instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned int fold_hash(unsigned long x, unsigned long y)
{
y ^= x * GOLDEN_RATIO_64;
y *= GOLDEN_RATIO_64;
return y >> 32;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lzw_add_to_dict(struct lzwdeccontext *d, unsigned int oldcode, iw_byte val)
{
static const unsigned int last_code_of_size[] = {
0,0,0,7,15,31,63,127,255,511,1023,2047,4095
};
unsigned int newpos;
if(d->ct_used>=4096) {
d->last_code_added = 0;
return 0;
}
newpos = d->ct_used;
d->ct_used++;
d->ct[newpos].parent = (iw_uint16)oldcode;
d->ct[newpos].length = d->ct[oldcode].length + 1;
d->ct[newpos].firstchar = d->ct[oldcode].firstchar;
d->ct[newpos].lastchar = val;
if(newpos == last_code_of_size[d->current_codesize]) {
if(d->current_codesize<12) {
d->current_codesize++;
}
}
d->last_code_added = newpos;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a GIF decoding bug (divide by zero)
Fixes issue #15
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 10,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ID3::Iterator::getstring(String8 *id, bool otherdata) const {
id->setTo("");
const uint8_t *frameData = mFrameData;
if (frameData == NULL) {
return;
}
uint8_t encoding = *frameData;
if (mParent.mVersion == ID3_V1 || mParent.mVersion == ID3_V1_1) {
if (mOffset == 126 || mOffset == 127) {
char tmp[16];
sprintf(tmp, "%d", (int)*frameData);
id->setTo(tmp);
return;
}
id->setTo((const char*)frameData, mFrameSize);
return;
}
if (mFrameSize < getHeaderLength() + 1) {
return;
}
size_t n = mFrameSize - getHeaderLength() - 1;
if (otherdata) {
frameData += 4;
int32_t i = n - 4;
while(--i >= 0 && *++frameData != 0) ;
int skipped = (frameData - mFrameData);
if (skipped >= (int)n) {
return;
}
n -= skipped;
}
if (encoding == 0x00) {
id->setTo((const char*)frameData + 1, n);
} else if (encoding == 0x03) {
id->setTo((const char *)(frameData + 1), n);
} else if (encoding == 0x02) {
int len = n / 2;
const char16_t *framedata = (const char16_t *) (frameData + 1);
char16_t *framedatacopy = NULL;
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
framedatacopy = new char16_t[len];
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
framedatacopy[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
framedata = framedatacopy;
#endif
id->setTo(framedata, len);
if (framedatacopy != NULL) {
delete[] framedatacopy;
}
} else if (encoding == 0x01) {
int len = n / 2;
const char16_t *framedata = (const char16_t *) (frameData + 1);
char16_t *framedatacopy = NULL;
if (*framedata == 0xfffe) {
framedatacopy = new char16_t[len];
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
framedatacopy[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
framedata = framedatacopy;
}
if (*framedata == 0xfeff) {
framedata++;
len--;
}
bool eightBit = true;
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (framedata[i] > 0xff) {
eightBit = false;
break;
}
}
if (eightBit) {
char *frame8 = new char[len];
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
frame8[i] = framedata[i];
}
id->setTo(frame8, len);
delete [] frame8;
} else {
id->setTo(framedata, len);
}
if (framedatacopy != NULL) {
delete[] framedatacopy;
}
}
}
Commit Message: better validation lengths of strings in ID3 tags
Validate lengths on strings in ID3 tags, particularly around 0.
Also added code to handle cases when we can't get memory for
copies of strings we want to extract from these tags.
Affects L/M/N/master, same patch for all of them.
Bug: 30744884
Change-Id: I2675a817a39f0927ec1f7e9f9c09f2e61020311e
Test: play mp3 file which caused a <0 length.
(cherry picked from commit d23c01546c4f82840a01a380def76ab6cae5d43f)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 12,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::FriendZone::AddCreatedCallbackForTesting(
const CreatedCallback& callback) {
g_created_callbacks.Get().push_back(callback);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AddLibrary(int resource_id) {
include_libraries_.push_back(resource_id);
}
Commit Message: WebUI: Include cr/ui/grid.js only on ChromeOS.
Not used in any other platform.
Bug: None
Change-Id: I13cb2550ee38a828d8d266aeea5a8aa04695b54e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1638915
Auto-Submit: Demetrios Papadopoulos <dpapad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Esmael El-Moslimany <aee@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Demetrios Papadopoulos <dpapad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#665766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 2,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: qreal QQuickWebViewExperimental::contentY() const
{
Q_D(const QQuickWebView);
ASSERT(d->flickProvider);
return d->flickProvider->contentY();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutomationProviderHistoryObserver::HistoryQueryComplete(
HistoryService::Handle request_handle,
history::QueryResults* results) {
if (!provider_) {
delete this;
return;
}
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> return_value(new DictionaryValue);
ListValue* history_list = new ListValue;
for (size_t i = 0; i < results->size(); ++i) {
DictionaryValue* page_value = new DictionaryValue;
history::URLResult const &page = (*results)[i];
page_value->SetString("title", page.title());
page_value->SetString("url", page.url().spec());
page_value->SetDouble("time",
static_cast<double>(page.visit_time().ToDoubleT()));
page_value->SetString("snippet", page.snippet().text());
page_value->SetBoolean(
"starred",
BookmarkModelFactory::GetForProfile(
provider_->profile())->IsBookmarked(page.url()));
history_list->Append(page_value);
}
return_value->Set("history", history_list);
AutomationJSONReply reply(provider_, reply_message_.release());
reply.SendSuccess(return_value.get());
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pdf_run_SC_pattern(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, const char *name, pdf_pattern *pat, int n, float *color)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pr->dev->flags &= ~FZ_DEVFLAG_STROKECOLOR_UNDEFINED;
pdf_set_pattern(ctx, pr, PDF_STROKE, pat, color);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_pre_pic_dec_proc(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
WORD32 u4_get_disp;
pic_buf_t *ps_disp_pic;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
u4_get_disp = 0;
ps_disp_pic = NULL;
/* Field Picture */
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure != FRAME_PICTURE)
{
ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb = (ps_dec->u2_vertical_size + 31) >> 5;
if(ps_dec->u2_num_flds_decoded == 0)
{
pic_buf_t *ps_pic_buf;
u4_get_disp = 1;
ps_pic_buf = impeg2_buf_mgr_get_next_free(ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, &ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id);
if (NULL == ps_pic_buf)
{
return IMPEG2D_NO_FREE_BUF_ERR;
}
impeg2_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
impeg2_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
if(ps_dec->u4_deinterlace)
impeg2_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id, MPEG2_BUF_MGR_DEINT);
ps_pic_buf->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_inp_ts;
ps_pic_buf->e_pic_type = ps_dec->e_pic_type;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_pic_buf;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_y = ps_pic_buf->pu1_y;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_u = ps_pic_buf->pu1_u;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_v = ps_pic_buf->pu1_v;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure == TOP_FIELD)
{
ps_dec->u2_fld_parity = TOP;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_fld_parity = BOTTOM;
}
ps_dec->u2_field_dct = 0;
ps_dec->u2_read_dct_type = 0;
ps_dec->u2_read_motion_type = 1;
ps_dec->u2_fld_pic = 1;
ps_dec->u2_frm_pic = 0;
ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back = gas_impeg2d_func_fld_fw_or_bk;
ps_dec->ps_func_bi_direct = gas_impeg2d_func_fld_bi_direct;
}
/* Frame Picture */
else
{
pic_buf_t *ps_pic_buf;
ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb = (ps_dec->u2_vertical_size + 15) >> 4;
u4_get_disp = 1;
ps_pic_buf = impeg2_buf_mgr_get_next_free(ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, &ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id);
if (NULL == ps_pic_buf)
{
return IMPEG2D_NO_FREE_BUF_ERR;
}
impeg2_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
impeg2_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
if(ps_dec->u4_deinterlace)
impeg2_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id, MPEG2_BUF_MGR_DEINT);
ps_pic_buf->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_inp_ts;
ps_pic_buf->e_pic_type = ps_dec->e_pic_type;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_pic_buf;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_y = ps_pic_buf->pu1_y;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_u = ps_pic_buf->pu1_u;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_v = ps_pic_buf->pu1_v;
if(ps_dec->u2_frame_pred_frame_dct == 0)
{
ps_dec->u2_read_dct_type = 1;
ps_dec->u2_read_motion_type = 1;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_read_dct_type = 0;
ps_dec->u2_read_motion_type = 0;
ps_dec->u2_motion_type = 2;
ps_dec->u2_field_dct = 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_fld_parity = TOP;
ps_dec->u2_fld_pic = 0;
ps_dec->u2_frm_pic = 1;
ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back = gas_impeg2d_func_frm_fw_or_bk;
ps_dec->ps_func_bi_direct = gas_impeg2d_func_frm_bi_direct;
}
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left = ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb * ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb;
if(u4_get_disp)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_num_frames_decoded > 1)
{
ps_disp_pic = impeg2_disp_mgr_get(&ps_dec->s_disp_mgr, &ps_dec->i4_disp_buf_id);
}
ps_dec->ps_disp_pic = ps_disp_pic;
if(ps_disp_pic)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_y_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_y;
if(IV_YUV_420P == ps_dec->i4_chromaFormat)
{
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_u_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_u;
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_v_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_v;
}
else
{
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
pu1_buf = ps_dec->as_disp_buffers[ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id].pu1_bufs[1];
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_u_buf = pu1_buf;
pu1_buf = ps_dec->as_disp_buffers[ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id].pu1_bufs[2];
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_v_buf = pu1_buf;
}
}
}
}
switch(ps_dec->e_pic_type)
{
case I_PIC:
{
ps_dec->pf_decode_slice = impeg2d_dec_i_slice;
break;
}
case D_PIC:
{
ps_dec->pf_decode_slice = impeg2d_dec_d_slice;
break;
}
case P_PIC:
{
ps_dec->pf_decode_slice = impeg2d_dec_p_b_slice;
ps_dec->pu2_mb_type = gau2_impeg2d_p_mb_type;
break;
}
case B_PIC:
{
ps_dec->pf_decode_slice = impeg2d_dec_p_b_slice;
ps_dec->pu2_mb_type = gau2_impeg2d_b_mb_type;
break;
}
default:
return IMPEG2D_INVALID_PIC_TYPE;
}
/*************************************************************************/
/* Set the reference pictures */
/*************************************************************************/
/* Error resilience: If forward and backward pictures are going to be NULL*/
/* then assign both to the current */
/* if one of them NULL then we will assign the non null to the NULL one */
if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == P_PIC)
{
if (NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0].pu1_y)
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0] = ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
}
if (NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1].pu1_y)
{
impeg2d_get_bottom_field_buf(&ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf, &ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1],
ps_dec->u2_frame_width);
}
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[FORW][TOP] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0];
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[FORW][BOTTOM] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1];
}
else if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == B_PIC)
{
if((NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0].pu1_y) && (NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0].pu1_y))
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0] = ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
impeg2d_get_bottom_field_buf(&ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf, &ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1],
ps_dec->u2_frame_width);
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0] = ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1];
}
else if ((NULL != ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0].pu1_y) && (NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0].pu1_y))
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0];
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1];
}
else if ((NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0].pu1_y) && (NULL != ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0].pu1_y))
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0];
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1];
}
/* Error resilience: If forward and backward pictures are going to be NULL*/
/* then assign both to the current */
/* if one of them NULL then we will assign the non null to the NULL one */
if((NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1].pu1_y) && (NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1].pu1_y))
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0] = ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
impeg2d_get_bottom_field_buf(&ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf, &ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1],
ps_dec->u2_frame_width);
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0] = ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1];
}
else if((NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1].pu1_y) && (NULL != ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1].pu1_y))
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0];
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1];
}
else if((NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1].pu1_y) && (NULL != ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1].pu1_y))
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0];
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1];
}
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[FORW][TOP] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0];
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[FORW][BOTTOM] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1];
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[BACK][TOP] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0];
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[BACK][BOTTOM] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1];
}
return e_error;
}
Commit Message: Adding Error Check for f_code Parameters
In MPEG1, the valid range for the forward and backward f_code parameters
is [1, 7]. Adding a check to enforce this. Without the check, the value
could be 0. We read (f_code - 1) bits from the stream and reading a
negative number of bits from the stream is undefined.
Bug: 64550583
Test: monitored temp ALOGD() output
Change-Id: Ia452cd43a28e9d566401f515947164635361782f
(cherry picked from commit 71d734b83d72e8a59f73f1230982da97615d2689)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 7,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t show_tabletODMCode(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct aiptek *aiptek = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%04x\n", aiptek->features.odmCode);
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SplitStringAlongWhitespace(const string16& str,
std::vector<string16>* result) {
SplitStringAlongWhitespaceT(str, result);
}
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillManager::Reset() {
form_structures_.reset();
has_logged_autofill_enabled_ = false;
has_logged_address_suggestions_count_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: param_functions* get_param_functions()
{
config_p_funcs.set_param_func(¶m);
config_p_funcs.set_param_bool_int_func(¶m_boolean_int);
config_p_funcs.set_param_wo_default_func(¶m_without_default);
return &config_p_funcs;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 11,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::scrollToOffset(const IntSize& offset)
{
ASSERT(hasOverflowClip());
DisableCompositingQueryAsserts disabler;
layer()->scrollableArea()->scrollToOffset(offset, ScrollOffsetClamped);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mismatch_cnt_show(struct mddev *mddev, char *page)
{
return sprintf(page, "%llu\n",
(unsigned long long)
atomic64_read(&mddev->resync_mismatches));
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int SVGIsStandalone(void *context)
{
SVGInfo
*svg_info;
/*
Is this document tagged standalone?
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," SAX.SVGIsStandalone()");
svg_info=(SVGInfo *) context;
return(svg_info->document->standalone == 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_apic_match_physical_addr(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u16 dest)
{
return dest == 0xff || kvm_apic_id(apic) == dest;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 15,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texSubImage3D(
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLsizei depth,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
ImageBitmap* bitmap,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texSubImage3D",
"a buffer is bound to PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
TexImageHelperImageBitmap(kTexSubImage3D, target, level, 0, format, type,
xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, bitmap,
GetTextureSourceSubRectangle(width, height), depth,
unpack_image_height_, exception_state);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nl80211_send_wiphy(struct sk_buff *msg, u32 pid, u32 seq, int flags,
struct cfg80211_registered_device *dev)
{
void *hdr;
struct nlattr *nl_bands, *nl_band;
struct nlattr *nl_freqs, *nl_freq;
struct nlattr *nl_rates, *nl_rate;
struct nlattr *nl_cmds;
enum ieee80211_band band;
struct ieee80211_channel *chan;
struct ieee80211_rate *rate;
int i;
const struct ieee80211_txrx_stypes *mgmt_stypes =
dev->wiphy.mgmt_stypes;
hdr = nl80211hdr_put(msg, pid, seq, flags, NL80211_CMD_NEW_WIPHY);
if (!hdr)
return -1;
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY, dev->wiphy_idx);
NLA_PUT_STRING(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_NAME, wiphy_name(&dev->wiphy));
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_GENERATION,
cfg80211_rdev_list_generation);
NLA_PUT_U8(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_RETRY_SHORT,
dev->wiphy.retry_short);
NLA_PUT_U8(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_RETRY_LONG,
dev->wiphy.retry_long);
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_FRAG_THRESHOLD,
dev->wiphy.frag_threshold);
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_RTS_THRESHOLD,
dev->wiphy.rts_threshold);
NLA_PUT_U8(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_COVERAGE_CLASS,
dev->wiphy.coverage_class);
NLA_PUT_U8(msg, NL80211_ATTR_MAX_NUM_SCAN_SSIDS,
dev->wiphy.max_scan_ssids);
NLA_PUT_U16(msg, NL80211_ATTR_MAX_SCAN_IE_LEN,
dev->wiphy.max_scan_ie_len);
if (dev->wiphy.flags & WIPHY_FLAG_IBSS_RSN)
NLA_PUT_FLAG(msg, NL80211_ATTR_SUPPORT_IBSS_RSN);
if (dev->wiphy.flags & WIPHY_FLAG_MESH_AUTH)
NLA_PUT_FLAG(msg, NL80211_ATTR_SUPPORT_MESH_AUTH);
NLA_PUT(msg, NL80211_ATTR_CIPHER_SUITES,
sizeof(u32) * dev->wiphy.n_cipher_suites,
dev->wiphy.cipher_suites);
NLA_PUT_U8(msg, NL80211_ATTR_MAX_NUM_PMKIDS,
dev->wiphy.max_num_pmkids);
if (dev->wiphy.flags & WIPHY_FLAG_CONTROL_PORT_PROTOCOL)
NLA_PUT_FLAG(msg, NL80211_ATTR_CONTROL_PORT_ETHERTYPE);
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_ANTENNA_AVAIL_TX,
dev->wiphy.available_antennas_tx);
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_ANTENNA_AVAIL_RX,
dev->wiphy.available_antennas_rx);
if ((dev->wiphy.available_antennas_tx ||
dev->wiphy.available_antennas_rx) && dev->ops->get_antenna) {
u32 tx_ant = 0, rx_ant = 0;
int res;
res = dev->ops->get_antenna(&dev->wiphy, &tx_ant, &rx_ant);
if (!res) {
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_ANTENNA_TX, tx_ant);
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_ANTENNA_RX, rx_ant);
}
}
if (nl80211_put_iftypes(msg, NL80211_ATTR_SUPPORTED_IFTYPES,
dev->wiphy.interface_modes))
goto nla_put_failure;
nl_bands = nla_nest_start(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_BANDS);
if (!nl_bands)
goto nla_put_failure;
for (band = 0; band < IEEE80211_NUM_BANDS; band++) {
if (!dev->wiphy.bands[band])
continue;
nl_band = nla_nest_start(msg, band);
if (!nl_band)
goto nla_put_failure;
/* add HT info */
if (dev->wiphy.bands[band]->ht_cap.ht_supported) {
NLA_PUT(msg, NL80211_BAND_ATTR_HT_MCS_SET,
sizeof(dev->wiphy.bands[band]->ht_cap.mcs),
&dev->wiphy.bands[band]->ht_cap.mcs);
NLA_PUT_U16(msg, NL80211_BAND_ATTR_HT_CAPA,
dev->wiphy.bands[band]->ht_cap.cap);
NLA_PUT_U8(msg, NL80211_BAND_ATTR_HT_AMPDU_FACTOR,
dev->wiphy.bands[band]->ht_cap.ampdu_factor);
NLA_PUT_U8(msg, NL80211_BAND_ATTR_HT_AMPDU_DENSITY,
dev->wiphy.bands[band]->ht_cap.ampdu_density);
}
/* add frequencies */
nl_freqs = nla_nest_start(msg, NL80211_BAND_ATTR_FREQS);
if (!nl_freqs)
goto nla_put_failure;
for (i = 0; i < dev->wiphy.bands[band]->n_channels; i++) {
nl_freq = nla_nest_start(msg, i);
if (!nl_freq)
goto nla_put_failure;
chan = &dev->wiphy.bands[band]->channels[i];
if (nl80211_msg_put_channel(msg, chan))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(msg, nl_freq);
}
nla_nest_end(msg, nl_freqs);
/* add bitrates */
nl_rates = nla_nest_start(msg, NL80211_BAND_ATTR_RATES);
if (!nl_rates)
goto nla_put_failure;
for (i = 0; i < dev->wiphy.bands[band]->n_bitrates; i++) {
nl_rate = nla_nest_start(msg, i);
if (!nl_rate)
goto nla_put_failure;
rate = &dev->wiphy.bands[band]->bitrates[i];
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_BITRATE_ATTR_RATE,
rate->bitrate);
if (rate->flags & IEEE80211_RATE_SHORT_PREAMBLE)
NLA_PUT_FLAG(msg,
NL80211_BITRATE_ATTR_2GHZ_SHORTPREAMBLE);
nla_nest_end(msg, nl_rate);
}
nla_nest_end(msg, nl_rates);
nla_nest_end(msg, nl_band);
}
nla_nest_end(msg, nl_bands);
nl_cmds = nla_nest_start(msg, NL80211_ATTR_SUPPORTED_COMMANDS);
if (!nl_cmds)
goto nla_put_failure;
i = 0;
#define CMD(op, n) \
do { \
if (dev->ops->op) { \
i++; \
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, i, NL80211_CMD_ ## n); \
} \
} while (0)
CMD(add_virtual_intf, NEW_INTERFACE);
CMD(change_virtual_intf, SET_INTERFACE);
CMD(add_key, NEW_KEY);
CMD(add_beacon, NEW_BEACON);
CMD(add_station, NEW_STATION);
CMD(add_mpath, NEW_MPATH);
CMD(update_mesh_config, SET_MESH_CONFIG);
CMD(change_bss, SET_BSS);
CMD(auth, AUTHENTICATE);
CMD(assoc, ASSOCIATE);
CMD(deauth, DEAUTHENTICATE);
CMD(disassoc, DISASSOCIATE);
CMD(join_ibss, JOIN_IBSS);
CMD(join_mesh, JOIN_MESH);
CMD(set_pmksa, SET_PMKSA);
CMD(del_pmksa, DEL_PMKSA);
CMD(flush_pmksa, FLUSH_PMKSA);
CMD(remain_on_channel, REMAIN_ON_CHANNEL);
CMD(set_bitrate_mask, SET_TX_BITRATE_MASK);
CMD(mgmt_tx, FRAME);
CMD(mgmt_tx_cancel_wait, FRAME_WAIT_CANCEL);
if (dev->wiphy.flags & WIPHY_FLAG_NETNS_OK) {
i++;
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, i, NL80211_CMD_SET_WIPHY_NETNS);
}
CMD(set_channel, SET_CHANNEL);
CMD(set_wds_peer, SET_WDS_PEER);
if (dev->wiphy.flags & WIPHY_FLAG_SUPPORTS_SCHED_SCAN)
CMD(sched_scan_start, START_SCHED_SCAN);
#undef CMD
if (dev->ops->connect || dev->ops->auth) {
i++;
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, i, NL80211_CMD_CONNECT);
}
if (dev->ops->disconnect || dev->ops->deauth) {
i++;
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, i, NL80211_CMD_DISCONNECT);
}
nla_nest_end(msg, nl_cmds);
if (dev->ops->remain_on_channel)
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_MAX_REMAIN_ON_CHANNEL_DURATION,
dev->wiphy.max_remain_on_channel_duration);
/* for now at least assume all drivers have it */
if (dev->ops->mgmt_tx)
NLA_PUT_FLAG(msg, NL80211_ATTR_OFFCHANNEL_TX_OK);
if (mgmt_stypes) {
u16 stypes;
struct nlattr *nl_ftypes, *nl_ifs;
enum nl80211_iftype ift;
nl_ifs = nla_nest_start(msg, NL80211_ATTR_TX_FRAME_TYPES);
if (!nl_ifs)
goto nla_put_failure;
for (ift = 0; ift < NUM_NL80211_IFTYPES; ift++) {
nl_ftypes = nla_nest_start(msg, ift);
if (!nl_ftypes)
goto nla_put_failure;
i = 0;
stypes = mgmt_stypes[ift].tx;
while (stypes) {
if (stypes & 1)
NLA_PUT_U16(msg, NL80211_ATTR_FRAME_TYPE,
(i << 4) | IEEE80211_FTYPE_MGMT);
stypes >>= 1;
i++;
}
nla_nest_end(msg, nl_ftypes);
}
nla_nest_end(msg, nl_ifs);
nl_ifs = nla_nest_start(msg, NL80211_ATTR_RX_FRAME_TYPES);
if (!nl_ifs)
goto nla_put_failure;
for (ift = 0; ift < NUM_NL80211_IFTYPES; ift++) {
nl_ftypes = nla_nest_start(msg, ift);
if (!nl_ftypes)
goto nla_put_failure;
i = 0;
stypes = mgmt_stypes[ift].rx;
while (stypes) {
if (stypes & 1)
NLA_PUT_U16(msg, NL80211_ATTR_FRAME_TYPE,
(i << 4) | IEEE80211_FTYPE_MGMT);
stypes >>= 1;
i++;
}
nla_nest_end(msg, nl_ftypes);
}
nla_nest_end(msg, nl_ifs);
}
if (dev->wiphy.wowlan.flags || dev->wiphy.wowlan.n_patterns) {
struct nlattr *nl_wowlan;
nl_wowlan = nla_nest_start(msg,
NL80211_ATTR_WOWLAN_TRIGGERS_SUPPORTED);
if (!nl_wowlan)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (dev->wiphy.wowlan.flags & WIPHY_WOWLAN_ANY)
NLA_PUT_FLAG(msg, NL80211_WOWLAN_TRIG_ANY);
if (dev->wiphy.wowlan.flags & WIPHY_WOWLAN_DISCONNECT)
NLA_PUT_FLAG(msg, NL80211_WOWLAN_TRIG_DISCONNECT);
if (dev->wiphy.wowlan.flags & WIPHY_WOWLAN_MAGIC_PKT)
NLA_PUT_FLAG(msg, NL80211_WOWLAN_TRIG_MAGIC_PKT);
if (dev->wiphy.wowlan.n_patterns) {
struct nl80211_wowlan_pattern_support pat = {
.max_patterns = dev->wiphy.wowlan.n_patterns,
.min_pattern_len =
dev->wiphy.wowlan.pattern_min_len,
.max_pattern_len =
dev->wiphy.wowlan.pattern_max_len,
};
NLA_PUT(msg, NL80211_WOWLAN_TRIG_PKT_PATTERN,
sizeof(pat), &pat);
}
nla_nest_end(msg, nl_wowlan);
}
if (nl80211_put_iftypes(msg, NL80211_ATTR_SOFTWARE_IFTYPES,
dev->wiphy.software_iftypes))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nl80211_put_iface_combinations(&dev->wiphy, msg))
goto nla_put_failure;
return genlmsg_end(msg, hdr);
nla_put_failure:
genlmsg_cancel(msg, hdr);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vrend_resource_copy_fallback(struct vrend_context *ctx,
struct vrend_resource *src_res,
struct vrend_resource *dst_res,
uint32_t dst_level,
uint32_t dstx, uint32_t dsty,
uint32_t dstz, uint32_t src_level,
const struct pipe_box *src_box)
{
char *tptr;
uint32_t transfer_size;
GLenum glformat, gltype;
int elsize = util_format_get_blocksize(dst_res->base.format);
int compressed = util_format_is_compressed(dst_res->base.format);
int cube_slice = 1;
uint32_t slice_size, slice_offset;
int i;
if (src_res->target == GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP)
cube_slice = 6;
if (src_res->base.format != dst_res->base.format) {
fprintf(stderr, "copy fallback failed due to mismatched formats %d %d\n", src_res->base.format, dst_res->base.format);
return;
}
/* this is ugly need to do a full GetTexImage */
slice_size = util_format_get_nblocks(src_res->base.format, u_minify(src_res->base.width0, src_level), u_minify(src_res->base.height0, src_level)) *
u_minify(src_res->base.depth0, src_level) * util_format_get_blocksize(src_res->base.format);
transfer_size = slice_size * src_res->base.array_size;
tptr = malloc(transfer_size);
if (!tptr)
return;
glformat = tex_conv_table[src_res->base.format].glformat;
gltype = tex_conv_table[src_res->base.format].gltype;
if (compressed)
glformat = tex_conv_table[src_res->base.format].internalformat;
switch (elsize) {
case 1:
glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT, 1);
break;
case 2:
glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT, 2);
break;
case 4:
default:
glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT, 4);
break;
case 8:
glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT, 8);
break;
}
glBindTexture(src_res->target, src_res->id);
slice_offset = 0;
for (i = 0; i < cube_slice; i++) {
GLenum ctarget = src_res->target == GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP ? GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_X + i : src_res->target;
if (compressed) {
if (vrend_state.have_robustness)
glGetnCompressedTexImageARB(ctarget, src_level, transfer_size, tptr + slice_offset);
else
glGetCompressedTexImage(ctarget, src_level, tptr + slice_offset);
} else {
if (vrend_state.have_robustness)
glGetnTexImageARB(ctarget, src_level, glformat, gltype, transfer_size, tptr + slice_offset);
else
glGetTexImage(ctarget, src_level, glformat, gltype, tptr + slice_offset);
}
slice_offset += slice_size;
}
glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT, 4);
switch (elsize) {
case 1:
glPixelStorei(GL_UNPACK_ALIGNMENT, 1);
break;
case 2:
glPixelStorei(GL_UNPACK_ALIGNMENT, 2);
break;
case 4:
default:
glPixelStorei(GL_UNPACK_ALIGNMENT, 4);
break;
case 8:
glPixelStorei(GL_UNPACK_ALIGNMENT, 8);
break;
}
glBindTexture(dst_res->target, dst_res->id);
slice_offset = 0;
for (i = 0; i < cube_slice; i++) {
GLenum ctarget = dst_res->target == GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP ? GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_X + i : dst_res->target;
if (compressed) {
if (ctarget == GL_TEXTURE_1D) {
glCompressedTexSubImage1D(ctarget, dst_level, dstx,
src_box->width,
glformat, transfer_size, tptr + slice_offset);
} else {
glCompressedTexSubImage2D(ctarget, dst_level, dstx, dsty,
src_box->width, src_box->height,
glformat, transfer_size, tptr + slice_offset);
}
} else {
if (ctarget == GL_TEXTURE_1D) {
glTexSubImage1D(ctarget, dst_level, dstx, src_box->width, glformat, gltype, tptr + slice_offset);
} else if (ctarget == GL_TEXTURE_3D ||
ctarget == GL_TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY ||
ctarget == GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_ARRAY) {
glTexSubImage3D(ctarget, dst_level, dstx, dsty, 0,src_box->width, src_box->height, src_box->depth, glformat, gltype, tptr + slice_offset);
} else {
glTexSubImage2D(ctarget, dst_level, dstx, dsty, src_box->width, src_box->height, glformat, gltype, tptr + slice_offset);
}
}
slice_offset += slice_size;
}
glPixelStorei(GL_UNPACK_ALIGNMENT, 4);
free(tptr);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 9,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void preempt_latency_start(int val) { }
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,789 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: net::RequestPriority ConvertWebKitPriorityToNetPriority(
const WebURLRequest::Priority& priority) {
switch (priority) {
case WebURLRequest::PriorityVeryHigh:
return net::HIGHEST;
case WebURLRequest::PriorityHigh:
return net::MEDIUM;
case WebURLRequest::PriorityMedium:
return net::LOW;
case WebURLRequest::PriorityLow:
return net::LOWEST;
case WebURLRequest::PriorityVeryLow:
return net::IDLE;
case WebURLRequest::PriorityUnresolved:
default:
NOTREACHED();
return net::LOW;
}
}
Commit Message: Protect WebURLLoaderImpl::Context while receiving responses.
A client's didReceiveResponse can cancel a request; by protecting the
Context we avoid a use after free in this case.
Interestingly, we really had very good warning about this problem, see
https://codereview.chromium.org/11900002/ back in January.
R=darin
BUG=241139
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15738007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 6,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::GetStats(
std::unique_ptr<blink::WebRTCStatsReportCallback> callback,
blink::RTCStatsFilter filter) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
signaling_thread()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&GetRTCStatsOnSignalingThread, task_runner_,
native_peer_connection_, std::move(callback), filter));
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t IPCThreadState::writeTransactionData(int32_t cmd, uint32_t binderFlags,
int32_t handle, uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, status_t* statusBuffer)
{
binder_transaction_data tr;
tr.target.ptr = 0; /* Don't pass uninitialized stack data to a remote process */
tr.target.handle = handle;
tr.code = code;
tr.flags = binderFlags;
tr.cookie = 0;
tr.sender_pid = 0;
tr.sender_euid = 0;
const status_t err = data.errorCheck();
if (err == NO_ERROR) {
tr.data_size = data.ipcDataSize();
tr.data.ptr.buffer = data.ipcData();
tr.offsets_size = data.ipcObjectsCount()*sizeof(binder_size_t);
tr.data.ptr.offsets = data.ipcObjects();
} else if (statusBuffer) {
tr.flags |= TF_STATUS_CODE;
*statusBuffer = err;
tr.data_size = sizeof(status_t);
tr.data.ptr.buffer = reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(statusBuffer);
tr.offsets_size = 0;
tr.data.ptr.offsets = 0;
} else {
return (mLastError = err);
}
mOut.writeInt32(cmd);
mOut.write(&tr, sizeof(tr));
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioRendererHost::OnPauseStream(int stream_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
AudioOutputDelegate* delegate = LookupById(stream_id);
if (!delegate) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
delegate->OnPauseStream();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mldv2_query_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int len)
{
const struct icmp6_hdr *icp = (const struct icmp6_hdr *) bp;
u_int mrc;
int mrt, qqi;
u_int nsrcs;
register u_int i;
/* Minimum len is 28 */
if (len < 28) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid len %d]", len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(icp->icmp6_data16[0]);
mrc = EXTRACT_16BITS(&icp->icmp6_data16[0]);
if (mrc < 32768) {
mrt = mrc;
} else {
mrt = ((mrc & 0x0fff) | 0x1000) << (((mrc & 0x7000) >> 12) + 3);
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," [max resp delay=%d]", mrt));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[8], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo," [gaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[8])));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[25]);
if (bp[24] & 0x08) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," sflag"));
}
if (bp[24] & 0x07) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," robustness=%d", bp[24] & 0x07));
}
if (bp[25] < 128) {
qqi = bp[25];
} else {
qqi = ((bp[25] & 0x0f) | 0x10) << (((bp[25] & 0x70) >> 4) + 3);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," qqi=%d", qqi));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[26], 2);
nsrcs = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[26]);
if (nsrcs > 0) {
if (len < 28 + nsrcs * sizeof(struct in6_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid number of sources]"));
else if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," {"));
for (i = 0; i < nsrcs; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[28 + i * sizeof(struct in6_addr)],
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[28 + i * sizeof(struct in6_addr)])));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," }"));
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo,", %d source(s)", nsrcs));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"]"));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|icmp6]"));
return;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 27,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::SetBounds(const gfx::Rect& bounds) {
if (IsFullscreen())
ExitFullscreen();
SetBoundsImpl(bounds, true, true);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct dentry *mount_bdev(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data,
int (*fill_super)(struct super_block *, void *, int))
{
struct block_device *bdev;
struct super_block *s;
fmode_t mode = FMODE_READ | FMODE_EXCL;
int error = 0;
if (!(flags & MS_RDONLY))
mode |= FMODE_WRITE;
bdev = blkdev_get_by_path(dev_name, mode, fs_type);
if (IS_ERR(bdev))
return ERR_CAST(bdev);
/*
* once the super is inserted into the list by sget, s_umount
* will protect the lockfs code from trying to start a snapshot
* while we are mounting
*/
mutex_lock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
if (bdev->bd_fsfreeze_count > 0) {
mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
error = -EBUSY;
goto error_bdev;
}
s = sget(fs_type, test_bdev_super, set_bdev_super, flags | MS_NOSEC,
bdev);
mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
if (IS_ERR(s))
goto error_s;
if (s->s_root) {
if ((flags ^ s->s_flags) & MS_RDONLY) {
deactivate_locked_super(s);
error = -EBUSY;
goto error_bdev;
}
/*
* s_umount nests inside bd_mutex during
* __invalidate_device(). blkdev_put() acquires
* bd_mutex and can't be called under s_umount. Drop
* s_umount temporarily. This is safe as we're
* holding an active reference.
*/
up_write(&s->s_umount);
blkdev_put(bdev, mode);
down_write(&s->s_umount);
} else {
char b[BDEVNAME_SIZE];
s->s_mode = mode;
strlcpy(s->s_id, bdevname(bdev, b), sizeof(s->s_id));
sb_set_blocksize(s, block_size(bdev));
error = fill_super(s, data, flags & MS_SILENT ? 1 : 0);
if (error) {
deactivate_locked_super(s);
goto error;
}
s->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
bdev->bd_super = s;
}
return dget(s->s_root);
error_s:
error = PTR_ERR(s);
error_bdev:
blkdev_put(bdev, mode);
error:
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 12,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType GetOneAuthenticPixel(Image *image,
const ssize_t x,const ssize_t y,PixelPacket *pixel,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
PixelPacket
*restrict pixels;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
*pixel=image->background_color;
if (cache_info->methods.get_one_authentic_pixel_from_handler !=
(GetOneAuthenticPixelFromHandler) NULL)
return(cache_info->methods.get_one_authentic_pixel_from_handler(image,x,y,
pixel,exception));
pixels=GetAuthenticPixelsCache(image,x,y,1UL,1UL,exception);
if (pixels == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
*pixel=(*pixels);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcctl_pre_down(struct ipc_namespace *ns,
struct ipc_ids *ids, int id, int cmd,
struct ipc64_perm *perm, int extra_perm)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp;
ipcp = ipcctl_pre_down_nolock(ns, ids, id, cmd, perm, extra_perm);
if (IS_ERR(ipcp))
goto out;
spin_lock(&ipcp->lock);
out:
return ipcp;
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 8,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: blink::mojom::BlobURLTokenPtrInfo CloneBlobURLToken(
mojo::MessagePipeHandle handle) {
if (!handle.is_valid())
return nullptr;
blink::mojom::BlobURLTokenPtrInfo result;
blink::mojom::BlobURLTokenPtr token(
blink::mojom::BlobURLTokenPtrInfo(mojo::ScopedMessagePipeHandle(handle),
blink::mojom::BlobURLToken::Version_));
token->Clone(MakeRequest(&result));
ignore_result(token.PassInterface().PassHandle().release());
return result;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 4,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionProcessBindings::HandleResponse(int request_id, bool success,
const std::string& response,
const std::string& error) {
PendingRequestMap& pending_requests = GetPendingRequestMap();
PendingRequestMap::iterator request = pending_requests.find(request_id);
if (request == pending_requests.end())
return; // The frame went away.
v8::HandleScope handle_scope;
v8::Handle<v8::Value> argv[5];
argv[0] = v8::Integer::New(request_id);
argv[1] = v8::String::New(request->second->name.c_str());
argv[2] = v8::Boolean::New(success);
argv[3] = v8::String::New(response.c_str());
argv[4] = v8::String::New(error.c_str());
v8::Handle<v8::Value> retval = bindings_utils::CallFunctionInContext(
request->second->context, "handleResponse", arraysize(argv), argv);
#ifndef NDEBUG
if (!retval.IsEmpty() && !retval->IsUndefined()) {
std::string error = *v8::String::AsciiValue(retval);
DCHECK(false) << error;
}
#endif
request->second->context.Dispose();
request->second->context.Clear();
pending_requests.erase(request);
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_free_createdata(struct nfs4_createdata *data)
{
nfs4_label_free(data->label);
kfree(data);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ioctl_fionbio(struct file *filp, int __user *argp)
{
unsigned int flag;
int on, error;
error = get_user(on, argp);
if (error)
return error;
flag = O_NONBLOCK;
#ifdef __sparc__
/* SunOS compatibility item. */
if (O_NONBLOCK != O_NDELAY)
flag |= O_NDELAY;
#endif
spin_lock(&filp->f_lock);
if (on)
filp->f_flags |= flag;
else
filp->f_flags &= ~flag;
spin_unlock(&filp->f_lock);
return error;
}
Commit Message: vfs: ioctl: prevent double-fetch in dedupe ioctl
This prevents a double-fetch from user space that can lead to to an
undersized allocation and heap overflow.
Fixes: 54dbc1517237 ("vfs: hoist the btrfs deduplication ioctl to the vfs")
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EXPORTED int mboxlist_mboxtree(const char *mboxname, mboxlist_cb *proc, void *rock, int flags)
{
struct allmb_rock mbrock = { NULL, flags, proc, rock };
int r = 0;
if (!(flags & MBOXTREE_SKIP_ROOT)) {
r = cyrusdb_forone(mbdb, mboxname, strlen(mboxname), allmbox_p, allmbox_cb, &mbrock, 0);
if (r) goto done;
}
if (!(flags & MBOXTREE_SKIP_CHILDREN)) {
char *prefix = strconcat(mboxname, ".", (char *)NULL);
r = cyrusdb_foreach(mbdb, prefix, strlen(prefix), allmbox_p, allmbox_cb, &mbrock, 0);
free(prefix);
if (r) goto done;
}
if ((flags & MBOXTREE_DELETED)) {
struct buf buf = BUF_INITIALIZER;
const char *p = strchr(mboxname, '!');
const char *dp = config_getstring(IMAPOPT_DELETEDPREFIX);
if (p) {
buf_printf(&buf, "%.*s!%s.%s", (int)(p-mboxname), mboxname, dp, p+1);
}
else {
buf_printf(&buf, "%s.%s", dp, mboxname);
}
const char *prefix = buf_cstring(&buf);
r = cyrusdb_foreach(mbdb, prefix, strlen(prefix), allmbox_p, allmbox_cb, &mbrock, 0);
buf_free(&buf);
if (r) goto done;
}
done:
mboxlist_entry_free(&mbrock.mbentry);
return r;
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t releaseBuffer(int buf, uint64_t frameNumber,
EGLDisplay display __attribute__((unused)), EGLSyncKHR fence __attribute__((unused)),
const sp<Fence>& releaseFence) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferConsumer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32(buf);
data.writeInt64(frameNumber);
data.write(*releaseFence);
status_t result = remote()->transact(RELEASE_BUFFER, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: IGraphicBufferConsumer: fix ATTACH_BUFFER info leak
Bug: 26338113
Change-Id: I019c4df2c6adbc944122df96968ddd11a02ebe33
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 18,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPagePrivate::syncProxyCredential(const WebCore::Credential& credential)
{
m_client->syncProxyCredential(credential.user(), credential.password());
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType ThrowException(ExceptionInfo *exception,
const ExceptionType severity,const char *reason,const char *description)
{
register ExceptionInfo
*p;
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
LockSemaphoreInfo(exception->semaphore);
p=(ExceptionInfo *) GetLastValueInLinkedList((LinkedListInfo *)
exception->exceptions);
if ((p != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL) && (p->severity == severity) &&
(LocaleCompare(exception->reason,reason) == 0) &&
(LocaleCompare(exception->description,description) == 0))
{
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(exception->semaphore);
return(MagickTrue);
}
p=(ExceptionInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*p));
if (p == (ExceptionInfo *) NULL)
{
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(exception->semaphore);
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(p,0,sizeof(*p));
p->severity=severity;
if (reason != (const char *) NULL)
p->reason=ConstantString(reason);
if (description != (const char *) NULL)
p->description=ConstantString(description);
p->signature=MagickSignature;
(void) AppendValueToLinkedList((LinkedListInfo *) exception->exceptions,p);
if (p->severity >= exception->severity)
{
exception->severity=p->severity;
exception->reason=p->reason;
exception->description=p->description;
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(exception->semaphore);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip6_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = ip6_finish_skb(sk);
if (!skb)
return 0;
return ip6_send_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: fix out of bound writes in __ip6_append_data()
Andrey Konovalov and idaifish@gmail.com reported crashes caused by
one skb shared_info being overwritten from __ip6_append_data()
Andrey program lead to following state :
copy -4200 datalen 2000 fraglen 2040
maxfraglen 2040 alloclen 2048 transhdrlen 0 offset 0 fraggap 6200
The skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb_prev, maxfraglen, data + transhdrlen,
fraggap, 0); is overwriting skb->head and skb_shared_info
Since we apparently detect this rare condition too late, move the
code earlier to even avoid allocating skb and risking crashes.
Once again, many thanks to Andrey and syzkaller team.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reported-by: <idaifish@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::ReportFindInPageMatchCount(int request_id,
int count,
bool final_update) {
int active_match_ordinal = count ? -1 : 0;
SendFindReply(request_id, count, active_match_ordinal, gfx::Rect(),
final_update);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WtsSessionProcessDelegate::LaunchProcess(
IPC::Listener* delegate,
base::win::ScopedHandle* process_exit_event_out) {
if (!core_)
return false;
return core_->LaunchProcess(delegate, process_exit_event_out);
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int plug_rq_cmp(void *priv, struct list_head *a, struct list_head *b)
{
struct request *rqa = container_of(a, struct request, queuelist);
struct request *rqb = container_of(b, struct request, queuelist);
return !(rqa->q < rqb->q ||
(rqa->q == rqb->q && blk_rq_pos(rqa) < blk_rq_pos(rqb)));
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 22,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteIndent(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
DCHECK(frame.GetDocument());
return IndentOutdentCommand::Create(*frame.GetDocument(),
IndentOutdentCommand::kIndent)
->Apply();
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mpol_new_preferred(struct mempolicy *pol, const nodemask_t *nodes)
{
if (!nodes)
pol->flags |= MPOL_F_LOCAL; /* local allocation */
else if (nodes_empty(*nodes))
return -EINVAL; /* no allowed nodes */
else
pol->v.preferred_node = first_node(*nodes);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOLEAN btm_dev_encrypted (tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec)
{
if(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_ENCRYPTED)
{
return(TRUE);
}
return(FALSE);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: seamless_get_token(char **s)
{
char *comma, *head;
head = *s;
if (!head)
return NULL;
comma = strchr(head, ',');
if (comma)
{
*comma = '\0';
*s = comma + 1;
}
else
{
*s = NULL;
}
return head;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FileWriterSync* DOMFileSystemSync::createWriter(const FileEntrySync* fileEntry, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
ASSERT(fileEntry);
FileWriterSync* fileWriter = FileWriterSync::create();
OwnPtr<ReceiveFileWriterCallback> successCallback = ReceiveFileWriterCallback::create();
FileError::ErrorCode errorCode = FileError::OK;
OwnPtr<LocalErrorCallback> errorCallback = LocalErrorCallback::create(errorCode);
OwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks = FileWriterBaseCallbacks::create(fileWriter, successCallback.release(), errorCallback.release(), m_context);
callbacks->setShouldBlockUntilCompletion(true);
fileSystem()->createFileWriter(createFileSystemURL(fileEntry), fileWriter, callbacks.release());
if (errorCode != FileError::OK) {
FileError::throwDOMException(exceptionState, errorCode);
return 0;
}
return fileWriter;
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *register_package_dir(cmd_parms *cmd, void *_cfg,
const char *arg)
{
ap_lua_dir_cfg *cfg = (ap_lua_dir_cfg *) _cfg;
return register_package_helper(cmd, arg, cfg->package_paths);
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Play() {
host_->OnPlayStream(kStreamId);
SyncWithAudioThread();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: logpixel(const Transform *transform, png_uint_32 x, png_uint_32 y,
const Pixel *in, const Pixel *calc, const Pixel *out, const char *reason)
{
const png_uint_32 in_format = transform->in_image->image.format;
const png_uint_32 out_format = transform->out_image->image.format;
png_uint_32 back_format = out_format & ~PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_ALPHA;
const char *via_linear = "";
char pixel_in[64], pixel_calc[64], pixel_out[64], pixel_loc[64];
char background_info[100];
print_pixel(pixel_in, in, in_format);
print_pixel(pixel_calc, calc, out_format);
print_pixel(pixel_out, out, out_format);
if (transform->is_palette)
sprintf(pixel_loc, "palette: %lu", (unsigned long)y);
else
sprintf(pixel_loc, "%lu,%lu", (unsigned long)x, (unsigned long)y);
if (transform->from_linear != NULL)
{
via_linear = " (via linear)";
/* And as a result the *read* format which did any background processing
* was itself linear, so the background color information is also
* linear.
*/
back_format |= PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR;
}
if (transform->background != NULL)
{
Pixel back;
char pixel_back[64];
back.r = transform->background->ir;
back.g = transform->background->ig;
back.b = transform->background->ib;
back.a = -1; /* not used */
print_pixel(pixel_back, &back, back_format);
sprintf(background_info, " on background %s", pixel_back);
}
else
background_info[0] = 0;
if (transform->in_image->file_name != transform->out_image->file_name)
{
char error_buffer[512];
sprintf(error_buffer,
"(%s) %s error%s:\n %s%s ->\n %s\n not: %s.\n"
"Use --preserve and examine: ", pixel_loc, reason, via_linear,
pixel_in, background_info, pixel_out, pixel_calc);
return logerror(transform->in_image, transform->in_image->file_name,
error_buffer, transform->out_image->file_name);
}
else
{
char error_buffer[512];
sprintf(error_buffer,
"(%s) %s error%s:\n %s%s ->\n %s\n not: %s.\n"
" The error happened when reading the original file with this format.",
pixel_loc, reason, via_linear, pixel_in, background_info, pixel_out,
pixel_calc);
return logerror(transform->in_image, transform->in_image->file_name,
error_buffer, "");
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_parse_mpeg2_frame(AVPacket *pkt, uint32_t *flags)
{
uint32_t c = -1;
int i, closed_gop = 0;
for (i = 0; i < pkt->size - 4; i++) {
c = (c << 8) + pkt->data[i];
if (c == 0x1b8) { // gop
closed_gop = pkt->data[i + 4] >> 6 & 0x01;
} else if (c == 0x100) { // pic
int temp_ref = (pkt->data[i + 1] << 2) | (pkt->data[i + 2] >> 6);
if (!temp_ref || closed_gop) // I picture is not reordered
*flags = MOV_SYNC_SAMPLE;
else
*flags = MOV_PARTIAL_SYNC_SAMPLE;
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 19,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::AdjustPreviewsStateForNavigation(
PreviewsState* previews_state) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->AdjustPreviewsStateForNavigation(this, previews_state);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 1,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int drm_mode_group_init(struct drm_device *dev, struct drm_mode_group *group)
{
uint32_t total_objects = 0;
total_objects += dev->mode_config.num_crtc;
total_objects += dev->mode_config.num_connector;
total_objects += dev->mode_config.num_encoder;
group->id_list = kzalloc(total_objects * sizeof(uint32_t), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!group->id_list)
return -ENOMEM;
group->num_crtcs = 0;
group->num_connectors = 0;
group->num_encoders = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void crash_disable_local_vmclear(int cpu)
{
cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, &crash_vmclear_enabled_bitmap);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vp7_decode_mb_row_sliced(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *tdata,
int jobnr, int threadnr)
{
return vp78_decode_mb_row_sliced(avctx, tdata, jobnr, threadnr, IS_VP7);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadPIXImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
Quantum
blue,
green,
red;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
height,
length,
width;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read PIX image.
*/
width=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
height=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image); /* x-offset */
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image); /* y-offset */
bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((width == 0UL) || (height == 0UL) || ((bits_per_pixel != 8) &&
(bits_per_pixel != 24)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
if (bits_per_pixel == 8)
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,256) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Convert PIX raster image to pixel packets.
*/
red=(Quantum) 0;
green=(Quantum) 0;
blue=(Quantum) 0;
index=(IndexPacket) 0;
length=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (length == 0)
{
length=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (bits_per_pixel == 8)
index=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
else
{
blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelBlue(q,blue);
SetPixelGreen(q,green);
SetPixelRed(q,red);
length--;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
status=(width != 0UL) && (height == 0UL) && ((bits_per_pixel == 8) ||
(bits_per_pixel == 24)) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (status != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 7,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<Network::ResourceTiming> getTiming(
const net::LoadTimingInfo& load_timing) {
const base::TimeTicks kNullTicks;
return Network::ResourceTiming::Create()
.SetRequestTime((load_timing.request_start - kNullTicks).InSecondsF())
.SetProxyStart(
timeDelta(load_timing.proxy_resolve_start, load_timing.request_start))
.SetProxyEnd(
timeDelta(load_timing.proxy_resolve_end, load_timing.request_start))
.SetDnsStart(timeDelta(load_timing.connect_timing.dns_start,
load_timing.request_start))
.SetDnsEnd(timeDelta(load_timing.connect_timing.dns_end,
load_timing.request_start))
.SetConnectStart(timeDelta(load_timing.connect_timing.connect_start,
load_timing.request_start))
.SetConnectEnd(timeDelta(load_timing.connect_timing.connect_end,
load_timing.request_start))
.SetSslStart(timeDelta(load_timing.connect_timing.ssl_start,
load_timing.request_start))
.SetSslEnd(timeDelta(load_timing.connect_timing.ssl_end,
load_timing.request_start))
.SetWorkerStart(-1)
.SetWorkerReady(-1)
.SetSendStart(
timeDelta(load_timing.send_start, load_timing.request_start))
.SetSendEnd(timeDelta(load_timing.send_end, load_timing.request_start))
.SetPushStart(
timeDelta(load_timing.push_start, load_timing.request_start, 0))
.SetPushEnd(timeDelta(load_timing.push_end, load_timing.request_start, 0))
.SetReceiveHeadersEnd(
timeDelta(load_timing.receive_headers_end, load_timing.request_start))
.Build();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::StringPiece GLES2Decoder::GetLogPrefix() {
return GetLogger()->GetLogPrefix();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 28,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Editor::writeSelectionToPasteboard() {
KURL url = frame().document()->url();
String html = frame().selection().selectedHTMLForClipboard();
String plainText = frame().selectedTextForClipboard();
Pasteboard::generalPasteboard()->writeHTML(html, url, plainText,
canSmartCopyOrDelete());
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cpl_closeall ()
{
struct cpelement *cpe;
for (cpe = coproc_list.head; cpe; cpe = cpe->next)
coproc_close (cpe->coproc);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __mem_cgroup_threshold(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, bool swap)
{
struct mem_cgroup_threshold_ary *t;
u64 usage;
int i;
rcu_read_lock();
if (!swap)
t = rcu_dereference(memcg->thresholds.primary);
else
t = rcu_dereference(memcg->memsw_thresholds.primary);
if (!t)
goto unlock;
usage = mem_cgroup_usage(memcg, swap);
/*
* current_threshold points to threshold just below usage.
* If it's not true, a threshold was crossed after last
* call of __mem_cgroup_threshold().
*/
i = t->current_threshold;
/*
* Iterate backward over array of thresholds starting from
* current_threshold and check if a threshold is crossed.
* If none of thresholds below usage is crossed, we read
* only one element of the array here.
*/
for (; i >= 0 && unlikely(t->entries[i].threshold > usage); i--)
eventfd_signal(t->entries[i].eventfd, 1);
/* i = current_threshold + 1 */
i++;
/*
* Iterate forward over array of thresholds starting from
* current_threshold+1 and check if a threshold is crossed.
* If none of thresholds above usage is crossed, we read
* only one element of the array here.
*/
for (; i < t->size && unlikely(t->entries[i].threshold <= usage); i++)
eventfd_signal(t->entries[i].eventfd, 1);
/* Update current_threshold */
t->current_threshold = i - 1;
unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pmcraid_allocate_cmd_blocks(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance)
{
int i;
sprintf(pinstance->cmd_pool_name, "pmcraid_cmd_pool_%d",
pinstance->host->unique_id);
pinstance->cmd_cachep = kmem_cache_create(
pinstance->cmd_pool_name,
sizeof(struct pmcraid_cmd), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN, NULL);
if (!pinstance->cmd_cachep)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < PMCRAID_MAX_CMD; i++) {
pinstance->cmd_list[i] =
kmem_cache_alloc(pinstance->cmd_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pinstance->cmd_list[i]) {
pmcraid_release_cmd_blocks(pinstance, i);
return -ENOMEM;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 3,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ft_outline_new_circle( FT_Outline* outline,
FT_F26Dot6 radius,
FTDemo_Handle* handle )
{
char* tag;
FT_Vector* vec;
FT_F26Dot6 disp = (FT_F26Dot6)( radius * 0.6781 );
FT_Outline_New( handle->library, 12, 1, outline );
outline->n_points = 12;
outline->n_contours = 1;
outline->contours[0] = outline->n_points-1;
vec = outline->points;
tag = outline->tags;
vec->x = radius; vec->y = 0; vec++; *tag++ = FT_CURVE_TAG_ON;
vec->x = radius; vec->y = disp; vec++; *tag++ = FT_CURVE_TAG_CUBIC;
vec->x = disp; vec->y = radius; vec++; *tag++ = FT_CURVE_TAG_CUBIC;
vec->x = 0; vec->y = radius; vec++; *tag++ = FT_CURVE_TAG_ON;
vec->x = -disp; vec->y = radius; vec++; *tag++ = FT_CURVE_TAG_CUBIC;
vec->x = -radius; vec->y = disp; vec++; *tag++ = FT_CURVE_TAG_CUBIC;
vec->x = -radius; vec->y = 0; vec++; *tag++ = FT_CURVE_TAG_ON;
vec->x = -radius; vec->y = -disp; vec++; *tag++ = FT_CURVE_TAG_CUBIC;
vec->x = -disp; vec->y = -radius; vec++; *tag++ = FT_CURVE_TAG_CUBIC;
vec->x = 0; vec->y = -radius; vec++; *tag++ = FT_CURVE_TAG_ON;
vec->x = disp; vec->y = -radius; vec++; *tag++ = FT_CURVE_TAG_CUBIC;
vec->x = radius; vec->y = -disp; vec++; *tag++ = FT_CURVE_TAG_CUBIC;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AckFeature(PPARANDIS_ADAPTER pContext, UINT32 Feature)
{
if (VirtIOIsFeatureEnabled(pContext->u32HostFeatures, Feature))
{
VirtIOFeatureEnable(pContext->u32GuestFeatures, Feature);
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterBMPImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("BMP","BMP","Microsoft Windows bitmap image");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadBMPImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteBMPImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsBMP;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("BMP","BMP2","Microsoft Windows bitmap image (V2)");
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteBMPImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsBMP;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("BMP","BMP3","Microsoft Windows bitmap image (V3)");
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteBMPImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsBMP;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in BMP coder (bug report from pwchen of tencent).
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 5,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int arm_dma_set_mask(struct device *dev, u64 dma_mask)
{
if (!dev->dma_mask || !dma_supported(dev, dma_mask))
return -EIO;
*dev->dma_mask = dma_mask;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String HTMLTextAreaElement::sanitizeUserInputValue(const String& proposedValue, unsigned maxLength)
{
if (maxLength > 0 && U16_IS_LEAD(proposedValue[maxLength - 1]))
--maxLength;
return proposedValue.left(maxLength);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltFuncShutdown (xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const xmlChar *URI ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
exsltFuncData *data) {
if (data->result != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(data->result);
xmlFree(data);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool isObjectAncestorContainerOf(RenderObject* ancestor, RenderObject* descendant)
{
for (RenderObject* r = descendant; r; r = r->container()) {
if (r == ancestor)
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 16,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int halt_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
svm->next_rip = kvm_rip_read(&svm->vcpu) + 1;
skip_emulated_instruction(&svm->vcpu);
return kvm_emulate_halt(&svm->vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InFlightBackendIO::EndEnumeration(
std::unique_ptr<Rankings::Iterator> iterator) {
scoped_refptr<BackendIO> operation(
new BackendIO(this, backend_, net::CompletionCallback()));
operation->EndEnumeration(std::move(iterator));
PostOperation(FROM_HERE, operation.get());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_unaligned_ins(insn_size_t instruction, struct pt_regs *regs,
struct mem_access *ma)
{
int ret, index, count;
unsigned long *rm, *rn;
unsigned char *src, *dst;
unsigned char __user *srcu, *dstu;
index = (instruction>>8)&15; /* 0x0F00 */
rn = ®s->regs[index];
index = (instruction>>4)&15; /* 0x00F0 */
rm = ®s->regs[index];
count = 1<<(instruction&3);
switch (count) {
case 1: inc_unaligned_byte_access(); break;
case 2: inc_unaligned_word_access(); break;
case 4: inc_unaligned_dword_access(); break;
case 8: inc_unaligned_multi_access(); break;
}
ret = -EFAULT;
switch (instruction>>12) {
case 0: /* mov.[bwl] to/from memory via r0+rn */
if (instruction & 8) {
/* from memory */
srcu = (unsigned char __user *)*rm;
srcu += regs->regs[0];
dst = (unsigned char *)rn;
*(unsigned long *)dst = 0;
#if !defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
dst += 4-count;
#endif
if (ma->from(dst, srcu, count))
goto fetch_fault;
sign_extend(count, dst);
} else {
/* to memory */
src = (unsigned char *)rm;
#if !defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
src += 4-count;
#endif
dstu = (unsigned char __user *)*rn;
dstu += regs->regs[0];
if (ma->to(dstu, src, count))
goto fetch_fault;
}
ret = 0;
break;
case 1: /* mov.l Rm,@(disp,Rn) */
src = (unsigned char*) rm;
dstu = (unsigned char __user *)*rn;
dstu += (instruction&0x000F)<<2;
if (ma->to(dstu, src, 4))
goto fetch_fault;
ret = 0;
break;
case 2: /* mov.[bwl] to memory, possibly with pre-decrement */
if (instruction & 4)
*rn -= count;
src = (unsigned char*) rm;
dstu = (unsigned char __user *)*rn;
#if !defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
src += 4-count;
#endif
if (ma->to(dstu, src, count))
goto fetch_fault;
ret = 0;
break;
case 5: /* mov.l @(disp,Rm),Rn */
srcu = (unsigned char __user *)*rm;
srcu += (instruction & 0x000F) << 2;
dst = (unsigned char *)rn;
*(unsigned long *)dst = 0;
if (ma->from(dst, srcu, 4))
goto fetch_fault;
ret = 0;
break;
case 6: /* mov.[bwl] from memory, possibly with post-increment */
srcu = (unsigned char __user *)*rm;
if (instruction & 4)
*rm += count;
dst = (unsigned char*) rn;
*(unsigned long*)dst = 0;
#if !defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
dst += 4-count;
#endif
if (ma->from(dst, srcu, count))
goto fetch_fault;
sign_extend(count, dst);
ret = 0;
break;
case 8:
switch ((instruction&0xFF00)>>8) {
case 0x81: /* mov.w R0,@(disp,Rn) */
src = (unsigned char *) ®s->regs[0];
#if !defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
src += 2;
#endif
dstu = (unsigned char __user *)*rm; /* called Rn in the spec */
dstu += (instruction & 0x000F) << 1;
if (ma->to(dstu, src, 2))
goto fetch_fault;
ret = 0;
break;
case 0x85: /* mov.w @(disp,Rm),R0 */
srcu = (unsigned char __user *)*rm;
srcu += (instruction & 0x000F) << 1;
dst = (unsigned char *) ®s->regs[0];
*(unsigned long *)dst = 0;
#if !defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
dst += 2;
#endif
if (ma->from(dst, srcu, 2))
goto fetch_fault;
sign_extend(2, dst);
ret = 0;
break;
}
break;
}
return ret;
fetch_fault:
/* Argh. Address not only misaligned but also non-existent.
* Raise an EFAULT and see if it's trapped
*/
die_if_no_fixup("Fault in unaligned fixup", regs, 0);
return -EFAULT;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 24,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_ol_stateid_locked(struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp,
struct list_head *reaplist)
{
struct nfs4_stid *s = &stp->st_stid;
struct nfs4_client *clp = s->sc_client;
lockdep_assert_held(&clp->cl_lock);
WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&stp->st_locks));
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&s->sc_count)) {
wake_up_all(&close_wq);
return;
}
idr_remove(&clp->cl_stateids, s->sc_stateid.si_opaque.so_id);
list_add(&stp->st_locks, reaplist);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 21,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: make_spnego_tokenInit_msg(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx,
int negHintsCompat,
gss_buffer_t mechListMIC, OM_uint32 req_flags,
gss_buffer_t data, send_token_flag sendtoken,
gss_buffer_t outbuf)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned int tlen, dataLen = 0;
unsigned int negTokenInitSize = 0;
unsigned int negTokenInitSeqSize = 0;
unsigned int negTokenInitContSize = 0;
unsigned int rspTokenSize = 0;
unsigned int mechListTokenSize = 0;
unsigned int micTokenSize = 0;
unsigned char *t;
unsigned char *ptr;
if (outbuf == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return (-1);
outbuf->length = 0;
outbuf->value = NULL;
/* calculate the data length */
/*
* 0xa0 [DER LEN] [mechTypes]
*/
mechListTokenSize = 1 +
gssint_der_length_size(spnego_ctx->DER_mechTypes.length) +
spnego_ctx->DER_mechTypes.length;
dataLen += mechListTokenSize;
/*
* If a token from gss_init_sec_context exists,
* add the length of the token + the ASN.1 overhead
*/
if (data != NULL) {
/*
* Encoded in final output as:
* 0xa2 [DER LEN] 0x04 [DER LEN] [DATA]
* -----s--------|--------s2----------
*/
rspTokenSize = 1 +
gssint_der_length_size(data->length) +
data->length;
dataLen += 1 + gssint_der_length_size(rspTokenSize) +
rspTokenSize;
}
if (mechListMIC) {
/*
* Encoded in final output as:
* 0xa3 [DER LEN] 0x04 [DER LEN] [DATA]
* --s-- -----tlen------------
*/
micTokenSize = 1 +
gssint_der_length_size(mechListMIC->length) +
mechListMIC->length;
dataLen += 1 +
gssint_der_length_size(micTokenSize) +
micTokenSize;
}
/*
* Add size of DER encoding
* [ SEQUENCE { MechTypeList | ReqFLags | Token | mechListMIC } ]
* 0x30 [DER_LEN] [data]
*
*/
negTokenInitContSize = dataLen;
negTokenInitSeqSize = 1 + gssint_der_length_size(dataLen) + dataLen;
dataLen = negTokenInitSeqSize;
/*
* negTokenInitSize indicates the bytes needed to
* hold the ASN.1 encoding of the entire NegTokenInit
* SEQUENCE.
* 0xa0 [DER_LEN] + data
*
*/
negTokenInitSize = 1 +
gssint_der_length_size(negTokenInitSeqSize) +
negTokenInitSeqSize;
tlen = g_token_size(gss_mech_spnego, negTokenInitSize);
t = (unsigned char *) gssalloc_malloc(tlen);
if (t == NULL) {
return (-1);
}
ptr = t;
/* create the message */
if ((ret = g_make_token_header(gss_mech_spnego, negTokenInitSize,
&ptr, tlen)))
goto errout;
*ptr++ = CONTEXT; /* NegotiationToken identifier */
if ((ret = gssint_put_der_length(negTokenInitSeqSize, &ptr, tlen)))
goto errout;
*ptr++ = SEQUENCE;
if ((ret = gssint_put_der_length(negTokenInitContSize, &ptr,
tlen - (int)(ptr-t))))
goto errout;
*ptr++ = CONTEXT | 0x00; /* MechTypeList identifier */
if ((ret = gssint_put_der_length(spnego_ctx->DER_mechTypes.length,
&ptr, tlen - (int)(ptr-t))))
goto errout;
/* We already encoded the MechSetList */
(void) memcpy(ptr, spnego_ctx->DER_mechTypes.value,
spnego_ctx->DER_mechTypes.length);
ptr += spnego_ctx->DER_mechTypes.length;
if (data != NULL) {
*ptr++ = CONTEXT | 0x02;
if ((ret = gssint_put_der_length(rspTokenSize,
&ptr, tlen - (int)(ptr - t))))
goto errout;
if ((ret = put_input_token(&ptr, data,
tlen - (int)(ptr - t))))
goto errout;
}
if (mechListMIC != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
*ptr++ = CONTEXT | 0x03;
if ((ret = gssint_put_der_length(micTokenSize,
&ptr, tlen - (int)(ptr - t))))
goto errout;
if (negHintsCompat) {
ret = put_neg_hints(&ptr, mechListMIC,
tlen - (int)(ptr - t));
if (ret)
goto errout;
} else if ((ret = put_input_token(&ptr, mechListMIC,
tlen - (int)(ptr - t))))
goto errout;
}
errout:
if (ret != 0) {
if (t)
free(t);
t = NULL;
tlen = 0;
}
outbuf->length = tlen;
outbuf->value = (void *) t;
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 17,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::ResetCompositorFrameSinkSupport() {
if (!support_)
return;
if (compositor_)
compositor_->RemoveFrameSink(frame_sink_id_);
support_.reset();
}
Commit Message: mac: Make RWHVMac::ClearCompositorFrame clear locks
Ensure that the BrowserCompositorMac not hold on to a compositor lock
when requested to clear its compositor frame. This lock may be held
indefinitely (if the renderer hangs) and so the frame will never be
cleared.
Bug: 739621
Change-Id: I15d0e82bdf632f3379a48e959f198afb8a4ac218
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/608239
Commit-Queue: ccameron chromium <ccameron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#493563}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(xml_get_current_column_number)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &pind) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
RETVAL_LONG(XML_GetCurrentColumnNumber(parser->parser));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string GetString(v8::Local<v8::Object> value, const std::string& key) {
v8::Local<v8::String> temp =
value->Get(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate_, key.c_str()))
.As<v8::String>();
if (temp.IsEmpty()) {
ADD_FAILURE();
return std::string();
}
v8::String::Utf8Value utf8(temp);
return std::string(*utf8, utf8.length());
}
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttrGetterAttributeSetterCallbackForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttrGetterAttributeSetterForMainWorld(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ucma_disconnect(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_disconnect cmd;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
int ret;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx_dev(file, cmd.id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
ret = rdma_disconnect(ctx->cm_id);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@beyondsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 25,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MYSQLND_METHOD(mysqlnd_protocol, get_change_auth_response_packet)(MYSQLND_PROTOCOL * const protocol, zend_bool persistent TSRMLS_DC)
{
struct st_mysqlnd_packet_change_auth_response * packet = mnd_pecalloc(1, packet_methods[PROT_CHANGE_AUTH_RESP_PACKET].struct_size, persistent);
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_protocol::get_change_auth_response_packet");
if (packet) {
packet->header.m = &packet_methods[PROT_CHANGE_AUTH_RESP_PACKET];
packet->header.persistent = persistent;
}
DBG_RETURN(packet);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72293 - Heap overflow in mysqlnd related to BIT fields
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ikev1_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *p, const u_char *ep)
{
int totlen;
uint32_t t;
if (p[0] & 0x80)
totlen = 4;
else
totlen = 4 + EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (ep < p + totlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|attr]"));
return ep + 1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
t = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[0]) & 0x7fff;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=#%d ", t));
if (p[0] & 0x80) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"value="));
t = p[2];
rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[2], 2);
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"len=%d value=", EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2])));
rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[4], EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
return p + totlen;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12990/Fix printing of ISAKMPv1 Notification payload data.
The closest thing to a specification for the contents of the payload
data is draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04, and nothing in there says that it
is ever a complete ISAKMP message, so don't dissect types we don't have
specific code for as a complete ISAKMP message.
While we're at it, fix a comment, and clean up printing of V1 Nonce,
V2 Authentication payloads, and v2 Notice payloads.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 11,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionService::SyncBundle::HasExtensionId(const std::string& id) const {
return synced_extensions.find(id) != synced_extensions.end();
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 11,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BlobStorageContext::RegisterPublicBlobURL(const GURL& blob_url,
const std::string& uuid) {
if (!registry_.CreateUrlMapping(blob_url, uuid))
return false;
IncrementBlobRefCount(uuid);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(u32 __user *pifutex,
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1,
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2,
union futex_key *key1, union futex_key *key2,
struct futex_pi_state **ps, int set_waiters)
{
struct futex_q *top_waiter = NULL;
u32 curval;
int ret, vpid;
if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, pifutex))
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Find the top_waiter and determine if there are additional waiters.
* If the caller intends to requeue more than 1 waiter to pifutex,
* force futex_lock_pi_atomic() to set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit now,
* as we have means to handle the possible fault. If not, don't set
* the bit unecessarily as it will force the subsequent unlock to enter
* the kernel.
*/
top_waiter = futex_top_waiter(hb1, key1);
/* There are no waiters, nothing for us to do. */
if (!top_waiter)
return 0;
/* Ensure we requeue to the expected futex. */
if (!match_futex(top_waiter->requeue_pi_key, key2))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Try to take the lock for top_waiter. Set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit in
* the contended case or if set_waiters is 1. The pi_state is returned
* in ps in contended cases.
*/
vpid = task_pid_vnr(top_waiter->task);
ret = futex_lock_pi_atomic(pifutex, hb2, key2, ps, top_waiter->task,
set_waiters);
if (ret == 1) {
requeue_pi_wake_futex(top_waiter, key2, hb2);
return vpid;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 22,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sp_insert(struct shared_policy *sp, struct sp_node *new)
{
struct rb_node **p = &sp->root.rb_node;
struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
struct sp_node *nd;
while (*p) {
parent = *p;
nd = rb_entry(parent, struct sp_node, nd);
if (new->start < nd->start)
p = &(*p)->rb_left;
else if (new->end > nd->end)
p = &(*p)->rb_right;
else
BUG();
}
rb_link_node(&new->nd, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(&new->nd, &sp->root);
pr_debug("inserting %lx-%lx: %d\n", new->start, new->end,
new->policy ? new->policy->mode : 0);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 11,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_change_type(struct path *path, int flag)
{
struct mount *m;
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
int recurse = flag & MS_REC;
int type;
int err = 0;
if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)
return -EINVAL;
type = flags_to_propagation_type(flag);
if (!type)
return -EINVAL;
down_write(&namespace_sem);
if (type == MS_SHARED) {
err = invent_group_ids(mnt, recurse);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
br_write_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
for (m = mnt; m; m = (recurse ? next_mnt(m, mnt) : NULL))
change_mnt_propagation(m, type);
br_write_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
out_unlock:
up_write(&namespace_sem);
return err;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long VideoTrack::Parse(Segment* pSegment, const Info& info,
long long element_start, long long element_size,
VideoTrack*& pResult) {
if (pResult)
return -1;
if (info.type != Track::kVideo)
return -1;
long long width = 0;
long long height = 0;
long long display_width = 0;
long long display_height = 0;
long long display_unit = 0;
long long stereo_mode = 0;
double rate = 0.0;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x30) { // pixel width
width = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (width <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x3A) { // pixel height
height = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (height <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x14B0) { // display width
display_width = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (display_width <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x14BA) { // display height
display_height = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (display_height <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x14B2) { // display unit
display_unit = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (display_unit < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x13B8) { // stereo mode
stereo_mode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (stereo_mode < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x0383E3) { // frame rate
const long status = UnserializeFloat(pReader, pos, size, rate);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (rate <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
VideoTrack* const pTrack =
new (std::nothrow) VideoTrack(pSegment, element_start, element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status) { // error
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pTrack->m_width = width;
pTrack->m_height = height;
pTrack->m_display_width = display_width;
pTrack->m_display_height = display_height;
pTrack->m_display_unit = display_unit;
pTrack->m_stereo_mode = stereo_mode;
pTrack->m_rate = rate;
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err reftype_AddRefTrack(GF_TrackReferenceTypeBox *ref, u32 trackID, u16 *outRefIndex)
{
u32 i;
if (!ref || !trackID) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
if (outRefIndex) *outRefIndex = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ref->trackIDCount; i++) {
if (ref->trackIDs[i] == trackID) {
if (outRefIndex) *outRefIndex = i+1;
return GF_OK;
}
}
ref->trackIDs = (u32 *) gf_realloc(ref->trackIDs, (ref->trackIDCount + 1) * sizeof(u32) );
if (!ref->trackIDs) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
ref->trackIDs[ref->trackIDCount] = trackID;
ref->trackIDCount++;
if (outRefIndex) *outRefIndex = ref->trackIDCount;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 25,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ssl_set_session_cache( ssl_context *ssl,
int (*f_get_cache)(void *, ssl_session *), void *p_get_cache,
int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const ssl_session *), void *p_set_cache )
{
ssl->f_get_cache = f_get_cache;
ssl->p_get_cache = p_get_cache;
ssl->f_set_cache = f_set_cache;
ssl->p_set_cache = p_set_cache;
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SavePackage::Stop() {
if (wait_state_ == INITIALIZE)
return;
DCHECK(canceled());
if (in_process_count()) {
SaveUrlItemMap::iterator it = in_progress_items_.begin();
for (; it != in_progress_items_.end(); ++it) {
SaveItem* save_item = it->second;
DCHECK(save_item->state() == SaveItem::IN_PROGRESS);
save_item->Cancel();
}
while (in_process_count())
PutInProgressItemToSavedMap(in_progress_items_.begin()->second);
}
SaveIDList save_ids;
for (SavedItemMap::iterator it = saved_success_items_.begin();
it != saved_success_items_.end(); ++it)
save_ids.push_back(it->first);
for (SaveUrlItemMap::iterator it = saved_failed_items_.begin();
it != saved_failed_items_.end(); ++it)
save_ids.push_back(it->second->save_id());
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SaveFileManager::RemoveSavedFileFromFileMap,
file_manager_,
save_ids));
finished_ = true;
wait_state_ = FAILED;
if (download_) {
download_->Cancel(false);
FinalizeDownloadEntry();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageLoader::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(image_content_);
visitor->Trace(image_resource_for_image_document_);
visitor->Trace(element_);
visitor->Trace(decode_requests_);
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioHandler::PullInputs(size_t frames_to_process) {
DCHECK(Context()->IsAudioThread());
for (auto& input : inputs_)
input->Pull(nullptr, frames_to_process);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::disabledAttributeChanged()
{
spinButtonElement()->releaseCapture();
clearButtonElement()->releaseCapture();
if (DateTimeEditElement* edit = dateTimeEditElement())
edit->disabledStateChanged();
}
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 15,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InstallablePaymentAppCrawler::InstallablePaymentAppCrawler(
content::WebContents* web_contents,
PaymentManifestDownloader* downloader,
PaymentManifestParser* parser,
PaymentManifestWebDataService* cache)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
downloader_(downloader),
parser_(parser),
number_of_payment_method_manifest_to_download_(0),
number_of_payment_method_manifest_to_parse_(0),
number_of_web_app_manifest_to_download_(0),
number_of_web_app_manifest_to_parse_(0),
number_of_web_app_icons_to_download_and_decode_(0),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: [Payments] Restrict just-in-time payment handler to payment method domain and its subdomains
Bug: 853937
Change-Id: I148b3d96950a9d90fa362e580e9593caa6b92a36
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1132116
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ganggui Tang <gogerald@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573911}
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t flatten_binder(const sp<ProcessState>& /*proc*/,
const sp<IBinder>& binder, Parcel* out)
{
flat_binder_object obj;
obj.flags = 0x7f | FLAT_BINDER_FLAG_ACCEPTS_FDS;
if (binder != NULL) {
IBinder *local = binder->localBinder();
if (!local) {
BpBinder *proxy = binder->remoteBinder();
if (proxy == NULL) {
ALOGE("null proxy");
}
const int32_t handle = proxy ? proxy->handle() : 0;
obj.type = BINDER_TYPE_HANDLE;
obj.binder = 0; /* Don't pass uninitialized stack data to a remote process */
obj.handle = handle;
obj.cookie = 0;
} else {
obj.type = BINDER_TYPE_BINDER;
obj.binder = reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(local->getWeakRefs());
obj.cookie = reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(local);
}
} else {
obj.type = BINDER_TYPE_BINDER;
obj.binder = 0;
obj.cookie = 0;
}
return finish_flatten_binder(binder, obj, out);
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BROTLI_INLINE int ReadDistanceInternal(int safe,
BrotliState* s, BrotliBitReader* br) {
int distval;
BrotliBitReaderState memento;
HuffmanCode* distance_tree = s->distance_hgroup.htrees[s->dist_htree_index];
if (!safe) {
s->distance_code = (int)ReadSymbol(distance_tree, br);
} else {
uint32_t code;
BrotliBitReaderSaveState(br, &memento);
if (!SafeReadSymbol(distance_tree, br, &code)) {
return 0;
}
s->distance_code = (int)code;
}
/* Convert the distance code to the actual distance by possibly */
/* looking up past distances from the s->ringbuffer. */
if ((s->distance_code & ~0xf) == 0) {
TakeDistanceFromRingBuffer(s);
--s->block_length[2];
return 1;
}
distval = s->distance_code - (int)s->num_direct_distance_codes;
if (distval >= 0) {
uint32_t nbits;
int postfix;
int offset;
if (!safe && (s->distance_postfix_bits == 0)) {
nbits = ((uint32_t)distval >> 1) + 1;
offset = ((2 + (distval & 1)) << nbits) - 4;
s->distance_code = (int)s->num_direct_distance_codes +
offset + (int)BrotliReadBits(br, nbits);
} else {
/* This branch also works well when s->distance_postfix_bits == 0 */
uint32_t bits;
postfix = distval & s->distance_postfix_mask;
distval >>= s->distance_postfix_bits;
nbits = ((uint32_t)distval >> 1) + 1;
if (safe) {
if (!SafeReadBits(br, nbits, &bits)) {
s->distance_code = -1; /* Restore precondition. */
BrotliBitReaderRestoreState(br, &memento);
return 0;
}
} else {
bits = BrotliReadBits(br, nbits);
}
offset = ((2 + (distval & 1)) << nbits) - 4;
s->distance_code = (int)s->num_direct_distance_codes +
((offset + (int)bits) << s->distance_postfix_bits) + postfix;
}
}
s->distance_code = s->distance_code - NUM_DISTANCE_SHORT_CODES + 1;
--s->block_length[2];
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_journal_check_start(struct super_block *sb)
{
journal_t *journal;
might_sleep();
if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
return -EROFS;
WARN_ON(sb->s_writers.frozen == SB_FREEZE_COMPLETE);
journal = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal;
/*
* Special case here: if the journal has aborted behind our
* backs (eg. EIO in the commit thread), then we still need to
* take the FS itself readonly cleanly.
*/
if (journal && is_journal_aborted(journal)) {
ext4_abort(sb, "Detected aborted journal");
return -EROFS;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix potential use after free in __ext4_journal_stop
There is a use-after-free possibility in __ext4_journal_stop() in the
case that we free the handle in the first jbd2_journal_stop() because
we're referencing handle->h_err afterwards. This was introduced in
9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625 and it is wrong. Fix it by
storing the handle->h_err value beforehand and avoid referencing
potentially freed handle.
Fixes: 9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 18,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GamepadProvider::RegisterForUserGesture(const base::Closure& closure) {
base::AutoLock lock(user_gesture_lock_);
user_gesture_observers_.push_back(
ClosureAndThread(closure, base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 12,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline signed int ReadProfileLong(const EndianType endian,
unsigned char *buffer)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
signed int
signed_value;
} quantum;
unsigned int
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned int) buffer[3] << 24;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[2] << 16;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[1] << 8;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[0];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffffffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
value=(unsigned int) buffer[0] << 24;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[1] << 16;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[2] << 8;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[3];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffffffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/354
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 17,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::SwitchToLocalRenderer(
MediaObserverClient::ReasonToSwitchToLocal reason) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(disable_pipeline_auto_suspend_);
disable_pipeline_auto_suspend_ = false;
CreateVideoDecodeStatsReporter();
ScheduleRestart();
if (client_)
client_->MediaRemotingStopped(GetSwitchToLocalMessage(reason));
}
Commit Message: Fix HasSingleSecurityOrigin for HLS
HLS manifests can request segments from a different origin than the
original manifest's origin. We do not inspect HLS manifests within
Chromium, and instead delegate to Android's MediaPlayer. This means we
need to be conservative, and always assume segments might come from a
different origin. HasSingleSecurityOrigin should always return false
when decoding HLS.
Bug: 864283
Change-Id: Ie16849ac6f29ae7eaa9caf342ad0509a226228ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142691
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Thomas Guilbert <tguilbert@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576378}
CWE ID: CWE-346 | 0 | 24,707 |
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