instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MPEG4Source::read(
MediaBuffer **out, const ReadOptions *options) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CHECK(mStarted);
if (options != nullptr && options->getNonBlocking() && !mGroup->has_buffers()) {
*out = nullptr;
return WOULD_BLOCK;
}
if (mFirstMoofOffset > 0) {
return fragmentedRead(out, options);
}
*out = NULL;
int64_t targetSampleTimeUs = -1;
int64_t seekTimeUs;
ReadOptions::SeekMode mode;
if (options && options->getSeekTo(&seekTimeUs, &mode)) {
uint32_t findFlags = 0;
switch (mode) {
case ReadOptions::SEEK_PREVIOUS_SYNC:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagBefore;
break;
case ReadOptions::SEEK_NEXT_SYNC:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagAfter;
break;
case ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST_SYNC:
case ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagClosest;
break;
default:
CHECK(!"Should not be here.");
break;
}
uint32_t sampleIndex;
status_t err = mSampleTable->findSampleAtTime(
seekTimeUs, 1000000, mTimescale,
&sampleIndex, findFlags);
if (mode == ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST) {
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagBefore;
}
uint32_t syncSampleIndex;
if (err == OK) {
err = mSampleTable->findSyncSampleNear(
sampleIndex, &syncSampleIndex, findFlags);
}
uint32_t sampleTime;
if (err == OK) {
err = mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
sampleIndex, NULL, NULL, &sampleTime);
}
if (err != OK) {
if (err == ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE) {
err = ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
ALOGV("end of stream");
return err;
}
if (mode == ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST) {
targetSampleTimeUs = (sampleTime * 1000000ll) / mTimescale;
}
#if 0
uint32_t syncSampleTime;
CHECK_EQ(OK, mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
syncSampleIndex, NULL, NULL, &syncSampleTime));
ALOGI("seek to time %lld us => sample at time %lld us, "
"sync sample at time %lld us",
seekTimeUs,
sampleTime * 1000000ll / mTimescale,
syncSampleTime * 1000000ll / mTimescale);
#endif
mCurrentSampleIndex = syncSampleIndex;
if (mBuffer != NULL) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
}
}
off64_t offset = 0;
size_t size = 0;
uint32_t cts, stts;
bool isSyncSample;
bool newBuffer = false;
if (mBuffer == NULL) {
newBuffer = true;
status_t err =
mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
mCurrentSampleIndex, &offset, &size, &cts, &isSyncSample, &stts);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
err = mGroup->acquire_buffer(&mBuffer);
if (err != OK) {
CHECK(mBuffer == NULL);
return err;
}
if (size > mBuffer->size()) {
ALOGE("buffer too small: %zu > %zu", size, mBuffer->size());
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
}
if ((!mIsAVC && !mIsHEVC) || mWantsNALFragments) {
if (newBuffer) {
ssize_t num_bytes_read =
mDataSource->readAt(offset, (uint8_t *)mBuffer->data(), size);
if (num_bytes_read < (ssize_t)size) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, size);
mBuffer->meta_data()->clear();
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTime, ((int64_t)cts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, ((int64_t)stts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
if (targetSampleTimeUs >= 0) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTargetTime, targetSampleTimeUs);
}
if (isSyncSample) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
}
++mCurrentSampleIndex;
}
if (!mIsAVC && !mIsHEVC) {
*out = mBuffer;
mBuffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
CHECK(mBuffer->range_length() >= mNALLengthSize);
const uint8_t *src =
(const uint8_t *)mBuffer->data() + mBuffer->range_offset();
size_t nal_size = parseNALSize(src);
if (mNALLengthSize > SIZE_MAX - nal_size) {
ALOGE("b/24441553, b/24445122");
}
if (mBuffer->range_length() - mNALLengthSize < nal_size) {
ALOGE("incomplete NAL unit.");
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
MediaBuffer *clone = mBuffer->clone();
CHECK(clone != NULL);
clone->set_range(mBuffer->range_offset() + mNALLengthSize, nal_size);
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(
mBuffer->range_offset() + mNALLengthSize + nal_size,
mBuffer->range_length() - mNALLengthSize - nal_size);
if (mBuffer->range_length() == 0) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
}
*out = clone;
return OK;
} else {
ssize_t num_bytes_read = 0;
int32_t drm = 0;
bool usesDRM = (mFormat->findInt32(kKeyIsDRM, &drm) && drm != 0);
if (usesDRM) {
num_bytes_read =
mDataSource->readAt(offset, (uint8_t*)mBuffer->data(), size);
} else {
num_bytes_read = mDataSource->readAt(offset, mSrcBuffer, size);
}
if (num_bytes_read < (ssize_t)size) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (usesDRM) {
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, size);
} else {
uint8_t *dstData = (uint8_t *)mBuffer->data();
size_t srcOffset = 0;
size_t dstOffset = 0;
while (srcOffset < size) {
bool isMalFormed = !isInRange((size_t)0u, size, srcOffset, mNALLengthSize);
size_t nalLength = 0;
if (!isMalFormed) {
nalLength = parseNALSize(&mSrcBuffer[srcOffset]);
srcOffset += mNALLengthSize;
isMalFormed = !isInRange((size_t)0u, size, srcOffset, nalLength);
}
if (isMalFormed) {
ALOGE("Video is malformed");
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (nalLength == 0) {
continue;
}
if (dstOffset > SIZE_MAX - 4 ||
dstOffset + 4 > SIZE_MAX - nalLength ||
dstOffset + 4 + nalLength > mBuffer->size()) {
ALOGE("b/27208621 : %zu %zu", dstOffset, mBuffer->size());
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27208621");
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 1;
memcpy(&dstData[dstOffset], &mSrcBuffer[srcOffset], nalLength);
srcOffset += nalLength;
dstOffset += nalLength;
}
CHECK_EQ(srcOffset, size);
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, dstOffset);
}
mBuffer->meta_data()->clear();
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTime, ((int64_t)cts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, ((int64_t)stts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
if (targetSampleTimeUs >= 0) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTargetTime, targetSampleTimeUs);
}
if (mIsAVC) {
uint32_t layerId = FindAVCLayerId(
(const uint8_t *)mBuffer->data(), mBuffer->range_length());
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyTemporalLayerId, layerId);
}
if (isSyncSample) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
}
++mCurrentSampleIndex;
*out = mBuffer;
mBuffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
}
Commit Message: Skip track if verification fails
Bug: 62187433
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: Ib9b0b6de88d046d8149e9ea5073d6c40ffec7b0c
(cherry picked from commit ef8c7830d838d877e6b37b75b47294b064c79397)
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: checker_no_swap_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
global_data->checker_no_swap = true;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::ProcessFragment(const KURL& url,
WebFrameLoadType frame_load_type,
LoadStartType load_start_type) {
LocalFrameView* view = frame_->View();
if (!view)
return;
Frame* boundary_frame =
url.HasFragmentIdentifier()
? frame_->FindUnsafeParentScrollPropagationBoundary()
: nullptr;
if (boundary_frame && boundary_frame->IsLocalFrame()) {
ToLocalFrame(boundary_frame)
->View()
->SetSafeToPropagateScrollToParent(false);
}
bool should_scroll_to_fragment =
(load_start_type == kNavigationWithinSameDocument &&
!IsBackForwardLoadType(frame_load_type)) ||
(!GetDocumentLoader()->GetInitialScrollState().did_restore_from_history &&
!(GetDocumentLoader()->GetHistoryItem() &&
GetDocumentLoader()->GetHistoryItem()->ScrollRestorationType() ==
kScrollRestorationManual));
view->ProcessUrlFragment(url, should_scroll_to_fragment
? LocalFrameView::kUrlFragmentScroll
: LocalFrameView::kUrlFragmentDontScroll);
if (boundary_frame && boundary_frame->IsLocalFrame())
ToLocalFrame(boundary_frame)
->View()
->SetSafeToPropagateScrollToParent(true);
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int x86_pmu_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct perf_event *event;
int idx, handled = 0;
u64 val;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
for (idx = 0; idx < x86_pmu.num_counters; idx++) {
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask)) {
/*
* Though we deactivated the counter some cpus
* might still deliver spurious interrupts still
* in flight. Catch them:
*/
if (__test_and_clear_bit(idx, cpuc->running))
handled++;
continue;
}
event = cpuc->events[idx];
val = x86_perf_event_update(event);
if (val & (1ULL << (x86_pmu.cntval_bits - 1)))
continue;
/*
* event overflow
*/
handled++;
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!x86_perf_event_set_period(event))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, regs))
x86_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
if (handled)
inc_irq_stat(apic_perf_irqs);
return handled;
}
Commit Message: perf, x86: Fix Intel fixed counters base initialization
The following patch solves the problems introduced by Robert's
commit 41bf498 and reported by Arun Sharma. This commit gets rid
of the base + index notation for reading and writing PMU msrs.
The problem is that for fixed counters, the new calculation for
the base did not take into account the fixed counter indexes,
thus all fixed counters were read/written from fixed counter 0.
Although all fixed counters share the same config MSR, they each
have their own counter register.
Without:
$ task -e unhalted_core_cycles -e instructions_retired -e baclears noploop 1 noploop for 1 seconds
242202299 unhalted_core_cycles (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
2389685946 instructions_retired (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
49473 baclears (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
With:
$ task -e unhalted_core_cycles -e instructions_retired -e baclears noploop 1 noploop for 1 seconds
2392703238 unhalted_core_cycles (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
2389793744 instructions_retired (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
47863 baclears (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: ming.m.lin@intel.com
Cc: robert.richter@amd.com
Cc: asharma@fb.com
Cc: perfmon2-devel@lists.sf.net
LKML-Reference: <20110319172005.GB4978@quad>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterDCMImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
static const char
*DCMNote=
{
"DICOM is used by the medical community for images like X-rays. The\n"
"specification, \"Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine\n"
"(DICOM)\", is available at http://medical.nema.org/. In particular,\n"
"see part 5 which describes the image encoding (RLE, JPEG, JPEG-LS),\n"
"and supplement 61 which adds JPEG-2000 encoding."
};
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("DCM","DCM",
"Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine image");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadDCMImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsDCM;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderDecoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->note=ConstantString(DCMNote);
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1199
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PeopleHandler::MarkFirstSetupComplete() {
signin::SetUserSkippedPromo(profile_);
ProfileSyncService* service = GetSyncService();
if (!service || service->IsFirstSetupComplete())
return;
base::FilePath profile_file_path = profile_->GetPath();
ProfileMetrics::LogProfileSyncSignIn(profile_file_path);
sync_blocker_.reset();
service->SetFirstSetupComplete();
FireWebUIListener("sync-settings-saved");
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jas_stream_display(jas_stream_t *stream, FILE *fp, int n)
{
unsigned char buf[16];
int i;
int j;
int m;
int c;
int display;
int cnt;
cnt = n - (n % 16);
display = 1;
for (i = 0; i < n; i += 16) {
if (n > 16 && i > 0) {
display = (i >= cnt) ? 1 : 0;
}
if (display) {
fprintf(fp, "%08x:", i);
}
m = JAS_MIN(n - i, 16);
for (j = 0; j < m; ++j) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(stream)) == EOF) {
abort();
return -1;
}
buf[j] = c;
}
if (display) {
for (j = 0; j < m; ++j) {
fprintf(fp, " %02x", buf[j]);
}
fputc(' ', fp);
for (; j < 16; ++j) {
fprintf(fp, " ");
}
for (j = 0; j < m; ++j) {
if (isprint(buf[j])) {
fputc(buf[j], fp);
} else {
fputc(' ', fp);
}
}
fprintf(fp, "\n");
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 26,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::setShouldCreateRenderers(bool f)
{
m_createRenderers = f;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetDeferImeStartup(bool defer) {}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 15,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::OnWindowBeginUserBoundsChange() {
WebContents* web_contents = GetActiveWebContents();
if (!web_contents)
return;
web_contents->GetRenderViewHost()->NotifyMoveOrResizeStarted();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void PushLZWStack(LZWStack *stack_info,const size_t value)
{
if (stack_info->index >= stack_info->top)
return;
*stack_info->index=value;
stack_info->index++;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/592
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void exit_notify(struct task_struct *tsk, int group_dead)
{
int signal;
void *cookie;
/*
* This does two things:
*
* A. Make init inherit all the child processes
* B. Check to see if any process groups have become orphaned
* as a result of our exiting, and if they have any stopped
* jobs, send them a SIGHUP and then a SIGCONT. (POSIX 3.2.2.2)
*/
forget_original_parent(tsk);
exit_task_namespaces(tsk);
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
if (group_dead)
kill_orphaned_pgrp(tsk->group_leader, NULL);
/* Let father know we died
*
* Thread signals are configurable, but you aren't going to use
* that to send signals to arbitary processes.
* That stops right now.
*
* If the parent exec id doesn't match the exec id we saved
* when we started then we know the parent has changed security
* domain.
*
* If our self_exec id doesn't match our parent_exec_id then
* we have changed execution domain as these two values started
* the same after a fork.
*/
if (tsk->exit_signal != SIGCHLD && !task_detached(tsk) &&
(tsk->parent_exec_id != tsk->real_parent->self_exec_id ||
tsk->self_exec_id != tsk->parent_exec_id))
tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
signal = tracehook_notify_death(tsk, &cookie, group_dead);
if (signal >= 0)
signal = do_notify_parent(tsk, signal);
tsk->exit_state = signal == DEATH_REAP ? EXIT_DEAD : EXIT_ZOMBIE;
/* mt-exec, de_thread() is waiting for us */
if (thread_group_leader(tsk) &&
tsk->signal->group_exit_task &&
tsk->signal->notify_count < 0)
wake_up_process(tsk->signal->group_exit_task);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
tracehook_report_death(tsk, signal, cookie, group_dead);
/* If the process is dead, release it - nobody will wait for it */
if (signal == DEATH_REAP)
release_task(tsk);
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static boolean ReadICCProfile(j_decompress_ptr jpeg_info)
{
char
magick[12];
ErrorManager
*error_manager;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
StringInfo
*icc_profile,
*profile;
/*
Read color profile.
*/
length=(size_t) ((size_t) GetCharacter(jpeg_info) << 8);
length+=(size_t) GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
length-=2;
if (length <= 14)
{
while (length-- > 0)
(void) GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
return(TRUE);
}
for (i=0; i < 12; i++)
magick[i]=(char) GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
if (LocaleCompare(magick,ICC_PROFILE) != 0)
{
/*
Not a ICC profile, return.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length-12); i++)
(void) GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
return(TRUE);
}
(void) GetCharacter(jpeg_info); /* id */
(void) GetCharacter(jpeg_info); /* markers */
length-=14;
error_manager=(ErrorManager *) jpeg_info->client_data;
image=error_manager->image;
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return(FALSE);
}
error_manager->profile=profile;
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
for (i=(ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile)-1; i >= 0; i--)
*p++=(unsigned char) GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
error_manager->profile=NULL;
icc_profile=(StringInfo *) GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if (icc_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
ConcatenateStringInfo(icc_profile,profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
else
{
status=SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return(FALSE);
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Profile: ICC, %.20g bytes",(double) length);
return(TRUE);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Parcel::acquireObjects()
{
const sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
size_t i = mObjectsSize;
uint8_t* const data = mData;
binder_size_t* const objects = mObjects;
while (i > 0) {
i--;
const flat_binder_object* flat
= reinterpret_cast<flat_binder_object*>(data+objects[i]);
acquire_object(proc, *flat, this, &mOpenAshmemSize);
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly handle dup() failure in Parcel::readNativeHandle
bail out if dup() fails, instead of creating an invalid native_handle_t
Bug: 28395952
Change-Id: Ia1a6198c0f45165b9c6a55a803e5f64d8afa0572
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline void QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::UpdateGapList(
std::list<Gap>::iterator gap_with_new_data_written,
QuicStreamOffset start_offset,
size_t bytes_written) {
if (gap_with_new_data_written->begin_offset == start_offset &&
gap_with_new_data_written->end_offset > start_offset + bytes_written) {
gap_with_new_data_written->begin_offset = start_offset + bytes_written;
} else if (gap_with_new_data_written->begin_offset < start_offset &&
gap_with_new_data_written->end_offset ==
start_offset + bytes_written) {
gap_with_new_data_written->end_offset = start_offset;
} else if (gap_with_new_data_written->begin_offset < start_offset &&
gap_with_new_data_written->end_offset >
start_offset + bytes_written) {
auto current = gap_with_new_data_written++;
QuicStreamOffset current_end = current->end_offset;
current->end_offset = start_offset;
gaps_.insert(gap_with_new_data_written,
Gap(start_offset + bytes_written, current_end));
} else if (gap_with_new_data_written->begin_offset == start_offset &&
gap_with_new_data_written->end_offset ==
start_offset + bytes_written) {
gaps_.erase(gap_with_new_data_written);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB Write in QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::OnStreamData
BUG=778505
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I1dfd1d26a2c7ee8fe047f7fe6e4ac2e9b97efa52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748282
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513144}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 18,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NaClProcessHost::OnResourcesReady() {
NaClBrowser* nacl_browser = NaClBrowser::GetInstance();
if (!nacl_browser->IsReady() || !SendStart()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot launch NaCl process";
delete this;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 24,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GfxIndexedColorSpace::getRGB(GfxColor *color, GfxRGB *rgb) {
GfxColor color2;
base->getRGB(mapColorToBase(color, &color2), rgb);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 17,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void copyStereo16(
short *dst,
const int *const *src,
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i];
*dst++ = src[1][i];
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 8,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int net_assign_generic(struct net *net, unsigned int id, void *data)
{
struct net_generic *ng, *old_ng;
BUG_ON(id < MIN_PERNET_OPS_ID);
old_ng = rcu_dereference_protected(net->gen,
lockdep_is_held(&pernet_ops_rwsem));
if (old_ng->s.len > id) {
old_ng->ptr[id] = data;
return 0;
}
ng = net_alloc_generic();
if (ng == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* Some synchronisation notes:
*
* The net_generic explores the net->gen array inside rcu
* read section. Besides once set the net->gen->ptr[x]
* pointer never changes (see rules in netns/generic.h).
*
* That said, we simply duplicate this array and schedule
* the old copy for kfree after a grace period.
*/
memcpy(&ng->ptr[MIN_PERNET_OPS_ID], &old_ng->ptr[MIN_PERNET_OPS_ID],
(old_ng->s.len - MIN_PERNET_OPS_ID) * sizeof(void *));
ng->ptr[id] = data;
rcu_assign_pointer(net->gen, ng);
kfree_rcu(old_ng, s.rcu);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::StartInputEventAckTimeout(TimeDelta delay) {
if (!input_event_ack_timeout_)
return;
input_event_ack_timeout_->Start(delay);
input_event_ack_start_time_ = clock_->NowTicks();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zval* ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_str_find(const HashTable *ht, const char *str, size_t len)
{
zend_ulong h;
Bucket *p;
IS_CONSISTENT(ht);
h = zend_inline_hash_func(str, len);
p = zend_hash_str_find_bucket(ht, str, len, h);
return p ? &p->val : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 8,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct lzxd_stream *lzxd_init(struct mspack_system *system,
struct mspack_file *input,
struct mspack_file *output,
int window_bits,
int reset_interval,
int input_buffer_size,
off_t output_length,
char is_delta)
{
unsigned int window_size = 1 << window_bits;
struct lzxd_stream *lzx;
if (!system) return NULL;
/* LZX DELTA window sizes are between 2^17 (128KiB) and 2^25 (32MiB),
* regular LZX windows are between 2^15 (32KiB) and 2^21 (2MiB)
*/
if (is_delta) {
if (window_bits < 17 || window_bits > 25) return NULL;
}
else {
if (window_bits < 15 || window_bits > 21) return NULL;
}
input_buffer_size = (input_buffer_size + 1) & -2;
if (!input_buffer_size) return NULL;
/* allocate decompression state */
if (!(lzx = (struct lzxd_stream *) system->alloc(system, sizeof(struct lzxd_stream)))) {
return NULL;
}
/* allocate decompression window and input buffer */
lzx->window = (unsigned char *) system->alloc(system, (size_t) window_size);
lzx->inbuf = (unsigned char *) system->alloc(system, (size_t) input_buffer_size);
if (!lzx->window || !lzx->inbuf) {
system->free(lzx->window);
system->free(lzx->inbuf);
system->free(lzx);
return NULL;
}
/* initialise decompression state */
lzx->sys = system;
lzx->input = input;
lzx->output = output;
lzx->offset = 0;
lzx->length = output_length;
lzx->inbuf_size = input_buffer_size;
lzx->window_size = 1 << window_bits;
lzx->ref_data_size = 0;
lzx->window_posn = 0;
lzx->frame_posn = 0;
lzx->frame = 0;
lzx->reset_interval = reset_interval;
lzx->intel_filesize = 0;
lzx->intel_curpos = 0;
lzx->intel_started = 0;
lzx->error = MSPACK_ERR_OK;
lzx->num_offsets = position_slots[window_bits - 15] << 3;
lzx->is_delta = is_delta;
lzx->o_ptr = lzx->o_end = &lzx->e8_buf[0];
lzxd_reset_state(lzx);
INIT_BITS;
return lzx;
}
Commit Message: Prevent a 1-byte underread of the input buffer if an odd-sized data block comes just before an uncompressed block header
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipgre_tap_init(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ip_tunnel *tunnel;
tunnel = netdev_priv(dev);
tunnel->dev = dev;
strcpy(tunnel->parms.name, dev->name);
ipgre_tunnel_bind_dev(dev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PS_SERIALIZER_DECODE_FUNC(php_serialize) /* {{{ */
{
const char *endptr = val + vallen;
zval *session_vars;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(session_vars);
if (php_var_unserialize(&session_vars, &val, endptr, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
var_push_dtor(&var_hash, &session_vars);
}
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
if (PS(http_session_vars)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&PS(http_session_vars));
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(session_vars) == IS_NULL) {
array_init(session_vars);
}
PS(http_session_vars) = session_vars;
ZEND_SET_GLOBAL_VAR_WITH_LENGTH("_SESSION", sizeof("_SESSION"), PS(http_session_vars), Z_REFCOUNT_P(PS(http_session_vars)) + 1, 1);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72681 - consume data even if we're not storing them
CWE ID: CWE-74 | 0 | 2,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _prolog_is_running (uint32_t jobid)
{
int rc = 0;
if (list_find_first (conf->prolog_running_jobs,
(ListFindF) _match_jobid, &jobid))
rc = 1;
return (rc);
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 28,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dns_packet_validate_query(DnsPacket *p) {
int r;
assert(p);
r = dns_packet_validate(p);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (DNS_PACKET_QR(p) != 0)
return 0;
if (DNS_PACKET_OPCODE(p) != 0)
return -EBADMSG;
if (DNS_PACKET_TC(p))
return -EBADMSG;
switch (p->protocol) {
case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR:
case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS:
/* RFC 4795, Section 2.1.1. says to discard all queries with QDCOUNT != 1 */
if (DNS_PACKET_QDCOUNT(p) != 1)
return -EBADMSG;
/* RFC 4795, Section 2.1.1. says to discard all queries with ANCOUNT != 0 */
if (DNS_PACKET_ANCOUNT(p) > 0)
return -EBADMSG;
/* RFC 4795, Section 2.1.1. says to discard all queries with NSCOUNT != 0 */
if (DNS_PACKET_NSCOUNT(p) > 0)
return -EBADMSG;
break;
case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS:
/* RFC 6762, Section 18 */
if (DNS_PACKET_AA(p) != 0 ||
DNS_PACKET_RD(p) != 0 ||
DNS_PACKET_RA(p) != 0 ||
DNS_PACKET_AD(p) != 0 ||
DNS_PACKET_CD(p) != 0 ||
DNS_PACKET_RCODE(p) != 0)
return -EBADMSG;
break;
default:
break;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: resolved: bugfix of null pointer p->question dereferencing (#6020)
See https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/+bug/1621396
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_handlereq_to_dentry(
struct file *parfilp,
xfs_fsop_handlereq_t *hreq)
{
return xfs_handle_to_dentry(parfilp, hreq->ihandle, hreq->ihandlen);
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: print_t_info(netdissect_options *ndo,
int info)
{
int ntype = info & 3;
switch (ntype) {
case 0: ND_PRINT((ndo, "reserved-ntype? ")); break;
case TI_L2ROUT: ND_PRINT((ndo, "l2rout ")); break;
case TI_L1ROUT: ND_PRINT((ndo, "l1rout ")); break;
case TI_ENDNODE: ND_PRINT((ndo, "endnode ")); break;
}
if (info & TI_VERIF)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "verif "));
if (info & TI_BLOCK)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "blo "));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12899/DECnet: Fix bounds checking.
If we're skipping over padding before the *real* flags, check whether
the real flags are in the captured data before fetching it. This fixes
a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Note one place where we don't need to do bounds checking as it's already
been done.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 26,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::UpdateLoadInfo() {
scoped_ptr<LoadInfoMap> info_map(GetLoadInfoForAllRoutes());
if (info_map->empty() || !scheduler_->HasLoadingClients()) {
update_load_states_timer_->Stop();
return;
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::UpdateLoadInfoOnUIThread,
base::Passed(&info_map)));
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 8,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int smaps_rollup_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct proc_maps_private *priv = seq->private;
if (priv->mm)
mmdrop(priv->mm);
kfree(priv);
return single_release(inode, file);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 1,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String LocalFrame::SelectedTextForClipboard() const {
if (!GetDocument())
return g_empty_string;
DCHECK(!GetDocument()->NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate());
return Selection().SelectedTextForClipboard();
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 2,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nntp_check_children(struct Context *ctx, const char *msgid)
{
struct NntpData *nntp_data = ctx->data;
struct ChildCtx cc;
char buf[STRING];
int rc;
bool quiet;
void *hc = NULL;
if (!nntp_data || !nntp_data->nserv)
return -1;
if (nntp_data->first_message > nntp_data->last_loaded)
return 0;
/* init context */
cc.ctx = ctx;
cc.num = 0;
cc.max = 10;
cc.child = mutt_mem_malloc(sizeof(anum_t) * cc.max);
/* fetch numbers of child messages */
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "XPAT References %u-%u *%s*\r\n",
nntp_data->first_message, nntp_data->last_loaded, msgid);
rc = nntp_fetch_lines(nntp_data, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, fetch_children, &cc);
if (rc)
{
FREE(&cc.child);
if (rc > 0)
{
if (mutt_str_strncmp("500", buf, 3) != 0)
mutt_error("XPAT: %s", buf);
else
{
mutt_error(_("Unable to find child articles because server does not "
"support XPAT command."));
}
}
return -1;
}
/* fetch all found messages */
quiet = ctx->quiet;
ctx->quiet = true;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
hc = nntp_hcache_open(nntp_data);
#endif
for (int i = 0; i < cc.num; i++)
{
rc = nntp_fetch_headers(ctx, hc, cc.child[i], cc.child[i], 1);
if (rc < 0)
break;
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
mutt_hcache_close(hc);
#endif
ctx->quiet = quiet;
FREE(&cc.child);
return (rc < 0) ? -1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: Add alloc fail check in nntp_fetch_headers
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_proc_write_setup(struct nfs_write_data *data, struct rpc_message *msg)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(data->header->inode);
if (!nfs4_write_need_cache_consistency_data(data)) {
data->args.bitmask = NULL;
data->res.fattr = NULL;
} else
data->args.bitmask = server->cache_consistency_bitmask;
if (!data->write_done_cb)
data->write_done_cb = nfs4_write_done_cb;
data->res.server = server;
data->timestamp = jiffies;
msg->rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_WRITE];
nfs41_init_sequence(&data->args.seq_args, &data->res.seq_res, 1);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FLAC__StreamEncoderWriteStatus SoftFlacEncoder::onEncodedFlacAvailable(
const FLAC__byte buffer[],
size_t bytes, unsigned samples,
unsigned current_frame) {
UNUSED_UNLESS_VERBOSE(current_frame);
ALOGV("SoftFlacEncoder::onEncodedFlacAvailable(bytes=%zu, samples=%u, curr_frame=%u)",
bytes, samples, current_frame);
#ifdef WRITE_FLAC_HEADER_IN_FIRST_BUFFER
if (samples == 0) {
ALOGI(" saving %zu bytes of header", bytes);
memcpy(mHeader + mHeaderOffset, buffer, bytes);
mHeaderOffset += bytes;// will contain header size when finished receiving header
return FLAC__STREAM_ENCODER_WRITE_STATUS_OK;
}
#endif
if ((samples == 0) || !mEncoderWriteData) {
ALOGV("ignoring %zu bytes of header data (samples=%d)", bytes, samples);
return FLAC__STREAM_ENCODER_WRITE_STATUS_OK;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
CHECK(!outQueue.empty());
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
#ifdef WRITE_FLAC_HEADER_IN_FIRST_BUFFER
if (!mWroteHeader) {
ALOGI(" writing %d bytes of header on output port", mHeaderOffset);
memcpy(outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset + outHeader->nFilledLen,
mHeader, mHeaderOffset);
outHeader->nFilledLen += mHeaderOffset;
outHeader->nOffset += mHeaderOffset;
mWroteHeader = true;
}
#endif
ALOGV(" writing %zu bytes of encoded data on output port", bytes);
if (bytes > outHeader->nAllocLen - outHeader->nOffset - outHeader->nFilledLen) {
ALOGE(" not enough space left to write encoded data, dropping %zu bytes", bytes);
return FLAC__STREAM_ENCODER_WRITE_STATUS_OK;
}
memcpy(outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset, buffer, bytes);
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mCurrentInputTimeStamp;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen += bytes;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
mEncoderReturnedEncodedData = true;
mEncoderReturnedNbBytes += bytes;
return FLAC__STREAM_ENCODER_WRITE_STATUS_OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isShader(WebGLShader* shader) {
if (!shader || isContextLost())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsShader(shader->Object());
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 25,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillPopupBaseView::AddExtraInitParams(
views::Widget::InitParams* params) {
params->opacity = views::Widget::InitParams::TRANSLUCENT_WINDOW;
params->shadow_type = views::Widget::InitParams::SHADOW_TYPE_NONE;
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 18,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FetchManager::Loader::Start() {
if (!ContentSecurityPolicy::ShouldBypassMainWorld(execution_context_) &&
!execution_context_->GetContentSecurityPolicy()->AllowConnectToSource(
fetch_request_data_->Url())) {
PerformNetworkError(
"Refused to connect to '" + fetch_request_data_->Url().ElidedString() +
"' because it violates the document's Content Security Policy.");
return;
}
if ((SecurityOrigin::Create(fetch_request_data_->Url())
->IsSameSchemeHostPort(fetch_request_data_->Origin().get())) ||
(fetch_request_data_->Url().ProtocolIsData() &&
fetch_request_data_->SameOriginDataURLFlag()) ||
(fetch_request_data_->Mode() == FetchRequestMode::kNavigate)) {
PerformSchemeFetch();
return;
}
if (fetch_request_data_->Mode() == FetchRequestMode::kSameOrigin) {
PerformNetworkError("Fetch API cannot load " +
fetch_request_data_->Url().GetString() +
". Request mode is \"same-origin\" but the URL\'s "
"origin is not same as the request origin " +
fetch_request_data_->Origin()->ToString() + ".");
return;
}
if (fetch_request_data_->Mode() == FetchRequestMode::kNoCORS) {
fetch_request_data_->SetResponseTainting(FetchRequestData::kOpaqueTainting);
PerformSchemeFetch();
return;
}
if (!SchemeRegistry::ShouldTreatURLSchemeAsSupportingFetchAPI(
fetch_request_data_->Url().Protocol())) {
PerformNetworkError(
"Fetch API cannot load " + fetch_request_data_->Url().GetString() +
". URL scheme must be \"http\" or \"https\" for CORS request.");
return;
}
fetch_request_data_->SetResponseTainting(FetchRequestData::kCORSTainting);
PerformHTTPFetch();
}
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <horo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 22,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u64 perf_cgroup_event_time(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_cgroup_info *t;
t = per_cpu_ptr(event->cgrp->info, event->cpu);
return t->time;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionOptionsGuest::~ExtensionOptionsGuest() {
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 27,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ar6000_rssiThreshold_event(struct ar6_softc *ar, WMI_RSSI_THRESHOLD_VAL newThreshold, s16 rssi)
{
USER_RSSI_THOLD userRssiThold;
rssi = rssi + SIGNAL_QUALITY_NOISE_FLOOR;
if (enablerssicompensation) {
rssi = rssi_compensation_calc(ar, rssi);
}
/* Send an event to the app */
userRssiThold.tag = ar->rssi_map[newThreshold].tag;
userRssiThold.rssi = rssi;
A_PRINTF("rssi Threshold range = %d tag = %d rssi = %d\n", newThreshold,
userRssiThold.tag, userRssiThold.rssi);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SERVER_REC *server_find_chatnet(const char *chatnet)
{
GSList *tmp;
g_return_val_if_fail(chatnet != NULL, NULL);
if (*chatnet == '\0') return NULL;
for (tmp = servers; tmp != NULL; tmp = tmp->next) {
SERVER_REC *server = tmp->data;
if (server->connrec->chatnet != NULL &&
g_strcasecmp(server->connrec->chatnet, chatnet) == 0)
return server;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> SerializedScriptValue::create(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, MessagePortArray* messagePorts, ArrayBufferArray* arrayBuffers, ExceptionState& exceptionState, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
return adoptRef(new SerializedScriptValue(value, messagePorts, arrayBuffers, 0, exceptionState, isolate));
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AwContents::SetDipScale(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj, jfloat dip_scale) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
SetDipScaleInternal(dip_scale);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: read_key (struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt, struct buffer *buf)
{
uint8_t cipher_length;
uint8_t hmac_length;
CLEAR (*key);
if (!buf_read (buf, &cipher_length, 1))
goto read_err;
if (!buf_read (buf, &hmac_length, 1))
goto read_err;
if (!buf_read (buf, key->cipher, cipher_length))
goto read_err;
if (!buf_read (buf, key->hmac, hmac_length))
goto read_err;
if (cipher_length != kt->cipher_length || hmac_length != kt->hmac_length)
goto key_len_err;
return 1;
read_err:
msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: error reading key from remote");
return -1;
key_len_err:
msg (D_TLS_ERRORS,
"TLS Error: key length mismatch, local cipher/hmac %d/%d, remote cipher/hmac %d/%d",
kt->cipher_length, kt->hmac_length, cipher_length, hmac_length);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 4,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: StructTraitsTest() {}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 5,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tcp_rcv_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct tcphdr *th, unsigned int len)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (unlikely(!sk->sk_rx_dst))
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops->sk_rx_dst_set(sk, skb);
/*
* Header prediction.
* The code loosely follows the one in the famous
* "30 instruction TCP receive" Van Jacobson mail.
*
* Van's trick is to deposit buffers into socket queue
* on a device interrupt, to call tcp_recv function
* on the receive process context and checksum and copy
* the buffer to user space. smart...
*
* Our current scheme is not silly either but we take the
* extra cost of the net_bh soft interrupt processing...
* We do checksum and copy also but from device to kernel.
*/
tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp = 0;
/* pred_flags is 0xS?10 << 16 + snd_wnd
* if header_prediction is to be made
* 'S' will always be tp->tcp_header_len >> 2
* '?' will be 0 for the fast path, otherwise pred_flags is 0 to
* turn it off (when there are holes in the receive
* space for instance)
* PSH flag is ignored.
*/
if ((tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_HP_BITS) == tp->pred_flags &&
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == tp->rcv_nxt &&
!after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq, tp->snd_nxt)) {
int tcp_header_len = tp->tcp_header_len;
/* Timestamp header prediction: tcp_header_len
* is automatically equal to th->doff*4 due to pred_flags
* match.
*/
/* Check timestamp */
if (tcp_header_len == sizeof(struct tcphdr) + TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED) {
/* No? Slow path! */
if (!tcp_parse_aligned_timestamp(tp, th))
goto slow_path;
/* If PAWS failed, check it more carefully in slow path */
if ((s32)(tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsval - tp->rx_opt.ts_recent) < 0)
goto slow_path;
/* DO NOT update ts_recent here, if checksum fails
* and timestamp was corrupted part, it will result
* in a hung connection since we will drop all
* future packets due to the PAWS test.
*/
}
if (len <= tcp_header_len) {
/* Bulk data transfer: sender */
if (len == tcp_header_len) {
/* Predicted packet is in window by definition.
* seq == rcv_nxt and rcv_wup <= rcv_nxt.
* Hence, check seq<=rcv_wup reduces to:
*/
if (tcp_header_len ==
(sizeof(struct tcphdr) + TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED) &&
tp->rcv_nxt == tp->rcv_wup)
tcp_store_ts_recent(tp);
/* We know that such packets are checksummed
* on entry.
*/
tcp_ack(sk, skb, 0);
__kfree_skb(skb);
tcp_data_snd_check(sk);
return;
} else { /* Header too small */
TCP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_INERRS);
goto discard;
}
} else {
int eaten = 0;
bool fragstolen = false;
if (tp->ucopy.task == current &&
tp->copied_seq == tp->rcv_nxt &&
len - tcp_header_len <= tp->ucopy.len &&
sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
if (!tcp_copy_to_iovec(sk, skb, tcp_header_len)) {
/* Predicted packet is in window by definition.
* seq == rcv_nxt and rcv_wup <= rcv_nxt.
* Hence, check seq<=rcv_wup reduces to:
*/
if (tcp_header_len ==
(sizeof(struct tcphdr) +
TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED) &&
tp->rcv_nxt == tp->rcv_wup)
tcp_store_ts_recent(tp);
tcp_rcv_rtt_measure_ts(sk, skb);
__skb_pull(skb, tcp_header_len);
tcp_rcv_nxt_update(tp, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq);
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPHPHITSTOUSER);
eaten = 1;
}
}
if (!eaten) {
if (tcp_checksum_complete_user(sk, skb))
goto csum_error;
if ((int)skb->truesize > sk->sk_forward_alloc)
goto step5;
/* Predicted packet is in window by definition.
* seq == rcv_nxt and rcv_wup <= rcv_nxt.
* Hence, check seq<=rcv_wup reduces to:
*/
if (tcp_header_len ==
(sizeof(struct tcphdr) + TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED) &&
tp->rcv_nxt == tp->rcv_wup)
tcp_store_ts_recent(tp);
tcp_rcv_rtt_measure_ts(sk, skb);
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPHPHITS);
/* Bulk data transfer: receiver */
eaten = tcp_queue_rcv(sk, skb, tcp_header_len,
&fragstolen);
}
tcp_event_data_recv(sk, skb);
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq != tp->snd_una) {
/* Well, only one small jumplet in fast path... */
tcp_ack(sk, skb, FLAG_DATA);
tcp_data_snd_check(sk);
if (!inet_csk_ack_scheduled(sk))
goto no_ack;
}
__tcp_ack_snd_check(sk, 0);
no_ack:
if (eaten)
kfree_skb_partial(skb, fragstolen);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
return;
}
}
slow_path:
if (len < (th->doff << 2) || tcp_checksum_complete_user(sk, skb))
goto csum_error;
if (!th->ack && !th->rst && !th->syn)
goto discard;
/*
* Standard slow path.
*/
if (!tcp_validate_incoming(sk, skb, th, 1))
return;
step5:
if (tcp_ack(sk, skb, FLAG_SLOWPATH | FLAG_UPDATE_TS_RECENT) < 0)
goto discard;
tcp_rcv_rtt_measure_ts(sk, skb);
/* Process urgent data. */
tcp_urg(sk, skb, th);
/* step 7: process the segment text */
tcp_data_queue(sk, skb);
tcp_data_snd_check(sk);
tcp_ack_snd_check(sk);
return;
csum_error:
TCP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_CSUMERRORS);
TCP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_INERRS);
discard:
__kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 2,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MakeSectionBold(views::StyledLabel* label,
const base::string16& text,
const base::Optional<int>& bold_start,
int bold_length) {
auto create_style = [&](bool is_bold) {
views::StyledLabel::RangeStyleInfo style;
if (is_bold) {
style.custom_font = label->GetDefaultFontList().Derive(
0, gfx::Font::FontStyle::NORMAL, gfx::Font::Weight::BOLD);
}
style.override_color = SK_ColorWHITE;
return style;
};
auto add_style = [&](const views::StyledLabel::RangeStyleInfo& style,
int start, int end) {
if (start >= end)
return;
label->AddStyleRange(gfx::Range(start, end), style);
};
views::StyledLabel::RangeStyleInfo regular_style =
create_style(false /*is_bold*/);
views::StyledLabel::RangeStyleInfo bold_style =
create_style(true /*is_bold*/);
if (!bold_start || bold_length == 0) {
add_style(regular_style, 0, text.length());
return;
}
add_style(regular_style, 0, *bold_start - 1);
add_style(bold_style, *bold_start, *bold_start + bold_length);
add_style(regular_style, *bold_start + bold_length + 1, text.length());
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void performInternal(WebPagePrivate* webPagePrivate)
{
webPagePrivate->m_webPage->setColorInput(webPagePrivate->m_cachedColorInput);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NuPlayer::GenericSource::onSelectTrack(sp<AMessage> msg) {
int32_t trackIndex, select;
int64_t timeUs;
CHECK(msg->findInt32("trackIndex", &trackIndex));
CHECK(msg->findInt32("select", &select));
CHECK(msg->findInt64("timeUs", &timeUs));
sp<AMessage> response = new AMessage;
status_t err = doSelectTrack(trackIndex, select, timeUs);
response->setInt32("err", err);
sp<AReplyToken> replyID;
CHECK(msg->senderAwaitsResponse(&replyID));
response->postReply(replyID);
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserCommandController::SetBlockCommandExecution(bool block) {
block_command_execution_ = block;
if (block) {
last_blocked_command_id_ = -1;
last_blocked_command_disposition_ = CURRENT_TAB;
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compute_object_path (const char *native_path)
{
const gchar *basename;
GString *s;
guint n;
g_return_val_if_fail (native_path != NULL, NULL);
basename = strrchr (native_path, '/');
if (basename != NULL)
{
basename++;
}
else
{
basename = native_path;
}
s = g_string_new ("/org/freedesktop/UDisks/devices/");
for (n = 0; basename[n] != '\0'; n++)
{
gint c = basename[n];
/* D-Bus spec sez:
*
* Each element must only contain the ASCII characters "[A-Z][a-z][0-9]_"
*/
if ((c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= '0' && c <= '9'))
{
g_string_append_c (s, c);
}
else
{
/* Escape bytes not in [A-Z][a-z][0-9] as _<hex-with-two-digits> */
g_string_append_printf (s, "_%02x", c);
}
}
return g_string_free (s, FALSE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 9,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int check_codec_match(LayeredAVStream *ccf, AVStream *ccs, int stream)
{
int matches = 1;
/* FIXME: Missed check on AVCodecContext.flags */
#define CHECK_CODEC(x) (ccf->codecpar->x != ccs->codecpar->x)
if (CHECK_CODEC(codec_id) || CHECK_CODEC(codec_type)) {
http_log("Codecs do not match for stream %d\n", stream);
matches = 0;
} else if (CHECK_CODEC(bit_rate)) {
http_log("Codec bitrates do not match for stream %d\n", stream);
matches = 0;
} else if (ccf->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) {
if (av_cmp_q(ccf->time_base, ccs->time_base) ||
CHECK_CODEC(width) || CHECK_CODEC(height)) {
http_log("Codec width, height or framerate do not match for stream %d\n", stream);
matches = 0;
}
} else if (ccf->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO) {
if (CHECK_CODEC(sample_rate) ||
CHECK_CODEC(channels) ||
CHECK_CODEC(frame_size)) {
http_log("Codec sample_rate, channels, frame_size do not match for stream %d\n", stream);
matches = 0;
}
} else {
http_log("Unknown codec type for stream %d\n", stream);
matches = 0;
}
return matches;
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GetCurrentRootWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev)
{
return RootWindow(dev->spriteInfo->sprite);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: open_patch_file (char const *filename)
{
file_offset file_pos = 0;
struct stat st;
if (!filename || !*filename || strEQ (filename, "-"))
{
file_offset stdin_pos;
#if HAVE_SETMODE_DOS
if (binary_transput)
{
if (isatty (STDIN_FILENO))
fatal ("cannot read binary data from tty on this platform");
setmode (STDIN_FILENO, O_BINARY);
}
#endif
if (fstat (STDIN_FILENO, &st) != 0)
pfatal ("fstat");
if (S_ISREG (st.st_mode) && (stdin_pos = file_tell (stdin)) != -1)
{
pfp = stdin;
file_pos = stdin_pos;
}
else
{
size_t charsread;
int fd = make_tempfile (&TMPPATNAME, 'p', NULL, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0);
TMPPATNAME_needs_removal = 1;
pfp = fdopen (fd, "w+b");
if (! pfp)
pfatal ("Can't open stream for file %s", quotearg (TMPPATNAME));
for (st.st_size = 0;
(charsread = fread (buf, 1, bufsize, stdin)) != 0;
st.st_size += charsread)
if (fwrite (buf, 1, charsread, pfp) != charsread)
write_fatal ();
if (ferror (stdin) || fclose (stdin) != 0)
read_fatal ();
if (fflush (pfp) != 0
|| file_seek (pfp, (file_offset) 0, SEEK_SET) != 0)
write_fatal ();
}
}
else
{
pfp = fopen (filename, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r");
if (!pfp)
pfatal ("Can't open patch file %s", quotearg (filename));
if (fstat (fileno (pfp), &st) != 0)
pfatal ("fstat");
}
p_filesize = st.st_size;
if (p_filesize != (file_offset) p_filesize)
fatal ("patch file is too long");
next_intuit_at (file_pos, 1);
set_hunkmax();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 13,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sweep(void)
{
int modified = 0;
struct ifsock *ifs, *tmp;
LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(ifs, &il, link, tmp) {
if (!ifs->stale)
continue;
modified++;
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "Removing stale ifs %s", inet_ntoa(ifs->addr.sin_addr));
LIST_REMOVE(ifs, link);
close(ifs->out);
free(ifs);
}
return modified;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SWFShape_drawScaledCurve(SWFShape shape,
int controldx, int controldy,
int anchordx, int anchordy)
{
ShapeRecord record;
if ( shape->isEnded )
return;
if ( controldx == 0 && controldy == 0 && anchordx == 0 && anchordy == 0 )
return;
record = newShapeRecord(shape, SHAPERECORD_CURVETO);
record.record.curveTo->controlx = controldx;
record.record.curveTo->controly = controldy;
record.record.curveTo->anchorx = anchordx;
record.record.curveTo->anchory = anchordy;
if ( SWFOutput_numSBits(controldx) >= 18 ||
SWFOutput_numSBits(controldy) >= 18 ||
SWFOutput_numSBits(anchordx) >= 18 ||
SWFOutput_numSBits(anchordy) >= 18 )
SWF_error("Curve parameters too large");
/* including the control point is sloppy, but safe.. */
shape->xpos += controldx;
shape->ypos += controldy;
SWFRect_includePoint(SWFCharacter_getBounds(CHARACTER(shape)),
shape->xpos, shape->ypos, shape->lineWidth);
SWFRect_includePoint(shape->edgeBounds, shape->xpos, shape->ypos, 0);
shape->xpos += anchordx;
shape->ypos += anchordy;
SWFRect_includePoint(SWFCharacter_getBounds(CHARACTER(shape)),
shape->xpos, shape->ypos, shape->lineWidth);
SWFRect_includePoint(shape->edgeBounds, shape->xpos, shape->ypos, 0);
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nf_tables_gettable(struct sock *nlsk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
const struct nlattr * const nla[])
{
const struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
const struct nft_af_info *afi;
const struct nft_table *table;
struct sk_buff *skb2;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
int family = nfmsg->nfgen_family;
int err;
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = nf_tables_dump_tables,
};
return netlink_dump_start(nlsk, skb, nlh, &c);
}
afi = nf_tables_afinfo_lookup(net, family, false);
if (IS_ERR(afi))
return PTR_ERR(afi);
table = nf_tables_table_lookup(afi, nla[NFTA_TABLE_NAME]);
if (IS_ERR(table))
return PTR_ERR(table);
if (table->flags & NFT_TABLE_INACTIVE)
return -ENOENT;
skb2 = alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb2)
return -ENOMEM;
err = nf_tables_fill_table_info(skb2, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
nlh->nlmsg_seq, NFT_MSG_NEWTABLE, 0,
family, table);
if (err < 0)
goto err;
return nlmsg_unicast(nlsk, skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
err:
kfree_skb(skb2);
return err;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 20,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: armpmu_disable_percpu_irq(void *data)
{
unsigned int irq = *(unsigned int *)data;
disable_percpu_irq(irq);
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_set_flush(png_structp png_ptr, int nrows)
{
png_debug(1, "in png_set_flush");
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
png_ptr->flush_dist = (nrows < 0 ? 0 : nrows);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseAudioContext::HandleDecodeAudioData(
AudioBuffer* audio_buffer,
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver,
V8PersistentCallbackFunction<V8DecodeSuccessCallback>* success_callback,
V8PersistentCallbackFunction<V8DecodeErrorCallback>* error_callback) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
if (audio_buffer) {
resolver->Resolve(audio_buffer);
if (success_callback)
success_callback->InvokeAndReportException(this, audio_buffer);
} else {
DOMException* error =
DOMException::Create(kEncodingError, "Unable to decode audio data");
resolver->Reject(error);
if (error_callback)
error_callback->InvokeAndReportException(this, error);
}
DCHECK(decode_audio_resolvers_.Contains(resolver));
decode_audio_resolvers_.erase(resolver);
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Smb4KGlobal::removeHost( Smb4KHost *host )
{
Q_ASSERT( host );
bool removed = false;
mutex.lock();
int index = p->hostsList.indexOf( host );
if ( index != -1 )
{
delete p->hostsList.takeAt( index );
removed = true;
}
else
{
Smb4KHost *h = findHost( host->hostName(), host->workgroupName() );
if ( h )
{
index = p->hostsList.indexOf( h );
if ( index != -1 )
{
delete p->hostsList.takeAt( index );
removed = true;
}
else
{
}
}
else
{
}
delete host;
}
mutex.unlock();
return removed;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void growLineArray(SWFShape shape)
{
int size;
if ( shape->nLines % STYLE_INCREMENT != 0 )
return;
size = (shape->nLines+STYLE_INCREMENT) * sizeof(SWFLineStyle);
shape->lines = (SWFLineStyle*)realloc(shape->lines, size);
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageline)
{
zval *IM;
long x1, y1, x2, y2, col;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rlllll", &IM, &x1, &y1, &x2, &y2, &col) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
#ifdef HAVE_GD_BUNDLED
if (im->antialias) {
gdImageAALine(im, x1, y1, x2, y2, col);
} else
#endif
{
gdImageLine(im, x1, y1, x2, y2, col);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 22,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool login_via_cert(PgSocket *client)
{
struct tls *tls = client->sbuf.tls;
struct tls_cert *cert;
struct tls_cert_dname *subj;
if (!tls) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "TLS connection required");
return false;
}
if (tls_get_peer_cert(client->sbuf.tls, &cert, NULL) < 0 || !cert) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "TLS client certificate required");
return false;
}
subj = &cert->subject;
log_debug("TLS cert login: CN=%s/C=%s/L=%s/ST=%s/O=%s/OU=%s",
subj->common_name ? subj->common_name : "(null)",
subj->country_name ? subj->country_name : "(null)",
subj->locality_name ? subj->locality_name : "(null)",
subj->state_or_province_name ? subj->state_or_province_name : "(null)",
subj->organization_name ? subj->organization_name : "(null)",
subj->organizational_unit_name ? subj->organizational_unit_name : "(null)");
if (!subj->common_name) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "Invalid TLS certificate");
goto fail;
}
if (strcmp(subj->common_name, client->auth_user->name) != 0) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "TLS certificate name mismatch");
goto fail;
}
tls_cert_free(cert);
/* login successful */
return finish_client_login(client);
fail:
tls_cert_free(cert);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove too early set of auth_user
When query returns 0 rows (user not found),
this user stays as login user...
Should fix #69.
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 4,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dccp_print_ack_no(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp)
{
const struct dccp_hdr *dh = (const struct dccp_hdr *)bp;
const u_char *ackp = bp + dccp_basic_hdr_len(dh);
uint64_t ackno;
if (DCCPH_X(dh) != 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*ackp, 8);
ackno = EXTRACT_48BITS(ackp + 2);
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(*ackp, 4);
ackno = EXTRACT_24BITS(ackp + 1);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ack=%" PRIu64 ") ", ackno));
trunc:
return;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16229/DCCP: Fix printing "Timestamp" and "Timestamp Echo" options
Add some comments.
Moreover:
Put a function definition name at the beginning of the line.
(This change was ported from commit 6df4852 in the master branch.)
Ryan Ackroyd had independently identified this buffer over-read later by
means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 19,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SavePackage::GetSaveInfo() {
FilePath website_save_dir, download_save_dir;
bool skip_dir_check;
DCHECK(download_manager_);
if (download_manager_->GetDelegate()) {
download_manager_->GetDelegate()->GetSaveDir(
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext(), &website_save_dir,
&download_save_dir, &skip_dir_check);
}
std::string mime_type = web_contents()->GetContentsMimeType();
std::string accept_languages =
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetAcceptLangs(
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext());
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SavePackage::CreateDirectoryOnFileThread, this,
website_save_dir, download_save_dir, skip_dir_check,
mime_type, accept_languages));
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string HeadlessWebContentsImpl::GetMainFrameDevToolsId() const {
return web_contents()->GetMainFrame()->GetDevToolsFrameToken().ToString();
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 9,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints(struct dwc3 *dwc)
{
struct dwc3_ep *dep;
u8 epnum;
for (epnum = 0; epnum < DWC3_ENDPOINTS_NUM; epnum++) {
dep = dwc->eps[epnum];
if (!dep)
continue;
/*
* Physical endpoints 0 and 1 are special; they form the
* bi-directional USB endpoint 0.
*
* For those two physical endpoints, we don't allocate a TRB
* pool nor do we add them the endpoints list. Due to that, we
* shouldn't do these two operations otherwise we would end up
* with all sorts of bugs when removing dwc3.ko.
*/
if (epnum != 0 && epnum != 1) {
dwc3_free_trb_pool(dep);
list_del(&dep->endpoint.ep_list);
}
kfree(dep);
}
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int handle_ldf_stq(u32 insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr = compute_effective_address(regs, insn, 0);
int freg = ((insn >> 25) & 0x1e) | ((insn >> 20) & 0x20);
struct fpustate *f = FPUSTATE;
int asi = decode_asi(insn, regs);
int flag = (freg < 32) ? FPRS_DL : FPRS_DU;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
save_and_clear_fpu();
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] &= ~0x1c000;
if (freg & 3) {
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] |= (6 << 14) /* invalid_fp_register */;
do_fpother(regs);
return 0;
}
if (insn & 0x200000) {
/* STQ */
u64 first = 0, second = 0;
if (current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flag) {
first = *(u64 *)&f->regs[freg];
second = *(u64 *)&f->regs[freg+2];
}
if (asi < 0x80) {
do_privact(regs);
return 1;
}
switch (asi) {
case ASI_P:
case ASI_S: break;
case ASI_PL:
case ASI_SL:
{
/* Need to convert endians */
u64 tmp = __swab64p(&first);
first = __swab64p(&second);
second = tmp;
break;
}
default:
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
if (put_user (first >> 32, (u32 __user *)addr) ||
__put_user ((u32)first, (u32 __user *)(addr + 4)) ||
__put_user (second >> 32, (u32 __user *)(addr + 8)) ||
__put_user ((u32)second, (u32 __user *)(addr + 12))) {
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
} else {
/* LDF, LDDF, LDQF */
u32 data[4] __attribute__ ((aligned(8)));
int size, i;
int err;
if (asi < 0x80) {
do_privact(regs);
return 1;
} else if (asi > ASI_SNFL) {
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
switch (insn & 0x180000) {
case 0x000000: size = 1; break;
case 0x100000: size = 4; break;
default: size = 2; break;
}
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
data[i] = 0;
err = get_user (data[0], (u32 __user *) addr);
if (!err) {
for (i = 1; i < size; i++)
err |= __get_user (data[i], (u32 __user *)(addr + 4*i));
}
if (err && !(asi & 0x2 /* NF */)) {
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
if (asi & 0x8) /* Little */ {
u64 tmp;
switch (size) {
case 1: data[0] = le32_to_cpup(data + 0); break;
default:*(u64 *)(data + 0) = le64_to_cpup((u64 *)(data + 0));
break;
case 4: tmp = le64_to_cpup((u64 *)(data + 0));
*(u64 *)(data + 0) = le64_to_cpup((u64 *)(data + 2));
*(u64 *)(data + 2) = tmp;
break;
}
}
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & FPRS_FEF)) {
current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] = FPRS_FEF;
current_thread_info()->gsr[0] = 0;
}
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flag)) {
if (freg < 32)
memset(f->regs, 0, 32*sizeof(u32));
else
memset(f->regs+32, 0, 32*sizeof(u32));
}
memcpy(f->regs + freg, data, size * 4);
current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] |= flag;
}
advance(regs);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 2,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FormAssociatedElement::setCustomValidity(const String& error)
{
m_customValidationMessage = error;
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash when a form control is in a past naems map of a demoted form element.
Note that we wanted to add the protector in FormAssociatedElement::setForm(),
but we couldn't do it because it is called from the constructor.
BUG=326854
TEST=automated.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/105693013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@163680 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 17,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int seed_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
struct seed_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
u32 *keyout = ctx->keysched;
const __be32 *key = (const __be32 *)in_key;
u32 i, t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4;
x1 = be32_to_cpu(key[0]);
x2 = be32_to_cpu(key[1]);
x3 = be32_to_cpu(key[2]);
x4 = be32_to_cpu(key[3]);
for (i = 0; i < SEED_NUM_KCONSTANTS; i++) {
t0 = x1 + x3 - KC[i];
t1 = x2 + KC[i] - x4;
*(keyout++) = SS0[byte(t0, 0)] ^ SS1[byte(t0, 1)] ^
SS2[byte(t0, 2)] ^ SS3[byte(t0, 3)];
*(keyout++) = SS0[byte(t1, 0)] ^ SS1[byte(t1, 1)] ^
SS2[byte(t1, 2)] ^ SS3[byte(t1, 3)];
if (i % 2 == 0) {
t0 = x1;
x1 = (x1 >> 8) ^ (x2 << 24);
x2 = (x2 >> 8) ^ (t0 << 24);
} else {
t0 = x3;
x3 = (x3 << 8) ^ (x4 >> 24);
x4 = (x4 << 8) ^ (t0 >> 24);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cf2_hintmap_init( CF2_HintMap hintmap,
CF2_Font font,
CF2_HintMap initialMap,
CF2_ArrStack hintMoves,
CF2_Fixed scale )
{
FT_ZERO( hintmap );
/* copy parameters from font instance */
hintmap->hinted = font->hinted;
hintmap->scale = scale;
hintmap->font = font;
hintmap->initialHintMap = initialMap;
/* will clear in `cf2_hintmap_adjustHints' */
hintmap->hintMoves = hintMoves;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_code_range_to_buf(BBuf** pbuf, OnigCodePoint from, OnigCodePoint to)
{
int r, inc_n, pos;
int low, high, bound, x;
OnigCodePoint n, *data;
BBuf* bbuf;
if (from > to) {
n = from; from = to; to = n;
}
if (IS_NULL(*pbuf)) {
r = new_code_range(pbuf);
if (r != 0) return r;
bbuf = *pbuf;
n = 0;
}
else {
bbuf = *pbuf;
GET_CODE_POINT(n, bbuf->p);
}
data = (OnigCodePoint* )(bbuf->p);
data++;
for (low = 0, bound = n; low < bound; ) {
x = (low + bound) >> 1;
if (from > data[x*2 + 1])
low = x + 1;
else
bound = x;
}
high = (to == ~((OnigCodePoint )0)) ? n : low;
for (bound = n; high < bound; ) {
x = (high + bound) >> 1;
if (to + 1 >= data[x*2])
high = x + 1;
else
bound = x;
}
inc_n = low + 1 - high;
if (n + inc_n > ONIG_MAX_MULTI_BYTE_RANGES_NUM)
return ONIGERR_TOO_MANY_MULTI_BYTE_RANGES;
if (inc_n != 1) {
if (from > data[low*2])
from = data[low*2];
if (to < data[(high - 1)*2 + 1])
to = data[(high - 1)*2 + 1];
}
if (inc_n != 0 && (OnigCodePoint )high < n) {
int from_pos = SIZE_CODE_POINT * (1 + high * 2);
int to_pos = SIZE_CODE_POINT * (1 + (low + 1) * 2);
int size = (n - high) * 2 * SIZE_CODE_POINT;
if (inc_n > 0) {
BB_MOVE_RIGHT(bbuf, from_pos, to_pos, size);
}
else {
BB_MOVE_LEFT_REDUCE(bbuf, from_pos, to_pos);
}
}
pos = SIZE_CODE_POINT * (1 + low * 2);
BB_ENSURE_SIZE(bbuf, pos + SIZE_CODE_POINT * 2);
BB_WRITE_CODE_POINT(bbuf, pos, from);
BB_WRITE_CODE_POINT(bbuf, pos + SIZE_CODE_POINT, to);
n += inc_n;
BB_WRITE_CODE_POINT(bbuf, 0, n);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix #147: Stack Exhaustion Problem caused by some parsing functions in regcomp.c making recursive calls to themselves.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 13,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmxnet3_msix_save(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque)
{
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(opaque);
msix_save(d, f);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::FlushPendingWork() {
if (!disconnected_)
channel_->EnsureFlush(UINT32_MAX);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 17,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int emulator_do_task_switch(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 tss_selector, int idt_index, int reason,
bool has_error_code, u32 error_code)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct desc_struct curr_tss_desc, next_tss_desc;
int ret;
u16 old_tss_sel = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_TR);
ulong old_tss_base =
ops->get_cached_segment_base(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_TR);
u32 desc_limit;
ulong desc_addr, dr7;
/* FIXME: old_tss_base == ~0 ? */
ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss_selector, &next_tss_desc, &desc_addr);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, old_tss_sel, &curr_tss_desc, &desc_addr);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
/* FIXME: check that next_tss_desc is tss */
/*
* Check privileges. The three cases are task switch caused by...
*
* 1. jmp/call/int to task gate: Check against DPL of the task gate
* 2. Exception/IRQ/iret: No check is performed
* 3. jmp/call to TSS/task-gate: No check is performed since the
* hardware checks it before exiting.
*/
if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE) {
if (idt_index != -1) {
/* Software interrupts */
struct desc_struct task_gate_desc;
int dpl;
ret = read_interrupt_descriptor(ctxt, idt_index,
&task_gate_desc);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
dpl = task_gate_desc.dpl;
if ((tss_selector & 3) > dpl || ops->cpl(ctxt) > dpl)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, (idt_index << 3) | 0x2);
}
}
desc_limit = desc_limit_scaled(&next_tss_desc);
if (!next_tss_desc.p ||
((desc_limit < 0x67 && (next_tss_desc.type & 8)) ||
desc_limit < 0x2b)) {
return emulate_ts(ctxt, tss_selector & 0xfffc);
}
if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_IRET || reason == TASK_SWITCH_JMP) {
curr_tss_desc.type &= ~(1 << 1); /* clear busy flag */
write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, old_tss_sel, &curr_tss_desc);
}
if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_IRET)
ctxt->eflags = ctxt->eflags & ~X86_EFLAGS_NT;
/* set back link to prev task only if NT bit is set in eflags
note that old_tss_sel is not used after this point */
if (reason != TASK_SWITCH_CALL && reason != TASK_SWITCH_GATE)
old_tss_sel = 0xffff;
if (next_tss_desc.type & 8)
ret = task_switch_32(ctxt, tss_selector, old_tss_sel,
old_tss_base, &next_tss_desc);
else
ret = task_switch_16(ctxt, tss_selector, old_tss_sel,
old_tss_base, &next_tss_desc);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_CALL || reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE)
ctxt->eflags = ctxt->eflags | X86_EFLAGS_NT;
if (reason != TASK_SWITCH_IRET) {
next_tss_desc.type |= (1 << 1); /* set busy flag */
write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss_selector, &next_tss_desc);
}
ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0, ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) | X86_CR0_TS);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, tss_selector, &next_tss_desc, 0, VCPU_SREG_TR);
if (has_error_code) {
ctxt->op_bytes = ctxt->ad_bytes = (next_tss_desc.type & 8) ? 4 : 2;
ctxt->lock_prefix = 0;
ctxt->src.val = (unsigned long) error_code;
ret = em_push(ctxt);
}
ops->get_dr(ctxt, 7, &dr7);
ops->set_dr(ctxt, 7, dr7 & ~(DR_LOCAL_ENABLE_MASK | DR_LOCAL_SLOWDOWN));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String8 effectFlagsToString(uint32_t flags) {
String8 s;
s.append("conn. mode: ");
switch (flags & EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) {
case EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_INSERT: s.append("insert"); break;
case EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_AUXILIARY: s.append("auxiliary"); break;
case EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_REPLACE: s.append("replace"); break;
case EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_PRE_PROC: s.append("preproc"); break;
case EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_POST_PROC: s.append("postproc"); break;
default: s.append("unknown/reserved"); break;
}
s.append(", ");
s.append("insert pref: ");
switch (flags & EFFECT_FLAG_INSERT_MASK) {
case EFFECT_FLAG_INSERT_ANY: s.append("any"); break;
case EFFECT_FLAG_INSERT_FIRST: s.append("first"); break;
case EFFECT_FLAG_INSERT_LAST: s.append("last"); break;
case EFFECT_FLAG_INSERT_EXCLUSIVE: s.append("exclusive"); break;
default: s.append("unknown/reserved"); break;
}
s.append(", ");
s.append("volume mgmt: ");
switch (flags & EFFECT_FLAG_VOLUME_MASK) {
case EFFECT_FLAG_VOLUME_NONE: s.append("none"); break;
case EFFECT_FLAG_VOLUME_CTRL: s.append("implements control"); break;
case EFFECT_FLAG_VOLUME_IND: s.append("requires indication"); break;
default: s.append("unknown/reserved"); break;
}
s.append(", ");
uint32_t devind = flags & EFFECT_FLAG_DEVICE_MASK;
if (devind) {
s.append("device indication: ");
switch (devind) {
case EFFECT_FLAG_DEVICE_IND: s.append("requires updates"); break;
default: s.append("unknown/reserved"); break;
}
s.append(", ");
}
s.append("input mode: ");
switch (flags & EFFECT_FLAG_INPUT_MASK) {
case EFFECT_FLAG_INPUT_DIRECT: s.append("direct"); break;
case EFFECT_FLAG_INPUT_PROVIDER: s.append("provider"); break;
case EFFECT_FLAG_INPUT_BOTH: s.append("direct+provider"); break;
default: s.append("not set"); break;
}
s.append(", ");
s.append("output mode: ");
switch (flags & EFFECT_FLAG_OUTPUT_MASK) {
case EFFECT_FLAG_OUTPUT_DIRECT: s.append("direct"); break;
case EFFECT_FLAG_OUTPUT_PROVIDER: s.append("provider"); break;
case EFFECT_FLAG_OUTPUT_BOTH: s.append("direct+provider"); break;
default: s.append("not set"); break;
}
s.append(", ");
uint32_t accel = flags & EFFECT_FLAG_HW_ACC_MASK;
if (accel) {
s.append("hardware acceleration: ");
switch (accel) {
case EFFECT_FLAG_HW_ACC_SIMPLE: s.append("non-tunneled"); break;
case EFFECT_FLAG_HW_ACC_TUNNEL: s.append("tunneled"); break;
default: s.append("unknown/reserved"); break;
}
s.append(", ");
}
uint32_t modeind = flags & EFFECT_FLAG_AUDIO_MODE_MASK;
if (modeind) {
s.append("mode indication: ");
switch (modeind) {
case EFFECT_FLAG_AUDIO_MODE_IND: s.append("required"); break;
default: s.append("unknown/reserved"); break;
}
s.append(", ");
}
uint32_t srcind = flags & EFFECT_FLAG_AUDIO_SOURCE_MASK;
if (srcind) {
s.append("source indication: ");
switch (srcind) {
case EFFECT_FLAG_AUDIO_SOURCE_IND: s.append("required"); break;
default: s.append("unknown/reserved"); break;
}
s.append(", ");
}
if (flags & EFFECT_FLAG_OFFLOAD_MASK) {
s.append("offloadable, ");
}
int len = s.length();
if (s.length() > 2) {
(void) s.lockBuffer(len);
s.unlockBuffer(len - 2);
}
return s;
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 28,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHPAPI void php_register_variable_safe(char *var, char *strval, size_t str_len, zval *track_vars_array)
{
zval new_entry;
assert(strval != NULL);
/* Prepare value */
ZVAL_NEW_STR(&new_entry, zend_string_init(strval, str_len, 0));
php_register_variable_ex(var, &new_entry, track_vars_array);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73807
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 16,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init init_hugetlbfs_fs(void)
{
int error;
struct vfsmount *vfsmount;
error = bdi_init(&hugetlbfs_backing_dev_info);
if (error)
return error;
hugetlbfs_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create("hugetlbfs_inode_cache",
sizeof(struct hugetlbfs_inode_info),
0, 0, init_once);
if (hugetlbfs_inode_cachep == NULL)
goto out2;
error = register_filesystem(&hugetlbfs_fs_type);
if (error)
goto out;
vfsmount = kern_mount(&hugetlbfs_fs_type);
if (!IS_ERR(vfsmount)) {
hugetlbfs_vfsmount = vfsmount;
return 0;
}
error = PTR_ERR(vfsmount);
out:
if (error)
kmem_cache_destroy(hugetlbfs_inode_cachep);
out2:
bdi_destroy(&hugetlbfs_backing_dev_info);
return error;
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void arrayBufferAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::arrayBufferAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_attr_set(
xfs_inode_t *dp,
const unsigned char *name,
unsigned char *value,
int valuelen,
int flags)
{
int error;
struct xfs_name xname;
XFS_STATS_INC(xs_attr_set);
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(dp->i_mount))
return (EIO);
error = xfs_attr_name_to_xname(&xname, name);
if (error)
return error;
return xfs_attr_set_int(dp, &xname, value, valuelen, flags);
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 5,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameFetchContext::IsMainFrame() const {
if (IsDetached())
return frozen_state_->is_main_frame;
return GetFrame()->IsMainFrame();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::SetFilterQuality(
SkFilterQuality filter_quality) {
if (!isContextLost() && GetDrawingBuffer()) {
GetDrawingBuffer()->SetFilterQuality(filter_quality);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::WidgetHidden() {
DCHECK_LT(hidden_widget_count_, widget_count_);
hidden_widget_count_++;
if (widget_count_ && hidden_widget_count_ == widget_count_) {
base::internal::DiscardableMemoryEmulated::
ReduceMemoryUsageUntilWithinLimit(
kEmulatedDiscardableMemoryBytesToKeepWhenWidgetsHidden);
if (GetContentClient()->renderer()->RunIdleHandlerWhenWidgetsHidden())
ScheduleIdleHandler(kInitialIdleHandlerDelayMs);
}
}
Commit Message: Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler
Disable forwarding tasks to the Blink scheduler to avoid some
regressions which it has introduced.
BUG=391005,415758,415478,412714,416362,416827,417608
TBR=jamesr@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/609483002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#296916}
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static NTSTATUS receive_smb_talloc(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, int fd,
char **buffer, unsigned int timeout,
size_t *p_unread, bool *p_encrypted,
size_t *p_len,
uint32_t *seqnum)
{
size_t len = 0;
NTSTATUS status;
*p_encrypted = false;
status = receive_smb_raw_talloc(mem_ctx, fd, buffer, timeout,
p_unread, &len);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return status;
}
if (is_encrypted_packet((uint8_t *)*buffer)) {
status = srv_decrypt_buffer(*buffer);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("receive_smb_talloc: SMB decryption failed on "
"incoming packet! Error %s\n",
nt_errstr(status) ));
return status;
}
*p_encrypted = true;
}
/* Check the incoming SMB signature. */
if (!srv_check_sign_mac(smbd_server_conn, *buffer, seqnum)) {
DEBUG(0, ("receive_smb: SMB Signature verification failed on "
"incoming packet!\n"));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
}
*p_len = len;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long vmsplice_to_pipe(struct file *file, const struct iovec __user *iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, unsigned int flags)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
struct page *pages[PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS];
struct partial_page partial[PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS];
struct splice_pipe_desc spd = {
.pages = pages,
.partial = partial,
.nr_pages_max = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS,
.flags = flags,
.ops = &user_page_pipe_buf_ops,
.spd_release = spd_release_page,
};
long ret;
pipe = get_pipe_info(file);
if (!pipe)
return -EBADF;
if (splice_grow_spd(pipe, &spd))
return -ENOMEM;
spd.nr_pages = get_iovec_page_array(iov, nr_segs, spd.pages,
spd.partial, false,
spd.nr_pages_max);
if (spd.nr_pages <= 0)
ret = spd.nr_pages;
else
ret = splice_to_pipe(pipe, &spd);
splice_shrink_spd(&spd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_turtle_writer_increase_indent(raptor_turtle_writer *turtle_writer)
{
turtle_writer->depth += turtle_writer->indent;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline String canonicalizedTitle(Document* document, const String& title)
{
const CharacterType* characters = title.getCharacters<CharacterType>();
unsigned length = title.length();
unsigned i;
StringBuffer<CharacterType> buffer(length);
unsigned builderIndex = 0;
for (i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
CharacterType c = characters[i];
if (!(c <= 0x20 || c == 0x7F))
break;
}
if (i == length)
return String();
bool previousCharWasWS = false;
for (; i < length; ++i) {
CharacterType c = characters[i];
if (c <= 0x20 || c == 0x7F || (WTF::Unicode::category(c) & (WTF::Unicode::Separator_Line | WTF::Unicode::Separator_Paragraph))) {
if (previousCharWasWS)
continue;
buffer[builderIndex++] = ' ';
previousCharWasWS = true;
} else {
buffer[builderIndex++] = c;
previousCharWasWS = false;
}
}
while (builderIndex > 0) {
--builderIndex;
if (buffer[builderIndex] != ' ')
break;
}
if (!builderIndex && buffer[builderIndex] == ' ')
return String();
buffer.shrink(builderIndex + 1);
return String::adopt(buffer);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void zap_page_range_single(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
unsigned long size, struct zap_details *details)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct mmu_gather tlb;
unsigned long end = address + size;
lru_add_drain();
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0);
update_hiwater_rss(mm);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(mm, address, end);
unmap_single_vma(&tlb, vma, address, end, details);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(mm, address, end);
tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, address, end);
}
Commit Message: vm: add vm_iomap_memory() helper function
Various drivers end up replicating the code to mmap() their memory
buffers into user space, and our core memory remapping function may be
very flexible but it is unnecessarily complicated for the common cases
to use.
Our internal VM uses pfn's ("page frame numbers") which simplifies
things for the VM, and allows us to pass physical addresses around in a
denser and more efficient format than passing a "phys_addr_t" around,
and having to shift it up and down by the page size. But it just means
that drivers end up doing that shifting instead at the interface level.
It also means that drivers end up mucking around with internal VM things
like the vma details (vm_pgoff, vm_start/end) way more than they really
need to.
So this just exports a function to map a certain physical memory range
into user space (using a phys_addr_t based interface that is much more
natural for a driver) and hides all the complexity from the driver.
Some drivers will still end up tweaking the vm_page_prot details for
things like prefetching or cacheability etc, but that's actually
relevant to the driver, rather than caring about what the page offset of
the mapping is into the particular IO memory region.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int picolcd_check_version(struct hid_device *hdev)
{
struct picolcd_data *data = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct picolcd_pending *verinfo;
int ret = 0;
if (!data)
return -ENODEV;
verinfo = picolcd_send_and_wait(hdev, REPORT_VERSION, NULL, 0);
if (!verinfo) {
hid_err(hdev, "no version response from PicoLCD\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
if (verinfo->raw_size == 2) {
data->version[0] = verinfo->raw_data[1];
data->version[1] = verinfo->raw_data[0];
if (data->status & PICOLCD_BOOTLOADER) {
hid_info(hdev, "PicoLCD, bootloader version %d.%d\n",
verinfo->raw_data[1], verinfo->raw_data[0]);
} else {
hid_info(hdev, "PicoLCD, firmware version %d.%d\n",
verinfo->raw_data[1], verinfo->raw_data[0]);
}
} else {
hid_err(hdev, "confused, got unexpected version response from PicoLCD\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
}
kfree(verinfo);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: HID: picolcd: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that raw_data
that we hold in picolcd_pending structure are always kept within proper
bounds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <scvitti@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_uncompressed_data(struct archive_read *a, const void **buff, size_t size,
size_t minimum)
{
struct _7zip *zip = (struct _7zip *)a->format->data;
ssize_t bytes_avail;
if (zip->codec == _7Z_COPY && zip->codec2 == (unsigned long)-1) {
/* Copy mode. */
/*
* Note: '1' here is a performance optimization.
* Recall that the decompression layer returns a count of
* available bytes; asking for more than that forces the
* decompressor to combine reads by copying data.
*/
*buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_avail);
if (bytes_avail <= 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated 7-Zip file data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if ((size_t)bytes_avail >
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining)
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining;
if ((size_t)bytes_avail > size)
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)size;
zip->pack_stream_bytes_unconsumed = bytes_avail;
} else if (zip->uncompressed_buffer_pointer == NULL) {
/* Decompression has failed. */
archive_set_error(&(a->archive),
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC, "Damaged 7-Zip archive");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
} else {
/* Packed mode. */
if (minimum > zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining) {
/*
* If remaining uncompressed data size is less than
* the minimum size, fill the buffer up to the
* minimum size.
*/
if (extract_pack_stream(a, minimum) < 0)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (size > zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining)
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining;
else
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)size;
*buff = zip->uncompressed_buffer_pointer;
zip->uncompressed_buffer_pointer += bytes_avail;
}
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining -= bytes_avail;
return (bytes_avail);
}
Commit Message: 7zip: fix crash when parsing certain archives
Fuzzing with CRCs disabled revealed that a call to get_uncompressed_data()
would sometimes fail to return at least 'minimum' bytes. This can cause
the crc32() invocation in header_bytes to read off into invalid memory.
A specially crafted archive can use this to cause a crash.
An ASAN trace is below, but ASAN is not required - an uninstrumented
binary will also crash.
==7719==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x631000040000 (pc 0x7fbdb3b3ec1d bp 0x7ffe77a51310 sp 0x7ffe77a51150 T0)
==7719==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x7fbdb3b3ec1c in crc32_z (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libz.so.1+0x2c1c)
#1 0x84f5eb in header_bytes (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84f5eb)
#2 0x856156 in read_Header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x856156)
#3 0x84e134 in slurp_central_directory (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84e134)
#4 0x849690 in archive_read_format_7zip_read_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x849690)
#5 0x5713b7 in _archive_read_next_header2 (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5713b7)
#6 0x570e63 in _archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x570e63)
#7 0x6f08bd in archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x6f08bd)
#8 0x52373f in read_archive (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x52373f)
#9 0x5257be in tar_mode_x (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5257be)
#10 0x51daeb in main (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x51daeb)
#11 0x7fbdb27cab96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310
#12 0x41dd09 in _start (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x41dd09)
This was primarly done with afl and FairFuzz. Some early corpus entries
may have been generated by qsym.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int usb_parse_interface(struct device *ddev, int cfgno,
struct usb_host_config *config, unsigned char *buffer, int size,
u8 inums[], u8 nalts[])
{
unsigned char *buffer0 = buffer;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *d;
int inum, asnum;
struct usb_interface_cache *intfc;
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
int i, n;
int len, retval;
int num_ep, num_ep_orig;
d = (struct usb_interface_descriptor *) buffer;
buffer += d->bLength;
size -= d->bLength;
if (d->bLength < USB_DT_INTERFACE_SIZE)
goto skip_to_next_interface_descriptor;
/* Which interface entry is this? */
intfc = NULL;
inum = d->bInterfaceNumber;
for (i = 0; i < config->desc.bNumInterfaces; ++i) {
if (inums[i] == inum) {
intfc = config->intf_cache[i];
break;
}
}
if (!intfc || intfc->num_altsetting >= nalts[i])
goto skip_to_next_interface_descriptor;
/* Check for duplicate altsetting entries */
asnum = d->bAlternateSetting;
for ((i = 0, alt = &intfc->altsetting[0]);
i < intfc->num_altsetting;
(++i, ++alt)) {
if (alt->desc.bAlternateSetting == asnum) {
dev_warn(ddev, "Duplicate descriptor for config %d "
"interface %d altsetting %d, skipping\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum);
goto skip_to_next_interface_descriptor;
}
}
++intfc->num_altsetting;
memcpy(&alt->desc, d, USB_DT_INTERFACE_SIZE);
/* Skip over any Class Specific or Vendor Specific descriptors;
* find the first endpoint or interface descriptor */
alt->extra = buffer;
i = find_next_descriptor(buffer, size, USB_DT_ENDPOINT,
USB_DT_INTERFACE, &n);
alt->extralen = i;
if (n > 0)
dev_dbg(ddev, "skipped %d descriptor%s after %s\n",
n, plural(n), "interface");
buffer += i;
size -= i;
/* Allocate space for the right(?) number of endpoints */
num_ep = num_ep_orig = alt->desc.bNumEndpoints;
alt->desc.bNumEndpoints = 0; /* Use as a counter */
if (num_ep > USB_MAXENDPOINTS) {
dev_warn(ddev, "too many endpoints for config %d interface %d "
"altsetting %d: %d, using maximum allowed: %d\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum, num_ep, USB_MAXENDPOINTS);
num_ep = USB_MAXENDPOINTS;
}
if (num_ep > 0) {
/* Can't allocate 0 bytes */
len = sizeof(struct usb_host_endpoint) * num_ep;
alt->endpoint = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!alt->endpoint)
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Parse all the endpoint descriptors */
n = 0;
while (size > 0) {
if (((struct usb_descriptor_header *) buffer)->bDescriptorType
== USB_DT_INTERFACE)
break;
retval = usb_parse_endpoint(ddev, cfgno, inum, asnum, alt,
num_ep, buffer, size);
if (retval < 0)
return retval;
++n;
buffer += retval;
size -= retval;
}
if (n != num_ep_orig)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d interface %d altsetting %d has %d "
"endpoint descriptor%s, different from the interface "
"descriptor's value: %d\n",
cfgno, inum, asnum, n, plural(n), num_ep_orig);
return buffer - buffer0;
skip_to_next_interface_descriptor:
i = find_next_descriptor(buffer, size, USB_DT_INTERFACE,
USB_DT_INTERFACE, NULL);
return buffer - buffer0 + i;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: fix out-of-bounds access bug in usb_get_bos_descriptor()
Andrey used the syzkaller fuzzer to find an out-of-bounds memory
access in usb_get_bos_descriptor(). The code wasn't checking that the
next usb_dev_cap_header structure could fit into the remaining buffer
space.
This patch fixes the error and also reduces the bNumDeviceCaps field
in the header to match the actual number of capabilities found, in
cases where there are fewer than expected.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 20,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_file (const char *currpath, grub_fshelp_node_t currroot,
grub_fshelp_node_t *currfound,
struct grub_fshelp_find_file_closure *c)
{
#ifndef _MSC_VER
char fpath[grub_strlen (currpath) + 1];
#else
char *fpath = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (currpath) + 1);
#endif
char *name = fpath;
char *next;
enum grub_fshelp_filetype type = GRUB_FSHELP_DIR;
grub_fshelp_node_t currnode = currroot;
grub_fshelp_node_t oldnode = currroot;
c->currroot = currroot;
grub_strncpy (fpath, currpath, grub_strlen (currpath) + 1);
/* Remove all leading slashes. */
while (*name == '/')
name++;
if (! *name)
{
*currfound = currnode;
return 0;
}
for (;;)
{
int found;
struct find_file_closure cc;
/* Extract the actual part from the pathname. */
next = grub_strchr (name, '/');
if (next)
{
/* Remove all leading slashes. */
while (*next == '/')
*(next++) = '\0';
}
/* At this point it is expected that the current node is a
directory, check if this is true. */
if (type != GRUB_FSHELP_DIR)
{
free_node (currnode, c);
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "not a directory");
}
cc.name = name;
cc.type = &type;
cc.oldnode = &oldnode;
cc.currnode = &currnode;
/* Iterate over the directory. */
found = c->iterate_dir (currnode, iterate, &cc);
if (! found)
{
if (grub_errno)
return grub_errno;
break;
}
/* Read in the symlink and follow it. */
if (type == GRUB_FSHELP_SYMLINK)
{
char *symlink;
/* Test if the symlink does not loop. */
if (++(c->symlinknest) == 8)
{
free_node (currnode, c);
free_node (oldnode, c);
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_SYMLINK_LOOP,
"too deep nesting of symlinks");
}
symlink = c->read_symlink (currnode);
free_node (currnode, c);
if (!symlink)
{
free_node (oldnode, c);
return grub_errno;
}
/* The symlink is an absolute path, go back to the root inode. */
if (symlink[0] == '/')
{
free_node (oldnode, c);
oldnode = c->rootnode;
}
/* Lookup the node the symlink points to. */
find_file (symlink, oldnode, &currnode, c);
type = c->foundtype;
grub_free (symlink);
if (grub_errno)
{
free_node (oldnode, c);
return grub_errno;
}
}
free_node (oldnode, c);
/* Found the node! */
if (! next || *next == '\0')
{
*currfound = currnode;
c->foundtype = type;
return 0;
}
name = next;
}
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "file not found");
}
Commit Message: Fix #7723 - crash in ext2 GRUB code because of variable size array in stack
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 18,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(struct vhost_scsi *vs,
struct vhost_scsi_target *t)
{
struct se_portal_group *se_tpg;
struct vhost_scsi_tport *tv_tport;
struct vhost_scsi_tpg *tpg;
struct vhost_scsi_tpg **vs_tpg;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
int index, ret, i, len;
bool match = false;
mutex_lock(&vhost_scsi_mutex);
mutex_lock(&vs->dev.mutex);
/* Verify that ring has been setup correctly. */
for (index = 0; index < vs->dev.nvqs; ++index) {
/* Verify that ring has been setup correctly. */
if (!vhost_vq_access_ok(&vs->vqs[index].vq)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
}
len = sizeof(vs_tpg[0]) * VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET;
vs_tpg = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vs_tpg) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (vs->vs_tpg)
memcpy(vs_tpg, vs->vs_tpg, len);
list_for_each_entry(tpg, &vhost_scsi_list, tv_tpg_list) {
mutex_lock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
if (!tpg->tpg_nexus) {
mutex_unlock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
continue;
}
if (tpg->tv_tpg_vhost_count != 0) {
mutex_unlock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
continue;
}
tv_tport = tpg->tport;
if (!strcmp(tv_tport->tport_name, t->vhost_wwpn)) {
if (vs->vs_tpg && vs->vs_tpg[tpg->tport_tpgt]) {
kfree(vs_tpg);
mutex_unlock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
ret = -EEXIST;
goto out;
}
/*
* In order to ensure individual vhost-scsi configfs
* groups cannot be removed while in use by vhost ioctl,
* go ahead and take an explicit se_tpg->tpg_group.cg_item
* dependency now.
*/
se_tpg = &tpg->se_tpg;
ret = configfs_depend_item(se_tpg->se_tpg_tfo->tf_subsys,
&se_tpg->tpg_group.cg_item);
if (ret) {
pr_warn("configfs_depend_item() failed: %d\n", ret);
kfree(vs_tpg);
mutex_unlock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
goto out;
}
tpg->tv_tpg_vhost_count++;
tpg->vhost_scsi = vs;
vs_tpg[tpg->tport_tpgt] = tpg;
smp_mb__after_atomic();
match = true;
}
mutex_unlock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
}
if (match) {
memcpy(vs->vs_vhost_wwpn, t->vhost_wwpn,
sizeof(vs->vs_vhost_wwpn));
for (i = 0; i < VHOST_SCSI_MAX_VQ; i++) {
vq = &vs->vqs[i].vq;
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
vq->private_data = vs_tpg;
vhost_init_used(vq);
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}
ret = 0;
} else {
ret = -EEXIST;
}
/*
* Act as synchronize_rcu to make sure access to
* old vs->vs_tpg is finished.
*/
vhost_scsi_flush(vs);
kfree(vs->vs_tpg);
vs->vs_tpg = vs_tpg;
out:
mutex_unlock(&vs->dev.mutex);
mutex_unlock(&vhost_scsi_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int emulate_popf(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
void *dest, int len)
{
int rc;
unsigned long val, change_mask;
int iopl = (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) >> IOPL_SHIFT;
int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &val, len);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
change_mask = EFLG_CF | EFLG_PF | EFLG_AF | EFLG_ZF | EFLG_SF | EFLG_OF
| EFLG_TF | EFLG_DF | EFLG_NT | EFLG_RF | EFLG_AC | EFLG_ID;
switch(ctxt->mode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16:
if (cpl == 0)
change_mask |= EFLG_IOPL;
if (cpl <= iopl)
change_mask |= EFLG_IF;
break;
case X86EMUL_MODE_VM86:
if (iopl < 3)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
change_mask |= EFLG_IF;
break;
default: /* real mode */
change_mask |= (EFLG_IOPL | EFLG_IF);
break;
}
*(unsigned long *)dest =
(ctxt->eflags & ~change_mask) | (val & change_mask);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void raisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "raisesExceptionLongAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setRaisesExceptionLongAttribute(cppValue, exceptionState);
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int coolkey_write_object(sc_card_t *card, unsigned long object_id,
size_t offset, const u8 *buf, size_t buf_len, const u8 *nonce, size_t nonce_size)
{
coolkey_write_object_param_t params;
size_t operation_len;
size_t left = buf_len;
int r;
ulong2bebytes(¶ms.head.object_id[0], object_id);
do {
ulong2bebytes(¶ms.head.offset[0], offset);
operation_len = MIN(left, COOLKEY_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE);
params.head.length = operation_len;
memcpy(params.buf, buf, operation_len);
r = coolkey_apdu_io(card, COOLKEY_CLASS, COOLKEY_INS_WRITE_OBJECT, 0, 0,
(u8 *)¶ms, sizeof(params.head)+operation_len, NULL, 0, nonce, nonce_size);
if (r < 0) {
goto fail;
}
buf += operation_len;
offset += operation_len;
left -= operation_len;
} while (left != 0);
return buf_len - left;
fail:
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 16,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RBinJavaObj * get_java_bin_obj(RAnal *anal) {
RBin *b = anal->binb.bin;
RBinPlugin *plugin = b->cur && b->cur->o ? b->cur->o->plugin : NULL;
ut8 is_java = (plugin && strcmp (plugin->name, "java") == 0) ? 1 : 0;
return is_java ? b->cur->o->bin_obj : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10296 - Heap out of bounds read in java_switch_op()
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 25,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nf_tables_check_loops(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
const struct nft_chain *chain)
{
const struct nft_rule *rule;
const struct nft_expr *expr, *last;
const struct nft_set *set;
struct nft_set_binding *binding;
struct nft_set_iter iter;
if (ctx->chain == chain)
return -ELOOP;
list_for_each_entry(rule, &chain->rules, list) {
nft_rule_for_each_expr(expr, last, rule) {
const struct nft_data *data = NULL;
int err;
if (!expr->ops->validate)
continue;
err = expr->ops->validate(ctx, expr, &data);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (data == NULL)
continue;
switch (data->verdict) {
case NFT_JUMP:
case NFT_GOTO:
err = nf_tables_check_loops(ctx, data->chain);
if (err < 0)
return err;
default:
break;
}
}
}
list_for_each_entry(set, &ctx->table->sets, list) {
if (!(set->flags & NFT_SET_MAP) ||
set->dtype != NFT_DATA_VERDICT)
continue;
list_for_each_entry(binding, &set->bindings, list) {
if (binding->chain != chain)
continue;
iter.skip = 0;
iter.count = 0;
iter.err = 0;
iter.fn = nf_tables_loop_check_setelem;
set->ops->walk(ctx, set, &iter);
if (iter.err < 0)
return iter.err;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 25,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sctp_sock *sp;
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p\n", __func__, sk);
/* Release our hold on the endpoint. */
sp = sctp_sk(sk);
/* This could happen during socket init, thus we bail out
* early, since the rest of the below is not setup either.
*/
if (sp->ep == NULL)
return;
if (sp->do_auto_asconf) {
sp->do_auto_asconf = 0;
list_del(&sp->auto_asconf_list);
}
sctp_endpoint_free(sp->ep);
local_bh_disable();
percpu_counter_dec(&sctp_sockets_allocated);
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, -1);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 5,932 |
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