instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int Track::Info::Copy(Info& dst) const {
if (&dst == this)
return 0;
dst.type = type;
dst.number = number;
dst.defaultDuration = defaultDuration;
dst.codecDelay = codecDelay;
dst.seekPreRoll = seekPreRoll;
dst.uid = uid;
dst.lacing = lacing;
dst.settings = settings;
if (int status = CopyStr(&Info::nameAsUTF8, dst))
return status;
if (int status = CopyStr(&Info::language, dst))
return status;
if (int status = CopyStr(&Info::codecId, dst))
return status;
if (int status = CopyStr(&Info::codecNameAsUTF8, dst))
return status;
if (codecPrivateSize > 0) {
if (codecPrivate == NULL)
return -1;
if (dst.codecPrivate)
return -1;
if (dst.codecPrivateSize != 0)
return -1;
dst.codecPrivate = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[codecPrivateSize];
if (dst.codecPrivate == NULL)
return -1;
memcpy(dst.codecPrivate, codecPrivate, codecPrivateSize);
dst.codecPrivateSize = codecPrivateSize;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,802
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TileIndependenceTest()
: EncoderTest(GET_PARAM(0)),
md5_fw_order_(),
md5_inv_order_(),
n_tiles_(GET_PARAM(1)) {
init_flags_ = VPX_CODEC_USE_PSNR;
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t cfg;
cfg.w = 704;
cfg.h = 144;
cfg.threads = 1;
fw_dec_ = codec_->CreateDecoder(cfg, 0);
inv_dec_ = codec_->CreateDecoder(cfg, 0);
inv_dec_->Control(VP9_INVERT_TILE_DECODE_ORDER, 1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,584
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static TEE_Result tee_svc_copy_param(struct tee_ta_session *sess,
struct tee_ta_session *called_sess,
struct utee_params *callee_params,
struct tee_ta_param *param,
void *tmp_buf_va[TEE_NUM_PARAMS],
struct mobj **mobj_tmp)
{
size_t n;
TEE_Result res;
size_t req_mem = 0;
size_t s;
uint8_t *dst = 0;
bool ta_private_memref[TEE_NUM_PARAMS];
struct user_ta_ctx *utc = to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx);
void *va;
size_t dst_offs;
/* fill 'param' input struct with caller params description buffer */
if (!callee_params) {
memset(param, 0, sizeof(*param));
} else {
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ | TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t)callee_params, sizeof(struct utee_params));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
utee_param_to_param(param, callee_params);
}
if (called_sess && is_pseudo_ta_ctx(called_sess->ctx)) {
/* pseudo TA borrows the mapping of the calling TA */
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
/* All mobj in param are of type MOJB_TYPE_VIRT */
for (n = 0; n < TEE_NUM_PARAMS; n++) {
ta_private_memref[n] = false;
switch (TEE_PARAM_TYPE_GET(param->types, n)) {
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INOUT:
va = (void *)param->u[n].mem.offs;
s = param->u[n].mem.size;
if (!va) {
if (s)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
/* uTA cannot expose its private memory */
if (tee_mmu_is_vbuf_inside_ta_private(utc, va, s)) {
s = ROUNDUP(s, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (ADD_OVERFLOW(req_mem, s, &req_mem))
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
ta_private_memref[n] = true;
break;
}
res = tee_mmu_vbuf_to_mobj_offs(utc, va, s,
¶m->u[n].mem.mobj,
¶m->u[n].mem.offs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (req_mem == 0)
return TEE_SUCCESS;
res = alloc_temp_sec_mem(req_mem, mobj_tmp, &dst);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
dst_offs = 0;
for (n = 0; n < TEE_NUM_PARAMS; n++) {
if (!ta_private_memref[n])
continue;
s = ROUNDUP(param->u[n].mem.size, sizeof(uint32_t));
switch (TEE_PARAM_TYPE_GET(param->types, n)) {
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT:
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_INOUT:
va = (void *)param->u[n].mem.offs;
if (va) {
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(dst, va,
param->u[n].mem.size);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
param->u[n].mem.offs = dst_offs;
param->u[n].mem.mobj = *mobj_tmp;
tmp_buf_va[n] = dst;
dst += s;
dst_offs += s;
}
break;
case TEE_PARAM_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT:
va = (void *)param->u[n].mem.offs;
if (va) {
param->u[n].mem.offs = dst_offs;
param->u[n].mem.mobj = *mobj_tmp;
tmp_buf_va[n] = dst;
dst += s;
dst_offs += s;
}
break;
default:
continue;
}
}
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Linaro/OP-TEE OP-TEE 3.3.0 and earlier is affected by: Buffer Overflow. The impact is: Memory corruption and disclosure of memory content. The component is: optee_os. The fixed version is: 3.4.0 and later.
Commit Message: core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
|
Low
| 169,470
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int create_qp_common(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct ib_pd *pd,
struct ib_qp_init_attr *init_attr,
struct ib_udata *udata, struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp)
{
struct mlx5_ib_resources *devr = &dev->devr;
int inlen = MLX5_ST_SZ_BYTES(create_qp_in);
struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = dev->mdev;
struct mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp resp;
struct mlx5_ib_cq *send_cq;
struct mlx5_ib_cq *recv_cq;
unsigned long flags;
u32 uidx = MLX5_IB_DEFAULT_UIDX;
struct mlx5_ib_create_qp ucmd;
struct mlx5_ib_qp_base *base;
int mlx5_st;
void *qpc;
u32 *in;
int err;
mutex_init(&qp->mutex);
spin_lock_init(&qp->sq.lock);
spin_lock_init(&qp->rq.lock);
mlx5_st = to_mlx5_st(init_attr->qp_type);
if (mlx5_st < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (init_attr->rwq_ind_tbl) {
if (!udata)
return -ENOSYS;
err = create_rss_raw_qp_tir(dev, qp, pd, init_attr, udata);
return err;
}
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_BLOCK_MULTICAST_LOOPBACK) {
if (!MLX5_CAP_GEN(mdev, block_lb_mc)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "block multicast loopback isn't supported\n");
return -EINVAL;
} else {
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_BLOCK_MULTICAST_LOOPBACK;
}
}
if (init_attr->create_flags &
(IB_QP_CREATE_CROSS_CHANNEL |
IB_QP_CREATE_MANAGED_SEND |
IB_QP_CREATE_MANAGED_RECV)) {
if (!MLX5_CAP_GEN(mdev, cd)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "cross-channel isn't supported\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_CROSS_CHANNEL)
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_CROSS_CHANNEL;
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_MANAGED_SEND)
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_MANAGED_SEND;
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_MANAGED_RECV)
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_MANAGED_RECV;
}
if (init_attr->qp_type == IB_QPT_UD &&
(init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_IPOIB_UD_LSO))
if (!MLX5_CAP_GEN(mdev, ipoib_basic_offloads)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "ipoib UD lso qp isn't supported\n");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_SCATTER_FCS) {
if (init_attr->qp_type != IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Scatter FCS is supported only for Raw Packet QPs");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (!MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, eth_net_offloads) ||
!MLX5_CAP_ETH(dev->mdev, scatter_fcs)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Scatter FCS isn't supported\n");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_CAP_SCATTER_FCS;
}
if (init_attr->sq_sig_type == IB_SIGNAL_ALL_WR)
qp->sq_signal_bits = MLX5_WQE_CTRL_CQ_UPDATE;
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_CVLAN_STRIPPING) {
if (!(MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, eth_net_offloads) &&
MLX5_CAP_ETH(dev->mdev, vlan_cap)) ||
(init_attr->qp_type != IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_CVLAN_STRIPPING;
}
if (pd && pd->uobject) {
if (ib_copy_from_udata(&ucmd, udata, sizeof(ucmd))) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "copy failed\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
err = get_qp_user_index(to_mucontext(pd->uobject->context),
&ucmd, udata->inlen, &uidx);
if (err)
return err;
qp->wq_sig = !!(ucmd.flags & MLX5_QP_FLAG_SIGNATURE);
qp->scat_cqe = !!(ucmd.flags & MLX5_QP_FLAG_SCATTER_CQE);
if (ucmd.flags & MLX5_QP_FLAG_TUNNEL_OFFLOADS) {
if (init_attr->qp_type != IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET ||
!tunnel_offload_supported(mdev)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Tunnel offload isn't supported\n");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
qp->tunnel_offload_en = true;
}
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_SOURCE_QPN) {
if (init_attr->qp_type != IB_QPT_UD ||
(MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, port_type) !=
MLX5_CAP_PORT_TYPE_IB) ||
!mlx5_get_flow_namespace(dev->mdev, MLX5_FLOW_NAMESPACE_BYPASS)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Source QP option isn't supported\n");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_UNDERLAY;
qp->underlay_qpn = init_attr->source_qpn;
}
} else {
qp->wq_sig = !!wq_signature;
}
base = (init_attr->qp_type == IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET ||
qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_UNDERLAY) ?
&qp->raw_packet_qp.rq.base :
&qp->trans_qp.base;
qp->has_rq = qp_has_rq(init_attr);
err = set_rq_size(dev, &init_attr->cap, qp->has_rq,
qp, (pd && pd->uobject) ? &ucmd : NULL);
if (err) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "err %d\n", err);
return err;
}
if (pd) {
if (pd->uobject) {
__u32 max_wqes =
1 << MLX5_CAP_GEN(mdev, log_max_qp_sz);
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "requested sq_wqe_count (%d)\n", ucmd.sq_wqe_count);
if (ucmd.rq_wqe_shift != qp->rq.wqe_shift ||
ucmd.rq_wqe_count != qp->rq.wqe_cnt) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "invalid rq params\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (ucmd.sq_wqe_count > max_wqes) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "requested sq_wqe_count (%d) > max allowed (%d)\n",
ucmd.sq_wqe_count, max_wqes);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (init_attr->create_flags &
mlx5_ib_create_qp_sqpn_qp1()) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "user-space is not allowed to create UD QPs spoofing as QP1\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
err = create_user_qp(dev, pd, qp, udata, init_attr, &in,
&resp, &inlen, base);
if (err)
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "err %d\n", err);
} else {
err = create_kernel_qp(dev, init_attr, qp, &in, &inlen,
base);
if (err)
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "err %d\n", err);
}
if (err)
return err;
} else {
in = kvzalloc(inlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!in)
return -ENOMEM;
qp->create_type = MLX5_QP_EMPTY;
}
if (is_sqp(init_attr->qp_type))
qp->port = init_attr->port_num;
qpc = MLX5_ADDR_OF(create_qp_in, in, qpc);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, st, mlx5_st);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, pm_state, MLX5_QP_PM_MIGRATED);
if (init_attr->qp_type != MLX5_IB_QPT_REG_UMR)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, pd, to_mpd(pd ? pd : devr->p0)->pdn);
else
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, latency_sensitive, 1);
if (qp->wq_sig)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, wq_signature, 1);
if (qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_BLOCK_MULTICAST_LOOPBACK)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, block_lb_mc, 1);
if (qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_CROSS_CHANNEL)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cd_master, 1);
if (qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_MANAGED_SEND)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cd_slave_send, 1);
if (qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_MANAGED_RECV)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cd_slave_receive, 1);
if (qp->scat_cqe && is_connected(init_attr->qp_type)) {
int rcqe_sz;
int scqe_sz;
rcqe_sz = mlx5_ib_get_cqe_size(dev, init_attr->recv_cq);
scqe_sz = mlx5_ib_get_cqe_size(dev, init_attr->send_cq);
if (rcqe_sz == 128)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cs_res, MLX5_RES_SCAT_DATA64_CQE);
else
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cs_res, MLX5_RES_SCAT_DATA32_CQE);
if (init_attr->sq_sig_type == IB_SIGNAL_ALL_WR) {
if (scqe_sz == 128)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cs_req, MLX5_REQ_SCAT_DATA64_CQE);
else
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cs_req, MLX5_REQ_SCAT_DATA32_CQE);
}
}
if (qp->rq.wqe_cnt) {
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, log_rq_stride, qp->rq.wqe_shift - 4);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, log_rq_size, ilog2(qp->rq.wqe_cnt));
}
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, rq_type, get_rx_type(qp, init_attr));
if (qp->sq.wqe_cnt) {
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, log_sq_size, ilog2(qp->sq.wqe_cnt));
} else {
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, no_sq, 1);
if (init_attr->srq &&
init_attr->srq->srq_type == IB_SRQT_TM)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, offload_type,
MLX5_QPC_OFFLOAD_TYPE_RNDV);
}
/* Set default resources */
switch (init_attr->qp_type) {
case IB_QPT_XRC_TGT:
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cqn_rcv, to_mcq(devr->c0)->mcq.cqn);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cqn_snd, to_mcq(devr->c0)->mcq.cqn);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, srqn_rmpn_xrqn, to_msrq(devr->s0)->msrq.srqn);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, xrcd, to_mxrcd(init_attr->xrcd)->xrcdn);
break;
case IB_QPT_XRC_INI:
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cqn_rcv, to_mcq(devr->c0)->mcq.cqn);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, xrcd, to_mxrcd(devr->x1)->xrcdn);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, srqn_rmpn_xrqn, to_msrq(devr->s0)->msrq.srqn);
break;
default:
if (init_attr->srq) {
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, xrcd, to_mxrcd(devr->x0)->xrcdn);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, srqn_rmpn_xrqn, to_msrq(init_attr->srq)->msrq.srqn);
} else {
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, xrcd, to_mxrcd(devr->x1)->xrcdn);
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, srqn_rmpn_xrqn, to_msrq(devr->s1)->msrq.srqn);
}
}
if (init_attr->send_cq)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cqn_snd, to_mcq(init_attr->send_cq)->mcq.cqn);
if (init_attr->recv_cq)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, cqn_rcv, to_mcq(init_attr->recv_cq)->mcq.cqn);
MLX5_SET64(qpc, qpc, dbr_addr, qp->db.dma);
/* 0xffffff means we ask to work with cqe version 0 */
if (MLX5_CAP_GEN(mdev, cqe_version) == MLX5_CQE_VERSION_V1)
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, user_index, uidx);
/* we use IB_QP_CREATE_IPOIB_UD_LSO to indicates ipoib qp */
if (init_attr->qp_type == IB_QPT_UD &&
(init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_IPOIB_UD_LSO)) {
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, ulp_stateless_offload_mode, 1);
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_LSO;
}
if (init_attr->create_flags & IB_QP_CREATE_PCI_WRITE_END_PADDING) {
if (!MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, end_pad)) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "scatter end padding is not supported\n");
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto err;
} else if (init_attr->qp_type != IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET) {
MLX5_SET(qpc, qpc, end_padding_mode,
MLX5_WQ_END_PAD_MODE_ALIGN);
} else {
qp->flags |= MLX5_IB_QP_PCI_WRITE_END_PADDING;
}
}
if (inlen < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
if (init_attr->qp_type == IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET ||
qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_UNDERLAY) {
qp->raw_packet_qp.sq.ubuffer.buf_addr = ucmd.sq_buf_addr;
raw_packet_qp_copy_info(qp, &qp->raw_packet_qp);
err = create_raw_packet_qp(dev, qp, in, inlen, pd);
} else {
err = mlx5_core_create_qp(dev->mdev, &base->mqp, in, inlen);
}
if (err) {
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "create qp failed\n");
goto err_create;
}
kvfree(in);
base->container_mibqp = qp;
base->mqp.event = mlx5_ib_qp_event;
get_cqs(init_attr->qp_type, init_attr->send_cq, init_attr->recv_cq,
&send_cq, &recv_cq);
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->reset_flow_resource_lock, flags);
mlx5_ib_lock_cqs(send_cq, recv_cq);
/* Maintain device to QPs access, needed for further handling via reset
* flow
*/
list_add_tail(&qp->qps_list, &dev->qp_list);
/* Maintain CQ to QPs access, needed for further handling via reset flow
*/
if (send_cq)
list_add_tail(&qp->cq_send_list, &send_cq->list_send_qp);
if (recv_cq)
list_add_tail(&qp->cq_recv_list, &recv_cq->list_recv_qp);
mlx5_ib_unlock_cqs(send_cq, recv_cq);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->reset_flow_resource_lock, flags);
return 0;
err_create:
if (qp->create_type == MLX5_QP_USER)
destroy_qp_user(dev, pd, qp, base);
else if (qp->create_type == MLX5_QP_KERNEL)
destroy_qp_kernel(dev, qp);
err:
kvfree(in);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.18.7. In create_qp_common in drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c, mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized, resulting in a leak of stack memory to userspace.
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
|
Low
| 169,763
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePALMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
currentOffset,
offset,
scene;
MagickSizeType
cc;
PixelPacket
transpix;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*p;
ssize_t
y;
size_t
count,
bits_per_pixel,
bytes_per_row,
nextDepthOffset,
one;
unsigned char
bit,
byte,
color,
*lastrow,
*one_row,
*ptr,
version;
unsigned int
transparentIndex;
unsigned short
color16,
flags;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
exception=AcquireExceptionInfo();
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
flags=0;
currentOffset=0;
transparentIndex=0;
transpix.red=0;
transpix.green=0;
transpix.blue=0;
transpix.opacity=0;
one=1;
version=0;
scene=0;
do
{
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
count=GetNumberColors(image,NULL,exception);
for (bits_per_pixel=1; (one << bits_per_pixel) < count; bits_per_pixel*=2) ;
if (bits_per_pixel > 16)
bits_per_pixel=16;
else
if (bits_per_pixel < 16)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,image->colorspace);
if (bits_per_pixel < 8)
{
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteType);
(void) SortColormapByIntensity(image);
}
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) && (image->colors > 256))
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
flags|=PALM_HAS_COLORMAP_FLAG;
else
flags|=PALM_IS_DIRECT_COLOR;
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns); /* width */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows); /* height */
bytes_per_row=((image->columns+(16/bits_per_pixel-1))/(16/
bits_per_pixel))*2;
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bytes_per_row);
if ((image_info->compression == RLECompression) ||
(image_info->compression == FaxCompression))
flags|=PALM_IS_COMPRESSED_FLAG;
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image, flags);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) bits_per_pixel);
if (bits_per_pixel > 1)
version=1;
if ((image_info->compression == RLECompression) ||
(image_info->compression == FaxCompression))
version=2;
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,version);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0); /* nextDepthOffset */
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) transparentIndex);
if (image_info->compression == RLECompression)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,PALM_COMPRESSION_RLE);
else
if (image_info->compression == FaxCompression)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,PALM_COMPRESSION_SCANLINE);
else
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,PALM_COMPRESSION_NONE);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0); /* reserved */
offset=16;
if (bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,5); /* # of bits of red */
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,6); /* # of bits of green */
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,5); /* # of bits of blue */
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0); /* reserved by Palm */
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0); /* no transparent color, YET */
offset+=8;
}
if (bits_per_pixel == 8)
{
if (flags & PALM_HAS_COLORMAP_FLAG) /* Write out colormap */
{
quantize_info->dither=IsPaletteImage(image,&image->exception);
quantize_info->number_colors=image->colors;
(void) QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->colors);
for (count = 0; count < image->colors; count++)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) count);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
image->colormap[count].red));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,
ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[count].green));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,
ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[count].blue));
}
offset+=2+count*4;
}
else /* Map colors to Palm standard colormap */
{
Image
*affinity_image;
affinity_image=ConstituteImage(256,1,"RGB",CharPixel,&PalmPalette,
exception);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(affinity_image,
affinity_image->colorspace);
(void) RemapImage(quantize_info,image,affinity_image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,FindColor(&image->colormap[
(ssize_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x)]));
}
affinity_image=DestroyImage(affinity_image);
}
}
if (flags & PALM_IS_COMPRESSED_FLAG)
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0); /* fill in size later */
lastrow=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (image_info->compression == FaxCompression)
lastrow=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(bytes_per_row,
sizeof(*lastrow));
/* TODO check whether memory really was acquired? */
one_row=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(bytes_per_row,
sizeof(*one_row));
if (one_row == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
ptr=one_row;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(ptr,0,bytes_per_row);
p=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
if (bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
color16=(unsigned short) ((((31*(size_t) GetPixelRed(p))/
(size_t) QuantumRange) << 11) |
(((63*(size_t) GetPixelGreen(p))/(size_t) QuantumRange) << 5) |
((31*(size_t) GetPixelBlue(p))/(size_t) QuantumRange));
if (GetPixelOpacity(p) == (Quantum) TransparentOpacity)
{
transpix.red=GetPixelRed(p);
transpix.green=GetPixelGreen(p);
transpix.blue=GetPixelBlue(p);
transpix.opacity=GetPixelOpacity(p);
flags|=PALM_HAS_TRANSPARENCY_FLAG;
}
*ptr++=(unsigned char) ((color16 >> 8) & 0xff);
*ptr++=(unsigned char) (color16 & 0xff);
p++;
}
}
else
{
byte=0x00;
bit=(unsigned char) (8-bits_per_pixel);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (bits_per_pixel >= 8)
color=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
else
color=(unsigned char) (GetPixelIndex(indexes+x)*
((one << bits_per_pixel)-1)/MagickMax(1*image->colors-1,1));
byte|=color << bit;
if (bit != 0)
bit-=(unsigned char) bits_per_pixel;
else
{
*ptr++=byte;
byte=0x00;
bit=(unsigned char) (8-bits_per_pixel);
}
}
if ((image->columns % (8/bits_per_pixel)) != 0)
*ptr++=byte;
}
if (image_info->compression == RLECompression)
{
x=0;
while (x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_row)
{
byte=one_row[x];
count=1;
while ((one_row[++x] == byte) && (count < 255) &&
(x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_row))
count++;
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) count);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) byte);
}
}
else
if (image_info->compression == FaxCompression)
{
char
tmpbuf[8],
*tptr;
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_row; x += 8)
{
tptr = tmpbuf;
for (bit=0, byte=0; bit < (unsigned char) MagickMin(8,(ssize_t) bytes_per_row-x); bit++)
{
if ((y == 0) || (lastrow[x + bit] != one_row[x + bit]))
{
byte |= (1 << (7 - bit));
*tptr++ = (char) one_row[x + bit];
}
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image, byte);
(void) WriteBlob(image,tptr-tmpbuf,(unsigned char *) tmpbuf);
}
(void) CopyMagickMemory(lastrow,one_row,bytes_per_row);
}
else
(void) WriteBlob(image,bytes_per_row,one_row);
}
if (flags & PALM_HAS_TRANSPARENCY_FLAG)
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,currentOffset+6,SEEK_SET);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,flags);
offset=SeekBlob(image,currentOffset+12,SEEK_SET);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) transparentIndex); /* trans index */
}
if (bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,currentOffset+20,SEEK_SET);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0); /* reserved by Palm */
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) ((31*transpix.red)/QuantumRange));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) ((63*transpix.green)/QuantumRange));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) ((31*transpix.blue)/QuantumRange));
}
if (flags & PALM_IS_COMPRESSED_FLAG) /* fill in size now */
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,currentOffset+offset,SEEK_SET);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (GetBlobSize(image)-
currentOffset-offset));
}
if (one_row != (unsigned char *) NULL)
one_row=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(one_row);
if (lastrow != (unsigned char *) NULL)
lastrow=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(lastrow);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
/* padding to 4 byte word */
for (cc=(GetBlobSize(image)) % 4; cc > 0; cc--)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
/* write nextDepthOffset and return to end of image */
(void) SeekBlob(image,currentOffset+10,SEEK_SET);
nextDepthOffset=(size_t) ((GetBlobSize(image)-currentOffset)/4);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) nextDepthOffset);
currentOffset=(MagickOffsetType) GetBlobSize(image);
(void) SeekBlob(image,currentOffset,SEEK_SET);
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
(void) DestroyExceptionInfo(exception);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.6-2 has a memory leak vulnerability in WritePALMImage in coders/palm.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/574
|
Medium
| 167,974
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ftrace_regex_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
loff_t ret;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
ret = seq_lseek(file, offset, whence);
else
file->f_pos = ret = 1;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ftrace implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.8.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for write access to the (1) set_ftrace_pid or (2) set_graph_function file, and then making an lseek system call.
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
Low
| 166,027
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void v9fs_read(void *opaque)
{
int32_t fid;
uint64_t off;
ssize_t err = 0;
int32_t count = 0;
size_t offset = 7;
uint32_t max_count;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dqd", &fid, &off, &max_count);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_read(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, off, max_count);
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_DIR) {
if (off == 0) {
v9fs_co_rewinddir(pdu, fidp);
}
count = v9fs_do_readdir_with_stat(pdu, fidp, max_count);
if (count < 0) {
err = count;
goto out;
}
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", count);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
err += offset + count;
} else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_FILE) {
QEMUIOVector qiov_full;
QEMUIOVector qiov;
int32_t len;
v9fs_init_qiov_from_pdu(&qiov_full, pdu, offset + 4, max_count, false);
qemu_iovec_init(&qiov, qiov_full.niov);
do {
qemu_iovec_reset(&qiov);
qemu_iovec_concat(&qiov, &qiov_full, count, qiov_full.size - count);
if (0) {
print_sg(qiov.iov, qiov.niov);
}
/* Loop in case of EINTR */
do {
len = v9fs_co_preadv(pdu, fidp, qiov.iov, qiov.niov, off);
if (len >= 0) {
off += len;
count += len;
}
} while (len == -EINTR && !pdu->cancelled);
if (len < 0) {
/* IO error return the error */
err = len;
goto out;
}
} while (count < max_count && len > 0);
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", count);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
err += offset + count;
qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov);
qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov_full);
} else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_XATTR) {
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
}
trace_v9fs_read_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id, count, err);
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in the v9fs_read function in hw/9pfs/9p.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via vectors related to an I/O read operation.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,911
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: unsigned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx)
{
struct desc_struct *desc;
short sel;
sel = get_segment_selector(regs, seg_reg_idx);
if (sel < 0)
return -1L;
if (v8086_mode(regs))
/*
* Base is simply the segment selector shifted 4
* bits to the right.
*/
return (unsigned long)(sel << 4);
if (user_64bit_mode(regs)) {
/*
* Only FS or GS will have a base address, the rest of
* the segments' bases are forced to 0.
*/
unsigned long base;
if (seg_reg_idx == INAT_SEG_REG_FS)
rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, base);
else if (seg_reg_idx == INAT_SEG_REG_GS)
/*
* swapgs was called at the kernel entry point. Thus,
* MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE will have the user-space GS base.
*/
rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, base);
else
base = 0;
return base;
}
/* In protected mode the segment selector cannot be null. */
if (!sel)
return -1L;
desc = get_desc(sel);
if (!desc)
return -1L;
return get_desc_base(desc);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c in the Linux kernel before 5.1.9, there is a use-after-free for access to an LDT entry because of a race condition between modify_ldt() and a #BR exception for an MPX bounds violation.
Commit Message: x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 169,610
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data[0];
struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
struct trusted_key_options *new_o;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
char *datablob;
int ret = 0;
if (!p->migratable)
return -EPERM;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!datablob)
return -ENOMEM;
new_o = trusted_options_alloc();
if (!new_o) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
if (!new_p) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
datablob[datalen] = '\0';
ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
if (ret != Opt_update) {
ret = -EINVAL;
kfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
if (!new_o->keyhandle) {
ret = -EINVAL;
kfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
/* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
dump_payload(p);
dump_payload(new_p);
ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
kfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
if (new_o->pcrlock) {
ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
kfree(new_p);
goto out;
}
}
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
out:
kfree(datablob);
kfree(new_o);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.4 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (BUG) via crafted keyctl commands that negatively instantiate a key, related to security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c, security/keys/trusted.c, and security/keys/user_defined.c.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
Low
| 167,534
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cib_remote_msg(gpointer data)
{
const char *value = NULL;
xmlNode *command = NULL;
cib_client_t *client = data;
crm_trace("%s callback", client->encrypted ? "secure" : "clear-text");
command = crm_recv_remote_msg(client->session, client->encrypted);
if (command == NULL) {
return -1;
}
value = crm_element_name(command);
if (safe_str_neq(value, "cib_command")) {
crm_log_xml_trace(command, "Bad command: ");
goto bail;
}
if (client->name == NULL) {
value = crm_element_value(command, F_CLIENTNAME);
if (value == NULL) {
client->name = strdup(client->id);
} else {
client->name = strdup(value);
}
}
if (client->callback_id == NULL) {
value = crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLBACK_TOKEN);
if (value != NULL) {
client->callback_id = strdup(value);
crm_trace("Callback channel for %s is %s", client->id, client->callback_id);
} else {
client->callback_id = strdup(client->id);
}
}
/* unset dangerous options */
xml_remove_prop(command, F_ORIG);
xml_remove_prop(command, F_CIB_HOST);
xml_remove_prop(command, F_CIB_GLOBAL_UPDATE);
crm_xml_add(command, F_TYPE, T_CIB);
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CLIENTID, client->id);
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CLIENTNAME, client->name);
#if ENABLE_ACL
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_USER, client->user);
#endif
if (crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLID) == NULL) {
char *call_uuid = crm_generate_uuid();
/* fix the command */
crm_xml_add(command, F_CIB_CALLID, call_uuid);
free(call_uuid);
}
if (crm_element_value(command, F_CIB_CALLOPTS) == NULL) {
crm_xml_add_int(command, F_CIB_CALLOPTS, 0);
}
crm_log_xml_trace(command, "Remote command: ");
cib_common_callback_worker(0, 0, command, client, TRUE);
bail:
free_xml(command);
command = NULL;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
Medium
| 166,149
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int unimac_mdio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct unimac_mdio_pdata *pdata = pdev->dev.platform_data;
struct unimac_mdio_priv *priv;
struct device_node *np;
struct mii_bus *bus;
struct resource *r;
int ret;
np = pdev->dev.of_node;
priv = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv)
return -ENOMEM;
r = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
/* Just ioremap, as this MDIO block is usually integrated into an
* Ethernet MAC controller register range
*/
priv->base = devm_ioremap(&pdev->dev, r->start, resource_size(r));
if (!priv->base) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to remap register\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
priv->mii_bus = mdiobus_alloc();
if (!priv->mii_bus)
return -ENOMEM;
bus = priv->mii_bus;
bus->priv = priv;
if (pdata) {
bus->name = pdata->bus_name;
priv->wait_func = pdata->wait_func;
priv->wait_func_data = pdata->wait_func_data;
bus->phy_mask = ~pdata->phy_mask;
} else {
bus->name = "unimac MII bus";
priv->wait_func_data = priv;
priv->wait_func = unimac_mdio_poll;
}
bus->parent = &pdev->dev;
bus->read = unimac_mdio_read;
bus->write = unimac_mdio_write;
bus->reset = unimac_mdio_reset;
snprintf(bus->id, MII_BUS_ID_SIZE, "%s-%d", pdev->name, pdev->id);
ret = of_mdiobus_register(bus, np);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "MDIO bus registration failed\n");
goto out_mdio_free;
}
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, priv);
dev_info(&pdev->dev, "Broadcom UniMAC MDIO bus at 0x%p\n", priv->base);
return 0;
out_mdio_free:
mdiobus_free(bus);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The unimac_mdio_probe function in drivers/net/phy/mdio-bcm-unimac.c in the Linux kernel through 4.15.8 does not validate certain resource availability, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference).
Commit Message: net: phy: mdio-bcm-unimac: fix potential NULL dereference in unimac_mdio_probe()
platform_get_resource() may fail and return NULL, so we should
better check it's return value to avoid a NULL pointer dereference
a bit later in the code.
This is detected by Coccinelle semantic patch.
@@
expression pdev, res, n, t, e, e1, e2;
@@
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, t, n);
+ if (!res)
+ return -EINVAL;
... when != res == NULL
e = devm_ioremap(e1, res->start, e2);
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 169,303
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ikev2_ID_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct ikev2_id id;
int id_len, idtype_len, i;
unsigned int dumpascii, dumphex;
const unsigned char *typedata;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&id, ext, sizeof(id));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), id.h.critical);
id_len = ntohs(id.h.len);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", id_len - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < id_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), id_len - 4))
goto trunc;
}
idtype_len =id_len - sizeof(struct ikev2_id);
dumpascii = 0;
dumphex = 0;
typedata = (const unsigned char *)(ext)+sizeof(struct ikev2_id);
switch(id.type) {
case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ipv4:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_FQDN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fqdn:"));
dumpascii=1;
break;
case ID_RFC822_ADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rfc822:"));
dumpascii=1;
break;
case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ipv6:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " dn:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_DER_ASN1_GN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " gn:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
case ID_KEY_ID:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " keyid:"));
dumphex=1;
break;
}
if(dumpascii) {
ND_TCHECK2(*typedata, idtype_len);
for(i=0; i<idtype_len; i++) {
if(ND_ISPRINT(typedata[i])) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", typedata[i]));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
}
}
}
if(dumphex) {
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)typedata, idtype_len))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + id_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IKEv2 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,796
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: InspectorResourceAgent::InspectorResourceAgent(InspectorPageAgent* pageAgent, InspectorClient* client)
: InspectorBaseAgent<InspectorResourceAgent>("Network")
, m_pageAgent(pageAgent)
, m_client(client)
, m_frontend(0)
, m_resourcesData(adoptPtr(new NetworkResourcesData()))
, m_isRecalculatingStyle(false)
{
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, does not properly load Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,345
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
opj_dinfo_t* dinfo;
opj_event_mgr_t event_mgr; /* event manager */
int tnum;
unsigned int snum;
opj_mj2_t *movie;
mj2_tk_t *track;
mj2_sample_t *sample;
unsigned char* frame_codestream;
FILE *file, *outfile;
char outfilename[50];
mj2_dparameters_t parameters;
if (argc != 3) {
printf("Usage: %s mj2filename output_location\n", argv[0]);
printf("Example: %s foreman.mj2 output/foreman\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
file = fopen(argv[1], "rb");
if (!file) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to open %s for reading\n", argv[1]);
return 1;
}
/*
configure the event callbacks (not required)
setting of each callback is optional
*/
memset(&event_mgr, 0, sizeof(opj_event_mgr_t));
event_mgr.error_handler = error_callback;
event_mgr.warning_handler = warning_callback;
event_mgr.info_handler = info_callback;
/* get a MJ2 decompressor handle */
dinfo = mj2_create_decompress();
/* catch events using our callbacks and give a local context */
opj_set_event_mgr((opj_common_ptr)dinfo, &event_mgr, stderr);
/* setup the decoder decoding parameters using user parameters */
memset(¶meters, 0, sizeof(mj2_dparameters_t));
movie = (opj_mj2_t*) dinfo->mj2_handle;
mj2_setup_decoder(movie, ¶meters);
if (mj2_read_struct(file, movie)) { /* Creating the movie structure*/
return 1;
}
/* Decode first video track */
tnum = 0;
while (movie->tk[tnum].track_type != 0) {
tnum ++;
}
track = &movie->tk[tnum];
fprintf(stdout, "Extracting %d frames from file...\n", track->num_samples);
for (snum = 0; snum < track->num_samples; snum++) {
sample = &track->sample[snum];
frame_codestream = (unsigned char*) malloc(sample->sample_size -
8); /* Skipping JP2C marker*/
fseek(file, sample->offset + 8, SEEK_SET);
fread(frame_codestream, sample->sample_size - 8, 1,
file); /* Assuming that jp and ftyp markers size do*/
sprintf(outfilename, "%s_%05d.j2k", argv[2], snum);
outfile = fopen(outfilename, "wb");
if (!outfile) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to open %s for writing\n", outfilename);
return 1;
}
fwrite(frame_codestream, sample->sample_size - 8, 1, outfile);
fclose(outfile);
free(frame_codestream);
}
fclose(file);
fprintf(stdout, "%d frames correctly extracted\n", snum);
/* free remaining structures */
if (dinfo) {
mj2_destroy_decompress((opj_mj2_t*)dinfo->mj2_handle);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in mj2/opj_mj2_extract.c in OpenJPEG 2.3.0. The output prefix was not checked for length, which could overflow a buffer, when providing a prefix with 50 or more characters on the command line.
Commit Message: opj_mj2_extract: Check provided output prefix for length
This uses snprintf() with correct buffer length instead of sprintf(). This
prevents a buffer overflow when providing a long output prefix. Furthermore
the program exits with an error when the provided output prefix is too long.
Fixes #1088.
|
Low
| 169,307
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MessageService::OpenChannelToNativeApp(
int source_process_id,
int source_routing_id,
int receiver_port_id,
const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& native_app_name,
const std::string& channel_name,
const std::string& connect_message) {
content::RenderProcessHost* source =
content::RenderProcessHost::FromID(source_process_id);
if (!source)
return;
WebContents* source_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
source_process_id, source_routing_id);
std::string tab_json = "null";
if (source_contents) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> tab_value(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
source_contents, ExtensionTabUtil::INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS));
base::JSONWriter::Write(tab_value.get(), &tab_json);
}
scoped_ptr<MessageChannel> channel(new MessageChannel());
channel->opener.reset(new ExtensionMessagePort(source, MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL,
source_extension_id));
NativeMessageProcessHost::MessageType type =
channel_name == "chrome.runtime.sendNativeMessage" ?
NativeMessageProcessHost::TYPE_SEND_MESSAGE_REQUEST :
NativeMessageProcessHost::TYPE_CONNECT;
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(
content::BrowserThread::FILE,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&NativeMessageProcessHost::Create,
base::WeakPtr<NativeMessageProcessHost::Client>(
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
native_app_name, connect_message, receiver_port_id,
type,
base::Bind(&MessageService::FinalizeOpenChannelToNativeApp,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
receiver_port_id,
channel_name,
base::Passed(&channel),
tab_json)));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not ensure that an extension has the tabs (aka APIPermission::kTab) permission before providing a URL to this extension, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,447
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DownloadResourceHandler::OnRequestRedirected(
const net::RedirectInfo& redirect_info,
network::ResourceResponse* response,
std::unique_ptr<ResourceController> controller) {
url::Origin new_origin(url::Origin::Create(redirect_info.new_url));
if (!follow_cross_origin_redirects_ &&
!first_origin_.IsSameOriginWith(new_origin)) {
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(
&NavigateOnUIThread, redirect_info.new_url, request()->url_chain(),
Referrer(GURL(redirect_info.new_referrer),
Referrer::NetReferrerPolicyToBlinkReferrerPolicy(
redirect_info.new_referrer_policy)),
GetRequestInfo()->HasUserGesture(),
GetRequestInfo()->GetWebContentsGetterForRequest()));
controller->Cancel();
return;
}
if (core_.OnRequestRedirected()) {
controller->Resume();
} else {
controller->Cancel();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 74.0.3729.108 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
|
Medium
| 173,025
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf *ntf, __u8 *data)
{
struct activation_params_nfca_poll_iso_dep *nfca_poll;
struct activation_params_nfcb_poll_iso_dep *nfcb_poll;
switch (ntf->activation_rf_tech_and_mode) {
case NCI_NFC_A_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
nfca_poll = &ntf->activation_params.nfca_poll_iso_dep;
nfca_poll->rats_res_len = *data++;
pr_debug("rats_res_len %d\n", nfca_poll->rats_res_len);
if (nfca_poll->rats_res_len > 0) {
memcpy(nfca_poll->rats_res,
data, nfca_poll->rats_res_len);
}
break;
case NCI_NFC_B_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
nfcb_poll = &ntf->activation_params.nfcb_poll_iso_dep;
nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len = *data++;
pr_debug("attrib_res_len %d\n", nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len);
if (nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len > 0) {
memcpy(nfcb_poll->attrib_res,
data, nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len);
}
break;
default:
pr_err("unsupported activation_rf_tech_and_mode 0x%x\n",
ntf->activation_rf_tech_and_mode);
return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
return NCI_STATUS_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in the Near Field Communication Controller Interface (NCI) in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via incoming frames with crafted length fields.
Commit Message: NFC: Prevent multiple buffer overflows in NCI
Fix multiple remotely-exploitable stack-based buffer overflows due to
the NCI code pulling length fields directly from incoming frames and
copying too much data into statically-sized arrays.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Ilan Elias <ilane@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
|
Low
| 166,200
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Cluster::HasBlockEntries(
const Segment* pSegment,
long long off, //relative to start of segment payload
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
assert(pSegment);
assert(off >= 0); //relative to segment
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = pSegment->m_start + off; //absolute
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
return 0; //we don't even have a complete cluster
const long long segment_stop =
(pSegment->m_size < 0) ? -1 : pSegment->m_start + pSegment->m_size;
long long cluster_stop = -1; //interpreted later to mean "unknown size"
{
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //need more data
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return 0;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id != 0x0F43B675) //weird: not cluster ID
return -1; //generic error
pos += len; //consume Cluster ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return 0;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
if (size == 0)
return 0; //cluster does not have entries
pos += len; //consume size field
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size != unknown_size)
{
cluster_stop = pos + size;
assert(cluster_stop >= 0);
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (cluster_stop > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && (cluster_stop > total))
return 0; //cluster does not have any entries
}
}
for (;;)
{
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
return 0; //no entries detected
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //need more data
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
return 0; //no entries found
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
return 0; //no entries found
pos += len; //consume id field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //underflow
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //not supported inside cluster
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x20) //BlockGroup ID
return 1; //have at least one entry
if (id == 0x23) //SimpleBlock ID
return 1; //have at least one entry
pos += size; //consume payload
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,384
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int touch_file(const char *path, bool parents, usec_t stamp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd;
int r;
assert(path);
if (parents)
mkdir_parents(path, 0755);
fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY, mode > 0 ? mode : 0644);
if (fd < 0)
return -errno;
if (mode > 0) {
r = fchmod(fd, mode);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (uid != UID_INVALID || gid != GID_INVALID) {
r = fchown(fd, uid, gid);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (stamp != USEC_INFINITY) {
struct timespec ts[2];
timespec_store(&ts[0], stamp);
ts[1] = ts[0];
r = futimens(fd, ts);
} else
r = futimens(fd, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: A flaw in systemd v228 in /src/basic/fs-util.c caused world writable suid files to be created when using the systemd timers features, allowing local attackers to escalate their privileges to root. This is fixed in v229.
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere
|
Low
| 170,105
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TIFFNumberOfStrips(TIFF* tif)
{
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
uint32 nstrips;
/* If the value was already computed and store in td_nstrips, then return it,
since ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip might have altered and resized the
since the td_stripbytecount and td_stripoffset arrays to the new value
after the initial affectation of td_nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips() in
tif_dirread.c ~line 3612.
See http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 */
if( td->td_nstrips )
return td->td_nstrips;
nstrips = (td->td_rowsperstrip == (uint32) -1 ? 1 :
TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, td->td_rowsperstrip));
if (td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE)
nstrips = _TIFFMultiply32(tif, nstrips, (uint32)td->td_samplesperpixel,
"TIFFNumberOfStrips");
return (nstrips);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: LibTIFF 4.0.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TIFF image, related to *READ of size 8* and libtiff/tif_read.c:523:22.
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
|
Medium
| 168,463
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::Shutdown() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderProcessObserver, observers_, OnRenderProcessShutdown());
ChildThread::Shutdown();
if (memory_observer_) {
message_loop()->RemoveTaskObserver(memory_observer_.get());
memory_observer_.reset();
}
if (webkit_platform_support_) {
webkit_platform_support_->web_database_observer_impl()->
WaitForAllDatabasesToClose();
}
if (devtools_agent_message_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(devtools_agent_message_filter_.get());
devtools_agent_message_filter_ = NULL;
}
RemoveFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_input_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = NULL;
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
RTCPeerConnectionHandler::DestructAllHandlers();
peer_connection_factory_.reset();
#endif
RemoveFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
vc_manager_.reset();
RemoveFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
db_message_filter_ = NULL;
if (file_thread_)
file_thread_->Stop();
if (compositor_output_surface_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(compositor_output_surface_filter_.get());
compositor_output_surface_filter_ = NULL;
}
media_thread_.reset();
compositor_thread_.reset();
input_handler_manager_.reset();
if (input_event_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(input_event_filter_.get());
input_event_filter_ = NULL;
}
embedded_worker_dispatcher_.reset();
main_thread_indexed_db_dispatcher_.reset();
if (webkit_platform_support_)
blink::shutdown();
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
NPChannelBase::CleanupChannels();
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the Web Audio implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to threading in core/html/HTMLMediaElement.cpp, core/platform/audio/AudioDSPKernelProcessor.cpp, core/platform/audio/HRTFElevation.cpp, and modules/webaudio/ConvolverNode.cpp.
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,176
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: juniper_mfr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
memset(&l2info, 0, sizeof(l2info));
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_MFR;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
/* child-link ? */
if (l2info.cookie_len == 0) {
mfr_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
}
/* first try the LSQ protos */
if (l2info.cookie_len == AS_PIC_COOKIE_LEN) {
switch(l2info.proto) {
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_IPV4:
ip_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p,l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MPLS:
mpls_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_ISO:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen);
return l2info.header_len;
default:
break;
}
return l2info.header_len;
}
/* suppress Bundle-ID if frame was captured on a child-link */
if (ndo->ndo_eflag && EXTRACT_32BITS(l2info.cookie) != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bundle-ID %u, ", l2info.bundle));
switch (l2info.proto) {
case (LLCSAP_ISONS<<8 | LLCSAP_ISONS):
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1, l2info.caplen - 1);
break;
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_Q933):
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_IP):
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_IP6):
/* pass IP{4,6} to the OSI layer for proper link-layer printing */
isoclns_print(ndo, p - 1, l2info.length + 1, l2info.caplen + 1);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown protocol 0x%04x, length %u", l2info.proto, l2info.length));
}
return l2info.header_len;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,950
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct thread_group_cred *tgcred;
#endif
struct cred *new;
int ret;
if (
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
!p->cred->thread_keyring &&
#endif
clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
) {
p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
get_cred(p->cred);
alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
return 0;
}
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) {
ret = create_user_ns(new);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_put;
}
/* cache user_ns in cred. Doesn't need a refcount because it will
* stay pinned by cred->user
*/
new->user_ns = new->user->user_ns;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
/* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already
* had one */
if (new->thread_keyring) {
key_put(new->thread_keyring);
new->thread_keyring = NULL;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
}
/* we share the process and session keyrings between all the threads in
* a process - this is slightly icky as we violate COW credentials a
* bit */
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tgcred) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error_put;
}
atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(new->tgcred->session_keyring);
release_tgcred(new);
new->tgcred = tgcred;
}
#endif
atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
validate_creds(new);
return 0;
error_put:
put_cred(new);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The copy_creds function in kernel/cred.c in the Linux kernel before 3.3.2 provides an invalid replacement session keyring to a child process, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) via a crafted application that uses the fork system call.
Commit Message: cred: copy_process() should clear child->replacement_session_keyring
keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets ->replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().
However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus ->replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).
change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong ->replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 165,589
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_self_test)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir);
if (mcrypt_module_self_test(module, dir) == 0) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
|
Low
| 167,095
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, portIndex);
return updateGraphicBufferInMeta_l(
portIndex, graphicBuffer, buffer, header,
portIndex == kPortIndexOutput /* updateCodecBuffer */);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
|
Medium
| 174,141
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BookmarkManagerView::BookmarkManagerView(Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile->GetOriginalProfile()),
table_view_(NULL),
tree_view_(NULL),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(search_factory_(this)) {
search_tf_ = new views::TextField();
search_tf_->set_default_width_in_chars(30);
table_view_ = new BookmarkTableView(profile_, NULL);
table_view_->SetObserver(this);
table_view_->SetContextMenuController(this);
tree_view_ = new BookmarkFolderTreeView(profile_, NULL);
tree_view_->SetController(this);
tree_view_->SetContextMenuController(this);
views::MenuButton* organize_menu_button = new views::MenuButton(
NULL, l10n_util::GetString(IDS_BOOKMARK_MANAGER_ORGANIZE_MENU),
this, true);
organize_menu_button->SetID(kOrganizeMenuButtonID);
views::MenuButton* tools_menu_button = new views::MenuButton(
NULL, l10n_util::GetString(IDS_BOOKMARK_MANAGER_TOOLS_MENU),
this, true);
tools_menu_button->SetID(kToolsMenuButtonID);
split_view_ = new views::SingleSplitView(tree_view_, table_view_);
split_view_->set_background(
views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kBackgroundColorBottom));
views::GridLayout* layout = new views::GridLayout(this);
SetLayoutManager(layout);
const int top_id = 1;
const int split_cs_id = 2;
layout->SetInsets(2, 0, 0, 0); // 2px padding above content.
views::ColumnSet* column_set = layout->AddColumnSet(top_id);
column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::LEADING, views::GridLayout::CENTER,
0, views::GridLayout::USE_PREF, 0, 0);
column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::LEADING, views::GridLayout::CENTER,
0, views::GridLayout::USE_PREF, 0, 0);
column_set->AddPaddingColumn(1, kUnrelatedControlHorizontalSpacing);
column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::LEADING, views::GridLayout::CENTER,
0, views::GridLayout::USE_PREF, 0, 0);
column_set->AddPaddingColumn(0, kRelatedControlHorizontalSpacing);
column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::TRAILING, views::GridLayout::CENTER,
0, views::GridLayout::USE_PREF, 0, 0);
column_set->AddPaddingColumn(0, 3); // 3px padding at end of row.
column_set = layout->AddColumnSet(split_cs_id);
column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::FILL, views::GridLayout::FILL, 1,
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF, 0, 0);
layout->StartRow(0, top_id);
layout->AddView(organize_menu_button);
layout->AddView(tools_menu_button);
layout->AddView(new views::Label(
l10n_util::GetString(IDS_BOOKMARK_MANAGER_SEARCH_TITLE)));
layout->AddView(search_tf_);
layout->AddPaddingRow(0, 3); // 3px padding between rows.
layout->StartRow(1, split_cs_id);
layout->AddView(split_view_);
BookmarkModel* bookmark_model = profile_->GetBookmarkModel();
if (!bookmark_model->IsLoaded())
bookmark_model->AddObserver(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) implementation in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the :first-letter pseudo-element.
Commit Message: Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,060
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WT_Interpolate (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
const EAS_SAMPLE *loopEnd;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
loopEnd = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
/*lint -e{713} truncation is OK */
phaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* check for loop end */
acc0 = (EAS_I32) (pSamples - loopEnd);
if (acc0 >= 0)
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopStart + acc0;
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sonivox in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for a negative number of samples, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtengine.c and arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtsynth.c, aka internal bug 26366256.
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
|
Low
| 174,601
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static float *get_window(vorb *f, int len)
{
len <<= 1;
if (len == f->blocksize_0) return f->window[0];
if (len == f->blocksize_1) return f->window[1];
assert(0);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A reachable assertion in the lookup1_values function in stb_vorbis through 2019-03-04 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by opening a crafted Ogg Vorbis file.
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point()
|
Medium
| 169,615
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: tar_directory_for_file (GsfInfileTar *dir, const char *name, gboolean last)
{
const char *s = name;
while (1) {
const char *s0 = s;
char *dirname;
/* Find a directory component, if any. */
while (1) {
if (*s == 0) {
if (last && s != s0)
break;
else
return dir;
}
/* This is deliberately slash-only. */
if (*s == '/')
break;
s++;
}
dirname = g_strndup (s0, s - s0);
while (*s == '/')
s++;
if (strcmp (dirname, ".") != 0) {
GsfInput *subdir =
gsf_infile_child_by_name (GSF_INFILE (dir),
dirname);
if (subdir) {
/* Undo the ref. */
g_object_unref (subdir);
dir = GSF_INFILE_TAR (subdir);
} else
dir = tar_create_dir (dir, dirname);
}
g_free (dirname);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An error within the *tar_directory_for_file()* function (gsf-infile-tar.c) in GNOME Structured File Library before 1.14.41 can be exploited to trigger a Null pointer dereference and subsequently cause a crash via a crafted TAR file.
Commit Message: tar: fix crash on broken tar file.
|
Medium
| 166,843
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int linear_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct linear_c *lc = (struct linear_c *) ti->private;
return __blkdev_driver_ioctl(lc->dev->bdev, lc->dev->mode, cmd, arg);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.2.2 does not properly restrict SG_IO ioctl calls, which allows local users to bypass intended restrictions on disk read and write operations by sending a SCSI command to (1) a partition block device or (2) an LVM volume.
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,723
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int hugetlb_reserve_pages(struct inode *inode,
long from, long to,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
vm_flags_t vm_flags)
{
long ret, chg;
struct hstate *h = hstate_inode(inode);
/*
* Only apply hugepage reservation if asked. At fault time, an
* attempt will be made for VM_NORESERVE to allocate a page
* and filesystem quota without using reserves
*/
if (vm_flags & VM_NORESERVE)
return 0;
/*
* Shared mappings base their reservation on the number of pages that
* are already allocated on behalf of the file. Private mappings need
* to reserve the full area even if read-only as mprotect() may be
* called to make the mapping read-write. Assume !vma is a shm mapping
*/
if (!vma || vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)
chg = region_chg(&inode->i_mapping->private_list, from, to);
else {
struct resv_map *resv_map = resv_map_alloc();
if (!resv_map)
return -ENOMEM;
chg = to - from;
set_vma_resv_map(vma, resv_map);
set_vma_resv_flags(vma, HPAGE_RESV_OWNER);
}
if (chg < 0)
return chg;
/* There must be enough filesystem quota for the mapping */
if (hugetlb_get_quota(inode->i_mapping, chg))
return -ENOSPC;
/*
* Check enough hugepages are available for the reservation.
* Hand back the quota if there are not
*/
ret = hugetlb_acct_memory(h, chg);
if (ret < 0) {
hugetlb_put_quota(inode->i_mapping, chg);
return ret;
}
/*
* Account for the reservations made. Shared mappings record regions
* that have reservations as they are shared by multiple VMAs.
* When the last VMA disappears, the region map says how much
* the reservation was and the page cache tells how much of
* the reservation was consumed. Private mappings are per-VMA and
* only the consumed reservations are tracked. When the VMA
* disappears, the original reservation is the VMA size and the
* consumed reservations are stored in the map. Hence, nothing
* else has to be done for private mappings here
*/
if (!vma || vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)
region_add(&inode->i_mapping->private_list, from, to);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel before 3.3.6, when huge pages are enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly gain privileges by interacting with a hugetlbfs filesystem, as demonstrated by a umount operation that triggers improper handling of quota data.
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
High
| 165,610
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: walk_string(fz_context *ctx, int uni, int remove, editable_str *str)
{
int rune;
if (str->utf8 == NULL)
return;
do
{
char *s = &str->utf8[str->pos];
size_t len;
int n = fz_chartorune(&rune, s);
if (rune == uni)
{
/* Match. Skip over that one. */
str->pos += n;
}
else if (uni == 32) {
/* We don't care if we're given whitespace
* and it doesn't match the string. Don't
* skip forward. Nothing to remove. */
break;
}
else if (rune == 32) {
/* The string has a whitespace, and we
* don't match it; that's forgivable as
* PDF often misses out spaces. Remove this
* if we are removing stuff. */
}
else
{
/* Mismatch. No point in tracking through any more. */
str->pos = -1;
break;
}
if (remove)
{
len = strlen(s+n);
memmove(s, s+n, len+1);
str->edited = 1;
}
}
while (rune != uni);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Artifex MuPDF before 1.16.0 has a heap-based buffer over-read in fz_chartorune in fitz/string.c because pdf/pdf-op-filter.c does not check for a missing string.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,660
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
int err;
struct dentry *upperdentry;
err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
if (err)
goto out;
upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
if (upperdentry) {
mutex_lock(&upperdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&upperdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
} else {
err = ovl_copy_up_last(dentry, attr, false);
}
ovl_drop_write(dentry);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The ovl_setattr function in fs/overlayfs/inode.c in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3 attempts to merge distinct setattr operations, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and modify the attributes of arbitrary overlay files via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ovl: fix permission checking for setattr
[Al Viro] The bug is in being too enthusiastic about optimizing ->setattr()
away - instead of "copy verbatim with metadata" + "chmod/chown/utimes"
(with the former being always safe and the latter failing in case of
insufficient permissions) it tries to combine these two. Note that copyup
itself will have to do ->setattr() anyway; _that_ is where the elevated
capabilities are right. Having these two ->setattr() (one to set verbatim
copy of metadata, another to do what overlayfs ->setattr() had been asked
to do in the first place) combined is where it breaks.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 166,559
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ext4_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct vfsmount *vfs)
{
int def_errors;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct super_block *sb = vfs->mnt_sb;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_super_block *es = sbi->s_es;
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
def_errors = le16_to_cpu(es->s_errors);
if (sbi->s_sb_block != 1)
seq_printf(seq, ",sb=%llu", sbi->s_sb_block);
if (test_opt(sb, MINIX_DF))
seq_puts(seq, ",minixdf");
if (test_opt(sb, GRPID) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS))
seq_puts(seq, ",grpid");
if (!test_opt(sb, GRPID) && (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS))
seq_puts(seq, ",nogrpid");
if (sbi->s_resuid != EXT4_DEF_RESUID ||
le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid) != EXT4_DEF_RESUID) {
seq_printf(seq, ",resuid=%u", sbi->s_resuid);
}
if (sbi->s_resgid != EXT4_DEF_RESGID ||
le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid) != EXT4_DEF_RESGID) {
seq_printf(seq, ",resgid=%u", sbi->s_resgid);
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO)) {
if (def_errors == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC ||
def_errors == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE) {
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=remount-ro");
}
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT) && def_errors != EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=continue");
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC) && def_errors != EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=panic");
if (test_opt(sb, NO_UID32) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16))
seq_puts(seq, ",nouid32");
if (test_opt(sb, DEBUG) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG))
seq_puts(seq, ",debug");
if (test_opt(sb, OLDALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",oldalloc");
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_XATTR
if (test_opt(sb, XATTR_USER) &&
!(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_XATTR_USER))
seq_puts(seq, ",user_xattr");
if (!test_opt(sb, XATTR_USER) &&
(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_XATTR_USER)) {
seq_puts(seq, ",nouser_xattr");
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
if (test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",acl");
if (!test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) && (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",noacl");
#endif
if (sbi->s_commit_interval != JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE*HZ) {
seq_printf(seq, ",commit=%u",
(unsigned) (sbi->s_commit_interval / HZ));
}
if (sbi->s_min_batch_time != EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME) {
seq_printf(seq, ",min_batch_time=%u",
(unsigned) sbi->s_min_batch_time);
}
if (sbi->s_max_batch_time != EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME) {
seq_printf(seq, ",max_batch_time=%u",
(unsigned) sbi->s_min_batch_time);
}
/*
* We're changing the default of barrier mount option, so
* let's always display its mount state so it's clear what its
* status is.
*/
seq_puts(seq, ",barrier=");
seq_puts(seq, test_opt(sb, BARRIER) ? "1" : "0");
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT))
seq_puts(seq, ",journal_async_commit");
if (test_opt(sb, NOBH))
seq_puts(seq, ",nobh");
if (test_opt(sb, I_VERSION))
seq_puts(seq, ",i_version");
if (!test_opt(sb, DELALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",nodelalloc");
if (sbi->s_stripe)
seq_printf(seq, ",stripe=%lu", sbi->s_stripe);
/*
* journal mode get enabled in different ways
* So just print the value even if we didn't specify it
*/
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=journal");
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=ordered");
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=writeback");
if (sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks != EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS)
seq_printf(seq, ",inode_readahead_blks=%u",
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks);
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_ERR_ABORT))
seq_puts(seq, ",data_err=abort");
if (test_opt(sb, NO_AUTO_DA_ALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",noauto_da_alloc");
if (test_opt(sb, DISCARD))
seq_puts(seq, ",discard");
if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD))
seq_puts(seq, ",norecovery");
ext4_show_quota_options(seq, sb);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 167,555
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: get_results(struct iperf_test *test)
{
int r = 0;
cJSON *j;
cJSON *j_cpu_util_total;
cJSON *j_cpu_util_user;
cJSON *j_cpu_util_system;
cJSON *j_sender_has_retransmits;
int result_has_retransmits;
cJSON *j_streams;
int n, i;
cJSON *j_stream;
cJSON *j_id;
cJSON *j_bytes;
cJSON *j_retransmits;
cJSON *j_jitter;
cJSON *j_errors;
cJSON *j_packets;
cJSON *j_server_output;
int sid, cerror, pcount;
double jitter;
iperf_size_t bytes_transferred;
int retransmits;
struct iperf_stream *sp;
j = JSON_read(test->ctrl_sck);
if (j == NULL) {
i_errno = IERECVRESULTS;
r = -1;
} else {
j_cpu_util_total = cJSON_GetObjectItem(j, "cpu_util_total");
j_cpu_util_user = cJSON_GetObjectItem(j, "cpu_util_user");
j_cpu_util_system = cJSON_GetObjectItem(j, "cpu_util_system");
j_sender_has_retransmits = cJSON_GetObjectItem(j, "sender_has_retransmits");
if (j_cpu_util_total == NULL || j_cpu_util_user == NULL || j_cpu_util_system == NULL || j_sender_has_retransmits == NULL) {
i_errno = IERECVRESULTS;
r = -1;
} else {
if (test->debug) {
printf("get_results\n%s\n", cJSON_Print(j));
}
test->remote_cpu_util[0] = j_cpu_util_total->valuefloat;
test->remote_cpu_util[1] = j_cpu_util_user->valuefloat;
test->remote_cpu_util[2] = j_cpu_util_system->valuefloat;
result_has_retransmits = j_sender_has_retransmits->valueint;
if (! test->sender)
test->sender_has_retransmits = result_has_retransmits;
j_streams = cJSON_GetObjectItem(j, "streams");
if (j_streams == NULL) {
i_errno = IERECVRESULTS;
r = -1;
} else {
n = cJSON_GetArraySize(j_streams);
for (i=0; i<n; ++i) {
j_stream = cJSON_GetArrayItem(j_streams, i);
if (j_stream == NULL) {
i_errno = IERECVRESULTS;
r = -1;
} else {
j_id = cJSON_GetObjectItem(j_stream, "id");
j_bytes = cJSON_GetObjectItem(j_stream, "bytes");
j_retransmits = cJSON_GetObjectItem(j_stream, "retransmits");
j_jitter = cJSON_GetObjectItem(j_stream, "jitter");
j_errors = cJSON_GetObjectItem(j_stream, "errors");
j_packets = cJSON_GetObjectItem(j_stream, "packets");
if (j_id == NULL || j_bytes == NULL || j_retransmits == NULL || j_jitter == NULL || j_errors == NULL || j_packets == NULL) {
i_errno = IERECVRESULTS;
r = -1;
} else {
sid = j_id->valueint;
bytes_transferred = j_bytes->valueint;
retransmits = j_retransmits->valueint;
jitter = j_jitter->valuefloat;
cerror = j_errors->valueint;
pcount = j_packets->valueint;
SLIST_FOREACH(sp, &test->streams, streams)
if (sp->id == sid) break;
if (sp == NULL) {
i_errno = IESTREAMID;
r = -1;
} else {
if (test->sender) {
sp->jitter = jitter;
sp->cnt_error = cerror;
sp->packet_count = pcount;
sp->result->bytes_received = bytes_transferred;
} else {
sp->result->bytes_sent = bytes_transferred;
sp->result->stream_retrans = retransmits;
}
}
}
}
}
/*
* If we're the client and we're supposed to get remote results,
* look them up and process accordingly.
*/
if (test->role == 'c' && iperf_get_test_get_server_output(test)) {
/* Look for JSON. If we find it, grab the object so it doesn't get deleted. */
j_server_output = cJSON_DetachItemFromObject(j, "server_output_json");
if (j_server_output != NULL) {
test->json_server_output = j_server_output;
}
else {
/* No JSON, look for textual output. Make a copy of the text for later. */
j_server_output = cJSON_GetObjectItem(j, "server_output_text");
if (j_server_output != NULL) {
test->server_output_text = strdup(j_server_output->valuestring);
}
}
}
}
}
cJSON_Delete(j);
}
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,314
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline bool is_flush_request(struct request *rq,
struct blk_flush_queue *fq, unsigned int tag)
{
return ((rq->cmd_flags & REQ_FLUSH_SEQ) &&
fq->flush_rq->tag == tag);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In blk_mq_tag_to_rq in blk-mq.c in the upstream kernel, there is a possible use after free due to a race condition when a request has been previously freed by blk_mq_complete_request. This could lead to local escalation of privilege. Product: Android. Versions: Android kernel. Android ID: A-63083046.
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
|
Medium
| 169,458
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int rdfa_parse_start(rdfacontext* context)
{
int rval = RDFA_PARSE_SUCCESS;
context->wb_allocated = sizeof(char) * READ_BUFFER_SIZE;
context->working_buffer = (char*)malloc(context->wb_allocated + 1);
*context->working_buffer = '\0';
#ifndef LIBRDFA_IN_RAPTOR
context->parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL);
#endif
context->done = 0;
context->context_stack = rdfa_create_list(32);
rdfa_push_item(context->context_stack, context, RDFALIST_FLAG_CONTEXT);
#ifdef LIBRDFA_IN_RAPTOR
context->sax2 = raptor_new_sax2(context->world, context->locator,
context->context_stack);
#else
#endif
#ifdef LIBRDFA_IN_RAPTOR
raptor_sax2_set_start_element_handler(context->sax2,
raptor_rdfa_start_element);
raptor_sax2_set_end_element_handler(context->sax2,
raptor_rdfa_end_element);
raptor_sax2_set_characters_handler(context->sax2,
raptor_rdfa_character_data);
raptor_sax2_set_namespace_handler(context->sax2,
raptor_rdfa_namespace_handler);
#else
XML_SetUserData(context->parser, context->context_stack);
XML_SetElementHandler(context->parser, start_element, end_element);
XML_SetCharacterDataHandler(context->parser, character_data);
#endif
rdfa_init_context(context);
#ifdef LIBRDFA_IN_RAPTOR
if(1) {
raptor_parser* rdf_parser = (raptor_parser*)context->callback_data;
/* Optionally forbid internal network and file requests in the
* XML parser
*/
raptor_sax2_set_option(context->sax2,
RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET, NULL,
RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET));
raptor_sax2_set_option(context->sax2,
RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE, NULL,
RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE));
if(rdf_parser->uri_filter)
raptor_sax2_set_uri_filter(context->sax2, rdf_parser->uri_filter,
rdf_parser->uri_filter_user_data);
}
context->base_uri=raptor_new_uri(context->sax2->world, (const unsigned char*)context->base);
raptor_sax2_parse_start(context->sax2, context->base_uri);
#endif
return rval;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Redland Raptor (aka libraptor) before 2.0.7, as used by OpenOffice 3.3 and 3.4 Beta, LibreOffice before 3.4.6 and 3.5.x before 3.5.1, and other products, allows user-assisted remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a crafted XML external entity (XXE) declaration and reference in an RDF document.
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
|
Medium
| 165,657
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CSSDefaultStyleSheets::loadFullDefaultStyle()
{
if (simpleDefaultStyleSheet) {
ASSERT(defaultStyle);
ASSERT(defaultPrintStyle == defaultStyle);
delete defaultStyle;
simpleDefaultStyleSheet->deref();
defaultStyle = RuleSet::create().leakPtr();
defaultPrintStyle = RuleSet::create().leakPtr();
simpleDefaultStyleSheet = 0;
} else {
ASSERT(!defaultStyle);
defaultStyle = RuleSet::create().leakPtr();
defaultPrintStyle = RuleSet::create().leakPtr();
defaultQuirksStyle = RuleSet::create().leakPtr();
}
String defaultRules = String(htmlUserAgentStyleSheet, sizeof(htmlUserAgentStyleSheet)) + RenderTheme::theme().extraDefaultStyleSheet();
defaultStyleSheet = parseUASheet(defaultRules);
defaultStyle->addRulesFromSheet(defaultStyleSheet, screenEval());
defaultStyle->addRulesFromSheet(parseUASheet(ViewportStyle::viewportStyleSheet()), screenEval());
defaultPrintStyle->addRulesFromSheet(defaultStyleSheet, printEval());
String quirksRules = String(quirksUserAgentStyleSheet, sizeof(quirksUserAgentStyleSheet)) + RenderTheme::theme().extraQuirksStyleSheet();
quirksStyleSheet = parseUASheet(quirksRules);
defaultQuirksStyle->addRulesFromSheet(quirksStyleSheet, screenEval());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly perform a cast of an unspecified variable during processing of the root of the structure tree, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,581
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void InitSkBitmapDataForTransfer(const SkBitmap& bitmap) {
const SkImageInfo& info = bitmap.info();
color_type = info.colorType();
alpha_type = info.alphaType();
width = info.width();
height = info.height();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Incorrect IPC serialization in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562}
|
Medium
| 172,891
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
char *orig_data = kstrdup(data, GFP_KERNEL);
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct ext4_super_block *es = NULL;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = kzalloc(sizeof(*sbi), GFP_KERNEL);
ext4_fsblk_t block;
ext4_fsblk_t sb_block = get_sb_block(&data);
ext4_fsblk_t logical_sb_block;
unsigned long offset = 0;
unsigned long journal_devnum = 0;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct inode *root;
const char *descr;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
int blocksize, clustersize;
unsigned int db_count;
unsigned int i;
int needs_recovery, has_huge_files, has_bigalloc;
__u64 blocks_count;
int err = 0;
unsigned int journal_ioprio = DEFAULT_JOURNAL_IOPRIO;
ext4_group_t first_not_zeroed;
if ((data && !orig_data) || !sbi)
goto out_free_base;
sbi->s_blockgroup_lock =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct blockgroup_lock), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi->s_blockgroup_lock)
goto out_free_base;
sb->s_fs_info = sbi;
sbi->s_sb = sb;
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks = EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS;
sbi->s_sb_block = sb_block;
if (sb->s_bdev->bd_part)
sbi->s_sectors_written_start =
part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[1]);
/* Cleanup superblock name */
strreplace(sb->s_id, '/', '!');
/* -EINVAL is default */
ret = -EINVAL;
blocksize = sb_min_blocksize(sb, EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (!blocksize) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to set blocksize");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* The ext4 superblock will not be buffer aligned for other than 1kB
* block sizes. We need to calculate the offset from buffer start.
*/
if (blocksize != EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE) {
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
} else {
logical_sb_block = sb_block;
}
if (!(bh = sb_bread_unmovable(sb, logical_sb_block))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to read superblock");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* Note: s_es must be initialized as soon as possible because
* some ext4 macro-instructions depend on its value
*/
es = (struct ext4_super_block *) (bh->b_data + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
sb->s_magic = le16_to_cpu(es->s_magic);
if (sb->s_magic != EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_kbytes_written = le64_to_cpu(es->s_kbytes_written);
/* Warn if metadata_csum and gdt_csum are both set. */
if (ext4_has_feature_metadata_csum(sb) &&
ext4_has_feature_gdt_csum(sb))
ext4_warning(sb, "metadata_csum and uninit_bg are "
"redundant flags; please run fsck.");
/* Check for a known checksum algorithm */
if (!ext4_verify_csum_type(sb, es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Found ext4 filesystem with "
"unknown checksum algorithm.");
silent = 1;
goto cantfind_ext4;
}
/* Load the checksum driver */
if (ext4_has_feature_metadata_csum(sb)) {
sbi->s_chksum_driver = crypto_alloc_shash("crc32c", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(sbi->s_chksum_driver)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Cannot load crc32c driver.");
ret = PTR_ERR(sbi->s_chksum_driver);
sbi->s_chksum_driver = NULL;
goto failed_mount;
}
}
/* Check superblock checksum */
if (!ext4_superblock_csum_verify(sb, es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Found ext4 filesystem with "
"invalid superblock checksum. Run e2fsck?");
silent = 1;
ret = -EFSBADCRC;
goto cantfind_ext4;
}
/* Precompute checksum seed for all metadata */
if (ext4_has_feature_csum_seed(sb))
sbi->s_csum_seed = le32_to_cpu(es->s_checksum_seed);
else if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb))
sbi->s_csum_seed = ext4_chksum(sbi, ~0, es->s_uuid,
sizeof(es->s_uuid));
/* Set defaults before we parse the mount options */
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
set_opt(sb, INIT_INODE_TABLE);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG)
set_opt(sb, DEBUG);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS)
set_opt(sb, GRPID);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16)
set_opt(sb, NO_UID32);
/* xattr user namespace & acls are now defaulted on */
set_opt(sb, XATTR_USER);
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
set_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL);
#endif
/* don't forget to enable journal_csum when metadata_csum is enabled. */
if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb))
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM);
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_DATA)
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_ORDERED)
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_WBACK)
set_opt(sb, WRITEBACK_DATA);
if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC);
else if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT);
else
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO);
/* block_validity enabled by default; disable with noblock_validity */
set_opt(sb, BLOCK_VALIDITY);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DISCARD)
set_opt(sb, DISCARD);
sbi->s_resuid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid));
sbi->s_resgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid));
sbi->s_commit_interval = JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE * HZ;
sbi->s_min_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME;
sbi->s_max_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME;
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NOBARRIER) == 0)
set_opt(sb, BARRIER);
/*
* enable delayed allocation by default
* Use -o nodelalloc to turn it off
*/
if (!IS_EXT3_SB(sb) && !IS_EXT2_SB(sb) &&
((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NODELALLOC) == 0))
set_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
/*
* set default s_li_wait_mult for lazyinit, for the case there is
* no mount option specified.
*/
sbi->s_li_wait_mult = EXT4_DEF_LI_WAIT_MULT;
if (sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts[0]) {
char *s_mount_opts = kstrndup(sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts,
sizeof(sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!s_mount_opts)
goto failed_mount;
if (!parse_options(s_mount_opts, sb, &journal_devnum,
&journal_ioprio, 0)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"failed to parse options in superblock: %s",
s_mount_opts);
}
kfree(s_mount_opts);
}
sbi->s_def_mount_opt = sbi->s_mount_opt;
if (!parse_options((char *) data, sb, &journal_devnum,
&journal_ioprio, 0))
goto failed_mount;
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA) {
printk_once(KERN_WARNING "EXT4-fs: Warning: mounting "
"with data=journal disables delayed "
"allocation and O_DIRECT support!\n");
if (test_opt2(sb, EXPLICIT_DELALLOC)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"both data=journal and delalloc");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (test_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"both data=journal and dioread_nolock");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (test_opt(sb, DAX)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"both data=journal and dax");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (test_opt(sb, DELALLOC))
clear_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
} else {
sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_CGROUPWB;
}
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_POSIXACL) |
(test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) ? MS_POSIXACL : 0);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV &&
(ext4_has_compat_features(sb) ||
ext4_has_ro_compat_features(sb) ||
ext4_has_incompat_features(sb)))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"feature flags set on rev 0 fs, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
if (es->s_creator_os == cpu_to_le32(EXT4_OS_HURD)) {
set_opt2(sb, HURD_COMPAT);
if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"The Hurd can't support 64-bit file systems");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
if (IS_EXT2_SB(sb)) {
if (ext2_feature_set_ok(sb))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounting ext2 file system "
"using the ext4 subsystem");
else {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "couldn't mount as ext2 due "
"to feature incompatibilities");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
if (IS_EXT3_SB(sb)) {
if (ext3_feature_set_ok(sb))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounting ext3 file system "
"using the ext4 subsystem");
else {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "couldn't mount as ext3 due "
"to feature incompatibilities");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
/*
* Check feature flags regardless of the revision level, since we
* previously didn't change the revision level when setting the flags,
* so there is a chance incompat flags are set on a rev 0 filesystem.
*/
if (!ext4_feature_set_ok(sb, (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)))
goto failed_mount;
blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size);
if (blocksize < EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE ||
blocksize > EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unsupported filesystem blocksize %d (%d log_block_size)",
blocksize, le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size));
goto failed_mount;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size) >
(EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_LOG_SIZE - EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_LOG_SIZE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Invalid log block size: %u",
le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size));
goto failed_mount;
}
if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks) > (blocksize / 4)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Number of reserved GDT blocks insanely large: %d",
le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks));
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_mount_opt & EXT4_MOUNT_DAX) {
err = bdev_dax_supported(sb, blocksize);
if (err)
goto failed_mount;
}
if (ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb) && es->s_encryption_level) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Unsupported encryption level %d",
es->s_encryption_level);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sb->s_blocksize != blocksize) {
/* Validate the filesystem blocksize */
if (!sb_set_blocksize(sb, blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "bad block size %d",
blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
brelse(bh);
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
bh = sb_bread_unmovable(sb, logical_sb_block);
if (!bh) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Can't read superblock on 2nd try");
goto failed_mount;
}
es = (struct ext4_super_block *)(bh->b_data + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
if (es->s_magic != cpu_to_le16(EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Magic mismatch, very weird!");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
has_huge_files = ext4_has_feature_huge_file(sb);
sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes = ext4_max_bitmap_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
has_huge_files);
sb->s_maxbytes = ext4_max_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits, has_huge_files);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV) {
sbi->s_inode_size = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
sbi->s_first_ino = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_FIRST_INO;
} else {
sbi->s_inode_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_inode_size);
sbi->s_first_ino = le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_ino);
if ((sbi->s_inode_size < EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) ||
(!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_inode_size)) ||
(sbi->s_inode_size > blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported inode size: %d",
sbi->s_inode_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE)
sb->s_time_gran = 1 << (EXT4_EPOCH_BITS - 2);
}
sbi->s_desc_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_desc_size);
if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb)) {
if (sbi->s_desc_size < EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE_64BIT ||
sbi->s_desc_size > EXT4_MAX_DESC_SIZE ||
!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_desc_size)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported descriptor size %lu",
sbi->s_desc_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
} else
sbi->s_desc_size = EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE;
sbi->s_blocks_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_per_group);
sbi->s_inodes_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_inodes_per_group);
sbi->s_inodes_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb);
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_block == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_group < sbi->s_inodes_per_block ||
sbi->s_inodes_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "invalid inodes per group: %lu\n",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_itb_per_group = sbi->s_inodes_per_group /
sbi->s_inodes_per_block;
sbi->s_desc_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_DESC_SIZE(sb);
sbi->s_sbh = bh;
sbi->s_mount_state = le16_to_cpu(es->s_state);
sbi->s_addr_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_ADDR_PER_BLOCK(sb));
sbi->s_desc_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
sbi->s_hash_seed[i] = le32_to_cpu(es->s_hash_seed[i]);
sbi->s_def_hash_version = es->s_def_hash_version;
if (ext4_has_feature_dir_index(sb)) {
i = le32_to_cpu(es->s_flags);
if (i & EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH)
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
else if ((i & EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH) == 0) {
#ifdef __CHAR_UNSIGNED__
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
es->s_flags |=
cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH);
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
#else
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
es->s_flags |=
cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH);
#endif
}
}
/* Handle clustersize */
clustersize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_cluster_size);
has_bigalloc = ext4_has_feature_bigalloc(sb);
if (has_bigalloc) {
if (clustersize < blocksize) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"cluster size (%d) smaller than "
"block size (%d)", clustersize, blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_cluster_size) >
(EXT4_MAX_CLUSTER_LOG_SIZE - EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_LOG_SIZE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Invalid log cluster size: %u",
le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_cluster_size));
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_cluster_bits = le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_cluster_size) -
le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size);
sbi->s_clusters_per_group =
le32_to_cpu(es->s_clusters_per_group);
if (sbi->s_clusters_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#clusters per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_clusters_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group !=
(sbi->s_clusters_per_group * (clustersize / blocksize))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "blocks per group (%lu) and "
"clusters per group (%lu) inconsistent",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group,
sbi->s_clusters_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
} else {
if (clustersize != blocksize) {
ext4_warning(sb, "fragment/cluster size (%d) != "
"block size (%d)", clustersize,
blocksize);
clustersize = blocksize;
}
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#blocks per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_clusters_per_group = sbi->s_blocks_per_group;
sbi->s_cluster_bits = 0;
}
sbi->s_cluster_ratio = clustersize / blocksize;
/* Do we have standard group size of clustersize * 8 blocks ? */
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group == clustersize << 3)
set_opt2(sb, STD_GROUP_SIZE);
/*
* Test whether we have more sectors than will fit in sector_t,
* and whether the max offset is addressable by the page cache.
*/
err = generic_check_addressable(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
ext4_blocks_count(es));
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "filesystem"
" too large to mount safely on this system");
if (sizeof(sector_t) < 8)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "CONFIG_LBDAF not enabled");
goto failed_mount;
}
if (EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
/* check blocks count against device size */
blocks_count = sb->s_bdev->bd_inode->i_size >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (blocks_count && ext4_blocks_count(es) > blocks_count) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: block count %llu "
"exceeds size of device (%llu blocks)",
ext4_blocks_count(es), blocks_count);
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* It makes no sense for the first data block to be beyond the end
* of the filesystem.
*/
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) >= ext4_blocks_count(es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: first data "
"block %u is beyond end of filesystem (%llu)",
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
ext4_blocks_count(es));
goto failed_mount;
}
blocks_count = (ext4_blocks_count(es) -
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) +
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
do_div(blocks_count, EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
if (blocks_count > ((uint64_t)1<<32) - EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "groups count too large: %u "
"(block count %llu, first data block %u, "
"blocks per group %lu)", sbi->s_groups_count,
ext4_blocks_count(es),
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_groups_count = blocks_count;
sbi->s_blockfile_groups = min_t(ext4_group_t, sbi->s_groups_count,
(EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS / EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)));
db_count = (sbi->s_groups_count + EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) - 1) /
EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb);
sbi->s_group_desc = ext4_kvmalloc(db_count *
sizeof(struct buffer_head *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (sbi->s_group_desc == NULL) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "not enough memory");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount;
}
bgl_lock_init(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++) {
block = descriptor_loc(sb, logical_sb_block, i);
sbi->s_group_desc[i] = sb_bread_unmovable(sb, block);
if (!sbi->s_group_desc[i]) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"can't read group descriptor %d", i);
db_count = i;
goto failed_mount2;
}
}
if (!ext4_check_descriptors(sb, logical_sb_block, &first_not_zeroed)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "group descriptors corrupted!");
ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto failed_mount2;
}
sbi->s_gdb_count = db_count;
get_random_bytes(&sbi->s_next_generation, sizeof(u32));
spin_lock_init(&sbi->s_next_gen_lock);
setup_timer(&sbi->s_err_report, print_daily_error_info,
(unsigned long) sb);
/* Register extent status tree shrinker */
if (ext4_es_register_shrinker(sbi))
goto failed_mount3;
sbi->s_stripe = ext4_get_stripe_size(sbi);
sbi->s_extent_max_zeroout_kb = 32;
/*
* set up enough so that it can read an inode
*/
sb->s_op = &ext4_sops;
sb->s_export_op = &ext4_export_ops;
sb->s_xattr = ext4_xattr_handlers;
sb->s_cop = &ext4_cryptops;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
sb->dq_op = &ext4_quota_operations;
if (ext4_has_feature_quota(sb))
sb->s_qcop = &dquot_quotactl_sysfile_ops;
else
sb->s_qcop = &ext4_qctl_operations;
sb->s_quota_types = QTYPE_MASK_USR | QTYPE_MASK_GRP | QTYPE_MASK_PRJ;
#endif
memcpy(sb->s_uuid, es->s_uuid, sizeof(es->s_uuid));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbi->s_orphan); /* unlinked but open files */
mutex_init(&sbi->s_orphan_lock);
sb->s_root = NULL;
needs_recovery = (es->s_last_orphan != 0 ||
ext4_has_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb));
if (ext4_has_feature_mmp(sb) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
if (ext4_multi_mount_protect(sb, le64_to_cpu(es->s_mmp_block)))
goto failed_mount3a;
/*
* The first inode we look at is the journal inode. Don't try
* root first: it may be modified in the journal!
*/
if (!test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) && ext4_has_feature_journal(sb)) {
if (ext4_load_journal(sb, es, journal_devnum))
goto failed_mount3a;
} else if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) &&
ext4_has_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "required journal recovery "
"suppressed and not mounted read-only");
goto failed_mount_wq;
} else {
/* Nojournal mode, all journal mount options are illegal */
if (test_opt2(sb, EXPLICIT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"journal_checksum, fs mounted w/o journal");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"journal_async_commit, fs mounted w/o journal");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (sbi->s_commit_interval != JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE*HZ) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"commit=%lu, fs mounted w/o journal",
sbi->s_commit_interval / HZ);
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (EXT4_MOUNT_DATA_FLAGS &
(sbi->s_mount_opt ^ sbi->s_def_mount_opt)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
"data=, fs mounted w/o journal");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
sbi->s_def_mount_opt &= EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM;
clear_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM);
clear_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
needs_recovery = 0;
goto no_journal;
}
if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb) &&
!jbd2_journal_set_features(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal, 0, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_64BIT)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to set 64-bit journal feature");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (!set_journal_csum_feature_set(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to set journal checksum "
"feature set");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
/* We have now updated the journal if required, so we can
* validate the data journaling mode. */
switch (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS)) {
case 0:
/* No mode set, assume a default based on the journal
* capabilities: ORDERED_DATA if the journal can
* cope, else JOURNAL_DATA
*/
if (jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE))
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
break;
case EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA:
case EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA:
if (!jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Journal does not support "
"requested data journaling mode");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
default:
break;
}
set_task_ioprio(sbi->s_journal->j_task, journal_ioprio);
sbi->s_journal->j_commit_callback = ext4_journal_commit_callback;
no_journal:
sbi->s_mb_cache = ext4_xattr_create_cache();
if (!sbi->s_mb_cache) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to create an mb_cache");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if ((DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) || ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) &&
(blocksize != PAGE_SIZE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unsupported blocksize for fs encryption");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) &&
!ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) {
ext4_set_feature_encrypt(sb);
ext4_commit_super(sb, 1);
}
/*
* Get the # of file system overhead blocks from the
* superblock if present.
*/
if (es->s_overhead_clusters)
sbi->s_overhead = le32_to_cpu(es->s_overhead_clusters);
else {
err = ext4_calculate_overhead(sb);
if (err)
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
/*
* The maximum number of concurrent works can be high and
* concurrency isn't really necessary. Limit it to 1.
*/
EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq =
alloc_workqueue("ext4-rsv-conversion", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_UNBOUND, 1);
if (!EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq) {
printk(KERN_ERR "EXT4-fs: failed to create workqueue\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount4;
}
/*
* The jbd2_journal_load will have done any necessary log recovery,
* so we can safely mount the rest of the filesystem now.
*/
root = ext4_iget(sb, EXT4_ROOT_INO);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root inode failed");
ret = PTR_ERR(root);
root = NULL;
goto failed_mount4;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(root->i_mode) || !root->i_blocks || !root->i_size) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "corrupt root inode, run e2fsck");
iput(root);
goto failed_mount4;
}
sb->s_root = d_make_root(root);
if (!sb->s_root) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root dentry failed");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount4;
}
if (ext4_setup_super(sb, es, sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
/* determine the minimum size of new large inodes, if present */
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
if (ext4_has_feature_extra_isize(sb)) {
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize);
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize);
}
}
/* Check if enough inode space is available */
if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + sbi->s_want_extra_isize >
sbi->s_inode_size) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "required extra inode space not"
"available");
}
ext4_set_resv_clusters(sb);
err = ext4_setup_system_zone(sb);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize system "
"zone (%d)", err);
goto failed_mount4a;
}
ext4_ext_init(sb);
err = ext4_mb_init(sb);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize mballoc (%d)",
err);
goto failed_mount5;
}
block = ext4_count_free_clusters(sb);
ext4_free_blocks_count_set(sbi->s_es,
EXT4_C2B(sbi, block));
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter, block,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!err) {
unsigned long freei = ext4_count_free_inodes(sb);
sbi->s_es->s_free_inodes_count = cpu_to_le32(freei);
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter, freei,
GFP_KERNEL);
}
if (!err)
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirs_counter,
ext4_count_dirs(sb), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!err)
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter, 0,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!err)
err = percpu_init_rwsem(&sbi->s_journal_flag_rwsem);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "insufficient memory");
goto failed_mount6;
}
if (ext4_has_feature_flex_bg(sb))
if (!ext4_fill_flex_info(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unable to initialize "
"flex_bg meta info!");
goto failed_mount6;
}
err = ext4_register_li_request(sb, first_not_zeroed);
if (err)
goto failed_mount6;
err = ext4_register_sysfs(sb);
if (err)
goto failed_mount7;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
/* Enable quota usage during mount. */
if (ext4_has_feature_quota(sb) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
err = ext4_enable_quotas(sb);
if (err)
goto failed_mount8;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_QUOTA */
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
ext4_orphan_cleanup(sb, es);
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state &= ~EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
if (needs_recovery) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "recovery complete");
ext4_mark_recovery_complete(sb, es);
}
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal) {
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
descr = " journalled data mode";
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
descr = " ordered data mode";
else
descr = " writeback data mode";
} else
descr = "out journal";
if (test_opt(sb, DISCARD)) {
struct request_queue *q = bdev_get_queue(sb->s_bdev);
if (!blk_queue_discard(q))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"mounting with \"discard\" option, but "
"the device does not support discard");
}
if (___ratelimit(&ext4_mount_msg_ratelimit, "EXT4-fs mount"))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounted filesystem with%s. "
"Opts: %.*s%s%s", descr,
(int) sizeof(sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts),
sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts,
*sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts ? "; " : "", orig_data);
if (es->s_error_count)
mod_timer(&sbi->s_err_report, jiffies + 300*HZ); /* 5 minutes */
/* Enable message ratelimiting. Default is 10 messages per 5 secs. */
ratelimit_state_init(&sbi->s_err_ratelimit_state, 5 * HZ, 10);
ratelimit_state_init(&sbi->s_warning_ratelimit_state, 5 * HZ, 10);
ratelimit_state_init(&sbi->s_msg_ratelimit_state, 5 * HZ, 10);
kfree(orig_data);
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
memcpy(sbi->key_prefix, EXT4_KEY_DESC_PREFIX,
EXT4_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE);
sbi->key_prefix_size = EXT4_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE;
#endif
return 0;
cantfind_ext4:
if (!silent)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Can't find ext4 filesystem");
goto failed_mount;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
failed_mount8:
ext4_unregister_sysfs(sb);
#endif
failed_mount7:
ext4_unregister_li_request(sb);
failed_mount6:
ext4_mb_release(sb);
if (sbi->s_flex_groups)
kvfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirs_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter);
failed_mount5:
ext4_ext_release(sb);
ext4_release_system_zone(sb);
failed_mount4a:
dput(sb->s_root);
sb->s_root = NULL;
failed_mount4:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "mount failed");
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq)
destroy_workqueue(EXT4_SB(sb)->rsv_conversion_wq);
failed_mount_wq:
if (sbi->s_mb_cache) {
ext4_xattr_destroy_cache(sbi->s_mb_cache);
sbi->s_mb_cache = NULL;
}
if (sbi->s_journal) {
jbd2_journal_destroy(sbi->s_journal);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
}
failed_mount3a:
ext4_es_unregister_shrinker(sbi);
failed_mount3:
del_timer_sync(&sbi->s_err_report);
if (sbi->s_mmp_tsk)
kthread_stop(sbi->s_mmp_tsk);
failed_mount2:
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++)
brelse(sbi->s_group_desc[i]);
kvfree(sbi->s_group_desc);
failed_mount:
if (sbi->s_chksum_driver)
crypto_free_shash(sbi->s_chksum_driver);
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
for (i = 0; i < EXT4_MAXQUOTAS; i++)
kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[i]);
#endif
ext4_blkdev_remove(sbi);
brelse(bh);
out_fail:
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
out_free_base:
kfree(sbi);
kfree(orig_data);
return err ? err : ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ext4_fill_super function in fs/ext4/super.c in the Linux kernel through 4.9.8 does not properly validate meta block groups, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and system crash) via a crafted ext4 image.
Commit Message: ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
|
Low
| 168,488
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void array_cleanup( char* arr[] , int arr_size)
{
int i=0;
for( i=0; i< arr_size; i++ ){
if( arr[i*2] ){
efree( arr[i*2]);
}
}
efree(arr);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
|
Low
| 167,200
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: string16 ExtensionInstallUI::Prompt::GetDialogTitle(
const Extension* extension) const {
if (type_ == INSTALL_PROMPT) {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(extension->is_app() ?
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALL_APP_PROMPT_TITLE :
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALL_EXTENSION_PROMPT_TITLE);
} else if (type_ == INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT) {
return l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
kTitleIds[type_], l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SHORT_PRODUCT_NAME));
} else {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(kTitleIds[type_]);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,981
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (ipc_enabled_)
worker_delegate_->OnChannelConnected();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,548
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __ip6_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *usin = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) uaddr;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct dst_entry *dst;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
int addr_type;
int err;
if (usin->sin6_family == AF_INET) {
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
err = __ip4_datagram_connect(sk, uaddr, addr_len);
goto ipv4_connected;
}
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = usin->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&usin->sin6_addr);
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY) {
/*
* connect to self
*/
usin->sin6_addr.s6_addr[15] = 0x01;
}
daddr = &usin->sin6_addr;
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
struct sockaddr_in sin;
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk)) {
err = -ENETUNREACH;
goto out;
}
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = daddr->s6_addr32[3];
sin.sin_port = usin->sin6_port;
err = __ip4_datagram_connect(sk,
(struct sockaddr *) &sin,
sizeof(sin));
ipv4_connected:
if (err)
goto out;
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(inet->inet_daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr);
if (ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr) ||
ipv6_mapped_addr_any(&np->saddr))
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(inet->inet_saddr, &np->saddr);
if (ipv6_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr) ||
ipv6_mapped_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr)) {
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(inet->inet_rcv_saddr,
&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr);
if (sk->sk_prot->rehash)
sk->sk_prot->rehash(sk);
}
goto out;
}
if (__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(addr_type)) {
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
usin->sin6_scope_id) {
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if &&
sk->sk_bound_dev_if != usin->sin6_scope_id) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = usin->sin6_scope_id;
}
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if && (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST))
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = np->mcast_oif;
/* Connect to link-local address requires an interface */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
sk->sk_v6_daddr = *daddr;
np->flow_label = fl6.flowlabel;
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin6_port;
/*
* Check for a route to destination an obtain the
* destination cache for it.
*/
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && (addr_type&IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST))
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
opt = flowlabel ? flowlabel->opt : np->opt;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
err = 0;
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto out;
}
/* source address lookup done in ip6_dst_lookup */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
np->saddr = fl6.saddr;
if (ipv6_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr)) {
sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = fl6.saddr;
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
if (sk->sk_prot->rehash)
sk->sk_prot->rehash(sk);
}
ip6_dst_store(sk, dst,
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr) ?
&sk->sk_v6_daddr : NULL,
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.saddr, &np->saddr) ?
&np->saddr :
#endif
NULL);
sk->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
sk_set_txhash(sk);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,329
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int mp4client_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char c;
const char *str;
int ret_val = 0;
u32 i, times[100], nb_times, dump_mode;
u32 simulation_time_in_ms = 0;
u32 initial_service_id = 0;
Bool auto_exit = GF_FALSE;
Bool logs_set = GF_FALSE;
Bool start_fs = GF_FALSE;
Bool use_rtix = GF_FALSE;
Bool pause_at_first = GF_FALSE;
Bool no_cfg_save = GF_FALSE;
Bool is_cfg_only = GF_FALSE;
Double play_from = 0;
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
GF_MemTrackerType mem_track = GF_MemTrackerNone;
#endif
Double fps = GF_IMPORT_DEFAULT_FPS;
Bool fill_ar, visible, do_uncache, has_command;
char *url_arg, *out_arg, *the_cfg, *rti_file, *views, *mosaic;
FILE *logfile = NULL;
Float scale = 1;
#ifndef WIN32
dlopen(NULL, RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL);
#endif
/*by default use current dir*/
strcpy(the_url, ".");
memset(&user, 0, sizeof(GF_User));
dump_mode = DUMP_NONE;
fill_ar = visible = do_uncache = has_command = GF_FALSE;
url_arg = out_arg = the_cfg = rti_file = views = mosaic = NULL;
nb_times = 0;
times[0] = 0;
/*first locate config file if specified*/
for (i=1; i<(u32) argc; i++) {
char *arg = argv[i];
if (!strcmp(arg, "-c") || !strcmp(arg, "-cfg")) {
the_cfg = argv[i+1];
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-mem-track") || !strcmp(arg, "-mem-track-stack")) {
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
mem_track = !strcmp(arg, "-mem-track-stack") ? GF_MemTrackerBackTrace : GF_MemTrackerSimple;
#else
fprintf(stderr, "WARNING - GPAC not compiled with Memory Tracker - ignoring \"%s\"\n", arg);
#endif
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-gui")) {
gui_mode = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-guid")) {
gui_mode = 2;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-h") || !strcmp(arg, "-help")) {
PrintUsage();
return 0;
}
}
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
gf_sys_init(mem_track);
#else
gf_sys_init(GF_MemTrackerNone);
#endif
gf_sys_set_args(argc, (const char **) argv);
cfg_file = gf_cfg_init(the_cfg, NULL);
if (!cfg_file) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Configuration File not found\n");
return 1;
}
/*if logs are specified, use them*/
if (gf_log_set_tools_levels( gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "Logs") ) != GF_OK) {
return 1;
}
if( gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "Logs") != NULL ) {
logs_set = GF_TRUE;
}
if (!gui_mode) {
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "ForceGUI");
if (str && !strcmp(str, "yes")) gui_mode = 1;
}
for (i=1; i<(u32) argc; i++) {
char *arg = argv[i];
if (!strcmp(arg, "-rti")) {
rti_file = argv[i+1];
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-rtix")) {
rti_file = argv[i+1];
i++;
use_rtix = GF_TRUE;
} else if (!stricmp(arg, "-size")) {
/*usage of %ud breaks sscanf on MSVC*/
if (sscanf(argv[i+1], "%dx%d", &forced_width, &forced_height) != 2) {
forced_width = forced_height = 0;
}
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-quiet")) {
be_quiet = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-strict-error")) {
gf_log_set_strict_error(1);
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-log-file") || !strcmp(arg, "-lf")) {
logfile = gf_fopen(argv[i+1], "wt");
gf_log_set_callback(logfile, on_gpac_log);
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-logs") ) {
if (gf_log_set_tools_levels(argv[i+1]) != GF_OK) {
return 1;
}
logs_set = GF_TRUE;
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-log-clock") || !strcmp(arg, "-lc")) {
log_time_start = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-log-utc") || !strcmp(arg, "-lu")) {
log_utc_time = 1;
}
#if defined(__DARWIN__) || defined(__APPLE__)
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-thread")) threading_flags = 0;
#else
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-thread")) threading_flags = GF_TERM_NO_DECODER_THREAD | GF_TERM_NO_COMPOSITOR_THREAD | GF_TERM_WINDOW_NO_THREAD;
#endif
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-cthread") || !strcmp(arg, "-no-compositor-thread")) threading_flags |= GF_TERM_NO_COMPOSITOR_THREAD;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-audio")) no_audio = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-regulation")) no_regulation = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-fs")) start_fs = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-opt")) {
set_cfg_option(argv[i+1]);
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-conf")) {
set_cfg_option(argv[i+1]);
is_cfg_only=GF_TRUE;
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-ifce")) {
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, "Network", "DefaultMCastInterface", argv[i+1]);
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-help")) {
PrintUsage();
return 1;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-noprog")) {
no_prog=1;
gf_set_progress_callback(NULL, progress_quiet);
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-no-save") || !stricmp(arg, "--no-save") /*old versions used --n-save ...*/) {
no_cfg_save=1;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-ntp-shift")) {
s32 shift = atoi(argv[i+1]);
i++;
gf_net_set_ntp_shift(shift);
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-run-for")) {
simulation_time_in_ms = atoi(argv[i+1]) * 1000;
if (!simulation_time_in_ms)
simulation_time_in_ms = 1; /*1ms*/
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-out")) {
out_arg = argv[i+1];
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-fps")) {
fps = atof(argv[i+1]);
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-avi") || !strcmp(arg, "-sha")) {
dump_mode &= 0xFFFF0000;
if (!strcmp(arg, "-sha")) dump_mode |= DUMP_SHA1;
else dump_mode |= DUMP_AVI;
if ((url_arg || (i+2<(u32)argc)) && get_time_list(argv[i+1], times, &nb_times)) {
if (!strcmp(arg, "-avi") && (nb_times!=2) ) {
fprintf(stderr, "Only one time arg found for -avi - check usage\n");
return 1;
}
i++;
}
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-rgbds")) { /*get dump in rgbds pixel format*/
dump_mode |= DUMP_RGB_DEPTH_SHAPE;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-rgbd")) { /*get dump in rgbd pixel format*/
dump_mode |= DUMP_RGB_DEPTH;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-depth")) {
dump_mode |= DUMP_DEPTH_ONLY;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-bmp")) {
dump_mode &= 0xFFFF0000;
dump_mode |= DUMP_BMP;
if ((url_arg || (i+2<(u32)argc)) && get_time_list(argv[i+1], times, &nb_times)) i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-png")) {
dump_mode &= 0xFFFF0000;
dump_mode |= DUMP_PNG;
if ((url_arg || (i+2<(u32)argc)) && get_time_list(argv[i+1], times, &nb_times)) i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-raw")) {
dump_mode &= 0xFFFF0000;
dump_mode |= DUMP_RAW;
if ((url_arg || (i+2<(u32)argc)) && get_time_list(argv[i+1], times, &nb_times)) i++;
} else if (!stricmp(arg, "-scale")) {
sscanf(argv[i+1], "%f", &scale);
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-c") || !strcmp(arg, "-cfg")) {
/* already parsed */
i++;
}
/*arguments only used in non-gui mode*/
if (!gui_mode) {
if (arg[0] != '-') {
if (url_arg) {
fprintf(stderr, "Several input URLs provided (\"%s\", \"%s\"). Check your command-line.\n", url_arg, arg);
return 1;
}
url_arg = arg;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-loop")) loop_at_end = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-bench")) bench_mode = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-vbench")) bench_mode = 2;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-sbench")) bench_mode = 3;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-addon")) enable_add_ons = GF_FALSE;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-pause")) pause_at_first = 1;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-play-from")) {
play_from = atof((const char *) argv[i+1]);
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-speed")) {
playback_speed = FLT2FIX( atof((const char *) argv[i+1]) );
if (playback_speed <= 0) playback_speed = FIX_ONE;
i++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-wnd")) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_WINDOWLESS;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no-back")) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_WINDOW_TRANSPARENT;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-align")) {
if (argv[i+1][0]=='m') align_mode = 1;
else if (argv[i+1][0]=='b') align_mode = 2;
align_mode <<= 8;
if (argv[i+1][1]=='m') align_mode |= 1;
else if (argv[i+1][1]=='r') align_mode |= 2;
i++;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-fill")) {
fill_ar = GF_TRUE;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-show")) {
visible = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-uncache")) {
do_uncache = GF_TRUE;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-exit")) auto_exit = GF_TRUE;
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-views")) {
views = argv[i+1];
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-mosaic")) {
mosaic = argv[i+1];
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-com")) {
has_command = GF_TRUE;
i++;
}
else if (!stricmp(arg, "-service")) {
initial_service_id = atoi(argv[i+1]);
i++;
}
}
}
if (is_cfg_only) {
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
fprintf(stderr, "GPAC Config updated\n");
return 0;
}
if (do_uncache) {
const char *cache_dir = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "CacheDirectory");
do_flatten_cache(cache_dir);
fprintf(stderr, "GPAC Cache dir %s flattened\n", cache_dir);
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
return 0;
}
if (dump_mode && !url_arg ) {
FILE *test;
url_arg = (char *)gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "StartupFile");
test = url_arg ? gf_fopen(url_arg, "rt") : NULL;
if (!test) url_arg = NULL;
else gf_fclose(test);
if (!url_arg) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing argument for dump\n");
PrintUsage();
if (logfile) gf_fclose(logfile);
return 1;
}
}
if (!gui_mode && !url_arg && (gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "StartupFile") != NULL)) {
gui_mode=1;
}
#ifdef WIN32
if (gui_mode==1) {
const char *opt;
TCHAR buffer[1024];
DWORD res = GetCurrentDirectory(1024, buffer);
buffer[res] = 0;
opt = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "ModulesDirectory");
if (strstr(opt, buffer)) {
gui_mode=1;
} else {
gui_mode=2;
}
}
#endif
if (gui_mode==1) {
hide_shell(1);
}
if (gui_mode) {
no_prog=1;
gf_set_progress_callback(NULL, progress_quiet);
}
if (!url_arg && simulation_time_in_ms)
simulation_time_in_ms += gf_sys_clock();
#if defined(__DARWIN__) || defined(__APPLE__)
carbon_init();
#endif
if (dump_mode) rti_file = NULL;
if (!logs_set) {
gf_log_set_tool_level(GF_LOG_ALL, GF_LOG_WARNING);
}
if (rti_file || logfile || log_utc_time || log_time_start)
gf_log_set_callback(NULL, on_gpac_log);
if (rti_file) init_rti_logs(rti_file, url_arg, use_rtix);
{
GF_SystemRTInfo rti;
if (gf_sys_get_rti(0, &rti, 0))
fprintf(stderr, "System info: %d MB RAM - %d cores\n", (u32) (rti.physical_memory/1024/1024), rti.nb_cores);
}
/*setup dumping options*/
if (dump_mode) {
user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_NO_DECODER_THREAD | GF_TERM_NO_COMPOSITOR_THREAD | GF_TERM_NO_REGULATION;
if (!visible)
user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_INIT_HIDE;
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, "Audio", "DriverName", "Raw Audio Output");
no_cfg_save=GF_TRUE;
} else {
init_w = forced_width;
init_h = forced_height;
}
user.modules = gf_modules_new(NULL, cfg_file);
if (user.modules) i = gf_modules_get_count(user.modules);
if (!i || !user.modules) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: no modules found - exiting\n");
if (user.modules) gf_modules_del(user.modules);
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
gf_sys_close();
if (logfile) gf_fclose(logfile);
return 1;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Modules Found : %d \n", i);
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "GPACVersion");
if (!str || strcmp(str, GPAC_FULL_VERSION)) {
gf_cfg_del_section(cfg_file, "PluginsCache");
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, "General", "GPACVersion", GPAC_FULL_VERSION);
}
user.config = cfg_file;
user.EventProc = GPAC_EventProc;
/*dummy in this case (global vars) but MUST be non-NULL*/
user.opaque = user.modules;
if (threading_flags) user.init_flags |= threading_flags;
if (no_audio) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_NO_AUDIO;
if (no_regulation) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_NO_REGULATION;
if (threading_flags & (GF_TERM_NO_DECODER_THREAD|GF_TERM_NO_COMPOSITOR_THREAD) ) term_step = GF_TRUE;
if (dump_mode) user.init_flags |= GF_TERM_USE_AUDIO_HW_CLOCK;
if (bench_mode) {
gf_cfg_discard_changes(user.config);
auto_exit = GF_TRUE;
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Audio", "DriverName", "Raw Audio Output");
if (bench_mode!=2) {
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Video", "DriverName", "Raw Video Output");
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "RAWVideo", "RawOutput", "null");
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Compositor", "OpenGLMode", "disable");
} else {
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Video", "DisableVSync", "yes");
}
}
{
char dim[50];
sprintf(dim, "%d", forced_width);
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Compositor", "DefaultWidth", forced_width ? dim : NULL);
sprintf(dim, "%d", forced_height);
gf_cfg_set_key(user.config, "Compositor", "DefaultHeight", forced_height ? dim : NULL);
}
fprintf(stderr, "Loading GPAC Terminal\n");
i = gf_sys_clock();
term = gf_term_new(&user);
if (!term) {
fprintf(stderr, "\nInit error - check you have at least one video out and one rasterizer...\nFound modules:\n");
list_modules(user.modules);
gf_modules_del(user.modules);
gf_cfg_discard_changes(cfg_file);
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
gf_sys_close();
if (logfile) gf_fclose(logfile);
return 1;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Terminal Loaded in %d ms\n", gf_sys_clock()-i);
if (bench_mode) {
display_rti = 2;
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_VIDEO_BENCH, (bench_mode==3) ? 2 : 1);
if (bench_mode==1) bench_mode=2;
}
if (dump_mode) {
if (fill_ar) gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_FILL_SCREEN);
} else {
/*check video output*/
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "Video", "DriverName");
if (!bench_mode && !strcmp(str, "Raw Video Output")) fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: using raw output video (memory only) - no display used\n");
/*check audio output*/
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "Audio", "DriverName");
if (!str || !strcmp(str, "No Audio Output Available")) fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: no audio output available - make sure no other program is locking the sound card\n");
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "NoMIMETypeFetch");
no_mime_check = (str && !stricmp(str, "yes")) ? 1 : 0;
}
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "HTTPProxy", "Enabled");
if (str && !strcmp(str, "yes")) {
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "HTTPProxy", "Name");
if (str) fprintf(stderr, "HTTP Proxy %s enabled\n", str);
}
if (rti_file) {
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "RTIRefreshPeriod");
if (str) {
rti_update_time_ms = atoi(str);
} else {
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, "General", "RTIRefreshPeriod", "200");
}
UpdateRTInfo("At GPAC load time\n");
}
Run = 1;
if (dump_mode) {
if (!nb_times) {
times[0] = 0;
nb_times++;
}
ret_val = dump_file(url_arg, out_arg, dump_mode, fps, forced_width, forced_height, scale, times, nb_times);
Run = 0;
}
else if (views) {
}
/*connect if requested*/
else if (!gui_mode && url_arg) {
char *ext;
if (strlen(url_arg) >= sizeof(the_url)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Input url %s is too long, truncating to %d chars.\n", url_arg, (int)(sizeof(the_url) - 1));
strncpy(the_url, url_arg, sizeof(the_url)-1);
the_url[sizeof(the_url) - 1] = 0;
}
else {
strcpy(the_url, url_arg);
}
ext = strrchr(the_url, '.');
if (ext && (!stricmp(ext, ".m3u") || !stricmp(ext, ".pls"))) {
GF_Err e = GF_OK;
fprintf(stderr, "Opening Playlist %s\n", the_url);
strcpy(pl_path, the_url);
/*this is not clean, we need to have a plugin handle playlist for ourselves*/
if (!strncmp("http:", the_url, 5)) {
GF_DownloadSession *sess = gf_dm_sess_new(term->downloader, the_url, GF_NETIO_SESSION_NOT_THREADED, NULL, NULL, &e);
if (sess) {
e = gf_dm_sess_process(sess);
if (!e) {
strncpy(the_url, gf_dm_sess_get_cache_name(sess), sizeof(the_url) - 1);
the_url[sizeof(the_cfg) - 1] = 0;
}
gf_dm_sess_del(sess);
}
}
playlist = e ? NULL : gf_fopen(the_url, "rt");
readonly_playlist = 1;
if (playlist) {
request_next_playlist_item = GF_TRUE;
} else {
if (e)
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open playlist %s: %s\n", the_url, gf_error_to_string(e) );
fprintf(stderr, "Hit 'h' for help\n\n");
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Opening URL %s\n", the_url);
if (pause_at_first) fprintf(stderr, "[Status: Paused]\n");
gf_term_connect_from_time(term, the_url, (u64) (play_from*1000), pause_at_first);
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Hit 'h' for help\n\n");
str = gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "StartupFile");
if (str) {
strncpy(the_url, "MP4Client "GPAC_FULL_VERSION , sizeof(the_url)-1);
the_url[sizeof(the_url) - 1] = 0;
gf_term_connect(term, str);
startup_file = 1;
is_connected = 1;
}
}
if (gui_mode==2) gui_mode=0;
if (start_fs) gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_FULLSCREEN, 1);
if (views) {
char szTemp[4046];
sprintf(szTemp, "views://%s", views);
gf_term_connect(term, szTemp);
}
if (mosaic) {
char szTemp[4046];
sprintf(szTemp, "mosaic://%s", mosaic);
gf_term_connect(term, szTemp);
}
if (bench_mode) {
rti_update_time_ms = 500;
bench_mode_start = gf_sys_clock();
}
while (Run) {
/*we don't want getchar to block*/
if ((gui_mode==1) || !gf_prompt_has_input()) {
if (reload) {
reload = 0;
gf_term_disconnect(term);
gf_term_connect(term, startup_file ? gf_cfg_get_key(cfg_file, "General", "StartupFile") : the_url);
}
if (restart && gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_IS_OVER)) {
restart = 0;
gf_term_play_from_time(term, 0, 0);
}
if (request_next_playlist_item) {
c = '\n';
request_next_playlist_item = 0;
goto force_input;
}
if (has_command && is_connected) {
has_command = GF_FALSE;
for (i=0; i<(u32)argc; i++) {
if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-com")) {
gf_term_scene_update(term, NULL, argv[i+1]);
i++;
}
}
}
if (initial_service_id && is_connected) {
GF_ObjectManager *root_od = gf_term_get_root_object(term);
if (root_od) {
gf_term_select_service(term, root_od, initial_service_id);
initial_service_id = 0;
}
}
if (!use_rtix || display_rti) UpdateRTInfo(NULL);
if (term_step) {
gf_term_process_step(term);
} else {
gf_sleep(rti_update_time_ms);
}
if (auto_exit && eos_seen && gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_IS_OVER)) {
Run = GF_FALSE;
}
/*sim time*/
if (simulation_time_in_ms
&& ( (gf_term_get_elapsed_time_in_ms(term)>simulation_time_in_ms) || (!url_arg && gf_sys_clock()>simulation_time_in_ms))
) {
Run = GF_FALSE;
}
continue;
}
c = gf_prompt_get_char();
force_input:
switch (c) {
case 'q':
{
GF_Event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(GF_Event));
evt.type = GF_EVENT_QUIT;
gf_term_send_event(term, &evt);
}
break;
case 'X':
exit(0);
break;
case 'Q':
break;
case 'o':
startup_file = 0;
gf_term_disconnect(term);
fprintf(stderr, "Enter the absolute URL\n");
if (1 > scanf("%s", the_url)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read absolute URL, aborting\n");
break;
}
if (rti_file) init_rti_logs(rti_file, the_url, use_rtix);
gf_term_connect(term, the_url);
break;
case 'O':
gf_term_disconnect(term);
fprintf(stderr, "Enter the absolute URL to the playlist\n");
if (1 > scanf("%s", the_url)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read the absolute URL, aborting.\n");
break;
}
playlist = gf_fopen(the_url, "rt");
if (playlist) {
if (1 > fscanf(playlist, "%s", the_url)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read any URL from playlist, aborting.\n");
gf_fclose( playlist);
break;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Opening URL %s\n", the_url);
gf_term_connect(term, the_url);
}
break;
case '\n':
case 'N':
if (playlist) {
int res;
gf_term_disconnect(term);
res = fscanf(playlist, "%s", the_url);
if ((res == EOF) && loop_at_end) {
fseek(playlist, 0, SEEK_SET);
res = fscanf(playlist, "%s", the_url);
}
if (res == EOF) {
fprintf(stderr, "No more items - exiting\n");
Run = 0;
} else if (the_url[0] == '#') {
request_next_playlist_item = GF_TRUE;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Opening URL %s\n", the_url);
gf_term_connect_with_path(term, the_url, pl_path);
}
}
break;
case 'P':
if (playlist) {
u32 count;
gf_term_disconnect(term);
if (1 > scanf("%u", &count)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read number, aborting.\n");
break;
}
while (count) {
if (fscanf(playlist, "%s", the_url)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to read line, aborting\n");
break;
}
count--;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Opening URL %s\n", the_url);
gf_term_connect(term, the_url);
}
break;
case 'r':
if (is_connected)
reload = 1;
break;
case 'D':
if (is_connected) gf_term_disconnect(term);
break;
case 'p':
if (is_connected) {
Bool is_pause = gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_PLAY_STATE);
fprintf(stderr, "[Status: %s]\n", is_pause ? "Playing" : "Paused");
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_PLAY_STATE, is_pause ? GF_STATE_PLAYING : GF_STATE_PAUSED);
}
break;
case 's':
if (is_connected) {
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_PLAY_STATE, GF_STATE_STEP_PAUSE);
fprintf(stderr, "Step time: ");
PrintTime(gf_term_get_time_in_ms(term));
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
break;
case 'z':
case 'T':
if (!CanSeek || (Duration<=2000)) {
fprintf(stderr, "scene not seekable\n");
} else {
Double res;
s32 seekTo;
fprintf(stderr, "Duration: ");
PrintTime(Duration);
res = gf_term_get_time_in_ms(term);
if (c=='z') {
res *= 100;
res /= (s64)Duration;
fprintf(stderr, " (current %.2f %%)\nEnter Seek percentage:\n", res);
if (scanf("%d", &seekTo) == 1) {
if (seekTo > 100) seekTo = 100;
res = (Double)(s64)Duration;
res /= 100;
res *= seekTo;
gf_term_play_from_time(term, (u64) (s64) res, 0);
}
} else {
u32 r, h, m, s;
fprintf(stderr, " - Current Time: ");
PrintTime((u64) res);
fprintf(stderr, "\nEnter seek time (Format: s, m:s or h:m:s):\n");
h = m = s = 0;
r =scanf("%d:%d:%d", &h, &m, &s);
if (r==2) {
s = m;
m = h;
h = 0;
}
else if (r==1) {
s = h;
m = h = 0;
}
if (r && (r<=3)) {
u64 time = h*3600 + m*60 + s;
gf_term_play_from_time(term, time*1000, 0);
}
}
}
break;
case 't':
{
if (is_connected) {
fprintf(stderr, "Current Time: ");
PrintTime(gf_term_get_time_in_ms(term));
fprintf(stderr, " - Duration: ");
PrintTime(Duration);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
}
break;
case 'w':
if (is_connected) PrintWorldInfo(term);
break;
case 'v':
if (is_connected) PrintODList(term, NULL, 0, 0, "Root");
break;
case 'i':
if (is_connected) {
u32 ID;
fprintf(stderr, "Enter OD ID (0 for main OD): ");
fflush(stderr);
if (scanf("%ud", &ID) == 1) {
ViewOD(term, ID, (u32)-1, NULL);
} else {
char str_url[GF_MAX_PATH];
if (scanf("%s", str_url) == 1)
ViewOD(term, 0, (u32)-1, str_url);
}
}
break;
case 'j':
if (is_connected) {
u32 num;
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter OD number (0 for main OD): ");
fflush(stderr);
} while( 1 > scanf("%ud", &num));
ViewOD(term, (u32)-1, num, NULL);
}
break;
case 'b':
if (is_connected) ViewODs(term, 1);
break;
case 'm':
if (is_connected) ViewODs(term, 0);
break;
case 'l':
list_modules(user.modules);
break;
case 'n':
if (is_connected) set_navigation();
break;
case 'x':
if (is_connected) gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_NAVIGATION_TYPE, 0);
break;
case 'd':
if (is_connected) {
GF_ObjectManager *odm = NULL;
char radname[GF_MAX_PATH], *sExt;
GF_Err e;
u32 i, count, odid;
Bool xml_dump, std_out;
radname[0] = 0;
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter Inline OD ID if any or 0 : ");
fflush(stderr);
} while( 1 > scanf("%ud", &odid));
if (odid) {
GF_ObjectManager *root_odm = gf_term_get_root_object(term);
if (!root_odm) break;
count = gf_term_get_object_count(term, root_odm);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_MediaInfo info;
odm = gf_term_get_object(term, root_odm, i);
if (gf_term_get_object_info(term, odm, &info) == GF_OK) {
if (info.od->objectDescriptorID==odid) break;
}
odm = NULL;
}
}
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter file radical name (+\'.x\' for XML dumping) - \"std\" for stderr: ");
fflush(stderr);
} while( 1 > scanf("%s", radname));
sExt = strrchr(radname, '.');
xml_dump = 0;
if (sExt) {
if (!stricmp(sExt, ".x")) xml_dump = 1;
sExt[0] = 0;
}
std_out = strnicmp(radname, "std", 3) ? 0 : 1;
e = gf_term_dump_scene(term, std_out ? NULL : radname, NULL, xml_dump, 0, odm);
fprintf(stderr, "Dump done (%s)\n", gf_error_to_string(e));
}
break;
case 'c':
PrintGPACConfig();
break;
case '3':
{
Bool use_3d = !gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_USE_OPENGL);
if (gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_USE_OPENGL, use_3d)==GF_OK) {
fprintf(stderr, "Using %s for 2D drawing\n", use_3d ? "OpenGL" : "2D rasterizer");
}
}
break;
case 'k':
{
Bool opt = gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_STRESS_MODE);
opt = !opt;
fprintf(stderr, "Turning stress mode %s\n", opt ? "on" : "off");
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_STRESS_MODE, opt);
}
break;
case '4':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_4_3);
break;
case '5':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_16_9);
break;
case '6':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_FILL_SCREEN);
break;
case '7':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_ASPECT_RATIO, GF_ASPECT_RATIO_KEEP);
break;
case 'C':
switch (gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE)) {
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISABLED:
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE, GF_MEDIA_CACHE_ENABLED);
break;
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_ENABLED:
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE, GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISABLED);
break;
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_RUNNING:
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache is running - please stop it first\n");
continue;
}
switch (gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE)) {
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_ENABLED:
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache Enabled\n");
break;
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISABLED:
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache Disabled\n");
break;
case GF_MEDIA_CACHE_RUNNING:
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache Running\n");
break;
}
break;
case 'S':
case 'A':
if (gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE)==GF_MEDIA_CACHE_RUNNING) {
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_MEDIA_CACHE, (c=='S') ? GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISABLED : GF_MEDIA_CACHE_DISCARD);
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache stopped\n");
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Streaming Cache not running\n");
}
break;
case 'R':
display_rti = !display_rti;
ResetCaption();
break;
case 'F':
if (display_rti) display_rti = 0;
else display_rti = 2;
ResetCaption();
break;
case 'u':
{
GF_Err e;
char szCom[8192];
fprintf(stderr, "Enter command to send:\n");
fflush(stdin);
szCom[0] = 0;
if (1 > scanf("%[^\t\n]", szCom)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read command to send, aborting.\n");
break;
}
e = gf_term_scene_update(term, NULL, szCom);
if (e) fprintf(stderr, "Processing command failed: %s\n", gf_error_to_string(e));
}
break;
case 'e':
{
GF_Err e;
char jsCode[8192];
fprintf(stderr, "Enter JavaScript code to evaluate:\n");
fflush(stdin);
jsCode[0] = 0;
if (1 > scanf("%[^\t\n]", jsCode)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read code to evaluate, aborting.\n");
break;
}
e = gf_term_scene_update(term, "application/ecmascript", jsCode);
if (e) fprintf(stderr, "Processing JS code failed: %s\n", gf_error_to_string(e));
}
break;
case 'L':
{
char szLog[1024], *cur_logs;
cur_logs = gf_log_get_tools_levels();
fprintf(stderr, "Enter new log level (current tools %s):\n", cur_logs);
gf_free(cur_logs);
if (scanf("%s", szLog) < 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read new log level, aborting.\n");
break;
}
gf_log_modify_tools_levels(szLog);
}
break;
case 'g':
{
GF_SystemRTInfo rti;
gf_sys_get_rti(rti_update_time_ms, &rti, 0);
fprintf(stderr, "GPAC allocated memory "LLD"\n", rti.gpac_memory);
}
break;
case 'M':
{
u32 size;
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter new video cache memory in kBytes (current %ud):\n", gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_VIDEO_CACHE_SIZE));
} while (1 > scanf("%ud", &size));
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_VIDEO_CACHE_SIZE, size);
}
break;
case 'H':
{
u32 http_bitrate = gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_HTTP_MAX_RATE);
do {
fprintf(stderr, "Enter new http bitrate in bps (0 for none) - current limit: %d\n", http_bitrate);
} while (1 > scanf("%ud", &http_bitrate));
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_HTTP_MAX_RATE, http_bitrate);
}
break;
case 'E':
gf_term_set_option(term, GF_OPT_RELOAD_CONFIG, 1);
break;
case 'B':
switch_bench(!bench_mode);
break;
case 'Y':
{
char szOpt[8192];
fprintf(stderr, "Enter option to set (Section:Name=Value):\n");
fflush(stdin);
szOpt[0] = 0;
if (1 > scanf("%[^\t\n]", szOpt)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read option\n");
break;
}
set_cfg_option(szOpt);
}
break;
/*extract to PNG*/
case 'Z':
{
char szFileName[100];
u32 nb_pass, nb_views, offscreen_view = 0;
GF_VideoSurface fb;
GF_Err e;
nb_pass = 1;
nb_views = gf_term_get_option(term, GF_OPT_NUM_STEREO_VIEWS);
if (nb_views>1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Auto-stereo mode detected - type number of view to dump (0 is main output, 1 to %d offscreen view, %d for all offscreen, %d for all offscreen and main)\n", nb_views, nb_views+1, nb_views+2);
if (scanf("%d", &offscreen_view) != 1) {
offscreen_view = 0;
}
if (offscreen_view==nb_views+1) {
offscreen_view = 1;
nb_pass = nb_views;
}
else if (offscreen_view==nb_views+2) {
offscreen_view = 0;
nb_pass = nb_views+1;
}
}
while (nb_pass) {
nb_pass--;
if (offscreen_view) {
sprintf(szFileName, "view%d_dump.png", offscreen_view);
e = gf_term_get_offscreen_buffer(term, &fb, offscreen_view-1, 0);
} else {
sprintf(szFileName, "gpac_video_dump_"LLU".png", gf_net_get_utc() );
e = gf_term_get_screen_buffer(term, &fb);
}
offscreen_view++;
if (e) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error dumping screen buffer %s\n", gf_error_to_string(e) );
nb_pass = 0;
} else {
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_AV_PARSERS
u32 dst_size = fb.width*fb.height*4;
char *dst = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char)*dst_size);
e = gf_img_png_enc(fb.video_buffer, fb.width, fb.height, fb.pitch_y, fb.pixel_format, dst, &dst_size);
if (e) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error encoding PNG %s\n", gf_error_to_string(e) );
nb_pass = 0;
} else {
FILE *png = gf_fopen(szFileName, "wb");
if (!png) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error writing file %s\n", szFileName);
nb_pass = 0;
} else {
gf_fwrite(dst, dst_size, 1, png);
gf_fclose(png);
fprintf(stderr, "Dump to %s\n", szFileName);
}
}
if (dst) gf_free(dst);
gf_term_release_screen_buffer(term, &fb);
#endif //GPAC_DISABLE_AV_PARSERS
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "Done: %s\n", szFileName);
}
break;
case 'G':
{
GF_ObjectManager *root_od, *odm;
u32 index;
char szOpt[8192];
fprintf(stderr, "Enter 0-based index of object to select or service ID:\n");
fflush(stdin);
szOpt[0] = 0;
if (1 > scanf("%[^\t\n]", szOpt)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot read OD ID\n");
break;
}
index = atoi(szOpt);
odm = NULL;
root_od = gf_term_get_root_object(term);
if (root_od) {
if ( gf_term_find_service(term, root_od, index)) {
gf_term_select_service(term, root_od, index);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot find service %d - trying with object index\n", index);
odm = gf_term_get_object(term, root_od, index);
if (odm) {
gf_term_select_object(term, odm);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot find object at index %d\n", index);
}
}
}
}
break;
case 'h':
PrintHelp();
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (bench_mode) {
PrintAVInfo(GF_TRUE);
}
/*FIXME: we have an issue in cleaning up after playing in bench mode and run-for 0 (buildbot tests). We for now disable error checks after run-for is done*/
if (simulation_time_in_ms) {
gf_log_set_strict_error(0);
}
i = gf_sys_clock();
gf_term_disconnect(term);
if (rti_file) UpdateRTInfo("Disconnected\n");
fprintf(stderr, "Deleting terminal... ");
if (playlist) gf_fclose(playlist);
#if defined(__DARWIN__) || defined(__APPLE__)
carbon_uninit();
#endif
gf_term_del(term);
fprintf(stderr, "done (in %d ms) - ran for %d ms\n", gf_sys_clock() - i, gf_sys_clock());
fprintf(stderr, "GPAC cleanup ...\n");
gf_modules_del(user.modules);
if (no_cfg_save)
gf_cfg_discard_changes(cfg_file);
gf_cfg_del(cfg_file);
gf_sys_close();
if (rti_logs) gf_fclose(rti_logs);
if (logfile) gf_fclose(logfile);
if (gui_mode) {
hide_shell(2);
}
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
if (mem_track && (gf_memory_size() || gf_file_handles_count() )) {
gf_log_set_tool_level(GF_LOG_MEMORY, GF_LOG_INFO);
gf_memory_print();
return 2;
}
#endif
return ret_val;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: In GPAC 0.7.1 and earlier, gf_text_get_utf8_line in media_tools/text_import.c in libgpac_static.a allows an out-of-bounds write because of missing szLineConv bounds checking.
Commit Message: add some boundary checks on gf_text_get_utf8_line (#1188)
|
Medium
| 169,787
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FrameSelection::SelectAll(SetSelectionBy set_selection_by) {
if (isHTMLSelectElement(GetDocument().FocusedElement())) {
HTMLSelectElement* select_element =
toHTMLSelectElement(GetDocument().FocusedElement());
if (select_element->CanSelectAll()) {
select_element->SelectAll();
return;
}
}
Node* root = nullptr;
Node* select_start_target = nullptr;
if (set_selection_by == SetSelectionBy::kUser && IsHidden()) {
root = GetDocument().documentElement();
select_start_target = GetDocument().body();
} else if (ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().IsContentEditable()) {
root = HighestEditableRoot(ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Start());
if (Node* shadow_root = NonBoundaryShadowTreeRootNode(
ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Start()))
select_start_target = shadow_root->OwnerShadowHost();
else
select_start_target = root;
} else {
root = NonBoundaryShadowTreeRootNode(
ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Start());
if (root) {
select_start_target = root->OwnerShadowHost();
} else {
root = GetDocument().documentElement();
select_start_target = GetDocument().body();
}
}
if (!root || EditingIgnoresContent(*root))
return;
if (select_start_target) {
const Document& expected_document = GetDocument();
if (select_start_target->DispatchEvent(Event::CreateCancelableBubble(
EventTypeNames::selectstart)) != DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled)
return;
if (!IsAvailable()) {
return;
}
if (!root->isConnected() || expected_document != root->GetDocument())
return;
}
SetSelection(SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SelectAllChildren(*root)
.SetIsHandleVisible(IsHandleVisible())
.Build());
SelectFrameElementInParentIfFullySelected();
NotifyTextControlOfSelectionChange(SetSelectionBy::kUser);
if (IsHandleVisible()) {
ContextMenuAllowedScope scope;
frame_->GetEventHandler().ShowNonLocatedContextMenu(nullptr,
kMenuSourceTouch);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The convolution implementation in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not properly constrain row lengths, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted graphics data.
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
Low
| 171,759
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ChromeURLRequestContext::ChromeURLRequestContext(
ContextType type,
chrome_browser_net::LoadTimeStats* load_time_stats)
: load_time_stats_(load_time_stats) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
if (load_time_stats_)
load_time_stats_->RegisterURLRequestContext(this, type);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote servers to execute arbitrary code via crafted response traffic after a URL request.
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,250
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int process_numeric_entity(const char **buf, unsigned *code_point)
{
long code_l;
int hexadecimal = (**buf == 'x' || **buf == 'X'); /* TODO: XML apparently disallows "X" */
char *endptr;
if (hexadecimal && (**buf != '\0'))
(*buf)++;
/* strtol allows whitespace and other stuff in the beginning
* we're not interested */
if ((hexadecimal && !isxdigit(**buf)) ||
(!hexadecimal && !isdigit(**buf))) {
return FAILURE;
}
code_l = strtol(*buf, &endptr, hexadecimal ? 16 : 10);
/* we're guaranteed there were valid digits, so *endptr > buf */
*buf = endptr;
if (**buf != ';')
return FAILURE;
/* many more are invalid, but that depends on whether it's HTML
* (and which version) or XML. */
if (code_l > 0x10FFFFL)
return FAILURE;
if (code_point != NULL)
*code_point = (unsigned)code_l;
return SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
|
Low
| 167,177
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void GetLoadTimes(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
WebLocalFrame* frame = WebLocalFrame::frameForCurrentContext();
if (frame) {
WebDataSource* data_source = frame->dataSource();
if (data_source) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(data_source);
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> load_times = v8::Object::New(isolate);
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "requestTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->request_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "startLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->start_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "commitLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->commit_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "finishDocumentLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(
isolate,
document_state->finish_document_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "finishLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->finish_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "firstPaintTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->first_paint_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "firstPaintAfterLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(
isolate,
document_state->first_paint_after_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "navigationType"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate, GetNavigationType(data_source->navigationType())));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasFetchedViaSpdy"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, document_state->was_fetched_via_spdy()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasNpnNegotiated"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, document_state->was_npn_negotiated()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "npnNegotiatedProtocol"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate, document_state->npn_negotiated_protocol().c_str()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasAlternateProtocolAvailable"),
v8::Boolean::New(
isolate, document_state->was_alternate_protocol_available()));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "connectionInfo"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate,
net::HttpResponseInfo::ConnectionInfoToString(
document_state->connection_info()).c_str()));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(load_times);
return;
}
}
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the GetLoadTimes function in renderer/loadtimes_extension_bindings.cc in the Extensions implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code that modifies a pointer used for reporting loadTimes data.
Commit Message: Cache all chrome.loadTimes info before passing them to setters.
The setters can invalidate the pointers frame, data_source and document_state.
BUG=549251
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1422753007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#357201}
|
Low
| 171,766
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsLoading() const {
return frame_tree_.IsLoading() &&
!(ShowingInterstitialPage() &&
GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page()->pause_throbber());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
|
Medium
| 172,331
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
{
long alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2;
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF))
return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
return alg2;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The ssl_get_algorithm2 function in ssl/s3_lib.c in OpenSSL before 1.0.2 obtains a certain version number from an incorrect data structure, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via crafted traffic from a TLS 1.2 client.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,567
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void update_rate_histogram(struct rate_hist *hist,
const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *cfg,
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
int i;
int64_t then = 0;
int64_t avg_bitrate = 0;
int64_t sum_sz = 0;
const int64_t now = pkt->data.frame.pts * 1000 *
(uint64_t)cfg->g_timebase.num /
(uint64_t)cfg->g_timebase.den;
int idx = hist->frames++ % hist->samples;
hist->pts[idx] = now;
hist->sz[idx] = (int)pkt->data.frame.sz;
if (now < cfg->rc_buf_initial_sz)
return;
then = now;
/* Sum the size over the past rc_buf_sz ms */
for (i = hist->frames; i > 0 && hist->frames - i < hist->samples; i--) {
const int i_idx = (i - 1) % hist->samples;
then = hist->pts[i_idx];
if (now - then > cfg->rc_buf_sz)
break;
sum_sz += hist->sz[i_idx];
}
if (now == then)
return;
avg_bitrate = sum_sz * 8 * 1000 / (now - then);
idx = (int)(avg_bitrate * (RATE_BINS / 2) / (cfg->rc_target_bitrate * 1000));
if (idx < 0)
idx = 0;
if (idx > RATE_BINS - 1)
idx = RATE_BINS - 1;
if (hist->bucket[idx].low > avg_bitrate)
hist->bucket[idx].low = (int)avg_bitrate;
if (hist->bucket[idx].high < avg_bitrate)
hist->bucket[idx].high = (int)avg_bitrate;
hist->bucket[idx].count++;
hist->total++;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,500
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> PersistentHistogramAllocator::GetHistogram(
Reference ref) {
PersistentHistogramData* data =
memory_allocator_->GetAsObject<PersistentHistogramData>(ref);
const size_t length = memory_allocator_->GetAllocSize(ref);
if (!data || data->name[0] == '\0' ||
reinterpret_cast<char*>(data)[length - 1] != '\0' ||
data->samples_metadata.id == 0 || data->logged_metadata.id == 0 ||
(data->logged_metadata.id != data->samples_metadata.id &&
data->logged_metadata.id != data->samples_metadata.id + 1) ||
HashMetricName(data->name) != data->samples_metadata.id) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_INVALID_METADATA);
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
return CreateHistogram(data);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 does not properly maintain own properties, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via crafted JavaScript code that triggers an incorrect cast, related to extensions/renderer/v8_helpers.h and gin/converter.h.
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
|
Medium
| 172,134
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MaybeCreateIBus() {
if (ibus_) {
return;
}
ibus_init();
ibus_ = ibus_bus_new();
if (!ibus_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ibus_bus_new() failed";
return;
}
ConnectIBusSignals();
ibus_bus_set_watch_dbus_signal(ibus_, TRUE);
ibus_bus_set_watch_ibus_signal(ibus_, TRUE);
if (ibus_bus_is_connected(ibus_)) {
LOG(INFO) << "IBus connection is ready.";
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,541
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::getParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, void *params, size_t /* size */) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetParameter(mHandle, index, params);
OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE extIndex = (OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)index;
if (err != OMX_ErrorNoMore) {
CLOG_IF_ERROR(getParameter, err, "%s(%#x)", asString(extIndex), index);
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
|
Medium
| 174,135
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int tcp_v4_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_in *usin = (struct sockaddr_in *)uaddr;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
__be16 orig_sport, orig_dport;
__be32 daddr, nexthop;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
int err;
if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin_family != AF_INET)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
nexthop = daddr = usin->sin_addr.s_addr;
if (inet->opt && inet->opt->srr) {
if (!daddr)
return -EINVAL;
nexthop = inet->opt->faddr;
}
orig_sport = inet->inet_sport;
orig_dport = usin->sin_port;
rt = ip_route_connect(&fl4, nexthop, inet->inet_saddr,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), sk->sk_bound_dev_if,
IPPROTO_TCP,
orig_sport, orig_dport, sk, true);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
if (err == -ENETUNREACH)
IP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
return err;
}
if (rt->rt_flags & (RTCF_MULTICAST | RTCF_BROADCAST)) {
ip_rt_put(rt);
return -ENETUNREACH;
}
if (!inet->opt || !inet->opt->srr)
daddr = rt->rt_dst;
if (!inet->inet_saddr)
inet->inet_saddr = rt->rt_src;
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = inet->inet_saddr;
if (tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp && inet->inet_daddr != daddr) {
/* Reset inherited state */
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent = 0;
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = 0;
tp->write_seq = 0;
}
if (tcp_death_row.sysctl_tw_recycle &&
!tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp && rt->rt_dst == daddr) {
struct inet_peer *peer = rt_get_peer(rt);
/*
* VJ's idea. We save last timestamp seen from
* the destination in peer table, when entering state
* TIME-WAIT * and initialize rx_opt.ts_recent from it,
* when trying new connection.
*/
if (peer) {
inet_peer_refcheck(peer);
if ((u32)get_seconds() - peer->tcp_ts_stamp <= TCP_PAWS_MSL) {
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = peer->tcp_ts_stamp;
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent = peer->tcp_ts;
}
}
}
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin_port;
inet->inet_daddr = daddr;
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (inet->opt)
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = inet->opt->optlen;
tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
/* Socket identity is still unknown (sport may be zero).
* However we set state to SYN-SENT and not releasing socket
* lock select source port, enter ourselves into the hash tables and
* complete initialization after this.
*/
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_SYN_SENT);
err = inet_hash_connect(&tcp_death_row, sk);
if (err)
goto failure;
rt = ip_route_newports(&fl4, rt, orig_sport, orig_dport,
inet->inet_sport, inet->inet_dport, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
rt = NULL;
goto failure;
}
/* OK, now commit destination to socket. */
sk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
if (!tp->write_seq)
tp->write_seq = secure_tcp_sequence_number(inet->inet_saddr,
inet->inet_daddr,
inet->inet_sport,
usin->sin_port);
inet->inet_id = tp->write_seq ^ jiffies;
err = tcp_connect(sk);
rt = NULL;
if (err)
goto failure;
return 0;
failure:
/*
* This unhashes the socket and releases the local port,
* if necessary.
*/
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE);
ip_rt_put(rt);
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
inet->inet_dport = 0;
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,570
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int frame_cnt = 0;
FILE *outfile = NULL;
vpx_codec_ctx_t codec;
VpxVideoReader *reader = NULL;
const VpxVideoInfo *info = NULL;
const VpxInterface *decoder = NULL;
exec_name = argv[0];
if (argc != 3)
die("Invalid number of arguments.");
reader = vpx_video_reader_open(argv[1]);
if (!reader)
die("Failed to open %s for reading.", argv[1]);
if (!(outfile = fopen(argv[2], "wb")))
die("Failed to open %s for writing.", argv[2]);
info = vpx_video_reader_get_info(reader);
decoder = get_vpx_decoder_by_fourcc(info->codec_fourcc);
if (!decoder)
die("Unknown input codec.");
printf("Using %s\n", vpx_codec_iface_name(decoder->interface()));
if (vpx_codec_dec_init(&codec, decoder->interface(), NULL, 0))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to initialize decoder");
while (vpx_video_reader_read_frame(reader)) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
size_t frame_size = 0;
const unsigned char *frame = vpx_video_reader_get_frame(reader,
&frame_size);
if (vpx_codec_decode(&codec, frame, (unsigned int)frame_size, NULL, 0))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to decode frame");
while ((img = vpx_codec_get_frame(&codec, &iter)) != NULL) {
unsigned char digest[16];
get_image_md5(img, digest);
print_md5(outfile, digest);
fprintf(outfile, " img-%dx%d-%04d.i420\n",
img->d_w, img->d_h, ++frame_cnt);
}
}
printf("Processed %d frames.\n", frame_cnt);
if (vpx_codec_destroy(&codec))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to destroy codec.");
vpx_video_reader_close(reader);
fclose(outfile);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,474
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const Chapters::Display* Chapters::Atom::GetDisplay(int index) const
{
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
if (index >= m_displays_count)
return NULL;
return m_displays + index;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,304
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct nfs4_state *nfs4_try_open_cached(struct nfs4_opendata *opendata)
{
struct nfs4_state *state = opendata->state;
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(state->inode);
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
int open_mode = opendata->o_arg.open_flags & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE|O_EXCL);
nfs4_stateid stateid;
int ret = -EAGAIN;
for (;;) {
if (can_open_cached(state, open_mode)) {
spin_lock(&state->owner->so_lock);
if (can_open_cached(state, open_mode)) {
update_open_stateflags(state, open_mode);
spin_unlock(&state->owner->so_lock);
goto out_return_state;
}
spin_unlock(&state->owner->so_lock);
}
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(nfsi->delegation);
if (delegation == NULL ||
!can_open_delegated(delegation, open_mode)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
break;
}
/* Save the delegation */
memcpy(stateid.data, delegation->stateid.data, sizeof(stateid.data));
rcu_read_unlock();
ret = nfs_may_open(state->inode, state->owner->so_cred, open_mode);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
ret = -EAGAIN;
/* Try to update the stateid using the delegation */
if (update_open_stateid(state, NULL, &stateid, open_mode))
goto out_return_state;
}
out:
return ERR_PTR(ret);
out_return_state:
atomic_inc(&state->count);
return state;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,704
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void xgroupCommand(client *c) {
const char *help[] = {
"CREATE <key> <groupname> <id or $> -- Create a new consumer group.",
"SETID <key> <groupname> <id or $> -- Set the current group ID.",
"DELGROUP <key> <groupname> -- Remove the specified group.",
"DELCONSUMER <key> <groupname> <consumer> -- Remove the specified conusmer.",
"HELP -- Prints this help.",
NULL
};
stream *s = NULL;
sds grpname = NULL;
streamCG *cg = NULL;
char *opt = c->argv[1]->ptr; /* Subcommand name. */
/* Lookup the key now, this is common for all the subcommands but HELP. */
if (c->argc >= 4) {
robj *o = lookupKeyWriteOrReply(c,c->argv[2],shared.nokeyerr);
if (o == NULL) return;
s = o->ptr;
grpname = c->argv[3]->ptr;
/* Certain subcommands require the group to exist. */
if ((cg = streamLookupCG(s,grpname)) == NULL &&
(!strcasecmp(opt,"SETID") ||
!strcasecmp(opt,"DELCONSUMER")))
{
addReplyErrorFormat(c, "-NOGROUP No such consumer group '%s' "
"for key name '%s'",
(char*)grpname, (char*)c->argv[2]->ptr);
return;
}
}
/* Dispatch the different subcommands. */
if (!strcasecmp(opt,"CREATE") && c->argc == 5) {
streamID id;
if (!strcmp(c->argv[4]->ptr,"$")) {
id = s->last_id;
} else if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[4],&id,0) != C_OK) {
return;
}
streamCG *cg = streamCreateCG(s,grpname,sdslen(grpname),&id);
if (cg) {
addReply(c,shared.ok);
server.dirty++;
} else {
addReplySds(c,
sdsnew("-BUSYGROUP Consumer Group name already exists\r\n"));
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"SETID") && c->argc == 5) {
streamID id;
if (!strcmp(c->argv[4]->ptr,"$")) {
id = s->last_id;
} else if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[4],&id,0) != C_OK) {
return;
}
cg->last_id = id;
addReply(c,shared.ok);
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"DESTROY") && c->argc == 4) {
if (cg) {
raxRemove(s->cgroups,(unsigned char*)grpname,sdslen(grpname),NULL);
streamFreeCG(cg);
addReply(c,shared.cone);
} else {
addReply(c,shared.czero);
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"DELCONSUMER") && c->argc == 5) {
/* Delete the consumer and returns the number of pending messages
* that were yet associated with such a consumer. */
long long pending = streamDelConsumer(cg,c->argv[4]->ptr);
addReplyLongLong(c,pending);
server.dirty++;
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"HELP")) {
addReplyHelp(c, help);
} else {
addReply(c,shared.syntaxerr);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-704
Summary: Type confusion in the xgroupCommand function in t_stream.c in redis-server in Redis before 5.0 allows remote attackers to cause denial-of-service via an XGROUP command in which the key is not a stream.
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
|
Low
| 169,193
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: M_bool M_fs_path_ishidden(const char *path, M_fs_info_t *info)
{
M_list_str_t *path_parts;
size_t len;
M_bool ret = M_FALSE;
(void)info;
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
return M_FALSE;
}
/* Hidden. Check if the first character of the last part of the path. Either the file or directory name itself
* starts with a '.'. */
path_parts = M_fs_path_componentize_path(path, M_FS_SYSTEM_UNIX);
len = M_list_str_len(path_parts);
if (len > 0) {
if (*M_list_str_at(path_parts, len-1) == '.') {
ret = M_TRUE;
}
}
M_list_str_destroy(path_parts);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: mstdlib (aka the M Standard Library for C) 1.2.0 has incorrect file access control in situations where M_fs_perms_can_access attempts to delete an existing file (that lacks public read/write access) during a copy operation, related to fs/m_fs.c and fs/m_fs_path.c. An attacker could create the file and then would have access to the data.
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
|
Low
| 169,145
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::FrameNavigationHelper::FrameNavigationHelper(
RenderFrameHost* plugin_rfh,
int32_t guest_instance_id,
int32_t element_instance_id,
bool is_full_page_plugin,
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter* filter)
: content::WebContentsObserver(
content::WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(plugin_rfh)),
frame_tree_node_id_(plugin_rfh->GetFrameTreeNodeId()),
guest_instance_id_(guest_instance_id),
element_instance_id_(element_instance_id),
is_full_page_plugin_(is_full_page_plugin),
filter_(filter),
parent_site_instance_(plugin_rfh->GetParent()->GetSiteInstance()),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(GetGuestView());
NavigateToAboutBlank();
base::PostDelayedTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(&ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::FrameNavigationHelper::
CancelPendingTask,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kAttachFailureDelayMS));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Data race in extensions guest view in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
|
High
| 173,041
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *usin = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) uaddr;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_type;
int err;
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = usin->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
IP6_ECN_flow_init(fl6.flowlabel);
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel;
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
}
}
/*
* connect() to INADDR_ANY means loopback (BSD'ism).
*/
if (ipv6_addr_any(&usin->sin6_addr))
usin->sin6_addr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&usin->sin6_addr);
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)
return -ENETUNREACH;
if (addr_type&IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
usin->sin6_scope_id) {
/* If interface is set while binding, indices
* must coincide.
*/
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if &&
sk->sk_bound_dev_if != usin->sin6_scope_id)
return -EINVAL;
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = usin->sin6_scope_id;
}
/* Connect to link-local address requires an interface */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp &&
!ipv6_addr_equal(&sk->sk_v6_daddr, &usin->sin6_addr)) {
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent = 0;
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = 0;
tp->write_seq = 0;
}
sk->sk_v6_daddr = usin->sin6_addr;
np->flow_label = fl6.flowlabel;
/*
* TCP over IPv4
*/
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
u32 exthdrlen = icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "connect: ipv4 mapped\n");
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -ENETUNREACH;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = usin->sin6_port;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = usin->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3];
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &ipv6_mapped;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = tcp_v4_do_rcv;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
tp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_mapped_specific;
#endif
err = tcp_v4_connect(sk, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
if (err) {
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = exthdrlen;
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &ipv6_specific;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = tcp_v6_do_rcv;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
tp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_specific;
#endif
goto failure;
}
np->saddr = sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
return err;
}
if (!ipv6_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr))
saddr = &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.saddr = saddr ? *saddr : np->saddr;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6.fl6_dport = usin->sin6_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto failure;
}
if (!saddr) {
saddr = &fl6.saddr;
sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = *saddr;
}
/* set the source address */
np->saddr = *saddr;
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
sk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
__ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
if (tcp_death_row.sysctl_tw_recycle &&
!tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
tcp_fetch_timewait_stamp(sk, dst);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (np->opt)
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen +
np->opt->opt_nflen);
tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = IPV6_MIN_MTU - sizeof(struct tcphdr) - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin6_port;
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_SYN_SENT);
err = inet6_hash_connect(&tcp_death_row, sk);
if (err)
goto late_failure;
sk_set_txhash(sk);
if (!tp->write_seq && likely(!tp->repair))
tp->write_seq = secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(np->saddr.s6_addr32,
sk->sk_v6_daddr.s6_addr32,
inet->inet_sport,
inet->inet_dport);
err = tcp_connect(sk);
if (err)
goto late_failure;
return 0;
late_failure:
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE);
__sk_dst_reset(sk);
failure:
inet->inet_dport = 0;
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,340
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
#else
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The stack randomization feature in the Linux kernel before 3.19.1 on 64-bit platforms uses incorrect data types for the results of bitwise left-shift operations, which makes it easier for attackers to bypass the ASLR protection mechanism by predicting the address of the top of the stack, related to the randomize_stack_top function in fs/binfmt_elf.c and the stack_maxrandom_size function in arch/x86/mm/mmap.c.
Commit Message: x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
|
Low
| 166,696
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HeapAllocator::backingFree(void* address) {
if (!address)
return;
ThreadState* state = ThreadState::current();
if (state->sweepForbidden())
return;
ASSERT(!state->isInGC());
BasePage* page = pageFromObject(address);
if (page->isLargeObjectPage() || page->arena()->getThreadState() != state)
return;
HeapObjectHeader* header = HeapObjectHeader::fromPayload(address);
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
NormalPageArena* arena = static_cast<NormalPage*>(page)->arenaForNormalPage();
state->promptlyFreed(header->gcInfoIndex());
arena->promptlyFreeObject(header);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Inline metadata in GarbageCollection in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
|
Medium
| 172,706
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(struct smb_request *req)
{
const uint8 *p;
DATA_BLOB blob1;
size_t bufrem;
char *tmp;
const char *native_os;
const char *native_lanman;
const char *primary_domain;
const char *p2;
uint16 data_blob_len = SVAL(req->vwv+7, 0);
enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
int vuid = req->vuid;
user_struct *vuser = NULL;
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
uint16 smbpid = req->smbpid;
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = smbd_server_conn;
DEBUG(3,("Doing spnego session setup\n"));
if (global_client_caps == 0) {
global_client_caps = IVAL(req->vwv+10, 0);
if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
}
}
p = req->buf;
if (data_blob_len == 0) {
/* an invalid request */
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
return;
}
bufrem = smbreq_bufrem(req, p);
/* pull the spnego blob */
blob1 = data_blob(p, MIN(bufrem, data_blob_len));
#if 0
file_save("negotiate.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length);
#endif
p2 = (char *)req->buf + data_blob_len;
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
native_os = tmp ? tmp : "";
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
native_lanman = tmp ? tmp : "";
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
primary_domain = tmp ? tmp : "";
DEBUG(3,("NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
/* Vista sets neither the OS or lanman strings */
if ( !strlen(native_os) && !strlen(native_lanman) )
set_remote_arch(RA_VISTA);
/* Windows 2003 doesn't set the native lanman string,
but does set primary domain which is a bug I think */
if ( !strlen(native_lanman) ) {
ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
} else {
ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
}
}
/* Did we get a valid vuid ? */
if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(sconn, vuid)) {
/* No, then try and see if this is an intermediate sessionsetup
* for a large SPNEGO packet. */
struct pending_auth_data *pad;
pad = get_pending_auth_data(sconn, smbpid);
if (pad) {
DEBUG(10,("reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego: found "
"pending vuid %u\n",
(unsigned int)pad->vuid ));
vuid = pad->vuid;
}
}
/* Do we have a valid vuid now ? */
if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(sconn, vuid)) {
/* No, start a new authentication setup. */
vuid = register_initial_vuid(sconn);
if (vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
return;
}
}
vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(sconn, vuid);
/* This MUST be valid. */
if (!vuser) {
smb_panic("reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego: invalid vuid.");
}
/* Large (greater than 4k) SPNEGO blobs are split into multiple
* sessionsetup requests as the Windows limit on the security blob
* field is 4k. Bug #4400. JRA.
*/
status = check_spnego_blob_complete(sconn, smbpid, vuid, &blob1);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,
NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
/* Real error - kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
}
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) {
/* its a negTokenTarg packet */
reply_spnego_negotiate(req, vuid, blob1,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
return;
}
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_CONTEXT(1)) {
/* its a auth packet */
reply_spnego_auth(req, vuid, blob1,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
return;
}
if (strncmp((char *)(blob1.data), "NTLMSSP", 7) == 0) {
DATA_BLOB chal;
if (!vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state) {
status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
}
status = auth_ntlmssp_update(vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
blob1, &chal);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_spnego_ntlmssp(req, vuid,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
&chal, status, OID_NTLMSSP, false);
data_blob_free(&chal);
return;
}
/* what sort of packet is this? */
DEBUG(1,("Unknown packet in reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego\n"));
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego function in sesssetup.c in smbd in Samba before 3.4.8 and 3.5.x before 3.5.2 allows remote attackers to trigger an out-of-bounds read, and cause a denial of service (process crash), via a \xff\xff security blob length in a Session Setup AndX request.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,054
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: u32 h264bsdInit(storage_t *pStorage, u32 noOutputReordering)
{
/* Variables */
u32 size;
/* Code */
ASSERT(pStorage);
h264bsdInitStorage(pStorage);
/* allocate mbLayer to be next multiple of 64 to enable use of
* specific NEON optimized "memset" for clearing the structure */
size = (sizeof(macroblockLayer_t) + 63) & ~0x3F;
pStorage->mbLayer = (macroblockLayer_t*)H264SwDecMalloc(size);
if (!pStorage->mbLayer)
return HANTRO_NOK;
if (noOutputReordering)
pStorage->noReordering = HANTRO_TRUE;
return HANTRO_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the h264dec component in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file that triggers a large memory allocation, aka internal bug 27855419.
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
|
Low
| 173,876
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> PersistentHistogramAllocator::CreateHistogram(
PersistentHistogramData* histogram_data_ptr) {
if (!histogram_data_ptr) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_INVALID_METADATA_POINTER);
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
if (histogram_data_ptr->histogram_type == SPARSE_HISTOGRAM) {
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> histogram =
SparseHistogram::PersistentCreate(this, histogram_data_ptr->name,
&histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
histogram->SetFlags(histogram_data_ptr->flags);
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_SUCCESS);
return histogram;
}
int32_t histogram_type = histogram_data_ptr->histogram_type;
int32_t histogram_flags = histogram_data_ptr->flags;
int32_t histogram_minimum = histogram_data_ptr->minimum;
int32_t histogram_maximum = histogram_data_ptr->maximum;
uint32_t histogram_bucket_count = histogram_data_ptr->bucket_count;
uint32_t histogram_ranges_ref = histogram_data_ptr->ranges_ref;
uint32_t histogram_ranges_checksum = histogram_data_ptr->ranges_checksum;
HistogramBase::Sample* ranges_data =
memory_allocator_->GetAsArray<HistogramBase::Sample>(
histogram_ranges_ref, kTypeIdRangesArray,
PersistentMemoryAllocator::kSizeAny);
const uint32_t max_buckets =
std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max() / sizeof(HistogramBase::Sample);
size_t required_bytes =
(histogram_bucket_count + 1) * sizeof(HistogramBase::Sample);
size_t allocated_bytes =
memory_allocator_->GetAllocSize(histogram_ranges_ref);
if (!ranges_data || histogram_bucket_count < 2 ||
histogram_bucket_count >= max_buckets ||
allocated_bytes < required_bytes) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_INVALID_RANGES_ARRAY);
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
std::unique_ptr<const BucketRanges> created_ranges = CreateRangesFromData(
ranges_data, histogram_ranges_checksum, histogram_bucket_count + 1);
if (!created_ranges) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_INVALID_RANGES_ARRAY);
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
const BucketRanges* ranges =
StatisticsRecorder::RegisterOrDeleteDuplicateRanges(
created_ranges.release());
size_t counts_bytes = CalculateRequiredCountsBytes(histogram_bucket_count);
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Reference counts_ref =
subtle::Acquire_Load(&histogram_data_ptr->counts_ref);
if (counts_bytes == 0 ||
(counts_ref != 0 &&
memory_allocator_->GetAllocSize(counts_ref) < counts_bytes)) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_INVALID_COUNTS_ARRAY);
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
DelayedPersistentAllocation counts_data(memory_allocator_.get(),
&histogram_data_ptr->counts_ref,
kTypeIdCountsArray, counts_bytes, 0);
DelayedPersistentAllocation logged_data(
memory_allocator_.get(), &histogram_data_ptr->counts_ref,
kTypeIdCountsArray, counts_bytes, counts_bytes / 2,
/*make_iterable=*/false);
const char* name = histogram_data_ptr->name;
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> histogram;
switch (histogram_type) {
case HISTOGRAM:
histogram = Histogram::PersistentCreate(
name, histogram_minimum, histogram_maximum, ranges, counts_data,
logged_data, &histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
break;
case LINEAR_HISTOGRAM:
histogram = LinearHistogram::PersistentCreate(
name, histogram_minimum, histogram_maximum, ranges, counts_data,
logged_data, &histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
break;
case BOOLEAN_HISTOGRAM:
histogram = BooleanHistogram::PersistentCreate(
name, ranges, counts_data, logged_data,
&histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
break;
case CUSTOM_HISTOGRAM:
histogram = CustomHistogram::PersistentCreate(
name, ranges, counts_data, logged_data,
&histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
if (histogram) {
DCHECK_EQ(histogram_type, histogram->GetHistogramType());
histogram->SetFlags(histogram_flags);
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_SUCCESS);
} else {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_UNKNOWN_TYPE);
}
return histogram;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 does not properly maintain own properties, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via crafted JavaScript code that triggers an incorrect cast, related to extensions/renderer/v8_helpers.h and gin/converter.h.
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
|
Medium
| 172,132
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int is_integer(char *string)
{
if (isdigit(string[0]) || string[0] == '-' || string[0] == '+') {
while (*++string && isdigit(*string))
; /* deliberately empty */
if (!*string)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the set_cs_start function in t1disasm.c in t1utils before 1.39 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file.
Commit Message: Security fixes.
- Don't overflow the small cs_start buffer (reported by Niels
Thykier via the debian tracker (Jakub Wilk), found with a
fuzzer ("American fuzzy lop")).
- Cast arguments to <ctype.h> functions to unsigned char.
|
Low
| 166,621
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::RequestPasskey(
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 17.0.963.46 does not properly handle PDF FAX images, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,972
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int update_open_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *open_stateid, nfs4_stateid *delegation, int open_flags)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(state->inode);
struct nfs_delegation *deleg_cur;
int ret = 0;
open_flags &= (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE);
rcu_read_lock();
deleg_cur = rcu_dereference(nfsi->delegation);
if (deleg_cur == NULL)
goto no_delegation;
spin_lock(&deleg_cur->lock);
if (nfsi->delegation != deleg_cur ||
(deleg_cur->type & open_flags) != open_flags)
goto no_delegation_unlock;
if (delegation == NULL)
delegation = &deleg_cur->stateid;
else if (memcmp(deleg_cur->stateid.data, delegation->data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE) != 0)
goto no_delegation_unlock;
nfs_mark_delegation_referenced(deleg_cur);
__update_open_stateid(state, open_stateid, &deleg_cur->stateid, open_flags);
ret = 1;
no_delegation_unlock:
spin_unlock(&deleg_cur->lock);
no_delegation:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!ret && open_stateid != NULL) {
__update_open_stateid(state, open_stateid, NULL, open_flags);
ret = 1;
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,708
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ResourceTracker::CleanupInstanceData(PP_Instance instance,
bool delete_instance) {
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(instance, PP_ID_TYPE_INSTANCE))
<< instance << " is not a PP_Instance.";
InstanceMap::iterator found = instance_map_.find(instance);
if (found == instance_map_.end()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
InstanceData& data = *found->second;
ResourceSet::iterator cur_res = data.resources.begin();
while (cur_res != data.resources.end()) {
ResourceMap::iterator found_resource = live_resources_.find(*cur_res);
if (found_resource == live_resources_.end()) {
NOTREACHED();
} else {
Resource* resource = found_resource->second.first;
resource->LastPluginRefWasDeleted(true);
live_resources_.erase(*cur_res);
}
ResourceSet::iterator current = cur_res++;
data.resources.erase(current);
}
DCHECK(data.resources.empty());
VarSet::iterator cur_var = data.object_vars.begin();
while (cur_var != data.object_vars.end()) {
VarSet::iterator current = cur_var++;
PP_Var object_pp_var;
object_pp_var.type = PP_VARTYPE_OBJECT;
object_pp_var.value.as_id = *current;
scoped_refptr<ObjectVar> object_var(ObjectVar::FromPPVar(object_pp_var));
if (object_var.get())
object_var->InstanceDeleted();
live_vars_.erase(*current);
data.object_vars.erase(*current);
}
DCHECK(data.object_vars.empty());
if (delete_instance)
instance_map_.erase(found);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to instantiation of the Pepper plug-in.
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,417
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int nsv_parse_NSVf_header(AVFormatContext *s)
{
NSVContext *nsv = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
unsigned int av_unused file_size;
unsigned int size;
int64_t duration;
int strings_size;
int table_entries;
int table_entries_used;
nsv->state = NSV_UNSYNC; /* in case we fail */
size = avio_rl32(pb);
if (size < 28)
return -1;
nsv->NSVf_end = size;
file_size = (uint32_t)avio_rl32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf chunk_size %u\n", size);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf file_size %u\n", file_size);
nsv->duration = duration = avio_rl32(pb); /* in ms */
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf duration %"PRId64" ms\n", duration);
strings_size = avio_rl32(pb);
table_entries = avio_rl32(pb);
table_entries_used = avio_rl32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf info-strings size: %d, table entries: %d, bis %d\n",
strings_size, table_entries, table_entries_used);
if (avio_feof(pb))
return -1;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV got header; filepos %"PRId64"\n", avio_tell(pb));
if (strings_size > 0) {
char *strings; /* last byte will be '\0' to play safe with str*() */
char *p, *endp;
char *token, *value;
char quote;
p = strings = av_mallocz((size_t)strings_size + 1);
if (!p)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
endp = strings + strings_size;
avio_read(pb, strings, strings_size);
while (p < endp) {
while (*p == ' ')
p++; /* strip out spaces */
if (p >= endp-2)
break;
token = p;
p = strchr(p, '=');
if (!p || p >= endp-2)
break;
*p++ = '\0';
quote = *p++;
value = p;
p = strchr(p, quote);
if (!p || p >= endp)
break;
*p++ = '\0';
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf INFO: %s='%s'\n", token, value);
av_dict_set(&s->metadata, token, value, 0);
}
av_free(strings);
}
if (avio_feof(pb))
return -1;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV got infos; filepos %"PRId64"\n", avio_tell(pb));
if (table_entries_used > 0) {
int i;
nsv->index_entries = table_entries_used;
if((unsigned)table_entries_used >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(uint32_t))
return -1;
nsv->nsvs_file_offset = av_malloc_array((unsigned)table_entries_used, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (!nsv->nsvs_file_offset)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
for(i=0;i<table_entries_used;i++)
nsv->nsvs_file_offset[i] = avio_rl32(pb) + size;
if(table_entries > table_entries_used &&
avio_rl32(pb) == MKTAG('T','O','C','2')) {
nsv->nsvs_timestamps = av_malloc_array((unsigned)table_entries_used, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (!nsv->nsvs_timestamps)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
for(i=0;i<table_entries_used;i++) {
nsv->nsvs_timestamps[i] = avio_rl32(pb);
}
}
}
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV got index; filepos %"PRId64"\n", avio_tell(pb));
avio_seek(pb, nsv->base_offset + size, SEEK_SET); /* required for dumbdriving-271.nsv (2 extra bytes) */
if (avio_feof(pb))
return -1;
nsv->state = NSV_HAS_READ_NSVF;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-834
Summary: In libavformat/nsvdec.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in nsv_parse_NSVf_header() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted NSV file, which claims a large *table_entries_used* field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop over 'table_entries_used' would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.
Commit Message: avformat/nsvdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check in nsvs_file_offset loop.
Fixes: 20170829.nsv
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 167,764
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPair(
const base::Closure& callback,
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback) {
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Paired";
if (!pairing_delegate_used_)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_NONE,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
UnregisterAgent();
SetTrusted();
ConnectInternal(true, callback, error_callback);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,227
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case REQUEST_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferIdx = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer;
int result = requestBuffer(bufferIdx, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(buffer != 0);
if (buffer != 0) {
reply->write(*buffer);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferCount = data.readInt32();
int result = setBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DEQUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool async = static_cast<bool>(data.readInt32());
uint32_t width = data.readUint32();
uint32_t height = data.readUint32();
PixelFormat format = static_cast<PixelFormat>(data.readInt32());
uint32_t usage = data.readUint32();
int buf = 0;
sp<Fence> fence;
int result = dequeueBuffer(&buf, &fence, async, width, height,
format, usage);
reply->writeInt32(buf);
reply->writeInt32(fence != NULL);
if (fence != NULL) {
reply->write(*fence);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DETACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int slot = data.readInt32();
int result = detachBuffer(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DETACH_NEXT_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer;
sp<Fence> fence;
int32_t result = detachNextBuffer(&buffer, &fence);
reply->writeInt32(result);
if (result == NO_ERROR) {
reply->writeInt32(buffer != NULL);
if (buffer != NULL) {
reply->write(*buffer);
}
reply->writeInt32(fence != NULL);
if (fence != NULL) {
reply->write(*fence);
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ATTACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*buffer.get());
int slot = 0;
int result = attachBuffer(&slot, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case QUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferInput input(data);
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
memset(output, 0, sizeof(QueueBufferOutput));
status_t result = queueBuffer(buf, input, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CANCEL_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
sp<Fence> fence = new Fence();
data.read(*fence.get());
cancelBuffer(buf, fence);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case QUERY: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int value = 0;
int what = data.readInt32();
int res = query(what, &value);
reply->writeInt32(value);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<IProducerListener> listener;
if (data.readInt32() == 1) {
listener = IProducerListener::asInterface(data.readStrongBinder());
}
int api = data.readInt32();
bool producerControlledByApp = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t res = connect(listener, api, producerControlledByApp, output);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int api = data.readInt32();
status_t res = disconnect(api);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_SIDEBAND_STREAM: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<NativeHandle> stream;
if (data.readInt32()) {
stream = NativeHandle::create(data.readNativeHandle(), true);
}
status_t result = setSidebandStream(stream);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOCATE_BUFFERS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool async = static_cast<bool>(data.readInt32());
uint32_t width = data.readUint32();
uint32_t height = data.readUint32();
PixelFormat format = static_cast<PixelFormat>(data.readInt32());
uint32_t usage = data.readUint32();
allocateBuffers(async, width, height, format, usage);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOW_ALLOCATION: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool allow = static_cast<bool>(data.readInt32());
status_t result = allowAllocation(allow);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_GENERATION_NUMBER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
uint32_t generationNumber = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setGenerationNumber(generationNumber);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_CONSUMER_NAME: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
reply->writeString8(getConsumerName());
return NO_ERROR;
}
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-05-01 does not initialize certain data structures, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information via a crafted application, related to IGraphicBufferConsumer.cpp and IGraphicBufferProducer.cpp, aka internal bug 27555981.
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
|
Medium
| 173,878
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
FILE *fp_rd = stdin;
FILE *fp_wr = stdout;
FILE *fp_al = NULL;
BOOL raw = TRUE;
BOOL alpha = FALSE;
int argi;
for (argi = 1; argi < argc; argi++)
{
if (argv[argi][0] == '-')
{
switch (argv[argi][1])
{
case 'n':
raw = FALSE;
break;
case 'r':
raw = TRUE;
break;
case 'a':
alpha = TRUE;
argi++;
if ((fp_al = fopen (argv[argi], "wb")) == NULL)
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNM2PNG\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Error: can not create alpha-channel file %s\n", argv[argi]);
exit (1);
}
break;
case 'h':
case '?':
usage();
exit(0);
break;
default:
fprintf (stderr, "PNG2PNM\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Error: unknown option %s\n", argv[argi]);
usage();
exit(1);
break;
} /* end switch */
}
else if (fp_rd == stdin)
{
if ((fp_rd = fopen (argv[argi], "rb")) == NULL)
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNG2PNM\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Error: file %s does not exist\n", argv[argi]);
exit (1);
}
}
else if (fp_wr == stdout)
{
if ((fp_wr = fopen (argv[argi], "wb")) == NULL)
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNG2PNM\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Error: can not create file %s\n", argv[argi]);
exit (1);
}
}
else
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNG2PNM\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Error: too many parameters\n");
usage();
exit(1);
}
} /* end for */
#ifdef __TURBOC__
/* set stdin/stdout if required to binary */
if (fp_rd == stdin)
{
setmode (STDIN, O_BINARY);
}
if ((raw) && (fp_wr == stdout))
{
setmode (STDOUT, O_BINARY);
}
#endif
/* call the conversion program itself */
if (png2pnm (fp_rd, fp_wr, fp_al, raw, alpha) == FALSE)
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNG2PNM\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Error: unsuccessful conversion of PNG-image\n");
exit(1);
}
/* close input file */
fclose (fp_rd);
/* close output file */
fclose (fp_wr);
/* close alpha file */
if (alpha)
fclose (fp_al);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,722
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> dispatchEventCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestEventTarget.dispatchEvent");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestEventTarget* imp = V8TestEventTarget::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
{
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(Event*, evt, V8Event::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8Event::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
bool result = imp->dispatchEvent(evt, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec))
goto fail;
return v8Boolean(result);
}
fail:
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,070
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool SVGElement::HasSVGParent() const {
return ParentOrShadowHostElement() &&
ParentOrShadowHostElement()->IsSVGElement();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-704
Summary: An incorrect object type assumption in SVG in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit object corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
|
Medium
| 173,065
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> serializedValueCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.serializedValue");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
bool serializedArgDidThrow = false;
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> serializedArg = SerializedScriptValue::create(args[0], 0, 0, serializedArgDidThrow, args.GetIsolate());
if (serializedArgDidThrow)
return v8::Undefined();
imp->serializedValue(serializedArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,104
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: krb5_ldap_put_principal(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *entry,
char **db_args)
{
int l=0, kerberos_principal_object_type=0;
unsigned int ntrees=0, tre=0;
krb5_error_code st=0, tempst=0;
LDAP *ld=NULL;
LDAPMessage *result=NULL, *ent=NULL;
char **subtreelist = NULL;
char *user=NULL, *subtree=NULL, *principal_dn=NULL;
char **values=NULL, *strval[10]={NULL}, errbuf[1024];
char *filtuser=NULL;
struct berval **bersecretkey=NULL;
LDAPMod **mods=NULL;
krb5_boolean create_standalone_prinicipal=FALSE;
krb5_boolean krb_identity_exists=FALSE, establish_links=FALSE;
char *standalone_principal_dn=NULL;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data=NULL;
krb5_key_data **keys=NULL;
kdb5_dal_handle *dal_handle=NULL;
krb5_ldap_context *ldap_context=NULL;
krb5_ldap_server_handle *ldap_server_handle=NULL;
osa_princ_ent_rec princ_ent = {0};
xargs_t xargs = {0};
char *polname = NULL;
OPERATION optype;
krb5_boolean found_entry = FALSE;
/* Clear the global error string */
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
SETUP_CONTEXT();
if (ldap_context->lrparams == NULL || ldap_context->container_dn == NULL)
return EINVAL;
/* get ldap handle */
GET_HANDLE();
if (!is_principal_in_realm(ldap_context, entry->princ)) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st,
_("Principal does not belong to the default realm"));
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the principal information to act on */
if (((st=krb5_unparse_name(context, entry->princ, &user)) != 0) ||
((st=krb5_ldap_unparse_principal_name(user)) != 0))
goto cleanup;
filtuser = ldap_filter_correct(user);
if (filtuser == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Identity the type of operation, it can be
* add principal or modify principal.
* hack if the entry->mask has KRB_PRINCIPAL flag set
* then it is a add operation
*/
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL)
optype = ADD_PRINCIPAL;
else
optype = MODIFY_PRINCIPAL;
if (((st=krb5_get_princ_type(context, entry, &kerberos_principal_object_type)) != 0) ||
((st=krb5_get_userdn(context, entry, &principal_dn)) != 0))
goto cleanup;
if ((st=process_db_args(context, db_args, &xargs, optype)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD) {
unsigned int tree = 0;
int numlentries = 0;
char *filter = NULL;
/* A load operation is special, will do a mix-in (add krbprinc
* attrs to a non-krb object entry) if an object exists with a
* matching krbprincipalname attribute so try to find existing
* object and set principal_dn. This assumes that the
* krbprincipalname attribute is unique (only one object entry has
* a particular krbprincipalname attribute).
*/
if (asprintf(&filter, FILTER"%s))", filtuser) < 0) {
filter = NULL;
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the current subtree list */
if ((st = krb5_get_subtree_info(ldap_context, &subtreelist, &ntrees)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
found_entry = FALSE;
/* search for entry with matching krbprincipalname attribute */
for (tree = 0; found_entry == FALSE && tree < ntrees; ++tree) {
if (principal_dn == NULL) {
LDAP_SEARCH_1(subtreelist[tree], ldap_context->lrparams->search_scope, filter, principal_attributes, IGNORE_STATUS);
} else {
/* just look for entry with principal_dn */
LDAP_SEARCH_1(principal_dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, filter, principal_attributes, IGNORE_STATUS);
}
if (st == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
numlentries = ldap_count_entries(ld, result);
if (numlentries > 1) {
free(filter);
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st,
_("operation can not continue, more than one "
"entry with principal name \"%s\" found"),
user);
goto cleanup;
} else if (numlentries == 1) {
found_entry = TRUE;
if (principal_dn == NULL) {
ent = ldap_first_entry(ld, result);
if (ent != NULL) {
/* setting principal_dn will cause that entry to be modified further down */
if ((principal_dn = ldap_get_dn(ld, ent)) == NULL) {
ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_RESULT_CODE, &st);
st = set_ldap_error (context, st, 0);
free(filter);
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
}
} else if (st != LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
/* could not perform search, return with failure */
st = set_ldap_error (context, st, 0);
free(filter);
goto cleanup;
}
ldap_msgfree(result);
result = NULL;
/*
* If it isn't found then assume a standalone princ entry is to
* be created.
*/
} /* end for (tree = 0; principal_dn == ... */
free(filter);
if (found_entry == FALSE && principal_dn != NULL) {
/*
* if principal_dn is null then there is code further down to
* deal with setting standalone_principal_dn. Also note that
* this will set create_standalone_prinicipal true for
* non-mix-in entries which is okay if loading from a dump.
*/
create_standalone_prinicipal = TRUE;
standalone_principal_dn = strdup(principal_dn);
CHECK_NULL(standalone_principal_dn);
}
} /* end if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD */
/* time to generate the DN information with the help of
* containerdn, principalcontainerreference or
* realmcontainerdn information
*/
if (principal_dn == NULL && xargs.dn == NULL) { /* creation of standalone principal */
/* get the subtree information */
if (entry->princ->length == 2 && entry->princ->data[0].length == strlen("krbtgt") &&
strncmp(entry->princ->data[0].data, "krbtgt", entry->princ->data[0].length) == 0) {
/* if the principal is a inter-realm principal, always created in the realm container */
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->realmdn);
} else if (xargs.containerdn) {
if ((st=checkattributevalue(ld, xargs.containerdn, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
if (st == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY || st == KRB5_KDB_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) {
int ost = st;
st = EINVAL;
k5_prependmsg(context, ost, st, _("'%s' not found"),
xargs.containerdn);
}
goto cleanup;
}
subtree = strdup(xargs.containerdn);
} else if (ldap_context->lrparams->containerref && strlen(ldap_context->lrparams->containerref) != 0) {
/*
* Here the subtree should be changed with
* principalcontainerreference attribute value
*/
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->containerref);
} else {
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->realmdn);
}
CHECK_NULL(subtree);
if (asprintf(&standalone_principal_dn, "krbprincipalname=%s,%s",
filtuser, subtree) < 0)
standalone_principal_dn = NULL;
CHECK_NULL(standalone_principal_dn);
/*
* free subtree when you are done using the subtree
* set the boolean create_standalone_prinicipal to TRUE
*/
create_standalone_prinicipal = TRUE;
free(subtree);
subtree = NULL;
}
/*
* If the DN information is presented by the user, time to
* validate the input to ensure that the DN falls under
* any of the subtrees
*/
if (xargs.dn_from_kbd == TRUE) {
/* make sure the DN falls in the subtree */
int dnlen=0, subtreelen=0;
char *dn=NULL;
krb5_boolean outofsubtree=TRUE;
if (xargs.dn != NULL) {
dn = xargs.dn;
} else if (xargs.linkdn != NULL) {
dn = xargs.linkdn;
} else if (standalone_principal_dn != NULL) {
/*
* Even though the standalone_principal_dn is constructed
* within this function, there is the containerdn input
* from the user that can become part of the it.
*/
dn = standalone_principal_dn;
}
/* Get the current subtree list if we haven't already done so. */
if (subtreelist == NULL) {
st = krb5_get_subtree_info(ldap_context, &subtreelist, &ntrees);
if (st)
goto cleanup;
}
for (tre=0; tre<ntrees; ++tre) {
if (subtreelist[tre] == NULL || strlen(subtreelist[tre]) == 0) {
outofsubtree = FALSE;
break;
} else {
dnlen = strlen (dn);
subtreelen = strlen(subtreelist[tre]);
if ((dnlen >= subtreelen) && (strcasecmp((dn + dnlen - subtreelen), subtreelist[tre]) == 0)) {
outofsubtree = FALSE;
break;
}
}
}
if (outofsubtree == TRUE) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("DN is out of the realm subtree"));
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* dn value will be set either by dn, linkdn or the standalone_principal_dn
* In the first 2 cases, the dn should be existing and in the last case we
* are supposed to create the ldap object. so the below should not be
* executed for the last case.
*/
if (standalone_principal_dn == NULL) {
/*
* If the ldap object is missing, this results in an error.
*/
/*
* Search for krbprincipalname attribute here.
* This is to find if a kerberos identity is already present
* on the ldap object, in which case adding a kerberos identity
* on the ldap object should result in an error.
*/
char *attributes[]={"krbticketpolicyreference", "krbprincipalname", NULL};
ldap_msgfree(result);
result = NULL;
LDAP_SEARCH_1(dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, 0, attributes, IGNORE_STATUS);
if (st == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
ent = ldap_first_entry(ld, result);
if (ent != NULL) {
if ((values=ldap_get_values(ld, ent, "krbticketpolicyreference")) != NULL) {
ldap_value_free(values);
}
if ((values=ldap_get_values(ld, ent, "krbprincipalname")) != NULL) {
krb_identity_exists = TRUE;
ldap_value_free(values);
}
}
} else {
st = set_ldap_error(context, st, OP_SEARCH);
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
/*
* If xargs.dn is set then the request is to add a
* kerberos principal on a ldap object, but if
* there is one already on the ldap object this
* should result in an error.
*/
if (xargs.dn != NULL && krb_identity_exists == TRUE) {
st = EINVAL;
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("ldap object is already kerberized"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
if (xargs.linkdn != NULL) {
/*
* link information can be changed using modprinc.
* However, link information can be changed only on the
* standalone kerberos principal objects. A standalone
* kerberos principal object is of type krbprincipal
* structural objectclass.
*
* NOTE: kerberos principals on an ldap object can't be
* linked to other ldap objects.
*/
if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL &&
kerberos_principal_object_type != KDB_STANDALONE_PRINCIPAL_OBJECT) {
st = EINVAL;
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("link information can not be set/updated as the "
"kerberos principal belongs to an ldap object"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Check the link information. If there is already a link
* existing then this operation is not allowed.
*/
{
char **linkdns=NULL;
int j=0;
if ((st=krb5_get_linkdn(context, entry, &linkdns)) != 0) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("Failed getting object references"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
if (linkdns != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("kerberos principal is already linked to a ldap "
"object"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
for (j=0; linkdns[j] != NULL; ++j)
free (linkdns[j]);
free (linkdns);
goto cleanup;
}
}
establish_links = TRUE;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->last_success)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastSuccessfulAuth", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->last_failed)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastFailedAuth", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free(strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) {
krb5_kvno fail_auth_count;
fail_auth_count = entry->fail_auth_count;
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT)
fail_auth_count++;
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
fail_auth_count);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT) {
int attr_mask = 0;
krb5_boolean has_fail_count;
/* Check if the krbLoginFailedCount attribute exists. (Through
* krb5 1.8.1, it wasn't set in new entries.) */
st = krb5_get_attributes_mask(context, entry, &attr_mask);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
has_fail_count = ((attr_mask & KDB_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_ATTR) != 0);
/*
* If the client library and server supports RFC 4525,
* then use it to increment by one the value of the
* krbLoginFailedCount attribute. Otherwise, assert the
* (provided) old value by deleting it before adding.
*/
#ifdef LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT
if (ldap_server_handle->server_info->modify_increment &&
has_fail_count) {
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT, 1);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
#endif /* LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT */
if (has_fail_count) {
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods,
"krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_DELETE,
entry->fail_auth_count);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_ADD,
entry->fail_auth_count + 1);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
#ifdef LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT
}
#endif
} else if (optype == ADD_PRINCIPAL) {
/* Initialize krbLoginFailedCount in new entries to help avoid a
* race during the first failed login. */
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_ADD, 0);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbmaxticketlife", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, entry->max_life)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbmaxrenewableage", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
entry->max_renewable_life)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketflags", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
entry->attributes)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = user;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalname", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalexpiration", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->pw_expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpasswordexpiration",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
memset(&princ_ent, 0, sizeof(princ_ent));
for (tl_data=entry->tl_data; tl_data; tl_data=tl_data->tl_data_next) {
if (tl_data->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA) {
if ((st = krb5_lookup_tl_kadm_data(tl_data, &princ_ent)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
break;
}
}
if (princ_ent.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((st = krb5_ldap_name_to_policydn (context, princ_ent.policy, &polname)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
strval[0] = polname;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, "Password policy value null");
goto cleanup;
}
} else if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD && found_entry == TRUE) {
/*
* a load is special in that existing entries must have attrs that
* removed.
*/
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) {
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA || entry->mask & KADM5_KVNO) {
krb5_kvno mkvno;
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_mkvno(context, entry, &mkvno)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
bersecretkey = krb5_encode_krbsecretkey (entry->key_data,
entry->n_key_data, mkvno);
if ((st=krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalkey",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, bersecretkey)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (!(entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL)) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->pw_expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods,
"krbpasswordexpiration",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
/* Update last password change whenever a new key is set */
{
krb5_timestamp last_pw_changed;
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(context, entry,
&last_pw_changed)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0] = getstringtime(last_pw_changed)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastPwdChange",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
} /* Modify Key data ends here */
/* Set tl_data */
if (entry->tl_data != NULL) {
int count = 0;
struct berval **ber_tl_data = NULL;
krb5_tl_data *ptr;
krb5_timestamp unlock_time;
for (ptr = entry->tl_data; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->tl_data_next) {
if (ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE
#ifdef SECURID
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_DB_ARGS
#endif
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KDB_TL_USER_INFO
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION_ACL
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_ADMIN_UNLOCK)
continue;
count++;
}
if (count != 0) {
int j;
ber_tl_data = (struct berval **) calloc (count + 1,
sizeof (struct berval*));
if (ber_tl_data == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
for (j = 0, ptr = entry->tl_data; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->tl_data_next) {
/* Ignore tl_data that are stored in separate directory
* attributes */
if (ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE
#ifdef SECURID
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_DB_ARGS
#endif
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KDB_TL_USER_INFO
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION_ACL
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_ADMIN_UNLOCK)
continue;
if ((st = tl_data2berval (ptr, &ber_tl_data[j])) != 0)
break;
j++;
}
if (st == 0) {
ber_tl_data[count] = NULL;
st=krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbExtraData",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE |
LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, ber_tl_data);
}
for (j = 0; ber_tl_data[j] != NULL; j++) {
free(ber_tl_data[j]->bv_val);
free(ber_tl_data[j]);
}
free(ber_tl_data);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_last_admin_unlock(context, entry,
&unlock_time)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (unlock_time != 0) {
/* Update last admin unlock */
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0] = getstringtime(unlock_time)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastAdminUnlock",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
}
/* Directory specific attribute */
if (xargs.tktpolicydn != NULL) {
int tmask=0;
if (strlen(xargs.tktpolicydn) != 0) {
st = checkattributevalue(ld, xargs.tktpolicydn, "objectclass", policyclass, &tmask);
CHECK_CLASS_VALIDITY(st, tmask, _("ticket policy object value: "));
strval[0] = xargs.tktpolicydn;
strval[1] = NULL;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
/* if xargs.tktpolicydn is a empty string, then delete
* already existing krbticketpolicyreference attr */
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (establish_links == TRUE) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = xargs.linkdn;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbObjectReferences", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* in case mods is NULL then return
* not sure but can happen in a modprinc
* so no need to return an error
* addprinc will at least have the principal name
* and the keys passed in
*/
if (mods == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (create_standalone_prinicipal == TRUE) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = "krbprincipal";
strval[1] = "krbprincipalaux";
strval[2] = "krbTicketPolicyAux";
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "objectclass", LDAP_MOD_ADD, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
st = ldap_add_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
if (st == LDAP_ALREADY_EXISTS && entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD) {
/* a load operation must replace an existing entry */
st = ldap_delete_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, NULL, NULL);
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("Principal delete failed (trying to replace "
"entry): %s"), ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_ADD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
} else {
st = ldap_add_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
}
}
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("Principal add failed: %s"),
ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_ADD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
/*
* Here existing ldap object is modified and can be related
* to any attribute, so always ensure that the ldap
* object is extended with all the kerberos related
* objectclasses so that there are no constraint
* violations.
*/
{
char *attrvalues[] = {"krbprincipalaux", "krbTicketPolicyAux", NULL};
int p, q, r=0, amask=0;
if ((st=checkattributevalue(ld, (xargs.dn) ? xargs.dn : principal_dn,
"objectclass", attrvalues, &amask)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
for (p=1, q=0; p<=2; p<<=1, ++q) {
if ((p & amask) == 0)
strval[r++] = attrvalues[q];
}
if (r != 0) {
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "objectclass", LDAP_MOD_ADD, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (xargs.dn != NULL)
st=ldap_modify_ext_s(ld, xargs.dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
else
st = ldap_modify_ext_s(ld, principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("User modification failed: %s"),
ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_MOD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT)
entry->fail_auth_count++;
}
cleanup:
if (user)
free(user);
if (filtuser)
free(filtuser);
free_xargs(xargs);
if (standalone_principal_dn)
free(standalone_principal_dn);
if (principal_dn)
free (principal_dn);
if (polname != NULL)
free(polname);
for (tre = 0; tre < ntrees; tre++)
free(subtreelist[tre]);
free(subtreelist);
if (subtree)
free (subtree);
if (bersecretkey) {
for (l=0; bersecretkey[l]; ++l) {
if (bersecretkey[l]->bv_val)
free (bersecretkey[l]->bv_val);
free (bersecretkey[l]);
}
free (bersecretkey);
}
if (keys)
free (keys);
ldap_mods_free(mods, 1);
ldap_osa_free_princ_ent(&princ_ent);
ldap_msgfree(result);
krb5_ldap_put_handle_to_pool(ldap_context, ldap_server_handle);
return(st);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_principal2.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.12.x and 1.13.x before 1.13.1, when the KDC uses LDAP, allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) by creating a database entry for a keyless principal, as demonstrated by a kadmin *add_principal -nokey* or *purgekeys -all* command.
Commit Message: Support keyless principals in LDAP [CVE-2014-5354]
Operations like "kadmin -q 'addprinc -nokey foo'" or
"kadmin -q 'purgekeys -all foo'" result in principal entries with
no keys present, so krb5_encode_krbsecretkey() would just return
NULL, which then got unconditionally dereferenced in
krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod().
Apply some fixes to krb5_encode_krbsecretkey() to handle zero-key
principals better, correct the test for an allocation failure, and
slightly restructure the cleanup handler to be shorter and more
appropriate for the usage. Once it no longer short-circuits when
n_key_data is zero, it will produce an array of length two with both
entries NULL, which is treated as an empty list by the LDAP library,
the correct behavior for a keyless principal.
However, attributes with empty values are only handled by the LDAP
library for Modify operations, not Add operations (which only get
a sequence of Attribute, with no operation field). Therefore, only
add an empty krbprincipalkey to the modlist when we will be performing a
Modify, and not when we will be performing an Add, which is conditional
on the (misspelled) create_standalone_prinicipal boolean.
CVE-2014-5354:
In MIT krb5, when kadmind is configured to use LDAP for the KDC
database, an authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL
dereference by inserting into the database a principal entry which
contains no long-term keys.
In order for the LDAP KDC backend to translate a principal entry
from the database abstraction layer into the form expected by the
LDAP schema, the principal's keys are encoded into a
NULL-terminated array of length-value entries to be stored in the
LDAP database. However, the subroutine which produced this array
did not correctly handle the case where no keys were present,
returning NULL instead of an empty array, and the array was
unconditionally dereferenced while adding to the list of LDAP
operations to perform.
Versions of MIT krb5 prior to 1.12 did not expose a way for
principal entries to have no long-term key material, and
therefore are not vulnerable.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8041 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.13.1
subject: kadmind with ldap backend crashes when putting keyless entries
|
Medium
| 166,273
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: RenderWidgetHostView* RenderFrameHostManager::GetRenderWidgetHostView() const {
if (interstitial_page_)
return interstitial_page_->GetView();
if (render_frame_host_)
return render_frame_host_->GetView();
return nullptr;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
|
Medium
| 172,322
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool RenderViewHostManager::ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
const NavigationEntry* curr_entry,
const NavigationEntryImpl* new_entry) const {
DCHECK(new_entry);
const GURL& current_url = (curr_entry) ? curr_entry->GetURL() :
render_view_host_->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL();
BrowserContext* browser_context =
delegate_->GetControllerForRenderManager().GetBrowserContext();
if (WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->UseWebUIForURL(
browser_context, current_url)) {
if (!WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->IsURLAcceptableForWebUI(
browser_context, new_entry->GetURL(), false)) {
return true;
}
} else {
if (WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->UseWebUIForURL(
browser_context, new_entry->GetURL())) {
return true;
}
}
if (GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
curr_entry ? curr_entry->GetURL() : GURL(), new_entry->GetURL())) {
return true;
}
if (!curr_entry)
return false;
if (curr_entry->IsViewSourceMode() != new_entry->IsViewSourceMode())
return true;
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Isolated Sites feature in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not properly enforce the use of separate processes, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,437
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int mutt_b64_decode(char *out, const char *in)
{
int len = 0;
unsigned char digit4;
do
{
const unsigned char digit1 = in[0];
if ((digit1 > 127) || (base64val(digit1) == BAD))
return -1;
const unsigned char digit2 = in[1];
if ((digit2 > 127) || (base64val(digit2) == BAD))
return -1;
const unsigned char digit3 = in[2];
if ((digit3 > 127) || ((digit3 != '=') && (base64val(digit3) == BAD)))
return -1;
digit4 = in[3];
if ((digit4 > 127) || ((digit4 != '=') && (base64val(digit4) == BAD)))
return -1;
in += 4;
/* digits are already sanity-checked */
*out++ = (base64val(digit1) << 2) | (base64val(digit2) >> 4);
len++;
if (digit3 != '=')
{
*out++ = ((base64val(digit2) << 4) & 0xf0) | (base64val(digit3) >> 2);
len++;
if (digit4 != '=')
{
*out++ = ((base64val(digit3) << 6) & 0xc0) | base64val(digit4);
len++;
}
}
} while (*in && digit4 != '=');
return len;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in Mutt before 1.10.1 and NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. They have a buffer overflow via base64 data.
Commit Message: Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report.
|
Low
| 169,128
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: init_ctx_reselect(OM_uint32 *minor_status, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc,
OM_uint32 acc_negState, gss_OID supportedMech,
gss_buffer_t *responseToken, gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState, send_token_flag *tokflag)
{
OM_uint32 tmpmin;
size_t i;
generic_gss_release_oid(&tmpmin, &sc->internal_mech);
gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin, &sc->ctx_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
/* Find supportedMech in sc->mech_set. */
for (i = 0; i < sc->mech_set->count; i++) {
if (g_OID_equal(supportedMech, &sc->mech_set->elements[i]))
break;
}
if (i == sc->mech_set->count)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
sc->internal_mech = &sc->mech_set->elements[i];
/*
* Windows 2003 and earlier don't correctly send a
* negState of request-mic when counter-proposing a
* mechanism. They probably don't handle mechListMICs
* properly either.
*/
if (acc_negState != REQUEST_MIC)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
sc->mech_complete = 0;
sc->mic_reqd = 1;
*negState = REQUEST_MIC;
*tokflag = CONT_TOKEN_SEND;
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the init_ctx_reselect function in the SPNEGO initiator in lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.10.x through 1.12.x before 1.12.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly execute arbitrary code via network traffic that appears to come from an intended acceptor, but specifies a security mechanism different from the one proposed by the initiator.
Commit Message: Fix double-free in SPNEGO [CVE-2014-4343]
In commit cd7d6b08 ("Verify acceptor's mech in SPNEGO initiator") the
pointer sc->internal_mech became an alias into sc->mech_set->elements,
which should be considered constant for the duration of the SPNEGO
context. So don't free it.
CVE-2014-4343:
In MIT krb5 releases 1.10 and newer, an unauthenticated remote
attacker with the ability to spoof packets appearing to be from a
GSSAPI acceptor can cause a double-free condition in GSSAPI initiators
(clients) which are using the SPNEGO mechanism, by returning a
different underlying mechanism than was proposed by the initiator. At
this stage of the negotiation, the acceptor is unauthenticated, and
the acceptor's response could be spoofed by an attacker with the
ability to inject traffic to the initiator.
Historically, some double-free vulnerabilities can be translated into
remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be tailored
to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated. Double-frees can also be exploited to cause an
application crash, for a denial of service. However, most GSSAPI
client applications are not vulnerable, as the SPNEGO mechanism is not
used by default (when GSS_C_NO_OID is passed as the mech_type argument
to gss_init_sec_context()). The most common use of SPNEGO is for
HTTP-Negotiate, used in web browsers and other web clients. Most such
clients are believed to not offer HTTP-Negotiate by default, instead
requiring a whitelist of sites for which it may be used to be
configured. If the whitelist is configured to only allow
HTTP-Negotiate over TLS connections ("https://"), a successful
attacker must also spoof the web server's SSL certificate, due to the
way the WWW-Authenticate header is sent in a 401 (Unauthorized)
response message. Unfortunately, many instructions for enabling
HTTP-Negotiate in common web browsers do not include a TLS
requirement.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary and CVSSv2 vector]
ticket: 7969 (new)
target_version: 1.12.2
tags: pullup
|
High
| 166,311
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
((void) p);
((void) end);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
((void) p);
((void) end);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server
* doesn't use a psk_identity_hint
*/
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE )
{
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
/* Current message is probably either
* CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key exchange message must "
"not be skipped" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
} /* FALLTROUGH */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
; /* nothing more to do */
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
p, end - p );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
size_t sig_len, hashlen;
unsigned char hash[64];
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
size_t params_len = p - params;
/*
* Handle the digitally-signed structure
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
if( ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( ssl, &p, end,
&md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
if( pk_alg != mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
/* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else
#endif
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/*
* Read signature
*/
sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
p += 2;
if( end != p + sig_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "signature", p, sig_len );
/*
* Compute the hash that has been signed
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
hashlen = 36;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, params,
params_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
/* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
hashlen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, params,
params_len, md_alg );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen != 0 ? hashlen :
(unsigned int) ( mbedtls_md_get_size( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) ) );
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* Verify signature
*/
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
exit:
ssl->state++;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server key exchange" ) );
return( 0 );
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ARM mbed TLS before 2.1.11, before 2.7.2, and before 2.8.0 has a buffer over-read in ssl_parse_server_key_exchange() that could cause a crash on invalid input.
Commit Message: Add bounds check before signature length read
|
Low
| 169,266
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void testRandomFrameDecode(const char* gifFile)
{
SCOPED_TRACE(gifFile);
RefPtr<SharedBuffer> fullData = readFile(gifFile);
ASSERT_TRUE(fullData.get());
Vector<unsigned> baselineHashes;
createDecodingBaseline(fullData.get(), &baselineHashes);
size_t frameCount = baselineHashes.size();
OwnPtr<GIFImageDecoder> decoder = createDecoder();
decoder->setData(fullData.get(), true);
const size_t skippingStep = 5;
for (size_t i = 0; i < skippingStep; ++i) {
for (size_t j = i; j < frameCount; j += skippingStep) {
SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "Random i:" << i << " j:" << j);
ImageFrame* frame = decoder->frameBufferAtIndex(j);
EXPECT_EQ(baselineHashes[j], hashSkBitmap(frame->getSkBitmap()));
}
}
decoder = createDecoder();
decoder->setData(fullData.get(), true);
for (size_t i = frameCount; i; --i) {
SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "Reverse i:" << i);
ImageFrame* frame = decoder->frameBufferAtIndex(i - 1);
EXPECT_EQ(baselineHashes[i - 1], hashSkBitmap(frame->getSkBitmap()));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the GIFImageReader::parseData function in platform/image-decoders/gif/GIFImageReader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted frame size in a GIF image.
Commit Message: Fix handling of broken GIFs with weird frame sizes
Code didn't handle well if a GIF frame has dimension greater than the
"screen" dimension. This will break deferred image decoding.
This change reports the size as final only when the first frame is
encountered.
Added a test to verify this behavior. Frame size reported by the decoder
should be constant.
BUG=437651
R=pkasting@chromium.org, senorblanco@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/813943003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@188423 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 172,028
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int crypto_skcipher_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher = __crypto_skcipher_cast(tfm);
struct skcipher_alg *alg = crypto_skcipher_alg(skcipher);
if (tfm->__crt_alg->cra_type == &crypto_blkcipher_type)
return crypto_init_skcipher_ops_blkcipher(tfm);
if (tfm->__crt_alg->cra_type == &crypto_ablkcipher_type ||
tfm->__crt_alg->cra_type == &crypto_givcipher_type)
return crypto_init_skcipher_ops_ablkcipher(tfm);
skcipher->setkey = alg->setkey;
skcipher->encrypt = alg->encrypt;
skcipher->decrypt = alg->decrypt;
skcipher->ivsize = alg->ivsize;
skcipher->keysize = alg->max_keysize;
if (alg->exit)
skcipher->base.exit = crypto_skcipher_exit_tfm;
if (alg->init)
return alg->init(skcipher);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The crypto_skcipher_init_tfm function in crypto/skcipher.c in the Linux kernel through 4.11.2 relies on a setkey function that lacks a key-size check, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 168,112
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MediaGalleriesCustomBindings::MediaGalleriesCustomBindings(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetMediaFileSystemObject",
base::Bind(&MediaGalleriesCustomBindings::GetMediaFileSystemObject,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
|
Medium
| 173,275
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SchedulerObject::release(std::string key, std::string &reason, std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster < 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Release: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
if (!releaseJob(id.cluster,
id.proc,
reason.c_str(),
true, // Always perform this action within a transaction
false, // Do not email the user about this action
false // Do not email admin about this action
)) {
text = "Failed to release job";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: aviary/jobcontrol.py in Condor, as used in Red Hat Enterprise MRG 2.3, when removing a job, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd restart) via square brackets in the cproc option.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,833
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static SharedMemorySupport DoQuerySharedMemorySupport(Display* dpy) {
int dummy;
Bool pixmaps_supported;
if (!XShmQueryVersion(dpy, &dummy, &dummy, &pixmaps_supported))
return SHARED_MEMORY_NONE;
#if defined(OS_FREEBSD)
int allow_removed;
size_t length = sizeof(allow_removed);
if ((sysctlbyname("kern.ipc.shm_allow_removed", &allow_removed, &length,
NULL, 0) < 0) || allow_removed < 1) {
return SHARED_MEMORY_NONE;
}
#endif
int shmkey = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, 1, 0666);
if (shmkey == -1)
return SHARED_MEMORY_NONE;
void* address = shmat(shmkey, NULL, 0);
shmctl(shmkey, IPC_RMID, NULL);
XShmSegmentInfo shminfo;
memset(&shminfo, 0, sizeof(shminfo));
shminfo.shmid = shmkey;
gdk_error_trap_push();
bool result = XShmAttach(dpy, &shminfo);
XSync(dpy, False);
if (gdk_error_trap_pop())
result = false;
shmdt(address);
if (!result)
return SHARED_MEMORY_NONE;
XShmDetach(dpy, &shminfo);
return pixmaps_supported ? SHARED_MEMORY_PIXMAP : SHARED_MEMORY_PUTIMAGE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 on Linux uses weak permissions for shared memory segments, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,594
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: LPSTR tr_esc_str(LPCSTR arg, bool format)
{
LPSTR tmp = NULL;
size_t cs = 0, x, ds, len;
size_t s;
if (NULL == arg)
return NULL;
s = strlen(arg);
/* Find trailing whitespaces */
while ((s > 0) && isspace(arg[s - 1]))
s--;
/* Prepare a initial buffer with the size of the result string. */
ds = s + 1;
if (s)
tmp = (LPSTR)realloc(tmp, ds * sizeof(CHAR));
if (NULL == tmp)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Could not allocate string buffer.\n");
exit(-2);
}
/* Copy character for character and check, if it is necessary to escape. */
memset(tmp, 0, ds * sizeof(CHAR));
for (x = 0; x < s; x++)
{
switch (arg[x])
{
case '<':
len = format ? 13 : 4;
ds += len - 1;
tmp = (LPSTR)realloc(tmp, ds * sizeof(CHAR));
if (NULL == tmp)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Could not reallocate string buffer.\n");
exit(-3);
}
if (format)
/* coverity[buffer_size] */
strncpy(&tmp[cs], "<replaceable>", len);
else
/* coverity[buffer_size] */
strncpy(&tmp[cs], "<", len);
cs += len;
break;
case '>':
len = format ? 14 : 4;
ds += len - 1;
tmp = (LPSTR)realloc(tmp, ds * sizeof(CHAR));
if (NULL == tmp)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Could not reallocate string buffer.\n");
exit(-4);
}
if (format)
/* coverity[buffer_size] */
strncpy(&tmp[cs], "</replaceable>", len);
else
/* coverity[buffer_size] */
strncpy(&tmp[cs], "<", len);
cs += len;
break;
case '\'':
ds += 5;
tmp = (LPSTR)realloc(tmp, ds * sizeof(CHAR));
if (NULL == tmp)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Could not reallocate string buffer.\n");
exit(-5);
}
tmp[cs++] = '&';
tmp[cs++] = 'a';
tmp[cs++] = 'p';
tmp[cs++] = 'o';
tmp[cs++] = 's';
tmp[cs++] = ';';
break;
case '"':
ds += 5;
tmp = (LPSTR)realloc(tmp, ds * sizeof(CHAR));
if (NULL == tmp)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Could not reallocate string buffer.\n");
exit(-6);
}
tmp[cs++] = '&';
tmp[cs++] = 'q';
tmp[cs++] = 'u';
tmp[cs++] = 'o';
tmp[cs++] = 't';
tmp[cs++] = ';';
break;
case '&':
ds += 4;
tmp = (LPSTR)realloc(tmp, ds * sizeof(CHAR));
if (NULL == tmp)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Could not reallocate string buffer.\n");
exit(-7);
}
tmp[cs++] = '&';
tmp[cs++] = 'a';
tmp[cs++] = 'm';
tmp[cs++] = 'p';
tmp[cs++] = ';';
break;
default:
tmp[cs++] = arg[x];
break;
}
/* Assure, the string is '\0' terminated. */
tmp[ds - 1] = '\0';
}
return tmp;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: HuffmanTree_makeFromFrequencies in lodepng.c in LodePNG through 2019-09-28, as used in WinPR in FreeRDP and other products, has a memory leak because a supplied realloc pointer (i.e., the first argument to realloc) is also used for a realloc return value.
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
|
Low
| 169,495
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Huff_Compress(msg_t *mbuf, int offset) {
int i, ch, size;
byte seq[65536];
byte* buffer;
huff_t huff;
size = mbuf->cursize - offset;
buffer = mbuf->data+ + offset;
if (size<=0) {
return;
}
Com_Memset(&huff, 0, sizeof(huff_t));
huff.tree = huff.lhead = huff.loc[NYT] = &(huff.nodeList[huff.blocNode++]);
huff.tree->symbol = NYT;
huff.tree->weight = 0;
huff.lhead->next = huff.lhead->prev = NULL;
huff.tree->parent = huff.tree->left = huff.tree->right = NULL;
seq[0] = (size>>8);
seq[1] = size&0xff;
bloc = 16;
for (i=0; i<size; i++ ) {
ch = buffer[i];
Huff_transmit(&huff, ch, seq); /* Transmit symbol */
Huff_addRef(&huff, (byte)ch); /* Do update */
}
bloc += 8; // next byte
mbuf->cursize = (bloc>>3) + offset;
Com_Memcpy(mbuf->data+offset, seq, (bloc>>3));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in ioquake3 before 2017-08-02 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
|
Low
| 167,993
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int pptp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
int sockaddr_len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_pppox *sp = (struct sockaddr_pppox *) uservaddr;
struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
struct pptp_opt *opt = &po->proto.pptp;
int error = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
opt->src_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp;
if (add_chan(po))
error = -EBUSY;
release_sock(sk);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The (1) pptp_bind and (2) pptp_connect functions in drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3 do not verify an address length, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism via a crafted application.
Commit Message: pptp: verify sockaddr_len in pptp_bind() and pptp_connect()
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,560
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jas_image_t *jp2_decode(jas_stream_t *in, char *optstr)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
int found;
jas_image_t *image;
jp2_dec_t *dec;
bool samedtype;
int dtype;
unsigned int i;
jp2_cmap_t *cmapd;
jp2_pclr_t *pclrd;
jp2_cdef_t *cdefd;
unsigned int channo;
int newcmptno;
int_fast32_t *lutents;
#if 0
jp2_cdefchan_t *cdefent;
int cmptno;
#endif
jp2_cmapent_t *cmapent;
jas_icchdr_t icchdr;
jas_iccprof_t *iccprof;
dec = 0;
box = 0;
image = 0;
if (!(dec = jp2_dec_create())) {
goto error;
}
/* Get the first box. This should be a JP box. */
if (!(box = jp2_box_get(in))) {
jas_eprintf("error: cannot get box\n");
goto error;
}
if (box->type != JP2_BOX_JP) {
jas_eprintf("error: expecting signature box\n");
goto error;
}
if (box->data.jp.magic != JP2_JP_MAGIC) {
jas_eprintf("incorrect magic number\n");
goto error;
}
jp2_box_destroy(box);
box = 0;
/* Get the second box. This should be a FTYP box. */
if (!(box = jp2_box_get(in))) {
goto error;
}
if (box->type != JP2_BOX_FTYP) {
jas_eprintf("expecting file type box\n");
goto error;
}
jp2_box_destroy(box);
box = 0;
/* Get more boxes... */
found = 0;
while ((box = jp2_box_get(in))) {
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jas_eprintf("got box type %s\n", box->info->name);
}
switch (box->type) {
case JP2_BOX_JP2C:
found = 1;
break;
case JP2_BOX_IHDR:
if (!dec->ihdr) {
dec->ihdr = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_BPCC:
if (!dec->bpcc) {
dec->bpcc = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_CDEF:
if (!dec->cdef) {
dec->cdef = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_PCLR:
if (!dec->pclr) {
dec->pclr = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_CMAP:
if (!dec->cmap) {
dec->cmap = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
case JP2_BOX_COLR:
if (!dec->colr) {
dec->colr = box;
box = 0;
}
break;
}
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
box = 0;
}
if (found) {
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
jas_eprintf("error: no code stream found\n");
goto error;
}
if (!(dec->image = jpc_decode(in, optstr))) {
jas_eprintf("error: cannot decode code stream\n");
goto error;
}
/* An IHDR box must be present. */
if (!dec->ihdr) {
jas_eprintf("error: missing IHDR box\n");
goto error;
}
/* Does the number of components indicated in the IHDR box match
the value specified in the code stream? */
if (dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.numcmpts != JAS_CAST(uint,
jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image))) {
jas_eprintf("warning: number of components mismatch\n");
}
/* At least one component must be present. */
if (!jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)) {
jas_eprintf("error: no components\n");
goto error;
}
/* Determine if all components have the same data type. */
samedtype = true;
dtype = jas_image_cmptdtype(dec->image, 0);
for (i = 1; i < JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)); ++i) {
if (jas_image_cmptdtype(dec->image, i) != dtype) {
samedtype = false;
break;
}
}
/* Is the component data type indicated in the IHDR box consistent
with the data in the code stream? */
if ((samedtype && dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.bpc != JP2_DTYPETOBPC(dtype)) ||
(!samedtype && dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.bpc != JP2_IHDR_BPCNULL)) {
jas_eprintf("warning: component data type mismatch\n");
}
/* Is the compression type supported? */
if (dec->ihdr->data.ihdr.comptype != JP2_IHDR_COMPTYPE) {
jas_eprintf("error: unsupported compression type\n");
goto error;
}
if (dec->bpcc) {
/* Is the number of components indicated in the BPCC box
consistent with the code stream data? */
if (dec->bpcc->data.bpcc.numcmpts != JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(
dec->image))) {
jas_eprintf("warning: number of components mismatch\n");
}
/* Is the component data type information indicated in the BPCC
box consistent with the code stream data? */
if (!samedtype) {
for (i = 0; i < JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image));
++i) {
if (jas_image_cmptdtype(dec->image, i) !=
JP2_BPCTODTYPE(dec->bpcc->data.bpcc.bpcs[i])) {
jas_eprintf("warning: component data type mismatch\n");
}
}
} else {
jas_eprintf("warning: superfluous BPCC box\n");
}
}
/* A COLR box must be present. */
if (!dec->colr) {
jas_eprintf("error: no COLR box\n");
goto error;
}
switch (dec->colr->data.colr.method) {
case JP2_COLR_ENUM:
jas_image_setclrspc(dec->image, jp2_getcs(&dec->colr->data.colr));
break;
case JP2_COLR_ICC:
iccprof = jas_iccprof_createfrombuf(dec->colr->data.colr.iccp,
dec->colr->data.colr.iccplen);
if (!iccprof) {
jas_eprintf("error: failed to parse ICC profile\n");
goto error;
}
jas_iccprof_gethdr(iccprof, &icchdr);
jas_eprintf("ICC Profile CS %08x\n", icchdr.colorspc);
jas_image_setclrspc(dec->image, fromiccpcs(icchdr.colorspc));
dec->image->cmprof_ = jas_cmprof_createfromiccprof(iccprof);
assert(dec->image->cmprof_);
jas_iccprof_destroy(iccprof);
break;
}
/* If a CMAP box is present, a PCLR box must also be present. */
if (dec->cmap && !dec->pclr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: missing PCLR box or superfluous CMAP box\n");
jp2_box_destroy(dec->cmap);
dec->cmap = 0;
}
/* If a CMAP box is not present, a PCLR box must not be present. */
if (!dec->cmap && dec->pclr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: missing CMAP box or superfluous PCLR box\n");
jp2_box_destroy(dec->pclr);
dec->pclr = 0;
}
/* Determine the number of channels (which is essentially the number
of components after any palette mappings have been applied). */
dec->numchans = dec->cmap ? dec->cmap->data.cmap.numchans :
JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image));
/* Perform a basic sanity check on the CMAP box if present. */
if (dec->cmap) {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
/* Is the component number reasonable? */
if (dec->cmap->data.cmap.ents[i].cmptno >= JAS_CAST(uint,
jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image))) {
jas_eprintf("error: invalid component number in CMAP box\n");
goto error;
}
/* Is the LUT index reasonable? */
if (dec->cmap->data.cmap.ents[i].pcol >=
dec->pclr->data.pclr.numchans) {
jas_eprintf("error: invalid CMAP LUT index\n");
goto error;
}
}
}
/* Allocate space for the channel-number to component-number LUT. */
if (!(dec->chantocmptlut = jas_alloc2(dec->numchans,
sizeof(uint_fast16_t)))) {
jas_eprintf("error: no memory\n");
goto error;
}
if (!dec->cmap) {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
dec->chantocmptlut[i] = i;
}
} else {
cmapd = &dec->cmap->data.cmap;
pclrd = &dec->pclr->data.pclr;
cdefd = &dec->cdef->data.cdef;
for (channo = 0; channo < cmapd->numchans; ++channo) {
cmapent = &cmapd->ents[channo];
if (cmapent->map == JP2_CMAP_DIRECT) {
dec->chantocmptlut[channo] = channo;
} else if (cmapent->map == JP2_CMAP_PALETTE) {
lutents = jas_alloc2(pclrd->numlutents, sizeof(int_fast32_t));
for (i = 0; i < pclrd->numlutents; ++i) {
lutents[i] = pclrd->lutdata[cmapent->pcol + i * pclrd->numchans];
}
newcmptno = jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image);
jas_image_depalettize(dec->image, cmapent->cmptno,
pclrd->numlutents, lutents,
JP2_BPCTODTYPE(pclrd->bpc[cmapent->pcol]), newcmptno);
dec->chantocmptlut[channo] = newcmptno;
jas_free(lutents);
#if 0
if (dec->cdef) {
cdefent = jp2_cdef_lookup(cdefd, channo);
if (!cdefent) {
abort();
}
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, newcmptno, jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image), cdefent->type, cdefent->assoc));
} else {
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, newcmptno, jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image), 0, channo + 1));
}
#endif
}
}
}
/* Mark all components as being of unknown type. */
for (i = 0; i < JAS_CAST(uint, jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)); ++i) {
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, i, JAS_IMAGE_CT_UNKNOWN);
}
/* Determine the type of each component. */
if (dec->cdef) {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
/* Is the channel number reasonable? */
if (dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].channo >= dec->numchans) {
jas_eprintf("error: invalid channel number in CDEF box\n");
goto error;
}
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image,
dec->chantocmptlut[dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].channo],
jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image),
dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].type,
dec->cdef->data.cdef.ents[i].assoc));
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < dec->numchans; ++i) {
jas_image_setcmpttype(dec->image, dec->chantocmptlut[i],
jp2_getct(jas_image_clrspc(dec->image), 0, i + 1));
}
}
/* Delete any components that are not of interest. */
for (i = jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image); i > 0; --i) {
if (jas_image_cmpttype(dec->image, i - 1) == JAS_IMAGE_CT_UNKNOWN) {
jas_image_delcmpt(dec->image, i - 1);
}
}
/* Ensure that some components survived. */
if (!jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image)) {
jas_eprintf("error: no components\n");
goto error;
}
#if 0
jas_eprintf("no of components is %d\n", jas_image_numcmpts(dec->image));
#endif
/* Prevent the image from being destroyed later. */
image = dec->image;
dec->image = 0;
jp2_dec_destroy(dec);
return image;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (dec) {
jp2_dec_destroy(dec);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,715
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: l2tp_q931_cc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
print_16bits_val(ndo, (const uint16_t *)dat);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %02x", dat[2]));
if (length > 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
print_string(ndo, dat+3, length-3);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,901
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ip_printroute(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register u_int ptr;
register u_int len;
if (length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", length));
return;
}
if ((length + 1) & 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", length));
ptr = cp[2] - 1;
if (ptr < 3 || ((ptr + 1) & 3) || ptr > length + 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad ptr %u]", cp[2]));
for (len = 3; len < length; len += 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &cp[len])));
if (ptr > len)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ip.c:ip_printroute().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13022/IP: Add bounds checks to ip_printroute().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
Low
| 167,870
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SplashOutputDev::drawSoftMaskedImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref,
Stream *str, int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
Stream *maskStr,
int maskWidth, int maskHeight,
GfxImageColorMap *maskColorMap) {
double *ctm;
SplashCoord mat[6];
SplashOutImageData imgData;
SplashOutImageData imgMaskData;
SplashColorMode srcMode;
SplashBitmap *maskBitmap;
Splash *maskSplash;
SplashColor maskColor;
GfxGray gray;
GfxRGB rgb;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
GfxCMYK cmyk;
#endif
Guchar pix;
int n, i;
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
imgMaskData.imgStr = new ImageStream(maskStr, maskWidth,
maskColorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
maskColorMap->getBits());
imgMaskData.imgStr->reset();
imgMaskData.colorMap = maskColorMap;
imgMaskData.maskColors = NULL;
imgMaskData.colorMode = splashModeMono8;
imgMaskData.width = maskWidth;
imgMaskData.height = maskHeight;
imgMaskData.y = 0;
n = 1 << maskColorMap->getBits();
imgMaskData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
maskColorMap->getGray(&pix, &gray);
imgMaskData.lookup[i] = colToByte(gray);
}
maskBitmap = new SplashBitmap(bitmap->getWidth(), bitmap->getHeight(),
1, splashModeMono8, gFalse);
maskSplash = new Splash(maskBitmap, vectorAntialias);
maskColor[0] = 0;
maskSplash->clear(maskColor);
maskSplash->drawImage(&imageSrc, &imgMaskData, splashModeMono8, gFalse,
maskWidth, maskHeight, mat);
delete imgMaskData.imgStr;
maskStr->close();
gfree(imgMaskData.lookup);
delete maskSplash;
splash->setSoftMask(maskBitmap);
imgData.imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgData.imgStr->reset();
imgData.colorMap = colorMap;
imgData.maskColors = NULL;
imgData.colorMode = colorMode;
imgData.width = width;
imgData.height = height;
imgData.y = 0;
imgData.lookup = NULL;
if (colorMap->getNumPixelComps() == 1) {
n = 1 << colorMap->getBits();
switch (colorMode) {
case splashModeMono1:
case splashModeMono8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getGray(&pix, &gray);
imgData.lookup[i] = colToByte(gray);
}
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(3 * n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[3*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[3*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[3*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
}
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(4 * n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = 255;
}
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(4 * n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getCMYK(&pix, &cmyk);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(cmyk.c);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(cmyk.m);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(cmyk.y);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = colToByte(cmyk.k);
}
break;
#endif
}
}
if (colorMode == splashModeMono1) {
srcMode = splashModeMono8;
} else {
srcMode = colorMode;
}
splash->drawImage(&imageSrc, &imgData, srcMode, gFalse, width, height, mat);
splash->setSoftMask(NULL);
gfree(imgData.lookup);
delete imgData.imgStr;
str->close();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,616
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<service_manager::Service> CreateMediaService() {
return std::unique_ptr<service_manager::Service>(
new ::media::MediaService(base::MakeUnique<CdmMojoMediaClient>()));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: SkPictureShader.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging access to a renderer process and providing crafted serialized data.
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
|
Low
| 171,941
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const SeekHead* Segment::GetSeekHead() const
{
return m_pSeekHead;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,353
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int nfs_readlink_reply(unsigned char *pkt, unsigned len)
{
uint32_t *data;
char *path;
int rlen;
int ret;
ret = rpc_check_reply(pkt, 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
data = (uint32_t *)(pkt + sizeof(struct rpc_reply));
data++;
rlen = ntohl(net_read_uint32(data)); /* new path length */
data++;
path = (char *)data;
} else {
memcpy(nfs_path, path, rlen);
nfs_path[rlen] = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Pengutronix barebox through 2019.08.1 has a remote buffer overflow in nfs_readlink_reply in net/nfs.c because a length field is directly used for a memcpy.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,625
|
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