instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static u_int mp_dss_len(const struct mp_dss *m, int csum)
{
u_int len;
len = 4;
if (m->flags & MP_DSS_A) {
/* Ack present - 4 or 8 octets */
len += (m->flags & MP_DSS_a) ? 8 : 4;
}
if (m->flags & MP_DSS_M) {
/*
* Data Sequence Number (DSN), Subflow Sequence Number (SSN),
* Data-Level Length present, and Checksum possibly present.
* All but the Checksum are 10 bytes if the m flag is
* clear (4-byte DSN) and 14 bytes if the m flag is set
* (8-byte DSN).
*/
len += (m->flags & MP_DSS_m) ? 14 : 10;
/*
* The Checksum is present only if negotiated.
*/
if (csum)
len += 2;
}
return len;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The MPTCP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-mptcp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13040/MPTCP: Clean up printing DSS suboption.
Do the length checking inline; that means we print stuff up to the point
at which we run out of option data.
First check to make sure we have at least 4 bytes of option, so we have
flags to check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kim Gwan Yeong.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,836
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _pyfribidi_log2vis (PyObject * self, PyObject * args, PyObject * kw)
{
PyObject *logical = NULL; /* input unicode or string object */
FriBidiParType base = FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL; /* optional direction */
const char *encoding = "utf-8"; /* optional input string encoding */
int clean = 0; /* optional flag to clean the string */
int reordernsm = 1; /* optional flag to allow reordering of non spacing marks*/
static char *kwargs[] =
{ "logical", "base_direction", "encoding", "clean", "reordernsm", NULL };
if (!PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords (args, kw, "O|isii", kwargs,
&logical, &base, &encoding, &clean, &reordernsm))
return NULL;
/* Validate base */
if (!(base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL ||
base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_LTR || base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_ON))
return PyErr_Format (PyExc_ValueError,
"invalid value %d: use either RTL, LTR or ON",
base);
/* Check object type and delegate to one of the log2vis functions */
if (PyUnicode_Check (logical))
return log2vis_unicode (logical, base, clean, reordernsm);
else if (PyString_Check (logical))
return log2vis_encoded_string (logical, encoding, base, clean, reordernsm);
else
return PyErr_Format (PyExc_TypeError,
"expected unicode or str, not %s",
logical->ob_type->tp_name);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode function in PyFriBidi before 0.11.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a 4-byte utf-8 sequence.
Commit Message: refactor pyfribidi.c module
pyfribidi.c is now compiled as _pyfribidi. This module only handles
unicode internally and doesn't use the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode
function (which can't handle 4 byte utf-8 sequences). This fixes the
buffer overflow in issue #2.
The code is now also much simpler: pyfribidi.c is down from 280 to 130
lines of code.
We now ship a pure python pyfribidi that handles the case when
non-unicode strings are passed in.
We now also adapt the size of the output string if clean=True is
passed.
|
Low
| 165,638
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *stateid, int open_flags)
{
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags) == 0)
memcpy(state->stateid.data, stateid->data, sizeof(state->stateid.data));
memcpy(state->open_stateid.data, stateid->data, sizeof(state->open_stateid.data));
switch (open_flags) {
case FMODE_READ:
set_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
break;
case FMODE_WRITE:
set_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
set_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,706
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: spnego_gss_inquire_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_name_t *src_name,
gss_name_t *targ_name,
OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec,
gss_OID *mech_type,
OM_uint32 *ctx_flags,
int *locally_initiated,
int *opened)
{
OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
ret = gss_inquire_context(minor_status,
context_handle,
src_name,
targ_name,
lifetime_rec,
mech_type,
ctx_flags,
locally_initiated,
opened);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,661
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::OnIntermediatePathDetermined(
DownloadFileManager* file_manager,
const FilePath& intermediate_path,
bool ok_to_overwrite) {
DownloadFileManager::RenameCompletionCallback callback =
base::Bind(&DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadRenamedToIntermediateName,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadFileManager::RenameInProgressDownloadFile,
file_manager, GetGlobalId(), intermediate_path,
ok_to_overwrite, callback));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,884
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void ResetModel() {
last_pts_ = 0;
bits_in_buffer_model_ = cfg_.rc_target_bitrate * cfg_.rc_buf_initial_sz;
frame_number_ = 0;
first_drop_ = 0;
bits_total_ = 0;
duration_ = 0.0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,517
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void encode_frame(vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec,
vpx_image_t *img,
int frame_index,
VpxVideoWriter *writer) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt = NULL;
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(codec, img, frame_index, 1, 0,
VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK)
die_codec(codec, "Failed to encode frame");
while ((pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(codec, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
const int keyframe = (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) != 0;
if (!vpx_video_writer_write_frame(writer,
pkt->data.frame.buf,
pkt->data.frame.sz,
pkt->data.frame.pts)) {
die_codec(codec, "Failed to write compressed frame");
}
printf(keyframe ? "K" : ".");
fflush(stdout);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,481
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
__be16 dport)
{
struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
u32 hash[12];
memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
hash[4] = (__force u32)dport;
memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
return twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) IPv4 and (2) IPv6 implementations in the Linux kernel before 3.1 use a modified MD4 algorithm to generate sequence numbers and Fragment Identification values, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) or hijack network sessions by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 165,767
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int em_call_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u16 sel, old_cs;
ulong old_eip;
int rc;
old_cs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_CS);
old_eip = ctxt->_eip;
memcpy(&sel, ctxt->src.valptr + ctxt->op_bytes, 2);
if (load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, VCPU_SREG_CS))
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
ctxt->_eip = 0;
memcpy(&ctxt->_eip, ctxt->src.valptr, ctxt->op_bytes);
ctxt->src.val = old_cs;
rc = em_push(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
ctxt->src.val = old_eip;
return em_push(ctxt);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during loading the new RIP, we are left in
unconsistent state. Therefore, this patch saves on 64-bit the old CS
descriptor and restores it if loading RIP failed.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,338
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ChildThread::Shutdown() {
file_system_dispatcher_.reset();
quota_dispatcher_.reset();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the ChildThread::Shutdown function in content/child/child_thread.cc in the filesystem API in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.153 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to a Blink shutdown.
Commit Message: [FileAPI] Clean up WebFileSystemImpl before Blink shutdown
WebFileSystemImpl should not outlive V8 instance, since it may have references to V8.
This CL ensures it deleted before Blink shutdown.
BUG=369525
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/270633009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269345 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,672
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void EncoderTest::InitializeConfig() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res = codec_->DefaultEncoderConfig(&cfg_, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,538
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file **lower_file,
struct dentry *lower_dentry,
struct vfsmount *lower_mnt,
const struct cred *cred)
{
struct ecryptfs_open_req req;
int flags = O_LARGEFILE;
int rc = 0;
init_completion(&req.done);
req.lower_file = lower_file;
req.path.dentry = lower_dentry;
req.path.mnt = lower_mnt;
/* Corresponding dput() and mntput() are done when the
* lower file is fput() when all eCryptfs files for the inode are
* released. */
flags |= IS_RDONLY(d_inode(lower_dentry)) ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR;
(*lower_file) = dentry_open(&req.path, flags, cred);
if (!IS_ERR(*lower_file))
goto out;
if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) {
rc = PTR_ERR((*lower_file));
goto out;
}
mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.mux);
if (ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.flags & ECRYPTFS_KTHREAD_ZOMBIE) {
rc = -EIO;
mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.mux);
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: We are in the middle of shutting down; "
"aborting privileged request to open lower file\n",
__func__);
goto out;
}
list_add_tail(&req.kthread_ctl_list, &ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.req_list);
mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.mux);
wake_up(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.wait);
wait_for_completion(&req.done);
if (IS_ERR(*lower_file))
rc = PTR_ERR(*lower_file);
out:
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ecryptfs_privileged_open function in fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c in the Linux kernel before 4.6.3 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (stack memory consumption) via vectors involving crafted mmap calls for /proc pathnames, leading to recursive pagefault handling.
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
|
Low
| 167,443
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeFactor() {
if (lex->tk==LEX_ID) {
JsVar *a = jspGetNamedVariable(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex));
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_ID);
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
if (lex->tk==LEX_TEMPLATE_LITERAL)
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Tagged template literals not supported");
else if (lex->tk==LEX_ARROW_FUNCTION && jsvIsName(a)) {
JsVar *funcVar = jspeArrowFunction(0,a);
jsvUnLock(a);
a=funcVar;
}
#endif
return a;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_INT) {
JsVar *v = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
v = jsvNewFromLongInteger(stringToInt(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex)));
}
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_INT);
return v;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_FLOAT) {
JsVar *v = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
v = jsvNewFromFloat(stringToFloat(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex)));
}
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_FLOAT);
return v;
} else if (lex->tk=='(') {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH('(');
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
#ifdef SAVE_ON_FLASH
JsVar *a = jspeExpression();
if (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE) JSP_MATCH_WITH_RETURN(')',a);
return a;
#else
return jspeExpressionOrArrowFunction();
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_TRUE) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_TRUE);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewFromBool(true) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_FALSE) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_FALSE);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewFromBool(false) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_NULL) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_NULL);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewWithFlags(JSV_NULL) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_UNDEFINED) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_UNDEFINED);
return 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_STR) {
JsVar *a = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE)
a = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_STR);
return a;
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_TEMPLATE_LITERAL) {
return jspeTemplateLiteral();
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_REGEX) {
JsVar *a = 0;
#ifdef SAVE_ON_FLASH
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "RegEx are not supported in this version of Espruino\n");
#else
JsVar *regex = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
size_t regexEnd = 0, regexLen = 0;
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&it, regex, 0);
while (jsvStringIteratorHasChar(&it)) {
regexLen++;
if (jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&it)=='/')
regexEnd = regexLen;
jsvStringIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
JsVar *flags = 0;
if (regexEnd < regexLen)
flags = jsvNewFromStringVar(regex, regexEnd, JSVAPPENDSTRINGVAR_MAXLENGTH);
JsVar *regexSource = jsvNewFromStringVar(regex, 1, regexEnd-2);
a = jswrap_regexp_constructor(regexSource, flags);
jsvUnLock3(regex, flags, regexSource);
#endif
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_REGEX);
return a;
} else if (lex->tk=='{') {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorObject();
} else if (lex->tk=='[') {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorArray();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_FUNCTION) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_FUNCTION);
return jspeFunctionDefinition(true);
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_CLASS) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_CLASS);
return jspeClassDefinition(true);
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_SUPER) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_SUPER);
/* This is kind of nasty, since super appears to do
three different things.
* In the constructor it references the extended class's constructor
* in a method it references the constructor's prototype.
* in a static method it references the extended class's constructor (but this is different)
*/
if (jsvIsObject(execInfo.thisVar)) {
JsVar *proto1 = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.thisVar, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0); // if we're in a method, get __proto__ first
JsVar *proto2 = jsvIsObject(proto1) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto1, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0) : 0; // still in method, get __proto__.__proto__
jsvUnLock(proto1);
if (!proto2) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
}
if (lex->tk=='(') return proto2; // eg. used in a constructor
JsVar *proto3 = jsvIsFunction(proto2) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto2, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, 0) : 0;
jsvUnLock(proto2);
return proto3;
} else if (jsvIsFunction(execInfo.thisVar)) {
JsVar *proto1 = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.thisVar, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, 0);
JsVar *proto2 = jsvIsObject(proto1) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto1, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0) : 0;
jsvUnLock(proto1);
if (!proto2) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
}
return proto2;
}
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_THIS) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_THIS);
return jsvLockAgain( execInfo.thisVar ? execInfo.thisVar : execInfo.root );
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_DELETE) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorDelete();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_TYPEOF) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorTypeOf();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_VOID) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_VOID);
jsvUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression());
return 0;
}
JSP_MATCH(LEX_EOF);
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Unexpected end of Input\n");
return 0;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspePostfixExpression(JsVar *a) {
while (lex->tk==LEX_PLUSPLUS || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSMINUS) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
JsVar *one = jsvNewFromInteger(1);
JsVar *oldValue = jsvAsNumberAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(a)); // keep the old value (but convert to number)
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(oldValue, one, op==LEX_PLUSPLUS ? '+' : '-');
jsvUnLock(one);
jspReplaceWith(a, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = oldValue;
}
}
return a;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspePostfixExpression() {
JsVar *a;
if (lex->tk==LEX_PLUSPLUS || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSMINUS) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
a = jspePostfixExpression();
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
JsVar *one = jsvNewFromInteger(1);
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(a, one, op==LEX_PLUSPLUS ? '+' : '-');
jsvUnLock(one);
jspReplaceWith(a, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
}
} else
a = jspeFactorFunctionCall();
return __jspePostfixExpression(a);
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeUnaryExpression() {
if (lex->tk=='!' || lex->tk=='~' || lex->tk=='-' || lex->tk=='+') {
short tk = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(tk);
if (!JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
return jspeUnaryExpression();
}
if (tk=='!') { // logical not
return jsvNewFromBool(!jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression())));
} else if (tk=='~') { // bitwise not
return jsvNewFromInteger(~jsvGetIntegerAndUnLock(jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression())));
} else if (tk=='-') { // unary minus
return jsvNegateAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression()); // names already skipped
} else if (tk=='+') { // unary plus (convert to number)
JsVar *v = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression());
JsVar *r = jsvAsNumber(v); // names already skipped
jsvUnLock(v);
return r;
}
assert(0);
return 0;
} else
return jspePostfixExpression();
}
unsigned int jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(int op) {
switch (op) {
case LEX_OROR: return 1; break;
case LEX_ANDAND: return 2; break;
case '|' : return 3; break;
case '^' : return 4; break;
case '&' : return 5; break;
case LEX_EQUAL:
case LEX_NEQUAL:
case LEX_TYPEEQUAL:
case LEX_NTYPEEQUAL: return 6;
case LEX_LEQUAL:
case LEX_GEQUAL:
case '<':
case '>':
case LEX_R_INSTANCEOF: return 7;
case LEX_R_IN: return (execInfo.execute&EXEC_FOR_INIT)?0:7;
case LEX_LSHIFT:
case LEX_RSHIFT:
case LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNED: return 8;
case '+':
case '-': return 9;
case '*':
case '/':
case '%': return 10;
default: return 0;
}
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeBinaryExpression(JsVar *a, unsigned int lastPrecedence) {
/* This one's a bit strange. Basically all the ops have their own precedence, it's not
* like & and | share the same precedence. We don't want to recurse for each one,
* so instead we do this.
*
* We deal with an expression in recursion ONLY if it's of higher precedence
* than the current one, otherwise we stick in the while loop.
*/
unsigned int precedence = jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(lex->tk);
while (precedence && precedence>lastPrecedence) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
if (op==LEX_ANDAND || op==LEX_OROR) {
bool aValue = jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(a));
if ((!aValue && op==LEX_ANDAND) ||
(aValue && op==LEX_OROR)) {
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(__jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence));
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
} else {
jsvUnLock(a);
a = __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence);
}
} else { // else it's a more 'normal' logical expression - just use Maths
JsVar *b = __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence);
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
if (op==LEX_R_IN) {
JsVar *av = jsvSkipName(a); // needle
JsVar *bv = jsvSkipName(b); // haystack
if (jsvIsArray(bv) || jsvIsObject(bv)) { // search keys, NOT values
av = jsvAsArrayIndexAndUnLock(av);
JsVar *varFound = jspGetVarNamedField( bv, av, true);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = jsvNewFromBool(varFound!=0);
jsvUnLock(varFound);
} else {// else it will be undefined
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Cannot use 'in' operator to search a %t", bv);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = 0;
}
jsvUnLock2(av, bv);
} else if (op==LEX_R_INSTANCEOF) {
bool inst = false;
JsVar *av = jsvSkipName(a);
JsVar *bv = jsvSkipName(b);
if (!jsvIsFunction(bv)) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Expecting a function on RHS in instanceof check, got %t", bv);
} else {
if (jsvIsObject(av) || jsvIsFunction(av)) {
JsVar *bproto = jspGetNamedField(bv, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, false);
JsVar *proto = jsvObjectGetChild(av, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0);
while (proto) {
if (proto == bproto) inst=true;
JsVar *childProto = jsvObjectGetChild(proto, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0);
jsvUnLock(proto);
proto = childProto;
}
if (jspIsConstructor(bv, "Object")) inst = true;
jsvUnLock(bproto);
}
if (!inst) {
const char *name = jswGetBasicObjectName(av);
if (name) {
inst = jspIsConstructor(bv, name);
}
if (!inst && (jsvIsArray(av) || jsvIsArrayBuffer(av)) &&
jspIsConstructor(bv, "Object"))
inst = true;
}
}
jsvUnLock3(av, bv, a);
a = jsvNewFromBool(inst);
} else { // --------------------------------------------- NORMAL
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(a, b, op);
jsvUnLock(a); a = res;
}
}
jsvUnLock(b);
}
precedence = jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(lex->tk);
}
return a;
}
JsVar *jspeBinaryExpression() {
return __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),0);
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeConditionalExpression(JsVar *lhs) {
if (lex->tk=='?') {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH('?');
if (!JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_MATCH(':');
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
} else {
bool first = jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(lhs));
jsvUnLock(lhs);
if (first) {
lhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
JSP_MATCH(':');
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
} else {
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
JSP_MATCH(':');
lhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
}
}
}
return lhs;
}
JsVar *jspeConditionalExpression() {
return __jspeConditionalExpression(jspeBinaryExpression());
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeAssignmentExpression(JsVar *lhs) {
if (lex->tk=='=' || lex->tk==LEX_PLUSEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_MULEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_DIVEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_MODEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_ANDEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_OREQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_XOREQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL) {
JsVar *rhs;
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
rhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
rhs = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(rhs); // ensure we get rid of any references on the RHS
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE && lhs) {
if (op=='=') {
/* If we're assigning to this and we don't have a parent,
* add it to the symbol table root */
if (!jsvGetRefs(lhs) && jsvIsName(lhs)) {
if (!jsvIsArrayBufferName(lhs) && !jsvIsNewChild(lhs))
jsvAddName(execInfo.root, lhs);
}
jspReplaceWith(lhs, rhs);
} else {
if (op==LEX_PLUSEQUAL) op='+';
else if (op==LEX_MINUSEQUAL) op='-';
else if (op==LEX_MULEQUAL) op='*';
else if (op==LEX_DIVEQUAL) op='/';
else if (op==LEX_MODEQUAL) op='%';
else if (op==LEX_ANDEQUAL) op='&';
else if (op==LEX_OREQUAL) op='|';
else if (op==LEX_XOREQUAL) op='^';
else if (op==LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL) op=LEX_RSHIFT;
else if (op==LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL) op=LEX_LSHIFT;
else if (op==LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL) op=LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNED;
if (op=='+' && jsvIsName(lhs)) {
JsVar *currentValue = jsvSkipName(lhs);
if (jsvIsString(currentValue) && !jsvIsFlatString(currentValue) && jsvGetRefs(currentValue)==1 && rhs!=currentValue) {
/* A special case for string += where this is the only use of the string
* and we're not appending to ourselves. In this case we can do a
* simple append (rather than clone + append)*/
JsVar *str = jsvAsString(rhs, false);
jsvAppendStringVarComplete(currentValue, str);
jsvUnLock(str);
op = 0;
}
jsvUnLock(currentValue);
}
if (op) {
/* Fallback which does a proper add */
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(lhs,rhs,op);
jspReplaceWith(lhs, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
}
}
}
jsvUnLock(rhs);
}
return lhs;
}
JsVar *jspeAssignmentExpression() {
return __jspeAssignmentExpression(jspeConditionalExpression());
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeExpression() {
while (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE) {
JsVar *a = jspeAssignmentExpression();
if (lex->tk!=',') return a;
jsvUnLock(a);
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(',');
}
return 0;
}
/** Parse a block `{ ... }` but assume brackets are already parsed */
NO_INLINE void jspeBlockNoBrackets() {
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
while (lex->tk && lex->tk!='}') {
jsvUnLock(jspeStatement());
if (JSP_HAS_ERROR) {
if (lex && !(execInfo.execute&EXEC_ERROR_LINE_REPORTED)) {
execInfo.execute = (JsExecFlags)(execInfo.execute | EXEC_ERROR_LINE_REPORTED);
JsVar *stackTrace = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.hiddenRoot, JSPARSE_STACKTRACE_VAR, JSV_STRING_0);
if (stackTrace) {
jsvAppendPrintf(stackTrace, "at ");
jspAppendStackTrace(stackTrace);
jsvUnLock(stackTrace);
}
}
}
if (JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE)
return;
}
} else {
int brackets = 0;
while (lex->tk && (brackets || lex->tk != '}')) {
if (lex->tk == '{') brackets++;
if (lex->tk == '}') brackets--;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(lex->tk);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Espruino before 1.99 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) with a user crafted input file via a Buffer Overflow during syntax parsing of *VOID* tokens in jsparse.c.
Commit Message: Fix stack overflow if void void void... is repeated many times (fix #1434)
|
Medium
| 169,214
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> idbKeyCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.idbKey");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(RefPtr<IDBKey>, key, createIDBKeyFromValue(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
imp->idbKey(key.get());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,084
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int sfgets(void)
{
struct pollfd pfd;
int pollret;
ssize_t readnb;
signed char seen_r = 0;
static size_t scanned;
static size_t readnbd;
if (scanned > (size_t) 0U) { /* support pipelining */
readnbd -= scanned;
memmove(cmd, cmd + scanned, readnbd); /* safe */
scanned = (size_t) 0U;
}
pfd.fd = clientfd;
#ifdef __APPLE_CC__
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLERR | POLLHUP;
#else
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLPRI | POLLERR | POLLHUP;
#endif
while (scanned < cmdsize) {
if (scanned >= readnbd) { /* nothing left in the buffer */
pfd.revents = 0;
while ((pollret = poll(&pfd, 1U, idletime * 1000UL)) < 0 &&
errno == EINTR);
if (pollret == 0) {
return -1;
}
if (pollret <= 0 ||
(pfd.revents & (POLLERR | POLLHUP | POLLNVAL)) != 0) {
return -2;
}
if ((pfd.revents & (POLLIN | POLLPRI)) == 0) {
continue;
}
if (readnbd >= cmdsize) {
break;
}
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if (tls_cnx != NULL) {
while ((readnb = SSL_read
(tls_cnx, cmd + readnbd, cmdsize - readnbd))
< (ssize_t) 0 && errno == EINTR);
} else
#endif
{
while ((readnb = read(clientfd, cmd + readnbd,
cmdsize - readnbd)) < (ssize_t) 0 &&
errno == EINTR);
}
if (readnb <= (ssize_t) 0) {
return -2;
}
readnbd += readnb;
if (readnbd > cmdsize) {
return -2;
}
}
#ifdef RFC_CONFORMANT_LINES
if (seen_r != 0) {
#endif
if (cmd[scanned] == '\n') {
#ifndef RFC_CONFORMANT_LINES
if (seen_r != 0) {
#endif
cmd[scanned - 1U] = 0;
#ifndef RFC_CONFORMANT_LINES
} else {
cmd[scanned] = 0;
}
#endif
if (++scanned >= readnbd) { /* non-pipelined command */
scanned = readnbd = (size_t) 0U;
}
return 0;
}
seen_r = 0;
#ifdef RFC_CONFORMANT_LINES
}
#endif
if (ISCTRLCODE(cmd[scanned])) {
if (cmd[scanned] == '\r') {
seen_r = 1;
}
#ifdef RFC_CONFORMANT_PARSER /* disabled by default, intentionnaly */
else if (cmd[scanned] == 0) {
cmd[scanned] = '\n';
}
#else
/* replace control chars with _ */
cmd[scanned] = '_';
#endif
}
scanned++;
}
die(421, LOG_WARNING, MSG_LINE_TOO_LONG); /* don't remove this */
return 0; /* to please GCC */
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The STARTTLS implementation in ftp_parser.c in Pure-FTPd before 1.0.30 does not properly restrict I/O buffering, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to insert commands into encrypted FTP sessions by sending a cleartext command that is processed after TLS is in place, related to a *plaintext command injection* attack, a similar issue to CVE-2011-0411.
Commit Message: Flush the command buffer after switching to TLS.
Fixes a flaw similar to CVE-2011-0411.
|
Medium
| 165,526
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int AudioRendererAlgorithm::FillBuffer(
uint8* dest, int requested_frames) {
DCHECK_NE(bytes_per_frame_, 0);
if (playback_rate_ == 0.0f)
return 0;
int total_frames_rendered = 0;
uint8* output_ptr = dest;
while (total_frames_rendered < requested_frames) {
if (index_into_window_ == window_size_)
ResetWindow();
bool rendered_frame = true;
if (playback_rate_ > 1.0)
rendered_frame = OutputFasterPlayback(output_ptr);
else if (playback_rate_ < 1.0)
rendered_frame = OutputSlowerPlayback(output_ptr);
else
rendered_frame = OutputNormalPlayback(output_ptr);
if (!rendered_frame) {
needs_more_data_ = true;
break;
}
output_ptr += bytes_per_frame_;
total_frames_rendered++;
}
return total_frames_rendered;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via vectors involving seek operations on video data.
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,527
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, __construct)
{
#if !HAVE_SPL
zend_throw_exception_ex(zend_exception_get_default(TSRMLS_C), 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot instantiate Phar object without SPL extension");
#else
char *fname, *alias = NULL, *error, *arch = NULL, *entry = NULL, *save_fname;
int fname_len, alias_len = 0, arch_len, entry_len, is_data;
#if PHP_VERSION_ID < 50300
long flags = 0;
#else
long flags = SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS|SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS;
#endif
long format = 0;
phar_archive_object *phar_obj;
phar_archive_data *phar_data;
zval *zobj = getThis(), arg1, arg2;
phar_obj = (phar_archive_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
is_data = instanceof_function(Z_OBJCE_P(zobj), phar_ce_data TSRMLS_CC);
if (is_data) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|ls!l", &fname, &fname_len, &flags, &alias, &alias_len, &format) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|ls!", &fname, &fname_len, &flags, &alias, &alias_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
if (phar_obj->arc.archive) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot call constructor twice");
return;
}
save_fname = fname;
if (SUCCESS == phar_split_fname(fname, fname_len, &arch, &arch_len, &entry, &entry_len, !is_data, 2 TSRMLS_CC)) {
/* use arch (the basename for the archive) for fname instead of fname */
/* this allows support for RecursiveDirectoryIterator of subdirectories */
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(arch, arch_len);
#endif
fname = arch;
fname_len = arch_len;
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
} else {
arch = estrndup(fname, fname_len);
arch_len = fname_len;
fname = arch;
phar_unixify_path_separators(arch, arch_len);
#endif
}
if (phar_open_or_create_filename(fname, fname_len, alias, alias_len, is_data, REPORT_ERRORS, &phar_data, &error TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
if (fname == arch && fname != save_fname) {
efree(arch);
fname = save_fname;
}
if (entry) {
efree(entry);
}
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"%s", error);
efree(error);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Phar creation or opening failed");
}
return;
}
if (is_data && phar_data->is_tar && phar_data->is_brandnew && format == PHAR_FORMAT_ZIP) {
phar_data->is_zip = 1;
phar_data->is_tar = 0;
}
if (fname == arch) {
efree(arch);
fname = save_fname;
}
if ((is_data && !phar_data->is_data) || (!is_data && phar_data->is_data)) {
if (is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"PharData class can only be used for non-executable tar and zip archives");
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Phar class can only be used for executable tar and zip archives");
}
efree(entry);
return;
}
is_data = phar_data->is_data;
if (!phar_data->is_persistent) {
++(phar_data->refcount);
}
phar_obj->arc.archive = phar_data;
phar_obj->spl.oth_handler = &phar_spl_foreign_handler;
if (entry) {
fname_len = spprintf(&fname, 0, "phar://%s%s", phar_data->fname, entry);
efree(entry);
} else {
fname_len = spprintf(&fname, 0, "phar://%s", phar_data->fname);
}
INIT_PZVAL(&arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&arg1, fname, fname_len, 0);
INIT_PZVAL(&arg2);
ZVAL_LONG(&arg2, flags);
zend_call_method_with_2_params(&zobj, Z_OBJCE_P(zobj),
&spl_ce_RecursiveDirectoryIterator->constructor, "__construct", NULL, &arg1, &arg2);
if (!phar_data->is_persistent) {
phar_obj->arc.archive->is_data = is_data;
} else if (!EG(exception)) {
/* register this guy so we can modify if necessary */
zend_hash_add(&PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_persist_map, (const char *) phar_obj->arc.archive, sizeof(phar_obj->arc.archive), (void *) &phar_obj, sizeof(phar_archive_object **), NULL);
}
phar_obj->spl.info_class = phar_ce_entry;
efree(fname);
#endif /* HAVE_SPL */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The phar_convert_to_other function in ext/phar/phar_object.c in PHP before 5.4.43, 5.5.x before 5.5.27, and 5.6.x before 5.6.11 does not validate a file pointer before a close operation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TAR archive that is mishandled in a Phar::convertToData call.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,291
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: InputMethodLibraryImpl()
: input_method_status_connection_(NULL),
should_launch_ime_(false),
ime_connected_(false),
defer_ime_startup_(false),
enable_auto_ime_shutdown_(true),
ibus_daemon_process_handle_(base::kNullProcessHandle),
#if !defined(TOUCH_UI)
initialized_successfully_(false),
candidate_window_controller_(NULL) {
#else
initialized_successfully_(false) {
#endif
notification_registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::APP_TERMINATING,
NotificationService::AllSources());
}
bool Init() {
DCHECK(!initialized_successfully_) << "Already initialized";
if (!CrosLibrary::Get()->EnsureLoaded())
return false;
input_method_status_connection_ = chromeos::MonitorInputMethodStatus(
this,
&InputMethodChangedHandler,
&RegisterPropertiesHandler,
&UpdatePropertyHandler,
&ConnectionChangeHandler);
if (!input_method_status_connection_)
return false;
initialized_successfully_ = true;
return true;
}
virtual ~InputMethodLibraryImpl() {
}
virtual void AddObserver(Observer* observer) {
if (!observers_.size()) {
observer->FirstObserverIsAdded(this);
}
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
virtual void RemoveObserver(Observer* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() {
chromeos::InputMethodDescriptors* result =
new chromeos::InputMethodDescriptors;
for (size_t i = 0; i < active_input_method_ids_.size(); ++i) {
const std::string& input_method_id = active_input_method_ids_[i];
const InputMethodDescriptor* descriptor =
chromeos::input_method::GetInputMethodDescriptorFromId(
input_method_id);
if (descriptor) {
result->push_back(*descriptor);
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Descriptor is not found for: " << input_method_id;
}
}
if (result->empty()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No active input methods found.";
result->push_back(input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor());
}
return result;
}
virtual size_t GetNumActiveInputMethods() {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> input_methods(GetActiveInputMethods());
return input_methods->size();
}
virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetSupportedInputMethods() {
if (!initialized_successfully_) {
InputMethodDescriptors* result = new InputMethodDescriptors;
result->push_back(input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor());
return result;
}
return chromeos::GetSupportedInputMethodDescriptors();
}
virtual void ChangeInputMethod(const std::string& input_method_id) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_ = input_method_id;
if (ibus_daemon_process_handle_ == base::kNullProcessHandle &&
chromeos::input_method::IsKeyboardLayout(input_method_id)) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(input_method_id);
} else {
StartInputMethodDaemon();
if (!ChangeInputMethodViaIBus(input_method_id)) {
VLOG(1) << "Failed to change the input method to " << input_method_id
<< " (deferring)";
}
}
}
virtual void SetImePropertyActivated(const std::string& key,
bool activated) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
DCHECK(!key.empty());
chromeos::SetImePropertyActivated(
input_method_status_connection_, key.c_str(), activated);
}
virtual bool InputMethodIsActivated(const std::string& input_method_id) {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> active_input_method_descriptors(
GetActiveInputMethods());
for (size_t i = 0; i < active_input_method_descriptors->size(); ++i) {
if (active_input_method_descriptors->at(i).id == input_method_id) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
virtual bool SetImeConfig(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList) {
active_input_method_ids_ = value.string_list_value;
}
MaybeStartInputMethodDaemon(section, config_name, value);
const ConfigKeyType key = std::make_pair(section, config_name);
current_config_values_[key] = value;
if (ime_connected_) {
pending_config_requests_[key] = value;
FlushImeConfig();
}
MaybeStopInputMethodDaemon(section, config_name, value);
MaybeChangeCurrentKeyboardLayout(section, config_name, value);
return pending_config_requests_.empty();
}
virtual InputMethodDescriptor previous_input_method() const {
if (previous_input_method_.id.empty()) {
return input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor();
}
return previous_input_method_;
}
virtual InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method() const {
if (current_input_method_.id.empty()) {
return input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor();
}
return current_input_method_;
}
virtual const ImePropertyList& current_ime_properties() const {
return current_ime_properties_;
}
virtual std::string GetKeyboardOverlayId(const std::string& input_method_id) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return "";
return chromeos::GetKeyboardOverlayId(input_method_id);
}
virtual void SendHandwritingStroke(const HandwritingStroke& stroke) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
chromeos::SendHandwritingStroke(input_method_status_connection_, stroke);
}
virtual void CancelHandwritingStrokes(int stroke_count) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
chromeos::CancelHandwriting(input_method_status_connection_, stroke_count);
}
private:
bool ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
return (value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList &&
value.string_list_value.size() == 1 &&
chromeos::input_method::IsKeyboardLayout(
value.string_list_value[0]));
}
void MaybeStartInputMethodDaemon(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList &&
!value.string_list_value.empty()) {
if (ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value) || defer_ime_startup_) {
return;
}
const bool just_started = StartInputMethodDaemon();
if (!just_started) {
return;
}
if (tentative_current_input_method_id_.empty()) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_ = current_input_method_.id;
}
if (std::find(value.string_list_value.begin(),
value.string_list_value.end(),
tentative_current_input_method_id_)
== value.string_list_value.end()) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_.clear();
}
}
}
void MaybeStopInputMethodDaemon(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value) &&
enable_auto_ime_shutdown_) {
StopInputMethodDaemon();
}
}
void MaybeChangeCurrentKeyboardLayout(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value)) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(value.string_list_value[0]);
}
}
bool ChangeInputMethodViaIBus(const std::string& input_method_id) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return false;
std::string input_method_id_to_switch = input_method_id;
if (!InputMethodIsActivated(input_method_id)) {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> input_methods(GetActiveInputMethods());
DCHECK(!input_methods->empty());
if (!input_methods->empty()) {
input_method_id_to_switch = input_methods->at(0).id;
LOG(INFO) << "Can't change the current input method to "
<< input_method_id << " since the engine is not preloaded. "
<< "Switch to " << input_method_id_to_switch << " instead.";
}
}
if (chromeos::ChangeInputMethod(input_method_status_connection_,
input_method_id_to_switch.c_str())) {
return true;
}
LOG(ERROR) << "Can't switch input method to " << input_method_id_to_switch;
return false;
}
void FlushImeConfig() {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
bool active_input_methods_are_changed = false;
InputMethodConfigRequests::iterator iter =
pending_config_requests_.begin();
while (iter != pending_config_requests_.end()) {
const std::string& section = iter->first.first;
const std::string& config_name = iter->first.second;
ImeConfigValue& value = iter->second;
if (config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
!tentative_current_input_method_id_.empty()) {
std::vector<std::string>::iterator engine_iter = std::find(
value.string_list_value.begin(),
value.string_list_value.end(),
tentative_current_input_method_id_);
if (engine_iter != value.string_list_value.end()) {
std::rotate(value.string_list_value.begin(),
engine_iter, // this becomes the new first element
value.string_list_value.end());
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << tentative_current_input_method_id_
<< " is not in preload_engines: " << value.ToString();
}
tentative_current_input_method_id_.erase();
}
if (chromeos::SetImeConfig(input_method_status_connection_,
section.c_str(),
config_name.c_str(),
value)) {
if (config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName) {
active_input_methods_are_changed = true;
VLOG(1) << "Updated preload_engines: " << value.ToString();
}
pending_config_requests_.erase(iter++);
} else {
break;
}
}
if (active_input_methods_are_changed) {
const size_t num_active_input_methods = GetNumActiveInputMethods();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
ActiveInputMethodsChanged(this,
current_input_method_,
num_active_input_methods));
}
}
static void InputMethodChangedHandler(
void* object,
const chromeos::InputMethodDescriptor& current_input_method) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->ChangeCurrentInputMethod(current_input_method);
}
static void RegisterPropertiesHandler(
void* object, const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->RegisterProperties(prop_list);
}
static void UpdatePropertyHandler(
void* object, const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->UpdateProperty(prop_list);
}
static void ConnectionChangeHandler(void* object, bool connected) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->ime_connected_ = connected;
if (connected) {
input_method_library->pending_config_requests_.clear();
input_method_library->pending_config_requests_.insert(
input_method_library->current_config_values_.begin(),
input_method_library->current_config_values_.end());
input_method_library->FlushImeConfig();
input_method_library->ChangeInputMethod(
input_method_library->previous_input_method().id);
input_method_library->ChangeInputMethod(
input_method_library->current_input_method().id);
}
}
void ChangeCurrentInputMethod(const InputMethodDescriptor& new_input_method) {
if (current_input_method_.id != new_input_method.id) {
previous_input_method_ = current_input_method_;
current_input_method_ = new_input_method;
if (!input_method::SetCurrentKeyboardLayoutByName(
current_input_method_.keyboard_layout)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to change keyboard layout to "
<< current_input_method_.keyboard_layout;
}
ObserverListBase<Observer>::Iterator it(observers_);
Observer* first_observer = it.GetNext();
if (first_observer) {
first_observer->PreferenceUpdateNeeded(this,
previous_input_method_,
current_input_method_);
}
}
const size_t num_active_input_methods = GetNumActiveInputMethods();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
InputMethodChanged(this,
current_input_method_,
num_active_input_methods));
}
void ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(const std::string& input_method_id) {
const chromeos::InputMethodDescriptor* descriptor =
chromeos::input_method::GetInputMethodDescriptorFromId(
input_method_id);
if (descriptor) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethod(*descriptor);
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Descriptor is not found for: " << input_method_id;
}
}
void RegisterProperties(const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
current_ime_properties_ = prop_list;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
PropertyListChanged(this,
current_ime_properties_));
}
bool StartInputMethodDaemon() {
should_launch_ime_ = true;
return MaybeLaunchInputMethodDaemon();
}
void UpdateProperty(const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < prop_list.size(); ++i) {
FindAndUpdateProperty(prop_list[i], ¤t_ime_properties_);
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
PropertyListChanged(this,
current_ime_properties_));
}
bool LaunchInputMethodProcess(const std::string& command_line,
base::ProcessHandle* process_handle) {
std::vector<std::string> argv;
base::file_handle_mapping_vector fds_to_remap;
base::ProcessHandle handle = base::kNullProcessHandle;
base::SplitString(command_line, ' ', &argv);
const bool result = base::LaunchApp(argv,
fds_to_remap, // no remapping
false, // wait
&handle);
if (!result) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not launch: " << command_line;
return false;
}
const base::ProcessId pid = base::GetProcId(handle);
g_child_watch_add(pid,
reinterpret_cast<GChildWatchFunc>(OnImeShutdown),
this);
*process_handle = handle;
VLOG(1) << command_line << " (PID=" << pid << ") is started";
return true;
}
bool MaybeLaunchInputMethodDaemon() {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return false;
if (!should_launch_ime_) {
return false;
}
#if !defined(TOUCH_UI)
if (!candidate_window_controller_.get()) {
candidate_window_controller_.reset(new CandidateWindowController);
if (!candidate_window_controller_->Init()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to initialize the candidate window controller";
}
}
#endif
if (ibus_daemon_process_handle_ != base::kNullProcessHandle) {
return false; // ibus-daemon is already running.
}
const std::string ibus_daemon_command_line =
StringPrintf("%s --panel=disable --cache=none --restart --replace",
kIBusDaemonPath);
if (!LaunchInputMethodProcess(
ibus_daemon_command_line, &ibus_daemon_process_handle_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch " << ibus_daemon_command_line;
return false;
}
return true;
}
static void OnImeShutdown(GPid pid,
gint status,
InputMethodLibraryImpl* library) {
if (library->ibus_daemon_process_handle_ != base::kNullProcessHandle &&
base::GetProcId(library->ibus_daemon_process_handle_) == pid) {
library->ibus_daemon_process_handle_ = base::kNullProcessHandle;
}
library->MaybeLaunchInputMethodDaemon();
}
void StopInputMethodDaemon() {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
should_launch_ime_ = false;
if (ibus_daemon_process_handle_ != base::kNullProcessHandle) {
const base::ProcessId pid = base::GetProcId(ibus_daemon_process_handle_);
if (!chromeos::StopInputMethodProcess(input_method_status_connection_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "StopInputMethodProcess IPC failed. Sending SIGTERM to "
<< "PID " << pid;
base::KillProcess(ibus_daemon_process_handle_, -1, false /* wait */);
}
VLOG(1) << "ibus-daemon (PID=" << pid << ") is terminated";
ibus_daemon_process_handle_ = base::kNullProcessHandle;
}
}
void SetDeferImeStartup(bool defer) {
VLOG(1) << "Setting DeferImeStartup to " << defer;
defer_ime_startup_ = defer;
}
void SetEnableAutoImeShutdown(bool enable) {
enable_auto_ime_shutdown_ = enable;
}
void Observe(NotificationType type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
if (type.value == NotificationType::APP_TERMINATING) {
notification_registrar_.RemoveAll();
StopInputMethodDaemon();
#if !defined(TOUCH_UI)
candidate_window_controller_.reset(NULL);
#endif
}
}
InputMethodStatusConnection* input_method_status_connection_;
ObserverList<Observer> observers_;
InputMethodDescriptor previous_input_method_;
InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method_;
ImePropertyList current_ime_properties_;
typedef std::pair<std::string, std::string> ConfigKeyType;
typedef std::map<ConfigKeyType, ImeConfigValue> InputMethodConfigRequests;
InputMethodConfigRequests pending_config_requests_;
InputMethodConfigRequests current_config_values_;
NotificationRegistrar notification_registrar_;
bool should_launch_ime_;
bool ime_connected_;
bool defer_ime_startup_;
bool enable_auto_ime_shutdown_;
std::string tentative_current_input_method_id_;
base::ProcessHandle ibus_daemon_process_handle_;
bool initialized_successfully_;
#if !defined(TOUCH_UI)
scoped_ptr<CandidateWindowController> candidate_window_controller_;
#endif
std::vector<std::string> active_input_method_ids_;
DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(InputMethodLibraryImpl);
};
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,497
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int prepend_path(const struct path *path,
const struct path *root,
char **buffer, int *buflen)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
struct vfsmount *vfsmnt;
struct mount *mnt;
int error = 0;
unsigned seq, m_seq = 0;
char *bptr;
int blen;
rcu_read_lock();
restart_mnt:
read_seqbegin_or_lock(&mount_lock, &m_seq);
seq = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
restart:
bptr = *buffer;
blen = *buflen;
error = 0;
dentry = path->dentry;
vfsmnt = path->mnt;
mnt = real_mount(vfsmnt);
read_seqbegin_or_lock(&rename_lock, &seq);
while (dentry != root->dentry || vfsmnt != root->mnt) {
struct dentry * parent;
if (dentry == vfsmnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
struct mount *parent = ACCESS_ONCE(mnt->mnt_parent);
/* Global root? */
if (mnt != parent) {
dentry = ACCESS_ONCE(mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
mnt = parent;
vfsmnt = &mnt->mnt;
continue;
}
if (!error)
error = is_mounted(vfsmnt) ? 1 : 2;
break;
}
parent = dentry->d_parent;
prefetch(parent);
error = prepend_name(&bptr, &blen, &dentry->d_name);
if (error)
break;
dentry = parent;
}
if (!(seq & 1))
rcu_read_unlock();
if (need_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq)) {
seq = 1;
goto restart;
}
done_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq);
if (!(m_seq & 1))
rcu_read_unlock();
if (need_seqretry(&mount_lock, m_seq)) {
m_seq = 1;
goto restart_mnt;
}
done_seqretry(&mount_lock, m_seq);
if (error >= 0 && bptr == *buffer) {
if (--blen < 0)
error = -ENAMETOOLONG;
else
*--bptr = '/';
}
*buffer = bptr;
*buflen = blen;
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The prepend_path function in fs/dcache.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2.4 does not properly handle rename actions inside a bind mount, which allows local users to bypass an intended container protection mechanism by renaming a directory, related to a *double-chroot attack.*
Commit Message: dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Medium
| 169,926
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: png_set_text_2(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_textp text_ptr,
int num_text)
{
int i;
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", ((png_ptr == NULL ||
png_ptr->chunk_name[0] == '\0') ?
"text" : (png_const_charp)png_ptr->chunk_name));
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL || num_text == 0)
return(0);
/* Make sure we have enough space in the "text" array in info_struct
* to hold all of the incoming text_ptr objects.
*/
if (info_ptr->num_text + num_text > info_ptr->max_text)
{
int old_max_text = info_ptr->max_text;
int old_num_text = info_ptr->num_text;
if (info_ptr->text != NULL)
{
png_textp old_text;
info_ptr->max_text = info_ptr->num_text + num_text + 8;
old_text = info_ptr->text;
info_ptr->text = (png_textp)png_malloc_warn(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(info_ptr->max_text * png_sizeof(png_text)));
if (info_ptr->text == NULL)
{
/* Restore to previous condition */
info_ptr->max_text = old_max_text;
info_ptr->text = old_text;
return(1);
}
png_memcpy(info_ptr->text, old_text, (png_size_t)(old_max_text *
png_sizeof(png_text)));
png_free(png_ptr, old_text);
}
else
{
info_ptr->max_text = num_text + 8;
info_ptr->num_text = 0;
info_ptr->text = (png_textp)png_malloc_warn(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(info_ptr->max_text * png_sizeof(png_text)));
if (info_ptr->text == NULL)
{
/* Restore to previous condition */
info_ptr->num_text = old_num_text;
info_ptr->max_text = old_max_text;
return(1);
}
#ifdef PNG_FREE_ME_SUPPORTED
info_ptr->free_me |= PNG_FREE_TEXT;
#endif
}
png_debug1(3, "allocated %d entries for info_ptr->text",
info_ptr->max_text);
}
for (i = 0; i < num_text; i++)
{
png_size_t text_length, key_len;
png_size_t lang_len, lang_key_len;
png_textp textp = &(info_ptr->text[info_ptr->num_text]);
if (text_ptr[i].key == NULL)
continue;
key_len = png_strlen(text_ptr[i].key);
if (text_ptr[i].compression <= 0)
{
lang_len = 0;
lang_key_len = 0;
}
else
#ifdef PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED
{
/* Set iTXt data */
if (text_ptr[i].lang != NULL)
lang_len = png_strlen(text_ptr[i].lang);
else
lang_len = 0;
if (text_ptr[i].lang_key != NULL)
lang_key_len = png_strlen(text_ptr[i].lang_key);
else
lang_key_len = 0;
}
#else /* PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED */
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "iTXt chunk not supported.");
continue;
}
#endif
if (text_ptr[i].text == NULL || text_ptr[i].text[0] == '\0')
{
text_length = 0;
#ifdef PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED
if (text_ptr[i].compression > 0)
textp->compression = PNG_ITXT_COMPRESSION_NONE;
else
#endif
textp->compression = PNG_TEXT_COMPRESSION_NONE;
}
else
{
text_length = png_strlen(text_ptr[i].text);
textp->compression = text_ptr[i].compression;
}
textp->key = (png_charp)png_malloc_warn(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)
(key_len + text_length + lang_len + lang_key_len + 4));
if (textp->key == NULL)
return(1);
png_debug2(2, "Allocated %lu bytes at %x in png_set_text",
(png_uint_32)
(key_len + lang_len + lang_key_len + text_length + 4),
(int)textp->key);
png_memcpy(textp->key, text_ptr[i].key,(png_size_t)(key_len));
*(textp->key + key_len) = '\0';
#ifdef PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED
if (text_ptr[i].compression > 0)
{
textp->lang = textp->key + key_len + 1;
png_memcpy(textp->lang, text_ptr[i].lang, lang_len);
*(textp->lang + lang_len) = '\0';
textp->lang_key = textp->lang + lang_len + 1;
png_memcpy(textp->lang_key, text_ptr[i].lang_key, lang_key_len);
*(textp->lang_key + lang_key_len) = '\0';
textp->text = textp->lang_key + lang_key_len + 1;
}
else
#endif
{
#ifdef PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED
textp->lang=NULL;
textp->lang_key=NULL;
#endif
textp->text = textp->key + key_len + 1;
}
if (text_length)
png_memcpy(textp->text, text_ptr[i].text,
(png_size_t)(text_length));
*(textp->text + text_length) = '\0';
#ifdef PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED
if (textp->compression > 0)
{
textp->text_length = 0;
textp->itxt_length = text_length;
}
else
#endif
{
textp->text_length = text_length;
#ifdef PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED
textp->itxt_length = 0;
#endif
}
info_ptr->num_text++;
png_debug1(3, "transferred text chunk %d", info_ptr->num_text);
}
return(0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
Low
| 172,185
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool freelist_state_initialize(union freelist_init_state *state,
struct kmem_cache *cachep,
unsigned int count)
{
bool ret;
unsigned int rand;
/* Use best entropy available to define a random shift */
rand = get_random_int();
/* Use a random state if the pre-computed list is not available */
if (!cachep->random_seq) {
prandom_seed_state(&state->rnd_state, rand);
ret = false;
} else {
state->list = cachep->random_seq;
state->count = count;
state->pos = 0;
state->rand = rand;
ret = true;
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The freelist-randomization feature in mm/slab.c in the Linux kernel 4.8.x and 4.9.x before 4.9.5 allows local users to cause a denial of service (duplicate freelist entries and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact in opportunistic circumstances by leveraging the selection of a large value for a random number.
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 168,396
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BufferQueueConsumer::dump(String8& result, const char* prefix) const {
const IPCThreadState* ipc = IPCThreadState::self();
const pid_t pid = ipc->getCallingPid();
const uid_t uid = ipc->getCallingUid();
if ((uid != AID_SHELL)
&& !PermissionCache::checkPermission(String16(
"android.permission.DUMP"), pid, uid)) {
result.appendFormat("Permission Denial: can't dump BufferQueueConsumer "
"from pid=%d, uid=%d\n", pid, uid);
} else {
mCore->dump(result, prefix);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libs/gui/BufferQueueConsumer.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for the android.permission.DUMP permission, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via a dump request, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27046057.
Commit Message: Add SN logging
Bug 27046057
Change-Id: Iede7c92e59e60795df1ec7768ebafd6b090f1c27
|
Low
| 173,894
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void set_banner(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
{
char *banner, *q;
const char *p;
if (!vpninfo->banner || !(banner = malloc(strlen(vpninfo->banner)))) {
unsetenv("CISCO_BANNER");
return;
}
p = vpninfo->banner;
q = banner;
while (*p) {
if (*p == '%' && isxdigit((int)(unsigned char)p[1]) &&
isxdigit((int)(unsigned char)p[2])) {
*(q++) = unhex(p + 1);
p += 3;
} else
*(q++) = *(p++);
}
*q = 0;
setenv("CISCO_BANNER", banner, 1);
free(banner);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in OpenConnect 3.18 allows remote servers to cause a denial of service via a crafted greeting banner.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,960
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int mxf_read_index_entry_array(AVIOContext *pb, MXFIndexTableSegment *segment)
{
int i, length;
segment->nb_index_entries = avio_rb32(pb);
length = avio_rb32(pb);
if (!(segment->temporal_offset_entries=av_calloc(segment->nb_index_entries, sizeof(*segment->temporal_offset_entries))) ||
!(segment->flag_entries = av_calloc(segment->nb_index_entries, sizeof(*segment->flag_entries))) ||
!(segment->stream_offset_entries = av_calloc(segment->nb_index_entries, sizeof(*segment->stream_offset_entries)))) {
av_freep(&segment->temporal_offset_entries);
av_freep(&segment->flag_entries);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < segment->nb_index_entries; i++) {
segment->temporal_offset_entries[i] = avio_r8(pb);
avio_r8(pb); /* KeyFrameOffset */
segment->flag_entries[i] = avio_r8(pb);
segment->stream_offset_entries[i] = avio_rb64(pb);
avio_skip(pb, length - 11);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-834
Summary: In libavformat/mxfdec.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in mxf_read_index_entry_array() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted MXF file, which claims a large *nb_index_entries* field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop. Moreover, this big loop can be invoked multiple times if there is more than one applicable data segment in the crafted MXF file.
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 167,765
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ftp_genlist(ftpbuf_t *ftp, const char *cmd, const char *path TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream *tmpstream = NULL;
databuf_t *data = NULL;
char *ptr;
int ch, lastch;
size_t size, rcvd;
size_t lines;
char **ret = NULL;
char **entry;
char *text;
if ((tmpstream = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile()) == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to create temporary file. Check permissions in temporary files directory.");
return NULL;
}
if (!ftp_type(ftp, FTPTYPE_ASCII)) {
goto bail;
}
if ((data = ftp_getdata(ftp TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
goto bail;
}
ftp->data = data;
if (!ftp_putcmd(ftp, cmd, path)) {
goto bail;
}
if (!ftp_getresp(ftp) || (ftp->resp != 150 && ftp->resp != 125 && ftp->resp != 226)) {
goto bail;
}
/* some servers don't open a ftp-data connection if the directory is empty */
if (ftp->resp == 226) {
ftp->data = data_close(ftp, data);
php_stream_close(tmpstream);
return ecalloc(1, sizeof(char*));
}
/* pull data buffer into tmpfile */
if ((data = data_accept(data, ftp TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
goto bail;
}
size = 0;
lines = 0;
lastch = 0;
while ((rcvd = my_recv(ftp, data->fd, data->buf, FTP_BUFSIZE))) {
if (rcvd == -1 || rcvd > ((size_t)(-1))-size) {
goto bail;
}
php_stream_write(tmpstream, data->buf, rcvd);
size += rcvd;
for (ptr = data->buf; rcvd; rcvd--, ptr++) {
if (*ptr == '\n' && lastch == '\r') {
lines++;
} else {
size++;
}
lastch = *ptr;
}
lastch = *ptr;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in the ftp_genlist function in ext/ftp/ftp.c in PHP before 5.4.42, 5.5.x before 5.5.26, and 5.6.x before 5.6.10 allows remote FTP servers to execute arbitrary code via a long reply to a LIST command, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2015-4022.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,301
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void vrend_clear(struct vrend_context *ctx,
unsigned buffers,
const union pipe_color_union *color,
double depth, unsigned stencil)
{
GLbitfield bits = 0;
if (ctx->in_error)
return;
if (ctx->ctx_switch_pending)
vrend_finish_context_switch(ctx);
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT, ctx->sub->fb_id);
vrend_update_frontface_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->stencil_state_dirty)
vrend_update_stencil_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->scissor_state_dirty)
vrend_update_scissor_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->viewport_state_dirty)
vrend_update_viewport_state(ctx);
vrend_use_program(ctx, 0);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_COLOR) {
if (ctx->sub->nr_cbufs && ctx->sub->surf[0] && vrend_format_is_emulated_alpha(ctx->sub->surf[0]->format)) {
glClearColor(color->f[3], 0.0, 0.0, 0.0);
} else {
glClearColor(color->f[0], color->f[1], color->f[2], color->f[3]);
}
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH) {
/* gallium clears don't respect depth mask */
glDepthMask(GL_TRUE);
glClearDepth(depth);
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_STENCIL)
glClearStencil(stencil);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_COLOR) {
uint32_t mask = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->sub->nr_cbufs; i++) {
if (ctx->sub->surf[i])
mask |= (1 << i);
}
if (mask != (buffers >> 2)) {
mask = buffers >> 2;
while (mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
if (util_format_is_pure_uint(ctx->sub->surf[i]->format))
glClearBufferuiv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLuint *)color);
else if (util_format_is_pure_sint(ctx->sub->surf[i]->format))
glClearBufferiv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLint *)color);
else
glClearBufferfv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLfloat *)color);
}
}
else
bits |= GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT;
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH)
bits |= GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT;
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_STENCIL)
bits |= GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT;
if (bits)
glClear(bits);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH)
if (!ctx->sub->dsa_state.depth.writemask)
glDepthMask(GL_FALSE);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The util_format_is_pure_uint function in vrend_renderer.c in Virgil 3d project (aka virglrenderer) 0.6.0 and earlier allows local guest OS users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted VIRGL_CCMD_CLEAR command.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,958
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderBlockFlow::styleDidChange(StyleDifference diff, const RenderStyle* oldStyle)
{
RenderBlock::styleDidChange(diff, oldStyle);
bool canPropagateFloatIntoSibling = !isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned() && !avoidsFloats();
if (diff == StyleDifferenceLayout && s_canPropagateFloatIntoSibling && !canPropagateFloatIntoSibling && hasOverhangingFloats()) {
RenderBlockFlow* parentBlockFlow = this;
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObjectSetIterator end = floatingObjectSet.end();
for (RenderObject* curr = parent(); curr && !curr->isRenderView(); curr = curr->parent()) {
if (curr->isRenderBlockFlow()) {
RenderBlockFlow* currBlock = toRenderBlockFlow(curr);
if (currBlock->hasOverhangingFloats()) {
for (FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
RenderBox* renderer = (*it)->renderer();
if (currBlock->hasOverhangingFloat(renderer)) {
parentBlockFlow = currBlock;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
parentBlockFlow->markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout();
parentBlockFlow->markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout();
}
if (diff == StyleDifferenceLayout || !oldStyle)
createOrDestroyMultiColumnFlowThreadIfNeeded();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Web Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,462
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: white_point(PNG_CONST color_encoding *encoding)
{
CIE_color white;
white.X = encoding->red.X + encoding->green.X + encoding->blue.X;
white.Y = encoding->red.Y + encoding->green.Y + encoding->blue.Y;
white.Z = encoding->red.Z + encoding->green.Z + encoding->blue.Z;
return white;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,718
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ComponentControllerImpl::ComponentControllerImpl(WebContentRunner* runner)
: runner_(runner),
controller_binding_(this),
frame_observer_binding_(this) {
DCHECK(runner);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PendingScript::notifyFinished function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/PendingScript.cpp in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 relies on memory-cache information about integrity-check occurrences instead of integrity-check successes, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Subresource Integrity (aka SRI) protection mechanism by triggering two loads of the same resource.
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
|
Low
| 172,149
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
int i,n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
unsigned short version;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
/* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
* pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
return 1;
/* get something from the wire */
again:
/* check if we have the header */
if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
p=s->packet;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
rr->type= *(p++);
ssl_major= *(p++);
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
n2s(p,rr->epoch);
memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
p+=6;
n2s(p,rr->length);
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
{
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
}
if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
{
/* wrong version, silently discard record */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
{
/* record too long, silently discard it */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i=rr->length;
n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if ( n != i)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now n == rr->length,
* and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if ( bitmap == NULL)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
{
#endif
/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
* Don't check if we're listening and this message is
* a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
* since they arrive from different connections and
* would be dropped unnecessarily.
*/
if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
}
#endif
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
/* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
* and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
* cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
* anything while listening.
*/
if (is_next_epoch)
{
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
{
dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
}
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
return(1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: OpenSSL before 0.9.8zd, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted DTLS message that is processed with a different read operation for the handshake header than for the handshake body, related to the dtls1_get_record function in d1_pkt.c and the ssl3_read_n function in s3_pkt.c.
Commit Message: Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was the original source
of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
|
Low
| 166,827
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int cp2112_gpio_get_all(struct gpio_chip *chip)
{
struct cp2112_device *dev = gpiochip_get_data(chip);
struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
u8 *buf = dev->in_out_buffer;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_GET, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_GET_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_GET_REPORT);
if (ret != CP2112_GPIO_GET_LENGTH) {
hid_err(hdev, "error requesting GPIO values: %d\n", ret);
ret = ret < 0 ? ret : -EIO;
goto exit;
}
ret = buf[1];
exit:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: drivers/hid/hid-cp2112.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.9 uses a spinlock without considering that sleeping is possible in a USB HID request callback, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: HID: cp2112: fix sleep-while-atomic
A recent commit fixing DMA-buffers on stack added a shared transfer
buffer protected by a spinlock. This is broken as the USB HID request
callbacks can sleep. Fix this up by replacing the spinlock with a mutex.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
Low
| 168,210
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CairoOutputDev::beginString(GfxState *state, GooString *s)
{
int len = s->getLength();
if (needFontUpdate)
updateFont(state);
if (!currentFont)
return;
glyphs = (cairo_glyph_t *) gmalloc (len * sizeof (cairo_glyph_t));
glyphCount = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,604
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int _gd2GetHeader(gdIOCtxPtr in, int *sx, int *sy, int *cs, int *vers, int *fmt, int *ncx, int *ncy, t_chunk_info ** chunkIdx)
{
int i;
int ch;
char id[5];
t_chunk_info *cidx;
int sidx;
int nc;
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Reading gd2 header info"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
ch = gdGetC(in);
if (ch == EOF) {
goto fail1;
}
id[i] = ch;
}
id[4] = 0;
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Got file code: %s", id));
/* Equiv. of 'magick'. */
if (strcmp(id, GD2_ID) != 0) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Not a valid gd2 file"));
goto fail1;
}
/* Version */
if (gdGetWord(vers, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Version: %d", *vers));
if ((*vers != 1) && (*vers != 2)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad version: %d", *vers));
goto fail1;
}
/* Image Size */
if (!gdGetWord(sx, in)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Could not get x-size"));
goto fail1;
}
if (!gdGetWord(sy, in)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Could not get y-size"));
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Image is %dx%d", *sx, *sy));
/* Chunk Size (pixels, not bytes!) */
if (gdGetWord(cs, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("ChunkSize: %d", *cs));
if ((*cs < GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MIN) || (*cs > GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MAX)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad chunk size: %d", *cs));
goto fail1;
}
/* Data Format */
if (gdGetWord(fmt, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Format: %d", *fmt));
if ((*fmt != GD2_FMT_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_COMPRESSED) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_COMPRESSED)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Bad data format: %d", *fmt));
goto fail1;
}
/* # of chunks wide */
if (gdGetWord(ncx, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("%d Chunks Wide", *ncx));
/* # of chunks high */
if (gdGetWord(ncy, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("%d Chunks vertically", *ncy));
if (gd2_compressed(*fmt)) {
nc = (*ncx) * (*ncy);
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Reading %d chunk index entries", nc));
sidx = sizeof(t_chunk_info) * nc;
if (sidx <= 0) {
goto fail1;
}
cidx = gdCalloc(sidx, 1);
for (i = 0; i < nc; i++) {
if (gdGetInt(&cidx[i].offset, in) != 1) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
if (gdGetInt(&cidx[i].size, in) != 1) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
if (cidx[i].offset < 0 || cidx[i].size < 0) {
gdFree(cidx);
goto fail1;
}
}
*chunkIdx = cidx;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("gd2 header complete"));
return 1;
fail1:
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the _gd2GetHeader function in gd_gd2.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.3, as used in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted chunk dimensions in an image.
Commit Message: Fixed #72339 Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in heap overflow
|
Medium
| 167,131
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void opj_get_all_encoding_parameters( const opj_image_t *p_image,
const opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 tileno,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx1,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty1,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dx_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dy_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_prec,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_res,
OPJ_UINT32 ** p_resolutions )
{
/* loop*/
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* pointers*/
const opj_tcp_t *tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t * l_tccp = 00;
const opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
/* to store l_dx, l_dy, w and h for each resolution and component.*/
OPJ_UINT32 * lResolutionPtr;
/* position in x and y of tile*/
OPJ_UINT32 p, q;
/* preconditions in debug*/
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(tileno < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations*/
tcp = &p_cp->tcps [tileno];
l_tccp = tcp->tccps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
/* position in x and y of tile*/
p = tileno % p_cp->tw;
q = tileno / p_cp->tw;
/* here calculation of tx0, tx1, ty0, ty1, maxprec, l_dx and l_dy */
*p_tx0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->tx0 + p * p_cp->tdx), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->x0);
*p_tx1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->tx0 + (p + 1) * p_cp->tdx), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->x1);
*p_ty0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->ty0 + q * p_cp->tdy), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->y0);
*p_ty1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->ty0 + (q + 1) * p_cp->tdy), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->y1);
/* max precision and resolution is 0 (can only grow)*/
*p_max_prec = 0;
*p_max_res = 0;
/* take the largest value for dx_min and dy_min*/
*p_dx_min = 0x7fffffff;
*p_dy_min = 0x7fffffff;
for (compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno) {
/* aritmetic variables to calculate*/
OPJ_UINT32 l_level_no;
OPJ_INT32 l_rx0, l_ry0, l_rx1, l_ry1;
OPJ_INT32 l_px0, l_py0, l_px1, py1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_product;
OPJ_INT32 l_tcx0, l_tcy0, l_tcx1, l_tcy1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pdx, l_pdy , l_pw , l_ph;
lResolutionPtr = p_resolutions[compno];
l_tcx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
l_tcx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
if (l_tccp->numresolutions > *p_max_res) {
*p_max_res = l_tccp->numresolutions;
}
/* use custom size for precincts*/
l_level_no = l_tccp->numresolutions - 1;
for (resno = 0; resno < l_tccp->numresolutions; ++resno) {
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx, l_dy;
/* precinct width and height*/
l_pdx = l_tccp->prcw[resno];
l_pdy = l_tccp->prch[resno];
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pdx;
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pdy;
l_dx = l_img_comp->dx * (1u << (l_pdx + l_level_no));
l_dy = l_img_comp->dy * (1u << (l_pdy + l_level_no));
/* take the minimum size for l_dx for each comp and resolution*/
*p_dx_min = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)*p_dx_min, (OPJ_INT32)l_dx);
*p_dy_min = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)*p_dy_min, (OPJ_INT32)l_dy);
/* various calculations of extents*/
l_rx0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_rx1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_px0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_rx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_py0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_ry0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_px1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_rx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
py1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_ry1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_pw = (l_rx0==l_rx1)?0:(OPJ_UINT32)((l_px1 - l_px0) >> l_pdx);
l_ph = (l_ry0==l_ry1)?0:(OPJ_UINT32)((py1 - l_py0) >> l_pdy);
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pw;
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_ph;
l_product = l_pw * l_ph;
/* update precision*/
if (l_product > *p_max_prec) {
*p_max_prec = l_product;
}
--l_level_no;
}
++l_tccp;
++l_img_comp;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An improper computation of p_tx0, p_tx1, p_ty0 and p_ty1 in the function opj_get_encoding_parameters in openjp2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 can lead to an integer overflow.
Commit Message: [trunk] fixed a buffer overflow in opj_tcd_init_decode_tile
Update issue 431
|
Medium
| 170,246
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void Unregister(const GURL& url) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
content::BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(content::BrowserThread::IO));
net::URLRequestFilter::GetInstance()->RemoveUrlHandler(url);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
|
Low
| 172,582
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_display_language)
{
get_icu_disp_value_src_php( LOC_LANG_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
|
Low
| 167,186
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int _6502_op(RAnal *anal, RAnalOp *op, ut64 addr, const ut8 *data, int len) {
char addrbuf[64];
const int buffsize = sizeof (addrbuf) - 1;
memset (op, '\0', sizeof (RAnalOp));
op->size = snes_op_get_size (1, 1, &snes_op[data[0]]); //snes-arch is similiar to nes/6502
op->addr = addr;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK;
op->id = data[0];
r_strbuf_init (&op->esil);
switch (data[0]) {
case 0x02:
case 0x03:
case 0x04:
case 0x07:
case 0x0b:
case 0x0c:
case 0x0f:
case 0x12:
case 0x13:
case 0x14:
case 0x17:
case 0x1a:
case 0x1b:
case 0x1c:
case 0x1f:
case 0x22:
case 0x23:
case 0x27:
case 0x2b:
case 0x2f:
case 0x32:
case 0x33:
case 0x34:
case 0x37:
case 0x3a:
case 0x3b:
case 0x3c:
case 0x3f:
case 0x42:
case 0x43:
case 0x44:
case 0x47:
case 0x4b:
case 0x4f:
case 0x52:
case 0x53:
case 0x54:
case 0x57:
case 0x5a:
case 0x5b:
case 0x5c:
case 0x5f:
case 0x62:
case 0x63:
case 0x64:
case 0x67:
case 0x6b:
case 0x6f:
case 0x72:
case 0x73:
case 0x74:
case 0x77:
case 0x7a:
case 0x7b:
case 0x7c:
case 0x7f:
case 0x80:
case 0x82:
case 0x83:
case 0x87:
case 0x89:
case 0x8b:
case 0x8f:
case 0x92:
case 0x93:
case 0x97:
case 0x9b:
case 0x9c:
case 0x9e:
case 0x9f:
case 0xa3:
case 0xa7:
case 0xab:
case 0xaf:
case 0xb2:
case 0xb3:
case 0xb7:
case 0xbb:
case 0xbf:
case 0xc2:
case 0xc3:
case 0xc7:
case 0xcb:
case 0xcf:
case 0xd2:
case 0xd3:
case 0xd4:
case 0xd7:
case 0xda:
case 0xdb:
case 0xdc:
case 0xdf:
case 0xe2:
case 0xe3:
case 0xe7:
case 0xeb:
case 0xef:
case 0xf2:
case 0xf3:
case 0xf4:
case 0xf7:
case 0xfa:
case 0xfb:
case 0xfc:
case 0xff:
op->size = 1;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_ILL;
break;
case 0x00: // brk
op->cycles = 7;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_SWI;
op->size = 1;
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, ",1,I,=,0,D,=,flags,0x10,|,0x100,sp,+,=[1],pc,1,+,0xfe,sp,+,=[2],3,sp,-=,0xfffe,[2],pc,=");
break;
case 0x78: // sei
case 0x58: // cli
case 0x38: // sec
case 0x18: // clc
case 0xf8: // sed
case 0xd8: // cld
case 0xb8: // clv
op->cycles = 2;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_NOP;
_6502_anal_esil_flags (op, data[0]);
break;
case 0x24: // bit $ff
case 0x2c: // bit $ffff
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_MOV;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern3 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 0);
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "a,%s,[1],&,0x80,&,!,!,N,=,a,%s,[1],&,0x40,&,!,!,V,=,a,%s,[1],&,0xff,&,!,Z,=",addrbuf, addrbuf, addrbuf);
break;
case 0x69: // adc #$ff
case 0x65: // adc $ff
case 0x75: // adc $ff,x
case 0x6d: // adc $ffff
case 0x7d: // adc $ffff,x
case 0x79: // adc $ffff,y
case 0x61: // adc ($ff,x)
case 0x71: // adc ($ff,y)
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_ADD;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
if (data[0] == 0x69) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,a,+=,C,NUM,$c7,C,=,a,+=,$c7,C,|=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],a,+=,C,NUM,$c7,C,=,a,+=,$c7,C,|=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
r_strbuf_append (&op->esil, ",a,a,=,$z,Z,=");
break;
case 0xe9: // sbc #$ff
case 0xe5: // sbc $ff
case 0xf5: // sbc $ff,x
case 0xed: // sbc $ffff
case 0xfd: // sbc $ffff,x
case 0xf9: // sbc $ffff,y
case 0xe1: // sbc ($ff,x)
case 0xf1: // sbc ($ff,y)
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_SUB;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
if (data[0] == 0xe9) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "C,!,%s,+,a,-=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "C,!,%s,[1],+,a,-=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_BNZ);
r_strbuf_append (&op->esil, ",a,a,=,$z,Z,=,C,!=");
break;
case 0x09: // ora #$ff
case 0x05: // ora $ff
case 0x15: // ora $ff,x
case 0x0d: // ora $ffff
case 0x1d: // ora $ffff,x
case 0x19: // ora $ffff,y
case 0x01: // ora ($ff,x)
case 0x11: // ora ($ff),y
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_OR;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
if (data[0] == 0x09) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,a,|=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],a,|=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0x29: // and #$ff
case 0x25: // and $ff
case 0x35: // and $ff,x
case 0x2d: // and $ffff
case 0x3d: // and $ffff,x
case 0x39: // and $ffff,y
case 0x21: // and ($ff,x)
case 0x31: // and ($ff),y
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_AND;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
if (data[0] == 0x29) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,a,&=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],a,&=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0x49: // eor #$ff
case 0x45: // eor $ff
case 0x55: // eor $ff,x
case 0x4d: // eor $ffff
case 0x5d: // eor $ffff,x
case 0x59: // eor $ffff,y
case 0x41: // eor ($ff,x)
case 0x51: // eor ($ff),y
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_XOR;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
if (data[0] == 0x49) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,a,^=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],a,^=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0x0a: // asl a
case 0x06: // asl $ff
case 0x16: // asl $ff,x
case 0x0e: // asl $ffff
case 0x1e: // asl $ffff,x
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_SHL;
if (data[0] == 0x0a) {
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "1,a,<<=,$c7,C,=,a,a,=");
} else {
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "1,%s,[1],<<,%s,=[1],$c7,C,=", addrbuf, addrbuf);
}
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0x4a: // lsr a
case 0x46: // lsr $ff
case 0x56: // lsr $ff,x
case 0x4e: // lsr $ffff
case 0x5e: // lsr $ffff,x
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_SHR;
if (data[0] == 0x4a) {
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "1,a,&,C,=,1,a,>>=");
} else {
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "1,%s,[1],&,C,=,1,%s,[1],>>,%s,=[1]", addrbuf, addrbuf, addrbuf);
}
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0x2a: // rol a
case 0x26: // rol $ff
case 0x36: // rol $ff,x
case 0x2e: // rol $ffff
case 0x3e: // rol $ffff,x
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_ROL;
if (data[0] == 0x2a) {
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "1,a,<<,C,|,a,=,$c7,C,=,a,a,=");
} else {
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "1,%s,[1],<<,C,|,%s,=[1],$c7,C,=", addrbuf, addrbuf);
}
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0x6a: // ror a
case 0x66: // ror $ff
case 0x76: // ror $ff,x
case 0x6e: // ror $ffff
case 0x7e: // ror $ffff,x
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_ROR;
if (data[0] == 0x6a) {
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "C,N,=,1,a,&,C,=,1,a,>>,7,N,<<,|,a,=");
} else {
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "C,N,=,1,%s,[1],&,C,=,1,%s,[1],>>,7,N,<<,|,%s,=[1]", addrbuf, addrbuf, addrbuf);
}
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0xe6: // inc $ff
case 0xf6: // inc $ff,x
case 0xee: // inc $ffff
case 0xfe: // inc $ffff,x
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_STORE;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,++=[1]", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0xc6: // dec $ff
case 0xd6: // dec $ff,x
case 0xce: // dec $ffff
case 0xde: // dec $ffff,x
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_STORE;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,--=[1]", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0xe8: // inx
case 0xc8: // iny
op->cycles = 2;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_STORE;
_6502_anal_esil_inc_reg (op, data[0], "+");
break;
case 0xca: // dex
case 0x88: // dey
op->cycles = 2;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_STORE;
_6502_anal_esil_inc_reg (op, data[0], "-");
break;
case 0xc9: // cmp #$ff
case 0xc5: // cmp $ff
case 0xd5: // cmp $ff,x
case 0xcd: // cmp $ffff
case 0xdd: // cmp $ffff,x
case 0xd9: // cmp $ffff,y
case 0xc1: // cmp ($ff,x)
case 0xd1: // cmp ($ff),y
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CMP;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
if (data[0] == 0xc9) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,a,==", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],a,==", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_BNZ);
r_strbuf_append (&op->esil, ",C,!,C,=");
break;
case 0xe0: // cpx #$ff
case 0xe4: // cpx $ff
case 0xec: // cpx $ffff
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CMP;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern3 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 0);
if (data[0] == 0xe0) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,x,==", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],x,==", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_BNZ);
r_strbuf_append (&op->esil, ",C,!,C,=");
break;
case 0xc0: // cpy #$ff
case 0xc4: // cpy $ff
case 0xcc: // cpy $ffff
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CMP;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern3 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 0);
if (data[0] == 0xc0) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,y,==", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],y,==", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_BNZ);
r_strbuf_append (&op->esil, ",C,!,C,=");
break;
case 0x10: // bpl $ffff
case 0x30: // bmi $ffff
case 0x50: // bvc $ffff
case 0x70: // bvs $ffff
case 0x90: // bcc $ffff
case 0xb0: // bcs $ffff
case 0xd0: // bne $ffff
case 0xf0: // beq $ffff
op->cycles = 2;
op->failcycles = 3;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CJMP;
if (data[1] <= 127)
op->jump = addr + data[1] + op->size;
else op->jump = addr - (256 - data[1]) + op->size;
op->fail = addr + op->size;
_6502_anal_esil_ccall (op, data[0]);
break;
case 0x20: // jsr $ffff
op->cycles = 6;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CALL;
op->jump = data[1] | data[2] << 8;
op->stackop = R_ANAL_STACK_INC;
op->stackptr = 2;
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "1,pc,-,0xff,sp,+,=[2],0x%04x,pc,=,2,sp,-=", op->jump);
break;
case 0x4c: // jmp $ffff
op->cycles = 3;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_JMP;
op->jump = data[1] | data[2] << 8;
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "0x%04x,pc,=", op->jump);
break;
case 0x6c: // jmp ($ffff)
op->cycles = 5;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UJMP;
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "0x%04x,[2],pc,=", data[1] | data[2] << 8);
break;
case 0x60: // rts
op->eob = true;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_RET;
op->cycles = 6;
op->stackop = R_ANAL_STACK_INC;
op->stackptr = -2;
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "0x101,sp,+,[2],pc,=,pc,++=,2,sp,+=");
break;
case 0x40: // rti
op->eob = true;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_RET;
op->cycles = 6;
op->stackop = R_ANAL_STACK_INC;
op->stackptr = -3;
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "0x101,sp,+,[1],flags,=,0x102,sp,+,[2],pc,=,3,sp,+=");
break;
case 0xea: // nop
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_NOP;
op->cycles = 2;
break;
case 0xa9: // lda #$ff
case 0xa5: // lda $ff
case 0xb5: // lda $ff,x
case 0xad: // lda $ffff
case 0xbd: // lda $ffff,x
case 0xb9: // lda $ffff,y
case 0xa1: // lda ($ff,x)
case 0xb1: // lda ($ff),y
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_LOAD;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
if (data[0] == 0xa9) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,a,=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],a,=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0xa2: // ldx #$ff
case 0xa6: // ldx $ff
case 0xb6: // ldx $ff,y
case 0xae: // ldx $ffff
case 0xbe: // ldx $ffff,y
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_LOAD;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'y');
if (data[0] == 0xa2) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,x,=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],x,=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0xa0: // ldy #$ff
case 0xa4: // ldy $ff
case 0xb4: // ldy $ff,x
case 0xac: // ldy $ffff
case 0xbc: // ldy $ffff,x
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_LOAD;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern3 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
if (data[0] == 0xa0) // immediate mode
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,y,=", addrbuf);
else r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,[1],y,=", addrbuf);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
break;
case 0x85: // sta $ff
case 0x95: // sta $ff,x
case 0x8d: // sta $ffff
case 0x9d: // sta $ffff,x
case 0x99: // sta $ffff,y
case 0x81: // sta ($ff,x)
case 0x91: // sta ($ff),y
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_STORE;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern1 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize);
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "a,%s,=[1]", addrbuf);
break;
case 0x86: // stx $ff
case 0x96: // stx $ff,y
case 0x8e: // stx $ffff
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_STORE;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern2 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'y');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "x,%s,=[1]", addrbuf);
break;
case 0x84: // sty $ff
case 0x94: // sty $ff,x
case 0x8c: // sty $ffff
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_STORE;
_6502_anal_esil_get_addr_pattern3 (op, data, addrbuf, buffsize, 'x');
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "y,%s,=[1]", addrbuf);
break;
case 0x08: // php
case 0x48: // pha
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_PUSH;
op->cycles = 3;
op->stackop = R_ANAL_STACK_INC;
op->stackptr = 1;
_6502_anal_esil_push (op, data[0]);
break;
case 0x28: // plp
case 0x68: // plp
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_POP;
op->cycles = 4;
op->stackop = R_ANAL_STACK_INC;
op->stackptr = -1;
_6502_anal_esil_pop (op, data[0]);
break;
case 0xaa: // tax
case 0x8a: // txa
case 0xa8: // tay
case 0x98: // tya
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_MOV;
op->cycles = 2;
_6502_anal_esil_mov (op, data[0]);
break;
case 0x9a: // txs
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_MOV;
op->cycles = 2;
op->stackop = R_ANAL_STACK_SET;
_6502_anal_esil_mov (op, data[0]);
break;
case 0xba: // tsx
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_MOV;
op->cycles = 2;
op->stackop = R_ANAL_STACK_GET;
_6502_anal_esil_mov (op, data[0]);
break;
}
return op->size;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: There is a heap out of bounds read in radare2 2.6.0 in _6502_op() in libr/anal/p/anal_6502.c via a crafted iNES ROM binary file.
Commit Message: Fix #10294 - crash in r2_hoobr__6502_op
|
Medium
| 169,197
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void VP8XChunk::width(XMP_Uns32 val)
{
PutLE24(&this->data[4], val - 1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An issue was discovered in Exempi before 2.4.3. The VPXChunk class in XMPFiles/source/FormatSupport/WEBP_Support.cpp does not ensure nonzero widths and heights, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure and application exit) via a crafted .webp file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,366
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: log2vis_encoded_string (PyObject * string, const char *encoding,
FriBidiParType base_direction, int clean, int reordernsm)
{
PyObject *logical = NULL; /* logical unicode object */
PyObject *result = NULL; /* output string object */
/* Always needed for the string length */
logical = PyUnicode_Decode (PyString_AS_STRING (string),
PyString_GET_SIZE (string),
encoding, "strict");
if (logical == NULL)
return NULL;
if (strcmp (encoding, "utf-8") == 0)
/* Shortcut for utf8 strings (little faster) */
result = log2vis_utf8 (string,
PyUnicode_GET_SIZE (logical),
base_direction, clean, reordernsm);
else
{
/* Invoke log2vis_unicode and encode back to encoding */
PyObject *visual = log2vis_unicode (logical, base_direction, clean, reordernsm);
if (visual)
{
result = PyUnicode_Encode (PyUnicode_AS_UNICODE
(visual),
PyUnicode_GET_SIZE (visual),
encoding, "strict");
Py_DECREF (visual);
}
}
Py_DECREF (logical);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode function in PyFriBidi before 0.11.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a 4-byte utf-8 sequence.
Commit Message: refactor pyfribidi.c module
pyfribidi.c is now compiled as _pyfribidi. This module only handles
unicode internally and doesn't use the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode
function (which can't handle 4 byte utf-8 sequences). This fixes the
buffer overflow in issue #2.
The code is now also much simpler: pyfribidi.c is down from 280 to 130
lines of code.
We now ship a pure python pyfribidi that handles the case when
non-unicode strings are passed in.
We now also adapt the size of the output string if clean=True is
passed.
|
Low
| 165,640
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ClientDiscardableSharedMemoryManager::AllocateCompletedOnIO(
base::SharedMemoryHandle* handle,
base::ScopedClosureRunner closure_runner,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle mojo_handle) {
size_t memory_size = 0;
bool read_only = false;
if (!mojo_handle.is_valid())
return;
auto result = mojo::UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(std::move(mojo_handle), handle,
&memory_size, &read_only);
DCHECK_EQ(result, MOJO_RESULT_OK);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
Medium
| 172,850
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event) {
if (event->isMouseEvent() &&
toMouseEvent(event)->button() !=
static_cast<short>(WebPointerProperties::Button::Left))
return;
if (!isConnected() || !document().isActive())
return;
MediaControlInputElement::defaultEventHandler(event);
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseover ||
event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseout ||
event->type() == EventTypeNames::mousemove)
return;
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mousedown)
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.VolumeChangeBegin"));
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseup)
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.VolumeChangeEnd"));
double volume = value().toDouble();
mediaElement().setVolume(volume);
mediaElement().setMuted(false);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly handle certain out-of-memory conditions, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document that triggers a large memory allocation.
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
|
Medium
| 171,899
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ip_build_and_send_pkt(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk,
__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, struct ip_options *opt)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb);
struct iphdr *iph;
/* Build the IP header. */
skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr) + (opt ? opt->optlen : 0));
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
iph->version = 4;
iph->ihl = 5;
iph->tos = inet->tos;
if (ip_dont_fragment(sk, &rt->dst))
iph->frag_off = htons(IP_DF);
else
iph->frag_off = 0;
iph->ttl = ip_select_ttl(inet, &rt->dst);
iph->daddr = rt->rt_dst;
iph->saddr = rt->rt_src;
iph->protocol = sk->sk_protocol;
ip_select_ident(iph, &rt->dst, sk);
if (opt && opt->optlen) {
iph->ihl += opt->optlen>>2;
ip_options_build(skb, opt, daddr, rt, 0);
}
skb->priority = sk->sk_priority;
skb->mark = sk->sk_mark;
/* Send it out. */
return ip_local_out(skb);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,562
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int perf_swevent_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
int event_id = event->attr.config;
if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE)
return -ENOENT;
/*
* no branch sampling for software events
*/
if (has_branch_stack(event))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
switch (event_id) {
case PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK:
case PERF_COUNT_SW_TASK_CLOCK:
return -ENOENT;
default:
break;
}
if (event_id >= PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX)
return -ENOENT;
if (!event->parent) {
int err;
err = swevent_hlist_get(event);
if (err)
return err;
static_key_slow_inc(&perf_swevent_enabled[event_id]);
event->destroy = sw_perf_event_destroy;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The perf_swevent_init function in kernel/events/core.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.9 uses an incorrect integer data type, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted perf_event_open system call.
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
Low
| 166,085
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: uint32_t _WM_SetupMidiEvent(struct _mdi *mdi, uint8_t * event_data, uint8_t running_event) {
/*
Only add standard MIDI and Sysex events in here.
Non-standard events need to be handled by calling function
to avoid compatibility issues.
TODO:
Add value limit checks
*/
uint32_t ret_cnt = 0;
uint8_t command = 0;
uint8_t channel = 0;
uint8_t data_1 = 0;
uint8_t data_2 = 0;
char *text = NULL;
if (event_data[0] >= 0x80) {
command = *event_data & 0xf0;
channel = *event_data++ & 0x0f;
ret_cnt++;
} else {
command = running_event & 0xf0;
channel = running_event & 0x0f;
}
switch(command) {
case 0x80:
_SETUP_NOTEOFF:
data_1 = *event_data++;
data_2 = *event_data++;
_WM_midi_setup_noteoff(mdi, channel, data_1, data_2);
ret_cnt += 2;
break;
case 0x90:
if (event_data[1] == 0) goto _SETUP_NOTEOFF; /* A velocity of 0 in a note on is actually a note off */
data_1 = *event_data++;
data_2 = *event_data++;
midi_setup_noteon(mdi, channel, data_1, data_2);
ret_cnt += 2;
break;
case 0xa0:
data_1 = *event_data++;
data_2 = *event_data++;
midi_setup_aftertouch(mdi, channel, data_1, data_2);
ret_cnt += 2;
break;
case 0xb0:
data_1 = *event_data++;
data_2 = *event_data++;
midi_setup_control(mdi, channel, data_1, data_2);
ret_cnt += 2;
break;
case 0xc0:
data_1 = *event_data++;
midi_setup_patch(mdi, channel, data_1);
ret_cnt++;
break;
case 0xd0:
data_1 = *event_data++;
midi_setup_channel_pressure(mdi, channel, data_1);
ret_cnt++;
break;
case 0xe0:
data_1 = *event_data++;
data_2 = *event_data++;
midi_setup_pitch(mdi, channel, ((data_2 << 7) | (data_1 & 0x7f)));
ret_cnt += 2;
break;
case 0xf0:
if (channel == 0x0f) {
/*
MIDI Meta Events
*/
uint32_t tmp_length = 0;
if ((event_data[0] == 0x00) && (event_data[1] == 0x02)) {
/*
Sequence Number
We only setting this up here for WM_Event2Midi function
*/
midi_setup_sequenceno(mdi, ((event_data[2] << 8) + event_data[3]));
ret_cnt += 4;
} else if (event_data[0] == 0x01) {
/* Text Event */
/* Get Length */
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
text = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(text, event_data, tmp_length);
text[tmp_length] = '\0';
midi_setup_text(mdi, text);
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
} else if (event_data[0] == 0x02) {
/* Copyright Event */
/* Get Length */
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
/* Copy copyright info in the getinfo struct */
if (mdi->extra_info.copyright) {
mdi->extra_info.copyright = realloc(mdi->extra_info.copyright,(strlen(mdi->extra_info.copyright) + 1 + tmp_length + 1));
memcpy(&mdi->extra_info.copyright[strlen(mdi->extra_info.copyright) + 1], event_data, tmp_length);
mdi->extra_info.copyright[strlen(mdi->extra_info.copyright) + 1 + tmp_length] = '\0';
mdi->extra_info.copyright[strlen(mdi->extra_info.copyright)] = '\n';
} else {
mdi->extra_info.copyright = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(mdi->extra_info.copyright, event_data, tmp_length);
mdi->extra_info.copyright[tmp_length] = '\0';
}
/* NOTE: free'd when events are cleared during closure of mdi */
text = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(text, event_data, tmp_length);
text[tmp_length] = '\0';
midi_setup_copyright(mdi, text);
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
} else if (event_data[0] == 0x03) {
/* Track Name Event */
/* Get Length */
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
text = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(text, event_data, tmp_length);
text[tmp_length] = '\0';
midi_setup_trackname(mdi, text);
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
} else if (event_data[0] == 0x04) {
/* Instrument Name Event */
/* Get Length */
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
text = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(text, event_data, tmp_length);
text[tmp_length] = '\0';
midi_setup_instrumentname(mdi, text);
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
} else if (event_data[0] == 0x05) {
/* Lyric Event */
/* Get Length */
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
text = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(text, event_data, tmp_length);
text[tmp_length] = '\0';
midi_setup_lyric(mdi, text);
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
} else if (event_data[0] == 0x06) {
/* Marker Event */
/* Get Length */
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
text = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(text, event_data, tmp_length);
text[tmp_length] = '\0';
midi_setup_marker(mdi, text);
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
} else if (event_data[0] == 0x07) {
/* Cue Point Event */
/* Get Length */
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
text = malloc(tmp_length + 1);
memcpy(text, event_data, tmp_length);
text[tmp_length] = '\0';
midi_setup_cuepoint(mdi, text);
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
} else if ((event_data[0] == 0x20) && (event_data[1] == 0x01)) {
/*
Channel Prefix
We only setting this up here for WM_Event2Midi function
*/
midi_setup_channelprefix(mdi, event_data[2]);
ret_cnt += 3;
} else if ((event_data[0] == 0x21) && (event_data[1] == 0x01)) {
/*
Port Prefix
We only setting this up here for WM_Event2Midi function
*/
midi_setup_portprefix(mdi, event_data[2]);
ret_cnt += 3;
} else if ((event_data[0] == 0x2F) && (event_data[1] == 0x00)) {
/*
End of Track
Deal with this inside calling function
We only setting this up here for _WM_Event2Midi function
*/
_WM_midi_setup_endoftrack(mdi);
ret_cnt += 2;
} else if ((event_data[0] == 0x51) && (event_data[1] == 0x03)) {
/*
Tempo
Deal with this inside calling function.
We only setting this up here for _WM_Event2Midi function
*/
_WM_midi_setup_tempo(mdi, ((event_data[2] << 16) + (event_data[3] << 8) + event_data[4]));
ret_cnt += 5;
} else if ((event_data[0] == 0x54) && (event_data[1] == 0x05)) {
/*
SMPTE Offset
We only setting this up here for WM_Event2Midi function
*/
midi_setup_smpteoffset(mdi, ((event_data[3] << 24) + (event_data[4] << 16) + (event_data[5] << 8) + event_data[6]));
/*
Because this has 5 bytes of data we gonna "hack" it a little
*/
mdi->events[mdi->events_size - 1].event_data.channel = event_data[2];
ret_cnt += 7;
} else if ((event_data[0] == 0x58) && (event_data[1] == 0x04)) {
/*
Time Signature
We only setting this up here for WM_Event2Midi function
*/
midi_setup_timesignature(mdi, ((event_data[2] << 24) + (event_data[3] << 16) + (event_data[4] << 8) + event_data[5]));
ret_cnt += 6;
} else if ((event_data[0] == 0x59) && (event_data[1] == 0x02)) {
/*
Key Signature
We only setting this up here for WM_Event2Midi function
*/
midi_setup_keysignature(mdi, ((event_data[2] << 8) + event_data[3]));
ret_cnt += 4;
} else {
/*
Unsupported Meta Event
*/
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
tmp_length = (tmp_length << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7f);
ret_cnt++;
ret_cnt += tmp_length;
}
} else if ((channel == 0) || (channel == 7)) {
/*
Sysex Events
*/
uint32_t sysex_len = 0;
uint8_t *sysex_store = NULL;
if (*event_data > 0x7f) {
do {
sysex_len = (sysex_len << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7F);
event_data++;
ret_cnt++;
} while (*event_data > 0x7f);
}
sysex_len = (sysex_len << 7) + (*event_data & 0x7F);
event_data++;
if (!sysex_len) break;
ret_cnt++;
sysex_store = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t) * sysex_len);
memcpy(sysex_store, event_data, sysex_len);
if (sysex_store[sysex_len - 1] == 0xF7) {
uint8_t rolandsysexid[] = { 0x41, 0x10, 0x42, 0x12 };
if (memcmp(rolandsysexid, sysex_store, 4) == 0) {
/* For Roland Sysex Messages */
/* checksum */
uint8_t sysex_cs = 0;
uint32_t sysex_ofs = 4;
do {
sysex_cs += sysex_store[sysex_ofs];
if (sysex_cs > 0x7F) {
sysex_cs -= 0x80;
}
sysex_ofs++;
} while (sysex_store[sysex_ofs + 1] != 0xf7);
sysex_cs = 128 - sysex_cs;
/* is roland sysex message valid */
if (sysex_cs == sysex_store[sysex_ofs]) {
/* process roland sysex event */
if (sysex_store[4] == 0x40) {
if (((sysex_store[5] & 0xf0) == 0x10) && (sysex_store[6] == 0x15)) {
/* Roland Drum Track Setting */
uint8_t sysex_ch = 0x0f & sysex_store[5];
if (sysex_ch == 0x00) {
sysex_ch = 0x09;
} else if (sysex_ch <= 0x09) {
sysex_ch -= 1;
}
midi_setup_sysex_roland_drum_track(mdi, sysex_ch, sysex_store[7]);
} else if ((sysex_store[5] == 0x00) && (sysex_store[6] == 0x7F) && (sysex_store[7] == 0x00)) {
/* Roland GS Reset */
midi_setup_sysex_roland_reset(mdi);
}
}
}
} else {
/* For non-Roland Sysex Messages */
uint8_t gm_reset[] = {0x7e, 0x7f, 0x09, 0x01, 0xf7};
uint8_t yamaha_reset[] = {0x43, 0x10, 0x4c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x00, 0xf7};
if (memcmp(gm_reset, sysex_store, 5) == 0) {
/* GM Reset */
midi_setup_sysex_gm_reset(mdi);
} else if (memcmp(yamaha_reset,sysex_store,8) == 0) {
/* Yamaha Reset */
midi_setup_sysex_yamaha_reset(mdi);
}
}
}
free(sysex_store);
sysex_store = NULL;
/*
event_data += sysex_len;
*/
ret_cnt += sysex_len;
} else {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(unrecognized meta type event)", 0);
return 0;
}
break;
default: /* Should NEVER get here */
ret_cnt = 0;
break;
}
if (ret_cnt == 0)
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(missing event)", 0);
return ret_cnt;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The _WM_SetupMidiEvent function in internal_midi.c:2122 in WildMIDI 0.4.2 can cause a denial of service (invalid memory read and application crash) via a crafted mid file.
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
|
Medium
| 168,007
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_codes(struct archive_read *a)
{
int i, j, val, n, r;
unsigned char bitlengths[MAX_SYMBOLS], zerocount, ppmd_flags;
unsigned int maxorder;
struct huffman_code precode;
struct rar *rar = (struct rar *)(a->format->data);
struct rar_br *br = &(rar->br);
free_codes(a);
/* Skip to the next byte */
rar_br_consume_unalined_bits(br);
/* PPMd block flag */
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 1))
goto truncated_data;
if ((rar->is_ppmd_block = rar_br_bits(br, 1)) != 0)
{
rar_br_consume(br, 1);
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 7))
goto truncated_data;
ppmd_flags = rar_br_bits(br, 7);
rar_br_consume(br, 7);
/* Memory is allocated in MB */
if (ppmd_flags & 0x20)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 8))
goto truncated_data;
rar->dictionary_size = (rar_br_bits(br, 8) + 1) << 20;
rar_br_consume(br, 8);
}
if (ppmd_flags & 0x40)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 8))
goto truncated_data;
rar->ppmd_escape = rar->ppmd7_context.InitEsc = rar_br_bits(br, 8);
rar_br_consume(br, 8);
}
else
rar->ppmd_escape = 2;
if (ppmd_flags & 0x20)
{
maxorder = (ppmd_flags & 0x1F) + 1;
if(maxorder > 16)
maxorder = 16 + (maxorder - 16) * 3;
if (maxorder == 1)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated RAR file data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Make sure ppmd7_contest is freed before Ppmd7_Construct
* because reading a broken file cause this abnormal sequence. */
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Free(&rar->ppmd7_context, &g_szalloc);
rar->bytein.a = a;
rar->bytein.Read = &ppmd_read;
__archive_ppmd7_functions.PpmdRAR_RangeDec_CreateVTable(&rar->range_dec);
rar->range_dec.Stream = &rar->bytein;
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Construct(&rar->ppmd7_context);
if (!__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Alloc(&rar->ppmd7_context,
rar->dictionary_size, &g_szalloc))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Out of memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (!__archive_ppmd7_functions.PpmdRAR_RangeDec_Init(&rar->range_dec))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unable to initialize PPMd range decoder");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Init(&rar->ppmd7_context, maxorder);
rar->ppmd_valid = 1;
}
else
{
if (!rar->ppmd_valid) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid PPMd sequence");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (!__archive_ppmd7_functions.PpmdRAR_RangeDec_Init(&rar->range_dec))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unable to initialize PPMd range decoder");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
}
}
else
{
rar_br_consume(br, 1);
/* Keep existing table flag */
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 1))
goto truncated_data;
if (!rar_br_bits(br, 1))
memset(rar->lengthtable, 0, sizeof(rar->lengthtable));
rar_br_consume(br, 1);
memset(&bitlengths, 0, sizeof(bitlengths));
for (i = 0; i < MAX_SYMBOLS;)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 4))
goto truncated_data;
bitlengths[i++] = rar_br_bits(br, 4);
rar_br_consume(br, 4);
if (bitlengths[i-1] == 0xF)
{
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 4))
goto truncated_data;
zerocount = rar_br_bits(br, 4);
rar_br_consume(br, 4);
if (zerocount)
{
i--;
for (j = 0; j < zerocount + 2 && i < MAX_SYMBOLS; j++)
bitlengths[i++] = 0;
}
}
}
memset(&precode, 0, sizeof(precode));
r = create_code(a, &precode, bitlengths, MAX_SYMBOLS, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
return (r);
}
for (i = 0; i < HUFFMAN_TABLE_SIZE;)
{
if ((val = read_next_symbol(a, &precode)) < 0) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (val < 16)
{
rar->lengthtable[i] = (rar->lengthtable[i] + val) & 0xF;
i++;
}
else if (val < 18)
{
if (i == 0)
{
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Internal error extracting RAR file.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if(val == 16) {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 3)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 3) + 3;
rar_br_consume(br, 3);
} else {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 7)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 7) + 11;
rar_br_consume(br, 7);
}
for (j = 0; j < n && i < HUFFMAN_TABLE_SIZE; j++)
{
rar->lengthtable[i] = rar->lengthtable[i-1];
i++;
}
}
else
{
if(val == 18) {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 3)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 3) + 3;
rar_br_consume(br, 3);
} else {
if (!rar_br_read_ahead(a, br, 7)) {
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
goto truncated_data;
}
n = rar_br_bits(br, 7) + 11;
rar_br_consume(br, 7);
}
for(j = 0; j < n && i < HUFFMAN_TABLE_SIZE; j++)
rar->lengthtable[i++] = 0;
}
}
free(precode.tree);
free(precode.table);
r = create_code(a, &rar->maincode, &rar->lengthtable[0], MAINCODE_SIZE,
MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
r = create_code(a, &rar->offsetcode, &rar->lengthtable[MAINCODE_SIZE],
OFFSETCODE_SIZE, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
r = create_code(a, &rar->lowoffsetcode,
&rar->lengthtable[MAINCODE_SIZE + OFFSETCODE_SIZE],
LOWOFFSETCODE_SIZE, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
r = create_code(a, &rar->lengthcode,
&rar->lengthtable[MAINCODE_SIZE + OFFSETCODE_SIZE +
LOWOFFSETCODE_SIZE], LENGTHCODE_SIZE, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
}
if (!rar->dictionary_size || !rar->lzss.window)
{
/* Seems as though dictionary sizes are not used. Even so, minimize
* memory usage as much as possible.
*/
void *new_window;
unsigned int new_size;
if (rar->unp_size >= DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE)
new_size = DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE;
else
new_size = rar_fls((unsigned int)rar->unp_size) << 1;
new_window = realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size);
if (new_window == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Unable to allocate memory for uncompressed data.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->lzss.window = (unsigned char *)new_window;
rar->dictionary_size = new_size;
memset(rar->lzss.window, 0, rar->dictionary_size);
rar->lzss.mask = rar->dictionary_size - 1;
}
rar->start_new_table = 0;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
truncated_data:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated RAR file data");
rar->valid = 0;
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the parse_codes function in archive_read_support_format_rar.c in libarchive before 3.2.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a RAR file with a zero-sized dictionary.
Commit Message: Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this.
|
Medium
| 167,319
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> convert1Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.convert1");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(a*, , V8a::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8a::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
imp->convert1();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,077
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void php_wddx_pop_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name)
{
st_entry *ent1, *ent2;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
HashTable *target_hash;
zend_class_entry **pce;
zval *obj;
zval *tmp;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
if (stack->top == 0) {
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING) || !strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN) || !strcmp(name, EL_NULL) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY) || !strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET) || !strcmp(name, EL_BINARY) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent1);
if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
int new_len=0;
unsigned char *new_str;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__wakeup", 1);
call_user_function_ex(NULL, &ent1->data, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent2);
/* if non-existent field */
if (ent2->type == ST_FIELD && ent2->data == NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY || Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
target_hash = HASH_OF(ent2->data);
if (ent1->varname) {
if (!strcmp(ent1->varname, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR) &&
Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) &&
ent2->type == ST_STRUCT && Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_bool incomplete_class = 0;
zend_str_tolower(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
if (zend_hash_find(EG(class_table), Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data),
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data)+1, (void **) &pce)==FAILURE) {
incomplete_class = 1;
pce = &PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
/* Initialize target object */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(obj);
object_init_ex(obj, *pce);
/* Merge current hashtable with object's default properties */
zend_hash_merge(Z_OBJPROP_P(obj),
Z_ARRVAL_P(ent2->data),
(void (*)(void *)) zval_add_ref,
(void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), 0);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(obj, Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
}
/* Clean up old array entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
/* Set stack entry to point to the newly created object */
ent2->data = obj;
/* Clean up class name var entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = Z_OBJCE_P(ent2->data);
Z_DELREF_P(ent1->data);
add_property_zval(ent2->data, ent1->varname, ent1->data);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
} else {
zend_symtable_update(target_hash, ent1->varname, strlen(ent1->varname)+1, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
efree(ent1->varname);
} else {
zend_hash_next_index_insert(target_hash, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
}
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR) && stack->varname) {
efree(stack->varname);
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void **)&ent);
efree(ent);
stack->top--;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in wddx.c in the WDDX extension in PHP before 5.5.33 and 5.6.x before 5.6.19 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a wddx_deserialize call on XML data containing a crafted var element.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,165
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnSearch(const SearchCallback& callback,
GetDocumentsParams* params,
GDataFileError error) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(error, GURL(), scoped_ptr<std::vector<SearchResultInfo> >());
return;
}
std::vector<SearchResultInfo>* results(new std::vector<SearchResultInfo>());
DCHECK_EQ(1u, params->feed_list->size());
DocumentFeed* feed = params->feed_list->at(0);
GURL next_feed;
feed->GetNextFeedURL(&next_feed);
if (feed->entries().empty()) {
scoped_ptr<std::vector<SearchResultInfo> > result_vec(results);
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(error, next_feed, result_vec.Pass());
return;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < feed->entries().size(); ++i) {
DocumentEntry* doc = const_cast<DocumentEntry*>(feed->entries()[i]);
scoped_ptr<GDataEntry> entry(
GDataEntry::FromDocumentEntry(NULL, doc, directory_service_.get()));
if (!entry.get())
continue;
DCHECK_EQ(doc->resource_id(), entry->resource_id());
DCHECK(!entry->is_deleted());
std::string entry_resource_id = entry->resource_id();
if (entry->AsGDataFile()) {
scoped_ptr<GDataFile> entry_as_file(entry.release()->AsGDataFile());
directory_service_->RefreshFile(entry_as_file.Pass());
DCHECK(!entry.get());
}
directory_service_->GetEntryByResourceIdAsync(entry_resource_id,
base::Bind(&AddEntryToSearchResults,
results,
callback,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::CheckForUpdates, ui_weak_ptr_),
error,
i+1 == feed->entries().size(),
next_feed));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,483
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SADs(unsigned int *results) {
const uint8_t* refs[] = {GetReference(0), GetReference(1),
GetReference(2), GetReference(3)};
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(GET_PARAM(2)(source_data_, source_stride_,
refs, reference_stride_,
results));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,576
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int validation_muldiv(int count, int argc, char **argv)
{
int tested = 0;
int overflow = 0;
int error = 0;
int error64 = 0;
int passed = 0;
int randbits = 0;
png_uint_32 randbuffer;
png_fixed_point a;
png_int_32 times, div;
while (--argc > 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "unknown argument %s\n", *++argv);
return 1;
}
/* Find out about the random number generator. */
randbuffer = RAND_MAX;
while (randbuffer != 0) ++randbits, randbuffer >>= 1;
printf("Using random number generator that makes %d bits\n", randbits);
for (div=0; div<32; div += randbits)
randbuffer = (randbuffer << randbits) ^ rand();
a = 0;
times = div = 0;
do
{
png_fixed_point result;
/* NOTE: your mileage may vary, a type is required below that can
* hold 64 bits or more, if floating point is used a 64 bit or
* better mantissa is required.
*/
long long int fp, fpround;
unsigned long hi, lo;
int ok;
/* Check the values, png_64bit_product can only handle positive
* numbers, so correct for that here.
*/
{
long u1, u2;
int n = 0;
if (a < 0) u1 = -a, n = 1; else u1 = a;
if (times < 0) u2 = -times, n = !n; else u2 = times;
png_64bit_product(u1, u2, &hi, &lo);
if (n)
{
/* -x = ~x+1 */
lo = ((~lo) + 1) & 0xffffffff;
hi = ~hi;
if (lo == 0) ++hi;
}
}
fp = a;
fp *= times;
if ((fp & 0xffffffff) != lo || ((fp >> 32) & 0xffffffff) != hi)
{
fprintf(stderr, "png_64bit_product %d * %d -> %lx|%.8lx not %llx\n",
a, times, hi, lo, fp);
++error64;
}
if (div != 0)
{
/* Round - this is C round to zero. */
if ((fp < 0) != (div < 0))
fp -= div/2;
else
fp += div/2;
fp /= div;
fpround = fp;
/* Assume 2's complement here: */
ok = fpround <= PNG_UINT_31_MAX &&
fpround >= -1-(long long int)PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
if (!ok) ++overflow;
}
else
ok = 0, ++overflow, fpround = fp/*misleading*/;
if (verbose)
fprintf(stderr, "TEST %d * %d / %d -> %lld (%s)\n", a, times, div,
fp, ok ? "ok" : "overflow");
++tested;
if (png_muldiv(&result, a, times, div) != ok)
{
++error;
if (ok)
fprintf(stderr, "%d * %d / %d -> overflow (expected %lld)\n", a,
times, div, fp);
else
fprintf(stderr, "%d * %d / %d -> %d (expected overflow %lld)\n", a,
times, div, result, fp);
}
else if (ok && result != fpround)
{
++error;
fprintf(stderr, "%d * %d / %d -> %d not %lld\n", a, times, div, result,
fp);
}
else
++passed;
/* Generate three new values, this uses rand() and rand() only returns
* up to RAND_MAX.
*/
/* CRUDE */
a += times;
times += div;
div = randbuffer;
randbuffer = (randbuffer << randbits) ^ rand();
}
while (--count > 0);
printf("%d tests including %d overflows, %d passed, %d failed (%d 64 bit "
"errors)\n", tested, overflow, passed, error, error64);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,721
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void UrlData::set_has_opaque_data(bool has_opaque_data) {
if (has_opaque_data_)
return;
has_opaque_data_ = has_opaque_data;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
Medium
| 172,629
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PreconnectManager::FinishPreresolveJob(PreresolveJobId job_id,
bool success) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
PreresolveJob* job = preresolve_jobs_.Lookup(job_id);
DCHECK(job);
bool need_preconnect = success && job->need_preconnect();
if (need_preconnect) {
PreconnectUrl(job->url, job->num_sockets, job->allow_credentials,
job->network_isolation_key);
}
PreresolveInfo* info = job->info;
if (info)
info->stats->requests_stats.emplace_back(job->url, need_preconnect);
preresolve_jobs_.Remove(job_id);
--inflight_preresolves_count_;
if (info) {
DCHECK_LE(1u, info->inflight_count);
--info->inflight_count;
}
if (info && info->is_done())
AllPreresolvesForUrlFinished(info);
TryToLaunchPreresolveJobs();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
|
Medium
| 172,374
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void jp2_box_dump(jp2_box_t *box, FILE *out)
{
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
assert(boxinfo);
fprintf(out, "JP2 box: ");
fprintf(out, "type=%c%s%c (0x%08"PRIxFAST32"); length=%"PRIuFAST32"\n", '"', boxinfo->name,
'"', box->type, box->len);
if (box->ops->dumpdata) {
(*box->ops->dumpdata)(box, out);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jp2_colr_destroy function in jp2_cod.c in JasPer before 1.900.13 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) by leveraging incorrect cleanup of JP2 box data on error. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-8887.
Commit Message: Fixed another problem with incorrect cleanup of JP2 box data upon error.
|
Low
| 168,472
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: CStarter::removeDeferredJobs() {
bool ret = true;
if ( this->deferral_tid == -1 ) {
return ( ret );
}
m_deferred_job_update = true;
if ( daemonCore->Cancel_Timer( this->deferral_tid ) >= 0 ) {
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "Cancelled time deferred execution for "
"Job %d.%d\n",
this->jic->jobCluster(),
this->jic->jobProc() );
this->deferral_tid = -1;
} else {
MyString error = "Failed to cancel deferred execution timer for Job ";
error += this->jic->jobCluster();
error += ".";
error += this->jic->jobProc();
EXCEPT( error.Value() );
ret = false;
}
return ( ret );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,379
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const char *cJSON_GetErrorPtr( void )
{
return ep;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,288
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned int type;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
PACKET extensions;
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
#endif
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
goto ri_check;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
return 0;
if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
return 0;
/*
* We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
* unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
* resumption.
*/
while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
PACKET extension;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
return 0;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
PACKET_remaining(&extension),
s->tlsext_debug_arg);
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
} else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
}
/*-
* The servername extension is treated as follows:
*
* - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
* - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
* in which case an fatal alert is generated.
* - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
* - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
* to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
* - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
* it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
* Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
* set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
* case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
* a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
* presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
* the value of the Host: field.
* - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
* if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
* session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
* extension.
* - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
*
*/
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
unsigned int servname_type;
PACKET sni, hostname;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
/* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
|| PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
return 0;
}
/*
* Although the server_name extension was intended to be
* extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
* syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
* such.
* RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
* is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
* SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
*
* Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
* i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
|| servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
|| !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->servername_done = 1;
} else {
/*
* TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
* fall back to a full handshake.
*/
s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
&& PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
PACKET srp_I;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
return 0;
if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
return 0;
/*
* TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
* upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
*/
if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
PACKET ec_point_format_list;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
&s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
&s->
session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
/* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
|| (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
&s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
&s->
session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
PACKET_remaining(&extension),
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
PACKET supported_sig_algs;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
|| (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
return 0;
}
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
(unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
const unsigned char *ext_data;
PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
(&extension, &responder_id_list))
return 0;
/*
* We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
* to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
*/
sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
OCSP_RESPID_free);
if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else {
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
OCSP_RESPID *id;
PACKET responder_id;
const unsigned char *id_data;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
&responder_id)
|| PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
return 0;
}
id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
if (id == NULL)
return 0;
if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
return 0;
}
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
return 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
PACKET_remaining(&exts));
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
|| ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
return 0;
}
}
} else
#endif
{
/*
* We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
*/
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
unsigned int hbtype;
if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
|| PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
switch (hbtype) {
case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default:
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
/*-
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
*
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
* the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
* anything like that, but this might change).
*
* A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
* in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
* 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
* in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
* Finished message could have been computed.)
*/
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
}
/* session ticket processed earlier */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
&& type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
/*
* Note: extended master secret extension handled in
* tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
*/
/*
* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
* nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
* TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
* callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
* ServerHello may be later returned.
*/
else if (!s->hit) {
if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
return 0;
}
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
/*
* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
*/
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
ri_check:
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
/*
* This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
* If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
* The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
* then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
*/
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then this can cause OpenSSL 1.1.0 before 1.1.0e to crash (dependent on ciphersuite). Both clients and servers are affected.
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
Low
| 168,428
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bool src_known, dst_known;
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 umin_val, umax_val;
u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;
smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
umax_val = src_reg.umax_value;
src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_SUB:
if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val;
dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_MUL:
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
* copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
*/
if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
/* (except what we can learn from the var_off) */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
break;
case BPF_AND:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value &
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
* bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_OR:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value |
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
* maximum of the operands' minima
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value |
dst_reg->var_off.mask;
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_LSH:
if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
* This includes shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
* up from var_off)
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
}
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_RSH:
if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
* This includes shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might
* be negative, then either:
* 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
* unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
* 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
* signed bounds
* 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
* about the result
* If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
* unsigned bounts capture the signed bounds.
* Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
* and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
* var_off of the result.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off,
umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
default:
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
/* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->32 */
coerce_reg_to_size(dst_reg, 4);
coerce_reg_to_size(&src_reg, 4);
}
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging unrestricted integer values for pointer arithmetic.
Commit Message: bpf: fix integer overflows
There were various issues related to the limited size of integers used in
the verifier:
- `off + size` overflow in __check_map_access()
- `off + reg->off` overflow in check_mem_access()
- `off + reg->var_off.value` overflow or 32-bit truncation of
`reg->var_off.value` in check_mem_access()
- 32-bit truncation in check_stack_boundary()
Make sure that any integer math cannot overflow by not allowing
pointer math with large values.
Also reduce the scope of "scalar op scalar" tracking.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
Low
| 167,644
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static unsigned char *AcquireCompactPixels(const Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
packet_size=image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((9*
image->columns)+1,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",
image->filename);
}
return(compact_pixels);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: coders/psd.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted PSD file, which triggers an out-of-bounds write.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/350
|
Medium
| 168,403
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::collectionEntries(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { object };
v8::Local<v8::Value> entriesValue = callDebuggerMethod("getCollectionEntries", 1, argv).ToLocalChecked();
if (!entriesValue->IsArray())
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Array> entries = entriesValue.As<v8::Array>();
if (!markArrayEntriesAsInternal(context, entries, V8InternalValueType::kEntry))
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
if (!entries->SetPrototype(context, v8::Null(m_isolate)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
return entries;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WebKit/Source/platform/v8_inspector/V8Debugger.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML into the Developer Tools (aka DevTools) subsystem via a crafted web site, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
|
Medium
| 172,064
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void scsi_read_complete(void * opaque, int ret)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = (SCSIDiskReq *)opaque;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
int n;
if (r->req.aiocb != NULL) {
r->req.aiocb = NULL;
bdrv_acct_done(s->bs, &r->acct);
}
if (ret) {
if (scsi_handle_rw_error(r, -ret, SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_READ)) {
return;
}
}
DPRINTF("Data ready tag=0x%x len=%zd\n", r->req.tag, r->iov.iov_len);
n = r->iov.iov_len / 512;
r->sector += n;
r->sector_count -= n;
scsi_req_data(&r->req, r->iov.iov_len);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in hw/scsi-disk.c in the SCSI subsystem in QEMU before 0.15.2, as used by Xen, might allow local guest users with permission to access the CD-ROM to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted SAI READ CAPACITY SCSI command. NOTE: this is only a vulnerability when root has manually modified certain permissions or ACLs.
Commit Message: scsi-disk: commonize iovec creation between reads and writes
Also, consistently use qiov.size instead of iov.iov_len.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
|
High
| 169,920
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
{
int ret = -ESRCH;
/*
* We take the read lock around doing both checks to close a
* possible race where someone else was tracing our child and
* detached between these two checks. After this locked check,
* we are sure that this is our traced child and that can only
* be changed by us so it's not changing right after this.
*/
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
if ((child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && child->parent == current) {
/*
* child->sighand can't be NULL, release_task()
* does ptrace_unlink() before __exit_signal().
*/
spin_lock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
WARN_ON_ONCE(task_is_stopped(child));
if (ignore_state || (task_is_traced(child) &&
!(child->jobctl & JOBCTL_LISTENING)))
ret = 0;
spin_unlock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
if (!ret && !ignore_state)
ret = wait_task_inactive(child, TASK_TRACED) ? 0 : -ESRCH;
/* All systems go.. */
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the ptrace functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.7.5 allows local users to gain privileges via a PTRACE_SETREGS ptrace system call in a crafted application, as demonstrated by ptrace_death.
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 166,138
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, valid)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name[0] != '\0');
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,030
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RecordDailyContentLengthHistograms(
int64 original_length,
int64 received_length,
int64 original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled,
int64 received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled,
int64 original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy,
int64 received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy) {
if (original_length <= 0 || received_length <= 0)
return;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyOriginalContentLength", original_length >> 10);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyContentLength", received_length >> 10);
int percent = 0;
if (original_length > received_length) {
percent = (100 * (original_length - received_length)) / original_length;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE("Net.DailyContentSavingPercent", percent);
if (original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled <= 0 ||
received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled <= 0) {
return;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyOriginalContentLength_DataReductionProxyEnabled",
original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled >> 10);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyContentLength_DataReductionProxyEnabled",
received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled >> 10);
int percent_data_reduction_proxy_enabled = 0;
if (original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled >
received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled) {
percent_data_reduction_proxy_enabled =
100 * (original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled -
received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled) /
original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentSavingPercent_DataReductionProxyEnabled",
percent_data_reduction_proxy_enabled);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentPercent_DataReductionProxyEnabled",
(100 * received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled) / received_length);
if (original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy <= 0 ||
received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy <= 0) {
return;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyOriginalContentLength_ViaDataReductionProxy",
original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy >> 10);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyContentLength_ViaDataReductionProxy",
received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy >> 10);
int percent_via_data_reduction_proxy = 0;
if (original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy >
received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy) {
percent_via_data_reduction_proxy =
100 * (original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy -
received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy) /
original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentSavingPercent_ViaDataReductionProxy",
percent_via_data_reduction_proxy);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentPercent_ViaDataReductionProxy",
(100 * received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy) / received_length);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,326
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Initialized(mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle shared_buffer,
mojo::ScopedHandle socket_handle,
bool initially_muted) {
ASSERT_TRUE(shared_buffer.is_valid());
ASSERT_TRUE(socket_handle.is_valid());
base::PlatformFile fd;
mojo::UnwrapPlatformFile(std::move(socket_handle), &fd);
socket_ = std::make_unique<base::CancelableSyncSocket>(fd);
EXPECT_NE(socket_->handle(), base::CancelableSyncSocket::kInvalidHandle);
size_t memory_length;
base::SharedMemoryHandle shmem_handle;
bool read_only;
EXPECT_EQ(
mojo::UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(std::move(shared_buffer), &shmem_handle,
&memory_length, &read_only),
MOJO_RESULT_OK);
EXPECT_TRUE(read_only);
buffer_ = std::make_unique<base::SharedMemory>(shmem_handle, read_only);
GotNotification(initially_muted);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
Medium
| 172,878
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static noinline int create_pending_snapshot(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
struct btrfs_pending_snapshot *pending)
{
struct btrfs_key key;
struct btrfs_root_item *new_root_item;
struct btrfs_root *tree_root = fs_info->tree_root;
struct btrfs_root *root = pending->root;
struct btrfs_root *parent_root;
struct btrfs_block_rsv *rsv;
struct inode *parent_inode;
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct btrfs_dir_item *dir_item;
struct dentry *parent;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct extent_buffer *tmp;
struct extent_buffer *old;
struct timespec cur_time = CURRENT_TIME;
int ret;
u64 to_reserve = 0;
u64 index = 0;
u64 objectid;
u64 root_flags;
uuid_le new_uuid;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path) {
ret = pending->error = -ENOMEM;
goto path_alloc_fail;
}
new_root_item = kmalloc(sizeof(*new_root_item), GFP_NOFS);
if (!new_root_item) {
ret = pending->error = -ENOMEM;
goto root_item_alloc_fail;
}
ret = btrfs_find_free_objectid(tree_root, &objectid);
if (ret) {
pending->error = ret;
goto no_free_objectid;
}
btrfs_reloc_pre_snapshot(trans, pending, &to_reserve);
if (to_reserve > 0) {
ret = btrfs_block_rsv_add(root, &pending->block_rsv,
to_reserve,
BTRFS_RESERVE_NO_FLUSH);
if (ret) {
pending->error = ret;
goto no_free_objectid;
}
}
ret = btrfs_qgroup_inherit(trans, fs_info, root->root_key.objectid,
objectid, pending->inherit);
if (ret) {
pending->error = ret;
goto no_free_objectid;
}
key.objectid = objectid;
key.offset = (u64)-1;
key.type = BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY;
rsv = trans->block_rsv;
trans->block_rsv = &pending->block_rsv;
dentry = pending->dentry;
parent = dget_parent(dentry);
parent_inode = parent->d_inode;
parent_root = BTRFS_I(parent_inode)->root;
record_root_in_trans(trans, parent_root);
/*
* insert the directory item
*/
ret = btrfs_set_inode_index(parent_inode, &index);
BUG_ON(ret); /* -ENOMEM */
/* check if there is a file/dir which has the same name. */
dir_item = btrfs_lookup_dir_item(NULL, parent_root, path,
btrfs_ino(parent_inode),
dentry->d_name.name,
dentry->d_name.len, 0);
if (dir_item != NULL && !IS_ERR(dir_item)) {
pending->error = -EEXIST;
goto fail;
} else if (IS_ERR(dir_item)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dir_item);
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto fail;
}
btrfs_release_path(path);
/*
* pull in the delayed directory update
* and the delayed inode item
* otherwise we corrupt the FS during
* snapshot
*/
ret = btrfs_run_delayed_items(trans, root);
if (ret) { /* Transaction aborted */
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto fail;
}
record_root_in_trans(trans, root);
btrfs_set_root_last_snapshot(&root->root_item, trans->transid);
memcpy(new_root_item, &root->root_item, sizeof(*new_root_item));
btrfs_check_and_init_root_item(new_root_item);
root_flags = btrfs_root_flags(new_root_item);
if (pending->readonly)
root_flags |= BTRFS_ROOT_SUBVOL_RDONLY;
else
root_flags &= ~BTRFS_ROOT_SUBVOL_RDONLY;
btrfs_set_root_flags(new_root_item, root_flags);
btrfs_set_root_generation_v2(new_root_item,
trans->transid);
uuid_le_gen(&new_uuid);
memcpy(new_root_item->uuid, new_uuid.b, BTRFS_UUID_SIZE);
memcpy(new_root_item->parent_uuid, root->root_item.uuid,
BTRFS_UUID_SIZE);
new_root_item->otime.sec = cpu_to_le64(cur_time.tv_sec);
new_root_item->otime.nsec = cpu_to_le32(cur_time.tv_nsec);
btrfs_set_root_otransid(new_root_item, trans->transid);
memset(&new_root_item->stime, 0, sizeof(new_root_item->stime));
memset(&new_root_item->rtime, 0, sizeof(new_root_item->rtime));
btrfs_set_root_stransid(new_root_item, 0);
btrfs_set_root_rtransid(new_root_item, 0);
old = btrfs_lock_root_node(root);
ret = btrfs_cow_block(trans, root, old, NULL, 0, &old);
if (ret) {
btrfs_tree_unlock(old);
free_extent_buffer(old);
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto fail;
}
btrfs_set_lock_blocking(old);
ret = btrfs_copy_root(trans, root, old, &tmp, objectid);
/* clean up in any case */
btrfs_tree_unlock(old);
free_extent_buffer(old);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto fail;
}
/* see comments in should_cow_block() */
root->force_cow = 1;
smp_wmb();
btrfs_set_root_node(new_root_item, tmp);
/* record when the snapshot was created in key.offset */
key.offset = trans->transid;
ret = btrfs_insert_root(trans, tree_root, &key, new_root_item);
btrfs_tree_unlock(tmp);
free_extent_buffer(tmp);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto fail;
}
/*
* insert root back/forward references
*/
ret = btrfs_add_root_ref(trans, tree_root, objectid,
parent_root->root_key.objectid,
btrfs_ino(parent_inode), index,
dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.len);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto fail;
}
key.offset = (u64)-1;
pending->snap = btrfs_read_fs_root_no_name(root->fs_info, &key);
if (IS_ERR(pending->snap)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(pending->snap);
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto fail;
}
ret = btrfs_reloc_post_snapshot(trans, pending);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto fail;
}
ret = btrfs_run_delayed_refs(trans, root, (unsigned long)-1);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto fail;
}
ret = btrfs_insert_dir_item(trans, parent_root,
dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.len,
parent_inode, &key,
BTRFS_FT_DIR, index);
/* We have check then name at the beginning, so it is impossible. */
BUG_ON(ret == -EEXIST);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto fail;
}
btrfs_i_size_write(parent_inode, parent_inode->i_size +
dentry->d_name.len * 2);
parent_inode->i_mtime = parent_inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
ret = btrfs_update_inode_fallback(trans, parent_root, parent_inode);
if (ret)
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
fail:
dput(parent);
trans->block_rsv = rsv;
no_free_objectid:
kfree(new_root_item);
root_item_alloc_fail:
btrfs_free_path(path);
path_alloc_fail:
btrfs_block_rsv_release(root, &pending->block_rsv, (u64)-1);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The CRC32C feature in the Btrfs implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.8-rc1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (prevention of file creation) by leveraging the ability to write to a directory important to the victim, and creating a file with a crafted name that is associated with a specific CRC32C hash value.
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
|
High
| 166,196
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void *btif_hl_select_thread(void *arg){
fd_set org_set, curr_set;
int r, max_curr_s, max_org_s;
UNUSED(arg);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("entered btif_hl_select_thread");
FD_ZERO(&org_set);
max_org_s = btif_hl_select_wakeup_init(&org_set);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("max_s=%d ", max_org_s);
for (;;)
{
r = 0;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("set curr_set = org_set ");
curr_set = org_set;
max_curr_s = max_org_s;
int ret = select((max_curr_s + 1), &curr_set, NULL, NULL, NULL);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("select unblocked ret=%d", ret);
if (ret == -1)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("select() ret -1, exit the thread");
btif_hl_thread_cleanup();
select_thread_id = -1;
return 0;
}
else if (ret)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wake_signaled, signal ret=%d", ret);
if (btif_hl_select_wake_signaled(&curr_set))
{
r = btif_hl_select_wake_reset();
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wake_signaled, signal:%d", r);
if (r == btif_hl_signal_select_wakeup || r == btif_hl_signal_select_close_connected )
{
btif_hl_select_wakeup_callback(&org_set, r);
}
else if( r == btif_hl_signal_select_exit)
{
btif_hl_thread_cleanup();
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Exit hl_select_thread for btif_hl_signal_select_exit");
return 0;
}
}
btif_hl_select_monitor_callback(&curr_set, &org_set);
max_org_s = btif_hl_update_maxfd(max_org_s);
}
else
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("no data, select ret: %d\n", ret);
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("leaving hl_select_thread");
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,442
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: doshn(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off, int num,
size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags, int mach, int strtab)
{
Elf32_Shdr sh32;
Elf64_Shdr sh64;
int stripped = 1;
size_t nbadcap = 0;
void *nbuf;
off_t noff, coff, name_off;
uint64_t cap_hw1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x hardware capabilites */
uint64_t cap_sf1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x software capabilites */
char name[50];
if (size != xsh_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted section header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/* Read offset of name section to be able to read section names later */
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off + size * strtab) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name_off = xsh_offset;
for ( ; num; num--) {
/* Read the name of this section. */
if (pread(fd, name, sizeof(name), name_off + xsh_name) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0';
if (strcmp(name, ".debug_info") == 0)
stripped = 0;
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_SYMTAB:
#if 0
case SHT_DYNSYM:
#endif
stripped = 0;
break;
default:
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xsh_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_NOTE:
if ((nbuf = malloc(xsh_size)) == NULL) {
file_error(ms, errno, "Cannot allocate memory"
" for note");
return -1;
}
if (pread(fd, nbuf, xsh_size, xsh_offset) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
free(nbuf);
return -1;
}
noff = 0;
for (;;) {
if (noff >= (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
noff = donote(ms, nbuf, (size_t)noff,
xsh_size, clazz, swap, 4, flags);
if (noff == 0)
break;
}
free(nbuf);
break;
case SHT_SUNW_cap:
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARCV9:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_386:
case EM_AMD64:
break;
default:
goto skip;
}
if (nbadcap > 5)
break;
if (lseek(fd, xsh_offset, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
file_badseek(ms);
return -1;
}
coff = 0;
for (;;) {
Elf32_Cap cap32;
Elf64_Cap cap64;
char cbuf[/*CONSTCOND*/
MAX(sizeof cap32, sizeof cap64)];
if ((coff += xcap_sizeof) > (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
if (read(fd, cbuf, (size_t)xcap_sizeof) !=
(ssize_t)xcap_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (cbuf[0] == 'A') {
#ifdef notyet
char *p = cbuf + 1;
uint32_t len, tag;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (memcmp("gnu", p, 3) != 0) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", unknown capability %.3s", p)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
p += strlen(p) + 1;
tag = *p++;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (tag != 1) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown gnu"
" capability tag %d", tag)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
#endif
break;
}
(void)memcpy(xcap_addr, cbuf, xcap_sizeof);
switch (xcap_tag) {
case CA_SUNW_NULL:
break;
case CA_SUNW_HW_1:
cap_hw1 |= xcap_val;
break;
case CA_SUNW_SF_1:
cap_sf1 |= xcap_val;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown capability "
"0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x = 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)xcap_tag,
(unsigned long long)xcap_val) == -1)
return -1;
if (nbadcap++ > 2)
coff = xsh_size;
break;
}
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
skip:
default:
break;
}
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %sstripped", stripped ? "" : "not ") == -1)
return -1;
if (cap_hw1) {
const cap_desc_t *cdp;
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARC32PLUS:
case EM_SPARCV9:
cdp = cap_desc_sparc;
break;
case EM_386:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_AMD64:
cdp = cap_desc_386;
break;
default:
cdp = NULL;
break;
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", uses") == -1)
return -1;
if (cdp) {
while (cdp->cd_name) {
if (cap_hw1 & cdp->cd_mask) {
if (file_printf(ms,
" %s", cdp->cd_name) == -1)
return -1;
cap_hw1 &= ~cdp->cd_mask;
}
++cdp;
}
if (cap_hw1)
if (file_printf(ms,
" unknown hardware capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
if (file_printf(ms,
" hardware capability 0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
if (cap_sf1) {
if (cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPUSED) {
if (file_printf(ms,
(cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPKNWN)
? ", uses frame pointer"
: ", not known to use frame pointer") == -1)
return -1;
}
cap_sf1 &= ~SF1_SUNW_MASK;
if (cap_sf1)
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown software capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_sf1) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: readelf.c in file before 5.22, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.37, 5.5.x before 5.5.21, and 5.6.x before 5.6.5, does not consider that pread calls sometimes read only a subset of the available data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted ELF file.
Commit Message: Bail out on partial reads, from Alexander Cherepanov
|
Low
| 166,769
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer(
OMX::buffer_id buffer,
OMX_U32 rangeOffset, OMX_U32 rangeLength,
OMX_U32 flags, OMX_TICKS timestamp) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer);
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength;
header->nOffset = rangeOffset;
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
buffer_meta->CopyToOMX(header);
return emptyBuffer_l(header, flags, timestamp, (intptr_t)buffer);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer function in omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application, aka internal bug 20634516.
Commit Message: IOMX: Add buffer range check to emptyBuffer
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: If351dbd573bb4aeb6968bfa33f6d407225bc752c
(cherry picked from commit d971df0eb300356b3c995d533289216f43aa60de)
|
Medium
| 174,122
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev,
void *data, struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct drm_clip_rect __user *clips_ptr;
struct drm_clip_rect *clips = NULL;
struct drm_mode_fb_dirty_cmd *r = data;
struct drm_mode_object *obj;
struct drm_framebuffer *fb;
unsigned flags;
int num_clips;
int ret = 0;
if (!drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_MODESET))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, r->fb_id, DRM_MODE_OBJECT_FB);
if (!obj) {
DRM_ERROR("invalid framebuffer id\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_err1;
}
fb = obj_to_fb(obj);
num_clips = r->num_clips;
clips_ptr = (struct drm_clip_rect *)(unsigned long)r->clips_ptr;
if (!num_clips != !clips_ptr) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_err1;
}
flags = DRM_MODE_FB_DIRTY_FLAGS & r->flags;
/* If userspace annotates copy, clips must come in pairs */
if (flags & DRM_MODE_FB_DIRTY_ANNOTATE_COPY && (num_clips % 2)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_err1;
}
if (num_clips && clips_ptr) {
clips = kzalloc(num_clips * sizeof(*clips), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!clips) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err1;
}
ret = copy_from_user(clips, clips_ptr,
num_clips * sizeof(*clips));
if (ret) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_err2;
}
}
if (fb->funcs->dirty) {
ret = fb->funcs->dirty(fb, file_priv, flags, r->color,
clips, num_clips);
} else {
ret = -ENOSYS;
goto out_err2;
}
out_err2:
kfree(clips);
out_err1:
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl function in drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc.c in the Direct Rendering Manager (DRM) subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1.5 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted ioctl call.
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 165,655
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GaiaOAuthClient::Core::RefreshToken(
const OAuthClientInfo& oauth_client_info,
const std::string& refresh_token,
GaiaOAuthClient::Delegate* delegate) {
DCHECK(!request_.get()) << "Tried to fetch two things at once!";
delegate_ = delegate;
access_token_.clear();
expires_in_seconds_ = 0;
std::string post_body =
"refresh_token=" + net::EscapeUrlEncodedData(refresh_token, true) +
"&client_id=" + net::EscapeUrlEncodedData(oauth_client_info.client_id,
true) +
"&client_secret=" +
net::EscapeUrlEncodedData(oauth_client_info.client_secret, true) +
"&grant_type=refresh_token";
request_.reset(new UrlFetcher(GURL(provider_info_.access_token_url),
UrlFetcher::POST));
request_->SetRequestContext(request_context_getter_);
request_->SetUploadData("application/x-www-form-urlencoded", post_body);
request_->Start(
base::Bind(&GaiaOAuthClient::Core::OnAuthTokenFetchComplete, this));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,809
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: krb5_gss_inquire_context(minor_status, context_handle, initiator_name,
acceptor_name, lifetime_rec, mech_type, ret_flags,
locally_initiated, opened)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_name_t *initiator_name;
gss_name_t *acceptor_name;
OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec;
gss_OID *mech_type;
OM_uint32 *ret_flags;
int *locally_initiated;
int *opened;
{
krb5_context context;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_gss_name_t initiator, acceptor;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_deltat lifetime;
if (initiator_name)
*initiator_name = (gss_name_t) NULL;
if (acceptor_name)
*acceptor_name = (gss_name_t) NULL;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
initiator = NULL;
acceptor = NULL;
context = ctx->k5_context;
if ((code = krb5_timeofday(context, &now))) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if ((lifetime = ctx->krb_times.endtime - now) < 0)
lifetime = 0;
if (initiator_name) {
if ((code = kg_duplicate_name(context,
ctx->initiate ? ctx->here : ctx->there,
&initiator))) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
}
if (acceptor_name) {
if ((code = kg_duplicate_name(context,
ctx->initiate ? ctx->there : ctx->here,
&acceptor))) {
if (initiator)
kg_release_name(context, &initiator);
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
}
if (initiator_name)
*initiator_name = (gss_name_t) initiator;
if (acceptor_name)
*acceptor_name = (gss_name_t) acceptor;
if (lifetime_rec)
*lifetime_rec = lifetime;
if (mech_type)
*mech_type = (gss_OID) ctx->mech_used;
if (ret_flags)
*ret_flags = ctx->gss_flags;
if (locally_initiated)
*locally_initiated = ctx->initiate;
if (opened)
*opened = ctx->established;
*minor_status = 0;
return((lifetime == 0)?GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED:GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The krb5_gss_process_context_token function in lib/gssapi/krb5/process_context_token.c in the libgssapi_krb5 library in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.11.5, 1.12.x through 1.12.2, and 1.13.x before 1.13.1 does not properly maintain security-context handles, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and double free, and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted GSSAPI traffic, as demonstrated by traffic to kadmind.
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 166,816
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: daemon_msg_open_req(uint8 ver, struct daemon_slpars *pars, uint32 plen,
char *source, size_t sourcelen)
{
char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for network errors
char errmsgbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for errors to send to the client
pcap_t *fp; // pcap_t main variable
int nread;
char sendbuf[RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE]; // temporary buffer in which data to be sent is buffered
int sendbufidx = 0; // index which keeps the number of bytes currently buffered
struct rpcap_openreply *openreply; // open reply message
if (plen > sourcelen - 1)
{
pcap_snprintf(errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Source string too long");
goto error;
}
nread = sock_recv(pars->sockctrl, source, plen,
SOCK_RECEIVEALL_YES|SOCK_EOF_IS_ERROR, errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE);
if (nread == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Read from client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
source[nread] = '\0';
plen -= nread;
if ((fp = pcap_open_live(source,
1500 /* fake snaplen */,
0 /* no promis */,
1000 /* fake timeout */,
errmsgbuf)) == NULL)
goto error;
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_header), NULL, &sendbufidx,
RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
rpcap_createhdr((struct rpcap_header *) sendbuf, ver,
RPCAP_MSG_OPEN_REPLY, 0, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply));
openreply = (struct rpcap_openreply *) &sendbuf[sendbufidx];
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply), NULL, &sendbufidx,
RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
memset(openreply, 0, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply));
openreply->linktype = htonl(pcap_datalink(fp));
openreply->tzoff = 0; /* This is always 0 for live captures */
pcap_close(fp);
if (sock_send(pars->sockctrl, sendbuf, sendbufidx, errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
return 0;
error:
if (rpcap_senderror(pars->sockctrl, ver, PCAP_ERR_OPEN,
errmsgbuf, errbuf) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
if (rpcapd_discard(pars->sockctrl, plen) == -1)
{
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-918
Summary: rpcapd/daemon.c in libpcap before 1.9.1 allows SSRF because a URL may be provided as a capture source.
Commit Message: In the open request, reject capture sources that are URLs.
You shouldn't be able to ask a server to open a remote device on some
*other* server; just open it yourself.
This addresses Include Security issue F13: [libpcap] Remote Packet
Capture Daemon Allows Opening Capture URLs.
|
Low
| 169,540
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void EglRenderingVDAClient::CreateDecoder() {
CHECK(decoder_deleted());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
scoped_refptr<DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator> decoder =
new DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator(this, base::GetCurrentProcessHandle());
#else // OS_WIN
scoped_refptr<OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator> decoder =
new OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
decoder->SetEglState(egl_display(), egl_context());
#endif // OS_WIN
decoder_ = decoder.release();
SetState(CS_DECODER_SET);
if (decoder_deleted())
return;
media::VideoCodecProfile profile = media::H264PROFILE_BASELINE;
if (profile_ != -1)
profile = static_cast<media::VideoCodecProfile>(profile_);
CHECK(decoder_->Initialize(profile));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,943
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static opj_bool pi_next_lrcp(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1;
pi->resno++) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.precno1 = res->pw * res->ph;
}
for (pi->precno = pi->poc.precno0; pi->precno < pi->poc.precno1; pi->precno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Out-of-bounds accesses in the functions pi_next_lrcp, pi_next_rlcp, pi_next_rpcl, pi_next_pcrl, pi_next_rpcl, and pi_next_cprl in openmj2/pi.c in OpenJPEG through 2.3.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash).
Commit Message: [MJ2] Avoid index out of bounds access to pi->include[]
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
|
Medium
| 169,768
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::postViolationReport(
const SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& violationData,
LocalFrame* contextFrame,
const Vector<String>& reportEndpoints) {
Document* document =
contextFrame ? contextFrame->document() : this->document();
if (!document)
return;
std::unique_ptr<JSONObject> cspReport = JSONObject::create();
cspReport->setString("document-uri", violationData.documentURI());
cspReport->setString("referrer", violationData.referrer());
cspReport->setString("violated-directive", violationData.violatedDirective());
cspReport->setString("effective-directive",
violationData.effectiveDirective());
cspReport->setString("original-policy", violationData.originalPolicy());
cspReport->setString("disposition", violationData.disposition());
cspReport->setString("blocked-uri", violationData.blockedURI());
if (violationData.lineNumber())
cspReport->setInteger("line-number", violationData.lineNumber());
if (violationData.columnNumber())
cspReport->setInteger("column-number", violationData.columnNumber());
if (!violationData.sourceFile().isEmpty())
cspReport->setString("source-file", violationData.sourceFile());
cspReport->setInteger("status-code", violationData.statusCode());
if (experimentalFeaturesEnabled())
cspReport->setString("sample", violationData.sample());
std::unique_ptr<JSONObject> reportObject = JSONObject::create();
reportObject->setObject("csp-report", std::move(cspReport));
String stringifiedReport = reportObject->toJSONString();
if (shouldSendViolationReport(stringifiedReport)) {
didSendViolationReport(stringifiedReport);
RefPtr<EncodedFormData> report =
EncodedFormData::create(stringifiedReport.utf8());
LocalFrame* frame = document->frame();
if (!frame)
return;
for (const String& endpoint : reportEndpoints) {
DCHECK(!contextFrame || !m_executionContext);
DCHECK(!contextFrame ||
getDirectiveType(violationData.effectiveDirective()) ==
DirectiveType::FrameAncestors);
KURL url =
contextFrame
? frame->document()->completeURLWithOverride(
endpoint, KURL(ParsedURLString, violationData.blockedURI()))
: completeURL(endpoint);
PingLoader::sendViolationReport(
frame, url, report, PingLoader::ContentSecurityPolicyViolationReport);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in CSP reporting in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to obtain the value of url fragments via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
|
Medium
| 172,362
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: load(ImlibImage * im, ImlibProgressFunction progress, char progress_granularity,
char immediate_load)
{
static const int intoffset[] = { 0, 4, 2, 1 };
static const int intjump[] = { 8, 8, 4, 2 };
int rc;
DATA32 *ptr;
GifFileType *gif;
GifRowType *rows;
GifRecordType rec;
ColorMapObject *cmap;
int i, j, done, bg, r, g, b, w = 0, h = 0;
float per = 0.0, per_inc;
int last_per = 0, last_y = 0;
int transp;
int fd;
done = 0;
rows = NULL;
transp = -1;
/* if immediate_load is 1, then dont delay image laoding as below, or */
/* already data in this image - dont load it again */
if (im->data)
return 0;
fd = open(im->real_file, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
return 0;
#if GIFLIB_MAJOR >= 5
gif = DGifOpenFileHandle(fd, NULL);
#else
gif = DGifOpenFileHandle(fd);
#endif
if (!gif)
{
close(fd);
return 0;
}
rc = 0; /* Failure */
do
{
if (DGifGetRecordType(gif, &rec) == GIF_ERROR)
{
/* PrintGifError(); */
rec = TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE;
}
if ((rec == IMAGE_DESC_RECORD_TYPE) && (!done))
{
if (DGifGetImageDesc(gif) == GIF_ERROR)
{
/* PrintGifError(); */
rec = TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE;
break;
}
w = gif->Image.Width;
h = gif->Image.Height;
if (!IMAGE_DIMENSIONS_OK(w, h))
goto quit2;
rows = calloc(h, sizeof(GifRowType *));
if (!rows)
goto quit2;
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
{
rows[i] = calloc(w, sizeof(GifPixelType));
if (!rows[i])
goto quit;
}
if (gif->Image.Interlace)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
for (j = intoffset[i]; j < h; j += intjump[i])
{
DGifGetLine(gif, rows[j], w);
}
}
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
{
DGifGetLine(gif, rows[i], w);
}
}
done = 1;
}
else if (rec == EXTENSION_RECORD_TYPE)
{
int ext_code;
GifByteType *ext;
ext = NULL;
DGifGetExtension(gif, &ext_code, &ext);
while (ext)
{
if ((ext_code == 0xf9) && (ext[1] & 1) && (transp < 0))
{
transp = (int)ext[4];
}
ext = NULL;
DGifGetExtensionNext(gif, &ext);
}
}
}
while (rec != TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE);
if (transp >= 0)
{
SET_FLAG(im->flags, F_HAS_ALPHA);
}
else
{
UNSET_FLAG(im->flags, F_HAS_ALPHA);
}
if (!rows)
{
goto quit2;
}
/* set the format string member to the lower-case full extension */
/* name for the format - so example names would be: */
/* "png", "jpeg", "tiff", "ppm", "pgm", "pbm", "gif", "xpm" ... */
im->w = w;
im->h = h;
if (!im->format)
im->format = strdup("gif");
if (im->loader || immediate_load || progress)
{
bg = gif->SBackGroundColor;
cmap = (gif->Image.ColorMap ? gif->Image.ColorMap : gif->SColorMap);
im->data = (DATA32 *) malloc(sizeof(DATA32) * w * h);
if (!im->data)
goto quit;
{
r = cmap->Colors[bg].Red;
g = cmap->Colors[bg].Green;
b = cmap->Colors[bg].Blue;
*ptr++ = 0x00ffffff & ((r << 16) | (g << 8) | b);
}
else
{
r = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Red;
g = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Green;
b = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Blue;
*ptr++ = (0xff << 24) | (r << 16) | (g << 8) | b;
{
for (j = 0; j < w; j++)
{
if (rows[i][j] == transp)
{
r = cmap->Colors[bg].Red;
g = cmap->Colors[bg].Green;
b = cmap->Colors[bg].Blue;
*ptr++ = 0x00ffffff & ((r << 16) | (g << 8) | b);
}
else
{
r = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Red;
g = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Green;
b = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Blue;
*ptr++ = (0xff << 24) | (r << 16) | (g << 8) | b;
}
per += per_inc;
if (progress && (((int)per) != last_per)
&& (((int)per) % progress_granularity == 0))
{
rc = 2;
goto quit;
}
last_y = i;
}
}
}
finish:
if (progress)
progress(im, 100, 0, last_y, w, h);
}
rc = 1; /* Success */
quit:
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
free(rows[i]);
free(rows);
quit2:
#if GIFLIB_MAJOR > 5 || (GIFLIB_MAJOR == 5 && GIFLIB_MINOR >= 1)
DGifCloseFile(gif, NULL);
#else
DGifCloseFile(gif);
#endif
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The GIF loader in imlib2 before 1.4.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or obtain sensitive information via a crafted image, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,079
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TaskService::TaskService()
: next_instance_id_(0), bound_instance_id_(kInvalidInstanceId) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The LoadIC::UpdateCaches function in ic/ic.cc in Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, does not ensure receiver compatibility before performing a cast of an unspecified variable, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: Change ReadWriteLock to Lock+ConditionVariable in TaskService
There are non-trivial performance implications of using shared
SRWLocking on Windows as more state has to be checked.
Since there are only two uses of the ReadWriteLock in Chromium after
over 1 year, the decision is to remove it.
BUG=758721
Change-Id: I84d1987d7b624a89e896eb37184ee50845c39d80
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/634423
Commit-Queue: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Toyoshima <toyoshim@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Francois Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#497632}
|
Medium
| 172,213
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: R_API void r_anal_bb_free(RAnalBlock *bb) {
if (!bb) {
return;
}
r_anal_cond_free (bb->cond);
R_FREE (bb->fingerprint);
r_anal_diff_free (bb->diff);
bb->diff = NULL;
R_FREE (bb->op_bytes);
r_anal_switch_op_free (bb->switch_op);
bb->switch_op = NULL;
bb->fingerprint = NULL;
bb->cond = NULL;
R_FREE (bb->label);
R_FREE (bb->op_pos);
R_FREE (bb->parent_reg_arena);
if (bb->prev) {
if (bb->prev->jumpbb == bb) {
bb->prev->jumpbb = NULL;
}
if (bb->prev->failbb == bb) {
bb->prev->failbb = NULL;
}
bb->prev = NULL;
}
if (bb->jumpbb) {
bb->jumpbb->prev = NULL;
bb->jumpbb = NULL;
}
if (bb->failbb) {
bb->failbb->prev = NULL;
bb->failbb = NULL;
}
R_FREE (bb);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: There is a use after free in radare2 2.6.0 in r_anal_bb_free() in libr/anal/bb.c via a crafted Java binary file.
Commit Message: Fix #10293 - Use-after-free in r_anal_bb_free()
|
Medium
| 169,199
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ProcessControlLaunched() {
base::ScopedAllowBlockingForTesting allow_blocking;
base::ProcessId service_pid;
EXPECT_TRUE(GetServiceProcessData(NULL, &service_pid));
EXPECT_NE(static_cast<base::ProcessId>(0), service_pid);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
service_process_ =
base::Process::OpenWithAccess(service_pid,
SYNCHRONIZE | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION);
#else
service_process_ = base::Process::Open(service_pid);
#endif
EXPECT_TRUE(service_process_.IsValid());
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::RunLoop::QuitCurrentWhenIdleClosureDeprecated());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-94
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux relies on an IFRAME source URL to identify an associated extension, which allows remote attackers to conduct extension-bindings injection attacks by leveraging script access to a resource that initially has the about:blank URL.
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
|
Medium
| 172,053
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int dns_validate_dns_response(unsigned char *resp, unsigned char *bufend,
struct dns_resolution *resolution, int max_answer_records)
{
unsigned char *reader;
char *previous_dname, tmpname[DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
int len, flags, offset;
int dns_query_record_id;
int nb_saved_records;
struct dns_query_item *dns_query;
struct dns_answer_item *dns_answer_record, *tmp_record;
struct dns_response_packet *dns_p;
int i, found = 0;
reader = resp;
len = 0;
previous_dname = NULL;
dns_query = NULL;
/* Initialization of response buffer and structure */
dns_p = &resolution->response;
/* query id */
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_p->header.id = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
reader += 2;
/* Flags and rcode are stored over 2 bytes
* First byte contains:
* - response flag (1 bit)
* - opcode (4 bits)
* - authoritative (1 bit)
* - truncated (1 bit)
* - recursion desired (1 bit)
*/
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
flags = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
if ((flags & DNS_FLAG_REPLYCODE) != DNS_RCODE_NO_ERROR) {
if ((flags & DNS_FLAG_REPLYCODE) == DNS_RCODE_NX_DOMAIN)
return DNS_RESP_NX_DOMAIN;
else if ((flags & DNS_FLAG_REPLYCODE) == DNS_RCODE_REFUSED)
return DNS_RESP_REFUSED;
return DNS_RESP_ERROR;
}
/* Move forward 2 bytes for flags */
reader += 2;
/* 2 bytes for question count */
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_p->header.qdcount = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
/* (for now) we send one query only, so we expect only one in the
* response too */
if (dns_p->header.qdcount != 1)
return DNS_RESP_QUERY_COUNT_ERROR;
if (dns_p->header.qdcount > DNS_MAX_QUERY_RECORDS)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
reader += 2;
/* 2 bytes for answer count */
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_p->header.ancount = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
if (dns_p->header.ancount == 0)
return DNS_RESP_ANCOUNT_ZERO;
/* Check if too many records are announced */
if (dns_p->header.ancount > max_answer_records)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
reader += 2;
/* 2 bytes authority count */
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_p->header.nscount = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
reader += 2;
/* 2 bytes additional count */
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_p->header.arcount = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
reader += 2;
/* Parsing dns queries */
LIST_INIT(&dns_p->query_list);
for (dns_query_record_id = 0; dns_query_record_id < dns_p->header.qdcount; dns_query_record_id++) {
/* Use next pre-allocated dns_query_item after ensuring there is
* still one available.
* It's then added to our packet query list. */
if (dns_query_record_id > DNS_MAX_QUERY_RECORDS)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_query = &resolution->response_query_records[dns_query_record_id];
LIST_ADDQ(&dns_p->query_list, &dns_query->list);
/* Name is a NULL terminated string in our case, since we have
* one query per response and the first one can't be compressed
* (using the 0x0c format) */
offset = 0;
len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, dns_query->name, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset, 0);
if (len == 0)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
reader += offset;
previous_dname = dns_query->name;
/* move forward 2 bytes for question type */
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_query->type = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
reader += 2;
/* move forward 2 bytes for question class */
if (reader + 2 >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_query->class = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
reader += 2;
}
/* TRUNCATED flag must be checked after we could read the query type
* because a TRUNCATED SRV query type response can still be exploited */
if (dns_query->type != DNS_RTYPE_SRV && flags & DNS_FLAG_TRUNCATED)
return DNS_RESP_TRUNCATED;
/* now parsing response records */
nb_saved_records = 0;
for (i = 0; i < dns_p->header.ancount; i++) {
if (reader >= bufend)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
dns_answer_record = pool_alloc(dns_answer_item_pool);
if (dns_answer_record == NULL)
return (DNS_RESP_INVALID);
offset = 0;
len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, tmpname, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset, 0);
if (len == 0) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
/* Check if the current record dname is valid. previous_dname
* points either to queried dname or last CNAME target */
if (dns_query->type != DNS_RTYPE_SRV && memcmp(previous_dname, tmpname, len) != 0) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
if (i == 0) {
/* First record, means a mismatch issue between
* queried dname and dname found in the first
* record */
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
else {
/* If not the first record, this means we have a
* CNAME resolution error */
return DNS_RESP_CNAME_ERROR;
}
}
memcpy(dns_answer_record->name, tmpname, len);
dns_answer_record->name[len] = 0;
reader += offset;
if (reader >= bufend) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
/* 2 bytes for record type (A, AAAA, CNAME, etc...) */
if (reader + 2 > bufend) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
dns_answer_record->type = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
reader += 2;
/* 2 bytes for class (2) */
if (reader + 2 > bufend) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
dns_answer_record->class = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
reader += 2;
/* 4 bytes for ttl (4) */
if (reader + 4 > bufend) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
dns_answer_record->ttl = reader[0] * 16777216 + reader[1] * 65536
+ reader[2] * 256 + reader[3];
reader += 4;
/* Now reading data len */
if (reader + 2 > bufend) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
dns_answer_record->data_len = reader[0] * 256 + reader[1];
/* Move forward 2 bytes for data len */
reader += 2;
/* Analyzing record content */
switch (dns_answer_record->type) {
case DNS_RTYPE_A:
dns_answer_record->address.sa_family = AF_INET;
memcpy(&(((struct sockaddr_in *)&dns_answer_record->address)->sin_addr),
reader, dns_answer_record->data_len);
break;
case DNS_RTYPE_CNAME:
/* Check if this is the last record and update the caller about the status:
* no IP could be found and last record was a CNAME. Could be triggered
* by a wrong query type
*
* + 1 because dns_answer_record_id starts at 0
* while number of answers is an integer and
* starts at 1.
*/
if (i + 1 == dns_p->header.ancount) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_CNAME_ERROR;
}
offset = 0;
len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, tmpname, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset, 0);
if (len == 0) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
memcpy(dns_answer_record->target, tmpname, len);
dns_answer_record->target[len] = 0;
previous_dname = dns_answer_record->target;
break;
case DNS_RTYPE_SRV:
/* Answer must contain :
* - 2 bytes for the priority
* - 2 bytes for the weight
* - 2 bytes for the port
* - the target hostname
*/
if (dns_answer_record->data_len <= 6) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
dns_answer_record->priority = read_n16(reader);
reader += sizeof(uint16_t);
dns_answer_record->weight = read_n16(reader);
reader += sizeof(uint16_t);
dns_answer_record->port = read_n16(reader);
reader += sizeof(uint16_t);
offset = 0;
len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, tmpname, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset, 0);
if (len == 0) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
dns_answer_record->data_len = len;
memcpy(dns_answer_record->target, tmpname, len);
dns_answer_record->target[len] = 0;
break;
case DNS_RTYPE_AAAA:
/* ipv6 is stored on 16 bytes */
if (dns_answer_record->data_len != 16) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
}
dns_answer_record->address.sa_family = AF_INET6;
memcpy(&(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&dns_answer_record->address)->sin6_addr),
reader, dns_answer_record->data_len);
break;
} /* switch (record type) */
/* Increment the counter for number of records saved into our
* local response */
nb_saved_records++;
/* Move forward dns_answer_record->data_len for analyzing next
* record in the response */
reader += ((dns_answer_record->type == DNS_RTYPE_SRV)
? offset
: dns_answer_record->data_len);
/* Lookup to see if we already had this entry */
found = 0;
list_for_each_entry(tmp_record, &dns_p->answer_list, list) {
if (tmp_record->type != dns_answer_record->type)
continue;
switch(tmp_record->type) {
case DNS_RTYPE_A:
if (!memcmp(&((struct sockaddr_in *)&dns_answer_record->address)->sin_addr,
&((struct sockaddr_in *)&tmp_record->address)->sin_addr,
sizeof(in_addr_t)))
found = 1;
break;
case DNS_RTYPE_AAAA:
if (!memcmp(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&dns_answer_record->address)->sin6_addr,
&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&tmp_record->address)->sin6_addr,
sizeof(struct in6_addr)))
found = 1;
break;
case DNS_RTYPE_SRV:
if (dns_answer_record->data_len == tmp_record->data_len &&
!memcmp(dns_answer_record->target, tmp_record->target, dns_answer_record->data_len) &&
dns_answer_record->port == tmp_record->port) {
tmp_record->weight = dns_answer_record->weight;
found = 1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (found == 1)
break;
}
if (found == 1) {
tmp_record->last_seen = now.tv_sec;
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
}
else {
dns_answer_record->last_seen = now.tv_sec;
LIST_ADDQ(&dns_p->answer_list, &dns_answer_record->list);
}
} /* for i 0 to ancount */
/* Save the number of records we really own */
dns_p->header.ancount = nb_saved_records;
dns_check_dns_response(resolution);
return DNS_RESP_VALID;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds read in dns_validate_dns_response in dns.c was discovered in HAProxy through 1.8.14. Due to a missing check when validating DNS responses, remote attackers might be able read the 16 bytes corresponding to an AAAA record from the non-initialized part of the buffer, possibly accessing anything that was left on the stack, or even past the end of the 8193-byte buffer, depending on the value of accepted_payload_size.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,600
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::fillRoundedRect(const IntRect& rect, const IntSize& topLeft, const IntSize& topRight, const IntSize& bottomLeft, const IntSize& bottomRight, const Color& color, ColorSpace colorSpace)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
notImplemented();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving floating styles.
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,426
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadRLEImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define SkipLinesOp 0x01
#define SetColorOp 0x02
#define SkipPixelsOp 0x03
#define ByteDataOp 0x05
#define RunDataOp 0x06
#define EOFOp 0x07
char
magick[12];
Image
*image;
int
opcode,
operand,
status;
MagickStatusType
flags;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
map_length,
number_colormaps,
number_planes,
one;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
background_color[256],
*colormap,
pixel,
plane,
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a RLE file.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count == 0) || (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
/*
Read image header.
*/
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->columns=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->rows=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
flags=(MagickStatusType) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->matte=flags & 0x04 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
number_planes=1UL*ReadBlobByte(image);
bits_per_pixel=1UL*ReadBlobByte(image);
number_colormaps=1UL*ReadBlobByte(image);
map_length=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (map_length >= 64)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
one=1;
map_length=one << map_length;
if ((number_planes == 0) || (number_planes == 2) || (bits_per_pixel != 8) ||
(image->columns == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (flags & 0x02)
{
/*
No background color-- initialize to black.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_planes; i++)
background_color[i]=0;
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
{
/*
Initialize background color.
*/
p=background_color;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_planes; i++)
*p++=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
if ((number_planes & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
colormap=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (number_colormaps != 0)
{
/*
Read image colormaps.
*/
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_colormaps,
map_length*sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_colormaps; i++)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) map_length; x++)
*p++=(unsigned char) ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
}
if ((flags & 0x08) != 0)
{
char
*comment;
size_t
length;
/*
Read image comment.
*/
length=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (length != 0)
{
comment=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,length-1,(unsigned char *) comment);
comment[length-1]='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
if ((length & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Allocate RLE pixels.
*/
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
number_planes++;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((number_pixels*number_planes) != (size_t) (number_pixels*number_planes))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*number_planes*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if ((flags & 0x01) && !(flags & 0x02))
{
ssize_t
j;
/*
Set background color.
*/
p=pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) number_planes; j++)
*p++=background_color[j];
else
{
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) (number_planes-1); j++)
*p++=background_color[j];
*p++=0; /* initialize matte channel */
}
}
}
/*
Read runlength-encoded image.
*/
plane=0;
x=0;
y=0;
opcode=ReadBlobByte(image);
do
{
switch (opcode & 0x3f)
{
case SkipLinesOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=(int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
x=0;
y+=operand;
break;
}
case SetColorOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
plane=(unsigned char) operand;
if (plane == 255)
plane=(unsigned char) (number_planes-1);
x=0;
break;
}
case SkipPixelsOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=(int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
x+=operand;
break;
}
case ByteDataOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=(int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
p=pixels+((image->rows-y-1)*image->columns*number_planes)+
x*number_planes+plane;
operand++;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) operand; i++)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((y < (ssize_t) image->rows) &&
((x+i) < (ssize_t) image->columns))
*p=pixel;
p+=number_planes;
}
if (operand & 0x01)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
x+=operand;
break;
}
case RunDataOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=(int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
operand++;
p=pixels+((image->rows-y-1)*image->columns*number_planes)+
x*number_planes+plane;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) operand; i++)
{
if ((y < (ssize_t) image->rows) &&
((x+i) < (ssize_t) image->columns))
*p=pixel;
p+=number_planes;
}
x+=operand;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
opcode=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (((opcode & 0x3f) != EOFOp) && (opcode != EOF));
if (number_colormaps != 0)
{
MagickStatusType
mask;
/*
Apply colormap affineation to image.
*/
mask=(MagickStatusType) (map_length-1);
p=pixels;
if (number_colormaps == 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
*p=colormap[*p & mask];
p++;
}
else
if ((number_planes >= 3) && (number_colormaps >= 3))
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_planes; x++)
{
*p=colormap[x*map_length+(*p & mask)];
p++;
}
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
if (number_planes >= 3)
{
/*
Convert raster image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
/*
Create colormap.
*/
if (number_colormaps == 0)
map_length=256;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,map_length) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=colormap;
if (number_colormaps == 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
/*
Pseudocolor.
*/
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
}
else
if (number_colormaps > 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+map_length));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+map_length*2));
p++;
}
p=pixels;
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
{
/*
Convert raster image to PseudoClass pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,*p++);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
}
else
{
/*
Image has a matte channel-- promote to DirectClass.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,image->colormap[*p++].red);
SetPixelGreen(q,image->colormap[*p++].green);
SetPixelBlue(q,image->colormap[*p++].blue);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
image->colormap);
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
image->colors=0;
}
}
if (number_colormaps != 0)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 0) && (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) == 0))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) == 0));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,600
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void show_object(struct object *object, struct strbuf *path,
const char *last, void *data)
{
struct bitmap *base = data;
bitmap_set(base, find_object_pos(object->oid.hash));
mark_as_seen(object);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Integer overflow in Git before 2.7.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a (1) long filename or (2) many nested trees, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
Low
| 167,421
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: make_error(png_store* volatile psIn, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
png_byte bit_depth, int interlace_type, int test, png_const_charp name)
{
png_store * volatile ps = psIn;
context(ps, fault);
check_interlace_type(interlace_type);
Try
{
png_structp pp;
png_infop pi;
pp = set_store_for_write(ps, &pi, name);
if (pp == NULL)
Throw ps;
png_set_IHDR(pp, pi, transform_width(pp, colour_type, bit_depth),
transform_height(pp, colour_type, bit_depth), bit_depth, colour_type,
interlace_type, PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE, PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
if (colour_type == 3) /* palette */
init_standard_palette(ps, pp, pi, 1U << bit_depth, 0/*do tRNS*/);
/* Time for a few errors; these are in various optional chunks, the
* standard tests test the standard chunks pretty well.
*/
# define exception__prev exception_prev_1
# define exception__env exception_env_1
Try
{
/* Expect this to throw: */
ps->expect_error = !error_test[test].warning;
ps->expect_warning = error_test[test].warning;
ps->saw_warning = 0;
error_test[test].fn(pp, pi);
/* Normally the error is only detected here: */
png_write_info(pp, pi);
/* And handle the case where it was only a warning: */
if (ps->expect_warning && ps->saw_warning)
Throw ps;
/* If we get here there is a problem, we have success - no error or
* no warning - when we shouldn't have success. Log an error.
*/
store_log(ps, pp, error_test[test].msg, 1 /*error*/);
}
Catch (fault)
ps = fault; /* expected exit, make sure ps is not clobbered */
#undef exception__prev
#undef exception__env
/* And clear these flags */
ps->expect_error = 0;
ps->expect_warning = 0;
/* Now write the whole image, just to make sure that the detected, or
* undetected, errro has not created problems inside libpng.
*/
if (png_get_rowbytes(pp, pi) !=
transform_rowsize(pp, colour_type, bit_depth))
png_error(pp, "row size incorrect");
else
{
png_uint_32 h = transform_height(pp, colour_type, bit_depth);
int npasses = png_set_interlace_handling(pp);
int pass;
if (npasses != npasses_from_interlace_type(pp, interlace_type))
png_error(pp, "write: png_set_interlace_handling failed");
for (pass=0; pass<npasses; ++pass)
{
png_uint_32 y;
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
{
png_byte buffer[TRANSFORM_ROWMAX];
transform_row(pp, buffer, colour_type, bit_depth, y);
png_write_row(pp, buffer);
}
}
}
png_write_end(pp, pi);
/* The following deletes the file that was just written. */
store_write_reset(ps);
}
Catch(fault)
{
store_write_reset(fault);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,661
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void __init acpi_debugfs_init(void)
{
acpi_debugfs_dir = debugfs_create_dir("acpi", NULL);
acpi_custom_method_init();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: drivers/acpi/debugfs.c in the Linux kernel before 3.0 allows local users to modify arbitrary kernel memory locations by leveraging root privileges to write to the /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method file. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2010-4347.
Commit Message: ACPI: Split out custom_method functionality into an own driver
With /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method root can write
to arbitrary memory and increase his priveleges, even if
these are restricted.
-> Make this an own debug .config option and warn about the
security issue in the config description.
-> Still keep acpi/debugfs.c which now only creates an empty
/sys/kernel/debug/acpi directory. There might be other
users of it later.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Renninger <trenn@suse.de>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Acked-by: rui.zhang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
|
Low
| 165,902
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const Block* BlockGroup::GetBlock() const
{
return &m_block;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,286
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int hmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct shash_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
struct shash_alg *salg;
int err;
int ds;
int ss;
err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH);
if (err)
return err;
salg = shash_attr_alg(tb[1], 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(salg))
return PTR_ERR(salg);
err = -EINVAL;
ds = salg->digestsize;
ss = salg->statesize;
alg = &salg->base;
if (ds > alg->cra_blocksize ||
ss < alg->cra_blocksize)
goto out_put_alg;
inst = shash_alloc_instance("hmac", alg);
err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto out_put_alg;
err = crypto_init_shash_spawn(shash_instance_ctx(inst), salg,
shash_crypto_instance(inst));
if (err)
goto out_free_inst;
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
ss = ALIGN(ss, alg->cra_alignmask + 1);
inst->alg.digestsize = ds;
inst->alg.statesize = ss;
inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct hmac_ctx) +
ALIGN(ss * 2, crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
inst->alg.base.cra_init = hmac_init_tfm;
inst->alg.base.cra_exit = hmac_exit_tfm;
inst->alg.init = hmac_init;
inst->alg.update = hmac_update;
inst->alg.final = hmac_final;
inst->alg.finup = hmac_finup;
inst->alg.export = hmac_export;
inst->alg.import = hmac_import;
inst->alg.setkey = hmac_setkey;
err = shash_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
if (err) {
out_free_inst:
shash_free_instance(shash_crypto_instance(inst));
}
out_put_alg:
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The HMAC implementation (crypto/hmac.c) in the Linux kernel before 4.14.8 does not validate that the underlying cryptographic hash algorithm is unkeyed, allowing a local attacker able to use the AF_ALG-based hash interface (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH) and the SHA-3 hash algorithm (CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3) to cause a kernel stack buffer overflow by executing a crafted sequence of system calls that encounter a missing SHA-3 initialization.
Commit Message: crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed
Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash
algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))"
through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC
being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being
called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow.
This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real
problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3)
because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer,
and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that,
but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent
hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything.
Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC
template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed.
Here is a reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int algfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))",
};
char key[4096] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
}
Here was the KASAN report from syzbot:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044
CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109
shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172
crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186
hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64
shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207
crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200
hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 167,649
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LogoService::GetLogo(LogoCallbacks callbacks) {
if (!template_url_service_) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const TemplateURL* template_url =
template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
if (!template_url) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const base::CommandLine* command_line =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
GURL logo_url;
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kSearchProviderLogoURL)) {
logo_url = GURL(
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSearchProviderLogoURL));
} else {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
logo_url = template_url->logo_url();
#endif
}
GURL base_url;
GURL doodle_url;
const bool is_google = template_url->url_ref().HasGoogleBaseURLs(
template_url_service_->search_terms_data());
if (is_google) {
base_url =
GURL(template_url_service_->search_terms_data().GoogleBaseURLValue());
doodle_url = search_provider_logos::GetGoogleDoodleURL(base_url);
} else if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kThirdPartyDoodles)) {
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kThirdPartyDoodleURL)) {
doodle_url = GURL(
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kThirdPartyDoodleURL));
} else {
std::string override_url = base::GetFieldTrialParamValueByFeature(
features::kThirdPartyDoodles,
features::kThirdPartyDoodlesOverrideUrlParam);
if (!override_url.empty()) {
doodle_url = GURL(override_url);
} else {
doodle_url = template_url->doodle_url();
}
}
base_url = doodle_url.GetOrigin();
}
if (!logo_url.is_valid() && !doodle_url.is_valid()) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const bool use_fixed_logo = !doodle_url.is_valid();
if (!logo_tracker_) {
std::unique_ptr<LogoCache> logo_cache = std::move(logo_cache_for_test_);
if (!logo_cache) {
logo_cache = std::make_unique<LogoCache>(cache_directory_);
}
std::unique_ptr<base::Clock> clock = std::move(clock_for_test_);
if (!clock) {
clock = std::make_unique<base::DefaultClock>();
}
logo_tracker_ = std::make_unique<LogoTracker>(
request_context_getter_,
std::make_unique<LogoDelegateImpl>(std::move(image_decoder_)),
std::move(logo_cache), std::move(clock));
}
if (use_fixed_logo) {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
logo_url, base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::ParseFixedLogoResponse),
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::UseFixedLogoUrl));
} else if (is_google) {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
doodle_url,
search_provider_logos::GetGoogleParseLogoResponseCallback(base_url),
search_provider_logos::GetGoogleAppendQueryparamsCallback(
use_gray_background_));
} else {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
doodle_url,
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::GoogleNewParseLogoResponse,
base_url),
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::GoogleNewAppendQueryparamsToLogoURL,
use_gray_background_));
}
logo_tracker_->GetLogo(std::move(callbacks));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Google V8 engine, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 and QtWebEngineCore in Qt before 5.5.1, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
|
Medium
| 171,952
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool scoped_pixel_buffer_object::Init(CGLContextObj cgl_context,
int size_in_bytes) {
cgl_context_ = cgl_context;
CGLContextObj CGL_MACRO_CONTEXT = cgl_context_;
glGenBuffersARB(1, &pixel_buffer_object_);
if (glGetError() == GL_NO_ERROR) {
glBindBufferARB(GL_PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER_ARB, pixel_buffer_object_);
glBufferDataARB(GL_PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER_ARB, size_in_bytes, NULL,
GL_STREAM_READ_ARB);
glBindBufferARB(GL_PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER_ARB, 0);
if (glGetError() != GL_NO_ERROR) {
Release();
}
} else {
cgl_context_ = NULL;
pixel_buffer_object_ = 0;
}
return pixel_buffer_object_ != 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to *ruby / table style handing.*
Commit Message: Workaround for bad driver issue with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5.
BUG=87283
TEST=Run on a machine with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5 immediately after booting.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7373018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@92651 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,317
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static INLINE BOOL zgfx_GetBits(ZGFX_CONTEXT* _zgfx, UINT32 _nbits)
{
if (!_zgfx)
return FALSE;
while (_zgfx->cBitsCurrent < _nbits)
{
_zgfx->BitsCurrent <<= 8;
if (_zgfx->pbInputCurrent < _zgfx->pbInputEnd)
_zgfx->BitsCurrent += *(_zgfx->pbInputCurrent)++;
_zgfx->cBitsCurrent += 8;
}
_zgfx->cBitsRemaining -= _nbits;
_zgfx->cBitsCurrent -= _nbits;
_zgfx->bits = _zgfx->BitsCurrent >> _zgfx->cBitsCurrent;
_zgfx->BitsCurrent &= ((1 << _zgfx->cBitsCurrent) - 1);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains a Heap-Based Buffer Overflow in function zgfx_decompress_segment() that results in a memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8784
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
Low
| 169,296
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ID3::ID3(const uint8_t *data, size_t size, bool ignoreV1)
: mIsValid(false),
mData(NULL),
mSize(0),
mFirstFrameOffset(0),
mVersion(ID3_UNKNOWN),
mRawSize(0) {
sp<MemorySource> source = new MemorySource(data, size);
mIsValid = parseV2(source, 0);
if (!mIsValid && !ignoreV1) {
mIsValid = parseV1(source);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: id3/ID3.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-10-01, and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 30744884.
Commit Message: better validation lengths of strings in ID3 tags
Validate lengths on strings in ID3 tags, particularly around 0.
Also added code to handle cases when we can't get memory for
copies of strings we want to extract from these tags.
Affects L/M/N/master, same patch for all of them.
Bug: 30744884
Change-Id: I2675a817a39f0927ec1f7e9f9c09f2e61020311e
Test: play mp3 file which caused a <0 length.
(cherry picked from commit d23c01546c4f82840a01a380def76ab6cae5d43f)
|
Medium
| 173,392
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void InsertRow(unsigned char *p,ssize_t y,Image *image, int bpp)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
int
bit;
ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
IndexPacket
index;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
exception=(&image->exception);
switch (bpp)
{
case 1: /* Convert bitmap scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
p++;
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
break;
break;
}
case 2: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=4)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
if ((image->columns % 4) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
if ((image->columns % 4) >= 1)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
if ((image->columns % 4) >= 2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
break;
}
case 4: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
break;
}
case 8: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
case 24: /* Convert DirectColor scanline. */
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
break;
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: coders/wpg.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Fixed out-of-bounds write reported in: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/102
|
Medium
| 170,114
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
bool from_vmentry, u32 *entry_failure_code)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 exec_control, vmcs12_exec_ctrl;
vmcs_write16(GUEST_ES_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_es_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_cs_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_SS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_ss_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_DS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_ds_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_FS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_fs_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_GS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_gs_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_tr_selector);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_ES_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_es_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_CS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_cs_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_ss_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_DS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_ds_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_FS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_fs_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_GS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_gs_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_tr_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_gdtr_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_idtr_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_es_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_CS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_cs_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_ss_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_DS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_ds_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_FS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_fs_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_GS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_gs_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_tr_ar_bytes);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_ES_BASE, vmcs12->guest_es_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_CS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_cs_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_ss_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_DS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_ds_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_FS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_fs_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_gs_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_LDTR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_tr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_gdtr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_idtr_base);
if (from_vmentry &&
(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS)) {
kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, vmcs12->guest_dr7);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl);
} else {
kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, vcpu->arch.dr7);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, vmx->nested.vmcs01_debugctl);
}
if (from_vmentry) {
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD,
vmcs12->vm_entry_intr_info_field);
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE,
vmcs12->vm_entry_exception_error_code);
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
vmcs12->guest_interruptibility_info);
vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked =
!(vmcs12->guest_interruptibility_info & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
} else {
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0);
}
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, vmcs12->guest_sysenter_cs);
vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_rflags);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS,
vmcs12->guest_pending_dbg_exceptions);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, vmcs12->guest_sysenter_esp);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, vmcs12->guest_sysenter_eip);
if (nested_cpu_has_xsaves(vmcs12))
vmcs_write64(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, vmcs12->xss_exit_bitmap);
vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull);
exec_control = vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control;
/* Preemption timer setting is only taken from vmcs01. */
exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
exec_control |= vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl;
if (vmx->hv_deadline_tsc == -1)
exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
/* Posted interrupts setting is only taken from vmcs12. */
if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12)) {
vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = vmcs12->posted_intr_nv;
vmx->nested.pi_pending = false;
vmcs_write16(POSTED_INTR_NV, POSTED_INTR_NESTED_VECTOR);
} else {
exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
}
vmcs_write32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
vmx->nested.preemption_timer_expired = false;
if (nested_cpu_has_preemption_timer(vmcs12))
vmx_start_preemption_timer(vcpu);
/*
* Whether page-faults are trapped is determined by a combination of
* 3 settings: PFEC_MASK, PFEC_MATCH and EXCEPTION_BITMAP.PF.
* If enable_ept, L0 doesn't care about page faults and we should
* set all of these to L1's desires. However, if !enable_ept, L0 does
* care about (at least some) page faults, and because it is not easy
* (if at all possible?) to merge L0 and L1's desires, we simply ask
* to exit on each and every L2 page fault. This is done by setting
* MASK=MATCH=0 and (see below) EB.PF=1.
* Note that below we don't need special code to set EB.PF beyond the
* "or"ing of the EB of vmcs01 and vmcs12, because when enable_ept,
* vmcs01's EB.PF is 0 so the "or" will take vmcs12's value, and when
* !enable_ept, EB.PF is 1, so the "or" will always be 1.
*/
vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK,
enable_ept ? vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_mask : 0);
vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH,
enable_ept ? vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_match : 0);
if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
exec_control = vmx->secondary_exec_control;
/* Take the following fields only from vmcs12 */
exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID |
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP |
SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |
SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC);
if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12,
CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS)) {
vmcs12_exec_ctrl = vmcs12->secondary_vm_exec_control &
~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
exec_control |= vmcs12_exec_ctrl;
}
/* All VMFUNCs are currently emulated through L0 vmexits. */
if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC)
vmcs_write64(VM_FUNCTION_CONTROL, 0);
if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) {
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0,
vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap0);
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1,
vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap1);
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2,
vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap2);
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3,
vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap3);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS,
vmcs12->guest_intr_status);
}
/*
* Write an illegal value to APIC_ACCESS_ADDR. Later,
* nested_get_vmcs12_pages will either fix it up or
* remove the VM execution control.
*/
if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)
vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, -1ull);
vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
}
/*
* Set host-state according to L0's settings (vmcs12 is irrelevant here)
* Some constant fields are set here by vmx_set_constant_host_state().
* Other fields are different per CPU, and will be set later when
* vmx_vcpu_load() is called, and when vmx_save_host_state() is called.
*/
vmx_set_constant_host_state(vmx);
/*
* Set the MSR load/store lists to match L0's settings.
*/
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, 0);
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.nr);
vmcs_write64(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.host));
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.nr);
vmcs_write64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.guest));
/*
* HOST_RSP is normally set correctly in vmx_vcpu_run() just before
* entry, but only if the current (host) sp changed from the value
* we wrote last (vmx->host_rsp). This cache is no longer relevant
* if we switch vmcs, and rather than hold a separate cache per vmcs,
* here we just force the write to happen on entry.
*/
vmx->host_rsp = 0;
exec_control = vmx_exec_control(vmx); /* L0's desires */
exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING;
exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING;
exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
exec_control |= vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
/*
* Write an illegal value to VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR. Later, if
* nested_get_vmcs12_pages can't fix it up, the illegal value
* will result in a VM entry failure.
*/
if (exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {
vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, -1ull);
vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, vmcs12->tpr_threshold);
}
/*
* Merging of IO bitmap not currently supported.
* Rather, exit every time.
*/
exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS;
exec_control |= CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING;
vmcs_write32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
/* EXCEPTION_BITMAP and CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK should basically be the
* bitwise-or of what L1 wants to trap for L2, and what we want to
* trap. Note that CR0.TS also needs updating - we do this later.
*/
update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits &= ~vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask;
vmcs_writel(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits);
/* L2->L1 exit controls are emulated - the hardware exit is to L0 so
* we should use its exit controls. Note that VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER
* bits are further modified by vmx_set_efer() below.
*/
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl);
/* vmcs12's VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER and VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE are
* emulated by vmx_set_efer(), below.
*/
vm_entry_controls_init(vmx,
(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER &
~VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) |
(vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & ~VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE));
if (from_vmentry &&
(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)) {
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmcs12->guest_ia32_pat);
vcpu->arch.pat = vmcs12->guest_ia32_pat;
} else if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmx->vcpu.arch.pat);
}
set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
if (from_vmentry &&
vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS)
vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, vmcs12->guest_bndcfgs);
if (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control & CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETING)
vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET,
vcpu->arch.tsc_offset + vmcs12->tsc_offset);
else
vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset);
if (kvm_has_tsc_control)
decache_tsc_multiplier(vmx);
if (enable_vpid) {
/*
* There is no direct mapping between vpid02 and vpid12, the
* vpid02 is per-vCPU for L0 and reused while the value of
* vpid12 is changed w/ one invvpid during nested vmentry.
* The vpid12 is allocated by L1 for L2, so it will not
* influence global bitmap(for vpid01 and vpid02 allocation)
* even if spawn a lot of nested vCPUs.
*/
if (nested_cpu_has_vpid(vmcs12) && vmx->nested.vpid02) {
vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->nested.vpid02);
if (vmcs12->virtual_processor_id != vmx->nested.last_vpid) {
vmx->nested.last_vpid = vmcs12->virtual_processor_id;
__vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vpid02);
}
} else {
vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->vpid);
vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu);
}
}
if (enable_pml) {
/*
* Conceptually we want to copy the PML address and index from
* vmcs01 here, and then back to vmcs01 on nested vmexit. But,
* since we always flush the log on each vmexit, this happens
* to be equivalent to simply resetting the fields in vmcs02.
*/
ASSERT(vmx->pml_pg);
vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->pml_pg));
vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
}
if (nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12)) {
if (nested_ept_init_mmu_context(vcpu)) {
*entry_failure_code = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT;
return 1;
}
} else if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) {
vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only(vcpu);
}
/*
* This sets GUEST_CR0 to vmcs12->guest_cr0, possibly modifying those
* bits which we consider mandatory enabled.
* The CR0_READ_SHADOW is what L2 should have expected to read given
* the specifications by L1; It's not enough to take
* vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow because on our cr0_guest_host_mask we we
* have more bits than L1 expected.
*/
vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_cr0);
vmcs_writel(CR0_READ_SHADOW, nested_read_cr0(vmcs12));
vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_cr4);
vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, nested_read_cr4(vmcs12));
if (from_vmentry &&
(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER))
vcpu->arch.efer = vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer;
else if (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE)
vcpu->arch.efer |= (EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
else
vcpu->arch.efer &= ~(EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
/* Note: modifies VM_ENTRY/EXIT_CONTROLS and GUEST/HOST_IA32_EFER */
vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer);
/* Shadow page tables on either EPT or shadow page tables. */
if (nested_vmx_load_cr3(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_cr3, nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12),
entry_failure_code))
return 1;
if (!enable_ept)
vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->inject_page_fault = vmx_inject_page_fault_nested;
/*
* L1 may access the L2's PDPTR, so save them to construct vmcs12
*/
if (enable_ept) {
vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR0, vmcs12->guest_pdptr0);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR1, vmcs12->guest_pdptr1);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR2, vmcs12->guest_pdptr2);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR3, vmcs12->guest_pdptr3);
}
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP, vmcs12->guest_rsp);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP, vmcs12->guest_rip);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The prepare_vmcs02 function in arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c in the Linux kernel through 4.13.3 does not ensure that the *CR8-load exiting* and *CR8-store exiting* L0 vmcs02 controls exist in cases where L1 omits the *use TPR shadow* vmcs12 control, which allows KVM L2 guest OS users to obtain read and write access to the hardware CR8 register.
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 167,990
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataReductionProxyManaged() {
return spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.IsManaged();
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An off by one error resulting in an allocation of zero size in FFmpeg in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.98 for Mac, and 54.0.2840.99 for Windows, and 54.0.2840.100 for Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
|
Medium
| 172,555
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static freelist_idx_t next_random_slot(union freelist_init_state *state)
{
return (state->list[state->pos++] + state->rand) % state->count;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The freelist-randomization feature in mm/slab.c in the Linux kernel 4.8.x and 4.9.x before 4.9.5 allows local users to cause a denial of service (duplicate freelist entries and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact in opportunistic circumstances by leveraging the selection of a large value for a random number.
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 168,397
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FetchManager::Loader::Start() {
if (!ContentSecurityPolicy::ShouldBypassMainWorld(execution_context_) &&
!execution_context_->GetContentSecurityPolicy()->AllowConnectToSource(
fetch_request_data_->Url())) {
PerformNetworkError(
"Refused to connect to '" + fetch_request_data_->Url().ElidedString() +
"' because it violates the document's Content Security Policy.");
return;
}
if ((SecurityOrigin::Create(fetch_request_data_->Url())
->IsSameSchemeHostPort(fetch_request_data_->Origin().get())) ||
(fetch_request_data_->Url().ProtocolIsData() &&
fetch_request_data_->SameOriginDataURLFlag()) ||
(fetch_request_data_->Mode() == FetchRequestMode::kNavigate)) {
PerformSchemeFetch();
return;
}
if (fetch_request_data_->Mode() == FetchRequestMode::kSameOrigin) {
PerformNetworkError("Fetch API cannot load " +
fetch_request_data_->Url().GetString() +
". Request mode is \"same-origin\" but the URL\'s "
"origin is not same as the request origin " +
fetch_request_data_->Origin()->ToString() + ".");
return;
}
if (fetch_request_data_->Mode() == FetchRequestMode::kNoCORS) {
fetch_request_data_->SetResponseTainting(FetchRequestData::kOpaqueTainting);
PerformSchemeFetch();
return;
}
if (!SchemeRegistry::ShouldTreatURLSchemeAsSupportingFetchAPI(
fetch_request_data_->Url().Protocol())) {
PerformNetworkError(
"Fetch API cannot load " + fetch_request_data_->Url().GetString() +
". URL scheme must be \"http\" or \"https\" for CORS request.");
return;
}
fetch_request_data_->SetResponseTainting(FetchRequestData::kCORSTainting);
PerformHTTPFetch();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An issue was discovered in certain Apple products. iOS before 11.3 is affected. Safari before 11.1 is affected. iCloud before 7.4 on Windows is affected. iTunes before 12.7.4 on Windows is affected. watchOS before 4.3 is affected. The issue involves the fetch API in the *WebKit* component. It allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy and obtain sensitive information via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <horo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
|
Medium
| 173,166
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void *arm_coherent_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size,
dma_addr_t *handle, gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, pgprot_kernel);
void *memory;
if (dma_alloc_from_coherent(dev, size, handle, &memory))
return memory;
return __dma_alloc(dev, size, handle, gfp, prot, true,
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/arm/mm/dma-mapping.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13 on ARM platforms, as used in Android before 2016-08-05 on Nexus 5 and 7 (2013) devices, does not prevent executable DMA mappings, which might allow local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 28803642 and Qualcomm internal bug CR642735.
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 167,577
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool TabStripModel::InternalCloseTabs(const std::vector<int>& indices,
uint32 close_types) {
if (indices.empty())
return true;
bool retval = true;
std::vector<TabContentsWrapper*> tabs;
for (size_t i = 0; i < indices.size(); ++i)
tabs.push_back(GetContentsAt(indices[i]));
if (browser_shutdown::GetShutdownType() == browser_shutdown::NOT_VALID) {
std::map<RenderProcessHost*, size_t> processes;
for (size_t i = 0; i < indices.size(); ++i) {
if (!delegate_->CanCloseContentsAt(indices[i])) {
retval = false;
continue;
}
TabContentsWrapper* detached_contents = GetContentsAt(indices[i]);
RenderProcessHost* process =
detached_contents->tab_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost();
std::map<RenderProcessHost*, size_t>::iterator iter =
processes.find(process);
if (iter == processes.end()) {
processes[process] = 1;
} else {
iter->second++;
}
}
for (std::map<RenderProcessHost*, size_t>::iterator iter =
processes.begin();
iter != processes.end(); ++iter) {
iter->first->FastShutdownForPageCount(iter->second);
}
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < tabs.size(); ++i) {
TabContentsWrapper* detached_contents = tabs[i];
int index = GetIndexOfTabContents(detached_contents);
if (index == kNoTab)
continue;
detached_contents->tab_contents()->OnCloseStarted();
if (!delegate_->CanCloseContentsAt(index)) {
retval = false;
continue;
}
if (!detached_contents->tab_contents()->closed_by_user_gesture()) {
detached_contents->tab_contents()->set_closed_by_user_gesture(
close_types & CLOSE_USER_GESTURE);
}
if (delegate_->RunUnloadListenerBeforeClosing(detached_contents)) {
retval = false;
continue;
}
InternalCloseTab(detached_contents, index,
(close_types & CLOSE_CREATE_HISTORICAL_TAB) != 0);
}
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 allows user-assisted remote attackers to spoof the URL bar via vectors related to *unusual user interaction.*
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,302
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BrowserPluginGuest::SetCompositingBufferData(int gpu_process_id,
uint32 client_id,
uint32 context_id,
uint32 texture_id_0,
uint32 texture_id_1,
uint32 sync_point) {
if (texture_id_0 == 0) {
DCHECK(texture_id_1 == 0);
return;
}
DCHECK(texture_id_1 != 0);
DCHECK(texture_id_0 != texture_id_1);
surface_handle_ = gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(gfx::kNullPluginWindow, true);
surface_handle_.parent_gpu_process_id = gpu_process_id;
surface_handle_.parent_client_id = client_id;
surface_handle_.parent_context_id = context_id;
surface_handle_.parent_texture_id[0] = texture_id_0;
surface_handle_.parent_texture_id[1] = texture_id_1;
surface_handle_.sync_point = sync_point;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,352
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void send_auth(char *username, char *password) {
struct mt_packet data;
unsigned short width = 0;
unsigned short height = 0;
char *terminal = getenv("TERM");
char md5data[100];
unsigned char md5sum[17];
int plen;
md5_state_t state;
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(_POSIX_MEMLOCK_RANGE)
mlock(md5data, sizeof(md5data));
mlock(md5sum, sizeof(md5data));
#endif
/* Concat string of 0 + password + pass_salt */
md5data[0] = 0;
strncpy(md5data + 1, password, 82);
md5data[83] = '\0';
memcpy(md5data + 1 + strlen(password), pass_salt, 16);
/* Generate md5 sum of md5data with a leading 0 */
md5_init(&state);
md5_append(&state, (const md5_byte_t *)md5data, strlen(password) + 17);
md5_finish(&state, (md5_byte_t *)md5sum + 1);
md5sum[0] = 0;
/* Send combined packet to server */
init_packet(&data, MT_PTYPE_DATA, srcmac, dstmac, sessionkey, outcounter);
plen = add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_PASSWORD, md5sum, 17);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_USERNAME, username, strlen(username));
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_TYPE, terminal, strlen(terminal));
if (is_a_tty && get_terminal_size(&width, &height) != -1) {
width = htole16(width);
height = htole16(height);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_WIDTH, &width, 2);
plen += add_control_packet(&data, MT_CPTYPE_TERM_HEIGHT, &height, 2);
}
outcounter += plen;
/* TODO: handle result */
send_udp(&data, 1);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the handle_packet function in mactelnet.c in the client in MAC-Telnet 0.4.3 and earlier allows remote TELNET servers to execute arbitrary code via a long string in an MT_CPTYPE_PASSSALT control packet.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
|
Low
| 166,963
|
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