instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ContentBrowserClient::GetExternalBrowserPpapiHost(int plugin_process_id) {
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_buf_ioerror(
xfs_buf_t *bp,
int error)
{
ASSERT(error >= 0 && error <= 0xffff);
bp->b_error = (unsigned short)error;
trace_xfs_buf_ioerror(bp, error, _RET_IP_);
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::setShadowColor(const String& color_string) {
Color color;
if (!ParseColorOrCurrentColor(color, color_string))
return;
if (GetState().ShadowColor() == color)
return;
ModifiableState().SetShadowColor(color.Rgb());
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::ScrollFocusedEditableElementIntoRect(
const gfx::Rect& rect) {
blink::WebAutofillClient* autofill_client = frame_->AutofillClient();
if (has_scrolled_focused_editable_node_into_rect_ &&
rect == rect_for_scrolled_focused_editable_node_ && autofill_client) {
autofill_client->DidCompleteFocusChangeInFrame();
return;
}
if (!frame_->LocalRoot()
->FrameWidget()
->ScrollFocusedEditableElementIntoView()) {
return;
}
rect_for_scrolled_focused_editable_node_ = rect;
has_scrolled_focused_editable_node_into_rect_ = true;
if (!GetRenderWidget()->layer_tree_view()->HasPendingPageScaleAnimation() &&
autofill_client) {
autofill_client->DidCompleteFocusChangeInFrame();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetFilterActions(FileMetricsProvider::Params* params,
const FileMetricsProvider::FilterAction* actions,
size_t count) {
filter_actions_ = actions;
filter_actions_remaining_ = count;
params->filter = base::Bind(&FileMetricsProviderTest::FilterSourcePath,
base::Unretained(this));
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ProfileDependencyManager::AssertFactoriesBuilt() {
if (built_factories_)
return;
#if defined(ENABLE_BACKGROUND)
BackgroundContentsServiceFactory::GetInstance();
#endif
BookmarkModelFactory::GetInstance();
#if defined(ENABLE_CAPTIVE_PORTAL_DETECTION)
captive_portal::CaptivePortalServiceFactory::GetInstance();
#endif
ChromeURLDataManagerFactory::GetInstance();
#if defined(ENABLE_PRINTING)
CloudPrintProxyServiceFactory::GetInstance();
#endif
CookieSettings::Factory::GetInstance();
#if defined(ENABLE_NOTIFICATIONS)
DesktopNotificationServiceFactory::GetInstance();
#endif
DownloadServiceFactory::GetInstance();
#if defined(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
extensions::AppRestoreServiceFactory::GetInstance();
extensions::BluetoothAPIFactory::GetInstance();
extensions::CommandServiceFactory::GetInstance();
extensions::CookiesAPIFactory::GetInstance();
extensions::ExtensionSystemFactory::GetInstance();
extensions::FontSettingsAPIFactory::GetInstance();
extensions::IdleManagerFactory::GetInstance();
extensions::ManagedModeAPIFactory::GetInstance();
extensions::ProcessesAPIFactory::GetInstance();
extensions::SuggestedLinksRegistryFactory::GetInstance();
extensions::TabCaptureRegistryFactory::GetInstance();
extensions::WebNavigationAPIFactory::GetInstance();
ExtensionManagementAPIFactory::GetInstance();
#endif
FaviconServiceFactory::GetInstance();
FindBarStateFactory::GetInstance();
#if defined(USE_AURA)
GesturePrefsObserverFactoryAura::GetInstance();
#endif
GlobalErrorServiceFactory::GetInstance();
GoogleURLTrackerFactory::GetInstance();
HistoryServiceFactory::GetInstance();
MediaGalleriesPreferencesFactory::GetInstance();
NTPResourceCacheFactory::GetInstance();
PasswordStoreFactory::GetInstance();
PersonalDataManagerFactory::GetInstance();
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
PinnedTabServiceFactory::GetInstance();
#endif
PluginPrefsFactory::GetInstance();
#if defined(ENABLE_CONFIGURATION_POLICY) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
policy::UserPolicySigninServiceFactory::GetInstance();
#endif
predictors::AutocompleteActionPredictorFactory::GetInstance();
predictors::PredictorDatabaseFactory::GetInstance();
predictors::ResourcePrefetchPredictorFactory::GetInstance();
prerender::PrerenderManagerFactory::GetInstance();
prerender::PrerenderLinkManagerFactory::GetInstance();
ProfileSyncServiceFactory::GetInstance();
ProtocolHandlerRegistryFactory::GetInstance();
#if defined(ENABLE_PROTECTOR_SERVICE)
protector::ProtectorServiceFactory::GetInstance();
#endif
#if defined(ENABLE_SESSION_SERVICE)
SessionServiceFactory::GetInstance();
#endif
ShortcutsBackendFactory::GetInstance();
ThumbnailServiceFactory::GetInstance();
SigninManagerFactory::GetInstance();
#if defined(ENABLE_INPUT_SPEECH)
SpeechInputExtensionManager::InitializeFactory();
ChromeSpeechRecognitionPreferences::InitializeFactory();
#endif
SpellcheckServiceFactory::GetInstance();
TabRestoreServiceFactory::GetInstance();
TemplateURLFetcherFactory::GetInstance();
TemplateURLServiceFactory::GetInstance();
#if defined(ENABLE_THEMES)
ThemeServiceFactory::GetInstance();
#endif
TokenServiceFactory::GetInstance();
UserStyleSheetWatcherFactory::GetInstance();
VisitedLinkMasterFactory::GetInstance();
WebDataServiceFactory::GetInstance();
#if defined(ENABLE_WEB_INTENTS)
WebIntentsRegistryFactory::GetInstance();
#endif
built_factories_ = true;
}
Commit Message: DIAL (Discovery and Launch protocol) extension API skeleton.
This implements the skeleton for a new Chrome extension API for local device discovery. The API will first be restricted to whitelisted extensions only. The API will allow extensions to receive events from a DIAL service running within Chrome which notifies of devices being discovered on the local network.
Spec available here:
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/14FI-VKWrsMG7pIy3trgM3ybnKS-o5TULkt8itiBNXlQ/edit
BUG=163288
TBR=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11444020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@172243 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 21,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void flush_packet(vorb *f)
{
while (get8_packet_raw(f) != EOP);
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: auth_compute_signature(struct sc_card *card, const unsigned char *in, size_t ilen,
unsigned char * out, size_t olen)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char resp[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
int rv;
if (!card || !in || !out) {
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
}
else if (ilen > 96) {
sc_log(card->ctx,
"Illegal input length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
ilen);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS, "Illegal input length");
}
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
sc_log(card->ctx,
"inlen %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u, outlen %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
ilen, olen);
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT, 0x2A, 0x9E, 0x9A);
apdu.datalen = ilen;
apdu.data = in;
apdu.lc = ilen;
apdu.le = olen > 256 ? 256 : olen;
apdu.resp = resp;
apdu.resplen = olen;
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "Compute signature failed");
if (apdu.resplen > olen) {
sc_log(card->ctx,
"Compute signature failed: invalid response length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
apdu.resplen);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_CARD_CMD_FAILED);
}
memcpy(out, apdu.resp, apdu.resplen);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, apdu.resplen);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 21,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MockContentSettingsClient::allowAutoplay(bool default_value) {
return default_value || flags_->autoplay_allowed();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 1,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bta_av_rc_disc_done(UNUSED_ATTR tBTA_AV_DATA* p_data) {
tBTA_AV_CB* p_cb = &bta_av_cb;
tBTA_AV_SCB* p_scb = NULL;
tBTA_AV_LCB* p_lcb;
uint8_t rc_handle;
tBTA_AV_FEAT peer_features = 0; /* peer features mask */
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: bta_av_rc_disc_done disc:x%x", __func__, p_cb->disc);
if (!p_cb->disc) {
return;
}
if ((p_cb->disc & BTA_AV_CHNL_MSK) == BTA_AV_CHNL_MSK) {
/* this is the rc handle/index to tBTA_AV_RCB */
rc_handle = p_cb->disc & (~BTA_AV_CHNL_MSK);
} else {
/* Validate array index*/
if (((p_cb->disc & BTA_AV_HNDL_MSK) - 1) < BTA_AV_NUM_STRS) {
p_scb = p_cb->p_scb[(p_cb->disc & BTA_AV_HNDL_MSK) - 1];
}
if (p_scb) {
rc_handle = p_scb->rc_handle;
} else {
p_cb->disc = 0;
return;
}
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: rc_handle %d", __func__, rc_handle);
#if (BTA_AV_SINK_INCLUDED == TRUE)
if (p_cb->sdp_a2dp_snk_handle) {
/* This is Sink + CT + TG(Abs Vol) */
peer_features =
bta_avk_check_peer_features(UUID_SERVCLASS_AV_REM_CTRL_TARGET);
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: populating rem ctrl target features %d", __func__,
peer_features);
if (BTA_AV_FEAT_ADV_CTRL &
bta_avk_check_peer_features(UUID_SERVCLASS_AV_REMOTE_CONTROL))
peer_features |= (BTA_AV_FEAT_ADV_CTRL | BTA_AV_FEAT_RCCT);
} else
#endif
if (p_cb->sdp_a2dp_handle) {
/* check peer version and whether support CT and TG role */
peer_features =
bta_av_check_peer_features(UUID_SERVCLASS_AV_REMOTE_CONTROL);
if ((p_cb->features & BTA_AV_FEAT_ADV_CTRL) &&
((peer_features & BTA_AV_FEAT_ADV_CTRL) == 0)) {
/* if we support advance control and peer does not, check their support on
* TG role
* some implementation uses 1.3 on CT ans 1.4 on TG */
peer_features |=
bta_av_check_peer_features(UUID_SERVCLASS_AV_REM_CTRL_TARGET);
}
/* Change our features if the remote AVRCP version is 1.3 or less */
tSDP_DISC_REC* p_rec = nullptr;
p_rec = SDP_FindServiceInDb(p_cb->p_disc_db,
UUID_SERVCLASS_AV_REMOTE_CONTROL, p_rec);
if (p_rec != NULL &&
SDP_FindAttributeInRec(p_rec, ATTR_ID_BT_PROFILE_DESC_LIST) != NULL) {
/* get profile version (if failure, version parameter is not updated) */
uint16_t peer_rc_version = 0xFFFF; // Don't change the AVRCP version
SDP_FindProfileVersionInRec(p_rec, UUID_SERVCLASS_AV_REMOTE_CONTROL,
&peer_rc_version);
if (peer_rc_version <= AVRC_REV_1_3) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Using AVRCP 1.3 Capabilities with remote device",
__func__);
p_bta_av_cfg = &bta_av_cfg_compatibility;
}
}
}
p_cb->disc = 0;
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&p_cb->p_disc_db);
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: peer_features 0x%x, features 0x%x", __func__,
peer_features, p_cb->features);
/* if we have no rc connection */
if (rc_handle == BTA_AV_RC_HANDLE_NONE) {
if (p_scb) {
/* if peer remote control service matches ours and USE_RC is true */
if ((((p_cb->features & BTA_AV_FEAT_RCCT) &&
(peer_features & BTA_AV_FEAT_RCTG)) ||
((p_cb->features & BTA_AV_FEAT_RCTG) &&
(peer_features & BTA_AV_FEAT_RCCT)))) {
p_lcb = bta_av_find_lcb(p_scb->PeerAddress(), BTA_AV_LCB_FIND);
if (p_lcb) {
rc_handle = bta_av_rc_create(p_cb, AVCT_INT,
(uint8_t)(p_scb->hdi + 1), p_lcb->lidx);
p_cb->rcb[rc_handle].peer_features = peer_features;
} else {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: can not find LCB!!", __func__);
}
} else if (p_scb->use_rc) {
/* can not find AVRC on peer device. report failure */
p_scb->use_rc = false;
tBTA_AV_RC_OPEN rc_open;
rc_open.peer_addr = p_scb->PeerAddress();
rc_open.peer_features = 0;
rc_open.status = BTA_AV_FAIL_SDP;
tBTA_AV bta_av_data;
bta_av_data.rc_open = rc_open;
(*p_cb->p_cback)(BTA_AV_RC_OPEN_EVT, &bta_av_data);
}
}
} else {
tBTA_AV_RC_FEAT rc_feat;
p_cb->rcb[rc_handle].peer_features = peer_features;
rc_feat.rc_handle = rc_handle;
rc_feat.peer_features = peer_features;
if (p_scb == NULL) {
/*
* In case scb is not created by the time we are done with SDP
* we still need to send RC feature event. So we need to get BD
* from Message
*/
rc_feat.peer_addr = p_cb->lcb[p_cb->rcb[rc_handle].lidx].addr;
} else {
rc_feat.peer_addr = p_scb->PeerAddress();
}
tBTA_AV bta_av_data;
bta_av_data.rc_feat = rc_feat;
(*p_cb->p_cback)(BTA_AV_RC_FEAT_EVT, &bta_av_data);
}
}
Commit Message: Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct lh_table* lh_kptr_table_new(int size, const char *name,
lh_entry_free_fn *free_fn)
{
return lh_table_new(size, name, free_fn, lh_ptr_hash, lh_ptr_equal);
}
Commit Message: Patch to address the following issues:
* CVE-2013-6371: hash collision denial of service
* CVE-2013-6370: buffer overflow if size_t is larger than int
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 27,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::ScriptingThrottler::IsAllowed(blink::WebFrame* frame) {
const int kMinSecondsToIgnoreJavascriptInitiatedPrint = 2;
const int kMaxSecondsToIgnoreJavascriptInitiatedPrint = 32;
bool too_frequent = false;
if (count_ > 0) {
base::TimeDelta diff = base::Time::Now() - last_print_;
int min_wait_seconds = kMinSecondsToIgnoreJavascriptInitiatedPrint;
if (count_ > 3) {
min_wait_seconds =
std::min(kMinSecondsToIgnoreJavascriptInitiatedPrint << (count_ - 3),
kMaxSecondsToIgnoreJavascriptInitiatedPrint);
}
if (diff.InSeconds() < min_wait_seconds) {
too_frequent = true;
}
}
if (!too_frequent) {
++count_;
last_print_ = base::Time::Now();
return true;
}
blink::WebString message(
blink::WebString::fromUTF8("Ignoring too frequent calls to print()."));
frame->addMessageToConsole(blink::WebConsoleMessage(
blink::WebConsoleMessage::LevelWarning, message));
return false;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnCompositingDidCommit(
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
if (can_lock_compositor_ == NO_PENDING_COMMIT) {
can_lock_compositor_ = YES;
for (ResizeLockList::iterator it = resize_locks_.begin();
it != resize_locks_.end(); ++it)
if ((*it)->GrabDeferredLock())
can_lock_compositor_ = YES_DID_LOCK;
}
RunCompositingDidCommitCallbacks(compositor);
locks_pending_commit_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 4,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void _WM_do_control_registered_param_fine(struct _mdi *mdi,
struct _event_data *data) {
uint8_t ch = data->channel;
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__,ch, data->data.value);
mdi->channel[ch].reg_data = (mdi->channel[ch].reg_data & 0x3F80)
| data->data.value;
mdi->channel[ch].reg_non = 0;
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 18,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_huge_page(struct page *page)
{
/*
* Can't pass hstate in here because it is called from the
* compound page destructor.
*/
struct hstate *h = page_hstate(page);
int nid = page_to_nid(page);
struct address_space *mapping;
mapping = (struct address_space *) page_private(page);
set_page_private(page, 0);
page->mapping = NULL;
BUG_ON(page_count(page));
BUG_ON(page_mapcount(page));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&page->lru);
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (h->surplus_huge_pages_node[nid] && huge_page_order(h) < MAX_ORDER) {
update_and_free_page(h, page);
h->surplus_huge_pages--;
h->surplus_huge_pages_node[nid]--;
} else {
enqueue_huge_page(h, page);
}
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (mapping)
hugetlb_put_quota(mapping, 1);
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 3,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document* HTMLFrameOwnerElement::contentDocument() const {
return (content_frame_ && content_frame_->IsLocalFrame())
? ToLocalFrame(content_frame_)->GetDocument()
: nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 5,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 get_coherent_dma_mask(struct device *dev)
{
u64 mask = (u64)arm_dma_limit;
if (dev) {
mask = dev->coherent_dma_mask;
/*
* Sanity check the DMA mask - it must be non-zero, and
* must be able to be satisfied by a DMA allocation.
*/
if (mask == 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "coherent DMA mask is unset\n");
return 0;
}
if ((~mask) & (u64)arm_dma_limit) {
dev_warn(dev, "coherent DMA mask %#llx is smaller "
"than system GFP_DMA mask %#llx\n",
mask, (u64)arm_dma_limit);
return 0;
}
}
return mask;
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ptrace_read_user(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long off,
unsigned long __user *ret)
{
unsigned long tmp;
if (off & 3)
return -EIO;
tmp = 0;
if (off == PT_TEXT_ADDR)
tmp = tsk->mm->start_code;
else if (off == PT_DATA_ADDR)
tmp = tsk->mm->start_data;
else if (off == PT_TEXT_END_ADDR)
tmp = tsk->mm->end_code;
else if (off < sizeof(struct pt_regs))
tmp = get_user_reg(tsk, off >> 2);
else if (off >= sizeof(struct user))
return -EIO;
return put_user(tmp, ret);
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_is_pdf14trans_compositor(const gs_composite_t * pct)
{
return (pct->type == &gs_composite_pdf14trans_type
|| pct->type == &gs_composite_pdf14trans_no_clist_writer_type);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 22,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _zip_read_cdir(zip_t *za, zip_buffer_t *buffer, zip_uint64_t buf_offset, zip_error_t *error)
{
zip_cdir_t *cd;
zip_uint16_t comment_len;
zip_uint64_t i, left;
zip_uint64_t eocd_offset = _zip_buffer_offset(buffer);
zip_buffer_t *cd_buffer;
if (_zip_buffer_left(buffer) < EOCDLEN) {
/* not enough bytes left for comment */
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_NOZIP, 0);
return NULL;
}
/* check for end-of-central-dir magic */
if (memcmp(_zip_buffer_get(buffer, 4), EOCD_MAGIC, 4) != 0) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_NOZIP, 0);
return NULL;
}
if (eocd_offset >= EOCD64LOCLEN && memcmp(_zip_buffer_data(buffer) + eocd_offset - EOCD64LOCLEN, EOCD64LOC_MAGIC, 4) == 0) {
_zip_buffer_set_offset(buffer, eocd_offset - EOCD64LOCLEN);
cd = _zip_read_eocd64(za->src, buffer, buf_offset, za->flags, error);
}
else {
_zip_buffer_set_offset(buffer, eocd_offset);
cd = _zip_read_eocd(buffer, buf_offset, za->flags, error);
}
if (cd == NULL)
return NULL;
_zip_buffer_set_offset(buffer, eocd_offset + 20);
comment_len = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
if (cd->offset + cd->size > buf_offset + eocd_offset) {
/* cdir spans past EOCD record */
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
_zip_cdir_free(cd);
return NULL;
}
if (comment_len || (za->open_flags & ZIP_CHECKCONS)) {
zip_uint64_t tail_len;
_zip_buffer_set_offset(buffer, eocd_offset + EOCDLEN);
tail_len = _zip_buffer_left(buffer);
if (tail_len < comment_len || ((za->open_flags & ZIP_CHECKCONS) && tail_len != comment_len)) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
_zip_cdir_free(cd);
return NULL;
}
if (comment_len) {
if ((cd->comment=_zip_string_new(_zip_buffer_get(buffer, comment_len), comment_len, ZIP_FL_ENC_GUESS, error)) == NULL) {
_zip_cdir_free(cd);
return NULL;
}
}
}
if (cd->offset >= buf_offset) {
zip_uint8_t *data;
/* if buffer already read in, use it */
_zip_buffer_set_offset(buffer, cd->offset - buf_offset);
if ((data = _zip_buffer_get(buffer, cd->size)) == NULL) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
_zip_cdir_free(cd);
return NULL;
}
if ((cd_buffer = _zip_buffer_new(data, cd->size)) == NULL) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MEMORY, 0);
_zip_cdir_free(cd);
return NULL;
}
}
else {
cd_buffer = NULL;
if (zip_source_seek(za->src, (zip_int64_t)cd->offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
_zip_error_set_from_source(error, za->src);
_zip_cdir_free(cd);
return NULL;
}
/* possible consistency check: cd->offset = len-(cd->size+cd->comment_len+EOCDLEN) ? */
if (zip_source_tell(za->src) != (zip_int64_t)cd->offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_NOZIP, 0);
_zip_cdir_free(cd);
return NULL;
}
}
left = (zip_uint64_t)cd->size;
i=0;
while (left > 0) {
bool grown = false;
zip_int64_t entry_size;
if (i == cd->nentry) {
/* InfoZIP has a hack to avoid using Zip64: it stores nentries % 0x10000 */
/* This hack isn't applicable if we're using Zip64, or if there is no central directory entry following. */
if (cd->is_zip64 || left < CDENTRYSIZE) {
break;
}
if (!_zip_cdir_grow(cd, 0x10000, error)) {
_zip_cdir_free(cd);
_zip_buffer_free(cd_buffer);
return NULL;
}
grown = true;
}
if ((cd->entry[i].orig=_zip_dirent_new()) == NULL || (entry_size = _zip_dirent_read(cd->entry[i].orig, za->src, cd_buffer, false, error)) < 0) {
if (grown && zip_error_code_zip(error) == ZIP_ER_NOZIP) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
}
_zip_cdir_free(cd);
_zip_buffer_free(cd_buffer);
return NULL;
}
i++;
left -= (zip_uint64_t)entry_size;
}
if (i != cd->nentry || left > 0) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
_zip_buffer_free(cd_buffer);
_zip_cdir_free(cd);
return NULL;
}
if (za->open_flags & ZIP_CHECKCONS) {
bool ok;
if (cd_buffer) {
ok = _zip_buffer_eof(cd_buffer);
}
else {
zip_int64_t offset = zip_source_tell(za->src);
if (offset < 0) {
_zip_error_set_from_source(error, za->src);
_zip_cdir_free(cd);
return NULL;
}
ok = ((zip_uint64_t)offset == cd->offset + cd->size);
}
if (!ok) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
_zip_buffer_free(cd_buffer);
_zip_cdir_free(cd);
return NULL;
}
}
_zip_buffer_free(cd_buffer);
return cd;
}
Commit Message: Make eocd checks more consistent between zip and zip64 cases.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int srpt_ch_qp_err(struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch)
{
struct ib_qp_attr qp_attr;
qp_attr.qp_state = IB_QPS_ERR;
return ib_modify_qp(ch->qp, &qp_attr, IB_QP_STATE);
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 18,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
{
ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 26,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GesturePoint::IsInClickWindow(const TouchEvent& event) const {
return IsInClickTimeWindow() && IsInsideManhattanSquare(event);
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: menu_remove(WebKitWebView *page, GArray *argv, GString *result) {
(void) page;
(void) result;
remove_from_menu(argv, WEBKIT_HIT_TEST_RESULT_CONTEXT_DOCUMENT);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaRequestState state(MediaStreamType stream_type) const {
return state_[stream_type];
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseNotationType(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
xmlEnumerationPtr ret = NULL, last = NULL, cur, tmp;
if (RAW != '(') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NOTATION_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
SHRINK;
do {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"Name expected in NOTATION declaration\n");
xmlFreeEnumeration(ret);
return(NULL);
}
tmp = ret;
while (tmp != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(name, tmp->name)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_DTD_DUP_TOKEN,
"standalone: attribute notation value token %s duplicated\n",
name, NULL);
if (!xmlDictOwns(ctxt->dict, name))
xmlFree((xmlChar *) name);
break;
}
tmp = tmp->next;
}
if (tmp == NULL) {
cur = xmlCreateEnumeration(name);
if (cur == NULL) {
xmlFreeEnumeration(ret);
return(NULL);
}
if (last == NULL) ret = last = cur;
else {
last->next = cur;
last = cur;
}
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
} while (RAW == '|');
if (RAW != ')') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NOTATION_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
xmlFreeEnumeration(ret);
return(NULL);
}
NEXT;
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 15,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry *entry, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (perf_guest_cbs && perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest()) {
/* TODO: We don't support guest os callchain now */
return;
}
perf_callchain_store(entry, regs->ip);
dump_trace(NULL, regs, NULL, &backtrace_ops, entry);
}
Commit Message: perf, x86: Fix Intel fixed counters base initialization
The following patch solves the problems introduced by Robert's
commit 41bf498 and reported by Arun Sharma. This commit gets rid
of the base + index notation for reading and writing PMU msrs.
The problem is that for fixed counters, the new calculation for
the base did not take into account the fixed counter indexes,
thus all fixed counters were read/written from fixed counter 0.
Although all fixed counters share the same config MSR, they each
have their own counter register.
Without:
$ task -e unhalted_core_cycles -e instructions_retired -e baclears noploop 1 noploop for 1 seconds
242202299 unhalted_core_cycles (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
2389685946 instructions_retired (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
49473 baclears (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
With:
$ task -e unhalted_core_cycles -e instructions_retired -e baclears noploop 1 noploop for 1 seconds
2392703238 unhalted_core_cycles (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
2389793744 instructions_retired (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
47863 baclears (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: ming.m.lin@intel.com
Cc: robert.richter@amd.com
Cc: asharma@fb.com
Cc: perfmon2-devel@lists.sf.net
LKML-Reference: <20110319172005.GB4978@quad>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileSystemOperationRunner::DidOpenFile(
const OperationID id,
OpenFileCallback callback,
base::File file,
base::OnceClosure on_close_callback) {
if (is_beginning_operation_) {
finished_operations_.insert(id);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&FileSystemOperationRunner::DidOpenFile, weak_ptr_, id,
std::move(callback), std::move(file),
std::move(on_close_callback)));
return;
}
std::move(callback).Run(std::move(file), std::move(on_close_callback));
FinishOperation(id);
}
Commit Message: [FileSystem] Harden against overflows of OperationID a bit better.
Rather than having a UAF when OperationID overflows instead overwrite
the old operation with the new one. Can still cause weirdness, but at
least won't result in UAF. Also update OperationID to uint64_t to
make sure we don't overflow to begin with.
Bug: 925864
Change-Id: Ifdf3fa0935ab5ea8802d91bba39601f02b0dbdc9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1441498
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#627115}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 13,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int move_to_new_page(struct page *newpage, struct page *page,
enum migrate_mode mode)
{
struct address_space *mapping;
int rc;
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(page), page);
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(newpage), newpage);
mapping = page_mapping(page);
if (!mapping)
rc = migrate_page(mapping, newpage, page, mode);
else if (mapping->a_ops->migratepage)
/*
* Most pages have a mapping and most filesystems provide a
* migratepage callback. Anonymous pages are part of swap
* space which also has its own migratepage callback. This
* is the most common path for page migration.
*/
rc = mapping->a_ops->migratepage(mapping, newpage, page, mode);
else
rc = fallback_migrate_page(mapping, newpage, page, mode);
/*
* When successful, old pagecache page->mapping must be cleared before
* page is freed; but stats require that PageAnon be left as PageAnon.
*/
if (rc == MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS) {
set_page_memcg(page, NULL);
if (!PageAnon(page))
page->mapping = NULL;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: mm: migrate dirty page without clear_page_dirty_for_io etc
clear_page_dirty_for_io() has accumulated writeback and memcg subtleties
since v2.6.16 first introduced page migration; and the set_page_dirty()
which completed its migration of PageDirty, later had to be moderated to
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers(); then PageSwapBacked had to skip that too.
No actual problems seen with this procedure recently, but if you look into
what the clear_page_dirty_for_io(page)+set_page_dirty(newpage) is actually
achieving, it turns out to be nothing more than moving the PageDirty flag,
and its NR_FILE_DIRTY stat from one zone to another.
It would be good to avoid a pile of irrelevant decrementations and
incrementations, and improper event counting, and unnecessary descent of
the radix_tree under tree_lock (to set the PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY which
radix_tree_replace_slot() left in place anyway).
Do the NR_FILE_DIRTY movement, like the other stats movements, while
interrupts still disabled in migrate_page_move_mapping(); and don't even
bother if the zone is the same. Do the PageDirty movement there under
tree_lock too, where old page is frozen and newpage not yet visible:
bearing in mind that as soon as newpage becomes visible in radix_tree, an
un-page-locked set_page_dirty() might interfere (or perhaps that's just
not possible: anything doing so should already hold an additional
reference to the old page, preventing its migration; but play safe).
But we do still need to transfer PageDirty in migrate_page_copy(), for
those who don't go the mapping route through migrate_page_move_mapping().
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 18,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageOpenPolygon (gdImagePtr im, gdPointPtr p, int n, int c)
{
int i;
int lx, ly;
if (n <= 0) {
return;
}
lx = p->x;
ly = p->y;
for (i = 1; (i < n); i++) {
p++;
gdImageLine (im, lx, ly, p->x, p->y, c);
lx = p->x;
ly = p->y;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsZipArchiverUnpackerEnabled() {
return !base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
kDisableZipArchiverUnpacker);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport size_t GetImageQuantumDepth(const Image *image,
const MagickBooleanType constrain)
{
size_t
depth;
depth=image->depth;
if (depth <= 8)
depth=8;
else
if (depth <= 16)
depth=16;
else
if (depth <= 32)
depth=32;
else
if (depth <= 64)
depth=64;
if (constrain != MagickFalse)
depth=(size_t) MagickMin((double) depth,(double) MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH);
return(depth);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/281
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 10,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int max_irr;
WARN_ON(!vcpu->arch.apicv_active);
if (pi_test_on(&vmx->pi_desc)) {
pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
/*
* IOMMU can write to PIR.ON, so the barrier matters even on UP.
* But on x86 this is just a compiler barrier anyway.
*/
smp_mb__after_atomic();
max_irr = kvm_apic_update_irr(vcpu, vmx->pi_desc.pir);
} else {
max_irr = kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(vcpu);
}
vmx_hwapic_irr_update(vcpu, max_irr);
return max_irr;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IsPinnedToTaskbarHelper::GetState(
std::unique_ptr<service_manager::Connector> connector,
const ErrorCallback& error_callback,
const ResultCallback& result_callback) {
new IsPinnedToTaskbarHelper(std::move(connector), error_callback,
result_callback);
}
Commit Message: Validate external protocols before launching on Windows
Bug: 889459
Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IMediaDeathNotifier::DeathNotifier::~DeathNotifier()
{
ALOGV("DeathNotifier::~DeathNotifier");
Mutex::Autolock _l(sServiceLock);
sObitRecipients.clear();
if (sMediaPlayerService != 0) {
IInterface::asBinder(sMediaPlayerService)->unlinkToDeath(this);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 14,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int on_freelist(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, void *search)
{
int nr = 0;
void *fp = page->freelist;
void *object = NULL;
unsigned long max_objects;
while (fp && nr <= page->objects) {
if (fp == search)
return 1;
if (!check_valid_pointer(s, page, fp)) {
if (object) {
object_err(s, page, object,
"Freechain corrupt");
set_freepointer(s, object, NULL);
break;
} else {
slab_err(s, page, "Freepointer corrupt");
page->freelist = NULL;
page->inuse = page->objects;
slab_fix(s, "Freelist cleared");
return 0;
}
break;
}
object = fp;
fp = get_freepointer(s, object);
nr++;
}
max_objects = (PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page)) / s->size;
if (max_objects > 65535)
max_objects = 65535;
if (page->objects != max_objects) {
slab_err(s, page, "Wrong number of objects. Found %d but "
"should be %d", page->objects, max_objects);
page->objects = max_objects;
slab_fix(s, "Number of objects adjusted.");
}
if (page->inuse != page->objects - nr) {
slab_err(s, page, "Wrong object count. Counter is %d but "
"counted were %d", page->inuse, page->objects - nr);
page->inuse = page->objects - nr;
slab_fix(s, "Object count adjusted.");
}
return search == NULL;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 7,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static noinline int split_leaf(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root,
struct btrfs_key *ins_key,
struct btrfs_path *path, int data_size,
int extend)
{
struct btrfs_disk_key disk_key;
struct extent_buffer *l;
u32 nritems;
int mid;
int slot;
struct extent_buffer *right;
int ret = 0;
int wret;
int split;
int num_doubles = 0;
int tried_avoid_double = 0;
l = path->nodes[0];
slot = path->slots[0];
if (extend && data_size + btrfs_item_size_nr(l, slot) +
sizeof(struct btrfs_item) > BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root))
return -EOVERFLOW;
/* first try to make some room by pushing left and right */
if (data_size && path->nodes[1]) {
int space_needed = data_size;
if (slot < btrfs_header_nritems(l))
space_needed -= btrfs_leaf_free_space(root, l);
wret = push_leaf_right(trans, root, path, space_needed,
space_needed, 0, 0);
if (wret < 0)
return wret;
if (wret) {
wret = push_leaf_left(trans, root, path, space_needed,
space_needed, 0, (u32)-1);
if (wret < 0)
return wret;
}
l = path->nodes[0];
/* did the pushes work? */
if (btrfs_leaf_free_space(root, l) >= data_size)
return 0;
}
if (!path->nodes[1]) {
ret = insert_new_root(trans, root, path, 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
again:
split = 1;
l = path->nodes[0];
slot = path->slots[0];
nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(l);
mid = (nritems + 1) / 2;
if (mid <= slot) {
if (nritems == 1 ||
leaf_space_used(l, mid, nritems - mid) + data_size >
BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root)) {
if (slot >= nritems) {
split = 0;
} else {
mid = slot;
if (mid != nritems &&
leaf_space_used(l, mid, nritems - mid) +
data_size > BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root)) {
if (data_size && !tried_avoid_double)
goto push_for_double;
split = 2;
}
}
}
} else {
if (leaf_space_used(l, 0, mid) + data_size >
BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root)) {
if (!extend && data_size && slot == 0) {
split = 0;
} else if ((extend || !data_size) && slot == 0) {
mid = 1;
} else {
mid = slot;
if (mid != nritems &&
leaf_space_used(l, mid, nritems - mid) +
data_size > BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root)) {
if (data_size && !tried_avoid_double)
goto push_for_double;
split = 2;
}
}
}
}
if (split == 0)
btrfs_cpu_key_to_disk(&disk_key, ins_key);
else
btrfs_item_key(l, &disk_key, mid);
right = btrfs_alloc_tree_block(trans, root, 0, root->root_key.objectid,
&disk_key, 0, l->start, 0);
if (IS_ERR(right))
return PTR_ERR(right);
root_add_used(root, root->nodesize);
memset_extent_buffer(right, 0, 0, sizeof(struct btrfs_header));
btrfs_set_header_bytenr(right, right->start);
btrfs_set_header_generation(right, trans->transid);
btrfs_set_header_backref_rev(right, BTRFS_MIXED_BACKREF_REV);
btrfs_set_header_owner(right, root->root_key.objectid);
btrfs_set_header_level(right, 0);
write_extent_buffer(right, root->fs_info->fsid,
btrfs_header_fsid(), BTRFS_FSID_SIZE);
write_extent_buffer(right, root->fs_info->chunk_tree_uuid,
btrfs_header_chunk_tree_uuid(right),
BTRFS_UUID_SIZE);
if (split == 0) {
if (mid <= slot) {
btrfs_set_header_nritems(right, 0);
insert_ptr(trans, root, path, &disk_key, right->start,
path->slots[1] + 1, 1);
btrfs_tree_unlock(path->nodes[0]);
free_extent_buffer(path->nodes[0]);
path->nodes[0] = right;
path->slots[0] = 0;
path->slots[1] += 1;
} else {
btrfs_set_header_nritems(right, 0);
insert_ptr(trans, root, path, &disk_key, right->start,
path->slots[1], 1);
btrfs_tree_unlock(path->nodes[0]);
free_extent_buffer(path->nodes[0]);
path->nodes[0] = right;
path->slots[0] = 0;
if (path->slots[1] == 0)
fixup_low_keys(root, path, &disk_key, 1);
}
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(right);
return ret;
}
copy_for_split(trans, root, path, l, right, slot, mid, nritems);
if (split == 2) {
BUG_ON(num_doubles != 0);
num_doubles++;
goto again;
}
return 0;
push_for_double:
push_for_double_split(trans, root, path, data_size);
tried_avoid_double = 1;
if (btrfs_leaf_free_space(root, path->nodes[0]) >= data_size)
return 0;
goto again;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 29,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const URLPatternSet& PermissionsData::PolicyAllowedHostsUnsafe() const {
runtime_lock_.AssertAcquired();
if (uses_default_policy_host_restrictions)
return default_policy_allowed_hosts();
return policy_allowed_hosts_unsafe_;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAAC2::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
aacParams->nBitRate = 0;
aacParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
aacParams->nAACtools = 0;
aacParams->nAACERtools = 0;
aacParams->eAACProfile = OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectMain;
aacParams->eAACStreamFormat =
mIsADTS
? OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4ADTS
: OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
aacParams->eChannelMode = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeStereo;
if (!isConfigured()) {
aacParams->nChannels = 1;
aacParams->nSampleRate = 44100;
aacParams->nFrameLength = 0;
} else {
aacParams->nChannels = mStreamInfo->numChannels;
aacParams->nSampleRate = mStreamInfo->sampleRate;
aacParams->nFrameLength = mStreamInfo->frameSize;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[2] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelCF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[3] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLFE;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[4] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLS;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[5] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRS;
if (!isConfigured()) {
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = 44100;
} else {
pcmParams->nChannels = mStreamInfo->numChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mStreamInfo->sampleRate;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 25,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::readInt64Vector(std::unique_ptr<std::vector<int64_t>>* val) const {
return readNullableTypedVector(val, &Parcel::readInt64);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wkbConvCircularStringToShape(wkbObj *w, shapeObj *shape)
{
int type;
lineObj line = {0, NULL};
/*endian = */wkbReadChar(w);
type = wkbTypeMap(w,wkbReadInt(w));
if( type != WKB_CIRCULARSTRING ) return MS_FAILURE;
/* Stroke the string into a point array */
if ( arcStrokeCircularString(w, SEGMENT_ANGLE, &line) == MS_FAILURE ) {
if(line.point) free(line.point);
return MS_FAILURE;
}
/* Fill in the lineObj */
if ( line.numpoints > 0 ) {
msAddLine(shape, &line);
if(line.point) free(line.point);
}
return MS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 24,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void capture(const BT_HDR *buffer, bool is_received) {
const uint8_t *p = buffer->data + buffer->offset;
btsnoop_mem_capture(buffer);
if (logfile_fd == INVALID_FD)
return;
switch (buffer->event & MSG_EVT_MASK) {
case MSG_HC_TO_STACK_HCI_EVT:
btsnoop_write_packet(kEventPacket, p, false);
break;
case MSG_HC_TO_STACK_HCI_ACL:
case MSG_STACK_TO_HC_HCI_ACL:
btsnoop_write_packet(kAclPacket, p, is_received);
break;
case MSG_HC_TO_STACK_HCI_SCO:
case MSG_STACK_TO_HC_HCI_SCO:
btsnoop_write_packet(kScoPacket, p, is_received);
break;
case MSG_STACK_TO_HC_HCI_CMD:
btsnoop_write_packet(kCommandPacket, p, true);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 9,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lua_ap_strcmp_match(lua_State *L)
{
int returnValue;
const char *str;
const char *expected;
int ignoreCase = 0;
luaL_checktype(L, 1, LUA_TSTRING);
str = lua_tostring(L, 1);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
expected = lua_tostring(L, 2);
if (lua_isboolean(L, 3))
ignoreCase = lua_toboolean(L, 3);
if (!ignoreCase)
returnValue = ap_strcmp_match(str, expected);
else
returnValue = ap_strcasecmp_match(str, expected);
lua_pushboolean(L, (!returnValue));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_yield_argv(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value b, mrb_int argc, const mrb_value *argv)
{
struct RProc *p = mrb_proc_ptr(b);
return mrb_yield_with_class(mrb, b, argc, argv, MRB_PROC_ENV(p)->stack[0], MRB_PROC_TARGET_CLASS(p));
}
Commit Message: Check length of env stack before accessing upvar; fix #3995
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void* binary_get_request(conn *c) {
char *ret = c->rcurr;
ret -= (sizeof(c->binary_header) + c->binary_header.request.keylen +
c->binary_header.request.extlen);
assert(ret >= c->rbuf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LockContentsView::ShowAuthErrorMessage() {
LoginBigUserView* big_view = CurrentBigUserView();
if (!big_view->auth_user())
return;
if (screen_type_ == LockScreen::ScreenType::kLogin &&
unlock_attempt_ >= kLoginAttemptsBeforeGaiaDialog) {
Shell::Get()->login_screen_controller()->ShowGaiaSignin(
true /*can_close*/,
big_view->auth_user()->current_user()->basic_user_info->account_id);
return;
}
base::string16 error_text = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
unlock_attempt_ > 1 ? IDS_ASH_LOGIN_ERROR_AUTHENTICATING_2ND_TIME
: IDS_ASH_LOGIN_ERROR_AUTHENTICATING);
ImeController* ime_controller = Shell::Get()->ime_controller();
if (ime_controller->IsCapsLockEnabled()) {
error_text += base::ASCIIToUTF16(" ") +
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_ASH_LOGIN_ERROR_CAPS_LOCK_HINT);
}
base::Optional<int> bold_start;
int bold_length = 0;
if (ime_controller->available_imes().size() > 1) {
error_text += base::ASCIIToUTF16(" ");
bold_start = error_text.length();
base::string16 shortcut =
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_ASH_LOGIN_KEYBOARD_SWITCH_SHORTCUT);
bold_length = shortcut.length();
size_t shortcut_offset_in_string;
error_text +=
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_ASH_LOGIN_ERROR_KEYBOARD_SWITCH_HINT,
shortcut, &shortcut_offset_in_string);
*bold_start += shortcut_offset_in_string;
}
views::StyledLabel* label = new views::StyledLabel(error_text, this);
MakeSectionBold(label, error_text, bold_start, bold_length);
label->set_auto_color_readability_enabled(false);
auth_error_bubble_->ShowErrorBubble(
label, big_view->auth_user()->password_view() /*anchor_view*/,
LoginBubble::kFlagsNone);
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tsize_t t2p_write_pdf_stream(tdata_t buffer, tsize_t len, TIFF* output){
tsize_t written=0;
written += t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, len);
return(written);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 6,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int compare_ts_with_wrapdetect(int64_t ts_a, struct playlist *pls_a,
int64_t ts_b, struct playlist *pls_b)
{
int64_t scaled_ts_a = av_rescale_q(ts_a, get_timebase(pls_a), MPEG_TIME_BASE_Q);
int64_t scaled_ts_b = av_rescale_q(ts_b, get_timebase(pls_b), MPEG_TIME_BASE_Q);
return av_compare_mod(scaled_ts_a, scaled_ts_b, 1LL << 33);
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 8,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DOMHighResTimeStamp PerformanceNavigationTiming::domComplete() const {
const DocumentTiming* timing = GetDocumentTiming();
if (!timing)
return 0.0;
return Performance::MonotonicTimeToDOMHighResTimeStamp(
TimeOrigin(), timing->DomComplete(), false /* allow_negative_value */);
}
Commit Message: Fix the |name| of PerformanceNavigationTiming
Previously, the |name| of a PerformanceNavigationTiming entry was the initial
URL (the request URL). After this CL, it is the response URL, so for example
a url of the form 'redirect?location=newLoc' will have 'newLoc' as the |name|.
Bug: 797465
Change-Id: Icab53ad8027d066422562c82bcf0354c264fea40
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/996579
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548773}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::OnGroupMadeObsolete(AppCacheGroup* group,
bool success,
int response_code) {
DCHECK(master_entry_fetches_.empty());
CancelAllMasterEntryFetches(AppCacheErrorDetails(
"The cache has been made obsolete, "
"the manifest file returned 404 or 410",
APPCACHE_MANIFEST_ERROR,
GURL(),
response_code,
false /*is_cross_origin*/));
if (success) {
DCHECK(group->is_obsolete());
NotifyAllAssociatedHosts(APPCACHE_OBSOLETE_EVENT);
internal_state_ = COMPLETED;
MaybeCompleteUpdate();
} else {
HandleCacheFailure(AppCacheErrorDetails(
"Failed to mark the cache as obsolete",
APPCACHE_UNKNOWN_ERROR, GURL(), 0,
false /*is_cross_origin*/),
DB_ERROR,
GURL());
}
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned hash_init(Hash* hash, unsigned windowsize)
{
unsigned i;
hash->head = (int*)calloc(sizeof(int), HASH_NUM_VALUES);
hash->val = (int*)calloc(sizeof(int), windowsize);
hash->chain = (unsigned short*)calloc(sizeof(unsigned short), windowsize);
hash->zeros = (unsigned short*)calloc(sizeof(unsigned short), windowsize);
hash->headz = (int*)calloc(sizeof(int), (MAX_SUPPORTED_DEFLATE_LENGTH + 1));
hash->chainz = (unsigned short*)calloc(sizeof(unsigned short), windowsize);
if(!hash->head || !hash->chain || !hash->val || !hash->headz|| !hash->chainz || !hash->zeros)
{
return 83; /*alloc fail*/
}
/*initialize hash table*/
for(i = 0; i < HASH_NUM_VALUES; i++) hash->head[i] = -1;
for(i = 0; i < windowsize; i++) hash->val[i] = -1;
for(i = 0; i < windowsize; i++) hash->chain[i] = i; /*same value as index indicates uninitialized*/
for(i = 0; i <= MAX_SUPPORTED_DEFLATE_LENGTH; i++) hash->headz[i] = -1;
for(i = 0; i < windowsize; i++) hash->chainz[i] = i; /*same value as index indicates uninitialized*/
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __dm_internal_resume(struct mapped_device *md)
{
BUG_ON(!md->internal_suspend_count);
if (--md->internal_suspend_count)
return; /* resume from nested internal suspend */
if (dm_suspended_md(md))
goto done; /* resume from nested suspend */
/*
* NOTE: existing callers don't need to call dm_table_resume_targets
* (which may fail -- so best to avoid it for now by passing NULL map)
*/
(void) __dm_resume(md, NULL);
done:
clear_bit(DMF_SUSPENDED_INTERNALLY, &md->flags);
smp_mb__after_atomic();
wake_up_bit(&md->flags, DMF_SUSPENDED_INTERNALLY);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 28,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_trace)
{
char *z_filename, *mode = "w";
size_t z_filename_len, mode_len;
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
int id = -1, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
PGconn *pgsql;
FILE *fp = NULL;
php_stream *stream;
id = FETCH_DEFAULT_LINK();
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "s|sr", &z_filename, &z_filename_len, &mode, &mode_len, &pgsql_link) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (argc < 3) {
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper(z_filename, mode, REPORT_ERRORS, NULL);
if (!stream) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (FAILURE == php_stream_cast(stream, PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO, (void**)&fp, REPORT_ERRORS)) {
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_auto_cleanup(stream);
PQtrace(pgsql, fp);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs41_same_server_scope(struct nfs41_server_scope *a,
struct nfs41_server_scope *b)
{
if (a->server_scope_sz == b->server_scope_sz &&
memcmp(a->server_scope, b->server_scope, a->server_scope_sz) == 0)
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_login(char *tag, char *user)
{
char userbuf[MAX_MAILBOX_BUFFER];
char replybuf[MAX_MAILBOX_BUFFER];
unsigned userlen;
const char *canon_user = userbuf;
const void *val;
int c;
struct buf passwdbuf;
char *passwd;
const char *reply = NULL;
int r;
int failedloginpause;
if (imapd_userid) {
eatline(imapd_in, ' ');
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Already logged in\r\n", tag);
return;
}
r = imapd_canon_user(imapd_saslconn, NULL, user, 0,
SASL_CU_AUTHID | SASL_CU_AUTHZID, NULL,
userbuf, sizeof(userbuf), &userlen);
if (r) {
eatline(imapd_in, ' ');
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "badlogin: %s plaintext %s invalid user",
imapd_clienthost, beautify_string(user));
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_INVALID_USER));
return;
}
/* possibly disallow login */
if (imapd_tls_required ||
(!imapd_starttls_done && (extprops_ssf < 2) &&
!config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_ALLOWPLAINTEXT) &&
!is_userid_anonymous(canon_user))) {
eatline(imapd_in, ' ');
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Login only available under a layer\r\n",
tag);
return;
}
memset(&passwdbuf,0,sizeof(struct buf));
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &passwdbuf);
if(c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') {
buf_free(&passwdbuf);
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Unexpected extra arguments to LOGIN\r\n",
tag);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
return;
}
passwd = passwdbuf.s;
if (is_userid_anonymous(canon_user)) {
if (config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_ALLOWANONYMOUSLOGIN)) {
passwd = beautify_string(passwd);
if (strlen(passwd) > 500) passwd[500] = '\0';
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "login: %s anonymous %s",
imapd_clienthost, passwd);
reply = "Anonymous access granted";
imapd_userid = xstrdup("anonymous");
}
else {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "badlogin: %s anonymous login refused",
imapd_clienthost);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_ANONYMOUS_NOT_PERMITTED));
buf_free(&passwdbuf);
return;
}
}
else if ( nosaslpasswdcheck ) {
snprintf(replybuf, sizeof(replybuf),
"User logged in SESSIONID=<%s>", session_id());
reply = replybuf;
imapd_userid = xstrdup(canon_user);
imapd_authstate = auth_newstate(canon_user);
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "login: %s %s%s nopassword%s %s", imapd_clienthost,
imapd_userid, imapd_magicplus ? imapd_magicplus : "",
imapd_starttls_done ? "+TLS" : "", reply);
}
else if ((r = sasl_checkpass(imapd_saslconn,
canon_user,
strlen(canon_user),
passwd,
strlen(passwd))) != SASL_OK) {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "badlogin: %s plaintext %s %s",
imapd_clienthost, canon_user, sasl_errdetail(imapd_saslconn));
failedloginpause = config_getint(IMAPOPT_FAILEDLOGINPAUSE);
if (failedloginpause != 0) {
sleep(failedloginpause);
}
/* Don't allow user probing */
if (r == SASL_NOUSER) r = SASL_BADAUTH;
if ((reply = sasl_errstring(r, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Login failed: %s\r\n", tag, reply);
} else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Login failed: %d\r\n", tag, r);
}
snmp_increment_args(AUTHENTICATION_NO, 1,
VARIABLE_AUTH, 0 /* hash_simple("LOGIN") */,
VARIABLE_LISTEND);
buf_free(&passwdbuf);
return;
}
else {
r = sasl_getprop(imapd_saslconn, SASL_USERNAME, &val);
if(r != SASL_OK) {
if ((reply = sasl_errstring(r, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Login failed: %s\r\n",
tag, reply);
} else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Login failed: %d\r\n", tag, r);
}
snmp_increment_args(AUTHENTICATION_NO, 1,
VARIABLE_AUTH, 0 /* hash_simple("LOGIN") */,
VARIABLE_LISTEND);
buf_free(&passwdbuf);
return;
}
snprintf(replybuf, sizeof(replybuf),
"User logged in SESSIONID=<%s>", session_id());
reply = replybuf;
imapd_userid = xstrdup((const char *) val);
snmp_increment_args(AUTHENTICATION_YES, 1,
VARIABLE_AUTH, 0 /*hash_simple("LOGIN") */,
VARIABLE_LISTEND);
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "login: %s %s%s plaintext%s %s", imapd_clienthost,
imapd_userid, imapd_magicplus ? imapd_magicplus : "",
imapd_starttls_done ? "+TLS" : "",
reply ? reply : "");
/* Apply penalty only if not under layer */
if (!imapd_starttls_done) {
int plaintextloginpause = config_getint(IMAPOPT_PLAINTEXTLOGINPAUSE);
if (plaintextloginpause) {
sleep(plaintextloginpause);
}
/* Fetch plaintext login nag message */
plaintextloginalert = config_getstring(IMAPOPT_PLAINTEXTLOGINALERT);
}
}
buf_free(&passwdbuf);
if (checklimits(tag)) return;
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK [CAPABILITY ", tag);
capa_response(CAPA_PREAUTH|CAPA_POSTAUTH);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "] %s\r\n", reply);
authentication_success();
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void evmcs_load(u64 phys_addr)
{
struct hv_vp_assist_page *vp_ap =
hv_get_vp_assist_page(smp_processor_id());
vp_ap->current_nested_vmcs = phys_addr;
vp_ap->enlighten_vmentry = 1;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ext4_free_blks_set(struct super_block *sb,
struct ext4_group_desc *bg, __u32 count)
{
bg->bg_free_blocks_count_lo = cpu_to_le16((__u16)count);
if (EXT4_DESC_SIZE(sb) >= EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE_64BIT)
bg->bg_free_blocks_count_hi = cpu_to_le16(count >> 16);
}
Commit Message: ext4: init timer earlier to avoid a kernel panic in __save_error_info
During mount, when we fail to open journal inode or root inode, the
__save_error_info will mod_timer. But actually s_err_report isn't
initialized yet and the kernel oops. The detailed information can
be found https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32082.
The best way is to check whether the timer s_err_report is initialized
or not. But it seems that in include/linux/timer.h, we can't find a
good function to check the status of this timer, so this patch just
move the initializtion of s_err_report earlier so that we can avoid
the kernel panic. The corresponding del_timer is also added in the
error path.
Reported-by: Sami Liedes <sliedes@cc.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <boyu.mt@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nautilus_file_operations_copy (GList *files,
GArray *relative_item_points,
GFile *target_dir,
GtkWindow *parent_window,
NautilusCopyCallback done_callback,
gpointer done_callback_data)
{
GTask *task;
CopyMoveJob *job;
job = op_job_new (CopyMoveJob, parent_window);
job->desktop_location = nautilus_get_desktop_location ();
job->done_callback = done_callback;
job->done_callback_data = done_callback_data;
job->files = g_list_copy_deep (files, (GCopyFunc) g_object_ref, NULL);
job->destination = g_object_ref (target_dir);
/* Need to indicate the destination for the operation notification open
* button. */
nautilus_progress_info_set_destination (((CommonJob *) job)->progress, target_dir);
if (relative_item_points != NULL &&
relative_item_points->len > 0)
{
job->icon_positions =
g_memdup (relative_item_points->data,
sizeof (GdkPoint) * relative_item_points->len);
job->n_icon_positions = relative_item_points->len;
}
job->debuting_files = g_hash_table_new_full (g_file_hash, (GEqualFunc) g_file_equal, g_object_unref, NULL);
inhibit_power_manager ((CommonJob *) job, _("Copying Files"));
if (!nautilus_file_undo_manager_is_operating ())
{
GFile *src_dir;
src_dir = g_file_get_parent (files->data);
job->common.undo_info = nautilus_file_undo_info_ext_new (NAUTILUS_FILE_UNDO_OP_COPY,
g_list_length (files),
src_dir, target_dir);
g_object_unref (src_dir);
}
task = g_task_new (NULL, job->common.cancellable, copy_task_done, job);
g_task_set_task_data (task, job, NULL);
g_task_run_in_thread (task, copy_task_thread_func);
g_object_unref (task);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadController::AcquireFileAccessPermission(
WebContents* web_contents,
const DownloadControllerBase::AcquireFileAccessPermissionCallback& cb) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(web_contents);
ui::ViewAndroid* view_android =
ViewAndroidHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents)->GetViewAndroid();
if (!view_android) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE, base::Bind(cb, false));
return;
}
ui::WindowAndroid* window_android = view_android->GetWindowAndroid();
if (window_android && HasFileAccessPermission(window_android)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE, base::Bind(cb, true));
return;
}
intptr_t callback_id = reinterpret_cast<intptr_t>(
new DownloadControllerBase::AcquireFileAccessPermissionCallback(cb));
ChromeDownloadDelegate::FromWebContents(web_contents)->
RequestFileAccess(callback_id);
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 28,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: netdev_tx_t ieee80211_monitor_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = wdev_priv(dev->ieee80211_ptr);
struct ieee80211_chanctx_conf *chanctx_conf;
struct ieee80211_channel *chan;
struct ieee80211_radiotap_header *prthdr =
(struct ieee80211_radiotap_header *)skb->data;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *tmp_sdata, *sdata;
u16 len_rthdr;
int hdrlen;
/* check for not even having the fixed radiotap header part */
if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof(struct ieee80211_radiotap_header)))
goto fail; /* too short to be possibly valid */
/* is it a header version we can trust to find length from? */
if (unlikely(prthdr->it_version))
goto fail; /* only version 0 is supported */
/* then there must be a radiotap header with a length we can use */
len_rthdr = ieee80211_get_radiotap_len(skb->data);
/* does the skb contain enough to deliver on the alleged length? */
if (unlikely(skb->len < len_rthdr))
goto fail; /* skb too short for claimed rt header extent */
/*
* fix up the pointers accounting for the radiotap
* header still being in there. We are being given
* a precooked IEEE80211 header so no need for
* normal processing
*/
skb_set_mac_header(skb, len_rthdr);
/*
* these are just fixed to the end of the rt area since we
* don't have any better information and at this point, nobody cares
*/
skb_set_network_header(skb, len_rthdr);
skb_set_transport_header(skb, len_rthdr);
if (skb->len < len_rthdr + 2)
goto fail;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + len_rthdr);
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
if (skb->len < len_rthdr + hdrlen)
goto fail;
/*
* Initialize skb->protocol if the injected frame is a data frame
* carrying a rfc1042 header
*/
if (ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
skb->len >= len_rthdr + hdrlen + sizeof(rfc1042_header) + 2) {
u8 *payload = (u8 *)hdr + hdrlen;
if (ether_addr_equal(payload, rfc1042_header))
skb->protocol = cpu_to_be16((payload[6] << 8) |
payload[7]);
}
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
info->flags = IEEE80211_TX_CTL_REQ_TX_STATUS |
IEEE80211_TX_CTL_INJECTED;
/* process and remove the injection radiotap header */
if (!ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap(skb))
goto fail;
rcu_read_lock();
/*
* We process outgoing injected frames that have a local address
* we handle as though they are non-injected frames.
* This code here isn't entirely correct, the local MAC address
* isn't always enough to find the interface to use; for proper
* VLAN/WDS support we will need a different mechanism (which
* likely isn't going to be monitor interfaces).
*/
sdata = IEEE80211_DEV_TO_SUB_IF(dev);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(tmp_sdata, &local->interfaces, list) {
if (!ieee80211_sdata_running(tmp_sdata))
continue;
if (tmp_sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_MONITOR ||
tmp_sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN ||
tmp_sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_WDS)
continue;
if (ether_addr_equal(tmp_sdata->vif.addr, hdr->addr2)) {
sdata = tmp_sdata;
break;
}
}
chanctx_conf = rcu_dereference(sdata->vif.chanctx_conf);
if (!chanctx_conf) {
tmp_sdata = rcu_dereference(local->monitor_sdata);
if (tmp_sdata)
chanctx_conf =
rcu_dereference(tmp_sdata->vif.chanctx_conf);
}
if (chanctx_conf)
chan = chanctx_conf->def.chan;
else if (!local->use_chanctx)
chan = local->_oper_chandef.chan;
else
goto fail_rcu;
/*
* Frame injection is not allowed if beaconing is not allowed
* or if we need radar detection. Beaconing is usually not allowed when
* the mode or operation (Adhoc, AP, Mesh) does not support DFS.
* Passive scan is also used in world regulatory domains where
* your country is not known and as such it should be treated as
* NO TX unless the channel is explicitly allowed in which case
* your current regulatory domain would not have the passive scan
* flag.
*
* Since AP mode uses monitor interfaces to inject/TX management
* frames we can make AP mode the exception to this rule once it
* supports radar detection as its implementation can deal with
* radar detection by itself. We can do that later by adding a
* monitor flag interfaces used for AP support.
*/
if ((chan->flags & (IEEE80211_CHAN_NO_IR | IEEE80211_CHAN_RADAR)))
goto fail_rcu;
ieee80211_xmit(sdata, skb, chan->band);
rcu_read_unlock();
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
fail_rcu:
rcu_read_unlock();
fail:
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK; /* meaning, we dealt with the skb */
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 18,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetShaderPrecisionFormat(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::GetShaderPrecisionFormat& c) {
GLenum shader_type = static_cast<GLenum>(c.shadertype);
GLenum precision_type = static_cast<GLenum>(c.precisiontype);
typedef cmds::GetShaderPrecisionFormat::Result Result;
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.result_shm_id, c.result_shm_offset, sizeof(*result));
if (!result) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (result->success != 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
if (!validators_->shader_type.IsValid(shader_type)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM(
"glGetShaderPrecisionFormat", shader_type, "shader_type");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->shader_precision.IsValid(precision_type)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM(
"glGetShaderPrecisionFormat", precision_type, "precision_type");
return error::kNoError;
}
result->success = 1; // true
GLint range[2] = { 0, 0 };
GLint precision = 0;
GetShaderPrecisionFormatImpl(shader_type, precision_type, range, &precision);
result->min_range = range[0];
result->max_range = range[1];
result->precision = precision;
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bgp_attr_aggregator(struct bgp_attr_parser_args *args)
{
struct peer *const peer = args->peer;
struct attr *const attr = args->attr;
const bgp_size_t length = args->length;
int wantedlen = 6;
/* peer with AS4 will send 4 Byte AS, peer without will send 2 Byte */
if (CHECK_FLAG(peer->cap, PEER_CAP_AS4_RCV))
wantedlen = 8;
if (length != wantedlen) {
flog_err(EC_BGP_ATTR_LEN,
"AGGREGATOR attribute length isn't %u [%u]", wantedlen,
length);
return bgp_attr_malformed(args, BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR,
args->total);
}
if (CHECK_FLAG(peer->cap, PEER_CAP_AS4_RCV))
attr->aggregator_as = stream_getl(peer->curr);
else
attr->aggregator_as = stream_getw(peer->curr);
attr->aggregator_addr.s_addr = stream_get_ipv4(peer->curr);
/* Set atomic aggregate flag. */
attr->flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_AGGREGATOR);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
}
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: doIgnoreSection(XML_Parser parser,
const ENCODING *enc,
const char **startPtr,
const char *end,
const char **nextPtr,
XML_Bool haveMore)
{
const char *next;
int tok;
const char *s = *startPtr;
const char **eventPP;
const char **eventEndPP;
if (enc == parser->m_encoding) {
eventPP = &parser->m_eventPtr;
*eventPP = s;
eventEndPP = &parser->m_eventEndPtr;
}
else {
/* It's not entirely clear, but it seems the following two lines
* of code cannot be executed. The only occasions on which 'enc'
* is not 'encoding' are when this function is called
* from the internal entity processing, and IGNORE sections are an
* error in internal entities.
*
* Since it really isn't clear that this is true, we keep the code
* and just remove it from our coverage tests.
*
* LCOV_EXCL_START
*/
eventPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventPtr);
eventEndPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventEndPtr);
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
}
*eventPP = s;
*startPtr = NULL;
tok = XmlIgnoreSectionTok(enc, s, end, &next);
*eventEndPP = next;
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_IGNORE_SECT:
if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
*startPtr = next;
*nextPtr = next;
if (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_FINISHED)
return XML_ERROR_ABORTED;
else
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
*eventPP = next;
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
case XML_TOK_NONE:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX; /* XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_IGNORE_SECTION */
default:
/* All of the tokens that XmlIgnoreSectionTok() returns have
* explicit cases to handle them, so this default case is never
* executed. We keep it as a safety net anyway, and remove it
* from our test coverage statistics.
*
* LCOV_EXCL_START
*/
*eventPP = next;
return XML_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_STATE;
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
}
/* not reached */
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 14,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlock::deleteEllipsisLineBoxes()
{
ETextAlign textAlign = style()->textAlign();
bool ltr = style()->isLeftToRightDirection();
bool firstLine = true;
for (RootInlineBox* curr = firstRootBox(); curr; curr = curr->nextRootBox()) {
if (curr->hasEllipsisBox()) {
curr->clearTruncation();
float logicalLeft = pixelSnappedLogicalLeftOffsetForLine(curr->lineTop(), firstLine);
float availableLogicalWidth = logicalRightOffsetForLine(curr->lineTop(), false) - logicalLeft;
float totalLogicalWidth = curr->logicalWidth();
updateLogicalWidthForAlignment(textAlign, curr, 0, logicalLeft, totalLogicalWidth, availableLogicalWidth, 0);
if (ltr)
curr->adjustLogicalPosition((logicalLeft - curr->logicalLeft()), 0);
else
curr->adjustLogicalPosition(-(curr->logicalLeft() - logicalLeft), 0);
}
firstLine = false;
}
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::IsRenderFrameCreated() {
return render_frame_created_;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 22,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsEnvironmentOptionEnabled(base::StringPiece option,
base::Environment* env) {
std::string name("OXIDE_");
name += option.data();
std::string result;
if (!env->GetVar(name, &result)) {
return false;
}
return result.size() > 0 && result[0] != '0';
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool reg_is_refcounted(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
return type_is_refcounted(reg->type);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int efx_netdev_event(struct notifier_block *this,
unsigned long event, void *ptr)
{
struct net_device *net_dev = ptr;
if (net_dev->netdev_ops == &efx_netdev_ops &&
event == NETDEV_CHANGENAME)
efx_update_name(netdev_priv(net_dev));
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Layer::ReplaceChild(Layer* reference, scoped_refptr<Layer> new_layer) {
DCHECK(reference);
DCHECK_EQ(reference->parent(), this);
DCHECK(IsPropertyChangeAllowed());
if (reference == new_layer.get())
return;
int reference_index = IndexOfChild(reference);
if (reference_index == -1) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
reference->RemoveFromParent();
if (new_layer.get()) {
new_layer->RemoveFromParent();
InsertChild(new_layer, reference_index);
}
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NonGarbageCollectedContainerRoot(Object* obj1, Object* obj2, int y)
: next_(obj1, y), obj_(obj2) {}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::RequestLoadStarted(unsigned long identifier,
Resource* resource,
const FetchParameters& params,
RevalidationPolicy policy,
bool is_static_data) {
KURL url = MemoryCache::RemoveFragmentIdentifierIfNeeded(params.Url());
if (policy == kUse && resource->GetStatus() == ResourceStatus::kCached &&
!cached_resources_map_.Contains(url)) {
DidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(identifier, resource,
params.GetResourceRequest());
}
if (is_static_data)
return;
if (policy == kUse && !resource->StillNeedsLoad() &&
!cached_resources_map_.Contains(url)) {
RefPtr<ResourceTimingInfo> info = ResourceTimingInfo::Create(
params.Options().initiator_info.name, MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(),
resource->GetType() == Resource::kMainResource);
PopulateTimingInfo(info.get(), resource);
info->ClearLoadTimings();
info->SetLoadFinishTime(info->InitialTime());
scheduled_resource_timing_reports_.push_back(std::move(info));
if (!resource_timing_report_timer_.IsActive())
resource_timing_report_timer_.StartOneShot(0, BLINK_FROM_HERE);
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::NewTab() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("NewTab"));
if (is_type_tabbed()) {
AddBlankTab(true);
GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper()->view()->RestoreFocus();
} else {
Browser* b = GetOrCreateTabbedBrowser(profile_);
b->AddBlankTab(true);
b->window()->Show();
b->GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper()->view()->RestoreFocus();
}
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mtree_atol10(char **p)
{
int64_t l, limit, last_digit_limit;
int base, digit, sign;
base = 10;
if (**p == '-') {
sign = -1;
limit = ((uint64_t)(INT64_MAX) + 1) / base;
last_digit_limit = ((uint64_t)(INT64_MAX) + 1) % base;
++(*p);
} else {
sign = 1;
limit = INT64_MAX / base;
last_digit_limit = INT64_MAX % base;
}
l = 0;
digit = **p - '0';
while (digit >= 0 && digit < base) {
if (l > limit || (l == limit && digit > last_digit_limit))
return (sign < 0) ? INT64_MIN : INT64_MAX;
l = (l * base) + digit;
digit = *++(*p) - '0';
}
return (sign < 0) ? -l : l;
}
Commit Message: Fix libarchive/archive_read_support_format_mtree.c:1388:11: error: array subscript is above array bounds
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void red_channel_pipes_add_type(RedChannel *channel, int pipe_item_type)
{
RingItem *link;
RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) {
red_channel_client_pipe_add_type(
SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link),
pipe_item_type);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 26,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHostView* InterstitialPageImpl::GetView() {
return render_view_host_->GetWidget()->GetView();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: path_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
char *str = PG_GETARG_CSTRING(0);
PATH *path;
int isopen;
char *s;
int npts;
int size;
int depth = 0;
if ((npts = pair_count(str, ',')) <= 0)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type path: \"%s\"", str)));
s = str;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *s))
s++;
/* skip single leading paren */
if ((*s == LDELIM) && (strrchr(s, LDELIM) == s))
{
s++;
depth++;
}
size = offsetof(PATH, p[0]) +sizeof(path->p[0]) * npts;
path = (PATH *) palloc(size);
SET_VARSIZE(path, size);
path->npts = npts;
if ((!path_decode(TRUE, npts, s, &isopen, &s, &(path->p[0])))
&& (!((depth == 0) && (*s == '\0'))) && !((depth >= 1) && (*s == RDELIM)))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type path: \"%s\"", str)));
path->closed = (!isopen);
/* prevent instability in unused pad bytes */
path->dummy = 0;
PG_RETURN_PATH_P(path);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void reds_on_client_seamless_migrate_complete(RedClient *client)
{
spice_debug(NULL);
if (!reds_find_client(client)) {
spice_info("client no longer exists");
return;
}
main_channel_migrate_dst_complete(red_client_get_main(client));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::writeUint32(uint32_t val)
{
return writeAligned(val);
}
Commit Message: Correctly handle dup() failure in Parcel::readNativeHandle
bail out if dup() fails, instead of creating an invalid native_handle_t
Bug: 28395952
Change-Id: Ia1a6198c0f45165b9c6a55a803e5f64d8afa0572
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport VirtualPixelMethod SetImageVirtualPixelMethod(Image *image,
const VirtualPixelMethod virtual_pixel_method,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
return(SetPixelCacheVirtualMethod(image,virtual_pixel_method,exception));
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputHandlerProxy::WillShutdown() {
scroll_elasticity_controller_.reset();
input_handler_ = NULL;
client_->WillShutdown();
}
Commit Message: Revert "Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures"
This reverts commit d9a56afcbdf9850bc39bb3edb56d07d11a1eb2b2.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 669086 as the
culprit for flakes in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/p/chromium/flake-portal/analysis/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyQwsSDEZsYWtlQ3VscHJpdCIxY2hyb21pdW0vZDlhNTZhZmNiZGY5ODUwYmMzOWJiM2VkYjU2ZDA3ZDExYTFlYjJiMgw
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.chromiumos/linux-chromeos-rel/25818
Sample Failed Step: content_browsertests on Ubuntu-16.04
Sample Flaky Test: ScrollLatencyScrollbarBrowserTest.ScrollbarThumbDragLatency
Original change's description:
> Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures
>
> The original change to enable scrollbar latency for the composited
> scrollbars incorrectly used an existing member to try and determine
> whether a GestureScrollUpdate was the first one in an injected sequence
> or not. is_first_gesture_scroll_update_ was incorrect because it is only
> updated when input is actually dispatched to InputHandlerProxy, and the
> flag is cleared for all GSUs before the location where it was being
> read.
>
> This bug was missed because of incorrect tests. The
> VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram method doesn't actually assert or
> expect anything - the return value must be inspected.
>
> As part of fixing up the tests, I made a few other changes to get them
> passing consistently across all platforms:
> - turn on main thread scrollbar injection feature (in case it's ever
> turned off we don't want the tests to start failing)
> - enable mock scrollbars
> - disable smooth scrolling
> - don't run scrollbar tests on Android
>
> The composited scrollbar button test is disabled due to a bug in how
> the mock theme reports its button sizes, which throws off the region
> detection in ScrollbarLayerImplBase::IdentifyScrollbarPart (filed
> crbug.com/974063 for this issue).
>
> Change-Id: Ie1a762a5f6ecc264d22f0256db68f141fc76b950
>
> Bug: 954007
> Change-Id: Ib258e08e083e79da90ba2e4e4216e4879cf00cf7
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1652741
> Commit-Queue: Daniel Libby <dlibby@microsoft.com>
> Reviewed-by: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669086}
Change-Id: Icc743e48fa740fe27f0cb0cfa21b209a696f518c
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 954007
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1660114
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669150}
CWE ID: CWE-281 | 0 | 2,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lock_encryption_data_ref (LockEncryptionData *data)
{
data->refcount++;
return data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 23,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: generate_pac(kdc_request_t r, Key *skey)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_pac p = NULL;
krb5_data data;
ret = _kdc_pac_generate(r->context, r->client, &p);
if (ret) {
_kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
r->client_name);
return ret;
}
if (p == NULL)
return 0;
ret = _krb5_pac_sign(r->context, p, r->et.authtime,
r->client->entry.principal,
&skey->key, /* Server key */
&skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
&data);
krb5_pac_free(r->context, p);
if (ret) {
_kdc_r_log(r, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
r->client_name);
return ret;
}
ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(r->context, &r->et,
KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
&data);
krb5_data_free(&data);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Security: Avoid NULL structure pointer member dereference
This can happen in the error path when processing malformed AS
requests with a NULL client name. Bug originally introduced on
Fri Feb 13 09:26:01 2015 +0100 in commit:
a873e21d7c06f22943a90a41dc733ae76799390d
kdc: base _kdc_fast_mk_error() on krb5_mk_error_ext()
Original patch by Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@secure-endpoints.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 18,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadJNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
MngInfo
*mng_info;
char
magic_number[MagickPathExtent];
size_t
count;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Enter ReadJNGImage()");
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
mng_info=(MngInfo *) NULL;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"JNG") != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/* Verify JNG signature. */
count=(size_t) ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (count < 8 || memcmp(magic_number,"\213JNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/* Allocate a MngInfo structure. */
mng_info=(MngInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*mng_info));
if (mng_info == (MngInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/* Initialize members of the MngInfo structure. */
(void) ResetMagickMemory(mng_info,0,sizeof(MngInfo));
mng_info->image=image;
image=ReadOneJNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
mng_info=MngInfoFreeStruct(mng_info);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadJNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadJNGImage() with error");
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"exit ReadJNGImage()");
return(image);
}
Commit Message: coders/png.c: Stop a memory leak in read_user_chunk_callback() (reference
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/517).
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CString TextCodecUTF8::EncodeCommon(const CharType* characters,
wtf_size_t length) {
CHECK_LE(length, std::numeric_limits<wtf_size_t>::max() / 3);
Vector<uint8_t> bytes(length * 3);
wtf_size_t i = 0;
wtf_size_t bytes_written = 0;
while (i < length) {
UChar32 character;
U16_NEXT(characters, i, length, character);
if (0xD800 <= character && character <= 0xDFFF)
character = kReplacementCharacter;
U8_APPEND_UNSAFE(bytes.data(), bytes_written, character);
}
return CString(reinterpret_cast<char*>(bytes.data()), bytes_written);
}
Commit Message: Add bounds CHECK to UTF-8 decoder memory allocation.
Avoid integer overflow when computing a total buffer size from a base
buffer and small partial sequence buffer.
Bug: 901030
Change-Id: Ic82db2c6af770bd748fb1ec881999d0dfaac30f0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1313833
Reviewed-by: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605011}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 19,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const gfx::ImageSkia PageInfoUI::GetVrSettingsIcon(SkColor related_text_color) {
return gfx::CreateVectorIcon(
kVrHeadsetIcon, kVectorIconSize,
color_utils::DeriveDefaultIconColor(related_text_color));
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int modbus_set_indication_timeout(modbus_t *ctx, uint32_t to_sec, uint32_t to_usec)
{
/* Indication timeout can be disabled when both values are zero */
if (ctx == NULL || to_usec > 999999) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
ctx->indication_timeout.tv_sec = to_sec;
ctx->indication_timeout.tv_usec = to_usec;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 4,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API bool r_config_save_char(RConfigHold *h, ...) {
va_list ap;
char *key;
if (!h->list_char) {
h->list_char = r_list_newf ((RListFree) free);
if (!h->list_char) {
return false;
}
}
va_start (ap, h);
while ((key = va_arg (ap, char *))) {
RConfigHoldChar *hc = R_NEW0 (RConfigHoldChar);
if (!hc) {
continue;
}
hc->key = key;
hc->value = r_config_get (h->cfg, key);
r_list_append (h->list_char, hc);
}
va_end (ap);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 19,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void doWriteAlgorithmId(blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmId id)
{
switch (id) {
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdAesCbc:
return doWriteUint32(AesCbcTag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdHmac:
return doWriteUint32(HmacTag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdRsaSsaPkcs1v1_5:
return doWriteUint32(RsaSsaPkcs1v1_5Tag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdSha1:
return doWriteUint32(Sha1Tag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdSha256:
return doWriteUint32(Sha256Tag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdSha384:
return doWriteUint32(Sha384Tag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdSha512:
return doWriteUint32(Sha512Tag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdAesGcm:
return doWriteUint32(AesGcmTag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdRsaOaep:
return doWriteUint32(RsaOaepTag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdAesCtr:
return doWriteUint32(AesCtrTag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdAesKw:
return doWriteUint32(AesKwTag);
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType JPEGWarningHandler(j_common_ptr jpeg_info,int level)
{
#define JPEGExcessiveWarnings 1000
char
message[JMSG_LENGTH_MAX];
ErrorManager
*error_manager;
Image
*image;
*message='\0';
error_manager=(ErrorManager *) jpeg_info->client_data;
image=error_manager->image;
if (level < 0)
{
/*
Process warning message.
*/
(jpeg_info->err->format_message)(jpeg_info,message);
if (jpeg_info->err->num_warnings++ < JPEGExcessiveWarnings)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageWarning,(char *) message,
image->filename);
}
else
if ((image->debug != MagickFalse) && (level >= jpeg_info->err->trace_level))
{
/*
Process trace message.
*/
(jpeg_info->err->format_message)(jpeg_info,message);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"[%s] JPEG Trace: \"%s\"",image->filename,message);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void perf_event_enable(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct task_struct *task = ctx->task;
if (!task) {
/*
* Enable the event on the cpu that it's on
*/
cpu_function_call(event->cpu, __perf_event_enable, event);
return;
}
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
if (event->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE)
goto out;
/*
* If the event is in error state, clear that first.
* That way, if we see the event in error state below, we
* know that it has gone back into error state, as distinct
* from the task having been scheduled away before the
* cross-call arrived.
*/
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_ERROR)
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF;
retry:
if (!ctx->is_active) {
__perf_event_mark_enabled(event);
goto out;
}
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
if (!task_function_call(task, __perf_event_enable, event))
return;
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
/*
* If the context is active and the event is still off,
* we need to retry the cross-call.
*/
if (ctx->is_active && event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF) {
/*
* task could have been flipped by a concurrent
* perf_event_context_sched_out()
*/
task = ctx->task;
goto retry;
}
out:
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 17,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ShellAuraPlatformData::~ShellAuraPlatformData() {
}
Commit Message: shell_aura: Set child to root window size, not host size
The host size is in pixels and the root window size is in scaled pixels.
So, using the pixel size may make the child window much larger than the
root window (and screen). Fix this by matching the root window size.
BUG=335713
TEST=ozone content_shell with --force-device-scale-factor=2
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/141853003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@246389 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType SetsRGBImageProfile(Image *image)
{
static unsigned char
sRGBProfile[] =
{
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0xfe, 0x4b, 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xff, 0x6d, 0xff, 0xff
};
StringInfo
*profile;
MagickBooleanType
status;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (GetImageProfile(image,"icc") != (const StringInfo *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
profile=AcquireStringInfo(sizeof(sRGBProfile));
SetStringInfoDatum(profile,sRGBProfile);
status=SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/354
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 26,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline size_t xfrm_mapping_msgsize(void)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_mapping));
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rdpRdp* rdp_new(freerdp* instance)
{
rdpRdp* rdp;
rdp = (rdpRdp*) malloc(sizeof(rdpRdp));
if (rdp != NULL)
{
ZeroMemory(rdp, sizeof(rdpRdp));
rdp->instance = instance;
rdp->settings = freerdp_settings_new((void*) instance);
if (instance != NULL)
instance->settings = rdp->settings;
rdp->extension = extension_new(instance);
rdp->transport = transport_new(rdp->settings);
rdp->license = license_new(rdp);
rdp->input = input_new(rdp);
rdp->update = update_new(rdp);
rdp->fastpath = fastpath_new(rdp);
rdp->nego = nego_new(rdp->transport);
rdp->mcs = mcs_new(rdp->transport);
rdp->redirection = redirection_new();
rdp->mppc_dec = mppc_dec_new();
rdp->mppc_enc = mppc_enc_new(PROTO_RDP_50);
}
return rdp;
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 8,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: coolkey_v0_get_attribute_data(const u8 *attr, size_t buf_len, sc_cardctl_coolkey_attribute_t *attr_out)
{
/* we need to manually detect types CK_ULONG */
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attr_type = coolkey_get_attribute_type(attr, COOLKEY_V0_OBJECT, buf_len);
int r;
size_t len;
attr_out->attribute_data_type = SC_CARDCTL_COOLKEY_ATTR_TYPE_STRING;
attr_out->attribute_length = 0;
attr_out->attribute_value = NULL;
r = coolkey_v0_get_attribute_len(attr, buf_len, &len);
if (r < 0) {
return r;
}
if ((attr_type == CKA_CLASS) || (attr_type == CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE)
|| (attr_type == CKA_KEY_TYPE)) {
if (len != 4) {
return SC_ERROR_CORRUPTED_DATA;
}
attr_out->attribute_data_type = SC_CARDCTL_COOLKEY_ATTR_TYPE_ULONG;
}
/* return the length and the data */
attr_out->attribute_length = len;
attr_out->attribute_value = attr+sizeof(coolkey_v0_attribute_header_t);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 19,822 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isTexture(WebGLTexture* texture) {
if (!texture || isContextLost())
return 0;
if (!texture->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
if (texture->IsDeleted())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsTexture(texture->Object());
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsTestObjFloatSequenceAttr(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
UNUSED_PARAM(exec);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
JSValue result = jsArray(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), impl->floatSequenceAttr());
return result;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String Range::toHTML() const
{
return createMarkup(this);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 6,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::SavePage() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("SavePage"), profile_);
TabContents* current_tab = GetSelectedTabContents();
if (current_tab && current_tab->contents_mime_type() == "application/pdf")
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("PDF.SavePage"), profile_);
GetSelectedTabContents()->OnSavePage();
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetProfile(Profile* profile) {
pref_registrar_.reset(new PrefChangeRegistrar);
pref_registrar_->Init(profile->GetPrefs());
pref_registrar_->Add(prefs::kUse24HourClock, this);
pref_registrar_->Add(prefs::kLanguageXkbRemapSearchKeyTo, this);
UpdateClockType(profile->GetPrefs());
search_key_mapped_to_ =
profile->GetPrefs()->GetInteger(prefs::kLanguageXkbRemapSearchKeyTo);
if (gdata::util::IsGDataAvailable(profile)) {
GDataSystemService* system_service =
GDataSystemServiceFactory::FindForProfile(profile);
if (!system_service || !system_service->file_system())
return;
system_service->file_system()->GetOperationRegistry()->
AddObserver(this);
}
}
Commit Message: Use display_email() for Uber Tray messages.
BUG=124087
TEST=manually
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10388171
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137721 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,169 |
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