
flop_image=DestroyImage(flop_image);
return(flop_image);
}
Commit Message: Fixed out of bounds error in SpliceImage.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 24,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_peeloff_flags(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
sctp_peeloff_flags_arg_t peeloff;
struct file *newfile = NULL;
int retval = 0;
if (len < sizeof(sctp_peeloff_flags_arg_t))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(sctp_peeloff_flags_arg_t);
if (copy_from_user(&peeloff, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
retval = sctp_getsockopt_peeloff_common(sk, &peeloff.p_arg,
&newfile, peeloff.flags);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
/* Return the fd mapped to the new socket. */
if (put_user(len, optlen)) {
fput(newfile);
put_unused_fd(retval);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (copy_to_user(optval, &peeloff, len)) {
fput(newfile);
put_unused_fd(retval);
return -EFAULT;
}
fd_install(retval, newfile);
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 14,188
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Editor::canSmartReplaceWithPasteboard(Pasteboard* pasteboard) {
return smartInsertDeleteEnabled() && pasteboard->canSmartReplace();
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,015
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::ResetProxyHosts() {
for (const auto& pair : proxy_hosts_) {
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(pair.second->GetSiteInstance())
->RemoveObserver(this);
}
proxy_hosts_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ecb_aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
int ret;
ret = need_fallback(key_len);
if (ret > 0) {
sctx->key_len = key_len;
return setkey_fallback_blk(tfm, in_key, key_len);
}
switch (key_len) {
case 16:
sctx->enc = KM_AES_128_ENCRYPT;
sctx->dec = KM_AES_128_DECRYPT;
break;
case 24:
sctx->enc = KM_AES_192_ENCRYPT;
sctx->dec = KM_AES_192_DECRYPT;
break;
case 32:
sctx->enc = KM_AES_256_ENCRYPT;
sctx->dec = KM_AES_256_DECRYPT;
break;
}
return aes_set_key(tfm, in_key, key_len);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 9,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ikev2_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length,
const u_char *bp2 _U_, struct isakmp *base)
{
const struct isakmp *p;
const u_char *ep;
u_char np;
int phase;
p = (const struct isakmp *)bp;
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
phase = (EXTRACT_32BITS(base->msgid) == 0) ? 1 : 2;
if (phase == 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " parent_sa"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " child_sa "));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ETYPESTR(base->etype)));
if (base->flags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[%s%s%s]",
base->flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_I ? "I" : "",
base->flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_V ? "V" : "",
base->flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_R ? "R" : ""));
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
const struct isakmp_gen *ext;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ":"));
/* regardless of phase... */
if (base->flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_E) {
/*
* encrypted, nothing we can do right now.
* we hope to decrypt the packet in the future...
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [encrypted %s]", NPSTR(base->np)));
goto done;
}
CHECKLEN(p + 1, base->np)
np = base->np;
ext = (const struct isakmp_gen *)(p + 1);
ikev2_sub_print(ndo, base, np, ext, ep, phase, 0, 0, 0);
}
done:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
if (ntohl(base->len) != length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (len mismatch: isakmp %u/ip %u)",
(uint32_t)ntohl(base->len), length));
}
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 29,890
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrelinEval8(register const cmsUInt16Number Input[],
register cmsUInt16Number Output[],
register const void* D)
{
cmsUInt8Number r, g, b;
cmsS15Fixed16Number rx, ry, rz;
cmsS15Fixed16Number c0, c1, c2, c3, Rest;
int OutChan;
register cmsS15Fixed16Number X0, X1, Y0, Y1, Z0, Z1;
Prelin8Data* p8 = (Prelin8Data*) D;
register const cmsInterpParams* p = p8 ->p;
int TotalOut = p -> nOutputs;
const cmsUInt16Number* LutTable = p -> Table;
r = Input[0] >> 8;
g = Input[1] >> 8;
b = Input[2] >> 8;
X0 = X1 = p8->X0[r];
Y0 = Y1 = p8->Y0[g];
Z0 = Z1 = p8->Z0[b];
rx = p8 ->rx[r];
ry = p8 ->ry[g];
rz = p8 ->rz[b];
X1 = X0 + ((rx == 0) ? 0 : p ->opta[2]);
Y1 = Y0 + ((ry == 0) ? 0 : p ->opta[1]);
Z1 = Z0 + ((rz == 0) ? 0 : p ->opta[0]);
for (OutChan=0; OutChan < TotalOut; OutChan++) {
c0 = DENS(X0, Y0, Z0);
if (rx >= ry && ry >= rz)
{
c1 = DENS(X1, Y0, Z0) - c0;
c2 = DENS(X1, Y1, Z0) - DENS(X1, Y0, Z0);
c3 = DENS(X1, Y1, Z1) - DENS(X1, Y1, Z0);
}
else
if (rx >= rz && rz >= ry)
{
c1 = DENS(X1, Y0, Z0) - c0;
c2 = DENS(X1, Y1, Z1) - DENS(X1, Y0, Z1);
c3 = DENS(X1, Y0, Z1) - DENS(X1, Y0, Z0);
}
else
if (rz >= rx && rx >= ry)
{
c1 = DENS(X1, Y0, Z1) - DENS(X0, Y0, Z1);
c2 = DENS(X1, Y1, Z1) - DENS(X1, Y0, Z1);
c3 = DENS(X0, Y0, Z1) - c0;
}
else
if (ry >= rx && rx >= rz)
{
c1 = DENS(X1, Y1, Z0) - DENS(X0, Y1, Z0);
c2 = DENS(X0, Y1, Z0) - c0;
c3 = DENS(X1, Y1, Z1) - DENS(X1, Y1, Z0);
}
else
if (ry >= rz && rz >= rx)
{
c1 = DENS(X1, Y1, Z1) - DENS(X0, Y1, Z1);
c2 = DENS(X0, Y1, Z0) - c0;
c3 = DENS(X0, Y1, Z1) - DENS(X0, Y1, Z0);
}
else
if (rz >= ry && ry >= rx)
{
c1 = DENS(X1, Y1, Z1) - DENS(X0, Y1, Z1);
c2 = DENS(X0, Y1, Z1) - DENS(X0, Y0, Z1);
c3 = DENS(X0, Y0, Z1) - c0;
}
else {
c1 = c2 = c3 = 0;
}
Rest = c1 * rx + c2 * ry + c3 * rz + 0x8001;
Output[OutChan] = (cmsUInt16Number)c0 + ((Rest + (Rest>>16))>>16);
}
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jpc_dec_process_unk(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
/* Eliminate compiler warnings about unused variables. */
dec = 0;
jas_eprintf("warning: ignoring unknown marker segment (0x%x)\n",
ms->id);
jpc_ms_dump(ms, stderr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an array overflow problem in the JPC decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit cast5_mod_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_alg(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 17,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::DidFinishNavigation() {
DCHECK((document_loader_ && document_loader_->SentDidFinishLoad()) ||
!HasProvisionalNavigation());
if (!document_loader_ || !document_loader_->SentDidFinishLoad() ||
HasProvisionalNavigation()) {
return;
}
if (frame_->IsLoading() && !protect_provisional_loader_) {
progress_tracker_->ProgressCompleted();
RestoreScrollPositionAndViewState();
if (document_loader_)
document_loader_->SetLoadType(WebFrameLoadType::kStandard);
frame_->DomWindow()->FinishedLoading();
}
Frame* parent = frame_->Tree().Parent();
if (parent)
parent->CheckCompleted();
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillManager::OnFullCardRequestSucceeded(
const payments::FullCardRequest& full_card_request,
const CreditCard& card,
const base::string16& cvc) {
FormStructure* form_structure = nullptr;
AutofillField* autofill_field = nullptr;
if (!GetCachedFormAndField(unmasking_form_, unmasking_field_, &form_structure,
&autofill_field))
return;
credit_card_form_event_logger_->OnDidFillSuggestion(
masked_card_, *form_structure, *autofill_field);
FillCreditCardForm(unmasking_query_id_, unmasking_form_, unmasking_field_,
card, cvc);
masked_card_ = CreditCard();
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int f2fs_issue_flush(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct flush_cmd_control *fcc = SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info;
struct flush_cmd cmd;
int ret;
if (test_opt(sbi, NOBARRIER))
return 0;
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush);
return ret;
}
if (!atomic_read(&fcc->issing_flush)) {
atomic_inc(&fcc->issing_flush);
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_dec(&fcc->issing_flush);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush);
return ret;
}
init_completion(&cmd.wait);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issing_flush);
llist_add(&cmd.llnode, &fcc->issue_list);
if (!fcc->dispatch_list)
wake_up(&fcc->flush_wait_queue);
if (fcc->f2fs_issue_flush) {
wait_for_completion(&cmd.wait);
atomic_dec(&fcc->issing_flush);
} else {
llist_del_all(&fcc->issue_list);
atomic_set(&fcc->issing_flush, 0);
}
return cmd.ret;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 25,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API void zend_hash_bucket_swap(Bucket *p, Bucket *q)
{
zval val;
zend_ulong h;
zend_string *key;
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&val, &p->val);
h = p->h;
key = p->key;
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&p->val, &q->val);
p->h = q->h;
p->key = q->key;
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&q->val, &val);
q->h = h;
q->key = key;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 6,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hook_valid (struct t_hook *hook)
{
int type;
struct t_hook *ptr_hook;
for (type = 0; type < HOOK_NUM_TYPES; type++)
{
for (ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[type]; ptr_hook;
ptr_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook)
{
if (!ptr_hook->deleted && (ptr_hook == hook))
return 1;
}
}
/* hook not found */
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,060
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned HTMLFormElement::formElementIndexWithFormAttribute(Element* element, unsigned rangeStart, unsigned rangeEnd)
{
if (m_associatedElements.isEmpty())
return 0;
ASSERT(rangeStart <= rangeEnd);
if (rangeStart == rangeEnd)
return rangeStart;
unsigned left = rangeStart;
unsigned right = rangeEnd - 1;
unsigned short position;
while (left != right) {
unsigned middle = left + ((right - left) / 2);
ASSERT(middle < m_associatedElementsBeforeIndex || middle >= m_associatedElementsAfterIndex);
position = element->compareDocumentPosition(toHTMLElement(m_associatedElements[middle]));
if (position & DOCUMENT_POSITION_FOLLOWING)
right = middle;
else
left = middle + 1;
}
ASSERT(left < m_associatedElementsBeforeIndex || left >= m_associatedElementsAfterIndex);
position = element->compareDocumentPosition(toHTMLElement(m_associatedElements[left]));
if (position & DOCUMENT_POSITION_FOLLOWING)
return left;
return left + 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash in HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission.
BUG=297478
TEST=automated with ASAN.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24910003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158428 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 9,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TabStripModel::InsertionPolicy TabStripModel::insertion_policy() const {
return order_controller_->insertion_policy();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AXObjectCache* Document::ExistingAXObjectCache() const {
auto& cache_owner = AxObjectCacheOwner();
if (!cache_owner.GetLayoutView())
return nullptr;
return cache_owner.ax_object_cache_.Get();
}
Commit Message: Inherit referrer and policy when creating a nested browsing context
BUG=763194
R=estark@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ide3950269adf26ba221f573dfa088e95291ab676
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/732652
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark <estark@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511211}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CacheQueryResult WebBluetoothServiceImpl::QueryCacheForService(
const std::string& service_instance_id) {
auto device_iter = service_id_to_device_address_.find(service_instance_id);
if (device_iter == service_id_to_device_address_.end()) {
CrashRendererAndClosePipe(bad_message::BDH_INVALID_SERVICE_ID);
return CacheQueryResult(CacheQueryOutcome::BAD_RENDERER);
}
const blink::WebBluetoothDeviceId* device_id =
allowed_devices().GetDeviceId(device_iter->second);
if (device_id == nullptr) {
CrashRendererAndClosePipe(bad_message::BDH_DEVICE_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_ORIGIN);
return CacheQueryResult(CacheQueryOutcome::BAD_RENDERER);
}
CacheQueryResult result = QueryCacheForDevice(*device_id);
if (result.outcome != CacheQueryOutcome::SUCCESS) {
return result;
}
result.service = result.device->GetGattService(service_instance_id);
if (result.service == nullptr) {
result.outcome = CacheQueryOutcome::NO_SERVICE;
} else if (!allowed_devices().IsAllowedToAccessService(
*device_id, result.service->GetUUID())) {
CrashRendererAndClosePipe(bad_message::BDH_SERVICE_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_ORIGIN);
return CacheQueryResult(CacheQueryOutcome::BAD_RENDERER);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: snd_compr_get_caps(struct snd_compr_stream *stream, unsigned long arg)
{
int retval;
struct snd_compr_caps caps;
if (!stream->ops->get_caps)
return -ENXIO;
retval = stream->ops->get_caps(stream, &caps);
if (retval)
goto out;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &caps, sizeof(caps)))
retval = -EFAULT;
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()
These are 32 bit values that come from the user, we need to check for
integer overflows or we could end up allocating a smaller buffer than
expected.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnDidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(
const GURL& url,
const std::string& security_info,
const std::string& http_method,
const std::string& mime_type,
ResourceType::Type resource_type) {
if (!url.is_valid() || !(url.SchemeIs("http") || url.SchemeIs("https")))
return;
filter_->GetURLRequestContext(resource_type)->http_transaction_factory()->
GetCache()->OnExternalCacheHit(url, http_method);
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Unpack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatBGRA8, uint8_t, uint8_t>(
const uint8_t* source,
uint8_t* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
const uint32_t* source32 = reinterpret_cast_ptr<const uint32_t*>(source);
uint32_t* destination32 = reinterpret_cast_ptr<uint32_t*>(destination);
#if defined(ARCH_CPU_X86_FAMILY)
SIMD::UnpackOneRowOfBGRA8LittleToRGBA8(source32, destination32,
pixels_per_row);
#endif
#if HAVE_MIPS_MSA_INTRINSICS
SIMD::unpackOneRowOfBGRA8LittleToRGBA8MSA(source32, destination32,
pixels_per_row);
#endif
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
uint32_t bgra = source32[i];
#if defined(ARCH_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN)
uint32_t brMask = 0xff00ff00;
uint32_t gaMask = 0x00ff00ff;
#else
uint32_t br_mask = 0x00ff00ff;
uint32_t ga_mask = 0xff00ff00;
#endif
uint32_t rgba =
(((bgra >> 16) | (bgra << 16)) & br_mask) | (bgra & ga_mask);
destination32[i] = rgba;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 170
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: V8ValueConverterImpl::V8ValueConverterImpl()
: date_allowed_(false),
reg_exp_allowed_(false),
function_allowed_(false),
strip_null_from_objects_(false),
avoid_identity_hash_for_testing_(false),
strategy_(NULL) {}
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HeadlessWebContentsImpl::RenderFrameCreated(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
for (const MojoService& service : mojo_services_) {
registry_.AddInterface(
service.service_name,
base::Bind(&HeadlessWebContentsImpl::CreateMojoService,
base::Unretained(this), service.service_factory),
browser()->BrowserMainThread());
}
browser_context_->SetDevToolsFrameToken(
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID(),
render_frame_host->GetDevToolsFrameToken(),
render_frame_host->GetFrameTreeNodeId());
if (headless_tab_socket_)
headless_tab_socket_->RenderFrameCreated(render_frame_host);
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 6,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::GetPagesMatchingQueryWhenLoadDone(
std::unique_ptr<OfflinePageModelQuery> query,
const MultipleOfflinePageItemCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(query);
DCHECK(is_loaded_);
MultipleOfflinePageItemResult offline_pages_result;
for (const auto& id_page_pair : offline_pages_) {
if (query->Matches(id_page_pair.second))
offline_pages_result.emplace_back(id_page_pair.second);
}
callback.Run(offline_pages_result);
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 24,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_ringmemory(struct b43_dmaring *ring)
{
dma_free_coherent(ring->dev->dev->dma_dev, B43_DMA_RINGMEMSIZE,
ring->descbase, ring->dmabase);
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_read_meta(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
while (atom.size > 8) {
uint32_t tag = avio_rl32(pb);
atom.size -= 4;
if (tag == MKTAG('h','d','l','r')) {
avio_seek(pb, -8, SEEK_CUR);
atom.size += 8;
return mov_read_default(c, pb, atom);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: connection_edge_destroy(circid_t circ_id, edge_connection_t *conn)
{
if (!conn->base_.marked_for_close) {
log_info(LD_EDGE, "CircID %u: At an edge. Marking connection for close.",
(unsigned) circ_id);
if (conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
entry_connection_t *entry_conn = EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY);
control_event_stream_bandwidth(conn);
control_event_stream_status(entry_conn, STREAM_EVENT_CLOSED,
END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY);
conn->end_reason |= END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SENT_CLOSED;
} else {
/* closing the circuit, nothing to send an END to */
conn->edge_has_sent_end = 1;
conn->end_reason = END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY;
conn->end_reason |= END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SENT_CLOSED;
connection_mark_and_flush(TO_CONN(conn));
}
}
conn->cpath_layer = NULL;
conn->on_circuit = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnDestroyTransferBuffer(
int32 id,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnDestroyTransferBuffer");
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
command_buffer_->DestroyTransferBuffer(id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RegisterAwContents(JNIEnv* env) {
return RegisterNativesImpl(env);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void blk_mq_stop_hw_queue(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
{
cancel_delayed_work(&hctx->run_work);
cancel_delayed_work(&hctx->delay_work);
set_bit(BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED, &hctx->state);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 17,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lua_websocket_close(lua_State *L)
{
apr_socket_t *sock;
char prelude[2];
request_rec *r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
sock = ap_get_conn_socket(r->connection);
/* Send a header that says: socket is closing. */
prelude[0] = 0x88; /* closing socket opcode */
prelude[1] = 0; /* zero length frame */
ap_rwrite(prelude, 2, r);
/* Close up tell the MPM and filters to back off */
apr_socket_close(sock);
r->output_filters = NULL;
r->connection->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_run_SC_pattern(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, const char *name, pdf_pattern *pat, int n, float *color)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pr->dev->flags &= ~FZ_DEVFLAG_STROKECOLOR_UNDEFINED;
pdf_set_pattern(ctx, pr, PDF_STROKE, pat, color);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,664
|
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