instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int decode_getacl(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct rpc_rqst *req,
size_t *acl_len)
{
__be32 *savep;
uint32_t attrlen,
bitmap[3] = {0};
struct kvec *iov = req->rq_rcv_buf.head;
int status;
*acl_len = 0;
if ((status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_GETATTR)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_bitmap(xdr, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_length(xdr, &attrlen, &savep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_ACL - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_ACL)) {
size_t hdrlen;
u32 recvd;
/* We ignore &savep and don't do consistency checks on
* the attr length. Let userspace figure it out.... */
hdrlen = (u8 *)xdr->p - (u8 *)iov->iov_base;
recvd = req->rq_rcv_buf.len - hdrlen;
if (attrlen > recvd) {
dprintk("NFS: server cheating in getattr"
" acl reply: attrlen %u > recvd %u\n",
attrlen, recvd);
return -EINVAL;
}
xdr_read_pages(xdr, attrlen);
*acl_len = attrlen;
} else
status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
out:
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.2.2 does not properly handle bitmap sizes in GETACL replies, which allows remote NFS servers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending an excessive number of bitmap words.
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
High
| 165,719
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool Editor::insertTextWithoutSendingTextEvent(const String& text,
bool selectInsertedText,
TextEvent* triggeringEvent) {
if (text.isEmpty())
return false;
const VisibleSelection& selection = selectionForCommand(triggeringEvent);
if (!selection.isContentEditable())
return false;
spellChecker().updateMarkersForWordsAffectedByEditing(
isSpaceOrNewline(text[0]));
TypingCommand::insertText(
*selection.start().document(), text, selection,
selectInsertedText ? TypingCommand::SelectInsertedText : 0,
triggeringEvent && triggeringEvent->isComposition()
? TypingCommand::TextCompositionConfirm
: TypingCommand::TextCompositionNone);
if (LocalFrame* editedFrame = selection.start().document()->frame()) {
if (Page* page = editedFrame->page()) {
LocalFrame* focusedOrMainFrame =
toLocalFrame(page->focusController().focusedOrMainFrame());
focusedOrMainFrame->selection().revealSelection(
ScrollAlignment::alignCenterIfNeeded);
}
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect ordering of operations in the Web SQL Database thread relative to Blink's main thread, related to the shutdown function in web/WebKit.cpp.
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
|
Low
| 172,030
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pdf_process_extgstate(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, pdf_csi *csi, pdf_obj *dict)
{
pdf_obj *obj;
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_LW);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_w)
proc->op_w(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_LC);
if (pdf_is_int(ctx, obj) && proc->op_J)
proc->op_J(ctx, proc, fz_clampi(pdf_to_int(ctx, obj), 0, 2));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_LJ);
if (pdf_is_int(ctx, obj) && proc->op_j)
proc->op_j(ctx, proc, fz_clampi(pdf_to_int(ctx, obj), 0, 2));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_ML);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_M)
proc->op_M(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_D);
if (pdf_is_array(ctx, obj) && proc->op_d)
{
pdf_obj *dash_array = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 0);
pdf_obj *dash_phase = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 1);
proc->op_d(ctx, proc, dash_array, pdf_to_real(ctx, dash_phase));
}
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_RI);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj) && proc->op_ri)
proc->op_ri(ctx, proc, pdf_to_name(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_FL);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_i)
proc->op_i(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_Font);
if (pdf_is_array(ctx, obj) && proc->op_Tf)
{
pdf_obj *font_ref = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 0);
pdf_obj *font_size = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 1);
pdf_font_desc *font = load_font_or_hail_mary(ctx, csi->doc, csi->rdb, font_ref, 0, csi->cookie);
fz_try(ctx)
proc->op_Tf(ctx, proc, "ExtGState", font, pdf_to_real(ctx, font_size));
fz_always(ctx)
pdf_drop_font(ctx, font);
fz_catch(ctx)
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
/* overprint and color management */
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_OP);
if (pdf_is_bool(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_OP)
proc->op_gs_OP(ctx, proc, pdf_to_bool(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_op);
if (pdf_is_bool(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_op)
proc->op_gs_op(ctx, proc, pdf_to_bool(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_OPM);
if (pdf_is_int(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_OPM)
proc->op_gs_OPM(ctx, proc, pdf_to_int(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_UseBlackPtComp);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_UseBlackPtComp)
proc->op_gs_UseBlackPtComp(ctx, proc, obj);
/* transfer functions */
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_TR2);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj))
if (!pdf_name_eq(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_Identity) && !pdf_name_eq(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_Default))
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring transfer function");
if (!obj) /* TR is ignored in the presence of TR2 */
{
pdf_obj *tr = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_TR);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, tr))
if (!pdf_name_eq(ctx, tr, PDF_NAME_Identity))
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring transfer function");
}
/* transparency state */
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_CA);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_CA)
proc->op_gs_CA(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_ca);
if (pdf_is_number(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_ca)
proc->op_gs_ca(ctx, proc, pdf_to_real(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_BM);
if (pdf_is_array(ctx, obj))
obj = pdf_array_get(ctx, obj, 0);
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj) && proc->op_gs_BM)
proc->op_gs_BM(ctx, proc, pdf_to_name(ctx, obj));
obj = pdf_dict_get(ctx, dict, PDF_NAME_SMask);
if (proc->op_gs_SMask)
{
if (pdf_is_dict(ctx, obj))
{
pdf_xobject *xobj;
pdf_obj *group, *s, *bc, *tr;
float softmask_bc[FZ_MAX_COLORS];
fz_colorspace *colorspace;
int colorspace_n = 1;
int k, luminosity;
fz_var(xobj);
group = pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_G);
if (!group)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_SYNTAX, "cannot load softmask xobject (%d 0 R)", pdf_to_num(ctx, obj));
xobj = pdf_load_xobject(ctx, csi->doc, group);
fz_try(ctx)
{
colorspace = pdf_xobject_colorspace(ctx, xobj);
if (colorspace)
colorspace_n = fz_colorspace_n(ctx, colorspace);
/* Default background color is black. */
for (k = 0; k < colorspace_n; k++)
softmask_bc[k] = 0;
/* Which in CMYK means not all zeros! This should really be
* a test for subtractive color spaces, but this will have
* to do for now. */
if (fz_colorspace_is_cmyk(ctx, colorspace))
softmask_bc[3] = 1.0f;
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, colorspace);
bc = pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_BC);
if (pdf_is_array(ctx, bc))
{
for (k = 0; k < colorspace_n; k++)
softmask_bc[k] = pdf_to_real(ctx, pdf_array_get(ctx, bc, k));
}
s = pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_S);
if (pdf_name_eq(ctx, s, PDF_NAME_Luminosity))
luminosity = 1;
else
luminosity = 0;
tr = pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_TR);
if (tr && !pdf_name_eq(ctx, tr, PDF_NAME_Identity))
fz_warn(ctx, "ignoring transfer function");
proc->op_gs_SMask(ctx, proc, xobj, csi->rdb, softmask_bc, luminosity);
}
fz_always(ctx)
{
pdf_drop_xobject(ctx, xobj);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
}
else if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj) && pdf_name_eq(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_None))
{
proc->op_gs_SMask(ctx, proc, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple reachable assertions in the PDF parser allow an attacker to cause a denial of service (assert crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,581
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: usbnet_probe (struct usb_interface *udev, const struct usb_device_id *prod)
{
struct usbnet *dev;
struct net_device *net;
struct usb_host_interface *interface;
struct driver_info *info;
struct usb_device *xdev;
int status;
const char *name;
struct usb_driver *driver = to_usb_driver(udev->dev.driver);
/* usbnet already took usb runtime pm, so have to enable the feature
* for usb interface, otherwise usb_autopm_get_interface may return
* failure if RUNTIME_PM is enabled.
*/
if (!driver->supports_autosuspend) {
driver->supports_autosuspend = 1;
pm_runtime_enable(&udev->dev);
}
name = udev->dev.driver->name;
info = (struct driver_info *) prod->driver_info;
if (!info) {
dev_dbg (&udev->dev, "blacklisted by %s\n", name);
return -ENODEV;
}
xdev = interface_to_usbdev (udev);
interface = udev->cur_altsetting;
status = -ENOMEM;
net = alloc_etherdev(sizeof(*dev));
if (!net)
goto out;
/* netdev_printk() needs this so do it as early as possible */
SET_NETDEV_DEV(net, &udev->dev);
dev = netdev_priv(net);
dev->udev = xdev;
dev->intf = udev;
dev->driver_info = info;
dev->driver_name = name;
dev->msg_enable = netif_msg_init (msg_level, NETIF_MSG_DRV
| NETIF_MSG_PROBE | NETIF_MSG_LINK);
init_waitqueue_head(&dev->wait);
skb_queue_head_init (&dev->rxq);
skb_queue_head_init (&dev->txq);
skb_queue_head_init (&dev->done);
skb_queue_head_init(&dev->rxq_pause);
dev->bh.func = usbnet_bh;
dev->bh.data = (unsigned long) dev;
INIT_WORK (&dev->kevent, usbnet_deferred_kevent);
init_usb_anchor(&dev->deferred);
dev->delay.function = usbnet_bh;
dev->delay.data = (unsigned long) dev;
init_timer (&dev->delay);
mutex_init (&dev->phy_mutex);
mutex_init(&dev->interrupt_mutex);
dev->interrupt_count = 0;
dev->net = net;
strcpy (net->name, "usb%d");
memcpy (net->dev_addr, node_id, sizeof node_id);
/* rx and tx sides can use different message sizes;
* bind() should set rx_urb_size in that case.
*/
dev->hard_mtu = net->mtu + net->hard_header_len;
net->netdev_ops = &usbnet_netdev_ops;
net->watchdog_timeo = TX_TIMEOUT_JIFFIES;
net->ethtool_ops = &usbnet_ethtool_ops;
if (info->bind) {
status = info->bind (dev, udev);
if (status < 0)
goto out1;
if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_ETHER) != 0 &&
((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_POINTTOPOINT) == 0 ||
(net->dev_addr [0] & 0x02) == 0))
strcpy (net->name, "eth%d");
/* WLAN devices should always be named "wlan%d" */
if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_WLAN) != 0)
strcpy(net->name, "wlan%d");
/* WWAN devices should always be named "wwan%d" */
if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_WWAN) != 0)
strcpy(net->name, "wwan%d");
/* devices that cannot do ARP */
if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_NOARP) != 0)
net->flags |= IFF_NOARP;
/* maybe the remote can't receive an Ethernet MTU */
if (net->mtu > (dev->hard_mtu - net->hard_header_len))
net->mtu = dev->hard_mtu - net->hard_header_len;
} else if (!info->in || !info->out)
status = usbnet_get_endpoints (dev, udev);
else {
dev->in = usb_rcvbulkpipe (xdev, info->in);
dev->out = usb_sndbulkpipe (xdev, info->out);
if (!(info->flags & FLAG_NO_SETINT))
status = usb_set_interface (xdev,
interface->desc.bInterfaceNumber,
interface->desc.bAlternateSetting);
else
status = 0;
}
if (status >= 0 && dev->status)
status = init_status (dev, udev);
if (status < 0)
goto out3;
if (!dev->rx_urb_size)
dev->rx_urb_size = dev->hard_mtu;
dev->maxpacket = usb_maxpacket (dev->udev, dev->out, 1);
/* let userspace know we have a random address */
if (ether_addr_equal(net->dev_addr, node_id))
net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM;
if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_WLAN) != 0)
SET_NETDEV_DEVTYPE(net, &wlan_type);
if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_WWAN) != 0)
SET_NETDEV_DEVTYPE(net, &wwan_type);
/* initialize max rx_qlen and tx_qlen */
usbnet_update_max_qlen(dev);
if (dev->can_dma_sg && !(info->flags & FLAG_SEND_ZLP) &&
!(info->flags & FLAG_MULTI_PACKET)) {
dev->padding_pkt = kzalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->padding_pkt) {
status = -ENOMEM;
goto out4;
}
}
status = register_netdev (net);
if (status)
goto out5;
netif_info(dev, probe, dev->net,
"register '%s' at usb-%s-%s, %s, %pM\n",
udev->dev.driver->name,
xdev->bus->bus_name, xdev->devpath,
dev->driver_info->description,
net->dev_addr);
usb_set_intfdata (udev, dev);
netif_device_attach (net);
if (dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_LINK_INTR)
usbnet_link_change(dev, 0, 0);
return 0;
out5:
kfree(dev->padding_pkt);
out4:
usb_free_urb(dev->interrupt);
out3:
if (info->unbind)
info->unbind (dev, udev);
out1:
free_netdev(net);
out:
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Double free vulnerability in drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by inserting a USB device with an invalid USB descriptor.
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 169,970
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::clipPath(const Path&, WindRule)
{
notImplemented();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving floating styles.
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,424
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BrowserEventRouter::ExtensionActionExecuted(
Profile* profile,
const ExtensionAction& extension_action,
WebContents* web_contents) {
const char* event_name = NULL;
switch (extension_action.action_type()) {
case Extension::ActionInfo::TYPE_BROWSER:
event_name = "browserAction.onClicked";
break;
case Extension::ActionInfo::TYPE_PAGE:
event_name = "pageAction.onClicked";
break;
case Extension::ActionInfo::TYPE_SCRIPT_BADGE:
event_name = "scriptBadge.onClicked";
break;
case Extension::ActionInfo::TYPE_SYSTEM_INDICATOR:
break;
}
if (event_name) {
scoped_ptr<ListValue> args(new ListValue());
DictionaryValue* tab_value = ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
web_contents,
ExtensionTabUtil::INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS);
args->Append(tab_value);
DispatchEventToExtension(profile,
extension_action.extension_id(),
event_name,
args.Pass(),
EventRouter::USER_GESTURE_ENABLED);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not ensure that an extension has the tabs (aka APIPermission::kTab) permission before providing a URL to this extension, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,450
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ip6t_entry *s, const struct ip6t_entry *e,
const char *hookname, const char **chainname,
const char **comment, unsigned int *rulenum)
{
const struct xt_standard_target *t = (void *)ip6t_get_target_c(s);
if (strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) {
/* Head of user chain: ERROR target with chainname */
*chainname = t->target.data;
(*rulenum) = 0;
} else if (s == e) {
(*rulenum)++;
if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
t->verdict < 0 &&
unconditional(&s->ipv6)) {
/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
*comment = *chainname == hookname
? comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
: comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_RETURN];
}
return 1;
} else
(*rulenum)++;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 does not validate certain offset fields, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via an IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt call.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 167,374
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static RList *r_bin_wasm_get_global_entries (RBinWasmObj *bin, RBinWasmSection *sec) {
RList *ret = NULL;
RBinWasmGlobalEntry *ptr = NULL;
int buflen = bin->buf->length;
if (sec->payload_data + 32 > buflen) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(ret = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
return NULL;
}
ut8* buf = bin->buf->buf + (ut32)sec->payload_data;
ut32 len = sec->payload_len;
ut32 count = sec->count;
ut32 i = 0, r = 0;
while (i < len && len < buflen && r < count) {
if (!(ptr = R_NEW0 (RBinWasmGlobalEntry))) {
return ret;
}
if (len + 8 > buflen || !(consume_u8 (buf + i, buf + len, (ut8*)&ptr->content_type, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
if (len + 8 > buflen || !(consume_u8 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->mutability, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
if (len + 8 > buflen || !(consume_init_expr (buf + i, buf + len, R_BIN_WASM_END_OF_CODE, NULL, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
r++;
}
return ret;
beach:
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The consume_init_expr function in wasm.c in radare2 1.3.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted Web Assembly file.
Commit Message: Fix crash in fuzzed wasm r2_hoobr_consume_init_expr
|
Medium
| 168,253
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: double AffineTransform::xScale() const
{
return sqrt(m_transform[0] * m_transform[0] + m_transform[1] * m_transform[1]);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 36.0.1985.143 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
|
Low
| 171,669
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void lppTransposer (HANDLE_SBR_LPP_TRANS hLppTrans, /*!< Handle of lpp transposer */
QMF_SCALE_FACTOR *sbrScaleFactor, /*!< Scaling factors */
FIXP_DBL **qmfBufferReal, /*!< Pointer to pointer to real part of subband samples (source) */
FIXP_DBL *degreeAlias, /*!< Vector for results of aliasing estimation */
FIXP_DBL **qmfBufferImag, /*!< Pointer to pointer to imaginary part of subband samples (source) */
const int useLP,
const int timeStep, /*!< Time step of envelope */
const int firstSlotOffs, /*!< Start position in time */
const int lastSlotOffs, /*!< Number of overlap-slots into next frame */
const int nInvfBands, /*!< Number of bands for inverse filtering */
INVF_MODE *sbr_invf_mode, /*!< Current inverse filtering modes */
INVF_MODE *sbr_invf_mode_prev /*!< Previous inverse filtering modes */
)
{
INT bwIndex[MAX_NUM_PATCHES];
FIXP_DBL bwVector[MAX_NUM_PATCHES]; /*!< pole moving factors */
int i;
int loBand, start, stop;
TRANSPOSER_SETTINGS *pSettings = hLppTrans->pSettings;
PATCH_PARAM *patchParam = pSettings->patchParam;
int patch;
FIXP_SGL alphar[LPC_ORDER], a0r, a1r;
FIXP_SGL alphai[LPC_ORDER], a0i=0, a1i=0;
FIXP_SGL bw = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
int autoCorrLength;
FIXP_DBL k1, k1_below=0, k1_below2=0;
ACORR_COEFS ac;
int startSample;
int stopSample;
int stopSampleClear;
int comLowBandScale;
int ovLowBandShift;
int lowBandShift;
/* int ovHighBandShift;*/
int targetStopBand;
alphai[0] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
alphai[1] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
startSample = firstSlotOffs * timeStep;
stopSample = pSettings->nCols + lastSlotOffs * timeStep;
inverseFilteringLevelEmphasis(hLppTrans, nInvfBands, sbr_invf_mode, sbr_invf_mode_prev, bwVector);
stopSampleClear = stopSample;
autoCorrLength = pSettings->nCols + pSettings->overlap;
/* Set upper subbands to zero:
This is required in case that the patches do not cover the complete highband
(because the last patch would be too short).
Possible optimization: Clearing bands up to usb would be sufficient here. */
targetStopBand = patchParam[pSettings->noOfPatches-1].targetStartBand
+ patchParam[pSettings->noOfPatches-1].numBandsInPatch;
int memSize = ((64) - targetStopBand) * sizeof(FIXP_DBL);
if (!useLP) {
for (i = startSample; i < stopSampleClear; i++) {
FDKmemclear(&qmfBufferReal[i][targetStopBand], memSize);
FDKmemclear(&qmfBufferImag[i][targetStopBand], memSize);
}
} else
for (i = startSample; i < stopSampleClear; i++) {
FDKmemclear(&qmfBufferReal[i][targetStopBand], memSize);
}
/* init bwIndex for each patch */
FDKmemclear(bwIndex, pSettings->noOfPatches*sizeof(INT));
/*
Calc common low band scale factor
*/
comLowBandScale = fixMin(sbrScaleFactor->ov_lb_scale,sbrScaleFactor->lb_scale);
ovLowBandShift = sbrScaleFactor->ov_lb_scale - comLowBandScale;
lowBandShift = sbrScaleFactor->lb_scale - comLowBandScale;
/* ovHighBandShift = firstSlotOffs == 0 ? ovLowBandShift:0;*/
/* outer loop over bands to do analysis only once for each band */
if (!useLP) {
start = pSettings->lbStartPatching;
stop = pSettings->lbStopPatching;
} else
{
start = fixMax(1, pSettings->lbStartPatching - 2);
stop = patchParam[0].targetStartBand;
}
for ( loBand = start; loBand < stop; loBand++ ) {
FIXP_DBL lowBandReal[(((1024)/(32))+(6))+LPC_ORDER];
FIXP_DBL *plowBandReal = lowBandReal;
FIXP_DBL **pqmfBufferReal = qmfBufferReal;
FIXP_DBL lowBandImag[(((1024)/(32))+(6))+LPC_ORDER];
FIXP_DBL *plowBandImag = lowBandImag;
FIXP_DBL **pqmfBufferImag = qmfBufferImag;
int resetLPCCoeffs=0;
int dynamicScale = DFRACT_BITS-1-LPC_SCALE_FACTOR;
int acDetScale = 0; /* scaling of autocorrelation determinant */
for(i=0;i<LPC_ORDER;i++){
*plowBandReal++ = hLppTrans->lpcFilterStatesReal[i][loBand];
if (!useLP)
*plowBandImag++ = hLppTrans->lpcFilterStatesImag[i][loBand];
}
/*
Take old slope length qmf slot source values out of (overlap)qmf buffer
*/
if (!useLP) {
for(i=0;i<pSettings->nCols+pSettings->overlap;i++){
*plowBandReal++ = (*pqmfBufferReal++)[loBand];
*plowBandImag++ = (*pqmfBufferImag++)[loBand];
}
} else
{
/* pSettings->overlap is always even */
FDK_ASSERT((pSettings->overlap & 1) == 0);
for(i=0;i<((pSettings->overlap+pSettings->nCols)>>1);i++) {
*plowBandReal++ = (*pqmfBufferReal++)[loBand];
*plowBandReal++ = (*pqmfBufferReal++)[loBand];
}
if (pSettings->nCols & 1) {
*plowBandReal++ = (*pqmfBufferReal++)[loBand];
}
}
/*
Determine dynamic scaling value.
*/
dynamicScale = fixMin(dynamicScale, getScalefactor(lowBandReal, LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap) + ovLowBandShift);
dynamicScale = fixMin(dynamicScale, getScalefactor(&lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap], pSettings->nCols) + lowBandShift);
if (!useLP) {
dynamicScale = fixMin(dynamicScale, getScalefactor(lowBandImag, LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap) + ovLowBandShift);
dynamicScale = fixMin(dynamicScale, getScalefactor(&lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap], pSettings->nCols) + lowBandShift);
}
dynamicScale = fixMax(0, dynamicScale-1); /* one additional bit headroom to prevent -1.0 */
/*
Scale temporal QMF buffer.
*/
scaleValues(&lowBandReal[0], LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap, dynamicScale-ovLowBandShift);
scaleValues(&lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap], pSettings->nCols, dynamicScale-lowBandShift);
if (!useLP) {
scaleValues(&lowBandImag[0], LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap, dynamicScale-ovLowBandShift);
scaleValues(&lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+pSettings->overlap], pSettings->nCols, dynamicScale-lowBandShift);
}
if (!useLP) {
acDetScale += autoCorr2nd_cplx(&ac, lowBandReal+LPC_ORDER, lowBandImag+LPC_ORDER, autoCorrLength);
}
else
{
acDetScale += autoCorr2nd_real(&ac, lowBandReal+LPC_ORDER, autoCorrLength);
}
/* Examine dynamic of determinant in autocorrelation. */
acDetScale += 2*(comLowBandScale + dynamicScale);
acDetScale *= 2; /* two times reflection coefficent scaling */
acDetScale += ac.det_scale; /* ac scaling of determinant */
/* In case of determinant < 10^-38, resetLPCCoeffs=1 has to be enforced. */
if (acDetScale>126 ) {
resetLPCCoeffs = 1;
}
alphar[1] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
if (!useLP)
alphai[1] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
if (ac.det != FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f)) {
FIXP_DBL tmp,absTmp,absDet;
absDet = fixp_abs(ac.det);
if (!useLP) {
tmp = ( fMultDiv2(ac.r01r,ac.r12r) >> (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR-1) ) -
( (fMultDiv2(ac.r01i,ac.r12i) + fMultDiv2(ac.r02r,ac.r11r)) >> (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR-1) );
} else
{
tmp = ( fMultDiv2(ac.r01r,ac.r12r) >> (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR-1) ) -
( fMultDiv2(ac.r02r,ac.r11r) >> (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR-1) );
}
absTmp = fixp_abs(tmp);
/*
Quick check: is first filter coeff >= 1(4)
*/
{
INT scale;
FIXP_DBL result = fDivNorm(absTmp, absDet, &scale);
scale = scale+ac.det_scale;
if ( (scale > 0) && (result >= (FIXP_DBL)MAXVAL_DBL>>scale) ) {
resetLPCCoeffs = 1;
}
else {
alphar[1] = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(scaleValue(result,scale));
if((tmp<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)) ^ (ac.det<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f))) {
alphar[1] = -alphar[1];
}
}
}
if (!useLP)
{
tmp = ( fMultDiv2(ac.r01i,ac.r12r) >> (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR-1) ) +
( (fMultDiv2(ac.r01r,ac.r12i) - (FIXP_DBL)fMultDiv2(ac.r02i,ac.r11r)) >> (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR-1) ) ;
absTmp = fixp_abs(tmp);
/*
Quick check: is second filter coeff >= 1(4)
*/
{
INT scale;
FIXP_DBL result = fDivNorm(absTmp, absDet, &scale);
scale = scale+ac.det_scale;
if ( (scale > 0) && (result >= /*FL2FXCONST_DBL(1.f)*/ (FIXP_DBL)MAXVAL_DBL>>scale) ) {
resetLPCCoeffs = 1;
}
else {
alphai[1] = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(scaleValue(result,scale));
if((tmp<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)) ^ (ac.det<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f))) {
alphai[1] = -alphai[1];
}
}
}
}
}
alphar[0] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
if (!useLP)
alphai[0] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
if ( ac.r11r != FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f) ) {
/* ac.r11r is always >=0 */
FIXP_DBL tmp,absTmp;
if (!useLP) {
tmp = (ac.r01r>>(LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+1)) +
(fMultDiv2(alphar[1],ac.r12r) + fMultDiv2(alphai[1],ac.r12i));
} else
{
if(ac.r01r>=FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f))
tmp = (ac.r01r>>(LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+1)) + fMultDiv2(alphar[1],ac.r12r);
else
tmp = -((-ac.r01r)>>(LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+1)) + fMultDiv2(alphar[1],ac.r12r);
}
absTmp = fixp_abs(tmp);
/*
Quick check: is first filter coeff >= 1(4)
*/
if (absTmp >= (ac.r11r>>1)) {
resetLPCCoeffs=1;
}
else {
INT scale;
FIXP_DBL result = fDivNorm(absTmp, fixp_abs(ac.r11r), &scale);
alphar[0] = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(scaleValue(result,scale+1));
if((tmp>FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)) ^ (ac.r11r<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)))
alphar[0] = -alphar[0];
}
if (!useLP)
{
tmp = (ac.r01i>>(LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+1)) +
(fMultDiv2(alphai[1],ac.r12r) - fMultDiv2(alphar[1],ac.r12i));
absTmp = fixp_abs(tmp);
/*
Quick check: is second filter coeff >= 1(4)
*/
if (absTmp >= (ac.r11r>>1)) {
resetLPCCoeffs=1;
}
else {
INT scale;
FIXP_DBL result = fDivNorm(absTmp, fixp_abs(ac.r11r), &scale);
alphai[0] = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(scaleValue(result,scale+1));
if((tmp>FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)) ^ (ac.r11r<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)))
alphai[0] = -alphai[0];
}
}
}
if (!useLP)
{
/* Now check the quadratic criteria */
if( (fMultDiv2(alphar[0],alphar[0]) + fMultDiv2(alphai[0],alphai[0])) >= FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.5f) )
resetLPCCoeffs=1;
if( (fMultDiv2(alphar[1],alphar[1]) + fMultDiv2(alphai[1],alphai[1])) >= FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.5f) )
resetLPCCoeffs=1;
}
if(resetLPCCoeffs){
alphar[0] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
alphar[1] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
if (!useLP)
{
alphai[0] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
alphai[1] = FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f);
}
}
if (useLP)
{
/* Aliasing detection */
if(ac.r11r==FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f)) {
k1 = FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f);
}
else {
if ( fixp_abs(ac.r01r) >= fixp_abs(ac.r11r) ) {
if ( fMultDiv2(ac.r01r,ac.r11r) < FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)) {
k1 = (FIXP_DBL)MAXVAL_DBL /*FL2FXCONST_SGL(1.0f)*/;
}else {
/* Since this value is squared later, it must not ever become -1.0f. */
k1 = (FIXP_DBL)(MINVAL_DBL+1) /*FL2FXCONST_SGL(-1.0f)*/;
}
}
else {
INT scale;
FIXP_DBL result = fDivNorm(fixp_abs(ac.r01r), fixp_abs(ac.r11r), &scale);
k1 = scaleValue(result,scale);
if(!((ac.r01r<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)) ^ (ac.r11r<FL2FX_DBL(0.0f)))) {
k1 = -k1;
}
}
}
if(loBand > 1){
/* Check if the gain should be locked */
FIXP_DBL deg = /*FL2FXCONST_DBL(1.0f)*/ (FIXP_DBL)MAXVAL_DBL - fPow2(k1_below);
degreeAlias[loBand] = FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f);
if (((loBand & 1) == 0) && (k1 < FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f))){
if (k1_below < FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f)) { /* 2-Ch Aliasing Detection */
degreeAlias[loBand] = (FIXP_DBL)MAXVAL_DBL /*FL2FXCONST_DBL(1.0f)*/;
if ( k1_below2 > FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f) ) { /* 3-Ch Aliasing Detection */
degreeAlias[loBand-1] = deg;
}
}
else if ( k1_below2 > FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f) ) { /* 3-Ch Aliasing Detection */
degreeAlias[loBand] = deg;
}
}
if (((loBand & 1) == 1) && (k1 > FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f))){
if (k1_below > FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f)) { /* 2-CH Aliasing Detection */
degreeAlias[loBand] = (FIXP_DBL)MAXVAL_DBL /*FL2FXCONST_DBL(1.0f)*/;
if ( k1_below2 < FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f) ) { /* 3-CH Aliasing Detection */
degreeAlias[loBand-1] = deg;
}
}
else if ( k1_below2 < FL2FXCONST_DBL(0.0f) ) { /* 3-CH Aliasing Detection */
degreeAlias[loBand] = deg;
}
}
}
/* remember k1 values of the 2 QMF channels below the current channel */
k1_below2 = k1_below;
k1_below = k1;
}
patch = 0;
while ( patch < pSettings->noOfPatches ) { /* inner loop over every patch */
int hiBand = loBand + patchParam[patch].targetBandOffs;
if ( loBand < patchParam[patch].sourceStartBand
|| loBand >= patchParam[patch].sourceStopBand
) {
/* Lowband not in current patch - proceed */
patch++;
continue;
}
FDK_ASSERT( hiBand < (64) );
/* bwIndex[patch] is already initialized with value from previous band inside this patch */
while (hiBand >= pSettings->bwBorders[bwIndex[patch]])
bwIndex[patch]++;
/*
Filter Step 2: add the left slope with the current filter to the buffer
pure source values are already in there
*/
bw = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(bwVector[bwIndex[patch]]);
a0r = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(fMult(bw,alphar[0])); /* Apply current bandwidth expansion factor */
if (!useLP)
a0i = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(fMult(bw,alphai[0]));
bw = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(fPow2(bw));
a1r = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(fMult(bw,alphar[1]));
if (!useLP)
a1i = FX_DBL2FX_SGL(fMult(bw,alphai[1]));
/*
Filter Step 3: insert the middle part which won't be windowed
*/
if ( bw <= FL2FXCONST_SGL(0.0f) ) {
if (!useLP) {
int descale = fixMin(DFRACT_BITS-1, (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+dynamicScale));
for(i = startSample; i < stopSample; i++ ) {
qmfBufferReal[i][hiBand] = lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i]>>descale;
qmfBufferImag[i][hiBand] = lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+i]>>descale;
}
} else
{
int descale = fixMin(DFRACT_BITS-1, (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+dynamicScale));
for(i = startSample; i < stopSample; i++ ) {
qmfBufferReal[i][hiBand] = lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i]>>descale;
}
}
}
else { /* bw <= 0 */
if (!useLP) {
int descale = fixMin(DFRACT_BITS-1, (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+dynamicScale));
#ifdef FUNCTION_LPPTRANSPOSER_func1
lppTransposer_func1(lowBandReal+LPC_ORDER+startSample,lowBandImag+LPC_ORDER+startSample,
qmfBufferReal+startSample,qmfBufferImag+startSample,
stopSample-startSample, (int) hiBand,
dynamicScale,descale,
a0r, a0i, a1r, a1i);
#else
for(i = startSample; i < stopSample; i++ ) {
FIXP_DBL accu1, accu2;
accu1 = (fMultDiv2(a0r,lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i-1]) - fMultDiv2(a0i,lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+i-1]) +
fMultDiv2(a1r,lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i-2]) - fMultDiv2(a1i,lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+i-2]))>>dynamicScale;
accu2 = (fMultDiv2(a0i,lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i-1]) + fMultDiv2(a0r,lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+i-1]) +
fMultDiv2(a1i,lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i-2]) + fMultDiv2(a1r,lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+i-2]))>>dynamicScale;
qmfBufferReal[i][hiBand] = (lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i]>>descale) + (accu1<<1);
qmfBufferImag[i][hiBand] = (lowBandImag[LPC_ORDER+i]>>descale) + (accu2<<1);
}
#endif
} else
{
int descale = fixMin(DFRACT_BITS-1, (LPC_SCALE_FACTOR+dynamicScale));
FDK_ASSERT(dynamicScale >= 0);
for(i = startSample; i < stopSample; i++ ) {
FIXP_DBL accu1;
accu1 = (fMultDiv2(a0r,lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i-1]) + fMultDiv2(a1r,lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i-2]))>>dynamicScale;
qmfBufferReal[i][hiBand] = (lowBandReal[LPC_ORDER+i]>>descale) + (accu1<<1);
}
}
} /* bw <= 0 */
patch++;
} /* inner loop over patches */
/*
* store the unmodified filter coefficients if there is
* an overlapping envelope
*****************************************************************/
} /* outer loop over bands (loBand) */
if (useLP)
{
for ( loBand = pSettings->lbStartPatching; loBand < pSettings->lbStopPatching; loBand++ ) {
patch = 0;
while ( patch < pSettings->noOfPatches ) {
UCHAR hiBand = loBand + patchParam[patch].targetBandOffs;
if ( loBand < patchParam[patch].sourceStartBand
|| loBand >= patchParam[patch].sourceStopBand
|| hiBand >= (64) /* Highband out of range (biterror) */
) {
/* Lowband not in current patch or highband out of range (might be caused by biterrors)- proceed */
patch++;
continue;
}
if(hiBand != patchParam[patch].targetStartBand)
degreeAlias[hiBand] = degreeAlias[loBand];
patch++;
}
}/* end for loop */
}
for (i = 0; i < nInvfBands; i++ ) {
hLppTrans->bwVectorOld[i] = bwVector[i];
}
/*
set high band scale factor
*/
sbrScaleFactor->hb_scale = comLowBandScale-(LPC_SCALE_FACTOR);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (aac). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-65280786.
Commit Message: Fix out of bound memory access in lppTransposer
In TRANSPOSER_SETTINGS, initialize the whole bwBorders array to a
reasonable value to guarantee correct termination in while loop
in lppTransposer function. This fixes the reported bug.
For completeness:
- clear the whole bwIndex array instead of noOfPatches entries only.
- abort criterion in while loop to prevent potential
infinite loop, and limit bwIndex[patch] to a valid range.
Test: see bug for malicious content, decoded with "stagefright -s -a"
Bug: 65280786
Change-Id: I16ed2e1c0f1601926239a652ca20a91284151843
(cherry picked from commit 6d3dd40e204bf550abcfa589bd9615df8778e118)
|
Low
| 174,113
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int __mdiobus_register(struct mii_bus *bus, struct module *owner)
{
struct mdio_device *mdiodev;
int i, err;
struct gpio_desc *gpiod;
if (NULL == bus || NULL == bus->name ||
NULL == bus->read || NULL == bus->write)
return -EINVAL;
BUG_ON(bus->state != MDIOBUS_ALLOCATED &&
bus->state != MDIOBUS_UNREGISTERED);
bus->owner = owner;
bus->dev.parent = bus->parent;
bus->dev.class = &mdio_bus_class;
bus->dev.groups = NULL;
dev_set_name(&bus->dev, "%s", bus->id);
err = device_register(&bus->dev);
if (err) {
pr_err("mii_bus %s failed to register\n", bus->id);
put_device(&bus->dev);
return -EINVAL;
}
mutex_init(&bus->mdio_lock);
/* de-assert bus level PHY GPIO reset */
gpiod = devm_gpiod_get_optional(&bus->dev, "reset", GPIOD_OUT_LOW);
if (IS_ERR(gpiod)) {
dev_err(&bus->dev, "mii_bus %s couldn't get reset GPIO\n",
bus->id);
device_del(&bus->dev);
return PTR_ERR(gpiod);
} else if (gpiod) {
bus->reset_gpiod = gpiod;
gpiod_set_value_cansleep(gpiod, 1);
udelay(bus->reset_delay_us);
gpiod_set_value_cansleep(gpiod, 0);
}
if (bus->reset)
bus->reset(bus);
for (i = 0; i < PHY_MAX_ADDR; i++) {
if ((bus->phy_mask & (1 << i)) == 0) {
struct phy_device *phydev;
phydev = mdiobus_scan(bus, i);
if (IS_ERR(phydev) && (PTR_ERR(phydev) != -ENODEV)) {
err = PTR_ERR(phydev);
goto error;
}
}
}
mdiobus_setup_mdiodev_from_board_info(bus, mdiobus_create_device);
bus->state = MDIOBUS_REGISTERED;
pr_info("%s: probed\n", bus->name);
return 0;
error:
while (--i >= 0) {
mdiodev = bus->mdio_map[i];
if (!mdiodev)
continue;
mdiodev->device_remove(mdiodev);
mdiodev->device_free(mdiodev);
}
/* Put PHYs in RESET to save power */
if (bus->reset_gpiod)
gpiod_set_value_cansleep(bus->reset_gpiod, 1);
device_del(&bus->dev);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0. The function __mdiobus_register() in drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c calls put_device(), which will trigger a fixed_mdio_bus_init use-after-free. This will cause a denial of service.
Commit Message: mdio_bus: Fix use-after-free on device_register fails
KASAN has found use-after-free in fixed_mdio_bus_init,
commit 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call
put_device on device_register() failure") call put_device()
while device_register() fails,give up the last reference
to the device and allow mdiobus_release to be executed
,kfreeing the bus. However in most drives, mdiobus_free
be called to free the bus while mdiobus_register fails.
use-after-free occurs when access bus again, this patch
revert it to let mdiobus_free free the bus.
KASAN report details as below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881dc824d78 by task syz-executor.0/3524
CPU: 1 PID: 3524 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x283/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f6215c19c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f6215c19c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6215c1a6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
Allocated by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:496
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
mdiobus_alloc_size+0x54/0x1b0 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:143
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x163/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:458
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1436 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2986 [inline]
kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3938
device_release+0x78/0x200 drivers/base/core.c:919
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline]
kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708
put_device+0x1c/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:2060
__mdiobus_register+0x483/0x560 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:382
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x26b/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881dc824c80
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 248 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff8881dc824c80, ffff8881dc825480)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007720800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02800 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000010200 0000000000000000 0000000500000001 ffff8881f6c02800
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881dc824c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8881dc824c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8881dc824d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881dc824d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8881dc824e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call put_device on device_register() failure")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 169,652
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ConflictResolver::ProcessSimpleConflict(WriteTransaction* trans,
const Id& id,
const Cryptographer* cryptographer,
StatusController* status) {
MutableEntry entry(trans, syncable::GET_BY_ID, id);
CHECK(entry.good());
if (!entry.Get(syncable::IS_UNAPPLIED_UPDATE) ||
!entry.Get(syncable::IS_UNSYNCED)) {
return NO_SYNC_PROGRESS;
}
if (entry.Get(syncable::IS_DEL) && entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_IS_DEL)) {
entry.Put(syncable::IS_UNSYNCED, false);
entry.Put(syncable::IS_UNAPPLIED_UPDATE, false);
return NO_SYNC_PROGRESS;
}
if (!entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_IS_DEL)) {
bool name_matches = entry.Get(syncable::NON_UNIQUE_NAME) ==
entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_NON_UNIQUE_NAME);
bool parent_matches = entry.Get(syncable::PARENT_ID) ==
entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_PARENT_ID);
bool entry_deleted = entry.Get(syncable::IS_DEL);
syncable::Id server_prev_id = entry.ComputePrevIdFromServerPosition(
entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_PARENT_ID));
bool needs_reinsertion = !parent_matches ||
server_prev_id != entry.Get(syncable::PREV_ID);
DVLOG_IF(1, needs_reinsertion) << "Insertion needed, server prev id "
<< " is " << server_prev_id << ", local prev id is "
<< entry.Get(syncable::PREV_ID);
const sync_pb::EntitySpecifics& specifics =
entry.Get(syncable::SPECIFICS);
const sync_pb::EntitySpecifics& server_specifics =
entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_SPECIFICS);
const sync_pb::EntitySpecifics& base_server_specifics =
entry.Get(syncable::BASE_SERVER_SPECIFICS);
std::string decrypted_specifics, decrypted_server_specifics;
bool specifics_match = false;
bool server_encrypted_with_default_key = false;
if (specifics.has_encrypted()) {
DCHECK(cryptographer->CanDecryptUsingDefaultKey(specifics.encrypted()));
decrypted_specifics = cryptographer->DecryptToString(
specifics.encrypted());
} else {
decrypted_specifics = specifics.SerializeAsString();
}
if (server_specifics.has_encrypted()) {
server_encrypted_with_default_key =
cryptographer->CanDecryptUsingDefaultKey(
server_specifics.encrypted());
decrypted_server_specifics = cryptographer->DecryptToString(
server_specifics.encrypted());
} else {
decrypted_server_specifics = server_specifics.SerializeAsString();
}
if (decrypted_server_specifics == decrypted_specifics &&
server_encrypted_with_default_key == specifics.has_encrypted()) {
specifics_match = true;
}
bool base_server_specifics_match = false;
if (server_specifics.has_encrypted() &&
IsRealDataType(GetModelTypeFromSpecifics(base_server_specifics))) {
std::string decrypted_base_server_specifics;
if (!base_server_specifics.has_encrypted()) {
decrypted_base_server_specifics =
base_server_specifics.SerializeAsString();
} else {
decrypted_base_server_specifics = cryptographer->DecryptToString(
base_server_specifics.encrypted());
}
if (decrypted_server_specifics == decrypted_base_server_specifics)
base_server_specifics_match = true;
}
if (entry.GetModelType() == syncable::NIGORI) {
sync_pb::EntitySpecifics specifics =
entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_SPECIFICS);
sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics* server_nigori = specifics.mutable_nigori();
cryptographer->UpdateNigoriFromEncryptedTypes(server_nigori);
if (cryptographer->is_ready()) {
cryptographer->GetKeys(server_nigori->mutable_encrypted());
server_nigori->set_using_explicit_passphrase(
entry.Get(syncable::SPECIFICS).nigori().
using_explicit_passphrase());
}
if (entry.Get(syncable::SPECIFICS).nigori().sync_tabs()) {
server_nigori->set_sync_tabs(true);
}
entry.Put(syncable::SPECIFICS, specifics);
DVLOG(1) << "Resolving simple conflict, merging nigori nodes: " << entry;
status->increment_num_server_overwrites();
OverwriteServerChanges(trans, &entry);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Sync.ResolveSimpleConflict",
NIGORI_MERGE,
CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_SIZE);
} else if (!entry_deleted && name_matches && parent_matches &&
specifics_match && !needs_reinsertion) {
DVLOG(1) << "Resolving simple conflict, everything matches, ignoring "
<< "changes for: " << entry;
OverwriteServerChanges(trans, &entry);
IgnoreLocalChanges(&entry);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Sync.ResolveSimpleConflict",
CHANGES_MATCH,
CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_SIZE);
} else if (base_server_specifics_match) {
DVLOG(1) << "Resolving simple conflict, ignoring server encryption "
<< " changes for: " << entry;
status->increment_num_server_overwrites();
OverwriteServerChanges(trans, &entry);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Sync.ResolveSimpleConflict",
IGNORE_ENCRYPTION,
CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_SIZE);
} else if (entry_deleted || !name_matches || !parent_matches) {
OverwriteServerChanges(trans, &entry);
status->increment_num_server_overwrites();
DVLOG(1) << "Resolving simple conflict, overwriting server changes "
<< "for: " << entry;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Sync.ResolveSimpleConflict",
OVERWRITE_SERVER,
CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_SIZE);
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "Resolving simple conflict, ignoring local changes for: "
<< entry;
IgnoreLocalChanges(&entry);
status->increment_num_local_overwrites();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Sync.ResolveSimpleConflict",
OVERWRITE_LOCAL,
CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_SIZE);
}
entry.Put(syncable::BASE_SERVER_SPECIFICS, sync_pb::EntitySpecifics());
return SYNC_PROGRESS;
} else { // SERVER_IS_DEL is true
if (entry.Get(syncable::IS_DIR)) {
Directory::ChildHandles children;
trans->directory()->GetChildHandlesById(trans,
entry.Get(syncable::ID),
&children);
if (0 != children.size()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Entry is a server deleted directory with local contents, "
<< "should be a hierarchy conflict. (race condition).";
return NO_SYNC_PROGRESS;
}
}
if (!entry.Get(syncable::UNIQUE_CLIENT_TAG).empty()) {
DCHECK_EQ(entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_VERSION), 0) << "For the server to "
"know to re-create, client-tagged items should revert to version 0 "
"when server-deleted.";
OverwriteServerChanges(trans, &entry);
status->increment_num_server_overwrites();
DVLOG(1) << "Resolving simple conflict, undeleting server entry: "
<< entry;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Sync.ResolveSimpleConflict",
OVERWRITE_SERVER,
CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_SIZE);
entry.Put(syncable::SERVER_VERSION, 0);
entry.Put(syncable::BASE_VERSION, 0);
} else {
SyncerUtil::SplitServerInformationIntoNewEntry(trans, &entry);
MutableEntry server_update(trans, syncable::GET_BY_ID, id);
CHECK(server_update.good());
CHECK(server_update.Get(syncable::META_HANDLE) !=
entry.Get(syncable::META_HANDLE))
<< server_update << entry;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Sync.ResolveSimpleConflict",
UNDELETE,
CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_SIZE);
}
return SYNC_PROGRESS;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the plug-in paint buffer.
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,791
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int utf8s_to_utf16s(const u8 *s, int len, wchar_t *pwcs)
{
u16 *op;
int size;
unicode_t u;
op = pwcs;
while (*s && len > 0) {
if (*s & 0x80) {
size = utf8_to_utf32(s, len, &u);
if (size < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (u >= PLANE_SIZE) {
u -= PLANE_SIZE;
*op++ = (wchar_t) (SURROGATE_PAIR |
((u >> 10) & SURROGATE_BITS));
*op++ = (wchar_t) (SURROGATE_PAIR |
SURROGATE_LOW |
(u & SURROGATE_BITS));
} else {
*op++ = (wchar_t) u;
}
s += size;
len -= size;
} else {
*op++ = *s++;
len--;
}
}
return op - pwcs;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the VFAT filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.3 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a VFAT write operation on a filesystem with the utf8 mount option, which is not properly handled during UTF-8 to UTF-16 conversion.
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
High
| 166,125
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ext4_ext_handle_uninitialized_extents(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
ext4_lblk_t iblock, unsigned int max_blocks,
struct ext4_ext_path *path, int flags,
unsigned int allocated, struct buffer_head *bh_result,
ext4_fsblk_t newblock)
{
int ret = 0;
int err = 0;
ext4_io_end_t *io = EXT4_I(inode)->cur_aio_dio;
ext_debug("ext4_ext_handle_uninitialized_extents: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u, flags %d, allocated %u",
inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)iblock, max_blocks,
flags, allocated);
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
/* get_block() before submit the IO, split the extent */
if (flags == EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO) {
ret = ext4_split_unwritten_extents(handle,
inode, path, iblock,
max_blocks, flags);
/*
* Flag the inode(non aio case) or end_io struct (aio case)
* that this IO needs to convertion to written when IO is
* completed
*/
if (io)
io->flag = EXT4_IO_UNWRITTEN;
else
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_DIO_UNWRITTEN);
goto out;
}
/* IO end_io complete, convert the filled extent to written */
if (flags == EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT) {
ret = ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio(handle, inode,
path);
if (ret >= 0)
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
goto out2;
}
/* buffered IO case */
/*
* repeat fallocate creation request
* we already have an unwritten extent
*/
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNINIT_EXT)
goto map_out;
/* buffered READ or buffered write_begin() lookup */
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE) == 0) {
/*
* We have blocks reserved already. We
* return allocated blocks so that delalloc
* won't do block reservation for us. But
* the buffer head will be unmapped so that
* a read from the block returns 0s.
*/
set_buffer_unwritten(bh_result);
goto out1;
}
/* buffered write, writepage time, convert*/
ret = ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized(handle, inode,
path, iblock,
max_blocks);
if (ret >= 0)
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
out:
if (ret <= 0) {
err = ret;
goto out2;
} else
allocated = ret;
set_buffer_new(bh_result);
/*
* if we allocated more blocks than requested
* we need to make sure we unmap the extra block
* allocated. The actual needed block will get
* unmapped later when we find the buffer_head marked
* new.
*/
if (allocated > max_blocks) {
unmap_underlying_metadata_blocks(inode->i_sb->s_bdev,
newblock + max_blocks,
allocated - max_blocks);
allocated = max_blocks;
}
/*
* If we have done fallocate with the offset that is already
* delayed allocated, we would have block reservation
* and quota reservation done in the delayed write path.
* But fallocate would have already updated quota and block
* count for this offset. So cancel these reservation
*/
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE)
ext4_da_update_reserve_space(inode, allocated, 0);
map_out:
set_buffer_mapped(bh_result);
out1:
if (allocated > max_blocks)
allocated = max_blocks;
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
bh_result->b_bdev = inode->i_sb->s_bdev;
bh_result->b_blocknr = newblock;
out2:
if (path) {
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
}
return err ? err : allocated;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 167,537
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: spnego_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t qop_req,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
{
return gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, iov,
iov_count);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,658
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static __u8 *pl_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 60 && rdesc[39] == 0x2a && rdesc[40] == 0xf5 &&
rdesc[41] == 0x00 && rdesc[59] == 0x26 &&
rdesc[60] == 0xf9 && rdesc[61] == 0x00) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Petalynx Maxter Remote report descriptor\n");
rdesc[60] = 0xfa;
rdesc[40] = 0xfa;
}
return rdesc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The report_fixup functions in the HID subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.16.2 might allow physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted device that provides a small report descriptor, related to (1) drivers/hid/hid-cherry.c, (2) drivers/hid/hid-kye.c, (3) drivers/hid/hid-lg.c, (4) drivers/hid/hid-monterey.c, (5) drivers/hid/hid-petalynx.c, and (6) drivers/hid/hid-sunplus.c.
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
Medium
| 166,374
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::GenerateFakeDiscoveredDevice(
const std::string& name,
const std::string& address,
const std::string& icon,
bool paired,
bool connected) {
DictionaryValue device;
device.SetString("name", name);
device.SetString("address", address);
device.SetString("icon", icon);
device.SetBoolean("paired", paired);
device.SetBoolean("connected", connected);
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction(
"options.SystemOptions.addBluetoothDevice", device);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 17.0.963.46 does not properly handle PDF FAX images, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,969
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IceGenerateMagicCookie (
int len
)
{
char *auth;
#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
long ldata[2];
int seed;
int value;
int i;
#endif
if ((auth = malloc (len + 1)) == NULL)
return (NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
arc4random_buf(auth, len);
#else
#ifdef ITIMER_REAL
{
struct timeval now;
int i;
ldata[0] = now.tv_sec;
ldata[1] = now.tv_usec;
}
#else
{
long time ();
ldata[0] = time ((long *) 0);
ldata[1] = getpid ();
}
#endif
seed = (ldata[0]) + (ldata[1] << 16);
srand (seed);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
ldata[1] = now.tv_usec;
value = rand ();
auth[i] = value & 0xff;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-331
Summary: It was discovered that libICE before 1.0.9-8 used a weak entropy to generate keys. A local attacker could potentially use this flaw for session hijacking using the information available from the process list.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,471
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: magic_getparam(struct magic_set *ms, int param, void *val)
{
switch (param) {
case MAGIC_PARAM_INDIR_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->indir_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_NAME_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->name_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_PHNUM_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->elf_phnum_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_SHNUM_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->elf_shnum_max;
return 0;
default:
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The ELF parser in file 5.08 through 5.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a large number of notes.
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
|
Low
| 166,774
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: match_at(regex_t* reg, const UChar* str, const UChar* end,
#ifdef USE_MATCH_RANGE_MUST_BE_INSIDE_OF_SPECIFIED_RANGE
const UChar* right_range,
#endif
const UChar* sstart, UChar* sprev, OnigMatchArg* msa)
{
static UChar FinishCode[] = { OP_FINISH };
int i, n, num_mem, best_len, pop_level;
LengthType tlen, tlen2;
MemNumType mem;
RelAddrType addr;
UChar *s, *q, *sbegin;
int is_alloca;
char *alloc_base;
OnigStackType *stk_base, *stk, *stk_end;
OnigStackType *stkp; /* used as any purpose. */
OnigStackIndex si;
OnigStackIndex *repeat_stk;
OnigStackIndex *mem_start_stk, *mem_end_stk;
#ifdef USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK
int scv;
unsigned char* state_check_buff = msa->state_check_buff;
int num_comb_exp_check = reg->num_comb_exp_check;
#endif
UChar *p = reg->p;
OnigOptionType option = reg->options;
OnigEncoding encode = reg->enc;
OnigCaseFoldType case_fold_flag = reg->case_fold_flag;
pop_level = reg->stack_pop_level;
num_mem = reg->num_mem;
STACK_INIT(INIT_MATCH_STACK_SIZE);
UPDATE_FOR_STACK_REALLOC;
for (i = 1; i <= num_mem; i++) {
mem_start_stk[i] = mem_end_stk[i] = INVALID_STACK_INDEX;
}
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
fprintf(stderr, "match_at: str: %d, end: %d, start: %d, sprev: %d\n",
(int )str, (int )end, (int )sstart, (int )sprev);
fprintf(stderr, "size: %d, start offset: %d\n",
(int )(end - str), (int )(sstart - str));
#endif
STACK_PUSH_ENSURED(STK_ALT, FinishCode); /* bottom stack */
best_len = ONIG_MISMATCH;
s = (UChar* )sstart;
while (1) {
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
{
UChar *q, *bp, buf[50];
int len;
fprintf(stderr, "%4d> \"", (int )(s - str));
bp = buf;
for (i = 0, q = s; i < 7 && q < end; i++) {
len = enclen(encode, q);
while (len-- > 0) *bp++ = *q++;
}
if (q < end) { xmemcpy(bp, "...\"", 4); bp += 4; }
else { xmemcpy(bp, "\"", 1); bp += 1; }
*bp = 0;
fputs((char* )buf, stderr);
for (i = 0; i < 20 - (bp - buf); i++) fputc(' ', stderr);
onig_print_compiled_byte_code(stderr, p, NULL, encode);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
sbegin = s;
switch (*p++) {
case OP_END: MOP_IN(OP_END);
n = s - sstart;
if (n > best_len) {
OnigRegion* region;
#ifdef USE_FIND_LONGEST_SEARCH_ALL_OF_RANGE
if (IS_FIND_LONGEST(option)) {
if (n > msa->best_len) {
msa->best_len = n;
msa->best_s = (UChar* )sstart;
}
else
goto end_best_len;
}
#endif
best_len = n;
region = msa->region;
if (region) {
#ifdef USE_POSIX_API_REGION_OPTION
if (IS_POSIX_REGION(msa->options)) {
posix_regmatch_t* rmt = (posix_regmatch_t* )region;
rmt[0].rm_so = sstart - str;
rmt[0].rm_eo = s - str;
for (i = 1; i <= num_mem; i++) {
if (mem_end_stk[i] != INVALID_STACK_INDEX) {
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, i))
rmt[i].rm_so = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[i])->u.mem.pstr - str;
else
rmt[i].rm_so = (UChar* )((void* )(mem_start_stk[i])) - str;
rmt[i].rm_eo = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, i)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[i])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[i])) - str;
}
else {
rmt[i].rm_so = rmt[i].rm_eo = ONIG_REGION_NOTPOS;
}
}
}
else {
#endif /* USE_POSIX_API_REGION_OPTION */
region->beg[0] = sstart - str;
region->end[0] = s - str;
for (i = 1; i <= num_mem; i++) {
if (mem_end_stk[i] != INVALID_STACK_INDEX) {
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, i))
region->beg[i] = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[i])->u.mem.pstr - str;
else
region->beg[i] = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[i]) - str;
region->end[i] = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, i)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[i])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[i])) - str;
}
else {
region->beg[i] = region->end[i] = ONIG_REGION_NOTPOS;
}
}
#ifdef USE_CAPTURE_HISTORY
if (reg->capture_history != 0) {
int r;
OnigCaptureTreeNode* node;
if (IS_NULL(region->history_root)) {
region->history_root = node = history_node_new();
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(node);
}
else {
node = region->history_root;
history_tree_clear(node);
}
node->group = 0;
node->beg = sstart - str;
node->end = s - str;
stkp = stk_base;
r = make_capture_history_tree(region->history_root, &stkp,
stk, (UChar* )str, reg);
if (r < 0) {
best_len = r; /* error code */
goto finish;
}
}
#endif /* USE_CAPTURE_HISTORY */
#ifdef USE_POSIX_API_REGION_OPTION
} /* else IS_POSIX_REGION() */
#endif
} /* if (region) */
} /* n > best_len */
#ifdef USE_FIND_LONGEST_SEARCH_ALL_OF_RANGE
end_best_len:
#endif
MOP_OUT;
if (IS_FIND_CONDITION(option)) {
if (IS_FIND_NOT_EMPTY(option) && s == sstart) {
best_len = ONIG_MISMATCH;
goto fail; /* for retry */
}
if (IS_FIND_LONGEST(option) && DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
goto fail; /* for retry */
}
}
/* default behavior: return first-matching result. */
goto finish;
break;
case OP_EXACT1: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT1);
#if 0
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
#endif
if (*p != *s++) goto fail;
DATA_ENSURE(0);
p++;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_EXACT1_IC: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT1_IC);
{
int len;
UChar *q, lowbuf[ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD_MAXLEN];
DATA_ENSURE(1);
len = ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD(encode,
/* DISABLE_CASE_FOLD_MULTI_CHAR(case_fold_flag), */
case_fold_flag,
&s, end, lowbuf);
DATA_ENSURE(0);
q = lowbuf;
while (len-- > 0) {
if (*p != *q) {
goto fail;
}
p++; q++;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_EXACT2: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT2);
DATA_ENSURE(2);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
sprev = s;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACT3: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT3);
DATA_ENSURE(3);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
sprev = s;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACT4: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT4);
DATA_ENSURE(4);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
sprev = s;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACT5: MOP_IN(OP_EXACT5);
DATA_ENSURE(5);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
sprev = s;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTN: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTN);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
DATA_ENSURE(tlen);
while (tlen-- > 0) {
if (*p++ != *s++) goto fail;
}
sprev = s - 1;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTN_IC: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTN_IC);
{
int len;
UChar *q, *endp, lowbuf[ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD_MAXLEN];
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
endp = p + tlen;
while (p < endp) {
sprev = s;
DATA_ENSURE(1);
len = ONIGENC_MBC_CASE_FOLD(encode,
/* DISABLE_CASE_FOLD_MULTI_CHAR(case_fold_flag), */
case_fold_flag,
&s, end, lowbuf);
DATA_ENSURE(0);
q = lowbuf;
while (len-- > 0) {
if (*p != *q) goto fail;
p++; q++;
}
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N1: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB2N1);
DATA_ENSURE(2);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N2: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB2N2);
DATA_ENSURE(4);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
sprev = s;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N3: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB2N3);
DATA_ENSURE(6);
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
sprev = s;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB2N);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
DATA_ENSURE(tlen * 2);
while (tlen-- > 0) {
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
}
sprev = s - 2;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB3N: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMB3N);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
DATA_ENSURE(tlen * 3);
while (tlen-- > 0) {
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
}
sprev = s - 3;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_EXACTMBN: MOP_IN(OP_EXACTMBN);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p); /* mb-len */
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen2, p); /* string len */
tlen2 *= tlen;
DATA_ENSURE(tlen2);
while (tlen2-- > 0) {
if (*p != *s) goto fail;
p++; s++;
}
sprev = s - tlen;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_CCLASS: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (BITSET_AT(((BitSetRef )p), *s) == 0) goto fail;
p += SIZE_BITSET;
s += enclen(encode, s); /* OP_CCLASS can match mb-code. \D, \S */
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_MB: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_MB);
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_HEAD(encode, s)) goto fail;
cclass_mb:
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
{
OnigCodePoint code;
UChar *ss;
int mb_len;
DATA_ENSURE(1);
mb_len = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(mb_len);
ss = s;
s += mb_len;
code = ONIGENC_MBC_TO_CODE(encode, ss, s);
#ifdef PLATFORM_UNALIGNED_WORD_ACCESS
if (! onig_is_in_code_range(p, code)) goto fail;
#else
q = p;
ALIGNMENT_RIGHT(q);
if (! onig_is_in_code_range(q, code)) goto fail;
#endif
}
p += tlen;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_MIX: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_MIX);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_HEAD(encode, s)) {
p += SIZE_BITSET;
goto cclass_mb;
}
else {
if (BITSET_AT(((BitSetRef )p), *s) == 0)
goto fail;
p += SIZE_BITSET;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
p += tlen;
s++;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_NOT);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (BITSET_AT(((BitSetRef )p), *s) != 0) goto fail;
p += SIZE_BITSET;
s += enclen(encode, s);
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_MB_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_MB_NOT);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_HEAD(encode, s)) {
s++;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
p += tlen;
goto cc_mb_not_success;
}
cclass_mb_not:
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
{
OnigCodePoint code;
UChar *ss;
int mb_len = enclen(encode, s);
if (! DATA_ENSURE_CHECK(mb_len)) {
DATA_ENSURE(1);
s = (UChar* )end;
p += tlen;
goto cc_mb_not_success;
}
ss = s;
s += mb_len;
code = ONIGENC_MBC_TO_CODE(encode, ss, s);
#ifdef PLATFORM_UNALIGNED_WORD_ACCESS
if (onig_is_in_code_range(p, code)) goto fail;
#else
q = p;
ALIGNMENT_RIGHT(q);
if (onig_is_in_code_range(q, code)) goto fail;
#endif
}
p += tlen;
cc_mb_not_success:
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_MIX_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_MIX_NOT);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_HEAD(encode, s)) {
p += SIZE_BITSET;
goto cclass_mb_not;
}
else {
if (BITSET_AT(((BitSetRef )p), *s) != 0)
goto fail;
p += SIZE_BITSET;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
p += tlen;
s++;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_CCLASS_NODE: MOP_IN(OP_CCLASS_NODE);
{
OnigCodePoint code;
void *node;
int mb_len;
UChar *ss;
DATA_ENSURE(1);
GET_POINTER_INC(node, p);
mb_len = enclen(encode, s);
ss = s;
s += mb_len;
DATA_ENSURE(0);
code = ONIGENC_MBC_TO_CODE(encode, ss, s);
if (onig_is_code_in_cc_len(mb_len, code, node) == 0) goto fail;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) goto fail;
s += n;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_ML: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_ML);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
s += n;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_STAR: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_STAR);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) goto fail;
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
n = enclen(encode, s);
if (n > 1) {
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
else {
sprev = s;
s++;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_STAR_PEEK_NEXT: MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_STAR_PEEK_NEXT);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
if (*p == *s) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + 1, s, sprev);
}
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) goto fail;
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
p++;
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR_PEEK_NEXT:MOP_IN(OP_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR_PEEK_NEXT);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
if (*p == *s) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + 1, s, sprev);
}
n = enclen(encode, s);
if (n > 1) {
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
else {
sprev = s;
s++;
}
}
p++;
MOP_OUT;
break;
#ifdef USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK
case OP_STATE_CHECK_ANYCHAR_STAR: MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK_ANYCHAR_STAR);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) goto fail;
STACK_PUSH_ALT_WITH_STATE_CHECK(p, s, sprev, mem);
n = enclen(encode, s);
DATA_ENSURE(n);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) goto fail;
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_STATE_CHECK_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR:
MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK_ANYCHAR_ML_STAR);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
while (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) goto fail;
STACK_PUSH_ALT_WITH_STATE_CHECK(p, s, sprev, mem);
n = enclen(encode, s);
if (n > 1) {
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
s += n;
}
else {
sprev = s;
s++;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
break;
#endif /* USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK */
case OP_WORD: MOP_IN(OP_WORD);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end))
goto fail;
s += enclen(encode, s);
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_NOT_WORD: MOP_IN(OP_NOT_WORD);
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end))
goto fail;
s += enclen(encode, s);
MOP_OUT;
break;
case OP_WORD_BOUND: MOP_IN(OP_WORD_BOUND);
if (ON_STR_BEGIN(s)) {
DATA_ENSURE(1);
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end))
goto fail;
}
else if (ON_STR_END(s)) {
if (! ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end))
goto fail;
}
else {
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end)
== ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end))
goto fail;
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_NOT_WORD_BOUND: MOP_IN(OP_NOT_WORD_BOUND);
if (ON_STR_BEGIN(s)) {
if (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1 && ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end))
goto fail;
}
else if (ON_STR_END(s)) {
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end))
goto fail;
}
else {
if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end)
!= ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end))
goto fail;
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#ifdef USE_WORD_BEGIN_END
case OP_WORD_BEGIN: MOP_IN(OP_WORD_BEGIN);
if (DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1 && ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end)) {
if (ON_STR_BEGIN(s) || !ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
}
goto fail;
break;
case OP_WORD_END: MOP_IN(OP_WORD_END);
if (!ON_STR_BEGIN(s) && ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, sprev, end)) {
if (ON_STR_END(s) || !ONIGENC_IS_MBC_WORD(encode, s, end)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
}
goto fail;
break;
#endif
case OP_BEGIN_BUF: MOP_IN(OP_BEGIN_BUF);
if (! ON_STR_BEGIN(s)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_END_BUF: MOP_IN(OP_END_BUF);
if (! ON_STR_END(s)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_BEGIN_LINE: MOP_IN(OP_BEGIN_LINE);
if (ON_STR_BEGIN(s)) {
if (IS_NOTBOL(msa->options)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, sprev, end) && !ON_STR_END(s)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
goto fail;
break;
case OP_END_LINE: MOP_IN(OP_END_LINE);
if (ON_STR_END(s)) {
#ifndef USE_NEWLINE_AT_END_OF_STRING_HAS_EMPTY_LINE
if (IS_EMPTY_STR || !ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, sprev, end)) {
#endif
if (IS_NOTEOL(msa->options)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
#ifndef USE_NEWLINE_AT_END_OF_STRING_HAS_EMPTY_LINE
}
#endif
}
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
#ifdef USE_CRNL_AS_LINE_TERMINATOR
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_CRNL(encode, s, end)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
#endif
goto fail;
break;
case OP_SEMI_END_BUF: MOP_IN(OP_SEMI_END_BUF);
if (ON_STR_END(s)) {
#ifndef USE_NEWLINE_AT_END_OF_STRING_HAS_EMPTY_LINE
if (IS_EMPTY_STR || !ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, sprev, end)) {
#endif
if (IS_NOTEOL(msa->options)) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
#ifndef USE_NEWLINE_AT_END_OF_STRING_HAS_EMPTY_LINE
}
#endif
}
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_NEWLINE(encode, s, end) &&
ON_STR_END(s + enclen(encode, s))) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
#ifdef USE_CRNL_AS_LINE_TERMINATOR
else if (ONIGENC_IS_MBC_CRNL(encode, s, end)) {
UChar* ss = s + enclen(encode, s);
ss += enclen(encode, ss);
if (ON_STR_END(ss)) {
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
}
#endif
goto fail;
break;
case OP_BEGIN_POSITION: MOP_IN(OP_BEGIN_POSITION);
if (s != msa->start)
goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_START_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_START_PUSH);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
STACK_PUSH_MEM_START(mem, s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_START: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_START);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
mem_start_stk[mem] = (OnigStackIndex )((void* )s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
STACK_PUSH_MEM_END(mem, s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_END: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_END);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
mem_end_stk[mem] = (OnigStackIndex )((void* )s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#ifdef USE_SUBEXP_CALL
case OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH_REC: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_END_PUSH_REC);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
STACK_GET_MEM_START(mem, stkp); /* should be before push mem-end. */
STACK_PUSH_MEM_END(mem, s);
mem_start_stk[mem] = GET_STACK_INDEX(stkp);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_MEMORY_END_REC: MOP_IN(OP_MEMORY_END_REC);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
mem_end_stk[mem] = (OnigStackIndex )((void* )s);
STACK_GET_MEM_START(mem, stkp);
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
mem_start_stk[mem] = GET_STACK_INDEX(stkp);
else
mem_start_stk[mem] = (OnigStackIndex )((void* )stkp->u.mem.pstr);
STACK_PUSH_MEM_END_MARK(mem);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
case OP_BACKREF1: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREF1);
mem = 1;
goto backref;
break;
case OP_BACKREF2: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREF2);
mem = 2;
goto backref;
break;
case OP_BACKREFN: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREFN);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
backref:
{
int len;
UChar *pstart, *pend;
/* if you want to remove following line,
you should check in parse and compile time. */
if (mem > num_mem) goto fail;
if (mem_end_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) goto fail;
if (mem_start_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) goto fail;
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
pstart = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr;
else
pstart = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[mem]);
pend = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, mem)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[mem]));
n = pend - pstart;
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
STRING_CMP(pstart, s, n);
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
case OP_BACKREFN_IC: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREFN_IC);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
{
int len;
UChar *pstart, *pend;
/* if you want to remove following line,
you should check in parse and compile time. */
if (mem > num_mem) goto fail;
if (mem_end_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) goto fail;
if (mem_start_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) goto fail;
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
pstart = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr;
else
pstart = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[mem]);
pend = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, mem)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[mem]));
n = pend - pstart;
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
STRING_CMP_IC(case_fold_flag, pstart, &s, n);
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
case OP_BACKREF_MULTI: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREF_MULTI);
{
int len, is_fail;
UChar *pstart, *pend, *swork;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
if (mem_end_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) continue;
if (mem_start_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) continue;
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
pstart = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr;
else
pstart = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[mem]);
pend = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, mem)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[mem]));
n = pend - pstart;
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
swork = s;
STRING_CMP_VALUE(pstart, swork, n, is_fail);
if (is_fail) continue;
s = swork;
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
p += (SIZE_MEMNUM * (tlen - i - 1));
break; /* success */
}
if (i == tlen) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
case OP_BACKREF_MULTI_IC: MOP_IN(OP_BACKREF_MULTI_IC);
{
int len, is_fail;
UChar *pstart, *pend, *swork;
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p);
if (mem_end_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) continue;
if (mem_start_stk[mem] == INVALID_STACK_INDEX) continue;
if (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_start, mem))
pstart = STACK_AT(mem_start_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr;
else
pstart = (UChar* )((void* )mem_start_stk[mem]);
pend = (BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->bt_mem_end, mem)
? STACK_AT(mem_end_stk[mem])->u.mem.pstr
: (UChar* )((void* )mem_end_stk[mem]));
n = pend - pstart;
DATA_ENSURE(n);
sprev = s;
swork = s;
STRING_CMP_VALUE_IC(case_fold_flag, pstart, &swork, n, is_fail);
if (is_fail) continue;
s = swork;
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
p += (SIZE_MEMNUM * (tlen - i - 1));
break; /* success */
}
if (i == tlen) goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
#ifdef USE_BACKREF_WITH_LEVEL
case OP_BACKREF_WITH_LEVEL:
{
int len;
OnigOptionType ic;
LengthType level;
GET_OPTION_INC(ic, p);
GET_LENGTH_INC(level, p);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
sprev = s;
if (backref_match_at_nested_level(reg, stk, stk_base, ic
, case_fold_flag, (int )level, (int )tlen, p, &s, end)) {
while (sprev + (len = enclen(encode, sprev)) < s)
sprev += len;
p += (SIZE_MEMNUM * tlen);
}
else
goto fail;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
break;
#endif
#if 0 /* no need: IS_DYNAMIC_OPTION() == 0 */
case OP_SET_OPTION_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_SET_OPTION_PUSH);
GET_OPTION_INC(option, p);
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
p += SIZE_OP_SET_OPTION + SIZE_OP_FAIL;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_SET_OPTION: MOP_IN(OP_SET_OPTION);
GET_OPTION_INC(option, p);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
case OP_NULL_CHECK_START: MOP_IN(OP_NULL_CHECK_START);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: null check id */
STACK_PUSH_NULL_CHECK_START(mem, s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_NULL_CHECK_END: MOP_IN(OP_NULL_CHECK_END);
{
int isnull;
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: null check id */
STACK_NULL_CHECK(isnull, mem, s);
if (isnull) {
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
fprintf(stderr, "NULL_CHECK_END: skip id:%d, s:%d\n",
(int )mem, (int )s);
#endif
null_check_found:
/* empty loop founded, skip next instruction */
switch (*p++) {
case OP_JUMP:
case OP_PUSH:
p += SIZE_RELADDR;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC:
case OP_REPEAT_INC_NG:
case OP_REPEAT_INC_SG:
case OP_REPEAT_INC_NG_SG:
p += SIZE_MEMNUM;
break;
default:
goto unexpected_bytecode_error;
break;
}
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#ifdef USE_MONOMANIAC_CHECK_CAPTURES_IN_ENDLESS_REPEAT
case OP_NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST: MOP_IN(OP_NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST);
{
int isnull;
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: null check id */
STACK_NULL_CHECK_MEMST(isnull, mem, s, reg);
if (isnull) {
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
fprintf(stderr, "NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST: skip id:%d, s:%d\n",
(int )mem, (int )s);
#endif
if (isnull == -1) goto fail;
goto null_check_found;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_SUBEXP_CALL
case OP_NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST_PUSH:
MOP_IN(OP_NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST_PUSH);
{
int isnull;
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: null check id */
#ifdef USE_MONOMANIAC_CHECK_CAPTURES_IN_ENDLESS_REPEAT
STACK_NULL_CHECK_MEMST_REC(isnull, mem, s, reg);
#else
STACK_NULL_CHECK_REC(isnull, mem, s);
#endif
if (isnull) {
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG_MATCH
fprintf(stderr, "NULL_CHECK_END_MEMST_PUSH: skip id:%d, s:%d\n",
(int )mem, (int )s);
#endif
if (isnull == -1) goto fail;
goto null_check_found;
}
else {
STACK_PUSH_NULL_CHECK_END(mem);
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
case OP_JUMP: MOP_IN(OP_JUMP);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
p += addr;
MOP_OUT;
CHECK_INTERRUPT_IN_MATCH_AT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + addr, s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#ifdef USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK
case OP_STATE_CHECK_PUSH: MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK_PUSH);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) goto fail;
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_PUSH_ALT_WITH_STATE_CHECK(p + addr, s, sprev, mem);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_STATE_CHECK_PUSH_OR_JUMP: MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK_PUSH_OR_JUMP);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) {
p += addr;
}
else {
STACK_PUSH_ALT_WITH_STATE_CHECK(p + addr, s, sprev, mem);
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_STATE_CHECK: MOP_IN(OP_STATE_CHECK);
GET_STATE_CHECK_NUM_INC(mem, p);
STATE_CHECK_VAL(scv, mem);
if (scv) goto fail;
STACK_PUSH_STATE_CHECK(s, mem);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif /* USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK */
case OP_POP: MOP_IN(OP_POP);
STACK_POP_ONE;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH_OR_JUMP_EXACT1: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_OR_JUMP_EXACT1);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
if (*p == *s && DATA_ENSURE_CHECK1) {
p++;
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + addr, s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
p += (addr + 1);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH_IF_PEEK_NEXT: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_IF_PEEK_NEXT);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
if (*p == *s) {
p++;
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + addr, s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
}
p++;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT);
{
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_ENSURE(1);
repeat_stk[mem] = GET_STACK_INDEX(stk);
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT(mem, p);
if (reg->repeat_range[mem].lower == 0) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p + addr, s, sprev);
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_NG: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_NG);
{
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_ENSURE(1);
repeat_stk[mem] = GET_STACK_INDEX(stk);
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT(mem, p);
if (reg->repeat_range[mem].lower == 0) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
p += addr;
}
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_INC);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
si = repeat_stk[mem];
stkp = STACK_AT(si);
repeat_inc:
stkp->u.repeat.count++;
if (stkp->u.repeat.count >= reg->repeat_range[mem].upper) {
/* end of repeat. Nothing to do. */
}
else if (stkp->u.repeat.count >= reg->repeat_range[mem].lower) {
STACK_PUSH_ALT(p, s, sprev);
p = STACK_AT(si)->u.repeat.pcode; /* Don't use stkp after PUSH. */
}
else {
p = stkp->u.repeat.pcode;
}
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT_INC(si);
MOP_OUT;
CHECK_INTERRUPT_IN_MATCH_AT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC_SG: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_INC_SG);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
STACK_GET_REPEAT(mem, stkp);
si = GET_STACK_INDEX(stkp);
goto repeat_inc;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC_NG: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_INC_NG);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
si = repeat_stk[mem];
stkp = STACK_AT(si);
repeat_inc_ng:
stkp->u.repeat.count++;
if (stkp->u.repeat.count < reg->repeat_range[mem].upper) {
if (stkp->u.repeat.count >= reg->repeat_range[mem].lower) {
UChar* pcode = stkp->u.repeat.pcode;
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT_INC(si);
STACK_PUSH_ALT(pcode, s, sprev);
}
else {
p = stkp->u.repeat.pcode;
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT_INC(si);
}
}
else if (stkp->u.repeat.count == reg->repeat_range[mem].upper) {
STACK_PUSH_REPEAT_INC(si);
}
MOP_OUT;
CHECK_INTERRUPT_IN_MATCH_AT;
continue;
break;
case OP_REPEAT_INC_NG_SG: MOP_IN(OP_REPEAT_INC_NG_SG);
GET_MEMNUM_INC(mem, p); /* mem: OP_REPEAT ID */
STACK_GET_REPEAT(mem, stkp);
si = GET_STACK_INDEX(stkp);
goto repeat_inc_ng;
break;
case OP_PUSH_POS: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_POS);
STACK_PUSH_POS(s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_POP_POS: MOP_IN(OP_POP_POS);
{
STACK_POS_END(stkp);
s = stkp->u.state.pstr;
sprev = stkp->u.state.pstr_prev;
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH_POS_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_POS_NOT);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_PUSH_POS_NOT(p + addr, s, sprev);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_FAIL_POS: MOP_IN(OP_FAIL_POS);
STACK_POP_TIL_POS_NOT;
goto fail;
break;
case OP_PUSH_STOP_BT: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_STOP_BT);
STACK_PUSH_STOP_BT;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_POP_STOP_BT: MOP_IN(OP_POP_STOP_BT);
STACK_STOP_BT_END;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_LOOK_BEHIND: MOP_IN(OP_LOOK_BEHIND);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
s = (UChar* )ONIGENC_STEP_BACK(encode, str, s, (int )tlen);
if (IS_NULL(s)) goto fail;
sprev = (UChar* )onigenc_get_prev_char_head(encode, str, s);
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_PUSH_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_PUSH_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT);
GET_RELADDR_INC(addr, p);
GET_LENGTH_INC(tlen, p);
q = (UChar* )ONIGENC_STEP_BACK(encode, str, s, (int )tlen);
if (IS_NULL(q)) {
/* too short case -> success. ex. /(?<!XXX)a/.match("a")
If you want to change to fail, replace following line. */
p += addr;
/* goto fail; */
}
else {
STACK_PUSH_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT(p + addr, s, sprev);
s = q;
sprev = (UChar* )onigenc_get_prev_char_head(encode, str, s);
}
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_FAIL_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT: MOP_IN(OP_FAIL_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT);
STACK_POP_TIL_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT;
goto fail;
break;
#ifdef USE_SUBEXP_CALL
case OP_CALL: MOP_IN(OP_CALL);
GET_ABSADDR_INC(addr, p);
STACK_PUSH_CALL_FRAME(p);
p = reg->p + addr;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
case OP_RETURN: MOP_IN(OP_RETURN);
STACK_RETURN(p);
STACK_PUSH_RETURN;
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
#endif
case OP_FINISH:
goto finish;
break;
fail:
MOP_OUT;
/* fall */
case OP_FAIL: MOP_IN(OP_FAIL);
STACK_POP;
p = stk->u.state.pcode;
s = stk->u.state.pstr;
sprev = stk->u.state.pstr_prev;
#ifdef USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK
if (stk->u.state.state_check != 0) {
stk->type = STK_STATE_CHECK_MARK;
stk++;
}
#endif
MOP_OUT;
continue;
break;
default:
goto bytecode_error;
} /* end of switch */
sprev = sbegin;
} /* end of while(1) */
finish:
STACK_SAVE;
return best_len;
#ifdef ONIG_DEBUG
stack_error:
STACK_SAVE;
return ONIGERR_STACK_BUG;
#endif
bytecode_error:
STACK_SAVE;
return ONIGERR_UNDEFINED_BYTECODE;
unexpected_bytecode_error:
STACK_SAVE;
return ONIGERR_UNEXPECTED_BYTECODE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in Oniguruma 6.2.0, as used in Oniguruma-mod in Ruby through 2.4.1 and mbstring in PHP through 7.1.5. A stack out-of-bounds read occurs in match_at() during regular expression searching. A logical error involving order of validation and access in match_at() could result in an out-of-bounds read from a stack buffer.
Commit Message: fix #57 : DATA_ENSURE() check must be before data access
|
Low
| 168,110
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: run_cmd(int fd, ...)
{
pid_t pid;
sigset_t sigm, sigm_old;
/* block signals, let child establish its own handlers */
sigemptyset(&sigm);
sigaddset(&sigm, SIGTERM);
sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &sigm, &sigm_old);
pid = fork();
if ( pid < 0 ) {
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigm_old, NULL);
fd_printf(STO, "*** cannot fork: %s ***\r\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
} else if ( pid ) {
/* father: picocom */
int status, r;
/* reset the mask */
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigm_old, NULL);
/* wait for child to finish */
do {
r = waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
} while ( r < 0 && errno == EINTR );
/* reset terminal (back to raw mode) */
term_apply(STI);
/* check and report child return status */
if ( WIFEXITED(status) ) {
fd_printf(STO, "\r\n*** exit status: %d ***\r\n",
WEXITSTATUS(status));
return WEXITSTATUS(status);
} else if ( WIFSIGNALED(status) ) {
fd_printf(STO, "\r\n*** killed by signal: %d ***\r\n",
WTERMSIG(status));
return -1;
} else {
fd_printf(STO, "\r\n*** abnormal termination: 0x%x ***\r\n", r);
return -1;
}
} else {
/* child: external program */
long fl;
char cmd[512];
/* unmanage terminal, and reset it to canonical mode */
term_remove(STI);
/* unmanage serial port fd, without reset */
term_erase(fd);
/* set serial port fd to blocking mode */
fl = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
fl &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fl);
/* connect stdin and stdout to serial port */
close(STI);
close(STO);
dup2(fd, STI);
dup2(fd, STO);
{
/* build command-line */
char *c, *ce;
const char *s;
int n;
va_list vls;
strcpy(cmd, EXEC);
c = &cmd[sizeof(EXEC)- 1];
ce = cmd + sizeof(cmd) - 1;
va_start(vls, fd);
while ( (s = va_arg(vls, const char *)) ) {
n = strlen(s);
if ( c + n + 1 >= ce ) break;
memcpy(c, s, n); c += n;
*c++ = ' ';
}
va_end(vls);
*c = '\0';
}
/* run extenral command */
fd_printf(STDERR_FILENO, "%s\n", &cmd[sizeof(EXEC) - 1]);
establish_child_signal_handlers();
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigm_old, NULL);
execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", cmd, NULL);
exit(42);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-77
Summary: picocom before 2.0 has a command injection vulnerability in the 'send and receive file' command because the command line is executed by /bin/sh unsafely.
Commit Message: Do not use "/bin/sh" to run external commands.
Picocom no longer uses /bin/sh to run external commands for
file-transfer operations. Parsing the command line and spliting it into
arguments is now performed internally by picocom, using quoting rules
very similar to those of the Unix shell. Hopefully, this makes it
impossible to inject shell-commands when supplying filenames or
extra arguments to the send- and receive-file commands.
|
Low
| 168,850
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AXObject::isLiveRegion() const {
const AtomicString& liveRegion = liveRegionStatus();
return equalIgnoringCase(liveRegion, "polite") ||
equalIgnoringCase(liveRegion, "assertive");
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
Medium
| 171,927
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadXWDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define CheckOverflowException(length,width,height) \
(((height) != 0) && ((length)/((size_t) height) != ((size_t) width)))
char
*comment;
Image
*image;
int
x_status;
MagickBooleanType
authentic_colormap;
MagickStatusType
status;
Quantum
index;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register size_t
pixel;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned long
lsb_first;
XColor
*colors;
XImage
*ximage;
XWDFileHeader
header;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read in header information.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,sz_XWDheader,(unsigned char *) &header);
if (count != sz_XWDheader)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageHeader");
/*
Ensure the header byte-order is most-significant byte first.
*/
lsb_first=1;
if ((int) (*(char *) &lsb_first) != 0)
MSBOrderLong((unsigned char *) &header,sz_XWDheader);
/*
Check to see if the dump file is in the proper format.
*/
if (header.file_version != XWD_FILE_VERSION)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"FileFormatVersionMismatch");
if (header.header_size < sz_XWDheader)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
switch (header.visual_class)
{
case StaticGray:
case GrayScale:
{
if (header.bits_per_pixel != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
}
case StaticColor:
case PseudoColor:
{
if ((header.bits_per_pixel < 1) || (header.bits_per_pixel > 15) ||
(header.ncolors == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
}
case TrueColor:
case DirectColor:
{
if ((header.bits_per_pixel != 16) && (header.bits_per_pixel != 24) &&
(header.bits_per_pixel != 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (header.pixmap_format)
{
case XYBitmap:
{
if (header.pixmap_depth != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
}
case XYPixmap:
case ZPixmap:
{
if ((header.pixmap_depth < 1) || (header.pixmap_depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
switch (header.bitmap_pad)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (header.bitmap_unit)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (header.byte_order)
{
case LSBFirst:
case MSBFirst:
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (header.bitmap_bit_order)
{
case LSBFirst:
case MSBFirst:
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (header.ncolors > 65535)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (((header.bitmap_pad % 8) != 0) || (header.bitmap_pad > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
length=(size_t) (header.header_size-sz_XWDheader);
comment=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,length,(unsigned char *) comment);
comment[length]='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment,exception);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
/*
Initialize the X image.
*/
ximage=(XImage *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*ximage));
if (ximage == (XImage *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
ximage->depth=(int) header.pixmap_depth;
ximage->format=(int) header.pixmap_format;
ximage->xoffset=(int) header.xoffset;
ximage->data=(char *) NULL;
ximage->width=(int) header.pixmap_width;
ximage->height=(int) header.pixmap_height;
ximage->bitmap_pad=(int) header.bitmap_pad;
ximage->bytes_per_line=(int) header.bytes_per_line;
ximage->byte_order=(int) header.byte_order;
ximage->bitmap_unit=(int) header.bitmap_unit;
ximage->bitmap_bit_order=(int) header.bitmap_bit_order;
ximage->bits_per_pixel=(int) header.bits_per_pixel;
ximage->red_mask=header.red_mask;
ximage->green_mask=header.green_mask;
ximage->blue_mask=header.blue_mask;
if ((ximage->width < 0) || (ximage->height < 0) || (ximage->depth < 0) ||
(ximage->format < 0) || (ximage->byte_order < 0) ||
(ximage->bitmap_bit_order < 0) || (ximage->bitmap_pad < 0) ||
(ximage->bytes_per_line < 0))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if ((ximage->width > 65535) || (ximage->height > 65535))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if ((ximage->bits_per_pixel > 32) || (ximage->bitmap_unit > 32))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
x_status=XInitImage(ximage);
if (x_status == 0)
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
/*
Read colormap.
*/
authentic_colormap=MagickFalse;
colors=(XColor *) NULL;
if (header.ncolors != 0)
{
XWDColor
color;
colors=(XColor *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) header.ncolors,
sizeof(*colors));
if (colors == (XColor *) NULL)
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) header.ncolors; i++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,sz_XWDColor,(unsigned char *) &color);
if (count != sz_XWDColor)
{
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
colors[i].pixel=color.pixel;
colors[i].red=color.red;
colors[i].green=color.green;
colors[i].blue=color.blue;
colors[i].flags=(char) color.flags;
if (color.flags != 0)
authentic_colormap=MagickTrue;
}
/*
Ensure the header byte-order is most-significant byte first.
*/
lsb_first=1;
if ((int) (*(char *) &lsb_first) != 0)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) header.ncolors; i++)
{
MSBOrderLong((unsigned char *) &colors[i].pixel,
sizeof(colors[i].pixel));
MSBOrderShort((unsigned char *) &colors[i].red,3*
sizeof(colors[i].red));
}
}
/*
Allocate the pixel buffer.
*/
length=(size_t) ximage->bytes_per_line*ximage->height;
if (CheckOverflowException(length,ximage->bytes_per_line,ximage->height))
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (ximage->format != ZPixmap)
{
size_t
extent;
extent=length;
length*=ximage->depth;
if (CheckOverflowException(length,extent,ximage->depth))
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
ximage->data=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*ximage->data));
if (ximage->data == (char *) NULL)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,(unsigned char *) ximage->data);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
/*
Convert image to MIFF format.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) ximage->width;
image->rows=(size_t) ximage->height;
image->depth=8;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if ((header.ncolors == 0U) || (ximage->red_mask != 0) ||
(ximage->green_mask != 0) || (ximage->blue_mask != 0))
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
else
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=header.ncolors;
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
switch (image->storage_class)
{
case DirectClass:
default:
{
register size_t
color;
size_t
blue_mask,
blue_shift,
green_mask,
green_shift,
red_mask,
red_shift;
/*
Determine shift and mask for red, green, and blue.
*/
red_mask=ximage->red_mask;
red_shift=0;
while ((red_mask != 0) && ((red_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
red_mask>>=1;
red_shift++;
}
green_mask=ximage->green_mask;
green_shift=0;
while ((green_mask != 0) && ((green_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
green_mask>>=1;
green_shift++;
}
blue_mask=ximage->blue_mask;
blue_shift=0;
while ((blue_mask != 0) && ((blue_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
blue_mask>>=1;
blue_shift++;
}
/*
Convert X image to DirectClass packets.
*/
if ((image->colors != 0) && (authentic_colormap != MagickFalse))
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=XGetPixel(ximage,(int) x,(int) y);
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
red_shift) & red_mask,exception);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
colors[(ssize_t) index].red),q);
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
green_shift) & green_mask,exception);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
colors[(ssize_t) index].green),q);
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
blue_shift) & blue_mask,exception);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
colors[(ssize_t) index].blue),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
else
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=XGetPixel(ximage,(int) x,(int) y);
color=(pixel >> red_shift) & red_mask;
if (red_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/red_mask;
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color),q);
color=(pixel >> green_shift) & green_mask;
if (green_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/green_mask;
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color),
q);
color=(pixel >> blue_shift) & blue_mask;
if (blue_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/blue_mask;
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case PseudoClass:
{
/*
Convert X image to PseudoClass packets.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(
colors[i].red);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(
colors[i].green);
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(
colors[i].blue);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t)
XGetPixel(ximage,(int) x,(int) y),exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
/*
Free image and colormap.
*/
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The XWD image (X Window System window dumping file) parsing component in ImageMagick 7.0.8-41 Q16 allows attackers to cause a denial-of-service (application crash resulting from an out-of-bounds Read) in ReadXWDImage in coders/xwd.c by crafting a corrupted XWD image file, a different vulnerability than CVE-2019-11472.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1553
|
Medium
| 169,556
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __init pf_init(void)
{ /* preliminary initialisation */
struct pf_unit *pf;
int unit;
if (disable)
return -EINVAL;
pf_init_units();
if (pf_detect())
return -ENODEV;
pf_busy = 0;
if (register_blkdev(major, name)) {
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++)
put_disk(pf->disk);
return -EBUSY;
}
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++) {
struct gendisk *disk = pf->disk;
if (!pf->present)
continue;
disk->private_data = pf;
add_disk(disk);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.9. There is a NULL pointer dereference for a pf data structure if alloc_disk fails in drivers/block/paride/pf.c.
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
Low
| 169,523
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WT_InterpolateMono (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_I32 *pMixBuffer;
const EAS_I8 *pLoopEnd;
const EAS_I8 *pCurrentPhaseInt;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
EAS_I32 gain;
EAS_I32 gainIncrement;
EAS_I32 currentPhaseFrac;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 tmp2;
EAS_I8 *pLoopStart;
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pMixBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pMixBuffer;
/* calculate gain increment */
gainIncrement = (pWTIntFrame->gainTarget - pWTIntFrame->prevGain) << (16 - SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
if (gainIncrement < 0)
gainIncrement++;
gain = pWTIntFrame->prevGain << 16;
pCurrentPhaseInt = pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum;
currentPhaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->phaseIncrement;
pLoopStart = pWTVoice->pLoopStart;
pLoopEnd = pWTVoice->pLoopEnd + 1;
InterpolationLoop:
tmp0 = (EAS_I32)(pCurrentPhaseInt - pLoopEnd);
if (tmp0 >= 0)
pCurrentPhaseInt = pLoopStart + tmp0;
tmp0 = *pCurrentPhaseInt;
tmp1 = *(pCurrentPhaseInt + 1);
tmp2 = phaseInc + currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp1 - tmp0;
tmp1 = tmp1 * currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp0 + (tmp1 >> NUM_EG1_FRAC_BITS);
pCurrentPhaseInt += (tmp2 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
currentPhaseFrac = tmp2 & PHASE_FRAC_MASK;
gain += gainIncrement;
tmp2 = (gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
tmp0 = *pMixBuffer;
tmp2 = tmp1 * tmp2;
tmp2 = (tmp2 >> 9);
tmp0 = tmp2 + tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp0;
numSamples--;
if (numSamples > 0)
goto InterpolationLoop;
pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum = pCurrentPhaseInt;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = currentPhaseFrac;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide>*/
pWTVoice->gain = (EAS_I16)(gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sonivox in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for a negative number of samples, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtengine.c and arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtsynth.c, aka internal bug 26366256.
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
|
Low
| 174,602
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Segment::DoLoadClusterUnknownSize(
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
assert(m_pos < 0);
assert(m_pUnknownSize);
#if 0
assert(m_pUnknownSize->GetElementSize() < 0); //TODO: verify this
const long long element_start = m_pUnknownSize->m_element_start;
pos = -m_pos;
assert(pos > element_start);
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
long long element_size = -1;
for (;;) //determine cluster size
{
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
{
element_size = total - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
{
element_size = segment_stop - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
if ((id == 0x0F43B675) || (id == 0x0C53BB6B)) //Cluster ID or Cues ID
{
element_size = pos - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
#ifdef _DEBUG
switch (id)
{
case 0x20: //BlockGroup
case 0x23: //Simple Block
case 0x67: //TimeCode
case 0x2B: //PrevSize
break;
default:
assert(false);
break;
}
#endif
pos += len; //consume ID (of sub-element)
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field of element
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //not allowed for sub-elements
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop)) //weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; //consume payload of sub-element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
} //determine cluster size
assert(element_size >= 0);
m_pos = element_start + element_size;
m_pUnknownSize = 0;
return 2; //continue parsing
#else
const long status = m_pUnknownSize->Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //error or underflow
return status;
if (status == 0) //parsed a block
return 2; //continue parsing
assert(status > 0); //nothing left to parse of this cluster
const long long start = m_pUnknownSize->m_element_start;
const long long size = m_pUnknownSize->GetElementSize();
assert(size >= 0);
pos = start + size;
m_pos = pos;
m_pUnknownSize = 0;
return 2; //continue parsing
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,265
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: purgekeys_2_svc(purgekeys_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name, service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_purgekeys";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_MODIFY,
arg->princ, NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg, &client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_purgekeys((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepkvno);
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 167,522
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int validation_gamma(int argc, char **argv)
{
double gamma[9] = { 2.2, 1.8, 1.52, 1.45, 1., 1/1.45, 1/1.52, 1/1.8, 1/2.2 };
double maxerr;
int i, silent=0, onlygamma=0;
/* Silence the output with -s, just test the gamma functions with -g: */
while (--argc > 0)
if (strcmp(*++argv, "-s") == 0)
silent = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-g") == 0)
onlygamma = 1;
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "unknown argument %s\n", *argv);
return 1;
}
if (!onlygamma)
{
/* First validate the log functions: */
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<256; ++i)
{
double correct = -log(i/255.)/log(2.)*65536;
double error = png_log8bit(i) - correct;
if (i != 0 && fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (i == 0 && png_log8bit(i) != 0xffffffff ||
i != 0 && png_log8bit(i) != floor(correct+.5))
{
fprintf(stderr, "8 bit log error: %d: got %u, expected %f\n",
i, png_log8bit(i), correct);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 8 bit log error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<65536; ++i)
{
double correct = -log(i/65535.)/log(2.)*65536;
double error = png_log16bit(i) - correct;
if (i != 0 && fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (i == 0 && png_log16bit(i) != 0xffffffff ||
i != 0 && png_log16bit(i) != floor(correct+.5))
{
if (error > .68) /* By experiment error is less than .68 */
{
fprintf(stderr, "16 bit log error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_log16bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 16 bit log error = %f\n", maxerr);
/* Now exponentiations. */
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * (65536. * 65536);
double error = png_exp(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > 1883) /* By experiment. */
{
fprintf(stderr, "32 bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 32 bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * 255;
double error = png_exp8bit(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > .50002) /* By experiment */
{
fprintf(stderr, "8 bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp8bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 8 bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * 65535;
double error = png_exp16bit(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > .524) /* By experiment */
{
fprintf(stderr, "16 bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp16bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 16 bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
} /* !onlygamma */
/* Test the overall gamma correction. */
for (i=0; i<9; ++i)
{
unsigned j;
double g = gamma[i];
png_fixed_point gfp = floor(g * PNG_FP_1 + .5);
if (!silent)
printf("Test gamma %f\n", g);
maxerr = 0;
for (j=0; j<256; ++j)
{
double correct = pow(j/255., g) * 255;
png_byte out = png_gamma_8bit_correct(j, gfp);
double error = out - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (out != floor(correct+.5))
{
fprintf(stderr, "8bit %d ^ %f: got %d expected %f error %f\n",
j, g, out, correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("gamma %f: maximum 8 bit error %f\n", g, maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (j=0; j<65536; ++j)
{
double correct = pow(j/65535., g) * 65535;
png_uint_16 out = png_gamma_16bit_correct(j, gfp);
double error = out - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > 1.62)
{
fprintf(stderr, "16bit %d ^ %f: got %d expected %f error %f\n",
j, g, out, correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("gamma %f: maximum 16 bit error %f\n", g, maxerr);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,720
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: modify_policy_2_svc(mpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_MODIFY, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 167,520
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void flush_tmregs_to_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/*
* If task is not current, it will have been flushed already to
* it's thread_struct during __switch_to().
*
* A reclaim flushes ALL the state or if not in TM save TM SPRs
* in the appropriate thread structures from live.
*/
if (tsk != current)
return;
if (MSR_TM_SUSPENDED(mfmsr())) {
tm_reclaim_current(TM_CAUSE_SIGNAL);
} else {
tm_enable();
tm_save_sprs(&(tsk->thread));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the flush_tmregs_to_thread function in arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.5, a guest kernel crash can be triggered from unprivileged userspace during a core dump on a POWER host due to a missing processor feature check and an erroneous use of transactional memory (TM) instructions in the core dump path, leading to a denial of service.
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
Low
| 169,356
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void buffer_slow_realign(struct buffer *buf)
{
/* two possible cases :
* - the buffer is in one contiguous block, we move it in-place
* - the buffer is in two blocks, we move it via the swap_buffer
*/
if (buf->i) {
int block1 = buf->i;
int block2 = 0;
if (buf->p + buf->i > buf->data + buf->size) {
/* non-contiguous block */
block1 = buf->data + buf->size - buf->p;
block2 = buf->p + buf->i - (buf->data + buf->size);
}
if (block2)
memcpy(swap_buffer, buf->data, block2);
memmove(buf->data, buf->p, block1);
if (block2)
memcpy(buf->data + block1, swap_buffer, block2);
}
buf->p = buf->data;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The buffer_slow_realign function in HAProxy 1.5.x before 1.5.14 and 1.6-dev does not properly realign a buffer that is used for pending outgoing data, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information (uninitialized memory contents of previous requests) via a crafted request.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,714
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::RequestConfirmation(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
uint32 passkey,
const ConfirmationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(device_path == object_path_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": RequestConfirmation: " << passkey;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_CONFIRM_PASSKEY,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
DCHECK(confirmation_callback_.is_null());
confirmation_callback_ = callback;
pairing_delegate_->ConfirmPasskey(this, passkey);
pairing_delegate_used_ = true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,235
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
struct bpf_binary_header *header = NULL;
int proglen, oldproglen = 0;
struct jit_context ctx = {};
u8 *image = NULL;
int *addrs;
int pass;
int i;
if (!bpf_jit_enable)
return;
if (!prog || !prog->len)
return;
addrs = kmalloc(prog->len * sizeof(*addrs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!addrs)
return;
/* Before first pass, make a rough estimation of addrs[]
* each bpf instruction is translated to less than 64 bytes
*/
for (proglen = 0, i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
proglen += 64;
addrs[i] = proglen;
}
ctx.cleanup_addr = proglen;
for (pass = 0; pass < 10; pass++) {
proglen = do_jit(prog, addrs, image, oldproglen, &ctx);
if (proglen <= 0) {
image = NULL;
if (header)
bpf_jit_binary_free(header);
goto out;
}
if (image) {
if (proglen != oldproglen) {
pr_err("bpf_jit: proglen=%d != oldproglen=%d\n",
proglen, oldproglen);
goto out;
}
break;
}
if (proglen == oldproglen) {
header = bpf_jit_binary_alloc(proglen, &image,
1, jit_fill_hole);
if (!header)
goto out;
}
oldproglen = proglen;
}
if (bpf_jit_enable > 1)
bpf_jit_dump(prog->len, proglen, 0, image);
if (image) {
bpf_flush_icache(header, image + proglen);
set_memory_ro((unsigned long)header, header->pages);
prog->bpf_func = (void *)image;
prog->jited = true;
}
out:
kfree(addrs);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The bpf_int_jit_compile function in arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by creating a packet filter and then loading crafted BPF instructions that trigger late convergence by the JIT compiler.
Commit Message: x86: bpf_jit: fix compilation of large bpf programs
x86 has variable length encoding. x86 JIT compiler is trying
to pick the shortest encoding for given bpf instruction.
While doing so the jump targets are changing, so JIT is doing
multiple passes over the program. Typical program needs 3 passes.
Some very short programs converge with 2 passes. Large programs
may need 4 or 5. But specially crafted bpf programs may hit the
pass limit and if the program converges on the last iteration
the JIT compiler will be producing an image full of 'int 3' insns.
Fix this corner case by doing final iteration over bpf program.
Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,611
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
char buf_space[11]; /* Request this many bytes in initial read.
* We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos
* ('type == 3') correctly only when the following
* is in a single record, which is not guaranteed by
* the protocol specification:
* Byte Content
* 0 type \
* 1/2 version > record header
* 3/4 length /
* 5 msg_type \
* 6-8 length > Client Hello message
* 9/10 client_version /
*/
char *buf= &(buf_space[0]);
unsigned char *p,*d,*d_len,*dd;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int csl,sil,cl;
int n=0,j;
int type=0;
int v[2];
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
/* read the initial header */
v[0]=v[1]=0;
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) goto err;
n=ssl23_read_bytes(s, sizeof buf_space);
if (n != sizeof buf_space) return(n); /* n == -1 || n == 0 */
p=s->packet;
memcpy(buf,p,n);
if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO))
{
/*
* SSLv2 header
*/
if ((p[3] == 0x00) && (p[4] == 0x02))
{
v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
/* SSLv2 */
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
type=1;
}
else if (p[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
{
v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
/* SSLv3/TLSv1 */
if (p[4] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
{
if (p[4] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
{
s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (p[4] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
{
s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
/* type=2; */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
{
type=1;
}
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
/* type=2; */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
type=1;
}
}
else if ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
(p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
(p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5 /* silly record length? */)
|| (p[9] >= p[1])))
{
/*
* SSLv3 or tls1 header
*/
v[0]=p[1]; /* major version (= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) */
/* We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message
* to get the correct minor version.
* However if we have only a pathologically small fragment of the
* Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
* to read more records to find out.
* No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
* so we simply reject such connections to avoid
* protocol version downgrade attacks. */
if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
* which will use the highest version 3 we support.
* If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
* this....
*/
if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
v[1]=0xff;
else
v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
{
if (v[1] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
{
s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (v[1] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
{
s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
type=3;
}
}
else
{
/* client requests SSL 3.0 */
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
/* we won't be able to use TLS of course,
* but this will send an appropriate alert */
s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
type=3;
}
}
}
else if ((strncmp("GET ", (char *)p,4) == 0) ||
(strncmp("POST ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
(strncmp("HEAD ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
(strncmp("PUT ", (char *)p,4) == 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
goto err;
}
else if (strncmp("CONNECT",(char *)p,7) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
goto err;
}
}
/* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
goto err;
}
#endif
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
goto err;
}
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B)
{
/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header
* (other cases skip this state) */
type=2;
p=s->packet;
v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
v[1] = p[4];
/* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
* record. It's format is:
* Byte Content
* 0-1 msg_length
* 2 msg_type
* 3-4 version
* 5-6 cipher_spec_length
* 7-8 session_id_length
* 9-10 challenge_length
* ... ...
*/
n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
if (n > (1024*4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
if (n < 9)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
/* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
* j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
* packet bytes. */
if (j <= 0) return(j);
ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-HELLO */
p=s->packet;
p+=5;
n2s(p,csl);
n2s(p,sil);
n2s(p,cl);
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if ((csl+sil+cl+11) != s->packet_length) /* We can't have TLS extensions in SSL 2.0 format
* Client Hello, can we? Error condition should be
* '>' otherweise */
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* record header: msg_type ... */
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
/* ... and length (actual value will be written later) */
d_len = d;
d += 3;
/* client_version */
*(d++) = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR; /* == v[0] */
*(d++) = v[1];
/* lets populate the random area */
/* get the challenge_length */
i=(cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:cl;
memset(d,0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
memcpy(&(d[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),&(p[csl+sil]),i);
d+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* no session-id reuse */
*(d++)=0;
/* ciphers */
j=0;
dd=d;
d+=2;
for (i=0; i<csl; i+=3)
{
if (p[i] != 0) continue;
*(d++)=p[i+1];
*(d++)=p[i+2];
j+=2;
}
s2n(j,dd);
/* COMPRESSION */
*(d++)=1;
*(d++)=0;
#if 0
/* copy any remaining data with may be extensions */
p = p+csl+sil+cl;
while (p < s->packet+s->packet_length)
{
*(d++)=*(p++);
}
#endif
i = (d-(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data) - 4;
l2n3((long)i, d_len);
/* get the data reused from the init_buf */
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
s->s3->tmp.message_type=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
s->s3->tmp.message_size=i;
}
/* imaginary new state (for program structure): */
/* s->state = SSL23_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C */
if (type == 1)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
#else
/* we are talking sslv2 */
/* we need to clean up the SSLv3/TLSv1 setup and put in the
* sslv2 stuff. */
if (s->s2 == NULL)
{
if (!ssl2_new(s))
goto err;
}
else
ssl2_clear(s);
if (s->s3 != NULL) ssl3_free(s);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
{
goto err;
}
s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 && s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)
s->s2->ssl2_rollback=0;
else
/* reject SSL 2.0 session if client supports SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0
* (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2) */
s->s2->ssl2_rollback=1;
/* setup the n bytes we have read so we get them from
* the sslv2 buffer */
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
s->packet_length=n;
s->packet= &(s->s2->rbuf[0]);
memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
s->s2->rbuf_left=n;
s->s2->rbuf_offs=0;
s->method=SSLv2_server_method();
s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
#endif
}
if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
{
/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
if (s->method == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
if (type == 3)
{
/* put the 'n' bytes we have read into the input buffer
* for SSLv3 */
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
s->packet_length=n;
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
goto err;
s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
s->s3->rbuf.left=n;
s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
}
else
{
s->packet_length=0;
s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
}
#if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
#endif
s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
}
if ((type < 1) || (type > 3))
{
/* bad, very bad */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
}
s->init_num=0;
if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
return(SSL_accept(s));
err:
if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
return(-1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ssl23_get_client_hello function in s23_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.8zc, 1.0.0o, and 1.0.1j does not properly handle attempts to use unsupported protocols, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) via an unexpected handshake, as demonstrated by an SSLv3 handshake to a no-ssl3 application with certain error handling. NOTE: this issue became relevant after the CVE-2014-3568 fix.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,153
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ssize_t MPEG4DataSource::readAt(off64_t offset, void *data, size_t size) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (offset >= mCachedOffset
&& offset + size <= mCachedOffset + mCachedSize) {
memcpy(data, &mCache[offset - mCachedOffset], size);
return size;
}
return mSource->readAt(offset, data, size);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via invalid size values of NAL units in MP4 data, aka internal bug 19641538.
Commit Message: Add AUtils::isInRange, and use it to detect malformed MPEG4 nal sizes
Bug: 19641538
Change-Id: I5aae3f100846c125decc61eec7cd6563e3f33777
|
Low
| 173,364
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DOMHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
host_ = frame_host;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,745
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteJP2Image(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
const char
*option,
*property;
int
jp2_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
opj_codec_t
*jp2_codec;
OPJ_COLOR_SPACE
jp2_colorspace;
opj_cparameters_t
parameters;
opj_image_cmptparm_t
jp2_info[5];
opj_image_t
*jp2_image;
opj_stream_t
*jp2_stream;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned int
channels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
/*
Initialize JPEG 2000 encoder parameters.
*/
opj_set_default_encoder_parameters(¶meters);
for (i=1; i < 6; i++)
if (((size_t) (1 << (i+2)) > image->columns) &&
((size_t) (1 << (i+2)) > image->rows))
break;
parameters.numresolution=i;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jp2:number-resolutions");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
parameters.numresolution=StringToInteger(option);
parameters.tcp_numlayers=1;
parameters.tcp_rates[0]=0; /* lossless */
parameters.cp_disto_alloc=1;
if ((image_info->quality != 0) && (image_info->quality != 100))
{
parameters.tcp_distoratio[0]=(double) image_info->quality;
parameters.cp_fixed_quality=OPJ_TRUE;
}
if (image_info->extract != (char *) NULL)
{
RectangleInfo
geometry;
int
flags;
/*
Set tile size.
*/
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(image_info->extract,&geometry);
parameters.cp_tdx=(int) geometry.width;
parameters.cp_tdy=(int) geometry.width;
if ((flags & HeightValue) != 0)
parameters.cp_tdy=(int) geometry.height;
if ((flags & XValue) != 0)
parameters.cp_tx0=geometry.x;
if ((flags & YValue) != 0)
parameters.cp_ty0=geometry.y;
parameters.tile_size_on=OPJ_TRUE;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jp2:quality");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
register const char
*p;
/*
Set quality PSNR.
*/
p=option;
for (i=0; sscanf(p,"%f",¶meters.tcp_distoratio[i]) == 1; i++)
{
if (i >= 100)
break;
while ((*p != '\0') && (*p != ','))
p++;
if (*p == '\0')
break;
p++;
}
parameters.tcp_numlayers=i+1;
parameters.cp_fixed_quality=OPJ_TRUE;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jp2:progression-order");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"LRCP") == 0)
parameters.prog_order=OPJ_LRCP;
if (LocaleCompare(option,"RLCP") == 0)
parameters.prog_order=OPJ_RLCP;
if (LocaleCompare(option,"RPCL") == 0)
parameters.prog_order=OPJ_RPCL;
if (LocaleCompare(option,"PCRL") == 0)
parameters.prog_order=OPJ_PCRL;
if (LocaleCompare(option,"CPRL") == 0)
parameters.prog_order=OPJ_CPRL;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jp2:rate");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
register const char
*p;
/*
Set compression rate.
*/
p=option;
for (i=0; sscanf(p,"%f",¶meters.tcp_rates[i]) == 1; i++)
{
if (i > 100)
break;
while ((*p != '\0') && (*p != ','))
p++;
if (*p == '\0')
break;
p++;
}
parameters.tcp_numlayers=i+1;
parameters.cp_disto_alloc=OPJ_TRUE;
}
if (image_info->sampling_factor != (const char *) NULL)
(void) sscanf(image_info->sampling_factor,"%d,%d",
¶meters.subsampling_dx,¶meters.subsampling_dy);
property=GetImageProperty(image,"comment");
if (property != (const char *) NULL)
parameters.cp_comment=property;
channels=3;
jp2_colorspace=OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
if (image->colorspace == YUVColorspace)
{
jp2_colorspace=OPJ_CLRSPC_SYCC;
parameters.subsampling_dx=2;
}
else
{
if (IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse)
{
channels=1;
jp2_colorspace=OPJ_CLRSPC_GRAY;
}
else
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
channels++;
}
parameters.tcp_mct=channels == 3 ? 1 : 0;
ResetMagickMemory(jp2_info,0,sizeof(jp2_info));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) channels; i++)
{
jp2_info[i].prec=(unsigned int) image->depth;
jp2_info[i].bpp=(unsigned int) image->depth;
if ((image->depth == 1) &&
((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"JPT") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"JP2") == 0)))
{
jp2_info[i].prec++; /* OpenJPEG returns exception for depth @ 1 */
jp2_info[i].bpp++;
}
jp2_info[i].sgnd=0;
jp2_info[i].dx=parameters.subsampling_dx;
jp2_info[i].dy=parameters.subsampling_dy;
jp2_info[i].w=(unsigned int) image->columns;
jp2_info[i].h=(unsigned int) image->rows;
}
jp2_image=opj_image_create(channels,jp2_info,jp2_colorspace);
if (jp2_image == (opj_image_t *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(DelegateError,"UnableToEncodeImageFile");
jp2_image->x0=parameters.image_offset_x0;
jp2_image->y0=parameters.image_offset_y0;
jp2_image->x1=(unsigned int) (2*parameters.image_offset_x0+(image->columns-1)*
parameters.subsampling_dx+1);
jp2_image->y1=(unsigned int) (2*parameters.image_offset_y0+(image->rows-1)*
parameters.subsampling_dx+1);
if ((image->depth == 12) &&
((image->columns == 2048) || (image->rows == 1080) ||
(image->columns == 4096) || (image->rows == 2160)))
CinemaProfileCompliance(jp2_image,¶meters);
if (channels == 4)
jp2_image->comps[3].alpha=1;
else
if ((channels == 2) && (jp2_colorspace == OPJ_CLRSPC_GRAY))
jp2_image->comps[1].alpha=1;
/*
Convert to JP2 pixels.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*p;
ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) channels; i++)
{
double
scale;
register int
*q;
scale=(double) ((1UL << jp2_image->comps[i].prec)-1)/QuantumRange;
q=jp2_image->comps[i].data+(y/jp2_image->comps[i].dy*
image->columns/jp2_image->comps[i].dx+x/jp2_image->comps[i].dx);
switch (i)
{
case 0:
{
if (jp2_colorspace == OPJ_CLRSPC_GRAY)
{
*q=(int) (scale*GetPixelLuma(image,p));
break;
}
*q=(int) (scale*p->red);
break;
}
case 1:
{
if (jp2_colorspace == OPJ_CLRSPC_GRAY)
{
*q=(int) (scale*(QuantumRange-p->opacity));
break;
}
*q=(int) (scale*p->green);
break;
}
case 2:
{
*q=(int) (scale*p->blue);
break;
}
case 3:
{
*q=(int) (scale*(QuantumRange-p->opacity));
break;
}
}
}
p++;
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"JPT") == 0)
jp2_codec=opj_create_compress(OPJ_CODEC_JPT);
else
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"J2K") == 0)
jp2_codec=opj_create_compress(OPJ_CODEC_J2K);
else
jp2_codec=opj_create_compress(OPJ_CODEC_JP2);
opj_set_warning_handler(jp2_codec,JP2WarningHandler,&image->exception);
opj_set_error_handler(jp2_codec,JP2ErrorHandler,&image->exception);
opj_setup_encoder(jp2_codec,¶meters,jp2_image);
jp2_stream=opj_stream_create(OPJ_J2K_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE,OPJ_FALSE);
opj_stream_set_read_function(jp2_stream,JP2ReadHandler);
opj_stream_set_write_function(jp2_stream,JP2WriteHandler);
opj_stream_set_seek_function(jp2_stream,JP2SeekHandler);
opj_stream_set_skip_function(jp2_stream,JP2SkipHandler);
opj_stream_set_user_data(jp2_stream,image,NULL);
if (jp2_stream == (opj_stream_t *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(DelegateError,"UnableToEncodeImageFile");
jp2_status=opj_start_compress(jp2_codec,jp2_image,jp2_stream);
if (jp2_status == 0)
ThrowWriterException(DelegateError,"UnableToEncodeImageFile");
if ((opj_encode(jp2_codec,jp2_stream) == 0) ||
(opj_end_compress(jp2_codec,jp2_stream) == 0))
{
opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
ThrowWriterException(DelegateError,"UnableToEncodeImageFile");
}
/*
Free resources.
*/
opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);
opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);
opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.6-2 has a memory leak vulnerability in WriteCALSImage in coders/cals.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/571
|
Medium
| 167,968
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ProcXSendExtensionEvent(ClientPtr client)
{
int ret;
DeviceIntPtr dev;
xEvent *first;
XEventClass *list;
struct tmask tmp[EMASKSIZE];
REQUEST(xSendExtensionEventReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xSendExtensionEventReq);
if (stuff->length !=
bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xSendExtensionEventReq)) + stuff->count +
(stuff->num_events * bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xEvent))))
return BadLength;
ret = dixLookupDevice(&dev, stuff->deviceid, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (ret != Success)
return ret;
if (stuff->num_events == 0)
return ret;
/* The client's event type must be one defined by an extension. */
first = ((xEvent *) &stuff[1]);
if (!((EXTENSION_EVENT_BASE <= first->u.u.type) &&
(first->u.u.type < lastEvent))) {
client->errorValue = first->u.u.type;
return BadValue;
}
list = (XEventClass *) (first + stuff->num_events);
return ret;
ret = (SendEvent(client, dev, stuff->destination,
stuff->propagate, (xEvent *) &stuff[1],
tmp[stuff->deviceid].mask, stuff->num_events));
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the X.Org X server before 2017-06-19, a user authenticated to an X Session could crash or execute code in the context of the X Server by exploiting a stack overflow in the endianness conversion of X Events.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,765
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
char *dest, *src;
char separator = '\0';
dest = src = a->name;
if (*src == '\0') {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid empty pathname");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
#if defined(__CYGWIN__)
cleanup_pathname_win(a);
#endif
/* Skip leading '/'. */
if (*src == '/') {
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Path is absolute");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
separator = *src++;
}
/* Scan the pathname one element at a time. */
for (;;) {
/* src points to first char after '/' */
if (src[0] == '\0') {
break;
} else if (src[0] == '/') {
/* Found '//', ignore second one. */
src++;
continue;
} else if (src[0] == '.') {
if (src[1] == '\0') {
/* Ignore trailing '.' */
break;
} else if (src[1] == '/') {
/* Skip './'. */
src += 2;
continue;
} else if (src[1] == '.') {
if (src[2] == '/' || src[2] == '\0') {
/* Conditionally warn about '..' */
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Path contains '..'");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
}
/*
* Note: Under no circumstances do we
* remove '..' elements. In
* particular, restoring
* '/foo/../bar/' should create the
* 'foo' dir as a side-effect.
*/
}
}
/* Copy current element, including leading '/'. */
if (separator)
*dest++ = '/';
while (*src != '\0' && *src != '/') {
*dest++ = *src++;
}
if (*src == '\0')
break;
/* Skip '/' separator. */
separator = *src++;
}
/*
* We've just copied zero or more path elements, not including the
* final '/'.
*/
if (dest == a->name) {
/*
* Nothing got copied. The path must have been something
* like '.' or '/' or './' or '/././././/./'.
*/
if (separator)
*dest++ = '/';
else
*dest++ = '.';
}
/* Terminate the result. */
*dest = '\0';
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The sandboxing code in libarchive 3.2.0 and earlier mishandles hardlink archive entries of non-zero data size, which might allow remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a crafted archive file.
Commit Message: Fixes for Issue #745 and Issue #746 from Doran Moppert.
|
Low
| 167,136
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CreatePersistentHistogramAllocator() {
GlobalHistogramAllocator::GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram();
GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithLocalMemory(
kAllocatorMemorySize, 0, "HistogramAllocatorTest");
allocator_ = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get()->memory_allocator();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 does not properly maintain own properties, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via crafted JavaScript code that triggers an incorrect cast, related to extensions/renderer/v8_helpers.h and gin/converter.h.
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
|
Medium
| 172,130
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ResourcePrefetchPredictor::PredictPreconnectOrigins(
const GURL& url,
PreconnectPrediction* prediction) const {
DCHECK(!prediction || prediction->requests.empty());
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (initialization_state_ != INITIALIZED)
return false;
url::Origin url_origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
url::Origin redirect_origin;
bool has_any_prediction = GetRedirectEndpointsForPreconnect(
url_origin, *host_redirect_data_, prediction);
if (!GetRedirectOrigin(url_origin, *host_redirect_data_, &redirect_origin)) {
return has_any_prediction;
}
OriginData data;
if (!origin_data_->TryGetData(redirect_origin.host(), &data)) {
return has_any_prediction;
}
if (prediction) {
prediction->host = redirect_origin.host();
prediction->is_redirected = (redirect_origin != url_origin);
}
net::NetworkIsolationKey network_isolation_key(redirect_origin,
redirect_origin);
for (const OriginStat& origin : data.origins()) {
float confidence = static_cast<float>(origin.number_of_hits()) /
(origin.number_of_hits() + origin.number_of_misses());
if (confidence < kMinOriginConfidenceToTriggerPreresolve)
continue;
has_any_prediction = true;
if (prediction) {
if (confidence > kMinOriginConfidenceToTriggerPreconnect) {
prediction->requests.emplace_back(GURL(origin.origin()), 1,
network_isolation_key);
} else {
prediction->requests.emplace_back(GURL(origin.origin()), 0,
network_isolation_key);
}
}
}
return has_any_prediction;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
|
Medium
| 172,382
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AppResult::AppResult(Profile* profile,
const std::string& app_id,
AppListControllerDelegate* controller,
bool is_recommendation)
: profile_(profile),
app_id_(app_id),
controller_(controller),
extension_registry_(NULL) {
set_id(extensions::Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(app_id_).spec());
if (app_list::switches::IsExperimentalAppListEnabled())
set_display_type(is_recommendation ? DISPLAY_RECOMMENDATION : DISPLAY_TILE);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_service()
->GetInstalledExtension(app_id_);
DCHECK(extension);
is_platform_app_ = extension->is_platform_app();
icon_.reset(
new extensions::IconImage(profile_,
extension,
extensions::IconsInfo::GetIcons(extension),
GetPreferredIconDimension(),
extensions::util::GetDefaultAppIcon(),
this));
UpdateIcon();
StartObservingExtensionRegistry();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 32.0.1700.76 on Windows and before 32.0.1700.77 on Mac OS X and Linux allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
|
Low
| 171,725
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebSocket::constructorCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebSocket.Constructor");
if (!args.IsConstructCall())
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("DOM object constructor cannot be called as a function.");
if (ConstructorMode::current() == ConstructorMode::WrapExistingObject)
return args.Holder();
if (args.Length() == 0)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
v8::TryCatch tryCatch;
v8::Handle<v8::String> urlstring = args[0]->ToString();
if (tryCatch.HasCaught())
return throwError(tryCatch.Exception(), args.GetIsolate());
if (urlstring.IsEmpty())
return V8Proxy::throwError(V8Proxy::SyntaxError, "Empty URL", args.GetIsolate());
ScriptExecutionContext* context = getScriptExecutionContext();
if (!context)
return V8Proxy::throwError(V8Proxy::ReferenceError, "WebSocket constructor's associated frame is not available", args.GetIsolate());
const KURL& url = context->completeURL(toWebCoreString(urlstring));
RefPtr<WebSocket> webSocket = WebSocket::create(context);
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
if (args.Length() < 2)
webSocket->connect(url, ec);
else {
v8::Local<v8::Value> protocolsValue = args[1];
if (protocolsValue->IsArray()) {
Vector<String> protocols;
v8::Local<v8::Array> protocolsArray = v8::Local<v8::Array>::Cast(protocolsValue);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < protocolsArray->Length(); ++i) {
v8::TryCatch tryCatchProtocol;
v8::Handle<v8::String> protocol = protocolsArray->Get(v8::Int32::New(i))->ToString();
if (tryCatchProtocol.HasCaught())
return throwError(tryCatchProtocol.Exception(), args.GetIsolate());
protocols.append(toWebCoreString(protocol));
}
webSocket->connect(url, protocols, ec);
} else {
v8::TryCatch tryCatchProtocol;
v8::Handle<v8::String> protocol = protocolsValue->ToString();
if (tryCatchProtocol.HasCaught())
return throwError(tryCatchProtocol.Exception(), args.GetIsolate());
webSocket->connect(url, toWebCoreString(protocol), ec);
}
}
if (ec)
return throwError(ec, args.GetIsolate());
V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(args.Holder(), &info, webSocket.get());
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForActiveDOMObject(webSocket.release(), v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(args.Holder()));
return args.Holder();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,133
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void UpdateContentLengthPrefs(int received_content_length,
int original_content_length,
bool via_data_reduction_proxy) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK_GE(received_content_length, 0);
DCHECK_GE(original_content_length, 0);
if (!g_browser_process)
return;
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (!prefs)
return;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled =
g_browser_process->profile_manager()->GetDefaultProfile()->
GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kSpdyProxyAuthEnabled);
#else
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled = false;
#endif
chrome_browser_net::UpdateContentLengthPrefs(
received_content_length,
original_content_length,
with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled,
via_data_reduction_proxy, prefs);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,334
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const Track* Tracks::GetTrackByNumber(long tn) const
{
if (tn < 0)
return NULL;
Track** i = m_trackEntries;
Track** const j = m_trackEntriesEnd;
while (i != j)
{
Track* const pTrack = *i++;
if (pTrack == NULL)
continue;
if (tn == pTrack->GetNumber())
return pTrack;
}
return NULL; //not found
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,371
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Splash::vertFlipImage(SplashBitmap *img, int width, int height,
int nComps) {
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guchar *p0, *p1;
int w;
w = width * nComps;
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guchar *p0, *p1;
int w;
w = width * nComps;
lineBuf = (Guchar *)gmalloc(w);
p0 += width, p1 -= width) {
memcpy(lineBuf, p0, width);
memcpy(p0, p1, width);
memcpy(p1, lineBuf, width);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: poppler before 0.22.1 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via vectors that trigger an "invalid memory access" in (1) splash/Splash.cc, (2) poppler/Function.cc, and (3) poppler/Stream.cc.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,736
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ShellBrowserMain(const content::MainFunctionParams& parameters) {
bool layout_test_mode =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kDumpRenderTree);
base::ScopedTempDir browser_context_path_for_layout_tests;
if (layout_test_mode) {
CHECK(browser_context_path_for_layout_tests.CreateUniqueTempDir());
CHECK(!browser_context_path_for_layout_tests.path().MaybeAsASCII().empty());
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kContentShellDataPath,
browser_context_path_for_layout_tests.path().MaybeAsASCII());
}
scoped_ptr<content::BrowserMainRunner> main_runner_(
content::BrowserMainRunner::Create());
int exit_code = main_runner_->Initialize(parameters);
if (exit_code >= 0)
return exit_code;
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kCheckLayoutTestSysDeps)) {
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, MessageLoop::QuitClosure());
main_runner_->Run();
main_runner_->Shutdown();
return 0;
}
if (layout_test_mode) {
content::WebKitTestController test_controller;
std::string test_string;
CommandLine::StringVector args =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetArgs();
size_t command_line_position = 0;
bool ran_at_least_once = false;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
std::cout << "#READY\n";
std::cout.flush();
#endif
while (GetNextTest(args, &command_line_position, &test_string)) {
if (test_string.empty())
continue;
if (test_string == "QUIT")
break;
bool enable_pixel_dumps;
std::string pixel_hash;
FilePath cwd;
GURL test_url = GetURLForLayoutTest(
test_string, &cwd, &enable_pixel_dumps, &pixel_hash);
if (!content::WebKitTestController::Get()->PrepareForLayoutTest(
test_url, cwd, enable_pixel_dumps, pixel_hash)) {
break;
}
ran_at_least_once = true;
main_runner_->Run();
if (!content::WebKitTestController::Get()->ResetAfterLayoutTest())
break;
}
if (!ran_at_least_once) {
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, MessageLoop::QuitClosure());
main_runner_->Run();
}
exit_code = 0;
} else {
exit_code = main_runner_->Run();
}
main_runner_->Shutdown();
return exit_code;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The XSS Auditor in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive HTTP Referer information via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [content shell] reset the CWD after each layout test
BUG=111316
R=marja@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11633017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173906 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,469
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Resource::Resource(PluginInstance* instance)
: resource_id_(0), instance_(instance) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to instantiation of the Pepper plug-in.
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,414
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int cipso_v4_validate(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned char **option)
{
unsigned char *opt = *option;
unsigned char *tag;
unsigned char opt_iter;
unsigned char err_offset = 0;
u8 opt_len;
u8 tag_len;
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def = NULL;
u32 tag_iter;
/* caller already checks for length values that are too large */
opt_len = opt[1];
if (opt_len < 8) {
err_offset = 1;
goto validate_return;
}
rcu_read_lock();
doi_def = cipso_v4_doi_search(get_unaligned_be32(&opt[2]));
if (doi_def == NULL) {
err_offset = 2;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
opt_iter = CIPSO_V4_HDR_LEN;
tag = opt + opt_iter;
while (opt_iter < opt_len) {
for (tag_iter = 0; doi_def->tags[tag_iter] != tag[0];)
if (doi_def->tags[tag_iter] == CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID ||
++tag_iter == CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT) {
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
tag_len = tag[1];
if (tag_len > (opt_len - opt_iter)) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
switch (tag[0]) {
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBITMAP:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBM_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
/* We are already going to do all the verification
* necessary at the socket layer so from our point of
* view it is safe to turn these checks off (and less
* work), however, the CIPSO draft says we should do
* all the CIPSO validations here but it doesn't
* really specify _exactly_ what we need to validate
* ... so, just make it a sysctl tunable. */
if (cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid) {
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBM_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_rbm_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_enum_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_RANGE:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_RNG_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_RNG_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_rng_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL:
/* This is a non-standard tag that we only allow for
* local connections, so if the incoming interface is
* not the loopback device drop the packet. */
if (!(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) {
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len != CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
default:
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
tag += tag_len;
opt_iter += tag_len;
}
validate_return_locked:
rcu_read_unlock();
validate_return:
*option = opt + err_offset;
return err_offset;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The cipso_v4_validate function in net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an IPOPT_CIPSO IP_OPTIONS setsockopt system call.
Commit Message: cipso: don't follow a NULL pointer when setsockopt() is called
As reported by Alan Cox, and verified by Lin Ming, when a user
attempts to add a CIPSO option to a socket using the CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL
tag the kernel dies a terrible death when it attempts to follow a NULL
pointer (the skb argument to cipso_v4_validate() is NULL when called via
the setsockopt() syscall).
This patch fixes this by first checking to ensure that the skb is
non-NULL before using it to find the incoming network interface. In
the unlikely case where the skb is NULL and the user attempts to add
a CIPSO option with the _TAG_LOCAL tag we return an error as this is
not something we want to allow.
A simple reproducer, kindly supplied by Lin Ming, although you must
have the CIPSO DOI #3 configure on the system first or you will be
caught early in cipso_v4_validate():
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <string.h>
struct local_tag {
char type;
char length;
char info[4];
};
struct cipso {
char type;
char length;
char doi[4];
struct local_tag local;
};
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int sockfd;
struct cipso cipso = {
.type = IPOPT_CIPSO,
.length = sizeof(struct cipso),
.local = {
.type = 128,
.length = sizeof(struct local_tag),
},
};
memset(cipso.doi, 0, 4);
cipso.doi[3] = 3;
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
#define SOL_IP 0
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_OPTIONS,
&cipso, sizeof(struct cipso));
return 0;
}
CC: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,143
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gs_heap_alloc_bytes(gs_memory_t * mem, uint size, client_name_t cname)
{
gs_malloc_memory_t *mmem = (gs_malloc_memory_t *) mem;
byte *ptr = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
const char *msg;
static const char *const ok_msg = "OK";
# define set_msg(str) (msg = (str))
#else
# define set_msg(str) DO_NOTHING
#endif
/* Exclusive acces so our decisions and changes are 'atomic' */
if (mmem->monitor)
gx_monitor_enter(mmem->monitor);
if (size > mmem->limit - sizeof(gs_malloc_block_t)) {
/* Definitely too large to allocate; also avoids overflow. */
set_msg("exceeded limit");
} else {
uint added = size + sizeof(gs_malloc_block_t);
if (mmem->limit - added < mmem->used)
set_msg("exceeded limit");
else if ((ptr = (byte *) Memento_label(malloc(added), cname)) == 0)
set_msg("failed");
else {
gs_malloc_block_t *bp = (gs_malloc_block_t *) ptr;
/*
* We would like to check that malloc aligns blocks at least as
* strictly as the compiler (as defined by ARCH_ALIGN_MEMORY_MOD).
* However, Microsoft VC 6 does not satisfy this requirement.
* See gsmemory.h for more explanation.
*/
set_msg(ok_msg);
if (mmem->allocated)
mmem->allocated->prev = bp;
bp->next = mmem->allocated;
bp->prev = 0;
bp->size = size;
bp->type = &st_bytes;
bp->cname = cname;
mmem->allocated = bp;
ptr = (byte *) (bp + 1);
mmem->used += size + sizeof(gs_malloc_block_t);
if (mmem->used > mmem->max_used)
mmem->max_used = mmem->used;
}
}
if (mmem->monitor)
gx_monitor_leave(mmem->monitor); /* Done with exclusive access */
/* We don't want to 'fill' under mutex to keep the window smaller */
if (ptr)
gs_alloc_fill(ptr, gs_alloc_fill_alloc, size);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (gs_debug_c('a') || msg != ok_msg)
dmlprintf6(mem, "[a+]gs_malloc(%s)(%u) = 0x%lx: %s, used=%ld, max=%ld\n",
client_name_string(cname), size, (ulong) ptr, msg, mmem->used, mmem->max_used);
#endif
return ptr;
#undef set_msg
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the gs_heap_alloc_bytes function in base/gsmalloc.c in Ghostscript 9.15 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted Postscript (ps) file, as demonstrated by using the ps2pdf command, which triggers an out-of-bounds read or write.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,715
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CoordinatorImpl::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
const std::vector<base::ProcessId>& pids,
GetVmRegionsForHeapProfilerCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
uint64_t dump_guid = ++next_dump_id_;
std::unique_ptr<QueuedVmRegionRequest> request =
std::make_unique<QueuedVmRegionRequest>(dump_guid, std::move(callback));
in_progress_vm_region_requests_[dump_guid] = std::move(request);
std::vector<QueuedRequestDispatcher::ClientInfo> clients;
for (const auto& kv : clients_) {
auto client_identity = kv.second->identity;
const base::ProcessId pid = GetProcessIdForClientIdentity(client_identity);
clients.emplace_back(kv.second->client.get(), pid, kv.second->process_type);
}
QueuedVmRegionRequest* request_ptr =
in_progress_vm_region_requests_[dump_guid].get();
auto os_callback =
base::BindRepeating(&CoordinatorImpl::OnOSMemoryDumpForVMRegions,
base::Unretained(this), dump_guid);
QueuedRequestDispatcher::SetUpAndDispatchVmRegionRequest(request_ptr, clients,
pids, os_callback);
FinalizeVmRegionDumpIfAllManagersReplied(dump_guid);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in ResourceCoordinator in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
|
Medium
| 173,213
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GDataDirectoryService::GDataDirectoryService()
: blocking_task_runner_(NULL),
serialized_size_(0),
largest_changestamp_(0),
origin_(UNINITIALIZED),
weak_ptr_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)) {
root_.reset(new GDataDirectory(NULL, this));
if (!util::IsDriveV2ApiEnabled())
InitializeRootEntry(kGDataRootDirectoryResourceId);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,490
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: zset_outputintent(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
int code = 0;
gx_device *dev = gs_currentdevice(igs);
cmm_dev_profile_t *dev_profile;
stream * s = 0L;
ref * pnval;
ref * pstrmval;
int ncomps, dev_comps;
cmm_profile_t *picc_profile;
int expected = 0;
gs_color_space_index index;
gsicc_manager_t *icc_manager = igs->icc_manager;
cmm_profile_t *source_profile = NULL;
check_type(*op, t_dictionary);
check_dict_read(*op);
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc, imemory, "[icc] Using OutputIntent\n");
/* Get the device structure */
code = dev_proc(dev, get_profile)(dev, &dev_profile);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (dev_profile == NULL) {
code = gsicc_init_device_profile_struct(dev, NULL, 0);
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = dev_proc(dev, get_profile)(dev, &dev_profile);
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
if (dev_profile->oi_profile != NULL) {
return 0; /* Allow only one setting of this object */
}
code = dict_find_string(op, "N", &pnval);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (code == 0)
return_error(gs_error_undefined);
ncomps = pnval->value.intval;
/* verify the DataSource entry. Creat profile from stream */
check_read_file(i_ctx_p, s, pstrmval);
picc_profile = gsicc_profile_new(s, gs_gstate_memory(igs), NULL, 0);
if (picc_profile == NULL)
return gs_throw(gs_error_VMerror, "Creation of ICC profile failed");
picc_profile->num_comps = ncomps;
picc_profile->profile_handle =
gsicc_get_profile_handle_buffer(picc_profile->buffer,
picc_profile->buffer_size,
gs_gstate_memory(igs));
if (picc_profile->profile_handle == NULL) {
rc_decrement(picc_profile,"zset_outputintent");
return -1;
}
picc_profile->data_cs =
gscms_get_profile_data_space(picc_profile->profile_handle,
picc_profile->memory);
switch (picc_profile->data_cs) {
case gsCIEXYZ:
case gsCIELAB:
case gsRGB:
expected = 3;
source_profile = icc_manager->default_rgb;
break;
case gsGRAY:
expected = 1;
source_profile = icc_manager->default_gray;
break;
case gsCMYK:
expected = 4;
source_profile = icc_manager->default_cmyk;
break;
case gsNCHANNEL:
expected = 0;
break;
case gsNAMED:
case gsUNDEFINED:
break;
}
if (expected && ncomps != expected) {
rc_decrement(picc_profile,"zset_outputintent");
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
}
gsicc_init_hash_cs(picc_profile, igs);
/* All is well with the profile. Lets set the stuff that needs to be set */
dev_profile->oi_profile = picc_profile;
picc_profile->name = (char *) gs_alloc_bytes(picc_profile->memory,
MAX_DEFAULT_ICC_LENGTH,
"zset_outputintent");
strncpy(picc_profile->name, OI_PROFILE, strlen(OI_PROFILE));
picc_profile->name[strlen(OI_PROFILE)] = 0;
picc_profile->name_length = strlen(OI_PROFILE);
/* Set the range of the profile */
gsicc_set_icc_range(&picc_profile);
/* If the output device has a different number of componenets, then we are
going to set the output intent as the proofing profile, unless the
proofing profile has already been set.
If the device has the same number of components (and color model) then as
the profile we will use this as the output profile, unless someone has
explicitly set the output profile.
Finally, we will use the output intent profile for the default profile
of the proper Device profile in the icc manager, again, unless someone
has explicitly set this default profile. */
dev_comps = dev_profile->device_profile[0]->num_comps;
index = gsicc_get_default_type(dev_profile->device_profile[0]);
if (ncomps == dev_comps && index < gs_color_space_index_DevicePixel) {
/* The OI profile is the same type as the profile for the device and a
"default" profile for the device was not externally set. So we go
ahead and use the OI profile as the device profile. Care needs to be
taken here to keep from screwing up any device parameters. We will
use a keyword of OIProfile for the user/device parameter to indicate
its usage. Also, note conflicts if one is setting object dependent
color management */
rc_assign(dev_profile->device_profile[0], picc_profile,
"zset_outputintent");
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc, imemory, "[icc] OutputIntent used for device profile\n");
} else {
if (dev_profile->proof_profile == NULL) {
/* This means that we should use the OI profile as the proofing
profile. Note that if someone already has specified a
proofing profile it is unclear what they are trying to do
with the output intent. In this case, we will use it
just for the source data below */
dev_profile->proof_profile = picc_profile;
rc_increment(picc_profile);
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc, imemory, "[icc] OutputIntent used for proof profile\n");
}
}
/* Now the source colors. See which source color space needs to use the
output intent ICC profile */
index = gsicc_get_default_type(source_profile);
if (index < gs_color_space_index_DevicePixel) {
/* source_profile is currently the default. Set it to the OI profile */
switch (picc_profile->data_cs) {
case gsGRAY:
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc, imemory, "[icc] OutputIntent used source Gray\n");
rc_assign(icc_manager->default_gray, picc_profile,
"zset_outputintent");
break;
case gsRGB:
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc, imemory, "[icc] OutputIntent used source RGB\n");
rc_assign(icc_manager->default_rgb, picc_profile,
"zset_outputintent");
break;
case gsCMYK:
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc, imemory, "[icc] OutputIntent used source CMYK\n");
rc_assign(icc_manager->default_cmyk, picc_profile,
"zset_outputintent");
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* Remove the output intent dict from the stack */
pop(1);
return code;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-704
Summary: psi/zicc.c in Artifex Ghostscript before 9.26 allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions because of a setcolorspace type confusion.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,636
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void add_probe(const char *name)
{
struct module_entry *m;
m = get_or_add_modentry(name);
if (!(option_mask32 & (OPT_REMOVE | OPT_SHOW_DEPS))
&& (m->flags & MODULE_FLAG_LOADED)
&& strncmp(m->modname, "symbol:", 7) == 0
) {
G.need_symbols = 1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The add_probe function in modutils/modprobe.c in BusyBox before 1.23.0 allows local users to bypass intended restrictions on loading kernel modules via a / (slash) character in a module name, as demonstrated by an "ifconfig /usbserial up" command or a "mount -t /snd_pcm none /" command.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,398
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::string TestURLLoader::TestUntendedLoad() {
pp::URLRequestInfo request(instance_);
request.SetURL("test_url_loader_data/hello.txt");
request.SetRecordDownloadProgress(true);
TestCompletionCallback callback(instance_->pp_instance(), callback_type());
pp::URLLoader loader(instance_);
callback.WaitForResult(loader.Open(request, callback.GetCallback()));
CHECK_CALLBACK_BEHAVIOR(callback);
ASSERT_EQ(PP_OK, callback.result());
int64_t bytes_received = 0;
int64_t total_bytes_to_be_received = 0;
while (true) {
loader.GetDownloadProgress(&bytes_received, &total_bytes_to_be_received);
if (total_bytes_to_be_received <= 0)
return ReportError("URLLoader::GetDownloadProgress total size",
total_bytes_to_be_received);
if (bytes_received == total_bytes_to_be_received)
break;
if (pp::Module::Get()->core()->IsMainThread()) {
NestedEvent event(instance_->pp_instance());
event.PostSignal(10);
event.Wait();
}
}
std::string body;
std::string error = ReadEntireResponseBody(&loader, &body);
if (!error.empty())
return error;
if (body != "hello\n")
return ReportError("Couldn't read data", callback.result());
PASS();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy by leveraging the mishandling of Document reattachment during destruction, related to FrameLoader.cpp and LocalFrame.cpp.
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
|
Medium
| 173,279
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void GetLoadTimes(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
WebLocalFrame* frame = WebLocalFrame::frameForCurrentContext();
if (!frame) {
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
return;
}
WebDataSource* data_source = frame->dataSource();
if (!data_source) {
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
return;
}
DocumentState* document_state = DocumentState::FromDataSource(data_source);
if (!document_state) {
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
return;
}
double request_time = document_state->request_time().ToDoubleT();
double start_load_time = document_state->start_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double commit_load_time = document_state->commit_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double finish_document_load_time =
document_state->finish_document_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double finish_load_time = document_state->finish_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double first_paint_time = document_state->first_paint_time().ToDoubleT();
double first_paint_after_load_time =
document_state->first_paint_after_load_time().ToDoubleT();
std::string navigation_type =
GetNavigationType(data_source->navigationType());
bool was_fetched_via_spdy = document_state->was_fetched_via_spdy();
bool was_npn_negotiated = document_state->was_npn_negotiated();
std::string npn_negotiated_protocol =
document_state->npn_negotiated_protocol();
bool was_alternate_protocol_available =
document_state->was_alternate_protocol_available();
std::string connection_info = net::HttpResponseInfo::ConnectionInfoToString(
document_state->connection_info());
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> load_times = v8::Object::New(isolate);
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "requestTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, request_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "startLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, start_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "commitLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, commit_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "finishDocumentLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, finish_document_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "finishLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, finish_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "firstPaintTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, first_paint_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "firstPaintAfterLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, first_paint_after_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "navigationType"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, navigation_type.c_str()));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasFetchedViaSpdy"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, was_fetched_via_spdy));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasNpnNegotiated"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, was_npn_negotiated));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "npnNegotiatedProtocol"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, npn_negotiated_protocol.c_str()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasAlternateProtocolAvailable"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, was_alternate_protocol_available));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "connectionInfo"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, connection_info.c_str()));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(load_times);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the GetLoadTimes function in renderer/loadtimes_extension_bindings.cc in the Extensions implementation in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.108 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: Cache csi info before passing it to JS setters.
JS setters invalidate the pointers frame, data_source and document_state.
BUG=590455
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1751553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#379047}
|
Medium
| 172,118
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ext4_xattr_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
{
mb_cache_shrink(sb->s_bdev);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 169,995
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int res_unpack(vorbis_info_residue *info,
vorbis_info *vi,oggpack_buffer *opb){
int j,k;
codec_setup_info *ci=(codec_setup_info *)vi->codec_setup;
memset(info,0,sizeof(*info));
info->type=oggpack_read(opb,16);
if(info->type>2 || info->type<0)goto errout;
info->begin=oggpack_read(opb,24);
info->end=oggpack_read(opb,24);
info->grouping=oggpack_read(opb,24)+1;
info->partitions=(char)(oggpack_read(opb,6)+1);
info->groupbook=(unsigned char)oggpack_read(opb,8);
if(info->groupbook>=ci->books)goto errout;
info->stagemasks=_ogg_malloc(info->partitions*sizeof(*info->stagemasks));
info->stagebooks=_ogg_malloc(info->partitions*8*sizeof(*info->stagebooks));
for(j=0;j<info->partitions;j++){
int cascade=oggpack_read(opb,3);
if(oggpack_read(opb,1))
cascade|=(oggpack_read(opb,5)<<3);
info->stagemasks[j]=cascade;
}
for(j=0;j<info->partitions;j++){
for(k=0;k<8;k++){
if((info->stagemasks[j]>>k)&1){
unsigned char book=(unsigned char)oggpack_read(opb,8);
if(book>=ci->books)goto errout;
info->stagebooks[j*8+k]=book;
if(k+1>info->stages)info->stages=k+1;
}else
info->stagebooks[j*8+k]=0xff;
}
}
if(oggpack_eop(opb))goto errout;
return 0;
errout:
res_clear_info(info);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (n/a). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-62800140.
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
|
Low
| 173,991
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _WM_ParseNewMidi(uint8_t *midi_data, uint32_t midi_size) {
struct _mdi *mdi;
uint32_t tmp_val;
uint32_t midi_type;
uint32_t track_size;
uint8_t **tracks;
uint32_t end_of_tracks = 0;
uint32_t no_tracks;
uint32_t i;
uint32_t divisions = 96;
uint32_t tempo = 500000;
float samples_per_delta_f = 0.0;
uint32_t sample_count = 0;
float sample_count_f = 0.0;
float sample_remainder = 0.0;
uint8_t *sysex_store = NULL;
uint32_t *track_delta;
uint8_t *track_end;
uint32_t smallest_delta = 0;
uint32_t subtract_delta = 0;
uint32_t setup_ret = 0;
if (midi_size < 14) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(too short)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (!memcmp(midi_data, "RIFF", 4)) {
if (midi_size < 34) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(too short)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
midi_data += 20;
midi_size -= 20;
}
if (memcmp(midi_data, "MThd", 4)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_MIDI, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
midi_data += 4;
midi_size -= 4;
/*
* Get Midi Header Size - must always be 6
*/
tmp_val = *midi_data++ << 24;
tmp_val |= *midi_data++ << 16;
tmp_val |= *midi_data++ << 8;
tmp_val |= *midi_data++;
midi_size -= 4;
if (tmp_val != 6) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Get Midi Format - we only support 0, 1 & 2
*/
tmp_val = *midi_data++ << 8;
tmp_val |= *midi_data++;
midi_size -= 2;
if (tmp_val > 2) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
midi_type = tmp_val;
/*
* Get No. of Tracks
*/
tmp_val = *midi_data++ << 8;
tmp_val |= *midi_data++;
midi_size -= 2;
if (tmp_val < 1) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(no tracks)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
no_tracks = tmp_val;
/*
* Check that type 0 midi file has only 1 track
*/
if ((midi_type == 0) && (no_tracks > 1)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID, "(expected 1 track for type 0 midi file, found more)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Get Divisions
*/
divisions = *midi_data++ << 8;
divisions |= *midi_data++;
midi_size -= 2;
if (divisions & 0x00008000) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
samples_per_delta_f = _WM_GetSamplesPerTick(divisions, tempo);
mdi = _WM_initMDI();
_WM_midi_setup_divisions(mdi,divisions);
tracks = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t *) * no_tracks);
track_delta = malloc(sizeof(uint32_t) * no_tracks);
track_end = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t) * no_tracks);
running_event = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t) * no_tracks);
smallest_delta = 0xffffffff;
for (i = 0; i < no_tracks; i++) {
if (midi_size < 8) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(too short)", 0);
goto _end;
}
if (memcmp(midi_data, "MTrk", 4) != 0) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(missing track header)", 0);
goto _end;
}
midi_data += 4;
midi_size -= 4;
track_size = *midi_data++ << 24;
track_size |= *midi_data++ << 16;
track_size |= *midi_data++ << 8;
track_size |= *midi_data++;
midi_size -= 4;
if (midi_size < track_size) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(too short)", 0);
goto _end;
}
if (track_size < 3) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(bad track size)", 0);
goto _end;
}
if ((midi_data[track_size - 3] != 0xFF)
|| (midi_data[track_size - 2] != 0x2F)
|| (midi_data[track_size - 1] != 0x00)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(missing EOT)", 0);
goto _end;
}
tracks[i] = midi_data;
midi_data += track_size;
midi_size -= track_size;
track_end[i] = 0;
running_event[i] = 0;
track_delta[i] = 0;
while (*tracks[i] > 0x7F) {
track_delta[i] = (track_delta[i] << 7) + (*tracks[i] & 0x7F);
tracks[i]++;
}
track_delta[i] = (track_delta[i] << 7) + (*tracks[i] & 0x7F);
tracks[i]++;
if (midi_type == 1 ) {
if (track_delta[i] < smallest_delta) {
smallest_delta = track_delta[i];
}
} else {
/*
* Type 0 & 2 midi only needs delta from 1st track
* for initial sample calculations.
*/
if (i == 0) smallest_delta = track_delta[i];
}
}
subtract_delta = smallest_delta;
sample_count_f = (((float) smallest_delta * samples_per_delta_f) + sample_remainder);
sample_count = (uint32_t) sample_count_f;
sample_remainder = sample_count_f - (float) sample_count;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next += sample_count;
mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += sample_count;
/*
* Handle type 0 & 2 the same, but type 1 differently
*/
if (midi_type == 1) {
/* Type 1 */
while (end_of_tracks != no_tracks) {
smallest_delta = 0;
for (i = 0; i < no_tracks; i++) {
if (track_end[i])
continue;
if (track_delta[i]) {
track_delta[i] -= subtract_delta;
if (track_delta[i]) {
if ((!smallest_delta)
|| (smallest_delta > track_delta[i])) {
smallest_delta = track_delta[i];
}
continue;
}
}
do {
setup_ret = _WM_SetupMidiEvent(mdi, tracks[i], running_event[i]);
if (setup_ret == 0) {
goto _end;
}
if (tracks[i][0] > 0x7f) {
if (tracks[i][0] < 0xf0) {
/* Events 0x80 - 0xef set running event */
running_event[i] = tracks[i][0];
} else if ((tracks[i][0] == 0xf0) || (tracks[i][0] == 0xf7)) {
/* Sysex resets running event */
running_event[i] = 0;
} else if ((tracks[i][0] == 0xff) && (tracks[i][1] == 0x2f) && (tracks[i][2] == 0x00)) {
/* End of Track */
end_of_tracks++;
track_end[i] = 1;
tracks[i] += 3;
goto NEXT_TRACK;
} else if ((tracks[i][0] == 0xff) && (tracks[i][1] == 0x51) && (tracks[i][2] == 0x03)) {
/* Tempo */
tempo = (tracks[i][3] << 16) + (tracks[i][4] << 8)+ tracks[i][5];
if (!tempo)
tempo = 500000;
samples_per_delta_f = _WM_GetSamplesPerTick(divisions, tempo);
}
}
tracks[i] += setup_ret;
if (*tracks[i] > 0x7f) {
do {
track_delta[i] = (track_delta[i] << 7) + (*tracks[i] & 0x7F);
tracks[i]++;
} while (*tracks[i] > 0x7f);
}
track_delta[i] = (track_delta[i] << 7) + (*tracks[i] & 0x7F);
tracks[i]++;
} while (!track_delta[i]);
if ((!smallest_delta) || (smallest_delta > track_delta[i])) {
smallest_delta = track_delta[i];
}
NEXT_TRACK: continue;
}
subtract_delta = smallest_delta;
sample_count_f = (((float) smallest_delta * samples_per_delta_f)
+ sample_remainder);
sample_count = (uint32_t) sample_count_f;
sample_remainder = sample_count_f - (float) sample_count;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next += sample_count;
mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += sample_count;
}
} else {
/* Type 0 & 2 */
if (midi_type == 2) {
mdi->is_type2 = 1;
}
sample_remainder = 0.0;
for (i = 0; i < no_tracks; i++) {
running_event[i] = 0;
do {
setup_ret = _WM_SetupMidiEvent(mdi, tracks[i], running_event[i]);
if (setup_ret == 0) {
goto _end;
}
if (tracks[i][0] > 0x7f) {
if (tracks[i][0] < 0xf0) {
/* Events 0x80 - 0xef set running event */
running_event[i] = tracks[i][0];
} else if ((tracks[i][0] == 0xf0) || (tracks[i][0] == 0xf7)) {
/* Sysex resets running event */
running_event[i] = 0;
} else if ((tracks[i][0] == 0xff) && (tracks[i][1] == 0x2f) && (tracks[i][2] == 0x00)) {
/* End of Track */
track_end[i] = 1;
goto NEXT_TRACK2;
} else if ((tracks[i][0] == 0xff) && (tracks[i][1] == 0x51) && (tracks[i][2] == 0x03)) {
/* Tempo */
tempo = (tracks[i][3] << 16) + (tracks[i][4] << 8)+ tracks[i][5];
if (!tempo)
tempo = 500000;
samples_per_delta_f = _WM_GetSamplesPerTick(divisions, tempo);
}
}
tracks[i] += setup_ret;
track_delta[i] = 0;
if (*tracks[i] > 0x7f) {
do {
track_delta[i] = (track_delta[i] << 7) + (*tracks[i] & 0x7F);
tracks[i]++;
} while (*tracks[i] > 0x7f);
}
track_delta[i] = (track_delta[i] << 7) + (*tracks[i] & 0x7F);
tracks[i]++;
sample_count_f = (((float) track_delta[i] * samples_per_delta_f)
+ sample_remainder);
sample_count = (uint32_t) sample_count_f;
sample_remainder = sample_count_f - (float) sample_count;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count - 1].samples_to_next += sample_count;
mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples += sample_count;
NEXT_TRACK2:
smallest_delta = track_delta[i]; /* Added just to keep Xcode happy */
UNUSED(smallest_delta); /* Added to just keep clang happy */
} while (track_end[i] == 0);
}
}
if ((mdi->reverb = _WM_init_reverb(_WM_SampleRate, _WM_reverb_room_width,
_WM_reverb_room_length, _WM_reverb_listen_posx, _WM_reverb_listen_posy))
== NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_MEM, "to init reverb", 0);
goto _end;
}
mdi->extra_info.current_sample = 0;
mdi->current_event = &mdi->events[0];
mdi->samples_to_mix = 0;
mdi->note = NULL;
_WM_ResetToStart(mdi);
_end: free(sysex_store);
free(track_end);
free(track_delta);
free(running_event);
free(tracks);
if (mdi->reverb) return (mdi);
_WM_freeMDI(mdi);
return (NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The _WM_SetupMidiEvent function in internal_midi.c:2122 in WildMIDI 0.4.2 can cause a denial of service (invalid memory read and application crash) via a crafted mid file.
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
|
Medium
| 168,004
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TestAppInstancesHelper(const std::string& app_name) {
LOG(INFO) << "Start of test.";
extensions::ProcessMap* process_map =
extensions::ProcessMap::Get(browser()->profile());
ASSERT_TRUE(LoadExtension(
test_data_dir_.AppendASCII(app_name)));
const Extension* extension = GetSingleLoadedExtension();
GURL base_url = GetTestBaseURL(app_name);
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURLWithDisposition(
browser(), base_url.Resolve("path1/empty.html"),
WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB,
ui_test_utils::BROWSER_TEST_WAIT_FOR_NAVIGATION);
LOG(INFO) << "Nav 1.";
EXPECT_TRUE(process_map->Contains(
browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(1)->
GetRenderProcessHost()->GetID()));
EXPECT_FALSE(browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(1)->GetWebUI());
content::WindowedNotificationObserver tab_added_observer(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_TAB_ADDED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
chrome::NewTab(browser());
tab_added_observer.Wait();
LOG(INFO) << "New tab.";
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(),
base_url.Resolve("path2/empty.html"));
LOG(INFO) << "Nav 2.";
EXPECT_TRUE(process_map->Contains(
browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(2)->
GetRenderProcessHost()->GetID()));
EXPECT_FALSE(browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(2)->GetWebUI());
ASSERT_EQ(3, browser()->tab_strip_model()->count());
WebContents* tab1 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(1);
WebContents* tab2 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(2);
EXPECT_NE(tab1->GetRenderProcessHost(), tab2->GetRenderProcessHost());
ASSERT_EQ(1u, chrome::GetBrowserCount(browser()->profile()));
OpenWindow(tab1, base_url.Resolve("path1/empty.html"), true, NULL);
LOG(INFO) << "WindowOpenHelper 1.";
OpenWindow(tab2, base_url.Resolve("path2/empty.html"), true, NULL);
LOG(INFO) << "End of test.";
UnloadExtension(extension->id());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 allowed a remote attacker to access Extension pages without authorisation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
|
Medium
| 172,956
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ProxyChannelDelegate::ProxyChannelDelegate()
: shutdown_event_(true, false) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,737
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ixheaacd_complex_anal_filt(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer) {
WORD32 idx;
WORD32 anal_size = 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
WORD32 N = (10 * anal_size);
for (idx = 0; idx < (ptr_hbe_txposer->no_bins >> 1); idx++) {
WORD32 i, j, k, l;
FLOAT32 window_output[640];
FLOAT32 u[128], u_in[256], u_out[256];
FLOAT32 accu_r, accu_i;
const FLOAT32 *inp_signal;
FLOAT32 *anal_buf;
FLOAT32 *analy_cos_sin_tab = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab;
const FLOAT32 *interp_window_coeff = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_wind_coeff;
FLOAT32 *x = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_buf;
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[idx + HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN - 1], 0,
TWICE_QMF_SYNTH_CHANNELS_NUM * sizeof(FLOAT32));
inp_signal = ptr_hbe_txposer->ptr_input_buf +
idx * 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size + 1;
anal_buf = &ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[idx + HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN - 1]
[4 * ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start];
for (i = N - 1; i >= anal_size; i--) {
x[i] = x[i - anal_size];
}
for (i = anal_size - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
x[i] = inp_signal[anal_size - 1 - i];
}
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
window_output[i] = x[i] * interp_window_coeff[i];
}
for (i = 0; i < 2 * anal_size; i++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (j = 0; j < 5; j++) {
accu_r = accu_r + window_output[i + j * 2 * anal_size];
}
u[i] = accu_r;
}
if (anal_size == 40) {
for (i = 1; i < anal_size; i++) {
FLOAT32 temp1 = u[i] + u[2 * anal_size - i];
FLOAT32 temp2 = u[i] - u[2 * anal_size - i];
u[i] = temp1;
u[2 * anal_size - i] = temp2;
}
for (k = 0; k < anal_size; k++) {
accu_r = u[anal_size];
if (k & 1)
accu_i = u[0];
else
accu_i = -u[0];
for (l = 1; l < anal_size; l++) {
accu_r = accu_r + u[0 + l] * analy_cos_sin_tab[2 * l + 0];
accu_i = accu_i + u[2 * anal_size - l] * analy_cos_sin_tab[2 * l + 1];
}
analy_cos_sin_tab += (2 * anal_size);
*anal_buf++ = (FLOAT32)accu_r;
*anal_buf++ = (FLOAT32)accu_i;
}
} else {
FLOAT32 *ptr_u = u_in;
FLOAT32 *ptr_v = u_out;
for (k = 0; k < anal_size * 2; k++) {
*ptr_u++ = ((*analy_cos_sin_tab++) * u[k]);
*ptr_u++ = ((*analy_cos_sin_tab++) * u[k]);
}
if (ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft != NULL)
(*ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft)(u_in, u_out, anal_size * 2);
else
return -1;
for (k = 0; k < anal_size / 2; k++) {
*(anal_buf + 1) = -*ptr_v++;
*anal_buf = *ptr_v++;
anal_buf += 2;
*(anal_buf + 1) = *ptr_v++;
*anal_buf = -*ptr_v++;
anal_buf += 2;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: In ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p3 of ixheaacd_esbr_fft.c there is a possible out of bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-9.0 Android ID: A-110769924
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
|
Medium
| 174,090
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: H264PictureToVaapiDecodeSurface(const scoped_refptr<H264Picture>& pic) {
VaapiH264Picture* vaapi_pic = pic->AsVaapiH264Picture();
CHECK(vaapi_pic);
return vaapi_pic->dec_surface();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
|
High
| 172,803
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: tt_cmap8_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p = table + 4;
FT_Byte* is32;
FT_UInt32 length;
FT_UInt32 num_groups;
if ( table + 16 + 8192 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
length = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( table + length > valid->limit || length < 8208 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
is32 = table + 12;
p = is32 + 8192; /* skip `is32' array */
num_groups = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( p + num_groups * 12 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check groups, they must be in increasing order */
{
FT_UInt32 n, start, end, start_id, count, last = 0;
for ( n = 0; n < num_groups; n++ )
{
FT_UInt hi, lo;
start = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
end = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
start_id = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( start > end )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( n > 0 && start <= last )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
if ( start_id + end - start >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
count = (FT_UInt32)( end - start + 1 );
if ( start & ~0xFFFFU )
{
/* start_hi != 0; check that is32[i] is 1 for each i in */
/* the `hi' and `lo' of the range [start..end] */
for ( ; count > 0; count--, start++ )
{
hi = (FT_UInt)( start >> 16 );
lo = (FT_UInt)( start & 0xFFFFU );
if ( (is32[hi >> 3] & ( 0x80 >> ( hi & 7 ) ) ) == 0 )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( (is32[lo >> 3] & ( 0x80 >> ( lo & 7 ) ) ) == 0 )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
}
else
{
/* start_hi == 0; check that is32[i] is 0 for each i in */
/* the range [start..end] */
/* end_hi cannot be != 0! */
if ( end & ~0xFFFFU )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, start++ )
{
lo = (FT_UInt)( start & 0xFFFFU );
if ( (is32[lo >> 3] & ( 0x80 >> ( lo & 7 ) ) ) != 0 )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
}
}
last = end;
}
}
return SFNT_Err_Ok;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in FreeType 2.3.9 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via vectors related to large values in certain inputs in (1) smooth/ftsmooth.c, (2) sfnt/ttcmap.c, and (3) cff/cffload.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,741
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void encode_frame(vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec,
vpx_image_t *img,
int frame_index,
int flags,
VpxVideoWriter *writer) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt = NULL;
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(codec, img, frame_index, 1,
flags, VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK)
die_codec(codec, "Failed to encode frame");
while ((pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(codec, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
const int keyframe = (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) != 0;
if (!vpx_video_writer_write_frame(writer,
pkt->data.frame.buf,
pkt->data.frame.sz,
pkt->data.frame.pts)) {
die_codec(codec, "Failed to write compressed frame");
}
printf(keyframe ? "K" : ".");
fflush(stdout);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,488
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: make_size_image(png_store* PNG_CONST ps, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
png_byte PNG_CONST bit_depth, int PNG_CONST interlace_type,
png_uint_32 PNG_CONST w, png_uint_32 PNG_CONST h,
int PNG_CONST do_interlace)
{
context(ps, fault);
/* At present libpng does not support the write of an interlaced image unless
* PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED, even with do_interlace so the code here
* does the pixel interlace itself, so:
*/
check_interlace_type(interlace_type);
Try
{
png_infop pi;
png_structp pp;
unsigned int pixel_size;
/* Make a name and get an appropriate id for the store: */
char name[FILE_NAME_SIZE];
PNG_CONST png_uint_32 id = FILEID(colour_type, bit_depth, 0/*palette*/,
interlace_type, w, h, do_interlace);
standard_name_from_id(name, sizeof name, 0, id);
pp = set_store_for_write(ps, &pi, name);
/* In the event of a problem return control to the Catch statement below
* to do the clean up - it is not possible to 'return' directly from a Try
* block.
*/
if (pp == NULL)
Throw ps;
png_set_IHDR(pp, pi, w, h, bit_depth, colour_type, interlace_type,
PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE, PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
#ifdef PNG_TEXT_SUPPORTED
{
static char key[] = "image name"; /* must be writeable */
size_t pos;
png_text text;
char copy[FILE_NAME_SIZE];
/* Use a compressed text string to test the correct interaction of text
* compression and IDAT compression.
*/
text.compression = TEXT_COMPRESSION;
text.key = key;
/* Yuck: the text must be writable! */
pos = safecat(copy, sizeof copy, 0, ps->wname);
text.text = copy;
text.text_length = pos;
text.itxt_length = 0;
text.lang = 0;
text.lang_key = 0;
png_set_text(pp, pi, &text, 1);
}
#endif
if (colour_type == 3) /* palette */
init_standard_palette(ps, pp, pi, 1U << bit_depth, 0/*do tRNS*/);
png_write_info(pp, pi);
/* Calculate the bit size, divide by 8 to get the byte size - this won't
* overflow because we know the w values are all small enough even for
* a system where 'unsigned int' is only 16 bits.
*/
pixel_size = bit_size(pp, colour_type, bit_depth);
if (png_get_rowbytes(pp, pi) != ((w * pixel_size) + 7) / 8)
png_error(pp, "row size incorrect");
else
{
int npasses = npasses_from_interlace_type(pp, interlace_type);
png_uint_32 y;
int pass;
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
int nfilter = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_LAST;
# endif
png_byte image[16][SIZE_ROWMAX];
/* To help consistent error detection make the parts of this buffer
* that aren't set below all '1':
*/
memset(image, 0xff, sizeof image);
if (!do_interlace && npasses != png_set_interlace_handling(pp))
png_error(pp, "write: png_set_interlace_handling failed");
/* Prepare the whole image first to avoid making it 7 times: */
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
size_row(image[y], w * pixel_size, y);
for (pass=0; pass<npasses; ++pass)
{
/* The following two are for checking the macros: */
PNG_CONST png_uint_32 wPass = PNG_PASS_COLS(w, pass);
/* If do_interlace is set we don't call png_write_row for every
* row because some of them are empty. In fact, for a 1x1 image,
* most of them are empty!
*/
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
{
png_const_bytep row = image[y];
png_byte tempRow[SIZE_ROWMAX];
/* If do_interlace *and* the image is interlaced we
* need a reduced interlace row; this may be reduced
* to empty.
*/
if (do_interlace && interlace_type == PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7)
{
/* The row must not be written if it doesn't exist, notice
* that there are two conditions here, either the row isn't
* ever in the pass or the row would be but isn't wide
* enough to contribute any pixels. In fact the wPass test
* can be used to skip the whole y loop in this case.
*/
if (PNG_ROW_IN_INTERLACE_PASS(y, pass) && wPass > 0)
{
/* Set to all 1's for error detection (libpng tends to
* set unset things to 0).
*/
memset(tempRow, 0xff, sizeof tempRow);
interlace_row(tempRow, row, pixel_size, w, pass);
row = tempRow;
}
else
continue;
}
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
/* Only get to here if the row has some pixels in it, set the
* filters to 'all' for the very first row and thereafter to a
* single filter. It isn't well documented, but png_set_filter
* does accept a filter number (per the spec) as well as a bit
* mask.
*
* The apparent wackiness of decrementing nfilter rather than
* incrementing is so that Paeth gets used in all images bigger
* than 1 row - it's the tricky one.
*/
png_set_filter(pp, 0/*method*/,
nfilter >= PNG_FILTER_VALUE_LAST ? PNG_ALL_FILTERS : nfilter);
if (nfilter-- == 0)
nfilter = PNG_FILTER_VALUE_LAST-1;
# endif
png_write_row(pp, row);
}
}
}
#ifdef PNG_TEXT_SUPPORTED
{
static char key[] = "end marker";
static char comment[] = "end";
png_text text;
/* Use a compressed text string to test the correct interaction of text
* compression and IDAT compression.
*/
text.compression = TEXT_COMPRESSION;
text.key = key;
text.text = comment;
text.text_length = (sizeof comment)-1;
text.itxt_length = 0;
text.lang = 0;
text.lang_key = 0;
png_set_text(pp, pi, &text, 1);
}
#endif
png_write_end(pp, pi);
/* And store this under the appropriate id, then clean up. */
store_storefile(ps, id);
store_write_reset(ps);
}
Catch(fault)
{
/* Use the png_store returned by the exception. This may help the compiler
* because 'ps' is not used in this branch of the setjmp. Note that fault
* and ps will always be the same value.
*/
store_write_reset(fault);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,664
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: lldp_private_8023_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *tptr, u_int tlv_len)
{
int subtype, hexdump = FALSE;
if (tlv_len < 4) {
return hexdump;
}
subtype = *(tptr+3);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Subtype (%u)",
tok2str(lldp_8023_subtype_values, "unknown", subtype),
subtype));
switch (subtype) {
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MACPHY:
if (tlv_len < 9) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t autonegotiation [%s] (0x%02x)",
bittok2str(lldp_8023_autonegotiation_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
*(tptr + 4)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t PMD autoneg capability [%s] (0x%04x)",
bittok2str(lldp_pmd_capability_values,"unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+5)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 5)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MAU type %s (0x%04x)",
tok2str(lldp_mau_types_values, "unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+7)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 7)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MDIPOWER:
if (tlv_len < 7) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MDI power support [%s], power pair %s, power class %s",
bittok2str(lldp_mdi_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
tok2str(lldp_mdi_power_pairs_values, "unknown", *(tptr+5)),
tok2str(lldp_mdi_power_class_values, "unknown", *(tptr + 6))));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_LINKAGGR:
if (tlv_len < 9) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t aggregation status [%s], aggregation port ID %u",
bittok2str(lldp_aggregation_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 5)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MTU:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MTU size %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 4)));
break;
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
return hexdump;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The LLDP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-lldp.c:lldp_private_8023_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13054/LLDP: add a missing length check
In lldp_private_8023_print() the case block for subtype 4 (Maximum Frame
Size TLV, IEEE 802.3bc-2009 Section 79.3.4) did not include the length
check and could over-read the input buffer, put it right.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,819
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, getSupportedSignatures)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "MD5", 3, 1);
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "SHA-1", 5, 1);
#ifdef PHAR_HASH_OK
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "SHA-256", 7, 1);
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "SHA-512", 7, 1);
#endif
#if PHAR_HAVE_OPENSSL
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "OpenSSL", 7, 1);
#else
if (zend_hash_exists(&module_registry, "openssl", sizeof("openssl"))) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "OpenSSL", 7, 1);
}
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The phar_convert_to_other function in ext/phar/phar_object.c in PHP before 5.4.43, 5.5.x before 5.5.27, and 5.6.x before 5.6.11 does not validate a file pointer before a close operation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TAR archive that is mishandled in a Phar::convertToData call.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,292
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void file_sb_list_add(struct file *file, struct super_block *sb)
{
if (likely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)))
return;
if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
return;
lg_local_lock(&files_lglock);
__file_sb_list_add(file, sb);
lg_local_unlock(&files_lglock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.13 performs certain operations on lists of files with an inappropriate locking approach, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup or system crash) via unspecified use of Asynchronous I/O (AIO) operations.
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 166,798
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int nfs_readlink_req(struct nfs_priv *npriv, struct nfs_fh *fh,
char **target)
{
uint32_t data[1024];
uint32_t *p;
uint32_t len;
struct packet *nfs_packet;
/*
* struct READLINK3args {
* nfs_fh3 symlink;
* };
*
* struct READLINK3resok {
* post_op_attr symlink_attributes;
* nfspath3 data;
* };
*
* struct READLINK3resfail {
* post_op_attr symlink_attributes;
* }
*
* union READLINK3res switch (nfsstat3 status) {
* case NFS3_OK:
* READLINK3resok resok;
* default:
* READLINK3resfail resfail;
* };
*/
p = &(data[0]);
p = rpc_add_credentials(p);
p = nfs_add_fh3(p, fh);
len = p - &(data[0]);
nfs_packet = rpc_req(npriv, PROG_NFS, NFSPROC3_READLINK, data, len);
if (IS_ERR(nfs_packet))
return PTR_ERR(nfs_packet);
p = (void *)nfs_packet->data + sizeof(struct rpc_reply) + 4;
p = nfs_read_post_op_attr(p, NULL);
len = ntoh32(net_read_uint32(p)); /* new path length */
p++;
*target = xzalloc(len + 1);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Pengutronix barebox through 2019.08.1 has a remote buffer overflow in nfs_readlink_req in fs/nfs.c because a length field is directly used for a memcpy.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,624
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiVP8Accelerator::CreateVP8Picture() {
scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface> va_surface = vaapi_dec_->CreateSurface();
if (!va_surface)
return nullptr;
return new VaapiVP8Picture(std::move(va_surface));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
|
High
| 172,798
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Track::ParseContentEncodingsEntry(long long start, long long size) {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
assert(pReader);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
int count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) // ContentEncoding ID
++count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (count <= 0)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_ = new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding* [count];
if (!content_encoding_entries_)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_end_ = content_encoding_entries_;
pos = start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) { // ContentEncoding ID
ContentEncoding* const content_encoding =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding();
if (!content_encoding)
return -1;
status = content_encoding->ParseContentEncodingEntry(pos, size, pReader);
if (status) {
delete content_encoding;
return status;
}
*content_encoding_entries_end_++ = content_encoding;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,851
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ActionReply Smb4KMountHelper::mount(const QVariantMap &args)
{
ActionReply reply;
QMapIterator<QString, QVariant> it(args);
proc.setOutputChannelMode(KProcess::SeparateChannels);
proc.setProcessEnvironment(QProcessEnvironment::systemEnvironment());
#if defined(Q_OS_LINUX)
proc.setEnv("PASSWD", entry["mh_url"].toUrl().password(), true);
#endif
QVariantMap entry = it.value().toMap();
KProcess proc(this);
command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList();
#elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD)
command << entry["mh_command"].toString();
command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList();
command << entry["mh_unc"].toString();
command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
#else
#endif
proc.setProgram(command);
proc.start();
if (proc.waitForStarted(-1))
{
bool userKill = false;
QStringList command;
#if defined(Q_OS_LINUX)
command << entry["mh_command"].toString();
command << entry["mh_unc"].toString();
command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList();
#elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD)
command << entry["mh_command"].toString();
command << entry["mh_options"].toStringList();
command << entry["mh_unc"].toString();
command << entry["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
else
{
}
if (HelperSupport::isStopped())
{
proc.kill();
userKill = true;
break;
}
else
{
}
}
if (proc.exitStatus() == KProcess::CrashExit)
{
if (!userKill)
{
reply.setType(ActionReply::HelperErrorType);
reply.setErrorDescription(i18n("The mount process crashed."));
break;
}
else
{
}
}
else
{
QString stdErr = QString::fromUtf8(proc.readAllStandardError());
reply.addData(QString("mh_error_message_%1").arg(index), stdErr.trimmed());
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: smb4k before 2.0.1 allows local users to gain root privileges by leveraging failure to verify arguments to the mount helper DBUS service.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,827
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_scale_16_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
if (that->bit_depth == 16)
{
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 8;
if (that->red_sBIT > 8) that->red_sBIT = 8;
if (that->green_sBIT > 8) that->green_sBIT = 8;
if (that->blue_sBIT > 8) that->blue_sBIT = 8;
if (that->alpha_sBIT > 8) that->alpha_sBIT = 8;
}
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,646
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ip6_frag_queue(struct frag_queue *fq, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct frag_hdr *fhdr, int nhoff)
{
struct sk_buff *prev, *next;
struct net_device *dev;
int offset, end;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
if (fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_COMPLETE)
goto err;
offset = ntohs(fhdr->frag_off) & ~0x7;
end = offset + (ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len) -
((u8 *)(fhdr + 1) - (u8 *)(ipv6_hdr(skb) + 1)));
if ((unsigned int)end > IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
icmpv6_param_prob(skb, ICMPV6_HDR_FIELD,
((u8 *)&fhdr->frag_off -
skb_network_header(skb)));
return -1;
}
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE) {
const unsigned char *nh = skb_network_header(skb);
skb->csum = csum_sub(skb->csum,
csum_partial(nh, (u8 *)(fhdr + 1) - nh,
0));
}
/* Is this the final fragment? */
if (!(fhdr->frag_off & htons(IP6_MF))) {
/* If we already have some bits beyond end
* or have different end, the segment is corrupted.
*/
if (end < fq->q.len ||
((fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) && end != fq->q.len))
goto err;
fq->q.last_in |= INET_FRAG_LAST_IN;
fq->q.len = end;
} else {
/* Check if the fragment is rounded to 8 bytes.
* Required by the RFC.
*/
if (end & 0x7) {
/* RFC2460 says always send parameter problem in
* this case. -DaveM
*/
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
icmpv6_param_prob(skb, ICMPV6_HDR_FIELD,
offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, payload_len));
return -1;
}
if (end > fq->q.len) {
/* Some bits beyond end -> corruption. */
if (fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_LAST_IN)
goto err;
fq->q.len = end;
}
}
if (end == offset)
goto err;
/* Point into the IP datagram 'data' part. */
if (!pskb_pull(skb, (u8 *) (fhdr + 1) - skb->data))
goto err;
if (pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, end - offset))
goto err;
/* Find out which fragments are in front and at the back of us
* in the chain of fragments so far. We must know where to put
* this fragment, right?
*/
prev = fq->q.fragments_tail;
if (!prev || FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset < offset) {
next = NULL;
goto found;
}
prev = NULL;
for(next = fq->q.fragments; next != NULL; next = next->next) {
if (FRAG6_CB(next)->offset >= offset)
break; /* bingo! */
prev = next;
}
found:
/* We found where to put this one. Check for overlap with
* preceding fragment, and, if needed, align things so that
* any overlaps are eliminated.
*/
if (prev) {
int i = (FRAG6_CB(prev)->offset + prev->len) - offset;
if (i > 0) {
offset += i;
if (end <= offset)
goto err;
if (!pskb_pull(skb, i))
goto err;
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
}
}
/* Look for overlap with succeeding segments.
* If we can merge fragments, do it.
*/
while (next && FRAG6_CB(next)->offset < end) {
int i = end - FRAG6_CB(next)->offset; /* overlap is 'i' bytes */
if (i < next->len) {
/* Eat head of the next overlapped fragment
* and leave the loop. The next ones cannot overlap.
*/
if (!pskb_pull(next, i))
goto err;
FRAG6_CB(next)->offset += i; /* next fragment */
fq->q.meat -= i;
if (next->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY)
next->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
break;
} else {
struct sk_buff *free_it = next;
/* Old fragment is completely overridden with
* new one drop it.
*/
next = next->next;
if (prev)
prev->next = next;
else
fq->q.fragments = next;
fq->q.meat -= free_it->len;
frag_kfree_skb(fq->q.net, free_it);
}
}
FRAG6_CB(skb)->offset = offset;
/* Insert this fragment in the chain of fragments. */
skb->next = next;
if (!next)
fq->q.fragments_tail = skb;
if (prev)
prev->next = skb;
else
fq->q.fragments = skb;
dev = skb->dev;
if (dev) {
fq->iif = dev->ifindex;
skb->dev = NULL;
}
fq->q.stamp = skb->tstamp;
fq->q.meat += skb->len;
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &fq->q.net->mem);
/* The first fragment.
* nhoffset is obtained from the first fragment, of course.
*/
if (offset == 0) {
fq->nhoffset = nhoff;
fq->q.last_in |= INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN;
}
if (fq->q.last_in == (INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN | INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) &&
fq->q.meat == fq->q.len)
return ip6_frag_reasm(fq, prev, dev);
write_lock(&ip6_frags.lock);
list_move_tail(&fq->q.lru_list, &fq->q.net->lru_list);
write_unlock(&ip6_frags.lock);
return -1;
err:
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_REASMFAILS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The ip6_frag_queue function in net/ipv6/reassembly.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.36 allows remote attackers to bypass intended network restrictions via overlapping IPv6 fragments.
Commit Message: ipv6: discard overlapping fragment
RFC5722 prohibits reassembling fragments when some data overlaps.
Bug spotted by Zhang Zuotao <zuotao.zhang@6wind.com>.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,539
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item = NULL;
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) {
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
}
while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) {
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The DTLS implementation in OpenSSL before 1.1.0 does not properly restrict the lifetime of queue entries associated with unused out-of-order messages, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by maintaining many crafted DTLS sessions simultaneously, related to d1_lib.c, statem_dtls.c, statem_lib.c, and statem_srvr.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,195
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::UpdateFrameHost(
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (frame_host == frame_host_) {
if (frame_host && !render_frame_alive_) {
render_frame_alive_ = true;
for (auto* inspector : protocol::InspectorHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
inspector->TargetReloadedAfterCrash();
MaybeReattachToRenderFrame();
}
return;
}
if (frame_host && !ShouldCreateDevToolsForHost(frame_host)) {
DestroyOnRenderFrameGone();
return;
}
if (IsAttached())
RevokePolicy();
frame_host_ = frame_host;
agent_ptr_.reset();
if (!render_frame_alive_) {
render_frame_alive_ = true;
for (auto* inspector : protocol::InspectorHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
inspector->TargetReloadedAfterCrash();
}
if (IsAttached()) {
GrantPolicy();
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions()) {
session->SetRenderer(frame_host ? frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID() : -1,
frame_host);
}
MaybeReattachToRenderFrame();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Allowing the chrome.debugger API to attach to Web UI pages in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
|
Medium
| 173,250
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: CString fileSystemRepresentation(const String&)
{
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return "";
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: [WIN] Implement WebCore::fileSystemRepresentation() for !USE(CF)
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=104456
Reviewed by Brent Fulgham.
Convert the UTF-16 path to the system default Windows ANSI code page (usually Windows Latin1).
* platform/win/FileSystemWin.cpp:
(WebCore::fileSystemRepresentation):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137547 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,759
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t k90_show_macro_mode(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
int ret;
struct usb_interface *usbif = to_usb_interface(dev->parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif);
const char *macro_mode;
char data[8];
ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0),
K90_REQUEST_GET_MODE,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_VENDOR |
USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, 0, data, 2,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "Failed to get K90 initial mode (error %d).\n",
ret);
return -EIO;
}
switch (data[0]) {
case K90_MACRO_MODE_HW:
macro_mode = "HW";
break;
case K90_MACRO_MODE_SW:
macro_mode = "SW";
break;
default:
dev_warn(dev, "K90 in unknown mode: %02hhx.\n",
data[0]);
return -EIO;
}
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", macro_mode);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/hid/hid-corsair.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.6 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: HID: corsair: fix DMA buffers on stack
Not all platforms support DMA to the stack, and specifically since v4.9
this is no longer supported on x86 with VMAP_STACK either.
Note that the macro-mode buffer was larger than necessary.
Fixes: 6f78193ee9ea ("HID: corsair: Add Corsair Vengeance K90 driver")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
Low
| 168,395
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1 ^ (ip_cnt & 1)];
get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS;
smp_wmb();
ip_cnt++;
schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work,
round_jiffies_relative(REKEY_INTERVAL));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) IPv4 and (2) IPv6 implementations in the Linux kernel before 3.1 use a modified MD4 algorithm to generate sequence numbers and Fragment Identification values, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) or hijack network sessions by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 165,762
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int asf_build_simple_index(AVFormatContext *s, int stream_index)
{
ff_asf_guid g;
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int64_t current_pos = avio_tell(s->pb);
int64_t ret;
if((ret = avio_seek(s->pb, asf->data_object_offset + asf->data_object_size, SEEK_SET)) < 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
/* the data object can be followed by other top-level objects,
* skip them until the simple index object is reached */
while (ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_simple_index_header)) {
int64_t gsize = avio_rl64(s->pb);
if (gsize < 24 || avio_feof(s->pb)) {
goto end;
}
avio_skip(s->pb, gsize - 24);
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
}
{
int64_t itime, last_pos = -1;
int pct, ict;
int i;
int64_t av_unused gsize = avio_rl64(s->pb);
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
itime = avio_rl64(s->pb);
pct = avio_rl32(s->pb);
ict = avio_rl32(s->pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"itime:0x%"PRIx64", pct:%d, ict:%d\n", itime, pct, ict);
for (i = 0; i < ict; i++) {
int pktnum = avio_rl32(s->pb);
int pktct = avio_rl16(s->pb);
int64_t pos = s->internal->data_offset + s->packet_size * (int64_t)pktnum;
int64_t index_pts = FFMAX(av_rescale(itime, i, 10000) - asf->hdr.preroll, 0);
if (pos != last_pos) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "pktnum:%d, pktct:%d pts: %"PRId64"\n",
pktnum, pktct, index_pts);
av_add_index_entry(s->streams[stream_index], pos, index_pts,
s->packet_size, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
last_pos = pos;
}
}
asf->index_read = ict > 1;
}
end:
avio_seek(s->pb, current_pos, SEEK_SET);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: In libavformat/asfdec_f.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in asf_build_simple_index() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted ASF file, which claims a large *ict* field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the for loop would consume huge CPU and memory resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 167,758
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadGIFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define BitSet(byte,bit) (((byte) & (bit)) == (bit))
#define LSBFirstOrder(x,y) (((y) << 8) | (x))
Image
*image,
*meta_image;
int
number_extensionss=0;
MagickBooleanType
status;
RectangleInfo
page;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
delay,
dispose,
duration,
global_colors,
image_count,
iterations,
one;
ssize_t
count,
opacity;
unsigned char
background,
c,
flag,
*global_colormap,
header[MaxTextExtent],
magick[12];
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a GIF file.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,6,magick);
if ((count != 6) || ((LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"GIF87",5) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"GIF89",5) != 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
page.width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
page.height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
flag=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
c=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image); /* reserved */
one=1;
global_colors=one << (((size_t) flag & 0x07)+1);
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
MagickMax(global_colors,256),3UL*sizeof(*global_colormap));
if (global_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (BitSet((int) flag,0x80) != 0)
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) (3*global_colors),global_colormap);
delay=0;
dispose=0;
duration=0;
iterations=1;
opacity=(-1);
image_count=0;
meta_image=AcquireImage(image_info); /* metadata container */
for ( ; ; )
{
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&c);
if (count != 1)
break;
if (c == (unsigned char) ';')
break; /* terminator */
if (c == (unsigned char) '!')
{
/*
GIF Extension block.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&c);
if (count != 1)
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadExtensionBlock");
}
switch (c)
{
case 0xf9:
{
/*
Read graphics control extension.
*/
while (ReadBlobBlock(image,header) != 0) ;
dispose=(size_t) (header[0] >> 2);
delay=(size_t) ((header[2] << 8) | header[1]);
if ((ssize_t) (header[0] & 0x01) == 0x01)
opacity=(ssize_t) header[3];
break;
}
case 0xfe:
{
char
*comments;
size_t
length;
/*
Read comment extension.
*/
comments=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (length=0; ; length+=count)
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobBlock(image,header);
if (count == 0)
break;
header[count]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateString(&comments,(const char *) header);
}
(void) SetImageProperty(meta_image,"comment",comments);
comments=DestroyString(comments);
break;
}
case 0xff:
{
MagickBooleanType
loop;
/*
Read Netscape Loop extension.
*/
loop=MagickFalse;
if (ReadBlobBlock(image,header) != 0)
loop=LocaleNCompare((char *) header,"NETSCAPE2.0",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (loop != MagickFalse)
{
while (ReadBlobBlock(image,header) != 0)
iterations=(size_t) ((header[2] << 8) | header[1]);
break;
}
else
{
char
name[MaxTextExtent];
int
block_length,
info_length,
reserved_length;
MagickBooleanType
i8bim,
icc,
iptc,
magick;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned char
*info;
/*
Store GIF application extension as a generic profile.
*/
icc=LocaleNCompare((char *) header,"ICCRGBG1012",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
magick=LocaleNCompare((char *) header,"ImageMagick",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
i8bim=LocaleNCompare((char *) header,"MGK8BIM0000",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
iptc=LocaleNCompare((char *) header,"MGKIPTC0000",11) == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
number_extensionss++;
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading GIF application extension");
info=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(255UL,sizeof(*info));
reserved_length=255;
for (info_length=0; ; )
{
block_length=(int) ReadBlobBlock(image,&info[info_length]);
if (block_length == 0)
break;
info_length+=block_length;
if (info_length > (reserved_length-255))
{
reserved_length+=4096;
info=(unsigned char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(info,(size_t)
reserved_length,sizeof(*info));
if (info == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
profile=BlobToStringInfo(info,(size_t) info_length);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (i8bim != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"8bim",sizeof(name));
else if (icc != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"icc",sizeof(name));
else if (iptc != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"iptc",sizeof(name));
else if (magick != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(name,"magick",sizeof(name));
image->gamma=StringToDouble((char *) info+6,(char **) NULL);
}
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(name,sizeof(name),"gif:%.11s",
header);
info=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info);
if (magick == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageProfile(meta_image,name,profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" profile name=%s",name);
}
break;
}
default:
{
while (ReadBlobBlock(image,header) != 0) ;
break;
}
}
}
if (c != (unsigned char) ',')
continue;
if (image_count != 0)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
image_count++;
/*
Read image attributes.
*/
meta_image->scene=image->scene;
CloneImageProperties(image,meta_image);
DestroyImageProperties(meta_image);
CloneImageProfiles(image,meta_image);
DestroyImageProfiles(meta_image);
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->compression=LZWCompression;
page.x=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
page.y=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->columns=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->rows=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->depth=8;
flag=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->interlace=BitSet((int) flag,0x40) != 0 ? GIFInterlace : NoInterlace;
image->colors=BitSet((int) flag,0x80) == 0 ? global_colors :
one << ((size_t) (flag & 0x07)+1);
if (opacity >= (ssize_t) image->colors)
opacity=(-1);
image->page.width=page.width;
image->page.height=page.height;
image->page.y=page.y;
image->page.x=page.x;
image->delay=delay;
image->iterations=iterations;
image->ticks_per_second=100;
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
image->matte=opacity >= 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
delay=0;
dispose=0;
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
}
/*
Inititialize colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(global_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (BitSet((int) flag,0x80) == 0)
{
/*
Use global colormap.
*/
p=global_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (i == opacity)
{
image->colormap[i].opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
image->transparent_color=image->colormap[opacity];
}
}
image->background_color=image->colormap[MagickMin(background,
image->colors-1)];
}
else
{
unsigned char
*colormap;
/*
Read local colormap.
*/
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,3*
sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,(3*image->colors)*sizeof(*colormap),colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
p=colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (i == opacity)
image->colormap[i].opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
}
if (image->gamma == 1.0)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if (IsGrayPixel(image->colormap+i) == MagickFalse)
break;
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,i == (ssize_t) image->colors ?
GRAYColorspace : RGBColorspace);
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Decode image.
*/
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
status=PingGIFImage(image);
else
status=DecodeImage(image,opacity);
if ((image_info->ping == MagickFalse) && (status == MagickFalse))
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
duration+=image->delay*image->iterations;
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
opacity=(-1);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) image->scene-1,
image->scene);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
image->duration=duration;
meta_image=DestroyImage(meta_image);
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(global_colormap);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,567
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(inotify_init1, int, flags)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group;
struct user_struct *user;
int ret;
/* Check the IN_* constants for consistency. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(IN_CLOEXEC != O_CLOEXEC);
BUILD_BUG_ON(IN_NONBLOCK != O_NONBLOCK);
if (flags & ~(IN_CLOEXEC | IN_NONBLOCK))
return -EINVAL;
user = get_current_user();
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&user->inotify_devs) >=
inotify_max_user_instances)) {
ret = -EMFILE;
goto out_free_uid;
}
/* fsnotify_obtain_group took a reference to group, we put this when we kill the file in the end */
group = inotify_new_group(user, inotify_max_queued_events);
if (IS_ERR(group)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(group);
goto out_free_uid;
}
atomic_inc(&user->inotify_devs);
ret = anon_inode_getfd("inotify", &inotify_fops, group,
O_RDONLY | flags);
if (ret >= 0)
return ret;
fsnotify_put_group(group);
atomic_dec(&user->inotify_devs);
out_free_uid:
free_uid(user);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the inotify subsystem in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via vectors involving failed attempts to create files. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2010-4250.
Commit Message: inotify: fix double free/corruption of stuct user
On an error path in inotify_init1 a normal user can trigger a double
free of struct user. This is a regression introduced by a2ae4cc9a16e
("inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure").
We fix this by making sure that if a group exists the user reference is
dropped when the group is cleaned up. We should not explictly drop the
reference on error and also drop the reference when the group is cleaned
up.
The new lifetime rules are that an inotify group lives from
inotify_new_group to the last fsnotify_put_group. Since the struct user
and inotify_devs are directly tied to this lifetime they are only
changed/updated in those two locations. We get rid of all special
casing of struct user or user->inotify_devs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.37 and up)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Medium
| 165,887
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void *hashtable_get(hashtable_t *hashtable, const char *key)
{
pair_t *pair;
size_t hash;
bucket_t *bucket;
hash = hash_str(key);
bucket = &hashtable->buckets[hash % num_buckets(hashtable)];
pair = hashtable_find_pair(hashtable, bucket, key, hash);
if(!pair)
return NULL;
return pair->value;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Jansson, possibly 2.4 and earlier, does not restrict the ability to trigger hash collisions predictably, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted JSON document.
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
|
Low
| 166,530
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MediaStreamManager::CancelAllRequests(int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
auto request_it = requests_.begin();
while (request_it != requests_.end()) {
if (request_it->second->requesting_process_id != render_process_id ||
request_it->second->requesting_frame_id != render_frame_id) {
++request_it;
continue;
}
const std::string label = request_it->first;
++request_it;
CancelRequest(label);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
Medium
| 173,100
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebsiteSettings::OnUIClosing() {
if (show_info_bar_)
WebsiteSettingsInfoBarDelegate::Create(infobar_service_);
SSLCertificateDecisionsDidRevoke user_decision =
did_revoke_user_ssl_decisions_ ? USER_CERT_DECISIONS_REVOKED
: USER_CERT_DECISIONS_NOT_REVOKED;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("interstitial.ssl.did_user_revoke_decisions",
user_decision,
END_OF_SSL_CERTIFICATE_DECISIONS_DID_REVOKE_ENUM);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Infobars implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site, related to browser/ui/views/website_settings/website_settings_popup_view.cc.
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
|
Medium
| 171,780
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BOOLEAN UIPC_Send(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, UINT16 msg_evt, UINT8 *p_buf,
UINT16 msglen)
{
UNUSED(msg_evt);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("UIPC_Send : ch_id:%d %d bytes", ch_id, msglen);
UIPC_LOCK();
if (write(uipc_main.ch[ch_id].fd, p_buf, msglen) < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("failed to write (%s)", strerror(errno));
}
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,494
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void jslTokenAsString(int token, char *str, size_t len) {
if (token>32 && token<128) {
assert(len>=4);
str[0] = '\'';
str[1] = (char)token;
str[2] = '\'';
str[3] = 0;
return;
}
switch (token) {
case LEX_EOF : strncpy(str, "EOF", len); return;
case LEX_ID : strncpy(str, "ID", len); return;
case LEX_INT : strncpy(str, "INT", len); return;
case LEX_FLOAT : strncpy(str, "FLOAT", len); return;
case LEX_STR : strncpy(str, "STRING", len); return;
case LEX_UNFINISHED_STR : strncpy(str, "UNFINISHED STRING", len); return;
case LEX_TEMPLATE_LITERAL : strncpy(str, "TEMPLATE LITERAL", len); return;
case LEX_UNFINISHED_TEMPLATE_LITERAL : strncpy(str, "UNFINISHED TEMPLATE LITERAL", len); return;
case LEX_REGEX : strncpy(str, "REGEX", len); return;
case LEX_UNFINISHED_REGEX : strncpy(str, "UNFINISHED REGEX", len); return;
case LEX_UNFINISHED_COMMENT : strncpy(str, "UNFINISHED COMMENT", len); return;
}
if (token>=_LEX_OPERATOR_START && token<_LEX_R_LIST_END) {
const char tokenNames[] =
/* LEX_EQUAL : */ "==\0"
/* LEX_TYPEEQUAL : */ "===\0"
/* LEX_NEQUAL : */ "!=\0"
/* LEX_NTYPEEQUAL : */ "!==\0"
/* LEX_LEQUAL : */ "<=\0"
/* LEX_LSHIFT : */ "<<\0"
/* LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL : */ "<<=\0"
/* LEX_GEQUAL : */ ">=\0"
/* LEX_RSHIFT : */ ">>\0"
/* LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNED */ ">>>\0"
/* LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL : */ ">>=\0"
/* LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL */ ">>>=\0"
/* LEX_PLUSEQUAL : */ "+=\0"
/* LEX_MINUSEQUAL : */ "-=\0"
/* LEX_PLUSPLUS : */ "++\0"
/* LEX_MINUSMINUS */ "--\0"
/* LEX_MULEQUAL : */ "*=\0"
/* LEX_DIVEQUAL : */ "/=\0"
/* LEX_MODEQUAL : */ "%=\0"
/* LEX_ANDEQUAL : */ "&=\0"
/* LEX_ANDAND : */ "&&\0"
/* LEX_OREQUAL : */ "|=\0"
/* LEX_OROR : */ "||\0"
/* LEX_XOREQUAL : */ "^=\0"
/* LEX_ARROW_FUNCTION */ "=>\0"
/*LEX_R_IF : */ "if\0"
/*LEX_R_ELSE : */ "else\0"
/*LEX_R_DO : */ "do\0"
/*LEX_R_WHILE : */ "while\0"
/*LEX_R_FOR : */ "for\0"
/*LEX_R_BREAK : */ "return\0"
/*LEX_R_CONTINUE */ "continue\0"
/*LEX_R_FUNCTION */ "function\0"
/*LEX_R_RETURN */ "return\0"
/*LEX_R_VAR : */ "var\0"
/*LEX_R_LET : */ "let\0"
/*LEX_R_CONST : */ "const\0"
/*LEX_R_THIS : */ "this\0"
/*LEX_R_THROW : */ "throw\0"
/*LEX_R_TRY : */ "try\0"
/*LEX_R_CATCH : */ "catch\0"
/*LEX_R_FINALLY : */ "finally\0"
/*LEX_R_TRUE : */ "true\0"
/*LEX_R_FALSE : */ "false\0"
/*LEX_R_NULL : */ "null\0"
/*LEX_R_UNDEFINED */ "undefined\0"
/*LEX_R_NEW : */ "new\0"
/*LEX_R_IN : */ "in\0"
/*LEX_R_INSTANCEOF */ "instanceof\0"
/*LEX_R_SWITCH */ "switch\0"
/*LEX_R_CASE */ "case\0"
/*LEX_R_DEFAULT */ "default\0"
/*LEX_R_DELETE */ "delete\0"
/*LEX_R_TYPEOF : */ "typeof\0"
/*LEX_R_VOID : */ "void\0"
/*LEX_R_DEBUGGER : */ "debugger\0"
/*LEX_R_CLASS : */ "class\0"
/*LEX_R_EXTENDS : */ "extends\0"
/*LEX_R_SUPER : */ "super\0"
/*LEX_R_STATIC : */ "static\0"
;
unsigned int p = 0;
int n = token-_LEX_OPERATOR_START;
while (n>0 && p<sizeof(tokenNames)) {
while (tokenNames[p] && p<sizeof(tokenNames)) p++;
p++; // skip the zero
n--; // next token
}
assert(n==0);
strncpy(str, &tokenNames[p], len);
return;
}
assert(len>=10);
strncpy(str, "?[",len);
itostr(token, &str[2], 10);
strncat(str, "]",len);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Espruino before 1.99 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) and a potential Escalation of Privileges with a user crafted input file via a Buffer Overflow during syntax parsing, because strncat is misused.
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
|
Medium
| 169,212
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int spl_load_fit_image(struct spl_load_info *info, ulong sector,
void *fit, ulong base_offset, int node,
struct spl_image_info *image_info)
{
int offset;
size_t length;
int len;
ulong size;
ulong load_addr, load_ptr;
void *src;
ulong overhead;
int nr_sectors;
int align_len = ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN - 1;
uint8_t image_comp = -1, type = -1;
const void *data;
bool external_data = false;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_FPGA_SUPPORT) ||
(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_OS_BOOT) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_GZIP))) {
if (fit_image_get_type(fit, node, &type))
puts("Cannot get image type.\n");
else
debug("%s ", genimg_get_type_name(type));
}
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_OS_BOOT) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_GZIP)) {
if (fit_image_get_comp(fit, node, &image_comp))
puts("Cannot get image compression format.\n");
else
debug("%s ", genimg_get_comp_name(image_comp));
}
if (fit_image_get_load(fit, node, &load_addr))
load_addr = image_info->load_addr;
if (!fit_image_get_data_position(fit, node, &offset)) {
external_data = true;
} else if (!fit_image_get_data_offset(fit, node, &offset)) {
offset += base_offset;
external_data = true;
}
if (external_data) {
/* External data */
if (fit_image_get_data_size(fit, node, &len))
return -ENOENT;
load_ptr = (load_addr + align_len) & ~align_len;
length = len;
overhead = get_aligned_image_overhead(info, offset);
nr_sectors = get_aligned_image_size(info, length, offset);
if (info->read(info,
sector + get_aligned_image_offset(info, offset),
nr_sectors, (void *)load_ptr) != nr_sectors)
return -EIO;
debug("External data: dst=%lx, offset=%x, size=%lx\n",
load_ptr, offset, (unsigned long)length);
src = (void *)load_ptr + overhead;
} else {
/* Embedded data */
if (fit_image_get_data(fit, node, &data, &length)) {
puts("Cannot get image data/size\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
debug("Embedded data: dst=%lx, size=%lx\n", load_addr,
(unsigned long)length);
src = (void *)data;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SPL_FIT_SIGNATURE
printf("## Checking hash(es) for Image %s ... ",
fit_get_name(fit, node, NULL));
if (!fit_image_verify_with_data(fit, node,
src, length))
return -EPERM;
puts("OK\n");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SPL_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS
board_fit_image_post_process(&src, &length);
#endif
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_GZIP) && image_comp == IH_COMP_GZIP) {
size = length;
if (gunzip((void *)load_addr, CONFIG_SYS_BOOTM_LEN,
src, &size)) {
puts("Uncompressing error\n");
return -EIO;
}
length = size;
} else {
memcpy((void *)load_addr, src, length);
}
if (image_info) {
image_info->load_addr = load_addr;
image_info->size = length;
image_info->entry_point = fdt_getprop_u32(fit, node, "entry");
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Das U-Boot versions 2016.09 through 2019.07-rc4 can memset() too much data while reading a crafted ext4 filesystem, which results in a stack buffer overflow and likely code execution.
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
|
Medium
| 169,640
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t ACodec::setupAACCodec(
bool encoder, int32_t numChannels, int32_t sampleRate,
int32_t bitRate, int32_t aacProfile, bool isADTS, int32_t sbrMode,
int32_t maxOutputChannelCount, const drcParams_t& drc,
int32_t pcmLimiterEnable) {
if (encoder && isADTS) {
return -EINVAL;
}
status_t err = setupRawAudioFormat(
encoder ? kPortIndexInput : kPortIndexOutput,
sampleRate,
numChannels);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (encoder) {
err = selectAudioPortFormat(kPortIndexOutput, OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = kPortIndexOutput;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
def.format.audio.bFlagErrorConcealment = OMX_TRUE;
def.format.audio.eEncoding = OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC;
err = mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE profile;
InitOMXParams(&profile);
profile.nPortIndex = kPortIndexOutput;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
profile.nChannels = numChannels;
profile.eChannelMode =
(numChannels == 1)
? OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeMono: OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeStereo;
profile.nSampleRate = sampleRate;
profile.nBitRate = bitRate;
profile.nAudioBandWidth = 0;
profile.nFrameLength = 0;
profile.nAACtools = OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAll;
profile.nAACERtools = OMX_AUDIO_AACERNone;
profile.eAACProfile = (OMX_AUDIO_AACPROFILETYPE) aacProfile;
profile.eAACStreamFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
switch (sbrMode) {
case 0:
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
case 1:
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
case 2:
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
case -1:
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
default:
return BAD_VALUE;
}
err = mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
return err;
}
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE profile;
InitOMXParams(&profile);
profile.nPortIndex = kPortIndexInput;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
profile.nChannels = numChannels;
profile.nSampleRate = sampleRate;
profile.eAACStreamFormat =
isADTS
? OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4ADTS
: OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_AACPRESENTATIONTYPE presentation;
presentation.nMaxOutputChannels = maxOutputChannelCount;
presentation.nDrcCut = drc.drcCut;
presentation.nDrcBoost = drc.drcBoost;
presentation.nHeavyCompression = drc.heavyCompression;
presentation.nTargetReferenceLevel = drc.targetRefLevel;
presentation.nEncodedTargetLevel = drc.encodedTargetLevel;
presentation.nPCMLimiterEnable = pcmLimiterEnable;
status_t res = mOMX->setParameter(mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (res == OK) {
mOMX->setParameter(mNode, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidAacPresentation,
&presentation, sizeof(presentation));
} else {
ALOGW("did not set AudioAndroidAacPresentation due to error %d when setting AudioAac", res);
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
|
Medium
| 174,228
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static noinline int hiddev_ioctl_usage(struct hiddev *hiddev, unsigned int cmd, void __user *user_arg)
{
struct hid_device *hid = hiddev->hid;
struct hiddev_report_info rinfo;
struct hiddev_usage_ref_multi *uref_multi = NULL;
struct hiddev_usage_ref *uref;
struct hid_report *report;
struct hid_field *field;
int i;
uref_multi = kmalloc(sizeof(struct hiddev_usage_ref_multi), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!uref_multi)
return -ENOMEM;
uref = &uref_multi->uref;
if (cmd == HIDIOCGUSAGES || cmd == HIDIOCSUSAGES) {
if (copy_from_user(uref_multi, user_arg,
sizeof(*uref_multi)))
goto fault;
} else {
if (copy_from_user(uref, user_arg, sizeof(*uref)))
goto fault;
}
switch (cmd) {
case HIDIOCGUCODE:
rinfo.report_type = uref->report_type;
rinfo.report_id = uref->report_id;
if ((report = hiddev_lookup_report(hid, &rinfo)) == NULL)
goto inval;
if (uref->field_index >= report->maxfield)
goto inval;
field = report->field[uref->field_index];
if (uref->usage_index >= field->maxusage)
goto inval;
uref->usage_code = field->usage[uref->usage_index].hid;
if (copy_to_user(user_arg, uref, sizeof(*uref)))
goto fault;
goto goodreturn;
default:
if (cmd != HIDIOCGUSAGE &&
cmd != HIDIOCGUSAGES &&
uref->report_type == HID_REPORT_TYPE_INPUT)
goto inval;
if (uref->report_id == HID_REPORT_ID_UNKNOWN) {
field = hiddev_lookup_usage(hid, uref);
if (field == NULL)
goto inval;
} else {
rinfo.report_type = uref->report_type;
rinfo.report_id = uref->report_id;
if ((report = hiddev_lookup_report(hid, &rinfo)) == NULL)
goto inval;
if (uref->field_index >= report->maxfield)
goto inval;
field = report->field[uref->field_index];
if (cmd == HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX) {
if (uref->usage_index >= field->maxusage)
goto inval;
} else if (uref->usage_index >= field->report_count)
goto inval;
else if ((cmd == HIDIOCGUSAGES || cmd == HIDIOCSUSAGES) &&
(uref_multi->num_values > HID_MAX_MULTI_USAGES ||
uref->usage_index + uref_multi->num_values > field->report_count))
goto inval;
}
switch (cmd) {
case HIDIOCGUSAGE:
uref->value = field->value[uref->usage_index];
if (copy_to_user(user_arg, uref, sizeof(*uref)))
goto fault;
goto goodreturn;
case HIDIOCSUSAGE:
field->value[uref->usage_index] = uref->value;
goto goodreturn;
case HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX:
i = field->usage[uref->usage_index].collection_index;
kfree(uref_multi);
return i;
case HIDIOCGUSAGES:
for (i = 0; i < uref_multi->num_values; i++)
uref_multi->values[i] =
field->value[uref->usage_index + i];
if (copy_to_user(user_arg, uref_multi,
sizeof(*uref_multi)))
goto fault;
goto goodreturn;
case HIDIOCSUSAGES:
for (i = 0; i < uref_multi->num_values; i++)
field->value[uref->usage_index + i] =
uref_multi->values[i];
goto goodreturn;
}
goodreturn:
kfree(uref_multi);
return 0;
fault:
kfree(uref_multi);
return -EFAULT;
inval:
kfree(uref_multi);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the hiddev_ioctl_usage function in drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c in the Linux kernel through 4.6.3 allow local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted (1) HIDIOCGUSAGES or (2) HIDIOCSUSAGES ioctl call.
Commit Message: HID: hiddev: validate num_values for HIDIOCGUSAGES, HIDIOCSUSAGES commands
This patch validates the num_values parameter from userland during the
HIDIOCGUSAGES and HIDIOCSUSAGES commands. Previously, if the report id was set
to HID_REPORT_ID_UNKNOWN, we would fail to validate the num_values parameter
leading to a heap overflow.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
Low
| 167,022
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool svc_rdma_prealloc_maps(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt)
{
unsigned int i;
/* One for each receive buffer on this connection. */
i = xprt->sc_max_requests;
while (i--) {
struct svc_rdma_req_map *map;
map = alloc_req_map(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!map) {
dprintk("svcrdma: No memory for request map\n");
return false;
}
list_add(&map->free, &xprt->sc_maps);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,182
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int i;
scm->fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp;
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
unix_notinflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Linux kernel before 4.5 allows local users to bypass file-descriptor limits and cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by leveraging incorrect tracking of descriptor ownership and sending each descriptor over a UNIX socket before closing it. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2013-4312.
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,395
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void rose_loopback_timer(unsigned long param)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct net_device *dev;
rose_address *dest;
struct sock *sk;
unsigned short frametype;
unsigned int lci_i, lci_o;
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&loopback_queue)) != NULL) {
lci_i = ((skb->data[0] << 8) & 0xF00) + ((skb->data[1] << 0) & 0x0FF);
frametype = skb->data[2];
dest = (rose_address *)(skb->data + 4);
lci_o = ROSE_DEFAULT_MAXVC + 1 - lci_i;
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
sk = rose_find_socket(lci_o, rose_loopback_neigh);
if (sk) {
if (rose_process_rx_frame(sk, skb) == 0)
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
}
if (frametype == ROSE_CALL_REQUEST) {
if ((dev = rose_dev_get(dest)) != NULL) {
if (rose_rx_call_request(skb, dev, rose_loopback_neigh, lci_o) == 0)
kfree_skb(skb);
} else {
kfree_skb(skb);
}
} else {
kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ROSE protocol implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not verify that certain data-length values are consistent with the amount of data sent, which might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via crafted data to a ROSE socket.
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,670
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CreateSession::ExecutePost(Response* const response) {
DictionaryValue *capabilities = NULL;
if (!GetDictionaryParameter("desiredCapabilities", &capabilities)) {
response->SetError(new Error(
kBadRequest, "Missing or invalid 'desiredCapabilities'"));
return;
}
CommandLine command_line_options(CommandLine::NO_PROGRAM);
ListValue* switches = NULL;
const char* kCustomSwitchesKey = "chrome.switches";
if (capabilities->GetListWithoutPathExpansion(kCustomSwitchesKey,
&switches)) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < switches->GetSize(); ++i) {
std::string switch_string;
if (!switches->GetString(i, &switch_string)) {
response->SetError(new Error(
kBadRequest, "Custom switch is not a string"));
return;
}
size_t separator_index = switch_string.find("=");
if (separator_index != std::string::npos) {
CommandLine::StringType switch_string_native;
if (!switches->GetString(i, &switch_string_native)) {
response->SetError(new Error(
kBadRequest, "Custom switch is not a string"));
return;
}
command_line_options.AppendSwitchNative(
switch_string.substr(0, separator_index),
switch_string_native.substr(separator_index + 1));
} else {
command_line_options.AppendSwitch(switch_string);
}
}
} else if (capabilities->HasKey(kCustomSwitchesKey)) {
response->SetError(new Error(
kBadRequest, "Custom switches must be a list"));
return;
}
FilePath browser_exe;
FilePath::StringType path;
if (capabilities->GetStringWithoutPathExpansion("chrome.binary", &path))
browser_exe = FilePath(path);
Session* session = new Session();
Error* error = session->Init(browser_exe, command_line_options);
if (error) {
response->SetError(error);
return;
}
bool native_events_required = false;
Value* native_events_value = NULL;
if (capabilities->GetWithoutPathExpansion(
"chrome.nativeEvents", &native_events_value)) {
if (native_events_value->GetAsBoolean(&native_events_required)) {
session->set_use_native_events(native_events_required);
}
}
bool screenshot_on_error = false;
if (capabilities->GetBoolean(
"takeScreenshotOnError", &screenshot_on_error)) {
session->set_screenshot_on_error(screenshot_on_error);
}
VLOG(1) << "Created session " << session->id();
std::ostringstream stream;
SessionManager* session_manager = SessionManager::GetInstance();
stream << "http://" << session_manager->GetAddress() << "/session/"
<< session->id();
response->SetStatus(kSeeOther);
response->SetValue(Value::CreateStringValue(stream.str()));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107, does not properly perform const lookups, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,453
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IndexedDBTransaction::IndexedDBTransaction(
int64_t id,
IndexedDBConnection* connection,
const std::set<int64_t>& object_store_ids,
blink::WebIDBTransactionMode mode,
IndexedDBBackingStore::Transaction* backing_store_transaction)
: id_(id),
object_store_ids_(object_store_ids),
mode_(mode),
connection_(connection),
transaction_(backing_store_transaction),
ptr_factory_(this) {
IDB_ASYNC_TRACE_BEGIN("IndexedDBTransaction::lifetime", this);
callbacks_ = connection_->callbacks();
database_ = connection_->database();
diagnostics_.tasks_scheduled = 0;
diagnostics_.tasks_completed = 0;
diagnostics_.creation_time = base::Time::Now();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Early free of object in use in IndexDB in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
|
???
| 173,220
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RunCoeffCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 1000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_ref_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_block, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() - rnd.Rand8();
fwd_txfm_ref(input_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_block, output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,520
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, offsetSet)
{
zval *zindex, *value;
spl_dllist_object *intern;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "zz", &zindex, &value) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(getThis());
if (Z_TYPE_P(zindex) == IS_NULL) {
/* $obj[] = ... */
spl_ptr_llist_push(intern->llist, value);
} else {
/* $obj[$foo] = ... */
zend_long index;
spl_ptr_llist_element *element;
index = spl_offset_convert_to_long(zindex);
if (index < 0 || index >= intern->llist->count) {
zval_ptr_dtor(value);
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_OutOfRangeException, "Offset invalid or out of range", 0);
return;
}
element = spl_ptr_llist_offset(intern->llist, index, intern->flags & SPL_DLLIST_IT_LIFO);
if (element != NULL) {
/* call dtor on the old element as in spl_ptr_llist_pop */
if (intern->llist->dtor) {
intern->llist->dtor(element);
}
/* the element is replaced, delref the old one as in
* SplDoublyLinkedList::pop() */
zval_ptr_dtor(&element->data);
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&element->data, value);
/* new element, call ctor as in spl_ptr_llist_push */
if (intern->llist->ctor) {
intern->llist->ctor(element);
}
} else {
zval_ptr_dtor(value);
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_OutOfRangeException, "Offset invalid", 0);
return;
}
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetUnset(mixed index)
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet function in ext/spl/spl_dllist.c in PHP 7.x before 7.0.6 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted index.
Commit Message: Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
|
Low
| 167,377
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *MeanShiftImage(const Image *image,const size_t width,
const size_t height,const double color_distance,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MaxMeanShiftIterations 100
#define MeanShiftImageTag "MeanShift/Image"
CacheView
*image_view,
*mean_view,
*pixel_view;
Image
*mean_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
mean_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (mean_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(mean_image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
mean_image=DestroyImage(mean_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
pixel_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
mean_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(mean_image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(status,progress) \
magick_number_threads(mean_image,mean_image,mean_image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) mean_image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(mean_view,0,y,mean_image->columns,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) mean_image->columns; x++)
{
PixelInfo
mean_pixel,
previous_pixel;
PointInfo
mean_location,
previous_location;
register ssize_t
i;
GetPixelInfo(image,&mean_pixel);
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,p,&mean_pixel);
mean_location.x=(double) x;
mean_location.y=(double) y;
for (i=0; i < MaxMeanShiftIterations; i++)
{
double
distance,
gamma;
PixelInfo
sum_pixel;
PointInfo
sum_location;
ssize_t
count,
v;
sum_location.x=0.0;
sum_location.y=0.0;
GetPixelInfo(image,&sum_pixel);
previous_location=mean_location;
previous_pixel=mean_pixel;
count=0;
for (v=(-((ssize_t) height/2)); v <= (((ssize_t) height/2)); v++)
{
ssize_t
u;
for (u=(-((ssize_t) width/2)); u <= (((ssize_t) width/2)); u++)
{
if ((v*v+u*u) <= (ssize_t) ((width/2)*(height/2)))
{
PixelInfo
pixel;
status=GetOneCacheViewVirtualPixelInfo(pixel_view,(ssize_t)
MagickRound(mean_location.x+u),(ssize_t) MagickRound(
mean_location.y+v),&pixel,exception);
distance=(mean_pixel.red-pixel.red)*(mean_pixel.red-pixel.red)+
(mean_pixel.green-pixel.green)*(mean_pixel.green-pixel.green)+
(mean_pixel.blue-pixel.blue)*(mean_pixel.blue-pixel.blue);
if (distance <= (color_distance*color_distance))
{
sum_location.x+=mean_location.x+u;
sum_location.y+=mean_location.y+v;
sum_pixel.red+=pixel.red;
sum_pixel.green+=pixel.green;
sum_pixel.blue+=pixel.blue;
sum_pixel.alpha+=pixel.alpha;
count++;
}
}
}
}
gamma=1.0/count;
mean_location.x=gamma*sum_location.x;
mean_location.y=gamma*sum_location.y;
mean_pixel.red=gamma*sum_pixel.red;
mean_pixel.green=gamma*sum_pixel.green;
mean_pixel.blue=gamma*sum_pixel.blue;
mean_pixel.alpha=gamma*sum_pixel.alpha;
distance=(mean_location.x-previous_location.x)*
(mean_location.x-previous_location.x)+
(mean_location.y-previous_location.y)*
(mean_location.y-previous_location.y)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.red-previous_pixel.red)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.red-previous_pixel.red)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.green-previous_pixel.green)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.green-previous_pixel.green)+
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.blue-previous_pixel.blue)*
255.0*QuantumScale*(mean_pixel.blue-previous_pixel.blue);
if (distance <= 3.0)
break;
}
SetPixelRed(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.red),q);
SetPixelGreen(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.green),q);
SetPixelBlue(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(mean_image,ClampToQuantum(mean_pixel.alpha),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(mean_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(mean_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,MeanShiftImageTag,progress,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
mean_view=DestroyCacheView(mean_view);
pixel_view=DestroyCacheView(pixel_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(mean_image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: In ImageMagick 7.x before 7.0.8-41 and 6.x before 6.9.10-41, there is a divide-by-zero vulnerability in the MeanShiftImage function. It allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by sending a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1552
|
Medium
| 170,189
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ResourceTracker::UnrefResource(PP_Resource res) {
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(res, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE))
<< res << " is not a PP_Resource.";
ResourceMap::iterator i = live_resources_.find(res);
if (i != live_resources_.end()) {
if (!--i->second.second) {
Resource* to_release = i->second.first;
PP_Instance instance = to_release->instance()->pp_instance();
to_release->LastPluginRefWasDeleted(false);
instance_map_[instance]->resources.erase(res);
live_resources_.erase(i);
}
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to instantiation of the Pepper plug-in.
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,419
|
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