instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int adev_open(const hw_module_t *module, const char *name,
hw_device_t **device)
{
struct audio_device *adev;
int i, ret, retry_count;
ALOGV("%s: enter", __func__);
if (strcmp(name, AUDIO_HARDWARE_INTERFACE) != 0) return -EINVAL;
adev = calloc(1, sizeof(struct audio_device));
adev->device.common.tag = HARDWARE_DEVICE_TAG;
adev->device.common.version = AUDIO_DEVICE_API_VERSION_2_0;
adev->device.common.module = (struct hw_module_t *)module;
adev->device.common.close = adev_close;
adev->device.init_check = adev_init_check;
adev->device.set_voice_volume = adev_set_voice_volume;
adev->device.set_master_volume = adev_set_master_volume;
adev->device.get_master_volume = adev_get_master_volume;
adev->device.set_master_mute = adev_set_master_mute;
adev->device.get_master_mute = adev_get_master_mute;
adev->device.set_mode = adev_set_mode;
adev->device.set_mic_mute = adev_set_mic_mute;
adev->device.get_mic_mute = adev_get_mic_mute;
adev->device.set_parameters = adev_set_parameters;
adev->device.get_parameters = adev_get_parameters;
adev->device.get_input_buffer_size = adev_get_input_buffer_size;
adev->device.open_output_stream = adev_open_output_stream;
adev->device.close_output_stream = adev_close_output_stream;
adev->device.open_input_stream = adev_open_input_stream;
adev->device.close_input_stream = adev_close_input_stream;
adev->device.dump = adev_dump;
/* Set the default route before the PCM stream is opened */
adev->mode = AUDIO_MODE_NORMAL;
adev->active_input = NULL;
adev->primary_output = NULL;
adev->voice_volume = 1.0f;
adev->tty_mode = TTY_MODE_OFF;
adev->bluetooth_nrec = true;
adev->in_call = false;
/* adev->cur_hdmi_channels = 0; by calloc() */
adev->snd_dev_ref_cnt = calloc(SND_DEVICE_MAX, sizeof(int));
adev->dualmic_config = DUALMIC_CONFIG_NONE;
adev->ns_in_voice_rec = false;
list_init(&adev->usecase_list);
if (mixer_init(adev) != 0) {
free(adev->snd_dev_ref_cnt);
free(adev);
ALOGE("%s: Failed to init, aborting.", __func__);
*device = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
if (access(SOUND_TRIGGER_HAL_LIBRARY_PATH, R_OK) == 0) {
adev->sound_trigger_lib = dlopen(SOUND_TRIGGER_HAL_LIBRARY_PATH,
RTLD_NOW);
if (adev->sound_trigger_lib == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: DLOPEN failed for %s", __func__,
SOUND_TRIGGER_HAL_LIBRARY_PATH);
} else {
ALOGV("%s: DLOPEN successful for %s", __func__,
SOUND_TRIGGER_HAL_LIBRARY_PATH);
adev->sound_trigger_open_for_streaming =
(int (*)(void))dlsym(adev->sound_trigger_lib,
"sound_trigger_open_for_streaming");
adev->sound_trigger_read_samples =
(size_t (*)(int, void *, size_t))dlsym(
adev->sound_trigger_lib,
"sound_trigger_read_samples");
adev->sound_trigger_close_for_streaming =
(int (*)(int))dlsym(
adev->sound_trigger_lib,
"sound_trigger_close_for_streaming");
if (!adev->sound_trigger_open_for_streaming ||
!adev->sound_trigger_read_samples ||
!adev->sound_trigger_close_for_streaming) {
ALOGE("%s: Error grabbing functions in %s", __func__,
SOUND_TRIGGER_HAL_LIBRARY_PATH);
adev->sound_trigger_open_for_streaming = 0;
adev->sound_trigger_read_samples = 0;
adev->sound_trigger_close_for_streaming = 0;
}
}
}
*device = &adev->device.common;
cras_dsp_init("/system/etc/cras/speakerdsp.ini");
ALOGV("%s: exit", __func__);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 14,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool isidchar(int c)
{
return isalnum(c) || ismiddle(c);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rgbvalidate(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, ref *space, float *values, int num_comps)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
int i;
if (num_comps < 3)
return_error(gs_error_stackunderflow);
op -= 2;
for (i=0;i<3;i++) {
if (!r_has_type(op, t_integer) && !r_has_type(op, t_real))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
op++;
}
for (i=0;i < 3; i++) {
if (values[i] > 1.0)
values[i] = 1.0;
if (values[i] < 0.0)
values[i] = 0.0;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 14,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<EventMatcher> EventBindings::ParseEventMatcher(
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> filter) {
return base::WrapUnique(new EventMatcher(
std::move(filter), context()->GetRenderFrame()->GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: Ignore filtered event if an event matcher cannot be added.
BUG=625404
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236133002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411472}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 4,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DriveFsHost::RemoveObserver(DriveFsHostObserver* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EditorClient& Editor::client() const {
if (Page* page = frame().page())
return page->editorClient();
return emptyEditorClient();
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnSetHistoryLengthAndPrune(int history_length,
int32 minimum_page_id) {
DCHECK(history_length >= 0);
DCHECK(history_list_offset_ == history_list_length_ - 1);
DCHECK(minimum_page_id >= -1);
std::vector<int32> new_history_page_ids(history_length, -1);
for (size_t i = 0; i < history_page_ids_.size(); ++i) {
if (minimum_page_id >= 0 && history_page_ids_[i] < minimum_page_id)
continue;
new_history_page_ids.push_back(history_page_ids_[i]);
}
new_history_page_ids.swap(history_page_ids_);
history_list_length_ = history_page_ids_.size();
history_list_offset_ = history_list_length_ - 1;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ap_interrupts_show(struct bus_type *bus, char *buf)
{
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
ap_using_interrupts() ? 1 : 0);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassScriptInstance ScriptController::createScriptInstanceForWidget(Widget* widget)
{
ASSERT(widget);
if (widget->isFrameView())
return 0;
NPObject* npObject = PlatformSupport::pluginScriptableObject(widget);
if (!npObject)
return 0;
v8::Local<v8::Object> wrapper = createV8ObjectForNPObject(npObject, 0);
m_pluginObjects.set(widget, npObject);
return V8ScriptInstance::create(wrapper);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *br_multicast_new_group(
struct net_bridge *br, struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct br_ip *group)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
int hash;
int err;
mdb = rcu_dereference_protected(br->mdb, 1);
if (!mdb) {
err = br_mdb_rehash(&br->mdb, BR_HASH_SIZE, 0);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
goto rehash;
}
hash = br_ip_hash(mdb, group);
mp = br_multicast_get_group(br, port, group, hash);
switch (PTR_ERR(mp)) {
case 0:
break;
case -EAGAIN:
rehash:
mdb = rcu_dereference_protected(br->mdb, 1);
hash = br_ip_hash(mdb, group);
break;
default:
goto out;
}
mp = kzalloc(sizeof(*mp), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!mp))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
mp->br = br;
mp->addr = *group;
setup_timer(&mp->timer, br_multicast_group_expired,
(unsigned long)mp);
setup_timer(&mp->query_timer, br_multicast_group_query_expired,
(unsigned long)mp);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&mp->hlist[mdb->ver], &mdb->mhash[hash]);
mdb->size++;
out:
return mp;
}
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int try_to_reset_cmd_device(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
{
int res;
struct Scsi_Host *shost = cmd->device->host;
if (!shost->hostt->eh_device_reset_handler)
goto try_target_reset;
res = shost->hostt->eh_device_reset_handler(cmd);
if (res == SUCCESS)
return res;
try_target_reset:
if (shost->hostt->eh_target_reset_handler)
return shost->hostt->eh_target_reset_handler(cmd);
return FAILED;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jp2_cdef_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_cdef_t *cdef = &box->data.cdef;
jp2_cdefchan_t *chan;
unsigned int channo;
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &cdef->numchans)) {
return -1;
}
if (!(cdef->ents = jas_alloc2(cdef->numchans, sizeof(jp2_cdefchan_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (channo = 0; channo < cdef->numchans; ++channo) {
chan = &cdef->ents[channo];
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->channo) || jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->type) ||
jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->assoc)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed another problem with incorrect cleanup of JP2 box data upon error.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 25,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int am_unhex_digit(char c) {
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
return c - '0';
} else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
return c - 'a' + 0xa;
} else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
return c - 'A' + 0xa;
} else {
return -1;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 27,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
{
/*
* Pass through host's Machine Check Enable value to hw_cr4, which
* is in force while we are in guest mode. Do not let guests control
* this bit, even if host CR4.MCE == 0.
*/
unsigned long hw_cr4 =
(cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE) |
(cr4 & ~X86_CR4_MCE) |
(to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active ?
KVM_RMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON : KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON);
if (cr4 & X86_CR4_VMXE) {
/*
* To use VMXON (and later other VMX instructions), a guest
* must first be able to turn on cr4.VMXE (see handle_vmon()).
* So basically the check on whether to allow nested VMX
* is here.
*/
if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
return 1;
}
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon && !nested_cr4_valid(vcpu, cr4))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.cr4 = cr4;
if (enable_ept) {
if (!is_paging(vcpu)) {
hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PAE;
hw_cr4 |= X86_CR4_PSE;
} else if (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)) {
hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PAE;
}
}
if (!enable_unrestricted_guest && !is_paging(vcpu))
/*
* SMEP/SMAP/PKU is disabled if CPU is in non-paging mode in
* hardware. To emulate this behavior, SMEP/SMAP/PKU needs
* to be manually disabled when guest switches to non-paging
* mode.
*
* If !enable_unrestricted_guest, the CPU is always running
* with CR0.PG=1 and CR4 needs to be modified.
* If enable_unrestricted_guest, the CPU automatically
* disables SMEP/SMAP/PKU when the guest sets CR0.PG=0.
*/
hw_cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE);
vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, cr4);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, hw_cr4);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 10,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetKnownUserWallpaperFilesId(
const AccountId& account_id,
const wallpaper::WallpaperFilesId& wallpaper_files_id) {
user_manager::known_user::SetStringPref(account_id, kWallpaperFilesId,
wallpaper_files_id.id());
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void done_path_create(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry)
{
dput(dentry);
mutex_unlock(&path->dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
mnt_drop_write(path->mnt);
path_put(path);
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 12,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DOMPatchSupport::~DOMPatchSupport() { }
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_SZP1( INS_ARG )
{
switch ( (FT_Int)args[0] )
{
case 0:
CUR.zp1 = CUR.twilight;
break;
case 1:
CUR.zp1 = CUR.pts;
break;
default:
if ( CUR.pedantic_hinting )
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
CUR.GS.gep1 = (FT_UShort)args[0];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
a* (toa(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->convert1();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 22,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void armv8pmu_write_evtype(int idx, u32 val)
{
if (armv8pmu_select_counter(idx) == idx) {
val &= ARMV8_EVTYPE_MASK;
asm volatile("msr pmxevtyper_el0, %0" :: "r" (val));
}
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 16,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ubb_show(struct md_rdev *rdev, char *page)
{
return badblocks_show(&rdev->badblocks, page, 1);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t hashtable_iter_serial(void *iter)
{
pair_t *pair = list_to_pair((list_t *)iter);
return pair->serial;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 13,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int job_control(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file)
{
/* Job control check -- must be done at start and after
every sleep (POSIX.1 7.1.1.4). */
/* NOTE: not yet done after every sleep pending a thorough
check of the logic of this change. -- jlc */
/* don't stop on /dev/console */
if (file->f_op->write == redirected_tty_write ||
current->signal->tty != tty)
return 0;
spin_lock_irq(&tty->ctrl_lock);
if (!tty->pgrp)
printk(KERN_ERR "n_tty_read: no tty->pgrp!\n");
else if (task_pgrp(current) != tty->pgrp) {
spin_unlock_irq(&tty->ctrl_lock);
if (is_ignored(SIGTTIN) || is_current_pgrp_orphaned())
return -EIO;
kill_pgrp(task_pgrp(current), SIGTTIN, 1);
set_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING);
return -ERESTARTSYS;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&tty->ctrl_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 15,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int i8042_remove_filter(bool (*filter)(unsigned char data, unsigned char str,
struct serio *port))
{
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&i8042_lock, flags);
if (i8042_platform_filter != filter) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
i8042_platform_filter = NULL;
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&i8042_lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <chenhong3@huawei.com>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 11,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Node::InsertionNotificationRequest HTMLFormControlElement::insertedInto(ContainerNode* insertionPoint)
{
m_ancestorDisabledState = AncestorDisabledStateUnknown;
m_dataListAncestorState = Unknown;
setNeedsWillValidateCheck();
HTMLElement::insertedInto(insertionPoint);
FormAssociatedElement::insertedInto(insertionPoint);
return InsertionDone;
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(struct kvm *kvm, enum kvm_bus bus_idx,
struct kvm_io_device *dev)
{
int i, r;
struct kvm_io_bus *new_bus, *bus;
bus = kvm->buses[bus_idx];
new_bus = kmemdup(bus, sizeof(*bus), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_bus)
return -ENOMEM;
r = -ENOENT;
for (i = 0; i < new_bus->dev_count; i++)
if (new_bus->range[i].dev == dev) {
r = 0;
new_bus->dev_count--;
new_bus->range[i] = new_bus->range[new_bus->dev_count];
sort(new_bus->range, new_bus->dev_count,
sizeof(struct kvm_io_range),
kvm_io_bus_sort_cmp, NULL);
break;
}
if (r) {
kfree(new_bus);
return r;
}
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->buses[bus_idx], new_bus);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kfree(bus);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MaybeReportDeepScanningVerdict(Profile* profile,
const GURL& url,
const std::string& file_name,
const std::string& download_digest_sha256,
const std::string& mime_type,
const std::string& trigger,
const int64_t content_size,
BinaryUploadService::Result result,
DeepScanningClientResponse response) {
if (result == BinaryUploadService::Result::FILE_TOO_LARGE) {
extensions::SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouterFactory::GetForProfile(profile)
->OnLargeUnscannedFileEvent(url, file_name, download_digest_sha256,
mime_type, trigger, content_size);
}
if (result != BinaryUploadService::Result::SUCCESS)
return;
if (response.malware_scan_verdict().verdict() ==
MalwareDeepScanningVerdict::UWS ||
response.malware_scan_verdict().verdict() ==
MalwareDeepScanningVerdict::MALWARE) {
extensions::SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouterFactory::GetForProfile(profile)
->OnDangerousDeepScanningResult(
url, file_name, download_digest_sha256,
MalwareVerdictToThreatType(
response.malware_scan_verdict().verdict()),
mime_type, trigger, content_size);
}
if (response.dlp_scan_verdict().status() == DlpDeepScanningVerdict::SUCCESS) {
if (!response.dlp_scan_verdict().triggered_rules().empty()) {
extensions::SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouterFactory::GetForProfile(profile)
->OnSensitiveDataEvent(response.dlp_scan_verdict(), url, file_name,
download_digest_sha256, mime_type, trigger,
content_size);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_wfree(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
struct sock *sk;
/* Get the saved chunk pointer. */
chunk = *((struct sctp_chunk **)(skb->cb));
asoc = chunk->asoc;
sk = asoc->base.sk;
asoc->sndbuf_used -= SCTP_DATA_SNDSIZE(chunk) +
sizeof(struct sk_buff) +
sizeof(struct sctp_chunk);
atomic_sub(sizeof(struct sctp_chunk), &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
sock_wfree(skb);
__sctp_write_space(asoc);
sctp_association_put(asoc);
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parse_msg_type(const char *str)
{
if (!strcmp(str, "error"))
return FSCK_ERROR;
else if (!strcmp(str, "warn"))
return FSCK_WARN;
else if (!strcmp(str, "ignore"))
return FSCK_IGNORE;
else
die("Unknown fsck message type: '%s'", str);
}
Commit Message: fsck: detect submodule urls starting with dash
Urls with leading dashes can cause mischief on older
versions of Git. We should detect them so that they can be
rejected by receive.fsckObjects, preventing modern versions
of git from being a vector by which attacks can spread.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: auth_set_security_env(struct sc_card *card,
const struct sc_security_env *env, int se_num)
{
struct auth_senv *auth_senv = &((struct auth_private_data *) card->drv_data)->senv;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
long unsigned pads = env->algorithm_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PADS;
long unsigned supported_pads = SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1 | SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_ISO9796;
int rv;
unsigned char rsa_sbuf[3] = {
0x80, 0x01, 0xFF
};
unsigned char des_sbuf[13] = {
0x80, 0x01, 0x01,
0x87, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
};
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
sc_log(card->ctx,
"op %i; path %s; key_ref 0x%X; algos 0x%X; flags 0x%lX",
env->operation, sc_print_path(&env->file_ref), env->key_ref[0],
env->algorithm_flags, env->flags);
memset(auth_senv, 0, sizeof(struct auth_senv));
if (!(env->flags & SC_SEC_ENV_FILE_REF_PRESENT))
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL, "Key file is not selected.");
switch (env->algorithm) {
case SC_ALGORITHM_DES:
case SC_ALGORITHM_3DES:
sc_log(card->ctx,
"algo SC_ALGORITHM_xDES: ref %X, flags %lX",
env->algorithm_ref, env->flags);
if (env->operation == SC_SEC_OPERATION_DECIPHER) {
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x22, 0x41, 0xB8);
apdu.lc = 3;
apdu.data = des_sbuf;
apdu.datalen = 3;
}
else {
sc_log(card->ctx, "Invalid crypto operation: %X", env->operation);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, "Invalid crypto operation");
}
break;
case SC_ALGORITHM_RSA:
sc_log(card->ctx, "algo SC_ALGORITHM_RSA");
if (env->algorithm_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASHES) {
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, "No support for hashes.");
}
if (pads & (~supported_pads)) {
sc_log(card->ctx, "No support for PAD %lX", pads);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, "No padding support.");
}
if (env->operation == SC_SEC_OPERATION_SIGN) {
rsa_sbuf[2] = 0x11;
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x22, 0x41, 0xB6);
apdu.lc = sizeof(rsa_sbuf);
apdu.datalen = sizeof(rsa_sbuf);
apdu.data = rsa_sbuf;
}
else if (env->operation == SC_SEC_OPERATION_DECIPHER) {
rsa_sbuf[2] = 0x11;
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x22, 0x41, 0xB8);
apdu.lc = sizeof(rsa_sbuf);
apdu.datalen = sizeof(rsa_sbuf);
apdu.data = rsa_sbuf;
}
else {
sc_log(card->ctx, "Invalid crypto operation: %X", env->operation);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
}
break;
default:
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, "Invalid crypto algorithm supplied");
}
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "Card returned error");
auth_senv->algorithm = env->algorithm;
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 9,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::CreateOpenerProxies(
SiteInstance* instance,
FrameTreeNode* skip_this_node) {
std::vector<FrameTree*> opener_frame_trees;
base::hash_set<FrameTreeNode*> nodes_with_back_links;
CollectOpenerFrameTrees(&opener_frame_trees, &nodes_with_back_links);
for (int i = opener_frame_trees.size() - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
opener_frame_trees[i]
->root()
->render_manager()
->CreateOpenerProxiesForFrameTree(instance, skip_this_node);
}
for (auto* node : nodes_with_back_links) {
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy =
node->render_manager()->GetRenderFrameProxyHost(instance);
if (!proxy)
continue;
int opener_routing_id =
node->render_manager()->GetOpenerRoutingID(instance);
DCHECK_NE(opener_routing_id, MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
proxy->Send(new FrameMsg_UpdateOpener(proxy->GetRoutingID(),
opener_routing_id));
}
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LauncherView::OnMouseMoved(const views::MouseEvent& event) {
if (ShouldHideTooltip(event.location()) && tooltip_->IsVisible())
tooltip_->Close();
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int writeToClient(int fd, client *c, int handler_installed) {
ssize_t nwritten = 0, totwritten = 0;
size_t objlen;
size_t objmem;
robj *o;
while(clientHasPendingReplies(c)) {
if (c->bufpos > 0) {
nwritten = write(fd,c->buf+c->sentlen,c->bufpos-c->sentlen);
if (nwritten <= 0) break;
c->sentlen += nwritten;
totwritten += nwritten;
/* If the buffer was sent, set bufpos to zero to continue with
* the remainder of the reply. */
if ((int)c->sentlen == c->bufpos) {
c->bufpos = 0;
c->sentlen = 0;
}
} else {
o = listNodeValue(listFirst(c->reply));
objlen = sdslen(o->ptr);
objmem = getStringObjectSdsUsedMemory(o);
if (objlen == 0) {
listDelNode(c->reply,listFirst(c->reply));
c->reply_bytes -= objmem;
continue;
}
nwritten = write(fd, ((char*)o->ptr)+c->sentlen,objlen-c->sentlen);
if (nwritten <= 0) break;
c->sentlen += nwritten;
totwritten += nwritten;
/* If we fully sent the object on head go to the next one */
if (c->sentlen == objlen) {
listDelNode(c->reply,listFirst(c->reply));
c->sentlen = 0;
c->reply_bytes -= objmem;
}
}
/* Note that we avoid to send more than NET_MAX_WRITES_PER_EVENT
* bytes, in a single threaded server it's a good idea to serve
* other clients as well, even if a very large request comes from
* super fast link that is always able to accept data (in real world
* scenario think about 'KEYS *' against the loopback interface).
*
* However if we are over the maxmemory limit we ignore that and
* just deliver as much data as it is possible to deliver. */
server.stat_net_output_bytes += totwritten;
if (totwritten > NET_MAX_WRITES_PER_EVENT &&
(server.maxmemory == 0 ||
zmalloc_used_memory() < server.maxmemory)) break;
}
if (nwritten == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN) {
nwritten = 0;
} else {
serverLog(LL_VERBOSE,
"Error writing to client: %s", strerror(errno));
freeClient(c);
return C_ERR;
}
}
if (totwritten > 0) {
/* For clients representing masters we don't count sending data
* as an interaction, since we always send REPLCONF ACK commands
* that take some time to just fill the socket output buffer.
* We just rely on data / pings received for timeout detection. */
if (!(c->flags & CLIENT_MASTER)) c->lastinteraction = server.unixtime;
}
if (!clientHasPendingReplies(c)) {
c->sentlen = 0;
if (handler_installed) aeDeleteFileEvent(server.el,c->fd,AE_WRITABLE);
/* Close connection after entire reply has been sent. */
if (c->flags & CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY) {
freeClient(c);
return C_ERR;
}
}
return C_OK;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 2,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didFinishDocumentLoad(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
WebDataSource* ds = frame->dataSource();
DocumentState* document_state = DocumentState::FromDataSource(ds);
document_state->set_finish_document_load_time(Time::Now());
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidFinishDocumentLoad(routing_id_));
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, render_view_->observers(),
DidFinishDocumentLoad(frame));
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderFrameObserver, observers_, DidFinishDocumentLoad());
render_view_->UpdateEncoding(frame, frame->view()->pageEncoding().utf8());
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t expect_preface(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn, const uint8_t *src, size_t len, const char **err_desc)
{
if (len < CONNECTION_PREFACE.len) {
return H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_INCOMPLETE;
}
if (memcmp(src, CONNECTION_PREFACE.base, CONNECTION_PREFACE.len) != 0) {
return H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_PROTOCOL_CLOSE_IMMEDIATELY;
}
{ /* send SETTINGS */
h2o_iovec_t vec = h2o_buffer_reserve(&conn->_write.buf, SETTINGS_HOST_BIN.len);
memcpy(vec.base, SETTINGS_HOST_BIN.base, SETTINGS_HOST_BIN.len);
conn->_write.buf->size += SETTINGS_HOST_BIN.len;
h2o_http2_conn_request_write(conn);
}
conn->_read_expect = expect_default;
return CONNECTION_PREFACE.len;
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HistogramBase* CustomHistogram::DeserializeInfoImpl(PickleIterator* iter) {
std::string histogram_name;
int flags;
int declared_min;
int declared_max;
uint32_t bucket_count;
uint32_t range_checksum;
if (!ReadHistogramArguments(iter, &histogram_name, &flags, &declared_min,
&declared_max, &bucket_count, &range_checksum)) {
return NULL;
}
std::vector<Sample> sample_ranges(bucket_count - 1);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < sample_ranges.size(); ++i) {
if (!iter->ReadInt(&sample_ranges[i]))
return NULL;
}
HistogramBase* histogram = CustomHistogram::FactoryGet(
histogram_name, sample_ranges, flags);
if (!ValidateRangeChecksum(*histogram, range_checksum)) {
return NULL;
}
return histogram;
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 28,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheDatabase::Disable() {
VLOG(1) << "Disabling appcache database.";
is_disabled_ = true;
ResetConnectionAndTables();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 28,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aspath_add_asns (struct aspath *aspath, as_t asno, u_char type, unsigned num)
{
struct assegment *assegment = aspath->segments;
unsigned i;
if (assegment && assegment->type == type)
{
/* extend existing segment */
aspath->segments = assegment_prepend_asns (aspath->segments, asno, num);
}
else
{
/* prepend with new segment */
struct assegment *newsegment = assegment_new (type, num);
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
newsegment->as[i] = asno;
/* insert potentially replacing empty segment */
if (assegment && assegment->length == 0)
{
newsegment->next = assegment->next;
assegment_free (assegment);
}
else
newsegment->next = assegment;
aspath->segments = newsegment;
}
aspath_str_update (aspath);
return aspath;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CrosMock::SetInputMethodLibraryStatusAreaExpectations() {
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_input_method_library_, AddObserver(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_input_method_library_, GetActiveInputMethods())
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(InvokeWithoutArgs(CreateInputMethodDescriptors))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_input_method_library_, GetSupportedInputMethods())
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(InvokeWithoutArgs(CreateInputMethodDescriptors))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_input_method_library_, GetKeyboardOverlayId(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly((Return("en_US")))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_input_method_library_, current_input_method())
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly((Return(current_input_method_)))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_input_method_library_, previous_input_method())
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly((Return(previous_input_method_)))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_input_method_library_, current_ime_properties())
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly((ReturnRef(ime_properties_)))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_input_method_library_, GetNumActiveInputMethods())
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly((Return(1)))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_input_method_library_, SetImeConfig(_, _, _))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly((Return(true)))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_input_method_library_, RemoveObserver(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_input_method_library_, SetDeferImeStartup(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_input_method_library_, StopInputMethodDaemon())
.Times(AnyNumber())
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_input_method_library_, ChangeInputMethod(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.RetiresOnSaturation();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EditorClientBlackBerry::textFieldDidEndEditing(Element* element)
{
if (m_webPagePrivate->m_webSettings->isFormAutofillEnabled()) {
if (HTMLInputElement* inputElement = element->toInputElement())
m_webPagePrivate->m_autofillManager->textFieldDidEndEditing(inputElement);
}
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSObject* throwTypeError(ExecState* exec)
{
return throwError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Type error"));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mem_cgroup_split_huge_fixup(struct page *head)
{
struct page_cgroup *head_pc = lookup_page_cgroup(head);
struct page_cgroup *pc;
int i;
if (mem_cgroup_disabled())
return;
for (i = 1; i < HPAGE_PMD_NR; i++) {
pc = head_pc + i;
pc->mem_cgroup = head_pc->mem_cgroup;
smp_wmb();/* see __commit_charge() */
pc->flags = head_pc->flags & ~PCGF_NOCOPY_AT_SPLIT;
}
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::IsLazyLoadPolicyEnforced() const {
return RuntimeEnabledFeatures::ExperimentalProductivityFeaturesEnabled() &&
!GetFeaturePolicy()->IsFeatureEnabled(
mojom::FeaturePolicyFeature::kLazyLoad);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 12,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::SaveWindowPlacement(const gfx::Rect& bounds,
ui::WindowShowState show_state) {
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfileIfExisting(profile());
if (session_service)
session_service->SetWindowBounds(session_id_, bounds, show_state);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftMPEG4::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && outQueue.size() == kNumOutputBuffers) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader == NULL) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
continue;
}
PortInfo *port = editPortInfo(1);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader =
port->mBuffers.editItemAt(mNumSamplesOutput & 1).mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
++mInputBufferCount;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
List<BufferInfo *>::iterator it = outQueue.begin();
while ((*it)->mHeader != outHeader) {
++it;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *it;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(it);
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
return;
}
uint8_t *bitstream = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
uint32_t *start_code = (uint32_t *)bitstream;
bool volHeader = *start_code == 0xB0010000;
if (volHeader) {
PVCleanUpVideoDecoder(mHandle);
mInitialized = false;
}
if (!mInitialized) {
uint8_t *vol_data[1];
int32_t vol_size = 0;
vol_data[0] = NULL;
if ((inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) || volHeader) {
vol_data[0] = bitstream;
vol_size = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
MP4DecodingMode mode =
(mMode == MODE_MPEG4) ? MPEG4_MODE : H263_MODE;
Bool success = PVInitVideoDecoder(
mHandle, vol_data, &vol_size, 1,
outputBufferWidth(), outputBufferHeight(), mode);
if (!success) {
ALOGW("PVInitVideoDecoder failed. Unsupported content?");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
MP4DecodingMode actualMode = PVGetDecBitstreamMode(mHandle);
if (mode != actualMode) {
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
PVSetPostProcType((VideoDecControls *) mHandle, 0);
bool hasFrameData = false;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
} else if (volHeader) {
hasFrameData = true;
}
mInitialized = true;
if (mode == MPEG4_MODE && handlePortSettingsChange()) {
return;
}
if (!hasFrameData) {
continue;
}
}
if (!mFramesConfigured) {
PortInfo *port = editPortInfo(1);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = port->mBuffers.editItemAt(1).mHeader;
PVSetReferenceYUV(mHandle, outHeader->pBuffer);
mFramesConfigured = true;
}
uint32_t useExtTimestamp = (inHeader->nOffset == 0);
uint32_t timestamp = 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (useExtTimestamp) {
mPvToOmxTimeMap.add(mPvTime, inHeader->nTimeStamp);
timestamp = mPvTime;
mPvTime++;
}
int32_t bufferSize = inHeader->nFilledLen;
int32_t tmp = bufferSize;
OMX_U32 frameSize = (mWidth * mHeight * 3) / 2;
if (outHeader->nAllocLen < frameSize) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27833616");
ALOGE("Insufficient output buffer size");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
if (PVDecodeVideoFrame(
mHandle, &bitstream, ×tamp, &tmp,
&useExtTimestamp,
outHeader->pBuffer) != PV_TRUE) {
ALOGE("failed to decode video frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
if (handlePortSettingsChange()) {
return;
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mPvToOmxTimeMap.valueFor(timestamp);
mPvToOmxTimeMap.removeItem(timestamp);
inHeader->nOffset += bufferSize;
inHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
} else {
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
++mInputBufferCount;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = frameSize;
List<BufferInfo *>::iterator it = outQueue.begin();
while ((*it)->mHeader != outHeader) {
++it;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *it;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(it);
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
++mNumSamplesOutput;
}
}
Commit Message: SoftMPEG4: Check the buffer size before writing the reference frame.
Also prevent overflow in SoftMPEG4 and division by zero in SoftMPEG4Encoder.
Bug: 30033990
Change-Id: I7701f5fc54c2670587d122330e5dc851f64ed3c2
(cherry picked from commit 695123195034402ca76169b195069c28c30342d3)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 6,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool userfaultfd_remove(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx;
struct userfaultfd_wait_queue ewq;
ctx = vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx;
if (!ctx || !(ctx->features & UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_REMOVE))
return true;
userfaultfd_ctx_get(ctx);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
msg_init(&ewq.msg);
ewq.msg.event = UFFD_EVENT_REMOVE;
ewq.msg.arg.remove.start = start;
ewq.msg.arg.remove.end = end;
userfaultfd_event_wait_completion(ctx, &ewq);
return false;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: non-cooperative: fix fork use after free
When reading the event from the uffd, we put it on a temporary
fork_event list to detect if we can still access it after releasing and
retaking the event_wqh.lock.
If fork aborts and removes the event from the fork_event all is fine as
long as we're still in the userfault read context and fork_event head is
still alive.
We've to put the event allocated in the fork kernel stack, back from
fork_event list-head to the event_wqh head, before returning from
userfaultfd_ctx_read, because the fork_event head lifetime is limited to
the userfaultfd_ctx_read stack lifetime.
Forgetting to move the event back to its event_wqh place then results in
__remove_wait_queue(&ctx->event_wqh, &ewq->wq); in
userfaultfd_event_wait_completion to remove it from a head that has been
already freed from the reader stack.
This could only happen if resolve_userfault_fork failed (for example if
there are no file descriptors available to allocate the fork uffd). If
it succeeded it was put back correctly.
Furthermore, after find_userfault_evt receives a fork event, the forked
userfault context in fork_nctx and uwq->msg.arg.reserved.reserved1 can
be released by the fork thread as soon as the event_wqh.lock is
released. Taking a reference on the fork_nctx before dropping the lock
prevents an use after free in resolve_userfault_fork().
If the fork side aborted and it already released everything, we still
try to succeed resolve_userfault_fork(), if possible.
Fixes: 893e26e61d04eac9 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170920180413.26713-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 4,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hiddev_hid_event(struct hid_device *hid, struct hid_field *field,
struct hid_usage *usage, __s32 value)
{
unsigned type = field->report_type;
struct hiddev_usage_ref uref;
uref.report_type =
(type == HID_INPUT_REPORT) ? HID_REPORT_TYPE_INPUT :
((type == HID_OUTPUT_REPORT) ? HID_REPORT_TYPE_OUTPUT :
((type == HID_FEATURE_REPORT) ? HID_REPORT_TYPE_FEATURE : 0));
uref.report_id = field->report->id;
uref.field_index = field->index;
uref.usage_index = (usage - field->usage);
uref.usage_code = usage->hid;
uref.value = value;
hiddev_send_event(hid, &uref);
}
Commit Message: HID: hiddev: validate num_values for HIDIOCGUSAGES, HIDIOCSUSAGES commands
This patch validates the num_values parameter from userland during the
HIDIOCGUSAGES and HIDIOCSUSAGES commands. Previously, if the report id was set
to HID_REPORT_ID_UNKNOWN, we would fail to validate the num_values parameter
leading to a heap overflow.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int zend_ts_hash_find(TsHashTable *ht, char *arKey, uint nKeyLength, void **pData)
{
int retval;
begin_read(ht);
retval = zend_hash_find(TS_HASH(ht), arKey, nKeyLength, pData);
end_read(ht);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sg_remove_request(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request * srp)
{
unsigned long iflags;
int res = 0;
if (!sfp || !srp || list_empty(&sfp->rq_list))
return res;
write_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
if (!list_empty(&srp->entry)) {
list_del(&srp->entry);
srp->parentfp = NULL;
res = 1;
}
write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
return res;
}
Commit Message: scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE
When calling SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl only a half-filled table is
returned; the remaining part will then contain stale kernel memory
information. This patch zeroes out the entire table to avoid this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 28,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::platformColorsChanged()
{
if (!isActive())
return;
styleEngine().platformColorsChanged();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutofillDialogViews::DetailsGroup::~DetailsGroup() {}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string MakeMediaAccessRequest(int index) {
const int render_process_id = 1;
const int render_frame_id = 1;
const int page_request_id = 1;
const url::Origin security_origin;
MediaStreamManager::MediaAccessRequestCallback callback =
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamManagerTest::ResponseCallback,
base::Unretained(this), index);
StreamControls controls(true, true);
return media_stream_manager_->MakeMediaAccessRequest(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, page_request_id, controls,
security_origin, std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSC::JSValue toJS(JSC::ExecState* exec, JSDOMGlobalObject* globalObject, TestInterface* impl)
{
return wrap<JSTestInterface>(exec, globalObject, impl);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterCINImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("CINEON");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static netdev_tx_t hwsim_mon_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *dev)
{
/* TODO: allow packet injection */
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 6,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int iwl_send_static_wepkey_cmd(struct iwl_priv *priv,
struct iwl_rxon_context *ctx,
bool send_if_empty)
{
int i, not_empty = 0;
u8 buff[sizeof(struct iwl_wep_cmd) +
sizeof(struct iwl_wep_key) * WEP_KEYS_MAX];
struct iwl_wep_cmd *wep_cmd = (struct iwl_wep_cmd *)buff;
size_t cmd_size = sizeof(struct iwl_wep_cmd);
struct iwl_host_cmd cmd = {
.id = ctx->wep_key_cmd,
.data = { wep_cmd, },
.flags = CMD_SYNC,
};
might_sleep();
memset(wep_cmd, 0, cmd_size +
(sizeof(struct iwl_wep_key) * WEP_KEYS_MAX));
for (i = 0; i < WEP_KEYS_MAX ; i++) {
wep_cmd->key[i].key_index = i;
if (ctx->wep_keys[i].key_size) {
wep_cmd->key[i].key_offset = i;
not_empty = 1;
} else {
wep_cmd->key[i].key_offset = WEP_INVALID_OFFSET;
}
wep_cmd->key[i].key_size = ctx->wep_keys[i].key_size;
memcpy(&wep_cmd->key[i].key[3], ctx->wep_keys[i].key,
ctx->wep_keys[i].key_size);
}
wep_cmd->global_key_type = WEP_KEY_WEP_TYPE;
wep_cmd->num_keys = WEP_KEYS_MAX;
cmd_size += sizeof(struct iwl_wep_key) * WEP_KEYS_MAX;
cmd.len[0] = cmd_size;
if (not_empty || send_if_empty)
return iwl_trans_send_cmd(trans(priv), &cmd);
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <wey-yi.w.guy@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void btrfs_merge_extent_hook(struct inode *inode,
struct extent_state *new,
struct extent_state *other)
{
u64 new_size, old_size;
u64 num_extents;
/* not delalloc, ignore it */
if (!(other->state & EXTENT_DELALLOC))
return;
if (new->start > other->start)
new_size = new->end - other->start + 1;
else
new_size = other->end - new->start + 1;
/* we're not bigger than the max, unreserve the space and go */
if (new_size <= BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE) {
spin_lock(&BTRFS_I(inode)->lock);
BTRFS_I(inode)->outstanding_extents--;
spin_unlock(&BTRFS_I(inode)->lock);
return;
}
/*
* We have to add up either side to figure out how many extents were
* accounted for before we merged into one big extent. If the number of
* extents we accounted for is <= the amount we need for the new range
* then we can return, otherwise drop. Think of it like this
*
* [ 4k][MAX_SIZE]
*
* So we've grown the extent by a MAX_SIZE extent, this would mean we
* need 2 outstanding extents, on one side we have 1 and the other side
* we have 1 so they are == and we can return. But in this case
*
* [MAX_SIZE+4k][MAX_SIZE+4k]
*
* Each range on their own accounts for 2 extents, but merged together
* they are only 3 extents worth of accounting, so we need to drop in
* this case.
*/
old_size = other->end - other->start + 1;
num_extents = div64_u64(old_size + BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE - 1,
BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE);
old_size = new->end - new->start + 1;
num_extents += div64_u64(old_size + BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE - 1,
BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE);
if (div64_u64(new_size + BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE - 1,
BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE) >= num_extents)
return;
spin_lock(&BTRFS_I(inode)->lock);
BTRFS_I(inode)->outstanding_extents--;
spin_unlock(&BTRFS_I(inode)->lock);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err stsg_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_SubTrackSampleGroupBox *ptr = (GF_SubTrackSampleGroupBox *)s;
ptr->size += 6 + 4 * ptr->nb_groups;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 3,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
{
struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), user);
gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), group);
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((user != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid))
goto error;
if ((group != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid))
goto error;
ret = 0;
if (user == (uid_t) -1 && group == (gid_t) -1)
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
}
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chown races */
ret = -EACCES;
down_write(&key->sem);
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid))
goto error_put;
/* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
* than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
if (group != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && !in_group_p(gid))
goto error_put;
}
/* change the UID */
if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(uid, key->uid)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
newowner = key_user_lookup(uid);
if (!newowner)
goto error_put;
/* transfer the quota burden to the new user */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
spin_lock(&newowner->lock);
if (newowner->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen >= maxbytes ||
newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen <
newowner->qnbytes)
goto quota_overrun;
newowner->qnkeys++;
newowner->qnbytes += key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
key->user->qnkeys--;
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
}
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys);
}
zapowner = key->user;
key->user = newowner;
key->uid = uid;
}
/* change the GID */
if (group != (gid_t) -1)
key->gid = gid;
ret = 0;
error_put:
up_write(&key->sem);
key_put(key);
if (zapowner)
key_user_put(zapowner);
error:
return ret;
quota_overrun:
spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
zapowner = newowner;
ret = -EDQUOT;
goto error_put;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 3,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::UpdateTileManagerMemoryPolicy(
const ManagedMemoryPolicy& policy) {
if (!resource_pool_)
return;
global_tile_state_.hard_memory_limit_in_bytes = 0;
global_tile_state_.soft_memory_limit_in_bytes = 0;
if (visible_ && policy.bytes_limit_when_visible > 0) {
global_tile_state_.hard_memory_limit_in_bytes =
policy.bytes_limit_when_visible;
global_tile_state_.soft_memory_limit_in_bytes =
(static_cast<int64_t>(global_tile_state_.hard_memory_limit_in_bytes) *
settings_.max_memory_for_prepaint_percentage) /
100;
}
global_tile_state_.memory_limit_policy =
ManagedMemoryPolicy::PriorityCutoffToTileMemoryLimitPolicy(
visible_ ? policy.priority_cutoff_when_visible
: gpu::MemoryAllocation::CUTOFF_ALLOW_NOTHING);
global_tile_state_.num_resources_limit = policy.num_resources_limit;
if (global_tile_state_.hard_memory_limit_in_bytes > 0) {
SetContextVisibility(true);
if (image_decode_cache_)
image_decode_cache_->SetShouldAggressivelyFreeResources(false);
}
DCHECK(resource_pool_);
resource_pool_->CheckBusyResources();
resource_pool_->SetResourceUsageLimits(
global_tile_state_.soft_memory_limit_in_bytes,
global_tile_state_.num_resources_limit);
DidModifyTilePriorities();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String16 Parcel::readString16() const
{
size_t len;
const char16_t* str = readString16Inplace(&len);
if (str) return String16(str, len);
ALOGE("Reading a NULL string not supported here.");
return String16();
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int flush_pending_x87_faults(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt);
rc = asm_safe("fwait");
ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt);
if (unlikely(rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE))
return emulate_exception(ctxt, MF_VECTOR, 0, false);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which is luckily not yet in any final release, this would
also be an exploitable kernel memory *write*!
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 96051572c819194c37a8367624b285be10297eca
Fixes: 283c95d0e3891b64087706b344a4b545d04a6e62
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 5,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int msgctl_nolock(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int msqid,
int cmd, int version, void __user *buf)
{
int err;
struct msg_queue *msq;
switch (cmd) {
case IPC_INFO:
case MSG_INFO:
{
struct msginfo msginfo;
int max_id;
if (!buf)
return -EFAULT;
/*
* We must not return kernel stack data.
* due to padding, it's not enough
* to set all member fields.
*/
err = security_msg_queue_msgctl(NULL, cmd);
if (err)
return err;
memset(&msginfo, 0, sizeof(msginfo));
msginfo.msgmni = ns->msg_ctlmni;
msginfo.msgmax = ns->msg_ctlmax;
msginfo.msgmnb = ns->msg_ctlmnb;
msginfo.msgssz = MSGSSZ;
msginfo.msgseg = MSGSEG;
down_read(&msg_ids(ns).rwsem);
if (cmd == MSG_INFO) {
msginfo.msgpool = msg_ids(ns).in_use;
msginfo.msgmap = atomic_read(&ns->msg_hdrs);
msginfo.msgtql = atomic_read(&ns->msg_bytes);
} else {
msginfo.msgmap = MSGMAP;
msginfo.msgpool = MSGPOOL;
msginfo.msgtql = MSGTQL;
}
max_id = ipc_get_maxid(&msg_ids(ns));
up_read(&msg_ids(ns).rwsem);
if (copy_to_user(buf, &msginfo, sizeof(struct msginfo)))
return -EFAULT;
return (max_id < 0) ? 0 : max_id;
}
case MSG_STAT:
case IPC_STAT:
{
struct msqid64_ds tbuf;
int success_return;
if (!buf)
return -EFAULT;
memset(&tbuf, 0, sizeof(tbuf));
rcu_read_lock();
if (cmd == MSG_STAT) {
msq = msq_obtain_object(ns, msqid);
if (IS_ERR(msq)) {
err = PTR_ERR(msq);
goto out_unlock;
}
success_return = msq->q_perm.id;
} else {
msq = msq_obtain_object_check(ns, msqid);
if (IS_ERR(msq)) {
err = PTR_ERR(msq);
goto out_unlock;
}
success_return = 0;
}
err = -EACCES;
if (ipcperms(ns, &msq->q_perm, S_IRUGO))
goto out_unlock;
err = security_msg_queue_msgctl(msq, cmd);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
kernel_to_ipc64_perm(&msq->q_perm, &tbuf.msg_perm);
tbuf.msg_stime = msq->q_stime;
tbuf.msg_rtime = msq->q_rtime;
tbuf.msg_ctime = msq->q_ctime;
tbuf.msg_cbytes = msq->q_cbytes;
tbuf.msg_qnum = msq->q_qnum;
tbuf.msg_qbytes = msq->q_qbytes;
tbuf.msg_lspid = msq->q_lspid;
tbuf.msg_lrpid = msq->q_lrpid;
rcu_read_unlock();
if (copy_msqid_to_user(buf, &tbuf, version))
return -EFAULT;
return success_return;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return err;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 25,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int poll_urgent(struct file *fp,
struct poll_table_struct *pt)
{
struct hfi1_filedata *fd = fp->private_data;
struct hfi1_ctxtdata *uctxt = fd->uctxt;
struct hfi1_devdata *dd = uctxt->dd;
unsigned pollflag;
poll_wait(fp, &uctxt->wait, pt);
spin_lock_irq(&dd->uctxt_lock);
if (uctxt->urgent != uctxt->urgent_poll) {
pollflag = POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
uctxt->urgent_poll = uctxt->urgent;
} else {
pollflag = 0;
set_bit(HFI1_CTXT_WAITING_URG, &uctxt->event_flags);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&dd->uctxt_lock);
return pollflag;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void TIFFSetEXIFProperties(TIFF *tiff,Image *image)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFREADEXIFDIRECTORY)
const char
*value;
register ssize_t
i;
uint32
offset;
/*
Write EXIF properties.
*/
offset=0;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBIFD,1,&offset);
for (i=0; exif_info[i].tag != 0; i++)
{
value=GetImageProperty(image,exif_info[i].property);
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
continue;
switch (exif_info[i].type)
{
case TIFF_ASCII:
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,value);
break;
}
case TIFF_SHORT:
{
uint16
field;
field=(uint16) StringToLong(value);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,field);
break;
}
case TIFF_LONG:
{
uint16
field;
field=(uint16) StringToLong(value);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,field);
break;
}
case TIFF_RATIONAL:
case TIFF_SRATIONAL:
{
float
field;
field=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,field);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
/* (void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXIFIFD,offset); */
#else
(void) tiff;
(void) image;
#endif
}
Commit Message: https://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=31161
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void unregister_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg, int cpu)
{
list_del_rcu(&tg->cfs_rq[cpu]->leaf_cfs_rq_list);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dtdReset(DTD *p, const XML_Memory_Handling_Suite *ms) {
HASH_TABLE_ITER iter;
hashTableIterInit(&iter, &(p->elementTypes));
for (;;) {
ELEMENT_TYPE *e = (ELEMENT_TYPE *)hashTableIterNext(&iter);
if (! e)
break;
if (e->allocDefaultAtts != 0)
ms->free_fcn(e->defaultAtts);
}
hashTableClear(&(p->generalEntities));
#ifdef XML_DTD
p->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
hashTableClear(&(p->paramEntities));
#endif /* XML_DTD */
hashTableClear(&(p->elementTypes));
hashTableClear(&(p->attributeIds));
hashTableClear(&(p->prefixes));
poolClear(&(p->pool));
poolClear(&(p->entityValuePool));
p->defaultPrefix.name = NULL;
p->defaultPrefix.binding = NULL;
p->in_eldecl = XML_FALSE;
ms->free_fcn(p->scaffIndex);
p->scaffIndex = NULL;
ms->free_fcn(p->scaffold);
p->scaffold = NULL;
p->scaffLevel = 0;
p->scaffSize = 0;
p->scaffCount = 0;
p->contentStringLen = 0;
p->keepProcessing = XML_TRUE;
p->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_FALSE;
p->standalone = XML_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 20,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NTPResourceCache::WindowType NTPResourceCache::GetWindowType(
Profile* profile, content::RenderProcessHost* render_host) {
if (profile->IsGuestSession()) {
return NTPResourceCache::GUEST;
} else if (render_host) {
if (render_host->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord())
return NTPResourceCache::INCOGNITO;
} else if (profile->IsOffTheRecord()) {
return NTPResourceCache::INCOGNITO;
}
return NTPResourceCache::NORMAL;
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void testInterfacePythonAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::testInterfacePythonAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,822 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType JPEGWarningHandler(j_common_ptr jpeg_info,int level)
{
#define JPEGExcessiveWarnings 1000
char
message[JMSG_LENGTH_MAX];
ErrorManager
*error_manager;
Image
*image;
*message='\0';
error_manager=(ErrorManager *) jpeg_info->client_data;
image=error_manager->image;
if (level < 0)
{
/*
Process warning message.
*/
(jpeg_info->err->format_message)(jpeg_info,message);
if (jpeg_info->err->num_warnings++ > JPEGExcessiveWarnings)
JPEGErrorHandler(jpeg_info);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageWarning,(char *) message,
image->filename);
}
else
if ((image->debug != MagickFalse) &&
(level >= jpeg_info->err->trace_level))
{
/*
Process trace message.
*/
(jpeg_info->err->format_message)(jpeg_info,message);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"[%s] JPEG Trace: \"%s\"",image->filename,message);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SimulateGestureEventWithLatencyInfo(WebInputEvent::Type type,
blink::WebGestureDevice sourceDevice,
const ui::LatencyInfo& ui_latency) {
SimulateGestureEventCoreWithLatencyInfo(
SyntheticWebGestureEventBuilder::Build(type, sourceDevice), ui_latency);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void documentAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::documentAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::DecodeImageOnDecoderThread(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner,
DOMArrayBuffer* array_buffer,
const String& premultiply_alpha_option,
const String& color_space_conversion_option) {
DCHECK(!IsMainThread());
ImageDecoder::AlphaOption alpha_op = ImageDecoder::kAlphaPremultiplied;
if (premultiply_alpha_option == "none")
alpha_op = ImageDecoder::kAlphaNotPremultiplied;
bool ignore_color_space = false;
if (color_space_conversion_option == "none")
ignore_color_space = true;
const bool data_complete = true;
std::unique_ptr<ImageDecoder> decoder(ImageDecoder::Create(
SegmentReader::CreateFromSkData(SkData::MakeWithoutCopy(
array_buffer->Data(), array_buffer->ByteLength())),
data_complete, alpha_op, ImageDecoder::kDefaultBitDepth,
ignore_color_space ? ColorBehavior::Ignore() : ColorBehavior::Tag()));
sk_sp<SkImage> frame;
if (decoder) {
frame = ImageBitmap::GetSkImageFromDecoder(std::move(decoder));
}
PostCrossThreadTask(
*task_runner, FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(&ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::
ResolvePromiseOnOriginalThread,
WrapCrossThreadPersistent(this), std::move(frame)));
}
Commit Message: Fix UAP in ImageBitmapLoader/FileReaderLoader
FileReaderLoader stores its client as a raw pointer, so in cases like
ImageBitmapLoader where the FileReaderLoaderClient really is garbage
collected we have to make sure to destroy the FileReaderLoader when
the ExecutionContext that owns it is destroyed.
Bug: 913970
Change-Id: I40b02115367cf7bf5bbbbb8e9b57874d2510f861
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374511
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616342}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cmp_gss_names(gss_name_t n1, gss_name_t n2)
{
OM_uint32 emin;
int equal;
if (GSS_ERROR(gss_compare_name(&emin, n1, n2, &equal)))
return(0);
return(equal);
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool blit_build_vs_passthrough(struct vrend_blitter_ctx *blit_ctx)
{
blit_ctx->vs = glCreateShader(GL_VERTEX_SHADER);
if (!build_and_check(blit_ctx->vs, VS_PASSTHROUGH)) {
glDeleteShader(blit_ctx->vs);
blit_ctx->vs = 0;
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 15,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int codebook_decode_start(vorb *f, Codebook *c)
{
int z = -1;
if (c->lookup_type == 0)
error(f, VORBIS_invalid_stream);
else {
DECODE_VQ(z,f,c);
if (c->sparse) assert(z < c->sorted_entries);
if (z < 0) { // check for EOP
if (!f->bytes_in_seg)
if (f->last_seg)
return z;
error(f, VORBIS_invalid_stream);
}
}
return z;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_tio(struct dm_target_io *tio)
{
bio_put(&tio->clone);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static union _zend_function *row_method_get(
zval **object_pp,
char *method_name, int method_len, const zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_function *fbc;
char *lc_method_name;
lc_method_name = emalloc(method_len + 1);
zend_str_tolower_copy(lc_method_name, method_name, method_len);
if (zend_hash_find(&pdo_row_ce->function_table, lc_method_name, method_len+1, (void**)&fbc) == FAILURE) {
efree(lc_method_name);
return NULL;
}
efree(lc_method_name);
return fbc;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 6,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int rtnl_dev_combine_flags(const struct net_device *dev,
const struct ifinfomsg *ifm)
{
unsigned int flags = ifm->ifi_flags;
/* bugwards compatibility: ifi_change == 0 is treated as ~0 */
if (ifm->ifi_change)
flags = (flags & ifm->ifi_change) |
(rtnl_dev_get_flags(dev) & ~ifm->ifi_change);
return flags;
}
Commit Message: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean webkitWebViewBaseKeyReleaseEvent(GtkWidget* widget, GdkEventKey* event)
{
WebKitWebViewBase* webViewBase = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_BASE(widget);
WebKitWebViewBasePrivate* priv = webViewBase->priv;
if (gtk_im_context_filter_keypress(priv->imContext.get(), event))
return TRUE;
if (priv->shouldForwardNextKeyEvent) {
priv->shouldForwardNextKeyEvent = FALSE;
return GTK_WIDGET_CLASS(webkit_web_view_base_parent_class)->key_release_event(widget, event);
}
priv->pageProxy->handleKeyboardEvent(NativeWebKeyboardEvent(reinterpret_cast<GdkEvent*>(event)));
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: align_column_to_tab (parser_line_counter_t column) /**< current column */
{
/* Tab aligns to zero column start position. */
return (parser_line_counter_t) (((column + (8u - 1u)) & ~ECMA_STRING_CONTAINER_MASK) + 1u);
} /* align_column_to_tab */
Commit Message: Do not allocate memory for zero length strings.
Fixes #1821.
JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Zoltan Herczeg zherczeg.u-szeged@partner.samsung.com
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewTest::SimulateUserInputChangeForElement(
blink::WebInputElement* input,
const std::string& new_value) {
ASSERT_TRUE(base::IsStringASCII(new_value));
while (!input->focused())
input->document().frame()->view()->advanceFocus(false);
size_t previous_length = input->value().length();
for (size_t i = 0; i < previous_length; ++i)
SimulateUserTypingASCIICharacter(ui::VKEY_BACK, false);
EXPECT_TRUE(input->value().utf8().empty());
for (size_t i = 0; i < new_value.size(); ++i)
SimulateUserTypingASCIICharacter(new_value[i], false);
EXPECT_EQ(new_value, input->value().utf8().substr(0, new_value.length()));
base::MessageLoop::current()->RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sched_free_group(struct task_group *tg)
{
free_fair_sched_group(tg);
free_rt_sched_group(tg);
autogroup_free(tg);
kmem_cache_free(task_group_cache, tg);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmxnet3_io_bar1_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned size)
{
VMXNET3State *s = opaque;
uint64_t ret = 0;
switch (addr) {
/* Vmxnet3 Revision Report Selection */
case VMXNET3_REG_VRRS:
VMW_CBPRN("Read BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_VRRS], size %d", size);
ret = VMXNET3_DEVICE_REVISION;
break;
/* UPT Version Report Selection */
case VMXNET3_REG_UVRS:
VMW_CBPRN("Read BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_UVRS], size %d", size);
ret = VMXNET3_DEVICE_VERSION;
break;
/* Command */
case VMXNET3_REG_CMD:
VMW_CBPRN("Read BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_CMD], size %d", size);
ret = vmxnet3_get_command_status(s);
break;
/* MAC Address Low */
case VMXNET3_REG_MACL:
VMW_CBPRN("Read BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_MACL], size %d", size);
ret = vmxnet3_get_mac_low(&s->conf.macaddr);
break;
/* MAC Address High */
case VMXNET3_REG_MACH:
VMW_CBPRN("Read BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_MACH], size %d", size);
ret = vmxnet3_get_mac_high(&s->conf.macaddr);
break;
/*
* Interrupt Cause Register
* Used for legacy interrupts only so interrupt index always 0
*/
case VMXNET3_REG_ICR:
VMW_CBPRN("Read BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_ICR], size %d", size);
if (vmxnet3_interrupt_asserted(s, 0)) {
vmxnet3_clear_interrupt(s, 0);
ret = true;
} else {
ret = false;
}
break;
default:
VMW_CBPRN("Unknow read BAR1[%" PRIx64 "], %d bytes", addr, size);
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fault_init(void)
{
if (test_facility(2) && test_facility(75))
store_indication = 0xc00;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fips_expand_key_bits(BYTE* in, BYTE* out)
{
BYTE buf[21], c;
int i, b, p, r;
/* reverse every byte in the key */
for (i = 0; i < 21; i++)
buf[i] = fips_reverse_table[in[i]];
/* insert a zero-bit after every 7th bit */
for (i = 0, b = 0; i < 24; i++, b += 7)
{
p = b / 8;
r = b % 8;
if (r == 0)
{
out[i] = buf[p] & 0xfe;
}
else
{
/* c is accumulator */
c = buf[p] << r;
c |= buf[p + 1] >> (8 - r);
out[i] = c & 0xfe;
}
}
/* reverse every byte */
/* alter lsb so the byte has odd parity */
for (i = 0; i < 24; i++)
out[i] = fips_oddparity_table[fips_reverse_table[out[i]]];
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 11,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cm_format_rep_event(struct cm_work *work, enum ib_qp_type qp_type)
{
struct cm_rep_msg *rep_msg;
struct ib_cm_rep_event_param *param;
rep_msg = (struct cm_rep_msg *)work->mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.mad;
param = &work->cm_event.param.rep_rcvd;
param->remote_ca_guid = rep_msg->local_ca_guid;
param->remote_qkey = be32_to_cpu(rep_msg->local_qkey);
param->remote_qpn = be32_to_cpu(cm_rep_get_qpn(rep_msg, qp_type));
param->starting_psn = be32_to_cpu(cm_rep_get_starting_psn(rep_msg));
param->responder_resources = rep_msg->initiator_depth;
param->initiator_depth = rep_msg->resp_resources;
param->target_ack_delay = cm_rep_get_target_ack_delay(rep_msg);
param->failover_accepted = cm_rep_get_failover(rep_msg);
param->flow_control = cm_rep_get_flow_ctrl(rep_msg);
param->rnr_retry_count = cm_rep_get_rnr_retry_count(rep_msg);
param->srq = cm_rep_get_srq(rep_msg);
work->cm_event.private_data = &rep_msg->private_data;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int crypto_register_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&crypto_chain, nb);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cvt_16(union VALUETYPE *p, const struct magic *m)
{
DO_CVT(h, (uint16_t));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void red_channel_client_push(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
PipeItem *pipe_item;
if (!rcc->during_send) {
rcc->during_send = TRUE;
} else {
return;
}
red_channel_client_ref(rcc);
if (rcc->send_data.blocked) {
red_channel_client_send(rcc);
}
if (!red_channel_client_no_item_being_sent(rcc) && !rcc->send_data.blocked) {
rcc->send_data.blocked = TRUE;
spice_printerr("ERROR: an item waiting to be sent and not blocked");
}
while ((pipe_item = red_channel_client_pipe_item_get(rcc))) {
red_channel_client_send_item(rcc, pipe_item);
}
rcc->during_send = FALSE;
red_channel_client_unref(rcc);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init camellia_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_alg(&camellia_alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::SetOverscrollBehavior(
const WebOverscrollBehavior& overscroll_behavior) {
web_view_->SetOverscrollBehavior(overscroll_behavior);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrintPreviewUIUnitTest() {}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 27,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: omx_video::~omx_video()
{
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("~omx_video(): Inside Destructor()");
if (m_pipe_in >= 0) close(m_pipe_in);
if (m_pipe_out >= 0) close(m_pipe_out);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("omx_video: Waiting on Msg Thread exit");
if (msg_thread_created)
pthread_join(msg_thread_id,NULL);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("omx_video: Waiting on Async Thread exit");
/*For V4L2 based drivers, pthread_join is done in device_close
* so no need to do it here*/
#ifndef _MSM8974_
if (async_thread_created)
pthread_join(async_thread_id,NULL);
#endif
pthread_mutex_destroy(&m_lock);
sem_destroy(&m_cmd_lock);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("m_etb_count = %" PRIu64 ", m_fbd_count = %" PRIu64, m_etb_count,
m_fbd_count);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("omx_video: Destructor exit");
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Exiting OMX Video Encoder ...");
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void doubleArrayAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::doubleArrayAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_search(char *tag, int usinguid)
{
int c;
struct searchargs *searchargs;
clock_t start = clock();
char mytime[100];
int n;
if (backend_current) {
/* remote mailbox */
const char *cmd = usinguid ? "UID Search" : "Search";
prot_printf(backend_current->out, "%s %s ", tag, cmd);
if (!pipe_command(backend_current, 65536)) {
pipe_including_tag(backend_current, tag, 0);
}
return;
}
/* local mailbox */
searchargs = new_searchargs(tag, GETSEARCH_CHARSET_KEYWORD|GETSEARCH_RETURN,
&imapd_namespace, imapd_userid, imapd_authstate,
imapd_userisadmin || imapd_userisproxyadmin);
/* special case quirk for iPhones */
if (imapd_id.quirks & QUIRK_SEARCHFUZZY)
searchargs->fuzzy_depth++;
c = get_search_program(imapd_in, imapd_out, searchargs);
if (c == EOF) {
eatline(imapd_in, ' ');
freesearchargs(searchargs);
return;
}
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Unexpected extra arguments to Search\r\n", tag);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
freesearchargs(searchargs);
return;
}
if (searchargs->charset == CHARSET_UNKNOWN_CHARSET) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_UNRECOGNIZED_CHARSET));
}
else {
n = index_search(imapd_index, searchargs, usinguid);
snprintf(mytime, sizeof(mytime), "%2.3f",
(clock() - start) / (double) CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s (%d msgs in %s secs)\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED), n, mytime);
}
freesearchargs(searchargs);
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Handle<Object> PopImpl(Handle<JSArray> receiver) {
return Subclass::RemoveElement(receiver, AT_END);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 14,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltExtFunctionTest(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt,
int nargs ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt;
void *data = NULL;
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
if (testData == NULL) {
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltExtFunctionTest: not initialized,"
" calling xsltGetExtData\n");
data = xsltGetExtData(tctxt, (const xmlChar *) XSLT_DEFAULT_URL);
if (data == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, NULL,
"xsltExtElementTest: not initialized\n");
return;
}
}
if (tctxt == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"xsltExtFunctionTest: failed to get the transformation context\n");
return;
}
if (data == NULL)
data = xsltGetExtData(tctxt, (const xmlChar *) XSLT_DEFAULT_URL);
if (data == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"xsltExtFunctionTest: failed to get module data\n");
return;
}
if (data != testData) {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"xsltExtFunctionTest: got wrong module data\n");
return;
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_FUNCTION
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"libxslt:test() called with %d args\n", nargs);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnBufferingStateChange(BufferingState state) {
OnBufferingStateChangeInternal(state, false);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 6,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
unsigned int mm_flags, unsigned long vm_flags,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int fault;
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
if (unlikely(!vma))
goto out;
if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > addr))
goto check_stack;
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so we can handle
* it.
*/
good_area:
/*
* Check that the permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which
* occurred.
*/
if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
goto out;
}
return handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, addr & PAGE_MASK, mm_flags);
check_stack:
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(vma, addr))
goto good_area;
out:
return fault;
}
Commit Message: Revert "arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions"
This reverts commit bc07c2c6e9ed125d362af0214b6313dca180cb08.
While the aim is increased security for --x memory maps, it does not
protect against kernel level reads. Until SECCOMP is implemented for
arm64, revert this patch to avoid giving a false idea of execute-only
mappings.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 1 | 19,546 |
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