instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: chunk_grow(chunk_t *chunk, size_t sz)
{
off_t offset;
size_t memlen_orig = chunk->memlen;
tor_assert(sz > chunk->memlen);
offset = chunk->data - chunk->mem;
chunk = tor_realloc(chunk, CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz));
chunk->memlen = sz;
chunk->data = chunk->mem + offset;
#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC
tor_assert(chunk->DBG_alloc == CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen_orig));
chunk->DBG_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz);
#endif
total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks +=
CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz) - CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen_orig);
return chunk;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Tor before 0.2.8.9 and 0.2.9.x before 0.2.9.4-alpha had internal functions that were entitled to expect that buf_t data had NUL termination, but the implementation of or/buffers.c did not ensure that NUL termination was present, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (client, hidden service, relay, or authority crash) via crafted data.
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
|
Low
| 168,757
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Splash::scaleMaskYdXu(SplashImageMaskSource src, void *srcData,
int srcWidth, int srcHeight,
int scaledWidth, int scaledHeight,
SplashBitmap *dest) {
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guint *pixBuf;
Guint pix;
Guchar *destPtr;
int yp, yq, xp, xq, yt, y, yStep, xt, x, xStep, d;
int i, j;
yp = srcHeight / scaledHeight;
lineBuf = (Guchar *)gmalloc(srcWidth);
pixBuf = (Guint *)gmallocn(srcWidth, sizeof(int));
yt = 0;
destPtr = dest->data;
for (y = 0; y < scaledHeight; ++y) {
yt = 0;
destPtr = dest->data;
for (y = 0; y < scaledHeight; ++y) {
}
memset(pixBuf, 0, srcWidth * sizeof(int));
for (i = 0; i < yStep; ++i) {
(*src)(srcData, lineBuf);
for (j = 0; j < srcWidth; ++j) {
pixBuf[j] += lineBuf[j];
}
}
xt = 0;
d = (255 << 23) / yStep;
for (x = 0; x < srcWidth; ++x) {
if ((xt += xq) >= srcWidth) {
xt -= srcWidth;
xStep = xp + 1;
} else {
xStep = xp;
}
pix = pixBuf[x];
pix = (pix * d) >> 23;
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix;
}
}
}
gfree(pixBuf);
gfree(lineBuf);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: poppler before 0.22.1 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via vectors that trigger an "invalid memory access" in (1) splash/Splash.cc, (2) poppler/Function.cc, and (3) poppler/Stream.cc.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,737
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateNull( void )
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item();
if ( item )
item->type = cJSON_NULL;
return item;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,276
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xps_select_font_encoding(xps_font_t *font, int idx)
{
byte *cmapdata, *entry;
int pid, eid;
if (idx < 0 || idx >= font->cmapsubcount)
return;
cmapdata = font->data + font->cmaptable;
entry = cmapdata + 4 + idx * 8;
pid = u16(entry + 0);
eid = u16(entry + 2);
font->cmapsubtable = font->cmaptable + u32(entry + 4);
font->usepua = (pid == 3 && eid == 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The xps_select_font_encoding function in xps/xpsfont.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document, related to the xps_encode_font_char_imp function.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,782
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SavePayload(size_t handle, uint32_t *payload, uint32_t index)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)handle;
if (mp4 == NULL) return;
uint32_t *MP4buffer = NULL;
if (index < mp4->indexcount && mp4->mediafp && payload)
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, mp4->metaoffsets[index], SEEK_SET);
fwrite(payload, 1, mp4->metasizes[index], mp4->mediafp);
}
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: GoPro GPMF-parser 1.2.2 has an out-of-bounds write in OpenMP4Source in demo/GPMF_mp4reader.c.
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
|
Medium
| 169,552
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct sta_info *sta_info_alloc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
const u8 *addr, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
struct sta_info *sta;
struct timespec uptime;
struct ieee80211_tx_latency_bin_ranges *tx_latency;
int i;
sta = kzalloc(sizeof(*sta) + local->hw.sta_data_size, gfp);
if (!sta)
return NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
tx_latency = rcu_dereference(local->tx_latency);
/* init stations Tx latency statistics && TID bins */
if (tx_latency) {
sta->tx_lat = kzalloc(IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS *
sizeof(struct ieee80211_tx_latency_stat),
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sta->tx_lat) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto free;
}
if (tx_latency->n_ranges) {
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) {
/* size of bins is size of the ranges +1 */
sta->tx_lat[i].bin_count =
tx_latency->n_ranges + 1;
sta->tx_lat[i].bins =
kcalloc(sta->tx_lat[i].bin_count,
sizeof(u32), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sta->tx_lat[i].bins) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto free;
}
}
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_lock_init(&sta->lock);
INIT_WORK(&sta->drv_unblock_wk, sta_unblock);
INIT_WORK(&sta->ampdu_mlme.work, ieee80211_ba_session_work);
mutex_init(&sta->ampdu_mlme.mtx);
#ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_MESH
if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif) &&
!sdata->u.mesh.user_mpm)
init_timer(&sta->plink_timer);
sta->nonpeer_pm = NL80211_MESH_POWER_ACTIVE;
#endif
memcpy(sta->sta.addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
sta->local = local;
sta->sdata = sdata;
sta->last_rx = jiffies;
sta->sta_state = IEEE80211_STA_NONE;
do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&uptime);
sta->last_connected = uptime.tv_sec;
ewma_init(&sta->avg_signal, 1024, 8);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sta->chain_signal_avg); i++)
ewma_init(&sta->chain_signal_avg[i], 1024, 8);
if (sta_prepare_rate_control(local, sta, gfp))
goto free;
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) {
/*
* timer_to_tid must be initialized with identity mapping
* to enable session_timer's data differentiation. See
* sta_rx_agg_session_timer_expired for usage.
*/
sta->timer_to_tid[i] = i;
}
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_ACS; i++) {
skb_queue_head_init(&sta->ps_tx_buf[i]);
skb_queue_head_init(&sta->tx_filtered[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++)
sta->last_seq_ctrl[i] = cpu_to_le16(USHRT_MAX);
sta->sta.smps_mode = IEEE80211_SMPS_OFF;
if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP ||
sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) {
struct ieee80211_supported_band *sband =
local->hw.wiphy->bands[ieee80211_get_sdata_band(sdata)];
u8 smps = (sband->ht_cap.cap & IEEE80211_HT_CAP_SM_PS) >>
IEEE80211_HT_CAP_SM_PS_SHIFT;
/*
* Assume that hostapd advertises our caps in the beacon and
* this is the known_smps_mode for a station that just assciated
*/
switch (smps) {
case WLAN_HT_SMPS_CONTROL_DISABLED:
sta->known_smps_mode = IEEE80211_SMPS_OFF;
break;
case WLAN_HT_SMPS_CONTROL_STATIC:
sta->known_smps_mode = IEEE80211_SMPS_STATIC;
break;
case WLAN_HT_SMPS_CONTROL_DYNAMIC:
sta->known_smps_mode = IEEE80211_SMPS_DYNAMIC;
break;
default:
WARN_ON(1);
}
}
sta_dbg(sdata, "Allocated STA %pM\n", sta->sta.addr);
return sta;
free:
if (sta->tx_lat) {
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++)
kfree(sta->tx_lat[i].bins);
kfree(sta->tx_lat);
}
kfree(sta);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the mac80211 subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.13.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) via network traffic that improperly interacts with the WLAN_STA_PS_STA state (aka power-save mode), related to sta_info.c and tx.c.
Commit Message: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
|
Medium
| 166,392
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, ftell)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
long ret = php_stream_tell(intern->u.file.stream);
if (ret == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
RETURN_LONG(ret);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int SplFileObject::fseek(int pos [, int whence = SEEK_SET])
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,065
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(grapheme_strpos)
{
unsigned char *haystack, *needle;
int haystack_len, needle_len;
unsigned char *found;
long loffset = 0;
int32_t offset = 0;
int ret_pos;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss|l", (char **)&haystack, &haystack_len, (char **)&needle, &needle_len, &loffset) == FAILURE) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"grapheme_strpos: unable to parse input param", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if ( OUTSIDE_STRING(loffset, haystack_len) ) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "grapheme_strpos: Offset not contained in string", 1 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* we checked that it will fit: */
offset = (int32_t) loffset;
/* the offset is 'grapheme count offset' so it still might be invalid - we'll check it later */
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "grapheme_strpos: Empty delimiter", 1 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The grapheme_strpos function in ext/intl/grapheme/grapheme_string.c in PHP before 5.5.35, 5.6.x before 5.6.21, and 7.x before 7.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a negative offset.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,034
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::ExtensionDevToolsClientHost(
Profile* profile,
DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
const std::string& extension_id,
const std::string& extension_name,
const Debuggee& debuggee)
: profile_(profile),
agent_host_(agent_host),
extension_id_(extension_id),
last_request_id_(0),
infobar_(nullptr),
detach_reason_(api::debugger::DETACH_REASON_TARGET_CLOSED),
extension_registry_observer_(this) {
CopyDebuggee(&debuggee_, debuggee);
g_attached_client_hosts.Get().insert(this);
extension_registry_observer_.Add(ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_));
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_APP_TERMINATING,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
agent_host_->AttachClient(this);
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
::switches::kSilentDebuggerExtensionAPI)) {
return;
}
const Extension* extension =
ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile)->enabled_extensions().GetByID(
extension_id);
if (extension && Manifest::IsPolicyLocation(extension->location()))
return;
infobar_ = ExtensionDevToolsInfoBar::Create(
extension_id, extension_name, this,
base::Bind(&ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::InfoBarDismissed,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to attach to Web UI pages in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
|
Medium
| 173,237
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::BeginRequest(
int request_id,
const ResourceHostMsg_Request& request_data,
IPC::Message* sync_result, // only valid for sync
int route_id) {
int process_type = filter_->process_type();
int child_id = filter_->child_id();
if (IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled() &&
IsResourceTypeFrame(request_data.resource_type) &&
!request_data.url.SchemeIs(url::kBlobScheme)) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(filter_, bad_message::RDH_INVALID_URL);
return;
}
if (request_data.priority < net::MINIMUM_PRIORITY ||
request_data.priority > net::MAXIMUM_PRIORITY) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(filter_, bad_message::RDH_INVALID_PRIORITY);
return;
}
char url_buf[128];
base::strlcpy(url_buf, request_data.url.spec().c_str(), arraysize(url_buf));
base::debug::Alias(url_buf);
LoaderMap::iterator it = pending_loaders_.find(
GlobalRequestID(request_data.transferred_request_child_id,
request_data.transferred_request_request_id));
if (it != pending_loaders_.end()) {
if (it->second->is_transferring()) {
ResourceLoader* deferred_loader = it->second.get();
UpdateRequestForTransfer(child_id, route_id, request_id,
request_data, it);
deferred_loader->CompleteTransfer();
} else {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
filter_, bad_message::RDH_REQUEST_NOT_TRANSFERRING);
}
return;
}
ResourceContext* resource_context = NULL;
net::URLRequestContext* request_context = NULL;
filter_->GetContexts(request_data.resource_type, request_data.origin_pid,
&resource_context, &request_context);
CHECK(ContainsKey(active_resource_contexts_, resource_context));
net::HttpRequestHeaders headers;
headers.AddHeadersFromString(request_data.headers);
if (is_shutdown_ ||
!ShouldServiceRequest(process_type, child_id, request_data, headers,
filter_, resource_context)) {
AbortRequestBeforeItStarts(filter_, sync_result, request_id);
return;
}
if (delegate_ && !delegate_->ShouldBeginRequest(request_data.method,
request_data.url,
request_data.resource_type,
resource_context)) {
AbortRequestBeforeItStarts(filter_, sync_result, request_id);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequest> new_request = request_context->CreateRequest(
request_data.url, request_data.priority, NULL);
new_request->set_method(request_data.method);
new_request->set_first_party_for_cookies(
request_data.first_party_for_cookies);
new_request->set_initiator(request_data.request_initiator);
if (request_data.resource_type == RESOURCE_TYPE_MAIN_FRAME) {
new_request->set_first_party_url_policy(
net::URLRequest::UPDATE_FIRST_PARTY_URL_ON_REDIRECT);
}
const Referrer referrer(request_data.referrer, request_data.referrer_policy);
SetReferrerForRequest(new_request.get(), referrer);
new_request->SetExtraRequestHeaders(headers);
storage::BlobStorageContext* blob_context =
GetBlobStorageContext(filter_->blob_storage_context());
if (request_data.request_body.get()) {
if (blob_context) {
AttachRequestBodyBlobDataHandles(
request_data.request_body.get(),
blob_context);
}
new_request->set_upload(UploadDataStreamBuilder::Build(
request_data.request_body.get(),
blob_context,
filter_->file_system_context(),
BrowserThread::GetMessageLoopProxyForThread(BrowserThread::FILE)
.get()));
}
bool allow_download = request_data.allow_download &&
IsResourceTypeFrame(request_data.resource_type);
bool do_not_prompt_for_login = request_data.do_not_prompt_for_login;
bool is_sync_load = sync_result != NULL;
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* policy =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
bool report_raw_headers = request_data.report_raw_headers;
if (report_raw_headers && !policy->CanReadRawCookies(child_id)) {
VLOG(1) << "Denied unauthorized request for raw headers";
report_raw_headers = false;
}
int load_flags =
BuildLoadFlagsForRequest(request_data, child_id, is_sync_load);
if (request_data.resource_type == RESOURCE_TYPE_PREFETCH ||
request_data.resource_type == RESOURCE_TYPE_FAVICON) {
do_not_prompt_for_login = true;
}
if (request_data.resource_type == RESOURCE_TYPE_IMAGE &&
HTTP_AUTH_RELATION_BLOCKED_CROSS ==
HttpAuthRelationTypeOf(request_data.url,
request_data.first_party_for_cookies)) {
do_not_prompt_for_login = true;
load_flags |= net::LOAD_DO_NOT_USE_EMBEDDED_IDENTITY;
}
bool support_async_revalidation =
!is_sync_load && async_revalidation_manager_ &&
AsyncRevalidationManager::QualifiesForAsyncRevalidation(request_data);
if (support_async_revalidation)
load_flags |= net::LOAD_SUPPORT_ASYNC_REVALIDATION;
if (is_sync_load) {
DCHECK_EQ(request_data.priority, net::MAXIMUM_PRIORITY);
DCHECK_NE(load_flags & net::LOAD_IGNORE_LIMITS, 0);
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(load_flags & net::LOAD_IGNORE_LIMITS, 0);
}
new_request->SetLoadFlags(load_flags);
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* extra_info = new ResourceRequestInfoImpl(
process_type, child_id, route_id,
-1, // frame_tree_node_id
request_data.origin_pid, request_id, request_data.render_frame_id,
request_data.is_main_frame, request_data.parent_is_main_frame,
request_data.resource_type, request_data.transition_type,
request_data.should_replace_current_entry,
false, // is download
false, // is stream
allow_download, request_data.has_user_gesture,
request_data.enable_load_timing, request_data.enable_upload_progress,
do_not_prompt_for_login, request_data.referrer_policy,
request_data.visiblity_state, resource_context, filter_->GetWeakPtr(),
report_raw_headers, !is_sync_load,
IsUsingLoFi(request_data.lofi_state, delegate_, *new_request,
resource_context,
request_data.resource_type == RESOURCE_TYPE_MAIN_FRAME),
support_async_revalidation ? request_data.headers : std::string());
extra_info->AssociateWithRequest(new_request.get());
if (new_request->url().SchemeIs(url::kBlobScheme)) {
storage::BlobProtocolHandler::SetRequestedBlobDataHandle(
new_request.get(),
filter_->blob_storage_context()->context()->GetBlobDataFromPublicURL(
new_request->url()));
}
const bool should_skip_service_worker =
request_data.skip_service_worker || is_sync_load;
ServiceWorkerRequestHandler::InitializeHandler(
new_request.get(), filter_->service_worker_context(), blob_context,
child_id, request_data.service_worker_provider_id,
should_skip_service_worker,
request_data.fetch_request_mode, request_data.fetch_credentials_mode,
request_data.fetch_redirect_mode, request_data.resource_type,
request_data.fetch_request_context_type, request_data.fetch_frame_type,
request_data.request_body);
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures)) {
ForeignFetchRequestHandler::InitializeHandler(
new_request.get(), filter_->service_worker_context(), blob_context,
child_id, request_data.service_worker_provider_id,
should_skip_service_worker,
request_data.fetch_request_mode, request_data.fetch_credentials_mode,
request_data.fetch_redirect_mode, request_data.resource_type,
request_data.fetch_request_context_type, request_data.fetch_frame_type,
request_data.request_body);
}
AppCacheInterceptor::SetExtraRequestInfo(
new_request.get(), filter_->appcache_service(), child_id,
request_data.appcache_host_id, request_data.resource_type,
request_data.should_reset_appcache);
scoped_ptr<ResourceHandler> handler(
CreateResourceHandler(
new_request.get(),
request_data, sync_result, route_id, process_type, child_id,
resource_context));
if (handler)
BeginRequestInternal(std::move(new_request), std::move(handler));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::BeginRequest function in content/browser/loader/resource_dispatcher_host_impl.cc in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.102 allows remote attackers to make arbitrary HTTP requests by leveraging access to a renderer process and reusing a request ID.
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
|
High
| 172,271
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: vmnc_handle_wmvi_rectangle (GstVMncDec * dec, struct RfbRectangle *rect,
const guint8 * data, int len, gboolean decode)
{
GstVideoFormat format;
gint bpp, tc;
guint32 redmask, greenmask, bluemask;
guint32 endianness, dataendianness;
GstVideoCodecState *state;
/* A WMVi rectangle has a 16byte payload */
if (len < 16) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Bad WMVi rect: too short");
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA;
}
/* We only compare 13 bytes; ignoring the 3 padding bytes at the end */
if (dec->have_format && memcmp (data, dec->format.descriptor, 13) == 0) {
/* Nothing changed, so just exit */
return 16;
}
/* Store the whole block for simple comparison later */
memcpy (dec->format.descriptor, data, 16);
if (rect->x != 0 || rect->y != 0) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Bad WMVi rect: wrong coordinates");
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
bpp = data[0];
dec->format.depth = data[1];
dec->format.big_endian = data[2];
dataendianness = data[2] ? G_BIG_ENDIAN : G_LITTLE_ENDIAN;
tc = data[3];
if (bpp != 8 && bpp != 16 && bpp != 32) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Bad bpp value: %d", bpp);
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
if (!tc) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Paletted video not supported");
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
dec->format.bytes_per_pixel = bpp / 8;
dec->format.width = rect->width;
dec->format.height = rect->height;
redmask = (guint32) (RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 4)) << data[10];
greenmask = (guint32) (RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 6)) << data[11];
bluemask = (guint32) (RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 8)) << data[12];
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Red: mask %d, shift %d",
RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 4), data[10]);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Green: mask %d, shift %d",
RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 6), data[11]);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Blue: mask %d, shift %d",
RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 8), data[12]);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "BPP: %d. endianness: %s", bpp,
data[2] ? "big" : "little");
/* GStreamer's RGB caps are a bit weird. */
if (bpp == 8) {
endianness = G_BYTE_ORDER; /* Doesn't matter */
} else if (bpp == 16) {
/* We require host-endian. */
endianness = G_BYTE_ORDER;
} else { /* bpp == 32 */
/* We require big endian */
endianness = G_BIG_ENDIAN;
if (endianness != dataendianness) {
redmask = GUINT32_SWAP_LE_BE (redmask);
greenmask = GUINT32_SWAP_LE_BE (greenmask);
bluemask = GUINT32_SWAP_LE_BE (bluemask);
}
}
format = gst_video_format_from_masks (dec->format.depth, bpp, endianness,
redmask, greenmask, bluemask, 0);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "From depth: %d bpp: %u endianess: %s redmask: %X "
"greenmask: %X bluemask: %X got format %s",
dec->format.depth, bpp, endianness == G_BIG_ENDIAN ? "BE" : "LE",
GUINT32_FROM_BE (redmask), GUINT32_FROM_BE (greenmask),
GUINT32_FROM_BE (bluemask),
format == GST_VIDEO_FORMAT_UNKNOWN ? "UNKOWN" :
gst_video_format_to_string (format));
if (format == GST_VIDEO_FORMAT_UNKNOWN) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Video format unknown to GStreamer");
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
dec->have_format = TRUE;
if (!decode) {
GST_LOG_OBJECT (dec, "Parsing, not setting caps");
return 16;
}
state = gst_video_decoder_set_output_state (GST_VIDEO_DECODER (dec), format,
rect->width, rect->height, dec->input_state);
gst_video_codec_state_unref (state);
g_free (dec->imagedata);
dec->imagedata = g_malloc (dec->format.width * dec->format.height *
dec->format.bytes_per_pixel);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Allocated image data at %p", dec->imagedata);
dec->format.stride = dec->format.width * dec->format.bytes_per_pixel;
return 16;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The vmnc decoder in the gstreamer does not initialize the render canvas, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information as demonstrated by thumbnailing a simple 1 frame vmnc movie that does not draw to the allocated render canvas.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,252
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void put_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts)
{
unsigned long flags;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ucounts->count)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&ucounts_lock, flags);
hlist_del_init(&ucounts->node);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ucounts_lock, flags);
kfree(ucounts);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in kernel/ucount.c in the Linux kernel through 4.10.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls that leverage certain decrement behavior that causes incorrect interaction between put_ucounts and get_ucounts.
Commit Message: ucount: Remove the atomicity from ucount->count
Always increment/decrement ucount->count under the ucounts_lock. The
increments are there already and moving the decrements there means the
locking logic of the code is simpler. This simplification in the
locking logic fixes a race between put_ucounts and get_ucounts that
could result in a use-after-free because the count could go zero then
be found by get_ucounts and then be freed by put_ucounts.
A bug presumably this one was found by a combination of syzkaller and
KASAN. JongWhan Kim reported the syzkaller failure and Dmitry Vyukov
spotted the race in the code.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f6b2db1a3e8d ("userns: Make the count of user namespaces per user")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
Medium
| 168,316
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FindBarController::MaybeSetPrepopulateText() {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
FindManager* find_manager = tab_contents_->GetFindManager();
string16 find_string = find_manager->find_text();
if (find_string.empty())
find_string = find_manager->previous_find_text();
if (find_string.empty()) {
find_string =
FindBarState::GetLastPrepopulateText(tab_contents_->profile());
}
find_bar_->SetFindText(find_string);
#else
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 10.0.648.204 does not properly handle SVG text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors that lead to a *stale pointer.*
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,659
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RunAccuracyCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
uint32_t max_error = 0;
int64_t total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 10000;
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_temp_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, kNumCoeffs);
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block,
test_temp_block, pitch_));
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
}
EXPECT_GE(1u, max_error)
<< "Error: 4x4 FHT/IHT has an individual round trip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE(count_test_block , total_error)
<< "Error: 4x4 FHT/IHT has average round trip error > 1 per block";
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,547
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: nf_nat_redirect_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_nat_ipv4_multi_range_compat *mr,
unsigned int hooknum)
{
struct nf_conn *ct;
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
__be32 newdst;
struct nf_nat_range newrange;
NF_CT_ASSERT(hooknum == NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING ||
hooknum == NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT);
ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo);
NF_CT_ASSERT(ct && (ctinfo == IP_CT_NEW || ctinfo == IP_CT_RELATED));
/* Local packets: make them go to loopback */
if (hooknum == NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT) {
newdst = htonl(0x7F000001);
} else {
struct in_device *indev;
struct in_ifaddr *ifa;
newdst = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
indev = __in_dev_get_rcu(skb->dev);
if (indev != NULL) {
ifa = indev->ifa_list;
newdst = ifa->ifa_local;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!newdst)
return NF_DROP;
}
/* Transfer from original range. */
memset(&newrange.min_addr, 0, sizeof(newrange.min_addr));
memset(&newrange.max_addr, 0, sizeof(newrange.max_addr));
newrange.flags = mr->range[0].flags | NF_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS;
newrange.min_addr.ip = newdst;
newrange.max_addr.ip = newdst;
newrange.min_proto = mr->range[0].min;
newrange.max_proto = mr->range[0].max;
/* Hand modified range to generic setup. */
return nf_nat_setup_info(ct, &newrange, NF_NAT_MANIP_DST);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The nf_nat_redirect_ipv4 function in net/netfilter/nf_nat_redirect.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by sending certain IPv4 packets to an incompletely configured interface, a related issue to CVE-2003-1604.
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_nat_redirect: add missing NULL pointer check
Commit 8b13eddfdf04cbfa561725cfc42d6868fe896f56 ("netfilter: refactor NAT
redirect IPv4 to use it from nf_tables") has introduced a trivial logic
change which can result in the following crash.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000030
IP: [<ffffffffa033002d>] nf_nat_redirect_ipv4+0x2d/0xa0 [nf_nat_redirect]
PGD 3ba662067 PUD 3ba661067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ipv6(E) xt_REDIRECT(E) nf_nat_redirect(E) xt_tcpudp(E) iptable_nat(E) nf_conntrack_ipv4(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) nf_nat_ipv4(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) binfmt_misc(E) xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) evbug(E) evdev(E) psmouse(E) i2c_piix4(E) i2c_core(E) acpi_cpufreq(E) button(E) ext4(E) crc16(E) jbd2(E) mbcache(E) dm_mirror(E) dm_region_hash(E) dm_log(E) dm_mod(E)
CPU: 0 PID: 2536 Comm: ip Tainted: G E 4.1.7-15.23.amzn1.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.2.amazon 05/06/2015
task: ffff8800eb438000 ti: ffff8803ba664000 task.ti: ffff8803ba664000
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa0334065>] redirect_tg4+0x15/0x20 [xt_REDIRECT]
[<ffffffffa02e2e99>] ipt_do_table+0x2b9/0x5e1 [ip_tables]
[<ffffffffa0328045>] iptable_nat_do_chain+0x25/0x30 [iptable_nat]
[<ffffffffa031777d>] nf_nat_ipv4_fn+0x13d/0x1f0 [nf_nat_ipv4]
[<ffffffffa0328020>] ? iptable_nat_ipv4_fn+0x20/0x20 [iptable_nat]
[<ffffffffa031785e>] nf_nat_ipv4_in+0x2e/0x90 [nf_nat_ipv4]
[<ffffffffa03280a5>] iptable_nat_ipv4_in+0x15/0x20 [iptable_nat]
[<ffffffff81449137>] nf_iterate+0x57/0x80
[<ffffffff814491f7>] nf_hook_slow+0x97/0x100
[<ffffffff814504d4>] ip_rcv+0x314/0x400
unsigned int
nf_nat_redirect_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
...
{
...
rcu_read_lock();
indev = __in_dev_get_rcu(skb->dev);
if (indev != NULL) {
ifa = indev->ifa_list;
newdst = ifa->ifa_local; <---
}
rcu_read_unlock();
...
}
Before the commit, 'ifa' had been always checked before access. After the
commit, however, it could be accessed even if it's NULL. Interestingly,
this was once fixed in 2003.
http://marc.info/?l=netfilter-devel&m=106668497403047&w=2
In addition to the original one, we have seen the crash when packets that
need to be redirected somehow arrive on an interface which hasn't been
yet fully configured.
This change just reverts the logic to the old behavior to avoid the crash.
Fixes: 8b13eddfdf04 ("netfilter: refactor NAT redirect IPv4 to use it from nf_tables")
Signed-off-by: Munehisa Kamata <kamatam@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 167,497
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_is_block_algorithm)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir)
if (mcrypt_module_is_block_algorithm(module, dir) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
|
Low
| 167,097
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebSocketJob::OnSentData(SocketStream* socket, int amount_sent) {
DCHECK_NE(INITIALIZED, state_);
if (state_ == CLOSED)
return;
if (state_ == CONNECTING) {
OnSentHandshakeRequest(socket, amount_sent);
return;
}
if (delegate_) {
DCHECK(state_ == OPEN || state_ == CLOSING);
DCHECK_GT(amount_sent, 0);
DCHECK(current_buffer_);
current_buffer_->DidConsume(amount_sent);
if (current_buffer_->BytesRemaining() > 0)
return;
amount_sent = send_frame_handler_->GetOriginalBufferSize();
DCHECK_GT(amount_sent, 0);
current_buffer_ = NULL;
send_frame_handler_->ReleaseCurrentBuffer();
delegate_->OnSentData(socket, amount_sent);
MessageLoopForIO::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, NewRunnableMethod(this, &WebSocketJob::SendPending));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The WebSockets implementation in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,305
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mISDN_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_mISDN *maddr;
int copied, err;
if (*debug & DEBUG_SOCKET)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: len %d, flags %x ch.nr %d, proto %x\n",
__func__, (int)len, flags, _pms(sk)->ch.nr,
sk->sk_protocol);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (sk->sk_state == MISDN_CLOSED)
return 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (!skb)
return err;
if (msg->msg_namelen >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_mISDN)) {
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_mISDN);
maddr = (struct sockaddr_mISDN *)msg->msg_name;
maddr->family = AF_ISDN;
maddr->dev = _pms(sk)->dev->id;
if ((sk->sk_protocol == ISDN_P_LAPD_TE) ||
(sk->sk_protocol == ISDN_P_LAPD_NT)) {
maddr->channel = (mISDN_HEAD_ID(skb) >> 16) & 0xff;
maddr->tei = (mISDN_HEAD_ID(skb) >> 8) & 0xff;
maddr->sapi = mISDN_HEAD_ID(skb) & 0xff;
} else {
maddr->channel = _pms(sk)->ch.nr;
maddr->sapi = _pms(sk)->ch.addr & 0xFF;
maddr->tei = (_pms(sk)->ch.addr >> 8) & 0xFF;
}
} else {
if (msg->msg_namelen)
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: too small namelen %d\n",
__func__, msg->msg_namelen);
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
}
copied = skb->len + MISDN_HEADER_LEN;
if (len < copied) {
if (flags & MSG_PEEK)
atomic_dec(&skb->users);
else
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
return -ENOSPC;
}
memcpy(skb_push(skb, MISDN_HEADER_LEN), mISDN_HEAD_P(skb),
MISDN_HEADER_LEN);
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
mISDN_sock_cmsg(sk, msg, skb);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return err ? : copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,486
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _dopr(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer,
size_t *maxlen,
size_t *retlen, int *truncated, const char *format, va_list args)
{
char ch;
LLONG value;
LDOUBLE fvalue;
char *strvalue;
int min;
int max;
int state;
int flags;
int cflags;
size_t currlen;
state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
flags = currlen = cflags = min = 0;
max = -1;
ch = *format++;
while (state != DP_S_DONE) {
if (ch == '\0' || (buffer == NULL && currlen >= *maxlen))
state = DP_S_DONE;
switch (state) {
case DP_S_DEFAULT:
if (ch == '%')
state = DP_S_FLAGS;
else
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
ch = *format++;
break;
case DP_S_FLAGS:
case '-':
flags |= DP_F_MINUS;
ch = *format++;
break;
case '+':
flags |= DP_F_PLUS;
ch = *format++;
break;
case ' ':
flags |= DP_F_SPACE;
ch = *format++;
break;
case '#':
flags |= DP_F_NUM;
ch = *format++;
break;
case '0':
flags |= DP_F_ZERO;
ch = *format++;
break;
default:
state = DP_S_MIN;
break;
}
break;
case DP_S_MIN:
if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
min = 10 * min + char_to_int(ch);
ch = *format++;
} else if (ch == '*') {
min = va_arg(args, int);
ch = *format++;
state = DP_S_DOT;
} else
state = DP_S_DOT;
break;
case DP_S_DOT:
if (ch == '.') {
state = DP_S_MAX;
ch = *format++;
} else
state = DP_S_MOD;
break;
case DP_S_MAX:
if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
if (max < 0)
max = 0;
max = 10 * max + char_to_int(ch);
ch = *format++;
} else if (ch == '*') {
max = va_arg(args, int);
ch = *format++;
state = DP_S_MOD;
} else
state = DP_S_MOD;
break;
case DP_S_MOD:
switch (ch) {
case 'h':
cflags = DP_C_SHORT;
ch = *format++;
break;
case 'l':
if (*format == 'l') {
cflags = DP_C_LLONG;
format++;
} else
cflags = DP_C_LONG;
ch = *format++;
break;
case 'q':
cflags = DP_C_LLONG;
ch = *format++;
break;
case 'L':
cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE;
ch = *format++;
break;
default:
break;
}
state = DP_S_CONV;
break;
case DP_S_CONV:
switch (ch) {
case 'd':
case 'i':
switch (cflags) {
case DP_C_SHORT:
value = (short int)va_arg(args, int);
break;
case DP_C_LONG:
value = va_arg(args, long int);
break;
case DP_C_LLONG:
value = va_arg(args, LLONG);
break;
default:
value = va_arg(args, int);
value = va_arg(args, int);
break;
}
fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
value, 10, min, max, flags);
break;
case 'X':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
case 'o':
case 'u':
flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
switch (cflags) {
case DP_C_SHORT:
value = (unsigned short int)va_arg(args, unsigned int);
break;
case DP_C_LONG:
value = (LLONG) va_arg(args, unsigned long int);
break;
case DP_C_LLONG:
value = va_arg(args, unsigned LLONG);
break;
default:
value = (LLONG) va_arg(args, unsigned int);
break;
value = (LLONG) va_arg(args, unsigned int);
break;
}
fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
ch == 'o' ? 8 : (ch == 'u' ? 10 : 16),
min, max, flags);
break;
case 'f':
if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE);
else
fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
fvalue, min, max, flags);
break;
case 'E':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
break;
case 'G':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
case 'g':
if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE);
else
fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
break;
case 'c':
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
break;
case 'c':
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
va_arg(args, int));
break;
case 's':
strvalue = va_arg(args, char *);
}
fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
flags, min, max);
else
max = *maxlen;
}
fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
flags, min, max);
break;
case 'p':
value = (long)va_arg(args, void *);
fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
value, 16, min, max, flags | DP_F_NUM);
break;
case 'n': /* XXX */
if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
} else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) { /* XXX */
LLONG *num;
num = va_arg(args, LLONG *);
*num = (LLONG) currlen;
} else {
int *num;
num = va_arg(args, int *);
*num = currlen;
}
break;
case '%':
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
break;
case 'w':
/* not supported yet, treat as next char */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The doapr_outch function in crypto/bio/b_print.c in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1s and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2g does not verify that a certain memory allocation succeeds, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write or memory consumption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long string, as demonstrated by a large amount of ASN.1 data, a different vulnerability than CVE-2016-0799.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,183
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: JSValue JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory(ExecState* exec)
{
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
DirectoryEntry* imp = static_cast<DirectoryEntry*>(impl());
const String& path = valueToStringWithUndefinedOrNullCheck(exec, exec->argument(0));
if (exec->hadException())
return jsUndefined();
int argsCount = exec->argumentCount();
if (argsCount <= 1) {
imp->getDirectory(path);
return jsUndefined();
}
RefPtr<WebKitFlags> flags;
if (!exec->argument(1).isNull() && !exec->argument(1).isUndefined() && exec->argument(1).isObject()) {
JSObject* object = exec->argument(1).getObject();
flags = WebKitFlags::create();
JSValue jsCreate = object->get(exec, Identifier(exec, "create"));
flags->setCreate(jsCreate.toBoolean(exec));
JSValue jsExclusive = object->get(exec, Identifier(exec, "exclusive"));
flags->setExclusive(jsExclusive.toBoolean(exec));
}
if (exec->hadException())
return jsUndefined();
RefPtr<EntryCallback> successCallback;
if (exec->argumentCount() > 2 && !exec->argument(2).isNull() && !exec->argument(2).isUndefined()) {
if (!exec->argument(2).isObject()) {
setDOMException(exec, TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR);
return jsUndefined();
}
successCallback = JSEntryCallback::create(asObject(exec->argument(2)), globalObject());
}
RefPtr<ErrorCallback> errorCallback;
if (exec->argumentCount() > 3 && !exec->argument(3).isNull() && !exec->argument(3).isUndefined()) {
if (!exec->argument(3).isObject()) {
setDOMException(exec, TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR);
return jsUndefined();
}
errorCallback = JSErrorCallback::create(asObject(exec->argument(3)), globalObject());
}
imp->getDirectory(path, flags, successCallback, errorCallback);
return jsUndefined();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,560
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Cues::~Cues()
{
const long n = m_count + m_preload_count;
CuePoint** p = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** const q = p + n;
while (p != q)
{
CuePoint* const pCP = *p++;
assert(pCP);
delete pCP;
}
delete[] m_cue_points;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,463
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cib_remote_connection_destroy(gpointer user_data)
{
cib_client_t *client = user_data;
if (client == NULL) {
return;
}
crm_trace("Cleaning up after client disconnect: %s/%s",
crm_str(client->name), client->id);
if (client->id != NULL) {
if (!g_hash_table_remove(client_list, client->id)) {
crm_err("Client %s not found in the hashtable", client->name);
}
}
crm_trace("Destroying %s (%p)", client->name, user_data);
num_clients--;
crm_trace("Num unfree'd clients: %d", num_clients);
free(client->name);
free(client->callback_id);
free(client->id);
free(client->user);
free(client);
crm_trace("Freed the cib client");
if (cib_shutdown_flag) {
cib_shutdown(0);
}
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
Medium
| 166,147
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PaymentRequest::Init(mojom::PaymentRequestClientPtr client,
std::vector<mojom::PaymentMethodDataPtr> method_data,
mojom::PaymentDetailsPtr details,
mojom::PaymentOptionsPtr options) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
client_ = std::move(client);
const GURL last_committed_url = delegate_->GetLastCommittedURL();
if (!OriginSecurityChecker::IsOriginSecure(last_committed_url)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not in a secure origin";
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
bool allowed_origin =
OriginSecurityChecker::IsSchemeCryptographic(last_committed_url) ||
OriginSecurityChecker::IsOriginLocalhostOrFile(last_committed_url);
if (!allowed_origin) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Only localhost, file://, and cryptographic scheme origins "
"allowed";
}
bool invalid_ssl =
OriginSecurityChecker::IsSchemeCryptographic(last_committed_url) &&
!delegate_->IsSslCertificateValid();
if (invalid_ssl)
LOG(ERROR) << "SSL certificate is not valid";
if (!allowed_origin || invalid_ssl) {
return;
}
std::string error;
if (!ValidatePaymentDetails(ConvertPaymentDetails(details), &error)) {
LOG(ERROR) << error;
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
if (!details->total) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Missing total";
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
spec_ = std::make_unique<PaymentRequestSpec>(
std::move(options), std::move(details), std::move(method_data), this,
delegate_->GetApplicationLocale());
state_ = std::make_unique<PaymentRequestState>(
web_contents_, top_level_origin_, frame_origin_, spec_.get(), this,
delegate_->GetApplicationLocale(), delegate_->GetPersonalDataManager(),
delegate_.get(), &journey_logger_);
journey_logger_.SetRequestedInformation(
spec_->request_shipping(), spec_->request_payer_email(),
spec_->request_payer_phone(), spec_->request_payer_name());
GURL google_pay_url(kGooglePayMethodName);
GURL android_pay_url(kAndroidPayMethodName);
auto non_google_it =
std::find_if(spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers().begin(),
spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers().end(),
[google_pay_url, android_pay_url](const GURL& url) {
return url != google_pay_url && url != android_pay_url;
});
journey_logger_.SetRequestedPaymentMethodTypes(
/*requested_basic_card=*/!spec_->supported_card_networks().empty(),
/*requested_method_google=*/
base::ContainsValue(spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers(),
google_pay_url) ||
base::ContainsValue(spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers(),
android_pay_url),
/*requested_method_other=*/non_google_it !=
spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers().end());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822}
|
Medium
| 173,082
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int bmp_validate(jas_stream_t *in)
{
int n;
int i;
uchar buf[2];
assert(JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK >= 2);
/* Read the first two characters that constitute the signature. */
if ((n = jas_stream_read(in, (char *) buf, 2)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
/* Put the characters read back onto the stream. */
for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, buf[i]) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
/* Did we read enough characters? */
if (n < 2) {
return -1;
}
/* Is the signature correct for the BMP format? */
if (buf[0] == (BMP_MAGIC & 0xff) && buf[1] == (BMP_MAGIC >> 8)) {
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,714
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cJSON *cJSON_DetachItemFromArray( cJSON *array, int which )
{
cJSON *c = array->child;
while ( c && which > 0 ) {
c = c->next;
--which;
}
if ( ! c )
return 0;
if ( c->prev )
c->prev->next = c->next;
if ( c->next ) c->next->prev = c->prev;
if ( c == array->child )
array->child = c->next;
c->prev = c->next = 0;
return c;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,284
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT1(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
bits;
ssize_t
j,
y;
unsigned char
code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, Min(4, dds_info->width - x),
Min(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickFalse);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (unsigned char) ((bits >> ((j*4+i)*2)) & 0x3);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.a[code]));
if (colors.a[code] && image->matte == MagickFalse)
/* Correct matte */
image->matte = MagickTrue;
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
SkipDXTMipmaps(image, dds_info, 8);
return MagickTrue;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/dds.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DDS file.
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
|
Medium
| 168,899
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::StartUpdate(AppCacheHost* host,
const GURL& new_master_resource) {
DCHECK(group_->update_job() == this);
DCHECK(!group_->is_obsolete());
bool is_new_pending_master_entry = false;
if (!new_master_resource.is_empty()) {
DCHECK(new_master_resource == host->pending_master_entry_url());
DCHECK(!new_master_resource.has_ref());
DCHECK(new_master_resource.GetOrigin() == manifest_url_.GetOrigin());
if (IsTerminating()) {
group_->QueueUpdate(host, new_master_resource);
return;
}
std::pair<PendingMasters::iterator, bool> ret =
pending_master_entries_.insert(
PendingMasters::value_type(new_master_resource, PendingHosts()));
is_new_pending_master_entry = ret.second;
ret.first->second.push_back(host);
host->AddObserver(this);
}
AppCacheGroup::UpdateAppCacheStatus update_status = group_->update_status();
if (update_status == AppCacheGroup::CHECKING ||
update_status == AppCacheGroup::DOWNLOADING) {
if (host) {
NotifySingleHost(host, APPCACHE_CHECKING_EVENT);
if (update_status == AppCacheGroup::DOWNLOADING)
NotifySingleHost(host, APPCACHE_DOWNLOADING_EVENT);
if (!new_master_resource.is_empty()) {
AddMasterEntryToFetchList(host, new_master_resource,
is_new_pending_master_entry);
}
}
return;
}
MadeProgress();
group_->SetUpdateAppCacheStatus(AppCacheGroup::CHECKING);
if (group_->HasCache()) {
base::TimeDelta kFullUpdateInterval = base::TimeDelta::FromHours(24);
update_type_ = UPGRADE_ATTEMPT;
base::TimeDelta time_since_last_check =
base::Time::Now() - group_->last_full_update_check_time();
doing_full_update_check_ = time_since_last_check > kFullUpdateInterval;
NotifyAllAssociatedHosts(APPCACHE_CHECKING_EVENT);
} else {
update_type_ = CACHE_ATTEMPT;
doing_full_update_check_ = true;
DCHECK(host);
NotifySingleHost(host, APPCACHE_CHECKING_EVENT);
}
if (!new_master_resource.is_empty()) {
AddMasterEntryToFetchList(host, new_master_resource,
is_new_pending_master_entry);
}
BrowserThread::PostAfterStartupTask(
FROM_HERE, base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get(),
base::Bind(&AppCacheUpdateJob::FetchManifest, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
true));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in content/browser/appcache/appcache_update_job.cc in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service by leveraging the mishandling of AppCache update jobs.
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
|
Low
| 171,733
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: decompileAction(int n, SWF_ACTION *actions, int maxn)
{
if( n > maxn ) SWF_error("Action overflow!!");
#ifdef DEBUG
fprintf(stderr,"%d:\tACTION[%3.3d]: %s\n",
actions[n].SWF_ACTIONRECORD.Offset, n,
actionName(actions[n].SWF_ACTIONRECORD.ActionCode));
#endif
switch(actions[n].SWF_ACTIONRECORD.ActionCode)
{
case SWFACTION_END:
return 0;
case SWFACTION_CONSTANTPOOL:
decompileCONSTANTPOOL(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GOTOLABEL:
return decompileGOTOFRAME(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_GOTOFRAME:
return decompileGOTOFRAME(n, actions, maxn,0);
case SWFACTION_GOTOFRAME2:
return decompileGOTOFRAME2(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_WAITFORFRAME:
decompileWAITFORFRAME(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETURL2:
decompileGETURL2(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETURL:
decompileGETURL(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_PUSH:
decompilePUSH(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_PUSHDUP:
decompilePUSHDUP(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_STACKSWAP:
decompileSTACKSWAP(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_SETPROPERTY:
decompileSETPROPERTY(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETPROPERTY:
decompileGETPROPERTY(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETTIME:
return decompileGETTIME(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_TRACE:
decompileTRACE(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_CALLFRAME:
decompileCALLFRAME(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_EXTENDS:
decompileEXTENDS(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_INITOBJECT:
decompileINITOBJECT(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_NEWOBJECT:
decompileNEWOBJECT(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_NEWMETHOD:
decompileNEWMETHOD(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETMEMBER:
decompileGETMEMBER(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_SETMEMBER:
decompileSETMEMBER(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETVARIABLE:
decompileGETVARIABLE(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_SETVARIABLE:
decompileSETVARIABLE(n, actions, maxn, 0);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_DEFINELOCAL:
decompileSETVARIABLE(n, actions, maxn, 1);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_DEFINELOCAL2:
decompileDEFINELOCAL2(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_DECREMENT:
return decompileINCR_DECR(n, actions, maxn, 0);
case SWFACTION_INCREMENT:
return decompileINCR_DECR(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_STOREREGISTER:
decompileSTOREREGISTER(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_JUMP:
return decompileJUMP(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_RETURN:
decompileRETURN(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_LOGICALNOT:
return decompileLogicalNot(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_IF:
return decompileIF(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_WITH:
decompileWITH(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_ENUMERATE:
return decompileENUMERATE(n, actions, maxn, 0);
case SWFACTION_ENUMERATE2 :
return decompileENUMERATE(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_INITARRAY:
return decompileINITARRAY(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_DEFINEFUNCTION:
return decompileDEFINEFUNCTION(n, actions, maxn,0);
case SWFACTION_DEFINEFUNCTION2:
return decompileDEFINEFUNCTION(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_CALLFUNCTION:
return decompileCALLFUNCTION(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_CALLMETHOD:
return decompileCALLMETHOD(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_INSTANCEOF:
case SWFACTION_SHIFTLEFT:
case SWFACTION_SHIFTRIGHT:
case SWFACTION_SHIFTRIGHT2:
case SWFACTION_ADD:
case SWFACTION_ADD2:
case SWFACTION_SUBTRACT:
case SWFACTION_MULTIPLY:
case SWFACTION_DIVIDE:
case SWFACTION_MODULO:
case SWFACTION_BITWISEAND:
case SWFACTION_BITWISEOR:
case SWFACTION_BITWISEXOR:
case SWFACTION_EQUAL:
case SWFACTION_EQUALS2:
case SWFACTION_LESS2:
case SWFACTION_LOGICALAND:
case SWFACTION_LOGICALOR:
case SWFACTION_GREATER:
case SWFACTION_LESSTHAN:
case SWFACTION_STRINGEQ:
case SWFACTION_STRINGCOMPARE:
case SWFACTION_STRICTEQUALS:
return decompileArithmeticOp(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_POP:
pop();
return 0;
case SWFACTION_STARTDRAG:
return decompileSTARTDRAG(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_DELETE:
return decompileDELETE(n, actions, maxn,0);
case SWFACTION_DELETE2:
return decompileDELETE(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_TARGETPATH:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"targetPath");
case SWFACTION_TYPEOF:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"typeof");
case SWFACTION_ORD:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"ord");
case SWFACTION_CHR:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"chr");
case SWFACTION_INT:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"int");
case SWFACTION_TOSTRING:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"String");
case SWFACTION_TONUMBER:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"Number");
case SWFACTION_RANDOMNUMBER:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"random");
case SWFACTION_STRINGLENGTH:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"length");
case SWFACTION_PLAY:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"play");
case SWFACTION_STOP:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"stop");
case SWFACTION_NEXTFRAME:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"nextFrame");
case SWFACTION_PREVFRAME:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"prevFrame");
case SWFACTION_ENDDRAG:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"stopDrag");
case SWFACTION_STOPSOUNDS:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"stopAllSounds");
case SWFACTION_TOGGLEQUALITY:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"toggleHighQuality");
case SWFACTION_MBSUBSTRING:
case SWFACTION_SUBSTRING:
return decompileSUBSTRING(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_STRINGCONCAT:
return decompileSTRINGCONCAT(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_REMOVECLIP:
return decompileREMOVECLIP(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_DUPLICATECLIP:
return decompileDUPLICATECLIP(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_SETTARGET:
return decompileSETTARGET(n, actions, maxn,0);
case SWFACTION_SETTARGET2:
return decompileSETTARGET(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_IMPLEMENTSOP:
return decompileIMPLEMENTS(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_CASTOP:
return decompileCAST(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_THROW:
return decompileTHROW(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_TRY:
return decompileTRY(n, actions, maxn);
default:
outputSWF_ACTION(n,&actions[n]);
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Ming (aka libming) 0.4.8 has a heap buffer overflow and underflow in the decompileCAST function in util/decompile.c in libutil.a. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service via a crafted SWF file.
Commit Message: decompileAction: Prevent heap buffer overflow and underflow with using OpCode
|
Medium
| 169,646
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PageSerializer::addImageToResources(ImageResource* image, RenderObject* imageRenderer, const KURL& url)
{
if (!shouldAddURL(url))
return;
if (!image || !image->hasImage() || image->image() == Image::nullImage())
return;
RefPtr<SharedBuffer> data = imageRenderer ? image->imageForRenderer(imageRenderer)->data() : 0;
if (!data)
data = image->image()->data();
addToResources(image, data, url);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly handle image data in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,564
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreate (int sx, int sy)
{
int i;
gdImagePtr im;
if (overflow2(sx, sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (unsigned char *), sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (unsigned char), sx)) {
return NULL;
}
im = (gdImage *) gdCalloc(1, sizeof(gdImage));
if (!im) {
return NULL;
}
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels = (unsigned char **) gdMalloc (sizeof (unsigned char *) * sy);
if (!im->pixels) {
gdFree(im);
return NULL;
}
im->polyInts = 0;
im->polyAllocated = 0;
im->brush = 0;
im->tile = 0;
im->style = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < sy); i++) {
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels[i] = (unsigned char *) gdCalloc (sx, sizeof (unsigned char));
if (!im->pixels[i]) {
for (--i ; i >= 0; i--) {
gdFree(im->pixels[i]);
}
gdFree(im->pixels);
gdFree(im);
return NULL;
}
}
im->sx = sx;
im->sy = sy;
im->colorsTotal = 0;
im->transparent = (-1);
im->interlace = 0;
im->thick = 1;
im->AA = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < gdMaxColors); i++) {
im->open[i] = 1;
};
im->trueColor = 0;
im->tpixels = 0;
im->cx1 = 0;
im->cy1 = 0;
im->cx2 = im->sx - 1;
im->cy2 = im->sy - 1;
im->res_x = GD_RESOLUTION;
im->res_y = GD_RESOLUTION;
im->interpolation = NULL;
im->interpolation_id = GD_BILINEAR_FIXED;
return im;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The gdImageCreate function in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system hang) via an oversized image.
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
|
Medium
| 168,743
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void fht4x4_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht4x4_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,558
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int handle_ldf_stq(u32 insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr = compute_effective_address(regs, insn, 0);
int freg = ((insn >> 25) & 0x1e) | ((insn >> 20) & 0x20);
struct fpustate *f = FPUSTATE;
int asi = decode_asi(insn, regs);
int flag = (freg < 32) ? FPRS_DL : FPRS_DU;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
save_and_clear_fpu();
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] &= ~0x1c000;
if (freg & 3) {
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] |= (6 << 14) /* invalid_fp_register */;
do_fpother(regs);
return 0;
}
if (insn & 0x200000) {
/* STQ */
u64 first = 0, second = 0;
if (current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flag) {
first = *(u64 *)&f->regs[freg];
second = *(u64 *)&f->regs[freg+2];
}
if (asi < 0x80) {
do_privact(regs);
return 1;
}
switch (asi) {
case ASI_P:
case ASI_S: break;
case ASI_PL:
case ASI_SL:
{
/* Need to convert endians */
u64 tmp = __swab64p(&first);
first = __swab64p(&second);
second = tmp;
break;
}
default:
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
if (put_user (first >> 32, (u32 __user *)addr) ||
__put_user ((u32)first, (u32 __user *)(addr + 4)) ||
__put_user (second >> 32, (u32 __user *)(addr + 8)) ||
__put_user ((u32)second, (u32 __user *)(addr + 12))) {
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
} else {
/* LDF, LDDF, LDQF */
u32 data[4] __attribute__ ((aligned(8)));
int size, i;
int err;
if (asi < 0x80) {
do_privact(regs);
return 1;
} else if (asi > ASI_SNFL) {
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
switch (insn & 0x180000) {
case 0x000000: size = 1; break;
case 0x100000: size = 4; break;
default: size = 2; break;
}
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
data[i] = 0;
err = get_user (data[0], (u32 __user *) addr);
if (!err) {
for (i = 1; i < size; i++)
err |= __get_user (data[i], (u32 __user *)(addr + 4*i));
}
if (err && !(asi & 0x2 /* NF */)) {
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
if (asi & 0x8) /* Little */ {
u64 tmp;
switch (size) {
case 1: data[0] = le32_to_cpup(data + 0); break;
default:*(u64 *)(data + 0) = le64_to_cpup((u64 *)(data + 0));
break;
case 4: tmp = le64_to_cpup((u64 *)(data + 0));
*(u64 *)(data + 0) = le64_to_cpup((u64 *)(data + 2));
*(u64 *)(data + 2) = tmp;
break;
}
}
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & FPRS_FEF)) {
current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] = FPRS_FEF;
current_thread_info()->gsr[0] = 0;
}
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flag)) {
if (freg < 32)
memset(f->regs, 0, 32*sizeof(u32));
else
memset(f->regs+32, 0, 32*sizeof(u32));
}
memcpy(f->regs + freg, data, size * 4);
current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] |= flag;
}
advance(regs);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,809
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
{
int ret;
int size;
if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
/* the direction of urb must be OUT. */
if (usb_pipein(urb->pipe))
return 0;
size = urb->transfer_buffer_length;
} else {
/* the direction of urb must be IN. */
if (usb_pipeout(urb->pipe))
return 0;
size = urb->actual_length;
}
/* no need to recv xbuff */
if (!(size > 0))
return 0;
ret = usbip_recv(ud->tcp_socket, urb->transfer_buffer, size);
if (ret != size) {
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "recv xbuf, %d\n", ret);
if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
} else {
usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
return -EPIPE;
}
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The usbip_recv_xbuff function in drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value in a USB/IP packet.
Commit Message: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Low
| 167,322
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int my_csr_reader( const char* i_csr_file_in,
unsigned int** o_row_idx,
unsigned int** o_column_idx,
REALTYPE** o_values,
unsigned int* o_row_count,
unsigned int* o_column_count,
unsigned int* o_element_count ) {
FILE *l_csr_file_handle;
const unsigned int l_line_length = 512;
char l_line[512/*l_line_length*/+1];
unsigned int l_header_read = 0;
unsigned int* l_row_idx_id = NULL;
unsigned int l_i = 0;
l_csr_file_handle = fopen( i_csr_file_in, "r" );
if ( l_csr_file_handle == NULL ) {
fprintf( stderr, "cannot open CSR file!\n" );
return -1;
}
while (fgets(l_line, l_line_length, l_csr_file_handle) != NULL) {
if ( strlen(l_line) == l_line_length ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not read file length!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* check if we are still reading comments header */
if ( l_line[0] == '%' ) {
continue;
} else {
/* if we are the first line after comment header, we allocate our data structures */
if ( l_header_read == 0 ) {
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %u", o_row_count, o_column_count, o_element_count) == 3 ) {
/* allocate CSC datastructure matching mtx file */
*o_column_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
*o_row_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count + 1));
*o_values = (REALTYPE*) malloc(sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
l_row_idx_id = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count));
/* check if mallocs were successful */
if ( ( *o_row_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_column_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_values == NULL ) ||
( l_row_idx_id == NULL ) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not allocate sp data!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* set everything to zero for init */
memset(*o_row_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_row_count + 1));
memset(*o_column_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_element_count));
memset(*o_values, 0, sizeof(double)*(*o_element_count));
memset(l_row_idx_id, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_row_count));
/* init column idx */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count + 1); l_i++)
(*o_row_idx)[l_i] = (*o_element_count);
/* init */
(*o_row_idx)[0] = 0;
l_i = 0;
l_header_read = 1;
} else {
fprintf( stderr, "could not csr description!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* now we read the actual content */
} else {
unsigned int l_row, l_column;
REALTYPE l_value;
/* read a line of content */
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %lf", &l_row, &l_column, &l_value) != 3 ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not read element!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* adjust numbers to zero termination */
l_row--;
l_column--;
/* add these values to row and value structure */
(*o_column_idx)[l_i] = l_column;
(*o_values)[l_i] = l_value;
l_i++;
/* handle columns, set id to own for this column, yeah we need to handle empty columns */
l_row_idx_id[l_row] = 1;
(*o_row_idx)[l_row+1] = l_i;
}
}
}
/* close mtx file */
fclose( l_csr_file_handle );
/* check if we read a file which was consistent */
if ( l_i != (*o_element_count) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "we were not able to read all elements!\n" );
return -1;
}
/* let's handle empty rows */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count); l_i++) {
if ( l_row_idx_id[l_i] == 0 ) {
(*o_row_idx)[l_i+1] = (*o_row_idx)[l_i];
}
}
/* free helper data structure */
if ( l_row_idx_id != NULL ) {
free( l_row_idx_id );
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: There is a heap-based buffer-overflow at generator_spgemm_csc_reader.c (function libxsmm_sparse_csc_reader) in LIBXSMM 1.10, a different vulnerability than CVE-2018-20541 (which is in a different part of the source code and is seen at a different address).
Commit Message: Issue #287: made CSR/CSC readers more robust against invalid input (case #1).
|
Medium
| 168,949
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg)
{
int nid;
long ret;
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
switch (cmd) {
case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
ret = p7->detached = (int)larg;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
os = p7->d.sign->contents->d.data;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
}
} else {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL,
PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE);
ret = 0;
}
break;
case PKCS7_OP_GET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
if (!p7->d.sign || !p7->d.sign->contents->d.ptr)
ret = 1;
else
ret = 0;
p7->detached = ret;
} else {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL,
PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE);
ret = 0;
}
break;
default:
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL, PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_OPERATION);
ret = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The PKCS#7 implementation in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zf, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0r, 1.0.1 before 1.0.1m, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2a does not properly handle a lack of outer ContentInfo, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) by leveraging an application that processes arbitrary PKCS#7 data and providing malformed data with ASN.1 encoding, related to crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c and crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,808
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int pnm_validate(jas_stream_t *in)
{
uchar buf[2];
int i;
int n;
assert(JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK >= 2);
/* Read the first two characters that constitute the signature. */
if ((n = jas_stream_read(in, buf, 2)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
/* Put these characters back to the stream. */
for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, buf[i]) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
/* Did we read enough data? */
if (n < 2) {
return -1;
}
/* Is this the correct signature for a PNM file? */
if (buf[0] == 'P' && isdigit(buf[1])) {
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,728
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::string ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::error() {
return error_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,394
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ImageBitmap::ImageBitmap(ImageData* data,
Optional<IntRect> cropRect,
const ImageBitmapOptions& options) {
IntRect dataSrcRect = IntRect(IntPoint(), data->size());
ParsedOptions parsedOptions =
parseOptions(options, cropRect, data->bitmapSourceSize());
if (dstBufferSizeHasOverflow(parsedOptions))
return;
IntRect srcRect = cropRect ? intersection(parsedOptions.cropRect, dataSrcRect)
: dataSrcRect;
if (!parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha) {
unsigned char* srcAddr = data->data()->data();
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::Make(
parsedOptions.cropRect.width(), parsedOptions.cropRect.height(),
kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
size_t bytesPerPixel = static_cast<size_t>(info.bytesPerPixel());
size_t srcPixelBytesPerRow = bytesPerPixel * data->size().width();
size_t dstPixelBytesPerRow = bytesPerPixel * parsedOptions.cropRect.width();
sk_sp<SkImage> skImage;
if (parsedOptions.cropRect == IntRect(IntPoint(), data->size())) {
swizzleImageData(srcAddr, data->size().height(), srcPixelBytesPerRow,
parsedOptions.flipY);
skImage =
SkImage::MakeRasterCopy(SkPixmap(info, srcAddr, dstPixelBytesPerRow));
swizzleImageData(srcAddr, data->size().height(), srcPixelBytesPerRow,
parsedOptions.flipY);
} else {
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer = ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(
static_cast<size_t>(parsedOptions.cropRect.height()) *
parsedOptions.cropRect.width(),
bytesPerPixel);
if (!dstBuffer)
return;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> copiedDataBuffer =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
if (!srcRect.isEmpty()) {
IntPoint srcPoint = IntPoint(
(parsedOptions.cropRect.x() > 0) ? parsedOptions.cropRect.x() : 0,
(parsedOptions.cropRect.y() > 0) ? parsedOptions.cropRect.y() : 0);
IntPoint dstPoint = IntPoint(
(parsedOptions.cropRect.x() >= 0) ? 0 : -parsedOptions.cropRect.x(),
(parsedOptions.cropRect.y() >= 0) ? 0
: -parsedOptions.cropRect.y());
int copyHeight = data->size().height() - srcPoint.y();
if (parsedOptions.cropRect.height() < copyHeight)
copyHeight = parsedOptions.cropRect.height();
int copyWidth = data->size().width() - srcPoint.x();
if (parsedOptions.cropRect.width() < copyWidth)
copyWidth = parsedOptions.cropRect.width();
for (int i = 0; i < copyHeight; i++) {
size_t srcStartCopyPosition =
(i + srcPoint.y()) * srcPixelBytesPerRow +
srcPoint.x() * bytesPerPixel;
size_t srcEndCopyPosition =
srcStartCopyPosition + copyWidth * bytesPerPixel;
size_t dstStartCopyPosition;
if (parsedOptions.flipY)
dstStartCopyPosition =
(parsedOptions.cropRect.height() - 1 - dstPoint.y() - i) *
dstPixelBytesPerRow +
dstPoint.x() * bytesPerPixel;
else
dstStartCopyPosition = (dstPoint.y() + i) * dstPixelBytesPerRow +
dstPoint.x() * bytesPerPixel;
for (size_t j = 0; j < srcEndCopyPosition - srcStartCopyPosition;
j++) {
if (kN32_SkColorType == kBGRA_8888_SkColorType) {
if (j % 4 == 0)
copiedDataBuffer->data()[dstStartCopyPosition + j] =
srcAddr[srcStartCopyPosition + j + 2];
else if (j % 4 == 2)
copiedDataBuffer->data()[dstStartCopyPosition + j] =
srcAddr[srcStartCopyPosition + j - 2];
else
copiedDataBuffer->data()[dstStartCopyPosition + j] =
srcAddr[srcStartCopyPosition + j];
} else {
copiedDataBuffer->data()[dstStartCopyPosition + j] =
srcAddr[srcStartCopyPosition + j];
}
}
}
}
skImage = newSkImageFromRaster(info, std::move(copiedDataBuffer),
dstPixelBytesPerRow);
}
if (!skImage)
return;
if (parsedOptions.shouldScaleInput)
m_image = StaticBitmapImage::create(scaleSkImage(
skImage, parsedOptions.resizeWidth, parsedOptions.resizeHeight,
parsedOptions.resizeQuality));
else
m_image = StaticBitmapImage::create(skImage);
if (!m_image)
return;
m_image->setPremultiplied(parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha);
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<ImageBuffer> buffer = ImageBuffer::create(
parsedOptions.cropRect.size(), NonOpaque, DoNotInitializeImagePixels);
if (!buffer)
return;
if (srcRect.isEmpty()) {
m_image = StaticBitmapImage::create(buffer->newSkImageSnapshot(
PreferNoAcceleration, SnapshotReasonUnknown));
return;
}
IntPoint dstPoint = IntPoint(std::min(0, -parsedOptions.cropRect.x()),
std::min(0, -parsedOptions.cropRect.y()));
if (parsedOptions.cropRect.x() < 0)
dstPoint.setX(-parsedOptions.cropRect.x());
if (parsedOptions.cropRect.y() < 0)
dstPoint.setY(-parsedOptions.cropRect.y());
buffer->putByteArray(Unmultiplied, data->data()->data(), data->size(),
srcRect, dstPoint);
sk_sp<SkImage> skImage =
buffer->newSkImageSnapshot(PreferNoAcceleration, SnapshotReasonUnknown);
if (parsedOptions.flipY)
skImage = flipSkImageVertically(skImage.get(), PremultiplyAlpha);
if (!skImage)
return;
if (parsedOptions.shouldScaleInput) {
sk_sp<SkSurface> surface = SkSurface::MakeRasterN32Premul(
parsedOptions.resizeWidth, parsedOptions.resizeHeight);
if (!surface)
return;
SkPaint paint;
paint.setFilterQuality(parsedOptions.resizeQuality);
SkRect dstDrawRect =
SkRect::MakeWH(parsedOptions.resizeWidth, parsedOptions.resizeHeight);
surface->getCanvas()->drawImageRect(skImage, dstDrawRect, &paint);
skImage = surface->makeImageSnapshot();
}
m_image = StaticBitmapImage::create(std::move(skImage));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Bad casting in bitmap manipulation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
|
Medium
| 172,498
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::IsDangerousFile(
const DownloadItem& download,
const FilePath& suggested_path,
bool visited_referrer_before) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (download.GetTransitionType() & content::PAGE_TRANSITION_FROM_ADDRESS_BAR)
return false;
if (extensions::FeatureSwitch::easy_off_store_install()->IsEnabled() &&
download_crx_util::IsExtensionDownload(download) &&
!extensions::WebstoreInstaller::GetAssociatedApproval(download)) {
return true;
}
if (ShouldOpenFileBasedOnExtension(suggested_path) &&
download.HasUserGesture())
return false;
download_util::DownloadDangerLevel danger_level =
download_util::GetFileDangerLevel(suggested_path.BaseName());
if (danger_level == download_util::AllowOnUserGesture)
return !download.HasUserGesture() || !visited_referrer_before;
return danger_level == download_util::Dangerous;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, does not properly enforce a user gesture requirement before proceeding with a file download, which might make it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted file.
Commit Message: For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,393
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
{
OM_uint32 maj;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
/* We don't currently support exporting partially established contexts. */
if (!ctx->established)
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
maj = krb5_gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, &ctx->gssc,
interprocess_token);
if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
return maj;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The iakerb_gss_export_sec_context function in lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.14 pre-release 2015-09-14 improperly accesses a certain pointer, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by interacting with an application that calls the gss_export_sec_context function. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2015-2696.
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context export/import [CVE-2015-2698]
The patches for CVE-2015-2696 contained a regression in the newly
added IAKERB iakerb_gss_export_sec_context() function, which could
cause it to corrupt memory. Fix the regression by properly
dereferencing the context_handle pointer before casting it.
Also, the patches did not implement an IAKERB gss_import_sec_context()
function, under the erroneous belief that an exported IAKERB context
would be tagged as a krb5 context. Implement it now to allow IAKERB
contexts to be successfully exported and imported after establishment.
CVE-2015-2698:
In any MIT krb5 release with the patches for CVE-2015-2696 applied, an
application which calls gss_export_sec_context() may experience memory
corruption if the context was established using the IAKERB mechanism.
Historically, some vulnerabilities of this nature can be translated
into remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be
tailored to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8273 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,640
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void opl3_setup_voice(int dev, int voice, int chn)
{
struct channel_info *info =
&synth_devs[dev]->chn_info[chn];
opl3_set_instr(dev, voice, info->pgm_num);
devc->voc[voice].bender = 0;
devc->voc[voice].bender_range = info->bender_range;
devc->voc[voice].volume = info->controllers[CTL_MAIN_VOLUME];
devc->voc[voice].panning = (info->controllers[CTL_PAN] * 2) - 128;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple array index errors in sound/oss/opl3.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 allow local users to cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging write access to /dev/sequencer.
Commit Message: sound/oss/opl3: validate voice and channel indexes
User-controllable indexes for voice and channel values may cause reading
and writing beyond the bounds of their respective arrays, leading to
potentially exploitable memory corruption. Validate these indexes.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
Low
| 165,891
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ptaReadStream(FILE *fp)
{
char typestr[128];
l_int32 i, n, ix, iy, type, version;
l_float32 x, y;
PTA *pta;
PROCNAME("ptaReadStream");
if (!fp)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("stream not defined", procName, NULL);
if (fscanf(fp, "\n Pta Version %d\n", &version) != 1)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("not a pta file", procName, NULL);
if (version != PTA_VERSION_NUMBER)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("invalid pta version", procName, NULL);
if (fscanf(fp, " Number of pts = %d; format = %s\n", &n, typestr) != 2)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("not a pta file", procName, NULL);
if (!strcmp(typestr, "float"))
type = 0;
else /* typestr is "integer" */
type = 1;
if ((pta = ptaCreate(n)) == NULL)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("pta not made", procName, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (type == 0) { /* data is float */
if (fscanf(fp, " (%f, %f)\n", &x, &y) != 2) {
ptaDestroy(&pta);
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("error reading floats", procName, NULL);
}
ptaAddPt(pta, x, y);
} else { /* data is integer */
if (fscanf(fp, " (%d, %d)\n", &ix, &iy) != 2) {
ptaDestroy(&pta);
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("error reading ints", procName, NULL);
}
ptaAddPt(pta, ix, iy);
}
}
return pta;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Leptonica before 1.75.3 does not limit the number of characters in a %s format argument to fscanf or sscanf, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long string, as demonstrated by the gplotRead and ptaReadStream functions.
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
|
Low
| 169,328
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int digi_startup(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct digi_serial *serial_priv;
int ret;
serial_priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*serial_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!serial_priv)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num = serial->type->num_ports;
serial_priv->ds_oob_port = serial->port[serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num];
ret = digi_port_init(serial_priv->ds_oob_port,
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num);
if (ret) {
kfree(serial_priv);
return ret;
}
usb_set_serial_data(serial, serial_priv);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The digi_port_init function in drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.1 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a crafted endpoints value in a USB device descriptor.
Commit Message: USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports
The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.
See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Low
| 167,357
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: UsbChooserContext::UsbChooserContext(Profile* profile)
: ChooserContextBase(profile,
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_USB_GUARD,
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_USB_CHOOSER_DATA),
is_incognito_(profile->IsOffTheRecord()),
client_binding_(this),
weak_factory_(this) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles coincidence runs, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted curves, related to SkOpCoincidence.cpp and SkPathOpsCommon.cpp.
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
|
High
| 173,336
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int nntp_fetch_headers(struct Context *ctx, void *hc, anum_t first,
anum_t last, int restore)
{
struct NntpData *nntp_data = ctx->data;
struct FetchCtx fc;
struct Header *hdr = NULL;
char buf[HUGE_STRING];
int rc = 0;
int oldmsgcount = ctx->msgcount;
anum_t current;
anum_t first_over = first;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
void *hdata = NULL;
#endif
/* if empty group or nothing to do */
if (!last || first > last)
return 0;
/* init fetch context */
fc.ctx = ctx;
fc.first = first;
fc.last = last;
fc.restore = restore;
fc.messages = mutt_mem_calloc(last - first + 1, sizeof(unsigned char));
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
fc.hc = hc;
#endif
/* fetch list of articles */
if (NntpListgroup && nntp_data->nserv->hasLISTGROUP && !nntp_data->deleted)
{
if (!ctx->quiet)
mutt_message(_("Fetching list of articles..."));
if (nntp_data->nserv->hasLISTGROUPrange)
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "LISTGROUP %s %u-%u\r\n", nntp_data->group, first, last);
else
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "LISTGROUP %s\r\n", nntp_data->group);
rc = nntp_fetch_lines(nntp_data, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, fetch_numbers, &fc);
if (rc > 0)
{
mutt_error("LISTGROUP: %s", buf);
}
if (rc == 0)
{
for (current = first; current <= last && rc == 0; current++)
{
if (fc.messages[current - first])
continue;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", current);
if (nntp_data->bcache)
{
mutt_debug(2, "#1 mutt_bcache_del %s\n", buf);
mutt_bcache_del(nntp_data->bcache, buf);
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
if (fc.hc)
{
mutt_debug(2, "mutt_hcache_delete %s\n", buf);
mutt_hcache_delete(fc.hc, buf, strlen(buf));
}
#endif
}
}
}
else
{
for (current = first; current <= last; current++)
fc.messages[current - first] = 1;
}
/* fetching header from cache or server, or fallback to fetch overview */
if (!ctx->quiet)
{
mutt_progress_init(&fc.progress, _("Fetching message headers..."),
MUTT_PROGRESS_MSG, ReadInc, last - first + 1);
}
for (current = first; current <= last && rc == 0; current++)
{
if (!ctx->quiet)
mutt_progress_update(&fc.progress, current - first + 1, -1);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", current);
#endif
/* delete header from cache that does not exist on server */
if (!fc.messages[current - first])
continue;
/* allocate memory for headers */
if (ctx->msgcount >= ctx->hdrmax)
mx_alloc_memory(ctx);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
/* try to fetch header from cache */
hdata = mutt_hcache_fetch(fc.hc, buf, strlen(buf));
if (hdata)
{
mutt_debug(2, "mutt_hcache_fetch %s\n", buf);
ctx->hdrs[ctx->msgcount] = hdr = mutt_hcache_restore(hdata);
mutt_hcache_free(fc.hc, &hdata);
hdr->data = 0;
/* skip header marked as deleted in cache */
if (hdr->deleted && !restore)
{
mutt_header_free(&hdr);
if (nntp_data->bcache)
{
mutt_debug(2, "#2 mutt_bcache_del %s\n", buf);
mutt_bcache_del(nntp_data->bcache, buf);
}
continue;
}
hdr->read = false;
hdr->old = false;
}
else
#endif
/* don't try to fetch header from removed newsgroup */
if (nntp_data->deleted)
continue;
/* fallback to fetch overview */
else if (nntp_data->nserv->hasOVER || nntp_data->nserv->hasXOVER)
{
if (NntpListgroup && nntp_data->nserv->hasLISTGROUP)
break;
else
continue;
}
/* fetch header from server */
else
{
FILE *fp = mutt_file_mkstemp();
if (!fp)
{
mutt_perror("mutt_file_mkstemp() failed!");
rc = -1;
break;
}
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "HEAD %u\r\n", current);
rc = nntp_fetch_lines(nntp_data, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, fetch_tempfile, fp);
if (rc)
{
mutt_file_fclose(&fp);
if (rc < 0)
break;
/* invalid response */
if (mutt_str_strncmp("423", buf, 3) != 0)
{
mutt_error("HEAD: %s", buf);
break;
}
/* no such article */
if (nntp_data->bcache)
{
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", current);
mutt_debug(2, "#3 mutt_bcache_del %s\n", buf);
mutt_bcache_del(nntp_data->bcache, buf);
}
rc = 0;
continue;
}
/* parse header */
hdr = ctx->hdrs[ctx->msgcount] = mutt_header_new();
hdr->env = mutt_rfc822_read_header(fp, hdr, 0, 0);
hdr->received = hdr->date_sent;
mutt_file_fclose(&fp);
}
/* save header in context */
hdr->index = ctx->msgcount++;
hdr->read = false;
hdr->old = false;
hdr->deleted = false;
hdr->data = mutt_mem_calloc(1, sizeof(struct NntpHeaderData));
NHDR(hdr)->article_num = current;
if (restore)
hdr->changed = true;
else
{
nntp_article_status(ctx, hdr, NULL, NHDR(hdr)->article_num);
if (!hdr->read)
nntp_parse_xref(ctx, hdr);
}
if (current > nntp_data->last_loaded)
nntp_data->last_loaded = current;
first_over = current + 1;
}
if (!NntpListgroup || !nntp_data->nserv->hasLISTGROUP)
current = first_over;
/* fetch overview information */
if (current <= last && rc == 0 && !nntp_data->deleted)
{
char *cmd = nntp_data->nserv->hasOVER ? "OVER" : "XOVER";
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s %u-%u\r\n", cmd, current, last);
rc = nntp_fetch_lines(nntp_data, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, parse_overview_line, &fc);
if (rc > 0)
{
mutt_error("%s: %s", cmd, buf);
}
}
if (ctx->msgcount > oldmsgcount)
mx_update_context(ctx, ctx->msgcount - oldmsgcount);
FREE(&fc.messages);
if (rc != 0)
return -1;
mutt_clear_error();
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An issue was discovered in NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. nntp.c proceeds even if memory allocation fails for messages data.
Commit Message: Add alloc fail check in nntp_fetch_headers
|
Low
| 169,124
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
/* unprotected vars, we dont care of overwrites */
static u32 challenge_timestamp;
static unsigned int challenge_count;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
u32 now;
/* First check our per-socket dupack rate limit. */
if (tcp_oow_rate_limited(sock_net(sk), skb,
LINUX_MIB_TCPACKSKIPPEDCHALLENGE,
&tp->last_oow_ack_time))
return;
/* Then check the check host-wide RFC 5961 rate limit. */
now = jiffies / HZ;
if (now != challenge_timestamp) {
challenge_timestamp = now;
challenge_count = 0;
}
if (++challenge_count <= sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit) {
NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK);
tcp_send_ack(sk);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: net/ipv4/tcp_input.c in the Linux kernel before 4.7 does not properly determine the rate of challenge ACK segments, which makes it easier for remote attackers to hijack TCP sessions via a blind in-window attack.
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 167,133
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteMAPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
depth,
packet_size;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*colormap,
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Allocate colormap.
*/
if (IsPaletteImage(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteType);
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickTrue);
packet_size=(size_t) (depth/8);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,packet_size*
sizeof(*pixels));
packet_size=(size_t) (image->colors > 256 ? 6UL : 3UL);
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,packet_size*
sizeof(*colormap));
if ((pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Write colormap to file.
*/
q=colormap;
q=colormap;
if (image->colors <= 256)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red);
*q++=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green);
*q++=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue);
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].red) >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) (ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].red) & 0xff);
*q++=(unsigned char) (ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].green) >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) (ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].green) & 0xff);;
*q++=(unsigned char) (ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].blue) >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) (ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].blue) & 0xff);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,colormap);
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
/*
Write image pixels to file.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->colors > 256)
*q++=(unsigned char) ((size_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x) >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (q-pixels),pixels);
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.6-2 has a memory leak vulnerability in WriteMAPImage in coders/map.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/573
|
Medium
| 167,976
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadTEXTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
char *text,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
filename[MaxTextExtent],
geometry[MaxTextExtent],
*p;
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
Image
*texture;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PointInfo
delta;
RectangleInfo
page;
ssize_t
offset;
TypeMetric
metrics;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
/*
Set the page geometry.
*/
delta.x=DefaultResolution;
delta.y=DefaultResolution;
if ((image->x_resolution == 0.0) || (image->y_resolution == 0.0))
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
flags=ParseGeometry(PSDensityGeometry,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
}
page.width=612;
page.height=792;
page.x=43;
page.y=43;
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(image_info->page,&page);
/*
Initialize Image structure.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) floor((((double) page.width*image->x_resolution)/
delta.x)+0.5);
image->rows=(size_t) floor((((double) page.height*image->y_resolution)/
delta.y)+0.5);
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
texture=(Image *) NULL;
if (image_info->texture != (char *) NULL)
{
ImageInfo
*read_info;
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
(void) CopyMagickString(read_info->filename,image_info->texture,
MaxTextExtent);
texture=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
}
/*
Annotate the text image.
*/
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(image_info,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,image_info->filename);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"0x0%+ld%+ld",(long) page.x,
(long) page.y);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
status=GetTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(TypeError,"UnableToGetTypeMetrics");
page.y=(ssize_t) ceil((double) page.y+metrics.ascent-0.5);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"0x0%+ld%+ld",(long) page.x,
(long) page.y);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
(void) CopyMagickString(filename,image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent);
if (*draw_info->text != '\0')
*draw_info->text='\0';
p=text;
for (offset=2*page.y; p != (char *) NULL; )
{
/*
Annotate image with text.
*/
(void) ConcatenateString(&draw_info->text,text);
(void) ConcatenateString(&draw_info->text,"\n");
offset+=(ssize_t) (metrics.ascent-metrics.descent);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,offset,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
p=ReadBlobString(image,text);
if ((offset < (ssize_t) image->rows) && (p != (char *) NULL))
continue;
if (texture != (Image *) NULL)
{
MagickProgressMonitor
progress_monitor;
progress_monitor=SetImageProgressMonitor(image,
(MagickProgressMonitor) NULL,image->client_data);
(void) TextureImage(image,texture);
(void) SetImageProgressMonitor(image,progress_monitor,
image->client_data);
}
(void) AnnotateImage(image,draw_info);
if (p == (char *) NULL)
break;
/*
Page is full-- allocate next image structure.
*/
*draw_info->text='\0';
offset=2*page.y;
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image->next->columns=image->columns;
image->next->rows=image->rows;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (texture != (Image *) NULL)
{
MagickProgressMonitor
progress_monitor;
progress_monitor=SetImageProgressMonitor(image,
(MagickProgressMonitor) NULL,image->client_data);
(void) TextureImage(image,texture);
(void) SetImageProgressMonitor(image,progress_monitor,image->client_data);
}
(void) AnnotateImage(image,draw_info);
if (texture != (Image *) NULL)
texture=DestroyImage(texture);
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,613
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: NeXTDecode(TIFF* tif, uint8* buf, tmsize_t occ, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "NeXTDecode";
unsigned char *bp, *op;
tmsize_t cc;
uint8* row;
tmsize_t scanline, n;
(void) s;
/*
* Each scanline is assumed to start off as all
* white (we assume a PhotometricInterpretation
* of ``min-is-black'').
*/
for (op = (unsigned char*) buf, cc = occ; cc-- > 0;)
*op++ = 0xff;
bp = (unsigned char *)tif->tif_rawcp;
cc = tif->tif_rawcc;
scanline = tif->tif_scanlinesize;
if (occ % scanline)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "Fractional scanlines cannot be read");
return (0);
}
for (row = buf; cc > 0 && occ > 0; occ -= scanline, row += scanline) {
n = *bp++, cc--;
switch (n) {
case LITERALROW:
/*
* The entire scanline is given as literal values.
*/
if (cc < scanline)
goto bad;
_TIFFmemcpy(row, bp, scanline);
bp += scanline;
cc -= scanline;
break;
case LITERALSPAN: {
tmsize_t off;
/*
* The scanline has a literal span that begins at some
* offset.
*/
if( cc < 4 )
goto bad;
off = (bp[0] * 256) + bp[1];
n = (bp[2] * 256) + bp[3];
if (cc < 4+n || off+n > scanline)
goto bad;
_TIFFmemcpy(row+off, bp+4, n);
bp += 4+n;
cc -= 4+n;
break;
}
default: {
uint32 npixels = 0, grey;
uint32 imagewidth = tif->tif_dir.td_imagewidth;
if( isTiled(tif) )
imagewidth = tif->tif_dir.td_tilewidth;
/*
* The scanline is composed of a sequence of constant
* color ``runs''. We shift into ``run mode'' and
* interpret bytes as codes of the form
* <color><npixels> until we've filled the scanline.
*/
op = row;
for (;;) {
grey = (uint32)((n>>6) & 0x3);
n &= 0x3f;
/*
* Ensure the run does not exceed the scanline
* bounds, potentially resulting in a security
* issue.
*/
while (n-- > 0 && npixels < imagewidth)
SETPIXEL(op, grey);
if (npixels >= imagewidth)
break;
if (cc == 0)
goto bad;
n = *bp++, cc--;
}
break;
}
}
}
tif->tif_rawcp = (uint8*) bp;
tif->tif_rawcc = cc;
return (1);
bad:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "Not enough data for scanline %ld",
(long) tif->tif_row);
return (0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The NeXTDecode function in tif_next.c in LibTIFF allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted TIFF image, as demonstrated by libtiff5.tif.
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_next.c: fix potential out-of-bound write in NeXTDecode()
triggered by http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/vulns/libtiff5.tif
(bugzilla #2508)
|
Medium
| 167,499
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor> RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::localDescription()
{
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,347
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GDataRootDirectory::GDataRootDirectory()
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(GDataDirectory(NULL, this)),
fake_search_directory_(new GDataDirectory(NULL, NULL)),
largest_changestamp_(0), serialized_size_(0) {
title_ = kGDataRootDirectory;
SetFileNameFromTitle();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,777
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::BluetoothDeviceChromeOS(
BluetoothAdapterChromeOS* adapter,
const dbus::ObjectPath& object_path)
: adapter_(adapter),
object_path_(object_path),
num_connecting_calls_(0),
pairing_delegate_(NULL),
pairing_delegate_used_(false),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,217
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IDNConversionResult IDNToUnicodeWithAdjustmentsImpl(
base::StringPiece host,
base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustments* adjustments,
bool enable_spoof_checks) {
if (adjustments)
adjustments->clear();
base::string16 input16;
input16.reserve(host.length());
input16.insert(input16.end(), host.begin(), host.end());
bool is_tld_ascii = true;
size_t last_dot = host.rfind('.');
if (last_dot != base::StringPiece::npos &&
host.substr(last_dot).starts_with(".xn--")) {
is_tld_ascii = false;
}
IDNConversionResult result;
base::string16 out16;
for (size_t component_start = 0, component_end;
component_start < input16.length();
component_start = component_end + 1) {
component_end = input16.find('.', component_start);
if (component_end == base::string16::npos)
component_end = input16.length(); // For getting the last component.
size_t component_length = component_end - component_start;
size_t new_component_start = out16.length();
bool converted_idn = false;
if (component_end > component_start) {
bool has_idn_component = false;
converted_idn = IDNToUnicodeOneComponent(
input16.data() + component_start, component_length, is_tld_ascii,
enable_spoof_checks, &out16, &has_idn_component);
result.has_idn_component |= has_idn_component;
}
size_t new_component_length = out16.length() - new_component_start;
if (converted_idn && adjustments) {
adjustments->push_back(base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustment(
component_start, component_length, new_component_length));
}
if (component_end < input16.length())
out16.push_back('.');
}
result.result = out16;
if (result.has_idn_component) {
result.matching_top_domain =
g_idn_spoof_checker.Get().GetSimilarTopDomain(out16);
if (enable_spoof_checks && !result.matching_top_domain.domain.empty()) {
if (adjustments)
adjustments->clear();
result.result = input16;
}
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of confusable characters in URL Formatter in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Restrict Latin Small Letter Thorn (U+00FE) to Icelandic domains
This character (þ) can be confused with both b and p when used in a domain
name. IDN spoof checker doesn't have a good way of flagging a character as
confusable with multiple characters, so it can't catch spoofs containing
this character. As a practical fix, this CL restricts this character to
domains under Iceland's ccTLD (.is). With this change, a domain name containing
"þ" with a non-.is TLD will be displayed in punycode in the UI.
This change affects less than 10 real world domains with limited popularity.
Bug: 798892, 843352, 904327, 1017707
Change-Id: Ib07190dcde406bf62ce4413688a4fb4859a51030
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1879992
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christopher Thompson <cthomp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#709309}
|
Medium
| 172,729
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WT_NoiseGenerator (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 nInterpolatedSample;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* get last two samples generated */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp0 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->phaseAccum) >> 18;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
/* generate a buffer of noise */
while (numSamples--) {
nInterpolatedSample = MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp0, (PHASE_ONE - pWTVoice->phaseFrac));
nInterpolatedSample += MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp1, pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_PCM) nInterpolatedSample;
/* update PRNG */
pWTVoice->phaseFrac += (EAS_U32) phaseInc;
if (GET_PHASE_INT_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac)) {
tmp0 = tmp1;
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = pWTVoice->loopEnd;
pWTVoice->loopEnd = (5 * pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1);
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = GET_PHASE_FRAC_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sonivox in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for a negative number of samples, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtengine.c and arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtsynth.c, aka internal bug 26366256.
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
|
Low
| 173,920
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AutocompleteMatch HistoryQuickProvider::QuickMatchToACMatch(
const ScoredHistoryMatch& history_match,
int score) {
const history::URLRow& info = history_match.url_info;
AutocompleteMatch match(this, score, !!info.visit_count(),
history_match.url_matches.empty() ?
AutocompleteMatch::HISTORY_URL : AutocompleteMatch::HISTORY_TITLE);
match.destination_url = info.url();
DCHECK(match.destination_url.is_valid());
std::vector<size_t> offsets =
OffsetsFromTermMatches(history_match.url_matches);
const net::FormatUrlTypes format_types = net::kFormatUrlOmitAll &
~(!history_match.match_in_scheme ? 0 : net::kFormatUrlOmitHTTP);
match.fill_into_edit =
AutocompleteInput::FormattedStringWithEquivalentMeaning(info.url(),
net::FormatUrlWithOffsets(info.url(), languages_, format_types,
net::UnescapeRule::SPACES, NULL, NULL, &offsets));
history::TermMatches new_matches =
ReplaceOffsetsInTermMatches(history_match.url_matches, offsets);
match.contents = net::FormatUrl(info.url(), languages_, format_types,
net::UnescapeRule::SPACES, NULL, NULL, NULL);
match.contents_class =
SpansFromTermMatch(new_matches, match.contents.length(), true);
if (!history_match.can_inline) {
match.inline_autocomplete_offset = string16::npos;
} else {
DCHECK(!new_matches.empty());
match.inline_autocomplete_offset = new_matches[0].offset +
new_matches[0].length;
if (match.inline_autocomplete_offset > match.fill_into_edit.length())
match.inline_autocomplete_offset = match.fill_into_edit.length();
}
match.description = info.title();
match.description_class = SpansFromTermMatch(
history_match.title_matches, match.description.length(), false);
return match;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52 on Linux does not properly perform a cast of an unspecified variable, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact by leveraging an error in the GTK implementation of the UI.
Commit Message: Fix icon returned for HQP matches; the two icons were reversed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9695022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126296 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,999
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: babel_print_v2(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
u_int i;
u_short bodylen;
u_char v4_prefix[16] =
{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
u_char v6_prefix[16] = {0};
ND_TCHECK2(*cp, 4);
if (length < 4)
goto invalid;
bodylen = EXTRACT_16BITS(cp + 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%u)", bodylen));
/* Process the TLVs in the body */
i = 0;
while(i < bodylen) {
const u_char *message;
u_int type, len;
message = cp + 4 + i;
ND_TCHECK2(*message, 1);
if((type = message[0]) == MESSAGE_PAD1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ndo->ndo_vflag ? "\n\tPad 1" : " pad1"));
i += 1;
continue;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*message, 2);
ICHECK(i, 2);
len = message[1];
ND_TCHECK2(*message, 2 + len);
ICHECK(i, 2 + len);
switch(type) {
case MESSAGE_PADN: {
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " padN"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tPad %d", len + 2));
}
break;
case MESSAGE_ACK_REQ: {
u_short nonce, interval;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ack-req"));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tAcknowledgment Request "));
if(len < 6) goto invalid;
nonce = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 4);
interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%04x %s", nonce, format_interval(interval)));
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_ACK: {
u_short nonce;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ack"));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tAcknowledgment "));
if(len < 2) goto invalid;
nonce = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%04x", nonce));
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_HELLO: {
u_short seqno, interval;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hello"));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tHello "));
if(len < 6) goto invalid;
seqno = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 4);
interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "seqno %u interval %s", seqno, format_interval(interval)));
/* Extra data. */
if(len > 6)
subtlvs_print(ndo, message + 8, message + 2 + len, type);
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_IHU: {
unsigned short txcost, interval;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ihu"));
else {
u_char address[16];
int rc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tIHU "));
if(len < 6) goto invalid;
txcost = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 4);
interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 6);
rc = network_address(message[2], message + 8, len - 6, address);
if(rc < 0) { ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr)); break; }
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s txcost %u interval %s",
format_address(ndo, address), txcost, format_interval(interval)));
/* Extra data. */
if((u_int)rc < len - 6)
subtlvs_print(ndo, message + 8 + rc, message + 2 + len,
type);
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_ROUTER_ID: {
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " router-id"));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tRouter Id"));
if(len < 10) goto invalid;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", format_id(message + 4)));
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_NH: {
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nh"));
else {
int rc;
u_char nh[16];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tNext Hop"));
if(len < 2) goto invalid;
rc = network_address(message[2], message + 4, len - 2, nh);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", format_address(ndo, nh)));
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_UPDATE: {
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " update"));
if(len < 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/truncated"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s%s",
(message[3] & 0x80) ? "/prefix": "",
(message[3] & 0x40) ? "/id" : "",
(message[3] & 0x3f) ? "/unknown" : ""));
} else {
u_short interval, seqno, metric;
u_char plen;
int rc;
u_char prefix[16];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tUpdate"));
if(len < 10) goto invalid;
plen = message[4] + (message[2] == 1 ? 96 : 0);
rc = network_prefix(message[2], message[4], message[5],
message + 12,
message[2] == 1 ? v4_prefix : v6_prefix,
len - 10, prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 6);
seqno = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 8);
metric = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 10);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s%s %s metric %u seqno %u interval %s",
(message[3] & 0x80) ? "/prefix": "",
(message[3] & 0x40) ? "/id" : "",
(message[3] & 0x3f) ? "/unknown" : "",
format_prefix(ndo, prefix, plen),
metric, seqno, format_interval_update(interval)));
if(message[3] & 0x80) {
if(message[2] == 1)
memcpy(v4_prefix, prefix, 16);
else
memcpy(v6_prefix, prefix, 16);
}
/* extra data? */
if((u_int)rc < len - 10)
subtlvs_print(ndo, message + 12 + rc, message + 2 + len, type);
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_REQUEST: {
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " request"));
else {
int rc;
u_char prefix[16], plen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tRequest "));
if(len < 2) goto invalid;
plen = message[3] + (message[2] == 1 ? 96 : 0);
rc = network_prefix(message[2], message[3], 0,
message + 4, NULL, len - 2, prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "for %s",
message[2] == 0 ? "any" : format_prefix(ndo, prefix, plen)));
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_MH_REQUEST : {
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " mh-request"));
else {
int rc;
u_short seqno;
u_char prefix[16], plen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tMH-Request "));
if(len < 14) goto invalid;
seqno = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 4);
rc = network_prefix(message[2], message[3], 0,
message + 16, NULL, len - 14, prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
plen = message[3] + (message[2] == 1 ? 96 : 0);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%u hops) for %s seqno %u id %s",
message[6], format_prefix(ndo, prefix, plen),
seqno, format_id(message + 8)));
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_TSPC :
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tspc"));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tTS/PC "));
if(len < 6) goto invalid;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "timestamp %u packetcounter %u", EXTRACT_32BITS (message + 4),
EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 2)));
}
break;
case MESSAGE_HMAC : {
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hmac"));
else {
unsigned j;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tHMAC "));
if(len < 18) goto invalid;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "key-id %u digest-%u ", EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 2), len - 2));
for (j = 0; j < len - 2; j++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02X", message[4 + j]));
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_UPDATE_SRC_SPECIFIC : {
if(!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ss-update"));
} else {
u_char prefix[16], src_prefix[16];
u_short interval, seqno, metric;
u_char ae, plen, src_plen, omitted;
int rc;
int parsed_len = 10;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tSS-Update"));
if(len < 10) goto invalid;
ae = message[2];
src_plen = message[3];
plen = message[4];
omitted = message[5];
interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 6);
seqno = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 8);
metric = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 10);
rc = network_prefix(ae, plen, omitted, message + 2 + parsed_len,
ae == 1 ? v4_prefix : v6_prefix,
len - parsed_len, prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
if(ae == 1)
plen += 96;
parsed_len += rc;
rc = network_prefix(ae, src_plen, 0, message + 2 + parsed_len,
NULL, len - parsed_len, src_prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
if(ae == 1)
src_plen += 96;
parsed_len += rc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s from", format_prefix(ndo, prefix, plen)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s metric %u seqno %u interval %s",
format_prefix(ndo, src_prefix, src_plen),
metric, seqno, format_interval_update(interval)));
/* extra data? */
if((u_int)parsed_len < len)
subtlvs_print(ndo, message + 2 + parsed_len,
message + 2 + len, type);
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_REQUEST_SRC_SPECIFIC : {
if(!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ss-request"));
else {
int rc, parsed_len = 3;
u_char ae, plen, src_plen, prefix[16], src_prefix[16];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tSS-Request "));
if(len < 3) goto invalid;
ae = message[2];
plen = message[3];
src_plen = message[4];
rc = network_prefix(ae, plen, 0, message + 2 + parsed_len,
NULL, len - parsed_len, prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
if(ae == 1)
plen += 96;
parsed_len += rc;
rc = network_prefix(ae, src_plen, 0, message + 2 + parsed_len,
NULL, len - parsed_len, src_prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
if(ae == 1)
src_plen += 96;
parsed_len += rc;
if(ae == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "for any"));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "for (%s, ", format_prefix(ndo, prefix, plen)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s)", format_prefix(ndo, src_prefix, src_plen)));
}
}
}
break;
case MESSAGE_MH_REQUEST_SRC_SPECIFIC : {
if(!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ss-mh-request"));
else {
int rc, parsed_len = 14;
u_short seqno;
u_char ae, plen, src_plen, prefix[16], src_prefix[16], hopc;
const u_char *router_id = NULL;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tSS-MH-Request "));
if(len < 14) goto invalid;
ae = message[2];
plen = message[3];
seqno = EXTRACT_16BITS(message + 4);
hopc = message[6];
src_plen = message[7];
router_id = message + 8;
rc = network_prefix(ae, plen, 0, message + 2 + parsed_len,
NULL, len - parsed_len, prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
if(ae == 1)
plen += 96;
parsed_len += rc;
rc = network_prefix(ae, src_plen, 0, message + 2 + parsed_len,
NULL, len - parsed_len, src_prefix);
if(rc < 0) goto invalid;
if(ae == 1)
src_plen += 96;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%u hops) for (%s, ",
hopc, format_prefix(ndo, prefix, plen)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s) seqno %u id %s",
format_prefix(ndo, src_prefix, src_plen),
seqno, format_id(router_id)));
}
}
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " unknown"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tUnknown message type %d", type));
}
i += len + 2;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tstr));
return;
invalid:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", istr));
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Babel parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-babel.c:babel_print_v2().
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14470/Babel: fix an existing length check
In babel_print_v2() the non-verbose branch for an Update TLV compared
the TLV Length against 1 instead of 10 (probably a typo), put it right.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 169,841
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AudioOutputDevice::ShutDownOnIOThread() {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (stream_id_) {
is_started_ = false;
if (ipc_) {
ipc_->CloseStream(stream_id_);
ipc_->RemoveDelegate(stream_id_);
}
stream_id_ = 0;
}
base::AutoLock auto_lock_(audio_thread_lock_);
if (!audio_thread_.get())
return;
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
audio_thread_->Stop(NULL);
audio_thread_.reset();
audio_callback_.reset();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.92 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via vectors related to audio devices.
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,706
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CopyFromCompositingSurface(
const gfx::Rect& src_subrect,
const gfx::Size& dst_size,
const base::Callback<void(bool)>& callback,
skia::PlatformBitmap* output) {
base::ScopedClosureRunner scoped_callback_runner(base::Bind(callback, false));
std::map<uint64, scoped_refptr<ui::Texture> >::iterator it =
image_transport_clients_.find(current_surface_);
if (it == image_transport_clients_.end())
return;
ui::Texture* container = it->second;
DCHECK(container);
gfx::Size dst_size_in_pixel = ConvertSizeToPixel(this, dst_size);
if (!output->Allocate(
dst_size_in_pixel.width(), dst_size_in_pixel.height(), true))
return;
ImageTransportFactory* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance();
GLHelper* gl_helper = factory->GetGLHelper();
if (!gl_helper)
return;
unsigned char* addr = static_cast<unsigned char*>(
output->GetBitmap().getPixels());
scoped_callback_runner.Release();
base::Callback<void(bool)> wrapper_callback = base::Bind(
&RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceFinished,
AsWeakPtr(),
callback);
++pending_thumbnail_tasks_;
gfx::Rect src_subrect_in_gl = src_subrect;
src_subrect_in_gl.set_y(GetViewBounds().height() - src_subrect.bottom());
gfx::Rect src_subrect_in_pixel = ConvertRectToPixel(this, src_subrect_in_gl);
gl_helper->CropScaleReadbackAndCleanTexture(container->PrepareTexture(),
container->size(),
src_subrect_in_pixel,
dst_size_in_pixel,
addr,
wrapper_callback);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,377
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
((void) p);
((void) end);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
((void) p);
((void) end);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server
* doesn't use a psk_identity_hint
*/
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE )
{
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
/* Current message is probably either
* CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key exchange message must "
"not be skipped" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
} /* FALLTROUGH */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
; /* nothing more to do */
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
p, end - p );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
size_t sig_len, hashlen;
unsigned char hash[64];
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
size_t params_len = p - params;
/*
* Handle the digitally-signed structure
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
if( ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( ssl, &p, end,
&md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
if( pk_alg != mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
/* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else
#endif
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/*
* Read signature
*/
if( p > end - 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
p += 2;
if( end != p + sig_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "signature", p, sig_len );
/*
* Compute the hash that has been signed
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
hashlen = 36;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, params,
params_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
/* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
hashlen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, params,
params_len, md_alg );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen != 0 ? hashlen :
(unsigned int) ( mbedtls_md_get_size( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) ) );
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* Verify signature
*/
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
exit:
ssl->state++;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server key exchange" ) );
return( 0 );
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ARM mbed TLS before 2.1.11, before 2.7.2, and before 2.8.0 has a buffer over-read in ssl_parse_server_key_exchange() that could cause a crash on invalid input.
Commit Message: Prevent arithmetic overflow on bounds check
|
Low
| 170,170
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void initializeHolderIfNeeded(ScriptState* scriptState, v8::Local<v8::Object> classObject, v8::Local<v8::Value> holder)
{
RELEASE_ASSERT(!holder.IsEmpty());
RELEASE_ASSERT(holder->IsObject());
v8::Local<v8::Object> holderObject = v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(holder);
v8::Isolate* isolate = scriptState->isolate();
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = scriptState->context();
auto privateIsInitialized = V8PrivateProperty::getPrivateScriptRunnerIsInitialized(isolate);
if (privateIsInitialized.hasValue(context, holderObject))
return; // Already initialized.
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> initializeFunction;
if (classObject->Get(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, "initialize")).ToLocal(&initializeFunction) && initializeFunction->IsFunction()) {
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> result;
if (!V8ScriptRunner::callFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(initializeFunction), scriptState->getExecutionContext(), holder, 0, 0, isolate).ToLocal(&result)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Object constructor threw an exception.\n");
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
}
if (classObject->GetPrototype() != holderObject->GetPrototype()) {
if (!v8CallBoolean(classObject->SetPrototype(context, holderObject->GetPrototype()))) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: SetPrototype failed.\n");
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
}
if (!v8CallBoolean(holderObject->SetPrototype(context, classObject))) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: SetPrototype failed.\n");
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
privateIsInitialized.set(context, holderObject, v8Boolean(true, isolate));
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android permitted execution of v8 microtasks while the DOM was in an inconsistent state, which allowed a remote attacker to inject arbitrary scripts or HTML (UXSS) via crafted HTML pages.
Commit Message: Blink-in-JS should not run micro tasks
If Blink-in-JS runs micro tasks, there's a risk of causing a UXSS bug
(see 645211 for concrete steps).
This CL makes Blink-in-JS use callInternalFunction (instead of callFunction)
to avoid running micro tasks after Blink-in-JS' callbacks.
BUG=645211
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2330843002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#417874}
|
Medium
| 172,074
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: iperf_on_connect(struct iperf_test *test)
{
time_t now_secs;
const char* rfc1123_fmt = "%a, %d %b %Y %H:%M:%S GMT";
char now_str[100];
char ipr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
int port;
struct sockaddr_storage sa;
struct sockaddr_in *sa_inP;
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa_in6P;
socklen_t len;
int opt;
now_secs = time((time_t*) 0);
(void) strftime(now_str, sizeof(now_str), rfc1123_fmt, gmtime(&now_secs));
if (test->json_output)
cJSON_AddItemToObject(test->json_start, "timestamp", iperf_json_printf("time: %s timesecs: %d", now_str, (int64_t) now_secs));
else if (test->verbose)
iprintf(test, report_time, now_str);
if (test->role == 'c') {
if (test->json_output)
cJSON_AddItemToObject(test->json_start, "connecting_to", iperf_json_printf("host: %s port: %d", test->server_hostname, (int64_t) test->server_port));
else {
iprintf(test, report_connecting, test->server_hostname, test->server_port);
if (test->reverse)
iprintf(test, report_reverse, test->server_hostname);
}
} else {
len = sizeof(sa);
getpeername(test->ctrl_sck, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, &len);
if (getsockdomain(test->ctrl_sck) == AF_INET) {
sa_inP = (struct sockaddr_in *) &sa;
inet_ntop(AF_INET, &sa_inP->sin_addr, ipr, sizeof(ipr));
port = ntohs(sa_inP->sin_port);
} else {
sa_in6P = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) &sa;
inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &sa_in6P->sin6_addr, ipr, sizeof(ipr));
port = ntohs(sa_in6P->sin6_port);
}
mapped_v4_to_regular_v4(ipr);
if (test->json_output)
cJSON_AddItemToObject(test->json_start, "accepted_connection", iperf_json_printf("host: %s port: %d", ipr, (int64_t) port));
else
iprintf(test, report_accepted, ipr, port);
}
if (test->json_output) {
cJSON_AddStringToObject(test->json_start, "cookie", test->cookie);
if (test->protocol->id == SOCK_STREAM) {
if (test->settings->mss)
cJSON_AddIntToObject(test->json_start, "tcp_mss", test->settings->mss);
else {
len = sizeof(opt);
getsockopt(test->ctrl_sck, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_MAXSEG, &opt, &len);
cJSON_AddIntToObject(test->json_start, "tcp_mss_default", opt);
}
}
} else if (test->verbose) {
iprintf(test, report_cookie, test->cookie);
if (test->protocol->id == SOCK_STREAM) {
if (test->settings->mss)
iprintf(test, " TCP MSS: %d\n", test->settings->mss);
else {
len = sizeof(opt);
getsockopt(test->ctrl_sck, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_MAXSEG, &opt, &len);
iprintf(test, " TCP MSS: %d (default)\n", opt);
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,315
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::CancelPairing() {
if (!RunPairingCallbacks(CANCELLED)) {
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->
CancelPairing(
object_path_,
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnCancelPairingError,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
UnregisterAgent();
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,219
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ssi_sd_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
SSISlave *ss = SSI_SLAVE(opaque);
ssi_sd_state *s = (ssi_sd_state *)opaque;
int i;
if (version_id != 1)
return -EINVAL;
s->mode = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->cmd = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
s->cmdarg[i] = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
s->response[i] = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->arglen = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->response_pos = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->stopping = qemu_get_be32(f);
ss->cs = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->mode = SSI_SD_CMD;
dinfo = drive_get_next(IF_SD);
s->sd = sd_init(dinfo ? dinfo->bdrv : NULL, true);
if (s->sd == NULL) {
return -1;
}
register_savevm(dev, "ssi_sd", -1, 1, ssi_sd_save, ssi_sd_load, s);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-94
Summary: The ssi_sd_transfer function in hw/sd/ssi-sd.c in QEMU before 1.7.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted arglen value in a savevm image.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,358
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void locationReplaceableAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationReplaceable());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the AttributeSetter function in bindings/templates/attributes.cpp in the bindings in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.152 on OS X and Linux and before 33.0.1750.154 on Windows, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving the document.location value.
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,686
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void dwc3_gadget_giveback(struct dwc3_ep *dep, struct dwc3_request *req,
int status)
{
struct dwc3 *dwc = dep->dwc;
req->started = false;
list_del(&req->list);
req->remaining = 0;
if (req->request.status == -EINPROGRESS)
req->request.status = status;
if (req->trb)
usb_gadget_unmap_request_by_dev(dwc->sysdev,
&req->request, req->direction);
req->trb = NULL;
trace_dwc3_gadget_giveback(req);
spin_unlock(&dwc->lock);
usb_gadget_giveback_request(&dep->endpoint, &req->request);
spin_lock(&dwc->lock);
if (dep->number > 1)
pm_runtime_put(dwc->dev);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.16.4, a double-locking error in drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c may potentially cause a deadlock with f_hid.
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Low
| 169,579
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline void sem_lock_and_putref(struct sem_array *sma)
{
ipc_lock_by_ptr(&sma->sem_perm);
ipc_rcu_putref(sma);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,975
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cdf_read_sector(const cdf_info_t *info, void *buf, size_t offs, size_t len,
const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
assert((size_t)CDF_SEC_SIZE(h) == len);
return cdf_read(info, (off_t)CDF_SEC_POS(h, id),
((char *)buf) + offs, len);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: file before 5.11 and libmagic allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted Composite Document File (CDF) file that triggers (1) an out-of-bounds read or (2) an invalid pointer dereference.
Commit Message: add more check found by cert's fuzzer.
|
Medium
| 169,883
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: HistogramBase* Histogram::Factory::Build() {
HistogramBase* histogram = StatisticsRecorder::FindHistogram(name_);
if (!histogram) {
const BucketRanges* created_ranges = CreateRanges();
const BucketRanges* registered_ranges =
StatisticsRecorder::RegisterOrDeleteDuplicateRanges(created_ranges);
if (bucket_count_ == 0) {
bucket_count_ = static_cast<uint32_t>(registered_ranges->bucket_count());
minimum_ = registered_ranges->range(1);
maximum_ = registered_ranges->range(bucket_count_ - 1);
}
PersistentHistogramAllocator::Reference histogram_ref = 0;
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> tentative_histogram;
PersistentHistogramAllocator* allocator = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get();
if (allocator) {
tentative_histogram = allocator->AllocateHistogram(
histogram_type_,
name_,
minimum_,
maximum_,
registered_ranges,
flags_,
&histogram_ref);
}
if (!tentative_histogram) {
DCHECK(!histogram_ref); // Should never have been set.
DCHECK(!allocator); // Shouldn't have failed.
flags_ &= ~HistogramBase::kIsPersistent;
tentative_histogram = HeapAlloc(registered_ranges);
tentative_histogram->SetFlags(flags_);
}
FillHistogram(tentative_histogram.get());
const void* tentative_histogram_ptr = tentative_histogram.get();
histogram = StatisticsRecorder::RegisterOrDeleteDuplicate(
tentative_histogram.release());
if (histogram_ref) {
allocator->FinalizeHistogram(histogram_ref,
histogram == tentative_histogram_ptr);
}
ReportHistogramActivity(*histogram, HISTOGRAM_CREATED);
} else {
ReportHistogramActivity(*histogram, HISTOGRAM_LOOKUP);
}
DCHECK_EQ(histogram_type_, histogram->GetHistogramType()) << name_;
if (bucket_count_ != 0 &&
!histogram->HasConstructionArguments(minimum_, maximum_, bucket_count_)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Histogram " << name_ << " has bad construction arguments";
return nullptr;
}
return histogram;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: Type confusion in Histogram in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit a near null dereference via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
|
Medium
| 172,493
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ScrollHitTestDisplayItem::PropertiesAsJSON(JSONObject& json) const {
DisplayItem::PropertiesAsJSON(json);
json.SetString("scrollOffsetNode",
String::Format("%p", scroll_offset_node_.get()));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,840
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ExtensionScriptAndCaptureVisibleTest()
: http_url("http://www.google.com"),
http_url_with_path("http://www.google.com/index.html"),
https_url("https://www.google.com"),
example_com("https://example.com"),
test_example_com("https://test.example.com"),
sample_example_com("https://sample.example.com"),
file_url("file:///foo/bar"),
favicon_url("chrome://favicon/http://www.google.com"),
extension_url("chrome-extension://" +
crx_file::id_util::GenerateIdForPath(
base::FilePath(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("foo")))),
settings_url("chrome://settings"),
about_url("about:flags") {
urls_.insert(http_url);
urls_.insert(http_url_with_path);
urls_.insert(https_url);
urls_.insert(example_com);
urls_.insert(test_example_com);
urls_.insert(sample_example_com);
urls_.insert(file_url);
urls_.insert(favicon_url);
urls_.insert(extension_url);
urls_.insert(settings_url);
urls_.insert(about_url);
PermissionsData::SetPolicyDelegate(NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to bypass navigation restrictions via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
|
Medium
| 173,231
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: my_object_many_args (MyObject *obj, guint32 x, const char *str, double trouble, double *d_ret, char **str_ret, GError **error)
{
*d_ret = trouble + (x * 2);
*str_ret = g_ascii_strup (str, -1);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,110
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb;
sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch;
sctp_errhdr_t *err;
__u8 *ch_end;
int ootb_shut_ack = 0;
int ootb_cookie_ack = 0;
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES);
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->chunk_hdr;
do {
/* Report violation if the chunk is less then minimal */
if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
/* Now that we know we at least have a chunk header,
* do things that are type appropriate.
*/
if (SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_ACK == ch->type)
ootb_shut_ack = 1;
/* RFC 2960, Section 3.3.7
* Moreover, under any circumstances, an endpoint that
* receives an ABORT MUST NOT respond to that ABORT by
* sending an ABORT of its own.
*/
if (SCTP_CID_ABORT == ch->type)
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* RFC 8.4, 7) If the packet contains a "Stale cookie" ERROR
* or a COOKIE ACK the SCTP Packet should be silently
* discarded.
*/
if (SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ACK == ch->type)
ootb_cookie_ack = 1;
if (SCTP_CID_ERROR == ch->type) {
sctp_walk_errors(err, ch) {
if (SCTP_ERROR_STALE_COOKIE == err->cause) {
ootb_cookie_ack = 1;
break;
}
}
}
/* Report violation if chunk len overflows */
ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length));
if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end;
} while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb));
if (ootb_shut_ack)
return sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
else if (ootb_cookie_ack)
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
else
return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The sctp_sf_ootb function in net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.8 lacks chunk-length checking for the first chunk, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds slab access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted SCTP data.
Commit Message: sctp: validate chunk len before actually using it
Andrey Konovalov reported that KASAN detected that SCTP was using a slab
beyond the boundaries. It was caused because when handling out of the
blue packets in function sctp_sf_ootb() it was checking the chunk len
only after already processing the first chunk, validating only for the
2nd and subsequent ones.
The fix is to just move the check upwards so it's also validated for the
1st chunk.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,861
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static long vop_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vop_vdev *vdev = f->private_data;
struct vop_info *vi = vdev->vi;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int ret;
switch (cmd) {
case MIC_VIRTIO_ADD_DEVICE:
{
struct mic_device_desc dd, *dd_config;
if (copy_from_user(&dd, argp, sizeof(dd)))
return -EFAULT;
if (mic_aligned_desc_size(&dd) > MIC_MAX_DESC_BLK_SIZE ||
dd.num_vq > MIC_MAX_VRINGS)
return -EINVAL;
dd_config = kzalloc(mic_desc_size(&dd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dd_config)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_from_user(dd_config, argp, mic_desc_size(&dd))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_ret;
}
mutex_lock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
mutex_lock(&vi->vop_mutex);
ret = vop_virtio_add_device(vdev, dd_config);
if (ret)
goto unlock_ret;
list_add_tail(&vdev->list, &vi->vdev_list);
unlock_ret:
mutex_unlock(&vi->vop_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
free_ret:
kfree(dd_config);
return ret;
}
case MIC_VIRTIO_COPY_DESC:
{
struct mic_copy_desc copy;
mutex_lock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
ret = vop_vdev_inited(vdev);
if (ret)
goto _unlock_ret;
if (copy_from_user(©, argp, sizeof(copy))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto _unlock_ret;
}
ret = vop_virtio_copy_desc(vdev, ©);
if (ret < 0)
goto _unlock_ret;
if (copy_to_user(
&((struct mic_copy_desc __user *)argp)->out_len,
©.out_len, sizeof(copy.out_len)))
ret = -EFAULT;
_unlock_ret:
mutex_unlock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
return ret;
}
case MIC_VIRTIO_CONFIG_CHANGE:
{
void *buf;
mutex_lock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
ret = vop_vdev_inited(vdev);
if (ret)
goto __unlock_ret;
buf = kzalloc(vdev->dd->config_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto __unlock_ret;
}
if (copy_from_user(buf, argp, vdev->dd->config_len)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto done;
}
ret = vop_virtio_config_change(vdev, buf);
done:
kfree(buf);
__unlock_ret:
mutex_unlock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
return ret;
}
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
};
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr. +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Race condition in the vop_ioctl function in drivers/misc/mic/vop/vop_vringh.c in the MIC VOP driver in the Linux kernel before 4.6.1 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory or cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) by changing a certain header, aka a *double fetch* vulnerability.
Commit Message: misc: mic: Fix for double fetch security bug in VOP driver
The MIC VOP driver does two successive reads from user space to read a
variable length data structure. Kernel memory corruption can result if
the data structure changes between the two reads. This patch disallows
the chance of this happening.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116651
Reported by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Dutt <sudeep.dutt@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 167,132
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateScrollAndScrollTranslation() {
DCHECK(properties_);
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
if (NeedsScrollNode(object_)) {
const LayoutBox& box = ToLayoutBox(object_);
auto* scrollable_area = box.GetScrollableArea();
ScrollPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.container_rect = PixelSnappedIntRect(
box.OverflowClipRect(context_.current.paint_offset));
state.contents_rect = IntRect(
-scrollable_area->ScrollOrigin() + state.container_rect.Location(),
scrollable_area->ContentsSize());
if (box.HasFlippedBlocksWritingMode())
state.contents_rect.Move(box.VerticalScrollbarWidth(), 0);
state.user_scrollable_horizontal =
scrollable_area->UserInputScrollable(kHorizontalScrollbar);
state.user_scrollable_vertical =
scrollable_area->UserInputScrollable(kVerticalScrollbar);
auto ancestor_reasons =
context_.current.scroll->GetMainThreadScrollingReasons();
state.main_thread_scrolling_reasons =
GetMainThreadScrollingReasons(object_, ancestor_reasons);
if (auto* existing_scroll = properties_->Scroll()) {
if (existing_scroll->GetMainThreadScrollingReasons() !=
state.main_thread_scrolling_reasons)
full_context_.force_subtree_update = true;
}
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled())
state.compositor_element_id = scrollable_area->GetCompositorElementId();
OnUpdate(
properties_->UpdateScroll(context_.current.scroll, std::move(state)));
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearScroll());
}
if (NeedsScrollOrScrollTranslation(object_)) {
const LayoutBox& box = ToLayoutBox(object_);
TransformPaintPropertyNode::State state;
IntSize scroll_offset = box.ScrolledContentOffset();
state.matrix.Translate(-scroll_offset.Width(), -scroll_offset.Height());
state.flattens_inherited_transform =
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
state.direct_compositing_reasons = CompositingReasonsForScroll(box);
state.rendering_context_id = context_.current.rendering_context_id;
}
state.scroll = properties_->Scroll();
OnUpdate(properties_->UpdateScrollTranslation(context_.current.transform,
std::move(state)));
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearScrollTranslation());
}
}
if (properties_->Scroll())
context_.current.scroll = properties_->Scroll();
if (properties_->ScrollTranslation()) {
context_.current.transform = properties_->ScrollTranslation();
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform = false;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
Low
| 171,804
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_const_principal client_princ,
krb5_const_principal header_srv_princ,
krb5_boolean issuing_referral,
const krb5_db_entry *server,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_subkey,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
krb5_db_entry **princ_ptr,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_boolean is_local_tgt;
krb5_pa_data *pa_data;
int flags;
krb5_db_entry *princ;
*princ_ptr = NULL;
pa_data = krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context,
request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER);
if (pa_data != NULL) {
code = kdc_process_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context,
request,
pa_data,
tgs_subkey,
tgs_session,
s4u_x509_user,
status);
if (code != 0)
return code;
} else {
pa_data = krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context,
request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER);
if (pa_data != NULL) {
code = kdc_process_for_user(kdc_active_realm,
pa_data,
tgs_session,
s4u_x509_user,
status);
if (code != 0)
return code;
} else
return 0;
}
/*
* We need to compare the client name in the TGT with the requested
* server name. Supporting server name aliases without assuming a
* global name service makes this difficult to do.
*
* The comparison below handles the following cases (note that the
* term "principal name" below excludes the realm).
*
* (1) The requested service is a host-based service with two name
* components, in which case we assume the principal name to
* contain sufficient qualifying information. The realm is
* ignored for the purpose of comparison.
*
* (2) The requested service name is an enterprise principal name:
* the service principal name is compared with the unparsed
* form of the client name (including its realm).
*
* (3) The requested service is some other name type: an exact
* match is required.
*
* An alternative would be to look up the server once again with
* FLAG_CANONICALIZE | FLAG_CLIENT_REFERRALS_ONLY set, do an exact
* match between the returned name and client_princ. However, this
* assumes that the client set FLAG_CANONICALIZE when requesting
* the TGT and that we have a global name service.
*/
flags = 0;
switch (krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server)) {
case KRB5_NT_SRV_HST: /* (1) */
if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2)
flags |= KRB5_PRINCIPAL_COMPARE_IGNORE_REALM;
break;
case KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL: /* (2) */
flags |= KRB5_PRINCIPAL_COMPARE_ENTERPRISE;
break;
default: /* (3) */
break;
}
if (!krb5_principal_compare_flags(kdc_context,
request->server,
client_princ,
flags)) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_REQUEST";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; /* match Windows error code */
}
/*
* Protocol transition is mutually exclusive with renew/forward/etc
* as well as user-to-user and constrained delegation. This check
* is also made in validate_as_request().
*
* We can assert from this check that the header ticket was a TGT, as
* that is validated previously in validate_tgs_request().
*/
if (request->kdc_options & AS_INVALID_OPTIONS) {
*status = "INVALID AS OPTIONS";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
/*
* Valid S4U2Self requests can occur in the following combinations:
*
* (1) local TGT, local user, local server
* (2) cross TGT, local user, issuing referral
* (3) cross TGT, non-local user, issuing referral
* (4) cross TGT, non-local user, local server
*
* The first case is for a single-realm S4U2Self scenario; the second,
* third, and fourth cases are for the initial, intermediate (if any), and
* final cross-realm requests in a multi-realm scenario.
*/
is_local_tgt = !is_cross_tgs_principal(header_srv_princ);
if (is_local_tgt && issuing_referral) {
/* The requesting server appears to no longer exist, and we found
* a referral instead. Treat this as a server lookup failure. */
*status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
}
/*
* Do not attempt to lookup principals in foreign realms.
*/
if (is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm,
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user)) {
krb5_db_entry no_server;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
if (!is_local_tgt && !issuing_referral) {
/* A local server should not need a cross-realm TGT to impersonate
* a local principal. */
*status = "NOT_CROSS_REALM_REQUEST";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; /* match Windows error */
}
code = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context,
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user,
KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC, &princ);
if (code == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY) {
*status = "UNKNOWN_S4U2SELF_PRINCIPAL";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
} else if (code) {
*status = "LOOKING_UP_S4U2SELF_PRINCIPAL";
return code; /* caller can free for_user */
}
memset(&no_server, 0, sizeof(no_server));
code = validate_as_request(kdc_active_realm, request, *princ,
no_server, kdc_time, status, &e_data);
if (code) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, princ);
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, e_data);
return code;
}
*princ_ptr = princ;
} else if (is_local_tgt) {
/*
* The server is asking to impersonate a principal from another realm,
* using a local TGT. It should instead ask that principal's realm and
* follow referrals back to us.
*/
*status = "S4U2SELF_CLIENT_NOT_OURS";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; /* match Windows error */
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: A Reachable Assertion issue was discovered in the KDC in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.17. If an attacker can obtain a krbtgt ticket using an older encryption type (single-DES, triple-DES, or RC4), the attacker can crash the KDC by making an S4U2Self request.
Commit Message: Ignore password attributes for S4U2Self requests
For consistency with Windows KDCs, allow protocol transition to work
even if the password has expired or needs changing.
Also, when looking up an enterprise principal with an AS request,
treat ERR_KEY_EXP as confirmation that the client is present in the
realm.
[ghudson@mit.edu: added comment in kdc_process_s4u2self_req(); edited
commit message]
ticket: 8763 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.17
|
Medium
| 168,957
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ihevcd_create(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj,
void *pv_api_ip,
void *pv_api_op)
{
ihevcd_cxa_create_op_t *ps_create_op;
WORD32 ret;
codec_t *ps_codec;
ps_create_op = (ihevcd_cxa_create_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
ret = ihevcd_allocate_static_bufs(&ps_codec_obj, pv_api_ip, pv_api_op);
/* If allocation of some buffer fails, then free buffers allocated till then */
if((IV_FAIL == ret) && (NULL != ps_codec_obj))
{
ihevcd_free_static_bufs(ps_codec_obj);
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
return IV_FAIL;
}
ps_codec = (codec_t *)ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle;
ret = ihevcd_init(ps_codec);
TRACE_INIT(NULL);
STATS_INIT();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-770
Summary: A vulnerability in the Android media framework (libhevc) related to handling ps_codec_obj memory allocation failures. Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-68299873.
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle ps_codec_obj memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for ps_codec_obj fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68299873
Test: before/after with always-failing malloc
Change-Id: I5e6c07b147b13df81e65476851662d4b55d33b83
(cherry picked from commit a966e2a65dd901151ce7f4481d0084840c9a0f7e)
|
Low
| 174,111
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid,
int, which, compat_pid_t, pid,
struct compat_siginfo __user *, infop, int, options,
struct compat_rusage __user *, uru)
{
struct rusage ru;
struct waitid_info info = {.status = 0};
long err = kernel_waitid(which, pid, &info, options, uru ? &ru : NULL);
int signo = 0;
if (err > 0) {
signo = SIGCHLD;
err = 0;
}
if (!err && uru) {
/* kernel_waitid() overwrites everything in ru */
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
err = copy_to_user(uru, &ru, sizeof(ru));
else
err = put_compat_rusage(&ru, uru);
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
}
if (!infop)
return err;
user_access_begin();
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(0, &infop->si_errno, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.cause, &infop->si_code, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.pid, &infop->si_pid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.uid, &infop->si_uid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.status, &infop->si_status, Efault);
user_access_end();
return err;
Efault:
user_access_end();
return -EFAULT;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The waitid implementation in kernel/exit.c in the Linux kernel through 4.13.4 accesses rusage data structures in unintended cases, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information, and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism, via a crafted system call.
Commit Message: fix infoleak in waitid(2)
kernel_waitid() can return a PID, an error or 0. rusage is filled in the first
case and waitid(2) rusage should've been copied out exactly in that case, *not*
whenever kernel_waitid() has not returned an error. Compat variant shares that
braino; none of kernel_wait4() callers do, so the below ought to fix it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Fixes: ce72a16fa705 ("wait4(2)/waitid(2): separate copying rusage to userland")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 167,742
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: NavigateParams::NavigateParams(Browser* a_browser,
TabContentsWrapper* a_target_contents)
: target_contents(a_target_contents),
source_contents(NULL),
disposition(CURRENT_TAB),
transition(content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK),
tabstrip_index(-1),
tabstrip_add_types(TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE),
window_action(NO_ACTION),
user_gesture(true),
path_behavior(RESPECT),
ref_behavior(IGNORE_REF),
browser(a_browser),
profile(NULL) {
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The view-source feature in Google Chrome before 16.0.912.63 allows remote attackers to spoof the URL bar via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix memory error in previous CL.
BUG=100315
BUG=99016
TEST=Memory bots go green
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8302001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@105577 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,250
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: JsVar *jswrap_graphics_createArrayBuffer(int width, int height, int bpp, JsVar *options) {
if (width<=0 || height<=0 || width>32767 || height>32767) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Invalid Size");
return 0;
}
if (!isValidBPP(bpp)) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Invalid BPP");
return 0;
}
JsVar *parent = jspNewObject(0, "Graphics");
if (!parent) return 0; // low memory
JsGraphics gfx;
graphicsStructInit(&gfx);
gfx.data.type = JSGRAPHICSTYPE_ARRAYBUFFER;
gfx.data.flags = JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_NONE;
gfx.graphicsVar = parent;
gfx.data.width = (unsigned short)width;
gfx.data.height = (unsigned short)height;
gfx.data.bpp = (unsigned char)bpp;
if (jsvIsObject(options)) {
if (jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvObjectGetChild(options, "zigzag", 0)))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_ARRAYBUFFER_ZIGZAG);
if (jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvObjectGetChild(options, "msb", 0)))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_ARRAYBUFFER_MSB);
if (jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvObjectGetChild(options, "vertical_byte", 0))) {
if (gfx.data.bpp==1)
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_ARRAYBUFFER_VERTICAL_BYTE);
else
jsWarn("vertical_byte only works for 1bpp ArrayBuffers\n");
}
JsVar *colorv = jsvObjectGetChild(options, "color_order", 0);
if (colorv) {
if (jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "rgb")) ; // The default
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "brg"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_BRG);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "bgr"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_BGR);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "gbr"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_GBR);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "grb"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_GRB);
else if (!jsvIsStringEqual(colorv, "rbg"))
gfx.data.flags = (JsGraphicsFlags)(gfx.data.flags | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_RBG);
else
jsWarn("color_order must be 3 characters");
jsvUnLock(colorv);
}
}
lcdInit_ArrayBuffer(&gfx);
graphicsSetVar(&gfx);
return parent;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Espruino before 1.98 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) with a user crafted input file via an Out-of-bounds Read during syntax parsing in which certain height validation is missing in libs/graphics/jswrap_graphics.c.
Commit Message: Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421)
|
Medium
| 169,216
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_enc_is_block_algorithm)
{
MCRYPT_GET_TD_ARG
if (mcrypt_enc_is_block_algorithm(pm->td) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE
} else {
RETURN_FALSE
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
|
Low
| 167,094
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int get_siz(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s)
{
int i;
int ncomponents;
uint32_t log2_chroma_wh = 0;
const enum AVPixelFormat *possible_fmts = NULL;
int possible_fmts_nb = 0;
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 36)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
s->avctx->profile = bytestream2_get_be16u(&s->g); // Rsiz
s->width = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // Width
s->height = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // Height
s->image_offset_x = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // X0Siz
s->image_offset_y = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // Y0Siz
s->tile_width = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // XTSiz
s->tile_height = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // YTSiz
s->tile_offset_x = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // XT0Siz
s->tile_offset_y = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // YT0Siz
ncomponents = bytestream2_get_be16u(&s->g); // CSiz
if (ncomponents <= 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid number of components: %d\n",
s->ncomponents);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (ncomponents > 4) {
avpriv_request_sample(s->avctx, "Support for %d components",
s->ncomponents);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
s->ncomponents = ncomponents;
if (s->tile_width <= 0 || s->tile_height <= 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid tile dimension %dx%d.\n",
s->tile_width, s->tile_height);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 3 * s->ncomponents)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < s->ncomponents; i++) { // Ssiz_i XRsiz_i, YRsiz_i
uint8_t x = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
s->cbps[i] = (x & 0x7f) + 1;
s->precision = FFMAX(s->cbps[i], s->precision);
s->sgnd[i] = !!(x & 0x80);
s->cdx[i] = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
s->cdy[i] = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
if (!s->cdx[i] || !s->cdy[i]) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid sample seperation\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
log2_chroma_wh |= s->cdy[i] >> 1 << i * 4 | s->cdx[i] >> 1 << i * 4 + 2;
}
s->numXtiles = ff_jpeg2000_ceildiv(s->width - s->tile_offset_x, s->tile_width);
s->numYtiles = ff_jpeg2000_ceildiv(s->height - s->tile_offset_y, s->tile_height);
if (s->numXtiles * (uint64_t)s->numYtiles > INT_MAX/sizeof(*s->tile)) {
s->numXtiles = s->numYtiles = 0;
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
s->tile = av_mallocz_array(s->numXtiles * s->numYtiles, sizeof(*s->tile));
if (!s->tile) {
s->numXtiles = s->numYtiles = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < s->numXtiles * s->numYtiles; i++) {
Jpeg2000Tile *tile = s->tile + i;
tile->comp = av_mallocz(s->ncomponents * sizeof(*tile->comp));
if (!tile->comp)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
/* compute image size with reduction factor */
s->avctx->width = ff_jpeg2000_ceildivpow2(s->width - s->image_offset_x,
s->reduction_factor);
s->avctx->height = ff_jpeg2000_ceildivpow2(s->height - s->image_offset_y,
s->reduction_factor);
if (s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_JPEG2000_DCINEMA_2K ||
s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_JPEG2000_DCINEMA_4K) {
possible_fmts = xyz_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(xyz_pix_fmts);
} else {
switch (s->colour_space) {
case 16:
possible_fmts = rgb_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(rgb_pix_fmts);
break;
case 17:
possible_fmts = gray_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(gray_pix_fmts);
break;
case 18:
possible_fmts = yuv_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(yuv_pix_fmts);
break;
default:
possible_fmts = all_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(all_pix_fmts);
break;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < possible_fmts_nb; ++i) {
if (pix_fmt_match(possible_fmts[i], ncomponents, s->precision, log2_chroma_wh, s->pal8)) {
s->avctx->pix_fmt = possible_fmts[i];
break;
}
}
if (s->avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_NONE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Unknown pix_fmt, profile: %d, colour_space: %d, "
"components: %d, precision: %d, "
"cdx[1]: %d, cdy[1]: %d, cdx[2]: %d, cdy[2]: %d\n",
s->avctx->profile, s->colour_space, ncomponents, s->precision,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdx[1] : 0,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdy[1] : 0,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdx[2] : 0,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdy[2] : 0);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The get_siz function in libavcodec/jpeg2000dec.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not ensure the expected sample separation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JPEG2000 data.
Commit Message: avcodec/jpeg2000dec: Check cdx/y values more carefully
Some invalid values where not handled correctly in the later pixel
format matching code.
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2848
Found-by: Piotr Bandurski <ami_stuff@o2.pl>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
Medium
| 165,923
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: parse_toshiba_packet(FILE_T fh, struct wtap_pkthdr *phdr, Buffer *buf,
int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
union wtap_pseudo_header *pseudo_header = &phdr->pseudo_header;
char line[TOSHIBA_LINE_LENGTH];
int num_items_scanned;
int pkt_len, pktnum, hr, min, sec, csec;
char channel[10], direction[10];
int i, hex_lines;
guint8 *pd;
/* Our file pointer should be on the line containing the
* summary information for a packet. Read in that line and
* extract the useful information
*/
if (file_gets(line, TOSHIBA_LINE_LENGTH, fh) == NULL) {
*err = file_error(fh, err_info);
if (*err == 0) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_SHORT_READ;
}
return FALSE;
}
/* Find text in line after "[No.". Limit the length of the
* two strings since we have fixed buffers for channel[] and
* direction[] */
num_items_scanned = sscanf(line, "%9d] %2d:%2d:%2d.%9d %9s %9s",
&pktnum, &hr, &min, &sec, &csec, channel, direction);
if (num_items_scanned != 7) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("toshiba: record header isn't valid");
return FALSE;
}
/* Scan lines until we find the OFFSET line. In a "telnet" trace,
* this will be the next line. But if you save your telnet session
* to a file from within a Windows-based telnet client, it may
* put in line breaks at 80 columns (or however big your "telnet" box
* is). CRT (a Windows telnet app from VanDyke) does this.
* Here we assume that 80 columns will be the minimum size, and that
* the OFFSET line is not broken in the middle. It's the previous
* line that is normally long and can thus be broken at column 80.
*/
do {
if (file_gets(line, TOSHIBA_LINE_LENGTH, fh) == NULL) {
*err = file_error(fh, err_info);
if (*err == 0) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_SHORT_READ;
}
return FALSE;
}
/* Check for "OFFSET 0001-0203" at beginning of line */
line[16] = '\0';
} while (strcmp(line, "OFFSET 0001-0203") != 0);
num_items_scanned = sscanf(line+64, "LEN=%9d", &pkt_len);
if (num_items_scanned != 1) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("toshiba: OFFSET line doesn't have valid LEN item");
return FALSE;
}
phdr->rec_type = REC_TYPE_PACKET;
phdr->presence_flags = WTAP_HAS_TS|WTAP_HAS_CAP_LEN;
phdr->ts.secs = hr * 3600 + min * 60 + sec;
phdr->ts.nsecs = csec * 10000000;
phdr->caplen = pkt_len;
phdr->len = pkt_len;
switch (channel[0]) {
case 'B':
phdr->pkt_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_ISDN;
pseudo_header->isdn.uton = (direction[0] == 'T');
pseudo_header->isdn.channel = (guint8)
strtol(&channel[1], NULL, 10);
break;
case 'D':
phdr->pkt_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_ISDN;
pseudo_header->isdn.uton = (direction[0] == 'T');
pseudo_header->isdn.channel = 0;
break;
default:
phdr->pkt_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET;
/* XXX - is there an FCS in the frame? */
pseudo_header->eth.fcs_len = -1;
break;
}
/* Make sure we have enough room for the packet */
ws_buffer_assure_space(buf, TOSHIBA_MAX_PACKET_LEN);
pd = ws_buffer_start_ptr(buf);
/* Calculate the number of hex dump lines, each
* containing 16 bytes of data */
hex_lines = pkt_len / 16 + ((pkt_len % 16) ? 1 : 0);
for (i = 0; i < hex_lines; i++) {
if (file_gets(line, TOSHIBA_LINE_LENGTH, fh) == NULL) {
*err = file_error(fh, err_info);
if (*err == 0) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_SHORT_READ;
}
return FALSE;
}
if (!parse_single_hex_dump_line(line, pd, i * 16)) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("toshiba: hex dump not valid");
return FALSE;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: wiretap/toshiba.c in the Toshiba file parser in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles sscanf unsigned-integer processing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Fix packet length handling.
Treat the packet length as unsigned - it shouldn't be negative in the
file. If it is, that'll probably cause the sscanf to fail, so we'll
report the file as bad.
Check it against WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE to make sure we don't try to
allocate a huge amount of memory, just as we do in other file readers.
Use the now-validated packet size as the length in
ws_buffer_assure_space(), so we are certain to have enough space, and
don't allocate too much space.
Bug: 12394
Change-Id: Ifa023ce70f7a2697bf151009b035a6e6cf8d5d90
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15169
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
|
Medium
| 169,967
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int attach_child_main(void* data)
{
struct attach_clone_payload* payload = (struct attach_clone_payload*)data;
int ipc_socket = payload->ipc_socket;
lxc_attach_options_t* options = payload->options;
struct lxc_proc_context_info* init_ctx = payload->init_ctx;
#if HAVE_SYS_PERSONALITY_H
long new_personality;
#endif
int ret;
int status;
int expected;
long flags;
int fd;
uid_t new_uid;
gid_t new_gid;
/* wait for the initial thread to signal us that it's ready
* for us to start initializing
*/
expected = 0;
status = -1;
ret = lxc_read_nointr_expect(ipc_socket, &status, sizeof(status), &expected);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error using IPC to receive notification from initial process (0)");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* A description of the purpose of this functionality is
* provided in the lxc-attach(1) manual page. We have to
* remount here and not in the parent process, otherwise
* /proc may not properly reflect the new pid namespace.
*/
if (!(options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWNS) && (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_REMOUNT_PROC_SYS)) {
ret = lxc_attach_remount_sys_proc();
if (ret < 0) {
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
/* now perform additional attachments*/
#if HAVE_SYS_PERSONALITY_H
if (options->personality < 0)
new_personality = init_ctx->personality;
else
new_personality = options->personality;
if (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_SET_PERSONALITY) {
ret = personality(new_personality);
if (ret < 0) {
SYSERROR("could not ensure correct architecture");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
#endif
if (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_DROP_CAPABILITIES) {
ret = lxc_attach_drop_privs(init_ctx);
if (ret < 0) {
ERROR("could not drop privileges");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
/* always set the environment (specify (LXC_ATTACH_KEEP_ENV, NULL, NULL) if you want this to be a no-op) */
ret = lxc_attach_set_environment(options->env_policy, options->extra_env_vars, options->extra_keep_env);
if (ret < 0) {
ERROR("could not set initial environment for attached process");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* set user / group id */
new_uid = 0;
new_gid = 0;
/* ignore errors, we will fall back to root in that case
* (/proc was not mounted etc.)
*/
if (options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWUSER)
lxc_attach_get_init_uidgid(&new_uid, &new_gid);
if (options->uid != (uid_t)-1)
new_uid = options->uid;
if (options->gid != (gid_t)-1)
new_gid = options->gid;
/* setup the control tty */
if (options->stdin_fd && isatty(options->stdin_fd)) {
if (setsid() < 0) {
SYSERROR("unable to setsid");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
if (ioctl(options->stdin_fd, TIOCSCTTY, (char *)NULL) < 0) {
SYSERROR("unable to TIOCSTTY");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
/* try to set the uid/gid combination */
if ((new_gid != 0 || options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWUSER)) {
if (setgid(new_gid) || setgroups(0, NULL)) {
SYSERROR("switching to container gid");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
}
if ((new_uid != 0 || options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWUSER) && setuid(new_uid)) {
SYSERROR("switching to container uid");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* tell initial process it may now put us into the cgroups */
status = 1;
ret = lxc_write_nointr(ipc_socket, &status, sizeof(status));
if (ret != sizeof(status)) {
ERROR("error using IPC to notify initial process for initialization (1)");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* wait for the initial thread to signal us that it has done
* everything for us when it comes to cgroups etc.
*/
expected = 2;
status = -1;
ret = lxc_read_nointr_expect(ipc_socket, &status, sizeof(status), &expected);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error using IPC to receive final notification from initial process (2)");
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
shutdown(ipc_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
close(ipc_socket);
/* set new apparmor profile/selinux context */
if ((options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWNS) && (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_LSM)) {
int on_exec;
int proc_mounted;
on_exec = options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_LSM_EXEC ? 1 : 0;
proc_mounted = mount_proc_if_needed("/");
if (proc_mounted == -1) {
ERROR("Error mounting a sane /proc");
rexit(-1);
}
ret = lsm_process_label_set(init_ctx->lsm_label,
init_ctx->container->lxc_conf, 0, on_exec);
if (proc_mounted)
umount("/proc");
if (ret < 0) {
rexit(-1);
}
}
if (init_ctx->container && init_ctx->container->lxc_conf &&
lxc_seccomp_load(init_ctx->container->lxc_conf) != 0) {
ERROR("Loading seccomp policy");
rexit(-1);
}
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
/* The following is done after the communication socket is
* shut down. That way, all errors that might (though
* unlikely) occur up until this point will have their messages
* printed to the original stderr (if logging is so configured)
* and not the fd the user supplied, if any.
*/
/* fd handling for stdin, stdout and stderr;
* ignore errors here, user may want to make sure
* the fds are closed, for example */
if (options->stdin_fd >= 0 && options->stdin_fd != 0)
dup2(options->stdin_fd, 0);
if (options->stdout_fd >= 0 && options->stdout_fd != 1)
dup2(options->stdout_fd, 1);
if (options->stderr_fd >= 0 && options->stderr_fd != 2)
dup2(options->stderr_fd, 2);
/* close the old fds */
if (options->stdin_fd > 2)
close(options->stdin_fd);
if (options->stdout_fd > 2)
close(options->stdout_fd);
if (options->stderr_fd > 2)
close(options->stderr_fd);
/* try to remove CLOEXEC flag from stdin/stdout/stderr,
* but also here, ignore errors */
for (fd = 0; fd <= 2; fd++) {
flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
if (flags < 0)
continue;
if (flags & FD_CLOEXEC) {
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags & ~FD_CLOEXEC) < 0) {
SYSERROR("Unable to clear CLOEXEC from fd");
}
}
}
/* we're done, so we can now do whatever the user intended us to do */
rexit(payload->exec_function(payload->exec_payload));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: attach.c in LXC 1.1.2 and earlier uses the proc filesystem in a container, which allows local container users to escape AppArmor or SELinux confinement by mounting a proc filesystem with a crafted (1) AppArmor profile or (2) SELinux label.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1334: Don't use the container's /proc during attach
A user could otherwise over-mount /proc and prevent the apparmor profile
or selinux label from being written which combined with a modified
/bin/sh or other commonly used binary would lead to unconfined code
execution.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
|
Low
| 166,723
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: create_principal3_2_svc(cprinc3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name, service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->rec.principal, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_ADD,
arg->rec.principal, &rp)
|| kadm5int_acl_impose_restrictions(handle->context,
&arg->rec, &arg->mask, rp)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
log_unauth("kadm5_create_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_create_principal_3((void *)handle,
&arg->rec, arg->mask,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->passwd);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_create_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 167,509
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
gss_mechanism mech;
status = val_wrap_iov_args(minor_status, context_handle, 0, qop_req, NULL,
iov, iov_count);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return status;
/* Select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and call it. */
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism(ctx->mech_type);
if (mech == NULL)
return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
if (mech->gss_get_mic_iov_length == NULL)
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
status = mech->gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, ctx->internal_ctx_id,
qop_req, iov, iov_count);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
map_error(minor_status, mech);
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving automatic deletion of security contexts on error.
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 168,030
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: rpl_daoack_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
const struct nd_rpl_daoack *daoack = (const struct nd_rpl_daoack *)bp;
const char *dagid_str = "<elided>";
ND_TCHECK2(*daoack, ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN);
if (length < ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN)
goto tooshort;
bp += ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN;
length -= ND_RPL_DAOACK_MIN_LEN;
if(RPL_DAOACK_D(daoack->rpl_flags)) {
ND_TCHECK2(daoack->rpl_dagid, DAGID_LEN);
if (length < DAGID_LEN)
goto tooshort;
dagid_str = ip6addr_string (ndo, daoack->rpl_dagid);
bp += DAGID_LEN;
length -= DAGID_LEN;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [dagid:%s,seq:%u,instance:%u,status:%u]",
dagid_str,
daoack->rpl_daoseq,
daoack->rpl_instanceid,
daoack->rpl_status));
/* no officially defined options for DAOACK, but print any we find */
if(ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const struct rpl_dio_genoption *opt = (const struct rpl_dio_genoption *)bp;
rpl_dio_printopt(ndo, opt, length);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|dao-truncated]"));
return;
tooshort:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|dao-length too short]"));
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ICMPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-icmp6.c.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
|
Low
| 169,829
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GpuProcessHost::EstablishChannelError(
const EstablishChannelCallback& callback,
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle,
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process_for_gpu,
const content::GPUInfo& gpu_info) {
callback.Run(channel_handle, renderer_process_for_gpu, gpu_info);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,920
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int mincore_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct mm_walk *walk)
{
spinlock_t *ptl;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->vma;
pte_t *ptep;
unsigned char *vec = walk->private;
int nr = (end - addr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
ptl = pmd_trans_huge_lock(pmd, vma);
if (ptl) {
memset(vec, 1, nr);
spin_unlock(ptl);
goto out;
}
if (pmd_trans_unstable(pmd)) {
__mincore_unmapped_range(addr, end, vma, vec);
goto out;
}
ptep = pte_offset_map_lock(walk->mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
for (; addr != end; ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
pte_t pte = *ptep;
if (pte_none(pte))
__mincore_unmapped_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE,
vma, vec);
else if (pte_present(pte))
*vec = 1;
else { /* pte is a swap entry */
swp_entry_t entry = pte_to_swp_entry(pte);
if (non_swap_entry(entry)) {
/*
* migration or hwpoison entries are always
* uptodate
*/
*vec = 1;
} else {
#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
*vec = mincore_page(swap_address_space(entry),
swp_offset(entry));
#else
WARN_ON(1);
*vec = 1;
#endif
}
}
vec++;
}
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep - 1, ptl);
out:
walk->private += nr;
cond_resched();
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The mincore() implementation in mm/mincore.c in the Linux kernel through 4.19.13 allowed local attackers to observe page cache access patterns of other processes on the same system, potentially allowing sniffing of secret information. (Fixing this affects the output of the fincore program.) Limited remote exploitation may be possible, as demonstrated by latency differences in accessing public files from an Apache HTTP Server.
Commit Message: Change mincore() to count "mapped" pages rather than "cached" pages
The semantics of what "in core" means for the mincore() system call are
somewhat unclear, but Linux has always (since 2.3.52, which is when
mincore() was initially done) treated it as "page is available in page
cache" rather than "page is mapped in the mapping".
The problem with that traditional semantic is that it exposes a lot of
system cache state that it really probably shouldn't, and that users
shouldn't really even care about.
So let's try to avoid that information leak by simply changing the
semantics to be that mincore() counts actual mapped pages, not pages
that might be cheaply mapped if they were faulted (note the "might be"
part of the old semantics: being in the cache doesn't actually guarantee
that you can access them without IO anyway, since things like network
filesystems may have to revalidate the cache before use).
In many ways the old semantics were somewhat insane even aside from the
information leak issue. From the very beginning (and that beginning is
a long time ago: 2.3.52 was released in March 2000, I think), the code
had a comment saying
Later we can get more picky about what "in core" means precisely.
and this is that "later". Admittedly it is much later than is really
comfortable.
NOTE! This is a real semantic change, and it is for example known to
change the output of "fincore", since that program literally does a
mmmap without populating it, and then doing "mincore()" on that mapping
that doesn't actually have any pages in it.
I'm hoping that nobody actually has any workflow that cares, and the
info leak is real.
We may have to do something different if it turns out that people have
valid reasons to want the old semantics, and if we can limit the
information leak sanely.
Cc: Kevin Easton <kevin@guarana.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Masatake YAMATO <yamato@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 169,747
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: do_async_error (IncrementData *data)
{
GError *error;
error = g_error_new (MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"%s",
"this method always loses");
dbus_g_method_return_error (data->context, error);
g_free (data);
return FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,082
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void __fput_sync(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
struct task_struct *task = current;
file_sb_list_del(file);
BUG_ON(!(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD));
__fput(file);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.13 performs certain operations on lists of files with an inappropriate locking approach, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup or system crash) via unspecified use of Asynchronous I/O (AIO) operations.
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 166,796
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: base::string16 GetAppForProtocolUsingRegistry(const GURL& url) {
base::string16 command_to_launch;
base::string16 cmd_key_path = base::ASCIIToUTF16(url.scheme());
base::win::RegKey cmd_key_name(HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, cmd_key_path.c_str(),
KEY_READ);
if (cmd_key_name.ReadValue(NULL, &command_to_launch) == ERROR_SUCCESS &&
!command_to_launch.empty()) {
return command_to_launch;
}
cmd_key_path = base::ASCIIToUTF16(url.scheme() + "\\shell\\open\\command");
base::win::RegKey cmd_key_exe(HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, cmd_key_path.c_str(),
KEY_READ);
if (cmd_key_exe.ReadValue(NULL, &command_to_launch) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
base::CommandLine command_line(
base::CommandLine::FromString(command_to_launch));
return command_line.GetProgram().BaseName().value();
}
return base::string16();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient validate of external protocols in Shell Integration in Google Chrome on Windows prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to launch external programs via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate external protocols before launching on Windows
Bug: 889459
Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611}
|
Medium
| 172,636
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AddInitialUrlToPreconnectPrediction(const GURL& initial_url,
PreconnectPrediction* prediction) {
GURL initial_origin = initial_url.GetOrigin();
static const int kMinSockets = 2;
if (!prediction->requests.empty() &&
prediction->requests.front().origin == initial_origin) {
prediction->requests.front().num_sockets =
std::max(prediction->requests.front().num_sockets, kMinSockets);
} else if (initial_origin.is_valid() &&
initial_origin.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS()) {
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(initial_origin);
prediction->requests.emplace(prediction->requests.begin(), initial_origin,
kMinSockets,
net::NetworkIsolationKey(origin, origin));
}
return !prediction->requests.empty();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
|
Medium
| 172,369
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void fht8x8_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht8x8_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,565
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static RFlagsAtOffset* r_flag_get_nearest_list(RFlag *f, ut64 off, int dir) {
RFlagsAtOffset *flags = NULL;
RFlagsAtOffset key;
key.off = off;
if (dir >= 0) {
flags = r_skiplist_get_geq (f->by_off, &key);
} else {
flags = r_skiplist_get_leq (f->by_off, &key);
}
if (dir == 0 && flags && flags->off != off) {
return NULL;
}
return flags;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The wasm_dis function in libr/asm/arch/wasm/wasm.c in radare2 2.0.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer over-read and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted WASM file that triggers an incorrect r_hex_bin2str call.
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
|
Medium
| 167,723
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType DrawClipPath(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,const char *name,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
filename[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*clip_mask;
const char
*value;
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
MagickStatusType
status;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(draw_info != (const DrawInfo *) NULL);
(void) FormatLocaleString(filename,MagickPathExtent,"%s",name);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,filename);
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
clip_mask=CloneImage(image,image->columns,image->rows,MagickTrue,exception);
if (clip_mask == (Image *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
(void) QueryColorCompliance("#0000",AllCompliance,
&clip_mask->background_color,exception);
clip_mask->background_color.alpha=(Quantum) TransparentAlpha;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(clip_mask,exception);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),"\nbegin clip-path %s",
draw_info->clip_mask);
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->primitive,value);
(void) QueryColorCompliance("#ffffff",AllCompliance,&clone_info->fill,
exception);
clone_info->clip_mask=(char *) NULL;
status=NegateImage(clip_mask,MagickFalse,exception);
(void) SetImageMask(image,ReadPixelMask,clip_mask,exception);
clip_mask=DestroyImage(clip_mask);
status&=DrawImage(image,clone_info,exception);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),"end clip-path");
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The DrawImage function in MagickCore/draw.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-0 and 7.x before 7.0.1-2 makes an incorrect function call in attempting to locate the next token, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
|
Low
| 167,243
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CheckValueType(const Value::ValueType expected,
const Value* const actual) {
DCHECK(actual != NULL) << "Expected value to be non-NULL";
DCHECK(expected == actual->GetType())
<< "Expected " << print_valuetype(expected)
<< ", but was " << print_valuetype(actual->GetType());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107, does not properly perform const lookups, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,465
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int gdTransformAffineCopy(gdImagePtr dst,
int dst_x, int dst_y,
const gdImagePtr src,
gdRectPtr src_region,
const double affine[6])
{
int c1x,c1y,c2x,c2y;
int backclip = 0;
int backup_clipx1, backup_clipy1, backup_clipx2, backup_clipy2;
register int x, y, src_offset_x, src_offset_y;
double inv[6];
int *dst_p;
gdPointF pt, src_pt;
gdRect bbox;
int end_x, end_y;
gdInterpolationMethod interpolation_id_bak = GD_DEFAULT;
interpolation_method interpolation_bak;
/* These methods use special implementations */
if (src->interpolation_id == GD_BILINEAR_FIXED || src->interpolation_id == GD_BICUBIC_FIXED || src->interpolation_id == GD_NEAREST_NEIGHBOUR) {
interpolation_id_bak = src->interpolation_id;
interpolation_bak = src->interpolation;
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(src, GD_BICUBIC);
}
gdImageClipRectangle(src, src_region);
if (src_region->x > 0 || src_region->y > 0
|| src_region->width < gdImageSX(src)
|| src_region->height < gdImageSY(src)) {
backclip = 1;
gdImageGetClip(src, &backup_clipx1, &backup_clipy1,
&backup_clipx2, &backup_clipy2);
gdImageSetClip(src, src_region->x, src_region->y,
src_region->x + src_region->width - 1,
src_region->y + src_region->height - 1);
}
if (!gdTransformAffineBoundingBox(src_region, affine, &bbox)) {
if (backclip) {
gdImageSetClip(src, backup_clipx1, backup_clipy1,
backup_clipx2, backup_clipy2);
}
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(src, interpolation_id_bak);
return GD_FALSE;
}
gdImageGetClip(dst, &c1x, &c1y, &c2x, &c2y);
end_x = bbox.width + (int) fabs(bbox.x);
end_y = bbox.height + (int) fabs(bbox.y);
/* Get inverse affine to let us work with destination -> source */
gdAffineInvert(inv, affine);
src_offset_x = src_region->x;
src_offset_y = src_region->y;
if (dst->alphaBlendingFlag) {
for (y = bbox.y; y <= end_y; y++) {
pt.y = y + 0.5;
for (x = 0; x <= end_x; x++) {
pt.x = x + 0.5;
gdAffineApplyToPointF(&src_pt, &pt, inv);
gdImageSetPixel(dst, dst_x + x, dst_y + y, getPixelInterpolated(src, src_offset_x + src_pt.x, src_offset_y + src_pt.y, 0));
}
}
} else {
for (y = 0; y <= end_y; y++) {
pt.y = y + 0.5 + bbox.y;
if ((dst_y + y) < 0 || ((dst_y + y) > gdImageSY(dst) -1)) {
continue;
}
dst_p = dst->tpixels[dst_y + y] + dst_x;
for (x = 0; x <= end_x; x++) {
pt.x = x + 0.5 + bbox.x;
gdAffineApplyToPointF(&src_pt, &pt, inv);
if ((dst_x + x) < 0 || (dst_x + x) > (gdImageSX(dst) - 1)) {
break;
}
*(dst_p++) = getPixelInterpolated(src, src_offset_x + src_pt.x, src_offset_y + src_pt.y, -1);
}
}
}
/* Restore clip if required */
if (backclip) {
gdImageSetClip(src, backup_clipx1, backup_clipy1,
backup_clipx2, backup_clipy2);
}
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(src, interpolation_id_bak);
return GD_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: gd_interpolation.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.1.1, as used in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image that is mishandled by the imagescale function.
Commit Message: Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a
|
Medium
| 170,006
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mb_split)
{
char *arg_pattern;
int arg_pattern_len;
php_mb_regex_t *re;
OnigRegion *regs = NULL;
char *string;
OnigUChar *pos, *chunk_pos;
int string_len;
int n, err;
long count = -1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss|l", &arg_pattern, &arg_pattern_len, &string, &string_len, &count) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (count > 0) {
count--;
}
/* create regex pattern buffer */
if ((re = php_mbregex_compile_pattern(arg_pattern, arg_pattern_len, MBREX(regex_default_options), MBREX(current_mbctype), MBREX(regex_default_syntax) TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
chunk_pos = pos = (OnigUChar *)string;
err = 0;
regs = onig_region_new();
/* churn through str, generating array entries as we go */
while (count != 0 && (pos - (OnigUChar *)string) < string_len) {
int beg, end;
err = onig_search(re, (OnigUChar *)string, (OnigUChar *)(string + string_len), pos, (OnigUChar *)(string + string_len), regs, 0);
if (err < 0) {
break;
}
beg = regs->beg[0], end = regs->end[0];
/* add it to the array */
if ((pos - (OnigUChar *)string) < end) {
if (beg < string_len && beg >= (chunk_pos - (OnigUChar *)string)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, (char *)chunk_pos, ((OnigUChar *)(string + beg) - chunk_pos), 1);
--count;
} else {
err = -2;
break;
}
/* point at our new starting point */
chunk_pos = pos = (OnigUChar *)string + end;
} else {
pos++;
}
onig_region_free(regs, 0);
}
onig_region_free(regs, 1);
/* see if we encountered an error */
if (err <= -2) {
OnigUChar err_str[ONIG_MAX_ERROR_MESSAGE_LEN];
onig_error_code_to_str(err_str, err);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "mbregex search failure in mbsplit(): %s", err_str);
zval_dtor(return_value);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* otherwise we just have one last element to add to the array */
n = ((OnigUChar *)(string + string_len) - chunk_pos);
if (n > 0) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, (char *)chunk_pos, n, 1);
} else {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "", 0, 1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec function in php_mbregex.c in the mbstring extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) by leveraging a callback exception.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
|
Low
| 167,115
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: png_zalloc(voidpf png_ptr, uInt items, uInt size)
{
png_voidp ptr;
png_structp p=(png_structp)png_ptr;
png_uint_32 save_flags=p->flags;
png_uint_32 num_bytes;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return (NULL);
if (items > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/size)
{
png_warning (p, "Potential overflow in png_zalloc()");
return (NULL);
}
num_bytes = (png_uint_32)items * size;
p->flags|=PNG_FLAG_MALLOC_NULL_MEM_OK;
ptr = (png_voidp)png_malloc((png_structp)png_ptr, num_bytes);
p->flags=save_flags;
#if defined(PNG_1_0_X) && !defined(PNG_NO_ZALLOC_ZERO)
if (ptr == NULL)
return ((voidpf)ptr);
if (num_bytes > (png_uint_32)0x8000L)
{
png_memset(ptr, 0, (png_size_t)0x8000L);
png_memset((png_bytep)ptr + (png_size_t)0x8000L, 0,
(png_size_t)(num_bytes - (png_uint_32)0x8000L));
}
else
{
png_memset(ptr, 0, (png_size_t)num_bytes);
}
#endif
return ((voidpf)ptr);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
Low
| 172,164
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: print_ccp_config_options(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
int len, opt;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
len = p[1];
opt = p[0];
if (length < len)
return 0;
if (len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u (length bogus, should be >= 2)",
tok2str(ccpconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
opt,
len));
return 0;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u",
tok2str(ccpconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
opt,
len));
switch (opt) {
case CCPOPT_BSDCOMP:
if (len < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 3)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Version: %u, Dictionary Bits: %u",
p[2] >> 5, p[2] & 0x1f));
break;
case CCPOPT_MVRCA:
if (len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 4)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Features: %u, PxP: %s, History: %u, #CTX-ID: %u",
(p[2] & 0xc0) >> 6,
(p[2] & 0x20) ? "Enabled" : "Disabled",
p[2] & 0x1f, p[3]));
break;
case CCPOPT_DEFLATE:
if (len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 4)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Window: %uK, Method: %s (0x%x), MBZ: %u, CHK: %u",
(p[2] & 0xf0) >> 4,
((p[2] & 0x0f) == 8) ? "zlib" : "unknown",
p[2] & 0x0f, (p[3] & 0xfc) >> 2, p[3] & 0x03));
break;
/* XXX: to be supported */
#if 0
case CCPOPT_OUI:
case CCPOPT_PRED1:
case CCPOPT_PRED2:
case CCPOPT_PJUMP:
case CCPOPT_HPPPC:
case CCPOPT_STACLZS:
case CCPOPT_MPPC:
case CCPOPT_GFZA:
case CCPOPT_V42BIS:
case CCPOPT_LZSDCP:
case CCPOPT_DEC:
case CCPOPT_RESV:
break;
#endif
default:
/*
* Unknown option; dump it as raw bytes now if we're
* not going to do so below.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2); /* exclude TLV header */
return len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ccp]"));
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The PPP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ppp.c:print_ccp_config_options().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13029/PPP: Fix a bounds check, and clean up other bounds checks.
For configuration protocol options, use ND_TCHECK() and
ND_TCHECK_nBITS() macros, passing them the appropriate pointer argument.
This fixes one case where the ND_TCHECK2() call they replace was not
checking enough bytes.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
Low
| 167,860
|
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