instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void on_read(h2o_socket_t *sock, int status)
{
h2o_http2_conn_t *conn = sock->data;
if (status != 0) {
h2o_socket_read_stop(conn->sock);
close_connection(conn);
return;
}
update_idle_timeout(conn);
parse_input(conn);
/* write immediately, if there is no write in flight and if pending write exists */
if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)) {
h2o_timeout_unlink(&conn->_write.timeout_entry);
do_emit_writereq(conn);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: lib/http2/connection.c in H2O before 1.7.3 and 2.x before 2.0.0-beta5 mishandles HTTP/2 disconnection, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
|
Low
| 167,226
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Plugin::LoadNaClModuleCommon(nacl::DescWrapper* wrapper,
NaClSubprocess* subprocess,
const Manifest* manifest,
bool should_report_uma,
ErrorInfo* error_info,
pp::CompletionCallback init_done_cb,
pp::CompletionCallback crash_cb) {
ServiceRuntime* new_service_runtime =
new ServiceRuntime(this, manifest, should_report_uma, init_done_cb,
crash_cb);
subprocess->set_service_runtime(new_service_runtime);
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::LoadNaClModuleCommon (service_runtime=%p)\n",
static_cast<void*>(new_service_runtime)));
if (NULL == new_service_runtime) {
error_info->SetReport(ERROR_SEL_LDR_INIT,
"sel_ldr init failure " + subprocess->description());
return false;
}
bool service_runtime_started =
new_service_runtime->Start(wrapper,
error_info,
manifest_base_url());
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::LoadNaClModuleCommon (service_runtime_started=%d)\n",
service_runtime_started));
if (!service_runtime_started) {
return false;
}
const PPB_NaCl_Private* ppb_nacl = GetNaclInterface();
if (ppb_nacl->StartPpapiProxy(pp_instance())) {
using_ipc_proxy_ = true;
CHECK(init_done_cb.pp_completion_callback().func != NULL);
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::LoadNaClModuleCommon, started ipc proxy.\n"));
pp::Module::Get()->core()->CallOnMainThread(0, init_done_cb, PP_OK);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,742
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: t42_parse_font_matrix( T42_Face face,
T42_Loader loader )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Matrix* matrix = &face->type1.font_matrix;
FT_Vector* offset = &face->type1.font_offset;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
(void)T1_ToFixedArray( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
/* note that the offsets must be expressed in integer font units */
offset->x = temp[4] >> 16;
offset->y = temp[5] >> 16;
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = 0x10000L;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The (1) t1_parse_font_matrix function in type1/t1load.c, (2) cid_parse_font_matrix function in cid/cidload.c, (3) t42_parse_font_matrix function in type42/t42parse.c, and (4) ps_parser_load_field function in psaux/psobjs.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 do not check return values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized memory access and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted font.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,343
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::HandleMasterEntryFetchCompleted(
URLFetcher* fetcher) {
DCHECK(internal_state_ == NO_UPDATE || internal_state_ == DOWNLOADING);
net::URLRequest* request = fetcher->request();
const GURL& url = request->original_url();
master_entry_fetches_.erase(url);
++master_entries_completed_;
int response_code = request->status().is_success()
? request->GetResponseCode() : -1;
PendingMasters::iterator found = pending_master_entries_.find(url);
DCHECK(found != pending_master_entries_.end());
PendingHosts& hosts = found->second;
if (response_code / 100 == 2) {
AppCache* cache = inprogress_cache_.get() ? inprogress_cache_.get()
: group_->newest_complete_cache();
DCHECK(fetcher->response_writer());
AppCacheEntry master_entry(AppCacheEntry::MASTER,
fetcher->response_writer()->response_id(),
fetcher->response_writer()->amount_written());
if (cache->AddOrModifyEntry(url, master_entry))
added_master_entries_.push_back(url);
else
duplicate_response_ids_.push_back(master_entry.response_id());
if (!inprogress_cache_.get()) {
DCHECK(cache == group_->newest_complete_cache());
for (PendingHosts::iterator host_it = hosts.begin();
host_it != hosts.end(); ++host_it) {
(*host_it)->AssociateCompleteCache(cache);
}
}
} else {
HostNotifier host_notifier;
for (PendingHosts::iterator host_it = hosts.begin();
host_it != hosts.end(); ++host_it) {
AppCacheHost* host = *host_it;
host_notifier.AddHost(host);
if (inprogress_cache_.get())
host->AssociateNoCache(GURL());
host->RemoveObserver(this);
}
hosts.clear();
const char* kFormatString = "Manifest fetch failed (%d) %s";
std::string message = FormatUrlErrorMessage(
kFormatString, request->url(), fetcher->result(), response_code);
host_notifier.SendErrorNotifications(
AppCacheErrorDetails(message,
APPCACHE_MANIFEST_ERROR,
request->url(),
response_code,
false /*is_cross_origin*/));
if (inprogress_cache_.get()) {
pending_master_entries_.erase(found);
--master_entries_completed_;
if (update_type_ == CACHE_ATTEMPT && pending_master_entries_.empty()) {
HandleCacheFailure(AppCacheErrorDetails(message,
APPCACHE_MANIFEST_ERROR,
request->url(),
response_code,
false /*is_cross_origin*/),
fetcher->result(),
GURL());
return;
}
}
}
DCHECK(internal_state_ != CACHE_FAILURE);
FetchMasterEntries();
MaybeCompleteUpdate();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in content/browser/appcache/appcache_update_job.cc in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service by leveraging the mishandling of AppCache update jobs.
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
|
Low
| 171,732
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: alloc_limit_failure (char *fn_name, size_t size)
{
fprintf (stderr,
"%s: Maximum allocation size exceeded "
"(maxsize = %lu; size = %lu).\n",
fn_name,
(unsigned long)alloc_limit,
(unsigned long)size);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An issue was discovered in tnef before 1.4.13. Several Integer Overflows, which can lead to Heap Overflows, have been identified in the functions that wrap memory allocation.
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows and harden memory allocator.
|
Medium
| 168,355
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadSTEGANOImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define GetBit(alpha,i) MagickMin((((size_t) (alpha) >> (size_t) \
(i)) & 0x01),16)
#define SetBit(indexes,i,set) SetPixelIndex(indexes,((set) != 0 ? \
(size_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes) | (one << (size_t) (i)) : (size_t) \
GetPixelIndex(indexes) & ~(one << (size_t) (i))))
Image
*image,
*watermark;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PixelPacket
pixel;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
depth,
one;
ssize_t
i,
j,
k,
y;
/*
Initialize Image structure.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
*read_info->magick='\0';
watermark=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (watermark == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
watermark->depth=MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,MaxColormapSize) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Get hidden watermark from low-order bits of image.
*/
c=0;
i=0;
j=0;
i=(ssize_t) (watermark->depth-1);
depth=watermark->depth;
for (k=image->offset; (i >= 0) && (j < (ssize_t) depth); i--)
{
for (y=0; (y < (ssize_t) image->rows) && (j < (ssize_t) depth); y++)
{
x=0;
for ( ; (x < (ssize_t) image->columns) && (j < (ssize_t) depth); x++)
{
if ((k/(ssize_t) watermark->columns) >= (ssize_t) watermark->rows)
break;
(void) GetOneVirtualPixel(watermark,k % (ssize_t) watermark->columns,
k/(ssize_t) watermark->columns,&pixel,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,x,y,1,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
switch (c)
{
case 0:
{
SetBit(indexes,i,GetBit(pixel.red,j));
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetBit(indexes,i,GetBit(pixel.green,j));
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetBit(indexes,i,GetBit(pixel.blue,j));
break;
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
c++;
if (c == 3)
c=0;
k++;
if (k == (ssize_t) (watermark->columns*watermark->columns))
k=0;
if (k == image->offset)
j++;
}
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,(MagickOffsetType) i,depth);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
watermark=DestroyImage(watermark);
(void) SyncImage(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,605
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void Sp_split_regexp(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
int limit, len, k;
const char *p, *a, *b, *c, *e;
Resub m;
text = checkstring(J, 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, 1);
limit = js_isdefined(J, 2) ? js_tointeger(J, 2) : 1 << 30;
js_newarray(J);
len = 0;
e = text + strlen(text);
/* splitting the empty string */
if (e == text) {
if (js_regexec(re->prog, text, &m, 0)) {
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushliteral(J, "");
js_setindex(J, -2, 0);
}
return;
}
p = a = text;
while (a < e) {
if (js_regexec(re->prog, a, &m, a > text ? REG_NOTBOL : 0))
break; /* no match */
b = m.sub[0].sp;
c = m.sub[0].ep;
/* empty string at end of last match */
if (b == p) {
++a;
continue;
}
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushlstring(J, p, b - p);
js_setindex(J, -2, len++);
for (k = 1; k < m.nsub; ++k) {
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushlstring(J, m.sub[k].sp, m.sub[k].ep - m.sub[k].sp);
js_setindex(J, -2, len++);
}
a = p = c;
}
if (len == limit) return;
js_pushstring(J, p);
js_setindex(J, -2, len);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in Artifex MuJS 1.0.5. It has unlimited recursion because the match function in regexp.c lacks a depth check.
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
|
Low
| 169,701
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void aes_crypt_ecb( aes_context *ctx,
int mode,
const unsigned char input[16],
unsigned char output[16] )
{
int i;
unsigned long *RK, X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3;
#if defined(XYSSL_PADLOCK_C) && defined(XYSSL_HAVE_X86)
if( padlock_supports( PADLOCK_ACE ) )
{
if( padlock_xcryptecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) == 0 )
return;
}
#endif
RK = ctx->rk;
GET_ULONG_LE( X0, input, 0 ); X0 ^= *RK++;
if( mode == AES_DECRYPT )
{
for( i = (ctx->nr >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i-- )
{
AES_RROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
AES_RROUND( X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 );
}
AES_RROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
X0 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X1 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y1 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X2 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y2 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X3 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y3 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
}
else /* AES_ENCRYPT */
{
for( i = (ctx->nr >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i-- )
{
AES_FROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
AES_FROUND( X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 );
}
AES_FROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
X0 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X1 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y1 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X2 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y2 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X3 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y3 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
}
PUT_ULONG_LE( X0, output, 0 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X1, output, 4 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X2, output, 8 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X3, output, 12 );
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In Artifex Ghostscript 9.23 before 2018-08-24, attackers able to supply crafted PostScript could use uninitialized memory access in the aesdecode operator to crash the interpreter or potentially execute code.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,702
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadPIXImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
Quantum
blue,
green,
red;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
height,
length,
width;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read PIX image.
*/
width=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
height=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image); /* x-offset */
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image); /* y-offset */
bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((width == 0UL) || (height == 0UL) || ((bits_per_pixel != 8) &&
(bits_per_pixel != 24)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
if (bits_per_pixel == 8)
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,256) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Convert PIX raster image to pixel packets.
*/
red=(Quantum) 0;
green=(Quantum) 0;
blue=(Quantum) 0;
index=(IndexPacket) 0;
length=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (length == 0)
{
length=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (bits_per_pixel == 8)
index=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
else
{
blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelBlue(q,blue);
SetPixelGreen(q,green);
SetPixelRed(q,red);
length--;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
status=(width != 0UL) && (height == 0UL) && ((bits_per_pixel == 8) ||
(bits_per_pixel == 24)) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (status != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,594
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int insert_pin(
sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
const char *path,
unsigned char id,
unsigned char auth_id,
unsigned char pin_reference,
int min_length,
const char *label,
int pin_flags
){
sc_card_t *card=p15card->card;
sc_context_t *ctx=p15card->card->ctx;
sc_file_t *f;
struct sc_pkcs15_auth_info pin_info;
struct sc_pkcs15_object pin_obj;
int r;
memset(&pin_info, 0, sizeof(pin_info));
pin_info.auth_id.len = 1;
pin_info.auth_id.value[0] = id;
pin_info.auth_type = SC_PKCS15_PIN_AUTH_TYPE_PIN;
pin_info.attrs.pin.reference = pin_reference;
pin_info.attrs.pin.flags = pin_flags;
pin_info.attrs.pin.type = SC_PKCS15_PIN_TYPE_ASCII_NUMERIC;
pin_info.attrs.pin.min_length = min_length;
pin_info.attrs.pin.stored_length = 16;
pin_info.attrs.pin.max_length = 16;
pin_info.attrs.pin.pad_char = '\0';
pin_info.logged_in = SC_PIN_STATE_UNKNOWN;
sc_format_path(path, &pin_info.path);
memset(&pin_obj, 0, sizeof(pin_obj));
strlcpy(pin_obj.label, label, sizeof(pin_obj.label));
pin_obj.flags = SC_PKCS15_CO_FLAG_MODIFIABLE | SC_PKCS15_CO_FLAG_PRIVATE;
pin_obj.auth_id.len = auth_id ? 0 : 1;
pin_obj.auth_id.value[0] = auth_id;
if(card->type==SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V3){
unsigned char buf[256];
int i, rec_no=0;
if(pin_info.path.len>=2) pin_info.path.len-=2;
sc_append_file_id(&pin_info.path, 0x5049);
if(sc_select_file(card, &pin_info.path, NULL)!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Select(%s) failed\n",
sc_print_path(&pin_info.path));
return 1;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Searching for PIN-Ref %02X\n", pin_reference);
while((r=sc_read_record(card, ++rec_no, buf, sizeof(buf), SC_RECORD_BY_REC_NR))>0){
int found=0, fbz=-1;
if(buf[0]!=0xA0) continue;
for(i=2;i<buf[1]+2;i+=2+buf[i+1]){
if(buf[i]==0x83 && buf[i+1]==1 && buf[i+2]==pin_reference) ++found;
if(buf[i]==0x90) fbz=buf[i+1+buf[i+1]];
}
if(found) pin_info.tries_left=fbz;
if(found) break;
}
if(r<=0){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,"No EF_PWDD-Record found\n");
return 1;
}
} else {
if(sc_select_file(card, &pin_info.path, &f)!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,"Select(%s) failed\n", path);
return 1;
}
pin_info.tries_left=f->prop_attr[3];
sc_file_free(f);
}
r=sc_pkcs15emu_add_pin_obj(p15card, &pin_obj, &pin_info);
if(r!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "sc_pkcs15emu_add_pin_obj(%s) failed\n", path);
return 4;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "%s: OK, FBZ=%d\n", path, pin_info.tries_left);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Various out of bounds reads when handling responses in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to potentially crash the opensc library using programs.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
Low
| 169,068
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AppCacheBackendImpl::SelectCacheForWorker(
int host_id, int parent_process_id, int parent_host_id) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host || host->was_select_cache_called())
return false;
host->SelectCacheForWorker(parent_process_id, parent_host_id);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the AppCache implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers with renderer access to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect AppCacheUpdateJob behavior associated with duplicate cache selection.
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
|
Low
| 171,738
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int a2dp_command(struct a2dp_stream_common *common, char cmd)
{
char ack;
DEBUG("A2DP COMMAND %s", dump_a2dp_ctrl_event(cmd));
/* send command */
if (send(common->ctrl_fd, &cmd, 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL) == -1)
{
ERROR("cmd failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
skt_disconnect(common->ctrl_fd);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
return -1;
}
/* wait for ack byte */
if (a2dp_ctrl_receive(common, &ack, 1) < 0)
return -1;
DEBUG("A2DP COMMAND %s DONE STATUS %d", dump_a2dp_ctrl_event(cmd), ack);
if (ack == A2DP_CTRL_ACK_INCALL_FAILURE)
return ack;
if (ack != A2DP_CTRL_ACK_SUCCESS)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,422
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ProfileChooserView::RemoveAccount() {
DCHECK(!account_id_to_remove_.empty());
ProfileOAuth2TokenService* oauth2_token_service =
ProfileOAuth2TokenServiceFactory::GetForProfile(browser_->profile());
if (oauth2_token_service) {
oauth2_token_service->RevokeCredentials(account_id_to_remove_);
PostActionPerformed(ProfileMetrics::PROFILE_DESKTOP_MENU_REMOVE_ACCT);
}
account_id_to_remove_.clear();
ShowViewFromMode(profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_ACCOUNT_MANAGEMENT);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The JSGenericLowering class in compiler/js-generic-lowering.cc in Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94, mishandles comparison operators, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
|
Medium
| 172,570
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AppShortcutManager::OnceOffCreateShortcuts() {
bool was_enabled = prefs_->GetBoolean(prefs::kAppShortcutsHaveBeenCreated);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
bool is_now_enabled = apps::IsAppShimsEnabled();
#else
bool is_now_enabled = true;
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (was_enabled != is_now_enabled)
prefs_->SetBoolean(prefs::kAppShortcutsHaveBeenCreated, is_now_enabled);
if (was_enabled || !is_now_enabled)
return;
extensions::ExtensionSystem* extension_system;
ExtensionServiceInterface* extension_service;
if (!(extension_system = extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)) ||
!(extension_service = extension_system->extension_service()))
return;
const extensions::ExtensionSet* apps = extension_service->extensions();
for (extensions::ExtensionSet::const_iterator it = apps->begin();
it != apps->end(); ++it) {
if (ShouldCreateShortcutFor(profile_, it->get()))
CreateShortcutsInApplicationsMenu(profile_, it->get());
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTMLMediaElement::didMoveToNewDocument function in core/html/HTMLMediaElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving the movement of a media element between documents.
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,146
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool snd_ctl_remove_numid_conflict(struct snd_card *card,
unsigned int count)
{
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
list_for_each_entry(kctl, &card->controls, list) {
if (kctl->id.numid < card->last_numid + 1 + count &&
kctl->id.numid + kctl->count > card->last_numid + 1) {
card->last_numid = kctl->id.numid + kctl->count - 1;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in sound/core/control.c in the ALSA control implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 allow local users to cause a denial of service by leveraging /dev/snd/controlCX access, related to (1) index values in the snd_ctl_add function and (2) numid values in the snd_ctl_remove_numid_conflict function.
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Handle numid overflow
Each control gets automatically assigned its numids when the control is created.
The allocation is done by incrementing the numid by the amount of allocated
numids per allocation. This means that excessive creation and destruction of
controls (e.g. via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD/REMOVE) can cause the id to
eventually overflow. Currently when this happens for the control that caused the
overflow kctl->id.numid + kctl->count will also over flow causing it to be
smaller than kctl->id.numid. Most of the code assumes that this is something
that can not happen, so we need to make sure that it won't happen
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Low
| 166,290
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SkippedMBMotionComp(
VideoDecData *video
)
{
Vop *prev = video->prevVop;
Vop *comp;
int ypos, xpos;
PIXEL *c_comp, *c_prev;
PIXEL *cu_comp, *cu_prev;
PIXEL *cv_comp, *cv_prev;
int width, width_uv;
int32 offset;
#ifdef PV_POSTPROC_ON // 2/14/2001
int imv;
int32 size = (int32) video->nTotalMB << 8;
uint8 *pp_dec_y, *pp_dec_u;
uint8 *pp_prev1;
int mvwidth = video->nMBPerRow << 1;
#endif
width = video->width;
width_uv = width >> 1;
ypos = video->mbnum_row << 4 ;
xpos = video->mbnum_col << 4 ;
offset = (int32)ypos * width + xpos;
/* zero motion compensation for previous frame */
/*mby*width + mbx;*/
c_prev = prev->yChan + offset;
/*by*width_uv + bx;*/
cu_prev = prev->uChan + (offset >> 2) + (xpos >> 2);
/*by*width_uv + bx;*/
cv_prev = prev->vChan + (offset >> 2) + (xpos >> 2);
comp = video->currVop;
c_comp = comp->yChan + offset;
cu_comp = comp->uChan + (offset >> 2) + (xpos >> 2);
cv_comp = comp->vChan + (offset >> 2) + (xpos >> 2);
/* Copy previous reconstructed frame into the current frame */
PutSKIPPED_MB(c_comp, c_prev, width);
PutSKIPPED_B(cu_comp, cu_prev, width_uv);
PutSKIPPED_B(cv_comp, cv_prev, width_uv);
/* 10/24/2000 post_processing semaphore generation */
#ifdef PV_POSTPROC_ON // 2/14/2001
if (video->postFilterType != PV_NO_POST_PROC)
{
imv = (offset >> 6) - (xpos >> 6) + (xpos >> 3);
/* Post-processing mode (copy previous MB) */
pp_prev1 = video->pstprcTypPrv + imv;
pp_dec_y = video->pstprcTypCur + imv;
*pp_dec_y = *pp_prev1;
*(pp_dec_y + 1) = *(pp_prev1 + 1);
*(pp_dec_y + mvwidth) = *(pp_prev1 + mvwidth);
*(pp_dec_y + mvwidth + 1) = *(pp_prev1 + mvwidth + 1);
/* chrominance */
/*4*MB_in_width*MB_in_height*/
pp_prev1 = video->pstprcTypPrv + (size >> 6) +
((imv + (xpos >> 3)) >> 2);
pp_dec_u = video->pstprcTypCur + (size >> 6) +
((imv + (xpos >> 3)) >> 2);
*pp_dec_u = *pp_prev1;
pp_dec_u[size>>8] = pp_prev1[size>>8];
}
#endif
/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------
; Return nothing or data or data pointer
----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A remote denial of service vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High severity due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-35269635.
Commit Message: Fix NPDs in h263 decoder
Bug: 35269635
Test: decoded PoC with and without patch
Change-Id: I636a14360c7801cc5bca63c9cb44d1d235df8fd8
(cherry picked from commit 2ad2a92318a3b9daf78ebcdc597085adbf32600d)
|
Medium
| 174,005
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int sctp_v6_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sctp_transport *transport)
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct flowi6 fl6;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
/* Fill in the dest address from the route entry passed with the skb
* and the source address from the transport.
*/
fl6.daddr = transport->ipaddr.v6.sin6_addr;
fl6.saddr = transport->saddr.v6.sin6_addr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
IP6_ECN_flow_xmit(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (ipv6_addr_type(&fl6.saddr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
fl6.flowi6_oif = transport->saddr.v6.sin6_scope_id;
else
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (np->opt && np->opt->srcrt) {
struct rt0_hdr *rt0 = (struct rt0_hdr *) np->opt->srcrt;
fl6.daddr = *rt0->addr;
}
pr_debug("%s: skb:%p, len:%d, src:%pI6 dst:%pI6\n", __func__, skb,
skb->len, &fl6.saddr, &fl6.daddr);
SCTP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), SCTP_MIB_OUTSCTPPACKS);
if (!(transport->param_flags & SPP_PMTUD_ENABLE))
skb->local_df = 1;
return ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The IPv6 SCTP implementation in net/sctp/ipv6.c in the Linux kernel through 3.11.1 uses data structures and function calls that do not trigger an intended configuration of IPsec encryption, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information by sniffing the network.
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:
SCTP + IPv4:
22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
SCTP + IPv6:
22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
Moreover, Alan says:
This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
...
0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l....
0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext...
Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:
SCTP + IPv6:
08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.
[1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
Reported-by: Alan Chester <alan.chester@tekelec.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,990
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static av_cold int vqa_decode_init(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
VqaContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int i, j, codebook_index;
s->avctx = avctx;
avctx->pix_fmt = PIX_FMT_PAL8;
/* make sure the extradata made it */
if (s->avctx->extradata_size != VQA_HEADER_SIZE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, " VQA video: expected extradata size of %d\n", VQA_HEADER_SIZE);
return -1;
}
/* load up the VQA parameters from the header */
s->vqa_version = s->avctx->extradata[0];
s->width = AV_RL16(&s->avctx->extradata[6]);
s->height = AV_RL16(&s->avctx->extradata[8]);
if(av_image_check_size(s->width, s->height, 0, avctx)){
s->width= s->height= 0;
return -1;
}
s->vector_width = s->avctx->extradata[10];
s->vector_height = s->avctx->extradata[11];
s->partial_count = s->partial_countdown = s->avctx->extradata[13];
/* the vector dimensions have to meet very stringent requirements */
if ((s->vector_width != 4) ||
((s->vector_height != 2) && (s->vector_height != 4))) {
/* return without further initialization */
return -1;
}
/* allocate codebooks */
s->codebook_size = MAX_CODEBOOK_SIZE;
s->codebook = av_malloc(s->codebook_size);
/* allocate decode buffer */
s->decode_buffer_size = (s->width / s->vector_width) *
(s->height / s->vector_height) * 2;
s->decode_buffer = av_malloc(s->decode_buffer_size);
if (!s->decode_buffer)
goto fail;
/* initialize the solid-color vectors */
if (s->vector_height == 4) {
codebook_index = 0xFF00 * 16;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
s->codebook[codebook_index++] = i;
} else {
codebook_index = 0xF00 * 8;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
s->codebook[codebook_index++] = i;
}
s->next_codebook_buffer_index = 0;
s->frame.data[0] = NULL;
return 0;
fail:
av_freep(&s->codebook);
av_freep(&s->next_codebook_buffer);
av_freep(&s->decode_buffer);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the vqa_decode_chunk function in the VQA codec (vqavideo.c) in libavcodec in Libav 0.5.x before 0.5.9, 0.6.x before 0.6.6, 0.7.x before 0.7.6, and 0.8.x before 0.8.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted VQA media file in which the image size is not a multiple of the block size.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,148
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static u32 __ipv6_select_ident(struct net *net, u32 hashrnd,
const struct in6_addr *dst,
const struct in6_addr *src)
{
u32 hash, id;
hash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(dst, hashrnd);
hash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(src, hash);
hash ^= net_hash_mix(net);
/* Treat id of 0 as unset and if we get 0 back from ip_idents_reserve,
* set the hight order instead thus minimizing possible future
* collisions.
*/
id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, 1);
if (unlikely(!id))
id = 1 << 31;
return id;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 5.1.7, a device can be tracked by an attacker using the IP ID values the kernel produces for connection-less protocols (e.g., UDP and ICMP). When such traffic is sent to multiple destination IP addresses, it is possible to obtain hash collisions (of indices to the counter array) and thereby obtain the hashing key (via enumeration). An attack may be conducted by hosting a crafted web page that uses WebRTC or gQUIC to force UDP traffic to attacker-controlled IP addresses.
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 169,717
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void BooleanOrNullAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "booleanOrNullAttribute");
bool cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLBoolean>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
bool is_null = IsUndefinedOrNull(v8_value);
impl->setBooleanOrNullAttribute(cpp_value, is_null);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Inappropriate use of www mismatch redirects in browser navigation in Google Chrome prior to 61.0.3163.79 for Mac, Windows, and Linux, and 61.0.3163.81 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to potentially downgrade HTTPS requests to HTTP via a crafted HTML page. In other words, Chrome could transmit cleartext even though the user had entered an https URL, because of a misdesigned workaround for cases where the domain name in a URL almost matches the domain name in an X.509 server certificate (but differs in the initial *www.* substring).
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
Medium
| 172,304
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RequestSender::OnNetworkFetcherComplete(
const GURL& original_url,
std::unique_ptr<std::string> response_body,
int net_error,
const std::string& header_etag,
int64_t xheader_retry_after_sec) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
VLOG(1) << "request completed from url: " << original_url.spec();
int error = -1;
if (response_body && response_code_ == 200) {
DCHECK_EQ(0, net_error);
error = 0;
} else if (response_code_ != -1) {
error = response_code_;
} else {
error = net_error;
}
int retry_after_sec = -1;
if (original_url.SchemeIsCryptographic() && error > 0)
retry_after_sec = base::saturated_cast<int>(xheader_retry_after_sec);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&RequestSender::SendInternalComplete,
base::Unretained(this), error,
response_body ? *response_body : std::string(),
header_etag, retry_after_sec));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Mac, Windows, and Linux, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs in a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Fix error handling in the request sender and url fetcher downloader.
That means handling the network errors by primarily looking at net_error.
Bug: 1028369
Change-Id: I8181bced25f8b56144ea336a03883d0dceea5108
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1935428
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sorin Jianu <sorin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#719199}
|
Medium
| 172,364
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SimpleSoftOMXComponent::onPortEnable(OMX_U32 portIndex, bool enable) {
CHECK_LT(portIndex, mPorts.size());
PortInfo *port = &mPorts.editItemAt(portIndex);
CHECK_EQ((int)port->mTransition, (int)PortInfo::NONE);
CHECK(port->mDef.bEnabled == !enable);
if (!enable) {
port->mDef.bEnabled = OMX_FALSE;
port->mTransition = PortInfo::DISABLING;
for (size_t i = 0; i < port->mBuffers.size(); ++i) {
BufferInfo *buffer = &port->mBuffers.editItemAt(i);
if (buffer->mOwnedByUs) {
buffer->mOwnedByUs = false;
if (port->mDef.eDir == OMX_DirInput) {
notifyEmptyBufferDone(buffer->mHeader);
} else {
CHECK_EQ(port->mDef.eDir, OMX_DirOutput);
notifyFillBufferDone(buffer->mHeader);
}
}
}
port->mQueue.clear();
} else {
port->mTransition = PortInfo::ENABLING;
}
checkTransitions();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: omx/SimpleSoftOMXComponent.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 does not prevent input-port changes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29421804.
Commit Message: omx: prevent input port enable/disable for software codecs
Bug: 29421804
Change-Id: Iba1011e9af942a6dff7f659af769a51e3f5ba66f
|
Medium
| 173,416
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ff_mpeg4_decode_picture_header(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
unsigned startcode, v;
int ret;
int vol = 0;
/* search next start code */
align_get_bits(gb);
if (!s->studio_profile && s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample != 8)
s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = 0;
if (s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("WV1F") && show_bits(gb, 24) == 0x575630) {
skip_bits(gb, 24);
if (get_bits(gb, 8) == 0xF0)
goto end;
}
startcode = 0xff;
for (;;) {
if (get_bits_count(gb) >= gb->size_in_bits) {
if (gb->size_in_bits == 8 &&
(ctx->divx_version >= 0 || ctx->xvid_build >= 0) || s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("QMP4")) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "frame skip %d\n", gb->size_in_bits);
return FRAME_SKIPPED; // divx bug
} else
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA; // end of stream
}
/* use the bits after the test */
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
startcode = ((startcode << 8) | v) & 0xffffffff;
if ((startcode & 0xFFFFFF00) != 0x100)
continue; // no startcode
if (s->avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_STARTCODE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "startcode: %3X ", startcode);
if (startcode <= 0x11F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Start");
else if (startcode <= 0x12F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Layer Start");
else if (startcode <= 0x13F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Reserved");
else if (startcode <= 0x15F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FGS bp start");
else if (startcode <= 0x1AF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Reserved");
else if (startcode == 0x1B0)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Seq Start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Seq End");
else if (startcode == 0x1B2)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "User Data");
else if (startcode == 0x1B3)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Group of VOP start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B4)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Session Error");
else if (startcode == 0x1B5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B6)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B7)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "slice start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B8)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "extension start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B9)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "fgs start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BA)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FBA Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BB)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FBA Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BC)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Mesh Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BD)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Mesh Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BE)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Still Texture Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Spatial Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C0)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture SNR Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Tile start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C2)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Shape Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C3)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "stuffing start");
else if (startcode <= 0x1C5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "reserved");
else if (startcode <= 0x1FF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "System start");
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " at %d\n", get_bits_count(gb));
}
if (startcode >= 0x120 && startcode <= 0x12F) {
if (vol) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring multiple VOL headers\n");
continue;
}
vol++;
if ((ret = decode_vol_header(ctx, gb)) < 0)
return ret;
} else if (startcode == USER_DATA_STARTCODE) {
decode_user_data(ctx, gb);
} else if (startcode == GOP_STARTCODE) {
mpeg4_decode_gop_header(s, gb);
} else if (startcode == VOS_STARTCODE) {
mpeg4_decode_profile_level(s, gb);
if (s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO &&
(s->avctx->level > 0 && s->avctx->level < 9)) {
s->studio_profile = 1;
next_start_code_studio(gb);
extension_and_user_data(s, gb, 0);
}
} else if (startcode == VISUAL_OBJ_STARTCODE) {
if (s->studio_profile) {
if ((ret = decode_studiovisualobject(ctx, gb)) < 0)
return ret;
} else
mpeg4_decode_visual_object(s, gb);
} else if (startcode == VOP_STARTCODE) {
break;
}
align_get_bits(gb);
startcode = 0xff;
}
end:
if (s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_LOW_DELAY)
s->low_delay = 1;
s->avctx->has_b_frames = !s->low_delay;
if (s->studio_profile) {
if (!s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Missing VOL header\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
return decode_studio_vop_header(ctx, gb);
} else
return decode_vop_header(ctx, gb);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In FFmpeg 4.0.1, due to a missing check of a profile value before setting it, the ff_mpeg4_decode_picture_header function in libavcodec/mpeg4videodec.c may trigger a NULL pointer dereference while converting a crafted AVI file to MPEG4, leading to a denial of service.
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check read profile before setting it
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_7.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 169,160
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void igmp_heard_query(struct in_device *in_dev, struct sk_buff *skb,
int len)
{
struct igmphdr *ih = igmp_hdr(skb);
struct igmpv3_query *ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
struct ip_mc_list *im;
__be32 group = ih->group;
int max_delay;
int mark = 0;
if (len == 8) {
if (ih->code == 0) {
/* Alas, old v1 router presents here. */
max_delay = IGMP_Query_Response_Interval;
in_dev->mr_v1_seen = jiffies +
IGMP_V1_Router_Present_Timeout;
group = 0;
} else {
/* v2 router present */
max_delay = ih->code*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
in_dev->mr_v2_seen = jiffies +
IGMP_V2_Router_Present_Timeout;
}
/* cancel the interface change timer */
in_dev->mr_ifc_count = 0;
if (del_timer(&in_dev->mr_ifc_timer))
__in_dev_put(in_dev);
/* clear deleted report items */
igmpv3_clear_delrec(in_dev);
} else if (len < 12) {
return; /* ignore bogus packet; freed by caller */
} else if (IGMP_V1_SEEN(in_dev)) {
/* This is a v3 query with v1 queriers present */
max_delay = IGMP_Query_Response_Interval;
group = 0;
} else if (IGMP_V2_SEEN(in_dev)) {
/* this is a v3 query with v2 queriers present;
* Interpretation of the max_delay code is problematic here.
* A real v2 host would use ih_code directly, while v3 has a
* different encoding. We use the v3 encoding as more likely
* to be intended in a v3 query.
*/
max_delay = IGMPV3_MRC(ih3->code)*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
} else { /* v3 */
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct igmpv3_query)))
return;
ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
if (ih3->nsrcs) {
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct igmpv3_query)
+ ntohs(ih3->nsrcs)*sizeof(__be32)))
return;
ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
}
max_delay = IGMPV3_MRC(ih3->code)*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
if (!max_delay)
max_delay = 1; /* can't mod w/ 0 */
in_dev->mr_maxdelay = max_delay;
if (ih3->qrv)
in_dev->mr_qrv = ih3->qrv;
if (!group) { /* general query */
if (ih3->nsrcs)
return; /* no sources allowed */
igmp_gq_start_timer(in_dev);
return;
}
/* mark sources to include, if group & source-specific */
mark = ih3->nsrcs != 0;
}
/*
* - Start the timers in all of our membership records
* that the query applies to for the interface on
* which the query arrived excl. those that belong
* to a "local" group (224.0.0.X)
* - For timers already running check if they need to
* be reset.
* - Use the igmp->igmp_code field as the maximum
* delay possible
*/
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_pmc_rcu(in_dev, im) {
int changed;
if (group && group != im->multiaddr)
continue;
if (im->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS)
continue;
spin_lock_bh(&im->lock);
if (im->tm_running)
im->gsquery = im->gsquery && mark;
else
im->gsquery = mark;
changed = !im->gsquery ||
igmp_marksources(im, ntohs(ih3->nsrcs), ih3->srcs);
spin_unlock_bh(&im->lock);
if (changed)
igmp_mod_timer(im, max_delay);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The igmp_heard_query function in net/ipv4/igmp.c in the Linux kernel before 3.2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and panic) via IGMP packets.
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,651
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int ret;
struct lxc_lock *lock;
lock = lxc_newlock(NULL, NULL);
if (!lock) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: failed to get unnamed lock\n", __LINE__);
exit(1);
}
ret = lxclock(lock, 0);
if (ret) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: failed to take unnamed lock (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
exit(1);
}
ret = lxcunlock(lock);
if (ret) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: failed to put unnamed lock (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
exit(1);
}
lxc_putlock(lock);
lock = lxc_newlock("/var/lib/lxc", mycontainername);
if (!lock) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: failed to get lock\n", __LINE__);
exit(1);
}
struct stat sb;
char *pathname = RUNTIME_PATH "/lock/lxc/var/lib/lxc/";
ret = stat(pathname, &sb);
if (ret != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: filename %s not created\n", __LINE__,
pathname);
exit(1);
}
lxc_putlock(lock);
test_two_locks();
fprintf(stderr, "all tests passed\n");
exit(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxclock.c in LXC 1.1.2 and earlier allows local users to create arbitrary files via a symlink attack on /run/lock/lxc/*.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1331: lxclock: use /run/lxc/lock rather than /run/lock/lxc
This prevents an unprivileged user to use LXC to create arbitrary file
on the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
|
Low
| 166,726
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void processInputBuffer(client *c) {
server.current_client = c;
/* Keep processing while there is something in the input buffer */
while(sdslen(c->querybuf)) {
/* Return if clients are paused. */
if (!(c->flags & CLIENT_SLAVE) && clientsArePaused()) break;
/* Immediately abort if the client is in the middle of something. */
if (c->flags & CLIENT_BLOCKED) break;
/* CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY closes the connection once the reply is
* written to the client. Make sure to not let the reply grow after
* this flag has been set (i.e. don't process more commands). */
if (c->flags & CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY) break;
/* Determine request type when unknown. */
if (!c->reqtype) {
if (c->querybuf[0] == '*') {
c->reqtype = PROTO_REQ_MULTIBULK;
} else {
c->reqtype = PROTO_REQ_INLINE;
}
}
if (c->reqtype == PROTO_REQ_INLINE) {
if (processInlineBuffer(c) != C_OK) break;
} else if (c->reqtype == PROTO_REQ_MULTIBULK) {
if (processMultibulkBuffer(c) != C_OK) break;
} else {
serverPanic("Unknown request type");
}
/* Multibulk processing could see a <= 0 length. */
if (c->argc == 0) {
resetClient(c);
} else {
/* Only reset the client when the command was executed. */
if (processCommand(c) == C_OK)
resetClient(c);
/* freeMemoryIfNeeded may flush slave output buffers. This may result
* into a slave, that may be the active client, to be freed. */
if (server.current_client == NULL) break;
}
}
server.current_client = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: networking.c in Redis before 3.2.7 allows *Cross Protocol Scripting* because it lacks a check for POST and Host: strings, which are not valid in the Redis protocol (but commonly occur when an attack triggers an HTTP request to the Redis TCP port).
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
|
Medium
| 168,453
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t *
p_code_block)
{
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_size;
l_data_size = (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) *
(p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) {
if (p_code_block->data) {
/* We refer to data - 1 since below we incremented it */
opj_free(p_code_block->data - 1);
}
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(l_data_size + 1);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data_size = 0U;
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_size = l_data_size;
/* We reserve the initial byte as a fake byte to a non-FF value */
/* and increment the data pointer, so that opj_mqc_init_enc() */
/* can do bp = data - 1, and opj_mqc_byteout() can safely dereference */
/* it. */
p_code_block->data[0] = 0;
p_code_block->data += 1; /*why +1 ?*/
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the opj_mqc_byteout function in mqc.c in OpenJPEG before 2.2.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted bmp file.
Commit Message: Fix write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_byteout(). Discovered by Ke Liu of Tencent's Xuanwu LAB (#835)
|
Medium
| 168,458
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static av_cold int xpm_decode_close(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
XPMDecContext *x = avctx->priv_data;
av_freep(&x->pixels);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the color_string_to_rgba function in libavcodec/xpmdec.c in FFmpeg 3.3 before 3.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: avcodec/xpmdec: Fix multiple pointer/memory issues
Most of these were found through code review in response to
fixing 1466/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5961584419536896
There is thus no testcase for most of this.
The initial issue was Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 168,077
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: CronTab::initRegexObject() {
if ( ! CronTab::regex.isInitialized() ) {
const char *errptr;
int erroffset;
MyString pattern( CRONTAB_PARAMETER_PATTERN ) ;
if ( ! CronTab::regex.compile( pattern, &errptr, &erroffset )) {
MyString error = "CronTab: Failed to compile Regex - ";
error += pattern;
EXCEPT( const_cast<char*>(error.Value()));
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,383
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MediaInterfaceProxy::CreateCdm(
media::mojom::ContentDecryptionModuleRequest request) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
GetMediaInterfaceFactory()->CreateCdm(std::move(request));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: SkPictureShader.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging access to a renderer process and providing crafted serialized data.
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
|
Low
| 171,936
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: png_write_start_row(png_structp png_ptr)
{
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* Arrays to facilitate easy interlacing - use pass (0 - 6) as index */
/* Start of interlace block */
int png_pass_start[7] = {0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0};
/* Offset to next interlace block */
int png_pass_inc[7] = {8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1};
/* Start of interlace block in the y direction */
int png_pass_ystart[7] = {0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1};
/* Offset to next interlace block in the y direction */
int png_pass_yinc[7] = {8, 8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2};
#endif
png_size_t buf_size;
png_debug(1, "in png_write_start_row");
buf_size = (png_size_t)(PNG_ROWBYTES(
png_ptr->usr_channels*png_ptr->usr_bit_depth, png_ptr->width) + 1);
/* Set up row buffer */
png_ptr->row_buf = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)buf_size);
png_ptr->row_buf[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_NONE;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
/* Set up filtering buffer, if using this filter */
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_SUB)
{
png_ptr->sub_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->sub_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_SUB;
}
/* We only need to keep the previous row if we are using one of these. */
if (png_ptr->do_filter & (PNG_FILTER_AVG | PNG_FILTER_UP | PNG_FILTER_PAETH))
{
/* Set up previous row buffer */
png_ptr->prev_row = (png_bytep)png_calloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)buf_size);
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_UP)
{
png_ptr->up_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->up_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_UP;
}
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_AVG)
{
png_ptr->avg_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->avg_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_AVG;
}
if (png_ptr->do_filter & PNG_FILTER_PAETH)
{
png_ptr->paeth_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(png_ptr->rowbytes + 1));
png_ptr->paeth_row[0] = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_PAETH;
}
}
#endif /* PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED */
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* If interlaced, we need to set up width and height of pass */
if (png_ptr->interlaced)
{
if (!(png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE))
{
png_ptr->num_rows = (png_ptr->height + png_pass_yinc[0] - 1 -
png_pass_ystart[0]) / png_pass_yinc[0];
png_ptr->usr_width = (png_ptr->width + png_pass_inc[0] - 1 -
png_pass_start[0]) / png_pass_inc[0];
}
else
{
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->usr_width = png_ptr->width;
}
}
else
#endif
{
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->usr_width = png_ptr->width;
}
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = (uInt)png_ptr->zbuf_size;
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
Low
| 172,196
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_slice(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
UWORD32 u4_slice_vertical_position;
UWORD32 u4_slice_vertical_position_extension;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* All the profiles supported require restricted slice structure. Hence */
/* there is no need to store slice_vertical_position. Note that max */
/* height supported does not exceed 2800 and scalablity is not supported */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Remove the slice start code */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN);
u4_slice_vertical_position = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream, 8);
if(u4_slice_vertical_position > 2800)
{
u4_slice_vertical_position_extension = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream, 3);
u4_slice_vertical_position += (u4_slice_vertical_position_extension << 7);
}
if((u4_slice_vertical_position > ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb) ||
(u4_slice_vertical_position == 0))
{
return IMPEG2D_INVALID_VERT_SIZE;
}
u4_slice_vertical_position--;
if (ps_dec->u2_mb_y != u4_slice_vertical_position)
{
ps_dec->u2_mb_y = u4_slice_vertical_position;
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 1;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quant scale code decoding */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
UWORD16 u2_quant_scale_code;
u2_quant_scale_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,5);
ps_dec->u1_quant_scale = (ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type) ?
gau1_impeg2_non_linear_quant_scale[u2_quant_scale_code] : (u2_quant_scale_code << 1);
}
if (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,9);
/* Flush extra bit information */
while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,9);
}
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
/* Reset the DC predictors to reset values given in Table 7.2 at the start*/
/* of slice data */
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* dec->DecMBsinSlice() implements the following psuedo code from standard*/
/* do */
/* { */
/* macroblock() */
/* } while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt() != '000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000') */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
e_error = ps_dec->pf_decode_slice(ps_dec);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
/* Check for the MBy index instead of number of MBs left, because the
* number of MBs left in case of multi-thread decode is the number of MBs
* in that row only
*/
if(ps_dec->u2_mb_y < ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb)
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: libmpeg2 in libstagefright in Android 6.x before 2016-03-01 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via crafted Bitstream data, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 25765591.
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
|
Low
| 173,947
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: CmdBufferImageTransportFactory::CreateSharedSurfaceHandle() {
if (!context_->makeContextCurrent()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Failed to make shared graphics context current";
return gfx::GLSurfaceHandle();
}
gfx::GLSurfaceHandle handle = gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(
gfx::kNullPluginWindow, true);
handle.parent_gpu_process_id = context_->GetGPUProcessID();
handle.parent_client_id = context_->GetChannelID();
handle.parent_context_id = context_->GetContextID();
handle.parent_texture_id[0] = context_->createTexture();
handle.parent_texture_id[1] = context_->createTexture();
handle.sync_point = context_->insertSyncPoint();
context_->flush();
return handle;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,363
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::RecordEnumeratedHistogram(const std::string& name,
int sample,
int boundary_value) {
if (!(boundary_value >= 0 && boundary_value <= 100 && sample >= 0 &&
sample < boundary_value)) {
frontend_host_->BadMessageRecieved();
return;
}
if (name == kDevToolsActionTakenHistogram)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(name, sample, boundary_value);
else if (name == kDevToolsPanelShownHistogram)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(name, sample, boundary_value);
else
frontend_host_->BadMessageRecieved();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Windows insufficiently sanitized DevTools URLs, which allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to read filesystem contents via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
|
Medium
| 172,454
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cosine_seek_read(wtap *wth, gint64 seek_off, struct wtap_pkthdr *phdr,
Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
int pkt_len;
char line[COSINE_LINE_LENGTH];
if (file_seek(wth->random_fh, seek_off, SEEK_SET, err) == -1)
return FALSE;
if (file_gets(line, COSINE_LINE_LENGTH, wth->random_fh) == NULL) {
*err = file_error(wth->random_fh, err_info);
if (*err == 0) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_SHORT_READ;
}
return FALSE;
}
/* Parse the header */
pkt_len = parse_cosine_rec_hdr(phdr, line, err, err_info);
if (pkt_len == -1)
return FALSE;
/* Convert the ASCII hex dump to binary data */
return parse_cosine_hex_dump(wth->random_fh, phdr, pkt_len, buf, err,
err_info);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: wiretap/cosine.c in the CoSine file parser in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles sscanf unsigned-integer processing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Fix packet length handling.
Treat the packet length as unsigned - it shouldn't be negative in the
file. If it is, that'll probably cause the sscanf to fail, so we'll
report the file as bad.
Check it against WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE to make sure we don't try to
allocate a huge amount of memory, just as we do in other file readers.
Use the now-validated packet size as the length in
ws_buffer_assure_space(), so we are certain to have enough space, and
don't allocate too much space.
Merge the header and packet data parsing routines while we're at it.
Bug: 12395
Change-Id: Ia70f33b71ff28451190fcf144c333fd1362646b2
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15172
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
|
Medium
| 169,964
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn,
struct nlattr *rp)
{
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *up;
int ulen;
if (!replay_esn || !rp)
return 0;
up = nla_data(rp);
ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
return -EINVAL;
if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The xfrm_replay_verify_len function in net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c in the Linux kernel through 4.10.6 does not validate certain size data after an XFRM_MSG_NEWAE update, which allows local users to obtain root privileges or cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds access) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability, as demonstrated during a Pwn2Own competition at CanSecWest 2017 for the Ubuntu 16.10 linux-image-* package 4.8.0.41.52.
Commit Message: xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder
Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 168,292
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void locationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithPerWorldBindings());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the AttributeSetter function in bindings/templates/attributes.cpp in the bindings in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.152 on OS X and Linux and before 33.0.1750.154 on Windows, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving the document.location value.
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,689
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::setLocalDescription(const WebRTCVoidRequest& request, const WebRTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor& localDescription)
{
if (!localDescription.isNull() && localDescription.type() == "offer") {
m_localDescription = localDescription;
postTask(new RTCVoidRequestTask(this, request, true));
} else
postTask(new RTCVoidRequestTask(this, request, false));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,362
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EAS_BOOL WT_CheckSampleEnd (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame, EAS_BOOL update)
{
EAS_U32 endPhaseAccum;
EAS_U32 endPhaseFrac;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
EAS_BOOL done = EAS_FALSE;
/* check to see if we hit the end of the waveform this time */
/*lint -e{703} use shift for performance */
endPhaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac + (pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement << SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
endPhaseAccum = pWTVoice->phaseAccum + GET_PHASE_INT_PART(endPhaseFrac);
if (endPhaseAccum >= pWTVoice->loopEnd)
{
/* calculate how far current ptr is from end */
numSamples = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd - pWTVoice->phaseAccum);
/* now account for the fractional portion */
/*lint -e{703} use shift for performance */
numSamples = (EAS_I32) ((numSamples << NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS) - pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
if (pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement) {
pWTIntFrame->numSamples = 1 + (numSamples / pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement);
} else {
pWTIntFrame->numSamples = numSamples;
}
/* sound will be done this frame */
done = EAS_TRUE;
}
/* update data for off-chip synth */
if (update)
{
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = endPhaseFrac;
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = endPhaseAccum;
}
return done;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sonivox in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for a negative number of samples, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtengine.c and arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtsynth.c, aka internal bug 26366256.
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
|
Low
| 173,923
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void nfs4_open_release(void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *data = calldata;
struct nfs4_state *state = NULL;
/* If this request hasn't been cancelled, do nothing */
if (data->cancelled == 0)
goto out_free;
/* In case of error, no cleanup! */
if (data->rpc_status != 0 || !data->rpc_done)
goto out_free;
/* In case we need an open_confirm, no cleanup! */
if (data->o_res.rflags & NFS4_OPEN_RESULT_CONFIRM)
goto out_free;
state = nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(data);
if (!IS_ERR(state))
nfs4_close_state(&data->path, state, data->o_arg.open_flags);
out_free:
nfs4_opendata_put(data);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,698
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const EffectPaintPropertyNode* e0() {
return EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,822
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct arpt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
t = compat_arpt_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_ARP, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto out;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(NFPROTO_ARP, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto release_target;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
release_target:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt implementation in the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory by leveraging in-container root access to provide a crafted offset value that leads to crossing a ruleset blob boundary.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 167,209
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void * adminchild(struct clientparam* param) {
int i, res;
char * buf;
char username[256];
char *sb;
char *req = NULL;
struct printparam pp;
int contentlen = 0;
int isform = 0;
pp.inbuf = 0;
pp.cp = param;
buf = myalloc(LINESIZE);
if(!buf) {RETURN(555);}
i = sockgetlinebuf(param, CLIENT, (unsigned char *)buf, LINESIZE - 1, '\n', conf.timeouts[STRING_S]);
if(i<5 || ((buf[0]!='G' || buf[1]!='E' || buf[2]!='T' || buf[3]!=' ' || buf[4]!='/') &&
(buf[0]!='P' || buf[1]!='O' || buf[2]!='S' || buf[3]!='T' || buf[4]!=' ' || buf[5]!='/')))
{
RETURN(701);
}
buf[i] = 0;
sb = strchr(buf+5, ' ');
if(!sb){
RETURN(702);
}
*sb = 0;
req = mystrdup(buf + ((*buf == 'P')? 6 : 5));
while((i = sockgetlinebuf(param, CLIENT, (unsigned char *)buf, LINESIZE - 1, '\n', conf.timeouts[STRING_S])) > 2){
buf[i] = 0;
if(i > 19 && (!strncasecmp(buf, "authorization", 13))){
sb = strchr(buf, ':');
if(!sb)continue;
++sb;
while(isspace(*sb))sb++;
if(!*sb || strncasecmp(sb, "basic", 5)){
continue;
}
sb+=5;
while(isspace(*sb))sb++;
i = de64((unsigned char *)sb, (unsigned char *)username, 255);
if(i<=0)continue;
username[i] = 0;
sb = strchr((char *)username, ':');
if(sb){
*sb = 0;
if(param->password)myfree(param->password);
param->password = (unsigned char *)mystrdup(sb+1);
}
if(param->username) myfree(param->username);
param->username = (unsigned char *)mystrdup(username);
continue;
}
else if(i > 15 && (!strncasecmp(buf, "content-length:", 15))){
sb = buf + 15;
while(isspace(*sb))sb++;
contentlen = atoi(sb);
}
else if(i > 13 && (!strncasecmp(buf, "content-type:", 13))){
sb = buf + 13;
while(isspace(*sb))sb++;
if(!strncasecmp(sb, "x-www-form-urlencoded", 21)) isform = 1;
}
}
param->operation = ADMIN;
if(isform && contentlen) {
printstr(&pp, "HTTP/1.0 100 Continue\r\n\r\n");
stdpr(&pp, NULL, 0);
}
res = (*param->srv->authfunc)(param);
if(res && res != 10) {
printstr(&pp, authreq);
RETURN(res);
}
if(param->srv->singlepacket || param->redirected){
if(*req == 'C') req[1] = 0;
else *req = 0;
}
sprintf(buf, ok, conf.stringtable?(char *)conf.stringtable[2]:"3proxy", conf.stringtable?(char *)conf.stringtable[2]:"3[APA3A] tiny proxy", conf.stringtable?(char *)conf.stringtable[3]:"");
if(*req != 'S') printstr(&pp, buf);
switch(*req){
case 'C':
printstr(&pp, counters);
{
struct trafcount *cp;
int num = 0;
for(cp = conf.trafcounter; cp; cp = cp->next, num++){
int inbuf = 0;
if(cp->ace && (param->srv->singlepacket || param->redirected)){
if(!ACLmatches(cp->ace, param))continue;
}
if(req[1] == 'S' && atoi(req+2) == num) cp->disabled=0;
if(req[1] == 'D' && atoi(req+2) == num) cp->disabled=1;
inbuf += sprintf(buf, "<tr>"
"<td>%s</td><td><A HREF=\'/C%c%d\'>%s</A></td><td>",
(cp->comment)?cp->comment:" ",
(cp->disabled)?'S':'D',
num,
(cp->disabled)?"NO":"YES"
);
if(!cp->ace || !cp->ace->users){
inbuf += sprintf(buf+inbuf, "<center>ANY</center>");
}
else {
inbuf += printuserlist(buf+inbuf, LINESIZE-800, cp->ace->users, ",<br />\r\n");
}
inbuf += sprintf(buf+inbuf, "</td><td>");
if(!cp->ace || !cp->ace->src){
inbuf += sprintf(buf+inbuf, "<center>ANY</center>");
}
else {
inbuf += printiplist(buf+inbuf, LINESIZE-512, cp->ace->src, ",<br />\r\n");
}
inbuf += sprintf(buf+inbuf, "</td><td>");
if(!cp->ace || !cp->ace->dst){
inbuf += sprintf(buf+inbuf, "<center>ANY</center>");
}
else {
inbuf += printiplist(buf+inbuf, LINESIZE-512, cp->ace->dst, ",<br />\r\n");
}
inbuf += sprintf(buf+inbuf, "</td><td>");
if(!cp->ace || !cp->ace->ports){
inbuf += sprintf(buf+inbuf, "<center>ANY</center>");
}
else {
inbuf += printportlist(buf+inbuf, LINESIZE-128, cp->ace->ports, ",<br />\r\n");
}
if(cp->type == NONE) {
inbuf += sprintf(buf+inbuf,
"</td><td colspan=\'6\' align=\'center\'>exclude from limitation</td></tr>\r\n"
);
}
else {
inbuf += sprintf(buf+inbuf,
"</td><td>%"PRINTF_INT64_MODIFIER"u</td>"
"<td>MB%s</td>"
"<td>%"PRINTF_INT64_MODIFIER"u</td>"
"<td>%s</td>",
cp->traflim64 / (1024 * 1024),
rotations[cp->type],
cp->traf64,
cp->cleared?ctime(&cp->cleared):"never"
);
inbuf += sprintf(buf + inbuf,
"<td>%s</td>"
"<td>%i</td>"
"</tr>\r\n",
cp->updated?ctime(&cp->updated):"never",
cp->number
);
}
printstr(&pp, buf);
}
}
printstr(&pp, counterstail);
break;
case 'R':
conf.needreload = 1;
printstr(&pp, "<h3>Reload scheduled</h3>");
break;
case 'S':
{
if(req[1] == 'X'){
printstr(&pp, style);
break;
}
printstr(&pp, xml);
printval(conf.services, TYPE_SERVER, 0, &pp);
printstr(&pp, postxml);
}
break;
case 'F':
{
FILE *fp;
char buf[256];
fp = confopen();
if(!fp){
printstr(&pp, "<h3><font color=\"red\">Failed to open config file</font></h3>");
break;
}
printstr(&pp, "<h3>Please be careful editing config file remotely</h3>");
printstr(&pp, "<form method=\"POST\" action=\"/U\"><textarea cols=\"80\" rows=\"30\" name=\"conffile\">");
while(fgets(buf, 256, fp)){
printstr(&pp, buf);
}
if(!writable) fclose(fp);
printstr(&pp, "</textarea><br><input type=\"Submit\"></form>");
break;
}
case 'U':
{
int l=0;
int error = 0;
if(!writable || fseek(writable, 0, 0)){
error = 1;
}
while((i = sockgetlinebuf(param, CLIENT, (unsigned char *)buf, LINESIZE - 1, '+', conf.timeouts[STRING_S])) > 0){
if(i > (contentlen - l)) i = (contentlen - l);
buf[i] = 0;
if(!l){
if(strncasecmp(buf, "conffile=", 9)) error = 1;
}
if(!error){
decodeurl((unsigned char *)buf, 1);
fprintf(writable, "%s", l? buf : buf + 9);
}
l += i;
if(l >= contentlen) break;
}
if(writable && !error){
fflush(writable);
#ifndef _WINCE
ftruncate(fileno(writable), ftell(writable));
#endif
}
printstr(&pp, error? "<h3><font color=\"red\">Config file is not writable</font></h3>Make sure you have \"writable\" command in configuration file":
"<h3>Configuration updated</h3>");
}
break;
default:
printstr(&pp, (char *)conf.stringtable[WEBBANNERS]);
break;
}
if(*req != 'S') printstr(&pp, tail);
CLEANRET:
printstr(&pp, NULL);
if(buf) myfree(buf);
(*param->srv->logfunc)(param, (unsigned char *)req);
if(req)myfree(req);
freeparam(param);
return (NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: webadmin.c in 3proxy before 0.8.13 has an out-of-bounds write in the admin interface.
Commit Message: Fix: out-of-bounds write and few more bugs in 'admin' configuration upload
|
Low
| 169,580
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key,
const struct key_match_data *match_data)
{
const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
const char *description = match_data->raw_data;
const char *spec = description;
const char *id;
ptrdiff_t speclen;
if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
return 0;
/* See if the full key description matches as is */
if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0)
return 1;
/* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a
* specifier, a colon and then an identifier.
*/
id = strchr(spec, ':');
if (!id)
return 0;
speclen = id - spec;
id++;
if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.18 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via vectors involving a NULL value for a certain match field, related to the keyring_search_iterator function in keyring.c.
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 168,436
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int crypto_report_comp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_comp rcomp;
strlcpy(rcomp.type, "compression", sizeof(rcomp.type));
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_COMPRESS,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_comp), &rcomp))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.19.3. crypto_report_one() and related functions in crypto/crypto_user.c (the crypto user configuration API) do not fully initialize structures that are copied to userspace, potentially leaking sensitive memory to user programs. NOTE: this is a CVE-2013-2547 regression but with easier exploitability because the attacker does not need a capability (however, the system must have the CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER kconfig option).
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix leaking uninitialized memory to userspace
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace. The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this. As a minimal fix, change it back.
Fixes: 4473710df1f8 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
???
| 168,966
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int mount_autodev(const char *name, const struct lxc_rootfs *rootfs, const char *lxcpath)
{
int ret;
size_t clen;
char *path;
INFO("Mounting container /dev");
/* $(rootfs->mount) + "/dev/pts" + '\0' */
clen = (rootfs->path ? strlen(rootfs->mount) : 0) + 9;
path = alloca(clen);
ret = snprintf(path, clen, "%s/dev", rootfs->path ? rootfs->mount : "");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= clen)
return -1;
if (!dir_exists(path)) {
WARN("No /dev in container.");
WARN("Proceeding without autodev setup");
return 0;
}
if (mount("none", path, "tmpfs", 0, "size=100000,mode=755")) {
SYSERROR("Failed mounting tmpfs onto %s\n", path);
return false;
}
INFO("Mounted tmpfs onto %s", path);
ret = snprintf(path, clen, "%s/dev/pts", rootfs->path ? rootfs->mount : "");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= clen)
return -1;
/*
* If we are running on a devtmpfs mapping, dev/pts may already exist.
* If not, then create it and exit if that fails...
*/
if (!dir_exists(path)) {
ret = mkdir(path, S_IRWXU | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP | S_IROTH | S_IXOTH);
if (ret) {
SYSERROR("Failed to create /dev/pts in container");
return -1;
}
}
INFO("Mounted container /dev");
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxc-start in lxc before 1.0.8 and 1.1.x before 1.1.4 allows local container administrators to escape AppArmor confinement via a symlink attack on a (1) mount target or (2) bind mount source.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
|
Low
| 166,714
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int vol_prc_lib_release(effect_handle_t handle)
{
struct listnode *node, *temp_node_next;
vol_listener_context_t *context = NULL;
vol_listener_context_t *recv_contex = (vol_listener_context_t *)handle;
int status = -1;
bool recompute_flag = false;
int active_stream_count = 0;
ALOGV("%s context %p", __func__, handle);
pthread_mutex_lock(&vol_listner_init_lock);
list_for_each_safe(node, temp_node_next, &vol_effect_list) {
context = node_to_item(node, struct vol_listener_context_s, effect_list_node);
if ((memcmp(&(context->desc->uuid), &(recv_contex->desc->uuid), sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0)
&& (context->session_id == recv_contex->session_id)
&& (context->stream_type == recv_contex->stream_type)) {
ALOGV("--- Found something to remove ---");
list_remove(&context->effect_list_node);
PRINT_STREAM_TYPE(context->stream_type);
if (context->dev_id && AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_SPEAKER) {
recompute_flag = true;
}
free(context);
status = 0;
} else {
++active_stream_count;
}
}
if (status != 0) {
ALOGE("something wrong ... <<<--- Found NOTHING to remove ... ???? --->>>>>");
}
if (active_stream_count == 0) {
current_gain_dep_cal_level = -1;
current_vol = 0.0;
}
if (recompute_flag) {
check_and_set_gain_dep_cal();
}
if (dumping_enabled) {
dump_list_l();
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&vol_listner_init_lock);
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: post_proc/volume_listener.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 mishandles deleted effect context, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 25753245.
Commit Message: post proc : volume listener : fix effect release crash
Fix access to deleted effect context in vol_prc_lib_release()
Bug: 25753245.
Change-Id: I64ca99e4d5d09667be4c8c605f66700b9ae67949
(cherry picked from commit 93ab6fdda7b7557ccb34372670c30fa6178f8426)
|
Low
| 173,916
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void cstm(JF, js_Ast *stm)
{
js_Ast *target;
int loop, cont, then, end;
emitline(J, F, stm);
switch (stm->type) {
case AST_FUNDEC:
break;
case STM_BLOCK:
cstmlist(J, F, stm->a);
break;
case STM_EMPTY:
if (F->script) {
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
emit(J, F, OP_UNDEF);
}
break;
case STM_VAR:
cvarinit(J, F, stm->a);
break;
case STM_IF:
if (stm->c) {
cexp(J, F, stm->a);
then = emitjump(J, F, OP_JTRUE);
cstm(J, F, stm->c);
end = emitjump(J, F, OP_JUMP);
label(J, F, then);
cstm(J, F, stm->b);
label(J, F, end);
} else {
cexp(J, F, stm->a);
end = emitjump(J, F, OP_JFALSE);
cstm(J, F, stm->b);
label(J, F, end);
}
break;
case STM_DO:
loop = here(J, F);
cstm(J, F, stm->a);
cont = here(J, F);
cexp(J, F, stm->b);
emitjumpto(J, F, OP_JTRUE, loop);
labeljumps(J, F, stm->jumps, here(J,F), cont);
break;
case STM_WHILE:
loop = here(J, F);
cexp(J, F, stm->a);
end = emitjump(J, F, OP_JFALSE);
cstm(J, F, stm->b);
emitjumpto(J, F, OP_JUMP, loop);
label(J, F, end);
labeljumps(J, F, stm->jumps, here(J,F), loop);
break;
case STM_FOR:
case STM_FOR_VAR:
if (stm->type == STM_FOR_VAR) {
cvarinit(J, F, stm->a);
} else {
if (stm->a) {
cexp(J, F, stm->a);
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
}
}
loop = here(J, F);
if (stm->b) {
cexp(J, F, stm->b);
end = emitjump(J, F, OP_JFALSE);
} else {
end = 0;
}
cstm(J, F, stm->d);
cont = here(J, F);
if (stm->c) {
cexp(J, F, stm->c);
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
}
emitjumpto(J, F, OP_JUMP, loop);
if (end)
label(J, F, end);
labeljumps(J, F, stm->jumps, here(J,F), cont);
break;
case STM_FOR_IN:
case STM_FOR_IN_VAR:
cexp(J, F, stm->b);
emit(J, F, OP_ITERATOR);
loop = here(J, F);
{
emit(J, F, OP_NEXTITER);
end = emitjump(J, F, OP_JFALSE);
cassignforin(J, F, stm);
if (F->script) {
emit(J, F, OP_ROT2);
cstm(J, F, stm->c);
emit(J, F, OP_ROT2);
} else {
cstm(J, F, stm->c);
}
emitjumpto(J, F, OP_JUMP, loop);
}
label(J, F, end);
labeljumps(J, F, stm->jumps, here(J,F), loop);
break;
case STM_SWITCH:
cswitch(J, F, stm->a, stm->b);
labeljumps(J, F, stm->jumps, here(J,F), 0);
break;
case STM_LABEL:
cstm(J, F, stm->b);
/* skip consecutive labels */
while (stm->type == STM_LABEL)
stm = stm->b;
/* loops and switches have already been labelled */
if (!isloop(stm->type) && stm->type != STM_SWITCH)
labeljumps(J, F, stm->jumps, here(J,F), 0);
break;
case STM_BREAK:
if (stm->a) {
target = breaktarget(J, F, stm, stm->a->string);
if (!target)
jsC_error(J, stm, "break label '%s' not found", stm->a->string);
} else {
target = breaktarget(J, F, stm, NULL);
if (!target)
jsC_error(J, stm, "unlabelled break must be inside loop or switch");
}
cexit(J, F, STM_BREAK, stm, target);
addjump(J, F, STM_BREAK, target, emitjump(J, F, OP_JUMP));
break;
case STM_CONTINUE:
if (stm->a) {
target = continuetarget(J, F, stm, stm->a->string);
if (!target)
jsC_error(J, stm, "continue label '%s' not found", stm->a->string);
} else {
target = continuetarget(J, F, stm, NULL);
if (!target)
jsC_error(J, stm, "continue must be inside loop");
}
cexit(J, F, STM_CONTINUE, stm, target);
addjump(J, F, STM_CONTINUE, target, emitjump(J, F, OP_JUMP));
break;
case STM_RETURN:
if (stm->a)
cexp(J, F, stm->a);
else
emit(J, F, OP_UNDEF);
target = returntarget(J, F, stm);
if (!target)
jsC_error(J, stm, "return not in function");
cexit(J, F, STM_RETURN, stm, target);
emit(J, F, OP_RETURN);
break;
case STM_THROW:
cexp(J, F, stm->a);
emit(J, F, OP_THROW);
break;
case STM_WITH:
cexp(J, F, stm->a);
emit(J, F, OP_WITH);
cstm(J, F, stm->b);
emit(J, F, OP_ENDWITH);
break;
case STM_TRY:
if (stm->b && stm->c) {
if (stm->d)
ctrycatchfinally(J, F, stm->a, stm->b, stm->c, stm->d);
else
ctrycatch(J, F, stm->a, stm->b, stm->c);
} else {
ctryfinally(J, F, stm->a, stm->d);
}
break;
case STM_DEBUGGER:
emit(J, F, OP_DEBUGGER);
break;
default:
if (F->script) {
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
cexp(J, F, stm);
} else {
cexp(J, F, stm);
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
}
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: Artifex Software, Inc. MuJS before 5008105780c0b0182ea6eda83ad5598f225be3ee allows context-dependent attackers to conduct "denial of service (application crash)" attacks by using the "malformed labeled break/continue in JavaScript" approach, related to a "NULL pointer dereference" issue affecting the jscompile.c component.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,901
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: file_add_mapi_attrs (File* file, MAPI_Attr** attrs)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; attrs[i]; i++)
{
MAPI_Attr* a = attrs[i];
if (a->num_values)
{
switch (a->name)
{
case MAPI_ATTACH_LONG_FILENAME:
if (file->name) XFREE(file->name);
file->name = strdup( (char*)a->values[0].data.buf );
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_DATA_OBJ:
file->len = a->values[0].len;
if (file->data) XFREE (file->data);
file->data = CHECKED_XMALLOC (unsigned char, file->len);
memmove (file->data, a->values[0].data.buf, file->len);
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_MIME_TAG:
if (file->mime_type) XFREE (file->mime_type);
file->mime_type = CHECKED_XMALLOC (char, a->values[0].len);
memmove (file->mime_type, a->values[0].data.buf, a->values[0].len);
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_CONTENT_ID:
if (file->content_id) XFREE(file->content_id);
file->content_id = CHECKED_XMALLOC (char, a->values[0].len);
memmove (file->content_id, a->values[0].data.buf, a->values[0].len);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in tnef before 1.4.13. Four type confusions have been identified in the file_add_mapi_attrs() function. These might lead to invalid read and write operations, controlled by an attacker.
Commit Message: Check types to avoid invalid reads/writes.
|
Medium
| 168,351
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHPAPI php_stream *_php_stream_memory_create(int mode STREAMS_DC TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_memory_data *self;
php_stream *stream;
self = emalloc(sizeof(*self));
self->data = NULL;
self->fpos = 0;
self->fsize = 0;
self->smax = ~0u;
self->mode = mode;
stream = php_stream_alloc_rel(&php_stream_memory_ops, self, 0, mode & TEMP_STREAM_READONLY ? "rb" : "w+b");
stream->flags |= PHP_STREAM_FLAG_NO_BUFFER;
return stream;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In PHP before 5.5.32, 5.6.x before 5.6.18, and 7.x before 7.0.3, all of the return values of stream_get_meta_data can be controlled if the input can be controlled (e.g., during file uploads). For example, a "$uri = stream_get_meta_data(fopen($file, "r"))['uri']" call mishandles the case where $file is data:text/plain;uri=eviluri, -- in other words, metadata can be set by an attacker.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,474
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int multipath_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct multipath *m = (struct multipath *) ti->private;
struct block_device *bdev = NULL;
fmode_t mode = 0;
unsigned long flags;
int r = 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
if (!m->current_pgpath)
__choose_pgpath(m, 0);
if (m->current_pgpath) {
bdev = m->current_pgpath->path.dev->bdev;
mode = m->current_pgpath->path.dev->mode;
}
if (m->queue_io)
r = -EAGAIN;
else if (!bdev)
r = -EIO;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
return r ? : __blkdev_driver_ioctl(bdev, mode, cmd, arg);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.2.2 does not properly restrict SG_IO ioctl calls, which allows local users to bypass intended restrictions on disk read and write operations by sending a SCSI command to (1) a partition block device or (2) an LVM volume.
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,724
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: process_IDAT(struct file *file)
/* Process the IDAT stream, this is the more complex than the preceding
* cases because the compressed data is spread across multiple IDAT chunks
* (typically). Rechunking of the data is not handled here; all this
* function does is establish whether the zlib header needs to be modified.
*
* Initially the function returns false, indicating that the chunk should not
* be written. It does this until the last IDAT chunk is passed in, then it
* checks the zlib data and returns true.
*
* It does not return false on a fatal error; it calls stop instead.
*
* The caller must have an instantiated (IDAT) control structure and it must
* have extent over the whole read of the IDAT stream. For a PNG this means
* the whole PNG read, for MNG it could have lesser extent.
*/
{
struct IDAT_list *list;
assert(file->idat != NULL && file->chunk != NULL);
/* We need to first check the entire sequence of IDAT chunks to ensure the
* stream is in sync. Do this by building a list of all the chunks and
* recording the length of each because the length may have been fixed up by
* sync_stream below.
*
* At the end of the list of chunks, where the type of the next chunk is not
* png_IDAT, process the whole stream using the list data to check validity
* then return control to the start and rewrite everything.
*/
list = file->idat->idat_list_tail;
if (list->count == list->length)
{
list = IDAT_list_extend(list);
if (list == NULL)
stop(file, READ_ERROR_CODE, "out of memory");
/* Move to the next block */
list->count = 0;
file->idat->idat_list_tail = list;
}
/* And fill in the next IDAT information buffer. */
list->lengths[(list->count)++] = file->chunk->chunk_length;
/* The type of the next chunk was recorded in the file control structure by
* the caller, if this is png_IDAT return 'skip' to the caller.
*/
if (file->type == png_IDAT)
return 0; /* skip this for the moment */
/* This is the final IDAT chunk, so run the tests to check for the too far
* back error and possibly optimize the window bits. This means going back
* to the start of the first chunk data, which is stored in the original
* chunk allocation.
*/
setpos(file->chunk);
if (zlib_check(file, 0))
{
struct IDAT *idat;
int cmp;
/* The IDAT stream was successfully uncompressed; see whether it
* contained the correct number of bytes of image data.
*/
cmp = uarb_cmp(file->image_bytes, file->image_digits,
file->chunk->uncompressed_bytes, file->chunk->uncompressed_digits);
if (cmp < 0)
type_message(file, png_IDAT, "extra uncompressed data");
else if (cmp > 0)
stop(file, LIBPNG_ERROR_CODE, "IDAT: uncompressed data too small");
/* Return the stream to the start of the first IDAT chunk; the length
* is set in the write case below but the input chunk variables must be
* set (once) here:
*/
setpos(file->chunk);
idat = file->idat;
idat->idat_cur = idat->idat_list_head;
idat->idat_length = idat->idat_cur->lengths[0];
idat->idat_count = 0; /* Count of chunks read in current list */
idat->idat_index = 0; /* Index into chunk data */
/* Update the chunk length to the correct value for the IDAT chunk: */
file->chunk->chunk_length = rechunk_length(idat);
/* Change the state to writing IDAT chunks */
file->state = STATE_IDAT;
return 1;
}
else /* Failure to decompress the IDAT stream; give up. */
stop(file, ZLIB_ERROR_CODE, "could not uncompress IDAT");
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,737
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: my_object_objpath (MyObject *obj, const char *incoming, const char **outgoing, GError **error)
{
if (strcmp (incoming, "/org/freedesktop/DBus/GLib/Tests/MyTestObject"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid incoming object");
return FALSE;
}
*outgoing = "/org/freedesktop/DBus/GLib/Tests/MyTestObject2";
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,114
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const char* Chapters::Display::GetCountry() const
{
return m_country;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,300
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jp2_box_t *jp2_box_create(int type)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
return 0;
}
memset(box, 0, sizeof(jp2_box_t));
box->type = type;
box->len = 0;
if (!(boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(type))) {
return 0;
}
box->info = boxinfo;
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
return box;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jp2_cdef_destroy function in jp2_cod.c in JasPer before 2.0.13 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted image.
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
|
Medium
| 168,317
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_args *args)
{
struct rds_iovec vec;
struct rds_iovec __user *local_vec;
int tot_pages = 0;
unsigned int nr_pages;
unsigned int i;
local_vec = (struct rds_iovec __user *)(unsigned long) args->local_vec_addr;
/* figure out the number of pages in the vector */
for (i = 0; i < args->nr_local; i++) {
if (copy_from_user(&vec, &local_vec[i],
sizeof(struct rds_iovec)))
return -EFAULT;
nr_pages = rds_pages_in_vec(&vec);
if (nr_pages == 0)
return -EINVAL;
tot_pages += nr_pages;
/*
* nr_pages for one entry is limited to (UINT_MAX>>PAGE_SHIFT)+1,
* so tot_pages cannot overflow without first going negative.
*/
if (tot_pages < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
return tot_pages * sizeof(struct scatterlist);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: In the Linux kernel through 4.14.13, the rds_message_alloc_sgs() function does not validate a value that is used during DMA page allocation, leading to a heap-based out-of-bounds write (related to the rds_rdma_extra_size function in net/rds/rdma.c).
Commit Message: RDS: Heap OOB write in rds_message_alloc_sgs()
When args->nr_local is 0, nr_pages gets also 0 due some size
calculation via rds_rm_size(), which is later used to allocate
pages for DMA, this bug produces a heap Out-Of-Bound write access
to a specific memory region.
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 169,354
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::OnCurrentSrcChanged(
const KURL& current_src) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
Locker<MediaElementAudioSourceHandler> locker(*this);
passes_current_src_cors_access_check_ =
PassesCurrentSrcCORSAccessCheck(current_src);
maybe_print_cors_message_ = !passes_current_src_cors_access_check_;
current_src_string_ = current_src.GetString();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
|
Medium
| 173,145
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_generic)
{
zval *mcryptind;
char *data;
int data_len;
php_mcrypt *pm;
unsigned char* data_s;
int block_size, data_size;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs", &mcryptind, &data, &data_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pm, php_mcrypt *, &mcryptind, -1, "MCrypt", le_mcrypt);
PHP_MCRYPT_INIT_CHECK
if (data_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "An empty string was passed");
RETURN_FALSE
}
/* Check blocksize */
if (mcrypt_enc_is_block_mode(pm->td) == 1) { /* It's a block algorithm */
block_size = mcrypt_enc_get_block_size(pm->td);
data_size = (((data_len - 1) / block_size) + 1) * block_size;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
} else { /* It's not a block algorithm */
data_size = data_len;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
}
mcrypt_generic(pm->td, data_s, data_size);
data_s[data_size] = '\0';
RETVAL_STRINGL(data_s, data_size, 1);
efree(data_s);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
|
Low
| 167,091
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadSCRImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char zxscr[6144];
char zxattr[768];
int octetnr;
int octetline;
int zoneline;
int zonenr;
int octet_val;
int attr_nr;
int pix;
int piy;
int binar[8];
int attrbin[8];
int *pbin;
int *abin;
int z;
int one_nr;
int ink;
int paper;
int bright;
unsigned char colour_palette[] = {
0, 0, 0,
0, 0,192,
192, 0, 0,
192, 0,192,
0,192, 0,
0,192,192,
192,192, 0,
192,192,192,
0, 0, 0,
0, 0,255,
255, 0, 0,
255, 0,255,
0,255, 0,
0,255,255,
255,255, 0,
255,255,255
};
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
count;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image->columns = 256;
image->rows = 192;
count=ReadBlob(image,6144,(unsigned char *) zxscr);
(void) count;
count=ReadBlob(image,768,(unsigned char *) zxattr);
for(zonenr=0;zonenr<3;zonenr++)
{
for(zoneline=0;zoneline<8;zoneline++)
{
for(octetline=0;octetline<8;octetline++)
{
for(octetnr=(zoneline*32);octetnr<((zoneline*32)+32);octetnr++)
{
octet_val = zxscr[octetnr+(256*octetline)+(zonenr*2048)];
attr_nr = zxattr[octetnr+(256*zonenr)];
pix = (((8*octetnr)-(256*zoneline)));
piy = ((octetline+(8*zoneline)+(zonenr*64)));
pbin = binar;
abin = attrbin;
one_nr=1;
for(z=0;z<8;z++)
{
if(octet_val&one_nr)
{
*pbin = 1;
} else {
*pbin = 0;
}
one_nr=one_nr*2;
pbin++;
}
one_nr = 1;
for(z=0;z<8;z++)
{
if(attr_nr&one_nr)
{
*abin = 1;
} else {
*abin = 0;
}
one_nr=one_nr*2;
abin++;
}
ink = (attrbin[0]+(2*attrbin[1])+(4*attrbin[2]));
paper = (attrbin[3]+(2*attrbin[4])+(4*attrbin[5]));
bright = attrbin[6];
if(bright) { ink=ink+8; paper=paper+8; }
for(z=7;z>-1;z--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,pix,piy,1,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
if(binar[z])
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(
colour_palette[3*ink]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(
colour_palette[1+(3*ink)]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(
colour_palette[2+(3*ink)]));
} else {
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(
colour_palette[3*paper]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(
colour_palette[1+(3*paper)]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(
colour_palette[2+(3*paper)]));
}
pix++;
}
}
}
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,601
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void sendTouchEvent(BlackBerry::Platform::TouchEvent::Type type)
{
BlackBerry::Platform::TouchEvent event;
event.m_type = type;
event.m_points.assign(touches.begin(), touches.end());
BlackBerry::WebKit::DumpRenderTree::currentInstance()->page()->touchEvent(event);
Vector<BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint> t;
for (Vector<BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint>::iterator it = touches.begin(); it != touches.end(); ++it) {
if (it->m_state != BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchReleased) {
it->m_state = BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchStationary;
t.append(*it);
}
}
touches = t;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,773
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
{
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(&s->rlayer);
{
pqueue *buffered_messages;
pqueue *sent_messages;
unsigned int mtu;
unsigned int link_mtu;
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer);
if (s->d1) {
buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages;
sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
mtu = s->d1->mtu;
link_mtu = s->d1->link_mtu;
dtls1_clear_queues(s);
memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*s->d1));
if (s->server) {
s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
}
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU) {
s->d1->mtu = mtu;
s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu;
}
s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages;
s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages;
}
ssl3_clear(s);
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
s->version = DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
else if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
s->client_version = s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
#endif
else
s->version = s->method->version;
}
long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
int ret = 0;
switch (cmd) {
case DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT:
if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, (struct timeval *)parg) != NULL) {
ret = 1;
}
break;
case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT:
ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
break;
case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU:
if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu())
return 0;
s->d1->link_mtu = larg;
return 1;
case DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU:
return (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu();
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
/*
* We may not have a BIO set yet so can't call dtls1_min_mtu()
* We'll have to make do with dtls1_link_min_mtu() and max overhead
*/
if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu() - DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD)
return 0;
s->d1->mtu = larg;
return larg;
default:
ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
break;
}
return (ret);
}
void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Disable timer for SCTP */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
return;
}
#endif
/* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second */
if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
}
/* Set timeout to current time */
get_current_time(&(s->d1->next_timeout));
/* Add duration to current time */
s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += s->d1->timeout_duration;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
&(s->d1->next_timeout));
}
struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft)
{
struct timeval timenow;
/* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */
if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
return NULL;
}
/* Get current time */
get_current_time(&timenow);
/* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */
if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
(s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) {
memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
return timeleft;
}
/* Calculate time left until timer expires */
memcpy(timeleft, &(s->d1->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
timeleft->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
timeleft->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
if (timeleft->tv_usec < 0) {
timeleft->tv_sec--;
timeleft->tv_usec += 1000000;
}
/*
* If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0 to prevent issues
* because of small divergences with socket timeouts.
*/
if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000) {
memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
}
return timeleft;
}
int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s)
{
struct timeval timeleft;
/* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
/* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0) {
return 0;
}
/* Timer expired, so return true */
return 1;
}
void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
{
s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2;
if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60)
s->d1->timeout_duration = 60;
dtls1_start_timer(s);
}
void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
{
/* Reset everything */
memset(&s->d1->timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->timeout));
memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
&(s->d1->next_timeout));
/* Clear retransmission buffer */
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
}
int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int mtu;
s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
&(s->d1->next_timeout));
/* Clear retransmission buffer */
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
}
int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) {
/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The DTLS implementation in OpenSSL before 1.1.0 does not properly restrict the lifetime of queue entries associated with unused out-of-order messages, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by maintaining many crafted DTLS sessions simultaneously, related to d1_lib.c, statem_dtls.c, statem_lib.c, and statem_srvr.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,196
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: check_acl(pam_handle_t *pamh,
const char *sense, const char *this_user, const char *other_user,
int noent_code, int debug)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
FILE *fp;
int i, save_errno;
uid_t fsuid;
/* Check this user's <sense> file. */
pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, this_user);
if (pwd == NULL) {
}
/* Figure out what that file is really named. */
i = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/.xauth/%s", pwd->pw_dir, sense);
if ((i >= (int)sizeof(path)) || (i < 0)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"name of user's home directory is too long");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
save_errno = errno;
setfsuid(fsuid);
if (fp != NULL) {
char buf[LINE_MAX], *tmp;
/* Scan the file for a list of specs of users to "trust". */
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) != NULL) {
other_user, path);
}
fclose(fp);
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
} else {
/* Default to okay if the file doesn't exist. */
errno = save_errno;
switch (errno) {
case ENOENT:
if (noent_code == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, ignoring",
path);
}
} else {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, failing",
path);
}
}
return noent_code;
default:
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"error opening %s: %m", path);
}
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The check_acl function in pam_xauth.c in the pam_xauth module in Linux-PAM (aka pam) 1.1.2 and earlier does not verify that a certain ACL file is a regular file, which might allow local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) via a special file.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,788
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jas_matrix_t *jas_matrix_create(int numrows, int numcols)
{
jas_matrix_t *matrix;
int i;
if (numrows < 0 || numcols < 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!(matrix = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_matrix_t)))) {
return 0;
}
matrix->flags_ = 0;
matrix->numrows_ = numrows;
matrix->numcols_ = numcols;
matrix->rows_ = 0;
matrix->maxrows_ = numrows;
matrix->data_ = 0;
matrix->datasize_ = numrows * numcols;
if (matrix->maxrows_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->rows_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->maxrows_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t *)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
if (matrix->datasize_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->data_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->datasize_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
matrix->rows_[i] = &matrix->data_[i * matrix->numcols_];
}
for (i = 0; i < matrix->datasize_; ++i) {
matrix->data_[i] = 0;
}
matrix->xstart_ = 0;
matrix->ystart_ = 0;
matrix->xend_ = matrix->numcols_;
matrix->yend_ = matrix->numrows_;
return matrix;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the jpc_dec_tiledecode function in jpc_dec.c in JasPer before 1.900.12 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted image file, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem.
|
Medium
| 168,476
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuFeatureFlags() {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(this, &GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuFeatureFlags));
return;
}
GpuBlacklist* gpu_blacklist = GetGpuBlacklist();
if (gpu_blacklist == NULL)
return;
if (!gpu_blacklist) {
gpu_feature_flags_.set_flags(0);
return;
}
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(gpu_info_lock_);
gpu_feature_flags_ = gpu_blacklist->DetermineGpuFeatureFlags(
GpuBlacklist::kOsAny, NULL, gpu_info_);
}
uint32 max_entry_id = gpu_blacklist->max_entry_id();
if (!gpu_feature_flags_.flags()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.BlacklistTestResultsPerEntry",
0, max_entry_id + 1);
return;
}
RunGpuInfoUpdateCallbacks();
std::vector<uint32> flag_entries;
gpu_blacklist->GetGpuFeatureFlagEntries(
GpuFeatureFlags::kGpuFeatureAll, flag_entries);
DCHECK_GT(flag_entries.size(), 0u);
for (size_t i = 0; i < flag_entries.size(); ++i) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.BlacklistTestResultsPerEntry",
flag_entries[i], max_entry_id + 1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle Khmer characters, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,310
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void locationAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->location());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the AttributeSetter function in bindings/templates/attributes.cpp in the bindings in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.152 on OS X and Linux and before 33.0.1750.154 on Windows, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving the document.location value.
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,685
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int crypto_pcomp_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_comp rpcomp;
snprintf(rpcomp.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "pcomp");
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_COMPRESS,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_comp), &rpcomp))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The crypto_report_one function in crypto/crypto_user.c in the report API in the crypto user configuration API in the Linux kernel through 3.8.2 uses an incorrect length value during a copy operation, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 166,070
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void* ipc_rcu_alloc(int size)
{
void* out;
/*
* We prepend the allocation with the rcu struct, and
* workqueue if necessary (for vmalloc).
*/
if (rcu_use_vmalloc(size)) {
out = vmalloc(HDRLEN_VMALLOC + size);
if (out) {
out += HDRLEN_VMALLOC;
container_of(out, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->is_vmalloc = 1;
container_of(out, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->refcount = 1;
}
} else {
out = kmalloc(HDRLEN_KMALLOC + size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (out) {
out += HDRLEN_KMALLOC;
container_of(out, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->is_vmalloc = 0;
container_of(out, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->refcount = 1;
}
}
return out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,983
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bittok2str_internal(register const struct tok *lp, register const char *fmt,
register u_int v, const char *sep)
{
static char buf[256]; /* our stringbuffer */
int buflen=0;
register u_int rotbit; /* this is the bit we rotate through all bitpositions */
register u_int tokval;
const char * sepstr = "";
while (lp != NULL && lp->s != NULL) {
tokval=lp->v; /* load our first value */
rotbit=1;
while (rotbit != 0) {
/*
* lets AND the rotating bit with our token value
* and see if we have got a match
*/
if (tokval == (v&rotbit)) {
/* ok we have found something */
buflen+=snprintf(buf+buflen, sizeof(buf)-buflen, "%s%s",
sepstr, lp->s);
sepstr = sep;
break;
}
rotbit=rotbit<<1; /* no match - lets shift and try again */
}
lp++;
}
if (buflen == 0)
/* bummer - lets print the "unknown" message as advised in the fmt string if we got one */
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt == NULL ? "#%08x" : fmt, v);
return (buf);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Several protocol parsers in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could cause a buffer overflow in util-print.c:bittok2str_internal().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13011/Properly check for buffer overflow in bittok2str_internal().
Also, make the buffer bigger.
This fixes a buffer overflow discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
Low
| 167,883
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PredictorEncodeTile(TIFF* tif, uint8* bp0, tmsize_t cc0, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "PredictorEncodeTile";
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
uint8 *working_copy;
tmsize_t cc = cc0, rowsize;
unsigned char* bp;
int result_code;
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->encodepfunc != NULL);
assert(sp->encodetile != NULL);
/*
* Do predictor manipulation in a working buffer to avoid altering
* the callers buffer. http://trac.osgeo.org/gdal/ticket/1965
*/
working_copy = (uint8*) _TIFFmalloc(cc0);
if( working_copy == NULL )
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Out of memory allocating " TIFF_SSIZE_FORMAT " byte temp buffer.",
cc0 );
return 0;
}
memcpy( working_copy, bp0, cc0 );
bp = working_copy;
rowsize = sp->rowsize;
assert(rowsize > 0);
if((cc0%rowsize)!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "PredictorEncodeTile",
"%s", "(cc0%rowsize)!=0");
return 0;
}
while (cc > 0) {
(*sp->encodepfunc)(tif, bp, rowsize);
cc -= rowsize;
bp += rowsize;
}
result_code = (*sp->encodetile)(tif, working_copy, cc0, s);
_TIFFfree( working_copy );
return result_code;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predic.c: fix memory leaks in error code paths added in
previous commit (fix for MSVR 35105)
|
Low
| 169,937
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport void *AcquireQuantumMemory(const size_t count,const size_t quantum)
{
size_t
extent;
if (CheckMemoryOverflow(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
return((void *) NULL);
extent=count*quantum;
return(AcquireMagickMemory(extent));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: magick/memory.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via vectors involving *too many exceptions,* which trigger a buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
|
Low
| 168,543
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SoftG711::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > kMaxNumSamplesPerFrame) {
ALOGE("input buffer too large (%d).", inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
const uint8_t *inputptr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
if (mIsMLaw) {
DecodeMLaw(
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
} else {
DecodeALaw(
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = inHeader->nFilledLen * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes for the GSM and G711 codecs, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27793367.
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (gsm|g711)dec
Bug: 27793163
Bug: 27793367
Change-Id: Iec3de8a237ee2379d87a8371c13e543878c6652c
|
Medium
| 173,778
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gfx::SwapResult GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::CommitOverlayPlanes(
PresentationCallback callback) {
NOTREACHED();
return gfx::SwapResult::SWAP_FAILED;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 52.0.2743.82 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
|
Medium
| 172,106
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: FromMojom(media::mojom::VideoCaptureError input,
media::VideoCaptureError* output) {
switch (input) {
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kNone:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kNone;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureControllerInvalidOrUnsupportedVideoCaptureParametersRequested:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureControllerInvalidOrUnsupportedVideoCaptureParametersRequested;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureControllerIsAlreadyInErrorState:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureControllerIsAlreadyInErrorState;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureManagerDeviceConnectionLost:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kVideoCaptureManagerDeviceConnectionLost;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kFrameSinkVideoCaptureDeviceAleradyEndedOnFatalError:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kFrameSinkVideoCaptureDeviceAleradyEndedOnFatalError;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kFrameSinkVideoCaptureDeviceEncounteredFatalError:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kFrameSinkVideoCaptureDeviceEncounteredFatalError;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToOpenV4L2DeviceDriverFile:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToOpenV4L2DeviceDriverFile;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2ThisIsNotAV4L2VideoCaptureDevice:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2ThisIsNotAV4L2VideoCaptureDevice;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kV4L2FailedToFindASupportedCameraFormat:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToFindASupportedCameraFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToSetVideoCaptureFormat:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToSetVideoCaptureFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2UnsupportedPixelFormat:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2UnsupportedPixelFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToSetCameraFramerate:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToSetCameraFramerate;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2ErrorRequestingMmapBuffers:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2ErrorRequestingMmapBuffers;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2AllocateBufferFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2AllocateBufferFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2VidiocStreamonFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2VidiocStreamonFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2VidiocStreamoffFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2VidiocStreamoffFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToVidiocReqbufsWithCount0:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToVidiocReqbufsWithCount0;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2PollFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2PollFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kV4L2MultipleContinuousTimeoutsWhileReadPolling:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kV4L2MultipleContinuousTimeoutsWhileReadPolling;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToDequeueCaptureBuffer:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToDequeueCaptureBuffer;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToEnqueueCaptureBuffer:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToEnqueueCaptureBuffer;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kSingleClientVideoCaptureHostLostConnectionToDevice:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kSingleClientVideoCaptureHostLostConnectionToDevice;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kSingleClientVideoCaptureDeviceLaunchAborted:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kSingleClientVideoCaptureDeviceLaunchAborted;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kDesktopCaptureDeviceWebrtcDesktopCapturerHasFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kDesktopCaptureDeviceWebrtcDesktopCapturerHasFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kFileVideoCaptureDeviceCouldNotOpenVideoFile:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kFileVideoCaptureDeviceCouldNotOpenVideoFile;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kDeviceCaptureLinuxFailedToCreateVideoCaptureDelegate:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kDeviceCaptureLinuxFailedToCreateVideoCaptureDelegate;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kErrorFakeDeviceIntentionallyEmittingErrorEvent:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kErrorFakeDeviceIntentionallyEmittingErrorEvent;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kDeviceClientTooManyFramesDroppedY16:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kDeviceClientTooManyFramesDroppedY16;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kDeviceMediaToMojoAdapterEncounteredUnsupportedBufferType:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kDeviceMediaToMojoAdapterEncounteredUnsupportedBufferType;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureManagerProcessDeviceStartQueueDeviceInfoNotFound:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureManagerProcessDeviceStartQueueDeviceInfoNotFound;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kInProcessDeviceLauncherFailedToCreateDeviceInstance:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kInProcessDeviceLauncherFailedToCreateDeviceInstance;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherLostConnectionToDeviceFactoryDuringDeviceStart:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherLostConnectionToDeviceFactoryDuringDeviceStart;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherServiceRespondedWithDeviceNotFound:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherServiceRespondedWithDeviceNotFound;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherConnectionLostWhileWaitingForCallback:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherConnectionLostWhileWaitingForCallback;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kIntentionalErrorRaisedByUnitTest:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kIntentionalErrorRaisedByUnitTest;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3FailedToStartDeviceThread:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3FailedToStartDeviceThread;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateMojoConnectionError:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateMojoConnectionError;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToGetCameraInfo:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToGetCameraInfo;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateMissingSensorOrientationInfo:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateMissingSensorOrientationInfo;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToOpenCameraDevice:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToOpenCameraDevice;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToInitializeCameraDevice:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToInitializeCameraDevice;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToConfigureStreams:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToConfigureStreams;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateWrongNumberOfStreamsConfigured:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateWrongNumberOfStreamsConfigured;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToGetDefaultRequestSettings:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToGetDefaultRequestSettings;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerHalRequestedTooManyBuffers:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerHalRequestedTooManyBuffers;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToCreateGpuMemoryBuffer:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToCreateGpuMemoryBuffer;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToMapGpuMemoryBuffer:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToMapGpuMemoryBuffer;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerUnsupportedVideoPixelFormat:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerUnsupportedVideoPixelFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToDupFd:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToDupFd;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToWrapGpuMemoryHandle:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToWrapGpuMemoryHandle;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToRegisterBuffer:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToRegisterBuffer;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerProcessCaptureRequestFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerProcessCaptureRequestFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidPendingResultId:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidPendingResultId;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedDuplicatedPartialMetadata:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedDuplicatedPartialMetadata;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerIncorrectNumberOfOutputBuffersReceived:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerIncorrectNumberOfOutputBuffersReceived;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidTypeOfOutputBuffersReceived:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidTypeOfOutputBuffersReceived;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedMultipleResultBuffersForFrame:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedMultipleResultBuffersForFrame;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerUnknownStreamInCamera3NotifyMsg:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerUnknownStreamInCamera3NotifyMsg;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedInvalidShutterTime:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedInvalidShutterTime;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFatalDeviceError:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFatalDeviceError;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedFrameIsOutOfOrder:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedFrameIsOutOfOrder;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToUnwrapReleaseFenceFd:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToUnwrapReleaseFenceFd;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerSyncWaitOnReleaseFenceTimedOut:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerSyncWaitOnReleaseFenceTimedOut;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidJpegBlob:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidJpegBlob;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToAllocate:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToAllocate;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToStartCapture:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToStartCapture;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToStopCapture:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToStopCapture;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi1CameraErrorCallbackReceived:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi1CameraErrorCallbackReceived;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2CameraDeviceErrorReceived:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2CameraDeviceErrorReceived;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2CaptureSessionConfigureFailed:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2CaptureSessionConfigureFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2ImageReaderUnexpectedImageFormat:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2ImageReaderUnexpectedImageFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2ImageReaderSizeDidNotMatchImageSize:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2ImageReaderSizeDidNotMatchImageSize;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2ErrorRestartingPreview:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2ErrorRestartingPreview;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureUnsupportedFormat:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidScreenCaptureUnsupportedFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureFailedToStartCaptureMachine:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureFailedToStartCaptureMachine;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureTheUserDeniedScreenCapture:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureTheUserDeniedScreenCapture;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureFailedToStartScreenCapture:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureFailedToStartScreenCapture;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowCantGetCaptureFormatSettings:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinDirectShowCantGetCaptureFormatSettings;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToGetNumberOfCapabilities:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToGetNumberOfCapabilities;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToGetCaptureDeviceCapabilities:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToGetCaptureDeviceCapabilities;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToSetCaptureDeviceOutputFormat:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToSetCaptureDeviceOutputFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToConnectTheCaptureGraph:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToConnectTheCaptureGraph;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToPauseTheCaptureDevice:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinDirectShowFailedToPauseTheCaptureDevice;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToStartTheCaptureDevice:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinDirectShowFailedToStartTheCaptureDevice;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToStopTheCaptureGraph:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinDirectShowFailedToStopTheCaptureGraph;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineIsNull:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineIsNull;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationEngineGetSourceFailed:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineGetSourceFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationFillPhotoCapabilitiesFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationFillPhotoCapabilitiesFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationFillVideoCapabilitiesFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationFillVideoCapabilitiesFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationNoVideoCapabilityFound:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationNoVideoCapabilityFound;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationGetAvailableDeviceMediaTypeFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationGetAvailableDeviceMediaTypeFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSetCurrentDeviceMediaTypeFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSetCurrentDeviceMediaTypeFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationEngineGetSinkFailed:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineGetSinkFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkQueryCapturePreviewInterfaceFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkQueryCapturePreviewInterfaceFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkRemoveAllStreamsFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkRemoveAllStreamsFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationCreateSinkVideoMediaTypeFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationCreateSinkVideoMediaTypeFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationConvertToVideoSinkMediaTypeFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationConvertToVideoSinkMediaTypeFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkAddStreamFailed:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationSinkAddStreamFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkSetSampleCallbackFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkSetSampleCallbackFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationEngineStartPreviewFailed:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineStartPreviewFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationGetMediaEventStatusFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationGetMediaEventStatusFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacSetCaptureDeviceFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kMacSetCaptureDeviceFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacCouldNotStartCaptureDevice:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kMacCouldNotStartCaptureDevice;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacReceivedFrameWithUnexpectedResolution:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kMacReceivedFrameWithUnexpectedResolution;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacUpdateCaptureResolutionFailed:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kMacUpdateCaptureResolutionFailed;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkDeviceIdNotFoundInTheSystem:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkDeviceIdNotFoundInTheSystem;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkErrorQueryingInputInterface:
*output =
media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkErrorQueryingInputInterface;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkErrorCreatingDisplayModeIterator:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkErrorCreatingDisplayModeIterator;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkCouldNotFindADisplayMode:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkCouldNotFindADisplayMode;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkCouldNotSelectTheVideoFormatWeLike:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkCouldNotSelectTheVideoFormatWeLike;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkCouldNotStartCapturing:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkCouldNotStartCapturing;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkUnsupportedPixelFormat:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkUnsupportedPixelFormat;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacAvFoundationReceivedAVCaptureSessionRuntimeErrorNotification:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::
kMacAvFoundationReceivedAVCaptureSessionRuntimeErrorNotification;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2ErrorConfiguringCamera:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2ErrorConfiguringCamera;
return true;
case media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToFlush:
*output = media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToFlush;
return true;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Windows mishandled downloaded files, which allowed a remote attacker to prevent the downloaded file from receiving the Mark of the Web via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Revert "Enable camera blob stream when needed"
This reverts commit 10f4b93635e12f9fa0cba1641a10938ca38ed448.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 601492 as the
culprit for failures in the build cycles as shown on:
https://findit-for-me.appspot.com/waterfall/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyRAsSDVdmU3VzcGVjdGVkQ0wiMWNocm9taXVtLzEwZjRiOTM2MzVlMTJmOWZhMGNiYTE2NDFhMTA5MzhjYTM4ZWQ0NDgM
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.memory/Linux%20ChromiumOS%20MSan%20Tests/9190
Sample Failed Step: capture_unittests
Original change's description:
> Enable camera blob stream when needed
>
> Since blob stream needs higher resolution, it causes higher cpu loading
> to require higher resolution and resize to smaller resolution.
> In hangout app, we don't need blob stream. Enabling blob stream when
> needed can save a lot of cpu usage.
>
> BUG=b:114676133
> TEST=manually test in apprtc and CCA. make sure picture taking still
> works in CCA.
>
> Change-Id: I9144461bc76627903d0b3b359ce9cf962ff3628c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1261242
> Commit-Queue: Heng-ruey Hsu <henryhsu@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601492}
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
BUG=b:114676133
Change-Id: If173ffe9259f7eca849b184806bd56e2a9fbaac4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1292256
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601538}
|
Medium
| 172,512
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool parse_reconnect(struct pool *pool, json_t *val)
{
char *sockaddr_url, *stratum_port, *tmp;
char *url, *port, address[256];
memset(address, 0, 255);
url = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 0));
if (!url)
url = pool->sockaddr_url;
else {
char *dot_pool, *dot_reconnect;
dot_pool = strchr(pool->sockaddr_url, '.');
if (!dot_pool) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Denied stratum reconnect request for pool without domain '%s'",
pool->sockaddr_url);
return false;
}
dot_reconnect = strchr(url, '.');
if (!dot_reconnect) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Denied stratum reconnect request to url without domain '%s'",
url);
return false;
}
if (strcmp(dot_pool, dot_reconnect)) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "Denied stratum reconnect request to non-matching domain url '%s'",
pool->sockaddr_url);
return false;
}
}
port = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 1));
if (!port)
port = pool->stratum_port;
sprintf(address, "%s:%s", url, port);
if (!extract_sockaddr(address, &sockaddr_url, &stratum_port))
return false;
applog(LOG_WARNING, "Stratum reconnect requested from pool %d to %s", pool->pool_no, address);
clear_pool_work(pool);
mutex_lock(&pool->stratum_lock);
__suspend_stratum(pool);
tmp = pool->sockaddr_url;
pool->sockaddr_url = sockaddr_url;
pool->stratum_url = pool->sockaddr_url;
free(tmp);
tmp = pool->stratum_port;
pool->stratum_port = stratum_port;
free(tmp);
mutex_unlock(&pool->stratum_lock);
if (!restart_stratum(pool)) {
pool_failed(pool);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the parse_notify function in sgminer before 4.2.2, cgminer before 4.3.5, and BFGMiner before 4.1.0 allow remote pool servers to have unspecified impact via a (1) large or (2) negative value in the Extranonc2_size parameter in a mining.subscribe response and a crafted mining.notify request.
Commit Message: Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing
|
Low
| 166,307
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static char* getPreferredTag(const char* gf_tag)
{
char* result = NULL;
int grOffset = 0;
grOffset = findOffset( LOC_GRANDFATHERED ,gf_tag);
if(grOffset < 0) {
return NULL;
}
if( grOffset < LOC_PREFERRED_GRANDFATHERED_LEN ){
/* return preferred tag */
result = estrdup( LOC_PREFERRED_GRANDFATHERED[grOffset] );
} else {
/* Return correct grandfathered language tag */
result = estrdup( LOC_GRANDFATHERED[grOffset] );
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
|
Low
| 167,201
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ParseRiffHeaderConfig (FILE *infile, char *infilename, char *fourcc, WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackConfig *config)
{
int is_rf64 = !strncmp (fourcc, "RF64", 4), got_ds64 = 0;
int64_t total_samples = 0, infilesize;
RiffChunkHeader riff_chunk_header;
ChunkHeader chunk_header;
WaveHeader WaveHeader;
DS64Chunk ds64_chunk;
uint32_t bcount;
CLEAR (WaveHeader);
CLEAR (ds64_chunk);
infilesize = DoGetFileSize (infile);
if (!is_rf64 && infilesize >= 4294967296LL && !(config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH)) {
error_line ("can't handle .WAV files larger than 4 GB (non-standard)!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
memcpy (&riff_chunk_header, fourcc, 4);
if ((!DoReadFile (infile, ((char *) &riff_chunk_header) + 4, sizeof (RiffChunkHeader) - 4, &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (RiffChunkHeader) - 4 || strncmp (riff_chunk_header.formType, "WAVE", 4))) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .WAV file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &riff_chunk_header, sizeof (RiffChunkHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
while (1) {
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &chunk_header, sizeof (ChunkHeader), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (ChunkHeader)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .WAV file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &chunk_header, sizeof (ChunkHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackLittleEndianToNative (&chunk_header, ChunkHeaderFormat);
if (!strncmp (chunk_header.ckID, "ds64", 4)) {
if (chunk_header.ckSize < sizeof (DS64Chunk) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, &ds64_chunk, chunk_header.ckSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != chunk_header.ckSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .WAV file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &ds64_chunk, chunk_header.ckSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
got_ds64 = 1;
WavpackLittleEndianToNative (&ds64_chunk, DS64ChunkFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("DS64: riffSize = %lld, dataSize = %lld, sampleCount = %lld, table_length = %d",
(long long) ds64_chunk.riffSize64, (long long) ds64_chunk.dataSize64,
(long long) ds64_chunk.sampleCount64, ds64_chunk.tableLength);
if (ds64_chunk.tableLength * sizeof (CS64Chunk) != chunk_header.ckSize - sizeof (DS64Chunk)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .WAV file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
while (ds64_chunk.tableLength--) {
CS64Chunk cs64_chunk;
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &cs64_chunk, sizeof (CS64Chunk), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (CS64Chunk) ||
(!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &cs64_chunk, sizeof (CS64Chunk)))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
}
}
else if (!strncmp (chunk_header.ckID, "fmt ", 4)) { // if it's the format chunk, we want to get some info out of there and
int supported = TRUE, format; // make sure it's a .wav file we can handle
if (chunk_header.ckSize < 16 || chunk_header.ckSize > sizeof (WaveHeader) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, &WaveHeader, chunk_header.ckSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != chunk_header.ckSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .WAV file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &WaveHeader, chunk_header.ckSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackLittleEndianToNative (&WaveHeader, WaveHeaderFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode) {
error_line ("format tag size = %d", chunk_header.ckSize);
error_line ("FormatTag = %x, NumChannels = %d, BitsPerSample = %d",
WaveHeader.FormatTag, WaveHeader.NumChannels, WaveHeader.BitsPerSample);
error_line ("BlockAlign = %d, SampleRate = %d, BytesPerSecond = %d",
WaveHeader.BlockAlign, WaveHeader.SampleRate, WaveHeader.BytesPerSecond);
if (chunk_header.ckSize > 16)
error_line ("cbSize = %d, ValidBitsPerSample = %d", WaveHeader.cbSize,
WaveHeader.ValidBitsPerSample);
if (chunk_header.ckSize > 20)
error_line ("ChannelMask = %x, SubFormat = %d",
WaveHeader.ChannelMask, WaveHeader.SubFormat);
}
if (chunk_header.ckSize > 16 && WaveHeader.cbSize == 2)
config->qmode |= QMODE_ADOBE_MODE;
format = (WaveHeader.FormatTag == 0xfffe && chunk_header.ckSize == 40) ?
WaveHeader.SubFormat : WaveHeader.FormatTag;
config->bits_per_sample = (chunk_header.ckSize == 40 && WaveHeader.ValidBitsPerSample) ?
WaveHeader.ValidBitsPerSample : WaveHeader.BitsPerSample;
if (format != 1 && format != 3)
supported = FALSE;
if (format == 3 && config->bits_per_sample != 32)
supported = FALSE;
if (!WaveHeader.NumChannels || WaveHeader.NumChannels > 256 ||
WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels < (config->bits_per_sample + 7) / 8 ||
WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels > 4 ||
WaveHeader.BlockAlign % WaveHeader.NumChannels)
supported = FALSE;
if (config->bits_per_sample < 1 || config->bits_per_sample > 32)
supported = FALSE;
if (!supported) {
error_line ("%s is an unsupported .WAV format!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (chunk_header.ckSize < 40) {
if (!config->channel_mask && !(config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED)) {
if (WaveHeader.NumChannels <= 2)
config->channel_mask = 0x5 - WaveHeader.NumChannels;
else if (WaveHeader.NumChannels <= 18)
config->channel_mask = (1 << WaveHeader.NumChannels) - 1;
else
config->channel_mask = 0x3ffff;
}
}
else if (WaveHeader.ChannelMask && (config->channel_mask || (config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED))) {
error_line ("this WAV file already has channel order information!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (WaveHeader.ChannelMask)
config->channel_mask = WaveHeader.ChannelMask;
if (format == 3)
config->float_norm_exp = 127;
else if ((config->qmode & QMODE_ADOBE_MODE) &&
WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels == 4) {
if (WaveHeader.BitsPerSample == 24)
config->float_norm_exp = 127 + 23;
else if (WaveHeader.BitsPerSample == 32)
config->float_norm_exp = 127 + 15;
}
if (debug_logging_mode) {
if (config->float_norm_exp == 127)
error_line ("data format: normalized 32-bit floating point");
else if (config->float_norm_exp)
error_line ("data format: 32-bit floating point (Audition %d:%d float type 1)",
config->float_norm_exp - 126, 150 - config->float_norm_exp);
else
error_line ("data format: %d-bit integers stored in %d byte(s)",
config->bits_per_sample, WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels);
}
}
else if (!strncmp (chunk_header.ckID, "data", 4)) { // on the data chunk, get size and exit loop
int64_t data_chunk_size = (got_ds64 && chunk_header.ckSize == (uint32_t) -1) ?
ds64_chunk.dataSize64 : chunk_header.ckSize;
if (!WaveHeader.NumChannels || (is_rf64 && !got_ds64)) { // make sure we saw "fmt" and "ds64" chunks (if required)
error_line ("%s is not a valid .WAV file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (infilesize && !(config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) && infilesize - data_chunk_size > 16777216) {
error_line ("this .WAV file has over 16 MB of extra RIFF data, probably is corrupt!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) {
if (infilesize && DoGetFilePosition (infile) != -1)
total_samples = (infilesize - DoGetFilePosition (infile)) / WaveHeader.BlockAlign;
else
total_samples = -1;
}
else {
total_samples = data_chunk_size / WaveHeader.BlockAlign;
if (got_ds64 && total_samples != ds64_chunk.sampleCount64) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .WAV file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (!total_samples) {
error_line ("this .WAV file has no audio samples, probably is corrupt!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (total_samples > MAX_WAVPACK_SAMPLES) {
error_line ("%s has too many samples for WavPack!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
}
config->bytes_per_sample = WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels;
config->num_channels = WaveHeader.NumChannels;
config->sample_rate = WaveHeader.SampleRate;
break;
}
else { // just copy unknown chunks to output file
int bytes_to_copy = (chunk_header.ckSize + 1) & ~1L;
char *buff = malloc (bytes_to_copy);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("extra unknown chunk \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
chunk_header.ckID [0], chunk_header.ckID [1], chunk_header.ckID [2],
chunk_header.ckID [3], chunk_header.ckSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, buff, bytes_to_copy, &bcount) ||
bcount != bytes_to_copy ||
(!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, buff, bytes_to_copy))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (buff);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
free (buff);
}
}
if (!WavpackSetConfiguration64 (wpc, config, total_samples, NULL)) {
error_line ("%s: %s", infilename, WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
return WAVPACK_NO_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A stack-based buffer over-read in the ParseRiffHeaderConfig function of cli/riff.c file of WavPack 5.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial-of-service attack or possibly have unspecified other impact via a maliciously crafted RF64 file.
Commit Message: issue #27, do not overwrite stack on corrupt RF64 file
|
Medium
| 169,334
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BeginInstallWithManifestFunction::OnParseSuccess(
const SkBitmap& icon, DictionaryValue* parsed_manifest) {
CHECK(parsed_manifest);
icon_ = icon;
parsed_manifest_.reset(parsed_manifest);
std::string init_errors;
dummy_extension_ = Extension::Create(
FilePath(),
Extension::INTERNAL,
*static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(parsed_manifest_.get()),
Extension::NO_FLAGS,
&init_errors);
if (!dummy_extension_.get()) {
OnParseFailure(MANIFEST_ERROR, std::string(kInvalidManifestError));
return;
}
if (icon_.empty())
icon_ = Extension::GetDefaultIcon(dummy_extension_->is_app());
ShowExtensionInstallDialog(profile(),
this,
dummy_extension_.get(),
&icon_,
dummy_extension_->GetPermissionMessageStrings(),
ExtensionInstallUI::INSTALL_PROMPT);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not ensure that extension installations are confirmed by a browser dialog, which makes it easier for remote attackers to modify the product's functionality via a Trojan horse extension.
Commit Message: Adding tests for new webstore beginInstallWithManifest method.
BUG=75821
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6900059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83080 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,405
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static av_cold int vqa_decode_init(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
VqaContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int i, j, codebook_index, ret;
s->avctx = avctx;
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8;
/* make sure the extradata made it */
if (s->avctx->extradata_size != VQA_HEADER_SIZE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "expected extradata size of %d\n", VQA_HEADER_SIZE);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* load up the VQA parameters from the header */
s->vqa_version = s->avctx->extradata[0];
switch (s->vqa_version) {
case 1:
case 2:
break;
case 3:
avpriv_report_missing_feature(avctx, "VQA Version %d", s->vqa_version);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
default:
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "VQA Version %i", s->vqa_version);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
s->width = AV_RL16(&s->avctx->extradata[6]);
s->height = AV_RL16(&s->avctx->extradata[8]);
if ((ret = av_image_check_size(s->width, s->height, 0, avctx)) < 0) {
s->width= s->height= 0;
return ret;
}
s->vector_width = s->avctx->extradata[10];
s->vector_height = s->avctx->extradata[11];
s->partial_count = s->partial_countdown = s->avctx->extradata[13];
/* the vector dimensions have to meet very stringent requirements */
if ((s->vector_width != 4) ||
((s->vector_height != 2) && (s->vector_height != 4))) {
/* return without further initialization */
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (s->width % s->vector_width || s->height % s->vector_height) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Image size not multiple of block size\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* allocate codebooks */
s->codebook_size = MAX_CODEBOOK_SIZE;
s->codebook = av_malloc(s->codebook_size);
if (!s->codebook)
goto fail;
s->next_codebook_buffer = av_malloc(s->codebook_size);
if (!s->next_codebook_buffer)
goto fail;
/* allocate decode buffer */
s->decode_buffer_size = (s->width / s->vector_width) *
(s->height / s->vector_height) * 2;
s->decode_buffer = av_mallocz(s->decode_buffer_size);
if (!s->decode_buffer)
goto fail;
/* initialize the solid-color vectors */
if (s->vector_height == 4) {
codebook_index = 0xFF00 * 16;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
s->codebook[codebook_index++] = i;
} else {
codebook_index = 0xF00 * 8;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
s->codebook[codebook_index++] = i;
}
s->next_codebook_buffer_index = 0;
return 0;
fail:
av_freep(&s->codebook);
av_freep(&s->next_codebook_buffer);
av_freep(&s->decode_buffer);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID:
Summary: FFmpeg before 4.2 has a heap-based buffer overflow in vqa_decode_chunk because of an out-of-array access in vqa_decode_init in libavcodec/vqavideo.c.
Commit Message: avcodec/vqavideo: Set video size
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 15919/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_VQA_fuzzer-5657368257363968
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
???
| 169,486
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void kvm_lapic_set_vapic_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t vapic_addr)
{
vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_addr = vapic_addr;
if (vapic_addr)
__set_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention);
else
__clear_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.12.5 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a VAPIC synchronization operation involving a page-end address.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
High
| 165,944
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void sock_release(struct socket *sock)
{
if (sock->ops) {
struct module *owner = sock->ops->owner;
sock->ops->release(sock);
sock->ops = NULL;
module_put(owner);
}
if (rcu_dereference_protected(sock->wq, 1)->fasync_list)
pr_err("%s: fasync list not empty!\n", __func__);
if (!sock->file) {
iput(SOCK_INODE(sock));
return;
}
sock->file = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In net/socket.c in the Linux kernel through 4.17.1, there is a race condition between fchownat and close in cases where they target the same socket file descriptor, related to the sock_close and sockfs_setattr functions. fchownat does not increment the file descriptor reference count, which allows close to set the socket to NULL during fchownat's execution, leading to a NULL pointer dereference and system crash.
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 169,204
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _TIFFmalloc(tsize_t s)
{
return (malloc((size_t) s));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: The _TIFFmalloc function in tif_unix.c in LibTIFF 4.0.3 does not reject a zero size, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) via a crafted TIFF image that is mishandled by the TIFFWriteScanline function in tif_write.c, as demonstrated by tiffdither.
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
|
Medium
| 169,460
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int xwd_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
AVFrame *p = data;
const uint8_t *buf = avpkt->data;
int i, ret, buf_size = avpkt->size;
uint32_t version, header_size, vclass, ncolors;
uint32_t xoffset, be, bpp, lsize, rsize;
uint32_t pixformat, pixdepth, bunit, bitorder, bpad;
uint32_t rgb[3];
uint8_t *ptr;
GetByteContext gb;
if (buf_size < XWD_HEADER_SIZE)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
bytestream2_init(&gb, buf, buf_size);
header_size = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
version = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
if (version != XWD_VERSION) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "unsupported version\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (buf_size < header_size || header_size < XWD_HEADER_SIZE) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid header size\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
pixformat = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
pixdepth = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
avctx->width = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
avctx->height = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
xoffset = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
be = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
bunit = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
bitorder = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
bpad = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
bpp = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
lsize = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
vclass = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
rgb[0] = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
rgb[1] = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
rgb[2] = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
bytestream2_skipu(&gb, 8);
ncolors = bytestream2_get_be32u(&gb);
bytestream2_skipu(&gb, header_size - (XWD_HEADER_SIZE - 20));
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"pixformat %"PRIu32", pixdepth %"PRIu32", bunit %"PRIu32", bitorder %"PRIu32", bpad %"PRIu32"\n",
pixformat, pixdepth, bunit, bitorder, bpad);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"vclass %"PRIu32", ncolors %"PRIu32", bpp %"PRIu32", be %"PRIu32", lsize %"PRIu32", xoffset %"PRIu32"\n",
vclass, ncolors, bpp, be, lsize, xoffset);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"red %0"PRIx32", green %0"PRIx32", blue %0"PRIx32"\n",
rgb[0], rgb[1], rgb[2]);
if (pixformat > XWD_Z_PIXMAP) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid pixmap format\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (pixdepth == 0 || pixdepth > 32) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid pixmap depth\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (xoffset) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "xoffset %"PRIu32"", xoffset);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (be > 1) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid byte order\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (bitorder > 1) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid bitmap bit order\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (bunit != 8 && bunit != 16 && bunit != 32) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid bitmap unit\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (bpad != 8 && bpad != 16 && bpad != 32) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid bitmap scan-line pad\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (bpp == 0 || bpp > 32) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid bits per pixel\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (ncolors > 256) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid number of entries in colormap\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if ((ret = av_image_check_size(avctx->width, avctx->height, 0, NULL)) < 0)
return ret;
rsize = FFALIGN(avctx->width * bpp, bpad) / 8;
if (lsize < rsize) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid bytes per scan-line\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&gb) < ncolors * XWD_CMAP_SIZE + (uint64_t)avctx->height * lsize) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "input buffer too small\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (pixformat != XWD_Z_PIXMAP) {
avpriv_report_missing_feature(avctx, "Pixmap format %"PRIu32, pixformat);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_NONE;
switch (vclass) {
case XWD_STATIC_GRAY:
case XWD_GRAY_SCALE:
if (bpp != 1 && bpp != 8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (pixdepth == 1) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_MONOWHITE;
} else if (pixdepth == 8) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY8;
}
break;
case XWD_STATIC_COLOR:
case XWD_PSEUDO_COLOR:
if (bpp == 8)
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8;
break;
case XWD_TRUE_COLOR:
case XWD_DIRECT_COLOR:
if (bpp != 16 && bpp != 24 && bpp != 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (bpp == 16 && pixdepth == 15) {
if (rgb[0] == 0x7C00 && rgb[1] == 0x3E0 && rgb[2] == 0x1F)
avctx->pix_fmt = be ? AV_PIX_FMT_RGB555BE : AV_PIX_FMT_RGB555LE;
else if (rgb[0] == 0x1F && rgb[1] == 0x3E0 && rgb[2] == 0x7C00)
avctx->pix_fmt = be ? AV_PIX_FMT_BGR555BE : AV_PIX_FMT_BGR555LE;
} else if (bpp == 16 && pixdepth == 16) {
if (rgb[0] == 0xF800 && rgb[1] == 0x7E0 && rgb[2] == 0x1F)
avctx->pix_fmt = be ? AV_PIX_FMT_RGB565BE : AV_PIX_FMT_RGB565LE;
else if (rgb[0] == 0x1F && rgb[1] == 0x7E0 && rgb[2] == 0xF800)
avctx->pix_fmt = be ? AV_PIX_FMT_BGR565BE : AV_PIX_FMT_BGR565LE;
} else if (bpp == 24) {
if (rgb[0] == 0xFF0000 && rgb[1] == 0xFF00 && rgb[2] == 0xFF)
avctx->pix_fmt = be ? AV_PIX_FMT_RGB24 : AV_PIX_FMT_BGR24;
else if (rgb[0] == 0xFF && rgb[1] == 0xFF00 && rgb[2] == 0xFF0000)
avctx->pix_fmt = be ? AV_PIX_FMT_BGR24 : AV_PIX_FMT_RGB24;
} else if (bpp == 32) {
if (rgb[0] == 0xFF0000 && rgb[1] == 0xFF00 && rgb[2] == 0xFF)
avctx->pix_fmt = be ? AV_PIX_FMT_ARGB : AV_PIX_FMT_BGRA;
else if (rgb[0] == 0xFF && rgb[1] == 0xFF00 && rgb[2] == 0xFF0000)
avctx->pix_fmt = be ? AV_PIX_FMT_ABGR : AV_PIX_FMT_RGBA;
}
bytestream2_skipu(&gb, ncolors * XWD_CMAP_SIZE);
break;
default:
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid visual class\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_NONE) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx,
"Unknown file: bpp %"PRIu32", pixdepth %"PRIu32", vclass %"PRIu32"",
bpp, pixdepth, vclass);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_buffer(avctx, p, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
p->key_frame = 1;
p->pict_type = AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;
if (avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8) {
uint32_t *dst = (uint32_t *)p->data[1];
uint8_t red, green, blue;
for (i = 0; i < ncolors; i++) {
bytestream2_skipu(&gb, 4); // skip colormap entry number
red = bytestream2_get_byteu(&gb);
bytestream2_skipu(&gb, 1);
green = bytestream2_get_byteu(&gb);
bytestream2_skipu(&gb, 1);
blue = bytestream2_get_byteu(&gb);
bytestream2_skipu(&gb, 3); // skip bitmask flag and padding
dst[i] = red << 16 | green << 8 | blue;
}
}
ptr = p->data[0];
for (i = 0; i < avctx->height; i++) {
bytestream2_get_bufferu(&gb, ptr, rsize);
bytestream2_skipu(&gb, lsize - rsize);
ptr += p->linesize[0];
}
*got_frame = 1;
return buf_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.12, 3.0.x before 3.0.8, 3.1.x before 3.1.8, 3.2.x before 3.2.5, and 3.3.x before 3.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: avcodec/xwddec: Check bpp more completely
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 1399/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-4866094172995584
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 168,075
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _WM_ParseNewHmp(uint8_t *hmp_data, uint32_t hmp_size) {
uint8_t is_hmp2 = 0;
uint32_t zero_cnt = 0;
uint32_t i = 0;
uint32_t hmp_file_length = 0;
uint32_t hmp_chunks = 0;
uint32_t hmp_divisions = 0;
uint32_t hmp_unknown = 0;
uint32_t hmp_bpm = 0;
uint32_t hmp_song_time = 0;
struct _mdi *hmp_mdi;
uint8_t **hmp_chunk;
uint32_t *chunk_length;
uint32_t *chunk_ofs;
uint32_t *chunk_delta;
uint8_t *chunk_end;
uint32_t chunk_num = 0;
uint32_t hmp_track = 0;
uint32_t smallest_delta = 0;
uint32_t subtract_delta = 0;
uint32_t end_of_chunks = 0;
uint32_t var_len_shift = 0;
float tempo_f = 500000.0;
float samples_per_delta_f = 0.0;
uint32_t sample_count = 0;
float sample_count_f = 0;
float sample_remainder = 0;
if (memcmp(hmp_data, "HMIMIDIP", 8)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_HMP, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
hmp_data += 8;
hmp_size -= 8;
if (!memcmp(hmp_data, "013195", 6)) {
hmp_data += 6;
hmp_size -= 6;
is_hmp2 = 1;
}
if (is_hmp2) {
zero_cnt = 18;
} else {
zero_cnt = 24;
}
for (i = 0; i < zero_cnt; i++) {
if (hmp_data[i] != 0) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_HMP, NULL, 0);
return NULL;
}
}
hmp_data += zero_cnt;
hmp_size -= zero_cnt;
hmp_file_length = *hmp_data++;
hmp_file_length += (*hmp_data++ << 8);
hmp_file_length += (*hmp_data++ << 16);
hmp_file_length += (*hmp_data++ << 24);
hmp_size -= 4;
UNUSED(hmp_file_length);
hmp_data += 12;
hmp_size -= 12;
hmp_chunks = *hmp_data++;
hmp_chunks += (*hmp_data++ << 8);
hmp_chunks += (*hmp_data++ << 16);
hmp_chunks += (*hmp_data++ << 24);
hmp_size -= 4;
hmp_unknown = *hmp_data++;
hmp_unknown += (*hmp_data++ << 8);
hmp_unknown += (*hmp_data++ << 16);
hmp_unknown += (*hmp_data++ << 24);
hmp_size -= 4;
UNUSED(hmp_unknown);
hmp_divisions = 60;
hmp_bpm = *hmp_data++;
hmp_bpm += (*hmp_data++ << 8);
hmp_bpm += (*hmp_data++ << 16);
hmp_bpm += (*hmp_data++ << 24);
hmp_size -= 4;
/* Slow but needed for accuracy */
if ((_WM_MixerOptions & WM_MO_ROUNDTEMPO)) {
tempo_f = (float) (60000000 / hmp_bpm) + 0.5f;
} else {
tempo_f = (float) (60000000 / hmp_bpm);
}
samples_per_delta_f = _WM_GetSamplesPerTick(hmp_divisions, tempo_f);
hmp_song_time = *hmp_data++;
hmp_song_time += (*hmp_data++ << 8);
hmp_song_time += (*hmp_data++ << 16);
hmp_song_time += (*hmp_data++ << 24);
hmp_size -= 4;
UNUSED(hmp_song_time);
if (is_hmp2) {
hmp_data += 840;
hmp_size -= 840;
} else {
hmp_data += 712;
hmp_size -= 712;
}
hmp_mdi = _WM_initMDI();
_WM_midi_setup_divisions(hmp_mdi, hmp_divisions);
_WM_midi_setup_tempo(hmp_mdi, (uint32_t)tempo_f);
hmp_chunk = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t *) * hmp_chunks);
chunk_length = malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * hmp_chunks);
chunk_delta = malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * hmp_chunks);
chunk_ofs = malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * hmp_chunks);
chunk_end = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t) * hmp_chunks);
smallest_delta = 0xffffffff;
for (i = 0; i < hmp_chunks; i++) {
hmp_chunk[i] = hmp_data;
chunk_ofs[i] = 0;
chunk_num = *hmp_data++;
chunk_num += (*hmp_data++ << 8);
chunk_num += (*hmp_data++ << 16);
chunk_num += (*hmp_data++ << 24);
chunk_ofs[i] += 4;
UNUSED(chunk_num);
chunk_length[i] = *hmp_data++;
chunk_length[i] += (*hmp_data++ << 8);
chunk_length[i] += (*hmp_data++ << 16);
chunk_length[i] += (*hmp_data++ << 24);
chunk_ofs[i] += 4;
if (chunk_length[i] > hmp_size) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_HMP, "file too short", 0);
goto _hmp_end;
}
hmp_size -= chunk_length[i];
hmp_track = *hmp_data++;
hmp_track += (*hmp_data++ << 8);
hmp_track += (*hmp_data++ << 16);
hmp_track += (*hmp_data++ << 24);
chunk_ofs[i] += 4;
UNUSED(hmp_track);
chunk_delta[i] = 0;
var_len_shift = 0;
if (*hmp_data < 0x80) {
do {
chunk_delta[i] = chunk_delta[i] | ((*hmp_data++ & 0x7F) << var_len_shift);
var_len_shift += 7;
chunk_ofs[i]++;
} while (*hmp_data < 0x80);
}
chunk_delta[i] = chunk_delta[i] | ((*hmp_data++ & 0x7F) << var_len_shift);
chunk_ofs[i]++;
if (chunk_delta[i] < smallest_delta) {
smallest_delta = chunk_delta[i];
}
hmp_data = hmp_chunk[i] + chunk_length[i];
hmp_chunk[i] += chunk_ofs[i]++;
chunk_end[i] = 0;
}
subtract_delta = smallest_delta;
sample_count_f = (((float) smallest_delta * samples_per_delta_f) + sample_remainder);
sample_count = (uint32_t) sample_count_f;
sample_remainder = sample_count_f - (float) sample_count;
hmp_mdi->events[hmp_mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next += sample_count;
hmp_mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += sample_count;
while (end_of_chunks < hmp_chunks) {
smallest_delta = 0;
for (i = 0; i < hmp_chunks; i++) {
if (chunk_end[i])
continue;
if (chunk_delta[i]) {
chunk_delta[i] -= subtract_delta;
if (chunk_delta[i]) {
if ((!smallest_delta)
|| (smallest_delta > chunk_delta[i])) {
smallest_delta = chunk_delta[i];
}
continue;
}
}
do {
if (((hmp_chunk[i][0] & 0xf0) == 0xb0 ) && ((hmp_chunk[i][1] == 110) || (hmp_chunk[i][1] == 111)) && (hmp_chunk[i][2] > 0x7f)) {
hmp_chunk[i] += 3;
} else {
uint32_t setup_ret = 0;
if ((setup_ret = _WM_SetupMidiEvent(hmp_mdi, hmp_chunk[i], 0)) == 0) {
goto _hmp_end;
}
if ((hmp_chunk[i][0] == 0xff) && (hmp_chunk[i][1] == 0x2f) && (hmp_chunk[i][2] == 0x00)) {
/* End of Chunk */
end_of_chunks++;
chunk_end[i] = 1;
hmp_chunk[i] += 3;
goto NEXT_CHUNK;
} else if ((hmp_chunk[i][0] == 0xff) && (hmp_chunk[i][1] == 0x51) && (hmp_chunk[i][2] == 0x03)) {
/* Tempo */
tempo_f = (float)((hmp_chunk[i][3] << 16) + (hmp_chunk[i][4] << 8)+ hmp_chunk[i][5]);
if (tempo_f == 0.0)
tempo_f = 500000.0;
fprintf(stderr,"DEBUG: Tempo change %f\r\n", tempo_f);
}
hmp_chunk[i] += setup_ret;
}
var_len_shift = 0;
chunk_delta[i] = 0;
if (*hmp_chunk[i] < 0x80) {
do {
chunk_delta[i] = chunk_delta[i] + ((*hmp_chunk[i] & 0x7F) << var_len_shift);
var_len_shift += 7;
hmp_chunk[i]++;
} while (*hmp_chunk[i] < 0x80);
}
chunk_delta[i] = chunk_delta[i] + ((*hmp_chunk[i] & 0x7F) << var_len_shift);
hmp_chunk[i]++;
} while (!chunk_delta[i]);
if ((!smallest_delta) || (smallest_delta > chunk_delta[i])) {
smallest_delta = chunk_delta[i];
}
NEXT_CHUNK: continue;
}
subtract_delta = smallest_delta;
sample_count_f= (((float) smallest_delta * samples_per_delta_f) + sample_remainder);
sample_count = (uint32_t) sample_count_f;
sample_remainder = sample_count_f - (float) sample_count;
hmp_mdi->events[hmp_mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next += sample_count;
hmp_mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += sample_count;
}
if ((hmp_mdi->reverb = _WM_init_reverb(_WM_SampleRate, _WM_reverb_room_width, _WM_reverb_room_length, _WM_reverb_listen_posx, _WM_reverb_listen_posy)) == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_MEM, "to init reverb", 0);
goto _hmp_end;
}
hmp_mdi->extra_info.current_sample = 0;
hmp_mdi->current_event = &hmp_mdi->events[0];
hmp_mdi->samples_to_mix = 0;
hmp_mdi->note = NULL;
_WM_ResetToStart(hmp_mdi);
_hmp_end:
free(hmp_chunk);
free(chunk_length);
free(chunk_delta);
free(chunk_ofs);
free(chunk_end);
if (hmp_mdi->reverb) return (hmp_mdi);
_WM_freeMDI(hmp_mdi);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The _WM_SetupMidiEvent function in internal_midi.c:2122 in WildMIDI 0.4.2 can cause a denial of service (invalid memory read and application crash) via a crafted mid file.
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
|
Medium
| 168,003
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PrintPreviewMessageHandler::PrintPreviewMessageHandler(
WebContents* web_contents)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents) {
DCHECK(web_contents);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The FrameFetchContext::updateTimingInfoForIFrameNavigation function in core/loader/FrameFetchContext.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, does not properly restrict the availability of IFRAME Resource Timing API times, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code that leverages a history.back call.
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
|
Low
| 171,891
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: untrusted_launcher_response_callback (GtkDialog *dialog,
int response_id,
ActivateParametersDesktop *parameters)
{
GdkScreen *screen;
char *uri;
GFile *file;
switch (response_id)
{
case RESPONSE_RUN:
{
screen = gtk_widget_get_screen (GTK_WIDGET (parameters->parent_window));
uri = nautilus_file_get_uri (parameters->file);
DEBUG ("Launching untrusted launcher %s", uri);
nautilus_launch_desktop_file (screen, uri, NULL,
parameters->parent_window);
g_free (uri);
}
break;
case RESPONSE_MARK_TRUSTED:
{
file = nautilus_file_get_location (parameters->file);
nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted (file,
parameters->parent_window,
TRUE,
NULL, NULL);
g_object_unref (file);
}
break;
default:
{
/* Just destroy dialog */
}
break;
}
gtk_widget_destroy (GTK_WIDGET (dialog));
activate_parameters_desktop_free (parameters);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: GNOME Nautilus before 3.23.90 allows attackers to spoof a file type by using the .desktop file extension, as demonstrated by an attack in which a .desktop file's Name field ends in .pdf but this file's Exec field launches a malicious *sh -c* command. In other words, Nautilus provides no UI indication that a file actually has the potentially unsafe .desktop extension; instead, the UI only shows the .pdf extension. One (slightly) mitigating factor is that an attack requires the .desktop file to have execute permission. The solution is to ask the user to confirm that the file is supposed to be treated as a .desktop file, and then remember the user's answer in the metadata::trusted field.
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
Low
| 167,753
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
char *rtype;
int want_reply;
int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0;
struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
want_reply = packet_get_char();
debug("server_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply);
/* -R style forwarding */
if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) {
struct passwd *pw;
struct Forward fwd;
pw = the_authctxt->pw;
if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
debug("server_input_global_request: tcpip-forward listen %s port %d",
fwd.listen_host, fwd.listen_port);
/* check permissions */
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 ||
no_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding ||
(!want_reply && fwd.listen_port == 0) ||
(fwd.listen_port != 0 &&
!bind_permitted(fwd.listen_port, pw->pw_uid))) {
success = 0;
packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
} else {
/* Start listening on the port */
success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(&fwd,
&allocated_listen_port, &options.fwd_opts);
}
free(fwd.listen_host);
if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if (allocated_listen_port != 0 &&
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, allocated_listen_port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u32: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) {
struct Forward fwd;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
debug("%s: cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d", __func__,
fwd.listen_host, fwd.listen_port);
success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(&fwd);
free(fwd.listen_host);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) {
struct Forward fwd;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL);
debug("server_input_global_request: streamlocal-forward listen path %s",
fwd.listen_path);
/* check permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
|| no_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding) {
success = 0;
packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
} else {
/* Start listening on the socket */
success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(
&fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts);
}
free(fwd.listen_path);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) {
struct Forward fwd;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL);
debug("%s: cancel-streamlocal-forward path %s", __func__,
fwd.listen_path);
success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(&fwd);
free(fwd.listen_path);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com") == 0) {
no_more_sessions = 1;
success = 1;
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com") == 0) {
success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(&resp);
}
if (want_reply) {
packet_start(success ?
SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
if (success && resp != NULL)
ssh_packet_put_raw(active_state, sshbuf_ptr(resp),
sshbuf_len(resp));
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
}
free(rtype);
sshbuf_free(resp);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: sshd in OpenSSH before 7.4, when privilege separation is not used, creates forwarded Unix-domain sockets as root, which might allow local users to gain privileges via unspecified vectors, related to serverloop.c.
Commit Message: disable Unix-domain socket forwarding when privsep is disabled
|
Medium
| 168,661
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void collapse_huge_page(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long address,
struct page **hpage,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
int node)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd, _pmd;
pte_t *pte;
pgtable_t pgtable;
struct page *new_page;
spinlock_t *ptl;
int isolated;
unsigned long hstart, hend;
VM_BUG_ON(address & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK);
#ifndef CONFIG_NUMA
VM_BUG_ON(!*hpage);
new_page = *hpage;
if (unlikely(mem_cgroup_newpage_charge(new_page, mm, GFP_KERNEL))) {
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return;
}
#else
VM_BUG_ON(*hpage);
/*
* Allocate the page while the vma is still valid and under
* the mmap_sem read mode so there is no memory allocation
* later when we take the mmap_sem in write mode. This is more
* friendly behavior (OTOH it may actually hide bugs) to
* filesystems in userland with daemons allocating memory in
* the userland I/O paths. Allocating memory with the
* mmap_sem in read mode is good idea also to allow greater
* scalability.
*/
new_page = alloc_hugepage_vma(khugepaged_defrag(), vma, address,
node, __GFP_OTHER_NODE);
if (unlikely(!new_page)) {
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
count_vm_event(THP_COLLAPSE_ALLOC_FAILED);
*hpage = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
return;
}
count_vm_event(THP_COLLAPSE_ALLOC);
if (unlikely(mem_cgroup_newpage_charge(new_page, mm, GFP_KERNEL))) {
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
put_page(new_page);
return;
}
#endif
/* after allocating the hugepage upgrade to mmap_sem write mode */
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* Prevent all access to pagetables with the exception of
* gup_fast later hanlded by the ptep_clear_flush and the VM
* handled by the anon_vma lock + PG_lock.
*/
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (unlikely(khugepaged_test_exit(mm)))
goto out;
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
hstart = (vma->vm_start + ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK) & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
hend = vma->vm_end & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
if (address < hstart || address + HPAGE_PMD_SIZE > hend)
goto out;
if ((!(vma->vm_flags & VM_HUGEPAGE) && !khugepaged_always()) ||
(vma->vm_flags & VM_NOHUGEPAGE))
goto out;
/* VM_PFNMAP vmas may have vm_ops null but vm_file set */
if (!vma->anon_vma || vma->vm_ops || vma->vm_file)
goto out;
if (is_vma_temporary_stack(vma))
goto out;
VM_BUG_ON(is_linear_pfn_mapping(vma) || is_pfn_mapping(vma));
pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
goto out;
pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
if (!pud_present(*pud))
goto out;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
/* pmd can't go away or become huge under us */
if (!pmd_present(*pmd) || pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))
goto out;
anon_vma_lock(vma->anon_vma);
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, address);
ptl = pte_lockptr(mm, pmd);
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock); /* probably unnecessary */
/*
* After this gup_fast can't run anymore. This also removes
* any huge TLB entry from the CPU so we won't allow
* huge and small TLB entries for the same virtual address
* to avoid the risk of CPU bugs in that area.
*/
_pmd = pmdp_clear_flush_notify(vma, address, pmd);
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
spin_lock(ptl);
isolated = __collapse_huge_page_isolate(vma, address, pte);
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (unlikely(!isolated)) {
pte_unmap(pte);
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
BUG_ON(!pmd_none(*pmd));
set_pmd_at(mm, address, pmd, _pmd);
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
anon_vma_unlock(vma->anon_vma);
goto out;
}
/*
* All pages are isolated and locked so anon_vma rmap
* can't run anymore.
*/
anon_vma_unlock(vma->anon_vma);
__collapse_huge_page_copy(pte, new_page, vma, address, ptl);
pte_unmap(pte);
__SetPageUptodate(new_page);
pgtable = pmd_pgtable(_pmd);
VM_BUG_ON(page_count(pgtable) != 1);
VM_BUG_ON(page_mapcount(pgtable) != 0);
_pmd = mk_pmd(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot);
_pmd = maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_mkdirty(_pmd), vma);
_pmd = pmd_mkhuge(_pmd);
/*
* spin_lock() below is not the equivalent of smp_wmb(), so
* this is needed to avoid the copy_huge_page writes to become
* visible after the set_pmd_at() write.
*/
smp_wmb();
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
BUG_ON(!pmd_none(*pmd));
page_add_new_anon_rmap(new_page, vma, address);
set_pmd_at(mm, address, pmd, _pmd);
update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry);
prepare_pmd_huge_pte(pgtable, mm);
mm->nr_ptes--;
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
#ifndef CONFIG_NUMA
*hpage = NULL;
#endif
khugepaged_pages_collapsed++;
out_up_write:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
return;
out:
mem_cgroup_uncharge_page(new_page);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
put_page(new_page);
#endif
goto out_up_write;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly create transparent huge pages in response to a MAP_PRIVATE mmap system call on /dev/zero, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 166,225
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PaintImage AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::PaintImageForCurrentFrame() {
CheckThread();
if (!IsValid())
return PaintImage();
sk_sp<SkImage> image;
if (original_skia_image_ &&
original_skia_image_thread_id_ ==
Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->ThreadId()) {
image = original_skia_image_;
} else {
CreateImageFromMailboxIfNeeded();
image = texture_holder_->GetSkImage();
}
return CreatePaintImageBuilder()
.set_image(image, paint_image_content_id_)
.set_completion_state(PaintImage::CompletionState::DONE)
.TakePaintImage();
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
|
Medium
| 172,596
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8DataView::getUint8Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.DataView.getUint8");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
DataView* imp = V8DataView::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(unsigned, byteOffset, toUInt32(args[0]));
uint8_t result = imp->getUint8(byteOffset, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec)) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
return v8::Integer::New(result);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,113
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ikev2_auth_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct ikev2_auth a;
const char *v2_auth[]={ "invalid", "rsasig",
"shared-secret", "dsssig" };
const u_char *authdata = (const u_char*)ext + sizeof(a);
unsigned int len;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&a, ext, sizeof(a));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), a.h.critical);
len = ntohs(a.h.len);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d method=%s", len-4,
STR_OR_ID(a.auth_method, v2_auth)));
if (1 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," authdata=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)authdata, len - sizeof(a)))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,") "));
} else if(ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < len) {
if(!ike_show_somedata(ndo, authdata, ep)) goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: The ISAKMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could enter an infinite loop due to bugs in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12990/Fix printing of ISAKMPv1 Notification payload data.
The closest thing to a specification for the contents of the payload
data is draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04, and nothing in there says that it
is ever a complete ISAKMP message, so don't dissect types we don't have
specific code for as a complete ISAKMP message.
While we're at it, fix a comment, and clean up printing of V1 Nonce,
V2 Authentication payloads, and v2 Notice payloads.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,926
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
void *data)
{
int err;
struct super_block *sb = path->mnt->mnt_sb;
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
if (!check_mnt(mnt))
return -EINVAL;
if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)
return -EINVAL;
err = security_sb_remount(sb, data);
if (err)
return err;
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (flags & MS_BIND)
err = change_mount_flags(path->mnt, flags);
else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
err = -EPERM;
else
err = do_remount_sb(sb, flags, data, 0);
if (!err) {
lock_mount_hash();
mnt_flags |= mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_PROPAGATION_MASK;
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = mnt_flags;
touch_mnt_namespace(mnt->mnt_ns);
unlock_mount_hash();
}
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The do_remount function in fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel through 3.16.1 does not maintain the MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit across a remount of a bind mount, which allows local users to bypass an intended read-only restriction and defeat certain sandbox protection mechanisms via a *mount -o remount* command within a user namespace.
Commit Message: mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount
Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io> discovered that by remounting a
read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the
MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user
to the remount a read-only mount read-write.
Correct this by replacing the mask of mount flags to preserve
with a mask of mount flags that may be changed, and preserve
all others. This ensures that any future bugs with this mask and
remount will fail in an easy to detect way where new mount flags
simply won't change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
Low
| 166,283
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t aio_run_iocb(struct kiocb *req, unsigned opcode,
char __user *buf, size_t len, bool compat)
{
struct file *file = req->ki_filp;
ssize_t ret;
unsigned long nr_segs;
int rw;
fmode_t mode;
aio_rw_op *rw_op;
rw_iter_op *iter_op;
struct iovec inline_vecs[UIO_FASTIOV], *iovec = inline_vecs;
struct iov_iter iter;
switch (opcode) {
case IOCB_CMD_PREAD:
case IOCB_CMD_PREADV:
mode = FMODE_READ;
rw = READ;
rw_op = file->f_op->aio_read;
iter_op = file->f_op->read_iter;
goto rw_common;
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITE:
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV:
mode = FMODE_WRITE;
rw = WRITE;
rw_op = file->f_op->aio_write;
iter_op = file->f_op->write_iter;
goto rw_common;
rw_common:
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & mode)))
return -EBADF;
if (!rw_op && !iter_op)
return -EINVAL;
if (opcode == IOCB_CMD_PREADV || opcode == IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV)
ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(req, rw, buf, &nr_segs,
&len, &iovec, compat);
else
ret = aio_setup_single_vector(req, rw, buf, &nr_segs,
len, iovec);
if (!ret)
ret = rw_verify_area(rw, file, &req->ki_pos, len);
if (ret < 0) {
if (iovec != inline_vecs)
kfree(iovec);
return ret;
}
len = ret;
/* XXX: move/kill - rw_verify_area()? */
/* This matches the pread()/pwrite() logic */
if (req->ki_pos < 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (rw == WRITE)
file_start_write(file);
if (iter_op) {
iov_iter_init(&iter, rw, iovec, nr_segs, len);
ret = iter_op(req, &iter);
} else {
ret = rw_op(req, iovec, nr_segs, req->ki_pos);
}
if (rw == WRITE)
file_end_write(file);
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FDSYNC:
if (!file->f_op->aio_fsync)
return -EINVAL;
ret = file->f_op->aio_fsync(req, 1);
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FSYNC:
if (!file->f_op->aio_fsync)
return -EINVAL;
ret = file->f_op->aio_fsync(req, 0);
break;
default:
pr_debug("EINVAL: no operation provided\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (iovec != inline_vecs)
kfree(iovec);
if (ret != -EIOCBQUEUED) {
/*
* There's no easy way to restart the syscall since other AIO's
* may be already running. Just fail this IO with EINTR.
*/
if (unlikely(ret == -ERESTARTSYS || ret == -ERESTARTNOINTR ||
ret == -ERESTARTNOHAND ||
ret == -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK))
ret = -EINTR;
aio_complete(req, ret, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID:
Summary: Integer overflow in the aio_setup_single_vector function in fs/aio.c in the Linux kernel 4.0 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large AIO iovec. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of a CVE-2012-6701 regression.
Commit Message: aio: lift iov_iter_init() into aio_setup_..._rw()
the only non-trivial detail is that we do it before rw_verify_area(),
so we'd better cap the length ourselves in aio_setup_single_rw()
case (for vectored case rw_copy_check_uvector() will do that for us).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 170,001
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TestNativeHandler::TestNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetWakeEventPage",
base::Bind(&TestNativeHandler::GetWakeEventPage, base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.79 does not properly restrict bindings access, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
|
Medium
| 172,255
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int php_wddx_deserialize_ex(char *value, int vallen, zval *return_value)
{
wddx_stack stack;
XML_Parser parser;
st_entry *ent;
int retval;
wddx_stack_init(&stack);
parser = XML_ParserCreate("UTF-8");
XML_SetUserData(parser, &stack);
XML_SetElementHandler(parser, php_wddx_push_element, php_wddx_pop_element);
XML_SetCharacterDataHandler(parser, php_wddx_process_data);
XML_Parse(parser, value, vallen, 1);
XML_ParserFree(parser);
if (stack.top == 1) {
wddx_stack_top(&stack, (void**)&ent);
*return_value = *(ent->data);
zval_copy_ctor(return_value);
retval = SUCCESS;
} else {
retval = FAILURE;
}
wddx_stack_destroy(&stack);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: ext/wddx/wddx.c in PHP before 5.6.25 and 7.x before 7.0.10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an invalid wddxPacket XML document that is mishandled in a wddx_deserialize call, as demonstrated by a stray element inside a boolean element, leading to incorrect pop processing.
Commit Message: Fix for bug #72790 and bug #72799
|
Low
| 166,948
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static long restore_tm_user_regs(struct pt_regs *regs,
struct mcontext __user *sr,
struct mcontext __user *tm_sr)
{
long err;
unsigned long msr, msr_hi;
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
int i;
#endif
/*
* restore general registers but not including MSR or SOFTE. Also
* take care of keeping r2 (TLS) intact if not a signal.
* See comment in signal_64.c:restore_tm_sigcontexts();
* TFHAR is restored from the checkpointed NIP; TEXASR and TFIAR
* were set by the signal delivery.
*/
err = restore_general_regs(regs, tm_sr);
err |= restore_general_regs(¤t->thread.ckpt_regs, sr);
err |= __get_user(current->thread.tm_tfhar, &sr->mc_gregs[PT_NIP]);
err |= __get_user(msr, &sr->mc_gregs[PT_MSR]);
if (err)
return 1;
/* Restore the previous little-endian mode */
regs->msr = (regs->msr & ~MSR_LE) | (msr & MSR_LE);
/*
* Do this before updating the thread state in
* current->thread.fpr/vr/evr. That way, if we get preempted
* and another task grabs the FPU/Altivec/SPE, it won't be
* tempted to save the current CPU state into the thread_struct
* and corrupt what we are writing there.
*/
discard_lazy_cpu_state();
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
regs->msr &= ~MSR_VEC;
if (msr & MSR_VEC) {
/* restore altivec registers from the stack */
if (__copy_from_user(¤t->thread.vr_state, &sr->mc_vregs,
sizeof(sr->mc_vregs)) ||
__copy_from_user(¤t->thread.transact_vr,
&tm_sr->mc_vregs,
sizeof(sr->mc_vregs)))
return 1;
} else if (current->thread.used_vr) {
memset(¤t->thread.vr_state, 0,
ELF_NVRREG * sizeof(vector128));
memset(¤t->thread.transact_vr, 0,
ELF_NVRREG * sizeof(vector128));
}
/* Always get VRSAVE back */
if (__get_user(current->thread.vrsave,
(u32 __user *)&sr->mc_vregs[32]) ||
__get_user(current->thread.transact_vrsave,
(u32 __user *)&tm_sr->mc_vregs[32]))
return 1;
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC))
mtspr(SPRN_VRSAVE, current->thread.vrsave);
#endif /* CONFIG_ALTIVEC */
regs->msr &= ~(MSR_FP | MSR_FE0 | MSR_FE1);
if (copy_fpr_from_user(current, &sr->mc_fregs) ||
copy_transact_fpr_from_user(current, &tm_sr->mc_fregs))
return 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
regs->msr &= ~MSR_VSX;
if (msr & MSR_VSX) {
/*
* Restore altivec registers from the stack to a local
* buffer, then write this out to the thread_struct
*/
if (copy_vsx_from_user(current, &sr->mc_vsregs) ||
copy_transact_vsx_from_user(current, &tm_sr->mc_vsregs))
return 1;
} else if (current->thread.used_vsr)
for (i = 0; i < 32 ; i++) {
current->thread.fp_state.fpr[i][TS_VSRLOWOFFSET] = 0;
current->thread.transact_fp.fpr[i][TS_VSRLOWOFFSET] = 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_VSX */
#ifdef CONFIG_SPE
/* SPE regs are not checkpointed with TM, so this section is
* simply the same as in restore_user_regs().
*/
regs->msr &= ~MSR_SPE;
if (msr & MSR_SPE) {
if (__copy_from_user(current->thread.evr, &sr->mc_vregs,
ELF_NEVRREG * sizeof(u32)))
return 1;
} else if (current->thread.used_spe)
memset(current->thread.evr, 0, ELF_NEVRREG * sizeof(u32));
/* Always get SPEFSCR back */
if (__get_user(current->thread.spefscr, (u32 __user *)&sr->mc_vregs
+ ELF_NEVRREG))
return 1;
#endif /* CONFIG_SPE */
/* Now, recheckpoint. This loads up all of the checkpointed (older)
* registers, including FP and V[S]Rs. After recheckpointing, the
* transactional versions should be loaded.
*/
tm_enable();
/* Make sure the transaction is marked as failed */
current->thread.tm_texasr |= TEXASR_FS;
/* This loads the checkpointed FP/VEC state, if used */
tm_recheckpoint(¤t->thread, msr);
/* Get the top half of the MSR */
if (__get_user(msr_hi, &tm_sr->mc_gregs[PT_MSR]))
return 1;
/* Pull in MSR TM from user context */
regs->msr = (regs->msr & ~MSR_TS_MASK) | ((msr_hi<<32) & MSR_TS_MASK);
/* This loads the speculative FP/VEC state, if used */
if (msr & MSR_FP) {
do_load_up_transact_fpu(¤t->thread);
regs->msr |= (MSR_FP | current->thread.fpexc_mode);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
if (msr & MSR_VEC) {
do_load_up_transact_altivec(¤t->thread);
regs->msr |= MSR_VEC;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The signal implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.3.5 on powerpc platforms does not check for an MSR with both the S and T bits set, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (TM Bad Thing exception and panic) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
Medium
| 167,481
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int userfaultfd_register(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = ctx->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev, *cur;
int ret;
struct uffdio_register uffdio_register;
struct uffdio_register __user *user_uffdio_register;
unsigned long vm_flags, new_flags;
bool found;
bool basic_ioctls;
unsigned long start, end, vma_end;
user_uffdio_register = (struct uffdio_register __user *) arg;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&uffdio_register, user_uffdio_register,
sizeof(uffdio_register)-sizeof(__u64)))
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (!uffdio_register.mode)
goto out;
if (uffdio_register.mode & ~(UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING|
UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_WP))
goto out;
vm_flags = 0;
if (uffdio_register.mode & UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING)
vm_flags |= VM_UFFD_MISSING;
if (uffdio_register.mode & UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_WP) {
vm_flags |= VM_UFFD_WP;
/*
* FIXME: remove the below error constraint by
* implementing the wprotect tracking mode.
*/
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = validate_range(mm, uffdio_register.range.start,
uffdio_register.range.len);
if (ret)
goto out;
start = uffdio_register.range.start;
end = start + uffdio_register.range.len;
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!mmget_not_zero(mm))
goto out;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma_prev(mm, start, &prev);
if (!vma)
goto out_unlock;
/* check that there's at least one vma in the range */
ret = -EINVAL;
if (vma->vm_start >= end)
goto out_unlock;
/*
* If the first vma contains huge pages, make sure start address
* is aligned to huge page size.
*/
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
unsigned long vma_hpagesize = vma_kernel_pagesize(vma);
if (start & (vma_hpagesize - 1))
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* Search for not compatible vmas.
*/
found = false;
basic_ioctls = false;
for (cur = vma; cur && cur->vm_start < end; cur = cur->vm_next) {
cond_resched();
BUG_ON(!!cur->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx ^
!!(cur->vm_flags & (VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP)));
/* check not compatible vmas */
ret = -EINVAL;
if (!vma_can_userfault(cur))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* UFFDIO_COPY will fill file holes even without
* PROT_WRITE. This check enforces that if this is a
* MAP_SHARED, the process has write permission to the backing
* file. If VM_MAYWRITE is set it also enforces that on a
* MAP_SHARED vma: there is no F_WRITE_SEAL and no further
* F_WRITE_SEAL can be taken until the vma is destroyed.
*/
ret = -EPERM;
if (unlikely(!(cur->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE)))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* If this vma contains ending address, and huge pages
* check alignment.
*/
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(cur) && end <= cur->vm_end &&
end > cur->vm_start) {
unsigned long vma_hpagesize = vma_kernel_pagesize(cur);
ret = -EINVAL;
if (end & (vma_hpagesize - 1))
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* Check that this vma isn't already owned by a
* different userfaultfd. We can't allow more than one
* userfaultfd to own a single vma simultaneously or we
* wouldn't know which one to deliver the userfaults to.
*/
ret = -EBUSY;
if (cur->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx &&
cur->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx != ctx)
goto out_unlock;
/*
* Note vmas containing huge pages
*/
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(cur))
basic_ioctls = true;
found = true;
}
BUG_ON(!found);
if (vma->vm_start < start)
prev = vma;
ret = 0;
do {
cond_resched();
BUG_ON(!vma_can_userfault(vma));
BUG_ON(vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx &&
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx != ctx);
WARN_ON(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE));
/*
* Nothing to do: this vma is already registered into this
* userfaultfd and with the right tracking mode too.
*/
if (vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx == ctx &&
(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags) == vm_flags)
goto skip;
if (vma->vm_start > start)
start = vma->vm_start;
vma_end = min(end, vma->vm_end);
new_flags = (vma->vm_flags & ~vm_flags) | vm_flags;
prev = vma_merge(mm, prev, start, vma_end, new_flags,
vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, vma->vm_pgoff,
vma_policy(vma),
((struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx){ ctx }));
if (prev) {
vma = prev;
goto next;
}
if (vma->vm_start < start) {
ret = split_vma(mm, vma, start, 1);
if (ret)
break;
}
if (vma->vm_end > end) {
ret = split_vma(mm, vma, end, 0);
if (ret)
break;
}
next:
/*
* In the vma_merge() successful mprotect-like case 8:
* the next vma was merged into the current one and
* the current one has not been updated yet.
*/
vma->vm_flags = new_flags;
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx = ctx;
skip:
prev = vma;
start = vma->vm_end;
vma = vma->vm_next;
} while (vma && vma->vm_start < end);
out_unlock:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
if (!ret) {
/*
* Now that we scanned all vmas we can already tell
* userland which ioctls methods are guaranteed to
* succeed on this range.
*/
if (put_user(basic_ioctls ? UFFD_API_RANGE_IOCTLS_BASIC :
UFFD_API_RANGE_IOCTLS,
&user_uffdio_register->ioctls))
ret = -EFAULT;
}
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The coredump implementation in the Linux kernel before 5.0.10 does not use locking or other mechanisms to prevent vma layout or vma flags changes while it runs, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information, cause a denial of service, or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a race condition with mmget_not_zero or get_task_mm calls. This is related to fs/userfaultfd.c, mm/mmap.c, fs/proc/task_mmu.c, and drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c.
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 169,687
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool GesturePoint::IsInSecondClickTimeWindow() const {
double duration = last_touch_time_ - last_tap_time_;
return duration < kMaximumSecondsBetweenDoubleClick;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly handle Tibetan text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,043
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IPV6DefragDoSturgesNovakTest(int policy, u_char *expected, size_t expected_len)
{
int i;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
/*
* Build the packets.
*/
int id = 1;
Packet *packets[17];
memset(packets, 0x00, sizeof(packets));
/*
* Original fragments.
*/
/* A*24 at 0. */
packets[0] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 0, 1, 'A', 24);
/* B*15 at 32. */
packets[1] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 32 >> 3, 1, 'B', 16);
/* C*24 at 48. */
packets[2] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 48 >> 3, 1, 'C', 24);
/* D*8 at 80. */
packets[3] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 80 >> 3, 1, 'D', 8);
/* E*16 at 104. */
packets[4] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 104 >> 3, 1, 'E', 16);
/* F*24 at 120. */
packets[5] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 120 >> 3, 1, 'F', 24);
/* G*16 at 144. */
packets[6] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 144 >> 3, 1, 'G', 16);
/* H*16 at 160. */
packets[7] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 160 >> 3, 1, 'H', 16);
/* I*8 at 176. */
packets[8] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 176 >> 3, 1, 'I', 8);
/*
* Overlapping subsequent fragments.
*/
/* J*32 at 8. */
packets[9] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 8 >> 3, 1, 'J', 32);
/* K*24 at 48. */
packets[10] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 48 >> 3, 1, 'K', 24);
/* L*24 at 72. */
packets[11] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 72 >> 3, 1, 'L', 24);
/* M*24 at 96. */
packets[12] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 96 >> 3, 1, 'M', 24);
/* N*8 at 128. */
packets[13] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 128 >> 3, 1, 'N', 8);
/* O*8 at 152. */
packets[14] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 152 >> 3, 1, 'O', 8);
/* P*8 at 160. */
packets[15] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 160 >> 3, 1, 'P', 8);
/* Q*16 at 176. */
packets[16] = IPV6BuildTestPacket(id, 176 >> 3, 0, 'Q', 16);
default_policy = policy;
/* Send all but the last. */
for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) {
Packet *tp = Defrag(NULL, NULL, packets[i], NULL);
if (tp != NULL) {
SCFree(tp);
goto end;
}
if (ENGINE_ISSET_EVENT(packets[i], IPV6_FRAG_OVERLAP)) {
goto end;
}
}
int overlap = 0;
for (; i < 16; i++) {
Packet *tp = Defrag(NULL, NULL, packets[i], NULL);
if (tp != NULL) {
SCFree(tp);
goto end;
}
if (ENGINE_ISSET_EVENT(packets[i], IPV6_FRAG_OVERLAP)) {
overlap++;
}
}
if (!overlap)
goto end;
/* And now the last one. */
Packet *reassembled = Defrag(NULL, NULL, packets[16], NULL);
if (reassembled == NULL)
goto end;
if (memcmp(GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled) + 40, expected, expected_len) != 0)
goto end;
if (IPV6_GET_PLEN(reassembled) != 192)
goto end;
SCFree(reassembled);
/* Make sure all frags were returned to the pool. */
if (defrag_context->frag_pool->outstanding != 0) {
printf("defrag_context->frag_pool->outstanding %u: ", defrag_context->frag_pool->outstanding);
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
for (i = 0; i < 17; i++) {
SCFree(packets[i]);
}
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
|
Low
| 168,308
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void iwjpeg_scan_exif(struct iwjpegrcontext *rctx,
const iw_byte *d, size_t d_len)
{
struct iw_exif_state e;
iw_uint32 ifd;
if(d_len<8) return;
iw_zeromem(&e,sizeof(struct iw_exif_state));
e.d = d;
e.d_len = d_len;
e.endian = d[0]=='I' ? IW_ENDIAN_LITTLE : IW_ENDIAN_BIG;
ifd = iw_get_ui32_e(&d[4],e.endian);
iwjpeg_scan_exif_ifd(rctx,&e,ifd);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The iw_get_ui16be function in imagew-util.c:422:24 in libimageworsener.a in ImageWorsener 1.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read) via a crafted image, related to imagew-jpeg.c.
Commit Message: Fixed invalid memory access bugs when decoding JPEG Exif data
Fixes issues #22, #23, #24, #25
|
Medium
| 168,115
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.getExtensionCallback()");
WebGLRenderingContext* imp = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, name, args[0]);
WebGLExtension* extension = imp->getExtension(name);
return toV8Object(extension, args.Holder(), args.GetIsolate());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,121
|
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