instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContinueDrag(views::View* view, const ui::LocatedEvent& event) {
if (drag_controller_.get() &&
drag_controller_->event_source() == EventSourceFromEvent(event)) {
gfx::Point screen_location(event.location());
views::View::ConvertPointToScreen(view, &screen_location);
drag_controller_->Drag(screen_location);
}
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: istr_set_get_as_list (GHashTable *table)
{
GList *list;
list = NULL;
g_hash_table_foreach (table, add_istr_to_list, &list);
return list;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptValue WebGLRenderingContextBase::GetBooleanArrayParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
GLenum pname) {
if (pname != GL_COLOR_WRITEMASK) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return WebGLAny(script_state, 0, 0);
}
GLboolean value[4] = {0};
if (!isContextLost())
ContextGL()->GetBooleanv(pname, value);
bool bool_value[4];
for (int ii = 0; ii < 4; ++ii)
bool_value[ii] = static_cast<bool>(value[ii]);
return WebGLAny(script_state, bool_value, 4);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void tm_recheckpoint_new_task(struct task_struct *new)
{
unsigned long msr;
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM))
return;
/* Recheckpoint the registers of the thread we're about to switch to.
*
* If the task was using FP, we non-lazily reload both the original and
* the speculative FP register states. This is because the kernel
* doesn't see if/when a TM rollback occurs, so if we take an FP
* unavoidable later, we are unable to determine which set of FP regs
* need to be restored.
*/
if (!new->thread.regs)
return;
/* The TM SPRs are restored here, so that TEXASR.FS can be set
* before the trecheckpoint and no explosion occurs.
*/
tm_restore_sprs(&new->thread);
if (!MSR_TM_ACTIVE(new->thread.regs->msr))
return;
msr = new->thread.tm_orig_msr;
/* Recheckpoint to restore original checkpointed register state. */
TM_DEBUG("*** tm_recheckpoint of pid %d "
"(new->msr 0x%lx, new->origmsr 0x%lx)\n",
new->pid, new->thread.regs->msr, msr);
/* This loads the checkpointed FP/VEC state, if used */
tm_recheckpoint(&new->thread, msr);
/* This loads the speculative FP/VEC state, if used */
if (msr & MSR_FP) {
do_load_up_transact_fpu(&new->thread);
new->thread.regs->msr |=
(MSR_FP | new->thread.fpexc_mode);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
if (msr & MSR_VEC) {
do_load_up_transact_altivec(&new->thread);
new->thread.regs->msr |= MSR_VEC;
}
#endif
/* We may as well turn on VSX too since all the state is restored now */
if (msr & MSR_VSX)
new->thread.regs->msr |= MSR_VSX;
TM_DEBUG("*** tm_recheckpoint of pid %d complete "
"(kernel msr 0x%lx)\n",
new->pid, mfmsr());
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MYSQLND ** mysqlnd_stream_array_check_for_readiness(MYSQLND ** conn_array TSRMLS_DC)
{
int cnt = 0;
MYSQLND **p = conn_array, **p_p;
MYSQLND **ret = NULL;
while (*p) {
if (CONN_GET_STATE((*p)->data) <= CONN_READY || CONN_GET_STATE((*p)->data) == CONN_QUIT_SENT) {
cnt++;
}
p++;
}
if (cnt) {
MYSQLND **ret_p = ret = ecalloc(cnt + 1, sizeof(MYSQLND *));
p_p = p = conn_array;
while (*p) {
if (CONN_GET_STATE((*p)->data) <= CONN_READY || CONN_GET_STATE((*p)->data) == CONN_QUIT_SENT) {
*ret_p = *p;
*p = NULL;
ret_p++;
} else {
*p_p = *p;
p_p++;
}
p++;
}
*ret_p = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 16,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err xml_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_XMLBox *p = (GF_XMLBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "XMLBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
fprintf(trace, "<![CDATA[\n");
if (p->xml)
gf_fwrite(p->xml, strlen(p->xml), 1, trace);
fprintf(trace, "]]>\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("XMLBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 8,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: clamp_indexed(const fz_colorspace *cs, const float *in, float *out)
{
struct indexed *idx = cs->data;
*out = fz_clamp(*in, 0, idx->high) / 255.0f; /* To do, avoid 255 divide */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ext4_zero_partial_blocks(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
loff_t lstart, loff_t length)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
unsigned partial_start, partial_end;
ext4_fsblk_t start, end;
loff_t byte_end = (lstart + length - 1);
int err = 0;
partial_start = lstart & (sb->s_blocksize - 1);
partial_end = byte_end & (sb->s_blocksize - 1);
start = lstart >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
end = byte_end >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
/* Handle partial zero within the single block */
if (start == end &&
(partial_start || (partial_end != sb->s_blocksize - 1))) {
err = ext4_block_zero_page_range(handle, mapping,
lstart, length);
return err;
}
/* Handle partial zero out on the start of the range */
if (partial_start) {
err = ext4_block_zero_page_range(handle, mapping,
lstart, sb->s_blocksize);
if (err)
return err;
}
/* Handle partial zero out on the end of the range */
if (partial_end != sb->s_blocksize - 1)
err = ext4_block_zero_page_range(handle, mapping,
byte_end - partial_end,
partial_end + 1);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rds_still_queued(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_incoming *inc,
int drop)
{
struct sock *sk = rds_rs_to_sk(rs);
int ret = 0;
unsigned long flags;
write_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_recv_lock, flags);
if (!list_empty(&inc->i_item)) {
ret = 1;
if (drop) {
/* XXX make sure this i_conn is reliable */
rds_recv_rcvbuf_delta(rs, sk, inc->i_conn->c_lcong,
-be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len),
inc->i_hdr.h_dport);
list_del_init(&inc->i_item);
rds_inc_put(inc);
}
}
write_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_recv_lock, flags);
rdsdebug("inc %p rs %p still %d dropped %d\n", inc, rs, ret, drop);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: rds: set correct msg_namelen
Jay Fenlason (fenlason@redhat.com) found a bug,
that recvfrom() on an RDS socket can return the contents of random kernel
memory to userspace if it was called with a address length larger than
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in).
rds_recvmsg() also fails to set the addr_len paramater properly before
returning, but that's just a bug.
There are also a number of cases wher recvfrom() can return an entirely bogus
address. Anything in rds_recvmsg() that returns a non-negative value but does
not go through the "sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;" code path
at the end of the while(1) loop will return up to 128 bytes of kernel memory
to userspace.
And I write two test programs to reproduce this bug, you will see that in
rds_server, fromAddr will be overwritten and the following sock_fd will be
destroyed.
Yes, it is the programmer's fault to set msg_namelen incorrectly, but it is
better to make the kernel copy the real length of address to user space in
such case.
How to run the test programs ?
I test them on 32bit x86 system, 3.5.0-rc7.
1 compile
gcc -o rds_client rds_client.c
gcc -o rds_server rds_server.c
2 run ./rds_server on one console
3 run ./rds_client on another console
4 you will see something like:
server is waiting to receive data...
old socket fd=3
server received data from client:data from client
msg.msg_namelen=32
new socket fd=-1067277685
sendmsg()
: Bad file descriptor
/***************** rds_client.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
struct sockaddr_in toAddr;
char recvBuffer[128] = "data from client";
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if (sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(1);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4001);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
memset(&toAddr, 0, sizeof(toAddr));
toAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
toAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
toAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = strlen(recvBuffer) + 1;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendto() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("client send data:%s\n", recvBuffer);
memset(recvBuffer, '\0', 128);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("receive data from server:%s\n", recvBuffer);
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
/***************** rds_server.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
struct sockaddr_in fromAddr;
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
unsigned int addrLen;
char recvBuffer[128];
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if(sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(0);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server is waiting to receive data...\n");
msg.msg_name = &fromAddr;
/*
* I add 16 to sizeof(fromAddr), ie 32,
* and pay attention to the definition of fromAddr,
* recvmsg() will overwrite sock_fd,
* since kernel will copy 32 bytes to userspace.
*
* If you just use sizeof(fromAddr), it works fine.
* */
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr) + 16;
/* msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr); */
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
while (1) {
printf("old socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server received data from client:%s\n", recvBuffer);
printf("msg.msg_namelen=%d\n", msg.msg_namelen);
printf("new socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
strcat(recvBuffer, "--data from server");
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendmsg()\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
}
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Weiping Pan <wpan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::ConnectToService(
const std::string& service_uuid,
const SocketCallback& callback) {
callback.Run(scoped_refptr<device::BluetoothSocket>());
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<EffectPaintPropertyNode> CreateSampleEffectNodeWithElementId() {
EffectPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.local_transform_space = TransformPaintPropertyNode::Root();
state.output_clip = ClipPaintPropertyNode::Root();
state.opacity = 2.0 / 255.0;
state.direct_compositing_reasons = CompositingReason::kActiveOpacityAnimation;
state.compositor_element_id = CompositorElementId(2);
return EffectPaintPropertyNode::Create(EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
std::move(state));
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 1 | 26,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_sndbuf_expand(struct sock *sk)
{
const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int sndmem, per_mss;
u32 nr_segs;
/* Worst case is non GSO/TSO : each frame consumes one skb
* and skb->head is kmalloced using power of two area of memory
*/
per_mss = max_t(u32, tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp, tp->mss_cache) +
MAX_TCP_HEADER +
SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info));
per_mss = roundup_pow_of_two(per_mss) +
SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct sk_buff));
nr_segs = max_t(u32, TCP_INIT_CWND, tp->snd_cwnd);
nr_segs = max_t(u32, nr_segs, tp->reordering + 1);
/* Fast Recovery (RFC 5681 3.2) :
* Cubic needs 1.7 factor, rounded to 2 to include
* extra cushion (application might react slowly to POLLOUT)
*/
sndmem = 2 * nr_segs * per_mss;
if (sk->sk_sndbuf < sndmem)
sk->sk_sndbuf = min(sndmem, sysctl_tcp_wmem[2]);
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sctp_assoc_update(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_association *new)
{
struct sctp_transport *trans;
struct list_head *pos, *temp;
/* Copy in new parameters of peer. */
asoc->c = new->c;
asoc->peer.rwnd = new->peer.rwnd;
asoc->peer.sack_needed = new->peer.sack_needed;
asoc->peer.i = new->peer.i;
sctp_tsnmap_init(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, SCTP_TSN_MAP_INITIAL,
asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn, GFP_ATOMIC);
/* Remove any peer addresses not present in the new association. */
list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
trans = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(new, &trans->ipaddr)) {
sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, trans);
continue;
}
if (asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED)
sctp_transport_reset(trans);
}
/* If the case is A (association restart), use
* initial_tsn as next_tsn. If the case is B, use
* current next_tsn in case data sent to peer
* has been discarded and needs retransmission.
*/
if (asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED) {
asoc->next_tsn = new->next_tsn;
asoc->ctsn_ack_point = new->ctsn_ack_point;
asoc->adv_peer_ack_point = new->adv_peer_ack_point;
/* Reinitialize SSN for both local streams
* and peer's streams.
*/
sctp_ssnmap_clear(asoc->ssnmap);
/* Flush the ULP reassembly and ordered queue.
* Any data there will now be stale and will
* cause problems.
*/
sctp_ulpq_flush(&asoc->ulpq);
/* reset the overall association error count so
* that the restarted association doesn't get torn
* down on the next retransmission timer.
*/
asoc->overall_error_count = 0;
} else {
/* Add any peer addresses from the new association. */
list_for_each_entry(trans, &new->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &trans->ipaddr))
sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, &trans->ipaddr,
GFP_ATOMIC, trans->state);
}
asoc->ctsn_ack_point = asoc->next_tsn - 1;
asoc->adv_peer_ack_point = asoc->ctsn_ack_point;
if (!asoc->ssnmap) {
/* Move the ssnmap. */
asoc->ssnmap = new->ssnmap;
new->ssnmap = NULL;
}
if (!asoc->assoc_id) {
/* get a new association id since we don't have one
* yet.
*/
sctp_assoc_set_id(asoc, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
}
/* SCTP-AUTH: Save the peer parameters from the new associations
* and also move the association shared keys over
*/
kfree(asoc->peer.peer_random);
asoc->peer.peer_random = new->peer.peer_random;
new->peer.peer_random = NULL;
kfree(asoc->peer.peer_chunks);
asoc->peer.peer_chunks = new->peer.peer_chunks;
new->peer.peer_chunks = NULL;
kfree(asoc->peer.peer_hmacs);
asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = new->peer.peer_hmacs;
new->peer.peer_hmacs = NULL;
sctp_auth_key_put(asoc->asoc_shared_key);
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(asoc, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
Commit Message: sctp: Fix sk_ack_backlog wrap-around problem
Consider the scenario:
For a TCP-style socket, while processing the COOKIE_ECHO chunk in
sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(), after it has passed a series of sanity check,
a new association would be created in sctp_unpack_cookie(), but afterwards,
some processing maybe failed, and sctp_association_free() will be called to
free the previously allocated association, in sctp_association_free(),
sk_ack_backlog value is decremented for this socket, since the initial
value for sk_ack_backlog is 0, after the decrement, it will be 65535,
a wrap-around problem happens, and if we want to establish new associations
afterward in the same socket, ABORT would be triggered since sctp deem the
accept queue as full.
Fix this issue by only decrementing sk_ack_backlog for associations in
the endpoint's list.
Fix-suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Xufeng Zhang <xufeng.zhang@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_SetExternalEntityRefHandler(XML_Parser parser,
XML_ExternalEntityRefHandler handler)
{
if (parser != NULL)
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler = handler;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 15,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FLTIsLineFilter(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode)
{
if (!psFilterNode || !psFilterNode->pszValue)
return 0;
if (psFilterNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_SPATIAL &&
psFilterNode->psRightNode &&
psFilterNode->psRightNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_GEOMETRY_LINE)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ext4_block_truncate_page(handle_t *handle,
struct address_space *mapping, loff_t from)
{
ext4_fsblk_t index = from >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
unsigned offset = from & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE-1);
unsigned blocksize, length, pos;
ext4_lblk_t iblock;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct page *page;
int err = 0;
page = find_or_create_page(mapping, from >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT,
mapping_gfp_mask(mapping) & ~__GFP_FS);
if (!page)
return -EINVAL;
blocksize = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize;
length = blocksize - (offset & (blocksize - 1));
iblock = index << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits);
/*
* For "nobh" option, we can only work if we don't need to
* read-in the page - otherwise we create buffers to do the IO.
*/
if (!page_has_buffers(page) && test_opt(inode->i_sb, NOBH) &&
ext4_should_writeback_data(inode) && PageUptodate(page)) {
zero_user(page, offset, length);
set_page_dirty(page);
goto unlock;
}
if (!page_has_buffers(page))
create_empty_buffers(page, blocksize, 0);
/* Find the buffer that contains "offset" */
bh = page_buffers(page);
pos = blocksize;
while (offset >= pos) {
bh = bh->b_this_page;
iblock++;
pos += blocksize;
}
err = 0;
if (buffer_freed(bh)) {
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "freed: skip");
goto unlock;
}
if (!buffer_mapped(bh)) {
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "unmapped");
ext4_get_block(inode, iblock, bh, 0);
/* unmapped? It's a hole - nothing to do */
if (!buffer_mapped(bh)) {
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "still unmapped");
goto unlock;
}
}
/* Ok, it's mapped. Make sure it's up-to-date */
if (PageUptodate(page))
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
if (!buffer_uptodate(bh)) {
err = -EIO;
ll_rw_block(READ, 1, &bh);
wait_on_buffer(bh);
/* Uhhuh. Read error. Complain and punt. */
if (!buffer_uptodate(bh))
goto unlock;
}
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get write access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh);
if (err)
goto unlock;
}
zero_user(page, offset, length);
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "zeroed end of block");
err = 0;
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
} else {
if (ext4_should_order_data(inode))
err = ext4_jbd2_file_inode(handle, inode);
mark_buffer_dirty(bh);
}
unlock:
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dgnc_mgmt_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
unsigned long flags;
unsigned int minor = iminor(inode);
spin_lock_irqsave(&dgnc_global_lock, flags);
/* mgmt device */
if (minor < MAXMGMTDEVICES) {
if (dgnc_mgmt_in_use[minor])
dgnc_mgmt_in_use[minor] = 0;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dgnc_global_lock, flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: staging/dgnc: fix info leak in ioctl
The dgnc_mgmt_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
struct digi_dinfo after the ->dinfo_nboards member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speirofr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct sk_buff *handle_bridge(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct packet_type **pt_prev, int *ret,
struct net_device *orig_dev)
{
struct net_bridge_port *port;
if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_LOOPBACK ||
(port = rcu_dereference(skb->dev->br_port)) == NULL)
return skb;
if (*pt_prev) {
*ret = deliver_skb(skb, *pt_prev, orig_dev);
*pt_prev = NULL;
}
return br_handle_frame_hook(port, skb);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: externalEntityContentProcessor(XML_Parser parser,
const char *start,
const char *end,
const char **endPtr)
{
enum XML_Error result = doContent(parser, 1, parser->m_encoding, start, end,
endPtr, (XML_Bool)!parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
if (result == XML_ERROR_NONE) {
if (!storeRawNames(parser))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 5,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_raw_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, OPJ_UINT32 stride,
OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_ARG_NOT_USED(width);
if (fread(pData, sizeof(OPJ_UINT8), stride * height, IN) != (stride * height)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: bmp_read_info_header(): reject bmp files with biBitCount == 0 (#983)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: destroy_starting_step(void *x)
{
xfree(x);
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 12,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int am_save_post(request_rec *r, const char **relay_state)
{
am_mod_cfg_rec *mod_cfg;
const char *content_type;
const char *charset;
const char *psf_id;
char *psf_name;
char *post_data;
apr_size_t post_data_len;
apr_size_t written;
apr_file_t *psf;
mod_cfg = am_get_mod_cfg(r->server);
if (mod_cfg->post_dir == NULL) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"MellonPostReplay enabled but MellonPostDirectory not set "
"-- cannot save post data");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
if (am_postdir_cleanup(r) != OK)
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
/* Check Content-Type */
content_type = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Content-Type");
if (content_type == NULL) {
content_type = "urlencoded";
charset = NULL;
} else {
if (am_has_header(r, content_type,
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded")) {
content_type = "urlencoded";
} else if (am_has_header(r, content_type,
"multipart/form-data")) {
content_type = "multipart";
} else {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Unknown POST Content-Type \"%s\"", content_type);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
charset = am_get_header_attr(r, content_type, NULL, "charset");
}
if ((psf_id = am_generate_id(r)) == NULL) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, "cannot generate id");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
psf_name = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "%s/%s", mod_cfg->post_dir, psf_id);
if (apr_file_open(&psf, psf_name,
APR_WRITE|APR_CREATE|APR_BINARY,
APR_FPROT_UREAD|APR_FPROT_UWRITE,
r->pool) != OK) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"cannot create POST session file");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
if (am_read_post_data(r, &post_data, &post_data_len) != OK) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, "cannot read POST data");
(void)apr_file_close(psf);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
if (post_data_len > mod_cfg->post_size) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"POST data size %" APR_SIZE_T_FMT
" exceeds maximum %" APR_SIZE_T_FMT ". "
"Increase MellonPostSize directive.",
post_data_len, mod_cfg->post_size);
(void)apr_file_close(psf);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
written = post_data_len;
if ((apr_file_write(psf, post_data, &written) != OK) ||
(written != post_data_len)) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"cannot write to POST session file");
(void)apr_file_close(psf);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
if (apr_file_close(psf) != OK) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"cannot close POST session file");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
if (charset != NULL)
charset = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "&charset=%s",
am_urlencode(r->pool, charset));
else
charset = "";
*relay_state = apr_psprintf(r->pool,
"%srepost?id=%s&ReturnTo=%s&enctype=%s%s",
am_get_endpoint_url(r), psf_id,
am_urlencode(r->pool, *relay_state),
content_type, charset);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 15,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void prep_new_huge_page(struct hstate *h, struct page *page, int nid)
{
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&page->lru);
set_compound_page_dtor(page, HUGETLB_PAGE_DTOR);
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
set_hugetlb_cgroup(page, NULL);
h->nr_huge_pages++;
h->nr_huge_pages_node[nid]++;
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
put_page(page); /* free it into the hugepage allocator */
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::DidAssociateByParser() {
if (!did_finish_parsing_children_)
return;
has_elements_associated_by_parser_ = true;
UseCounter::Count(GetDocument(), WebFeature::kFormAssociationByParser);
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 29,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lacks_info (NautilusFile *file)
{
return !file->details->file_info_is_up_to_date
&& !file->details->is_gone;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LUALIB_API int luaopen_cmsgpack_safe(lua_State *L) {
int i;
luaopen_cmsgpack(L);
/* Wrap all functions in the safe handler */
for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(cmds)/sizeof(*cmds) - 1); i++) {
lua_getfield(L, -1, cmds[i].name);
lua_pushcclosure(L, mp_safe, 1);
lua_setfield(L, -2, cmds[i].name);
}
#if LUA_VERSION_NUM < 502
/* Register name globally for 5.1 */
lua_pushvalue(L, -1);
lua_setglobal(L, LUACMSGPACK_SAFE_NAME);
#endif
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct wireless_dev *brcmf_cfg80211_add_iface(struct wiphy *wiphy,
const char *name,
unsigned char name_assign_type,
enum nl80211_iftype type,
u32 *flags,
struct vif_params *params)
{
struct wireless_dev *wdev;
int err;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "enter: %s type %d\n", name, type);
err = brcmf_vif_add_validate(wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy), type);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("iface validation failed: err=%d\n", err);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
switch (type) {
case NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC:
case NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION:
case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN:
case NL80211_IFTYPE_WDS:
case NL80211_IFTYPE_MONITOR:
case NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT:
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP:
wdev = brcmf_ap_add_vif(wiphy, name, flags, params);
break;
case NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_CLIENT:
case NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO:
case NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_DEVICE:
wdev = brcmf_p2p_add_vif(wiphy, name, name_assign_type, type, flags, params);
break;
case NL80211_IFTYPE_UNSPECIFIED:
default:
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (IS_ERR(wdev))
brcmf_err("add iface %s type %d failed: err=%d\n",
name, type, (int)PTR_ERR(wdev));
else
brcmf_cfg80211_update_proto_addr_mode(wdev);
return wdev;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int setup_e820_entries(struct boot_params *params)
{
unsigned int nr_e820_entries;
nr_e820_entries = e820_saved.nr_map;
/* TODO: Pass entries more than E820MAX in bootparams setup data */
if (nr_e820_entries > E820MAX)
nr_e820_entries = E820MAX;
params->e820_entries = nr_e820_entries;
memcpy(¶ms->e820_map, &e820_saved.map,
nr_e820_entries * sizeof(struct e820entry));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kexec/uefi: copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag
in original kernel.
secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 29,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ShouldCompareEffectiveURLsForSiteInstanceSelection(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
content::SiteInstance* candidate_site_instance,
bool is_main_frame,
const GURL& candidate_url,
const GURL& destination_url) {
DCHECK(browser_context);
DCHECK(candidate_site_instance);
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
return ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::
ShouldCompareEffectiveURLsForSiteInstanceSelection(
browser_context, candidate_site_instance, is_main_frame,
candidate_url, destination_url);
#else
return true;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void crypto_ccm_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
{
struct ccm_instance_ctx *ctx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
crypto_drop_spawn(&ctx->cipher);
crypto_drop_skcipher(&ctx->ctr);
kfree(inst);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidEnforceInsecureRequestPolicy(
blink::WebInsecureRequestPolicy policy) {
GetFrameHost()->EnforceInsecureRequestPolicy(policy);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ndp_msg_opt_prefix_flag_auto_addr_conf(struct ndp_msg *msg, int offset)
{
struct nd_opt_prefix_info *pi =
ndp_msg_payload_opts_offset(msg, offset);
return pi->nd_opt_pi_flags_reserved & ND_OPT_PI_FLAG_AUTO;
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 4,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserPpapiHostImpl::AddInstance(
PP_Instance instance,
const PepperRendererInstanceData& renderer_instance_data) {
DCHECK(instance_map_.find(instance) == instance_map_.end());
instance_map_[instance] =
base::MakeUnique<InstanceData>(renderer_instance_data);
}
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 24,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool __bss_tim_get(u8 *tim, u16 id)
{
/*
* This format has been mandated by the IEEE specifications,
* so this line may not be changed to use the test_bit() format.
*/
return tim[id / 8] & (1 << (id % 8));
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 28,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_do_chop(png_row_infop row_info, png_bytep row)
{
png_debug(1, "in png_do_chop");
#ifdef PNG_USELESS_TESTS_SUPPORTED
if (row != NULL && row_info != NULL && row_info->bit_depth == 16)
#else
if (row_info->bit_depth == 16)
#endif
{
png_bytep sp = row;
png_bytep dp = row;
png_uint_32 i;
png_uint_32 istop = row_info->width * row_info->channels;
for (i = 0; i<istop; i++, sp += 2, dp++)
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_16_TO_8_ACCURATE_SCALE_SUPPORTED
/* This does a more accurate scaling of the 16-bit color
* value, rather than a simple low-byte truncation.
*
* What the ideal calculation should be:
* *dp = (((((png_uint_32)(*sp) << 8) |
* (png_uint_32)(*(sp + 1))) * 255 + 127)
* / (png_uint_32)65535L;
*
* GRR: no, I think this is what it really should be:
* *dp = (((((png_uint_32)(*sp) << 8) |
* (png_uint_32)(*(sp + 1))) + 128L)
* / (png_uint_32)257L;
*
* GRR: here's the exact calculation with shifts:
* temp = (((png_uint_32)(*sp) << 8) |
* (png_uint_32)(*(sp + 1))) + 128L;
* *dp = (temp - (temp >> 8)) >> 8;
*
* Approximate calculation with shift/add instead of multiply/divide:
* *dp = ((((png_uint_32)(*sp) << 8) |
* (png_uint_32)((int)(*(sp + 1)) - *sp)) + 128) >> 8;
*
* What we actually do to avoid extra shifting and conversion:
*/
*dp = *sp + ((((int)(*(sp + 1)) - *sp) > 128) ? 1 : 0);
#else
/* Simply discard the low order byte */
*dp = *sp;
#endif
}
row_info->bit_depth = 8;
row_info->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(8 * row_info->channels);
row_info->rowbytes = row_info->width * row_info->channels;
}
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t num_requests() { return num_requests_; }
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _bdf_atoul( char* s,
char** end,
int base )
{
unsigned long v;
const unsigned char* dmap;
if ( s == 0 || *s == 0 )
return 0;
/* Make sure the radix is something recognizable. Default to 10. */
switch ( base )
{
case 8:
dmap = odigits;
break;
case 16:
dmap = hdigits;
break;
default:
base = 10;
dmap = ddigits;
break;
}
/* Check for the special hex prefix. */
if ( *s == '0' &&
( *( s + 1 ) == 'x' || *( s + 1 ) == 'X' ) )
{
base = 16;
dmap = hdigits;
s += 2;
}
for ( v = 0; sbitset( dmap, *s ); s++ )
v = v * base + a2i[(int)*s];
if ( end != 0 )
*end = s;
return v;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: close_ops_fd (void)
{
SetupOp *op;
for (op = ops; op != NULL; op = op->next)
{
if (op->fd != -1)
{
(void) close (op->fd);
op->fd = -1;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Don't create our own temporary mount point for pivot_root
An attacker could pre-create /tmp/.bubblewrap-$UID and make it a
non-directory, non-symlink (in which case mounting our tmpfs would fail,
causing denial of service), or make it a symlink under their control
(potentially allowing bad things if the protected_symlinks sysctl is
not enabled).
Instead, temporarily mount the tmpfs on a directory that we are sure
exists and is not attacker-controlled. /tmp (the directory itself, not
a subdirectory) will do.
Fixes: #304
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=923557
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
Closes: #305
Approved by: cgwalters
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct kvm_memory_slot *__gfn_to_memslot(struct kvm_memslots *slots,
gfn_t gfn)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < slots->nmemslots; ++i) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot = &slots->memslots[i];
if (gfn >= memslot->base_gfn
&& gfn < memslot->base_gfn + memslot->npages)
return memslot;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Validate userspace_addr of memslot when registered
This way, we can avoid checking the user space address many times when
we read the guest memory.
Although we can do the same for write if we check which slots are
writable, we do not care write now: reading the guest memory happens
more often than writing.
[avi: change VERIFY_READ to VERIFY_WRITE]
Signed-off-by: Takuya Yoshikawa <yoshikawa.takuya@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct bio *bio_clone_bioset(struct bio *bio_src, gfp_t gfp_mask,
struct bio_set *bs)
{
struct bvec_iter iter;
struct bio_vec bv;
struct bio *bio;
/*
* Pre immutable biovecs, __bio_clone() used to just do a memcpy from
* bio_src->bi_io_vec to bio->bi_io_vec.
*
* We can't do that anymore, because:
*
* - The point of cloning the biovec is to produce a bio with a biovec
* the caller can modify: bi_idx and bi_bvec_done should be 0.
*
* - The original bio could've had more than BIO_MAX_PAGES biovecs; if
* we tried to clone the whole thing bio_alloc_bioset() would fail.
* But the clone should succeed as long as the number of biovecs we
* actually need to allocate is fewer than BIO_MAX_PAGES.
*
* - Lastly, bi_vcnt should not be looked at or relied upon by code
* that does not own the bio - reason being drivers don't use it for
* iterating over the biovec anymore, so expecting it to be kept up
* to date (i.e. for clones that share the parent biovec) is just
* asking for trouble and would force extra work on
* __bio_clone_fast() anyways.
*/
bio = bio_alloc_bioset(gfp_mask, bio_segments(bio_src), bs);
if (!bio)
return NULL;
bio->bi_disk = bio_src->bi_disk;
bio->bi_opf = bio_src->bi_opf;
bio->bi_write_hint = bio_src->bi_write_hint;
bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = bio_src->bi_iter.bi_sector;
bio->bi_iter.bi_size = bio_src->bi_iter.bi_size;
switch (bio_op(bio)) {
case REQ_OP_DISCARD:
case REQ_OP_SECURE_ERASE:
case REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES:
break;
case REQ_OP_WRITE_SAME:
bio->bi_io_vec[bio->bi_vcnt++] = bio_src->bi_io_vec[0];
break;
default:
bio_for_each_segment(bv, bio_src, iter)
bio->bi_io_vec[bio->bi_vcnt++] = bv;
break;
}
if (bio_integrity(bio_src)) {
int ret;
ret = bio_integrity_clone(bio, bio_src, gfp_mask);
if (ret < 0) {
bio_put(bio);
return NULL;
}
}
bio_clone_blkcg_association(bio, bio_src);
return bio;
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 7,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: commit_metadata(struct svc_fh *fhp)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(fhp->fh_dentry);
const struct export_operations *export_ops = inode->i_sb->s_export_op;
if (!EX_ISSYNC(fhp->fh_export))
return 0;
if (export_ops->commit_metadata)
return export_ops->commit_metadata(inode);
return sync_inode_metadata(inode, 1);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 4,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebSandboxFlags WebLocalFrameImpl::EffectiveSandboxFlags() const {
if (!GetFrame())
return WebSandboxFlags::kNone;
return static_cast<WebSandboxFlags>(
GetFrame()->Loader().EffectiveSandboxFlags());
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 4,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int BitsPerPixelForPixmapDepth(Display* dpy, int depth) {
int count;
XPixmapFormatValues* formats = XListPixmapFormats(dpy, &count);
if (!formats)
return -1;
int bits_per_pixel = -1;
for (int i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
if (formats[i].depth == depth) {
bits_per_pixel = formats[i].bits_per_pixel;
break;
}
}
XFree(formats);
return bits_per_pixel;
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 5,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_group_attach(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event *group_leader = event->group_leader, *pos;
/*
* We can have double attach due to group movement in perf_event_open.
*/
if (event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_GROUP)
return;
event->attach_state |= PERF_ATTACH_GROUP;
if (group_leader == event)
return;
WARN_ON_ONCE(group_leader->ctx != event->ctx);
group_leader->group_caps &= event->event_caps;
list_add_tail(&event->group_entry, &group_leader->sibling_list);
group_leader->nr_siblings++;
perf_event__header_size(group_leader);
list_for_each_entry(pos, &group_leader->sibling_list, group_entry)
perf_event__header_size(pos);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 7,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PlatformSensorProviderLinux::CreateSensorAndNotify(
mojom::SensorType type,
SensorInfoLinux* sensor_device) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
scoped_refptr<PlatformSensorLinux> sensor;
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping = MapSharedBufferForType(type);
if (sensor_device && mapping && StartPollingThread()) {
sensor =
new PlatformSensorLinux(type, std::move(mapping), this, sensor_device,
polling_thread_->task_runner());
}
NotifySensorCreated(type, sensor);
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 1 | 16,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
preempt_disable();
kvm_arch_vcpu_put(vcpu);
preempt_notifier_unregister(&vcpu->preempt_notifier);
preempt_enable();
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline MagickBooleanType IsPoint(const char *point)
{
char
*p;
double
value;
value=StringToDouble(point,&p);
return((value == 0.0) && (p == point) ? MagickFalse : MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t WebPage::setComposingRegion(int32_t start, int32_t end)
{
return d->m_inputHandler->setComposingRegion(start, end);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __sum16 tcp_v6_checksum_init(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE) {
if (!tcp_v6_check(skb->len, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, skb->csum)) {
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
return 0;
}
}
skb->csum = ~csum_unfold(tcp_v6_check(skb->len,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, 0));
if (skb->len <= 76) {
return __skb_checksum_complete(skb);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 25,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _gnutls_decrypt (gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * ciphertext,
size_t ciphertext_size, uint8_t * data,
size_t max_data_size, content_type_t type,
record_parameters_st * params, uint64 *sequence)
{
gnutls_datum_t gcipher;
int ret, data_size;
if (ciphertext_size == 0)
return 0;
gcipher.size = ciphertext_size;
gcipher.data = ciphertext;
if (is_read_comp_null (params) == 0)
{
ret =
ciphertext_to_compressed (session, &gcipher, data, max_data_size,
type, params, sequence);
if (ret < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
return ret;
}
else
{
uint8_t* tmp_data;
tmp_data = gnutls_malloc(max_data_size);
if (tmp_data == NULL)
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
ret =
ciphertext_to_compressed (session, &gcipher, tmp_data, max_data_size,
type, params, sequence);
if (ret < 0)
goto leave;
data_size = ret;
if (ret != 0)
{
ret = _gnutls_decompress( ¶ms->read.compression_state, tmp_data, data_size, data, max_data_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto leave;
}
leave:
gnutls_free(tmp_data);
return ret;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 11,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLScriptRunner::runScript(Element* script, const TextPosition& scriptStartPosition)
{
ASSERT(m_document);
ASSERT(!hasParserBlockingScript());
{
ScriptLoader* scriptLoader = toScriptLoaderIfPossible(script);
ASSERT(scriptLoader);
if (!scriptLoader)
return;
ASSERT(scriptLoader->isParserInserted());
if (!isExecutingScript())
Microtask::performCheckpoint();
InsertionPointRecord insertionPointRecord(m_host->inputStream());
NestingLevelIncrementer nestingLevelIncrementer(m_scriptNestingLevel);
scriptLoader->prepareScript(scriptStartPosition);
if (!scriptLoader->willBeParserExecuted())
return;
if (scriptLoader->willExecuteWhenDocumentFinishedParsing()) {
requestDeferredScript(script);
} else if (scriptLoader->readyToBeParserExecuted()) {
if (m_scriptNestingLevel == 1) {
m_parserBlockingScript.setElement(script);
m_parserBlockingScript.setStartingPosition(scriptStartPosition);
} else {
ScriptSourceCode sourceCode(script->textContent(), documentURLForScriptExecution(m_document), scriptStartPosition);
scriptLoader->executeScript(sourceCode);
}
} else {
requestParsingBlockingScript(script);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 22,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err tims_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_TSHintEntryBox *p;
p = (GF_TSHintEntryBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "RTPTimeScaleBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "TimeScale=\"%d\">\n", p->timeScale);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("RTPTimeScaleBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 2,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sk_buff *validate_xmit_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
netdev_features_t features;
if (skb->next)
return skb;
features = netif_skb_features(skb);
skb = validate_xmit_vlan(skb, features);
if (unlikely(!skb))
goto out_null;
if (netif_needs_gso(skb, features)) {
struct sk_buff *segs;
segs = skb_gso_segment(skb, features);
if (IS_ERR(segs)) {
goto out_kfree_skb;
} else if (segs) {
consume_skb(skb);
skb = segs;
}
} else {
if (skb_needs_linearize(skb, features) &&
__skb_linearize(skb))
goto out_kfree_skb;
/* If packet is not checksummed and device does not
* support checksumming for this protocol, complete
* checksumming here.
*/
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
if (skb->encapsulation)
skb_set_inner_transport_header(skb,
skb_checksum_start_offset(skb));
else
skb_set_transport_header(skb,
skb_checksum_start_offset(skb));
if (!(features & NETIF_F_CSUM_MASK) &&
skb_checksum_help(skb))
goto out_kfree_skb;
}
}
return skb;
out_kfree_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
out_null:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 4,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void llc_ui_sk_init(struct socket *sock, struct sock *sk)
{
sock_graft(sk, sock);
sk->sk_type = sock->type;
sock->ops = &llc_ui_ops;
}
Commit Message: llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg()
For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member
to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized
sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack
memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets
in case the socket is shutting down during receive.
Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be
updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 9,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: usage(int iExitCode)
{
char word[32];
sprintf( word, getJobActionString(mode) );
fprintf( stderr, "Usage: %s [options] [constraints]\n", MyName );
fprintf( stderr, " where [options] is zero or more of:\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -help Display this message and exit\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -version Display version information and exit\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -name schedd_name Connect to the given schedd\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -pool hostname Use the given central manager to find daemons\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -addr <ip:port> Connect directly to the given \"sinful string\"\n" );
if( mode == JA_REMOVE_JOBS || mode == JA_REMOVE_X_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr, " -reason reason Use the given RemoveReason\n");
} else if( mode == JA_RELEASE_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr, " -reason reason Use the given ReleaseReason\n");
} else if( mode == JA_HOLD_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr, " -reason reason Use the given HoldReason\n");
fprintf( stderr, " -subcode number Set HoldReasonSubCode\n");
}
if( mode == JA_REMOVE_JOBS || mode == JA_REMOVE_X_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr,
" -forcex Force the immediate local removal of jobs in the X state\n"
" (only affects jobs already being removed)\n" );
}
if( mode == JA_VACATE_JOBS || mode == JA_VACATE_FAST_JOBS ) {
fprintf( stderr,
" -fast Use a fast vacate (hardkill)\n" );
}
fprintf( stderr, " and where [constraints] is one of:\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " cluster.proc %s the given job\n", word );
fprintf( stderr, " cluster %s the given cluster of jobs\n", word );
fprintf( stderr, " user %s all jobs owned by user\n", word );
fprintf( stderr, " -constraint expr %s all jobs matching the boolean expression\n", word );
fprintf( stderr, " -all %s all jobs "
"(cannot be used with other constraints)\n", word );
exit( iExitCode );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 1 | 370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum virtio_device_endian virtio_default_endian(void)
{
if (target_words_bigendian()) {
return VIRTIO_DEVICE_ENDIAN_BIG;
} else {
return VIRTIO_DEVICE_ENDIAN_LITTLE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static base::Callback<void(const gfx::Image&)> Wrap(
const base::Callback<void(const SkBitmap&)>& image_decoded_callback) {
auto* handler = new ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout(image_decoded_callback);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout::OnImageDecoded,
handler->weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), gfx::Image()),
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(kDecodeLogoTimeoutSeconds));
return base::Bind(&ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout::OnImageDecoded,
handler->weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 24,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smb2cli_req_set_notify_async(struct tevent_req *req)
{
struct smbXcli_req_state *state =
tevent_req_data(req,
struct smbXcli_req_state);
state->smb2.notify_async = true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AuthenticatorSelectAccountSheetModel::SetCurrentSelection(int selected) {
DCHECK_LE(0, selected);
DCHECK_LT(static_cast<size_t>(selected), dialog_model()->responses().size());
selected_ = selected;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ovl_create_real(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *newdentry,
struct kstat *stat, const char *link,
struct dentry *hardlink, bool debug)
{
int err;
if (newdentry->d_inode)
return -ESTALE;
if (hardlink) {
err = ovl_do_link(hardlink, dir, newdentry, debug);
} else {
switch (stat->mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFREG:
err = ovl_do_create(dir, newdentry, stat->mode, debug);
break;
case S_IFDIR:
err = ovl_do_mkdir(dir, newdentry, stat->mode, debug);
break;
case S_IFCHR:
case S_IFBLK:
case S_IFIFO:
case S_IFSOCK:
err = ovl_do_mknod(dir, newdentry,
stat->mode, stat->rdev, debug);
break;
case S_IFLNK:
err = ovl_do_symlink(dir, newdentry, link, debug);
break;
default:
err = -EPERM;
}
}
if (!err && WARN_ON(!newdentry->d_inode)) {
/*
* Not quite sure if non-instantiated dentry is legal or not.
* VFS doesn't seem to care so check and warn here.
*/
err = -ENOENT;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: ovl: verify upper dentry before unlink and rename
Unlink and rename in overlayfs checked the upper dentry for staleness by
verifying upper->d_parent against upperdir. However the dentry can go
stale also by being unhashed, for example.
Expand the verification to actually look up the name again (under parent
lock) and check if it matches the upper dentry. This matches what the VFS
does before passing the dentry to filesytem's unlink/rename methods, which
excludes any inconsistency caused by overlayfs.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void send_ext_key_event_ack(VncState *vs)
{
vnc_lock_output(vs);
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0,
pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server),
pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server),
VNC_ENCODING_EXT_KEY_EVENT);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void zgfx_context_reset(ZGFX_CONTEXT* zgfx, BOOL flush)
{
zgfx->HistoryIndex = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8785
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Node* Document::adoptNode(Node* source, ExceptionState& exception_state) {
EventQueueScope scope;
switch (source->getNodeType()) {
case kDocumentNode:
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"The node provided is of type '" +
source->nodeName() +
"', which may not be adopted.");
return nullptr;
case kAttributeNode: {
Attr* attr = ToAttr(source);
if (Element* owner_element = attr->ownerElement())
owner_element->removeAttributeNode(attr, exception_state);
break;
}
default:
if (source->IsShadowRoot()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kHierarchyRequestError,
"The node provided is a shadow root, which may not be adopted.");
return nullptr;
}
if (auto* frame_owner_element =
DynamicTo<HTMLFrameOwnerElement>(source)) {
if (GetFrame() && GetFrame()->Tree().IsDescendantOf(
frame_owner_element->ContentFrame())) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kHierarchyRequestError,
"The node provided is a frame which contains this document.");
return nullptr;
}
}
if (source->parentNode()) {
source->parentNode()->RemoveChild(source, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return nullptr;
if (source->parentNode()) {
AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kJSMessageSource, mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kWarning,
ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("adoptNode", "Document",
"Unable to remove the "
"specified node from the "
"original parent.")));
return nullptr;
}
}
}
AdoptIfNeeded(*source);
return source;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 28,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_init_slot_table(struct nfs4_slot_table *tbl,
int max_slots, int ivalue)
{
struct nfs4_slot *slot;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
BUG_ON(max_slots > NFS4_MAX_SLOT_TABLE);
dprintk("--> %s: max_reqs=%u\n", __func__, max_slots);
slot = kcalloc(max_slots, sizeof(struct nfs4_slot), GFP_NOFS);
if (!slot)
goto out;
ret = 0;
spin_lock(&tbl->slot_tbl_lock);
tbl->max_slots = max_slots;
tbl->slots = slot;
tbl->highest_used_slotid = -1; /* no slot is currently used */
spin_unlock(&tbl->slot_tbl_lock);
dprintk("%s: tbl=%p slots=%p max_slots=%d\n", __func__,
tbl, tbl->slots, tbl->max_slots);
out:
dprintk("<-- %s: return %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::DuplicateContentsAt(int index) {
TabContentsWrapper* contents = GetTabContentsWrapperAt(index);
CHECK(contents);
TabContentsWrapper* contents_dupe = contents->Clone();
TabContents* new_contents = contents_dupe->tab_contents();
bool pinned = false;
if (CanSupportWindowFeature(FEATURE_TABSTRIP)) {
int index = tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->
GetIndexOfTabContents(contents);
pinned = tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->IsTabPinned(index);
int add_types = TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE |
TabStripModel::ADD_INHERIT_GROUP |
(pinned ? TabStripModel::ADD_PINNED : 0);
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->InsertTabContentsAt(index + 1,
contents_dupe,
add_types);
} else {
Browser* browser = NULL;
if (type_ & TYPE_APP) {
CHECK_EQ((type_ & TYPE_POPUP), 0);
CHECK_NE(type_, TYPE_APP_PANEL);
browser = Browser::CreateForApp(app_name_, gfx::Size(), profile_,
false);
} else if (type_ == TYPE_POPUP) {
browser = Browser::CreateForType(TYPE_POPUP, profile_);
}
BrowserWindow* new_window = browser->window();
new_window->SetBounds(gfx::Rect(new_window->GetRestoredBounds().origin(),
window()->GetRestoredBounds().size()));
browser->window()->Show();
browser->AddTab(contents_dupe, PageTransition::LINK);
}
if (profile_->HasSessionService()) {
SessionService* session_service = profile_->GetSessionService();
if (session_service)
session_service->TabRestored(&new_contents->controller(), pinned);
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void expire_client(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
unhash_client(clp);
nfsd4_client_record_remove(clp);
__destroy_client(clp);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 13,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int build_lut(int idx, mp_int* a, mp_int* modulus, mp_digit mp,
mp_int* mu)
{
int err;
unsigned x, y, bitlen, lut_gap;
mp_int tmp;
if (mp_init(&tmp) != MP_OKAY)
return GEN_MEM_ERR;
/* sanity check to make sure lut_order table is of correct size,
should compile out to a NOP if true */
if ((sizeof(lut_orders) / sizeof(lut_orders[0])) < (1U<<FP_LUT)) {
err = BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}
else {
/* get bitlen and round up to next multiple of FP_LUT */
bitlen = mp_unsigned_bin_size(modulus) << 3;
x = bitlen % FP_LUT;
if (x) {
bitlen += FP_LUT - x;
}
lut_gap = bitlen / FP_LUT;
/* init the mu */
err = mp_init_copy(&fp_cache[idx].mu, mu);
}
/* copy base */
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if ((mp_mulmod(fp_cache[idx].g->x, mu, modulus,
fp_cache[idx].LUT[1]->x) != MP_OKAY) ||
(mp_mulmod(fp_cache[idx].g->y, mu, modulus,
fp_cache[idx].LUT[1]->y) != MP_OKAY) ||
(mp_mulmod(fp_cache[idx].g->z, mu, modulus,
fp_cache[idx].LUT[1]->z) != MP_OKAY)) {
err = MP_MULMOD_E;
}
}
/* make all single bit entries */
for (x = 1; x < FP_LUT; x++) {
if (err != MP_OKAY)
break;
if ((mp_copy(fp_cache[idx].LUT[1<<(x-1)]->x,
fp_cache[idx].LUT[1<<x]->x) != MP_OKAY) ||
(mp_copy(fp_cache[idx].LUT[1<<(x-1)]->y,
fp_cache[idx].LUT[1<<x]->y) != MP_OKAY) ||
(mp_copy(fp_cache[idx].LUT[1<<(x-1)]->z,
fp_cache[idx].LUT[1<<x]->z) != MP_OKAY)){
err = MP_INIT_E;
break;
} else {
/* now double it bitlen/FP_LUT times */
for (y = 0; y < lut_gap; y++) {
if ((err = ecc_projective_dbl_point(fp_cache[idx].LUT[1<<x],
fp_cache[idx].LUT[1<<x], a, modulus, mp)) != MP_OKAY) {
break;
}
}
}
}
/* now make all entries in increase order of hamming weight */
for (x = 2; x <= FP_LUT; x++) {
if (err != MP_OKAY)
break;
for (y = 0; y < (1UL<<FP_LUT); y++) {
if (lut_orders[y].ham != (int)x) continue;
/* perform the add */
if ((err = ecc_projective_add_point(
fp_cache[idx].LUT[lut_orders[y].terma],
fp_cache[idx].LUT[lut_orders[y].termb],
fp_cache[idx].LUT[y], a, modulus, mp)) != MP_OKAY) {
break;
}
}
}
/* now map all entries back to affine space to make point addition faster */
for (x = 1; x < (1UL<<FP_LUT); x++) {
if (err != MP_OKAY)
break;
/* convert z to normal from montgomery */
err = mp_montgomery_reduce(fp_cache[idx].LUT[x]->z, modulus, mp);
/* invert it */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_invmod(fp_cache[idx].LUT[x]->z, modulus,
fp_cache[idx].LUT[x]->z);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
/* now square it */
err = mp_sqrmod(fp_cache[idx].LUT[x]->z, modulus, &tmp);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
/* fix x */
err = mp_mulmod(fp_cache[idx].LUT[x]->x, &tmp, modulus,
fp_cache[idx].LUT[x]->x);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
/* get 1/z^3 */
err = mp_mulmod(&tmp, fp_cache[idx].LUT[x]->z, modulus, &tmp);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
/* fix y */
err = mp_mulmod(fp_cache[idx].LUT[x]->y, &tmp, modulus,
fp_cache[idx].LUT[x]->y);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
/* free z */
mp_clear(fp_cache[idx].LUT[x]->z);
}
mp_clear(&tmp);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
return MP_OKAY;
/* err cleanup */
for (y = 0; y < (1U<<FP_LUT); y++) {
wc_ecc_del_point(fp_cache[idx].LUT[y]);
fp_cache[idx].LUT[y] = NULL;
}
wc_ecc_del_point(fp_cache[idx].g);
fp_cache[idx].g = NULL;
fp_cache[idx].lru_count = 0;
mp_clear(&fp_cache[idx].mu);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 17,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool QueryManager::BeginQuery(Query* query) {
DCHECK(query);
if (!RemovePendingQuery(query)) {
return false;
}
return query->Begin();
}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
R=jbauman@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleCompressedTexSubImage3D(
uint32_t immediate_data_size, const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const volatile gles2::cmds::CompressedTexSubImage3D& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::CompressedTexSubImage3D*>(
cmd_data);
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLint xoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.xoffset);
GLint yoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.yoffset);
GLint zoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.zoffset);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLsizei depth = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.depth);
GLenum format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.format);
GLsizei image_size = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.imageSize);
uint32_t data_shm_id = c.data_shm_id;
uint32_t data_shm_offset = c.data_shm_offset;
const void* data;
if (state_.bound_pixel_unpack_buffer.get()) {
if (data_shm_id) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
data = reinterpret_cast<const void*>(data_shm_offset);
} else {
if (!data_shm_id && data_shm_offset) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
data = GetSharedMemoryAs<const void*>(
data_shm_id, data_shm_offset, image_size);
}
return DoCompressedTexSubImage(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset,
width, height, depth, format, image_size,
data, ContextState::k3D);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 18,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_proc_access(struct inode *inode, struct nfs_access_entry *entry)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
struct nfs4_accessargs args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.bitmask = server->cache_consistency_bitmask,
};
struct nfs4_accessres res = {
.server = server,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_ACCESS],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
.rpc_cred = entry->cred,
};
int mode = entry->mask;
int status = 0;
/*
* Determine which access bits we want to ask for...
*/
if (mode & MAY_READ)
args.access |= NFS4_ACCESS_READ;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
args.access |= NFS4_ACCESS_MODIFY | NFS4_ACCESS_EXTEND | NFS4_ACCESS_DELETE;
if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
args.access |= NFS4_ACCESS_LOOKUP;
} else {
if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
args.access |= NFS4_ACCESS_MODIFY | NFS4_ACCESS_EXTEND;
if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
args.access |= NFS4_ACCESS_EXECUTE;
}
res.fattr = nfs_alloc_fattr();
if (res.fattr == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
status = nfs4_call_sync(server->client, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (!status) {
nfs_access_set_mask(entry, res.access);
nfs_refresh_inode(inode, res.fattr);
}
nfs_free_fattr(res.fattr);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rdma_destroy_id(struct rdma_cm_id *id)
{
struct rdma_id_private *id_priv;
enum rdma_cm_state state;
id_priv = container_of(id, struct rdma_id_private, id);
state = cma_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING);
cma_cancel_operation(id_priv, state);
/*
* Wait for any active callback to finish. New callbacks will find
* the id_priv state set to destroying and abort.
*/
mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
if (id_priv->cma_dev) {
switch (rdma_node_get_transport(id_priv->id.device->node_type)) {
case RDMA_TRANSPORT_IB:
if (id_priv->cm_id.ib)
ib_destroy_cm_id(id_priv->cm_id.ib);
break;
case RDMA_TRANSPORT_IWARP:
if (id_priv->cm_id.iw)
iw_destroy_cm_id(id_priv->cm_id.iw);
break;
default:
break;
}
cma_leave_mc_groups(id_priv);
cma_release_dev(id_priv);
}
cma_release_port(id_priv);
cma_deref_id(id_priv);
wait_for_completion(&id_priv->comp);
if (id_priv->internal_id)
cma_deref_id(id_priv->id.context);
kfree(id_priv->id.route.path_rec);
kfree(id_priv);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<Resource> ResourceTracker::GetResource(PP_Resource res) const {
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(res, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE))
<< res << " is not a PP_Resource.";
ResourceMap::const_iterator result = live_resources_.find(res);
if (result == live_resources_.end()) {
return scoped_refptr<Resource>();
}
return result->second.first;
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void reset()
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < createNotifications.size(); ++i)
delete createNotifications[i];
for (size_t i = 0; i < releaseNotifications.size(); ++i)
delete releaseNotifications[i];
createNotifications.clear();
releaseNotifications.clear();
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int atusb_write_subreg(struct atusb *atusb, uint8_t reg, uint8_t mask,
uint8_t shift, uint8_t value)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = atusb->usb_dev;
uint8_t orig, tmp;
int ret = 0;
dev_dbg(&usb_dev->dev, "atusb_write_subreg: 0x%02x <- 0x%02x\n",
reg, value);
orig = atusb_read_reg(atusb, reg);
/* Write the value only into that part of the register which is allowed
* by the mask. All other bits stay as before.
*/
tmp = orig & ~mask;
tmp |= (value << shift) & mask;
if (tmp != orig)
ret = atusb_write_reg(atusb, reg, tmp);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *Com_StringContains(char *str1, char *str2, int casesensitive) {
int len, i, j;
len = strlen(str1) - strlen(str2);
for (i = 0; i <= len; i++, str1++) {
for (j = 0; str2[j]; j++) {
if (casesensitive) {
if (str1[j] != str2[j]) {
break;
}
}
else {
if (toupper(str1[j]) != toupper(str2[j])) {
break;
}
}
}
if (!str2[j]) {
return str1;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 13,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageCopyResampled (gdImagePtr dst,
gdImagePtr src,
int dstX, int dstY,
int srcX, int srcY,
int dstW, int dstH, int srcW, int srcH)
{
int x, y;
if (!dst->trueColor) {
gdImageCopyResized (dst, src, dstX, dstY, srcX, srcY, dstW, dstH, srcW, srcH);
return;
}
for (y = dstY; (y < dstY + dstH); y++) {
for (x = dstX; (x < dstX + dstW); x++) {
float sy1, sy2, sx1, sx2;
float sx, sy;
float spixels = 0.0;
float red = 0.0, green = 0.0, blue = 0.0, alpha = 0.0;
float alpha_factor, alpha_sum = 0.0, contrib_sum = 0.0;
sy1 = ((float)(y - dstY)) * (float)srcH / (float)dstH;
sy2 = ((float)(y + 1 - dstY)) * (float) srcH / (float) dstH;
sy = sy1;
do {
float yportion;
if (floorf(sy) == floorf(sy1)) {
yportion = 1.0 - (sy - floorf(sy));
if (yportion > sy2 - sy1) {
yportion = sy2 - sy1;
}
sy = floorf(sy);
} else if (sy == floorf(sy2)) {
yportion = sy2 - floorf(sy2);
} else {
yportion = 1.0;
}
sx1 = ((float)(x - dstX)) * (float) srcW / dstW;
sx2 = ((float)(x + 1 - dstX)) * (float) srcW / dstW;
sx = sx1;
do {
float xportion;
float pcontribution;
int p;
if (floorf(sx) == floorf(sx1)) {
xportion = 1.0 - (sx - floorf(sx));
if (xportion > sx2 - sx1) {
xportion = sx2 - sx1;
}
sx = floorf(sx);
} else if (sx == floorf(sx2)) {
xportion = sx2 - floorf(sx2);
} else {
xportion = 1.0;
}
pcontribution = xportion * yportion;
p = gdImageGetTrueColorPixel(src, (int) sx + srcX, (int) sy + srcY);
alpha_factor = ((gdAlphaMax - gdTrueColorGetAlpha(p))) * pcontribution;
red += gdTrueColorGetRed (p) * alpha_factor;
green += gdTrueColorGetGreen (p) * alpha_factor;
blue += gdTrueColorGetBlue (p) * alpha_factor;
alpha += gdTrueColorGetAlpha (p) * pcontribution;
alpha_sum += alpha_factor;
contrib_sum += pcontribution;
spixels += xportion * yportion;
sx += 1.0;
}
while (sx < sx2);
sy += 1.0f;
}
while (sy < sy2);
if (spixels != 0.0) {
red /= spixels;
green /= spixels;
blue /= spixels;
alpha /= spixels;
}
if ( alpha_sum != 0.0) {
if( contrib_sum != 0.0) {
alpha_sum /= contrib_sum;
}
red /= alpha_sum;
green /= alpha_sum;
blue /= alpha_sum;
}
/* Clamping to allow for rounding errors above */
if (red > 255.0) {
red = 255.0;
}
if (green > 255.0) {
green = 255.0;
}
if (blue > 255.0f) {
blue = 255.0;
}
if (alpha > gdAlphaMax) {
alpha = gdAlphaMax;
}
gdImageSetPixel(dst, x, y, gdTrueColorAlpha ((int) red, (int) green, (int) blue, (int) alpha));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Splash::setTransfer(Guchar *red, Guchar *green, Guchar *blue,
Guchar *gray) {
state->setTransfer(red, green, blue, gray);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ihevcd_update_function_ptr(codec_t *ps_codec)
{
/* Init inter pred function array */
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[0] = NULL;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[1] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_luma_copy_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[2] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_luma_vert_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[3] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_luma_horz_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[4] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_luma_horz_w16out_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[5] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_luma_copy_w16out_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[6] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_luma_vert_w16out_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[7] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_luma_horz_w16out_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[8] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_luma_horz_w16out_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[9] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_luma_vert_w16inp_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[10] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_luma_vert_w16inp_w16out_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[11] = NULL;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[12] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_chroma_copy_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[13] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_chroma_vert_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[14] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_chroma_horz_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[15] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_chroma_horz_w16out_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[16] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_chroma_copy_w16out_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[17] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_chroma_vert_w16out_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[18] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_chroma_horz_w16out_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[19] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_chroma_horz_w16out_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[20] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_chroma_vert_w16inp_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_inter_pred[21] = (pf_inter_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_inter_pred_chroma_vert_w16inp_w16out_fptr;
/* Init intra pred function array */
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_luma[0] = (pf_intra_pred)NULL;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_luma[1] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_luma_planar_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_luma[2] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_luma_dc_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_luma[3] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_luma_mode2_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_luma[4] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_luma_mode_3_to_9_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_luma[5] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_luma_horz_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_luma[6] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_luma_mode_11_to_17_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_luma[7] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_luma_mode_18_34_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_luma[8] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_luma_mode_19_to_25_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_luma[9] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_luma_ver_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_luma[10] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_luma_mode_27_to_33_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_chroma[0] = (pf_intra_pred)NULL;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_chroma[1] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_chroma_planar_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_chroma[2] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_chroma_dc_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_chroma[3] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_chroma_mode2_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_chroma[4] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_chroma_mode_3_to_9_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_chroma[5] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_chroma_horz_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_chroma[6] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_chroma_mode_11_to_17_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_chroma[7] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_chroma_mode_18_34_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_chroma[8] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_chroma_mode_19_to_25_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_chroma[9] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_chroma_ver_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_intra_pred_chroma[10] = (pf_intra_pred)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_intra_pred_chroma_mode_27_to_33_fptr;
/* Init itrans_recon function array */
ps_codec->apf_itrans_recon[0] = (pf_itrans_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_itrans_recon_4x4_ttype1_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_itrans_recon[1] = (pf_itrans_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_itrans_recon_4x4_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_itrans_recon[2] = (pf_itrans_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_itrans_recon_8x8_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_itrans_recon[3] = (pf_itrans_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_itrans_recon_16x16_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_itrans_recon[4] = (pf_itrans_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_itrans_recon_32x32_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_itrans_recon[5] = (pf_itrans_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_chroma_itrans_recon_4x4_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_itrans_recon[6] = (pf_itrans_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_chroma_itrans_recon_8x8_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_itrans_recon[7] = (pf_itrans_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_chroma_itrans_recon_16x16_fptr;
/* Init recon function array */
ps_codec->apf_recon[0] = (pf_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_recon_4x4_ttype1_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_recon[1] = (pf_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_recon_4x4_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_recon[2] = (pf_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_recon_8x8_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_recon[3] = (pf_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_recon_16x16_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_recon[4] = (pf_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_recon_32x32_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_recon[5] = (pf_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_chroma_recon_4x4_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_recon[6] = (pf_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_chroma_recon_8x8_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_recon[7] = (pf_recon)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_chroma_recon_16x16_fptr;
/* Init itrans_recon_dc function array */
ps_codec->apf_itrans_recon_dc[0] = (pf_itrans_recon_dc)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevcd_itrans_recon_dc_luma_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_itrans_recon_dc[1] = (pf_itrans_recon_dc)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevcd_itrans_recon_dc_chroma_fptr;
/* Init sao function array */
ps_codec->apf_sao_luma[0] = (pf_sao_luma)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_sao_edge_offset_class0_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_sao_luma[1] = (pf_sao_luma)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_sao_edge_offset_class1_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_sao_luma[2] = (pf_sao_luma)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_sao_edge_offset_class2_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_sao_luma[3] = (pf_sao_luma)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_sao_edge_offset_class3_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_sao_chroma[0] = (pf_sao_chroma)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_sao_edge_offset_class0_chroma_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_sao_chroma[1] = (pf_sao_chroma)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_sao_edge_offset_class1_chroma_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_sao_chroma[2] = (pf_sao_chroma)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_sao_edge_offset_class2_chroma_fptr;
ps_codec->apf_sao_chroma[3] = (pf_sao_chroma)ps_codec->s_func_selector.ihevc_sao_edge_offset_class3_chroma_fptr;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle ps_codec_obj memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for ps_codec_obj fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68299873
Test: before/after with always-failing malloc
Change-Id: I5e6c07b147b13df81e65476851662d4b55d33b83
(cherry picked from commit a966e2a65dd901151ce7f4481d0084840c9a0f7e)
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 0 | 7,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::DidStartLoading() {
is_loading_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::DispatchDidClearWindowObjectInMainWorld() {
DCHECK(frame_->GetDocument());
if (!frame_->GetDocument()->CanExecuteScripts(kNotAboutToExecuteScript))
return;
if (dispatching_did_clear_window_object_in_main_world_)
return;
AutoReset<bool> in_did_clear_window_object(
&dispatching_did_clear_window_object_in_main_world_, true);
Client()->DispatchDidClearWindowObjectInMainWorld();
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 24,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void splice_shrink_spd(struct splice_pipe_desc *spd)
{
if (spd->nr_pages_max <= PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS)
return;
kfree(spd->pages);
kfree(spd->partial);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 3,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::GenPathsCHROMIUMHelper(GLuint first_client_id,
GLsizei range) {
GLuint last_client_id;
if (!SafeAddUint32(first_client_id, range - 1, &last_client_id))
return false;
if (path_manager()->HasPathsInRange(first_client_id, last_client_id))
return false;
GLuint first_service_id = api()->glGenPathsNVFn(range);
if (first_service_id == 0) {
return false;
}
DCHECK(first_service_id + range - 1 >= first_service_id);
path_manager()->CreatePathRange(first_client_id, last_client_id,
first_service_id);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold void jpg_free_context(JPGContext *ctx)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
ff_free_vlc(&ctx->dc_vlc[i]);
ff_free_vlc(&ctx->ac_vlc[i]);
}
av_freep(&ctx->buf);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/g2meet: Fix framebuf size
Currently the code can in some cases draw tiles that hang outside the
allocated buffer. This patch increases the buffer size to avoid out
of array accesses. An alternative would be to fail if such tiles are
encountered.
I do not know if any valid files use such hanging tiles.
Fixes Ticket2971
Found-by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void task_mem(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
unsigned long data, text, lib, swap, ptes, pmds;
unsigned long hiwater_vm, total_vm, hiwater_rss, total_rss;
/*
* Note: to minimize their overhead, mm maintains hiwater_vm and
* hiwater_rss only when about to *lower* total_vm or rss. Any
* collector of these hiwater stats must therefore get total_vm
* and rss too, which will usually be the higher. Barriers? not
* worth the effort, such snapshots can always be inconsistent.
*/
hiwater_vm = total_vm = mm->total_vm;
if (hiwater_vm < mm->hiwater_vm)
hiwater_vm = mm->hiwater_vm;
hiwater_rss = total_rss = get_mm_rss(mm);
if (hiwater_rss < mm->hiwater_rss)
hiwater_rss = mm->hiwater_rss;
data = mm->total_vm - mm->shared_vm - mm->stack_vm;
text = (PAGE_ALIGN(mm->end_code) - (mm->start_code & PAGE_MASK)) >> 10;
lib = (mm->exec_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10)) - text;
swap = get_mm_counter(mm, MM_SWAPENTS);
ptes = PTRS_PER_PTE * sizeof(pte_t) * atomic_long_read(&mm->nr_ptes);
pmds = PTRS_PER_PMD * sizeof(pmd_t) * mm_nr_pmds(mm);
seq_printf(m,
"VmPeak:\t%8lu kB\n"
"VmSize:\t%8lu kB\n"
"VmLck:\t%8lu kB\n"
"VmPin:\t%8lu kB\n"
"VmHWM:\t%8lu kB\n"
"VmRSS:\t%8lu kB\n"
"VmData:\t%8lu kB\n"
"VmStk:\t%8lu kB\n"
"VmExe:\t%8lu kB\n"
"VmLib:\t%8lu kB\n"
"VmPTE:\t%8lu kB\n"
"VmPMD:\t%8lu kB\n"
"VmSwap:\t%8lu kB\n",
hiwater_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
total_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
mm->locked_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
mm->pinned_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
hiwater_rss << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
total_rss << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
data << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
mm->stack_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10), text, lib,
ptes >> 10,
pmds >> 10,
swap << (PAGE_SHIFT-10));
}
Commit Message: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::InsertDeletableResponseIds(
const std::vector<int64_t>& response_ids) {
static const char kSql[] =
"INSERT INTO DeletableResponseIds (response_id) VALUES (?)";
return RunCachedStatementWithIds(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql, response_ids);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Point BrowserView::OffsetPointForToolbarBackgroundImage(
const gfx::Point& point) const {
gfx::Point window_point(point + GetMirroredPosition().OffsetFromOrigin());
window_point.Offset(frame_->GetThemeBackgroundXInset(),
-frame_->GetTabStripInsets(false).top);
return window_point;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CreateContextProviderOnMainThread(
ContextProviderCreationInfo* creation_info,
base::WaitableEvent* waitable_event) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
*creation_info->using_gpu_compositing =
!Platform::Current()->IsGpuCompositingDisabled();
creation_info->created_context_provider =
Platform::Current()->CreateOffscreenGraphicsContext3DProvider(
creation_info->context_attributes, creation_info->url,
creation_info->gl_info);
waitable_event->Signal();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 22,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ib_uverbs_release_async_event_file(struct kref *ref)
{
struct ib_uverbs_async_event_file *file =
container_of(ref, struct ib_uverbs_async_event_file, ref);
kfree(file);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 15,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::UserGestureDone() {
OnUserInteraction(GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget(),
blink::WebInputEvent::kUndefined);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadPNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
MngInfo
*mng_info;
char
magic_number[MaxTextExtent];
ssize_t
count;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Enter ReadPNGImage()");
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
mng_info=(MngInfo *) NULL;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile");
/*
Verify PNG signature.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (count < 8 || memcmp(magic_number,"\211PNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Allocate a MngInfo structure.
*/
mng_info=(MngInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(MngInfo));
if (mng_info == (MngInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize members of the MngInfo structure.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(mng_info,0,sizeof(MngInfo));
mng_info->image=image;
image=ReadOnePNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
mng_info=MngInfoFreeStruct(mng_info);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error.");
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
if ((IssRGBColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
((image->gamma < .45) || (image->gamma > .46)) &&
!(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x>0.6399f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x<0.6401f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y>0.3299f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y<0.3301f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x>0.2999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x<0.3001f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y>0.5999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y<0.6001f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x>0.1499f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x<0.1501f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y>0.0599f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y<0.0601f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x>0.3126f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x<0.3128f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y>0.3289f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y<0.3291f))
SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" page.w: %.20g, page.h: %.20g,page.x: %.20g, page.y: %.20g.",
(double) image->page.width,(double) image->page.height,
(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"exit ReadPNGImage()");
return(image);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 1 | 9,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int _yr_emit_inst_arg_uint16(
RE_EMIT_CONTEXT* emit_context,
uint8_t opcode,
uint16_t argument,
uint8_t** instruction_addr,
uint16_t** argument_addr,
int* code_size)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&opcode,
sizeof(uint8_t),
(void**) instruction_addr));
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&argument,
sizeof(uint16_t),
(void**) argument_addr));
*code_size = sizeof(uint8_t) + sizeof(uint16_t);
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #646 (#648)
* Fix issue #646 and some edge cases with wide regexps using \b and \B
* Rename function IS_WORD_CHAR to _yr_re_is_word_char
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 20,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void paravirt_start_context_switch(struct task_struct *prev)
{
BUG_ON(preemptible());
if (this_cpu_read(paravirt_lazy_mode) == PARAVIRT_LAZY_MMU) {
arch_leave_lazy_mmu_mode();
set_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(prev), TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES);
}
enter_lazy(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU);
}
Commit Message: x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests
Nadav reported that on guests we're failing to rewrite the indirect
calls to CALLEE_SAVE paravirt functions. In particular the
pv_queued_spin_unlock() call is left unpatched and that is all over the
place. This obviously wrecks Spectre-v2 mitigation (for paravirt
guests) which relies on not actually having indirect calls around.
The reason is an incorrect clobber test in paravirt_patch_call(); this
function rewrites an indirect call with a direct call to the _SAME_
function, there is no possible way the clobbers can be different
because of this.
Therefore remove this clobber check. Also put WARNs on the other patch
failure case (not enough room for the instruction) which I've not seen
trigger in my (limited) testing.
Three live kernel image disassemblies for lock_sock_nested (as a small
function that illustrates the problem nicely). PRE is the current
situation for guests, POST is with this patch applied and NATIVE is with
or without the patch for !guests.
PRE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq *0xffffffff822299e8
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
POST:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq 0xffffffff810a0c20 <__raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock>
0xffffffff817be9a5 <+53>: xchg %ax,%ax
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063aa0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
NATIVE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: movb $0x0,(%rdi)
0xffffffff817be9a3 <+51>: nopl 0x0(%rax)
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
Fixes: 63f70270ccd9 ("[PATCH] i386: PARAVIRT: add common patching machinery")
Fixes: 3010a0663fd9 ("x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls")
Reported-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 24,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __ftrace_function_set_filter(int filter, char *buf, int len,
struct function_filter_data *data)
{
int i, re_cnt, ret = -EINVAL;
int *reset;
char **re;
reset = filter ? &data->first_filter : &data->first_notrace;
/*
* The 'ip' field could have multiple filters set, separated
* either by space or comma. We first cut the filter and apply
* all pieces separatelly.
*/
re = ftrace_function_filter_re(buf, len, &re_cnt);
if (!re)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < re_cnt; i++) {
ret = ftrace_function_set_regexp(data->ops, filter, *reset,
re[i], strlen(re[i]));
if (ret)
break;
if (*reset)
*reset = 0;
}
argv_free(re);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 25,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int do_sigaction(int sig, struct k_sigaction *act, struct k_sigaction *oact)
{
struct task_struct *t = current;
struct k_sigaction *k;
sigset_t mask;
if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1 || (act && sig_kernel_only(sig)))
return -EINVAL;
k = &t->sighand->action[sig-1];
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
if (oact)
*oact = *k;
if (act) {
sigdelsetmask(&act->sa.sa_mask,
sigmask(SIGKILL) | sigmask(SIGSTOP));
*k = *act;
/*
* POSIX 3.3.1.3:
* "Setting a signal action to SIG_IGN for a signal that is
* pending shall cause the pending signal to be discarded,
* whether or not it is blocked."
*
* "Setting a signal action to SIG_DFL for a signal that is
* pending and whose default action is to ignore the signal
* (for example, SIGCHLD), shall cause the pending signal to
* be discarded, whether or not it is blocked"
*/
if (sig_handler_ignored(sig_handler(t, sig), sig)) {
sigemptyset(&mask);
sigaddset(&mask, sig);
rm_from_queue_full(&mask, &t->signal->shared_pending);
do {
rm_from_queue_full(&mask, &t->pending);
t = next_thread(t);
} while (t != current);
}
}
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: irc_server_search_option (const char *option_name)
{
int i;
if (!option_name)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < IRC_SERVER_NUM_OPTIONS; i++)
{
if (weechat_strcasecmp (irc_server_option_string[i],
option_name) == 0)
return i;
}
/* server option not found */
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackendIO::OpenNextEntry(Rankings::Iterator* iterator,
Entry** next_entry) {
operation_ = OP_OPEN_NEXT;
iterator_ = iterator;
entry_ptr_ = next_entry;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mmu_page_add_parent_pte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, u64 *parent_pte)
{
if (!parent_pte)
return;
pte_list_add(vcpu, parent_pte, &sp->parent_ptes);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int add_metadata_from_side_data(AVPacket *avpkt, AVFrame *frame)
{
int size;
const uint8_t *side_metadata;
AVDictionary **frame_md = avpriv_frame_get_metadatap(frame);
side_metadata = av_packet_get_side_data(avpkt,
AV_PKT_DATA_STRINGS_METADATA, &size);
return av_packet_unpack_dictionary(side_metadata, size, frame_md);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 27,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Dispatcher::Dispatcher(DispatcherDelegate* delegate)
: delegate_(delegate),
content_watcher_(new ContentWatcher()),
source_map_(&ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance()),
v8_schema_registry_(new V8SchemaRegistry),
user_script_set_manager_observer_(this),
webrequest_used_(false) {
const base::CommandLine& command_line =
*(base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess());
set_idle_notifications_ =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kExtensionProcess) ||
command_line.HasSwitch(::switches::kSingleProcess);
if (set_idle_notifications_) {
RenderThread::Get()->SetIdleNotificationDelayInMs(
kInitialExtensionIdleHandlerDelayMs);
}
script_context_set_.reset(new ScriptContextSet(&active_extension_ids_));
user_script_set_manager_.reset(new UserScriptSetManager());
script_injection_manager_.reset(
new ScriptInjectionManager(user_script_set_manager_.get()));
user_script_set_manager_observer_.Add(user_script_set_manager_.get());
request_sender_.reset(new RequestSender(this));
PopulateSourceMap();
WakeEventPage::Get()->Init(RenderThread::Get());
RenderThread::Get()->RegisterExtension(SafeBuiltins::CreateV8Extension());
using RegisterFunction = void (*)(const WebString&);
RegisterFunction register_functions[] = {
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsSecure,
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsCORSEnabled,
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsBypassingContentSecurityPolicy,
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsSupportingFetchAPI,
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsFirstPartyWhenTopLevel,
};
WebString extension_scheme(base::ASCIIToUTF16(kExtensionScheme));
WebString extension_resource_scheme(base::ASCIIToUTF16(
kExtensionResourceScheme));
for (RegisterFunction func : register_functions) {
func(extension_scheme);
func(extension_resource_scheme);
}
if (set_idle_notifications_) {
forced_idle_timer_.reset(new base::RepeatingTimer);
forced_idle_timer_->Start(
FROM_HERE,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kMaxExtensionIdleHandlerDelayMs),
RenderThread::Get(),
&RenderThread::IdleHandler);
}
for (const std::string& extension_id : active_extension_ids_) {
const Extension* extension =
RendererExtensionRegistry::Get()->GetByID(extension_id);
CHECK(extension);
InitOriginPermissions(extension);
}
EnableCustomElementWhiteList();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 28,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nicklist_destroy(CHANNEL_REC *channel, NICK_REC *nick)
{
signal_emit("nicklist remove", 2, channel, nick);
if (channel->ownnick == nick)
channel->ownnick = NULL;
/*MODULE_DATA_DEINIT(nick);*/
g_free(nick->nick);
g_free_not_null(nick->realname);
g_free_not_null(nick->host);
g_free(nick);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,610 |
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