instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadMONOImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
bit,
byte;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
/*
Initialize image colormap.
*/
image->depth=1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,2) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Convert bi-level image to pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (bit == 0)
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (image_info->endian == LSBEndian)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,((byte & 0x01) != 0) ? 0x00 : 0x01)
else
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,((byte & 0x01) != 0) ? 0x01 : 0x00)
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
bit=0;
byte>>=1;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,582
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
{
char description[16];
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = &key_type_request_key_auth,
.index_key.description = description,
.cred = current_cred(),
.match_data.cmp = user_match,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
};
struct key *authkey;
key_ref_t authkey_ref;
sprintf(description, "%x", target_id);
authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
if (authkey == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN))
authkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
goto error;
}
authkey = key_ref_to_ptr(authkey_ref);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) {
key_put(authkey);
authkey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
}
error:
return authkey;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.18 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via vectors involving a NULL value for a certain match field, related to the keyring_search_iterator function in keyring.c.
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 168,442
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadBMPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
BMPInfo
bmp_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
profile_data,
profile_size,
start_position;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
Quantum
index;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bit,
bytes_per_line,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
magick[12],
*pixels;
unsigned int
blue,
green,
offset_bits,
red;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a BMP file.
*/
(void) memset(&bmp_info,0,sizeof(bmp_info));
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
start_position=0;
offset_bits=0;
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if (count != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
PixelInfo
quantum_bits;
PixelPacket
shift;
/*
Verify BMP identifier.
*/
start_position=TellBlob(image)-2;
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
while (LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BA",2) == 0)
{
bmp_info.file_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.ba_offset=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.offset_bits=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if (count != 2)
break;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Magick: %c%c",
magick[0],magick[1]);
if ((count != 2) || ((LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BM",2) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"CI",2) != 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bmp_info.file_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.offset_bits=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," BMP size: %u",
bmp_info.size);
profile_data=0;
profile_size=0;
if (bmp_info.size == 12)
{
/*
OS/2 BMP image file.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"BMP2",MagickPathExtent);
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) ((short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) ((short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
bmp_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.x_pixels=0;
bmp_info.y_pixels=0;
bmp_info.number_colors=0;
bmp_info.compression=BI_RGB;
bmp_info.image_size=0;
bmp_info.alpha_mask=0;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format: OS/2 Bitmap");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Geometry: %.20gx%.20g",(double) bmp_info.width,(double)
bmp_info.height);
}
}
else
{
/*
Microsoft Windows BMP image file.
*/
if (bmp_info.size < 40)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NonOS2HeaderSizeError");
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
bmp_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.compression=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.image_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.x_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.y_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.number_colors=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((MagickSizeType) bmp_info.number_colors > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
bmp_info.colors_important=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format: MS Windows bitmap");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Geometry: %.20gx%.20g",(double) bmp_info.width,(double)
bmp_info.height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Bits per pixel: %.20g",(double) bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
switch (bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RGB");
break;
}
case BI_RLE4:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RLE4");
break;
}
case BI_RLE8:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RLE8");
break;
}
case BI_BITFIELDS:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_BITFIELDS");
break;
}
case BI_PNG:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_PNG");
break;
}
case BI_JPEG:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_JPEG");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: UNKNOWN (%u)",bmp_info.compression);
}
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Number of colors: %u",bmp_info.number_colors);
}
bmp_info.red_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.green_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.blue_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (bmp_info.size > 40)
{
double
gamma;
/*
Read color management information.
*/
bmp_info.alpha_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.colorspace=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
/*
Decode 2^30 fixed point formatted CIE primaries.
*/
# define BMP_DENOM ((double) 0x40000000)
bmp_info.red_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.red_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.red_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
gamma=bmp_info.red_primary.x+bmp_info.red_primary.y+
bmp_info.red_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.red_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.red_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=bmp_info.red_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=bmp_info.red_primary.y;
gamma=bmp_info.green_primary.x+bmp_info.green_primary.y+
bmp_info.green_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.green_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.green_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=bmp_info.green_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=bmp_info.green_primary.y;
gamma=bmp_info.blue_primary.x+bmp_info.blue_primary.y+
bmp_info.blue_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.blue_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.blue_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=bmp_info.blue_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=bmp_info.blue_primary.y;
/*
Decode 16^16 fixed point formatted gamma_scales.
*/
bmp_info.gamma_scale.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
bmp_info.gamma_scale.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
bmp_info.gamma_scale.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
/*
Compute a single gamma from the BMP 3-channel gamma.
*/
image->gamma=(bmp_info.gamma_scale.x+bmp_info.gamma_scale.y+
bmp_info.gamma_scale.z)/3.0;
}
else
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"BMP3",MagickPathExtent);
if (bmp_info.size > 108)
{
size_t
intent;
/*
Read BMP Version 5 color management information.
*/
intent=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
switch ((int) intent)
{
case LCS_GM_BUSINESS:
{
image->rendering_intent=SaturationIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_GRAPHICS:
{
image->rendering_intent=RelativeIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_IMAGES:
{
image->rendering_intent=PerceptualIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_ABS_COLORIMETRIC:
{
image->rendering_intent=AbsoluteIntent;
break;
}
}
profile_data=(MagickOffsetType)ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
profile_size=(MagickOffsetType)ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /* Reserved byte */
}
}
if ((MagickSizeType) bmp_info.file_size > GetBlobSize(image))
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"LengthAndFilesizeDoNotMatch","`%s'",image->filename);
else
if ((MagickSizeType) bmp_info.file_size < GetBlobSize(image))
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageWarning,"LengthAndFilesizeDoNotMatch","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (bmp_info.width <= 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
if (bmp_info.height == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
if (bmp_info.planes != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"StaticPlanesValueNotEqualToOne");
if ((bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 1) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 4) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 8) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 16) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 24) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnsupportedBitsPerPixel");
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16 &&
bmp_info.number_colors > (1U << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedNumberOfColors");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 1) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 8))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnsupportedBitsPerPixel");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 2) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnsupportedBitsPerPixel");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 3) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnsupportedBitsPerPixel");
switch (bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
image->compression=NoCompression;
break;
case BI_RLE8:
case BI_RLE4:
image->compression=RLECompression;
break;
case BI_BITFIELDS:
break;
case BI_JPEG:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"JPEGCompressNotSupported");
case BI_PNG:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"PNGCompressNotSupported");
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
image->columns=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(bmp_info.width);
image->rows=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(bmp_info.height);
image->depth=bmp_info.bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? bmp_info.bits_per_pixel : 8;
image->alpha_trait=((bmp_info.alpha_mask != 0) &&
(bmp_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS)) ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16)
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=bmp_info.number_colors;
one=1;
if (image->colors == 0)
image->colors=one << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel;
}
image->resolution.x=(double) bmp_info.x_pixels/100.0;
image->resolution.y=(double) bmp_info.y_pixels/100.0;
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
unsigned char
*bmp_colormap;
size_t
packet_size;
/*
Read BMP raster colormap.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading colormap of %.20g colors",(double) image->colors);
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
image->colors,4*sizeof(*bmp_colormap));
if (bmp_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((bmp_info.size == 12) || (bmp_info.size == 64))
packet_size=3;
else
packet_size=4;
offset=SeekBlob(image,start_position+14+bmp_info.size,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
{
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,bmp_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
{
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
p=bmp_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (packet_size == 4)
p++;
}
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
}
/*
Read image data.
*/
if (bmp_info.offset_bits == offset_bits)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
offset_bits=bmp_info.offset_bits;
offset=SeekBlob(image,start_position+bmp_info.offset_bits,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE4)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel<<=1;
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*bmp_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
length=(size_t) bytes_per_line*image->rows;
if ((MagickSizeType) (length/256) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if ((bmp_info.compression == BI_RGB) ||
(bmp_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,
MagickMax(bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading pixels (%.20g bytes)",(double) length);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,
MagickMax(bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
status=DecodeImage(image,bmp_info.compression,pixels,
image->columns*image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnableToRunlengthDecodeImage");
}
}
/*
Convert BMP raster image to pixel packets.
*/
if (bmp_info.compression == BI_RGB)
{
/*
We should ignore the alpha value in BMP3 files but there have been
reports about 32 bit files with alpha. We do a quick check to see if
the alpha channel contains a value that is not zero (default value).
If we find a non zero value we asume the program that wrote the file
wants to use the alpha channel.
*/
if ((image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait) &&
(bmp_info.size == 40) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 32))
{
bytes_per_line=4*(image->columns);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (*(p+3) != 0)
{
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
y=-1;
break;
}
p+=4;
}
}
}
bmp_info.alpha_mask=image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ?
0xff000000U : 0U;
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00ff0000U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x0000ff00U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x000000ffU;
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
/*
RGB555.
*/
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00007c00U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x000003e0U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x0000001fU;
}
}
(void) memset(&shift,0,sizeof(shift));
(void) memset(&quantum_bits,0,sizeof(quantum_bits));
if ((bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 16) || (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 32))
{
register unsigned int
sample;
/*
Get shift and quantum bits info from bitfield masks.
*/
if (bmp_info.red_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.red_mask << shift.red) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.red++;
if (shift.red >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.green_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.green_mask << shift.green) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.green++;
if (shift.green >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.blue_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.blue_mask << shift.blue) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.blue++;
if (shift.blue >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.alpha_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.alpha_mask << shift.alpha) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.alpha++;
if (shift.alpha >= 32U)
break;
}
sample=shift.red;
while (((bmp_info.red_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.red=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.red);
sample=shift.green;
while (((bmp_info.green_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.green=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.green);
sample=shift.blue;
while (((bmp_info.blue_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.blue=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.blue);
sample=shift.alpha;
while (((bmp_info.alpha_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.alpha=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.alpha);
}
switch (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=(Quantum) (((*p) & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=(Quantum) (((*p) & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) ((*p >> 4) & 0x0f),&index,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) (*p & 0x0f),&index,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) ((*p >> 4) & 0xf),&index,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p++;
x++;
}
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE8) ||
(bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE4))
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; --x)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) *p++,&index,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned int
alpha,
pixel;
/*
Convert bitfield encoded 16-bit PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression != BI_RGB) &&
(bmp_info.compression != BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
bytes_per_line=2*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(unsigned int) (*p++);
pixel|=(*p++) << 8;
red=((pixel & bmp_info.red_mask) << shift.red) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.red == 5)
red|=((red & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.red <= 8)
red|=((red & 0xff00) >> 8);
green=((pixel & bmp_info.green_mask) << shift.green) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.green == 5)
green|=((green & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.green == 6)
green|=((green & 0xc000) >> 6);
if (quantum_bits.green <= 8)
green|=((green & 0xff00) >> 8);
blue=((pixel & bmp_info.blue_mask) << shift.blue) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.blue == 5)
blue|=((blue & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.blue <= 8)
blue|=((blue & 0xff00) >> 8);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
alpha=((pixel & bmp_info.alpha_mask) << shift.alpha) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.alpha <= 8)
alpha|=((alpha & 0xff00) >> 8);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) alpha),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*24+31)/32);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
/*
Convert bitfield encoded DirectColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression != BI_RGB) &&
(bmp_info.compression != BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
bytes_per_line=4*(image->columns);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
unsigned int
alpha,
pixel;
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(unsigned int) (*p++);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 8);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 16);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 24);
red=((pixel & bmp_info.red_mask) << shift.red) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.red == 8)
red|=(red >> 8);
green=((pixel & bmp_info.green_mask) << shift.green) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.green == 8)
green|=(green >> 8);
blue=((pixel & bmp_info.blue_mask) << shift.blue) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.blue == 8)
blue|=(blue >> 8);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
alpha=((pixel & bmp_info.alpha_mask) << shift.alpha) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.alpha == 8)
alpha|=(alpha >> 8);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) alpha),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (y > 0)
break;
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if (bmp_info.height < 0)
{
Image
*flipped_image;
/*
Correct image orientation.
*/
flipped_image=FlipImage(image,exception);
if (flipped_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
DuplicateBlob(flipped_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image, flipped_image);
image=flipped_image;
}
}
/*
Read embeded ICC profile
*/
if ((bmp_info.colorspace == 0x4D424544L) && (profile_data > 0) &&
(profile_size > 0))
{
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned char
*datum;
offset=start_position+14+profile_data;
if ((offset < TellBlob(image)) ||
(SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET) != offset) ||
(GetBlobSize(image) < (MagickSizeType) (offset+profile_size)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
profile=AcquireStringInfo((size_t) profile_size);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
if (ReadBlob(image,(size_t) profile_size,datum) == (ssize_t) profile_size)
{
MagickOffsetType
profile_size_orig;
/*
Trimming padded bytes.
*/
profile_size_orig=(MagickOffsetType) datum[0] << 24;
profile_size_orig|=(MagickOffsetType) datum[1] << 16;
profile_size_orig|=(MagickOffsetType) datum[2] << 8;
profile_size_orig|=(MagickOffsetType) datum[3];
if (profile_size_orig < profile_size)
SetStringInfoLength(profile,(size_t) profile_size_orig);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Profile: ICC, %u bytes",(unsigned int) profile_size_orig);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile,exception);
}
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) bmp_info.ba_offset;
if (offset != 0)
if ((offset < TellBlob(image)) ||
(SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET) != offset))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
*magick='\0';
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if ((count == 2) && (IsBMP(magick,2) != MagickFalse))
{
/*
Acquire next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (IsBMP(magick,2) != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick before 7.0.8-50 has a memory leak vulnerability in the function ReadVIFFImage in coders/viff.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1600
|
Medium
| 169,622
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t nfs4_proc_get_acl(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
int ret;
if (!nfs4_server_supports_acls(server))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ret = nfs_revalidate_inode(server, inode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (NFS_I(inode)->cache_validity & NFS_INO_INVALID_ACL)
nfs_zap_acl_cache(inode);
ret = nfs4_read_cached_acl(inode, buf, buflen);
if (ret != -ENOENT)
return ret;
return nfs4_get_acl_uncached(inode, buf, buflen);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.2.2 does not properly handle bitmap sizes in GETACL replies, which allows remote NFS servers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending an excessive number of bitmap words.
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
High
| 165,718
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int cmd_mount(void *data, const char *_input) {
ut64 off = 0;
char *input, *oinput, *ptr, *ptr2;
RList *list;
RListIter *iter;
RFSFile *file;
RFSRoot *root;
RFSPlugin *plug;
RFSPartition *part;
RCore *core = (RCore *)data;
if (!strncmp ("kdir", _input, 4)) {
return cmd_mkdir (data, _input);
}
if (!strncmp ("v", _input, 1)) {
return cmd_mv (data, _input);
}
input = oinput = strdup (_input);
switch (*input) {
case ' ':
input++;
if (input[0]==' ')
input++;
ptr = strchr (input, ' ');
if (ptr) {
*ptr = 0;
ptr++;
ptr2 = strchr (ptr, ' ');
if (ptr2) {
*ptr2 = 0;
off = r_num_math (core->num, ptr2+1);
}
if (!r_fs_mount (core->fs, ptr, input, off))
eprintf ("Cannot mount %s\n", input);
} else {
if (!(ptr = r_fs_name (core->fs, core->offset)))
eprintf ("Unknown filesystem type\n");
else if (!r_fs_mount (core->fs, ptr, input, core->offset))
eprintf ("Cannot mount %s\n", input);
free (ptr);
}
break;
case '-':
r_fs_umount (core->fs, input+1);
break;
case '*':
eprintf ("List commands in radare format\n");
r_list_foreach (core->fs->roots, iter, root) {
r_cons_printf ("m %s %s 0x%"PFMT64x"\n",
root-> path, root->p->name, root->delta);
}
break;
case '\0':
r_list_foreach (core->fs->roots, iter, root) {
r_cons_printf ("%s\t0x%"PFMT64x"\t%s\n",
root->p->name, root->delta, root->path);
}
break;
case 'l': // list of plugins
r_list_foreach (core->fs->plugins, iter, plug) {
r_cons_printf ("%10s %s\n", plug->name, plug->desc);
}
break;
case 'd':
input++;
if (input[0]==' ')
input++;
list = r_fs_dir (core->fs, input);
if (list) {
r_list_foreach (list, iter, file) {
r_cons_printf ("%c %s\n", file->type, file->name);
}
r_list_free (list);
} else eprintf ("Cannot open '%s' directory\n", input);
break;
case 'p':
input++;
if (*input == ' ')
input++;
ptr = strchr (input, ' ');
if (ptr) {
*ptr = 0;
off = r_num_math (core->num, ptr+1);
}
list = r_fs_partitions (core->fs, input, off);
if (list) {
r_list_foreach (list, iter, part) {
r_cons_printf ("%d %02x 0x%010"PFMT64x" 0x%010"PFMT64x"\n",
part->number, part->type,
part->start, part->start+part->length);
}
r_list_free (list);
} else eprintf ("Cannot read partition\n");
break;
case 'o':
input++;
if (input[0]==' ')
input++;
file = r_fs_open (core->fs, input);
if (file) {
r_fs_read (core->fs, file, 0, file->size);
r_cons_printf ("f file %d 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", file->size, file->off);
r_fs_close (core->fs, file);
} else eprintf ("Cannot open file\n");
break;
case 'g':
input++;
if (*input == ' ')
input++;
ptr = strchr (input, ' ');
if (ptr)
*ptr++ = 0;
else
ptr = "./";
file = r_fs_open (core->fs, input);
if (file) {
r_fs_read (core->fs, file, 0, file->size);
write (1, file->data, file->size);
r_fs_close (core->fs, file);
write (1, "\n", 1);
} else if (!r_fs_dir_dump (core->fs, input, ptr))
eprintf ("Cannot open file\n");
break;
case 'f':
input++;
switch (*input) {
case '?':
r_cons_printf (
"Usage: mf[no] [...]\n"
" mfn /foo *.c ; search files by name in /foo path\n"
" mfo /foo 0x5e91 ; search files by offset in /foo path\n"
);
break;
case 'n':
input++;
if (*input == ' ')
input++;
ptr = strchr (input, ' ');
if (ptr) {
*ptr++ = 0;
list = r_fs_find_name (core->fs, input, ptr);
r_list_foreach (list, iter, ptr) {
r_str_chop_path (ptr);
printf ("%s\n", ptr);
}
} else eprintf ("Unknown store path\n");
break;
case 'o':
input++;
if (*input == ' ')
input++;
ptr = strchr (input, ' ');
if (ptr) {
*ptr++ = 0;
ut64 off = r_num_math (core->num, ptr);
list = r_fs_find_off (core->fs, input, off);
r_list_foreach (list, iter, ptr) {
r_str_chop_path (ptr);
printf ("%s\n", ptr);
}
} else eprintf ("Unknown store path\n");
break;
}
break;
case 's':
if (core->http_up) {
free (oinput);
return false;
}
input++;
if (input[0]==' ')
input++;
r_fs_prompt (core->fs, input);
break;
case 'y':
eprintf ("TODO\n");
break;
case '?': {
const char* help_msg[] = {
"Usage:", "m[-?*dgy] [...] ", "Mountpoints management",
"m", "", "List all mountpoints in human readable format",
"m*", "", "Same as above, but in r2 commands",
"ml", "", "List filesystem plugins",
"m", " /mnt", "Mount fs at /mnt with autodetect fs and current offset",
"m", " /mnt ext2 0", "Mount ext2 fs at /mnt with delta 0 on IO",
"m-/", "", "Umount given path (/)",
"my", "", "Yank contents of file into clipboard",
"mo", " /foo", "Get offset and size of given file",
"mg", " /foo", "Get contents of file/dir dumped to disk (XXX?)",
"mf", "[?] [o|n]", "Search files for given filename or for offset",
"md", " /", "List directory contents for path",
"mp", "", "List all supported partition types",
"mp", " msdos 0", "Show partitions in msdos format at offset 0",
"ms", " /mnt", "Open filesystem prompt at /mnt",
NULL};
r_core_cmd_help (core, help_msg);
}
break;
}
free (oinput);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The grub_ext2_read_block function in fs/ext2.c in GNU GRUB before 2013-11-12, as used in shlr/grub/fs/ext2.c in radare2 1.5.0, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (excessive stack use and application crash) via a crafted binary file, related to use of a variable-size stack array.
Commit Message: Fix #7723 - crash in ext2 GRUB code because of variable size array in stack
|
Low
| 168,086
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GC_API void * GC_CALL GC_generic_malloc(size_t lb, int k)
{
void * result;
DCL_LOCK_STATE;
if (EXPECT(GC_have_errors, FALSE))
GC_print_all_errors();
GC_INVOKE_FINALIZERS();
if (SMALL_OBJ(lb)) {
LOCK();
result = GC_generic_malloc_inner((word)lb, k);
UNLOCK();
} else {
size_t lg;
size_t lb_rounded;
word n_blocks;
GC_bool init;
lg = ROUNDED_UP_GRANULES(lb);
lb_rounded = GRANULES_TO_BYTES(lg);
n_blocks = OBJ_SZ_TO_BLOCKS(lb_rounded);
init = GC_obj_kinds[k].ok_init;
LOCK();
result = (ptr_t)GC_alloc_large(lb_rounded, k, 0);
if (0 != result) {
if (GC_debugging_started) {
BZERO(result, n_blocks * HBLKSIZE);
} else {
# ifdef THREADS
/* Clear any memory that might be used for GC descriptors */
/* before we release the lock. */
((word *)result)[0] = 0;
((word *)result)[1] = 0;
((word *)result)[GRANULES_TO_WORDS(lg)-1] = 0;
((word *)result)[GRANULES_TO_WORDS(lg)-2] = 0;
# endif
}
}
GC_bytes_allocd += lb_rounded;
UNLOCK();
if (init && !GC_debugging_started && 0 != result) {
BZERO(result, n_blocks * HBLKSIZE);
}
}
if (0 == result) {
return((*GC_get_oom_fn())(lb));
} else {
return(result);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the (1) GC_generic_malloc and (2) calloc functions in malloc.c, and the (3) GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page function in mallocx.c in Boehm-Demers-Weiser GC (libgc) before 7.2 make it easier for context-dependent attackers to perform memory-related attacks such as buffer overflows via a large size value, which causes less memory to be allocated than expected.
Commit Message: Fix allocation size overflows due to rounding.
* malloc.c (GC_generic_malloc): Check if the allocation size is
rounded to a smaller value.
* mallocx.c (GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page): Likewise.
|
Low
| 169,878
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PlatformSensor::PlatformSensor(mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
PlatformSensorProvider* provider)
: task_runner_(base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()),
shared_buffer_mapping_(std::move(mapping)),
type_(type),
provider_(provider),
weak_factory_(this) {}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,822
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void QuitMessageLoop() {
base::RunLoop::QuitCurrentWhenIdleDeprecated();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-94
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux relies on an IFRAME source URL to identify an associated extension, which allows remote attackers to conduct extension-bindings injection attacks by leveraging script access to a resource that initially has the about:blank URL.
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
|
Medium
| 172,054
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int handle_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
u32 intr_info, ex_no, error_code;
unsigned long cr2, rip, dr6;
u32 vect_info;
enum emulation_result er;
vect_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
intr_info = vmx->exit_intr_info;
if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
return handle_machine_check(vcpu);
if ((intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) == INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR)
return 1; /* already handled by vmx_vcpu_run() */
if (is_no_device(intr_info)) {
vmx_fpu_activate(vcpu);
return 1;
}
if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info)) {
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
er = emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD);
if (er != EMULATE_DONE)
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
error_code = 0;
if (intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
/*
* The #PF with PFEC.RSVD = 1 indicates the guest is accessing
* MMIO, it is better to report an internal error.
* See the comments in vmx_handle_exit.
*/
if ((vect_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
!(is_page_fault(intr_info) && !(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK))) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_SIMUL_EX;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 3;
vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vect_info;
vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = intr_info;
vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = error_code;
return 0;
}
if (is_page_fault(intr_info)) {
/* EPT won't cause page fault directly */
BUG_ON(enable_ept);
cr2 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
trace_kvm_page_fault(cr2, error_code);
if (kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu))
kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt(vcpu, cr2);
return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, cr2, error_code, NULL, 0);
}
ex_no = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no))
return handle_rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no, error_code);
switch (ex_no) {
case AC_VECTOR:
kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code);
return 1;
case DB_VECTOR:
dr6 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))) {
vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~15;
vcpu->arch.dr6 |= dr6 | DR6_RTM;
if (!(dr6 & ~DR6_RESERVED)) /* icebp */
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = dr6 | DR6_FIXED_1;
kvm_run->debug.arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
/* fall through */
case BP_VECTOR:
/*
* Update instruction length as we may reinject #BP from
* user space while in guest debugging mode. Reading it for
* #DB as well causes no harm, it is not used in that case.
*/
vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE) + rip;
kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = ex_no;
break;
default:
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
kvm_run->ex.exception = ex_no;
kvm_run->ex.error_code = error_code;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-388
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c in the Linux kernel through 4.9 mismanages the #BP and #OF exceptions, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) by declining to handle an exception thrown by an L2 guest.
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,854
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int dcbnl_getperm_hwaddr(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u8 perm_addr[MAX_ADDR_LEN];
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpermhwaddr)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpermhwaddr(netdev, perm_addr);
return nla_put(skb, DCB_ATTR_PERM_HWADDR, sizeof(perm_addr), perm_addr);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: net/dcb/dcbnl.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 does not initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,058
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SyncType GetSyncType(const Extension* extension) {
if (!IsSyncable(extension)) {
return SYNC_TYPE_NONE;
}
if (!ManifestURL::GetUpdateURL(extension).is_empty() &&
!ManifestURL::UpdatesFromGallery(extension)) {
return SYNC_TYPE_NONE;
}
if (PluginInfo::HasPlugins(extension))
return SYNC_TYPE_NONE;
switch (extension->GetType()) {
case Manifest::TYPE_EXTENSION:
return SYNC_TYPE_EXTENSION;
case Manifest::TYPE_USER_SCRIPT:
if (ManifestURL::UpdatesFromGallery(extension))
return SYNC_TYPE_EXTENSION;
return SYNC_TYPE_NONE;
case Manifest::TYPE_HOSTED_APP:
case Manifest::TYPE_LEGACY_PACKAGED_APP:
case Manifest::TYPE_PLATFORM_APP:
return SYNC_TYPE_APP;
case Manifest::TYPE_UNKNOWN:
case Manifest::TYPE_THEME:
case Manifest::TYPE_SHARED_MODULE:
return SYNC_TYPE_NONE;
}
NOTREACHED();
return SYNC_TYPE_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: common/extensions/sync_helper.cc in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 proceeds with sync operations for NPAPI extensions without checking for a certain plugin permission setting, which might allow remote attackers to trigger unwanted extension changes via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix syncing of NPAPI plugins.
This fix adds a check for |plugin| permission
while syncing NPAPI plugins.
BUG=252034
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16816024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207830 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,248
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void put_prev_task(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *prev)
{
if (prev->se.on_rq)
update_rq_clock(rq);
rq->skip_clock_update = 0;
prev->sched_class->put_prev_task(rq, prev);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The Linux kernel before 2.6.37 does not properly implement a certain clock-update optimization, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via an application that executes code in a loop.
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,676
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadMATImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image, *image2=NULL,
*rotated_image;
PixelPacket *q;
unsigned int status;
MATHeader MATLAB_HDR;
size_t size;
size_t CellType;
QuantumInfo *quantum_info;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
int i;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff = NULL;
double MinVal, MaxVal;
size_t Unknown6;
unsigned z, z2;
unsigned Frames;
int logging;
int sample_size;
MagickOffsetType filepos=0x80;
BlobInfo *blob;
size_t one;
unsigned int (*ReadBlobXXXLong)(Image *image);
unsigned short (*ReadBlobXXXShort)(Image *image);
void (*ReadBlobDoublesXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, double *data);
void (*ReadBlobFloatsXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, float *data);
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging = LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"enter");
/*
Open image file.
*/
image = AcquireImage(image_info);
status = OpenBlob(image_info, image, ReadBinaryBlobMode, exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read MATLAB image.
*/
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if(ReadBlob(image,124,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.identific) != 124)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific,"MATLAB",6) != 0)
{
image2=ReadMATImageV4(image_info,image,exception);
if (image2 == NULL)
goto MATLAB_KO;
image=image2;
goto END_OF_READING;
}
MATLAB_HDR.Version = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator) != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Endian %c%c",
MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[0],MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[1]);
if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "IM", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobLSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobLSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesLSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsLSB;
image->endian = LSBEndian;
}
else if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "MI", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobMSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobMSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesMSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsMSB;
image->endian = MSBEndian;
}
else
goto MATLAB_KO; /* unsupported endian */
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific, "MATLAB", 6))
MATLAB_KO: ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
filepos = TellBlob(image);
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
Frames = 1;
(void) SeekBlob(image,filepos,SEEK_SET);
/* printf("pos=%X\n",TellBlob(image)); */
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
filepos += MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize + 4 + 4;
image2 = image;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType == miCOMPRESSED)
{
image2 = DecompressBlock(image,MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize,clone_info,exception);
if(image2==NULL) continue;
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* replace compressed object type. */
}
#endif
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType!=miMATRIX) continue; /* skip another objects. */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown1 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown2 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass = MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag = (MATLAB_HDR.unknown5>>8) & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.unknown3 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if(image!=image2)
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* ??? don't understand why ?? */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeX = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeY = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
switch(MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag)
{
case 8: z2=z=1; break; /* 2D matrix*/
case 12: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 3D matrix RGB*/
Unknown6 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
(void) Unknown6;
if(z!=3) ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
break;
case 16: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 4D matrix animation */
if(z!=3 && z!=1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
Frames = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
break;
default: ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
MATLAB_HDR.Flag1 = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass %d",MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass);
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxCHAR_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxSINGLE_CLASS && /* float + complex float */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxDOUBLE_CLASS && /* double + complex double */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT8_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT8_CLASS && /* uint8 + uint8 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT16_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT16_CLASS && /* uint16 + uint16 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT32_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT32_CLASS && /* uint32 + uint32 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT64_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT64_CLASS) /* uint64 + uint64 3D */
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
switch (MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag)
{
case 0:
size = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Object name string size */
size = 4 * (ssize_t) ((size + 3 + 1) / 4);
(void) SeekBlob(image2, size, SEEK_CUR);
break;
case 1:
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* Object name string */
break;
default:
goto MATLAB_KO;
}
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
if (logging)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.CellType: %.20g",(double) CellType);
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* data size */
NEXT_FRAME:
switch (CellType)
{
case miINT8:
case miUINT8:
sample_size = 8;
if(MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL)
image->depth = 1;
else
image->depth = 8; /* Byte type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
break;
case miINT16:
case miUINT16:
sample_size = 16;
image->depth = 16; /* Word type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (2 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT32:
case miUINT32:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* Dword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT64:
case miUINT64:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* Qword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miSINGLE:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex float type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miDOUBLE:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (sizeof(double) != 8)
RestoreMSCWarning
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "IncompatibleSizeOfDouble");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex double type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
}
(void) sample_size;
image->columns = MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
image->rows = MATLAB_HDR.SizeY;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(clone_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
one=1;
image->colors = one << image->depth;
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
goto MATLAB_KO;
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
{
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->type=GrayscaleType;
}
/*
If ping is true, then only set image size and colors without
reading any image data.
*/
if (image_info->ping)
{
size_t temp = image->columns;
image->columns = image->rows;
image->rows = temp;
goto done_reading; /* !!!!!! BAD !!!! */
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/* ----- Load raster data ----- */
BImgBuff = (unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (ldblk),sizeof(double)); /* Ldblk was set in the check phase */
if (BImgBuff == NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
MinVal = 0;
MaxVal = 0;
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE) /* Find Min and Max Values for floats */
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &quantum_info->minimum, &quantum_info->maximum);
}
/* Main loop for reading all scanlines */
if(z==1) z=0; /* read grey scanlines */
/* else read color scanlines */
do
{
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT set image pixels returns unexpected NULL on a row %u.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto done_reading; /* Skip image rotation, when cannot set image pixels */
}
if(ReadBlob(image2,ldblk,(unsigned char *)BImgBuff) != (ssize_t) ldblk)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT cannot read scanrow %u from a file.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
if((CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miUINT8) && (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL))
{
FixLogical((unsigned char *)BImgBuff,ldblk);
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
{
ImportQuantumPixelsFailed:
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to ImportQuantumPixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
break;
}
}
else
{
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
goto ImportQuantumPixelsFailed;
if (z<=1 && /* fix only during a last pass z==0 || z==1 */
(CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miINT16 || CellType==miINT32 || CellType==miINT64))
FixSignedValues(q,MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to sync image pixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
}
} while(z-- >= 2);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
ExitLoop:
/* Read complex part of numbers here */
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* Find Min and Max Values for complex parts of floats */
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
i = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* size of a complex part - toss away*/
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE)
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &MinVal, &MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miDOUBLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobDoublesXXX(image2, ldblk, (double *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexDoubleRow((double *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miSINGLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobFloatsXXX(image2, ldblk, (float *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexFloatRow((float *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
}
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix AGAIN!!! */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (image->depth == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
if(image2==image)
image2 = NULL; /* Remove shadow copy to an image before rotation. */
/* Rotate image. */
rotated_image = RotateImage(image, 90.0, exception);
if (rotated_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
/* Remove page offsets added by RotateImage */
rotated_image->page.x=0;
rotated_image->page.y=0;
blob = rotated_image->blob;
rotated_image->blob = image->blob;
rotated_image->colors = image->colors;
image->blob = blob;
AppendImageToList(&image,rotated_image);
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
}
done_reading:
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL) break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
/* row scan buffer is no longer needed */
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
BImgBuff = NULL;
if(--Frames>0)
{
z = z2;
if(image2==NULL) image2 = image;
goto NEXT_FRAME;
}
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image) /* Does shadow temporary decompressed image exist? */
{
/* CloseBlob(image2); */
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) unlink(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
}
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
END_OF_READING:
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
CloseBlob(image);
{
Image *p;
ssize_t scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=scene++;
}
if(clone_info != NULL) /* cleanup garbage file from compression */
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info = NULL;
}
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"return");
if(image==NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
return (image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/mat.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a mat file with an invalid number of frames.
Commit Message: Added check for invalid number of frames.
|
Medium
| 168,536
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
/*
* If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
* then nothing to do.
*/
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
(cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
return;
switch (cmd) {
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
return;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
goto retpoline_auto;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
goto retpoline_amd;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
goto retpoline_generic;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
goto retpoline_auto;
break;
}
pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
return;
retpoline_auto:
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
retpoline_amd:
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
goto retpoline_generic;
}
mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
} else {
retpoline_generic:
mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC :
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
}
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
/*
* If neither SMEP nor PTI are available, there is a risk of
* hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
* from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
* the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
*
* Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
* RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
* The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported
* or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
* switch is required.
*/
if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
}
/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
}
/*
* Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
* branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The spectre_v2_select_mitigation function in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c in the Linux kernel before 4.18.1 does not always fill RSB upon a context switch, which makes it easier for attackers to conduct userspace-userspace spectreRSB attacks.
Commit Message: x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack
Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks,
making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to
BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).
Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.
[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1807261308190.997@cbobk.fhfr.pm
|
Low
| 169,102
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::CreateNewDownloadItemToStart(
std::unique_ptr<download::DownloadCreateInfo> info,
const download::DownloadUrlParameters::OnStartedCallback& on_started,
download::InProgressDownloadManager::StartDownloadItemCallback callback,
uint32_t id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
download::DownloadItemImpl* download = CreateActiveItem(id, *info);
std::move(callback).Run(std::move(info), download,
should_persist_new_download_);
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.OnDownloadCreated(this, download);
OnNewDownloadCreated(download);
OnDownloadStarted(download, on_started);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Integer overflow in download manager in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform out of bounds memory access via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
|
Medium
| 172,966
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: spnego_gss_wrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer,
gss_buffer_t input_payload_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap_aead(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
input_assoc_buffer,
input_payload_buffer,
conf_state,
output_message_buffer);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,672
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestEventConstructor.Constructor");
if (!args.IsConstructCall())
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("DOM object constructor cannot be called as a function.");
if (ConstructorMode::current() == ConstructorMode::WrapExistingObject)
return args.Holder();
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, type, args[0]);
TestEventConstructorInit eventInit;
if (args.Length() >= 2) {
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(Dictionary, options, args[1]);
if (!fillTestEventConstructorInit(eventInit, options))
return v8::Undefined();
}
RefPtr<TestEventConstructor> event = TestEventConstructor::create(type, eventInit);
V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(args.Holder(), &info, event.get());
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForDOMObject(event.release(), v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(args.Holder()), args.GetIsolate());
return args.Holder();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,069
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gplotAddPlot(GPLOT *gplot,
NUMA *nax,
NUMA *nay,
l_int32 plotstyle,
const char *plottitle)
{
char buf[L_BUF_SIZE];
char emptystring[] = "";
char *datastr, *title;
l_int32 n, i;
l_float32 valx, valy, startx, delx;
SARRAY *sa;
PROCNAME("gplotAddPlot");
if (!gplot)
return ERROR_INT("gplot not defined", procName, 1);
if (!nay)
return ERROR_INT("nay not defined", procName, 1);
if (plotstyle < 0 || plotstyle >= NUM_GPLOT_STYLES)
return ERROR_INT("invalid plotstyle", procName, 1);
if ((n = numaGetCount(nay)) == 0)
return ERROR_INT("no points to plot", procName, 1);
if (nax && (n != numaGetCount(nax)))
return ERROR_INT("nax and nay sizes differ", procName, 1);
if (n == 1 && plotstyle == GPLOT_LINES) {
L_INFO("only 1 pt; changing style to points\n", procName);
plotstyle = GPLOT_POINTS;
}
/* Save plotstyle and plottitle */
numaGetParameters(nay, &startx, &delx);
numaAddNumber(gplot->plotstyles, plotstyle);
if (plottitle) {
title = stringNew(plottitle);
sarrayAddString(gplot->plottitles, title, L_INSERT);
} else {
sarrayAddString(gplot->plottitles, emptystring, L_COPY);
}
/* Generate and save data filename */
gplot->nplots++;
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%s.data.%d", gplot->rootname, gplot->nplots);
sarrayAddString(gplot->datanames, buf, L_COPY);
/* Generate data and save as a string */
sa = sarrayCreate(n);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (nax)
numaGetFValue(nax, i, &valx);
else
valx = startx + i * delx;
numaGetFValue(nay, i, &valy);
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "%f %f\n", valx, valy);
sarrayAddString(sa, buf, L_COPY);
}
datastr = sarrayToString(sa, 0);
sarrayAddString(gplot->plotdata, datastr, L_INSERT);
sarrayDestroy(&sa);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Leptonica before 1.75.3 does not limit the number of characters in a %s format argument to fscanf or sscanf, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long string, as demonstrated by the gplotRead and ptaReadStream functions.
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
|
Low
| 169,323
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: enum ImapAuthRes imap_auth_gss(struct ImapData *idata, const char *method)
{
gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token;
gss_buffer_t sec_token;
gss_name_t target_name;
gss_ctx_id_t context;
gss_OID mech_name;
char server_conf_flags;
gss_qop_t quality;
int cflags;
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
char buf1[GSS_BUFSIZE], buf2[GSS_BUFSIZE];
unsigned long buf_size;
int rc;
if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, AGSSAPI))
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
if (mutt_account_getuser(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
/* get an IMAP service ticket for the server */
snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "imap@%s", idata->conn->account.host);
request_buf.value = buf1;
request_buf.length = strlen(buf1);
maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, gss_nt_service_name, &target_name);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n", buf1);
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
}
else if (DebugLevel >= 2)
{
gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf, &mech_name);
mutt_debug(2, "Using service name [%s]\n", (char *) request_buf.value);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
}
/* Acquire initial credentials - without a TGT GSSAPI is UNAVAIL */
sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
/* build token */
maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &context, target_name,
GSS_C_NO_OID, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG,
0, GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, sec_token, NULL,
&send_token, (unsigned int *) &cflags, NULL);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
{
print_gss_error(maj_stat, min_stat);
mutt_debug(1, "Error acquiring credentials - no TGT?\n");
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
}
/* now begin login */
mutt_message(_("Authenticating (GSSAPI)..."));
imap_cmd_start(idata, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI");
/* expect a null continuation response ("+") */
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Invalid response from server: %s\n", buf1);
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
goto bail;
}
/* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
mutt_debug(2, "Sending credentials\n");
mutt_b64_encode(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length, sizeof(buf1) - 2);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
mutt_str_strcat(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "\r\n");
mutt_socket_send(idata->conn, buf1);
while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
{
/* Read server data */
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
mutt_debug(1, "#1 Error receiving server response.\n");
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
goto bail;
}
request_buf.length = mutt_b64_decode(buf2, idata->buf + 2);
request_buf.value = buf2;
sec_token = &request_buf;
/* Write client data */
maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(
&min_stat, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &context, target_name, GSS_C_NO_OID,
GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, 0, GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
sec_token, NULL, &send_token, (unsigned int *) &cflags, NULL);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
{
print_gss_error(maj_stat, min_stat);
mutt_debug(1, "Error exchanging credentials\n");
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
goto err_abort_cmd;
}
mutt_b64_encode(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length, sizeof(buf1) - 2);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
mutt_str_strcat(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "\r\n");
mutt_socket_send(idata->conn, buf1);
}
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
/* get security flags and buffer size */
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
mutt_debug(1, "#2 Error receiving server response.\n");
goto bail;
}
request_buf.length = mutt_b64_decode(buf2, idata->buf + 2);
request_buf.value = buf2;
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token, &cflags, &quality);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
{
print_gss_error(maj_stat, min_stat);
mutt_debug(2, "Couldn't unwrap security level data\n");
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
goto err_abort_cmd;
}
mutt_debug(2, "Credential exchange complete\n");
/* first octet is security levels supported. We want NONE */
server_conf_flags = ((char *) send_token.value)[0];
if (!(((char *) send_token.value)[0] & GSS_AUTH_P_NONE))
{
mutt_debug(2, "Server requires integrity or privacy\n");
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
goto err_abort_cmd;
}
/* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap content. But here it is */
((char *) send_token.value)[0] = '\0';
buf_size = ntohl(*((long *) send_token.value));
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
mutt_debug(2, "Unwrapped security level flags: %c%c%c\n",
(server_conf_flags & GSS_AUTH_P_NONE) ? 'N' : '-',
(server_conf_flags & GSS_AUTH_P_INTEGRITY) ? 'I' : '-',
(server_conf_flags & GSS_AUTH_P_PRIVACY) ? 'P' : '-');
mutt_debug(2, "Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n", buf_size);
/* agree to terms (hack!) */
buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* not relevant without integrity/privacy */
memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4);
buf1[0] = GSS_AUTH_P_NONE;
/* server decides if principal can log in as user */
strncpy(buf1 + 4, idata->conn->account.user, sizeof(buf1) - 4);
request_buf.value = buf1;
request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(idata->conn->account.user);
maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
&cflags, &send_token);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Error creating login request\n");
goto err_abort_cmd;
}
mutt_b64_encode(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length, sizeof(buf1) - 2);
mutt_debug(2, "Requesting authorisation as %s\n", idata->conn->account.user);
mutt_str_strcat(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "\r\n");
mutt_socket_send(idata->conn, buf1);
/* Joy of victory or agony of defeat? */
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc == IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Unexpected server continuation request.\n");
goto err_abort_cmd;
}
if (imap_code(idata->buf))
{
/* flush the security context */
mutt_debug(2, "Releasing GSS credentials\n");
maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
mutt_debug(1, "Error releasing credentials\n");
/* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
* credentials. RFC1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
* support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server knows
* enough to flush its own credentials */
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
return IMAP_AUTH_SUCCESS;
}
else
goto bail;
err_abort_cmd:
mutt_socket_send(idata->conn, "*\r\n");
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
bail:
mutt_error(_("GSSAPI authentication failed."));
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in Mutt before 1.10.1 and NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. They have a buffer overflow via base64 data.
Commit Message: Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report.
|
Low
| 169,127
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: deinterlace_row(png_bytep buffer, png_const_bytep row,
unsigned int pixel_size, png_uint_32 w, int pass)
{
/* The inverse of the above, 'row' is part of row 'y' of the output image,
* in 'buffer'. The image is 'w' wide and this is pass 'pass', distribute
* the pixels of row into buffer and return the number written (to allow
* this to be checked).
*/
png_uint_32 xin, xout, xstep;
xout = PNG_PASS_START_COL(pass);
xstep = 1U<<PNG_PASS_COL_SHIFT(pass);
for (xin=0; xout<w; xout+=xstep)
{
pixel_copy(buffer, xout, row, xin, pixel_size);
++xin;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,607
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BindSkiaToInProcessGL() {
static bool host_StubGL_installed = false;
if (!host_StubGL_installed) {
GrGLBinding binding;
switch (gfx::GetGLImplementation()) {
case gfx::kGLImplementationNone:
NOTREACHED();
return;
case gfx::kGLImplementationDesktopGL:
binding = kDesktop_GrGLBinding;
break;
case gfx::kGLImplementationOSMesaGL:
binding = kDesktop_GrGLBinding;
break;
case gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2:
binding = kES2_GrGLBinding;
break;
case gfx::kGLImplementationMockGL:
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
static GrGLInterface host_gl_interface = {
binding,
kProbe_GrGLCapability, // NPOTRenderTargetSupport
kProbe_GrGLCapability, // MinRenderTargetHeight
kProbe_GrGLCapability, // MinRenderTargetWidth
StubGLActiveTexture,
StubGLAttachShader,
StubGLBindAttribLocation,
StubGLBindBuffer,
StubGLBindTexture,
StubGLBlendColor,
StubGLBlendFunc,
StubGLBufferData,
StubGLBufferSubData,
StubGLClear,
StubGLClearColor,
StubGLClearStencil,
NULL, // glClientActiveTexture
NULL, // glColor4ub
StubGLColorMask,
NULL, // glColorPointer
StubGLCompileShader,
StubGLCompressedTexImage2D,
StubGLCreateProgram,
StubGLCreateShader,
StubGLCullFace,
StubGLDeleteBuffers,
StubGLDeleteProgram,
StubGLDeleteShader,
StubGLDeleteTextures,
StubGLDepthMask,
StubGLDisable,
NULL, // glDisableClientState
StubGLDisableVertexAttribArray,
StubGLDrawArrays,
StubGLDrawElements,
StubGLEnable,
NULL, // glEnableClientState
StubGLEnableVertexAttribArray,
StubGLFrontFace,
StubGLGenBuffers,
StubGLGenTextures,
StubGLGetBufferParameteriv,
StubGLGetError,
StubGLGetIntegerv,
StubGLGetProgramInfoLog,
StubGLGetProgramiv,
StubGLGetShaderInfoLog,
StubGLGetShaderiv,
StubGLGetString,
StubGLGetUniformLocation,
StubGLLineWidth,
StubGLLinkProgram,
NULL, // glLoadMatrixf
NULL, // glMatrixMode
StubGLPixelStorei,
NULL, // glPointSize
StubGLReadPixels,
StubGLScissor,
NULL, // glShadeModel
StubGLShaderSource,
StubGLStencilFunc,
StubGLStencilFuncSeparate,
StubGLStencilMask,
StubGLStencilMaskSeparate,
StubGLStencilOp,
StubGLStencilOpSeparate,
NULL, // glTexCoordPointer
NULL, // glTexEnvi
StubGLTexImage2D,
StubGLTexParameteri,
StubGLTexSubImage2D,
StubGLUniform1f,
StubGLUniform1i,
StubGLUniform1fv,
StubGLUniform1iv,
StubGLUniform2f,
StubGLUniform2i,
StubGLUniform2fv,
StubGLUniform2iv,
StubGLUniform3f,
StubGLUniform3i,
StubGLUniform3fv,
StubGLUniform3iv,
StubGLUniform4f,
StubGLUniform4i,
StubGLUniform4fv,
StubGLUniform4iv,
StubGLUniformMatrix2fv,
StubGLUniformMatrix3fv,
StubGLUniformMatrix4fv,
StubGLUseProgram,
StubGLVertexAttrib4fv,
StubGLVertexAttribPointer,
NULL, // glVertexPointer
StubGLViewport,
StubGLBindFramebuffer,
StubGLBindRenderbuffer,
StubGLCheckFramebufferStatus,
StubGLDeleteFramebuffers,
StubGLDeleteRenderbuffers,
StubGLFramebufferRenderbuffer,
StubGLFramebufferTexture2D,
StubGLGenFramebuffers,
StubGLGenRenderbuffers,
StubGLRenderBufferStorage,
StubGLRenderbufferStorageMultisample,
StubGLBlitFramebuffer,
NULL, // glResolveMultisampleFramebuffer
StubGLMapBuffer,
StubGLUnmapBuffer,
NULL, // glBindFragDataLocationIndexed
GrGLInterface::kStaticInitEndGuard,
};
GrGLSetGLInterface(&host_gl_interface);
host_StubGL_installed = true;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on 32-bit platforms allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving uniform arrays.
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,371
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: makepol(QPRS_STATE *state)
{
int32 val = 0,
type;
int32 lenval = 0;
char *strval = NULL;
int32 stack[STACKDEPTH];
int32 lenstack = 0;
uint16 flag = 0;
while ((type = gettoken_query(state, &val, &lenval, &strval, &flag)) != END)
{
switch (type)
{
case VAL:
pushval_asis(state, VAL, strval, lenval, flag);
while (lenstack && (stack[lenstack - 1] == (int32) '&' ||
stack[lenstack - 1] == (int32) '!'))
{
lenstack--;
pushquery(state, OPR, stack[lenstack], 0, 0, 0);
}
break;
case OPR:
if (lenstack && val == (int32) '|')
pushquery(state, OPR, val, 0, 0, 0);
else
{
if (lenstack == STACKDEPTH)
/* internal error */
elog(ERROR, "stack too short");
stack[lenstack] = val;
lenstack++;
}
break;
case OPEN:
if (makepol(state) == ERR)
return ERR;
while (lenstack && (stack[lenstack - 1] == (int32) '&' ||
stack[lenstack - 1] == (int32) '!'))
{
lenstack--;
pushquery(state, OPR, stack[lenstack], 0, 0, 0);
}
break;
case CLOSE:
while (lenstack)
{
lenstack--;
pushquery(state, OPR, stack[lenstack], 0, 0, 0);
};
return END;
break;
case ERR:
default:
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
errmsg("syntax error")));
return ERR;
}
}
while (lenstack)
{
lenstack--;
pushquery(state, OPR, stack[lenstack], 0, 0, 0);
};
return END;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c in PostgreSQL 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the (1) hstore_recv, (2) hstore_from_arrays, and (3) hstore_from_array functions in contrib/hstore/hstore_io.c; and the (4) hstoreArrayToPairs function in contrib/hstore/hstore_op.c, which triggers a buffer overflow. NOTE: this issue was SPLIT from CVE-2014-0064 because it has a different set of affected versions.
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
Low
| 166,407
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: init_remote_listener(int port, gboolean encrypted)
{
int rc;
int *ssock = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in saddr;
int optval;
static struct mainloop_fd_callbacks remote_listen_fd_callbacks =
{
.dispatch = cib_remote_listen,
.destroy = remote_connection_destroy,
};
if (port <= 0) {
/* dont start it */
return 0;
}
if (encrypted) {
#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
crm_warn("TLS support is not available");
return 0;
#else
crm_notice("Starting a tls listener on port %d.", port);
gnutls_global_init();
/* gnutls_global_set_log_level (10); */
gnutls_global_set_log_function(debug_log);
gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_params);
gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_params, DH_BITS);
gnutls_anon_allocate_server_credentials(&anon_cred_s);
gnutls_anon_set_server_dh_params(anon_cred_s, dh_params);
#endif
} else {
crm_warn("Starting a plain_text listener on port %d.", port);
}
#ifndef HAVE_PAM
crm_warn("PAM is _not_ enabled!");
#endif
/* create server socket */
ssock = malloc(sizeof(int));
*ssock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (*ssock == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not create server socket." ERROR_SUFFIX);
free(ssock);
return -1;
}
/* reuse address */
optval = 1;
rc = setsockopt(*ssock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &optval, sizeof(optval));
if(rc < 0) {
crm_perror(LOG_INFO, "Couldn't allow the reuse of local addresses by our remote listener");
}
/* bind server socket */
memset(&saddr, '\0', sizeof(saddr));
saddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
saddr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
saddr.sin_port = htons(port);
if (bind(*ssock, (struct sockaddr *)&saddr, sizeof(saddr)) == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not bind server socket." ERROR_SUFFIX);
close(*ssock);
free(ssock);
return -2;
}
if (listen(*ssock, 10) == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not start listen." ERROR_SUFFIX);
close(*ssock);
free(ssock);
return -3;
}
mainloop_add_fd("cib-remote", G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, *ssock, ssock, &remote_listen_fd_callbacks);
return *ssock;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
Medium
| 166,150
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CrosMock::SetSpeechSynthesisLibraryExpectations() {
InSequence s;
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, StopSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, Speak(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, IsSpeaking())
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(true));
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, StopSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, Speak(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, IsSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.WillOnce(Return(false))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,372
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
poll_table *wait)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk, *other;
unsigned int mask, writable;
sock_poll_wait(file, sk_sleep(sk), wait);
mask = 0;
/* exceptional events? */
if (sk->sk_err || !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue))
mask |= POLLERR |
(sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0);
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
mask |= POLLRDHUP | POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (sk->sk_shutdown == SHUTDOWN_MASK)
mask |= POLLHUP;
/* readable? */
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
/* Connection-based need to check for termination and startup */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE)
mask |= POLLHUP;
/* connection hasn't started yet? */
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_SENT)
return mask;
}
/* No write status requested, avoid expensive OUT tests. */
if (!(poll_requested_events(wait) & (POLLWRBAND|POLLWRNORM|POLLOUT)))
return mask;
writable = unix_writable(sk);
other = unix_peer_get(sk);
if (other) {
if (unix_peer(other) != sk) {
sock_poll_wait(file, &unix_sk(other)->peer_wait, wait);
if (unix_recvq_full(other))
writable = 0;
}
sock_put(other);
}
if (writable)
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND;
else
set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
return mask;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in net/unix/af_unix.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 allows local users to bypass intended AF_UNIX socket permissions or cause a denial of service (panic) via crafted epoll_ctl calls.
Commit Message: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,835
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RunFwdTxfm(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride) {
fwd_txfm_(in, out, stride);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,549
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int OmniboxViewViews::OnDrop(const ui::OSExchangeData& data) {
if (HasTextBeingDragged())
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_NONE;
if (data.HasURL(ui::OSExchangeData::CONVERT_FILENAMES)) {
GURL url;
base::string16 title;
if (data.GetURLAndTitle(
ui::OSExchangeData::CONVERT_FILENAMES, &url, &title)) {
base::string16 text(
StripJavascriptSchemas(base::UTF8ToUTF16(url.spec())));
if (model()->CanPasteAndGo(text)) {
model()->PasteAndGo(text);
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_COPY;
}
}
} else if (data.HasString()) {
base::string16 text;
if (data.GetString(&text)) {
base::string16 collapsed_text(base::CollapseWhitespace(text, true));
if (model()->CanPasteAndGo(collapsed_text))
model()->PasteAndGo(collapsed_text);
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_COPY;
}
}
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 63.0.3239.84 allowed a socially engineered user to XSS themselves by dragging and dropping a javascript: URL into the URL bar.
Commit Message: Strip JavaScript schemas on Linux text drop
When dropping text onto the Omnibox, any leading JavaScript schemes
should be stripped to avoid a "self-XSS" attack. This stripping already
occurs in all cases except when plaintext is dropped on Linux. This CL
corrects that oversight.
Bug: 768910
Change-Id: I43af24ace4a13cf61d15a32eb9382dcdd498a062
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/685638
Reviewed-by: Justin Donnelly <jdonnelly@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504695}
|
Medium
| 172,937
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int mboxlist_do_find(struct find_rock *rock, const strarray_t *patterns)
{
const char *userid = rock->userid;
int isadmin = rock->isadmin;
int crossdomains = config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_CROSSDOMAINS);
char inbox[MAX_MAILBOX_BUFFER];
size_t inboxlen = 0;
size_t prefixlen, len;
size_t domainlen = 0;
size_t userlen = userid ? strlen(userid) : 0;
char domainpat[MAX_MAILBOX_BUFFER]; /* do intra-domain fetches only */
char commonpat[MAX_MAILBOX_BUFFER];
int r = 0;
int i;
const char *p;
if (patterns->count < 1) return 0; /* nothing to do */
for (i = 0; i < patterns->count; i++) {
glob *g = glob_init(strarray_nth(patterns, i), rock->namespace->hier_sep);
ptrarray_append(&rock->globs, g);
}
if (config_virtdomains && userid && (p = strchr(userid, '@'))) {
userlen = p - userid;
domainlen = strlen(p); /* includes separator */
snprintf(domainpat, sizeof(domainpat), "%s!", p+1);
}
else
domainpat[0] = '\0';
/* calculate the inbox (with trailing .INBOX. for later use) */
if (userid && (!(p = strchr(userid, rock->namespace->hier_sep)) ||
((p - userid) > (int)userlen)) &&
strlen(userid)+7 < MAX_MAILBOX_BUFFER) {
char *t, *tmpuser = NULL;
const char *inboxuser;
if (domainlen)
snprintf(inbox, sizeof(inbox), "%s!", userid+userlen+1);
if (rock->namespace->hier_sep == '/' && (p = strchr(userid, '.'))) {
tmpuser = xmalloc(userlen);
memcpy(tmpuser, userid, userlen);
t = tmpuser + (p - userid);
while(t < (tmpuser + userlen)) {
if (*t == '.')
*t = '^';
t++;
}
inboxuser = tmpuser;
} else
inboxuser = userid;
snprintf(inbox+domainlen, sizeof(inbox)-domainlen,
"user.%.*s.INBOX.", (int)userlen, inboxuser);
free(tmpuser);
inboxlen = strlen(inbox) - 7;
}
else {
userid = 0;
}
/* Find the common search prefix of all patterns */
const char *firstpat = strarray_nth(patterns, 0);
for (prefixlen = 0; firstpat[prefixlen]; prefixlen++) {
if (prefixlen >= MAX_MAILBOX_NAME) {
r = IMAP_MAILBOX_BADNAME;
goto done;
}
char c = firstpat[prefixlen];
for (i = 1; i < patterns->count; i++) {
const char *pat = strarray_nth(patterns, i);
if (pat[prefixlen] != c) break;
}
if (i < patterns->count) break;
if (c == '*' || c == '%' || c == '?') break;
commonpat[prefixlen] = c;
}
commonpat[prefixlen] = '\0';
if (patterns->count == 1) {
/* Skip pattern which matches shared namespace prefix */
if (!strcmp(firstpat+prefixlen, "%"))
rock->singlepercent = 2;
/* output prefix regardless */
if (!strcmp(firstpat+prefixlen, "*%"))
rock->singlepercent = 1;
}
/*
* Personal (INBOX) namespace (only if not admin)
*/
if (userid && !isadmin) {
/* first the INBOX */
rock->mb_category = MBNAME_INBOX;
r = cyrusdb_forone(rock->db, inbox, inboxlen, &find_p, &find_cb, rock, NULL);
if (r == CYRUSDB_DONE) r = 0;
if (r) goto done;
if (rock->namespace->isalt) {
/* do exact INBOX subs before resetting the namebuffer */
rock->mb_category = MBNAME_INBOXSUB;
r = cyrusdb_foreach(rock->db, inbox, inboxlen+7, &find_p, &find_cb, rock, NULL);
if (r == CYRUSDB_DONE) r = 0;
if (r) goto done;
/* reset the the namebuffer */
r = (*rock->proc)(NULL, rock->procrock);
if (r) goto done;
}
/* iterate through all the mailboxes under the user's inbox */
rock->mb_category = MBNAME_OWNER;
r = cyrusdb_foreach(rock->db, inbox, inboxlen+1, &find_p, &find_cb, rock, NULL);
if (r == CYRUSDB_DONE) r = 0;
if (r) goto done;
/* "Alt Prefix" folders */
if (rock->namespace->isalt) {
/* reset the the namebuffer */
r = (*rock->proc)(NULL, rock->procrock);
if (r) goto done;
rock->mb_category = MBNAME_ALTINBOX;
/* special case user.foo.INBOX. If we're singlepercent == 2, this could
return DONE, in which case we don't need to foreach the rest of the
altprefix space */
r = cyrusdb_forone(rock->db, inbox, inboxlen+6, &find_p, &find_cb, rock, NULL);
if (r == CYRUSDB_DONE) goto skipalt;
if (r) goto done;
/* special case any other altprefix stuff */
rock->mb_category = MBNAME_ALTPREFIX;
r = cyrusdb_foreach(rock->db, inbox, inboxlen+1, &find_p, &find_cb, rock, NULL);
skipalt: /* we got a done, so skip out of the foreach early */
if (r == CYRUSDB_DONE) r = 0;
if (r) goto done;
}
}
/*
* Other Users namespace
*
* If "Other Users*" can match pattern, search for those mailboxes next
*/
if (isadmin || rock->namespace->accessible[NAMESPACE_USER]) {
len = strlen(rock->namespace->prefix[NAMESPACE_USER]);
if (len) len--; // trailing separator
if (!strncmp(rock->namespace->prefix[NAMESPACE_USER], commonpat, MIN(len, prefixlen))) {
if (prefixlen < len) {
/* we match all users */
strlcpy(domainpat+domainlen, "user.", sizeof(domainpat)-domainlen);
}
else {
/* just those in this prefix */
strlcpy(domainpat+domainlen, "user.", sizeof(domainpat)-domainlen);
strlcpy(domainpat+domainlen+5, commonpat+len+1, sizeof(domainpat)-domainlen-5);
}
rock->mb_category = MBNAME_OTHERUSER;
/* because of how domains work, with crossdomains or admin you can't prefix at all :( */
size_t thislen = (isadmin || crossdomains) ? 0 : strlen(domainpat);
/* reset the the namebuffer */
r = (*rock->proc)(NULL, rock->procrock);
if (r) goto done;
r = mboxlist_find_category(rock, domainpat, thislen);
if (r) goto done;
}
}
/*
* Shared namespace
*
* search for all remaining mailboxes.
* just bother looking at the ones that have the same pattern prefix.
*/
if (isadmin || rock->namespace->accessible[NAMESPACE_SHARED]) {
len = strlen(rock->namespace->prefix[NAMESPACE_SHARED]);
if (len) len--; // trailing separator
if (!strncmp(rock->namespace->prefix[NAMESPACE_SHARED], commonpat, MIN(len, prefixlen))) {
rock->mb_category = MBNAME_SHARED;
/* reset the the namebuffer */
r = (*rock->proc)(NULL, rock->procrock);
if (r) goto done;
/* iterate through all the non-user folders on the server */
r = mboxlist_find_category(rock, domainpat, domainlen);
if (r) goto done;
}
}
/* finish with a reset call always */
r = (*rock->proc)(NULL, rock->procrock);
done:
for (i = 0; i < rock->globs.count; i++) {
glob *g = ptrarray_nth(&rock->globs, i);
glob_free(&g);
}
ptrarray_fini(&rock->globs);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In the mboxlist_do_find function in imap/mboxlist.c in Cyrus IMAP before 3.0.4, an off-by-one error in prefix calculation for the LIST command caused use of uninitialized memory, which might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information or cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a 'LIST ** *Other Users*' command.
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
|
Low
| 167,757
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int get_debug_info(struct PE_(r_bin_pe_obj_t)* bin, PE_(image_debug_directory_entry)* dbg_dir_entry, ut8* dbg_data, int dbg_data_len, SDebugInfo* res) {
#define SIZEOF_FILE_NAME 255
int i = 0;
const char* basename;
if (!dbg_data) {
return 0;
}
switch (dbg_dir_entry->Type) {
case IMAGE_DEBUG_TYPE_CODEVIEW:
if (!strncmp ((char*) dbg_data, "RSDS", 4)) {
SCV_RSDS_HEADER rsds_hdr;
init_rsdr_hdr (&rsds_hdr);
if (!get_rsds (dbg_data, dbg_data_len, &rsds_hdr)) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot read PE debug info\n");
return 0;
}
snprintf (res->guidstr, GUIDSTR_LEN,
"%08x%04x%04x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%x",
rsds_hdr.guid.data1,
rsds_hdr.guid.data2,
rsds_hdr.guid.data3,
rsds_hdr.guid.data4[0],
rsds_hdr.guid.data4[1],
rsds_hdr.guid.data4[2],
rsds_hdr.guid.data4[3],
rsds_hdr.guid.data4[4],
rsds_hdr.guid.data4[5],
rsds_hdr.guid.data4[6],
rsds_hdr.guid.data4[7],
rsds_hdr.age);
basename = r_file_basename ((char*) rsds_hdr.file_name);
strncpy (res->file_name, (const char*)
basename, sizeof (res->file_name));
res->file_name[sizeof (res->file_name) - 1] = 0;
rsds_hdr.free ((struct SCV_RSDS_HEADER*) &rsds_hdr);
} else if (strncmp ((const char*) dbg_data, "NB10", 4) == 0) {
SCV_NB10_HEADER nb10_hdr;
init_cv_nb10_header (&nb10_hdr);
get_nb10 (dbg_data, &nb10_hdr);
snprintf (res->guidstr, sizeof (res->guidstr),
"%x%x", nb10_hdr.timestamp, nb10_hdr.age);
strncpy (res->file_name, (const char*)
nb10_hdr.file_name, sizeof(res->file_name) - 1);
res->file_name[sizeof (res->file_name) - 1] = 0;
nb10_hdr.free ((struct SCV_NB10_HEADER*) &nb10_hdr);
} else {
bprintf ("CodeView section not NB10 or RSDS\n");
return 0;
}
break;
default:
return 0;
}
while (i < 33) {
res->guidstr[i] = toupper ((int) res->guidstr[i]);
i++;
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_debug_info() function in radare2 2.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted PE file.
Commit Message: Fix crash in pe
|
Medium
| 169,228
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: add_job(cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Client connection */
cupsd_printer_t *printer, /* I - Destination printer */
mime_type_t *filetype) /* I - First print file type, if any */
{
http_status_t status; /* Policy status */
ipp_attribute_t *attr, /* Current attribute */
*auth_info; /* auth-info attribute */
const char *mandatory; /* Current mandatory job attribute */
const char *val; /* Default option value */
int priority; /* Job priority */
cupsd_job_t *job; /* Current job */
char job_uri[HTTP_MAX_URI]; /* Job URI */
int kbytes; /* Size of print file */
int i; /* Looping var */
int lowerpagerange; /* Page range bound */
int exact; /* Did we have an exact match? */
ipp_attribute_t *media_col, /* media-col attribute */
*media_margin; /* media-*-margin attribute */
ipp_t *unsup_col; /* media-col in unsupported response */
static const char * const readonly[] =/* List of read-only attributes */
{
"date-time-at-completed",
"date-time-at-creation",
"date-time-at-processing",
"job-detailed-status-messages",
"job-document-access-errors",
"job-id",
"job-impressions-completed",
"job-k-octets-completed",
"job-media-sheets-completed",
"job-pages-completed",
"job-printer-up-time",
"job-printer-uri",
"job-state",
"job-state-message",
"job-state-reasons",
"job-uri",
"number-of-documents",
"number-of-intervening-jobs",
"output-device-assigned",
"time-at-completed",
"time-at-creation",
"time-at-processing"
};
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "add_job(%p[%d], %p(%s), %p(%s/%s))",
con, con->number, printer, printer->name,
filetype, filetype ? filetype->super : "none",
filetype ? filetype->type : "none");
/*
* Check remote printing to non-shared printer...
*/
if (!printer->shared &&
_cups_strcasecmp(con->http->hostname, "localhost") &&
_cups_strcasecmp(con->http->hostname, ServerName))
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_AUTHORIZED,
_("The printer or class is not shared."));
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Check policy...
*/
auth_info = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "auth-info", IPP_TAG_TEXT);
if ((status = cupsdCheckPolicy(printer->op_policy_ptr, con, NULL)) != HTTP_OK)
{
send_http_error(con, status, printer);
return (NULL);
}
else if (printer->num_auth_info_required == 1 &&
!strcmp(printer->auth_info_required[0], "negotiate") &&
!con->username[0])
{
send_http_error(con, HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED, printer);
return (NULL);
}
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
else if (auth_info && !con->http->tls &&
!httpAddrLocalhost(con->http->hostaddr))
{
/*
* Require encryption of auth-info over non-local connections...
*/
send_http_error(con, HTTP_UPGRADE_REQUIRED, printer);
return (NULL);
}
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
/*
* See if the printer is accepting jobs...
*/
if (!printer->accepting)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_ACCEPTING,
_("Destination \"%s\" is not accepting jobs."),
printer->name);
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Validate job template attributes; for now just document-format,
* copies, job-sheets, number-up, page-ranges, mandatory attributes, and
* media...
*/
for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(readonly) / sizeof(readonly[0])); i ++)
{
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, readonly[i], IPP_TAG_ZERO)) != NULL)
{
ippDeleteAttribute(con->request, attr);
if (StrictConformance)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST, _("The '%s' Job Status attribute cannot be supplied in a job creation request."), readonly[i]);
return (NULL);
}
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_INFO, "Unexpected '%s' Job Status attribute in a job creation request.", readonly[i]);
}
}
if (printer->pc)
{
for (mandatory = (char *)cupsArrayFirst(printer->pc->mandatory);
mandatory;
mandatory = (char *)cupsArrayNext(printer->pc->mandatory))
{
if (!ippFindAttribute(con->request, mandatory, IPP_TAG_ZERO))
{
/*
* Missing a required attribute...
*/
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_CONFLICT,
_("The \"%s\" attribute is required for print jobs."),
mandatory);
return (NULL);
}
}
}
if (filetype && printer->filetypes &&
!cupsArrayFind(printer->filetypes, filetype))
{
char mimetype[MIME_MAX_SUPER + MIME_MAX_TYPE + 2];
/* MIME media type string */
snprintf(mimetype, sizeof(mimetype), "%s/%s", filetype->super,
filetype->type);
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_DOCUMENT_FORMAT,
_("Unsupported format \"%s\"."), mimetype);
ippAddString(con->response, IPP_TAG_UNSUPPORTED_GROUP, IPP_TAG_MIMETYPE,
"document-format", NULL, mimetype);
return (NULL);
}
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "copies",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
{
if (attr->values[0].integer < 1 || attr->values[0].integer > MaxCopies)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_ATTRIBUTES, _("Bad copies value %d."),
attr->values[0].integer);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_UNSUPPORTED_GROUP, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"copies", attr->values[0].integer);
return (NULL);
}
}
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "job-sheets",
IPP_TAG_ZERO)) != NULL)
{
if (attr->value_tag != IPP_TAG_KEYWORD &&
attr->value_tag != IPP_TAG_NAME)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST, _("Bad job-sheets value type."));
return (NULL);
}
if (attr->num_values > 2)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST,
_("Too many job-sheets values (%d > 2)."),
attr->num_values);
return (NULL);
}
for (i = 0; i < attr->num_values; i ++)
if (strcmp(attr->values[i].string.text, "none") &&
!cupsdFindBanner(attr->values[i].string.text))
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST, _("Bad job-sheets value \"%s\"."),
attr->values[i].string.text);
return (NULL);
}
}
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "number-up",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
{
if (attr->values[0].integer != 1 &&
attr->values[0].integer != 2 &&
attr->values[0].integer != 4 &&
attr->values[0].integer != 6 &&
attr->values[0].integer != 9 &&
attr->values[0].integer != 16)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_ATTRIBUTES, _("Bad number-up value %d."),
attr->values[0].integer);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_UNSUPPORTED_GROUP, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"number-up", attr->values[0].integer);
return (NULL);
}
}
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "page-ranges",
IPP_TAG_RANGE)) != NULL)
{
for (i = 0, lowerpagerange = 1; i < attr->num_values; i ++)
{
if (attr->values[i].range.lower < lowerpagerange ||
attr->values[i].range.lower > attr->values[i].range.upper)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST,
_("Bad page-ranges values %d-%d."),
attr->values[i].range.lower,
attr->values[i].range.upper);
return (NULL);
}
lowerpagerange = attr->values[i].range.upper + 1;
}
}
/*
* Do media selection as needed...
*/
if (!ippFindAttribute(con->request, "PageRegion", IPP_TAG_ZERO) &&
!ippFindAttribute(con->request, "PageSize", IPP_TAG_ZERO) &&
_ppdCacheGetPageSize(printer->pc, con->request, NULL, &exact))
{
if (!exact &&
(media_col = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "media-col",
IPP_TAG_BEGIN_COLLECTION)) != NULL)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_OK_SUBST, _("Unsupported margins."));
unsup_col = ippNew();
if ((media_margin = ippFindAttribute(media_col->values[0].collection,
"media-bottom-margin",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
ippAddInteger(unsup_col, IPP_TAG_ZERO, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"media-bottom-margin", media_margin->values[0].integer);
if ((media_margin = ippFindAttribute(media_col->values[0].collection,
"media-left-margin",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
ippAddInteger(unsup_col, IPP_TAG_ZERO, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"media-left-margin", media_margin->values[0].integer);
if ((media_margin = ippFindAttribute(media_col->values[0].collection,
"media-right-margin",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
ippAddInteger(unsup_col, IPP_TAG_ZERO, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"media-right-margin", media_margin->values[0].integer);
if ((media_margin = ippFindAttribute(media_col->values[0].collection,
"media-top-margin",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
ippAddInteger(unsup_col, IPP_TAG_ZERO, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"media-top-margin", media_margin->values[0].integer);
ippAddCollection(con->response, IPP_TAG_UNSUPPORTED_GROUP, "media-col",
unsup_col);
ippDelete(unsup_col);
}
}
/*
* Make sure we aren't over our limit...
*/
if (MaxJobs && cupsArrayCount(Jobs) >= MaxJobs)
cupsdCleanJobs();
if (MaxJobs && cupsArrayCount(Jobs) >= MaxJobs)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE, _("Too many active jobs."));
return (NULL);
}
if ((i = check_quotas(con, printer)) < 0)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE, _("Quota limit reached."));
return (NULL);
}
else if (i == 0)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_AUTHORIZED, _("Not allowed to print."));
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Create the job and set things up...
*/
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "job-priority",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
priority = attr->values[0].integer;
else
{
if ((val = cupsGetOption("job-priority", printer->num_options,
printer->options)) != NULL)
priority = atoi(val);
else
priority = 50;
ippAddInteger(con->request, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER, "job-priority",
priority);
}
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "job-name", IPP_TAG_ZERO)) == NULL)
ippAddString(con->request, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NAME, "job-name", NULL, "Untitled");
else if ((attr->value_tag != IPP_TAG_NAME &&
attr->value_tag != IPP_TAG_NAMELANG) ||
attr->num_values != 1)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_ATTRIBUTES,
_("Bad job-name value: Wrong type or count."));
if ((attr = ippCopyAttribute(con->response, attr, 0)) != NULL)
attr->group_tag = IPP_TAG_UNSUPPORTED_GROUP;
return (NULL);
}
else if (!ippValidateAttribute(attr))
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_ATTRIBUTES, _("Bad job-name value: %s"),
cupsLastErrorString());
if ((attr = ippCopyAttribute(con->response, attr, 0)) != NULL)
attr->group_tag = IPP_TAG_UNSUPPORTED_GROUP;
return (NULL);
}
if ((job = cupsdAddJob(priority, printer->name)) == NULL)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("Unable to add job for destination \"%s\"."),
printer->name);
return (NULL);
}
job->dtype = printer->type & (CUPS_PRINTER_CLASS | CUPS_PRINTER_REMOTE);
job->attrs = con->request;
job->dirty = 1;
con->request = ippNewRequest(job->attrs->request.op.operation_id);
cupsdMarkDirty(CUPSD_DIRTY_JOBS);
add_job_uuid(job);
apply_printer_defaults(printer, job);
attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "requesting-user-name", IPP_TAG_NAME);
if (con->username[0])
{
cupsdSetString(&job->username, con->username);
if (attr)
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 0, con->username);
}
else if (attr)
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG,
"add_job: requesting-user-name=\"%s\"",
attr->values[0].string.text);
cupsdSetString(&job->username, attr->values[0].string.text);
}
else
cupsdSetString(&job->username, "anonymous");
if (!attr)
ippAddString(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NAME,
"job-originating-user-name", NULL, job->username);
else
{
ippSetGroupTag(job->attrs, &attr, IPP_TAG_JOB);
ippSetName(job->attrs, &attr, "job-originating-user-name");
}
if (con->username[0] || auth_info)
{
save_auth_info(con, job, auth_info);
/*
* Remove the auth-info attribute from the attribute data...
*/
if (auth_info)
ippDeleteAttribute(job->attrs, auth_info);
}
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "job-name", IPP_TAG_NAME)) != NULL)
cupsdSetString(&(job->name), attr->values[0].string.text);
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "job-originating-host-name",
IPP_TAG_ZERO)) != NULL)
{
/*
* Request contains a job-originating-host-name attribute; validate it...
*/
if (attr->value_tag != IPP_TAG_NAME ||
attr->num_values != 1 ||
strcmp(con->http->hostname, "localhost"))
{
/*
* Can't override the value if we aren't connected via localhost.
* Also, we can only have 1 value and it must be a name value.
*/
ippDeleteAttribute(job->attrs, attr);
ippAddString(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NAME, "job-originating-host-name", NULL, con->http->hostname);
}
else
ippSetGroupTag(job->attrs, &attr, IPP_TAG_JOB);
}
else
{
/*
* No job-originating-host-name attribute, so use the hostname from
* the connection...
*/
ippAddString(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NAME,
"job-originating-host-name", NULL, con->http->hostname);
}
ippAddOutOfBand(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NOVALUE, "date-time-at-completed");
ippAddDate(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, "date-time-at-creation", ippTimeToDate(time(NULL)));
ippAddOutOfBand(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NOVALUE, "date-time-at-processing");
ippAddOutOfBand(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NOVALUE, "time-at-completed");
ippAddInteger(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER, "time-at-creation", time(NULL));
ippAddOutOfBand(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NOVALUE, "time-at-processing");
/*
* Add remaining job attributes...
*/
ippAddInteger(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER, "job-id", job->id);
job->state = ippAddInteger(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_ENUM,
"job-state", IPP_JOB_STOPPED);
job->state_value = (ipp_jstate_t)job->state->values[0].integer;
job->reasons = ippAddString(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_KEYWORD,
"job-state-reasons", NULL, "job-incoming");
job->impressions = ippAddInteger(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER, "job-impressions-completed", 0);
job->sheets = ippAddInteger(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"job-media-sheets-completed", 0);
ippAddString(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_URI, "job-printer-uri", NULL,
printer->uri);
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "job-k-octets", IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) != NULL)
attr->values[0].integer = 0;
else
ippAddInteger(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER, "job-k-octets", 0);
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "job-hold-until",
IPP_TAG_KEYWORD)) == NULL)
attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "job-hold-until", IPP_TAG_NAME);
if (!attr)
{
if ((val = cupsGetOption("job-hold-until", printer->num_options,
printer->options)) == NULL)
val = "no-hold";
attr = ippAddString(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_KEYWORD,
"job-hold-until", NULL, val);
}
if (printer->holding_new_jobs)
{
/*
* Hold all new jobs on this printer...
*/
if (attr && strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "no-hold"))
cupsdSetJobHoldUntil(job, ippGetString(attr, 0, NULL), 0);
else
cupsdSetJobHoldUntil(job, "indefinite", 0);
job->state->values[0].integer = IPP_JOB_HELD;
job->state_value = IPP_JOB_HELD;
ippSetString(job->attrs, &job->reasons, 0, "job-held-on-create");
}
else if (attr && strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "no-hold"))
{
/*
* Hold job until specified time...
*/
cupsdSetJobHoldUntil(job, attr->values[0].string.text, 0);
job->state->values[0].integer = IPP_JOB_HELD;
job->state_value = IPP_JOB_HELD;
ippSetString(job->attrs, &job->reasons, 0, "job-hold-until-specified");
}
else if (job->attrs->request.op.operation_id == IPP_CREATE_JOB)
{
job->hold_until = time(NULL) + MultipleOperationTimeout;
job->state->values[0].integer = IPP_JOB_HELD;
job->state_value = IPP_JOB_HELD;
}
else
{
job->state->values[0].integer = IPP_JOB_PENDING;
job->state_value = IPP_JOB_PENDING;
ippSetString(job->attrs, &job->reasons, 0, "none");
}
if (!(printer->type & CUPS_PRINTER_REMOTE) || Classification)
{
/*
* Add job sheets options...
*/
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "job-sheets",
IPP_TAG_ZERO)) == NULL)
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG,
"Adding default job-sheets values \"%s,%s\"...",
printer->job_sheets[0], printer->job_sheets[1]);
attr = ippAddStrings(job->attrs, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_NAME, "job-sheets",
2, NULL, NULL);
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 0, printer->job_sheets[0]);
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 1, printer->job_sheets[1]);
}
job->job_sheets = attr;
/*
* Enforce classification level if set...
*/
if (Classification)
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_INFO,
"Classification=\"%s\", ClassifyOverride=%d",
Classification ? Classification : "(null)",
ClassifyOverride);
if (ClassifyOverride)
{
if (!strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "none") &&
(attr->num_values == 1 ||
!strcmp(attr->values[1].string.text, "none")))
{
/*
* Force the leading banner to have the classification on it...
*/
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 0, Classification);
cupsdLogJob(job, CUPSD_LOG_NOTICE, "CLASSIFICATION FORCED "
"job-sheets=\"%s,none\", "
"job-originating-user-name=\"%s\"",
Classification, job->username);
}
else if (attr->num_values == 2 &&
strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text,
attr->values[1].string.text) &&
strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "none") &&
strcmp(attr->values[1].string.text, "none"))
{
/*
* Can't put two different security markings on the same document!
*/
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 1, attr->values[0].string.text);
cupsdLogJob(job, CUPSD_LOG_NOTICE, "CLASSIFICATION FORCED "
"job-sheets=\"%s,%s\", "
"job-originating-user-name=\"%s\"",
attr->values[0].string.text,
attr->values[1].string.text, job->username);
}
else if (strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, Classification) &&
strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "none") &&
(attr->num_values == 1 ||
(strcmp(attr->values[1].string.text, Classification) &&
strcmp(attr->values[1].string.text, "none"))))
{
if (attr->num_values == 1)
cupsdLogJob(job, CUPSD_LOG_NOTICE,
"CLASSIFICATION OVERRIDDEN "
"job-sheets=\"%s\", "
"job-originating-user-name=\"%s\"",
attr->values[0].string.text, job->username);
else
cupsdLogJob(job, CUPSD_LOG_NOTICE,
"CLASSIFICATION OVERRIDDEN "
"job-sheets=\"%s,%s\",fffff "
"job-originating-user-name=\"%s\"",
attr->values[0].string.text,
attr->values[1].string.text, job->username);
}
}
else if (strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, Classification) &&
(attr->num_values == 1 ||
strcmp(attr->values[1].string.text, Classification)))
{
/*
* Force the banner to have the classification on it...
*/
if (attr->num_values > 1 &&
!strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, attr->values[1].string.text))
{
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 0, Classification);
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 1, Classification);
}
else
{
if (attr->num_values == 1 ||
strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "none"))
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 0, Classification);
if (attr->num_values > 1 &&
strcmp(attr->values[1].string.text, "none"))
ippSetString(job->attrs, &attr, 1, Classification);
}
if (attr->num_values > 1)
cupsdLogJob(job, CUPSD_LOG_NOTICE,
"CLASSIFICATION FORCED "
"job-sheets=\"%s,%s\", "
"job-originating-user-name=\"%s\"",
attr->values[0].string.text,
attr->values[1].string.text, job->username);
else
cupsdLogJob(job, CUPSD_LOG_NOTICE,
"CLASSIFICATION FORCED "
"job-sheets=\"%s\", "
"job-originating-user-name=\"%s\"",
Classification, job->username);
}
}
/*
* See if we need to add the starting sheet...
*/
if (!(printer->type & CUPS_PRINTER_REMOTE))
{
cupsdLogJob(job, CUPSD_LOG_INFO, "Adding start banner page \"%s\".",
attr->values[0].string.text);
if ((kbytes = copy_banner(con, job, attr->values[0].string.text)) < 0)
{
cupsdSetJobState(job, IPP_JOB_ABORTED, CUPSD_JOB_PURGE,
"Aborting job because the start banner could not be "
"copied.");
return (NULL);
}
cupsdUpdateQuota(printer, job->username, 0, kbytes);
}
}
else if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "job-sheets",
IPP_TAG_ZERO)) != NULL)
job->job_sheets = attr;
/*
* Fill in the response info...
*/
httpAssembleURIf(HTTP_URI_CODING_ALL, job_uri, sizeof(job_uri), "ipp", NULL,
con->clientname, con->clientport, "/jobs/%d", job->id);
ippAddString(con->response, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_URI, "job-uri", NULL,
job_uri);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER, "job-id", job->id);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_ENUM, "job-state",
job->state_value);
ippAddString(con->response, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_TEXT, "job-state-message", NULL, "");
ippAddString(con->response, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_KEYWORD, "job-state-reasons",
NULL, job->reasons->values[0].string.text);
con->response->request.status.status_code = IPP_OK;
/*
* Add any job subscriptions...
*/
add_job_subscriptions(con, job);
/*
* Set all but the first two attributes to the job attributes group...
*/
for (attr = job->attrs->attrs->next->next; attr; attr = attr->next)
attr->group_tag = IPP_TAG_JOB;
/*
* Fire the "job created" event...
*/
cupsdAddEvent(CUPSD_EVENT_JOB_CREATED, printer, job, "Job created.");
/*
* Return the new job...
*/
return (job);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The add_job function in scheduler/ipp.c in CUPS before 2.2.6, when D-Bus support is enabled, can be crashed by remote attackers by sending print jobs with an invalid username, related to a D-Bus notification.
Commit Message: DBUS notifications could crash the scheduler (Issue #5143)
- scheduler/ipp.c: Make sure requesting-user-name string is valid UTF-8.
|
Medium
| 169,380
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(
RenderViewHost* render_view_host,
const ViewHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError_Params& params) {
VLOG(1) << "Failed Provisional Load: " << params.url.possibly_invalid_spec()
<< ", error_code: " << params.error_code
<< ", error_description: " << params.error_description
<< ", is_main_frame: " << params.is_main_frame
<< ", showing_repost_interstitial: " <<
params.showing_repost_interstitial
<< ", frame_id: " << params.frame_id;
GURL validated_url(params.url);
RenderProcessHost* render_process_host =
render_view_host->GetProcess();
RenderViewHost::FilterURL(render_process_host, false, &validated_url);
if (net::ERR_ABORTED == params.error_code) {
if (ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Discarding message during interstitial.";
return;
}
render_manager_.RendererAbortedProvisionalLoad(render_view_host);
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver,
observers_,
DidFailProvisionalLoad(params.frame_id,
params.is_main_frame,
validated_url,
params.error_code,
params.error_description,
render_view_host));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66 preserves pending NavigationEntry objects in certain invalid circumstances, which allows remote attackers to spoof the address bar via a URL with a malformed scheme, as demonstrated by a nonexistent:12121 URL.
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,189
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree()
{
ASSERT(!m_isDestroyingShadowSubtree);
m_isDestroyingShadowSubtree = true;
if (SpinButtonElement* element = spinButtonElement())
element->removeSpinButtonOwner();
if (ClearButtonElement* element = clearButtonElement())
element->removeClearButtonOwner();
if (DateTimeEditElement* element = dateTimeEditElement())
element->removeEditControlOwner();
if (PickerIndicatorElement* element = pickerIndicatorElement())
element->removePickerIndicatorOwner();
if (element()->focused())
element()->focus();
BaseDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree();
m_isDestroyingShadowSubtree = false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.95 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to not properly considering focus during the processing of JavaScript events in the presence of a multiple-fields input type.
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,210
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
/* Kernel starts us with all fd's closed.
* But it's dangerous:
* fprintf(stderr) can dump messages into random fds, etc.
* Ensure that if any of fd 0,1,2 is closed, we open it to /dev/null.
*/
int fd = xopen("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
while (fd < 2)
fd = xdup(fd);
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
if (argc < 8)
{
/* percent specifier: %s %c %p %u %g %t %e %h */
/* argv: [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]*/
error_msg_and_die("Usage: %s SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID UID GID TIME BINARY_NAME [HOSTNAME]", argv[0]);
}
/* Not needed on 2.6.30.
* At least 2.6.18 has a bug where
* argv[1] = "SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* argv[2] = "CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* and so on. Fixing it:
*/
if (strchr(argv[1], ' '))
{
int i;
for (i = 1; argv[i]; i++)
{
strchrnul(argv[i], ' ')[0] = '\0';
}
}
logmode = LOGMODE_JOURNAL;
/* Parse abrt.conf */
load_abrt_conf();
/* ... and plugins/CCpp.conf */
bool setting_MakeCompatCore;
bool setting_SaveBinaryImage;
{
map_string_t *settings = new_map_string();
load_abrt_plugin_conf_file("CCpp.conf", settings);
const char *value;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "MakeCompatCore");
setting_MakeCompatCore = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveBinaryImage");
setting_SaveBinaryImage = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "VerboseLog");
if (value)
g_verbose = xatoi_positive(value);
free_map_string(settings);
}
errno = 0;
const char* signal_str = argv[1];
int signal_no = xatoi_positive(signal_str);
off_t ulimit_c = strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10);
if (ulimit_c < 0) /* unlimited? */
{
/* set to max possible >0 value */
ulimit_c = ~((off_t)1 << (sizeof(off_t)*8-1));
}
const char *pid_str = argv[3];
pid_t pid = xatoi_positive(argv[3]);
uid_t uid = xatoi_positive(argv[4]);
if (errno || pid <= 0)
{
perror_msg_and_die("PID '%s' or limit '%s' is bogus", argv[3], argv[2]);
}
{
char *s = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose(VAR_RUN"/abrt/saved_core_pattern");
/* If we have a saved pattern and it's not a "|PROG ARGS" thing... */
if (s && s[0] != '|')
core_basename = s;
else
free(s);
}
struct utsname uts;
if (!argv[8]) /* no HOSTNAME? */
{
uname(&uts);
argv[8] = uts.nodename;
}
char path[PATH_MAX];
int src_fd_binary = -1;
char *executable = get_executable(pid, setting_SaveBinaryImage ? &src_fd_binary : NULL);
if (executable && strstr(executable, "/abrt-hook-ccpp"))
{
error_msg_and_die("PID %lu is '%s', not dumping it to avoid recursion",
(long)pid, executable);
}
user_pwd = get_cwd(pid); /* may be NULL on error */
log_notice("user_pwd:'%s'", user_pwd);
sprintf(path, "/proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
proc_pid_status = xmalloc_xopen_read_close(path, /*maxsz:*/ NULL);
uid_t fsuid = uid;
uid_t tmp_fsuid = get_fsuid();
int suid_policy = dump_suid_policy();
if (tmp_fsuid != uid)
{
/* use root for suided apps unless it's explicitly set to UNSAFE */
fsuid = 0;
if (suid_policy == DUMP_SUID_UNSAFE)
{
fsuid = tmp_fsuid;
}
}
/* Open a fd to compat coredump, if requested and is possible */
if (setting_MakeCompatCore && ulimit_c != 0)
/* note: checks "user_pwd == NULL" inside; updates core_basename */
user_core_fd = open_user_core(uid, fsuid, pid, &argv[1]);
if (executable == NULL)
{
/* readlink on /proc/$PID/exe failed, don't create abrt dump dir */
error_msg("Can't read /proc/%lu/exe link", (long)pid);
goto create_user_core;
}
const char *signame = NULL;
switch (signal_no)
{
case SIGILL : signame = "ILL" ; break;
case SIGFPE : signame = "FPE" ; break;
case SIGSEGV: signame = "SEGV"; break;
case SIGBUS : signame = "BUS" ; break; //Bus error (bad memory access)
case SIGABRT: signame = "ABRT"; break; //usually when abort() was called
case SIGTRAP: signame = "TRAP"; break; //Trace/breakpoint trap
default: goto create_user_core; // not a signal we care about
}
if (!daemon_is_ok())
{
/* not an error, exit with exit code 0 */
log("abrtd is not running. If it crashed, "
"/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains a stale value, "
"consider resetting it to 'core'"
);
goto create_user_core;
}
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* If free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize... */
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
goto create_user_core;
}
/* Check /var/tmp/abrt/last-ccpp marker, do not dump repeated crashes
* if they happen too often. Else, write new marker value.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/last-ccpp", g_settings_dump_location);
if (check_recent_crash_file(path, executable))
{
/* It is a repeating crash */
goto create_user_core;
}
const char *last_slash = strrchr(executable, '/');
if (last_slash && strncmp(++last_slash, "abrt", 4) == 0)
{
/* If abrtd/abrt-foo crashes, we don't want to create a _directory_,
* since that can make new copy of abrtd to process it,
* and maybe crash again...
* Unlike dirs, mere files are ignored by abrtd.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump", g_settings_dump_location, last_slash);
int abrt_core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
off_t core_size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (core_size < 0 || fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_eof logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
return 0;
}
unsigned path_len = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/ccpp-%s-%lu.new",
g_settings_dump_location, iso_date_string(NULL), (long)pid);
if (path_len >= (sizeof(path) - sizeof("/"FILENAME_COREDUMP)))
{
goto create_user_core;
}
/* use fsuid instead of uid, so we don't expose any sensitive
* information of suided app in /var/tmp/abrt
*/
dd = dd_create(path, fsuid, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
if (dd)
{
char *rootdir = get_rootdir(pid);
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, (rootdir && strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0) ? rootdir : NULL);
char source_filename[sizeof("/proc/%lu/somewhat_long_name") + sizeof(long)*3];
int source_base_ofs = sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/smaps", (long)pid);
source_base_ofs -= strlen("smaps");
char *dest_filename = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, "also_somewhat_longish_name");
char *dest_base = strrchr(dest_filename, '/') + 1;
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "maps");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_MAPS);
copy_file(source_filename, dest_filename, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
IGNORE_RESULT(chown(dest_filename, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid));
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "limits");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_LIMITS);
copy_file(source_filename, dest_filename, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
IGNORE_RESULT(chown(dest_filename, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid));
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "cgroup");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_CGROUP);
copy_file(source_filename, dest_filename, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
IGNORE_RESULT(chown(dest_filename, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid));
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_OPEN_FDS);
if (dump_fd_info(dest_filename, source_filename, source_base_ofs))
IGNORE_RESULT(chown(dest_filename, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid));
free(dest_filename);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ANALYZER, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TYPE, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_EXECUTABLE, executable);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PID, pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PROC_PID_STATUS, proc_pid_status);
if (user_pwd)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PWD, user_pwd);
if (rootdir)
{
if (strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ROOTDIR, rootdir);
}
char *reason = xasprintf("%s killed by SIG%s",
last_slash, signame ? signame : signal_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_REASON, reason);
free(reason);
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline ? : "");
free(cmdline);
char *environ = get_environ(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ENVIRON, environ ? : "");
free(environ);
char *fips_enabled = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled");
if (fips_enabled)
{
if (strcmp(fips_enabled, "0") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, "fips_enabled", fips_enabled);
free(fips_enabled);
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
if (src_fd_binary > 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_BINARY);
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd_binary, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (fsync(dst_fd) != 0 || close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
dd_delete(dd);
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
close(src_fd_binary);
}
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_COREDUMP);
int abrt_core_fd = create_or_die(path);
/* We write both coredumps at once.
* We can't write user coredump first, since it might be truncated
* and thus can't be copied and used as abrt coredump;
* and if we write abrt coredump first and then copy it as user one,
* then we have a race when process exits but coredump does not exist yet:
* $ echo -e '#include<signal.h>\nmain(){raise(SIGSEGV);}' | gcc -o test -x c -
* $ rm -f core*; ulimit -c unlimited; ./test; ls -l core*
* 21631 Segmentation fault (core dumped) ./test
* ls: cannot access core*: No such file or directory <=== BAD
*/
off_t core_size = copyfd_sparse(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, user_core_fd, ulimit_c);
if (fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || close(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
unlink(path);
dd_delete(dd);
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
{
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
}
/* copyfd_sparse logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error writing '%s'", path);
}
if (user_core_fd >= 0
/* error writing user coredump? */
&& (fsync(user_core_fd) != 0 || close(user_core_fd) != 0
/* user coredump is too big? */
|| (ulimit_c == 0 /* paranoia */ || core_size > ulimit_c)
)
) {
/* nuke it (silently) */
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
}
/* Save JVM crash log if it exists. (JVM's coredump per se
* is nearly useless for JVM developers)
*/
{
char *java_log = xasprintf("/tmp/jvm-%lu/hs_error.log", (long)pid);
int src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
/* If we couldn't open the error log in /tmp directory we can try to
* read the log from the current directory. It may produce AVC, it
* may produce some error log but all these are expected.
*/
if (src_fd < 0)
{
java_log = xasprintf("%s/hs_err_pid%lu.log", user_pwd, (long)pid);
src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
}
if (src_fd >= 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/hs_err.log");
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
dd_delete(dd);
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
close(src_fd);
}
}
/* We close dumpdir before we start catering for crash storm case.
* Otherwise, delete_dump_dir's from other concurrent
* CCpp's won't be able to delete our dump (their delete_dump_dir
* will wait for us), and we won't be able to delete their dumps.
* Classic deadlock.
*/
dd_close(dd);
path[path_len] = '\0'; /* path now contains only directory name */
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, path_len - (sizeof(".new")-1));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
notify_new_path(path);
/* rhbz#539551: "abrt going crazy when crashing process is respawned" */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* x1.25 and round up to 64m: go a bit up, so that usual in-daemon trimming
* kicks in first, and we don't "fight" with it:
*/
unsigned maxsize = g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize + g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize / 4;
maxsize |= 63;
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, maxsize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
free(rootdir);
return 0;
}
/* We didn't create abrt dump, but may need to create compat coredump */
create_user_core:
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
{
off_t core_size = copyfd_size(STDIN_FILENO, user_core_fd, ulimit_c, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (fsync(user_core_fd) != 0 || close(user_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
/* perror first, otherwise unlink may trash errno */
perror_msg("Error writing '%s'", full_core_basename);
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
return 1;
}
if (ulimit_c == 0 || core_size > ulimit_c)
{
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
return 1;
}
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, full_core_basename, (long long)core_size);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) allows local users to read, change the ownership of, or have other unspecified impact on arbitrary files via a symlink attack on (1) /var/tmp/abrt/*/maps, (2) /tmp/jvm-*/hs_error.log, (3) /proc/*/exe, (4) /etc/os-release in a chroot, or (5) an unspecified root directory related to librpm.
Commit Message: ccpp: fix symlink race conditions
Fix copy & chown race conditions
Related: #1211835
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 170,137
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MediaControlsProgressView::HandleSeeking(
const gfx::Point& location_in_bar) {
double seek_to_progress =
static_cast<double>(location_in_bar.x()) / progress_bar_->width();
seek_callback_.Run(seek_to_progress);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
|
High
| 172,345
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct rtable *icmp_route_lookup(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb_in,
const struct iphdr *iph,
__be32 saddr, u8 tos,
int type, int code,
struct icmp_bxm *param)
{
struct flowi4 fl4 = {
.daddr = (param->replyopts.srr ?
param->replyopts.faddr : iph->saddr),
.saddr = saddr,
.flowi4_tos = RT_TOS(tos),
.flowi4_proto = IPPROTO_ICMP,
.fl4_icmp_type = type,
.fl4_icmp_code = code,
};
struct rtable *rt, *rt2;
int err;
security_skb_classify_flow(skb_in, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = __ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
return rt;
/* No need to clone since we're just using its address. */
rt2 = rt;
if (!fl4.saddr)
fl4.saddr = rt->rt_src;
rt = (struct rtable *) xfrm_lookup(net, &rt->dst,
flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4), NULL, 0);
if (!IS_ERR(rt)) {
if (rt != rt2)
return rt;
} else if (PTR_ERR(rt) == -EPERM) {
rt = NULL;
} else
return rt;
err = xfrm_decode_session_reverse(skb_in, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4), AF_INET);
if (err)
goto relookup_failed;
if (inet_addr_type(net, fl4.saddr) == RTN_LOCAL) {
rt2 = __ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt2))
err = PTR_ERR(rt2);
} else {
struct flowi4 fl4_2 = {};
unsigned long orefdst;
fl4_2.daddr = fl4.saddr;
rt2 = ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4_2);
if (IS_ERR(rt2)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt2);
goto relookup_failed;
}
/* Ugh! */
orefdst = skb_in->_skb_refdst; /* save old refdst */
err = ip_route_input(skb_in, fl4.daddr, fl4.saddr,
RT_TOS(tos), rt2->dst.dev);
dst_release(&rt2->dst);
rt2 = skb_rtable(skb_in);
skb_in->_skb_refdst = orefdst; /* restore old refdst */
}
if (err)
goto relookup_failed;
rt2 = (struct rtable *) xfrm_lookup(net, &rt2->dst,
flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4), NULL,
XFRM_LOOKUP_ICMP);
if (!IS_ERR(rt2)) {
dst_release(&rt->dst);
rt = rt2;
} else if (PTR_ERR(rt2) == -EPERM) {
if (rt)
dst_release(&rt->dst);
return rt2;
} else {
err = PTR_ERR(rt2);
goto relookup_failed;
}
return rt;
relookup_failed:
if (rt)
return rt;
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,553
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BlobURLRegistry::registerURL(SecurityOrigin* origin, const KURL& publicURL, URLRegistrable* blob)
{
ASSERT(&blob->registry() == this);
ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(origin, publicURL, static_cast<Blob*>(blob)->url());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,677
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ExtensionTtsSpeakCompletedFunction::RunImpl() {
int request_id;
std::string error_message;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetInteger(0, &request_id));
if (args_->GetSize() >= 2)
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetString(1, &error_message));
ExtensionTtsController::GetInstance()->OnSpeechFinished(
request_id, error_message);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,385
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ChromeRenderProcessObserver::OnControlMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(ChromeRenderProcessObserver, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_SetIsIncognitoProcess,
OnSetIsIncognitoProcess)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_SetCacheCapacities, OnSetCacheCapacities)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_ClearCache, OnClearCache)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_SetFieldTrialGroup, OnSetFieldTrialGroup)
#if defined(USE_TCMALLOC)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_SetTcmallocHeapProfiling,
OnSetTcmallocHeapProfiling)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_WriteTcmallocHeapProfile,
OnWriteTcmallocHeapProfile)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_GetV8HeapStats, OnGetV8HeapStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_GetCacheResourceStats,
OnGetCacheResourceStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_PurgeMemory, OnPurgeMemory)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_SetContentSettingRules,
OnSetContentSettingRules)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewMsg_ToggleWebKitSharedTimer,
OnToggleWebKitSharedTimer)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SVG implementation in WebKit, as used in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.94, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,665
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_file (FILE* input_file, char* directory,
char *body_filename, char *body_pref,
int flags)
{
uint32 d;
uint16 key;
Attr *attr = NULL;
File *file = NULL;
int rtf_size = 0, html_size = 0;
MessageBody body;
memset (&body, '\0', sizeof (MessageBody));
/* store the program options in our file global variables */
g_flags = flags;
/* check that this is in fact a TNEF file */
d = geti32(input_file);
if (d != TNEF_SIGNATURE)
{
fprintf (stdout, "Seems not to be a TNEF file\n");
return 1;
}
/* Get the key */
key = geti16(input_file);
debug_print ("TNEF Key: %hx\n", key);
/* The rest of the file is a series of 'messages' and 'attachments' */
while ( data_left( input_file ) )
{
attr = read_object( input_file );
if ( attr == NULL ) break;
/* This signals the beginning of a file */
if (attr->name == attATTACHRENDDATA)
{
if (file)
{
file_write (file, directory);
file_free (file);
}
else
{
file = CHECKED_XCALLOC (File, 1);
}
}
/* Add the data to our lists. */
switch (attr->lvl_type)
{
case LVL_MESSAGE:
if (attr->name == attBODY)
{
body.text_body = get_text_data (attr);
}
else if (attr->name == attMAPIPROPS)
{
MAPI_Attr **mapi_attrs
= mapi_attr_read (attr->len, attr->buf);
if (mapi_attrs)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; mapi_attrs[i]; i++)
{
MAPI_Attr *a = mapi_attrs[i];
if (a->name == MAPI_BODY_HTML)
{
body.html_bodies = get_html_data (a);
html_size = a->num_values;
}
else if (a->name == MAPI_RTF_COMPRESSED)
{
body.rtf_bodies = get_rtf_data (a);
rtf_size = a->num_values;
}
}
/* cannot save attributes to file, since they
* are not attachment attributes */
/* file_add_mapi_attrs (file, mapi_attrs); */
mapi_attr_free_list (mapi_attrs);
XFREE (mapi_attrs);
}
}
break;
case LVL_ATTACHMENT:
file_add_attr (file, attr);
break;
default:
fprintf (stderr, "Invalid lvl type on attribute: %d\n",
attr->lvl_type);
return 1;
break;
}
attr_free (attr);
XFREE (attr);
}
if (file)
{
file_write (file, directory);
file_free (file);
XFREE (file);
}
/* Write the message body */
if (flags & SAVEBODY)
{
int i = 0;
int all_flag = 0;
if (strcmp (body_pref, "all") == 0)
{
all_flag = 1;
body_pref = "rht";
}
for (; i < 3; i++)
{
File **files
= get_body_files (body_filename, body_pref[i], &body);
if (files)
{
int j = 0;
for (; files[j]; j++)
{
file_write(files[j], directory);
file_free (files[j]);
XFREE(files[j]);
}
XFREE(files);
if (!all_flag) break;
}
}
}
if (body.text_body)
{
free_bodies(body.text_body, 1);
XFREE(body.text_body);
}
if (rtf_size > 0)
{
free_bodies(body.rtf_bodies, rtf_size);
XFREE(body.rtf_bodies);
}
if (html_size > 0)
{
free_bodies(body.html_bodies, html_size);
XFREE(body.html_bodies);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in tnef before 1.4.13. Four type confusions have been identified in the file_add_mapi_attrs() function. These might lead to invalid read and write operations, controlled by an attacker.
Commit Message: Check types to avoid invalid reads/writes.
|
Medium
| 168,353
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void smp_proc_id_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->tk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); /* reuse TK for IRK */
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In smp_proc_enc_info of smp_act.cc, there is a possible out of bounds read due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote information disclosure over Bluetooth with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-7.0 Android-7.1.1 Android-7.1.2 Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android-9.0 Android ID: A-111937065
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
|
Low
| 174,075
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DaemonProcess::OnChannelConnected() {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DeleteAllDesktopSessions();
next_terminal_id_ = 0;
SendToNetwork(
new ChromotingDaemonNetworkMsg_Configuration(serialized_config_));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,540
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Segment::Segment(IMkvReader* pReader, long long elem_start,
long long start, long long size)
: m_pReader(pReader),
m_element_start(elem_start),
m_start(start),
m_size(size),
m_pos(start),
m_pUnknownSize(0),
m_pSeekHead(NULL),
m_pInfo(NULL),
m_pTracks(NULL),
m_pCues(NULL),
m_pChapters(NULL),
m_clusters(NULL),
m_clusterCount(0),
m_clusterPreloadCount(0),
m_clusterSize(0) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,864
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t oz_cdev_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *fpos)
{
struct oz_pd *pd;
struct oz_elt_buf *eb;
struct oz_elt_info *ei;
struct oz_elt *elt;
struct oz_app_hdr *app_hdr;
struct oz_serial_ctx *ctx;
spin_lock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
pd = g_cdev.active_pd;
if (pd)
oz_pd_get(pd);
spin_unlock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
if (pd == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
if (!(pd->state & OZ_PD_S_CONNECTED))
return -EAGAIN;
eb = &pd->elt_buff;
ei = oz_elt_info_alloc(eb);
if (ei == NULL) {
count = 0;
goto out;
}
elt = (struct oz_elt *)ei->data;
app_hdr = (struct oz_app_hdr *)(elt+1);
elt->length = sizeof(struct oz_app_hdr) + count;
elt->type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA;
ei->app_id = OZ_APPID_SERIAL;
ei->length = elt->length + sizeof(struct oz_elt);
app_hdr->app_id = OZ_APPID_SERIAL;
if (copy_from_user(app_hdr+1, buf, count))
goto out;
spin_lock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB-1]);
ctx = (struct oz_serial_ctx *)pd->app_ctx[OZ_APPID_SERIAL-1];
if (ctx) {
app_hdr->elt_seq_num = ctx->tx_seq_num++;
if (ctx->tx_seq_num == 0)
ctx->tx_seq_num = 1;
spin_lock(&eb->lock);
if (oz_queue_elt_info(eb, 0, 0, ei) == 0)
ei = NULL;
spin_unlock(&eb->lock);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB-1]);
out:
if (ei) {
count = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&eb->lock);
oz_elt_info_free(eb, ei);
spin_unlock_bh(&eb->lock);
}
oz_pd_put(pd);
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the oz_cdev_write function in drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozcdev.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted write operation.
Commit Message: staging: ozwpan: prevent overflow in oz_cdev_write()
We need to check "count" so we don't overflow the ei->data buffer.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,965
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DiceResponseHandler::OnTokenExchangeSuccess(
DiceTokenFetcher* token_fetcher,
const std::string& refresh_token,
bool is_under_advanced_protection) {
const std::string& email = token_fetcher->email();
const std::string& gaia_id = token_fetcher->gaia_id();
if (!CanGetTokenForAccount(gaia_id, email))
return;
VLOG(1) << "[Dice] OAuth success for email " << email;
bool should_enable_sync = token_fetcher->should_enable_sync();
std::string account_id =
account_tracker_service_->SeedAccountInfo(gaia_id, email);
account_tracker_service_->SetIsAdvancedProtectionAccount(
account_id, is_under_advanced_protection);
token_service_->UpdateCredentials(account_id, refresh_token);
about_signin_internals_->OnRefreshTokenReceived(
base::StringPrintf("Successful (%s)", account_id.c_str()));
if (should_enable_sync)
token_fetcher->delegate()->EnableSync(account_id);
DeleteTokenFetcher(token_fetcher);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The JSGenericLowering class in compiler/js-generic-lowering.cc in Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94, mishandles comparison operators, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
|
Medium
| 172,566
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void xfrm6_tunnel_spi_fini(void)
{
kmem_cache_destroy(xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The tunnels implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34, when tunnel functionality is configured as a module, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending a packet during module loading.
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,881
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnCancelPendingPreviewRequest() {
g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Set(preview_ui_addr_str_, -1);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,836
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: next_line(struct archive_read *a,
const char **b, ssize_t *avail, ssize_t *ravail, ssize_t *nl)
{
ssize_t len;
int quit;
quit = 0;
if (*avail == 0) {
*nl = 0;
len = 0;
} else
len = get_line_size(*b, *avail, nl);
/*
* Read bytes more while it does not reach the end of line.
*/
while (*nl == 0 && len == *avail && !quit) {
ssize_t diff = *ravail - *avail;
size_t nbytes_req = (*ravail+1023) & ~1023U;
ssize_t tested;
/* Increase reading bytes if it is not enough to at least
* new two lines. */
if (nbytes_req < (size_t)*ravail + 160)
nbytes_req <<= 1;
*b = __archive_read_ahead(a, nbytes_req, avail);
if (*b == NULL) {
if (*ravail >= *avail)
return (0);
/* Reading bytes reaches the end of file. */
*b = __archive_read_ahead(a, *avail, avail);
quit = 1;
}
*ravail = *avail;
*b += diff;
*avail -= diff;
tested = len;/* Skip some bytes we already determinated. */
len = get_line_size(*b, *avail, nl);
if (len >= 0)
len += tested;
}
return (len);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The mtree bidder in libarchive 3.2.1 does not keep track of line sizes when extending the read-ahead, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted file, which triggers an invalid read in the (1) detect_form or (2) bid_entry function in libarchive/archive_read_support_format_mtree.c.
Commit Message: Issue 747 (and others?): Avoid OOB read when parsing multiple long lines
The mtree bidder needs to look several lines ahead
in the input. It does this by extending the read-ahead
and parsing subsequent lines from the same growing buffer.
A bookkeeping error when extending the read-ahead would
sometimes lead it to significantly over-count the
size of the line being read.
|
Medium
| 168,765
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int __fsnotify_parent(const struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, __u32 mask)
{
struct dentry *parent;
struct inode *p_inode;
int ret = 0;
if (!dentry)
dentry = path->dentry;
if (!(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_FSNOTIFY_PARENT_WATCHED))
return 0;
parent = dget_parent(dentry);
p_inode = parent->d_inode;
if (unlikely(!fsnotify_inode_watches_children(p_inode)))
__fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags(p_inode);
else if (p_inode->i_fsnotify_mask & mask) {
/* we are notifying a parent so come up with the new mask which
* specifies these are events which came from a child. */
mask |= FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD;
if (path)
ret = fsnotify(p_inode, mask, path, FSNOTIFY_EVENT_PATH,
dentry->d_name.name, 0);
else
ret = fsnotify(p_inode, mask, dentry->d_inode, FSNOTIFY_EVENT_INODE,
dentry->d_name.name, 0);
}
dput(parent);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the fsnotify implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.12.4 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted application that leverages simultaneous execution of the inotify_handle_event and vfs_rename functions.
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Medium
| 168,264
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cc::FrameSinkId RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetFrameSinkId() {
return delegated_frame_host_ ? delegated_frame_host_->GetFrameSinkId()
: cc::FrameSinkId();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The Omnibox implementation in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82 allows remote attackers to spoof a document's origin via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
|
Medium
| 172,234
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: png_push_save_buffer(png_structp png_ptr)
{
if (png_ptr->save_buffer_size)
{
if (png_ptr->save_buffer_ptr != png_ptr->save_buffer)
{
png_size_t i, istop;
png_bytep sp;
png_bytep dp;
istop = png_ptr->save_buffer_size;
for (i = 0, sp = png_ptr->save_buffer_ptr, dp = png_ptr->save_buffer;
i < istop; i++, sp++, dp++)
{
*dp = *sp;
}
}
}
if (png_ptr->save_buffer_size + png_ptr->current_buffer_size >
png_ptr->save_buffer_max)
{
png_size_t new_max;
png_bytep old_buffer;
if (png_ptr->save_buffer_size > PNG_SIZE_MAX -
(png_ptr->current_buffer_size + 256))
{
png_error(png_ptr, "Potential overflow of save_buffer");
}
new_max = png_ptr->save_buffer_size + png_ptr->current_buffer_size + 256;
old_buffer = png_ptr->save_buffer;
png_ptr->save_buffer = (png_bytep)png_malloc_warn(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)new_max);
if (png_ptr->save_buffer == NULL)
{
png_free(png_ptr, old_buffer);
png_error(png_ptr, "Insufficient memory for save_buffer");
}
png_memcpy(png_ptr->save_buffer, old_buffer, png_ptr->save_buffer_size);
png_free(png_ptr, old_buffer);
png_ptr->save_buffer_max = new_max;
}
if (png_ptr->current_buffer_size)
{
png_memcpy(png_ptr->save_buffer + png_ptr->save_buffer_size,
png_ptr->current_buffer_ptr, png_ptr->current_buffer_size);
png_ptr->save_buffer_size += png_ptr->current_buffer_size;
png_ptr->current_buffer_size = 0;
}
png_ptr->save_buffer_ptr = png_ptr->save_buffer;
png_ptr->buffer_size = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
Low
| 172,168
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RunPairingCallbacks(Status status) {
if (!agent_.get())
return false;
bool callback_run = false;
if (!pincode_callback_.is_null()) {
pincode_callback_.Run(status, "");
pincode_callback_.Reset();
callback_run = true;
}
if (!passkey_callback_.is_null()) {
passkey_callback_.Run(status, 0);
passkey_callback_.Reset();
callback_run = true;
}
if (!confirmation_callback_.is_null()) {
confirmation_callback_.Run(status);
confirmation_callback_.Reset();
callback_run = true;
}
return callback_run;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,238
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int snd_timer_close(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri)
{
struct snd_timer *timer = NULL;
struct snd_timer_instance *slave, *tmp;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!timeri))
return -ENXIO;
/* force to stop the timer */
snd_timer_stop(timeri);
if (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_SLAVE) {
/* wait, until the active callback is finished */
spin_lock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
while (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK) {
spin_unlock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
udelay(10);
spin_lock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
mutex_lock(®ister_mutex);
list_del(&timeri->open_list);
mutex_unlock(®ister_mutex);
} else {
timer = timeri->timer;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!timer))
goto out;
/* wait, until the active callback is finished */
spin_lock_irq(&timer->lock);
while (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK) {
spin_unlock_irq(&timer->lock);
udelay(10);
spin_lock_irq(&timer->lock);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&timer->lock);
mutex_lock(®ister_mutex);
list_del(&timeri->open_list);
if (timer && list_empty(&timer->open_list_head) &&
timer->hw.close)
timer->hw.close(timer);
/* remove slave links */
list_for_each_entry_safe(slave, tmp, &timeri->slave_list_head,
open_list) {
spin_lock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
_snd_timer_stop(slave, 1, SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION);
list_move_tail(&slave->open_list, &snd_timer_slave_list);
slave->master = NULL;
slave->timer = NULL;
spin_unlock_irq(&slave_active_lock);
}
mutex_unlock(®ister_mutex);
}
out:
if (timeri->private_free)
timeri->private_free(timeri);
kfree(timeri->owner);
kfree(timeri);
if (timer)
module_put(timer->module);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: sound/core/timer.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 retains certain linked lists after a close or stop action, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted ioctl call, related to the (1) snd_timer_close and (2) _snd_timer_stop functions.
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Harden slave timer list handling
A slave timer instance might be still accessible in a racy way while
operating the master instance as it lacks of locking. Since the
master operation is mostly protected with timer->lock, we should cope
with it while changing the slave instance, too. Also, some linked
lists (active_list and ack_list) of slave instances aren't unlinked
immediately at stopping or closing, and this may lead to unexpected
accesses.
This patch tries to address these issues. It adds spin lock of
timer->lock (either from master or slave, which is equivalent) in a
few places. For avoiding a deadlock, we ensure that the global
slave_active_lock is always locked at first before each timer lock.
Also, ack and active_list of slave instances are properly unlinked at
snd_timer_stop() and snd_timer_close().
Last but not least, remove the superfluous call of _snd_timer_stop()
at removing slave links. This is a noop, and calling it may confuse
readers wrt locking. Further cleanup will follow in a later patch.
Actually we've got reports of use-after-free by syzkaller fuzzer, and
this hopefully fixes these issues.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Low
| 167,402
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MessageService::OpenChannelToTab(
int source_process_id, int source_routing_id, int receiver_port_id,
int tab_id, const std::string& extension_id,
const std::string& channel_name) {
content::RenderProcessHost* source =
content::RenderProcessHost::FromID(source_process_id);
if (!source)
return;
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(source->GetBrowserContext());
WebContents* contents = NULL;
scoped_ptr<MessagePort> receiver;
if (ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabById(tab_id, profile, true,
NULL, NULL, &contents, NULL)) {
receiver.reset(new ExtensionMessagePort(
contents->GetRenderProcessHost(),
contents->GetRenderViewHost()->GetRoutingID(),
extension_id));
}
if (contents && contents->GetController().NeedsReload()) {
ExtensionMessagePort port(source, MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL, extension_id);
port.DispatchOnDisconnect(GET_OPPOSITE_PORT_ID(receiver_port_id), true);
return;
}
WebContents* source_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
source_process_id, source_routing_id);
std::string tab_json = "null";
if (source_contents) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> tab_value(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
source_contents, ExtensionTabUtil::INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS));
base::JSONWriter::Write(tab_value.get(), &tab_json);
}
scoped_ptr<OpenChannelParams> params(new OpenChannelParams(source, tab_json,
receiver.release(),
receiver_port_id,
extension_id,
extension_id,
channel_name));
OpenChannelImpl(params.Pass());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not ensure that an extension has the tabs (aka APIPermission::kTab) permission before providing a URL to this extension, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,448
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestEventTarget::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestEventTarget* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestEventTarget*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestEventTarget::s_info);
TestEventTarget* impl = static_cast<TestEventTarget*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
Event* evt(toEvent(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = jsBoolean(impl->dispatchEvent(evt, ec));
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,571
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void GetCSI(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
WebLocalFrame* frame = WebLocalFrame::frameForCurrentContext();
if (frame) {
WebDataSource* data_source = frame->dataSource();
if (data_source) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(data_source);
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> csi = v8::Object::New(isolate);
base::Time now = base::Time::Now();
base::Time start = document_state->request_time().is_null() ?
document_state->start_load_time() :
document_state->request_time();
base::Time onload = document_state->finish_document_load_time();
base::TimeDelta page = now - start;
csi->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "startE"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, floor(start.ToDoubleT() * 1000)));
csi->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "onloadT"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, floor(onload.ToDoubleT() * 1000)));
csi->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "pageT"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, page.InMillisecondsF()));
csi->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "tran"),
v8::Number::New(
isolate, GetCSITransitionType(data_source->navigationType())));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(csi);
return;
}
}
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the GetLoadTimes function in renderer/loadtimes_extension_bindings.cc in the Extensions implementation in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.108 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: Cache csi info before passing it to JS setters.
JS setters invalidate the pointers frame, data_source and document_state.
BUG=590455
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1751553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#379047}
|
Medium
| 172,117
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int dispatch_discard_io(struct xen_blkif *blkif,
struct blkif_request *req)
{
int err = 0;
int status = BLKIF_RSP_OKAY;
struct block_device *bdev = blkif->vbd.bdev;
unsigned long secure;
blkif->st_ds_req++;
xen_blkif_get(blkif);
secure = (blkif->vbd.discard_secure &&
(req->u.discard.flag & BLKIF_DISCARD_SECURE)) ?
BLKDEV_DISCARD_SECURE : 0;
err = blkdev_issue_discard(bdev, req->u.discard.sector_number,
req->u.discard.nr_sectors,
GFP_KERNEL, secure);
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
pr_debug(DRV_PFX "discard op failed, not supported\n");
status = BLKIF_RSP_EOPNOTSUPP;
} else if (err)
status = BLKIF_RSP_ERROR;
make_response(blkif, req->u.discard.id, req->operation, status);
xen_blkif_put(blkif);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The dispatch_discard_io function in drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c in the Xen blkback implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.10.5 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (data loss) via filesystem write operations on a read-only disk that supports the (1) BLKIF_OP_DISCARD (aka discard or TRIM) or (2) SCSI UNMAP feature.
Commit Message: xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
|
Medium
| 166,083
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::reshape(int width, int height) {
cached_width_ = width;
cached_height_ = height;
gl_->ResizeCHROMIUM(width, height);
#ifdef FLIP_FRAMEBUFFER_VERTICALLY
scanline_.reset(new uint8[width * 4]);
#endif // FLIP_FRAMEBUFFER_VERTICALLY
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebGL implementation in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not properly handle CANVAS elements, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix mismanagement in handling of temporary scanline for vertical flip.
BUG=116637
TEST=manual test from bug report with ASAN
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9617038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125301 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,064
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static __u8 *nci_extract_rf_params_nfcb_passive_poll(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct rf_tech_specific_params_nfcb_poll *nfcb_poll,
__u8 *data)
{
nfcb_poll->sensb_res_len = *data++;
pr_debug("sensb_res_len %d\n", nfcb_poll->sensb_res_len);
memcpy(nfcb_poll->sensb_res, data, nfcb_poll->sensb_res_len);
data += nfcb_poll->sensb_res_len;
return data;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in the Near Field Communication Controller Interface (NCI) in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via incoming frames with crafted length fields.
Commit Message: NFC: Prevent multiple buffer overflows in NCI
Fix multiple remotely-exploitable stack-based buffer overflows due to
the NCI code pulling length fields directly from incoming frames and
copying too much data into statically-sized arrays.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Ilan Elias <ilane@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
|
Low
| 166,202
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> setValueAndClosePopupCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
if (args.Length() < 2)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
DOMWindow* imp = V8DOMWindow::toNative(args.Data()->ToObject());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, intValue, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, stringValue, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
DOMWindowPagePopup::setValueAndClosePopup(imp, intValue, stringValue);
return v8::Undefined();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,109
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HistoryController::UpdateForCommit(RenderFrameImpl* frame,
const WebHistoryItem& item,
WebHistoryCommitType commit_type,
bool navigation_within_page) {
switch (commit_type) {
case blink::WebBackForwardCommit:
if (!provisional_entry_)
return;
current_entry_.reset(provisional_entry_.release());
if (HistoryEntry::HistoryNode* node =
current_entry_->GetHistoryNodeForFrame(frame)) {
node->set_item(item);
}
break;
case blink::WebStandardCommit:
CreateNewBackForwardItem(frame, item, navigation_within_page);
break;
case blink::WebInitialCommitInChildFrame:
UpdateForInitialLoadInChildFrame(frame, item);
break;
case blink::WebHistoryInertCommit:
if (current_entry_) {
if (HistoryEntry::HistoryNode* node =
current_entry_->GetHistoryNodeForFrame(frame)) {
if (!navigation_within_page)
node->RemoveChildren();
node->set_item(item);
}
}
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid commit type: " << commit_type;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The HistoryController::UpdateForCommit function in content/renderer/history_controller.cc in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94 mishandles the interaction between subframe forward navigations and other forward navigations, which allows remote attackers to spoof the address bar via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Fix HistoryEntry corruption when commit isn't for provisional entry.
BUG=597322
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1848103004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#384659}
|
Medium
| 172,565
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadCALSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
filename[MagickPathExtent],
header[MagickPathExtent],
message[MagickPathExtent];
FILE
*file;
Image
*image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c,
unique_file;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
unsigned long
density,
direction,
height,
orientation,
pel_path,
type,
width;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read CALS header.
*/
(void) memset(header,0,sizeof(header));
density=0;
direction=0;
orientation=1;
pel_path=0;
type=1;
width=0;
height=0;
for (i=0; i < 16; i++)
{
if (ReadBlob(image,128,(unsigned char *) header) != 128)
break;
switch (*header)
{
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleNCompare(header,"rdensty:",8) == 0)
{
(void) sscanf(header+8,"%lu",&density);
break;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(header,"rpelcnt:",8) == 0)
{
(void) sscanf(header+8,"%lu,%lu",&width,&height);
break;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(header,"rorient:",8) == 0)
{
(void) sscanf(header+8,"%lu,%lu",&pel_path,&direction);
if (pel_path == 90)
orientation=5;
else
if (pel_path == 180)
orientation=3;
else
if (pel_path == 270)
orientation=7;
if (direction == 90)
orientation++;
break;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(header,"rtype:",6) == 0)
{
(void) sscanf(header+6,"%lu",&type);
break;
}
break;
}
}
}
/*
Read CALS pixels.
*/
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
ThrowImageException(FileOpenError,"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile");
while ((c=ReadBlobByte(image)) != EOF)
(void) fputc(c,file);
(void) fclose(file);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,"group4:%s",
filename);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"%lux%lu",width,height);
(void) CloneString(&read_info->size,message);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"%lu",density);
(void) CloneString(&read_info->density,message);
read_info->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick_filename,image_info->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"CALS",MagickPathExtent);
}
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The functions ReadDCMImage in coders/dcm.c, ReadPWPImage in coders/pwp.c, ReadCALSImage in coders/cals.c, and ReadPICTImage in coders/pict.c in ImageMagick 7.0.8-4 do not check the return value of the fputc function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted image file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1199
|
Medium
| 169,038
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void vmx_set_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_nested;
else if (vcpu->arch.apic_base & X2APIC_ENABLE) {
if (is_long_mode(vcpu))
msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic;
else
msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic;
} else {
if (is_long_mode(vcpu))
msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode;
else
msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy;
}
vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(msr_bitmap));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c in the Linux kernel through 4.6.3 mishandles the APICv on/off state, which allows guest OS users to obtain direct APIC MSR access on the host OS, and consequently cause a denial of service (host OS crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code on the host OS, via x2APIC mode.
Commit Message: kvm:vmx: more complete state update on APICv on/off
The function to update APICv on/off state (in particular, to deactivate
it when enabling Hyper-V SynIC) is incomplete: it doesn't adjust
APICv-related fields among secondary processor-based VM-execution
controls. As a result, Windows 2012 guests get stuck when SynIC-based
auto-EOI interrupt intersected with e.g. an IPI in the guest.
In addition, the MSR intercept bitmap isn't updated every time "virtualize
x2APIC mode" is toggled. This path can only be triggered by a malicious
guest, because Windows didn't use x2APIC but rather their own synthetic
APIC access MSRs; however a guest running in a SynIC-enabled VM could
switch to x2APIC and thus obtain direct access to host APIC MSRs
(CVE-2016-4440).
The patch fixes those omissions.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Reported-by: Yang Zhang <yang.zhang.wz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 167,264
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int bta_co_rfc_data_outgoing_size(void *user_data, int *size) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&slot_lock);
uint32_t id = (uintptr_t)user_data;
int ret = false;
*size = 0;
rfc_slot_t *slot = find_rfc_slot_by_id(id);
if (!slot)
goto out;
if (ioctl(slot->fd, FIONREAD, size) == 0) {
ret = true;
} else {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to determine bytes remaining to be read on fd %d: %s", __func__, slot->fd, strerror(errno));
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
}
out:;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&slot_lock);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,456
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplTempFileObject, __construct)
{
long max_memory = PHP_STREAM_MAX_MEM;
char tmp_fname[48];
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|l", &max_memory) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
if (max_memory < 0) {
intern->file_name = "php://memory";
intern->file_name_len = 12;
} else if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS()) {
intern->file_name_len = slprintf(tmp_fname, sizeof(tmp_fname), "php://temp/maxmemory:%ld", max_memory);
intern->file_name = tmp_fname;
} else {
intern->file_name = "php://temp";
intern->file_name_len = 10;
}
intern->u.file.open_mode = "wb";
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 1;
intern->u.file.zcontext = NULL;
if (spl_filesystem_file_open(intern, 0, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
intern->_path_len = 0;
intern->_path = estrndup("", 0);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplFileObject::rewind()
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,050
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int dmarc_process() {
int sr, origin; /* used in SPF section */
int dmarc_spf_result = 0; /* stores spf into dmarc conn ctx */
pdkim_signature *sig = NULL;
BOOL has_dmarc_record = TRUE;
u_char **ruf; /* forensic report addressees, if called for */
/* ACLs have "control=dmarc_disable_verify" */
if (dmarc_disable_verify == TRUE)
{
dmarc_ar_header = dmarc_auth_results_header(from_header, NULL);
return OK;
}
/* Store the header From: sender domain for this part of DMARC.
* If there is no from_header struct, then it's likely this message
* is locally generated and relying on fixups to add it. Just skip
* the entire DMARC system if we can't find a From: header....or if
* there was a previous error.
*/
if (from_header == NULL || dmarc_abort == TRUE)
dmarc_abort = TRUE;
else
{
/* I strongly encourage anybody who can make this better to contact me directly!
* <cannonball> Is this an insane way to extract the email address from the From: header?
* <jgh_hm> it's sure a horrid layer-crossing....
* <cannonball> I'm not denying that :-/
* <jgh_hm> there may well be no better though
*/
header_from_sender = expand_string(
string_sprintf("${domain:${extract{1}{:}{${addresses:%s}}}}",
from_header->text) );
/* The opendmarc library extracts the domain from the email address, but
* only try to store it if it's not empty. Otherwise, skip out of DMARC. */
if (strcmp( CCS header_from_sender, "") == 0)
dmarc_abort = TRUE;
libdm_status = (dmarc_abort == TRUE) ?
DMARC_PARSE_OKAY :
opendmarc_policy_store_from_domain(dmarc_pctx, header_from_sender);
if (libdm_status != DMARC_PARSE_OKAY)
{
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failure to store header From: in DMARC: %s, header was '%s'",
opendmarc_policy_status_to_str(libdm_status), from_header->text);
dmarc_abort = TRUE;
}
}
/* Use the envelope sender domain for this part of DMARC */
spf_sender_domain = expand_string(US"$sender_address_domain");
if ( spf_response == NULL )
{
/* No spf data means null envelope sender so generate a domain name
* from the sender_helo_name */
if (spf_sender_domain == NULL)
{
spf_sender_domain = sender_helo_name;
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DMARC using synthesized SPF sender domain = %s\n",
spf_sender_domain);
DEBUG(D_receive)
debug_printf("DMARC using synthesized SPF sender domain = %s\n", spf_sender_domain);
}
dmarc_spf_result = DMARC_POLICY_SPF_OUTCOME_NONE;
dmarc_spf_ares_result = ARES_RESULT_UNKNOWN;
origin = DMARC_POLICY_SPF_ORIGIN_HELO;
spf_human_readable = US"";
}
else
{
sr = spf_response->result;
dmarc_spf_result = (sr == SPF_RESULT_NEUTRAL) ? DMARC_POLICY_SPF_OUTCOME_NONE :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_PASS) ? DMARC_POLICY_SPF_OUTCOME_PASS :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_FAIL) ? DMARC_POLICY_SPF_OUTCOME_FAIL :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_SOFTFAIL) ? DMARC_POLICY_SPF_OUTCOME_TMPFAIL :
DMARC_POLICY_SPF_OUTCOME_NONE;
dmarc_spf_ares_result = (sr == SPF_RESULT_NEUTRAL) ? ARES_RESULT_NEUTRAL :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_PASS) ? ARES_RESULT_PASS :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_FAIL) ? ARES_RESULT_FAIL :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_SOFTFAIL) ? ARES_RESULT_SOFTFAIL :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_NONE) ? ARES_RESULT_NONE :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_TEMPERROR) ? ARES_RESULT_TEMPERROR :
(sr == SPF_RESULT_PERMERROR) ? ARES_RESULT_PERMERROR :
ARES_RESULT_UNKNOWN;
origin = DMARC_POLICY_SPF_ORIGIN_MAILFROM;
spf_human_readable = (uschar *)spf_response->header_comment;
DEBUG(D_receive)
debug_printf("DMARC using SPF sender domain = %s\n", spf_sender_domain);
}
if (strcmp( CCS spf_sender_domain, "") == 0)
dmarc_abort = TRUE;
if (dmarc_abort == FALSE)
{
libdm_status = opendmarc_policy_store_spf(dmarc_pctx, spf_sender_domain,
dmarc_spf_result, origin, spf_human_readable);
if (libdm_status != DMARC_PARSE_OKAY)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failure to store spf for DMARC: %s",
opendmarc_policy_status_to_str(libdm_status));
}
/* Now we cycle through the dkim signature results and put into
* the opendmarc context, further building the DMARC reply. */
sig = dkim_signatures;
dkim_history_buffer = US"";
while (sig != NULL)
{
int dkim_result, dkim_ares_result, vs, ves;
vs = sig->verify_status;
ves = sig->verify_ext_status;
dkim_result = ( vs == PDKIM_VERIFY_PASS ) ? DMARC_POLICY_DKIM_OUTCOME_PASS :
( vs == PDKIM_VERIFY_FAIL ) ? DMARC_POLICY_DKIM_OUTCOME_FAIL :
( vs == PDKIM_VERIFY_INVALID ) ? DMARC_POLICY_DKIM_OUTCOME_TMPFAIL :
DMARC_POLICY_DKIM_OUTCOME_NONE;
libdm_status = opendmarc_policy_store_dkim(dmarc_pctx, (uschar *)sig->domain,
dkim_result, US"");
DEBUG(D_receive)
debug_printf("DMARC adding DKIM sender domain = %s\n", sig->domain);
if (libdm_status != DMARC_PARSE_OKAY)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failure to store dkim (%s) for DMARC: %s",
sig->domain, opendmarc_policy_status_to_str(libdm_status));
dkim_ares_result = ( vs == PDKIM_VERIFY_PASS ) ? ARES_RESULT_PASS :
( vs == PDKIM_VERIFY_FAIL ) ? ARES_RESULT_FAIL :
( vs == PDKIM_VERIFY_NONE ) ? ARES_RESULT_NONE :
( vs == PDKIM_VERIFY_INVALID ) ?
( ves == PDKIM_VERIFY_INVALID_PUBKEY_UNAVAILABLE ? ARES_RESULT_PERMERROR :
ves == PDKIM_VERIFY_INVALID_BUFFER_SIZE ? ARES_RESULT_PERMERROR :
ves == PDKIM_VERIFY_INVALID_PUBKEY_PARSING ? ARES_RESULT_PERMERROR :
ARES_RESULT_UNKNOWN ) :
ARES_RESULT_UNKNOWN;
dkim_history_buffer = string_sprintf("%sdkim %s %d\n", dkim_history_buffer,
sig->domain, dkim_ares_result);
sig = sig->next;
}
libdm_status = opendmarc_policy_query_dmarc(dmarc_pctx, US"");
switch (libdm_status)
{
case DMARC_DNS_ERROR_NXDOMAIN:
case DMARC_DNS_ERROR_NO_RECORD:
DEBUG(D_receive)
debug_printf("DMARC no record found for %s\n", header_from_sender);
has_dmarc_record = FALSE;
break;
case DMARC_PARSE_OKAY:
DEBUG(D_receive)
debug_printf("DMARC record found for %s\n", header_from_sender);
break;
case DMARC_PARSE_ERROR_BAD_VALUE:
DEBUG(D_receive)
debug_printf("DMARC record parse error for %s\n", header_from_sender);
has_dmarc_record = FALSE;
break;
default:
/* everything else, skip dmarc */
DEBUG(D_receive)
debug_printf("DMARC skipping (%d), unsure what to do with %s",
libdm_status, from_header->text);
has_dmarc_record = FALSE;
break;
}
/* Can't use exim's string manipulation functions so allocate memory
* for libopendmarc using its max hostname length definition. */
uschar *dmarc_domain = (uschar *)calloc(DMARC_MAXHOSTNAMELEN, sizeof(uschar));
libdm_status = opendmarc_policy_fetch_utilized_domain(dmarc_pctx, dmarc_domain,
DMARC_MAXHOSTNAMELEN-1);
dmarc_used_domain = string_copy(dmarc_domain);
free(dmarc_domain);
if (libdm_status != DMARC_PARSE_OKAY)
{
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failure to read domainname used for DMARC lookup: %s",
opendmarc_policy_status_to_str(libdm_status));
}
libdm_status = opendmarc_get_policy_to_enforce(dmarc_pctx);
dmarc_policy = libdm_status;
switch(libdm_status)
{
case DMARC_POLICY_ABSENT: /* No DMARC record found */
dmarc_status = US"norecord";
dmarc_pass_fail = US"none";
dmarc_status_text = US"No DMARC record";
action = DMARC_RESULT_ACCEPT;
break;
case DMARC_FROM_DOMAIN_ABSENT: /* No From: domain */
dmarc_status = US"nofrom";
dmarc_pass_fail = US"temperror";
dmarc_status_text = US"No From: domain found";
action = DMARC_RESULT_ACCEPT;
break;
case DMARC_POLICY_NONE: /* Accept and report */
dmarc_status = US"none";
dmarc_pass_fail = US"none";
dmarc_status_text = US"None, Accept";
action = DMARC_RESULT_ACCEPT;
break;
case DMARC_POLICY_PASS: /* Explicit accept */
dmarc_status = US"accept";
dmarc_pass_fail = US"pass";
dmarc_status_text = US"Accept";
action = DMARC_RESULT_ACCEPT;
break;
case DMARC_POLICY_REJECT: /* Explicit reject */
dmarc_status = US"reject";
dmarc_pass_fail = US"fail";
dmarc_status_text = US"Reject";
action = DMARC_RESULT_REJECT;
break;
case DMARC_POLICY_QUARANTINE: /* Explicit quarantine */
dmarc_status = US"quarantine";
dmarc_pass_fail = US"fail";
dmarc_status_text = US"Quarantine";
action = DMARC_RESULT_QUARANTINE;
break;
default:
dmarc_status = US"temperror";
dmarc_pass_fail = US"temperror";
dmarc_status_text = US"Internal Policy Error";
action = DMARC_RESULT_TEMPFAIL;
break;
}
libdm_status = opendmarc_policy_fetch_alignment(dmarc_pctx, &da, &sa);
if (libdm_status != DMARC_PARSE_OKAY)
{
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failure to read DMARC alignment: %s",
opendmarc_policy_status_to_str(libdm_status));
}
if (has_dmarc_record == TRUE)
{
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DMARC results: spf_domain=%s dmarc_domain=%s "
"spf_align=%s dkim_align=%s enforcement='%s'",
spf_sender_domain, dmarc_used_domain,
(sa==DMARC_POLICY_SPF_ALIGNMENT_PASS) ?"yes":"no",
(da==DMARC_POLICY_DKIM_ALIGNMENT_PASS)?"yes":"no",
dmarc_status_text);
history_file_status = dmarc_write_history_file();
/* Now get the forensic reporting addresses, if any */
ruf = opendmarc_policy_fetch_ruf(dmarc_pctx, NULL, 0, 1);
dmarc_send_forensic_report(ruf);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The dmarc_process function in dmarc.c in Exim before 4.82.1, when EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC is enabled, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via the From header in an email, which is passed to the expand_string function.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,193
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long SeekHead::Parse() {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
int entry_count = 0;
int void_element_count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x0DBB) // SeekEntry ID
++entry_count;
else if (id == 0x6C) // Void ID
++void_element_count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
m_entries = new (std::nothrow) Entry[entry_count];
if (m_entries == NULL)
return -1;
m_void_elements = new (std::nothrow) VoidElement[void_element_count];
if (m_void_elements == NULL)
return -1;
Entry* pEntry = m_entries;
VoidElement* pVoidElement = m_void_elements;
pos = m_start;
while (pos < stop) {
const long long idpos = pos;
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x0DBB) { // SeekEntry ID
if (ParseEntry(pReader, pos, size, pEntry)) {
Entry& e = *pEntry++;
e.element_start = idpos;
e.element_size = (pos + size) - idpos;
}
} else if (id == 0x6C) { // Void ID
VoidElement& e = *pVoidElement++;
e.element_start = idpos;
e.element_size = (pos + size) - idpos;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
ptrdiff_t count_ = ptrdiff_t(pEntry - m_entries);
assert(count_ >= 0);
assert(count_ <= entry_count);
m_entry_count = static_cast<int>(count_);
count_ = ptrdiff_t(pVoidElement - m_void_elements);
assert(count_ >= 0);
assert(count_ <= void_element_count);
m_void_element_count = static_cast<int>(count_);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,836
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gst_vorbis_tag_add_coverart (GstTagList * tags, const gchar * img_data_base64,
gint base64_len)
{
GstBuffer *img;
guchar *img_data;
gsize img_len;
guint save = 0;
gint state = 0;
if (base64_len < 2)
goto not_enough_data;
img_data = g_try_malloc0 (base64_len * 3 / 4);
if (img_data == NULL)
goto alloc_failed;
img_len = g_base64_decode_step (img_data_base64, base64_len, img_data,
&state, &save);
if (img_len == 0)
goto decode_failed;
img = gst_tag_image_data_to_image_buffer (img_data, img_len,
GST_TAG_IMAGE_TYPE_NONE);
if (img == NULL)
gst_tag_list_add (tags, GST_TAG_MERGE_APPEND,
GST_TAG_PREVIEW_IMAGE, img, NULL);
GST_TAG_PREVIEW_IMAGE, img, NULL);
gst_buffer_unref (img);
g_free (img_data);
return;
/* ERRORS */
{
GST_WARNING ("COVERART tag with too little base64-encoded data");
GST_WARNING ("COVERART tag with too little base64-encoded data");
return;
}
alloc_failed:
{
GST_WARNING ("Couldn't allocate enough memory to decode COVERART tag");
return;
}
decode_failed:
{
GST_WARNING ("Couldn't decode bas64 image data from COVERART tag");
g_free (img_data);
return;
}
convert_failed:
{
GST_WARNING ("Couldn't extract image or image type from COVERART tag");
g_free (img_data);
return;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the gst_vorbis_tag_add_coverart function (gst-libs/gst/tag/gstvorbistag.c) in vorbistag in gst-plugins-base (aka gstreamer-plugins-base) before 0.10.23 in GStreamer allows context-dependent attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted COVERART tag that is converted from a base64 representation, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,754
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CtcpHandler::handleTime(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
Q_UNUSED(target)
if(ctcptype == CtcpQuery) {
if(_ignoreListManager->ctcpMatch(prefix, network()->networkName(), "TIME"))
return;
reply(nickFromMask(prefix), "TIME", QDateTime::currentDateTime().toString());
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP TIME request by %1").arg(prefix));
}
else {
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP TIME answer from %1: %2")
.arg(nickFromMask(prefix)).arg(param));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ctcphandler.cpp in Quassel before 0.6.3 and 0.7.x before 0.7.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (unresponsive IRC) via multiple Client-To-Client Protocol (CTCP) requests in a PRIVMSG message.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,879
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnWriteObjectsSync(
const ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap& objects,
base::SharedMemoryHandle bitmap_handle) {
DCHECK(base::SharedMemory::IsHandleValid(bitmap_handle))
<< "Bad bitmap handle";
scoped_ptr<ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap> long_living_objects(
new ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap(objects));
if (!ui::Clipboard::ReplaceSharedMemHandle(
long_living_objects.get(), bitmap_handle, PeerHandle()))
return;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&WriteObjectsOnUIThread,
base::Owned(long_living_objects.release())));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ScopedClipboardWriter::WritePickledData function in ui/base/clipboard/scoped_clipboard_writer.cc in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.152 on OS X and Linux and before 33.0.1750.154 on Windows does not verify a certain format value, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the clipboard.
Commit Message: Refactor ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap sanitization in ClipboardMsgFilter.
BUG=352395
R=tony@chromium.org
TBR=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/200523004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@257164 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,692
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: CryptohomeLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetCryptohomeLibrary() {
return crypto_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,622
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ssize_t socket_write(const socket_t *socket, const void *buf, size_t count) {
assert(socket != NULL);
assert(buf != NULL);
return send(socket->fd, buf, count, MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,487
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ihevcd_decode(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
WORD32 ret = IV_SUCCESS;
codec_t *ps_codec = (codec_t *)(ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle);
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
WORD32 proc_idx = 0;
WORD32 prev_proc_idx = 0;
/* Initialize error code */
ps_codec->i4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
{
UWORD32 u4_size = ps_dec_op->u4_size;
memset(ps_dec_op, 0, sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->u4_size = u4_size; //Restore size field
}
if(ps_codec->i4_init_done != 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IHEVCD_INIT_NOT_DONE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IHEVCD_NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT_REACHED;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* If reset flag is set, flush the existing buffers */
if(ps_codec->i4_reset_flag)
{
ps_codec->i4_flush_mode = 1;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
/* In case the decoder is not in flush mode check for input buffer validity */
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_flush_mode)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN)
{
if((WORD32)ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes > 0)
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes;
else
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
#ifdef APPLY_CONCEALMENT
{
WORD32 num_mbs;
num_mbs = (ps_codec->i4_wd * ps_codec->i4_ht + 255) >> 8;
/* Reset MB Count at the beginning of every process call */
ps_codec->mb_count = 0;
memset(ps_codec->mb_map, 0, ((num_mbs + 7) >> 3));
}
#endif
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf && ps_codec->i4_header_mode == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
ps_codec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_codec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
if(ps_codec->i4_flush_mode)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_codec->ps_disp_buf = (pic_buf_t *)ihevc_disp_mgr_get(
(disp_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_disp_buf_mgr, &ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id);
/* In case of non-shared mode, then convert/copy the frame to output buffer */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf)
&& ((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf)
|| (IV_YUV_420P
== ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)))
{
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[prev_proc_idx];
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
/* Set remaining number of rows to be processed */
ret = ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, &ps_codec->as_process[prev_proc_idx],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], 0,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
}
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
if(1 == ps_dec_op->u4_output_present)
{
WORD32 xpos = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd - 32 - LOGO_WD;
WORD32 ypos = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - 32 - LOGO_HT;
if(ypos < 0)
ypos = 0;
if(xpos < 0)
xpos = 0;
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], ps_codec->i4_disp_strd,
xpos,
ypos,
ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt,
ps_codec->i4_disp_wd,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
}
if(NULL == ps_codec->ps_disp_buf)
{
/* If in flush mode and there are no more buffers to flush,
* check for the reset flag and reset the decoder */
if(ps_codec->i4_reset_flag)
{
ihevcd_init(ps_codec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
/* In case of shared mode, check if there is a free buffer for reconstruction */
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_header_mode) && (1 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf))
{
WORD32 buf_status;
buf_status = 1;
if(ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr)
buf_status = ihevc_buf_mgr_check_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr);
/* If there is no free buffer, then return with an error code */
if(0 == buf_status)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes;
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame = 0;
ps_codec->i4_pic_present = 0;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
ps_codec->ps_disp_buf = NULL;
if(ps_codec->i4_num_cores > 1)
{
ithread_set_affinity(0);
}
while(MIN_START_CODE_LEN < ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining)
{
WORD32 nal_len;
WORD32 nal_ofst;
WORD32 bits_len;
if(ps_codec->i4_slice_error)
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
WORD32 next_slice_addr = ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x +
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y * ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx == next_slice_addr)
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
}
if(ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_dynamic)
{
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf = ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_dynamic;
ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size = ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size_dynamic;
}
else
{
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf = ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_static;
ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size = ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size_static;
}
nal_ofst = ihevcd_nal_search_start_code(ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf,
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining);
ps_codec->i4_nal_ofst = nal_ofst;
{
WORD32 bytes_remaining = ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - nal_ofst;
bytes_remaining = MIN((UWORD32)bytes_remaining, ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size);
ihevcd_nal_remv_emuln_bytes(ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf + nal_ofst,
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf,
bytes_remaining,
&nal_len, &bits_len);
/* Decoder may read upto 8 extra bytes at the end of frame */
/* These are not used, but still set them to zero to avoid uninitialized reads */
if(bits_len < (WORD32)(ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size - 8))
{
memset(ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf + bits_len, 0, 2 * sizeof(UWORD32));
}
}
/* This may be used to update the offsets for tiles and entropy sync row offsets */
ps_codec->i4_num_emln_bytes = nal_len - bits_len;
ps_codec->i4_nal_len = nal_len;
ihevcd_bits_init(&ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm, ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf,
bits_len);
ret = ihevcd_nal_unit(ps_codec);
/* If the frame is incomplete and
* the bytes remaining is zero or a header is received,
* complete the frame treating it to be in error */
if(ps_codec->i4_pic_present &&
(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx != ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i4_pic_size_in_ctb))
{
if((ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - (nal_len + nal_ofst) <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN) ||
(ps_codec->i4_header_in_slice_mode))
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx--;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx < 0)
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + ((ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx + 1) & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 1;
continue;
}
}
if(IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE == ret)
{
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf += (nal_ofst + nal_len);
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining -= (nal_ofst + nal_len);
continue;
}
if((IVD_RES_CHANGED == ret) ||
(IHEVCD_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS == ret))
{
break;
}
/* Update bytes remaining and bytes consumed and input bitstream pointer */
/* Do not consume the NAL in the following cases */
/* Slice header reached during header decode mode */
/* TODO: Next picture's slice reached */
if(ret != IHEVCD_SLICE_IN_HEADER_MODE)
{
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_slice_error) ||
(ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - (nal_len + nal_ofst) <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN))
{
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf += (nal_ofst + nal_len);
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining -= (nal_ofst + nal_len);
}
if(ret != IHEVCD_SUCCESS)
break;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame)
break;
}
else
{
ret = IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
break;
}
/* Allocate dynamic bitstream buffer once SPS is decoded */
if((ps_codec->u4_allocate_dynamic_done == 0) && ps_codec->i4_sps_done)
{
WORD32 ret;
ret = ihevcd_allocate_dynamic_bufs(ps_codec);
if(ret != IV_SUCCESS)
{
/* Free any dynamic buffers that are allocated */
ihevcd_free_dynamic_bufs(ps_codec);
ps_codec->i4_error_code = IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
BREAK_AFTER_SLICE_NAL();
}
if((ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt == 0) && (ret != IHEVCD_SUCCESS))
{
ps_codec->i4_error_code = ret;
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(1 == ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
WORD32 i;
sps_t *ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
ps_codec->i4_first_pic_done = 1;
/*TODO temporary fix: end_of_frame is checked before adding format conversion to job queue */
if(ps_codec->i4_num_cores > 1 && ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame)
{
/* Add job queue for format conversion / frame copy for each ctb row */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc;
/* i4_num_cores - 1 contexts are currently being used by other threads */
ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1];
if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf) &&
((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) || (IV_YUV_420P == ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)))
{
/* If format conversion jobs were not issued in pic_init() add them here */
if((0 == ps_codec->u4_enable_fmt_conv_ahead) ||
(ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id == ps_proc->i4_cur_pic_buf_id))
for(i = 0; i < ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb; i++)
{
proc_job_t s_job;
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret;
s_job.i4_cmd = CMD_FMTCONV;
s_job.i2_ctb_cnt = 0;
s_job.i2_ctb_x = 0;
s_job.i2_ctb_y = i;
s_job.i2_slice_idx = 0;
s_job.i4_tu_coeff_data_ofst = 0;
ret = ihevcd_jobq_queue((jobq_t *)ps_codec->s_parse.pv_proc_jobq,
&s_job, sizeof(proc_job_t), 1);
if(ret != (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS)
return (WORD32)ret;
}
}
/* Reached end of frame : Signal terminate */
/* The terminate flag is checked only after all the jobs are dequeued */
ret = ihevcd_jobq_terminate((jobq_t *)ps_codec->s_parse.pv_proc_jobq);
while(1)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret;
proc_job_t s_job;
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc;
/* i4_num_cores - 1 contexts are currently being used by other threads */
ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1];
ret = ihevcd_jobq_dequeue((jobq_t *)ps_proc->pv_proc_jobq, &s_job,
sizeof(proc_job_t), 1);
if((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS != ret)
break;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_cnt = s_job.i2_ctb_cnt;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_x = s_job.i2_ctb_x;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_y = s_job.i2_ctb_y;
ps_proc->i4_cur_slice_idx = s_job.i2_slice_idx;
if(CMD_PROCESS == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, s_job.i4_tu_coeff_data_ofst);
ihevcd_process(ps_proc);
}
else if(CMD_FMTCONV == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
sps_t *ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
WORD32 num_rows = 1 << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size;
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
num_rows = MIN(num_rows, (ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - (s_job.i2_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size)));
if(num_rows < 0)
num_rows = 0;
ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, ps_proc,
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
s_job.i2_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size,
num_rows);
}
}
}
/* In case of non-shared mode and while running in single core mode, then convert/copy the frame to output buffer */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
else if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf) && ((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) ||
(IV_YUV_420P == ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)) &&
(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame))
{
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx];
/* Set remaining number of rows to be processed */
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht
- ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row;
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
if(ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows < 0)
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows = 0;
ret = ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, ps_proc,
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row,
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows);
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row += ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows;
}
DEBUG_DUMP_MV_MAP(ps_codec);
/* Mark MV Buf as needed for reference */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_mv_bank_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_REF);
/* Mark pic buf as needed for reference */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_REF);
/* Mark pic buf as needed for display */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_DISP);
/* Insert the current picture as short term reference */
ihevc_dpb_mgr_insert_ref((dpb_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_dpb_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].ps_cur_pic,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id);
/* If a frame was displayed (in non-shared mode), then release it from display manager */
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) && (ps_codec->ps_disp_buf))
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
/* Wait for threads */
for(i = 0; i < (ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1); i++)
{
if(ps_codec->ai4_process_thread_created[i])
{
ithread_join(ps_codec->apv_process_thread_handle[i], NULL);
ps_codec->ai4_process_thread_created[i] = 0;
}
}
DEBUG_VALIDATE_PADDED_REGION(&ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx]);
if(ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt > 0)
{
DEBUG_DUMP_PIC_PU(ps_codec);
}
DEBUG_DUMP_PIC_BUFFERS(ps_codec);
/* Increment the number of pictures decoded */
ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt++;
}
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
if(1 == ps_dec_op->u4_output_present)
{
WORD32 xpos = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd - 32 - LOGO_WD;
WORD32 ypos = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - 32 - LOGO_HT;
if(ypos < 0)
ypos = 0;
if(xpos < 0)
xpos = 0;
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], ps_codec->i4_disp_strd,
xpos,
ypos,
ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt,
ps_codec->i4_disp_wd,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A denial of service vulnerability in decoder/ihevcd_decode.c in libhevc in Mediaserver could enable a remote attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-32322258.
Commit Message: Handle invalid slice_address in slice header
If an invalid slice_address was parsed, it was resulting in an incomplete
slice header during decode stage. Fix this by not incrementing slice_idx
for ignore slice error
Bug: 32322258
Change-Id: I8638d7094d65f4409faa9b9e337ef7e7b64505de
(cherry picked from commit f4f3556e04a9776bcc776523ae0763e7d0d5c668)
|
Medium
| 174,070
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DownloadController::OnDownloadStarted(
DownloadItem* download_item) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
WebContents* web_contents = download_item->GetWebContents();
if (!web_contents)
return;
download_item->AddObserver(this);
ChromeDownloadDelegate::FromWebContents(web_contents)->OnDownloadStarted(
download_item->GetTargetFilePath().BaseName().value(),
download_item->GetMimeType());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The UnescapeURLWithAdjustmentsImpl implementation in net/base/escape.cc in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85 does not prevent display of Unicode LOCK characters in the omnibox, which makes it easier for remote attackers to spoof the SSL lock icon by placing one of these characters at the end of a URL, as demonstrated by the omnibox in localizations for right-to-left languages.
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
|
Low
| 171,882
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: process_plane(uint8 * in, int width, int height, uint8 * out, int size)
{
UNUSED(size);
int indexw;
int indexh;
int code;
int collen;
int replen;
int color;
int x;
int revcode;
uint8 * last_line;
uint8 * this_line;
uint8 * org_in;
uint8 * org_out;
org_in = in;
org_out = out;
last_line = 0;
indexh = 0;
while (indexh < height)
{
out = (org_out + width * height * 4) - ((indexh + 1) * width * 4);
color = 0;
this_line = out;
indexw = 0;
if (last_line == 0)
{
while (indexw < width)
{
code = CVAL(in);
replen = code & 0xf;
collen = (code >> 4) & 0xf;
revcode = (replen << 4) | collen;
if ((revcode <= 47) && (revcode >= 16))
{
replen = revcode;
collen = 0;
}
while (collen > 0)
{
color = CVAL(in);
*out = color;
out += 4;
indexw++;
collen--;
}
while (replen > 0)
{
*out = color;
out += 4;
indexw++;
replen--;
}
}
}
else
{
while (indexw < width)
{
code = CVAL(in);
replen = code & 0xf;
collen = (code >> 4) & 0xf;
revcode = (replen << 4) | collen;
if ((revcode <= 47) && (revcode >= 16))
{
replen = revcode;
collen = 0;
}
while (collen > 0)
{
x = CVAL(in);
if (x & 1)
{
x = x >> 1;
x = x + 1;
color = -x;
}
else
{
x = x >> 1;
color = x;
}
x = last_line[indexw * 4] + color;
*out = x;
out += 4;
indexw++;
collen--;
}
while (replen > 0)
{
x = last_line[indexw * 4] + color;
*out = x;
out += 4;
indexw++;
replen--;
}
}
}
indexh++;
last_line = this_line;
}
return (int) (in - org_in);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain a Buffer Overflow over the global variables in the function seamless_process_line() that results in memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
Low
| 169,795
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int bochs_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVBochsState *s = bs->opaque;
uint32_t i;
struct bochs_header bochs;
int ret;
bs->read_only = 1; // no write support yet
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 0, &bochs, sizeof(bochs));
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
if (strcmp(bochs.magic, HEADER_MAGIC) ||
strcmp(bochs.type, REDOLOG_TYPE) ||
strcmp(bochs.subtype, GROWING_TYPE) ||
((le32_to_cpu(bochs.version) != HEADER_VERSION) &&
(le32_to_cpu(bochs.version) != HEADER_V1))) {
error_setg(errp, "Image not in Bochs format");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(bochs.version) == HEADER_V1) {
bs->total_sectors = le64_to_cpu(bochs.extra.redolog_v1.disk) / 512;
} else {
bs->total_sectors = le64_to_cpu(bochs.extra.redolog.disk) / 512;
}
s->catalog_size = le32_to_cpu(bochs.catalog);
s->catalog_bitmap = g_malloc(s->catalog_size * 4);
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, le32_to_cpu(bochs.header), s->catalog_bitmap,
s->data_offset = le32_to_cpu(bochs.header) + (s->catalog_size * 4);
s->bitmap_blocks = 1 + (le32_to_cpu(bochs.bitmap) - 1) / 512;
s->extent_blocks = 1 + (le32_to_cpu(bochs.extent) - 1) / 512;
s->extent_size = le32_to_cpu(bochs.extent);
qemu_co_mutex_init(&s->lock);
return 0;
fail:
s->extent_size = le32_to_cpu(bochs.extent);
qemu_co_mutex_init(&s->lock);
return 0;
extent_index = offset / s->extent_size;
extent_offset = (offset % s->extent_size) / 512;
if (s->catalog_bitmap[extent_index] == 0xffffffff) {
return -1; /* not allocated */
}
bitmap_offset = s->data_offset + (512 * s->catalog_bitmap[extent_index] *
(s->extent_blocks + s->bitmap_blocks));
/* read in bitmap for current extent */
if (bdrv_pread(bs->file, bitmap_offset + (extent_offset / 8),
&bitmap_entry, 1) != 1) {
return -1;
}
if (!((bitmap_entry >> (extent_offset % 8)) & 1)) {
return -1; /* not allocated */
}
return bitmap_offset + (512 * (s->bitmap_blocks + extent_offset));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the block drivers in QEMU, possibly before 2.0.0, allow local users to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted catalog size in (1) the parallels_open function in block/parallels.c or (2) bochs_open function in bochs.c, a large L1 table in the (3) qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp in qcow2-snapshot.c or (4) qcow2_grow_l1_table function in qcow2-cluster.c, (5) a large request in the bdrv_check_byte_request function in block.c and other block drivers, (6) crafted cluster indexes in the get_refcount function in qcow2-refcount.c, or (7) a large number of blocks in the cloop_open function in cloop.c, which trigger buffer overflows, memory corruption, large memory allocations and out-of-bounds read and writes.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,404
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ContextualSearchDelegate::DecodeSearchTermFromJsonResponse(
const std::string& response,
std::string* search_term,
std::string* display_text,
std::string* alternate_term,
std::string* mid,
std::string* prevent_preload,
int* mention_start,
int* mention_end,
std::string* lang,
std::string* thumbnail_url,
std::string* caption) {
bool contains_xssi_escape =
base::StartsWith(response, kXssiEscape, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE);
const std::string& proper_json =
contains_xssi_escape ? response.substr(sizeof(kXssiEscape) - 1)
: response;
JSONStringValueDeserializer deserializer(proper_json);
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> root =
deserializer.Deserialize(nullptr, nullptr);
const std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> dict =
base::DictionaryValue::From(std::move(root));
if (!dict)
return;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchPreventPreload, prevent_preload);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseSearchTermParam, search_term);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseLanguageParam, lang);
if (!dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseDisplayTextParam,
display_text)) {
*display_text = *search_term;
}
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseMidParam, mid);
if (!field_trial_->IsDecodeMentionsDisabled()) {
base::ListValue* mentions_list = nullptr;
dict->GetList(kContextualSearchMentions, &mentions_list);
if (mentions_list && mentions_list->GetSize() >= 2)
ExtractMentionsStartEnd(*mentions_list, mention_start, mention_end);
}
std::string selected_text;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseSelectedTextParam, &selected_text);
if (selected_text != *search_term) {
*alternate_term = selected_text;
} else {
std::string resolved_term;
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchResponseResolvedTermParam, &resolved_term);
if (resolved_term != *search_term) {
*alternate_term = resolved_term;
}
}
if (field_trial_->IsNowOnTapBarIntegrationEnabled()) {
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchCaption, caption);
dict->GetString(kContextualSearchThumbnail, thumbnail_url);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 38.0.2125.101 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
|
Low
| 171,642
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: LockContentsView::UserState::UserState(AccountId account_id)
: account_id(account_id) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in browser/extensions/api/webrtc_audio_private/webrtc_audio_private_api.cc in the WebRTC Audio Private API implementation in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect reliance on the resource context pointer.
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
|
Low
| 172,198
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TestResultCallback()
: callback_(base::Bind(&TestResultCallback::SetResult,
base::Unretained(this))) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Update helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest for OnceCallback
Helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest.cc don't fit to OnceCallback
migration, as they are copied and passed to others.
This CL updates them to pass new callbacks for each use to avoid the
copy of callbacks.
Bug: 714018
Change-Id: Ifb70901439ae92b6b049b84534283c39ebc40ee0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/527549
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478549}
|
Low
| 171,977
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GBool SplashFTFont::makeGlyph(int c, int xFrac, int yFrac,
SplashGlyphBitmap *bitmap, int x0, int y0, SplashClip *clip, SplashClipResult *clipRes) {
SplashFTFontFile *ff;
FT_Vector offset;
FT_GlyphSlot slot;
FT_UInt gid;
int rowSize;
Guchar *p, *q;
int i;
ff = (SplashFTFontFile *)fontFile;
ff->face->size = sizeObj;
offset.x = (FT_Pos)(int)((SplashCoord)xFrac * splashFontFractionMul * 64);
offset.y = 0;
FT_Set_Transform(ff->face, &matrix, &offset);
slot = ff->face->glyph;
if (ff->codeToGID && c < ff->codeToGIDLen) {
gid = (FT_UInt)ff->codeToGID[c];
} else {
gid = (FT_UInt)c;
}
if (ff->trueType && gid == 0) {
return gFalse;
}
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER
if (FT_Load_Glyph(ff->face, gid,
aa ? FT_LOAD_NO_BITMAP : FT_LOAD_DEFAULT)) {
return gFalse;
}
#else
if (FT_Load_Glyph(ff->face, gid,
aa ? FT_LOAD_NO_HINTING | FT_LOAD_NO_BITMAP
: FT_LOAD_DEFAULT)) {
return gFalse;
}
#endif
FT_Glyph_Metrics *glyphMetrics = &(ff->face->glyph->metrics);
bitmap->x = splashRound(-glyphMetrics->horiBearingX / 64.0);
bitmap->y = splashRound(glyphMetrics->horiBearingY / 64.0);
bitmap->w = splashRound(glyphMetrics->width / 64.0);
bitmap->h = splashRound(glyphMetrics->height / 64.0);
*clipRes = clip->testRect(x0 - bitmap->x,
y0 - bitmap->y,
x0 - bitmap->x + bitmap->w,
y0 - bitmap->y + bitmap->h);
if (*clipRes == splashClipAllOutside) {
bitmap->freeData = gFalse;
return gTrue;
}
if (FT_Render_Glyph(slot, aa ? ft_render_mode_normal
: ft_render_mode_mono)) {
return gFalse;
}
bitmap->x = -slot->bitmap_left;
bitmap->y = slot->bitmap_top;
bitmap->w = slot->bitmap.width;
bitmap->h = slot->bitmap.rows;
bitmap->aa = aa;
if (aa) {
rowSize = bitmap->w;
} else {
rowSize = (bitmap->w + 7) >> 3;
}
bitmap->data = (Guchar *)gmalloc(rowSize * bitmap->h);
bitmap->freeData = gTrue;
for (i = 0, p = bitmap->data, q = slot->bitmap.buffer;
i < bitmap->h;
++i, p += rowSize, q += slot->bitmap.pitch) {
memcpy(p, q, rowSize);
}
return gTrue;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,621
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo *image_info,
const int argc,const char **argv,Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
ImageInfo
*mogrify_info;
MagickStatusType
status;
PixelInterpolateMethod
interpolate_method;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
index;
/*
Apply options to the image list.
*/
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(images != (Image **) NULL);
assert((*images)->previous == (Image *) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
(*images)->filename);
if ((argc <= 0) || (*argv == (char *) NULL))
return(MagickTrue);
interpolate_method=UndefinedInterpolatePixel;
mogrify_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(mogrify_info);
status=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) argc; i++)
{
if (*images == (Image *) NULL)
break;
option=argv[i];
if (IsCommandOption(option) == MagickFalse)
continue;
count=ParseCommandOption(MagickCommandOptions,MagickFalse,option);
count=MagickMax(count,0L);
if ((i+count) >= (ssize_t) argc)
break;
status=MogrifyImageInfo(mogrify_info,(int) count+1,argv+i,exception);
switch (*(option+1))
{
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare("affinity",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("append",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*append_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
append_image=AppendImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,exception);
if (append_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=append_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("average",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*average_image;
/*
Average an image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
average_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MeanEvaluateOperator,
exception);
if (average_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=average_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channel-fx",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*channel_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
channel_image=ChannelFxImage(*images,argv[i+1],exception);
if (channel_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=channel_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*clut_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
clut_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (clut_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) ClutImage(image,clut_image,interpolate_method,exception);
clut_image=DestroyImage(clut_image);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("coalesce",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*coalesce_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
coalesce_image=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (coalesce_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=coalesce_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("combine",option+1) == 0)
{
ColorspaceType
colorspace;
Image
*combine_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
colorspace=(*images)->colorspace;
if ((*images)->number_channels < GetImageListLength(*images))
colorspace=sRGBColorspace;
if (*option == '+')
colorspace=(ColorspaceType) ParseCommandOption(
MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
combine_image=CombineImages(*images,colorspace,exception);
if (combine_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=combine_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("compare",option+1) == 0)
{
double
distortion;
Image
*difference_image,
*image,
*reconstruct_image;
MetricType
metric;
/*
Mathematically and visually annotate the difference between an
image and its reconstruction.
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
reconstruct_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (reconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
metric=UndefinedErrorMetric;
option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"metric");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
difference_image=CompareImages(image,reconstruct_image,metric,
&distortion,exception);
if (difference_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=difference_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("complex",option+1) == 0)
{
ComplexOperator
op;
Image
*complex_images;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
op=(ComplexOperator) ParseCommandOption(MagickComplexOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
complex_images=ComplexImages(*images,op,exception);
if (complex_images == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=complex_images;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("composite",option+1) == 0)
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
const char*
value;
MagickBooleanType
clip_to_self;
Image
*mask_image,
*new_images,
*source_image;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/* Compose value from "-compose" option only */
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose");
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
compose=OverCompositeOp; /* use Over not source_image->compose */
else
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
/* Get "clip-to-self" expert setting (false is normal) */
clip_to_self=GetCompositeClipToSelf(compose);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose:clip-to-self");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
clip_to_self=IsStringTrue(value);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose:outside-overlay");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
clip_to_self=IsStringFalse(value); /* deprecated */
new_images=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
source_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (source_image == (Image *) NULL)
break; /* FUTURE - produce Exception, rather than silent fail */
/* FUTURE: this should not be here! - should be part of -geometry */
if (source_image->geometry != (char *) NULL)
{
RectangleInfo
resize_geometry;
(void) ParseRegionGeometry(source_image,source_image->geometry,
&resize_geometry,exception);
if ((source_image->columns != resize_geometry.width) ||
(source_image->rows != resize_geometry.height))
{
Image
*resize_image;
resize_image=ResizeImage(source_image,resize_geometry.width,
resize_geometry.height,source_image->filter,exception);
if (resize_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
source_image=DestroyImage(source_image);
source_image=resize_image;
}
}
}
SetGeometry(source_image,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(source_image->geometry,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(new_images->columns,new_images->rows,
new_images->gravity,&geometry);
mask_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (mask_image == (Image *) NULL)
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
else
{
if ((compose == DisplaceCompositeOp) ||
(compose == DistortCompositeOp))
{
status&=CompositeImage(source_image,mask_image,
CopyGreenCompositeOp,MagickTrue,0,0,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
}
else
{
Image
*clone_image;
clone_image=CloneImage(new_images,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,mask_image,
CopyAlphaCompositeOp,MagickTrue,0,0,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(clone_image,new_images,
OverCompositeOp,clip_to_self,0,0,exception);
new_images=DestroyImageList(new_images);
new_images=clone_image;
}
mask_image=DestroyImage(mask_image);
}
source_image=DestroyImage(source_image);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=new_images;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("copy",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*source_image;
OffsetInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Copy image pixels.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
(void) ParsePageGeometry(*images,argv[i+2],&geometry,exception);
offset.x=geometry.x;
offset.y=geometry.y;
source_image=(*images);
if (source_image->next != (Image *) NULL)
source_image=source_image->next;
(void) ParsePageGeometry(source_image,argv[i+1],&geometry,
exception);
status=CopyImagePixels(*images,source_image,&geometry,&offset,
exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("deconstruct",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*deconstruct_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
deconstruct_image=CompareImagesLayers(*images,CompareAnyLayer,
exception);
if (deconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=deconstruct_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("delete",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
DeleteImages(images,"-1",exception);
else
DeleteImages(images,argv[i+1],exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("dither",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
{
quantize_info->dither_method=NoDitherMethod;
break;
}
quantize_info->dither_method=(DitherMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickDitherOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("duplicate",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*duplicate_images;
if (*option == '+')
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,1,"-1",exception);
else
{
const char
*p;
size_t
number_duplicates;
number_duplicates=(size_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=strchr(argv[i+1],',');
if (p == (const char *) NULL)
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,
"-1",exception);
else
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,p,
exception);
}
AppendImageToList(images, duplicate_images);
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare("evaluate-sequence",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*evaluate_image;
MagickEvaluateOperator
op;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
op=(MagickEvaluateOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickEvaluateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
evaluate_image=EvaluateImages(*images,op,exception);
if (evaluate_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=evaluate_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare("fft",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image;
/*
Implements the discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
fourier_image=ForwardFourierTransformImage(*images,*option == '-' ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("flatten",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*flatten_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
flatten_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,FlattenLayer,exception);
if (flatten_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=flatten_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("fx",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fx_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
fx_image=FxImage(*images,argv[i+1],exception);
if (fx_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fx_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("hald-clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*hald_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
hald_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (hald_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) HaldClutImage(image,hald_image,exception);
hald_image=DestroyImage(hald_image);
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("ift",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image,
*magnitude_image,
*phase_image;
/*
Implements the inverse fourier discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
magnitude_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
phase_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (phase_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
fourier_image=InverseFourierTransformImage(magnitude_image,
phase_image,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("insert",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q;
index=0;
if (*option != '+')
index=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=RemoveLastImageFromList(images);
if (p == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
q=p;
if (index == 0)
PrependImageToList(images,q);
else
if (index == (ssize_t) GetImageListLength(*images))
AppendImageToList(images,q);
else
{
q=GetImageFromList(*images,index-1);
if (q == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InsertImageInList(&q,p);
}
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("interpolate",option+1) == 0)
{
interpolate_method=(PixelInterpolateMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickInterpolateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("layers",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*layers;
LayerMethod
method;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
layers=(Image *) NULL;
method=(LayerMethod) ParseCommandOption(MagickLayerOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
switch (method)
{
case CoalesceLayer:
{
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case CompareAnyLayer:
case CompareClearLayer:
case CompareOverlayLayer:
default:
{
layers=CompareImagesLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case MergeLayer:
case FlattenLayer:
case MosaicLayer:
case TrimBoundsLayer:
{
layers=MergeImageLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case DisposeLayer:
{
layers=DisposeImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeImageLayer:
{
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizePlusLayer:
{
layers=OptimizePlusImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeTransLayer:
{
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveDupsLayer:
{
RemoveDuplicateLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveZeroLayer:
{
RemoveZeroDelayLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeLayer:
{
/*
General Purpose, GIF Animation Optimizer.
*/
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=(Image *) NULL;
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
case CompositeLayer:
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
Image
*source;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Split image sequence at the first 'NULL:' image.
*/
source=(*images);
while (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
source=GetNextImageInList(source);
if ((source != (Image *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(source->magick,"NULL") == 0))
break;
}
if (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL) ||
(GetNextImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL))
source=(Image *) NULL;
else
{
/*
Separate the two lists, junk the null: image.
*/
source=SplitImageList(source->previous);
DeleteImageFromList(&source);
}
}
if (source == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"MissingNullSeparator","layers Composite");
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
/*
Adjust offset with gravity and virtual canvas.
*/
SetGeometry(*images,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry((*images)->geometry,&geometry);
geometry.width=source->page.width != 0 ?
source->page.width : source->columns;
geometry.height=source->page.height != 0 ?
source->page.height : source->rows;
GravityAdjustGeometry((*images)->page.width != 0 ?
(*images)->page.width : (*images)->columns,
(*images)->page.height != 0 ? (*images)->page.height :
(*images)->rows,(*images)->gravity,&geometry);
compose=OverCompositeOp;
option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,option);
CompositeLayers(*images,compose,source,geometry.x,geometry.y,
exception);
source=DestroyImageList(source);
break;
}
}
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare("map",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("maximum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*maximum_image;
/*
Maximum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
maximum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MaxEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (maximum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=maximum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("minimum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*minimum_image;
/*
Minimum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
minimum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MinEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (minimum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=minimum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("morph",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*morph_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
morph_image=MorphImages(*images,StringToUnsignedLong(argv[i+1]),
exception);
if (morph_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=morph_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("mosaic",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*mosaic_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
mosaic_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,MosaicLayer,exception);
if (mosaic_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=mosaic_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("poly",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*args,
token[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*p;
double
*arguments;
Image
*polynomial_image;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
number_arguments;
/*
Polynomial image.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
args=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1],
exception);
if (args == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; *p != '\0'; x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
}
number_arguments=(size_t) x;
arguments=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_arguments,
sizeof(*arguments));
if (arguments == (double *) NULL)
ThrowWandFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed",(*images)->filename);
(void) memset(arguments,0,number_arguments*
sizeof(*arguments));
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; (x < (ssize_t) number_arguments) && (*p != '\0'); x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
arguments[x]=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
}
args=DestroyString(args);
polynomial_image=PolynomialImage(*images,number_arguments >> 1,
arguments,exception);
arguments=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
if (polynomial_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=polynomial_image;
}
if (LocaleCompare("print",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*string;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
string=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1],
exception);
if (string == (char *) NULL)
break;
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%s",string);
string=DestroyString(string);
}
if (LocaleCompare("process",option+1) == 0)
{
char
**arguments;
int
j,
number_arguments;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
arguments=StringToArgv(argv[i+1],&number_arguments);
if (arguments == (char **) NULL)
break;
if ((argc > 1) && (strchr(arguments[1],'=') != (char *) NULL))
{
char
breaker,
quote,
*token;
const char
*argument;
int
next,
token_status;
size_t
length;
TokenInfo
*token_info;
/*
Support old style syntax, filter="-option arg".
*/
length=strlen(argv[i+1]);
token=(char *) NULL;
if (~length >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
token=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*token));
if (token == (char *) NULL)
break;
next=0;
argument=argv[i+1];
token_info=AcquireTokenInfo();
token_status=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,length,argument,"",
"=","\"",'\0',&breaker,&next,"e);
token_info=DestroyTokenInfo(token_info);
if (token_status == 0)
{
const char
*arg;
arg=(&(argument[next]));
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(token,&(*images),1,&arg,
exception);
}
token=DestroyString(token);
break;
}
(void) SubstituteString(&arguments[1],"-","");
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(arguments[1],&(*images),
number_arguments-2,(const char **) arguments+2,exception);
for (j=0; j < number_arguments; j++)
arguments[j]=DestroyString(arguments[j]);
arguments=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("reverse",option+1) == 0)
{
ReverseImageList(images);
break;
}
break;
}
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare("smush",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*smush_image;
ssize_t
offset;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
offset=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
smush_image=SmushImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,offset,exception);
if (smush_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=smush_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("swap",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q,
*u,
*v;
ssize_t
swap_index;
index=(-1);
swap_index=(-2);
if (*option != '+')
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
swap_index=(-1);
flags=ParseGeometry(argv[i+1],&geometry_info);
index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
swap_index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma;
}
p=GetImageFromList(*images,index);
q=GetImageFromList(*images,swap_index);
if ((p == (Image *) NULL) || (q == (Image *) NULL))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",(*images)->filename);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (p == q)
break;
u=CloneImage(p,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (u == (Image *) NULL)
break;
v=CloneImage(q,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (v == (Image *) NULL)
{
u=DestroyImage(u);
break;
}
ReplaceImageInList(&p,v);
ReplaceImageInList(&q,u);
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("write",option+1) == 0)
{
char
key[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*write_images;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MagickPathExtent,"cache:%s",
argv[i+1]);
(void) DeleteImageRegistry(key);
write_images=(*images);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=CloneImageList(*images,exception);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=WriteImages(write_info,write_images,argv[i+1],exception);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=DestroyImageList(write_images);
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
i+=count;
}
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
mogrify_info=DestroyImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=MogrifyImageInfo(image_info,argc,argv,exception);
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks at AcquireMagickMemory because of an error in MagickWand/mogrify.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1616
|
Medium
| 170,197
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int i, n;
unsigned long len;
unsigned char *p;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cs; /* a stack of SSL_CIPHERS */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cl; /* the ones we want to use */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
int z;
/*
* This is a bit of a hack to check for the correct packet type the first
* time round.
*/
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A) {
s->first_packet = 1;
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B;
}
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B) {
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), 9 - s->init_num);
if (i < (9 - s->init_num))
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, i));
s->init_num = 9;
if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
} else
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i < s->version)
s->version = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.session_id_length = i;
if ((i < 0) || (i > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return -1;
}
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->challenge_length = i;
if ((i < SSL2_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) ||
(i > SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
return (-1);
}
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C;
}
/* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C */
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
len =
9 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length +
(unsigned long)s->s2->challenge_length +
(unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.session_id_length;
if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
}
n = (int)len - s->init_num;
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), n);
if (i != n)
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, i));
if (s->msg_callback) {
/* CLIENT-HELLO */
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
p += 9;
/*
* get session-id before cipher stuff so we can get out session structure
* if it is cached
*/
/* session-id */
if ((s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != 0) &&
(s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
return (-1);
}
if (s->s2->tmp.session_id_length == 0) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
} else {
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &(p[s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length]),
s->s2->tmp.session_id_length, NULL);
if (i == 1) { /* previous session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return (-1);
} else {
if (s->cert == NULL) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return (-1);
}
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
}
}
if (!s->hit) {
cs = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length,
&s->session->ciphers);
if (cs == NULL)
goto mem_err;
cl = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
prio = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cl);
if (prio == NULL)
goto mem_err;
allow = cs;
} else {
prio = cs;
allow = cl;
}
for (z = 0; z < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++) {
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z)) < 0) {
(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio, z);
z--;
}
}
/*
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = prio;
}
/*
* s->session->ciphers should now have a list of ciphers that are on
* both the client and server. This list is ordered by the order the
if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof s->s2->challenge) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
memcpy(s->s2->challenge, p, (unsigned int)s->s2->challenge_length);
return (1);
mem_err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: ssl/s2_srvr.c in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1r and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2f does not prevent use of disabled ciphers, which makes it easier for man-in-the-middle attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by performing computations on SSLv2 traffic, related to the get_client_master_key and get_client_hello functions.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,321
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ptrace_siblings(pid_t pid, pid_t main_tid, std::set<pid_t>& tids) {
char task_path[64];
//// Attach to a thread, and verify that it's still a member of the given process
snprintf(task_path, sizeof(task_path), "/proc/%d/task", pid);
std::unique_ptr<DIR, int (*)(DIR*)> d(opendir(task_path), closedir);
if (!d) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: failed to open /proc/%d/task: %s", pid, strerror(errno));
return;
}
struct dirent* de;
while ((de = readdir(d.get())) != NULL) {
if (!strcmp(de->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(de->d_name, "..")) {
continue;
}
char* end;
pid_t tid = strtoul(de->d_name, &end, 10);
if (*end) {
continue;
}
if (tid == main_tid) {
continue;
}
if (ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, tid, 0, 0) < 0) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: ptrace attach to %d failed: %s", tid, strerror(errno));
continue;
}
tids.insert(tid);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: debuggerd/debuggerd.cpp in Debuggerd in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 mishandles the interaction between PTRACE_ATTACH operations and thread exits, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29555636.
Commit Message: debuggerd: verify that traced threads belong to the right process.
Fix two races in debuggerd's PTRACE_ATTACH logic:
1. The target thread in a crash dump request could exit between the
/proc/<pid>/task/<tid> check and the PTRACE_ATTACH.
2. Sibling threads could exit between listing /proc/<pid>/task and the
PTRACE_ATTACH.
Bug: http://b/29555636
Change-Id: I4dfe1ea30e2c211d2389321bd66e3684dd757591
|
Medium
| 173,406
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MediaControlsProgressView::OnGestureEvent(ui::GestureEvent* event) {
gfx::Point location_in_bar(event->location());
ConvertPointToTarget(this, this->progress_bar_, &location_in_bar);
if (event->type() != ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP ||
!progress_bar_->GetLocalBounds().Contains(location_in_bar)) {
return;
}
HandleSeeking(location_in_bar);
event->SetHandled();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
|
High
| 172,347
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: new_msg_register_event (u_int32_t seqnum, struct lsa_filter_type *filter)
{
u_char buf[OSPF_API_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
struct msg_register_event *emsg;
int len;
emsg = (struct msg_register_event *) buf;
len = sizeof (struct msg_register_event) +
filter->num_areas * sizeof (struct in_addr);
emsg->filter.typemask = htons (filter->typemask);
emsg->filter.origin = filter->origin;
emsg->filter.num_areas = filter->num_areas;
return msg_new (MSG_REGISTER_EVENT, emsg, seqnum, len);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the new_msg_lsa_change_notify function in the OSPFD API (ospf_api.c) in Quagga before 0.99.22.2, when --enable-opaque-lsa and the -a command line option are used, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a large LSA.
Commit Message:
|
High
| 164,716
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TEE_Result tee_mmu_check_access_rights(const struct user_ta_ctx *utc,
uint32_t flags, uaddr_t uaddr,
size_t len)
{
uaddr_t a;
size_t addr_incr = MIN(CORE_MMU_USER_CODE_SIZE,
CORE_MMU_USER_PARAM_SIZE);
if (ADD_OVERFLOW(uaddr, len, &a))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_NONSECURE) &&
(flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_SECURE))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
/*
* Rely on TA private memory test to check if address range is private
* to TA or not.
*/
if (!(flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER) &&
!tee_mmu_is_vbuf_inside_ta_private(utc, (void *)uaddr, len))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
for (a = uaddr; a < (uaddr + len); a += addr_incr) {
uint32_t attr;
TEE_Result res;
res = tee_mmu_user_va2pa_attr(utc, (void *)a, NULL, &attr);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_NONSECURE) &&
(attr & TEE_MATTR_SECURE))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_SECURE) &&
!(attr & TEE_MATTR_SECURE))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_WRITE) && !(attr & TEE_MATTR_UW))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if ((flags & TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ) && !(attr & TEE_MATTR_UR))
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Linaro/OP-TEE OP-TEE 3.3.0 and earlier is affected by: Boundary crossing. The impact is: Memory corruption of the TEE itself. The component is: optee_os. The fixed version is: 3.4.0 and later.
Commit Message: core: tee_mmu_check_access_rights() check all pages
Prior to this patch tee_mmu_check_access_rights() checks an address in
each page of a supplied range. If both the start and length of that
range is unaligned the last page in the range is sometimes not checked.
With this patch the first address of each page in the range is checked
to simplify the logic of checking each page and the range and also to
cover the last page under all circumstances.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0005: "tee_mmu_check_access_rights does not check
final page of TA buffer"
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
|
Low
| 169,473
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data, int force)
{
int retval;
int remount_ro;
if (sb->s_writers.frozen != SB_UNFROZEN)
return -EBUSY;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
if (!(flags & MS_RDONLY) && bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev))
return -EACCES;
#endif
if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
acct_auto_close(sb);
shrink_dcache_sb(sb);
sync_filesystem(sb);
remount_ro = (flags & MS_RDONLY) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY);
/* If we are remounting RDONLY and current sb is read/write,
make sure there are no rw files opened */
if (remount_ro) {
if (force) {
mark_files_ro(sb);
} else {
retval = sb_prepare_remount_readonly(sb);
if (retval)
return retval;
}
}
if (sb->s_op->remount_fs) {
retval = sb->s_op->remount_fs(sb, &flags, data);
if (retval) {
if (!force)
goto cancel_readonly;
/* If forced remount, go ahead despite any errors */
WARN(1, "forced remount of a %s fs returned %i\n",
sb->s_type->name, retval);
}
}
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_RMT_MASK) | (flags & MS_RMT_MASK);
/* Needs to be ordered wrt mnt_is_readonly() */
smp_wmb();
sb->s_readonly_remount = 0;
/*
* Some filesystems modify their metadata via some other path than the
* bdev buffer cache (eg. use a private mapping, or directories in
* pagecache, etc). Also file data modifications go via their own
* mappings. So If we try to mount readonly then copy the filesystem
* from bdev, we could get stale data, so invalidate it to give a best
* effort at coherency.
*/
if (remount_ro && sb->s_bdev)
invalidate_bdev(sb->s_bdev);
return 0;
cancel_readonly:
sb->s_readonly_remount = 0;
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.13 performs certain operations on lists of files with an inappropriate locking approach, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup or system crash) via unspecified use of Asynchronous I/O (AIO) operations.
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 166,808
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::useGraphicBuffer2_l(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer) {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetParameter(mHandle, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition;
CLOG_ERROR(getParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u",
asString(index), index, portString(portIndex), portIndex);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = new BufferMeta(graphicBuffer);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = NULL;
OMX_U8* bufferHandle = const_cast<OMX_U8*>(
reinterpret_cast<const OMX_U8*>(graphicBuffer->handle));
err = OMX_UseBuffer(
mHandle,
&header,
portIndex,
bufferMeta,
def.nBufferSize,
bufferHandle);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, err, BUFFER_FMT(portIndex, "%u@%p", def.nBufferSize, bufferHandle));
delete bufferMeta;
bufferMeta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pBuffer, bufferHandle);
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, bufferMeta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
CLOG_BUFFER(useGraphicBuffer2, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%u@%p", def.nBufferSize, bufferHandle));
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
|
Low
| 173,535
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: CancelPendingTask() {
filter_->ResumeAttachOrDestroy(element_instance_id_,
MSG_ROUTING_NONE /* no plugin frame */);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Data race in extensions guest view in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
|
High
| 173,037
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct svc_xprt *svc_rdma_accept(struct svc_xprt *xprt)
{
struct svcxprt_rdma *listen_rdma;
struct svcxprt_rdma *newxprt = NULL;
struct rdma_conn_param conn_param;
struct rpcrdma_connect_private pmsg;
struct ib_qp_init_attr qp_attr;
struct ib_device *dev;
struct sockaddr *sap;
unsigned int i;
int ret = 0;
listen_rdma = container_of(xprt, struct svcxprt_rdma, sc_xprt);
clear_bit(XPT_CONN, &xprt->xpt_flags);
/* Get the next entry off the accept list */
spin_lock_bh(&listen_rdma->sc_lock);
if (!list_empty(&listen_rdma->sc_accept_q)) {
newxprt = list_entry(listen_rdma->sc_accept_q.next,
struct svcxprt_rdma, sc_accept_q);
list_del_init(&newxprt->sc_accept_q);
}
if (!list_empty(&listen_rdma->sc_accept_q))
set_bit(XPT_CONN, &listen_rdma->sc_xprt.xpt_flags);
spin_unlock_bh(&listen_rdma->sc_lock);
if (!newxprt)
return NULL;
dprintk("svcrdma: newxprt from accept queue = %p, cm_id=%p\n",
newxprt, newxprt->sc_cm_id);
dev = newxprt->sc_cm_id->device;
/* Qualify the transport resource defaults with the
* capabilities of this particular device */
newxprt->sc_max_sge = min((size_t)dev->attrs.max_sge,
(size_t)RPCSVC_MAXPAGES);
newxprt->sc_max_sge_rd = min_t(size_t, dev->attrs.max_sge_rd,
RPCSVC_MAXPAGES);
newxprt->sc_max_req_size = svcrdma_max_req_size;
newxprt->sc_max_requests = min_t(u32, dev->attrs.max_qp_wr,
svcrdma_max_requests);
newxprt->sc_fc_credits = cpu_to_be32(newxprt->sc_max_requests);
newxprt->sc_max_bc_requests = min_t(u32, dev->attrs.max_qp_wr,
svcrdma_max_bc_requests);
newxprt->sc_rq_depth = newxprt->sc_max_requests +
newxprt->sc_max_bc_requests;
newxprt->sc_sq_depth = RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT * newxprt->sc_rq_depth;
atomic_set(&newxprt->sc_sq_avail, newxprt->sc_sq_depth);
if (!svc_rdma_prealloc_ctxts(newxprt))
goto errout;
if (!svc_rdma_prealloc_maps(newxprt))
goto errout;
/*
* Limit ORD based on client limit, local device limit, and
* configured svcrdma limit.
*/
newxprt->sc_ord = min_t(size_t, dev->attrs.max_qp_rd_atom, newxprt->sc_ord);
newxprt->sc_ord = min_t(size_t, svcrdma_ord, newxprt->sc_ord);
newxprt->sc_pd = ib_alloc_pd(dev, 0);
if (IS_ERR(newxprt->sc_pd)) {
dprintk("svcrdma: error creating PD for connect request\n");
goto errout;
}
newxprt->sc_sq_cq = ib_alloc_cq(dev, newxprt, newxprt->sc_sq_depth,
0, IB_POLL_WORKQUEUE);
if (IS_ERR(newxprt->sc_sq_cq)) {
dprintk("svcrdma: error creating SQ CQ for connect request\n");
goto errout;
}
newxprt->sc_rq_cq = ib_alloc_cq(dev, newxprt, newxprt->sc_rq_depth,
0, IB_POLL_WORKQUEUE);
if (IS_ERR(newxprt->sc_rq_cq)) {
dprintk("svcrdma: error creating RQ CQ for connect request\n");
goto errout;
}
memset(&qp_attr, 0, sizeof qp_attr);
qp_attr.event_handler = qp_event_handler;
qp_attr.qp_context = &newxprt->sc_xprt;
qp_attr.cap.max_send_wr = newxprt->sc_sq_depth;
qp_attr.cap.max_recv_wr = newxprt->sc_rq_depth;
qp_attr.cap.max_send_sge = newxprt->sc_max_sge;
qp_attr.cap.max_recv_sge = newxprt->sc_max_sge;
qp_attr.sq_sig_type = IB_SIGNAL_REQ_WR;
qp_attr.qp_type = IB_QPT_RC;
qp_attr.send_cq = newxprt->sc_sq_cq;
qp_attr.recv_cq = newxprt->sc_rq_cq;
dprintk("svcrdma: newxprt->sc_cm_id=%p, newxprt->sc_pd=%p\n",
newxprt->sc_cm_id, newxprt->sc_pd);
dprintk(" cap.max_send_wr = %d, cap.max_recv_wr = %d\n",
qp_attr.cap.max_send_wr, qp_attr.cap.max_recv_wr);
dprintk(" cap.max_send_sge = %d, cap.max_recv_sge = %d\n",
qp_attr.cap.max_send_sge, qp_attr.cap.max_recv_sge);
ret = rdma_create_qp(newxprt->sc_cm_id, newxprt->sc_pd, &qp_attr);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: failed to create QP, ret=%d\n", ret);
goto errout;
}
newxprt->sc_qp = newxprt->sc_cm_id->qp;
/*
* Use the most secure set of MR resources based on the
* transport type and available memory management features in
* the device. Here's the table implemented below:
*
* Fast Global DMA Remote WR
* Reg LKEY MR Access
* Sup'd Sup'd Needed Needed
*
* IWARP N N Y Y
* N Y Y Y
* Y N Y N
* Y Y N -
*
* IB N N Y N
* N Y N -
* Y N Y N
* Y Y N -
*
* NB: iWARP requires remote write access for the data sink
* of an RDMA_READ. IB does not.
*/
newxprt->sc_reader = rdma_read_chunk_lcl;
if (dev->attrs.device_cap_flags & IB_DEVICE_MEM_MGT_EXTENSIONS) {
newxprt->sc_frmr_pg_list_len =
dev->attrs.max_fast_reg_page_list_len;
newxprt->sc_dev_caps |= SVCRDMA_DEVCAP_FAST_REG;
newxprt->sc_reader = rdma_read_chunk_frmr;
} else
newxprt->sc_snd_w_inv = false;
/*
* Determine if a DMA MR is required and if so, what privs are required
*/
if (!rdma_protocol_iwarp(dev, newxprt->sc_cm_id->port_num) &&
!rdma_ib_or_roce(dev, newxprt->sc_cm_id->port_num))
goto errout;
if (rdma_protocol_iwarp(dev, newxprt->sc_cm_id->port_num))
newxprt->sc_dev_caps |= SVCRDMA_DEVCAP_READ_W_INV;
/* Post receive buffers */
for (i = 0; i < newxprt->sc_max_requests; i++) {
ret = svc_rdma_post_recv(newxprt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: failure posting receive buffers\n");
goto errout;
}
}
/* Swap out the handler */
newxprt->sc_cm_id->event_handler = rdma_cma_handler;
/* Construct RDMA-CM private message */
pmsg.cp_magic = rpcrdma_cmp_magic;
pmsg.cp_version = RPCRDMA_CMP_VERSION;
pmsg.cp_flags = 0;
pmsg.cp_send_size = pmsg.cp_recv_size =
rpcrdma_encode_buffer_size(newxprt->sc_max_req_size);
/* Accept Connection */
set_bit(RDMAXPRT_CONN_PENDING, &newxprt->sc_flags);
memset(&conn_param, 0, sizeof conn_param);
conn_param.responder_resources = 0;
conn_param.initiator_depth = newxprt->sc_ord;
conn_param.private_data = &pmsg;
conn_param.private_data_len = sizeof(pmsg);
ret = rdma_accept(newxprt->sc_cm_id, &conn_param);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: failed to accept new connection, ret=%d\n",
ret);
goto errout;
}
dprintk("svcrdma: new connection %p accepted:\n", newxprt);
sap = (struct sockaddr *)&newxprt->sc_cm_id->route.addr.src_addr;
dprintk(" local address : %pIS:%u\n", sap, rpc_get_port(sap));
sap = (struct sockaddr *)&newxprt->sc_cm_id->route.addr.dst_addr;
dprintk(" remote address : %pIS:%u\n", sap, rpc_get_port(sap));
dprintk(" max_sge : %d\n", newxprt->sc_max_sge);
dprintk(" max_sge_rd : %d\n", newxprt->sc_max_sge_rd);
dprintk(" sq_depth : %d\n", newxprt->sc_sq_depth);
dprintk(" max_requests : %d\n", newxprt->sc_max_requests);
dprintk(" ord : %d\n", newxprt->sc_ord);
return &newxprt->sc_xprt;
errout:
dprintk("svcrdma: failure accepting new connection rc=%d.\n", ret);
/* Take a reference in case the DTO handler runs */
svc_xprt_get(&newxprt->sc_xprt);
if (newxprt->sc_qp && !IS_ERR(newxprt->sc_qp))
ib_destroy_qp(newxprt->sc_qp);
rdma_destroy_id(newxprt->sc_cm_id);
/* This call to put will destroy the transport */
svc_xprt_put(&newxprt->sc_xprt);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,179
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void color_cmyk_to_rgb(opj_image_t *image)
{
float C, M, Y, K;
float sC, sM, sY, sK;
unsigned int w, h, max, i;
w = image->comps[0].w;
h = image->comps[0].h;
if(image->numcomps < 4) return;
max = w * h;
sC = 1.0F / (float)((1 << image->comps[0].prec) - 1);
sM = 1.0F / (float)((1 << image->comps[1].prec) - 1);
sY = 1.0F / (float)((1 << image->comps[2].prec) - 1);
sK = 1.0F / (float)((1 << image->comps[3].prec) - 1);
for(i = 0; i < max; ++i)
{
/* CMYK values from 0 to 1 */
C = (float)(image->comps[0].data[i]) * sC;
M = (float)(image->comps[1].data[i]) * sM;
Y = (float)(image->comps[2].data[i]) * sY;
K = (float)(image->comps[3].data[i]) * sK;
/* Invert all CMYK values */
C = 1.0F - C;
M = 1.0F - M;
Y = 1.0F - Y;
K = 1.0F - K;
/* CMYK -> RGB : RGB results from 0 to 255 */
image->comps[0].data[i] = (int)(255.0F * C * K); /* R */
image->comps[1].data[i] = (int)(255.0F * M * K); /* G */
image->comps[2].data[i] = (int)(255.0F * Y * K); /* B */
}
free(image->comps[3].data); image->comps[3].data = NULL;
image->comps[0].prec = 8;
image->comps[1].prec = 8;
image->comps[2].prec = 8;
image->numcomps -= 1;
image->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
for (i = 3; i < image->numcomps; ++i) {
memcpy(&(image->comps[i]), &(image->comps[i+1]), sizeof(image->comps[i]));
}
}/* color_cmyk_to_rgb() */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the color_cmyk_to_rgb in common/color.c in OpenJPEG before 2.1.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted .j2k file.
Commit Message: Fix Heap Buffer Overflow in function color_cmyk_to_rgb
Fix uclouvain/openjpeg#774
|
Medium
| 168,836
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
WORD32 num_mb_skip,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc,
WORD32 prev_slice_err)
{
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2;
UWORD32 u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 i2_mb_skip_run;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD32 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD16 u2_total_mbs_coded;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info;
WORD32 ret;
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return 0;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag && (num_mb_skip & 1))
{
num_mb_skip++;
}
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_long_term_reference_flag = 0;
if(prev_slice_err == 1)
{
/* first slice - missing/header corruption */
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc.u2_frame_num =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
}
{
WORD32 i, j, poc = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = 0;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic != NULL)
poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc + 2;
j = -1;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS; i++)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].u1_is_valid == TRUE)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].ps_sps->u1_is_valid == TRUE)
{
j = i;
break;
}
}
}
if(j == -1)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
/* call ih264d_start_of_pic only if it was not called earlier*/
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = 1;
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, poc, ps_cur_poc,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->ps_pps[j]);
if(ret != OK)
{
return ret;
}
}
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][0]->u1_pic_buf_id = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 0;
}
else
{
dec_slice_struct_t *ps_parse_cur_slice;
ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf + ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done
&& ps_parse_cur_slice == ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice)
{
if((u1_mbaff) && (ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb & 1))
{
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb - 1;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
}
u1_num_mbs = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs - 1;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info;
}
else
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info
+ ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_prev_nmb - 1;
}
}
ps_dec->u2_mby = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity =
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst -= SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == P_SLICE
|| ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next)
&& (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = 1;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 1;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Inserting new slice only if the current slice has atleast 1 MB*/
if(ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice <
(UWORD32)(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag))
{
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
}
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf
+ ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
}
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations to new slice */
/******************************************************/
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MIN(MAX_FRAMES, ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init);
num_entries = 2 * ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = (volatile void **)pu1_buf;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations specific to P slice */
/******************************************************/
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_pmb;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->u2_mbx =
(MOD(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby =
(DIV(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby <<= u1_mbaff;
/******************************************************/
/* Parsing / decoding the slice */
/******************************************************/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_slice_end = 0;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
u1_decode_nmb = 0;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
i2_cur_mb_addr = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
i2_mb_skip_run = num_mb_skip;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
break;
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/**************************************************************/
/* mb_x, mb_y, neighbor availablity, */
if (u1_mbaff)
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
else
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
{
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
}
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_mc_mode = PRED_16x16;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
/* Storing Skip partition info */
ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CAVLC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
i2_mb_skip_run--;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
if (u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
u1_num_mbs++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = !i2_mb_skip_run;
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbs_next,
u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Mbs in slice: %d\n", ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice);
/* incremented here only if first slice is inserted */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
}
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in libavc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-33641588.
Commit Message: Decoder: Moved end of pic processing to end of decode call
ih264d_end_of_pic() was called after parsing slice of a new picture.
This is now being done at the end of decode of the current picture.
decode_gaps_in_frame_num which needs frame_num of new slice is now
done after decoding frame_num in new slice.
This helps in handling errors in picaff streams with gaps in frames
Bug: 33588051
Bug: 33641588
Bug: 34097231
Change-Id: I1a26e611aaa2c19e2043e05a210849bd21b22220
|
Medium
| 174,055
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int mem_cgroup_move_charge_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct mm_walk *walk)
{
int ret = 0;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->private;
pte_t *pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
split_huge_page_pmd(walk->mm, pmd);
retry:
pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
for (; addr != end; addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
pte_t ptent = *(pte++);
union mc_target target;
int type;
struct page *page;
struct page_cgroup *pc;
swp_entry_t ent;
if (!mc.precharge)
break;
type = is_target_pte_for_mc(vma, addr, ptent, &target);
switch (type) {
case MC_TARGET_PAGE:
page = target.page;
if (isolate_lru_page(page))
goto put;
pc = lookup_page_cgroup(page);
if (!mem_cgroup_move_account(page, 1, pc,
mc.from, mc.to, false)) {
mc.precharge--;
/* we uncharge from mc.from later. */
mc.moved_charge++;
}
putback_lru_page(page);
put: /* is_target_pte_for_mc() gets the page */
put_page(page);
break;
case MC_TARGET_SWAP:
ent = target.ent;
if (!mem_cgroup_move_swap_account(ent,
mc.from, mc.to, false)) {
mc.precharge--;
/* we fixup refcnts and charges later. */
mc.moved_swap++;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
pte_unmap_unlock(pte - 1, ptl);
cond_resched();
if (addr != end) {
/*
* We have consumed all precharges we got in can_attach().
* We try charge one by one, but don't do any additional
* charges to mc.to if we have failed in charge once in attach()
* phase.
*/
ret = mem_cgroup_do_precharge(1);
if (!ret)
goto retry;
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.3.1, when KVM is used, allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) by leveraging administrative access to the guest OS, related to the pmd_none_or_clear_bad function and page faults for huge pages.
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 165,632
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetExternalFileEntry",
base::Bind(&FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetExternalFileEntry,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetEntryURL",
base::Bind(&FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetEntryURL,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
|
Medium
| 173,271
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int masq_inet_event(struct notifier_block *this,
unsigned long event,
void *ptr)
{
struct net_device *dev = ((struct in_ifaddr *)ptr)->ifa_dev->dev;
struct netdev_notifier_info info;
netdev_notifier_info_init(&info, dev);
return masq_device_event(this, event, &info);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The IPv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5.2 mishandles destruction of device objects, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS networking outage) by arranging for a large number of IP addresses.
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
|
Low
| 167,356
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DiceResponseHandler::ProcessDiceSignoutHeader(
const std::vector<signin::DiceResponseParams::AccountInfo>& account_infos) {
VLOG(1) << "Start processing Dice signout response";
if (account_consistency_ ==
signin::AccountConsistencyMethod::kDiceFixAuthErrors) {
return;
}
std::string primary_account = signin_manager_->GetAuthenticatedAccountId();
bool primary_account_signed_out = false;
for (const auto& account_info : account_infos) {
std::string signed_out_account =
account_tracker_service_->PickAccountIdForAccount(account_info.gaia_id,
account_info.email);
if (signed_out_account == primary_account) {
primary_account_signed_out = true;
RecordDiceResponseHeader(kSignoutPrimary);
RecordGaiaSignoutMetrics(
(account_info.session_index == 0)
? kChromePrimaryAccountIsFirstGaiaAccount
: kChromePrimaryAccountIsSecondaryGaiaAccount);
if (account_consistency_ == signin::AccountConsistencyMethod::kDice) {
token_service_->UpdateCredentials(
primary_account,
MutableProfileOAuth2TokenServiceDelegate::kInvalidRefreshToken);
} else {
continue;
}
} else {
token_service_->RevokeCredentials(signed_out_account);
}
for (auto it = token_fetchers_.begin(); it != token_fetchers_.end(); ++it) {
std::string token_fetcher_account_id =
account_tracker_service_->PickAccountIdForAccount(
it->get()->gaia_id(), it->get()->email());
if (token_fetcher_account_id == signed_out_account) {
token_fetchers_.erase(it);
break;
}
}
}
if (!primary_account_signed_out) {
RecordDiceResponseHeader(kSignoutSecondary);
RecordGaiaSignoutMetrics(primary_account.empty()
? kNoChromePrimaryAccount
: kChromePrimaryAccountIsNotInGaiaAccounts);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The JSGenericLowering class in compiler/js-generic-lowering.cc in Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94, mishandles comparison operators, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
|
Medium
| 172,567
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForSystemDialog() {
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = print_preview_context_.source_frame();
if (!frame) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
Print(frame, print_preview_context_.source_node(), false);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the PrintWebViewHelper class in components/printing/renderer/print_web_view_helper.cc in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85 allow user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering nested IPC messages during preparation for printing, as demonstrated by messages associated with PDF documents in conjunction with messages about printer capabilities.
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
|
Low
| 171,874
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int git_delta_apply(
void **out,
size_t *out_len,
const unsigned char *base,
size_t base_len,
const unsigned char *delta,
size_t delta_len)
{
const unsigned char *delta_end = delta + delta_len;
size_t base_sz, res_sz, alloc_sz;
unsigned char *res_dp;
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
/* Check that the base size matches the data we were given;
* if not we would underflow while accessing data from the
* base object, resulting in data corruption or segfault.
*/
if ((hdr_sz(&base_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) || (base_sz != base_len)) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
if (hdr_sz(&res_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloc_sz, res_sz, 1);
res_dp = git__malloc(alloc_sz);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(res_dp);
res_dp[res_sz] = '\0';
*out = res_dp;
*out_len = res_sz;
while (delta < delta_end) {
unsigned char cmd = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x80) {
/* cmd is a copy instruction; copy from the base.
*/
size_t off = 0, len = 0;
if (cmd & 0x01) off = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x02) off |= *delta++ << 8UL;
if (cmd & 0x04) off |= *delta++ << 16UL;
if (cmd & 0x08) off |= *delta++ << 24UL;
if (cmd & 0x10) len = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x20) len |= *delta++ << 8UL;
if (cmd & 0x40) len |= *delta++ << 16UL;
if (!len) len = 0x10000;
if (base_len < off + len || res_sz < len)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, base + off, len);
res_dp += len;
res_sz -= len;
}
else if (cmd) {
/* cmd is a literal insert instruction; copy from
* the delta stream itself.
*/
if (delta_end - delta < cmd || res_sz < cmd)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, delta, cmd);
delta += cmd;
res_dp += cmd;
res_sz -= cmd;
}
else {
/* cmd == 0 is reserved for future encodings.
*/
goto fail;
}
}
if (delta != delta_end || res_sz)
goto fail;
return 0;
fail:
git__free(*out);
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta");
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: A flaw was found in libgit2 before version 0.27.3. It has been discovered that an unexpected sign extension in git_delta_apply function in delta.c file may lead to an integer overflow which in turn leads to an out of bound read, allowing to read before the base object. An attacker may use this flaw to leak memory addresses or cause a Denial of Service.
Commit Message: delta: fix sign-extension of big left-shift
Our delta code was originally adapted from JGit, which itself adapted it
from git itself. Due to this heritage, we inherited a bug from git.git
in how we compute the delta offset, which was fixed upstream in
48fb7deb5 (Fix big left-shifts of unsigned char, 2009-06-17). As
explained by Linus:
Shifting 'unsigned char' or 'unsigned short' left can result in sign
extension errors, since the C integer promotion rules means that the
unsigned char/short will get implicitly promoted to a signed 'int' due to
the shift (or due to other operations).
This normally doesn't matter, but if you shift things up sufficiently, it
will now set the sign bit in 'int', and a subsequent cast to a bigger type
(eg 'long' or 'unsigned long') will now sign-extend the value despite the
original expression being unsigned.
One example of this would be something like
unsigned long size;
unsigned char c;
size += c << 24;
where despite all the variables being unsigned, 'c << 24' ends up being a
signed entity, and will get sign-extended when then doing the addition in
an 'unsigned long' type.
Since git uses 'unsigned char' pointers extensively, we actually have this
bug in a couple of places.
In our delta code, we inherited such a bogus shift when computing the
offset at which the delta base is to be found. Due to the sign extension
we can end up with an offset where all the bits are set. This can allow
an arbitrary memory read, as the addition in `base_len < off + len` can
now overflow if `off` has all its bits set.
Fix the issue by casting the result of `*delta++ << 24UL` to an unsigned
integer again. Add a test with a crafted delta that would actually
succeed with an out-of-bounds read in case where the cast wouldn't
exist.
Reported-by: Riccardo Schirone <rschiron@redhat.com>
Test-provided-by: Riccardo Schirone <rschiron@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 170,168
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int wanxl_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
const size_t size = sizeof(sync_serial_settings);
sync_serial_settings line;
port_t *port = dev_to_port(dev);
if (cmd != SIOCWANDEV)
return hdlc_ioctl(dev, ifr, cmd);
switch (ifr->ifr_settings.type) {
case IF_GET_IFACE:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_SYNC_SERIAL;
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size < size) {
ifr->ifr_settings.size = size; /* data size wanted */
return -ENOBUFS;
}
line.clock_type = get_status(port)->clocking;
line.clock_rate = 0;
line.loopback = 0;
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.sync, &line, size))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case IF_IFACE_SYNC_SERIAL:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP)
return -EBUSY;
if (copy_from_user(&line, ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.sync,
size))
return -EFAULT;
if (line.clock_type != CLOCK_EXT &&
line.clock_type != CLOCK_TXFROMRX)
return -EINVAL; /* No such clock setting */
if (line.loopback != 0)
return -EINVAL;
get_status(port)->clocking = line.clock_type;
return 0;
default:
return hdlc_ioctl(dev, ifr, cmd);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The wanxl_ioctl function in drivers/net/wan/wanxl.c in the Linux kernel before 3.11.7 does not properly initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via an ioctl call.
Commit Message: wanxl: fix info leak in ioctl
The wanxl_ioctl() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,438
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CuePoint::Load(IMkvReader* pReader) {
if (m_timecode >= 0) // already loaded
return;
assert(m_track_positions == NULL);
assert(m_track_positions_count == 0);
long long pos_ = -m_timecode;
const long long element_start = pos_;
long long stop;
{
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos_, len);
assert(id == 0x3B); // CuePoint ID
if (id != 0x3B)
return;
pos_ += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos_, len);
assert(size >= 0);
pos_ += len; // consume Size field
stop = pos_ + size;
}
const long long element_size = stop - element_start;
long long pos = pos_;
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x33) // CueTime ID
m_timecode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x37) // CueTrackPosition(s) ID
++m_track_positions_count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(m_timecode >= 0);
assert(m_track_positions_count > 0);
m_track_positions = new TrackPosition[m_track_positions_count];
TrackPosition* p = m_track_positions;
pos = pos_;
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x37) { // CueTrackPosition(s) ID
TrackPosition& tp = *p++;
tp.Parse(pReader, pos, size);
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(size_t(p - m_track_positions) == m_track_positions_count);
m_element_start = element_start;
m_element_size = element_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,829
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::setLocalDescription(PassRefPtr<RTCVoidRequest>, PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor>)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,349
|
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