instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
235k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline void print_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
printk("vma start 0x%08lx\n", vma->vm_start);
printk("vma end 0x%08lx\n", vma->vm_end);
print_prots(vma->vm_page_prot);
printk("vm_flags 0x%08lx\n", vma->vm_flags);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: base::TimeDelta GetLongestObservationWindow() {
const SiteCharacteristicsDatabaseParams& params =
GetStaticSiteCharacteristicsDatabaseParams();
return std::max({params.favicon_update_observation_window,
params.title_update_observation_window,
params.audio_usage_observation_window,
params.notifications_usage_observation_window});
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 132,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void do_send_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
unsigned long error_code, int signal_code, int breakpt)
{
siginfo_t info;
current->thread.trap_nr = signal_code;
if (notify_die(DIE_DABR_MATCH, "dabr_match", regs, error_code,
11, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
return;
/* Deliver the signal to userspace */
info.si_signo = SIGTRAP;
info.si_errno = breakpt; /* breakpoint or watchpoint id */
info.si_code = signal_code;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)address;
force_sig_info(SIGTRAP, &info, current);
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void nfs40_clear_delegation_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state)
{
if (rcu_access_pointer(NFS_I(state->inode)->delegation) != NULL)
nfs_finish_clear_delegation_stateid(state);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: json_t *json_loads(const char *string, size_t flags, json_error_t *error)
{
lex_t lex;
json_t *result;
string_data_t stream_data;
jsonp_error_init(error, "<string>");
if (string == NULL) {
error_set(error, NULL, "wrong arguments");
return NULL;
}
stream_data.data = string;
stream_data.pos = 0;
if(lex_init(&lex, string_get, flags, (void *)&stream_data))
return NULL;
result = parse_json(&lex, flags, error);
lex_close(&lex);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix for issue #282
The fix limits recursion depths when parsing arrays and objects.
The limit is configurable via the `JSON_PARSER_MAX_DEPTH` setting
within `jansson_config.h` and is set by default to 2048.
Update the RFC conformance document to note the limit; the RFC
allows limits to be set by the implementation so nothing has
actually changed w.r.t. conformance state.
Reported by Gustavo Grieco.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 53,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void MediaStreamManager::FinishTabCaptureRequestSetupWithDeviceId(
const std::string& label,
const DesktopMediaID& device_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::IO);
DeviceRequest* request = FindRequest(label);
if (!request) {
DVLOG(1) << "SetUpRequest label " << label << " doesn't exist!!";
return; // This can happen if the request has been canceled.
}
if (device_id.type != content::DesktopMediaID::TYPE_WEB_CONTENTS) {
FinalizeRequestFailed(label, request, MEDIA_DEVICE_TAB_CAPTURE_FAILURE);
return;
}
content::WebContentsMediaCaptureId web_id = device_id.web_contents_id;
web_id.disable_local_echo = request->controls.disable_local_echo;
request->tab_capture_device_id = web_id.ToString();
request->CreateTabCaptureUIRequest(web_id.render_process_id,
web_id.main_render_frame_id);
DVLOG(3) << "SetUpTabCaptureRequest "
<< ", {capture_device_id = " << web_id.ToString() << "}"
<< ", {target_render_process_id = " << web_id.render_process_id
<< "}"
<< ", {target_render_frame_id = " << web_id.main_render_frame_id
<< "}";
ReadOutputParamsAndPostRequestToUI(label, request, MediaDeviceEnumeration());
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: std::string TemplateURLRef::GetPostParamsString() const {
switch (type_) {
case INDEXED:
case SEARCH: return owner_->search_url_post_params();
case SUGGEST: return owner_->suggestions_url_post_params();
case INSTANT: return owner_->instant_url_post_params();
case NEW_TAB: return std::string();
case CONTEXTUAL_SEARCH: return std::string();
case IMAGE: return owner_->image_url_post_params();
default: NOTREACHED(); return std::string(); // NOLINT
}
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHost::InitializeProxy(scoped_ptr<Proxy> proxy) {
TRACE_EVENT0("cc", "LayerTreeHost::InitializeForReal");
proxy_ = proxy.Pass();
proxy_->Start();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(wddx_packet_end)
{
zval *packet_id;
wddx_packet *packet = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r", &packet_id) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((packet = (wddx_packet *)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(packet_id), "WDDX packet ID", le_wddx)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_E);
php_wddx_packet_end(packet);
smart_str_0(packet);
RETVAL_STR_COPY(packet->s);
zend_list_close(Z_RES_P(packet_id));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73831 - NULL Pointer Dereference while unserialize php object
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 71,111
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void OmniboxViewViews::ExecuteCommand(int command_id, int event_flags) {
DestroyTouchSelection();
switch (command_id) {
case IDC_PASTE_AND_GO:
model()->PasteAndGo(GetClipboardText());
return;
case IDS_SHOW_URL:
model()->Unelide(true /* exit_query_in_omnibox */);
return;
case IDC_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES:
location_bar_view_->command_updater()->ExecuteCommand(command_id);
return;
case IDC_SEND_TAB_TO_SELF:
send_tab_to_self::RecordSendTabToSelfClickResult(
send_tab_to_self::kOmniboxMenu, SendTabToSelfClickResult::kClickItem);
send_tab_to_self::CreateNewEntry(location_bar_view_->GetWebContents());
return;
case IDS_APP_PASTE:
ExecuteTextEditCommand(ui::TextEditCommand::PASTE);
return;
default:
if (Textfield::IsCommandIdEnabled(command_id)) {
Textfield::ExecuteCommand(command_id, event_flags);
return;
}
OnBeforePossibleChange();
location_bar_view_->command_updater()->ExecuteCommand(command_id);
OnAfterPossibleChange(true);
return;
}
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 142,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 eb;
eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
(1u << NM_VECTOR) | (1u << DB_VECTOR);
if ((vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)) ==
(KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP))
eb |= 1u << BP_VECTOR;
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active)
eb = ~0;
if (enable_ept)
eb &= ~(1u << PF_VECTOR); /* bypass_guest_pf = 0 */
if (vcpu->fpu_active)
eb &= ~(1u << NM_VECTOR);
/* When we are running a nested L2 guest and L1 specified for it a
* certain exception bitmap, we must trap the same exceptions and pass
* them to L1. When running L2, we will only handle the exceptions
* specified above if L1 did not want them.
*/
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
eb |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->exception_bitmap;
vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void AppCacheGroup::QueueUpdate(AppCacheHost* host,
const GURL& new_master_resource) {
DCHECK(update_job_ && host && !new_master_resource.is_empty());
queued_updates_.insert(QueuedUpdates::value_type(
host, std::make_pair(host, new_master_resource)));
host->AddObserver(host_observer_.get());
if (FindObserver(host, observers_)) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(host);
queued_observers_.AddObserver(host);
}
}
Commit Message: Refcount AppCacheGroup correctly.
Bug: 888926
Change-Id: Iab0d82d272e2f24a5e91180d64bc8e2aa8a8238d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1246827
Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594475}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: status_t GraphicBuffer::lock(uint32_t usage, const Rect& rect, void** vaddr)
{
if (rect.left < 0 || rect.right > this->width ||
rect.top < 0 || rect.bottom > this->height) {
ALOGE("locking pixels (%d,%d,%d,%d) outside of buffer (w=%d, h=%d)",
rect.left, rect.top, rect.right, rect.bottom,
this->width, this->height);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
status_t res = getBufferMapper().lock(handle, usage, rect, vaddr);
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void tcp_v6_hash(struct sock *sk)
{
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE) {
if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops == &ipv6_mapped) {
tcp_prot.hash(sk);
return;
}
local_bh_disable();
__inet6_hash(sk, NULL);
local_bh_enable();
}
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,133
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int GetSelectedIndex() {
base::string16 script(base::ASCIIToUTF16(kSelectID));
script.append(base::ASCIIToUTF16(".selectedIndex"));
int selected_index = -1;
ExecuteJavaScriptAndReturnIntValue(script, &selected_index);
return selected_index;
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,832
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DetachDelegate() {
delegate_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,604
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static long setup_tm_sigcontexts(struct sigcontext __user *sc,
struct sigcontext __user *tm_sc,
struct pt_regs *regs,
int signr, sigset_t *set, unsigned long handler)
{
/* When CONFIG_ALTIVEC is set, we _always_ setup v_regs even if the
* process never used altivec yet (MSR_VEC is zero in pt_regs of
* the context). This is very important because we must ensure we
* don't lose the VRSAVE content that may have been set prior to
* the process doing its first vector operation
* Userland shall check AT_HWCAP to know wether it can rely on the
* v_regs pointer or not.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
elf_vrreg_t __user *v_regs = sigcontext_vmx_regs(sc);
elf_vrreg_t __user *tm_v_regs = sigcontext_vmx_regs(tm_sc);
#endif
unsigned long msr = regs->msr;
long err = 0;
BUG_ON(!MSR_TM_ACTIVE(regs->msr));
/* Remove TM bits from thread's MSR. The MSR in the sigcontext
* just indicates to userland that we were doing a transaction, but we
* don't want to return in transactional state. This also ensures
* that flush_fp_to_thread won't set TIF_RESTORE_TM again.
*/
regs->msr &= ~MSR_TS_MASK;
flush_fp_to_thread(current);
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
err |= __put_user(v_regs, &sc->v_regs);
err |= __put_user(tm_v_regs, &tm_sc->v_regs);
/* save altivec registers */
if (current->thread.used_vr) {
flush_altivec_to_thread(current);
/* Copy 33 vec registers (vr0..31 and vscr) to the stack */
err |= __copy_to_user(v_regs, ¤t->thread.vr_state,
33 * sizeof(vector128));
/* If VEC was enabled there are transactional VRs valid too,
* else they're a copy of the checkpointed VRs.
*/
if (msr & MSR_VEC)
err |= __copy_to_user(tm_v_regs,
¤t->thread.transact_vr,
33 * sizeof(vector128));
else
err |= __copy_to_user(tm_v_regs,
¤t->thread.vr_state,
33 * sizeof(vector128));
/* set MSR_VEC in the MSR value in the frame to indicate
* that sc->v_reg contains valid data.
*/
msr |= MSR_VEC;
}
/* We always copy to/from vrsave, it's 0 if we don't have or don't
* use altivec.
*/
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC))
current->thread.vrsave = mfspr(SPRN_VRSAVE);
err |= __put_user(current->thread.vrsave, (u32 __user *)&v_regs[33]);
if (msr & MSR_VEC)
err |= __put_user(current->thread.transact_vrsave,
(u32 __user *)&tm_v_regs[33]);
else
err |= __put_user(current->thread.vrsave,
(u32 __user *)&tm_v_regs[33]);
#else /* CONFIG_ALTIVEC */
err |= __put_user(0, &sc->v_regs);
err |= __put_user(0, &tm_sc->v_regs);
#endif /* CONFIG_ALTIVEC */
/* copy fpr regs and fpscr */
err |= copy_fpr_to_user(&sc->fp_regs, current);
if (msr & MSR_FP)
err |= copy_transact_fpr_to_user(&tm_sc->fp_regs, current);
else
err |= copy_fpr_to_user(&tm_sc->fp_regs, current);
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
/*
* Copy VSX low doubleword to local buffer for formatting,
* then out to userspace. Update v_regs to point after the
* VMX data.
*/
if (current->thread.used_vsr) {
__giveup_vsx(current);
v_regs += ELF_NVRREG;
tm_v_regs += ELF_NVRREG;
err |= copy_vsx_to_user(v_regs, current);
if (msr & MSR_VSX)
err |= copy_transact_vsx_to_user(tm_v_regs, current);
else
err |= copy_vsx_to_user(tm_v_regs, current);
/* set MSR_VSX in the MSR value in the frame to
* indicate that sc->vs_reg) contains valid data.
*/
msr |= MSR_VSX;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_VSX */
err |= __put_user(&sc->gp_regs, &sc->regs);
err |= __put_user(&tm_sc->gp_regs, &tm_sc->regs);
WARN_ON(!FULL_REGS(regs));
err |= __copy_to_user(&tm_sc->gp_regs, regs, GP_REGS_SIZE);
err |= __copy_to_user(&sc->gp_regs,
¤t->thread.ckpt_regs, GP_REGS_SIZE);
err |= __put_user(msr, &tm_sc->gp_regs[PT_MSR]);
err |= __put_user(msr, &sc->gp_regs[PT_MSR]);
err |= __put_user(signr, &sc->signal);
err |= __put_user(handler, &sc->handler);
if (set != NULL)
err |= __put_user(set->sig[0], &sc->oldmask);
return err;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 56,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int fixed_msr_to_range_index(u32 msr)
{
int seg, unit;
if (!fixed_msr_to_seg_unit(msr, &seg, &unit))
return -1;
return fixed_mtrr_seg_unit_range_index(seg, unit);
}
Commit Message: KVM: MTRR: remove MSR 0x2f8
MSR 0x2f8 accessed the 124th Variable Range MTRR ever since MTRR support
was introduced by 9ba075a664df ("KVM: MTRR support").
0x2f8 became harmful when 910a6aae4e2e ("KVM: MTRR: exactly define the
size of variable MTRRs") shrinked the array of VR MTRRs from 256 to 8,
which made access to index 124 out of bounds. The surrounding code only
WARNs in this situation, thus the guest gained a limited read/write
access to struct kvm_arch_vcpu.
0x2f8 is not a valid VR MTRR MSR, because KVM has/advertises only 16 VR
MTRR MSRs, 0x200-0x20f. Every VR MTRR is set up using two MSRs, 0x2f8
was treated as a PHYSBASE and 0x2f9 would be its PHYSMASK, but 0x2f9 was
not implemented in KVM, therefore 0x2f8 could never do anything useful
and getting rid of it is safe.
This fixes CVE-2016-3713.
Fixes: 910a6aae4e2e ("KVM: MTRR: exactly define the size of variable MTRRs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 53,748
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::didUninstallPageOverlay()
{
destroyPageOverlayLayer();
scheduleLayerFlush();
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 97,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: rotateContigSamples24bits(uint16 rotation, uint16 spp, uint16 bps, uint32 width,
uint32 length, uint32 col, uint8 *src, uint8 *dst)
{
int ready_bits = 0;
uint32 row, rowsize, bit_offset;
uint32 src_byte = 0, src_bit = 0;
uint32 matchbits = 0, maskbits = 0;
uint32 buff1 = 0, buff2 = 0;
uint8 bytebuff1 = 0, bytebuff2 = 0;
uint8 *next;
tsample_t sample;
if ((src == NULL) || (dst == NULL))
{
TIFFError("rotateContigSamples24bits","Invalid src or destination buffer");
return (1);
}
rowsize = ((bps * spp * width) + 7) / 8;
ready_bits = 0;
maskbits = (uint32)-1 >> (32 - bps);
buff1 = buff2 = 0;
for (row = 0; row < length; row++)
{
bit_offset = col * bps * spp;
for (sample = 0; sample < spp; sample++)
{
if (sample == 0)
{
src_byte = bit_offset / 8;
src_bit = bit_offset % 8;
}
else
{
src_byte = (bit_offset + (sample * bps)) / 8;
src_bit = (bit_offset + (sample * bps)) % 8;
}
switch (rotation)
{
case 90: next = src + src_byte - (row * rowsize);
break;
case 270: next = src + src_byte + (row * rowsize);
break;
default: TIFFError("rotateContigSamples8bits", "Invalid rotation %d", rotation);
return (1);
}
matchbits = maskbits << (32 - src_bit - bps);
if (little_endian)
buff1 = (next[0] << 24) | (next[1] << 16) | (next[2] << 8) | next[3];
else
buff1 = (next[3] << 24) | (next[2] << 16) | (next[1] << 8) | next[0];
buff1 = (buff1 & matchbits) << (src_bit);
/* If we have a full buffer's worth, write it out */
if (ready_bits >= 16)
{
bytebuff1 = (buff2 >> 24);
*dst++ = bytebuff1;
bytebuff2 = (buff2 >> 16);
*dst++ = bytebuff2;
ready_bits -= 16;
/* shift in new bits */
buff2 = ((buff2 << 16) | (buff1 >> ready_bits));
}
else
{ /* add another bps bits to the buffer */
bytebuff1 = bytebuff2 = 0;
buff2 = (buff2 | (buff1 >> ready_bits));
}
ready_bits += bps;
}
}
/* catch any trailing bits at the end of the line */
while (ready_bits > 0)
{
bytebuff1 = (buff2 >> 24);
*dst++ = bytebuff1;
buff2 = (buff2 << 8);
bytebuff2 = bytebuff1;
ready_bits -= 8;
}
return (0);
} /* end rotateContigSamples24bits */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 48,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void Document::suspendScriptedAnimationControllerCallbacks()
{
#if ENABLE(REQUEST_ANIMATION_FRAME)
if (m_scriptedAnimationController)
m_scriptedAnimationController->suspend();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoIsSampler(GLuint sampler,
uint32_t* result) {
*result = api()->glIsSamplerFn(GetSamplerServiceID(sampler, resources_));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int compat_import_iovec(int type, const struct compat_iovec __user * uvector,
unsigned nr_segs, unsigned fast_segs,
struct iovec **iov, struct iov_iter *i)
{
ssize_t n;
struct iovec *p;
n = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(type, uvector, nr_segs, fast_segs,
*iov, &p);
if (n < 0) {
if (p != *iov)
kfree(p);
*iov = NULL;
return n;
}
iov_iter_init(i, type, p, nr_segs, n);
*iov = p == *iov ? NULL : p;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 68,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: xfs_attr_shortform_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
{
xfs_attr_sf_sort_t *sa, *sb;
sa = (xfs_attr_sf_sort_t *)a;
sb = (xfs_attr_sf_sort_t *)b;
if (sa->hash < sb->hash) {
return(-1);
} else if (sa->hash > sb->hash) {
return(1);
} else {
return(sa->entno - sb->entno);
}
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 44,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int vrend_decode_set_streamout_targets(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx,
uint16_t length)
{
uint32_t handles[16];
uint32_t num_handles = length - 1;
uint32_t append_bitmask;
int i;
if (length < 1)
return EINVAL;
if (num_handles > ARRAY_SIZE(handles))
return EINVAL;
append_bitmask = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_SET_STREAMOUT_TARGETS_APPEND_BITMASK);
for (i = 0; i < num_handles; i++)
handles[i] = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_SET_STREAMOUT_TARGETS_H0 + i);
vrend_set_streamout_targets(ctx->grctx, append_bitmask, num_handles, handles);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 9,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void xdr_write_pages(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct page **pages, unsigned int base,
unsigned int len)
{
struct xdr_buf *buf = xdr->buf;
struct kvec *iov = buf->tail;
buf->pages = pages;
buf->page_base = base;
buf->page_len = len;
iov->iov_base = (char *)xdr->p;
iov->iov_len = 0;
xdr->iov = iov;
if (len & 3) {
unsigned int pad = 4 - (len & 3);
BUG_ON(xdr->p >= xdr->end);
iov->iov_base = (char *)xdr->p + (len & 3);
iov->iov_len += pad;
len += pad;
*xdr->p++ = 0;
}
buf->buflen += len;
buf->len += len;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,544
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoFlush() {
api()->glFlushFn();
error::Error error = ProcessReadPixels(false);
if (error != error::kNoError) {
return error;
}
return ProcessQueries(false);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,961
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::OnaddICECandidateResult(
const blink::WebRTCVoidRequest& webkit_request, bool result) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
TRACE_EVENT0("webrtc", "RTCPeerConnectionHandler::OnaddICECandidateResult");
if (!result) {
return webkit_request.RequestFailed(
webrtc::RTCError(webrtc::RTCErrorType::UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION,
std::move("Error processing ICE candidate")));
}
return webkit_request.RequestSucceeded();
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void CastCastView::UpdateLabel() {
if (cast_config_delegate_ == nullptr ||
cast_config_delegate_->HasCastExtension() == false)
return;
cast_config_delegate_->GetReceiversAndActivities(
base::Bind(&CastCastView::UpdateLabelCallback, base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 119,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: val_unwrap_aead_args(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer,
gss_buffer_t output_payload_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
/* Initialize outputs. */
if (minor_status != NULL)
*minor_status = 0;
/* Validate arguments. */
if (minor_status == NULL)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE);
if (context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
if (input_message_buffer == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ);
if (output_payload_buffer == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE);
return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 63,349
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int nf_tables_dump_sets(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
const struct nft_set *set;
unsigned int idx, s_idx = cb->args[0];
struct nft_af_info *afi;
struct nft_table *table, *cur_table = (struct nft_table *)cb->args[2];
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
int cur_family = cb->args[3];
struct nft_ctx *ctx = cb->data, ctx_set;
if (cb->args[1])
return skb->len;
rcu_read_lock();
cb->seq = net->nft.base_seq;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(afi, &net->nft.af_info, list) {
if (ctx->afi && ctx->afi != afi)
continue;
if (cur_family) {
if (afi->family != cur_family)
continue;
cur_family = 0;
}
list_for_each_entry_rcu(table, &afi->tables, list) {
if (ctx->table && ctx->table != table)
continue;
if (cur_table) {
if (cur_table != table)
continue;
cur_table = NULL;
}
idx = 0;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(set, &table->sets, list) {
if (idx < s_idx)
goto cont;
ctx_set = *ctx;
ctx_set.table = table;
ctx_set.afi = afi;
if (nf_tables_fill_set(skb, &ctx_set, set,
NFT_MSG_NEWSET,
NLM_F_MULTI) < 0) {
cb->args[0] = idx;
cb->args[2] = (unsigned long) table;
cb->args[3] = afi->family;
goto done;
}
nl_dump_check_consistent(cb, nlmsg_hdr(skb));
cont:
idx++;
}
if (s_idx)
s_idx = 0;
}
}
cb->args[1] = 1;
done:
rcu_read_unlock();
return skb->len;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 57,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: vqp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *pptr, register u_int len)
{
const struct vqp_common_header_t *vqp_common_header;
const struct vqp_obj_tlv_t *vqp_obj_tlv;
const u_char *tptr;
uint16_t vqp_obj_len;
uint32_t vqp_obj_type;
int tlen;
uint8_t nitems;
tptr=pptr;
tlen = len;
vqp_common_header = (const struct vqp_common_header_t *)pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*vqp_common_header);
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (VQP_EXTRACT_VERSION(vqp_common_header->version) != VQP_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VQP version %u packet not supported",
VQP_EXTRACT_VERSION(vqp_common_header->version)));
return;
}
/* in non-verbose mode just lets print the basic Message Type */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VQPv%u %s Message, error-code %s (%u), length %u",
VQP_EXTRACT_VERSION(vqp_common_header->version),
tok2str(vqp_msg_type_values, "unknown (%u)",vqp_common_header->msg_type),
tok2str(vqp_error_code_values, "unknown (%u)",vqp_common_header->error_code),
vqp_common_header->error_code,
len));
return;
}
/* ok they seem to want to know everything - lets fully decode it */
nitems = vqp_common_header->nitems;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tVQPv%u, %s Message, error-code %s (%u), seq 0x%08x, items %u, length %u",
VQP_EXTRACT_VERSION(vqp_common_header->version),
tok2str(vqp_msg_type_values, "unknown (%u)",vqp_common_header->msg_type),
tok2str(vqp_error_code_values, "unknown (%u)",vqp_common_header->error_code),
vqp_common_header->error_code,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&vqp_common_header->sequence),
nitems,
len));
/* skip VQP Common header */
tptr+=sizeof(const struct vqp_common_header_t);
tlen-=sizeof(const struct vqp_common_header_t);
while (nitems > 0 && tlen > 0) {
vqp_obj_tlv = (const struct vqp_obj_tlv_t *)tptr;
vqp_obj_type = EXTRACT_32BITS(vqp_obj_tlv->obj_type);
vqp_obj_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(vqp_obj_tlv->obj_length);
tptr+=sizeof(struct vqp_obj_tlv_t);
tlen-=sizeof(struct vqp_obj_tlv_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Object (0x%08x), length %u, value: ",
tok2str(vqp_obj_values, "Unknown", vqp_obj_type),
vqp_obj_type, vqp_obj_len));
/* basic sanity check */
if (vqp_obj_type == 0 || vqp_obj_len ==0) {
return;
}
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, vqp_obj_len);
switch(vqp_obj_type) {
case VQP_OBJ_IP_ADDRESS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (0x%08x)", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
/* those objects have similar semantics - fall through */
case VQP_OBJ_PORT_NAME:
case VQP_OBJ_VLAN_NAME:
case VQP_OBJ_VTP_DOMAIN:
case VQP_OBJ_ETHERNET_PKT:
safeputs(ndo, tptr, vqp_obj_len);
break;
/* those objects have similar semantics - fall through */
case VQP_OBJ_MAC_ADDRESS:
case VQP_OBJ_MAC_NULL:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", etheraddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo,tptr, "\n\t ", vqp_obj_len);
break;
}
tptr += vqp_obj_len;
tlen -= vqp_obj_len;
nitems--;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t[|VQP]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13045/VQP: add some bounds checks
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 167,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static long sched_group_rt_period(struct task_group *tg)
{
u64 rt_period_us;
rt_period_us = ktime_to_ns(tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_period);
do_div(rt_period_us, NSEC_PER_USEC);
return rt_period_us;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper::OnNotifyDeviceChange(
uint32_t callback_id,
int /* request_id */,
const std::vector<ppapi::DeviceRefData>& devices) {
resource_host_->host()->SendUnsolicitedReply(
resource_host_->pp_resource(),
PpapiPluginMsg_DeviceEnumeration_NotifyDeviceChange(callback_id,
devices));
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static BROTLI_INLINE BrotliResult ProcessCommandsInternal(int safe,
BrotliState* s) {
int pos = s->pos;
int i = s->loop_counter;
BrotliResult result = BROTLI_RESULT_SUCCESS;
BrotliBitReader* br = &s->br;
if (!CheckInputAmount(safe, br, 28) || !WarmupBitReader(safe, br)) {
result = BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
/* Jump into state machine. */
if (s->state == BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_BEGIN) {
goto CommandBegin;
} else if (s->state == BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_INNER) {
goto CommandInner;
} else if (s->state == BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_POST_DECODE_LITERALS) {
goto CommandPostDecodeLiterals;
} else if (s->state == BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_POST_WRAP_COPY) {
goto CommandPostWrapCopy;
} else {
return BROTLI_FAILURE();
}
CommandBegin:
if (safe) {
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_BEGIN;
}
if (!CheckInputAmount(safe, br, 28)) { /* 156 bits + 7 bytes */
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_BEGIN;
result = BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
if (PREDICT_FALSE(s->block_length[1] == 0)) {
BROTLI_SAFE(DecodeCommandBlockSwitch(s));
goto CommandBegin;
}
/* Read the insert/copy length in the command */
BROTLI_SAFE(ReadCommand(s, br, &i));
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(i);
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(s->copy_length);
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(s->distance_code);
if (i == 0) {
goto CommandPostDecodeLiterals;
}
s->meta_block_remaining_len -= i;
CommandInner:
if (safe) {
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_INNER;
}
/* Read the literals in the command */
if (s->trivial_literal_context) {
uint32_t bits;
uint32_t value;
PreloadSymbol(safe, s->literal_htree, br, &bits, &value);
do {
if (!CheckInputAmount(safe, br, 28)) { /* 162 bits + 7 bytes */
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_INNER;
result = BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
if (PREDICT_FALSE(s->block_length[0] == 0)) {
BROTLI_SAFE(DecodeLiteralBlockSwitch(s));
PreloadSymbol(safe, s->literal_htree, br, &bits, &value);
}
if (!safe) {
s->ringbuffer[pos] = (uint8_t)ReadPreloadedSymbol(
s->literal_htree, br, &bits, &value);
} else {
uint32_t literal;
if (!SafeReadSymbol(s->literal_htree, br, &literal)) {
result = BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
s->ringbuffer[pos] = (uint8_t)literal;
}
--s->block_length[0];
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(s->literal_htree_index);
BROTLI_LOG_ARRAY_INDEX(s->ringbuffer, pos);
++pos;
if (PREDICT_FALSE(pos == s->ringbuffer_size)) {
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_INNER_WRITE;
--i;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
} while (--i != 0);
} else {
uint8_t p1 = s->ringbuffer[(pos - 1) & s->ringbuffer_mask];
uint8_t p2 = s->ringbuffer[(pos - 2) & s->ringbuffer_mask];
do {
const HuffmanCode* hc;
uint8_t context;
if (!CheckInputAmount(safe, br, 28)) { /* 162 bits + 7 bytes */
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_INNER;
result = BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
if (PREDICT_FALSE(s->block_length[0] == 0)) {
BROTLI_SAFE(DecodeLiteralBlockSwitch(s));
}
context = s->context_lookup1[p1] | s->context_lookup2[p2];
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(context);
hc = s->literal_hgroup.htrees[s->context_map_slice[context]];
p2 = p1;
if (!safe) {
p1 = (uint8_t)ReadSymbol(hc, br);
} else {
uint32_t literal;
if (!SafeReadSymbol(hc, br, &literal)) {
result = BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
p1 = (uint8_t)literal;
}
s->ringbuffer[pos] = p1;
--s->block_length[0];
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(s->context_map_slice[context]);
BROTLI_LOG_ARRAY_INDEX(s->ringbuffer, pos & s->ringbuffer_mask);
++pos;
if (PREDICT_FALSE(pos == s->ringbuffer_size)) {
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_INNER_WRITE;
--i;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
} while (--i != 0);
}
if (s->meta_block_remaining_len <= 0) {
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_METABLOCK_DONE;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
CommandPostDecodeLiterals:
if (safe) {
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_POST_DECODE_LITERALS;
}
if (s->distance_code >= 0) {
--s->dist_rb_idx;
s->distance_code = s->dist_rb[s->dist_rb_idx & 3];
goto postReadDistance; /* We already have the implicit distance */
}
/* Read distance code in the command, unless it was implicitly zero. */
if (PREDICT_FALSE(s->block_length[2] == 0)) {
BROTLI_SAFE(DecodeDistanceBlockSwitch(s));
}
BROTLI_SAFE(ReadDistance(s, br));
postReadDistance:
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(s->distance_code);
if (s->max_distance != s->max_backward_distance) {
if (pos < s->max_backward_distance_minus_custom_dict_size) {
s->max_distance = pos + s->custom_dict_size;
} else {
s->max_distance = s->max_backward_distance;
}
}
i = s->copy_length;
/* Apply copy of LZ77 back-reference, or static dictionary reference if
the distance is larger than the max LZ77 distance */
if (s->distance_code > s->max_distance) {
if (i >= kBrotliMinDictionaryWordLength &&
i <= kBrotliMaxDictionaryWordLength) {
int offset = kBrotliDictionaryOffsetsByLength[i];
int word_id = s->distance_code - s->max_distance - 1;
uint32_t shift = kBrotliDictionarySizeBitsByLength[i];
int mask = (int)BitMask(shift);
int word_idx = word_id & mask;
int transform_idx = word_id >> shift;
offset += word_idx * i;
if (transform_idx < kNumTransforms) {
const uint8_t* word = &kBrotliDictionary[offset];
int len = i;
if (transform_idx == 0) {
memcpy(&s->ringbuffer[pos], word, (size_t)len);
} else {
len = TransformDictionaryWord(
&s->ringbuffer[pos], word, len, transform_idx);
}
pos += len;
s->meta_block_remaining_len -= len;
if (pos >= s->ringbuffer_size) {
/*s->partial_pos_rb += (size_t)s->ringbuffer_size;*/
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_POST_WRITE_1;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
} else {
BROTLI_LOG(("Invalid backward reference. pos: %d distance: %d "
"len: %d bytes left: %d\n",
pos, s->distance_code, i,
s->meta_block_remaining_len));
return BROTLI_FAILURE();
}
} else {
BROTLI_LOG(("Invalid backward reference. pos: %d distance: %d "
"len: %d bytes left: %d\n", pos, s->distance_code, i,
s->meta_block_remaining_len));
return BROTLI_FAILURE();
}
} else {
const uint8_t *ringbuffer_end_minus_copy_length =
s->ringbuffer_end - i;
uint8_t* copy_src = &s->ringbuffer[
(pos - s->distance_code) & s->ringbuffer_mask];
uint8_t* copy_dst = &s->ringbuffer[pos];
/* update the recent distances cache */
s->dist_rb[s->dist_rb_idx & 3] = s->distance_code;
++s->dist_rb_idx;
s->meta_block_remaining_len -= i;
if (PREDICT_FALSE(s->meta_block_remaining_len < 0)) {
BROTLI_LOG(("Invalid backward reference. pos: %d distance: %d "
"len: %d bytes left: %d\n", pos, s->distance_code, i,
s->meta_block_remaining_len));
return BROTLI_FAILURE();
}
/* There is 128+ bytes of slack in the ringbuffer allocation.
Also, we have 16 short codes, that make these 16 bytes irrelevant
in the ringbuffer. Let's copy over them as a first guess.
*/
memmove16(copy_dst, copy_src);
/* Now check if the copy extends over the ringbuffer end,
or if the copy overlaps with itself, if yes, do wrap-copy. */
if (copy_src < copy_dst) {
if (copy_dst >= ringbuffer_end_minus_copy_length) {
goto CommandPostWrapCopy;
}
if (copy_src + i > copy_dst) {
goto postSelfintersecting;
}
} else {
if (copy_src >= ringbuffer_end_minus_copy_length) {
goto CommandPostWrapCopy;
}
if (copy_dst + i > copy_src) {
goto postSelfintersecting;
}
}
pos += i;
if (i > 16) {
if (i > 32) {
memcpy(copy_dst + 16, copy_src + 16, (size_t)(i - 16));
} else {
/* This branch covers about 45% cases.
Fixed size short copy allows more compiler optimizations. */
memmove16(copy_dst + 16, copy_src + 16);
}
}
}
if (s->meta_block_remaining_len <= 0) {
/* Next metablock, if any */
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_METABLOCK_DONE;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
} else {
goto CommandBegin;
}
postSelfintersecting:
while (--i >= 0) {
s->ringbuffer[pos] =
s->ringbuffer[(pos - s->distance_code) & s->ringbuffer_mask];
++pos;
}
if (s->meta_block_remaining_len <= 0) {
/* Next metablock, if any */
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_METABLOCK_DONE;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
} else {
goto CommandBegin;
}
CommandPostWrapCopy:
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_POST_WRAP_COPY;
while (--i >= 0) {
s->ringbuffer[pos] =
s->ringbuffer[(pos - s->distance_code) & s->ringbuffer_mask];
++pos;
if (pos == s->ringbuffer_size) {
/*s->partial_pos_rb += (size_t)s->ringbuffer_size;*/
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_COMMAND_POST_WRITE_2;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
}
}
if (s->meta_block_remaining_len <= 0) {
/* Next metablock, if any */
s->state = BROTLI_STATE_METABLOCK_DONE;
goto saveStateAndReturn;
} else {
goto CommandBegin;
}
saveStateAndReturn:
s->pos = pos;
s->loop_counter = i;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 172,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: OptimizationHintsMockComponentUpdateService() {}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void __sdt_free(const struct cpumask *cpu_map)
{
struct sched_domain_topology_level *tl;
int j;
for_each_sd_topology(tl) {
struct sd_data *sdd = &tl->data;
for_each_cpu(j, cpu_map) {
struct sched_domain *sd;
if (sdd->sd) {
sd = *per_cpu_ptr(sdd->sd, j);
if (sd && (sd->flags & SD_OVERLAP))
free_sched_groups(sd->groups, 0);
kfree(*per_cpu_ptr(sdd->sd, j));
}
if (sdd->sg)
kfree(*per_cpu_ptr(sdd->sg, j));
if (sdd->sgc)
kfree(*per_cpu_ptr(sdd->sgc, j));
}
free_percpu(sdd->sd);
sdd->sd = NULL;
free_percpu(sdd->sg);
sdd->sg = NULL;
free_percpu(sdd->sgc);
sdd->sgc = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,475
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::setSelectionRangeForBinding(int start, int end, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (!m_inputType->supportsSelectionAPI()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidStateError, "The input element's type ('" + m_inputType->formControlType() + "') does not support selection.");
return;
}
HTMLTextFormControlElement::setSelectionRange(start, end);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 114,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void AXObjectCacheImpl::labelChanged(Element* element) {
textChanged(toHTMLLabelElement(element)->control());
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoDrawArraysInstancedANGLE(
GLenum mode,
GLint first,
GLsizei count,
GLsizei primcount) {
BindPendingImagesForSamplersIfNeeded();
api()->glDrawArraysInstancedANGLEFn(mode, first, count, primcount);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,949
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int flexarray_get_bin(struct flexarray *flex, int index)
{
int i;
(void)flex;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bin_offset); i++)
if (index < bin_offset[i])
return i - 1;
return -1;
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int sniffing_mode(struct airo_info *ai)
{
return (le16_to_cpu(ai->config.rmode) & le16_to_cpu(RXMODE_MASK)) >=
le16_to_cpu(RXMODE_RFMON);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: mrb_top_run(mrb_state *mrb, struct RProc *proc, mrb_value self, unsigned int stack_keep)
{
mrb_callinfo *ci;
mrb_value v;
if (!mrb->c->cibase) {
return mrb_vm_run(mrb, proc, self, stack_keep);
}
if (mrb->c->ci == mrb->c->cibase) {
return mrb_vm_run(mrb, proc, self, stack_keep);
}
ci = cipush(mrb);
ci->mid = 0;
ci->nregs = 1; /* protect the receiver */
ci->acc = CI_ACC_SKIP;
ci->target_class = mrb->object_class;
v = mrb_vm_run(mrb, proc, self, stack_keep);
cipop(mrb);
return v;
}
Commit Message: Check length of env stack before accessing upvar; fix #3995
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 83,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool DownloadItemImpl::IsValidStateTransition(DownloadInternalState from,
DownloadInternalState to) {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
switch (from) {
case INITIAL_INTERNAL:
return to == TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL ||
to == INTERRUPTED_TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL;
case TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL:
return to == INTERRUPTED_TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL ||
to == TARGET_RESOLVED_INTERNAL || to == CANCELLED_INTERNAL;
case INTERRUPTED_TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL:
return to == TARGET_RESOLVED_INTERNAL || to == CANCELLED_INTERNAL;
case TARGET_RESOLVED_INTERNAL:
return to == IN_PROGRESS_INTERNAL || to == INTERRUPTED_INTERNAL ||
to == CANCELLED_INTERNAL;
case IN_PROGRESS_INTERNAL:
return to == COMPLETING_INTERNAL || to == CANCELLED_INTERNAL ||
to == INTERRUPTED_INTERNAL;
case COMPLETING_INTERNAL:
return to == COMPLETE_INTERNAL;
case COMPLETE_INTERNAL:
return false;
case INTERRUPTED_INTERNAL:
return to == RESUMING_INTERNAL || to == CANCELLED_INTERNAL;
case RESUMING_INTERNAL:
return to == TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL ||
to == INTERRUPTED_TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL ||
to == TARGET_RESOLVED_INTERNAL || to == CANCELLED_INTERNAL;
case CANCELLED_INTERNAL:
return false;
case MAX_DOWNLOAD_INTERNAL_STATE:
NOTREACHED();
}
return false;
#else
return true;
#endif // DCHECK_IS_ON()
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ram_addr_t migration_bitmap_find_and_reset_dirty(MemoryRegion *mr,
ram_addr_t start)
{
unsigned long base = mr->ram_addr >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
unsigned long nr = base + (start >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS);
uint64_t mr_size = TARGET_PAGE_ALIGN(memory_region_size(mr));
unsigned long size = base + (mr_size >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS);
unsigned long next;
if (ram_bulk_stage && nr > base) {
next = nr + 1;
} else {
next = find_next_bit(migration_bitmap, size, nr);
}
if (next < size) {
clear_bit(next, migration_bitmap);
migration_dirty_pages--;
}
return (next - base) << TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: hstore_eq(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
int res = DatumGetInt32(DirectFunctionCall2(hstore_cmp,
PG_GETARG_DATUM(0),
PG_GETARG_DATUM(1)));
PG_RETURN_BOOL(res == 0);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: long jas_stream_seek(jas_stream_t *stream, long offset, int origin)
{
long newpos;
/* The buffer cannot be in use for both reading and writing. */
assert(!((stream->bufmode_ & JAS_STREAM_RDBUF) && (stream->bufmode_ &
JAS_STREAM_WRBUF)));
/* Reset the EOF indicator (since we may not be at the EOF anymore). */
stream->flags_ &= ~JAS_STREAM_EOF;
if (stream->bufmode_ & JAS_STREAM_RDBUF) {
if (origin == SEEK_CUR) {
offset -= stream->cnt_;
}
} else if (stream->bufmode_ & JAS_STREAM_WRBUF) {
if (jas_stream_flush(stream)) {
return -1;
}
}
stream->cnt_ = 0;
stream->ptr_ = stream->bufstart_;
stream->bufmode_ &= ~(JAS_STREAM_RDBUF | JAS_STREAM_WRBUF);
if ((newpos = (*stream->ops_->seek_)(stream->obj_, offset, origin))
< 0) {
return -1;
}
return newpos;
}
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 73,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int srv_set_message(char *buf,
int num_words,
int num_bytes,
bool zero)
{
if (zero && (num_words || num_bytes)) {
memset(buf + smb_size,'\0',num_words*2 + num_bytes);
}
SCVAL(buf,smb_wct,num_words);
SSVAL(buf,smb_vwv + num_words*SIZEOFWORD,num_bytes);
smb_setlen(buf,(smb_size + num_words*2 + num_bytes - 4));
return (smb_size + num_words*2 + num_bytes);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int sfile_close(jas_stream_obj_t *obj)
{
FILE *fp;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("sfile_close(%p)\n", obj));
fp = JAS_CAST(FILE *, obj);
return fclose(fp);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 67,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateNetworkServiceDefaultFactoryInternal(
const base::Optional<url::Origin>& origin,
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryRequest default_factory_request) {
auto* context = GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext();
bool bypass_redirect_checks = false;
network::mojom::TrustedURLLoaderHeaderClientPtrInfo header_client;
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService)) {
GetContentClient()->browser()->WillCreateURLLoaderFactory(
context, this, GetProcess()->GetID(), false /* is_navigation */,
origin.value_or(url::Origin()), &default_factory_request,
&header_client, &bypass_redirect_checks);
}
devtools_instrumentation::WillCreateURLLoaderFactory(
this, false /* is_navigation */, false /* is_download */,
&default_factory_request);
if (g_create_network_factory_callback_for_test.Get().is_null()) {
GetProcess()->CreateURLLoaderFactory(origin, std::move(header_client),
std::move(default_factory_request));
} else {
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtr original_factory;
GetProcess()->CreateURLLoaderFactory(origin, std::move(header_client),
mojo::MakeRequest(&original_factory));
g_create_network_factory_callback_for_test.Get().Run(
std::move(default_factory_request), GetProcess()->GetID(),
original_factory.PassInterface());
}
return bypass_redirect_checks;
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int shmem_lock(struct file *file, int lock, struct user_struct *user)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgid, gid_t __user *, egid, gid_t __user *, sgid)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int retval;
if (!(retval = put_user(cred->gid, rgid)) &&
!(retval = put_user(cred->egid, egid)))
retval = put_user(cred->sgid, sgid);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 162,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int dwc3_gadget_start_config(struct dwc3 *dwc, struct dwc3_ep *dep)
{
struct dwc3_gadget_ep_cmd_params params;
u32 cmd;
int i;
int ret;
if (dep->number)
return 0;
memset(¶ms, 0x00, sizeof(params));
cmd = DWC3_DEPCMD_DEPSTARTCFG;
ret = dwc3_send_gadget_ep_cmd(dep, cmd, ¶ms);
if (ret)
return ret;
for (i = 0; i < DWC3_ENDPOINTS_NUM; i++) {
struct dwc3_ep *dep = dwc->eps[i];
if (!dep)
continue;
ret = dwc3_gadget_set_xfer_resource(dwc, dep);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 88,685
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int ecp_check_pubkey_mx( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt )
{
/* [Curve25519 p. 5] Just check X is the correct number of bytes */
if( mbedtls_mpi_size( &pt->X ) > ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 96,544
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void fdc_specify(void)
{
unsigned char spec1;
unsigned char spec2;
unsigned long srt;
unsigned long hlt;
unsigned long hut;
unsigned long dtr = NOMINAL_DTR;
unsigned long scale_dtr = NOMINAL_DTR;
int hlt_max_code = 0x7f;
int hut_max_code = 0xf;
if (FDCS->need_configure && FDCS->version >= FDC_82072A) {
fdc_configure();
FDCS->need_configure = 0;
}
switch (raw_cmd->rate & 0x03) {
case 3:
dtr = 1000;
break;
case 1:
dtr = 300;
if (FDCS->version >= FDC_82078) {
/* chose the default rate table, not the one
* where 1 = 2 Mbps */
output_byte(FD_DRIVESPEC);
if (need_more_output() == MORE_OUTPUT) {
output_byte(UNIT(current_drive));
output_byte(0xc0);
}
}
break;
case 2:
dtr = 250;
break;
}
if (FDCS->version >= FDC_82072) {
scale_dtr = dtr;
hlt_max_code = 0x00; /* 0==256msec*dtr0/dtr (not linear!) */
hut_max_code = 0x0; /* 0==256msec*dtr0/dtr (not linear!) */
}
/* Convert step rate from microseconds to milliseconds and 4 bits */
srt = 16 - DIV_ROUND_UP(DP->srt * scale_dtr / 1000, NOMINAL_DTR);
if (slow_floppy)
srt = srt / 4;
SUPBOUND(srt, 0xf);
INFBOUND(srt, 0);
hlt = DIV_ROUND_UP(DP->hlt * scale_dtr / 2, NOMINAL_DTR);
if (hlt < 0x01)
hlt = 0x01;
else if (hlt > 0x7f)
hlt = hlt_max_code;
hut = DIV_ROUND_UP(DP->hut * scale_dtr / 16, NOMINAL_DTR);
if (hut < 0x1)
hut = 0x1;
else if (hut > 0xf)
hut = hut_max_code;
spec1 = (srt << 4) | hut;
spec2 = (hlt << 1) | (use_virtual_dma & 1);
/* If these parameters did not change, just return with success */
if (FDCS->spec1 != spec1 || FDCS->spec2 != spec2) {
/* Go ahead and set spec1 and spec2 */
output_byte(FD_SPECIFY);
output_byte(FDCS->spec1 = spec1);
output_byte(FDCS->spec2 = spec2);
}
} /* fdc_specify */
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 39,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHostQt::forceRepaint()
{
scheduleLayerFlush();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 101,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static uintmax_t parse_mark_ref_eol(const char *p)
{
char *end;
uintmax_t mark;
mark = parse_mark_ref(p, &end);
if (*end != '\0')
die("Garbage after mark: %s", command_buf.buf);
return mark;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: kvm_irqfd_assign(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irqfd *args)
{
struct kvm_kernel_irqfd *irqfd, *tmp;
struct fd f;
struct eventfd_ctx *eventfd = NULL, *resamplefd = NULL;
int ret;
unsigned int events;
int idx;
if (!kvm_arch_intc_initialized(kvm))
return -EAGAIN;
irqfd = kzalloc(sizeof(*irqfd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!irqfd)
return -ENOMEM;
irqfd->kvm = kvm;
irqfd->gsi = args->gsi;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&irqfd->list);
INIT_WORK(&irqfd->inject, irqfd_inject);
INIT_WORK(&irqfd->shutdown, irqfd_shutdown);
seqcount_init(&irqfd->irq_entry_sc);
f = fdget(args->fd);
if (!f.file) {
ret = -EBADF;
goto out;
}
eventfd = eventfd_ctx_fileget(f.file);
if (IS_ERR(eventfd)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(eventfd);
goto fail;
}
irqfd->eventfd = eventfd;
if (args->flags & KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_RESAMPLE) {
struct kvm_kernel_irqfd_resampler *resampler;
resamplefd = eventfd_ctx_fdget(args->resamplefd);
if (IS_ERR(resamplefd)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(resamplefd);
goto fail;
}
irqfd->resamplefd = resamplefd;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&irqfd->resampler_link);
mutex_lock(&kvm->irqfds.resampler_lock);
list_for_each_entry(resampler,
&kvm->irqfds.resampler_list, link) {
if (resampler->notifier.gsi == irqfd->gsi) {
irqfd->resampler = resampler;
break;
}
}
if (!irqfd->resampler) {
resampler = kzalloc(sizeof(*resampler), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!resampler) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
mutex_unlock(&kvm->irqfds.resampler_lock);
goto fail;
}
resampler->kvm = kvm;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&resampler->list);
resampler->notifier.gsi = irqfd->gsi;
resampler->notifier.irq_acked = irqfd_resampler_ack;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&resampler->link);
list_add(&resampler->link, &kvm->irqfds.resampler_list);
kvm_register_irq_ack_notifier(kvm,
&resampler->notifier);
irqfd->resampler = resampler;
}
list_add_rcu(&irqfd->resampler_link, &irqfd->resampler->list);
synchronize_srcu(&kvm->irq_srcu);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->irqfds.resampler_lock);
}
/*
* Install our own custom wake-up handling so we are notified via
* a callback whenever someone signals the underlying eventfd
*/
init_waitqueue_func_entry(&irqfd->wait, irqfd_wakeup);
init_poll_funcptr(&irqfd->pt, irqfd_ptable_queue_proc);
spin_lock_irq(&kvm->irqfds.lock);
ret = 0;
list_for_each_entry(tmp, &kvm->irqfds.items, list) {
if (irqfd->eventfd != tmp->eventfd)
continue;
/* This fd is used for another irq already. */
ret = -EBUSY;
spin_unlock_irq(&kvm->irqfds.lock);
goto fail;
}
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu);
irqfd_update(kvm, irqfd);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
list_add_tail(&irqfd->list, &kvm->irqfds.items);
spin_unlock_irq(&kvm->irqfds.lock);
/*
* Check if there was an event already pending on the eventfd
* before we registered, and trigger it as if we didn't miss it.
*/
events = f.file->f_op->poll(f.file, &irqfd->pt);
if (events & POLLIN)
schedule_work(&irqfd->inject);
/*
* do not drop the file until the irqfd is fully initialized, otherwise
* we might race against the POLLHUP
*/
fdput(f);
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQ_BYPASS
if (kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass()) {
irqfd->consumer.token = (void *)irqfd->eventfd;
irqfd->consumer.add_producer = kvm_arch_irq_bypass_add_producer;
irqfd->consumer.del_producer = kvm_arch_irq_bypass_del_producer;
irqfd->consumer.stop = kvm_arch_irq_bypass_stop;
irqfd->consumer.start = kvm_arch_irq_bypass_start;
ret = irq_bypass_register_consumer(&irqfd->consumer);
if (ret)
pr_info("irq bypass consumer (token %p) registration fails: %d\n",
irqfd->consumer.token, ret);
}
#endif
return 0;
fail:
if (irqfd->resampler)
irqfd_resampler_shutdown(irqfd);
if (resamplefd && !IS_ERR(resamplefd))
eventfd_ctx_put(resamplefd);
if (eventfd && !IS_ERR(eventfd))
eventfd_ctx_put(eventfd);
fdput(f);
out:
kfree(irqfd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Don't accept obviously wrong gsi values via KVM_IRQFD
We cannot add routes for gsi values >= KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES -- see
kvm_set_irq_routing(). Hence, there is no sense in accepting them
via KVM_IRQFD. Prevent them from entering the system in the first
place.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 58,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: size_t GLES2Util::GetGLTypeSizeForTextures(uint32_t type) {
return static_cast<size_t>(BytesPerElement(type));
}
Commit Message: Validate glClearBuffer*v function |buffer| param on the client side
Otherwise we could read out-of-bounds even if an invalid |buffer| is passed
in and in theory we should not read the buffer at all.
BUG=908749
TEST=gl_tests in ASAN build
R=piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I94b69b56ce3358ff9bfc0e21f0618aec4371d1ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1354571
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#612023}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 153,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int send_to_group(struct inode *to_tell,
struct fsnotify_mark *inode_mark,
struct fsnotify_mark *vfsmount_mark,
__u32 mask, const void *data,
int data_is, u32 cookie,
const unsigned char *file_name,
struct fsnotify_iter_info *iter_info)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group = NULL;
__u32 inode_test_mask = 0;
__u32 vfsmount_test_mask = 0;
if (unlikely(!inode_mark && !vfsmount_mark)) {
BUG();
return 0;
}
/* clear ignored on inode modification */
if (mask & FS_MODIFY) {
if (inode_mark &&
!(inode_mark->flags & FSNOTIFY_MARK_FLAG_IGNORED_SURV_MODIFY))
inode_mark->ignored_mask = 0;
if (vfsmount_mark &&
!(vfsmount_mark->flags & FSNOTIFY_MARK_FLAG_IGNORED_SURV_MODIFY))
vfsmount_mark->ignored_mask = 0;
}
/* does the inode mark tell us to do something? */
if (inode_mark) {
group = inode_mark->group;
inode_test_mask = (mask & ~FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD);
inode_test_mask &= inode_mark->mask;
inode_test_mask &= ~inode_mark->ignored_mask;
}
/* does the vfsmount_mark tell us to do something? */
if (vfsmount_mark) {
vfsmount_test_mask = (mask & ~FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD);
group = vfsmount_mark->group;
vfsmount_test_mask &= vfsmount_mark->mask;
vfsmount_test_mask &= ~vfsmount_mark->ignored_mask;
if (inode_mark)
vfsmount_test_mask &= ~inode_mark->ignored_mask;
}
pr_debug("%s: group=%p to_tell=%p mask=%x inode_mark=%p"
" inode_test_mask=%x vfsmount_mark=%p vfsmount_test_mask=%x"
" data=%p data_is=%d cookie=%d\n",
__func__, group, to_tell, mask, inode_mark,
inode_test_mask, vfsmount_mark, vfsmount_test_mask, data,
data_is, cookie);
if (!inode_test_mask && !vfsmount_test_mask)
return 0;
return group->ops->handle_event(group, to_tell, inode_mark,
vfsmount_mark, mask, data, data_is,
file_name, cookie, iter_info);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 67,475
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static struct multipath *alloc_multipath(struct dm_target *ti)
{
struct multipath *m;
m = kzalloc(sizeof(*m), GFP_KERNEL);
if (m) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&m->priority_groups);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&m->queued_ios);
spin_lock_init(&m->lock);
m->queue_io = 1;
m->pg_init_delay_msecs = DM_PG_INIT_DELAY_DEFAULT;
INIT_WORK(&m->process_queued_ios, process_queued_ios);
INIT_WORK(&m->trigger_event, trigger_event);
init_waitqueue_head(&m->pg_init_wait);
mutex_init(&m->work_mutex);
m->mpio_pool = mempool_create_slab_pool(MIN_IOS, _mpio_cache);
if (!m->mpio_pool) {
kfree(m);
return NULL;
}
m->ti = ti;
ti->private = m;
}
return m;
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: buffer_percent_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct trace_array *tr = filp->private_data;
char buf[64];
int r;
r = tr->buffer_percent;
r = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", r);
return simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, cnt, ppos, buf, r);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static ut64 baddr(RBinFile *arch) {
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix #6872
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 68,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: BrowserEventRouter::TabEntry::TabEntry()
: complete_waiting_on_load_(false),
url_() {
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 116,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void swap_guid(ff_asf_guid guid)
{
FFSWAP(unsigned char, guid[0], guid[3]);
FFSWAP(unsigned char, guid[1], guid[2]);
FFSWAP(unsigned char, guid[4], guid[5]);
FFSWAP(unsigned char, guid[6], guid[7]);
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 74,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int cma_loopback_addr(struct sockaddr *addr)
{
switch (addr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
return ipv4_is_loopback(((struct sockaddr_in *) addr)->sin_addr.s_addr);
case AF_INET6:
return ipv6_addr_loopback(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addr)->sin6_addr);
case AF_IB:
return ib_addr_loopback(&((struct sockaddr_ib *) addr)->sib_addr);
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static long btrfs_ioctl_qgroup_limit(struct file *file, void __user *arg)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(fdentry(file)->d_inode)->root;
struct btrfs_ioctl_qgroup_limit_args *sa;
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
int ret;
int err;
u64 qgroupid;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
ret = mnt_want_write_file(file);
if (ret)
return ret;
sa = memdup_user(arg, sizeof(*sa));
if (IS_ERR(sa)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(sa);
goto drop_write;
}
trans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
goto out;
}
qgroupid = sa->qgroupid;
if (!qgroupid) {
/* take the current subvol as qgroup */
qgroupid = root->root_key.objectid;
}
/* FIXME: check if the IDs really exist */
ret = btrfs_limit_qgroup(trans, root->fs_info, qgroupid, &sa->lim);
err = btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
if (err && !ret)
ret = err;
out:
kfree(sa);
drop_write:
mnt_drop_write_file(file);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: SVGSVGElement* SVGDocumentExtensions::rootElement(const Document& document)
{
Element* elem = document.documentElement();
return isSVGSVGElement(elem) ? toSVGSVGElement(elem) : 0;
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool BrowserView::IsTabStripEditable() const {
return tabstrip_->IsTabStripEditable();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: fst_process_tx_work_q(unsigned long /*void **/work_q)
{
unsigned long flags;
u64 work_txq;
int i;
/*
* Grab the queue exclusively
*/
dbg(DBG_TX, "fst_process_tx_work_q\n");
spin_lock_irqsave(&fst_work_q_lock, flags);
work_txq = fst_work_txq;
fst_work_txq = 0;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fst_work_q_lock, flags);
/*
* Call the bottom half for each card with work waiting
*/
for (i = 0; i < FST_MAX_CARDS; i++) {
if (work_txq & 0x01) {
if (fst_card_array[i] != NULL) {
dbg(DBG_TX, "Calling tx bh for card %d\n", i);
do_bottom_half_tx(fst_card_array[i]);
}
}
work_txq = work_txq >> 1;
}
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 39,531
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: ShellContentBrowserClient::CreateQuotaPermissionContext() {
return new ShellQuotaPermissionContext();
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: int HTMLSelectElement::nextSelectableListIndex(int startIndex) const
{
return nextValidIndex(startIndex, SkipForwards, 1);
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 103,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: Editor::Command Editor::CreateCommand(const String& command_name) {
return Command(InternalCommand(command_name), kCommandFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
frame_);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void FillConstant(uint8_t *data, int stride, uint8_t fill_constant) {
for (int h = 0; h < height_; ++h) {
for (int w = 0; w < width_; ++w) {
data[h * stride + w] = fill_constant;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,571
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void sctp_assoc_sync_pmtu(struct sock *sk, struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct sctp_transport *t;
__u32 pmtu = 0;
if (!asoc)
return;
/* Get the lowest pmtu of all the transports. */
list_for_each_entry(t, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
if (t->pmtu_pending && t->dst) {
sctp_transport_update_pmtu(sk, t, dst_mtu(t->dst));
t->pmtu_pending = 0;
}
if (!pmtu || (t->pathmtu < pmtu))
pmtu = t->pathmtu;
}
if (pmtu) {
asoc->pathmtu = pmtu;
asoc->frag_point = sctp_frag_point(asoc, pmtu);
}
pr_debug("%s: asoc:%p, pmtu:%d, frag_point:%d\n", __func__, asoc,
asoc->pathmtu, asoc->frag_point);
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 36,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: sBIT0_error_fn(png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
/* 0 is invalid... */
png_color_8 bad;
bad.red = bad.green = bad.blue = bad.gray = bad.alpha = 0;
png_set_sBIT(pp, pi, &bad);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void Dispatcher::OnDeliverMessage(int target_port_id, const Message& message) {
scoped_ptr<RequestSender::ScopedTabID> scoped_tab_id;
std::map<int, int>::const_iterator it =
port_to_tab_id_map_.find(target_port_id);
if (it != port_to_tab_id_map_.end()) {
scoped_tab_id.reset(
new RequestSender::ScopedTabID(request_sender(), it->second));
}
MessagingBindings::DeliverMessage(*script_context_set_, target_port_id,
message,
NULL); // All render frames.
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteInsertLineBreak(LocalFrame& frame,
Event* event,
EditorCommandSource source,
const String&) {
switch (source) {
case kCommandFromMenuOrKeyBinding:
return TargetFrame(frame, event)
->GetEventHandler()
.HandleTextInputEvent("\n", event, kTextEventInputLineBreak);
case kCommandFromDOM:
DCHECK(frame.GetDocument());
return TypingCommand::InsertLineBreak(*frame.GetDocument());
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static loff_t ecryptfs_dir_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
return vfs_llseek(ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file), offset, whence);
}
Commit Message: ecryptfs: don't allow mmap when the lower fs doesn't support it
There are legitimate reasons to disallow mmap on certain files, notably
in sysfs or procfs. We shouldn't emulate mmap support on file systems
that don't offer support natively.
CVE-2016-1583
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[tyhicks: clean up f_op check by using ecryptfs_file_to_lower()]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: WGC3Denum convertReason(gpu::error::ContextLostReason reason) {
switch (reason) {
case gpu::error::kGuilty:
return GL_GUILTY_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB;
case gpu::error::kInnocent:
return GL_INNOCENT_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB;
case gpu::error::kUnknown:
return GL_UNKNOWN_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB;
}
NOTREACHED();
return GL_UNKNOWN_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void ttwu_queue(struct task_struct *p, int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
#if defined(CONFIG_SMP)
if (sched_feat(TTWU_QUEUE) && cpu != smp_processor_id()) {
sched_clock_cpu(cpu); /* sync clocks x-cpu */
ttwu_queue_remote(p, cpu);
return;
}
#endif
raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock);
ttwu_do_activate(rq, p, 0);
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int do_move_mount(struct path *path, const char *old_name)
{
struct path old_path, parent_path;
struct mount *p;
struct mount *old;
struct mountpoint *mp;
int err;
if (!old_name || !*old_name)
return -EINVAL;
err = kern_path(old_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
if (err)
return err;
mp = lock_mount(path);
err = PTR_ERR(mp);
if (IS_ERR(mp))
goto out;
old = real_mount(old_path.mnt);
p = real_mount(path->mnt);
err = -EINVAL;
if (!check_mnt(p) || !check_mnt(old))
goto out1;
if (old->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
goto out1;
err = -EINVAL;
if (old_path.dentry != old_path.mnt->mnt_root)
goto out1;
if (!mnt_has_parent(old))
goto out1;
if (d_is_dir(path->dentry) !=
d_is_dir(old_path.dentry))
goto out1;
/*
* Don't move a mount residing in a shared parent.
*/
if (IS_MNT_SHARED(old->mnt_parent))
goto out1;
/*
* Don't move a mount tree containing unbindable mounts to a destination
* mount which is shared.
*/
if (IS_MNT_SHARED(p) && tree_contains_unbindable(old))
goto out1;
err = -ELOOP;
for (; mnt_has_parent(p); p = p->mnt_parent)
if (p == old)
goto out1;
err = attach_recursive_mnt(old, real_mount(path->mnt), mp, &parent_path);
if (err)
goto out1;
/* if the mount is moved, it should no longer be expire
* automatically */
list_del_init(&old->mnt_expire);
out1:
unlock_mount(mp);
out:
if (!err)
path_put(&parent_path);
path_put(&old_path);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 50,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void ccid3_hc_rx_send_feedback(struct sock *sk,
const struct sk_buff *skb,
enum ccid3_fback_type fbtype)
{
struct ccid3_hc_rx_sock *hc = ccid3_hc_rx_sk(sk);
struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
s64 delta = 0;
switch (fbtype) {
case CCID3_FBACK_INITIAL:
hc->rx_x_recv = 0;
hc->rx_pinv = ~0U; /* see RFC 4342, 8.5 */
break;
case CCID3_FBACK_PARAM_CHANGE:
/*
* When parameters change (new loss or p > p_prev), we do not
* have a reliable estimate for R_m of [RFC 3448, 6.2] and so
* need to reuse the previous value of X_recv. However, when
* X_recv was 0 (due to early loss), this would kill X down to
* s/t_mbi (i.e. one packet in 64 seconds).
* To avoid such drastic reduction, we approximate X_recv as
* the number of bytes since last feedback.
* This is a safe fallback, since X is bounded above by X_calc.
*/
if (hc->rx_x_recv > 0)
break;
/* fall through */
case CCID3_FBACK_PERIODIC:
delta = ktime_us_delta(now, hc->rx_tstamp_last_feedback);
if (delta <= 0)
DCCP_BUG("delta (%ld) <= 0", (long)delta);
else
hc->rx_x_recv = scaled_div32(hc->rx_bytes_recv, delta);
break;
default:
return;
}
ccid3_pr_debug("Interval %ldusec, X_recv=%u, 1/p=%u\n", (long)delta,
hc->rx_x_recv, hc->rx_pinv);
hc->rx_tstamp_last_feedback = now;
hc->rx_last_counter = dccp_hdr(skb)->dccph_ccval;
hc->rx_bytes_recv = 0;
dp->dccps_hc_rx_insert_options = 1;
dccp_send_ack(sk);
}
Commit Message: dccp: fix info leak via getsockopt(DCCP_SOCKOPT_CCID_TX_INFO)
The CCID3 code fails to initialize the trailing padding bytes of struct
tfrc_tx_info added for alignment on 64 bit architectures. It that for
potentially leaks four bytes kernel stack via the getsockopt() syscall.
Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,153
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: android::SoftOMXComponent *createSoftOMXComponent(
const char *name, const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData, OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component) {
using namespace android;
if (!strcmp(name, "OMX.google.h263.decoder")) {
return new android::SoftMPEG4(
name, "video_decoder.h263", OMX_VIDEO_CodingH263,
kH263ProfileLevels, ARRAY_SIZE(kH263ProfileLevels),
callbacks, appData, component);
} else if (!strcmp(name, "OMX.google.mpeg4.decoder")) {
return new android::SoftMPEG4(
name, "video_decoder.mpeg4", OMX_VIDEO_CodingMPEG4,
kM4VProfileLevels, ARRAY_SIZE(kM4VProfileLevels),
callbacks, appData, component);
} else {
CHECK(!"Unknown component");
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: SoftMPEG4: Check the buffer size before writing the reference frame.
Also prevent overflow in SoftMPEG4 and division by zero in SoftMPEG4Encoder.
Bug: 30033990
Change-Id: I7701f5fc54c2670587d122330e5dc851f64ed3c2
(cherry picked from commit 695123195034402ca76169b195069c28c30342d3)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 158,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void nfs4_unhash_lockowner(struct nfs4_stateowner *sop)
{
unhash_lockowner_locked(lockowner(sop));
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: long Cluster::ParseSimpleBlock(long long block_size, long long& pos,
long& len) {
const long long block_start = pos;
const long long block_stop = pos + block_size;
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long track = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (track < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(track);
if (track == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
#if 0
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
#endif
pos += len; // consume track number
if ((pos + 2) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 2) > avail) {
len = 2;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
pos += 2; // consume timecode
if ((pos + 1) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
unsigned char flags;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &flags);
if (status < 0) { // error or underflow
len = 1;
return status;
}
++pos; // consume flags byte
assert(pos <= avail);
if (pos >= block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const int lacing = int(flags & 0x06) >> 1;
if ((lacing != 0) && (block_stop > avail)) {
len = static_cast<long>(block_stop - pos);
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
status = CreateBlock(0x23, // simple block id
block_start, block_size,
0); // DiscardPadding
if (status != 0)
return status;
m_pos = block_stop;
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 173,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static gboolean webkit_web_view_draw(GtkWidget* widget, cairo_t* cr)
{
WebKitWebView* webView = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(widget);
WebKitWebViewPrivate* priv = webView->priv;
GdkRectangle clipRect;
if (!gdk_cairo_get_clip_rectangle(cr, &clipRect))
return FALSE;
Frame* frame = core(webView)->mainFrame();
if (frame->contentRenderer() && frame->view()) {
GraphicsContext gc(cr);
IntRect rect = clipRect;
cairo_rectangle_list_t* rectList = cairo_copy_clip_rectangle_list(cr);
frame->view()->updateLayoutAndStyleIfNeededRecursive();
Vector<IntRect> rects;
if (!rectList->status && rectList->num_rectangles > 0) {
for (int i = 0; i < rectList->num_rectangles; i++)
rects.append(enclosingIntRect(FloatRect(rectList->rectangles[i])));
}
paintWebView(frame, priv->transparent, gc, rect, rects);
cairo_rectangle_list_destroy(rectList);
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,544
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalSetVp8Params(
const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE* vp8Params) {
if (vp8Params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
if (vp8Params->eProfile != OMX_VIDEO_VP8ProfileMain) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (vp8Params->eLevel == OMX_VIDEO_VP8Level_Version0 ||
vp8Params->eLevel == OMX_VIDEO_VP8Level_Version1 ||
vp8Params->eLevel == OMX_VIDEO_VP8Level_Version2 ||
vp8Params->eLevel == OMX_VIDEO_VP8Level_Version3) {
mLevel = vp8Params->eLevel;
} else {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (vp8Params->nDCTPartitions <= kMaxDCTPartitions) {
mDCTPartitions = vp8Params->nDCTPartitions;
} else {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
mErrorResilience = vp8Params->bErrorResilientMode;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in VP8 encoder.
Bug: 27569635
Change-Id: I469573f40e21dc9f4c200749d4f220e3a2d31761
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int check_i2c_image(struct edgeport_serial *serial)
{
struct device *dev = &serial->serial->dev->dev;
int status = 0;
struct ti_i2c_desc *rom_desc;
int start_address = 2;
__u8 *buffer;
__u16 ttype;
rom_desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*rom_desc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rom_desc)
return -ENOMEM;
buffer = kmalloc(TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer) {
kfree(rom_desc);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Read the first byte (Signature0) must be 0x52 or 0x10 */
status = read_rom(serial, 0, 1, buffer);
if (status)
goto out;
if (*buffer != UMP5152 && *buffer != UMP3410) {
dev_err(dev, "%s - invalid buffer signature\n", __func__);
status = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
do {
/* Validate the I2C */
status = read_rom(serial,
start_address,
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc),
(__u8 *)rom_desc);
if (status)
break;
if ((start_address + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc) +
le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size)) > TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE) {
status = -ENODEV;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - structure too big, erroring out.\n", __func__);
break;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "%s Type = 0x%x\n", __func__, rom_desc->Type);
/* Skip type 2 record */
ttype = rom_desc->Type & 0x0f;
if (ttype != I2C_DESC_TYPE_FIRMWARE_BASIC
&& ttype != I2C_DESC_TYPE_FIRMWARE_AUTO) {
/* Read the descriptor data */
status = read_rom(serial, start_address +
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc),
le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size),
buffer);
if (status)
break;
status = valid_csum(rom_desc, buffer);
if (status)
break;
}
start_address = start_address + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc) +
le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size);
} while ((rom_desc->Type != I2C_DESC_TYPE_ION) &&
(start_address < TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE));
if ((rom_desc->Type != I2C_DESC_TYPE_ION) ||
(start_address > TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE))
status = -ENODEV;
out:
kfree(buffer);
kfree(rom_desc);
return status;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191
| 0
| 66,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int lz4hc_compress_crypto(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *src,
unsigned int slen, u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen)
{
struct lz4hc_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
size_t tmp_len = *dlen;
int err;
err = lz4hc_compress(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len, ctx->lz4hc_comp_mem);
if (err < 0)
return -EINVAL;
*dlen = tmp_len;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void RemoveProcess(RenderProcessHost* host) {
std::set<std::string> sites;
for (SiteToProcessMap::const_iterator i = map_.begin();
i != map_.end();
i++) {
if (i->second == host)
sites.insert(i->first);
}
for (std::set<std::string>::iterator i = sites.begin();
i != sites.end();
i++) {
SiteToProcessMap::iterator iter = map_.find(*i);
if (iter != map_.end()) {
DCHECK_EQ(iter->second, host);
map_.erase(iter);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int auth_session_timeout_cb(CALLBACK_FRAME) {
pr_event_generate("core.timeout-session", NULL);
pr_response_send_async(R_421,
_("Session Timeout (%d seconds): closing control connection"),
TimeoutSession);
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_NOTICE, "%s", "FTP session timed out, disconnected");
pr_session_disconnect(&auth_module, PR_SESS_DISCONNECT_TIMEOUT,
"TimeoutSession");
/* no need to restart the timer -- session's over */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Backporting recursive handling of DefaultRoot path, when AllowChrootSymlinks
is off, to 1.3.5 branch.
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 95,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool Matches(const String& url, const String& pattern) {
Vector<String> parts;
pattern.Split("*", parts);
size_t pos = 0;
for (const String& part : parts) {
pos = url.Find(part, pos);
if (pos == kNotFound)
return false;
pos += part.length();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void uio_major_cleanup(void)
{
unregister_chrdev_region(MKDEV(uio_major, 0), UIO_MAX_DEVICES);
cdev_del(uio_cdev);
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: hfs_cat_read_file_folder_record(HFS_INFO * hfs, TSK_OFF_T off,
hfs_file_folder * record)
{
TSK_FS_INFO *fs = (TSK_FS_INFO *) & (hfs->fs_info);
ssize_t cnt;
char rec_type[2];
memset(record, 0, sizeof(hfs_file_folder));
cnt = tsk_fs_attr_read(hfs->catalog_attr, off, rec_type, 2, 0);
if (cnt != 2) {
if (cnt >= 0) {
tsk_error_reset();
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_READ);
}
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_read_file_folder_record: Error reading record type from catalog offset %"
PRIuOFF " (header)", off);
return 1;
}
if (tsk_getu16(fs->endian, rec_type) == HFS_FOLDER_RECORD) {
cnt =
tsk_fs_attr_read(hfs->catalog_attr, off, (char *) record,
sizeof(hfs_folder), 0);
if (cnt != sizeof(hfs_folder)) {
if (cnt >= 0) {
tsk_error_reset();
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_READ);
}
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_read_file_folder_record: Error reading catalog offset %"
PRIuOFF " (folder)", off);
return 1;
}
}
else if (tsk_getu16(fs->endian, rec_type) == HFS_FILE_RECORD) {
cnt =
tsk_fs_attr_read(hfs->catalog_attr, off, (char *) record,
sizeof(hfs_file), 0);
if (cnt != sizeof(hfs_file)) {
if (cnt >= 0) {
tsk_error_reset();
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_READ);
}
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_read_file_folder_record: Error reading catalog offset %"
PRIuOFF " (file)", off);
return 1;
}
}
else {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_read_file_folder_record: unexpected record type %"
PRIu16, tsk_getu16(fs->endian, rec_type));
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,679
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static void locationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeGetterCallbackForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::locationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeGetterForMainWorld(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static vpx_codec_err_t vp8_init(vpx_codec_ctx_t *ctx,
vpx_codec_priv_enc_mr_cfg_t *data)
{
vpx_codec_err_t res = VPX_CODEC_OK;
vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *priv = NULL;
(void) data;
vp8_rtcd();
vpx_dsp_rtcd();
vpx_scale_rtcd();
/* This function only allocates space for the vpx_codec_alg_priv_t
* structure. More memory may be required at the time the stream
* information becomes known.
*/
if (!ctx->priv) {
vp8_init_ctx(ctx);
priv = (vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *)ctx->priv;
/* initialize number of fragments to zero */
priv->fragments.count = 0;
/* is input fragments enabled? */
priv->fragments.enabled =
(priv->base.init_flags & VPX_CODEC_USE_INPUT_FRAGMENTS);
/*post processing level initialized to do nothing */
} else {
priv = (vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *)ctx->priv;
}
priv->yv12_frame_buffers.use_frame_threads =
(ctx->priv->init_flags & VPX_CODEC_USE_FRAME_THREADING);
/* for now, disable frame threading */
priv->yv12_frame_buffers.use_frame_threads = 0;
if (priv->yv12_frame_buffers.use_frame_threads &&
((ctx->priv->init_flags & VPX_CODEC_USE_ERROR_CONCEALMENT) ||
(ctx->priv->init_flags & VPX_CODEC_USE_INPUT_FRAGMENTS))) {
/* row-based threading, error concealment, and input fragments will
* not be supported when using frame-based threading */
res = VPX_CODEC_INVALID_PARAM;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: Cherry-pick 0f42d1f from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp8: fix decoder crash with invalid leading keyframes
decoding the same invalid keyframe twice would result in a crash as the
second time through the decoder would be assumed to have been
initialized as there was no resolution change. in this case the
resolution was itself invalid (0x6), but vp8_peek_si() was only failing
in the case of 0x0.
invalid-vp80-00-comprehensive-018.ivf.2kf_0x6.ivf tests this case by
duplicating the first keyframe and additionally adds a valid one to
ensure decoding can resume without error.
Bug: 30593765
Change-Id: I0de85f5a5eb5c0a5605230faf20c042b69aea507
(cherry picked from commit fc0466b695dce03e10390101844caa374848d903)
(cherry picked from commit 1114575245cb9d2f108749f916c76549524f5136)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 157,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: bool GesturePoint::IsInFlickWindow(const TouchEvent& event) {
return IsOverMinFlickSpeed() && event.type() != ui::ET_TOUCH_CANCELLED;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 108,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: static int vhost_net_init(void)
{
if (experimental_zcopytx)
vhost_net_enable_zcopy(VHOST_NET_VQ_TX);
return misc_register(&vhost_net_misc);
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 30,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation.
|
Code: void NavigatorImpl::DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError_Params& params) {
VLOG(1) << "Failed Provisional Load: " << params.url.possibly_invalid_spec()
<< ", error_code: " << params.error_code
<< ", error_description: " << params.error_description
<< ", showing_repost_interstitial: " <<
params.showing_repost_interstitial
<< ", frame_id: " << render_frame_host->GetRoutingID();
GURL validated_url(params.url);
RenderProcessHost* render_process_host = render_frame_host->GetProcess();
render_process_host->FilterURL(false, &validated_url);
if (net::ERR_ABORTED == params.error_code) {
FrameTreeNode* root =
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->frame_tree()->root();
if (root->render_manager()->interstitial_page() != NULL) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Discarding message during interstitial.";
return;
}
}
DiscardPendingEntryIfNeeded(render_frame_host->navigation_handle());
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,693
|
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