instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::DidCancelPopupMenu() {
Send(new FrameMsg_SelectPopupMenuItems(
routing_id_, true, std::vector<int>()));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 4,524
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _free_ptr(zend_rsrc_list_entry *rsrc TSRMLS_DC)
{
pgLofp *lofp = (pgLofp *)rsrc->ptr;
efree(lofp);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t TestWebKitPlatformSupport::audioHardwareBufferSize() {
return 128;
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::Observe(NotificationType type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
switch (type.value) {
case NotificationType::TAB_CONTENTS_DISCONNECTED:
if (is_attempting_to_close_browser_) {
ClearUnloadState(Source<TabContents>(source).ptr(), false);
}
break;
case NotificationType::SSL_VISIBLE_STATE_CHANGED:
if (GetSelectedTabContents() &&
&GetSelectedTabContents()->controller() ==
Source<NavigationController>(source).ptr())
UpdateToolbar(false);
break;
case NotificationType::EXTENSION_UPDATE_DISABLED: {
Profile* profile = Source<Profile>(source).ptr();
if (profile_->IsSameProfile(profile)) {
ExtensionService* service = profile->GetExtensionService();
DCHECK(service);
const Extension* extension = Details<const Extension>(details).ptr();
if (service->extension_prefs()->DidExtensionEscalatePermissions(
extension->id()))
ShowExtensionDisabledUI(service, profile_, extension);
}
break;
}
case NotificationType::EXTENSION_UNLOADED: {
window()->GetLocationBar()->UpdatePageActions();
const Extension* extension =
Details<UnloadedExtensionInfo>(details)->extension;
TabStripModel* model = tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel();
for (int i = model->count() - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
TabContents* tc = model->GetTabContentsAt(i)->tab_contents();
if (tc->GetURL().SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme) &&
tc->GetURL().host() == extension->id()) {
CloseTabContents(tc);
}
}
break;
}
case NotificationType::EXTENSION_PROCESS_TERMINATED: {
window()->GetLocationBar()->InvalidatePageActions();
break;
}
case NotificationType::EXTENSION_UNINSTALLED:
case NotificationType::EXTENSION_LOADED:
window()->GetLocationBar()->UpdatePageActions();
break;
case NotificationType::BROWSER_THEME_CHANGED:
window()->UserChangedTheme();
break;
case NotificationType::EXTENSION_READY_FOR_INSTALL: {
if (BrowserList::FindBrowserWithType(profile(),
Browser::TYPE_NORMAL,
true) != this)
break;
GURL download_url = *(Details<GURL>(details).ptr());
if (ExtensionService::IsDownloadFromMiniGallery(download_url))
window()->ShowThemeInstallBubble();
break;
}
case NotificationType::PREF_CHANGED: {
const std::string& pref_name = *Details<std::string>(details).ptr();
if (pref_name == prefs::kUseVerticalTabs) {
UseVerticalTabsChanged();
} else if (pref_name == prefs::kPrintingEnabled) {
UpdatePrintingState(GetContentRestrictionsForSelectedTab());
} else if (pref_name == prefs::kInstantEnabled) {
if (!InstantController::IsEnabled(profile())) {
if (instant()) {
instant()->DestroyPreviewContents();
instant_.reset();
instant_unload_handler_.reset();
}
} else {
CreateInstantIfNecessary();
}
} else if (pref_name == prefs::kDevToolsDisabled) {
UpdateCommandsForDevTools();
if (dev_tools_disabled_.GetValue())
g_browser_process->devtools_manager()->CloseAllClientHosts();
} else if (pref_name == prefs::kIncognitoEnabled) {
break; // No further action is required.
} else if (pref_name == prefs::kEditBookmarksEnabled) {
UpdateCommandsForBookmarkEditing();
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
break;
}
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Got a notification we didn't register for.";
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::IsConnected() const {
BluetoothDeviceClient::Properties* properties =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->
GetProperties(object_path_);
DCHECK(properties);
return properties->connected.value();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: enum nss_status _nss_mymachines_gethostbyname4_r(
const char *name,
struct gaih_addrtuple **pat,
char *buffer, size_t buflen,
int *errnop, int *h_errnop,
int32_t *ttlp) {
struct gaih_addrtuple *r_tuple, *r_tuple_first = NULL;
_cleanup_bus_message_unref_ sd_bus_message* reply = NULL;
_cleanup_bus_flush_close_unref_ sd_bus *bus = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ int *ifindices = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *class = NULL;
size_t l, ms, idx;
unsigned i = 0, c = 0;
char *r_name;
int n_ifindices, r;
assert(name);
assert(pat);
assert(buffer);
assert(errnop);
assert(h_errnop);
r = sd_machine_get_class(name, &class);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
if (!streq(class, "container")) {
r = -ENOTTY;
goto fail;
}
n_ifindices = sd_machine_get_ifindices(name, &ifindices);
if (n_ifindices < 0) {
r = n_ifindices;
goto fail;
}
r = sd_bus_open_system(&bus);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_call_method(bus,
"org.freedesktop.machine1",
"/org/freedesktop/machine1",
"org.freedesktop.machine1.Manager",
"GetMachineAddresses",
NULL,
&reply,
"s", name);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_message_enter_container(reply, 'a', "(iay)");
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = count_addresses(reply, AF_UNSPEC, &c);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
if (c <= 0) {
*errnop = ESRCH;
*h_errnop = HOST_NOT_FOUND;
return NSS_STATUS_NOTFOUND;
}
l = strlen(name);
ms = ALIGN(l+1) + ALIGN(sizeof(struct gaih_addrtuple)) * c;
if (buflen < ms) {
*errnop = ENOMEM;
*h_errnop = TRY_AGAIN;
return NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN;
}
/* First, append name */
r_name = buffer;
memcpy(r_name, name, l+1);
idx = ALIGN(l+1);
/* Second, append addresses */
r_tuple_first = (struct gaih_addrtuple*) (buffer + idx);
while ((r = sd_bus_message_enter_container(reply, 'r', "iay")) > 0) {
int family;
const void *a;
size_t sz;
r = sd_bus_message_read(reply, "i", &family);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_message_read_array(reply, 'y', &a, &sz);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_message_exit_container(reply);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
if (!IN_SET(family, AF_INET, AF_INET6)) {
r = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
goto fail;
}
if (sz != FAMILY_ADDRESS_SIZE(family)) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
r_tuple = (struct gaih_addrtuple*) (buffer + idx);
r_tuple->next = i == c-1 ? NULL : (struct gaih_addrtuple*) ((char*) r_tuple + ALIGN(sizeof(struct gaih_addrtuple)));
r_tuple->name = r_name;
r_tuple->family = family;
r_tuple->scopeid = n_ifindices == 1 ? ifindices[0] : 0;
memcpy(r_tuple->addr, a, sz);
idx += ALIGN(sizeof(struct gaih_addrtuple));
i++;
}
assert(i == c);
r = sd_bus_message_exit_container(reply);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
assert(idx == ms);
if (*pat)
**pat = *r_tuple_first;
else
*pat = r_tuple_first;
if (ttlp)
*ttlp = 0;
/* Explicitly reset all error variables */
*errnop = 0;
*h_errnop = NETDB_SUCCESS;
h_errno = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
fail:
*errnop = -r;
*h_errnop = NO_DATA;
return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
}
Commit Message: nss-mymachines: do not allow overlong machine names
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/2002
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rng_backend_prop_set_opened(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp)
{
RngBackend *s = RNG_BACKEND(obj);
RngBackendClass *k = RNG_BACKEND_GET_CLASS(s);
Error *local_err = NULL;
if (value == s->opened) {
return;
}
if (!value && s->opened) {
error_setg(errp, QERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
return;
}
if (k->opened) {
k->opened(s, &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
return;
}
}
s->opened = true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,415
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __dequeue_signal(struct sigpending *pending, sigset_t *mask,
siginfo_t *info)
{
int sig = next_signal(pending, mask);
if (sig) {
if (current->notifier) {
if (sigismember(current->notifier_mask, sig)) {
if (!(current->notifier)(current->notifier_data)) {
clear_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING);
return 0;
}
}
}
collect_signal(sig, pending, info);
}
return sig;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l2tp_ip_open(struct sock *sk)
{
/* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */
inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP;
write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip_table);
write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 23,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos::PostBrowserStart() {
if (system::InputDeviceSettings::Get()->ForceKeyboardDrivenUINavigation()) {
content::ServiceManagerConnection* connection =
content::ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess();
ash::mojom::EventRewriterControllerPtr event_rewriter_controller_ptr;
connection->GetConnector()->BindInterface(ash::mojom::kServiceName,
&event_rewriter_controller_ptr);
event_rewriter_controller_ptr->SetKeyboardDrivenEventRewriterEnabled(true);
}
spoken_feedback_event_rewriter_delegate_ =
std::make_unique<SpokenFeedbackEventRewriterDelegate>();
if (chromeos::GetAshConfig() != ash::Config::MASH) {
ash::EventRewriterController* event_rewriter_controller =
ash::Shell::Get()->event_rewriter_controller();
event_rewriter_delegate_ = std::make_unique<EventRewriterDelegateImpl>();
event_rewriter_controller->AddEventRewriter(
std::make_unique<ui::EventRewriterChromeOS>(
event_rewriter_delegate_.get(),
ash::Shell::Get()->sticky_keys_controller()));
}
shutdown_policy_forwarder_ = std::make_unique<ShutdownPolicyForwarder>();
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kAdaptiveScreenBrightnessLogging)) {
adaptive_screen_brightness_manager_ =
power::ml::AdaptiveScreenBrightnessManager::CreateInstance();
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kUserActivityEventLogging)) {
user_activity_controller_ =
std::make_unique<power::ml::UserActivityController>();
}
ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux::PostBrowserStart();
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,760
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: http_Unset(struct http *hp, const char *hdr)
{
uint16_t u, v;
for (v = u = HTTP_HDR_FIRST; u < hp->nhd; u++) {
if (hp->hd[u].b == NULL)
continue;
if (http_IsHdr(&hp->hd[u], hdr))
continue;
if (v != u) {
memcpy(&hp->hd[v], &hp->hd[u], sizeof *hp->hd);
memcpy(&hp->hdf[v], &hp->hdf[u], sizeof *hp->hdf);
}
v++;
}
hp->nhd = v;
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IndexedDBDatabase::FilterObservation(IndexedDBTransaction* transaction,
int64_t object_store_id,
blink::WebIDBOperationType type,
const IndexedDBKeyRange& key_range,
const IndexedDBValue* value) {
for (auto* connection : connections_) {
bool recorded = false;
for (const auto& observer : connection->active_observers()) {
if (!observer->IsRecordingType(type) ||
!observer->IsRecordingObjectStore(object_store_id))
continue;
if (!recorded) {
auto observation = ::indexed_db::mojom::Observation::New();
observation->object_store_id = object_store_id;
observation->type = type;
if (type != blink::kWebIDBClear)
observation->key_range = key_range;
transaction->AddObservation(connection->id(), std::move(observation));
recorded = true;
}
::indexed_db::mojom::ObserverChangesPtr& changes =
*transaction->GetPendingChangesForConnection(connection->id());
changes->observation_index_map[observer->id()].push_back(
changes->observations.size() - 1);
if (observer->include_transaction() &&
!base::ContainsKey(changes->transaction_map, observer->id())) {
auto mojo_transaction = ::indexed_db::mojom::ObserverTransaction::New();
mojo_transaction->id = connection->NewObserverTransactionId();
mojo_transaction->scope.insert(mojo_transaction->scope.end(),
observer->object_store_ids().begin(),
observer->object_store_ids().end());
changes->transaction_map[observer->id()] = std::move(mojo_transaction);
}
if (value && observer->values() && !changes->observations.back()->value) {
IndexedDBValue copy = *value;
changes->observations.back()->value =
IndexedDBCallbacks::ConvertAndEraseValue(©);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int v9fs_receive_response(V9fsProxy *proxy, int type,
int *status, void *response)
{
int retval;
ProxyHeader header;
struct iovec *reply = &proxy->in_iovec;
*status = 0;
reply->iov_len = 0;
retval = socket_read(proxy->sockfd, reply->iov_base, PROXY_HDR_SZ);
if (retval < 0) {
return retval;
}
reply->iov_len = PROXY_HDR_SZ;
proxy_unmarshal(reply, 0, "dd", &header.type, &header.size);
/*
* if response size > PROXY_MAX_IO_SZ, read the response but ignore it and
* return -ENOBUFS
*/
if (header.size > PROXY_MAX_IO_SZ) {
int count;
while (header.size > 0) {
count = MIN(PROXY_MAX_IO_SZ, header.size);
count = socket_read(proxy->sockfd, reply->iov_base, count);
if (count < 0) {
return count;
}
header.size -= count;
}
*status = -ENOBUFS;
return 0;
}
retval = socket_read(proxy->sockfd,
reply->iov_base + PROXY_HDR_SZ, header.size);
if (retval < 0) {
return retval;
}
reply->iov_len += header.size;
/* there was an error during processing request */
if (header.type == T_ERROR) {
int ret;
ret = proxy_unmarshal(reply, PROXY_HDR_SZ, "d", status);
if (ret < 0) {
*status = ret;
}
return 0;
}
switch (type) {
case T_LSTAT: {
ProxyStat prstat;
retval = proxy_unmarshal(reply, PROXY_HDR_SZ,
"qqqdddqqqqqqqqqq", &prstat.st_dev,
&prstat.st_ino, &prstat.st_nlink,
&prstat.st_mode, &prstat.st_uid,
&prstat.st_gid, &prstat.st_rdev,
&prstat.st_size, &prstat.st_blksize,
&prstat.st_blocks,
&prstat.st_atim_sec, &prstat.st_atim_nsec,
&prstat.st_mtim_sec, &prstat.st_mtim_nsec,
&prstat.st_ctim_sec, &prstat.st_ctim_nsec);
prstat_to_stat(response, &prstat);
break;
}
case T_STATFS: {
ProxyStatFS prstfs;
retval = proxy_unmarshal(reply, PROXY_HDR_SZ,
"qqqqqqqqqqq", &prstfs.f_type,
&prstfs.f_bsize, &prstfs.f_blocks,
&prstfs.f_bfree, &prstfs.f_bavail,
&prstfs.f_files, &prstfs.f_ffree,
&prstfs.f_fsid[0], &prstfs.f_fsid[1],
&prstfs.f_namelen, &prstfs.f_frsize);
prstatfs_to_statfs(response, &prstfs);
break;
}
case T_READLINK: {
V9fsString target;
v9fs_string_init(&target);
retval = proxy_unmarshal(reply, PROXY_HDR_SZ, "s", &target);
strcpy(response, target.data);
v9fs_string_free(&target);
break;
}
case T_LGETXATTR:
case T_LLISTXATTR: {
V9fsString xattr;
v9fs_string_init(&xattr);
retval = proxy_unmarshal(reply, PROXY_HDR_SZ, "s", &xattr);
memcpy(response, xattr.data, xattr.size);
v9fs_string_free(&xattr);
break;
}
case T_GETVERSION:
proxy_unmarshal(reply, PROXY_HDR_SZ, "q", response);
break;
default:
return -1;
}
if (retval < 0) {
*status = retval;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 15,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jpc_pchg_destroy(jpc_pchg_t *pchg)
{
jas_free(pchg);
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem in the JPC codec that later resulted
in the use of uninitialized data.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 14,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateShaderSource(const String& string) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < string.length(); ++i) {
if (IsWebGL2OrHigher() && string[i] == '\\') {
continue;
}
if (!ValidateCharacter(string[i])) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "shaderSource", "string not ASCII");
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int intel_pmu_cpu_prepare(int cpu)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &per_cpu(cpu_hw_events, cpu);
if (!cpu_has_ht_siblings())
return NOTIFY_OK;
cpuc->per_core = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct intel_percore),
GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(cpu));
if (!cpuc->per_core)
return NOTIFY_BAD;
raw_spin_lock_init(&cpuc->per_core->lock);
cpuc->per_core->core_id = -1;
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MemoryMappedFile::MemoryMappedFile()
: file_(base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue),
data_(NULL),
length_(0) {
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 9,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_lseg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int seg = ctxt->src2.val;
unsigned short sel;
int rc;
memcpy(&sel, ctxt->src.valptr + ctxt->op_bytes, 2);
rc = load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, seg);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src.val;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_attr_namesp_match(int arg_flags, int ondisk_flags)
{
return XFS_ATTR_NSP_ONDISK(ondisk_flags) == XFS_ATTR_NSP_ARGS_TO_ONDISK(arg_flags);
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 24,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutTestContentRendererClient::OverrideCreateAudioDevice(
double sample_rate) {
WebTestInterfaces* interfaces =
LayoutTestRenderProcessObserver::GetInstance()->test_interfaces();
return interfaces->CreateAudioDevice(sample_rate);
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 4,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AudioInputRendererHost::AudioEntry::~AudioEntry() {}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_snmp_error(zval *object, const char *docref, int type, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
php_snmp_object *snmp_object = NULL;
if (object) {
snmp_object = Z_SNMP_P(object);
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
memset(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, 0, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr));
} else {
va_start(args, format);
vsnprintf(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr) - 1, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
snmp_object->snmp_errno = type;
}
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
return;
}
if (object && (snmp_object->exceptions_enabled & type)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(php_snmp_exception_ce, type, snmp_object->snmp_errstr);
} else {
va_start(args, format);
php_verror(docref, "", E_WARNING, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 1,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nlmclnt_proc(struct nlm_host *host, int cmd, struct file_lock *fl)
{
struct nlm_rqst *call;
int status;
nlm_get_host(host);
call = nlm_alloc_call(host);
if (call == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
nlmclnt_locks_init_private(fl, host);
/* Set up the argument struct */
nlmclnt_setlockargs(call, fl);
if (IS_SETLK(cmd) || IS_SETLKW(cmd)) {
if (fl->fl_type != F_UNLCK) {
call->a_args.block = IS_SETLKW(cmd) ? 1 : 0;
status = nlmclnt_lock(call, fl);
} else
status = nlmclnt_unlock(call, fl);
} else if (IS_GETLK(cmd))
status = nlmclnt_test(call, fl);
else
status = -EINVAL;
fl->fl_ops->fl_release_private(fl);
fl->fl_ops = NULL;
dprintk("lockd: clnt proc returns %d\n", status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hostap_enable_hostapd(local_info_t *local, int rtnl_locked)
{
struct net_device *dev = local->dev;
if (local->apdev)
return -EEXIST;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: enabling hostapd mode\n", dev->name);
local->apdev = hostap_add_interface(local, HOSTAP_INTERFACE_AP,
rtnl_locked, local->ddev->name,
"ap");
if (local->apdev == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfsd4_cb_recall_prepare(struct nfsd4_callback *cb)
{
struct nfs4_delegation *dp = cb_to_delegation(cb);
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(dp->dl_stid.sc_client->net,
nfsd_net_id);
block_delegations(&dp->dl_stid.sc_file->fi_fhandle);
/*
* We can't do this in nfsd_break_deleg_cb because it is
* already holding inode->i_lock.
*
* If the dl_time != 0, then we know that it has already been
* queued for a lease break. Don't queue it again.
*/
spin_lock(&state_lock);
if (dp->dl_time == 0) {
dp->dl_time = get_seconds();
list_add_tail(&dp->dl_recall_lru, &nn->del_recall_lru);
}
spin_unlock(&state_lock);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 12,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnCompositingAborted(
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,272
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: syncable::ModelTypeSet SyncManager::GetEncryptedDataTypesForTest() const {
ReadTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
return GetEncryptedTypes(&trans);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 13,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int run_script_argv(const char *name, const char *section,
const char *script, const char *hook, const char *lxcpath,
char **argsin)
{
int ret, i;
char *buffer;
size_t size = 0;
INFO("Executing script '%s' for container '%s', config section '%s'",
script, name, section);
for (i=0; argsin && argsin[i]; i++)
size += strlen(argsin[i]) + 1;
size += strlen(hook) + 1;
size += strlen(script);
size += strlen(name);
size += strlen(section);
size += 3;
if (size > INT_MAX)
return -1;
buffer = alloca(size);
if (!buffer) {
ERROR("failed to allocate memory");
return -1;
}
ret = snprintf(buffer, size, "%s %s %s %s", script, name, section, hook);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= size) {
ERROR("Script name too long");
return -1;
}
for (i=0; argsin && argsin[i]; i++) {
int len = size-ret;
int rc;
rc = snprintf(buffer + ret, len, " %s", argsin[i]);
if (rc < 0 || rc >= len) {
ERROR("Script args too long");
return -1;
}
ret += rc;
}
return run_buffer(buffer);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 28,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockRenderCallback() {}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 2,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void vring_used_flags_unset_bit(VirtQueue *vq, int mask)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = vq->vdev;
hwaddr pa;
pa = vq->vring.used + offsetof(VRingUsed, flags);
virtio_stw_phys(vdev, pa, virtio_lduw_phys(vdev, pa) & ~mask);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RTCPeerConnection::didGenerateIceCandidate(PassRefPtr<RTCIceCandidateDescriptor> iceCandidateDescriptor)
{
ASSERT(scriptExecutionContext()->isContextThread());
if (!iceCandidateDescriptor)
dispatchEvent(RTCIceCandidateEvent::create(false, false, 0));
else {
RefPtr<RTCIceCandidate> iceCandidate = RTCIceCandidate::create(iceCandidateDescriptor);
dispatchEvent(RTCIceCandidateEvent::create(false, false, iceCandidate.release()));
}
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteGROUP4Image(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
char
filename[MaxTextExtent];
FILE
*file;
Image
*huffman_image;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
int
unique_file;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count;
TIFF
*tiff;
toff_t
*byte_count,
strip_size;
unsigned char
*buffer;
/*
Write image as CCITT Group4 TIFF image to a temporary file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
huffman_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,&image->exception);
if (huffman_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
huffman_image->endian=MSBEndian;
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
{
ThrowFileException(&image->exception,FileOpenError,
"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(huffman_image->filename,MaxTextExtent,"tiff:%s",
filename);
(void) SetImageType(huffman_image,BilevelType);
write_info=CloneImageInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL);
SetImageInfoFile(write_info,file);
write_info->compression=Group4Compression;
write_info->type=BilevelType;
(void) SetImageOption(write_info,"quantum:polarity","min-is-white");
status=WriteTIFFImage(write_info,huffman_image);
(void) fflush(file);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(&image->exception,&huffman_image->exception);
huffman_image=DestroyImage(huffman_image);
(void) fclose(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
tiff=TIFFOpen(filename,"rb");
if (tiff == (TIFF *) NULL)
{
huffman_image=DestroyImage(huffman_image);
(void) fclose(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
ThrowFileException(&image->exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile",
image_info->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
/*
Allocate raw strip buffer.
*/
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_STRIPBYTECOUNTS,&byte_count) != 1)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
huffman_image=DestroyImage(huffman_image);
(void) fclose(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
strip_size=byte_count[0];
for (i=1; i < (ssize_t) TIFFNumberOfStrips(tiff); i++)
if (byte_count[i] > strip_size)
strip_size=byte_count[i];
buffer=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) strip_size,
sizeof(*buffer));
if (buffer == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
huffman_image=DestroyImage(huffman_image);
(void) fclose(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image_info->filename);
}
/*
Compress runlength encoded to 2D Huffman pixels.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) TIFFNumberOfStrips(tiff); i++)
{
count=(ssize_t) TIFFReadRawStrip(tiff,(uint32) i,buffer,strip_size);
if (WriteBlob(image,(size_t) count,buffer) != count)
status=MagickFalse;
}
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
TIFFClose(tiff);
huffman_image=DestroyImage(huffman_image);
(void) fclose(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int perf_event_task_enable(void)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
struct perf_event *event;
mutex_lock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(event, ¤t->perf_event_list, owner_entry) {
ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
perf_event_for_each_child(event, _perf_event_enable);
perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
}
mutex_unlock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 8,348
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutSize RenderBox::overrideSize() const
{
if (!hasOverrideSize())
return LayoutSize(-1, -1);
return gOverrideSizeMap->get(this);
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ocfs2_add_inode_data(struct ocfs2_super *osb,
struct inode *inode,
u32 *logical_offset,
u32 clusters_to_add,
int mark_unwritten,
struct buffer_head *fe_bh,
handle_t *handle,
struct ocfs2_alloc_context *data_ac,
struct ocfs2_alloc_context *meta_ac,
enum ocfs2_alloc_restarted *reason_ret)
{
int ret;
struct ocfs2_extent_tree et;
ocfs2_init_dinode_extent_tree(&et, INODE_CACHE(inode), fe_bh);
ret = ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree(handle, &et, logical_offset,
clusters_to_add, mark_unwritten,
data_ac, meta_ac, reason_ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int userfaultfd_unmap_prep(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
struct list_head *unmaps)
{
for ( ; vma && vma->vm_start < end; vma = vma->vm_next) {
struct userfaultfd_unmap_ctx *unmap_ctx;
struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx = vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx;
if (!ctx || !(ctx->features & UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_UNMAP) ||
has_unmap_ctx(ctx, unmaps, start, end))
continue;
unmap_ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*unmap_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!unmap_ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
userfaultfd_ctx_get(ctx);
WRITE_ONCE(ctx->mmap_changing, true);
unmap_ctx->ctx = ctx;
unmap_ctx->start = start;
unmap_ctx->end = end;
list_add_tail(&unmap_ctx->list, unmaps);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas
After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has
VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration. This way we inherit all
common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and
hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY.
The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless
it's a MAP_PRIVATE.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-4-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,480
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CloudPolicyController::OnCredentialsChanged() {
if (data_store_->device_token().empty()) {
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::UNENROLLED,
CloudPolicySubsystem::NO_DETAILS,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ =
kPolicyRefreshErrorDelayInMilliseconds;
SetState(STATE_TOKEN_UNAVAILABLE);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 23,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sctp_cmd_t3_rtx_timers_stop(sctp_cmd_seq_t *cmds,
struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct sctp_transport *t;
list_for_each_entry(t, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
if (del_timer(&t->T3_rtx_timer))
sctp_transport_put(t);
}
}
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 13,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned LoadWPG2Flags(Image *image,char Precision,float *Angle,tCTM *CTM)
{
const unsigned char TPR=1,TRN=2,SKW=4,SCL=8,ROT=0x10,OID=0x20,LCK=0x80;
ssize_t x;
unsigned DenX;
unsigned Flags;
(void) memset(*CTM,0,sizeof(*CTM)); /*CTM.erase();CTM.resize(3,3);*/
(*CTM)[0][0]=1;
(*CTM)[1][1]=1;
(*CTM)[2][2]=1;
Flags=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Flags & LCK) (void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /*Edit lock*/
if(Flags & OID)
{
if(Precision==0)
{(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);} /*ObjectID*/
else
{(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);} /*ObjectID (Double precision)*/
}
if(Flags & ROT)
{
x=ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /*Rot Angle*/
if(Angle) *Angle=x/65536.0;
}
if(Flags & (ROT|SCL))
{
x=ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /*Sx*cos()*/
(*CTM)[0][0] = (float)x/0x10000;
x=ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /*Sy*cos()*/
(*CTM)[1][1] = (float)x/0x10000;
}
if(Flags & (ROT|SKW))
{
x=ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /*Kx*sin()*/
(*CTM)[1][0] = (float)x/0x10000;
x=ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /*Ky*sin()*/
(*CTM)[0][1] = (float)x/0x10000;
}
if(Flags & TRN)
{
x=ReadBlobLSBLong(image); DenX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); /*Tx*/
if(x>=0) (*CTM)[0][2] = (float)x+(float)DenX/0x10000;
else (*CTM)[0][2] = (float)x-(float)DenX/0x10000;
x=ReadBlobLSBLong(image); DenX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); /*Ty*/
(*CTM)[1][2]=(float)x + ((x>=0)?1:-1)*(float)DenX/0x10000;
if(x>=0) (*CTM)[1][2] = (float)x+(float)DenX/0x10000;
else (*CTM)[1][2] = (float)x-(float)DenX/0x10000;
}
if(Flags & TPR)
{
x=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); DenX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); /*Px*/
(*CTM)[2][0] = x + (float)DenX/0x10000;;
x=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); DenX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); /*Py*/
(*CTM)[2][1] = x + (float)DenX/0x10000;
}
return(Flags);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/85
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlock::setPaginationStrut(LayoutUnit strut)
{
if (!m_rareData) {
if (!strut)
return;
m_rareData = adoptPtr(new RenderBlockRareData());
}
m_rareData->m_paginationStrut = strut;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static av_cold int dpcm_decode_init(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
DPCMContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int i;
if (avctx->channels < 1 || avctx->channels > 2) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_INFO, "invalid number of channels\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
s->channels = avctx->channels;
s->sample[0] = s->sample[1] = 0;
switch(avctx->codec->id) {
case CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
/* initialize square table */
for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) {
int16_t square = i * i;
s->roq_square_array[i ] = square;
s->roq_square_array[i + 128] = -square;
}
break;
case CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM:
switch(avctx->codec_tag){
case 1:
s->sol_table = sol_table_old;
s->sample[0] = s->sample[1] = 0x80;
break;
case 2:
s->sol_table = sol_table_new;
s->sample[0] = s->sample[1] = 0x80;
break;
case 3:
break;
default:
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unknown SOL subcodec\n");
return -1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (avctx->codec->id == CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM && avctx->codec_tag != 3)
avctx->sample_fmt = AV_SAMPLE_FMT_U8;
else
avctx->sample_fmt = AV_SAMPLE_FMT_S16;
avcodec_get_frame_defaults(&s->frame);
avctx->coded_frame = &s->frame;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int x509_info_ext_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size,
const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage )
{
int ret;
const char *desc;
size_t n = *size;
char *p = *buf;
const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = extended_key_usage;
const char *sep = "";
while( cur != NULL )
{
if( mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 )
desc = "???";
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc );
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
sep = ", ";
cur = cur->next;
}
*size = n;
*buf = p;
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Improve behaviour on fatal errors
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 26,046
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: kdc_get_ticket_renewtime(kdc_realm_t *realm, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_enc_tkt_part *tgt, krb5_db_entry *client,
krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_enc_tkt_part *tkt)
{
krb5_timestamp rtime, max_rlife;
tkt->times.renew_till = 0;
/* Don't issue renewable tickets if the client or server don't allow it,
* or if this is a TGS request and the TGT isn't renewable. */
if (server->attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE)
return;
if (client != NULL && (client->attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE))
return;
if (tgt != NULL && !(tgt->flags & TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE))
return;
/* Determine the requested renewable time. */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE))
rtime = request->rtime ? request->rtime : kdc_infinity;
else if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
tkt->times.endtime < request->till)
rtime = request->till;
else
return;
/* Truncate it to the allowable renewable time. */
if (tgt != NULL)
rtime = min(rtime, tgt->times.renew_till);
max_rlife = min(server->max_renewable_life, realm->realm_maxrlife);
if (client != NULL)
max_rlife = min(max_rlife, client->max_renewable_life);
rtime = min(rtime, tkt->times.starttime + max_rlife);
/* Make the ticket renewable if the truncated requested time is larger than
* the ticket end time. */
if (rtime > tkt->times.endtime) {
setflag(tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
tkt->times.renew_till = rtime;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix S4U2Self KDC crash when anon is restricted
In validate_as_request(), when enforcing restrict_anonymous_to_tgt,
use client.princ instead of request->client; the latter is NULL when
validating S4U2Self requests.
CVE-2016-3120:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause krb5kdc
to dereference a null pointer if the restrict_anonymous_to_tgt option
is set to true, by making an S4U2Self request.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8458 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 28,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void path_put(const struct path *path)
{
dput(path->dentry);
mntput(path->mnt);
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 24,808
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u_char * create_data_segment(struct filter_header *fh, struct filter_op *fop, size_t n)
{
size_t i, len = 0;
u_char *data = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
switch(fop[i].opcode) {
case FOP_FUNC:
if (fop[i].op.func.slen) {
ef_debug(1, "@");
len += add_data_segment(&data, len, &fop[i].op.func.string, fop[i].op.func.slen);
}
if (fop[i].op.func.rlen) {
ef_debug(1, "@");
len += add_data_segment(&data, len, &fop[i].op.func.replace, fop[i].op.func.rlen);
}
break;
case FOP_TEST:
if (fop[i].op.test.slen) {
ef_debug(1, "@");
len += add_data_segment(&data, len, &fop[i].op.test.string, fop[i].op.test.slen);
}
break;
case FOP_ASSIGN:
if (fop[i].op.assign.slen) {
ef_debug(1, "@");
len += add_data_segment(&data, len, &fop[i].op.test.string, fop[i].op.test.slen);
}
break;
}
}
/* where starts the code ? */
fh->code = fh->data + len;
return data;
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 4,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long FrameLoader::loadResourceSynchronously(const ResourceRequest& request, StoredCredentials storedCredentials, ResourceError& error, ResourceResponse& response, Vector<char>& data)
{
ASSERT(m_frame->document());
String referrer = SecurityPolicy::generateReferrerHeader(m_frame->document()->referrerPolicy(), request.url(), outgoingReferrer());
ResourceRequest initialRequest = request;
initialRequest.setTimeoutInterval(10);
if (!referrer.isEmpty())
initialRequest.setHTTPReferrer(referrer);
addHTTPOriginIfNeeded(initialRequest, outgoingOrigin());
addExtraFieldsToRequest(initialRequest);
unsigned long identifier = 0;
ResourceRequest newRequest(initialRequest);
requestFromDelegate(newRequest, identifier, error);
if (error.isNull()) {
ASSERT(!newRequest.isNull());
documentLoader()->applicationCacheHost()->willStartLoadingSynchronously(newRequest);
ResourceLoader::loadResourceSynchronously(newRequest, storedCredentials, error, response, data);
}
int encodedDataLength = response.resourceLoadInfo() ? static_cast<int>(response.resourceLoadInfo()->encodedDataLength) : -1;
notifier()->sendRemainingDelegateMessages(m_documentLoader.get(), identifier, response, data.data(), data.size(), encodedDataLength, error);
return identifier;
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: free_netinfo_config(
struct netinfo_config_state *config
)
{
ni_free(config->domain);
free(config);
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void flush_stack(struct sock **stack, unsigned int count,
struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int final)
{
unsigned int i;
struct sock *sk;
struct sk_buff *skb1;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
skb1 = (i == final) ? skb : skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
sk = stack[i];
if (skb1) {
if (sk_rcvqueues_full(sk, skb1)) {
kfree_skb(skb1);
goto drop;
}
bh_lock_sock(sk);
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
udpv6_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb1);
else if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb1)) {
kfree_skb(skb1);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
goto drop;
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
continue;
}
drop:
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
UDP6_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_RCVBUFERRORS, IS_UDPLITE(sk));
UDP6_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS, IS_UDPLITE(sk));
}
}
Commit Message: ipv6: udp: fix the wrong headroom check
At this point, skb->data points to skb_transport_header.
So, headroom check is wrong.
For some case:bridge(UFO is on) + eth device(UFO is off),
there is no enough headroom for IPv6 frag head.
But headroom check is always false.
This will bring about data be moved to there prior to skb->head,
when adding IPv6 frag header to skb.
Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,312
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: check_indicators(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *server,
krb5_data *const *indicators)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
char *str = NULL, *copy = NULL, *save, *ind;
ret = krb5_dbe_get_string(context, server, KRB5_KDB_SK_REQUIRE_AUTH, &str);
if (ret || str == NULL)
goto cleanup;
copy = strdup(str);
if (copy == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Look for any of the space-separated strings in indicators. */
ind = strtok_r(copy, " ", &save);
while (ind != NULL) {
if (authind_contains(indicators, ind))
goto cleanup;
ind = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &save);
}
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
k5_setmsg(context, ret,
_("Required auth indicators not present in ticket: %s"), str);
cleanup:
krb5_dbe_free_string(context, str);
free(copy);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix S4U2Self KDC crash when anon is restricted
In validate_as_request(), when enforcing restrict_anonymous_to_tgt,
use client.princ instead of request->client; the latter is NULL when
validating S4U2Self requests.
CVE-2016-3120:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause krb5kdc
to dereference a null pointer if the restrict_anonymous_to_tgt option
is set to true, by making an S4U2Self request.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8458 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 4,907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int get_vp9_zero_frame_buffer(void *user_priv, size_t min_size,
vpx_codec_frame_buffer_t *fb) {
ExternalFrameBufferList *const fb_list =
reinterpret_cast<ExternalFrameBufferList*>(user_priv);
return fb_list->GetZeroFrameBuffer(min_size, fb);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sha1_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
{
struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
const struct sha1_state *ictx = in;
sctx->count = ictx->count;
memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state));
memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buffer, sizeof(ictx->buffer));
sctx->func = KIMD_SHA_1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 3,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int tracing_get_cpu(struct inode *inode)
{
if (inode->i_cdev) /* See trace_create_cpu_file() */
return (long)inode->i_cdev - 1;
return RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 12,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::PerformanceWarning(
const char* filename, int line, const std::string& msg) {
logger_.LogMessage(filename, line,
std::string("PERFORMANCE WARNING: ") + msg);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_mmap_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct perf_event *event = vma->vm_file->private_data;
atomic_inc(&event->mmap_count);
atomic_inc(&event->rb->mmap_count);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 6,464
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<MediaSource> MPEG4Extractor::getTrack(size_t index) {
status_t err;
if ((err = readMetaData()) != OK) {
return NULL;
}
Track *track = mFirstTrack;
while (index > 0) {
if (track == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
track = track->next;
--index;
}
if (track == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
Trex *trex = NULL;
int32_t trackId;
if (track->meta->findInt32(kKeyTrackID, &trackId)) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < mTrex.size(); i++) {
Trex *t = &mTrex.editItemAt(index);
if (t->track_ID == (uint32_t) trackId) {
trex = t;
break;
}
}
}
ALOGV("getTrack called, pssh: %zu", mPssh.size());
return new MPEG4Source(this,
track->meta, mDataSource, track->timescale, track->sampleTable,
mSidxEntries, trex, mMoofOffset);
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 21,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AXObjectCacheImpl::checkedStateChanged(Node* node) {
postNotification(node, AXObjectCacheImpl::AXCheckedStateChanged);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 21,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct vfsmount *debugfs_automount(struct path *path)
{
debugfs_automount_t f;
f = (debugfs_automount_t)path->dentry->d_fsdata;
return f(path->dentry, d_inode(path->dentry)->i_private);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 22,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sha1_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
{
struct sha1_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
memcpy(out, sctx, sizeof(*sctx));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioHandler::UpdateChannelCountMode() {
channel_count_mode_ = new_channel_count_mode_;
UpdateChannelsForInputs();
}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 12,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nested_vmx_msr_check_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmx_msr_entry *e)
{
/* x2APIC MSR accesses are not allowed */
if (vcpu->arch.apic_base & X2APIC_ENABLE && e->index >> 8 == 0x8)
return -EINVAL;
if (e->index == MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE || /* SDM Table 35-2 */
e->index == MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV)
return -EINVAL;
if (e->reserved != 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API RBinPlugin *r_bin_get_binplugin_by_bytes(RBin *bin, const ut8 *bytes, ut64 sz) {
RBinPlugin *plugin;
RListIter *it;
if (!bin || !bytes) {
return NULL;
}
r_list_foreach (bin->plugins, it, plugin) {
if (plugin->check_bytes && plugin->check_bytes (bytes, sz)) {
return plugin;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 1,961
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentUtilityClient::OnPatchFileCourgette(
const base::FilePath& input_file,
const base::FilePath& patch_file,
const base::FilePath& output_file) {
if (input_file.empty() || patch_file.empty() || output_file.empty()) {
Send(new ChromeUtilityHostMsg_PatchFile_Finished(-1));
} else {
const int patch_status = courgette::ApplyEnsemblePatch(
input_file.value().c_str(),
patch_file.value().c_str(),
output_file.value().c_str());
Send(new ChromeUtilityHostMsg_PatchFile_Finished(patch_status));
}
ReleaseProcessIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const uint8_t* SharedMemoryHandleProvider::Handle::const_data() const {
return static_cast<const uint8_t*>(owner_->shared_memory_->memory());
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 2,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct super_block *sb,
ext4_fsblk_t sb_block,
ext4_group_t *first_not_zeroed)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
ext4_fsblk_t first_block = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_first_data_block);
ext4_fsblk_t last_block;
ext4_fsblk_t block_bitmap;
ext4_fsblk_t inode_bitmap;
ext4_fsblk_t inode_table;
int flexbg_flag = 0;
ext4_group_t i, grp = sbi->s_groups_count;
if (ext4_has_feature_flex_bg(sb))
flexbg_flag = 1;
ext4_debug("Checking group descriptors");
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_groups_count; i++) {
struct ext4_group_desc *gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, i, NULL);
if (i == sbi->s_groups_count - 1 || flexbg_flag)
last_block = ext4_blocks_count(sbi->s_es) - 1;
else
last_block = first_block +
(EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
if ((grp == sbi->s_groups_count) &&
!(gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED)))
grp = i;
block_bitmap = ext4_block_bitmap(sb, gdp);
if (block_bitmap == sb_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Block bitmap for group %u overlaps "
"superblock", i);
}
if (block_bitmap < first_block || block_bitmap > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Block bitmap for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, block_bitmap);
return 0;
}
inode_bitmap = ext4_inode_bitmap(sb, gdp);
if (inode_bitmap == sb_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Inode bitmap for group %u overlaps "
"superblock", i);
}
if (inode_bitmap < first_block || inode_bitmap > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Inode bitmap for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, inode_bitmap);
return 0;
}
inode_table = ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp);
if (inode_table == sb_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Inode table for group %u overlaps "
"superblock", i);
}
if (inode_table < first_block ||
inode_table + sbi->s_itb_per_group - 1 > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Inode table for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, inode_table);
return 0;
}
ext4_lock_group(sb, i);
if (!ext4_group_desc_csum_verify(sb, i, gdp)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Checksum for group %u failed (%u!=%u)",
i, le16_to_cpu(ext4_group_desc_csum(sb, i,
gdp)), le16_to_cpu(gdp->bg_checksum));
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
ext4_unlock_group(sb, i);
return 0;
}
}
ext4_unlock_group(sb, i);
if (!flexbg_flag)
first_block += EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb);
}
if (NULL != first_not_zeroed)
*first_not_zeroed = grp;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 29,474
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void write_selected_commits_v1(struct sha1file *f,
struct pack_idx_entry **index,
uint32_t index_nr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < writer.selected_nr; ++i) {
struct bitmapped_commit *stored = &writer.selected[i];
int commit_pos =
sha1_pos(stored->commit->object.oid.hash, index, index_nr, sha1_access);
if (commit_pos < 0)
die("BUG: trying to write commit not in index");
sha1write_be32(f, commit_pos);
sha1write_u8(f, stored->xor_offset);
sha1write_u8(f, stored->flags);
dump_bitmap(f, stored->write_as);
}
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_block_zero_page_range(handle_t *handle,
struct address_space *mapping, loff_t from, loff_t length)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
unsigned offset = from & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE-1);
unsigned blocksize = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize;
unsigned max = blocksize - (offset & (blocksize - 1));
/*
* correct length if it does not fall between
* 'from' and the end of the block
*/
if (length > max || length < 0)
length = max;
if (IS_DAX(inode))
return dax_zero_page_range(inode, from, length, ext4_get_block);
return __ext4_block_zero_page_range(handle, mapping, from, length);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 23,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BrowserSideNavigationBrowserTest() {}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SocketStreamDispatcherHost::DeleteSocketStreamHost(int socket_id) {
SocketStreamHost* socket_stream_host = hosts_.Lookup(socket_id);
DCHECK(socket_stream_host);
delete socket_stream_host;
hosts_.Remove(socket_id);
if (!Send(new SocketStreamMsg_Closed(socket_id))) {
LOG(ERROR) << "SocketStreamMsg_Closed failed.";
}
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteBGRImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Allocate memory for pixels.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image_info->interlace != PartitionInterlace)
{
/*
Open output image file.
*/
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
}
quantum_type=BGRQuantum;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"BGRA") == 0)
{
quantum_type=BGRAQuantum;
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
scene=0;
do
{
/*
Convert MIFF to BGR raster pixels.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"BGRA") == 0) &&
(image->matte == MagickFalse))
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,ResetAlphaChannel);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
switch (image_info->interlace)
{
case NoInterlace:
default:
{
/*
No interlacing: BGRBGRBGRBGRBGRBGR...
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case LineInterlace:
{
/*
Line interlacing: BBB...GGG...RRR...RRR...GGG...BBB...
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlueQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GreenQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,RedQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
if (quantum_type == BGRAQuantum)
{
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,AlphaQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PlaneInterlace:
{
/*
Plane interlacing: RRRRRR...GGGGGG...BBBBBB...
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,RedQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,1,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GreenQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,2,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlueQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,3,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (quantum_type == BGRAQuantum)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,AlphaQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,5,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image_info->interlace == PartitionInterlace)
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,
MaxTextExtent);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,6,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case PartitionInterlace:
{
/*
Partition interlacing: BBBBBB..., GGGGGG..., RRRRRR...
*/
AppendImageFormat("B",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,scene == 0 ? WriteBinaryBlobMode :
AppendBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlueQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,1,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("G",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,scene == 0 ? WriteBinaryBlobMode :
AppendBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GreenQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,2,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("R",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,scene == 0 ? WriteBinaryBlobMode :
AppendBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,RedQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,3,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (quantum_type == BGRAQuantum)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("A",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,scene == 0 ? WriteBinaryBlobMode :
AppendBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,AlphaQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,5,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,
MaxTextExtent);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,6,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: free_key_string(decryption_key_t *dk)
{
if (dk->key)
g_string_free(dk->key, TRUE);
if (dk->ssid)
g_byte_array_free(dk->ssid, TRUE);
g_free(dk);
}
Commit Message: Sanity check eapol_len in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey
Bug: 12175
Change-Id: Iaf977ba48f8668bf8095800a115ff9a3472dd893
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15326
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Tested-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 23,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: horizontalDifference16(unsigned short *ip, int n, int stride,
unsigned short *wp, uint16 *From14)
{
register int r1, g1, b1, a1, r2, g2, b2, a2, mask;
/* assumption is unsigned pixel values */
#undef CLAMP
#define CLAMP(v) From14[(v) >> 2]
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (n >= stride) {
if (stride == 3) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]);
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 3;
wp += 3;
ip += 3;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]); a2 = wp[3] = CLAMP(ip[3]);
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 4;
wp += 4;
ip += 4;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
a1 = CLAMP(ip[3]); wp[3] = (uint16)((a1-a2) & mask); a2 = a1;
}
} else {
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp++; ip++)
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride,
wp[0] = (uint16)((CLAMP(ip[0])-CLAMP(ip[-stride])) & mask);
wp++; ip++)
n -= stride;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 24,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct crypto_instance *chainiv_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
struct crypto_instance *inst;
int err;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return ERR_CAST(algt);
err = crypto_get_default_rng();
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
inst = skcipher_geniv_alloc(&chainiv_tmpl, tb, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto put_rng;
inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.givencrypt = chainiv_givencrypt_first;
inst->alg.cra_init = chainiv_init;
inst->alg.cra_exit = skcipher_geniv_exit;
inst->alg.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chainiv_ctx);
if (!crypto_requires_sync(algt->type, algt->mask)) {
inst->alg.cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.givencrypt =
async_chainiv_givencrypt_first;
inst->alg.cra_init = async_chainiv_init;
inst->alg.cra_exit = async_chainiv_exit;
inst->alg.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct async_chainiv_ctx);
}
inst->alg.cra_ctxsize += inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.ivsize;
out:
return inst;
put_rng:
crypto_put_default_rng();
goto out;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scale10_round_decimal_decoded (int e, mpn_t m, void *memory, int n)
{
int s;
size_t extra_zeroes;
unsigned int abs_n;
unsigned int abs_s;
mp_limb_t *pow5_ptr;
size_t pow5_len;
unsigned int s_limbs;
unsigned int s_bits;
mpn_t pow5;
mpn_t z;
void *z_memory;
char *digits;
if (memory == NULL)
return NULL;
/* x = 2^e * m, hence
y = round (2^e * 10^n * m) = round (2^(e+n) * 5^n * m)
= round (2^s * 5^n * m). */
s = e + n;
extra_zeroes = 0;
/* Factor out a common power of 10 if possible. */
if (s > 0 && n > 0)
{
extra_zeroes = (s < n ? s : n);
s -= extra_zeroes;
n -= extra_zeroes;
}
/* Here y = round (2^s * 5^n * m) * 10^extra_zeroes.
Before converting to decimal, we need to compute
z = round (2^s * 5^n * m). */
/* Compute 5^|n|, possibly shifted by |s| bits if n and s have the same
sign. 2.322 is slightly larger than log(5)/log(2). */
abs_n = (n >= 0 ? n : -n);
abs_s = (s >= 0 ? s : -s);
pow5_ptr = (mp_limb_t *) malloc (((int)(abs_n * (2.322f / GMP_LIMB_BITS)) + 1
+ abs_s / GMP_LIMB_BITS + 1)
* sizeof (mp_limb_t));
if (pow5_ptr == NULL)
{
free (memory);
return NULL;
}
/* Initialize with 1. */
pow5_ptr[0] = 1;
pow5_len = 1;
/* Multiply with 5^|n|. */
if (abs_n > 0)
{
static mp_limb_t const small_pow5[13 + 1] =
{
1, 5, 25, 125, 625, 3125, 15625, 78125, 390625, 1953125, 9765625,
48828125, 244140625, 1220703125
};
unsigned int n13;
for (n13 = 0; n13 <= abs_n; n13 += 13)
{
mp_limb_t digit1 = small_pow5[n13 + 13 <= abs_n ? 13 : abs_n - n13];
size_t j;
mp_twolimb_t carry = 0;
for (j = 0; j < pow5_len; j++)
{
mp_limb_t digit2 = pow5_ptr[j];
carry += (mp_twolimb_t) digit1 * (mp_twolimb_t) digit2;
pow5_ptr[j] = (mp_limb_t) carry;
carry = carry >> GMP_LIMB_BITS;
}
if (carry > 0)
pow5_ptr[pow5_len++] = (mp_limb_t) carry;
}
}
s_limbs = abs_s / GMP_LIMB_BITS;
s_bits = abs_s % GMP_LIMB_BITS;
if (n >= 0 ? s >= 0 : s <= 0)
{
/* Multiply with 2^|s|. */
if (s_bits > 0)
{
mp_limb_t *ptr = pow5_ptr;
mp_twolimb_t accu = 0;
size_t count;
for (count = pow5_len; count > 0; count--)
{
accu += (mp_twolimb_t) *ptr << s_bits;
*ptr++ = (mp_limb_t) accu;
accu = accu >> GMP_LIMB_BITS;
}
if (accu > 0)
{
*ptr = (mp_limb_t) accu;
pow5_len++;
}
}
if (s_limbs > 0)
{
size_t count;
for (count = pow5_len; count > 0;)
{
count--;
pow5_ptr[s_limbs + count] = pow5_ptr[count];
}
for (count = s_limbs; count > 0;)
{
count--;
pow5_ptr[count] = 0;
}
pow5_len += s_limbs;
}
pow5.limbs = pow5_ptr;
pow5.nlimbs = pow5_len;
if (n >= 0)
{
/* Multiply m with pow5. No division needed. */
z_memory = multiply (m, pow5, &z);
}
else
{
/* Divide m by pow5 and round. */
z_memory = divide (m, pow5, &z);
}
}
else
{
pow5.limbs = pow5_ptr;
pow5.nlimbs = pow5_len;
if (n >= 0)
{
/* n >= 0, s < 0.
Multiply m with pow5, then divide by 2^|s|. */
mpn_t numerator;
mpn_t denominator;
void *tmp_memory;
tmp_memory = multiply (m, pow5, &numerator);
if (tmp_memory == NULL)
{
free (pow5_ptr);
free (memory);
return NULL;
}
/* Construct 2^|s|. */
{
mp_limb_t *ptr = pow5_ptr + pow5_len;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < s_limbs; i++)
ptr[i] = 0;
ptr[s_limbs] = (mp_limb_t) 1 << s_bits;
denominator.limbs = ptr;
denominator.nlimbs = s_limbs + 1;
}
z_memory = divide (numerator, denominator, &z);
free (tmp_memory);
}
else
{
/* n < 0, s > 0.
Multiply m with 2^s, then divide by pow5. */
mpn_t numerator;
mp_limb_t *num_ptr;
num_ptr = (mp_limb_t *) malloc ((m.nlimbs + s_limbs + 1)
* sizeof (mp_limb_t));
if (num_ptr == NULL)
{
free (pow5_ptr);
free (memory);
return NULL;
}
{
mp_limb_t *destptr = num_ptr;
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < s_limbs; i++)
*destptr++ = 0;
}
if (s_bits > 0)
{
const mp_limb_t *sourceptr = m.limbs;
mp_twolimb_t accu = 0;
size_t count;
for (count = m.nlimbs; count > 0; count--)
{
accu += (mp_twolimb_t) *sourceptr++ << s_bits;
*destptr++ = (mp_limb_t) accu;
accu = accu >> GMP_LIMB_BITS;
}
if (accu > 0)
*destptr++ = (mp_limb_t) accu;
}
else
{
const mp_limb_t *sourceptr = m.limbs;
size_t count;
for (count = m.nlimbs; count > 0; count--)
*destptr++ = *sourceptr++;
}
numerator.limbs = num_ptr;
numerator.nlimbs = destptr - num_ptr;
}
z_memory = divide (numerator, pow5, &z);
free (num_ptr);
}
}
free (pow5_ptr);
free (memory);
/* Here y = round (x * 10^n) = z * 10^extra_zeroes. */
if (z_memory == NULL)
return NULL;
digits = convert_to_decimal (z, extra_zeroes);
free (z_memory);
return digits;
}
Commit Message: vasnprintf: Fix heap memory overrun bug.
Reported by Ben Pfaff <blp@cs.stanford.edu> in
<https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnulib/2018-09/msg00107.html>.
* lib/vasnprintf.c (convert_to_decimal): Allocate one more byte of
memory.
* tests/test-vasnprintf.c (test_function): Add another test.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_getfh(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs_fh *fh)
{
__be32 *p;
uint32_t len;
int status;
/* Zero handle first to allow comparisons */
memset(fh, 0, sizeof(*fh));
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_GETFH);
if (status)
return status;
READ_BUF(4);
READ32(len);
if (len > NFS4_FHSIZE)
return -EIO;
fh->size = len;
READ_BUF(len);
COPYMEM(fh->data, len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nr_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct nr_sock *nr = nr_sk(sk);
int val = 0;
int len;
if (level != SOL_NETROM)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
switch (optname) {
case NETROM_T1:
val = nr->t1 / HZ;
break;
case NETROM_T2:
val = nr->t2 / HZ;
break;
case NETROM_N2:
val = nr->n2;
break;
case NETROM_T4:
val = nr->t4 / HZ;
break;
case NETROM_IDLE:
val = nr->idle / (60 * HZ);
break;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(int));
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
return copy_to_user(optval, &val, len) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: netrom: fix info leak via msg_name in nr_recvmsg()
In case msg_name is set the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of
struct sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Also
the sax25_ndigis member does not get assigned, leaking four more
bytes.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 10,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void shm_rmid(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct shmid_kernel *s)
{
list_del(&s->shm_clist);
ipc_rmid(&shm_ids(ns), &s->shm_perm);
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 12,153
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::experimentalFeaturesEnabled() const {
return RuntimeEnabledFeatures::
experimentalContentSecurityPolicyFeaturesEnabled();
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 24,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnInitialize(
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnInitialize");
DCHECK(!command_buffer_.get());
command_buffer_.reset(new gpu::CommandBufferService(
context_group_->transfer_buffer_manager()));
if (!command_buffer_->Initialize()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "CommandBufferService failed to initialize.\n";
OnInitializeFailed(reply_message);
return;
}
decoder_.reset(::gpu::gles2::GLES2Decoder::Create(context_group_.get()));
scheduler_.reset(new gpu::GpuScheduler(command_buffer_.get(),
decoder_.get(),
decoder_.get()));
if (preempt_by_counter_.get())
scheduler_->SetPreemptByCounter(preempt_by_counter_);
decoder_->set_engine(scheduler_.get());
if (!handle_.is_null()) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(UI_COMPOSITOR_IMAGE_TRANSPORT)
if (software_) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "No software support.\n";
OnInitializeFailed(reply_message);
return;
}
#endif
surface_ = ImageTransportSurface::CreateSurface(
channel_->gpu_channel_manager(),
this,
handle_);
} else {
GpuChannelManager* manager = channel_->gpu_channel_manager();
surface_ = manager->GetDefaultOffscreenSurface();
}
if (!surface_.get()) {
decoder_.reset();
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create surface.\n";
OnInitializeFailed(reply_message);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<gfx::GLContext> context;
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableVirtualGLContexts) && channel_->share_group()) {
context = channel_->share_group()->GetSharedContext();
if (!context) {
context = gfx::GLContext::CreateGLContext(
channel_->share_group(),
channel_->gpu_channel_manager()->GetDefaultOffscreenSurface(),
gpu_preference_);
channel_->share_group()->SetSharedContext(context);
}
DCHECK(context->GetHandle());
context = new gpu::GLContextVirtual(channel_->share_group(),
context,
decoder_->AsWeakPtr());
if (!context->Initialize(surface_, gpu_preference_)) {
context = NULL;
LOG(FATAL) << "Failed to initialize virtual GL context.";
} else {
LOG(INFO) << "Created virtual GL context.";
}
}
if (!context) {
context = gfx::GLContext::CreateGLContext(
channel_->share_group(),
surface_.get(),
gpu_preference_);
}
if (!context) {
decoder_.reset();
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create context.\n";
OnInitializeFailed(reply_message);
return;
}
if (!context->MakeCurrent(surface_.get())) {
decoder_.reset();
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to make context current.";
OnInitializeFailed(reply_message);
return;
}
if (!context->GetTotalGpuMemory(&total_gpu_memory_))
total_gpu_memory_ = 0;
if (!context_group_->has_program_cache()) {
context_group_->set_program_cache(
channel_->gpu_channel_manager()->program_cache());
}
if (!decoder_->Initialize(surface_,
context,
!surface_id(),
initial_size_,
disallowed_features_,
allowed_extensions_.c_str(),
requested_attribs_)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initialize decoder.";
OnInitializeFailed(reply_message);
return;
}
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableGPUServiceLogging)) {
decoder_->set_log_commands(true);
}
decoder_->SetMsgCallback(
base::Bind(&GpuCommandBufferStub::SendConsoleMessage,
base::Unretained(this)));
command_buffer_->SetPutOffsetChangeCallback(
base::Bind(&GpuCommandBufferStub::PutChanged, base::Unretained(this)));
command_buffer_->SetGetBufferChangeCallback(
base::Bind(&gpu::GpuScheduler::SetGetBuffer,
base::Unretained(scheduler_.get())));
command_buffer_->SetParseErrorCallback(
base::Bind(&GpuCommandBufferStub::OnParseError, base::Unretained(this)));
scheduler_->SetScheduledCallback(
base::Bind(&GpuCommandBufferStub::OnReschedule, base::Unretained(this)));
if (watchdog_) {
scheduler_->SetCommandProcessedCallback(
base::Bind(&GpuCommandBufferStub::OnCommandProcessed,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
decoder_->SetStreamTextureManager(channel_->stream_texture_manager());
#endif
if (parent_stub_for_initialization_) {
decoder_->SetParent(parent_stub_for_initialization_->decoder_.get(),
parent_texture_for_initialization_);
parent_stub_for_initialization_.reset();
parent_texture_for_initialization_ = 0;
}
GpuCommandBufferMsg_Initialize::WriteReplyParams(reply_message, true);
Send(reply_message);
if (handle_.is_null() && !active_url_.is_empty()) {
GpuChannelManager* gpu_channel_manager = channel_->gpu_channel_manager();
gpu_channel_manager->Send(new GpuHostMsg_DidCreateOffscreenContext(
active_url_));
}
}
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_display_region)
{
get_icu_disp_value_src_php( LOC_REGION_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 15,623
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int readlink_and_make_absolute(const char *p, char **r) {
char *target, *k;
int j;
assert(p);
assert(r);
if ((j = readlink_malloc(p, &target)) < 0)
return j;
k = file_in_same_dir(p, target);
free(target);
if (!k)
return -ENOMEM;
*r = k;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 21,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const TemplateURL* ZeroSuggestProvider::GetTemplateURL(bool is_keyword) const {
DCHECK(!is_keyword);
return client()->GetTemplateURLService()->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
}
Commit Message: Provide experimental contextual suggestions when current URL comes from a google domain.
The counts for the Omnibox.ZeroSuggestRequests historgram are 35% smaller for groups that are running under the ZeroSuggestRedirectToChrome flag. Note that previous to this CL, a request was not made when the user was visiting an HTTPS page and the domain of the current was different from that of the service providing zero suggestions. This CL addresses this restrictions by making sure that requests are sent to the experimental service when Google is the default search engine AND the same request was validated to be sent to Google.
BUG=692471
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2915163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#476786}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_decode_ofp10_phy_port(struct ofputil_phy_port *pp,
const struct ofp10_phy_port *opp)
{
pp->port_no = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(opp->port_no));
pp->hw_addr = opp->hw_addr;
ovs_strlcpy(pp->name, opp->name, OFP_MAX_PORT_NAME_LEN);
pp->config = ntohl(opp->config) & OFPPC10_ALL;
pp->state = ntohl(opp->state) & OFPPS10_ALL;
pp->curr = netdev_port_features_from_ofp10(opp->curr);
pp->advertised = netdev_port_features_from_ofp10(opp->advertised);
pp->supported = netdev_port_features_from_ofp10(opp->supported);
pp->peer = netdev_port_features_from_ofp10(opp->peer);
pp->curr_speed = netdev_features_to_bps(pp->curr, 0) / 1000;
pp->max_speed = netdev_features_to_bps(pp->supported, 0) / 1000;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 3,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InterstitialPageImpl::FocusThroughTabTraversal(bool reverse) {
if (!enabled())
return;
render_view_host_->SetInitialFocus(reverse);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ElementsAccessor::InitializeOncePerProcess() {
static ElementsAccessor* accessor_array[] = {
#define ACCESSOR_ARRAY(Class, Kind, Store) new Class(#Kind),
ELEMENTS_LIST(ACCESSOR_ARRAY)
#undef ACCESSOR_ARRAY
};
STATIC_ASSERT((sizeof(accessor_array) / sizeof(*accessor_array)) ==
kElementsKindCount);
elements_accessors_ = accessor_array;
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tt_cmap14_init( TT_CMap14 cmap,
FT_Byte* table )
{
cmap->cmap.data = table;
table += 6;
cmap->num_selectors = FT_PEEK_ULONG( table );
cmap->max_results = 0;
cmap->results = NULL;
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int platform_device_add(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
int i, ret;
if (!pdev)
return -EINVAL;
if (!pdev->dev.parent)
pdev->dev.parent = &platform_bus;
pdev->dev.bus = &platform_bus_type;
switch (pdev->id) {
default:
dev_set_name(&pdev->dev, "%s.%d", pdev->name, pdev->id);
break;
case PLATFORM_DEVID_NONE:
dev_set_name(&pdev->dev, "%s", pdev->name);
break;
case PLATFORM_DEVID_AUTO:
/*
* Automatically allocated device ID. We mark it as such so
* that we remember it must be freed, and we append a suffix
* to avoid namespace collision with explicit IDs.
*/
ret = ida_simple_get(&platform_devid_ida, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret < 0)
goto err_out;
pdev->id = ret;
pdev->id_auto = true;
dev_set_name(&pdev->dev, "%s.%d.auto", pdev->name, pdev->id);
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < pdev->num_resources; i++) {
struct resource *p, *r = &pdev->resource[i];
if (r->name == NULL)
r->name = dev_name(&pdev->dev);
p = r->parent;
if (!p) {
if (resource_type(r) == IORESOURCE_MEM)
p = &iomem_resource;
else if (resource_type(r) == IORESOURCE_IO)
p = &ioport_resource;
}
if (p && insert_resource(p, r)) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to claim resource %d: %pR\n", i, r);
ret = -EBUSY;
goto failed;
}
}
pr_debug("Registering platform device '%s'. Parent at %s\n",
dev_name(&pdev->dev), dev_name(pdev->dev.parent));
ret = device_add(&pdev->dev);
if (ret == 0)
return ret;
failed:
if (pdev->id_auto) {
ida_simple_remove(&platform_devid_ida, pdev->id);
pdev->id = PLATFORM_DEVID_AUTO;
}
while (--i >= 0) {
struct resource *r = &pdev->resource[i];
if (r->parent)
release_resource(r);
}
err_out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 14,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnDragTargetDrop(const gfx::Point& client_point,
const gfx::Point& screen_point) {
webview()->dragTargetDrop(client_point, screen_point);
Send(new DragHostMsg_TargetDrop_ACK(routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 15,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int can_migrate_task(struct task_struct *p, struct lb_env *env)
{
int tsk_cache_hot;
lockdep_assert_held(&env->src_rq->lock);
/*
* We do not migrate tasks that are:
* 1) throttled_lb_pair, or
* 2) cannot be migrated to this CPU due to cpus_allowed, or
* 3) running (obviously), or
* 4) are cache-hot on their current CPU.
*/
if (throttled_lb_pair(task_group(p), env->src_cpu, env->dst_cpu))
return 0;
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(env->dst_cpu, &p->cpus_allowed)) {
int cpu;
schedstat_inc(p->se.statistics.nr_failed_migrations_affine);
env->flags |= LBF_SOME_PINNED;
/*
* Remember if this task can be migrated to any other CPU in
* our sched_group. We may want to revisit it if we couldn't
* meet load balance goals by pulling other tasks on src_cpu.
*
* Avoid computing new_dst_cpu for NEWLY_IDLE or if we have
* already computed one in current iteration.
*/
if (env->idle == CPU_NEWLY_IDLE || (env->flags & LBF_DST_PINNED))
return 0;
/* Prevent to re-select dst_cpu via env's CPUs: */
for_each_cpu_and(cpu, env->dst_grpmask, env->cpus) {
if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, &p->cpus_allowed)) {
env->flags |= LBF_DST_PINNED;
env->new_dst_cpu = cpu;
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Record that we found atleast one task that could run on dst_cpu */
env->flags &= ~LBF_ALL_PINNED;
if (task_running(env->src_rq, p)) {
schedstat_inc(p->se.statistics.nr_failed_migrations_running);
return 0;
}
/*
* Aggressive migration if:
* 1) destination numa is preferred
* 2) task is cache cold, or
* 3) too many balance attempts have failed.
*/
tsk_cache_hot = migrate_degrades_locality(p, env);
if (tsk_cache_hot == -1)
tsk_cache_hot = task_hot(p, env);
if (tsk_cache_hot <= 0 ||
env->sd->nr_balance_failed > env->sd->cache_nice_tries) {
if (tsk_cache_hot == 1) {
schedstat_inc(env->sd->lb_hot_gained[env->idle]);
schedstat_inc(p->se.statistics.nr_forced_migrations);
}
return 1;
}
schedstat_inc(p->se.statistics.nr_failed_migrations_hot);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 7,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decode_unicode_ssetup(char **pbcc_area, int bleft, struct cifs_ses *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int len;
char *data = *pbcc_area;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "bleft %d\n", bleft);
kfree(ses->serverOS);
ses->serverOS = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "serverOS=%s\n", ses->serverOS);
len = (UniStrnlen((wchar_t *) data, bleft / 2) * 2) + 2;
data += len;
bleft -= len;
if (bleft <= 0)
return;
kfree(ses->serverNOS);
ses->serverNOS = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "serverNOS=%s\n", ses->serverNOS);
len = (UniStrnlen((wchar_t *) data, bleft / 2) * 2) + 2;
data += len;
bleft -= len;
if (bleft <= 0)
return;
kfree(ses->serverDomain);
ses->serverDomain = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "serverDomain=%s\n", ses->serverDomain);
return;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 12,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int octal2dec(int octal)
{
int dec, n;
dec = 0; n = 1;
while (octal != 0) {
dec += n*(octal%10);
octal /= 10; n *= 8;
}
return dec;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 17,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChildThread::EnsureConnected() {
VLOG(0) << "ChildThread::EnsureConnected()";
base::KillProcess(base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(), 0, false);
}
Commit Message: [FileAPI] Clean up WebFileSystemImpl before Blink shutdown
WebFileSystemImpl should not outlive V8 instance, since it may have references to V8.
This CL ensures it deleted before Blink shutdown.
BUG=369525
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/270633009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269345 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal;
struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand;
spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock;
if (thread_group_empty(tsk))
goto no_thread_group;
/*
* Kill all other threads in the thread group.
*/
spin_lock_irq(lock);
if (signal_group_exit(sig)) {
/*
* Another group action in progress, just
* return so that the signal is processed.
*/
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
return -EAGAIN;
}
sig->group_exit_task = tsk;
sig->notify_count = zap_other_threads(tsk);
if (!thread_group_leader(tsk))
sig->notify_count--;
while (sig->notify_count) {
__set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
schedule();
if (unlikely(__fatal_signal_pending(tsk)))
goto killed;
spin_lock_irq(lock);
}
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
/*
* At this point all other threads have exited, all we have to
* do is to wait for the thread group leader to become inactive,
* and to assume its PID:
*/
if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) {
struct task_struct *leader = tsk->group_leader;
sig->notify_count = -1; /* for exit_notify() */
for (;;) {
threadgroup_change_begin(tsk);
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
if (likely(leader->exit_state))
break;
__set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
threadgroup_change_end(tsk);
schedule();
if (unlikely(__fatal_signal_pending(tsk)))
goto killed;
}
/*
* The only record we have of the real-time age of a
* process, regardless of execs it's done, is start_time.
* All the past CPU time is accumulated in signal_struct
* from sister threads now dead. But in this non-leader
* exec, nothing survives from the original leader thread,
* whose birth marks the true age of this process now.
* When we take on its identity by switching to its PID, we
* also take its birthdate (always earlier than our own).
*/
tsk->start_time = leader->start_time;
tsk->real_start_time = leader->real_start_time;
BUG_ON(!same_thread_group(leader, tsk));
BUG_ON(has_group_leader_pid(tsk));
/*
* An exec() starts a new thread group with the
* TGID of the previous thread group. Rehash the
* two threads with a switched PID, and release
* the former thread group leader:
*/
/* Become a process group leader with the old leader's pid.
* The old leader becomes a thread of the this thread group.
* Note: The old leader also uses this pid until release_task
* is called. Odd but simple and correct.
*/
tsk->pid = leader->pid;
change_pid(tsk, PIDTYPE_PID, task_pid(leader));
transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_PGID);
transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_SID);
list_replace_rcu(&leader->tasks, &tsk->tasks);
list_replace_init(&leader->sibling, &tsk->sibling);
tsk->group_leader = tsk;
leader->group_leader = tsk;
tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
leader->exit_signal = -1;
BUG_ON(leader->exit_state != EXIT_ZOMBIE);
leader->exit_state = EXIT_DEAD;
/*
* We are going to release_task()->ptrace_unlink() silently,
* the tracer can sleep in do_wait(). EXIT_DEAD guarantees
* the tracer wont't block again waiting for this thread.
*/
if (unlikely(leader->ptrace))
__wake_up_parent(leader, leader->parent);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
threadgroup_change_end(tsk);
release_task(leader);
}
sig->group_exit_task = NULL;
sig->notify_count = 0;
no_thread_group:
/* we have changed execution domain */
tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
exit_itimers(sig);
flush_itimer_signals();
if (atomic_read(&oldsighand->count) != 1) {
struct sighand_struct *newsighand;
/*
* This ->sighand is shared with the CLONE_SIGHAND
* but not CLONE_THREAD task, switch to the new one.
*/
newsighand = kmem_cache_alloc(sighand_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!newsighand)
return -ENOMEM;
atomic_set(&newsighand->count, 1);
memcpy(newsighand->action, oldsighand->action,
sizeof(newsighand->action));
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
spin_lock(&oldsighand->siglock);
rcu_assign_pointer(tsk->sighand, newsighand);
spin_unlock(&oldsighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
__cleanup_sighand(oldsighand);
}
BUG_ON(!thread_group_leader(tsk));
return 0;
killed:
/* protects against exit_notify() and __exit_signal() */
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
sig->group_exit_task = NULL;
sig->notify_count = 0;
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return -EAGAIN;
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 13,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Dispatcher::RegisterNativeHandlers(ModuleSystem* module_system,
ScriptContext* context) {
RegisterNativeHandlers(module_system,
context,
this,
request_sender_.get(),
v8_schema_registry_.get());
const Extension* extension = context->extension();
int manifest_version = extension ? extension->manifest_version() : 1;
bool is_component_extension =
extension && Manifest::IsComponentLocation(extension->location());
bool send_request_disabled =
(extension && Manifest::IsUnpackedLocation(extension->location()) &&
BackgroundInfo::HasLazyBackgroundPage(extension));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"process",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new ProcessInfoNativeHandler(
context,
context->GetExtensionID(),
context->GetContextTypeDescription(),
ExtensionsRendererClient::Get()->IsIncognitoProcess(),
is_component_extension,
manifest_version,
send_request_disabled)));
delegate_->RegisterNativeHandlers(this, module_system, context);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 9,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltAddStackElemList(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xsltStackElemPtr elems)
{
return(xsltAddStackElem(ctxt, elems));
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name)
{
int error = 0;
if (!name)
return -EFAULT;
down_read(&uts_sem);
if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof(*name)))
error = -EFAULT;
up_read(&uts_sem);
if (!error && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
error = -EFAULT;
if (!error && override_architecture(name))
error = -EFAULT;
return error;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void update_regset_xstate_info(unsigned int size, u64 xstate_mask)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
x86_64_regsets[REGSET_XSTATE].n = size / sizeof(u64);
#endif
#if defined CONFIG_X86_32 || defined CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
x86_32_regsets[REGSET_XSTATE].n = size / sizeof(u64);
#endif
xstate_fx_sw_bytes[USER_XSTATE_XCR0_WORD] = xstate_mask;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline HarfBuzzShaper::HarfBuzzRun::HarfBuzzRun(const SimpleFontData* fontData, unsigned startIndex, unsigned numCharacters, hb_direction_t direction, hb_script_t script)
: m_fontData(fontData)
, m_startIndex(startIndex)
, m_numCharacters(numCharacters)
, m_numGlyphs(0)
, m_direction(direction)
, m_script(script)
, m_width(0)
{
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_chacha20(void)
{
return (&chacha20);
}
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 24,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_buffer_environ(Buffer *buf)
{
static Buffer *prev_buf = NULL;
static Line *prev_line = NULL;
static int prev_pos = -1;
Line *l;
if (buf == NULL)
return;
if (buf != prev_buf) {
set_environ("W3M_SOURCEFILE", buf->sourcefile);
set_environ("W3M_FILENAME", buf->filename);
set_environ("W3M_TITLE", buf->buffername);
set_environ("W3M_URL", parsedURL2Str(&buf->currentURL)->ptr);
set_environ("W3M_TYPE", buf->real_type ? buf->real_type : "unknown");
#ifdef USE_M17N
set_environ("W3M_CHARSET", wc_ces_to_charset(buf->document_charset));
#endif
}
l = buf->currentLine;
if (l && (buf != prev_buf || l != prev_line || buf->pos != prev_pos)) {
Anchor *a;
ParsedURL pu;
char *s = GetWord(buf);
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_WORD", s ? s : "");
a = retrieveCurrentAnchor(buf);
if (a) {
parseURL2(a->url, &pu, baseURL(buf));
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_LINK", parsedURL2Str(&pu)->ptr);
}
else
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_LINK", "");
a = retrieveCurrentImg(buf);
if (a) {
parseURL2(a->url, &pu, baseURL(buf));
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_IMG", parsedURL2Str(&pu)->ptr);
}
else
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_IMG", "");
a = retrieveCurrentForm(buf);
if (a)
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_FORM", form2str((FormItemList *)a->url));
else
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_FORM", "");
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_LINE", Sprintf("%ld",
l->real_linenumber)->ptr);
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_COLUMN", Sprintf("%d",
buf->currentColumn +
buf->cursorX + 1)->ptr);
}
else if (!l) {
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_WORD", "");
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_LINK", "");
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_IMG", "");
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_FORM", "");
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_LINE", "0");
set_environ("W3M_CURRENT_COLUMN", "0");
}
prev_buf = buf;
prev_line = l;
prev_pos = buf->pos;
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 2,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FaxModem::recvEndPage(TIFF* tif, const Class2Params& params)
{
/*
* FAXRECVPARAMS is limited to a 32-bit value, and as that is quite
* limited in comparison to all possible fax parameters, FAXDCS is
* intended to be used to discern most fax parameters. The DCS
* signal, however, does not contain bitrate information when V.34-Fax
* is used, so tiffinfo, for example, will use FAXDCS for all fax
* parameters except for bitrate which comes from FAXRECVPARAMS.
*
* As FAXDCS is more recent in libtiff than is FAXRECVPARAMS some
* installations may not be able to use FAXDCS, in which case those
* installations will be limited to the 32-bit restraints.
*/
#ifdef TIFFTAG_FAXRECVPARAMS
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_FAXRECVPARAMS, (uint32) params.encode());
#endif
#ifdef TIFFTAG_FAXDCS
FaxParams pageparams = FaxParams(params);
fxStr faxdcs = "";
pageparams.asciiEncode(faxdcs);
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_FAXDCS, (const char*) faxdcs);
#endif
#ifdef TIFFTAG_FAXSUBADDRESS
if (sub != "")
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_FAXSUBADDRESS, (const char*) sub);
#endif
#ifdef TIFFTAG_FAXRECVTIME
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_FAXRECVTIME,
(uint32) server.setPageTransferTime());
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,803
|
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