instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 235k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int entry_unshown(struct object_array_entry *entry, void *cb_data_unused)
{
return !(entry->item->flags & SHOWN);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,986 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void PSOutputDev::addProcessColor(double c, double m, double y, double k) {
if (c > 0) {
processColors |= psProcessCyan;
}
if (m > 0) {
processColors |= psProcessMagenta;
}
if (y > 0) {
processColors |= psProcessYellow;
}
if (k > 0) {
processColors |= psProcessBlack;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void prb_close_block(struct tpacket_kbdq_core *pkc1,
struct tpacket_block_desc *pbd1,
struct packet_sock *po, unsigned int stat)
{
__u32 status = TP_STATUS_USER | stat;
struct tpacket3_hdr *last_pkt;
struct tpacket_hdr_v1 *h1 = &pbd1->hdr.bh1;
if (po->stats.stats3.tp_drops)
status |= TP_STATUS_LOSING;
last_pkt = (struct tpacket3_hdr *)pkc1->prev;
last_pkt->tp_next_offset = 0;
/* Get the ts of the last pkt */
if (BLOCK_NUM_PKTS(pbd1)) {
h1->ts_last_pkt.ts_sec = last_pkt->tp_sec;
h1->ts_last_pkt.ts_nsec = last_pkt->tp_nsec;
} else {
/* Ok, we tmo'd - so get the current time */
struct timespec ts;
getnstimeofday(&ts);
h1->ts_last_pkt.ts_sec = ts.tv_sec;
h1->ts_last_pkt.ts_nsec = ts.tv_nsec;
}
smp_wmb();
/* Flush the block */
prb_flush_block(pkc1, pbd1, status);
pkc1->kactive_blk_num = GET_NEXT_PRB_BLK_NUM(pkc1);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: device_drive_benchmark_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
Device *device,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
const gchar *action_id,
guint num_user_data,
gpointer *user_data_elements)
{
gboolean do_write_benchmark = GPOINTER_TO_INT (user_data_elements[0]);
gchar **options = user_data_elements[1];
gchar *argv[16];
guint n;
if (!device->priv->device_is_drive)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Device is not a drive");
goto out;
}
if (do_write_benchmark)
{
if (device->priv->device_is_partition_table)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "A partition table was detected - write benchmarking requires "
"the disk to be completely empty");
goto out;
}
if (device->priv->id_usage != NULL)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "The disk seems to have usage `%s' - write benchmarking requires "
"the disk to be completely empty", device->priv->id_usage);
goto out;
}
}
for (n = 0; options[n] != NULL; n++)
{
const char *option = options[n];
throw_error (context, ERROR_INVALID_OPTION, "Unknown option %s", option);
goto out;
}
n = 0;
argv[n++] = "udisks-helper-drive-benchmark";
argv[n++] = device->priv->device_file;
argv[n++] = do_write_benchmark ? "1" : "0";
argv[n++] = NULL;
if (!job_new (context, "DriveBenchmark", TRUE, device, argv, NULL, drive_benchmark_completed_cb, FALSE, NULL, NULL))
{
goto out;
}
out:
;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int nf_tables_delset(struct sock *nlsk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
const struct nlattr * const nla[])
{
const struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct nft_set *set;
struct nft_ctx ctx;
int err;
if (nfmsg->nfgen_family == NFPROTO_UNSPEC)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (nla[NFTA_SET_TABLE] == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
err = nft_ctx_init_from_setattr(&ctx, skb, nlh, nla);
if (err < 0)
return err;
set = nf_tables_set_lookup(ctx.table, nla[NFTA_SET_NAME]);
if (IS_ERR(set))
return PTR_ERR(set);
if (set->flags & NFT_SET_INACTIVE)
return -ENOENT;
if (!list_empty(&set->bindings))
return -EBUSY;
return nft_delset(&ctx, set);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 57,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: std::unique_ptr<HistogramSamples> Histogram::SnapshotSamples() const {
return SnapshotSampleVector();
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 140,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: const std::vector<size_t>& manifests_reported_when_favicon_url_updated() {
return manifests_reported_when_favicon_url_updated_;
}
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
CWE ID: | 0 | 150,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int initialize_unit_leds(void)
{
/*
* Init the unit LEDs per default they all are
* ok apart from bootstat
*/
uchar buf;
if (i2c_read(BOCO, REG_CTRL_H, 1, &buf, 1) != 0) {
printf("%s: Error reading Boco\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
buf |= MASK_WRL_UNITRUN;
if (i2c_write(BOCO, REG_CTRL_H, 1, &buf, 1) != 0) {
printf("%s: Error writing Boco\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 89,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
BN_CTX *ctx)
{
if (group->meth->is_on_curve == 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
return group->meth->is_on_curve(group, point, ctx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 12,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int default_cu2_call(struct notifier_block *nfb, unsigned long action,
void *data)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = data;
switch (action) {
default:
die_if_kernel("Unhandled kernel unaligned access or invalid "
"instruction", regs);
/* Fall through */
case CU2_EXCEPTION:
force_sig(SIGILL, current);
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void AutofillPopupBaseView::OnNativeFocusChanged(gfx::NativeView focused_now) {
if (GetWidget() && GetWidget()->GetNativeView() != focused_now)
HideController();
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void call_snmp_init_once(void) {
static int have_init = 0;
if (have_init == 0)
init_snmp(PACKAGE_NAME);
have_init = 1;
} /* void call_snmp_init_once */
Commit Message: snmp plugin: Fix double free of request PDU
snmp_sess_synch_response() always frees request PDU, in both case of request
error and success. If error condition occurs inside of `while (status == 0)`
loop, double free of `req` happens.
Issue: #2291
Signed-off-by: Florian Forster <octo@collectd.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 59,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_arp *arp)
{
static const struct arpt_arp uncond;
return memcmp(arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: AcpiNsOpensScope (
ACPI_OBJECT_TYPE Type)
{
ACPI_FUNCTION_ENTRY ();
if (Type > ACPI_TYPE_LOCAL_MAX)
{
/* type code out of range */
ACPI_WARNING ((AE_INFO, "Invalid Object Type 0x%X", Type));
return (ACPI_NS_NORMAL);
}
return (((UINT32) AcpiGbl_NsProperties[Type]) & ACPI_NS_NEWSCOPE);
}
Commit Message: Namespace: fix operand cache leak
I found some ACPI operand cache leaks in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.174332] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.175504] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.176010] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.177032] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.178284] ACPI: SCI (IRQ16705) allocation failed
>[ 0.179352] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_ACQUIRED, Unable to install
System Control Interrupt handler (20160930/evevent-131)
>[ 0.180008] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.181125] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler
(20160930/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.184068] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has
objects
>[ 0.185358] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3 #2
>[ 0.186820] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.188000] Call Trace:
>[ 0.188000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x7d
>[ 0.188000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x224/0x230
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x22/0x22
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0xd
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_terminate+0x5/0xf
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_init+0x288/0x32e
>[ 0.188000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? video_setup+0x7a/0x7a
>[ 0.188000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1b0
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x194/0x21a
>[ 0.188000] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.188000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling AcpiTerminate() function. The function calls
AcpiNsTerminate() function to delete namespace data and ACPI operand cache
(AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList).
But the deletion code in AcpiNsTerminate() function is wrapped in
ACPI_EXEC_APP definition, therefore the code is only executed when the
definition exists. If the define doesn't exist, ACPI operand cache
(AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList) is leaked, and stack dump is shown in kernel log.
This causes a security threat because the old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory
locations of kernel functions in stack dump, therefore kernel ASLR can be
neutralized.
To fix ACPI operand leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which
removes the ACPI_EXEC_APP define in AcpiNsTerminate() function for
executing the deletion code unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-755 | 0 | 95,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: compress_job_on_error (AutoarCompressor *compressor,
GError *error,
gpointer user_data)
{
CompressJob *compress_job = user_data;
char *status;
if (compress_job->total_files == 1)
{
status = f (_("Error compressing “%B” into “%B”"),
G_FILE (compress_job->source_files->data),
compress_job->output_file);
}
else
{
status = f (ngettext ("Error compressing %'d file into “%B”",
"Error compressing %'d files into “%B”",
compress_job->total_files),
compress_job->total_files,
compress_job->output_file);
}
nautilus_progress_info_take_status (compress_job->common.progress,
status);
run_error ((CommonJob *) compress_job,
g_strdup (_("There was an error while compressing files.")),
g_strdup (error->message),
NULL,
FALSE,
CANCEL,
NULL);
abort_job ((CommonJob *) compress_job);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void perf_swevent_cancel_hrtimer(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
if (is_sampling_event(event)) {
ktime_t remaining = hrtimer_get_remaining(&hwc->hrtimer);
local64_set(&hwc->period_left, ktime_to_ns(remaining));
hrtimer_cancel(&hwc->hrtimer);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform2uiv(GLint fake_location,
GLsizei count,
const volatile GLuint* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniform2uiv",
Program::kUniform2ui,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
api()->glUniform2uivFn(real_location, count,
const_cast<const GLuint*>(value));
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::DoSetDecryptionPassphrase(
const std::string& passphrase) {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), sync_loop_);
sync_manager_->SetDecryptionPassphrase(passphrase);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: String XMLHttpRequest::statusText(ExceptionState& es) const
{
if (!m_response.httpStatusText().isNull())
return m_response.httpStatusText();
if (m_state == OPENED) {
es.throwDOMException(InvalidStateError, ExceptionMessages::failedToGet("statusText", "XMLHttpRequest", "the object's state must not be OPENED."));
}
return String();
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void atl2_get_drvinfo(struct net_device *netdev,
struct ethtool_drvinfo *drvinfo)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
strlcpy(drvinfo->driver, atl2_driver_name, sizeof(drvinfo->driver));
strlcpy(drvinfo->version, atl2_driver_version,
sizeof(drvinfo->version));
strlcpy(drvinfo->fw_version, "L2", sizeof(drvinfo->fw_version));
strlcpy(drvinfo->bus_info, pci_name(adapter->pdev),
sizeof(drvinfo->bus_info));
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 55,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static inline unsigned long brk_rnd(void)
{
unsigned long rnd = 0;
/* 8MB for 32bit, 1GB for 64bit */
if (is_32bit_task())
rnd = (long)(get_random_int() % (1<<(23-PAGE_SHIFT)));
else
rnd = (long)(get_random_int() % (1<<(30-PAGE_SHIFT)));
return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void math_error(struct pt_regs *regs, int error_code, int trapnr)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
siginfo_t info;
unsigned short err;
char *str = (trapnr == X86_TRAP_MF) ? "fpu exception" :
"simd exception";
if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, str, regs, error_code, trapnr, SIGFPE) == NOTIFY_STOP)
return;
conditional_sti(regs);
if (!user_mode_vm(regs))
{
if (!fixup_exception(regs)) {
task->thread.error_code = error_code;
task->thread.trap_nr = trapnr;
die(str, regs, error_code);
}
return;
}
/*
* Save the info for the exception handler and clear the error.
*/
save_init_fpu(task);
task->thread.trap_nr = trapnr;
task->thread.error_code = error_code;
info.si_signo = SIGFPE;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs);
if (trapnr == X86_TRAP_MF) {
unsigned short cwd, swd;
/*
* (~cwd & swd) will mask out exceptions that are not set to unmasked
* status. 0x3f is the exception bits in these regs, 0x200 is the
* C1 reg you need in case of a stack fault, 0x040 is the stack
* fault bit. We should only be taking one exception at a time,
* so if this combination doesn't produce any single exception,
* then we have a bad program that isn't synchronizing its FPU usage
* and it will suffer the consequences since we won't be able to
* fully reproduce the context of the exception
*/
cwd = get_fpu_cwd(task);
swd = get_fpu_swd(task);
err = swd & ~cwd;
} else {
/*
* The SIMD FPU exceptions are handled a little differently, as there
* is only a single status/control register. Thus, to determine which
* unmasked exception was caught we must mask the exception mask bits
* at 0x1f80, and then use these to mask the exception bits at 0x3f.
*/
unsigned short mxcsr = get_fpu_mxcsr(task);
err = ~(mxcsr >> 7) & mxcsr;
}
if (err & 0x001) { /* Invalid op */
/*
* swd & 0x240 == 0x040: Stack Underflow
* swd & 0x240 == 0x240: Stack Overflow
* User must clear the SF bit (0x40) if set
*/
info.si_code = FPE_FLTINV;
} else if (err & 0x004) { /* Divide by Zero */
info.si_code = FPE_FLTDIV;
} else if (err & 0x008) { /* Overflow */
info.si_code = FPE_FLTOVF;
} else if (err & 0x012) { /* Denormal, Underflow */
info.si_code = FPE_FLTUND;
} else if (err & 0x020) { /* Precision */
info.si_code = FPE_FLTRES;
} else {
/*
* If we're using IRQ 13, or supposedly even some trap
* X86_TRAP_MF implementations, it's possible
* we get a spurious trap, which is not an error.
*/
return;
}
force_sig_info(SIGFPE, &info, task);
}
Commit Message: x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS
On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.
This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: dma_addr_t map_descbuffer(struct b43_dmaring *ring,
unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int tx)
{
dma_addr_t dmaaddr;
if (tx) {
dmaaddr = dma_map_single(ring->dev->dev->dma_dev,
buf, len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
} else {
dmaaddr = dma_map_single(ring->dev->dev->dma_dev,
buf, len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
}
return dmaaddr;
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: TIFFStripSize(TIFF* tif)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFStripSize";
uint64 m;
tmsize_t n;
m=TIFFStripSize64(tif);
n=(tmsize_t)m;
if ((uint64)n!=m)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Integer overflow");
n=0;
}
return(n);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool CreatePairImpl(HANDLE* socket_a, HANDLE* socket_b, bool overlapped) {
DCHECK_NE(socket_a, socket_b);
DCHECK_EQ(*socket_a, SyncSocket::kInvalidHandle);
DCHECK_EQ(*socket_b, SyncSocket::kInvalidHandle);
wchar_t name[kPipePathMax];
ScopedHandle handle_a;
DWORD flags = PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX | FILE_FLAG_FIRST_PIPE_INSTANCE;
if (overlapped)
flags |= FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED;
do {
unsigned int rnd_name;
if (rand_s(&rnd_name) != 0)
return false;
swprintf(name, kPipePathMax,
kPipeNameFormat,
GetCurrentProcessId(),
GetCurrentThreadId(),
rnd_name);
handle_a.Set(CreateNamedPipeW(
name,
flags,
PIPE_TYPE_BYTE | PIPE_READMODE_BYTE,
1,
kOutBufferSize,
kInBufferSize,
kDefaultTimeoutMilliSeconds,
NULL));
} while (!handle_a.IsValid() &&
(GetLastError() == ERROR_PIPE_BUSY));
if (!handle_a.IsValid()) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
flags = SECURITY_SQOS_PRESENT | SECURITY_ANONYMOUS;
if (overlapped)
flags |= FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED;
ScopedHandle handle_b(CreateFileW(name,
GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
0, // no sharing.
NULL, // default security attributes.
OPEN_EXISTING, // opens existing pipe.
flags,
NULL)); // no template file.
if (!handle_b.IsValid()) {
DPLOG(ERROR) << "CreateFileW failed";
return false;
}
if (!ConnectNamedPipe(handle_a.Get(), NULL)) {
DWORD error = GetLastError();
if (error != ERROR_PIPE_CONNECTED) {
DPLOG(ERROR) << "ConnectNamedPipe failed";
return false;
}
}
*socket_a = handle_a.Take();
*socket_b = handle_b.Take();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 110,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplPriorityQueue, top)
{
zval *value, **value_out;
spl_heap_object *intern;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "") == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = (spl_heap_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->heap->flags & SPL_HEAP_CORRUPTED) {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_RuntimeException, "Heap is corrupted, heap properties are no longer ensured.", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
value = (zval *)spl_ptr_heap_top(intern->heap);
if (!value) {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_RuntimeException, "Can't peek at an empty heap", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
value_out = spl_pqueue_extract_helper(&value, intern->flags);
if (!value_out) {
zend_error(E_RECOVERABLE_ERROR, "Unable to extract from the PriorityQueue node");
return;
}
RETURN_ZVAL(*value_out, 1, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
if (acpi_rsdp && (get_securelevel() <= 0))
return acpi_rsdp;
#endif
if (efi_enabled(EFI_CONFIG_TABLES)) {
if (efi.acpi20 != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
return efi.acpi20;
else if (efi.acpi != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
return efi.acpi;
else {
printk(KERN_ERR PREFIX
"System description tables not found\n");
return 0;
}
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ACPI_LEGACY_TABLES_LOOKUP)) {
acpi_physical_address pa = 0;
acpi_find_root_pointer(&pa);
return pa;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::Stop() {
Send(new FrameMsg_Stop(routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int verify_vc_allocation(unsigned idx) {
char vcname[sizeof("/dev/vcs") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(unsigned) - 2];
xsprintf(vcname, "/dev/vcs%u", idx);
if (access(vcname, F_OK) < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | 0 | 92,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: gfx::Image Browser::GetCurrentPageIcon() const {
WebContents* web_contents = chrome::GetActiveWebContents(this);
FaviconTabHelper* favicon_tab_helper =
web_contents ? FaviconTabHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents) : NULL;
return favicon_tab_helper ? favicon_tab_helper->GetFavicon() : gfx::Image();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void XMLObjAttrAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(TestObject*, cppValue, V8TestObject::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), jsValue));
imp->setXMLObjAttr(WTF::getPtr(cppValue));
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void AudioHandler::AddInput() {
inputs_.push_back(AudioNodeInput::Create(*this));
}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 148,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int rose_info_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
char buf[11], rsbuf[11];
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN)
seq_puts(seq,
"dest_addr dest_call src_addr src_call dev lci neigh st vs vr va t t1 t2 t3 hb idle Snd-Q Rcv-Q inode\n");
else {
struct sock *s = sk_entry(v);
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(s);
const char *devname, *callsign;
const struct net_device *dev = rose->device;
if (!dev)
devname = "???";
else
devname = dev->name;
seq_printf(seq, "%-10s %-9s ",
rose2asc(rsbuf, &rose->dest_addr),
ax2asc(buf, &rose->dest_call));
if (ax25cmp(&rose->source_call, &null_ax25_address) == 0)
callsign = "??????-?";
else
callsign = ax2asc(buf, &rose->source_call);
seq_printf(seq,
"%-10s %-9s %-5s %3.3X %05d %d %d %d %d %3lu %3lu %3lu %3lu %3lu %3lu/%03lu %5d %5d %ld\n",
rose2asc(rsbuf, &rose->source_addr),
callsign,
devname,
rose->lci & 0x0FFF,
(rose->neighbour) ? rose->neighbour->number : 0,
rose->state,
rose->vs,
rose->vr,
rose->va,
ax25_display_timer(&rose->timer) / HZ,
rose->t1 / HZ,
rose->t2 / HZ,
rose->t3 / HZ,
rose->hb / HZ,
ax25_display_timer(&rose->idletimer) / (60 * HZ),
rose->idle / (60 * HZ),
sk_wmem_alloc_get(s),
sk_rmem_alloc_get(s),
s->sk_socket ? SOCK_INODE(s->sk_socket)->i_ino : 0L);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: FT_Get_Module_Interface( FT_Library library,
const char* mod_name )
{
FT_Module module;
/* test for valid `library' delayed to FT_Get_Module() */
module = FT_Get_Module( library, mod_name );
return module ? module->clazz->module_interface : 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Extension::SetCachedImage(const ExtensionResource& source,
const SkBitmap& image,
const gfx::Size& original_size) const {
DCHECK(source.extension_root() == path()); // The resource must come from
const FilePath& path = source.relative_path();
gfx::Size actual_size(image.width(), image.height());
std::string location;
if (actual_size != original_size)
location = SizeToString(actual_size);
image_cache_[ImageCacheKey(path, location)] = image;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint::UpdatePrintParams(
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params) {
DCHECK(!finished_);
WebKit::WebPrintParams webkit_print_params;
ComputeWebKitPrintParamsInDesiredDpi(print_params, &webkit_print_params);
if (webkit_print_params.printContentArea ==
web_print_params_.printContentArea &&
webkit_print_params.printableArea == web_print_params_.printableArea &&
webkit_print_params.paperSize == web_print_params_.paperSize &&
webkit_print_params.printScalingOption ==
web_print_params_.printScalingOption) {
return;
}
frame_->printEnd();
StartPrinting(webkit_print_params);
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: MockAutofillClient() {}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool MediaStreamManager::DoesMediaDeviceIDMatchHMAC(
const std::string& salt,
const url::Origin& security_origin,
const std::string& device_guid,
const std::string& raw_unique_id) {
DCHECK(!raw_unique_id.empty());
std::string guid_from_raw_device_id =
GetHMACForMediaDeviceID(salt, security_origin, raw_unique_id);
return guid_from_raw_device_id == device_guid;
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: struct net_device *dev_get_by_name(struct net *net, const char *name)
{
struct net_device *dev;
rcu_read_lock();
dev = dev_get_by_name_rcu(net, name);
if (dev)
dev_hold(dev);
rcu_read_unlock();
return dev;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static inline int flexarray_get_bin_size(struct flexarray *flex, int bin)
{
(void)flex;
if (bin >= ARRAY_SIZE(bin_offset))
return -1;
int next = bin_offset[bin + 1];
return next - bin_offset[bin];
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: file_mbswidth(const char *s)
{
#if defined(HAVE_WCHAR_H) && defined(HAVE_MBRTOWC) && defined(HAVE_WCWIDTH)
size_t bytesconsumed, old_n, n, width = 0;
mbstate_t state;
wchar_t nextchar;
(void)memset(&state, 0, sizeof(mbstate_t));
old_n = n = strlen(s);
while (n > 0) {
bytesconsumed = mbrtowc(&nextchar, s, n, &state);
if (bytesconsumed == (size_t)(-1) ||
bytesconsumed == (size_t)(-2)) {
/* Something went wrong, return something reasonable */
return old_n;
}
if (s[0] == '\n') {
/*
* do what strlen() would do, so that caller
* is always right
*/
width++;
} else {
int w = wcwidth(nextchar);
if (w > 0)
width += w;
}
s += bytesconsumed, n -= bytesconsumed;
}
return width;
#else
return strlen(s);
#endif
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 45,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void jas_icclut16_dump(jas_iccattrval_t *attrval, FILE *out)
{
jas_icclut16_t *lut16 = &attrval->data.lut16;
int i;
int j;
fprintf(out, "numinchans=%d, numoutchans=%d, clutlen=%d\n",
lut16->numinchans, lut16->numoutchans, lut16->clutlen);
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < 3; ++j) {
fprintf(out, "e[%d][%d]=%f ", i, j, lut16->e[i][j] / 65536.0);
}
fprintf(out, "\n");
}
fprintf(out, "numintabents=%"PRIuFAST16", numouttabents=%"PRIuFAST16"\n",
lut16->numintabents, lut16->numouttabents);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int mmtimer_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
int ret = 0;
switch (cmd) {
case MMTIMER_GETOFFSET: /* offset of the counter */
/*
* SN RTC registers are on their own 64k page
*/
if(PAGE_SIZE <= (1 << 16))
ret = (((long)RTC_COUNTER_ADDR) & (PAGE_SIZE-1)) / 8;
else
ret = -ENOSYS;
break;
case MMTIMER_GETRES: /* resolution of the clock in 10^-15 s */
if(copy_to_user((unsigned long __user *)arg,
&mmtimer_femtoperiod, sizeof(unsigned long)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
case MMTIMER_GETFREQ: /* frequency in Hz */
if(copy_to_user((unsigned long __user *)arg,
&sn_rtc_cycles_per_second,
sizeof(unsigned long)))
return -EFAULT;
ret = 0;
break;
case MMTIMER_GETBITS: /* number of bits in the clock */
ret = RTC_BITS;
break;
case MMTIMER_MMAPAVAIL: /* can we mmap the clock into userspace? */
ret = (PAGE_SIZE <= (1 << 16)) ? 1 : 0;
break;
case MMTIMER_GETCOUNTER:
if(copy_to_user((unsigned long __user *)arg,
RTC_COUNTER_ADDR, sizeof(unsigned long)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
default:
ret = -ENOSYS;
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void DoSplitViewTransition(
base::flat_map<aura::Window*, WindowStateType> windows,
int divider_position) {
if (windows.empty())
return;
SplitViewController* split_view_controller =
Shell::Get()->split_view_controller();
if (!split_view_controller->InSplitViewMode())
split_view_controller->InitDividerPositionForTransition(divider_position);
for (auto& iter : windows) {
split_view_controller->SnapWindow(
iter.first, iter.second == WindowStateType::kLeftSnapped
? SplitViewController::LEFT
: SplitViewController::RIGHT);
}
if (split_view_controller->InClamshellSplitViewMode() &&
!Shell::Get()->overview_controller()->InOverviewSession()) {
split_view_controller->EndSplitView();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix the crash after clamshell -> tablet transition in overview mode.
This CL just reverted some changes that were made in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1658955. In
that CL, we changed the clamshell <-> tablet transition when clamshell
split view mode is enabled, however, we should keep the old behavior
unchanged if the feature is not enabled, i.e., overview should be ended
if it's active before the transition. Otherwise, it will cause a nullptr
dereference crash since |split_view_drag_indicators_| is not created in
clamshell overview and will be used in tablet overview.
Bug: 982507
Change-Id: I238fe9472648a446cff4ab992150658c228714dd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1705474
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima (Slow - on/off site) <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679306}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: R_API RBinJavaAnnotation *r_bin_java_annotation_new(ut8 *buffer, ut64 sz, ut64 buf_offset) {
ut32 i = 0;
RBinJavaAnnotation *annotation = NULL;
RBinJavaElementValuePair *ev_pairs = NULL;
ut64 offset = 0;
annotation = R_NEW0 (RBinJavaAnnotation);
if (!annotation) {
return NULL;
}
annotation->type_idx = R_BIN_JAVA_USHORT (buffer, offset);
offset += 2;
annotation->num_element_value_pairs = R_BIN_JAVA_USHORT (buffer, offset);
offset += 2;
annotation->element_value_pairs = r_list_newf (r_bin_java_element_pair_free);
for (i = 0; i < annotation->num_element_value_pairs; i++) {
if (offset > sz) {
break;
}
ev_pairs = r_bin_java_element_pair_new (buffer + offset, sz - offset, buf_offset + offset);
if (ev_pairs) {
offset += ev_pairs->size;
r_list_append (annotation->element_value_pairs, (void *) ev_pairs);
}
}
annotation->size = offset;
return annotation;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10498 - Crash in fuzzed java file
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 79,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::StartPlayerLoad() {
DCHECK(!web_media_player_);
WebMediaPlayerSource source;
if (src_object_) {
source = WebMediaPlayerSource(WebMediaStream(src_object_));
} else {
KURL request_url = current_src_;
if (!request_url.User().IsEmpty())
request_url.SetUser(String());
if (!request_url.Pass().IsEmpty())
request_url.SetPass(String());
KURL kurl(request_url);
source = WebMediaPlayerSource(WebURL(kurl));
}
LocalFrame* frame = GetDocument().GetFrame();
if (!frame) {
MediaLoadingFailed(
WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError,
BuildElementErrorMessage("Player load failure: document has no frame"));
return;
}
web_media_player_ = frame->Client()->CreateWebMediaPlayer(
*this, source, this,
frame->GetPage()->GetChromeClient().GetWebLayerTreeView(frame));
if (!web_media_player_) {
MediaLoadingFailed(WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError,
BuildElementErrorMessage(
"Player load failure: error creating media player"));
return;
}
if (GetLayoutObject())
GetLayoutObject()->SetShouldDoFullPaintInvalidation();
audio_source_provider_.Wrap(web_media_player_->GetAudioSourceProvider());
web_media_player_->SetVolume(EffectiveMediaVolume());
web_media_player_->SetPoster(PosterImageURL());
const auto preload = EffectivePreloadType();
web_media_player_->SetPreload(preload);
web_media_player_->RequestRemotePlaybackDisabled(
FastHasAttribute(disableremoteplaybackAttr));
auto load_timing = web_media_player_->Load(GetLoadType(), source, CorsMode());
if (load_timing == WebMediaPlayer::LoadTiming::kDeferred) {
SetShouldDelayLoadEvent(false);
}
if (IsFullscreen())
web_media_player_->EnteredFullscreen();
web_media_player_->BecameDominantVisibleContent(mostly_filling_viewport_);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldEraseMarkersAfterChangeSelection(TextCheckingType) const
{
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int dib7070_set_param_override(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
{
struct dtv_frontend_properties *p = &fe->dtv_property_cache;
struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap = fe->dvb->priv;
struct dib0700_adapter_state *state = adap->priv;
u16 offset;
u8 band = BAND_OF_FREQUENCY(p->frequency/1000);
switch (band) {
case BAND_VHF: offset = 950; break;
default:
case BAND_UHF: offset = 550; break;
}
state->dib7000p_ops.set_wbd_ref(fe, offset + dib0070_wbd_offset(fe));
return state->set_param_save(fe);
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void RenderView::showContextMenu(
WebFrame* frame, const WebContextMenuData& data) {
ContextMenuParams params = ContextMenuParams(data);
if (params.src_url.spec().size() > content::kMaxURLChars)
params.src_url = GURL();
context_menu_node_ = data.node;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_ContextMenu(routing_id_, params));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void set_defaults_(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder)
{
#if FLAC__HAS_OGG
decoder->private_->is_ogg = false;
#endif
decoder->private_->read_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->seek_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->tell_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->length_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->eof_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->write_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->metadata_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->error_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->client_data = 0;
memset(decoder->private_->metadata_filter, 0, sizeof(decoder->private_->metadata_filter));
decoder->private_->metadata_filter[FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_STREAMINFO] = true;
decoder->private_->metadata_filter_ids_count = 0;
decoder->protected_->md5_checking = false;
#if FLAC__HAS_OGG
FLAC__ogg_decoder_aspect_set_defaults(&decoder->protected_->ogg_decoder_aspect);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: parse_peer_options(int call_type, xmlNode * request,
gboolean * local_notify, gboolean * needs_reply, gboolean * process,
gboolean * needs_forward)
{
const char *op = NULL;
const char *host = NULL;
const char *delegated = NULL;
const char *originator = crm_element_value(request, F_ORIG);
const char *reply_to = crm_element_value(request, F_CIB_ISREPLY);
const char *update = crm_element_value(request, F_CIB_GLOBAL_UPDATE);
gboolean is_reply = safe_str_eq(reply_to, cib_our_uname);
if (crm_is_true(update)) {
*needs_reply = FALSE;
if (is_reply) {
*local_notify = TRUE;
crm_trace("Processing global/peer update from %s"
" that originated from us", originator);
} else {
crm_trace("Processing global/peer update from %s", originator);
}
return TRUE;
}
host = crm_element_value(request, F_CIB_HOST);
if (host != NULL && safe_str_eq(host, cib_our_uname)) {
crm_trace("Processing request sent to us from %s", originator);
return TRUE;
} else if (host == NULL && cib_is_master == TRUE) {
crm_trace("Processing request sent to master instance from %s", originator);
return TRUE;
}
op = crm_element_value(request, F_CIB_OPERATION);
if(safe_str_eq(op, "cib_shutdown_req")) {
/* Always process these */
*local_notify = FALSE;
if(reply_to == NULL || is_reply) {
*process = TRUE;
}
if(is_reply) {
*needs_reply = FALSE;
}
return *process;
}
if (is_reply) {
crm_trace("Forward reply sent from %s to local clients", originator);
*process = FALSE;
*needs_reply = FALSE;
*local_notify = TRUE;
return TRUE;
}
delegated = crm_element_value(request, F_CIB_DELEGATED);
if (delegated != NULL) {
crm_trace("Ignoring msg for master instance");
} else if (host != NULL) {
/* this is for a specific instance and we're not it */
crm_trace("Ignoring msg for instance on %s", crm_str(host));
} else if (reply_to == NULL && cib_is_master == FALSE) {
/* this is for the master instance and we're not it */
crm_trace("Ignoring reply to %s", crm_str(reply_to));
} else if (safe_str_eq(op, "cib_shutdown_req")) {
if (reply_to != NULL) {
crm_debug("Processing %s from %s", op, host);
*needs_reply = FALSE;
} else {
crm_debug("Processing %s reply from %s", op, host);
}
return TRUE;
} else {
crm_err("Nothing for us to do?");
crm_log_xml_err(request, "Peer[inbound]");
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static BOOL update_end_paint(rdpContext* context)
{
wStream* s;
int headerLength;
rdpUpdate* update = context->update;
if (!update->us)
return FALSE;
s = update->us;
headerLength = Stream_Length(s);
Stream_SealLength(s);
Stream_SetPosition(s, headerLength);
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, update->numberOrders); /* numberOrders (2 bytes) */
Stream_SetPosition(s, Stream_Length(s));
if (update->numberOrders > 0)
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "sending %"PRIu16" orders", update->numberOrders);
fastpath_send_update_pdu(context->rdp->fastpath, FASTPATH_UPDATETYPE_ORDERS, s,
FALSE);
}
update->combineUpdates = FALSE;
update->numberOrders = 0;
update->us = NULL;
Stream_Free(s, TRUE);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_pic_ext_data(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
UWORD32 u4_start_code;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while ( (u4_start_code == EXTENSION_START_CODE ||
u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE) &&
(IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE == e_error)
{
if(u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE)
{
impeg2d_dec_user_data(ps_dec);
}
else
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
switch(u4_start_code)
{
case QUANT_MATRIX_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_quant_matrix_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case COPYRIGHT_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_copyright_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case PIC_DISPLAY_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_pic_disp_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case CAMERA_PARAM_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_cam_param_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case ITU_T_EXT_ID:
impeg2d_dec_itu_t_ext(ps_dec);
break;
case PIC_SPATIAL_SCALABLE_EXT_ID:
case PIC_TEMPORAL_SCALABLE_EXT_ID:
e_error = IMPEG2D_SCALABLITY_NOT_SUP;
break;
default:
/* In case its a reserved extension code */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
break;
}
}
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
}
return e_error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 173,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: hook_process (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin,
const char *command, int timeout,
t_hook_callback_process *callback, void *callback_data)
{
return hook_process_hashtable (plugin, command, NULL, timeout,
callback, callback_data);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
{
/* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
* preferences.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
{
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
return 2;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
return 2;
}
#endif
/* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
{
*psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
}
else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
{
*psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
}
else
{
*psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ProcRenderCreateCursor(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xRenderCreateCursorReq);
PicturePtr pSrc;
ScreenPtr pScreen;
unsigned short width, height;
CARD32 *argbbits, *argb;
unsigned char *srcbits, *srcline;
unsigned char *mskbits, *mskline;
int stride;
int x, y;
int nbytes_mono;
CursorMetricRec cm;
CursorPtr pCursor;
CARD32 twocolor[3];
int rc, ncolor;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderCreateCursorReq);
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->cid, client);
VERIFY_PICTURE(pSrc, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
if (!pSrc->pDrawable)
return BadDrawable;
pScreen = pSrc->pDrawable->pScreen;
width = pSrc->pDrawable->width;
height = pSrc->pDrawable->height;
if (height && width > UINT32_MAX / (height * sizeof(CARD32)))
return BadAlloc;
if (stuff->x > width || stuff->y > height)
return BadMatch;
argbbits = malloc(width * height * sizeof(CARD32));
if (!argbbits)
return BadAlloc;
stride = BitmapBytePad(width);
nbytes_mono = stride * height;
srcbits = calloc(1, nbytes_mono);
if (!srcbits) {
free(argbbits);
return BadAlloc;
}
mskbits = calloc(1, nbytes_mono);
if (!mskbits) {
free(argbbits);
free(srcbits);
return BadAlloc;
}
if (pSrc->format == PICT_a8r8g8b8) {
(*pScreen->GetImage) (pSrc->pDrawable,
0, 0, width, height, ZPixmap,
0xffffffff, (void *) argbbits);
}
else {
PixmapPtr pPixmap;
PicturePtr pPicture;
PictFormatPtr pFormat;
int error;
pFormat = PictureMatchFormat(pScreen, 32, PICT_a8r8g8b8);
if (!pFormat) {
free(argbbits);
free(srcbits);
free(mskbits);
return BadImplementation;
}
pPixmap = (*pScreen->CreatePixmap) (pScreen, width, height, 32,
CREATE_PIXMAP_USAGE_SCRATCH);
if (!pPixmap) {
free(argbbits);
free(srcbits);
free(mskbits);
return BadAlloc;
}
pPicture = CreatePicture(0, &pPixmap->drawable, pFormat, 0, 0,
client, &error);
if (!pPicture) {
free(argbbits);
free(srcbits);
free(mskbits);
return error;
}
(*pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pPixmap);
CompositePicture(PictOpSrc,
pSrc, 0, pPicture, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, width, height);
(*pScreen->GetImage) (pPicture->pDrawable,
0, 0, width, height, ZPixmap,
0xffffffff, (void *) argbbits);
FreePicture(pPicture, 0);
}
/*
* Check whether the cursor can be directly supported by
* the core cursor code
*/
ncolor = 0;
argb = argbbits;
for (y = 0; ncolor <= 2 && y < height; y++) {
for (x = 0; ncolor <= 2 && x < width; x++) {
CARD32 p = *argb++;
CARD32 a = (p >> 24);
if (a == 0) /* transparent */
continue;
if (a == 0xff) { /* opaque */
int n;
for (n = 0; n < ncolor; n++)
if (p == twocolor[n])
break;
if (n == ncolor)
twocolor[ncolor++] = p;
}
else
ncolor = 3;
}
}
/*
* Convert argb image to two plane cursor
*/
srcline = srcbits;
mskline = mskbits;
argb = argbbits;
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
for (x = 0; x < width; x++) {
CARD32 p = *argb++;
if (ncolor <= 2) {
CARD32 a = ((p >> 24));
RenderSetBit(mskline, x, a != 0);
RenderSetBit(srcline, x, a != 0 && p == twocolor[0]);
}
else {
CARD32 a = ((p >> 24) * DITHER_SIZE + 127) / 255;
CARD32 i = ((CvtR8G8B8toY15(p) >> 7) * DITHER_SIZE + 127) / 255;
CARD32 d =
orderedDither[y & (DITHER_DIM - 1)][x & (DITHER_DIM - 1)];
/* Set mask from dithered alpha value */
RenderSetBit(mskline, x, a > d);
/* Set src from dithered intensity value */
RenderSetBit(srcline, x, a > d && i <= d);
}
}
srcline += stride;
mskline += stride;
}
/*
* Dither to white and black if the cursor has more than two colors
*/
if (ncolor > 2) {
twocolor[0] = 0xff000000;
twocolor[1] = 0xffffffff;
}
else {
free(argbbits);
argbbits = 0;
}
#define GetByte(p,s) (((p) >> (s)) & 0xff)
#define GetColor(p,s) (GetByte(p,s) | (GetByte(p,s) << 8))
cm.width = width;
cm.height = height;
cm.xhot = stuff->x;
cm.yhot = stuff->y;
rc = AllocARGBCursor(srcbits, mskbits, argbbits, &cm,
GetColor(twocolor[0], 16),
GetColor(twocolor[0], 8),
GetColor(twocolor[0], 0),
GetColor(twocolor[1], 16),
GetColor(twocolor[1], 8),
GetColor(twocolor[1], 0),
&pCursor, client, stuff->cid);
if (rc != Success)
goto bail;
if (!AddResource(stuff->cid, RT_CURSOR, (void *) pCursor)) {
rc = BadAlloc;
goto bail;
}
return Success;
bail:
free(srcbits);
free(mskbits);
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void tg3_restore_pci_state(struct tg3 *tp)
{
u32 val;
/* Re-enable indirect register accesses. */
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_MISC_HOST_CTRL,
tp->misc_host_ctrl);
/* Set MAX PCI retry to zero. */
val = (PCISTATE_ROM_ENABLE | PCISTATE_ROM_RETRY_ENABLE);
if (tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5704_A0 &&
tg3_flag(tp, PCIX_MODE))
val |= PCISTATE_RETRY_SAME_DMA;
/* Allow reads and writes to the APE register and memory space. */
if (tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_APE))
val |= PCISTATE_ALLOW_APE_CTLSPC_WR |
PCISTATE_ALLOW_APE_SHMEM_WR |
PCISTATE_ALLOW_APE_PSPACE_WR;
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_PCISTATE, val);
pci_write_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, tp->pci_cmd);
if (!tg3_flag(tp, PCI_EXPRESS)) {
pci_write_config_byte(tp->pdev, PCI_CACHE_LINE_SIZE,
tp->pci_cacheline_sz);
pci_write_config_byte(tp->pdev, PCI_LATENCY_TIMER,
tp->pci_lat_timer);
}
/* Make sure PCI-X relaxed ordering bit is clear. */
if (tg3_flag(tp, PCIX_MODE)) {
u16 pcix_cmd;
pci_read_config_word(tp->pdev, tp->pcix_cap + PCI_X_CMD,
&pcix_cmd);
pcix_cmd &= ~PCI_X_CMD_ERO;
pci_write_config_word(tp->pdev, tp->pcix_cap + PCI_X_CMD,
pcix_cmd);
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5780_CLASS)) {
/* Chip reset on 5780 will reset MSI enable bit,
* so need to restore it.
*/
if (tg3_flag(tp, USING_MSI)) {
u16 ctrl;
pci_read_config_word(tp->pdev,
tp->msi_cap + PCI_MSI_FLAGS,
&ctrl);
pci_write_config_word(tp->pdev,
tp->msi_cap + PCI_MSI_FLAGS,
ctrl | PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE);
val = tr32(MSGINT_MODE);
tw32(MSGINT_MODE, val | MSGINT_MODE_ENABLE);
}
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: gsf_infile_tar_seek (GsfInput *input, gsf_off_t offset, GSeekType whence)
{
(void)input;
(void)offset;
(void)whence;
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: tar: fix crash on broken tar file.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 47,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: Element* Document::createElementNS(const AtomicString& namespace_uri,
const AtomicString& qualified_name,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
QualifiedName q_name(
CreateQualifiedName(namespace_uri, qualified_name, exception_state));
if (q_name == QualifiedName::Null())
return nullptr;
CreateElementFlags flags = CreateElementFlags::ByCreateElement();
if (CustomElement::ShouldCreateCustomElement(q_name))
return CustomElement::CreateCustomElement(*this, q_name, flags);
if (RegistrationContext() && V0CustomElement::IsValidName(q_name.LocalName()))
return RegistrationContext()->CreateCustomTagElement(*this, q_name);
return CreateRawElement(q_name, flags);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int kvm_alloc_vmm_area(void)
{
if (!kvm_vmm_base && (kvm_vm_buffer_size < KVM_VM_BUFFER_SIZE)) {
kvm_vmm_base = __get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL,
get_order(KVM_VMM_SIZE));
if (!kvm_vmm_base)
return -ENOMEM;
memset((void *)kvm_vmm_base, 0, KVM_VMM_SIZE);
kvm_vm_buffer = kvm_vmm_base + VMM_SIZE;
printk(KERN_DEBUG"kvm:VMM's Base Addr:0x%lx, vm_buffer:0x%lx\n",
kvm_vmm_base, kvm_vm_buffer);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: JsArgList SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetChildNodeIds(
const JsArgList& args) {
ListValue return_args;
ListValue* child_ids = new ListValue();
return_args.Append(child_ids);
int64 id = GetId(args.Get(), 0);
if (id != kInvalidId) {
ReadTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
syncable::Directory::ChildHandles child_handles;
trans.GetDirectory()->GetChildHandlesByHandle(trans.GetWrappedTrans(),
id, &child_handles);
for (syncable::Directory::ChildHandles::const_iterator it =
child_handles.begin(); it != child_handles.end(); ++it) {
child_ids->Append(Value::CreateStringValue(
base::Int64ToString(*it)));
}
}
return JsArgList(&return_args);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int decode_v3_header_fields(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx, const iw_byte *buf)
{
unsigned int nplanes;
int biXPelsPerMeter, biYPelsPerMeter;
unsigned int biClrUsed = 0;
rctx->width = iw_get_i32le(&buf[4]);
rctx->height = iw_get_i32le(&buf[8]);
if(rctx->height<0) {
rctx->height = -rctx->height;
rctx->topdown = 1;
}
nplanes = iw_get_ui16le(&buf[12]);
if(nplanes!=1) return 0;
rctx->bitcount = iw_get_ui16le(&buf[14]);
if(rctx->bitcount!=1 && rctx->bitcount!=2 && rctx->bitcount!=4 &&
rctx->bitcount!=8 && rctx->bitcount!=16 && rctx->bitcount!=24 &&
rctx->bitcount!=32)
{
iw_set_errorf(rctx->ctx,"Bad or unsupported bit count (%d)",(int)rctx->bitcount);
return 0;
}
if(rctx->infoheader_size<=16) {
goto infoheaderdone;
}
rctx->compression = iw_get_ui32le(&buf[16]);
if(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_BITFIELDS) {
if(rctx->bitcount==1) {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Huffman 1D compression not supported");
return 0;
}
else if(rctx->bitcount!=16 && rctx->bitcount!=32) {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Bad or unsupported image type");
return 0;
}
rctx->uses_bitfields = 1;
if(rctx->bmpversion==3) {
rctx->bitfields_nbytes = 12;
}
rctx->compression=IWBMP_BI_RGB;
}
biXPelsPerMeter = iw_get_i32le(&buf[24]);
biYPelsPerMeter = iw_get_i32le(&buf[28]);
rctx->img->density_code = IW_DENSITY_UNITS_PER_METER;
rctx->img->density_x = (double)biXPelsPerMeter;
rctx->img->density_y = (double)biYPelsPerMeter;
if(!iw_is_valid_density(rctx->img->density_x,rctx->img->density_y,rctx->img->density_code)) {
rctx->img->density_code=IW_DENSITY_UNKNOWN;
}
biClrUsed = iw_get_ui32le(&buf[32]);
if(biClrUsed>100000) return 0;
infoheaderdone:
if(biClrUsed==0 && rctx->bitcount<=8) {
rctx->palette_entries = 1<<rctx->bitcount;
}
else {
rctx->palette_entries = biClrUsed;
}
rctx->palette_nbytes = 4*rctx->palette_entries;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: double jas_tmr_get(jas_tmr_t *tmr)
{
double t;
t = ((tmr->stop.ru_utime.tv_sec * 1e6 + tmr->stop.ru_utime.tv_usec) -
(tmr->start.ru_utime.tv_sec * 1e6 + tmr->start.ru_utime.tv_usec)) / 1e6;
t += ((tmr->stop.ru_stime.tv_sec * 1e6 + tmr->stop.ru_stime.tv_usec) -
(tmr->start.ru_stime.tv_sec * 1e6 + tmr->start.ru_stime.tv_usec)) / 1e6;
return t;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void perWorldReadOnlyAttributeAttributeGetterForMainWorld(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<TestObject> result(imp->perWorldReadOnlyAttribute());
if (result && DOMDataStore::setReturnValueFromWrapperForMainWorld<V8TestObject>(info.GetReturnValue(), result.get()))
return;
v8::Handle<v8::Value> wrapper = toV8(result.get(), info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (!wrapper.IsEmpty()) {
V8HiddenValue::setHiddenValue(info.GetIsolate(), info.Holder(), v8AtomicString(info.GetIsolate(), "perWorldReadOnlyAttribute"), wrapper);
v8SetReturnValue(info, wrapper);
}
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t DecodePSDPixels(const size_t number_compact_pixels,
const unsigned char *compact_pixels,const ssize_t depth,
const size_t number_pixels,unsigned char *pixels)
{
#define CheckNumberCompactPixels \
if (packets == 0) \
return(i); \
packets--
#define CheckNumberPixels(count) \
if (((ssize_t) i + count) > (ssize_t) number_pixels) \
return(i); \
i+=count
int
pixel;
register ssize_t
i,
j;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
packets;
packets=(ssize_t) number_compact_pixels;
for (i=0; (packets > 1) && (i < (ssize_t) number_pixels); )
{
packets--;
length=(size_t) (*compact_pixels++);
if (length == 128)
continue;
if (length > 128)
{
length=256-length+1;
CheckNumberCompactPixels;
pixel=(*compact_pixels++);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j++)
{
switch (depth)
{
case 1:
{
CheckNumberPixels(8);
*pixels++=(pixel >> 7) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(pixel >> 6) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(pixel >> 5) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(pixel >> 4) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(pixel >> 3) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(pixel >> 2) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(pixel >> 1) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(pixel >> 0) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
break;
}
case 2:
{
CheckNumberPixels(4);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) ((pixel >> 6) & 0x03);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) ((pixel >> 4) & 0x03);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) ((pixel >> 2) & 0x03);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) ((pixel & 0x03) & 0x03);
break;
}
case 4:
{
CheckNumberPixels(2);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) ((pixel >> 4) & 0xff);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) ((pixel & 0x0f) & 0xff);
break;
}
default:
{
CheckNumberPixels(1);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) pixel;
break;
}
}
}
continue;
}
length++;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j++)
{
CheckNumberCompactPixels;
switch (depth)
{
case 1:
{
CheckNumberPixels(8);
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 7) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 6) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 5) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 4) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 3) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 2) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 1) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 0) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
break;
}
case 2:
{
CheckNumberPixels(4);
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 6) & 0x03;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 4) & 0x03;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 2) & 0x03;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels & 0x03) & 0x03;
break;
}
case 4:
{
CheckNumberPixels(2);
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 4) & 0xff;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels & 0x0f) & 0xff;
break;
}
default:
{
CheckNumberPixels(1);
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels);
break;
}
}
compact_pixels++;
}
}
return(i);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void CSoundFile::UpdateTimeSignature()
{
if(!Patterns.IsValidIndex(m_PlayState.m_nPattern) || !Patterns[m_PlayState.m_nPattern].GetOverrideSignature())
{
m_PlayState.m_nCurrentRowsPerBeat = m_nDefaultRowsPerBeat;
m_PlayState.m_nCurrentRowsPerMeasure = m_nDefaultRowsPerMeasure;
} else
{
m_PlayState.m_nCurrentRowsPerBeat = Patterns[m_PlayState.m_nPattern].GetRowsPerBeat();
m_PlayState.m_nCurrentRowsPerMeasure = Patterns[m_PlayState.m_nPattern].GetRowsPerMeasure();
}
}
Commit Message: [Fix] Possible out-of-bounds read when computing length of some IT files with pattern loops (OpenMPT: formats that are converted to IT, libopenmpt: IT/ITP/MO3), caught with afl-fuzz.
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@10027 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: xsltProcessingInstructionComp(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemPIPtr comp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp;
#endif
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp = (xsltStyleItemPIPtr) xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_PI);
#else
comp = xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_PI);
#endif
if (comp == NULL)
return;
inst->psvi = comp;
comp->inst = inst;
comp->name = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"name",
XSLT_NAMESPACE, &comp->has_name);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void flush_thread(void)
{
discard_lazy_cpu_state();
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT
flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(current);
#else /* CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT */
set_debug_reg_defaults(¤t->thread);
#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT */
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void cassign(JF, js_Ast *exp)
{
js_Ast *lhs = exp->a;
js_Ast *rhs = exp->b;
switch (lhs->type) {
case EXP_IDENTIFIER:
cexp(J, F, rhs);
emitlocal(J, F, OP_SETLOCAL, OP_SETVAR, lhs);
break;
case EXP_INDEX:
cexp(J, F, lhs->a);
cexp(J, F, lhs->b);
cexp(J, F, rhs);
emit(J, F, OP_SETPROP);
break;
case EXP_MEMBER:
cexp(J, F, lhs->a);
cexp(J, F, rhs);
emitstring(J, F, OP_SETPROP_S, lhs->b->string);
break;
default:
jsC_error(J, lhs, "invalid l-value in assignment");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: rend_service_del_ephemeral(const char *service_id)
{
rend_service_t *s;
if (!rend_valid_service_id(service_id)) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested malformed Onion Service id for removal.");
return -1;
}
if ((s = rend_service_get_by_service_id(service_id)) == NULL) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-existent Onion Service id for "
"removal.");
return -1;
}
if (!rend_service_is_ephemeral(s)) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-ephemeral Onion Service for removal.");
return -1;
}
/* Kill the intro point circuit for the Onion Service, and remove it from
* the list. Closing existing connections is the application's problem.
*
* XXX: As with the comment in rend_config_services(), a nice abstraction
* would be ideal here, but for now just duplicate the code.
*/
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
if (!circ->marked_for_close &&
(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO ||
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO)) {
origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
tor_assert(oc->rend_data);
if (!rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(oc, (uint8_t *) s->pk_digest)) {
continue;
}
log_debug(LD_REND, "Closing intro point %s for service %s.",
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(
oc->build_state->chosen_exit)),
rend_data_get_address(oc->rend_data));
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
smartlist_remove(rend_service_list, s);
rend_service_free(s);
log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "Removed ephemeral Onion Service: %s", service_id);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532 | 0 | 69,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: gx_dc_pure_masked_get_dev_halftone(const gx_device_color * pdevc)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 1,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int StreamTcpSessionPoolInit(void *data, void* initdata)
{
memset(data, 0, sizeof(TcpSession));
StreamTcpIncrMemuse((uint64_t)sizeof(TcpSession));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 79,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode,
struct delayed_call *done)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
return proc_pid_get_link(dentry, inode, done);
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 49,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void WebPluginDelegateProxy::ImeCompositionCompleted(const string16& text,
int plugin_id) {
if (instance_id_ != plugin_id)
return;
IPC::Message* msg = new PluginMsg_ImeCompositionCompleted(instance_id_, text);
msg->set_unblock(true);
Send(msg);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int handle_switch_ime_count() const {
return handle_switch_ime_count_;
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 106,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void TabStripModel::AddSelectionFromAnchorTo(int index) {
int old_active = active_index();
selection_model_.AddSelectionFromAnchorTo(index);
NotifySelectionChanged(old_active);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void DatabaseImpl::CreateIndex(int64_t transaction_id,
int64_t object_store_id,
int64_t index_id,
const base::string16& name,
const IndexedDBKeyPath& key_path,
bool unique,
bool multi_entry) {
idb_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&IDBThreadHelper::CreateIndex, base::Unretained(helper_),
transaction_id, object_store_id, index_id, name, key_path,
unique, multi_entry));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 136,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void BlobURLRequestJob::AdvanceItem() {
DeleteCurrentFileReader();
current_item_index_++;
current_item_offset_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 115,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: struct buffer_head *udf_expand_dir_adinicb(struct inode *inode, int *block,
int *err)
{
int newblock;
struct buffer_head *dbh = NULL;
struct kernel_lb_addr eloc;
uint8_t alloctype;
struct extent_position epos;
struct udf_fileident_bh sfibh, dfibh;
loff_t f_pos = udf_ext0_offset(inode);
int size = udf_ext0_offset(inode) + inode->i_size;
struct fileIdentDesc cfi, *sfi, *dfi;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_USE_SHORT_AD))
alloctype = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT;
else
alloctype = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG;
if (!inode->i_size) {
iinfo->i_alloc_type = alloctype;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
return NULL;
}
/* alloc block, and copy data to it */
*block = udf_new_block(inode->i_sb, inode,
iinfo->i_location.partitionReferenceNum,
iinfo->i_location.logicalBlockNum, err);
if (!(*block))
return NULL;
newblock = udf_get_pblock(inode->i_sb, *block,
iinfo->i_location.partitionReferenceNum,
0);
if (!newblock)
return NULL;
dbh = udf_tgetblk(inode->i_sb, newblock);
if (!dbh)
return NULL;
lock_buffer(dbh);
memset(dbh->b_data, 0x00, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize);
set_buffer_uptodate(dbh);
unlock_buffer(dbh);
mark_buffer_dirty_inode(dbh, inode);
sfibh.soffset = sfibh.eoffset =
f_pos & (inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1);
sfibh.sbh = sfibh.ebh = NULL;
dfibh.soffset = dfibh.eoffset = 0;
dfibh.sbh = dfibh.ebh = dbh;
while (f_pos < size) {
iinfo->i_alloc_type = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB;
sfi = udf_fileident_read(inode, &f_pos, &sfibh, &cfi, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!sfi) {
brelse(dbh);
return NULL;
}
iinfo->i_alloc_type = alloctype;
sfi->descTag.tagLocation = cpu_to_le32(*block);
dfibh.soffset = dfibh.eoffset;
dfibh.eoffset += (sfibh.eoffset - sfibh.soffset);
dfi = (struct fileIdentDesc *)(dbh->b_data + dfibh.soffset);
if (udf_write_fi(inode, sfi, dfi, &dfibh, sfi->impUse,
sfi->fileIdent +
le16_to_cpu(sfi->lengthOfImpUse))) {
iinfo->i_alloc_type = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB;
brelse(dbh);
return NULL;
}
}
mark_buffer_dirty_inode(dbh, inode);
memset(iinfo->i_ext.i_data + iinfo->i_lenEAttr, 0,
iinfo->i_lenAlloc);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = 0;
eloc.logicalBlockNum = *block;
eloc.partitionReferenceNum =
iinfo->i_location.partitionReferenceNum;
iinfo->i_lenExtents = inode->i_size;
epos.bh = NULL;
epos.block = iinfo->i_location;
epos.offset = udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode);
udf_add_aext(inode, &epos, &eloc, inode->i_size, 0);
/* UniqueID stuff */
brelse(epos.bh);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
return dbh;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs
We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.
Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 36,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void hmhd_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_HintMediaHeaderBox *ptr = (GF_HintMediaHeaderBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_strip_16_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(colour_type)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return bit_depth > 8;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: PHPAPI char *php_unescape_html_entities(unsigned char *old, size_t oldlen, size_t *newlen, int all, int flags, char *hint_charset TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t retlen;
char *ret;
enum entity_charset charset;
const entity_ht *inverse_map = NULL;
size_t new_size = TRAVERSE_FOR_ENTITIES_EXPAND_SIZE(oldlen);
if (all) {
charset = determine_charset(hint_charset TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
charset = cs_8859_1; /* charset shouldn't matter, use ISO-8859-1 for performance */
}
/* don't use LIMIT_ALL! */
if (oldlen > new_size) {
/* overflow, refuse to do anything */
ret = estrndup((char*)old, oldlen);
retlen = oldlen;
goto empty_source;
}
ret = emalloc(new_size);
*ret = '\0';
retlen = oldlen;
if (retlen == 0) {
goto empty_source;
}
inverse_map = unescape_inverse_map(all, flags);
/* replace numeric entities */
traverse_for_entities(old, oldlen, ret, &retlen, all, flags, inverse_map, charset);
empty_source:
*newlen = retlen;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void skb_coalesce_rx_frag(struct sk_buff *skb, int i, int size,
unsigned int truesize)
{
skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
skb_frag_size_add(frag, size);
skb->len += size;
skb->data_len += size;
skb->truesize += truesize;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 39,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void logi_dj_recv_destroy_djhid_device(struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev,
struct dj_report *dj_report)
{
/* Called in delayed work context */
struct dj_device *dj_dev;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&djrcv_dev->lock, flags);
dj_dev = djrcv_dev->paired_dj_devices[dj_report->device_index];
djrcv_dev->paired_dj_devices[dj_report->device_index] = NULL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&djrcv_dev->lock, flags);
if (dj_dev != NULL) {
hid_destroy_device(dj_dev->hdev);
kfree(dj_dev);
} else {
dev_err(&djrcv_dev->hdev->dev, "%s: can't destroy a NULL device\n",
__func__);
}
}
Commit Message: HID: logitech: fix bounds checking on LED report size
The check on report size for REPORT_TYPE_LEDS in logi_dj_ll_raw_request()
is wrong; the current check doesn't make any sense -- the report allocated
by HID core in hid_hw_raw_request() can be much larger than
DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, and currently logi_dj_ll_raw_request() doesn't
handle this properly at all.
Fix the check by actually trimming down the report size properly if it is
too large.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
{
struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
dentry->d_inode->i_mode
};
return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond);
}
Commit Message: AppArmor: fix oops in apparmor_setprocattr
When invalid parameters are passed to apparmor_setprocattr a NULL deref
oops occurs when it tries to record an audit message. This is because
it is passing NULL for the profile parameter for aa_audit. But aa_audit
now requires that the profile passed is not NULL.
Fix this by passing the current profile on the task that is trying to
setprocattr.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 34,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: const uint8_t *ff_h264_decode_nal(H264Context *h, const uint8_t *src,
int *dst_length, int *consumed, int length)
{
int i, si, di;
uint8_t *dst;
int bufidx;
h->nal_ref_idc = src[0] >> 5;
h->nal_unit_type = src[0] & 0x1F;
src++;
length--;
#define STARTCODE_TEST \
if (i + 2 < length && src[i + 1] == 0 && src[i + 2] <= 3) { \
if (src[i + 2] != 3) { \
/* startcode, so we must be past the end */ \
length = i; \
} \
break; \
}
#if HAVE_FAST_UNALIGNED
#define FIND_FIRST_ZERO \
if (i > 0 && !src[i]) \
i--; \
while (src[i]) \
i++
#if HAVE_FAST_64BIT
for (i = 0; i + 1 < length; i += 9) {
if (!((~AV_RN64A(src + i) &
(AV_RN64A(src + i) - 0x0100010001000101ULL)) &
0x8000800080008080ULL))
continue;
FIND_FIRST_ZERO;
STARTCODE_TEST;
i -= 7;
}
#else
for (i = 0; i + 1 < length; i += 5) {
if (!((~AV_RN32A(src + i) &
(AV_RN32A(src + i) - 0x01000101U)) &
0x80008080U))
continue;
FIND_FIRST_ZERO;
STARTCODE_TEST;
i -= 3;
}
#endif
#else
for (i = 0; i + 1 < length; i += 2) {
if (src[i])
continue;
if (i > 0 && src[i - 1] == 0)
i--;
STARTCODE_TEST;
}
#endif
bufidx = h->nal_unit_type == NAL_DPC ? 1 : 0;
si = h->rbsp_buffer_size[bufidx];
av_fast_padded_malloc(&h->rbsp_buffer[bufidx], &h->rbsp_buffer_size[bufidx], length+MAX_MBPAIR_SIZE);
dst = h->rbsp_buffer[bufidx];
if (dst == NULL)
return NULL;
if(i>=length-1){ //no escaped 0
*dst_length= length;
*consumed= length+1; //+1 for the header
if(h->avctx->flags2 & CODEC_FLAG2_FAST){
return src;
}else{
memcpy(dst, src, length);
return dst;
}
}
memcpy(dst, src, i);
si = di = i;
while (si + 2 < length) {
if (src[si + 2] > 3) {
dst[di++] = src[si++];
dst[di++] = src[si++];
} else if (src[si] == 0 && src[si + 1] == 0) {
if (src[si + 2] == 3) { // escape
dst[di++] = 0;
dst[di++] = 0;
si += 3;
continue;
} else // next start code
goto nsc;
}
dst[di++] = src[si++];
}
while (si < length)
dst[di++] = src[si++];
nsc:
memset(dst + di, 0, FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
*dst_length = di;
*consumed = si + 1; // +1 for the header
/* FIXME store exact number of bits in the getbitcontext
* (it is needed for decoding) */
return dst;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ptaaTruncate(PTAA *ptaa)
{
l_int32 i, n, np;
PTA *pta;
PROCNAME("ptaaTruncate");
if (!ptaa)
return ERROR_INT("ptaa not defined", procName, 1);
n = ptaaGetCount(ptaa);
for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
pta = ptaaGetPta(ptaa, i, L_CLONE);
if (!pta) {
ptaa->n--;
continue;
}
np = ptaGetCount(pta);
ptaDestroy(&pta);
if (np == 0) {
ptaDestroy(&ptaa->pta[i]);
ptaa->n--;
} else {
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void AddLocalizedStringsBulk(content::WebUIDataSource* html_source,
LocalizedString localized_strings[],
size_t num_strings) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_strings; i++) {
html_source->AddLocalizedString(localized_strings[i].name,
localized_strings[i].id);
}
}
Commit Message: [md-settings] Clarify Password Saving and Autofill Toggles
This change clarifies the wording around the password saving and
autofill toggles.
Bug: 822465
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I91b31fe61cd0754239f7908e8c04c7e69b72f670
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/970541
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544661}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 148,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int cmd_rap_run(void *data, const char *input) {
RCore *core = (RCore *)data;
char *res = r_io_system (core->io, input);
if (res) {
int ret = atoi (res);
free (res);
return ret;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix #14990 - multiple quoted command parsing issue ##core
> "?e hello""?e world"
hello
world"
> "?e hello";"?e world"
hello
world
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 87,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static HB_Error Get_ValueRecord( GPOS_Instance* gpi,
HB_ValueRecord* vr,
HB_UShort format,
HB_Position gd )
{
HB_Short pixel_value;
HB_Error error = HB_Err_Ok;
#ifdef HB_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_MASTER
HB_GPOSHeader* gpos = gpi->gpos;
HB_Fixed value;
#endif
HB_UShort x_ppem, y_ppem;
HB_16Dot16 x_scale, y_scale;
if ( !format )
return HB_Err_Ok;
x_ppem = gpi->font->x_ppem;
y_ppem = gpi->font->y_ppem;
x_scale = gpi->font->x_scale;
y_scale = gpi->font->y_scale;
/* design units -> fractional pixel */
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_X_PLACEMENT )
gd->x_pos += x_scale * vr->XPlacement / 0x10000;
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_Y_PLACEMENT )
gd->y_pos += y_scale * vr->YPlacement / 0x10000;
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_X_ADVANCE )
gd->x_advance += x_scale * vr->XAdvance / 0x10000;
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_Y_ADVANCE )
gd->y_advance += y_scale * vr->YAdvance / 0x10000;
if ( !gpi->dvi )
{
/* pixel -> fractional pixel */
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_X_PLACEMENT_DEVICE )
{
_HB_OPEN_Get_Device( vr->DeviceTables[VR_X_PLACEMENT_DEVICE], x_ppem, &pixel_value );
gd->x_pos += pixel_value << 6;
}
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_Y_PLACEMENT_DEVICE )
{
_HB_OPEN_Get_Device( vr->DeviceTables[VR_Y_PLACEMENT_DEVICE], y_ppem, &pixel_value );
gd->y_pos += pixel_value << 6;
}
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_X_ADVANCE_DEVICE )
{
_HB_OPEN_Get_Device( vr->DeviceTables[VR_X_ADVANCE_DEVICE], x_ppem, &pixel_value );
gd->x_advance += pixel_value << 6;
}
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_Y_ADVANCE_DEVICE )
{
_HB_OPEN_Get_Device( vr->DeviceTables[VR_Y_ADVANCE_DEVICE], y_ppem, &pixel_value );
gd->y_advance += pixel_value << 6;
}
}
#ifdef HB_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_MASTER
/* values returned from mmfunc() are already in fractional pixels */
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_X_ID_PLACEMENT )
{
error = (gpos->mmfunc)( gpi->font, vr->XIdPlacement,
&value, gpos->data );
if ( error )
return error;
gd->x_pos += value;
}
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_Y_ID_PLACEMENT )
{
error = (gpos->mmfunc)( gpi->font, vr->YIdPlacement,
&value, gpos->data );
if ( error )
return error;
gd->y_pos += value;
}
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_X_ID_ADVANCE )
{
error = (gpos->mmfunc)( gpi->font, vr->XIdAdvance,
&value, gpos->data );
if ( error )
return error;
gd->x_advance += value;
}
if ( format & HB_GPOS_FORMAT_HAVE_Y_ID_ADVANCE )
{
error = (gpos->mmfunc)( gpi->font, vr->YIdAdvance,
&value, gpos->data );
if ( error )
return error;
gd->y_advance += value;
}
#endif
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void* Type_S15Fixed16_Dup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void *Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
return _cmsDupMem(self ->ContextID, Ptr, n * sizeof(cmsFloat64Number));
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 71,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoCompressedTexSubImage2D(
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLsizei image_size,
const void * data) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = GetTextureInfoForTarget(target);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glCompressedTexSubImage2D: unknown texture for target");
return;
}
GLenum type = 0;
GLenum internal_format = 0;
if (!info->GetLevelType(target, level, &type, &internal_format)) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glCompressedTexSubImage2D: level does not exist.");
return;
}
if (internal_format != format) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glCompressedTexSubImage2D: format does not match internal format.");
return;
}
if (!info->ValidForTexture(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height, format, type)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glCompressedTexSubImage2D: bad dimensions.");
return;
}
glCompressedTexSubImage2D(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height, format, image_size, data);
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::WillWmDestroy() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void _launch_complete_add(uint32_t job_id)
{
int j, empty;
slurm_mutex_lock(&job_state_mutex);
empty = -1;
for (j = 0; j < JOB_STATE_CNT; j++) {
if (job_id == active_job_id[j])
break;
if ((active_job_id[j] == 0) && (empty == -1))
empty = j;
}
if (j >= JOB_STATE_CNT || job_id != active_job_id[j]) {
if (empty == -1) /* Discard oldest job */
empty = 0;
for (j = empty + 1; j < JOB_STATE_CNT; j++) {
active_job_id[j - 1] = active_job_id[j];
}
active_job_id[JOB_STATE_CNT - 1] = 0;
for (j = 0; j < JOB_STATE_CNT; j++) {
if (active_job_id[j] == 0) {
active_job_id[j] = job_id;
break;
}
}
}
pthread_cond_signal(&job_state_cond);
slurm_mutex_unlock(&job_state_mutex);
_launch_complete_log("job add", job_id);
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: cvt_float(union VALUETYPE *p, const struct magic *m)
{
DO_CVT2(f, (float));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBlock::marginIntrinsicLogicalWidthForChild(RenderBox* child) const
{
Length marginLeft = child->style()->marginStartUsing(style());
Length marginRight = child->style()->marginEndUsing(style());
LayoutUnit margin = 0;
if (marginLeft.isFixed())
margin += marginLeft.value();
if (marginRight.isFixed())
margin += marginRight.value();
return margin;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void drain_all_stock_async(struct mem_cgroup *root_memcg)
{
/*
* If someone calls draining, avoid adding more kworker runs.
*/
if (!mutex_trylock(&percpu_charge_mutex))
return;
drain_all_stock(root_memcg, false);
mutex_unlock(&percpu_charge_mutex);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static bool fanout_flow_is_huge(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u32 rxhash;
int i, count = 0;
rxhash = skb_get_hash(skb);
for (i = 0; i < ROLLOVER_HLEN; i++)
if (po->rollover->history[i] == rxhash)
count++;
po->rollover->history[prandom_u32() % ROLLOVER_HLEN] = rxhash;
return count > (ROLLOVER_HLEN >> 1);
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void VideoCaptureManager::PauseCaptureForClient(
VideoCaptureController* controller,
VideoCaptureControllerID client_id,
VideoCaptureControllerEventHandler* client_handler) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(controller);
DCHECK(client_handler);
if (!IsControllerPointerValid(controller))
NOTREACHED() << "Got Null controller while pausing capture";
const bool had_active_client = controller->HasActiveClient();
controller->PauseClient(client_id, client_handler);
if (!had_active_client || controller->HasActiveClient())
return;
if (!controller->IsDeviceAlive())
return;
controller->MaybeSuspend();
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: PP_Bool StartPpapiProxy(PP_Instance instance) {
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableNaClIPCProxy)) {
ChannelHandleMap& map = g_channel_handle_map.Get();
ChannelHandleMap::iterator it = map.find(instance);
if (it == map.end())
return PP_FALSE;
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle = it->second;
map.erase(it);
webkit::ppapi::PluginInstance* plugin_instance =
content::GetHostGlobals()->GetInstance(instance);
if (!plugin_instance)
return PP_FALSE;
WebView* web_view =
plugin_instance->container()->element().document().frame()->view();
RenderView* render_view = content::RenderView::FromWebView(web_view);
webkit::ppapi::PluginModule* plugin_module = plugin_instance->module();
scoped_refptr<SyncMessageStatusReceiver>
status_receiver(new SyncMessageStatusReceiver());
scoped_ptr<OutOfProcessProxy> out_of_process_proxy(new OutOfProcessProxy);
if (out_of_process_proxy->Init(
channel_handle,
plugin_module->pp_module(),
webkit::ppapi::PluginModule::GetLocalGetInterfaceFunc(),
ppapi::Preferences(render_view->GetWebkitPreferences()),
status_receiver.get())) {
plugin_module->InitAsProxiedNaCl(
out_of_process_proxy.PassAs<PluginDelegate::OutOfProcessProxy>(),
instance);
return PP_TRUE;
}
}
return PP_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,739 |
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