instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline IndexPacket PushColormapIndex(Image *image,
const size_t index,MagickBooleanType *range_exception)
{
if (index < image->colors)
return((IndexPacket) index);
*range_exception=MagickTrue;
return((IndexPacket) 0);
}
Commit Message: Fixed incorrect call to DestroyImage reported in #491.
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 25,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void ModulateLCHuv(const double percent_luma,
const double percent_chroma,const double percent_hue,double *red,
double *green,double *blue)
{
double
hue,
luma,
chroma;
/*
Increase or decrease color luma, chroma, or hue.
*/
ConvertRGBToLCHuv(*red,*green,*blue,&luma,&chroma,&hue);
luma*=0.01*percent_luma;
chroma*=0.01*percent_chroma;
hue+=0.5*(0.01*percent_hue-1.0);
while (hue < 0.0)
hue+=1.0;
while (hue >= 1.0)
hue-=1.0;
ConvertLCHuvToRGB(luma,chroma,hue,red,green,blue);
}
Commit Message: Evaluate lazy pixel cache morphology to prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim M. El-Sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 22,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CURLcode imap_select(struct connectdata *conn)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
struct imap_conn *imapc = &conn->proto.imapc;
const char *str;
str = getcmdid(conn);
result = imapsendf(conn, str, "%s SELECT %s", str,
imapc->mailbox?imapc->mailbox:"");
if(result)
return result;
state(conn, IMAP_SELECT);
return result;
}
Commit Message: URL sanitize: reject URLs containing bad data
Protocols (IMAP, POP3 and SMTP) that use the path part of a URL in a
decoded manner now use the new Curl_urldecode() function to reject URLs
with embedded control codes (anything that is or decodes to a byte value
less than 32).
URLs containing such codes could easily otherwise be used to do harm and
allow users to do unintended actions with otherwise innocent tools and
applications. Like for example using a URL like
pop3://pop3.example.com/1%0d%0aDELE%201 when the app wants a URL to get
a mail and instead this would delete one.
This flaw is considered a security vulnerability: CVE-2012-0036
Security advisory at: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20120124.html
Reported by: Dan Fandrich
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 25,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int imap_mbox_check(struct Context *ctx, int *index_hint)
{
int rc;
(void) index_hint;
imap_allow_reopen(ctx);
rc = imap_check(ctx->data, 0);
imap_disallow_reopen(ctx);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 20,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Editor* Editor::Create(LocalFrame& frame) {
return new Editor(frame);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void udp_lib_rehash(struct sock *sk, u16 newhash)
{
if (sk_hashed(sk)) {
struct udp_table *udptable = sk->sk_prot->h.udp_table;
struct udp_hslot *hslot, *hslot2, *nhslot2;
hslot2 = udp_hashslot2(udptable, udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash);
nhslot2 = udp_hashslot2(udptable, newhash);
udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash = newhash;
if (hslot2 != nhslot2) {
hslot = udp_hashslot(udptable, sock_net(sk),
udp_sk(sk)->udp_port_hash);
/* we must lock primary chain too */
spin_lock_bh(&hslot->lock);
spin_lock(&hslot2->lock);
hlist_nulls_del_init_rcu(&udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_node);
hslot2->count--;
spin_unlock(&hslot2->lock);
spin_lock(&nhslot2->lock);
hlist_nulls_add_head_rcu(&udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_node,
&nhslot2->head);
nhslot2->count++;
spin_unlock(&nhslot2->lock);
spin_unlock_bh(&hslot->lock);
}
}
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 10,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SafeSock::SafeSock(const SafeSock & orig)
: Sock(orig)
{
init();
char *buf = NULL;
buf = orig.serialize(); // get state from orig sock
ASSERT(buf);
serialize(buf); // put the state into the new sock
delete [] buf;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 25,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WallpaperManagerBase::MoveLoggedInUserCustomWallpaper() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
const user_manager::User* logged_in_user =
user_manager::UserManager::Get()->GetActiveUser();
if (logged_in_user) {
task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&WallpaperManagerBase::MoveCustomWallpapersOnWorker,
logged_in_user->GetAccountId(),
GetFilesId(logged_in_user->GetAccountId()),
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get(),
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BaseShadow::emailHoldEvent( const char* reason )
{
Email mailer;
mailer.sendHold( jobAd, reason );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 6,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_pre_pic_dec_proc(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
WORD32 u4_get_disp;
pic_buf_t *ps_disp_pic;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
u4_get_disp = 0;
ps_disp_pic = NULL;
/* Field Picture */
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure != FRAME_PICTURE)
{
ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb = (ps_dec->u2_vertical_size + 31) >> 5;
if(ps_dec->u2_num_flds_decoded == 0)
{
pic_buf_t *ps_pic_buf;
u4_get_disp = 1;
ps_pic_buf = impeg2_buf_mgr_get_next_free(ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, &ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id);
if (NULL == ps_pic_buf)
{
return IMPEG2D_NO_FREE_BUF_ERR;
}
impeg2_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
impeg2_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
ps_pic_buf->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_inp_ts;
ps_pic_buf->e_pic_type = ps_dec->e_pic_type;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_pic_buf;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_y = ps_pic_buf->pu1_y;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_u = ps_pic_buf->pu1_u;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_v = ps_pic_buf->pu1_v;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure == TOP_FIELD)
{
ps_dec->u2_fld_parity = TOP;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_fld_parity = BOTTOM;
}
ps_dec->u2_field_dct = 0;
ps_dec->u2_read_dct_type = 0;
ps_dec->u2_read_motion_type = 1;
ps_dec->u2_fld_pic = 1;
ps_dec->u2_frm_pic = 0;
ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back = gas_impeg2d_func_fld_fw_or_bk;
ps_dec->ps_func_bi_direct = gas_impeg2d_func_fld_bi_direct;
}
/* Frame Picture */
else
{
pic_buf_t *ps_pic_buf;
ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb = (ps_dec->u2_vertical_size + 15) >> 4;
u4_get_disp = 1;
ps_pic_buf = impeg2_buf_mgr_get_next_free(ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, &ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id);
if (NULL == ps_pic_buf)
{
return IMPEG2D_NO_FREE_BUF_ERR;
}
impeg2_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
impeg2_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
ps_pic_buf->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_inp_ts;
ps_pic_buf->e_pic_type = ps_dec->e_pic_type;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_pic_buf;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_y = ps_pic_buf->pu1_y;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_u = ps_pic_buf->pu1_u;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_v = ps_pic_buf->pu1_v;
if(ps_dec->u2_frame_pred_frame_dct == 0)
{
ps_dec->u2_read_dct_type = 1;
ps_dec->u2_read_motion_type = 1;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_read_dct_type = 0;
ps_dec->u2_read_motion_type = 0;
ps_dec->u2_motion_type = 2;
ps_dec->u2_field_dct = 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_fld_parity = TOP;
ps_dec->u2_fld_pic = 0;
ps_dec->u2_frm_pic = 1;
ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back = gas_impeg2d_func_frm_fw_or_bk;
ps_dec->ps_func_bi_direct = gas_impeg2d_func_frm_bi_direct;
}
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left = ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb * ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb;
if(u4_get_disp)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_num_frames_decoded > 1)
{
ps_disp_pic = impeg2_disp_mgr_get(&ps_dec->s_disp_mgr, &ps_dec->i4_disp_buf_id);
}
ps_dec->ps_disp_pic = ps_disp_pic;
if(ps_disp_pic)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_y_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_y;
if(IV_YUV_420P == ps_dec->i4_chromaFormat)
{
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_u_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_u;
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_v_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_v;
}
else
{
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
pu1_buf = ps_dec->as_disp_buffers[ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id].pu1_bufs[1];
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_u_buf = pu1_buf;
pu1_buf = ps_dec->as_disp_buffers[ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id].pu1_bufs[2];
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_v_buf = pu1_buf;
}
}
}
}
switch(ps_dec->e_pic_type)
{
case I_PIC:
{
ps_dec->pf_decode_slice = impeg2d_dec_i_slice;
break;
}
case D_PIC:
{
ps_dec->pf_decode_slice = impeg2d_dec_d_slice;
break;
}
case P_PIC:
{
ps_dec->pf_decode_slice = impeg2d_dec_p_b_slice;
ps_dec->pu2_mb_type = gau2_impeg2d_p_mb_type;
break;
}
case B_PIC:
{
ps_dec->pf_decode_slice = impeg2d_dec_p_b_slice;
ps_dec->pu2_mb_type = gau2_impeg2d_b_mb_type;
break;
}
default:
return IMPEG2D_INVALID_PIC_TYPE;
}
/*************************************************************************/
/* Set the reference pictures */
/*************************************************************************/
/* Error resilience: If forward and backward pictures are going to be NULL*/
/* then assign both to the current */
/* if one of them NULL then we will assign the non null to the NULL one */
if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == P_PIC)
{
if (NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0].pu1_y)
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0] = ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
}
if (NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1].pu1_y)
{
impeg2d_get_bottom_field_buf(&ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf, &ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1],
ps_dec->u2_frame_width);
}
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[FORW][TOP] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0];
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[FORW][BOTTOM] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1];
}
else if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == B_PIC)
{
if((NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0].pu1_y) && (NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0].pu1_y))
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0] = ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
impeg2d_get_bottom_field_buf(&ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf, &ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1],
ps_dec->u2_frame_width);
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0] = ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1];
}
else if ((NULL != ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0].pu1_y) && (NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0].pu1_y))
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0];
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1];
}
else if ((NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0].pu1_y) && (NULL != ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0].pu1_y))
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0];
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1];
}
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[FORW][TOP] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0];
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[FORW][BOTTOM] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1];
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[BACK][TOP] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0];
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[BACK][BOTTOM] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1];
}
return e_error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 20,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void inet_rcu_free_ifa(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct in_ifaddr *ifa = container_of(head, struct in_ifaddr, rcu_head);
if (ifa->ifa_dev)
in_dev_put(ifa->ifa_dev);
kfree(ifa);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rom_write(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, u32 value, void *data)
{
struct pci_bar_info *bar = data;
if (unlikely(!bar)) {
pr_warn(DRV_NAME ": driver data not found for %s\n",
pci_name(dev));
return XEN_PCI_ERR_op_failed;
}
/* A write to obtain the length must happen as a 32-bit write.
* This does not (yet) support writing individual bytes
*/
if (value == ~PCI_ROM_ADDRESS_ENABLE)
bar->which = 1;
else {
u32 tmpval;
pci_read_config_dword(dev, offset, &tmpval);
if (tmpval != bar->val && value == bar->val) {
/* Allow restoration of bar value. */
pci_write_config_dword(dev, offset, bar->val);
}
bar->which = 0;
}
/* Do we need to support enabling/disabling the rom address here? */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register
Otherwise the guest can abuse that control to cause e.g. PCIe
Unsupported Request responses by disabling memory and/or I/O decoding
and subsequently causing (CPU side) accesses to the respective address
ranges, which (depending on system configuration) may be fatal to the
host.
Note that to alter any of the bits collected together as
PCI_COMMAND_GUEST permissive mode is now required to be enabled
globally or on the specific device.
This is CVE-2015-2150 / XSA-120.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ndisc_netdev_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, void *ptr)
{
struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr);
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct inet6_dev *idev;
switch (event) {
case NETDEV_CHANGEADDR:
neigh_changeaddr(&nd_tbl, dev);
fib6_run_gc(0, net, false);
idev = in6_dev_get(dev);
if (!idev)
break;
if (idev->cnf.ndisc_notify)
ndisc_send_unsol_na(dev);
in6_dev_put(idev);
break;
case NETDEV_DOWN:
neigh_ifdown(&nd_tbl, dev);
fib6_run_gc(0, net, false);
break;
case NETDEV_NOTIFY_PEERS:
ndisc_send_unsol_na(dev);
break;
default:
break;
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <ljungmark@modio.se>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 3,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int cfg_driver_info(struct uilreq *urq, struct wl_private *lp)
{
int result = 0;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DBG_FUNC("cfg_driver_info");
DBG_ENTER(DbgInfo);
/* Make sure that user buffer can handle the driver information buffer */
if (urq->len < sizeof(lp->driverInfo)) {
urq->len = sizeof(lp->driverInfo);
urq->result = UIL_ERR_LEN;
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
/* Verify the user buffer. */
result = verify_area(VERIFY_WRITE, urq->data, sizeof(lp->driverInfo));
if (result != 0) {
urq->result = UIL_FAILURE;
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
lp->driverInfo.card_stat = lp->hcfCtx.IFB_CardStat;
/* Copy the driver information into the user's buffer. */
urq->result = UIL_SUCCESS;
copy_to_user(urq->data, &(lp->driverInfo), sizeof(lp->driverInfo));
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
} /* cfg_driver_info */
Commit Message: staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaymentHandlerWebFlowViewController::LoadProgressChanged(
content::WebContents* source,
double progress) {
DCHECK(source == web_contents());
progress_bar_->SetValue(progress);
if (progress == 1.0 && show_progress_bar_) {
show_progress_bar_ = false;
UpdateHeaderContentSeparatorView();
return;
}
if (progress < 1.0 && !show_progress_bar_) {
show_progress_bar_ = true;
UpdateHeaderContentSeparatorView();
return;
}
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 20,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebPagePrivate::handleMouseEvent(PlatformMouseEvent& mouseEvent)
{
EventHandler* eventHandler = m_mainFrame->eventHandler();
if (mouseEvent.type() == WebCore::PlatformEvent::MouseMoved)
return eventHandler->mouseMoved(mouseEvent);
if (mouseEvent.type() == WebCore::PlatformEvent::MouseScroll)
return true;
Node* node = 0;
if (mouseEvent.inputMethod() == TouchScreen) {
const FatFingersResult lastFatFingersResult = m_touchEventHandler->lastFatFingersResult();
node = lastFatFingersResult.node(FatFingersResult::ShadowContentNotAllowed);
}
if (!node) {
HitTestResult result = eventHandler->hitTestResultAtPoint(mapFromViewportToContents(mouseEvent.position()), false /*allowShadowContent*/);
node = result.innerNode();
}
if (mouseEvent.type() == WebCore::PlatformEvent::MousePressed) {
m_inputHandler->setInputModeEnabled();
if (m_inputHandler->willOpenPopupForNode(node)) {
ASSERT(node->isElementNode());
if (node->isElementNode()) {
Element* element = static_cast<Element*>(node);
element->focus();
}
} else
eventHandler->handleMousePressEvent(mouseEvent);
} else if (mouseEvent.type() == WebCore::PlatformEvent::MouseReleased) {
if (!m_inputHandler->didNodeOpenPopup(node))
eventHandler->handleMouseReleaseEvent(mouseEvent);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLenum WebGLImageConversion::ComputeImageSizeInBytes(
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLsizei depth,
const PixelStoreParams& params,
unsigned* image_size_in_bytes,
unsigned* padding_in_bytes,
unsigned* skip_size_in_bytes) {
DCHECK(image_size_in_bytes);
DCHECK(params.alignment == 1 || params.alignment == 2 ||
params.alignment == 4 || params.alignment == 8);
DCHECK_GE(params.row_length, 0);
DCHECK_GE(params.image_height, 0);
DCHECK_GE(params.skip_pixels, 0);
DCHECK_GE(params.skip_rows, 0);
DCHECK_GE(params.skip_images, 0);
if (width < 0 || height < 0 || depth < 0)
return GL_INVALID_VALUE;
if (!width || !height || !depth) {
*image_size_in_bytes = 0;
if (padding_in_bytes)
*padding_in_bytes = 0;
if (skip_size_in_bytes)
*skip_size_in_bytes = 0;
return GL_NO_ERROR;
}
int row_length = params.row_length > 0 ? params.row_length : width;
int image_height = params.image_height > 0 ? params.image_height : height;
unsigned bytes_per_component, components_per_pixel;
if (!ComputeFormatAndTypeParameters(format, type, &bytes_per_component,
&components_per_pixel))
return GL_INVALID_ENUM;
unsigned bytes_per_group = bytes_per_component * components_per_pixel;
CheckedNumeric<uint32_t> checked_value = static_cast<uint32_t>(row_length);
checked_value *= bytes_per_group;
if (!checked_value.IsValid())
return GL_INVALID_VALUE;
unsigned last_row_size;
if (params.row_length > 0 && params.row_length != width) {
CheckedNumeric<uint32_t> tmp = width;
tmp *= bytes_per_group;
if (!tmp.IsValid())
return GL_INVALID_VALUE;
last_row_size = tmp.ValueOrDie();
} else {
last_row_size = checked_value.ValueOrDie();
}
unsigned padding = 0;
CheckedNumeric<uint32_t> checked_residual = checked_value % params.alignment;
if (!checked_residual.IsValid()) {
return GL_INVALID_VALUE;
}
unsigned residual = checked_residual.ValueOrDie();
if (residual) {
padding = params.alignment - residual;
checked_value += padding;
}
if (!checked_value.IsValid())
return GL_INVALID_VALUE;
unsigned padded_row_size = checked_value.ValueOrDie();
CheckedNumeric<uint32_t> rows = image_height;
rows *= (depth - 1);
rows += height;
if (!rows.IsValid())
return GL_INVALID_VALUE;
checked_value *= (rows - 1);
checked_value += last_row_size;
if (!checked_value.IsValid())
return GL_INVALID_VALUE;
*image_size_in_bytes = checked_value.ValueOrDie();
if (padding_in_bytes)
*padding_in_bytes = padding;
CheckedNumeric<uint32_t> skip_size = 0;
if (params.skip_images > 0) {
CheckedNumeric<uint32_t> tmp = padded_row_size;
tmp *= image_height;
tmp *= params.skip_images;
if (!tmp.IsValid())
return GL_INVALID_VALUE;
skip_size += tmp.ValueOrDie();
}
if (params.skip_rows > 0) {
CheckedNumeric<uint32_t> tmp = padded_row_size;
tmp *= params.skip_rows;
if (!tmp.IsValid())
return GL_INVALID_VALUE;
skip_size += tmp.ValueOrDie();
}
if (params.skip_pixels > 0) {
CheckedNumeric<uint32_t> tmp = bytes_per_group;
tmp *= params.skip_pixels;
if (!tmp.IsValid())
return GL_INVALID_VALUE;
skip_size += tmp.ValueOrDie();
}
if (!skip_size.IsValid())
return GL_INVALID_VALUE;
if (skip_size_in_bytes)
*skip_size_in_bytes = skip_size.ValueOrDie();
checked_value += skip_size.ValueOrDie();
if (!checked_value.IsValid())
return GL_INVALID_VALUE;
return GL_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 29,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void handle_message(int sd)
{
struct ifsock *ifs;
LIST_FOREACH(ifs, &il, link) {
if (ifs->in != sd)
continue;
if (ifs->cb)
ifs->cb(sd);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: destroy_address_fifo(
address_fifo * pfifo
)
{
address_node * addr_node;
if (pfifo != NULL) {
do {
UNLINK_FIFO(addr_node, *pfifo, link);
if (addr_node != NULL)
destroy_address_node(addr_node);
} while (addr_node != NULL);
free(pfifo);
}
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gluster_compare_hosts(gluster_hostdef *src_server, gluster_hostdef *dst_server)
{
if (src_server->type != dst_server->type)
return false;
switch (src_server->type) {
case GLUSTER_TRANSPORT_UNIX:
if (!strcmp(src_server->u.uds.socket, dst_server->u.uds.socket))
return true;
break;
case GLUSTER_TRANSPORT_TCP:
case GLUSTER_TRANSPORT_RDMA:
if (!strcmp(src_server->u.inet.addr, dst_server->u.inet.addr)
&&
!strcmp(src_server->u.inet.port, dst_server->u.inet.port))
return true;
break;
case GLUSTER_TRANSPORT__MAX:
break;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: glfs: discard glfs_check_config
Signed-off-by: Prasanna Kumar Kalever <prasanna.kalever@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShellSurface::SetTitle(const base::string16& title) {
TRACE_EVENT1("exo", "ShellSurface::SetTitle", "title",
base::UTF16ToUTF8(title));
title_ = title;
if (widget_)
widget_->UpdateWindowTitle();
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VP8XChunk::VP8XChunk(Container* parent)
: Chunk(parent, kChunk_VP8X)
{
this->needsRewrite = true;
this->size = 10;
this->data.resize(this->size);
this->data.assign(this->size, 0);
XMP_Uns8* bitstream =
(XMP_Uns8*)parent->chunks[WEBP_CHUNK_IMAGE][0]->data.data();
XMP_Uns32 width = ((bitstream[7] << 8) | bitstream[6]) & 0x3fff;
XMP_Uns32 height = ((bitstream[9] << 8) | bitstream[8]) & 0x3fff;
this->width(width);
this->height(height);
parent->vp8x = this;
VP8XChunk::VP8XChunk(Container* parent, WEBP_MetaHandler* handler)
: Chunk(parent, handler)
{
this->size = 10;
this->needsRewrite = true;
parent->vp8x = this;
}
XMP_Uns32 VP8XChunk::width()
{
return GetLE24(&this->data[4]) + 1;
}
void VP8XChunk::width(XMP_Uns32 val)
{
PutLE24(&this->data[4], val > 0 ? val - 1 : 0);
}
XMP_Uns32 VP8XChunk::height()
{
return GetLE24(&this->data[7]) + 1;
}
void VP8XChunk::height(XMP_Uns32 val)
{
PutLE24(&this->data[7], val > 0 ? val - 1 : 0);
}
bool VP8XChunk::xmp()
{
XMP_Uns32 flags = GetLE32(&this->data[0]);
return (bool)((flags >> XMP_FLAG_BIT) & 1);
}
void VP8XChunk::xmp(bool hasXMP)
{
XMP_Uns32 flags = GetLE32(&this->data[0]);
flags ^= (-hasXMP ^ flags) & (1 << XMP_FLAG_BIT);
PutLE32(&this->data[0], flags);
}
Container::Container(WEBP_MetaHandler* handler) : Chunk(NULL, handler)
{
this->needsRewrite = false;
XMP_IO* file = handler->parent->ioRef;
file->Seek(12, kXMP_SeekFromStart);
XMP_Int64 size = handler->initialFileSize;
XMP_Uns32 peek = 0;
while (file->Offset() < size) {
peek = XIO::PeekUns32_LE(file);
switch (peek) {
case kChunk_XMP_:
this->addChunk(new XMPChunk(this, handler));
break;
case kChunk_VP8X:
this->addChunk(new VP8XChunk(this, handler));
break;
default:
this->addChunk(new Chunk(this, handler));
break;
}
}
if (this->chunks[WEBP_CHUNK_IMAGE].size() == 0) {
XMP_Throw("File has no image bitstream", kXMPErr_BadFileFormat);
}
if (this->chunks[WEBP_CHUNK_VP8X].size() == 0) {
this->needsRewrite = true;
this->addChunk(new VP8XChunk(this));
}
if (this->chunks[WEBP_CHUNK_XMP].size() == 0) {
XMPChunk* xmpChunk = new XMPChunk(this);
this->addChunk(xmpChunk);
handler->xmpChunk = xmpChunk;
this->vp8x->xmp(true);
}
}
Chunk* Container::getExifChunk()
{
if (this->chunks[WEBP::WEBP_CHUNK_EXIF].size() == 0) {
return NULL;
}
return this->chunks[WEBP::WEBP_CHUNK_EXIF][0];
}
void Container::addChunk(Chunk* chunk)
{
ChunkId idx;
try {
idx = chunkMap.at(chunk->tag);
}
catch (const std::out_of_range& e) {
idx = WEBP_CHUNK_UNKNOWN;
}
this->chunks[idx].push_back(chunk);
}
void Container::write(WEBP_MetaHandler* handler)
{
XMP_IO* file = handler->parent->ioRef;
file->Rewind();
XIO::WriteUns32_LE(file, this->tag);
XIO::WriteUns32_LE(file, (XMP_Uns32) this->size);
XIO::WriteUns32_LE(file, kChunk_WEBP);
size_t i, j;
std::vector<Chunk*> chunkVect;
for (i = 0; i < WEBP_CHUNK_NIL; i++) {
chunkVect = this->chunks[i];
for (j = 0; j < chunkVect.size(); j++) {
chunkVect.at(j)->write(handler);
}
}
XMP_Int64 lastOffset = file->Offset();
this->size = lastOffset - 8;
file->Seek(this->pos + 4, kXMP_SeekFromStart);
XIO::WriteUns32_LE(file, (XMP_Uns32) this->size);
file->Seek(lastOffset, kXMP_SeekFromStart);
if (lastOffset < handler->initialFileSize) {
file->Truncate(lastOffset);
}
}
Container::~Container()
{
Chunk* chunk;
size_t i;
std::vector<Chunk*> chunkVect;
for (i = 0; i < WEBP_CHUNK_NIL; i++) {
chunkVect = this->chunks[i];
while (!chunkVect.empty()) {
chunk = chunkVect.back();
delete chunk;
chunkVect.pop_back();
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 16,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_gen_update_masterclock(struct kvm *kvm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
int i;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
struct kvm_arch *ka = &kvm->arch;
spin_lock(&ka->pvclock_gtod_sync_lock);
kvm_make_mclock_inprogress_request(kvm);
/* no guest entries from this point */
pvclock_update_vm_gtod_copy(kvm);
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
/* guest entries allowed */
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
clear_bit(KVM_REQ_MCLOCK_INPROGRESS, &vcpu->requests);
spin_unlock(&ka->pvclock_gtod_sync_lock);
#endif
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 24,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: krb5_gss_authorize_localname(OM_uint32 *minor,
const gss_name_t pname,
gss_const_buffer_t local_user,
gss_const_OID name_type)
{
krb5_context context;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_gss_name_t kname;
char *user;
int user_ok;
if (name_type != GSS_C_NO_OID &&
!g_OID_equal(name_type, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME)) {
return GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE;
}
kname = (krb5_gss_name_t)pname;
code = krb5_gss_init_context(&context);
if (code != 0) {
*minor = code;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
user = k5memdup0(local_user->value, local_user->length, &code);
if (user == NULL) {
*minor = code;
krb5_free_context(context);
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
user_ok = krb5_kuserok(context, kname->princ, user);
free(user);
krb5_free_context(context);
*minor = 0;
return user_ok ? GSS_S_COMPLETE : GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED;
}
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context export/import [CVE-2015-2698]
The patches for CVE-2015-2696 contained a regression in the newly
added IAKERB iakerb_gss_export_sec_context() function, which could
cause it to corrupt memory. Fix the regression by properly
dereferencing the context_handle pointer before casting it.
Also, the patches did not implement an IAKERB gss_import_sec_context()
function, under the erroneous belief that an exported IAKERB context
would be tagged as a krb5 context. Implement it now to allow IAKERB
contexts to be successfully exported and imported after establishment.
CVE-2015-2698:
In any MIT krb5 release with the patches for CVE-2015-2696 applied, an
application which calls gss_export_sec_context() may experience memory
corruption if the context was established using the IAKERB mechanism.
Historically, some vulnerabilities of this nature can be translated
into remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be
tailored to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8273 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: horizontalDifferenceF(float *ip, int n, int stride, uint16 *wp, uint16 *FromLT2)
{
int32 r1, g1, b1, a1, r2, g2, b2, a2, mask;
float fltsize = Fltsize;
#define CLAMP(v) ( (v<(float)0.) ? 0 \
: (v<(float)2.) ? FromLT2[(int)(v*fltsize)] \
: (v>(float)24.2) ? 2047 \
: LogK1*log(v*LogK2) + 0.5 )
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (n >= stride) {
if (stride == 3) {
r2 = wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]);
g2 = wp[1] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[2]);
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 3;
wp += 3;
ip += 3;
r1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
r2 = wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]);
g2 = wp[1] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[2]);
a2 = wp[3] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[3]);
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 4;
wp += 4;
ip += 4;
r1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
a1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[3]); wp[3] = (uint16)((a1-a2) & mask); a2 = a1;
}
} else {
ip += n - 1; /* point to last one */
wp += n - 1; /* point to last one */
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]);
wp[stride] -= wp[0];
wp[stride] &= mask;
wp--; ip--)
n -= stride;
}
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]); wp--; ip--)
}
}
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 27,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sctp_af *sctp_sockaddr_af(struct sctp_sock *opt,
union sctp_addr *addr, int len)
{
struct sctp_af *af;
/* Check minimum size. */
if (len < sizeof (struct sockaddr))
return NULL;
/* Does this PF support this AF? */
if (!opt->pf->af_supported(addr->sa.sa_family, opt))
return NULL;
/* If we get this far, af is valid. */
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->sa.sa_family);
if (len < af->sockaddr_len)
return NULL;
return af;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void spl_dllist_it_dtor(zend_object_iterator *iter) /* {{{ */
{
spl_dllist_it *iterator = (spl_dllist_it *)iter;
SPL_LLIST_CHECK_DELREF(iterator->traverse_pointer);
zend_user_it_invalidate_current(iter);
zval_ptr_dtor(&iterator->intern.it.data);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 18,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_set_random_seed(struct iw_context *ctx, int randomize, int rand_seed)
{
ctx->randomize = randomize;
ctx->random_seed = rand_seed;
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 3,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cdrom_is_mrw(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi, int *write)
{
struct packet_command cgc;
struct mrw_feature_desc *mfd;
unsigned char buffer[16];
int ret;
*write = 0;
init_cdrom_command(&cgc, buffer, sizeof(buffer), CGC_DATA_READ);
cgc.cmd[0] = GPCMD_GET_CONFIGURATION;
cgc.cmd[3] = CDF_MRW;
cgc.cmd[8] = sizeof(buffer);
cgc.quiet = 1;
if ((ret = cdi->ops->generic_packet(cdi, &cgc)))
return ret;
mfd = (struct mrw_feature_desc *)&buffer[sizeof(struct feature_header)];
if (be16_to_cpu(mfd->feature_code) != CDF_MRW)
return 1;
*write = mfd->write;
if ((ret = cdrom_mrw_probe_pc(cdi))) {
*write = 0;
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err minf_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_MediaInformationBox *p;
p = (GF_MediaInformationBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "MediaInformationBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (p->size)
gf_isom_box_dump_ex(p->InfoHeader, trace, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_NMHD);
if (p->size)
gf_isom_box_dump_ex(p->dataInformation, trace, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_DINF);
if (p->size)
gf_isom_box_dump_ex(p->sampleTable, trace, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STBL);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("MediaInformationBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 14,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rdp_recv_callback(rdpTransport* transport, STREAM* s, void* extra)
{
int status = 0;
rdpRdp* rdp = (rdpRdp*) extra;
switch (rdp->state)
{
case CONNECTION_STATE_NEGO:
if (!rdp_client_connect_mcs_connect_response(rdp, s))
status = -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_ATTACH_USER:
if (!rdp_client_connect_mcs_attach_user_confirm(rdp, s))
status = -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_CHANNEL_JOIN:
if (!rdp_client_connect_mcs_channel_join_confirm(rdp, s))
status = -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_LICENSE:
if (!rdp_client_connect_license(rdp, s))
status = -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_CAPABILITY:
if (!rdp_client_connect_demand_active(rdp, s))
status = -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_FINALIZATION:
status = rdp_recv_pdu(rdp, s);
if ((status >= 0) && (rdp->finalize_sc_pdus == FINALIZE_SC_COMPLETE))
rdp->state = CONNECTION_STATE_ACTIVE;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_ACTIVE:
status = rdp_recv_pdu(rdp, s);
break;
default:
printf("Invalid state %d\n", rdp->state);
status = -1;
break;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pvscsi_on_cmd_setup_rings(PVSCSIState *s)
{
PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *rc =
(PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *) s->curr_cmd_data;
trace_pvscsi_on_cmd_arrived("PVSCSI_CMD_SETUP_RINGS");
if (!rc->reqRingNumPages
|| rc->reqRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES
|| !rc->cmpRingNumPages
|| rc->cmpRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES) {
return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_FAILED;
}
pvscsi_dbg_dump_tx_rings_config(rc);
pvscsi_ring_init_data(&s->rings, rc);
s->rings_info_valid = TRUE;
return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_SUCCEEDED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RecordDangerousDownloadDiscard(DownloadDiscardReason reason,
DownloadDangerType danger_type,
const base::FilePath& file_path) {
switch (reason) {
case DOWNLOAD_DISCARD_DUE_TO_USER_ACTION:
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Download.UserDiscard", danger_type,
DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_MAX);
if (danger_type == DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_DANGEROUS_FILE) {
base::UmaHistogramSparse("Download.DangerousFile.UserDiscard",
GetDangerousFileType(file_path));
}
break;
case DOWNLOAD_DISCARD_DUE_TO_SHUTDOWN:
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Download.Discard", danger_type,
DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_MAX);
if (danger_type == DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_DANGEROUS_FILE) {
base::UmaHistogramSparse("Download.DangerousFile.Discard",
GetDangerousFileType(file_path));
}
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Add .desktop file to download_file_types.asciipb
.desktop files act as shortcuts on Linux, allowing arbitrary code
execution. We should send pings for these files.
Bug: 904182
Change-Id: Ibc26141fb180e843e1ffaf3f78717a9109d2fa9a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1344552
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#611272}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcm_loop_shutdown_session(struct se_session *se_sess)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NetworkLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetNetworkLibrary() {
return network_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 14,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::LoseContextImpl(
WebGLRenderingContextBase::LostContextMode mode,
AutoRecoveryMethod auto_recovery_method) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
context_lost_mode_ = mode;
DCHECK_NE(context_lost_mode_, kNotLostContext);
auto_recovery_method_ = auto_recovery_method;
for (size_t i = 0; i < extensions_.size(); ++i) {
ExtensionTracker* tracker = extensions_[i];
tracker->LoseExtension(false);
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < kWebGLExtensionNameCount; ++i)
extension_enabled_[i] = false;
RemoveAllCompressedTextureFormats();
if (mode == kRealLostContext) {
task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&WebGLRenderingContextBase::HoldReferenceToDrawingBuffer,
WrapWeakPersistent(this), WTF::RetainedRef(drawing_buffer_)));
}
DestroyContext();
ConsoleDisplayPreference display =
(mode == kRealLostContext) ? kDisplayInConsole : kDontDisplayInConsole;
SynthesizeGLError(GC3D_CONTEXT_LOST_WEBGL, "loseContext", "context lost",
display);
restore_allowed_ = false;
DeactivateContext(this);
if (auto_recovery_method_ == kWhenAvailable)
AddToEvictedList(this);
dispatch_context_lost_event_timer_.StartOneShot(TimeDelta(), FROM_HERE);
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int qeth_init_input_buffer(struct qeth_card *card,
struct qeth_qdio_buffer *buf)
{
struct qeth_buffer_pool_entry *pool_entry;
int i;
if ((card->options.cq == QETH_CQ_ENABLED) && (!buf->rx_skb)) {
buf->rx_skb = dev_alloc_skb(QETH_RX_PULL_LEN + ETH_HLEN);
if (!buf->rx_skb)
return 1;
}
pool_entry = qeth_find_free_buffer_pool_entry(card);
if (!pool_entry)
return 1;
/*
* since the buffer is accessed only from the input_tasklet
* there shouldn't be a need to synchronize; also, since we use
* the QETH_IN_BUF_REQUEUE_THRESHOLD we should never run out off
* buffers
*/
buf->pool_entry = pool_entry;
for (i = 0; i < QETH_MAX_BUFFER_ELEMENTS(card); ++i) {
buf->buffer->element[i].length = PAGE_SIZE;
buf->buffer->element[i].addr = pool_entry->elements[i];
if (i == QETH_MAX_BUFFER_ELEMENTS(card) - 1)
buf->buffer->element[i].eflags = SBAL_EFLAGS_LAST_ENTRY;
else
buf->buffer->element[i].eflags = 0;
buf->buffer->element[i].sflags = 0;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouter::OnSecurityInterstitialShown(
const GURL& url,
const std::string& reason,
int net_error_code) {
api::safe_browsing_private::InterstitialInfo params;
params.url = url.spec();
params.reason = reason;
if (net_error_code < 0) {
params.net_error_code =
std::make_unique<std::string>(base::NumberToString(net_error_code));
}
params.user_name = GetProfileUserName();
if (event_router_) {
auto event_value = std::make_unique<base::ListValue>();
event_value->Append(params.ToValue());
auto extension_event = std::make_unique<Event>(
events::SAFE_BROWSING_PRIVATE_ON_SECURITY_INTERSTITIAL_SHOWN,
api::safe_browsing_private::OnSecurityInterstitialShown::kEventName,
std::move(event_value));
event_router_->BroadcastEvent(std::move(extension_event));
}
if (client_) {
base::Value event(base::Value::Type::DICTIONARY);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyUrl, params.url);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyReason, params.reason);
event.SetIntKey(kKeyNetErrorCode, net_error_code);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyProfileUserName, params.user_name);
event.SetBoolKey(kKeyClickedThrough, false);
ReportRealtimeEvent(kKeyInterstitialEvent, std::move(event));
}
}
Commit Message: Add reporting for DLP deep scanning
For each triggered rule in the DLP response, we report the download as
violating that rule.
This also implements the UnsafeReportingEnabled enterprise policy, which
controls whether or not we do any reporting.
Bug: 980777
Change-Id: I48100cfb4dd5aa92ed80da1f34e64a6e393be2fa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1772381
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691371}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 8,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: peek_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr, addr_t data)
{
addr_t tmp, mask;
/*
* Stupid gdb peeks/pokes the access registers in 64 bit with
* an alignment of 4. Programmers from hell...
*/
mask = __ADDR_MASK;
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
if (addr >= (addr_t) &((struct user *) NULL)->regs.acrs &&
addr < (addr_t) &((struct user *) NULL)->regs.orig_gpr2)
mask = 3;
#endif
if ((addr & mask) || addr > sizeof(struct user) - __ADDR_MASK)
return -EIO;
tmp = __peek_user(child, addr);
return put_user(tmp, (addr_t __user *) data);
}
Commit Message: s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the address-space-control bit combination for home space.
Fixes CVE-2014-3534
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline size_t snd_compr_get_avail(struct snd_compr_stream *stream)
{
struct snd_compr_avail avail;
return snd_compr_calc_avail(stream, &avail);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sctp_unhash_established(struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
if (asoc->temp)
return;
sctp_local_bh_disable();
__sctp_unhash_established(asoc);
sctp_local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: sctp: Fix another socket race during accept/peeloff
There is a race between sctp_rcv() and sctp_accept() where we
have moved the association from the listening socket to the
accepted socket, but sctp_rcv() processing cached the old
socket and continues to use it.
The easy solution is to check for the socket mismatch once we've
grabed the socket lock. If we hit a mis-match, that means
that were are currently holding the lock on the listening socket,
but the association is refrencing a newly accepted socket. We need
to drop the lock on the old socket and grab the lock on the new one.
A more proper solution might be to create accepted sockets when
the new association is established, similar to TCP. That would
eliminate the race for 1-to-1 style sockets, but it would still
existing for 1-to-many sockets where a user wished to peeloff an
association. For now, we'll live with this easy solution as
it addresses the problem.
Reported-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 20,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int speed_max(struct mddev *mddev)
{
return mddev->sync_speed_max ?
mddev->sync_speed_max : sysctl_speed_limit_max;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sit_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff)
{
skb->encapsulation = 1;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_SIT;
return ipv6_gro_complete(skb, nhoff);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 2,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::ViewportDefiningElementDidChange() {
HTMLBodyElement* body = FirstBodyElement();
if (!body)
return;
if (body->NeedsReattachLayoutTree())
return;
LayoutObject* layout_object = body->GetLayoutObject();
if (layout_object && layout_object->IsLayoutBlock()) {
layout_object->SetStyle(ComputedStyle::Clone(*layout_object->Style()));
if (layout_object->HasLayer()) {
ToLayoutBoxModelObject(layout_object)
->Layer()
->SetNeedsCompositingReasonsUpdate();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void locationAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::getPtr(imp->location()), imp);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int http_stream_write_single(
git_smart_subtransport_stream *stream,
const char *buffer,
size_t len)
{
http_stream *s = (http_stream *)stream;
http_subtransport *t = OWNING_SUBTRANSPORT(s);
git_buf request = GIT_BUF_INIT;
assert(t->connected);
if (s->sent_request) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "Subtransport configured for only one write");
return -1;
}
clear_parser_state(t);
if (gen_request(&request, s, len) < 0)
return -1;
if (git_stream_write(t->io, request.ptr, request.size, 0) < 0)
goto on_error;
if (len && git_stream_write(t->io, buffer, len, 0) < 0)
goto on_error;
git_buf_free(&request);
s->sent_request = 1;
return 0;
on_error:
git_buf_free(&request);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: http: check certificate validity before clobbering the error variable
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 16,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void usb_deauthorize_interface(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct device *dev = &intf->dev;
device_lock(dev->parent);
if (intf->authorized) {
device_lock(dev);
intf->authorized = 0;
device_unlock(dev);
usb_forced_unbind_intf(intf);
}
device_unlock(dev->parent);
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller)
{
unsigned long save_flags;
void *objp;
flags &= gfp_allowed_mask;
cachep = slab_pre_alloc_hook(cachep, flags);
if (unlikely(!cachep))
return NULL;
cache_alloc_debugcheck_before(cachep, flags);
local_irq_save(save_flags);
objp = __do_cache_alloc(cachep, flags);
local_irq_restore(save_flags);
objp = cache_alloc_debugcheck_after(cachep, flags, objp, caller);
prefetchw(objp);
if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO) && objp)
memset(objp, 0, cachep->object_size);
slab_post_alloc_hook(cachep, flags, 1, &objp);
return objp;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<GraphicsContext3D> GraphicsContext3D::create(GraphicsContext3D::Attributes attrs, HostWindow* hostWindow, GraphicsContext3D::RenderStyle renderStyle)
{
if (renderStyle == RenderDirectlyToHostWindow)
return 0;
RefPtr<GraphicsContext3D> context = adoptRef(new GraphicsContext3D(attrs, hostWindow, renderStyle));
return context->m_private ? context.release() : 0;
}
Commit Message: [Qt] Remove an unnecessary masking from swapBgrToRgb()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103630
Reviewed by Zoltan Herczeg.
Get rid of a masking command in swapBgrToRgb() to speed up a little bit.
* platform/graphics/qt/GraphicsContext3DQt.cpp:
(WebCore::swapBgrToRgb):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@136375 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CastConfigDelegateChromeos::CastToReceiver(
const std::string& receiver_id) {
ExecuteJavaScript("backgroundSetup.launchDesktopMirroring('" + receiver_id +
"');");
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 8,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hot_remove_disk(struct mddev *mddev, dev_t dev)
{
char b[BDEVNAME_SIZE];
struct md_rdev *rdev;
rdev = find_rdev(mddev, dev);
if (!rdev)
return -ENXIO;
if (mddev_is_clustered(mddev))
md_cluster_ops->metadata_update_start(mddev);
clear_bit(Blocked, &rdev->flags);
remove_and_add_spares(mddev, rdev);
if (rdev->raid_disk >= 0)
goto busy;
if (mddev_is_clustered(mddev))
md_cluster_ops->remove_disk(mddev, rdev);
md_kick_rdev_from_array(rdev);
md_update_sb(mddev, 1);
md_new_event(mddev);
if (mddev_is_clustered(mddev))
md_cluster_ops->metadata_update_finish(mddev);
return 0;
busy:
if (mddev_is_clustered(mddev))
md_cluster_ops->metadata_update_cancel(mddev);
printk(KERN_WARNING "md: cannot remove active disk %s from %s ...\n",
bdevname(rdev->bdev,b), mdname(mddev));
return -EBUSY;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 9,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ieee802_15_4_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int hdrlen;
uint16_t fc;
uint8_t seq;
uint16_t panid = 0;
if (caplen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return caplen;
}
hdrlen = 3;
fc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
seq = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(p + 2);
p += 3;
caplen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"IEEE 802.15.4 %s packet ", ftypes[FC_FRAME_TYPE(fc)]));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"seq %02x ", seq));
/*
* Destination address and PAN ID, if present.
*/
switch (FC_DEST_ADDRESSING_MODE(fc)) {
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_NONE:
if (fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION) {
/*
* PAN ID compression; this requires that both
* the source and destination addresses be present,
* but the destination address is missing.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_RESERVED:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved destination addressing mode"));
return hdrlen;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_SHORT:
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p + 2)));
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_LONG:
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
if (caplen < 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p + 2)));
p += 8;
caplen -= 8;
hdrlen += 8;
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"< "));
/*
* Source address and PAN ID, if present.
*/
switch (FC_SRC_ADDRESSING_MODE(fc)) {
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_NONE:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_RESERVED:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved source addressing mode"));
return 0;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_SHORT:
if (!(fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION)) {
/*
* The source PAN ID is not compressed out, so
* fetch it. (Otherwise, we'll use the destination
* PAN ID, fetched above.)
*/
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
}
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p)));
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_LONG:
if (!(fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION)) {
/*
* The source PAN ID is not compressed out, so
* fetch it. (Otherwise, we'll use the destination
* PAN ID, fetched above.)
*/
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
}
if (caplen < 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p)));
p += 8;
caplen -= 8;
hdrlen += 8;
break;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
return hdrlen;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13000/IEEE 802.15.4: Fix bug introduced by previous fix.
We've already advanced the pointer past the PAN ID, if present; it now
points to the address, so don't add 2 to it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 26,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SpoolssSetPrinterData_r(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
proto_item *hidden_item;
hidden_item = proto_tree_add_uint(
tree, hf_printerdata, tvb, offset, 0, 1);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item);
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_doserror(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_rc, NULL);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::JobRecord::~JobRecord() {}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlCreatePushParserCtxt(xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax, void *user_data,
const char *chunk, int size, const char *filename) {
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
xmlParserInputPtr inputStream;
xmlParserInputBufferPtr buf;
xmlCharEncoding enc = XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE;
/*
* plug some encoding conversion routines
*/
if ((chunk != NULL) && (size >= 4))
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding((const xmlChar *) chunk, size);
buf = xmlAllocParserInputBuffer(enc);
if (buf == NULL) return(NULL);
ctxt = xmlNewParserCtxt();
if (ctxt == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(NULL, "creating parser: out of memory\n");
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(buf);
return(NULL);
}
ctxt->dictNames = 1;
ctxt->pushTab = (void **) xmlMalloc(ctxt->nameMax * 3 * sizeof(xmlChar *));
if (ctxt->pushTab == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(buf);
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
if (sax != NULL) {
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
if (ctxt->sax != (xmlSAXHandlerPtr) &xmlDefaultSAXHandler)
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
xmlFree(ctxt->sax);
ctxt->sax = (xmlSAXHandlerPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlSAXHandler));
if (ctxt->sax == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(buf);
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
memset(ctxt->sax, 0, sizeof(xmlSAXHandler));
if (sax->initialized == XML_SAX2_MAGIC)
memcpy(ctxt->sax, sax, sizeof(xmlSAXHandler));
else
memcpy(ctxt->sax, sax, sizeof(xmlSAXHandlerV1));
if (user_data != NULL)
ctxt->userData = user_data;
}
if (filename == NULL) {
ctxt->directory = NULL;
} else {
ctxt->directory = xmlParserGetDirectory(filename);
}
inputStream = xmlNewInputStream(ctxt);
if (inputStream == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(buf);
return(NULL);
}
if (filename == NULL)
inputStream->filename = NULL;
else {
inputStream->filename = (char *)
xmlCanonicPath((const xmlChar *) filename);
if (inputStream->filename == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(buf);
return(NULL);
}
}
inputStream->buf = buf;
xmlBufResetInput(inputStream->buf->buffer, inputStream);
inputPush(ctxt, inputStream);
/*
* If the caller didn't provide an initial 'chunk' for determining
* the encoding, we set the context to XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE so
* that it can be automatically determined later
*/
if ((size == 0) || (chunk == NULL)) {
ctxt->charset = XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE;
} else if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && (ctxt->input->buf != NULL)) {
size_t base = xmlBufGetInputBase(ctxt->input->buf->buffer, ctxt->input);
size_t cur = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
xmlParserInputBufferPush(ctxt->input->buf, size, chunk);
xmlBufSetInputBaseCur(ctxt->input->buf->buffer, ctxt->input, base, cur);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "PP: pushed %d\n", size);
#endif
}
if (enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
}
return(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 27,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int data_pkt(git_pkt **out, const char *line, size_t len)
{
git_pkt_data *pkt;
size_t alloclen;
line++;
len--;
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloclen, sizeof(git_pkt_progress), len);
pkt = git__malloc(alloclen);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(pkt);
pkt->type = GIT_PKT_DATA;
pkt->len = (int) len;
memcpy(pkt->data, line, len);
*out = (git_pkt *) pkt;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 3,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::initFromDataSource() {
sp<MediaExtractor> extractor;
CHECK(mDataSource != NULL);
if (mIsWidevine) {
String8 mimeType;
float confidence;
sp<AMessage> dummy;
bool success;
success = SniffWVM(mDataSource, &mimeType, &confidence, &dummy);
if (!success
|| strcasecmp(
mimeType.string(), MEDIA_MIMETYPE_CONTAINER_WVM)) {
ALOGE("unsupported widevine mime: %s", mimeType.string());
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
mWVMExtractor = new WVMExtractor(mDataSource);
mWVMExtractor->setAdaptiveStreamingMode(true);
if (mUIDValid) {
mWVMExtractor->setUID(mUID);
}
extractor = mWVMExtractor;
} else {
extractor = MediaExtractor::Create(mDataSource,
mSniffedMIME.empty() ? NULL: mSniffedMIME.c_str());
}
if (extractor == NULL) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
if (extractor->getDrmFlag()) {
checkDrmStatus(mDataSource);
}
mFileMeta = extractor->getMetaData();
if (mFileMeta != NULL) {
int64_t duration;
if (mFileMeta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration)) {
mDurationUs = duration;
}
}
int32_t totalBitrate = 0;
size_t numtracks = extractor->countTracks();
if (numtracks == 0) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < numtracks; ++i) {
sp<MediaSource> track = extractor->getTrack(i);
sp<MetaData> meta = extractor->getTrackMetaData(i);
const char *mime;
CHECK(meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp(mime, "audio/", 6)) {
if (mAudioTrack.mSource == NULL) {
mAudioTrack.mIndex = i;
mAudioTrack.mSource = track;
mAudioTrack.mPackets =
new AnotherPacketSource(mAudioTrack.mSource->getFormat());
if (!strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_VORBIS)) {
mAudioIsVorbis = true;
} else {
mAudioIsVorbis = false;
}
}
} else if (!strncasecmp(mime, "video/", 6)) {
if (mVideoTrack.mSource == NULL) {
mVideoTrack.mIndex = i;
mVideoTrack.mSource = track;
mVideoTrack.mPackets =
new AnotherPacketSource(mVideoTrack.mSource->getFormat());
int32_t secure;
if (meta->findInt32(kKeyRequiresSecureBuffers, &secure)
&& secure) {
mIsWidevine = true;
if (mUIDValid) {
extractor->setUID(mUID);
}
}
}
}
if (track != NULL) {
mSources.push(track);
int64_t durationUs;
if (meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > mDurationUs) {
mDurationUs = durationUs;
}
}
int32_t bitrate;
if (totalBitrate >= 0 && meta->findInt32(kKeyBitRate, &bitrate)) {
totalBitrate += bitrate;
} else {
totalBitrate = -1;
}
}
}
mBitrate = totalBitrate;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: GenericSource: reset mDrmManagerClient when mDataSource is cleared.
Bug: 25070434
Change-Id: Iade3472c496ac42456e42db35e402f7b66416f5b
(cherry picked from commit b41fd0d4929f0a89811bafcc4fd944b128f00ce2)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnFrameClosed() {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
UpdatePlayState();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 25,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
Element* impl = V8Element::toImpl(holder);
v8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectstringattributeAttr), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 25,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit ConnectionFilterController(ConnectionFilterImpl* filter)
: filter_(filter) {}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_setup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
kvm_vcpu_mtrr_init(vcpu);
r = vcpu_load(vcpu);
if (r)
return r;
kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu, false);
kvm_mmu_setup(vcpu);
vcpu_put(vcpu);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_add_entry(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de;
struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *t;
struct super_block *sb;
int retval;
int dx_fallback=0;
unsigned blocksize;
ext4_lblk_t block, blocks;
int csum_size = 0;
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM))
csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail);
sb = dir->i_sb;
blocksize = sb->s_blocksize;
if (!dentry->d_name.len)
return -EINVAL;
if (ext4_has_inline_data(dir)) {
retval = ext4_try_add_inline_entry(handle, dentry, inode);
if (retval < 0)
return retval;
if (retval == 1) {
retval = 0;
return retval;
}
}
if (is_dx(dir)) {
retval = ext4_dx_add_entry(handle, dentry, inode);
if (!retval || (retval != ERR_BAD_DX_DIR))
return retval;
ext4_clear_inode_flag(dir, EXT4_INODE_INDEX);
dx_fallback++;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir);
}
blocks = dir->i_size >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
for (block = 0; block < blocks; block++) {
if (!(bh = ext4_bread(handle, dir, block, 0, &retval))) {
if (!retval) {
retval = -EIO;
ext4_error(inode->i_sb,
"Directory hole detected on inode %lu\n",
inode->i_ino);
}
return retval;
}
if (!buffer_verified(bh) &&
!ext4_dirent_csum_verify(dir,
(struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data))
return -EIO;
set_buffer_verified(bh);
retval = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, dentry, inode, NULL, bh);
if (retval != -ENOSPC) {
brelse(bh);
return retval;
}
if (blocks == 1 && !dx_fallback &&
EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_DIR_INDEX))
return make_indexed_dir(handle, dentry, inode, bh);
brelse(bh);
}
bh = ext4_append(handle, dir, &block, &retval);
if (!bh)
return retval;
de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) bh->b_data;
de->inode = 0;
de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(blocksize - csum_size, blocksize);
if (csum_size) {
t = EXT4_DIRENT_TAIL(bh->b_data, blocksize);
initialize_dirent_tail(t, blocksize);
}
retval = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, dentry, inode, de, bh);
brelse(bh);
if (retval == 0)
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NEWENTRY);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_amf_double(AVIOContext *pb, double d)
{
avio_w8(pb, AMF_DATA_TYPE_NUMBER);
avio_wb64(pb, av_double2int(d));
}
Commit Message: avformat/flvenc: Check audio packet size
Fixes: Assertion failure
Fixes: assert_flvenc.c:941_1.swf
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 14,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void RuntimeCallStatsCounterMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->RuntimeCallStatsCounterMethod();
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err EncodeFileChunk(char *chunkFile, char *bifs, char *inputContext, char *outputContext, const char *tmpdir)
{
#if defined(GPAC_DISABLE_SMGR) || defined(GPAC_DISABLE_BIFS_ENC) || defined(GPAC_DISABLE_SCENE_ENCODER) || defined (GPAC_DISABLE_SCENE_DUMP)
fprintf(stderr, "BIFS encoding is not supported in this build of GPAC\n");
return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
#else
GF_Err e;
GF_SceneGraph *sg;
GF_SceneManager *ctx;
GF_SceneLoader load;
/*Step 1: create context and load input*/
sg = gf_sg_new();
ctx = gf_sm_new(sg);
memset(&load, 0, sizeof(GF_SceneLoader));
load.fileName = inputContext;
load.ctx = ctx;
/*since we're encoding we must get MPEG4 nodes only*/
load.flags = GF_SM_LOAD_MPEG4_STRICT;
e = gf_sm_load_init(&load);
if (!e) e = gf_sm_load_run(&load);
gf_sm_load_done(&load);
if (e) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot load context %s - %s\n", inputContext, gf_error_to_string(e));
goto exit;
}
/* Step 2: make sure we have only ONE RAP for each stream*/
e = gf_sm_aggregate(ctx, 0);
if (e) goto exit;
/*Step 3: loading the chunk into the context*/
memset(&load, 0, sizeof(GF_SceneLoader));
load.fileName = chunkFile;
load.ctx = ctx;
load.flags = GF_SM_LOAD_MPEG4_STRICT | GF_SM_LOAD_CONTEXT_READY;
e = gf_sm_load_init(&load);
if (!e) e = gf_sm_load_run(&load);
gf_sm_load_done(&load);
if (e) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot load chunk context %s - %s\n", chunkFile, gf_error_to_string(e));
goto exit;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Context and chunks loaded\n");
/* Assumes that the first AU contains only one command a SceneReplace and
that is not part of the current chunk */
/* Last argument is a callback to pass the encoded AUs: not needed here
Saving is not handled correctly */
e = EncodeBIFSChunk(ctx, bifs, NULL);
if (e) goto exit;
if (outputContext) {
u32 d_mode, do_enc;
char szF[GF_MAX_PATH], *ext;
/*make random access for storage*/
e = gf_sm_aggregate(ctx, 0);
if (e) goto exit;
/*check if we dump to BT, XMT or encode to MP4*/
strcpy(szF, outputContext);
ext = strrchr(szF, '.');
d_mode = GF_SM_DUMP_BT;
do_enc = 0;
if (ext) {
if (!stricmp(ext, ".xmt") || !stricmp(ext, ".xmta")) d_mode = GF_SM_DUMP_XMTA;
else if (!stricmp(ext, ".mp4")) do_enc = 1;
ext[0] = 0;
}
if (do_enc) {
GF_ISOFile *mp4;
strcat(szF, ".mp4");
mp4 = gf_isom_open(szF, GF_ISOM_WRITE_EDIT, tmpdir);
e = gf_sm_encode_to_file(ctx, mp4, NULL);
if (e) gf_isom_delete(mp4);
else gf_isom_close(mp4);
}
else e = gf_sm_dump(ctx, szF, GF_FALSE, d_mode);
}
exit:
if (ctx) {
sg = ctx->scene_graph;
gf_sm_del(ctx);
gf_sg_del(sg);
}
return e;
#endif /*defined(GPAC_DISABLE_BIFS_ENC) || defined(GPAC_DISABLE_SCENE_ENCODER) || defined (GPAC_DISABLE_SCENE_DUMP)*/
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *dn_socket_get_next(struct seq_file *seq,
struct sock *n)
{
struct dn_iter_state *state = seq->private;
n = sk_next(n);
try_again:
if (n)
goto out;
if (++state->bucket >= DN_SK_HASH_SIZE)
goto out;
n = sk_head(&dn_sk_hash[state->bucket]);
goto try_again;
out:
return n;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct syscall_metadata *syscall_nr_to_meta(int nr)
{
if (!syscalls_metadata || nr >= NR_syscalls || nr < 0)
return NULL;
return syscalls_metadata[nr];
}
Commit Message: tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline J_DITHER_MODE ditherMode() { return JDITHER_NONE; }
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 23,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BinaryUploadService::Request::FinishRequest(
Result result,
DeepScanningClientResponse response) {
std::move(callback_).Run(result, response);
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int lrw_init_table(struct lrw_table_ctx *ctx, const u8 *tweak)
{
be128 tmp = { 0 };
int i;
if (ctx->table)
gf128mul_free_64k(ctx->table);
/* initialize multiplication table for Key2 */
ctx->table = gf128mul_init_64k_bbe((be128 *)tweak);
if (!ctx->table)
return -ENOMEM;
/* initialize optimization table */
for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) {
setbit128_bbe(&tmp, i);
ctx->mulinc[i] = tmp;
gf128mul_64k_bbe(&ctx->mulinc[i], ctx->table);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHost* RenderWidgetHost::FromID(
int32_t process_id,
int32_t routing_id) {
return RenderWidgetHostImpl::FromID(process_id, routing_id);
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_segfault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long addr)
{
siginfo_t info;
if (find_vma(current->mm, addr) == NULL)
info.si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
else
info.si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_addr = (void *) instruction_pointer(regs);
pr_debug("SWP{B} emulation: access caused memory abort!\n");
arm_notify_die("Illegal memory access", regs, &info, 0, 0);
abtcounter++;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int apply_subsystem_event_filter(struct trace_subsystem_dir *dir,
char *filter_string)
{
struct event_subsystem *system = dir->subsystem;
struct trace_array *tr = dir->tr;
struct event_filter *filter = NULL;
int err = 0;
mutex_lock(&event_mutex);
/* Make sure the system still has events */
if (!dir->nr_events) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (!strcmp(strstrip(filter_string), "0")) {
filter_free_subsystem_preds(dir, tr);
remove_filter_string(system->filter);
filter = system->filter;
system->filter = NULL;
/* Ensure all filters are no longer used */
synchronize_sched();
filter_free_subsystem_filters(dir, tr);
__free_filter(filter);
goto out_unlock;
}
err = create_system_filter(dir, tr, filter_string, &filter);
if (filter) {
/*
* No event actually uses the system filter
* we can free it without synchronize_sched().
*/
__free_filter(system->filter);
system->filter = filter;
}
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&event_mutex);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 1,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::setPlaybackRate(double rate,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "setPlaybackRate(" << (void*)this << ", " << rate << ")";
if (rate != 0.0 && (rate < kMinRate || rate > kMaxRate)) {
UseCounter::Count(GetDocument(),
WebFeature::kHTMLMediaElementMediaPlaybackRateOutOfRange);
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"The provided playback rate (" + String::Number(rate) +
") is not in the " + "supported playback range.");
return;
}
if (playback_rate_ != rate) {
playback_rate_ = rate;
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::ratechange);
}
UpdatePlaybackRate();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 13,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _regulator_can_change_status(struct regulator_dev *rdev)
{
if (!rdev->constraints)
return 0;
if (rdev->constraints->valid_ops_mask & REGULATOR_CHANGE_STATUS)
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 1,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int spacePush(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int val) {
if (ctxt->spaceNr >= ctxt->spaceMax) {
int *tmp;
ctxt->spaceMax *= 2;
tmp = (int *) xmlRealloc(ctxt->spaceTab,
ctxt->spaceMax * sizeof(ctxt->spaceTab[0]));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
ctxt->spaceMax /=2;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->spaceTab = tmp;
}
ctxt->spaceTab[ctxt->spaceNr] = val;
ctxt->space = &ctxt->spaceTab[ctxt->spaceNr];
return(ctxt->spaceNr++);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 27,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int in_set_sample_rate(struct audio_stream *stream, uint32_t rate)
{
struct a2dp_stream_in *in = (struct a2dp_stream_in *)stream;
FNLOG();
if (in->common.cfg.rate > 0 && in->common.cfg.rate == rate)
return 0;
else
return -1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 5,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tee_obj_attr_free(struct tee_obj *o)
{
const struct tee_cryp_obj_type_props *tp;
size_t n;
if (!o->attr)
return;
tp = tee_svc_find_type_props(o->info.objectType);
if (!tp)
return;
for (n = 0; n < tp->num_type_attrs; n++) {
const struct tee_cryp_obj_type_attrs *ta = tp->type_attrs + n;
attr_ops[ta->ops_index].free((uint8_t *)o->attr + ta->raw_offs);
}
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_write_rx_descr(E1000ECore *core, uint8_t *desc,
struct NetRxPkt *pkt, const E1000E_RSSInfo *rss_info,
size_t ps_hdr_len, uint16_t(*written)[MAX_PS_BUFFERS])
{
if (e1000e_rx_use_legacy_descriptor(core)) {
assert(ps_hdr_len == 0);
e1000e_write_lgcy_rx_descr(core, desc, pkt, rss_info, (*written)[0]);
} else {
if (core->mac[RCTL] & E1000_RCTL_DTYP_PS) {
e1000e_write_ps_rx_descr(core, desc, pkt, rss_info,
ps_hdr_len, written);
} else {
assert(ps_hdr_len == 0);
e1000e_write_ext_rx_descr(core, desc, pkt, rss_info,
(*written)[0]);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 14,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~ApiParameterExtractor() {}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadTargetDetermined(
const base::FilePath& target_path,
TargetDisposition disposition,
DownloadDangerType danger_type,
const base::FilePath& intermediate_path,
DownloadInterruptReason interrupt_reason) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (state_ == CANCELLED_INTERNAL)
return;
DCHECK(state_ == TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL ||
state_ == INTERRUPTED_TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL);
DVLOG(20) << __func__ << "() target_path:" << target_path.value()
<< " intermediate_path:" << intermediate_path.value()
<< " disposition:" << disposition << " danger_type:" << danger_type
<< " interrupt_reason:"
<< DownloadInterruptReasonToString(interrupt_reason)
<< " this:" << DebugString(true);
RecordDownloadCount(DOWNLOAD_TARGET_DETERMINED_COUNT);
if (IsCancellation(interrupt_reason) || target_path.empty()) {
Cancel(true);
return;
}
if (state_ == TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL &&
interrupt_reason != DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE) {
deferred_interrupt_reason_ = interrupt_reason;
TransitionTo(INTERRUPTED_TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL);
OnTargetResolved();
return;
}
destination_info_.target_path = target_path;
destination_info_.target_disposition = disposition;
SetDangerType(danger_type);
if (state_ == INTERRUPTED_TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL && !download_file_) {
OnTargetResolved();
return;
}
DCHECK(intermediate_path.DirName() == target_path.DirName());
if (intermediate_path == GetFullPath()) {
OnDownloadRenamedToIntermediateName(DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE,
intermediate_path);
return;
}
DCHECK(!IsSavePackageDownload());
DownloadFile::RenameCompletionCallback callback =
base::Bind(&DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadRenamedToIntermediateName,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
GetDownloadTaskRunner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&DownloadFile::RenameAndUniquify,
base::Unretained(download_file_.get()), intermediate_path,
callback));
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::SendPings(const WebURL& destination_url) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
DCHECK(context_menu_node_.Get());
Element* anchor = context_menu_node_->EnclosingLinkEventParentOrSelf();
if (isHTMLAnchorElement(anchor))
toHTMLAnchorElement(anchor)->SendPings(destination_url);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 19,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void S_AL_StartLocalSound(sfxHandle_t sfx, int channel)
{
srcHandle_t src;
if(S_AL_CheckInput(0, sfx))
return;
src = S_AL_SrcAlloc(SRCPRI_LOCAL, -1, channel);
if(src == -1)
return;
S_AL_SrcSetup(src, sfx, SRCPRI_LOCAL, -1, channel, qtrue);
srcList[src].isPlaying = qtrue;
qalSourcePlay(srcList[src].alSource);
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 10,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType GetImageEntropy(const Image *image,
double *entropy,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
status=GetImageChannelEntropy(image,CompositeChannels,entropy,exception);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int StreamTcpTest39 (void)
{
Flow f;
ThreadVars tv;
StreamTcpThread stt;
uint8_t payload[4];
TCPHdr tcph;
PacketQueue pq;
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars));
memset(&stt, 0, sizeof (StreamTcpThread));
memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof (TCPHdr));
memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue));
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return 0;
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
tcph.th_win = htons(5480);
tcph.th_flags = TH_SYN;
p->tcph = &tcph;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
int ret = 0;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1) {
printf("failed in processing packet in StreamTcpPacket\n");
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_SYN | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1) {
printf("failed in processing packet in StreamTcpPacket\n");
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1) {
printf("failed in processing packet in StreamTcpPacket\n");
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_PUSH | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x41, 3, 4); /*AAA*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1) {
printf("failed in processing packet in StreamTcpPacket\n");
goto end;
}
if (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.next_seq != 4) {
printf("the server.next_seq should be 4, but it is %"PRIu32"\n",
((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.next_seq);
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(4);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(2);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_PUSH | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x41, 3, 4); /*AAA*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1) {
printf("failed in processing packet in StreamTcpPacket\n");
goto end;
}
/* last_ack value should be 4 as the previous sent ACK value is inside
window */
if (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.last_ack != 4) {
printf("the server.last_ack should be 4, but it is %"PRIu32"\n",
((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.last_ack);
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(4);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(5);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_PUSH | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x41, 3, 4); /*AAA*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1) {
printf("failed in processing packet in StreamTcpPacket\n");
goto end;
}
/* next_seq value should be 2987 as the previous sent ACK value is inside
window */
if (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.next_seq != 7) {
printf("the server.next_seq should be 7, but it is %"PRIu32"\n",
((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.next_seq);
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
StreamTcpSessionClear(p->flow->protoctx);
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_SetCdataSectionHandler(XML_Parser parser,
XML_StartCdataSectionHandler start,
XML_EndCdataSectionHandler end)
{
if (parser == NULL)
return;
parser->m_startCdataSectionHandler = start;
parser->m_endCdataSectionHandler = end;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 9,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptPromise ServiceWorkerContainer::getRegistrations(ScriptState* scriptState)
{
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
if (!m_provider) {
resolver->reject(DOMException::create(InvalidStateError, "Failed to get ServiceWorkerRegistration objects: The document is in an invalid state."));
return promise;
}
ExecutionContext* executionContext = scriptState->getExecutionContext();
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> documentOrigin = executionContext->getSecurityOrigin();
String errorMessage;
if (!executionContext->isSecureContext(errorMessage)) {
resolver->reject(DOMException::create(SecurityError, errorMessage));
return promise;
}
KURL pageURL = KURL(KURL(), documentOrigin->toString());
if (!SchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(pageURL.protocol())) {
resolver->reject(DOMException::create(SecurityError, "Failed to get ServiceWorkerRegistration objects: The URL protocol of the current origin ('" + documentOrigin->toString() + "') is not supported."));
return promise;
}
m_provider->getRegistrations(new GetRegistrationsCallback(resolver));
return promise;
}
Commit Message: Check CSP before registering ServiceWorkers
Service Worker registrations should be subject to the same CSP checks as
other workers. The spec doesn't say this explicitly
(https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#directive-child-src-workers says "Worker or
SharedWorker constructors"), but it seems to be in the spirit of things,
and it matches Firefox's behavior.
BUG=579801
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1861253004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385775}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 24,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ApiTestEnvironment::ApiTestEnvironment(
ModuleSystemTestEnvironment* environment) {
env_ = environment;
InitializeEnvironment();
RegisterModules();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: print_html_status(pe_working_set_t * data_set, const char *filename, gboolean web_cgi)
{
FILE *stream;
GListPtr gIter = NULL;
node_t *dc = NULL;
static int updates = 0;
char *filename_tmp = NULL;
if (web_cgi) {
stream = stdout;
fprintf(stream, "Content-type: text/html\n\n");
} else {
filename_tmp = crm_concat(filename, "tmp", '.');
stream = fopen(filename_tmp, "w");
if (stream == NULL) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Cannot open %s for writing", filename_tmp);
free(filename_tmp);
return -1;
}
}
updates++;
dc = data_set->dc_node;
fprintf(stream, "<html>");
fprintf(stream, "<head>");
fprintf(stream, "<title>Cluster status</title>");
/* content="%d;url=http://webdesign.about.com" */
fprintf(stream, "<meta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"%d\">", reconnect_msec / 1000);
fprintf(stream, "</head>");
/*** SUMMARY ***/
fprintf(stream, "<h2>Cluster summary</h2>");
{
char *now_str = NULL;
time_t now = time(NULL);
now_str = ctime(&now);
now_str[24] = EOS; /* replace the newline */
fprintf(stream, "Last updated: <b>%s</b><br/>\n", now_str);
}
if (dc == NULL) {
fprintf(stream, "Current DC: <font color=\"red\"><b>NONE</b></font><br/>");
} else {
fprintf(stream, "Current DC: %s (%s)<br/>", dc->details->uname, dc->details->id);
}
fprintf(stream, "%d Nodes configured.<br/>", g_list_length(data_set->nodes));
fprintf(stream, "%d Resources configured.<br/>", count_resources(data_set, NULL));
/*** CONFIG ***/
fprintf(stream, "<h3>Config Options</h3>\n");
fprintf(stream, "<table>\n");
fprintf(stream, "<tr><td>STONITH of failed nodes</td><td>:</td><td>%s</td></tr>\n",
is_set(data_set->flags, pe_flag_stonith_enabled) ? "enabled" : "disabled");
fprintf(stream, "<tr><td>Cluster is</td><td>:</td><td>%ssymmetric</td></tr>\n",
is_set(data_set->flags, pe_flag_symmetric_cluster) ? "" : "a-");
fprintf(stream, "<tr><td>No Quorum Policy</td><td>:</td><td>");
switch (data_set->no_quorum_policy) {
case no_quorum_freeze:
fprintf(stream, "Freeze resources");
break;
case no_quorum_stop:
fprintf(stream, "Stop ALL resources");
break;
case no_quorum_ignore:
fprintf(stream, "Ignore");
break;
case no_quorum_suicide:
fprintf(stream, "Suicide");
break;
}
fprintf(stream, "\n</td></tr>\n</table>\n");
/*** NODE LIST ***/
fprintf(stream, "<h2>Node List</h2>\n");
fprintf(stream, "<ul>\n");
for (gIter = data_set->nodes; gIter != NULL; gIter = gIter->next) {
node_t *node = (node_t *) gIter->data;
fprintf(stream, "<li>");
if (node->details->standby_onfail && node->details->online) {
fprintf(stream, "Node: %s (%s): %s", node->details->uname, node->details->id,
"<font color=\"orange\">standby (on-fail)</font>\n");
} else if (node->details->standby && node->details->online) {
fprintf(stream, "Node: %s (%s): %s", node->details->uname, node->details->id,
"<font color=\"orange\">standby</font>\n");
} else if (node->details->standby) {
fprintf(stream, "Node: %s (%s): %s", node->details->uname, node->details->id,
"<font color=\"red\">OFFLINE (standby)</font>\n");
} else if (node->details->online) {
fprintf(stream, "Node: %s (%s): %s", node->details->uname, node->details->id,
"<font color=\"green\">online</font>\n");
} else {
fprintf(stream, "Node: %s (%s): %s", node->details->uname, node->details->id,
"<font color=\"red\">OFFLINE</font>\n");
}
if (group_by_node) {
GListPtr lpc2 = NULL;
fprintf(stream, "<ul>\n");
for (lpc2 = node->details->running_rsc; lpc2 != NULL; lpc2 = lpc2->next) {
resource_t *rsc = (resource_t *) lpc2->data;
fprintf(stream, "<li>");
rsc->fns->print(rsc, NULL, pe_print_html | pe_print_rsconly, stream);
fprintf(stream, "</li>\n");
}
fprintf(stream, "</ul>\n");
}
fprintf(stream, "</li>\n");
}
fprintf(stream, "</ul>\n");
if (group_by_node && inactive_resources) {
fprintf(stream, "<h2>Inactive Resources</h2>\n");
} else if (group_by_node == FALSE) {
fprintf(stream, "<h2>Resource List</h2>\n");
}
if (group_by_node == FALSE || inactive_resources) {
for (gIter = data_set->resources; gIter != NULL; gIter = gIter->next) {
resource_t *rsc = (resource_t *) gIter->data;
gboolean is_active = rsc->fns->active(rsc, TRUE);
gboolean partially_active = rsc->fns->active(rsc, FALSE);
if (is_set(rsc->flags, pe_rsc_orphan) && is_active == FALSE) {
continue;
} else if (group_by_node == FALSE) {
if (partially_active || inactive_resources) {
rsc->fns->print(rsc, NULL, pe_print_html, stream);
}
} else if (is_active == FALSE && inactive_resources) {
rsc->fns->print(rsc, NULL, pe_print_html, stream);
}
}
}
fprintf(stream, "</html>");
fflush(stream);
fclose(stream);
if (!web_cgi) {
if (rename(filename_tmp, filename) != 0) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Unable to rename %s->%s", filename_tmp, filename);
}
free(filename_tmp);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __blk_mq_run_hw_queue(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
{
struct request_queue *q = hctx->queue;
struct request *rq;
LIST_HEAD(rq_list);
LIST_HEAD(driver_list);
struct list_head *dptr;
int queued;
WARN_ON(!cpumask_test_cpu(raw_smp_processor_id(), hctx->cpumask));
if (unlikely(test_bit(BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED, &hctx->state)))
return;
hctx->run++;
/*
* Touch any software queue that has pending entries.
*/
flush_busy_ctxs(hctx, &rq_list);
/*
* If we have previous entries on our dispatch list, grab them
* and stuff them at the front for more fair dispatch.
*/
if (!list_empty_careful(&hctx->dispatch)) {
spin_lock(&hctx->lock);
if (!list_empty(&hctx->dispatch))
list_splice_init(&hctx->dispatch, &rq_list);
spin_unlock(&hctx->lock);
}
/*
* Start off with dptr being NULL, so we start the first request
* immediately, even if we have more pending.
*/
dptr = NULL;
/*
* Now process all the entries, sending them to the driver.
*/
queued = 0;
while (!list_empty(&rq_list)) {
struct blk_mq_queue_data bd;
int ret;
rq = list_first_entry(&rq_list, struct request, queuelist);
list_del_init(&rq->queuelist);
bd.rq = rq;
bd.list = dptr;
bd.last = list_empty(&rq_list);
ret = q->mq_ops->queue_rq(hctx, &bd);
switch (ret) {
case BLK_MQ_RQ_QUEUE_OK:
queued++;
continue;
case BLK_MQ_RQ_QUEUE_BUSY:
list_add(&rq->queuelist, &rq_list);
__blk_mq_requeue_request(rq);
break;
default:
pr_err("blk-mq: bad return on queue: %d\n", ret);
case BLK_MQ_RQ_QUEUE_ERROR:
rq->errors = -EIO;
blk_mq_end_request(rq, rq->errors);
break;
}
if (ret == BLK_MQ_RQ_QUEUE_BUSY)
break;
/*
* We've done the first request. If we have more than 1
* left in the list, set dptr to defer issue.
*/
if (!dptr && rq_list.next != rq_list.prev)
dptr = &driver_list;
}
if (!queued)
hctx->dispatched[0]++;
else if (queued < (1 << (BLK_MQ_MAX_DISPATCH_ORDER - 1)))
hctx->dispatched[ilog2(queued) + 1]++;
/*
* Any items that need requeuing? Stuff them into hctx->dispatch,
* that is where we will continue on next queue run.
*/
if (!list_empty(&rq_list)) {
spin_lock(&hctx->lock);
list_splice(&rq_list, &hctx->dispatch);
spin_unlock(&hctx->lock);
/*
* the queue is expected stopped with BLK_MQ_RQ_QUEUE_BUSY, but
* it's possible the queue is stopped and restarted again
* before this. Queue restart will dispatch requests. And since
* requests in rq_list aren't added into hctx->dispatch yet,
* the requests in rq_list might get lost.
*
* blk_mq_run_hw_queue() already checks the STOPPED bit
**/
blk_mq_run_hw_queue(hctx, true);
}
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoEnable(GLenum cap) {
if (SetCapabilityState(cap, true)) {
glEnable(cap);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShelfLayoutManager::UpdateVisibilityState() {
ShellDelegate* delegate = Shell::GetInstance()->delegate();
if (delegate && delegate->IsScreenLocked()) {
SetState(VISIBLE);
} else {
WorkspaceManager::WindowState window_state(
workspace_manager_->GetWindowState());
switch (window_state) {
case WorkspaceManager::WINDOW_STATE_FULL_SCREEN:
SetState(HIDDEN);
break;
case WorkspaceManager::WINDOW_STATE_MAXIMIZED:
SetState(auto_hide_behavior_ != SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_BEHAVIOR_NEVER ?
AUTO_HIDE : VISIBLE);
break;
case WorkspaceManager::WINDOW_STATE_WINDOW_OVERLAPS_SHELF:
case WorkspaceManager::WINDOW_STATE_DEFAULT:
SetState(auto_hide_behavior_ == SHELF_AUTO_HIDE_BEHAVIOR_ALWAYS ?
AUTO_HIDE : VISIBLE);
SetWindowOverlapsShelf(window_state ==
WorkspaceManager::WINDOW_STATE_WINDOW_OVERLAPS_SHELF);
}
}
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::RecordUserMetrics(const std::string& action) {
Send(new ViewHostMsg_UserMetricsRecordAction(action));
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_io_bus_write_cookie(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_bus bus_idx,
gpa_t addr, int len, const void *val, long cookie)
{
struct kvm_io_bus *bus;
struct kvm_io_range range;
range = (struct kvm_io_range) {
.addr = addr,
.len = len,
};
bus = srcu_dereference(vcpu->kvm->buses[bus_idx], &vcpu->kvm->srcu);
if (!bus)
return -ENOMEM;
/* First try the device referenced by cookie. */
if ((cookie >= 0) && (cookie < bus->dev_count) &&
(kvm_io_bus_cmp(&range, &bus->range[cookie]) == 0))
if (!kvm_iodevice_write(vcpu, bus->range[cookie].dev, addr, len,
val))
return cookie;
/*
* cookie contained garbage; fall back to search and return the
* correct cookie value.
*/
return __kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, bus, &range, val);
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvp_process_ip_address(void *addrp,
int family, char *buffer,
int length, int *offset)
{
struct sockaddr_in *addr;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
int addr_length;
char tmp[50];
const char *str;
if (family == AF_INET) {
addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)addrp;
str = inet_ntop(family, &addr->sin_addr, tmp, 50);
addr_length = INET_ADDRSTRLEN;
} else {
addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addrp;
str = inet_ntop(family, &addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, tmp, 50);
addr_length = INET6_ADDRSTRLEN;
}
if ((length - *offset) < addr_length + 2)
return HV_E_FAIL;
if (str == NULL) {
strcpy(buffer, "inet_ntop failed\n");
return HV_E_FAIL;
}
if (*offset == 0)
strcpy(buffer, tmp);
else {
strcat(buffer, ";");
strcat(buffer, tmp);
}
*offset += strlen(str) + 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tools: hv: Netlink source address validation allows DoS
The source code without this patch caused hypervkvpd to exit when it processed
a spoofed Netlink packet which has been sent from an untrusted local user.
Now Netlink messages with a non-zero nl_pid source address are ignored
and a warning is printed into the syslog.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Hozza <thozza@redhat.com>
Acked-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UnloadController::CancelWindowClose() {
DCHECK(is_attempting_to_close_browser_);
tabs_needing_before_unload_fired_.clear();
tabs_needing_unload_fired_.clear();
is_attempting_to_close_browser_ = false;
content::NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_CLOSE_CANCELLED,
content::Source<Browser>(browser_),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper::PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper(
ppapi::host::ResourceHost* resource_host,
Delegate* delegate,
PP_DeviceType_Dev device_type,
const GURL& document_url)
: resource_host_(resource_host),
delegate_(delegate),
device_type_(device_type),
document_url_(document_url) {}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 5,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnCompositingLockStateChanged(
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
if (!compositor->IsLocked() && can_lock_compositor_ == YES_DID_LOCK) {
can_lock_compositor_ = NO_PENDING_RENDERER_FRAME;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AtomicString& Element::webkitRegionOverset() const
{
document()->updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, undefinedState, ("undefined", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::cssRegionsEnabled() || !renderRegion())
return undefinedState;
switch (renderRegion()->regionOversetState()) {
case RegionFit: {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, fitState, ("fit", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
return fitState;
}
case RegionEmpty: {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, emptyState, ("empty", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
return emptyState;
}
case RegionOverset: {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, overflowState, ("overset", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
return overflowState;
}
case RegionUndefined:
return undefinedState;
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return undefinedState;
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evdns_base_clear_nameservers_and_suspend(struct evdns_base *base)
{
struct nameserver *server, *started_at;
int i;
EVDNS_LOCK(base);
server = base->server_head;
started_at = base->server_head;
if (!server) {
EVDNS_UNLOCK(base);
return 0;
}
while (1) {
struct nameserver *next = server->next;
(void) event_del(&server->event);
if (evtimer_initialized(&server->timeout_event))
(void) evtimer_del(&server->timeout_event);
if (server->probe_request) {
evdns_cancel_request(server->base, server->probe_request);
server->probe_request = NULL;
}
if (server->socket >= 0)
evutil_closesocket(server->socket);
mm_free(server);
if (next == started_at)
break;
server = next;
}
base->server_head = NULL;
base->global_good_nameservers = 0;
for (i = 0; i < base->n_req_heads; ++i) {
struct request *req, *req_started_at;
req = req_started_at = base->req_heads[i];
while (req) {
struct request *next = req->next;
req->tx_count = req->reissue_count = 0;
req->ns = NULL;
/* ???? What to do about searches? */
(void) evtimer_del(&req->timeout_event);
req->trans_id = 0;
req->transmit_me = 0;
base->global_requests_waiting++;
evdns_request_insert(req, &base->req_waiting_head);
/* We want to insert these suspended elements at the front of
* the waiting queue, since they were pending before any of
* the waiting entries were added. This is a circular list,
* so we can just shift the start back by one.*/
base->req_waiting_head = base->req_waiting_head->prev;
if (next == req_started_at)
break;
req = next;
}
base->req_heads[i] = NULL;
}
base->global_requests_inflight = 0;
EVDNS_UNLOCK(base);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 15,511 |
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