instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DECLAREwriteFunc(writeBufferToContigTiles)
{
uint32 imagew = TIFFScanlineSize(out);
uint32 tilew = TIFFTileRowSize(out);
int iskew = imagew - tilew;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(out);
tdata_t obuf;
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
uint32 tl, tw;
uint32 row;
(void) spp;
obuf = _TIFFmalloc(TIFFTileSize(out));
if (obuf == NULL)
return 0;
_TIFFmemset(obuf, 0, tilesize);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
(void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tilelength) {
uint32 nrow = (row+tl > imagelength) ? imagelength-row : tl;
uint32 colb = 0;
uint32 col;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw) {
/*
* Tile is clipped horizontally. Calculate
* visible portion and skewing factors.
*/
if (colb + tilew > imagew) {
uint32 width = imagew - colb;
int oskew = tilew - width;
cpStripToTile(obuf, bufp + colb, nrow, width,
oskew, oskew + iskew);
} else
cpStripToTile(obuf, bufp + colb, nrow, tilew,
0, iskew);
if (TIFFWriteTile(out, obuf, col, row, 0, 0) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, can't write tile at %lu %lu",
(unsigned long) col,
(unsigned long) row);
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 0;
}
colb += tilew;
}
bufp += nrow * imagew;
}
_TIFFfree(obuf);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: tools/tiffcp.c in libtiff 4.0.6 has an out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd tile width versus image width. Reported as MSVR 35103, aka *cpStripToTile heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
|
Low
| 166,863
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void command_timed_out(UNUSED_ATTR void *context) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&commands_pending_response_lock);
if (list_is_empty(commands_pending_response)) {
LOG_ERROR("%s with no commands pending response", __func__);
} else {
waiting_command_t *wait_entry = list_front(commands_pending_response);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&commands_pending_response_lock);
LOG_ERROR("%s hci layer timeout waiting for response to a command. opcode: 0x%x", __func__, wait_entry->opcode);
}
LOG_ERROR("%s restarting the bluetooth process.", __func__);
usleep(10000);
kill(getpid(), SIGKILL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,478
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int crypto_report_one(struct crypto_alg *alg,
struct crypto_user_alg *ualg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
memcpy(&ualg->cru_name, &alg->cra_name, sizeof(ualg->cru_name));
memcpy(&ualg->cru_driver_name, &alg->cra_driver_name,
sizeof(ualg->cru_driver_name));
memcpy(&ualg->cru_module_name, module_name(alg->cra_module),
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
ualg->cru_flags = alg->cra_flags;
ualg->cru_refcnt = atomic_read(&alg->cra_refcnt);
if (nla_put_u32(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_PRIORITY_VAL, alg->cra_priority))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL) {
struct crypto_report_larval rl;
snprintf(rl.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "larval");
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_LARVAL,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_larval), &rl))
goto nla_put_failure;
goto out;
}
if (alg->cra_type && alg->cra_type->report) {
if (alg->cra_type->report(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
goto out;
}
switch (alg->cra_flags & (CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL)) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER:
if (crypto_report_cipher(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_COMPRESS:
if (crypto_report_comp(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
}
out:
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The crypto_report_one function in crypto/crypto_user.c in the report API in the crypto user configuration API in the Linux kernel through 3.8.2 uses an incorrect length value during a copy operation, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 166,069
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: juniper_monitor_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
struct juniper_monitor_header {
uint8_t pkt_type;
uint8_t padding;
uint8_t iif[2];
uint8_t service_id[4];
};
const struct juniper_monitor_header *mh;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_MONITOR;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
mh = (const struct juniper_monitor_header *)p;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "service-id %u, iif %u, pkt-type %u: ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&mh->service_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->iif),
mh->pkt_type));
/* no proto field - lets guess by first byte of IP header*/
ip_heuristic_guess (ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The Juniper protocols parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-juniper.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,918
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_getdomainname, char __user *, name, int, namelen)
{
unsigned len;
int i;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, namelen))
return -EFAULT;
len = namelen;
if (namelen > 32)
len = 32;
down_read(&uts_sem);
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
__put_user(utsname()->domainname[i], name + i);
if (utsname()->domainname[i] == '\0')
break;
}
up_read(&uts_sem);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The osf_wait4 function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform uses an incorrect pointer, which allows local users to gain privileges by writing a certain integer value to kernel memory.
Commit Message: alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,867
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gs_nulldevice(gs_gstate * pgs)
{
int code = 0;
if (pgs->device == 0 || !gx_device_is_null(pgs->device)) {
gx_device *ndev;
code = gs_copydevice(&ndev, (const gx_device *)&gs_null_device,
pgs->memory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/*
* Internal devices have a reference count of 0, not 1,
* aside from references from graphics states.
to sort out how the icc profile is best handled with this device.
It seems to inherit properties from the current device if there
is one */
rc_init(ndev, pgs->memory, 0);
if (pgs->device != NULL) {
if ((code = dev_proc(pgs->device, get_profile)(pgs->device,
&(ndev->icc_struct))) < 0)
return code;
rc_increment(ndev->icc_struct);
set_dev_proc(ndev, get_profile, gx_default_get_profile);
}
if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0)
if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0)
gs_free_object(pgs->memory, ndev, "gs_copydevice(device)");
}
return code;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-78
Summary: It was found that RHSA-2018:2918 did not fully fix CVE-2018-16509. An attacker could possibly exploit another variant of the flaw and bypass the -dSAFER protection to, for example, execute arbitrary shell commands via a specially crafted PostScript document. This only affects ghostscript 9.07 as shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,687
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::BindRequest(
mojom::MediaStreamDispatcherHostRequest request) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
bindings_.AddBinding(this, std::move(request));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
Medium
| 173,091
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void __update_open_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *open_stateid, const nfs4_stateid *deleg_stateid, int open_flags)
{
/*
* Protect the call to nfs4_state_set_mode_locked and
* serialise the stateid update
*/
write_seqlock(&state->seqlock);
if (deleg_stateid != NULL) {
memcpy(state->stateid.data, deleg_stateid->data, sizeof(state->stateid.data));
set_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags);
}
if (open_stateid != NULL)
nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(state, open_stateid, open_flags);
write_sequnlock(&state->seqlock);
spin_lock(&state->owner->so_lock);
update_open_stateflags(state, open_flags);
spin_unlock(&state->owner->so_lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,683
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ContainerNode::removeChildren()
{
if (!m_firstChild)
return;
RefPtr<ContainerNode> protect(this);
if (FullscreenElementStack* fullscreen = FullscreenElementStack::fromIfExists(&document()))
fullscreen->removeFullScreenElementOfSubtree(this, true);
willRemoveChildren(protect.get());
{
SubframeLoadingDisabler disabler(this);
document().removeFocusedElementOfSubtree(this, true);
}
NodeVector removedChildren;
{
RenderWidget::UpdateSuspendScope suspendWidgetHierarchyUpdates;
{
NoEventDispatchAssertion assertNoEventDispatch;
removedChildren.reserveInitialCapacity(childNodeCount());
while (m_firstChild) {
removedChildren.append(m_firstChild);
removeBetween(0, m_firstChild->nextSibling(), m_firstChild);
}
}
childrenChanged(false, 0, 0, -static_cast<int>(removedChildren.size()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < removedChildren.size(); ++i)
ChildNodeRemovalNotifier(this).notify(removedChildren[i].get());
}
dispatchSubtreeModifiedEvent();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in core/dom/ContainerNode.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper handling of DOM range objects in circumstances that require child node removal after a (1) mutation or (2) blur event.
Commit Message: Notify nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event
This patch changes notifying nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event. In willRemoveChildren(), like willRemoveChild(); r115686 did same change, although it didn't change willRemoveChildren().
The issue 295010, use-after-free, is caused by setting removed node to Selection in mutation event handler.
BUG=295010
TEST=LayoutTests/fast/dom/Range/range-created-during-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-mutation-event-by-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-blur-event-by-remove-children.html
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25389004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,158
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ipt_entry *s, const struct ipt_entry *e,
const char *hookname, const char **chainname,
const char **comment, unsigned int *rulenum)
{
const struct xt_standard_target *t = (void *)ipt_get_target_c(s);
if (strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) {
/* Head of user chain: ERROR target with chainname */
*chainname = t->target.data;
(*rulenum) = 0;
} else if (s == e) {
(*rulenum)++;
if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
t->verdict < 0 &&
unconditional(&s->ip)) {
/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
*comment = *chainname == hookname
? comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
: comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_RETURN];
}
return 1;
} else
(*rulenum)++;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 does not validate certain offset fields, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via an IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt call.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
Low
| 167,369
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: header_put_be_int (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 4)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
} ;
} /* header_put_be_int */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
|
Medium
| 170,051
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IW_IMPL(unsigned int) iw_get_ui32le(const iw_byte *b)
{
return b[0] | (b[1]<<8) | (b[2]<<16) | (b[3]<<24);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: libimageworsener.a in ImageWorsener before 1.3.1 has *left shift cannot be represented in type int* undefined behavior issues, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image, related to imagew-bmp.c and imagew-util.c.
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
|
Medium
| 168,200
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", (long long)*offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
int32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, (long long)*offset, depth);
if (kUseHexDump) {
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
}
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f') && !mMoofFound) {
mMoofFound = true;
mMoofOffset = *offset;
}
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (chunk_size < 20 || pssh.datalen > chunk_size - 20) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (!timescale) {
ALOGE("timescale should not be ZERO.");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0 && mLastTrack->timescale != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index __unused = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index __unused = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
if (max_size > SIZE_MAX - 10 * 2) {
ALOGE("max sample size too big: %zu", max_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
uint32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, (int32_t*)&width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight,(int32_t*) &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
} else {
if (width > 32768 || height > 32768) {
ALOGE("can't support %u x %u video", width, height);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC(0xA9, 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v')) {
ESDS esds(&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
uint8_t objectTypeIndication;
if (esds.getObjectTypeIndication(&objectTypeIndication) == OK) {
if (objectTypeIndication >= 0x60 && objectTypeIndication <= 0x65) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_MPEG2);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", (long long)chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
bool isParsingMetaKeys = underQTMetaPath(mPath, 2);
if (!isParsingMetaKeys) {
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset = stop_offset;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset = stop_offset;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset = stop_offset;
return OK;
}
*offset += sizeof(buffer);
}
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0 && mHeaderTimescale != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0 && mHeaderTimescale != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
mMdatFound = true;
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (underQTMetaPath(mPath, 3)) {
break;
}
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
if (mLastTrack != NULL) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('k', 'e', 'y', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (underQTMetaPath(mPath, 3)) {
parseQTMetaKey(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
if ((chunk_size > SIZE_MAX) || (SIZE_MAX - chunk_size <= size)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %" PRId64 " and data_offset = %" PRId64,
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
if (chunk_data_size < 0 || static_cast<uint64_t>(chunk_data_size) >= SIZE_MAX - 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
if (underQTMetaPath(mPath, 3)) {
parseQTMetaVal(chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not check whether memory allocation succeeds, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 28471206.
Commit Message: Check malloc result to avoid NPD
Bug: 28471206
Change-Id: Id5d055d76893d6f53a2e524ff5f282d1ddca3345
|
Low
| 173,547
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType GetMagickModulePath(const char *filename,
MagickModuleType module_type,char *path,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*module_path;
assert(filename != (const char *) NULL);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",filename);
assert(path != (char *) NULL);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
(void) CopyMagickString(path,filename,MaxTextExtent);
module_path=(char *) NULL;
switch (module_type)
{
case MagickImageCoderModule:
default:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(ModuleEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Searching for coder module file \"%s\" ...",filename);
module_path=GetEnvironmentValue("MAGICK_CODER_MODULE_PATH");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CODER_PATH)
if (module_path == (char *) NULL)
module_path=AcquireString(MAGICKCORE_CODER_PATH);
#endif
break;
}
case MagickImageFilterModule:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(ModuleEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Searching for filter module file \"%s\" ...",filename);
module_path=GetEnvironmentValue("MAGICK_CODER_FILTER_PATH");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_FILTER_PATH)
if (module_path == (char *) NULL)
module_path=AcquireString(MAGICKCORE_FILTER_PATH);
#endif
break;
}
}
if (module_path != (char *) NULL)
{
register char
*p,
*q;
for (p=module_path-1; p != (char *) NULL; )
{
(void) CopyMagickString(path,p+1,MaxTextExtent);
q=strchr(path,DirectoryListSeparator);
if (q != (char *) NULL)
*q='\0';
q=path+strlen(path)-1;
if ((q >= path) && (*q != *DirectorySeparator))
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(path,DirectorySeparator,MaxTextExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(path,filename,MaxTextExtent);
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
{
module_path=DestroyString(module_path);
return(MagickTrue);
}
p=strchr(p+1,DirectoryListSeparator);
}
module_path=DestroyString(module_path);
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_INSTALLED_SUPPORT)
else
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CODER_PATH)
{
const char
*directory;
/*
Search hard coded paths.
*/
switch (module_type)
{
case MagickImageCoderModule:
default:
{
directory=MAGICKCORE_CODER_PATH;
break;
}
case MagickImageFilterModule:
{
directory=MAGICKCORE_FILTER_PATH;
break;
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MaxTextExtent,"%s%s",directory,filename);
if (IsPathAccessible(path) == MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,ConfigureWarning,
"UnableToOpenModuleFile",path);
return(MagickFalse);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
#else
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINDOWS_SUPPORT)
{
const char
*registery_key;
unsigned char
*key_value;
/*
Locate path via registry key.
*/
switch (module_type)
{
case MagickImageCoderModule:
default:
{
registery_key="CoderModulesPath";
break;
}
case MagickImageFilterModule:
{
registery_key="FilterModulesPath";
break;
}
}
key_value=NTRegistryKeyLookup(registery_key);
if (key_value == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),ConfigureError,
"RegistryKeyLookupFailed","`%s'",registery_key);
return(MagickFalse);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MaxTextExtent,"%s%s%s",(char *) key_value,
DirectorySeparator,filename);
key_value=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(key_value);
if (IsPathAccessible(path) == MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,ConfigureWarning,
"UnableToOpenModuleFile",path);
return(MagickFalse);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
#endif
#endif
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_CODER_PATH) && !defined(MAGICKCORE_WINDOWS_SUPPORT)
# error MAGICKCORE_CODER_PATH or MAGICKCORE_WINDOWS_SUPPORT must be defined when MAGICKCORE_INSTALLED_SUPPORT is defined
#endif
#else
{
char
*home;
home=GetEnvironmentValue("MAGICK_HOME");
if (home != (char *) NULL)
{
/*
Search MAGICK_HOME.
*/
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_POSIX_SUPPORT)
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MaxTextExtent,"%s%s%s",home,
DirectorySeparator,filename);
#else
const char
*directory;
switch (module_type)
{
case MagickImageCoderModule:
default:
{
directory=MAGICKCORE_CODER_RELATIVE_PATH;
break;
}
case MagickImageFilterModule:
{
directory=MAGICKCORE_FILTER_RELATIVE_PATH;
break;
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MaxTextExtent,"%s/lib/%s/%s",home,
directory,filename);
#endif
home=DestroyString(home);
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
if (*GetClientPath() != '\0')
{
/*
Search based on executable directory.
*/
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_POSIX_SUPPORT)
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MaxTextExtent,"%s%s%s",GetClientPath(),
DirectorySeparator,filename);
#else
char
prefix[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*directory;
switch (module_type)
{
case MagickImageCoderModule:
default:
{
directory="coders";
break;
}
case MagickImageFilterModule:
{
directory="filters";
break;
}
}
(void) CopyMagickString(prefix,GetClientPath(),MaxTextExtent);
ChopPathComponents(prefix,1);
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MaxTextExtent,"%s/lib/%s/%s/%s",prefix,
MAGICKCORE_MODULES_RELATIVE_PATH,directory,filename);
#endif
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINDOWS_SUPPORT)
{
/*
Search module path.
*/
if ((NTGetModulePath("CORE_RL_magick_.dll",path) != MagickFalse) ||
(NTGetModulePath("CORE_DB_magick_.dll",path) != MagickFalse) ||
(NTGetModulePath("Magick.dll",path) != MagickFalse))
{
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(path,DirectorySeparator,MaxTextExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(path,filename,MaxTextExtent);
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
#endif
{
char
*home;
home=GetEnvironmentValue("XDG_CONFIG_HOME");
if (home == (char *) NULL)
home=GetEnvironmentValue("LOCALAPPDATA");
if (home == (char *) NULL)
home=GetEnvironmentValue("APPDATA");
if (home == (char *) NULL)
home=GetEnvironmentValue("USERPROFILE");
if (home != (char *) NULL)
{
/*
Search $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/ImageMagick.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MaxTextExtent,"%s%sImageMagick%s%s",
home,DirectorySeparator,DirectorySeparator,filename);
home=DestroyString(home);
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
}
home=GetEnvironmentValue("HOME");
if (home != (char *) NULL)
{
/*
Search $HOME/.config/ImageMagick.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MaxTextExtent,
"%s%s.config%sImageMagick%s%s",home,DirectorySeparator,
DirectorySeparator,DirectorySeparator,filename);
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
{
home=DestroyString(home);
return(MagickTrue);
}
/*
Search $HOME/.magick.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MaxTextExtent,"%s%s.magick%s%s",home,
DirectorySeparator,DirectorySeparator,filename);
home=DestroyString(home);
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
/*
Search current directory.
*/
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
if (exception->severity < ConfigureError)
ThrowFileException(exception,ConfigureWarning,"UnableToOpenModuleFile",
path);
#endif
return(MagickFalse);
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Directory traversal vulnerability in magick/module.c in ImageMagick 6.9.4-7 allows remote attackers to load arbitrary modules via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
|
Low
| 168,642
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int pcd_detect(void)
{
char id[18];
int k, unit;
struct pcd_unit *cd;
printk("%s: %s version %s, major %d, nice %d\n",
name, name, PCD_VERSION, major, nice);
par_drv = pi_register_driver(name);
if (!par_drv) {
pr_err("failed to register %s driver\n", name);
return -1;
}
k = 0;
if (pcd_drive_count == 0) { /* nothing spec'd - so autoprobe for 1 */
cd = pcd;
if (pi_init(cd->pi, 1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, pcd_buffer,
PI_PCD, verbose, cd->name)) {
if (!pcd_probe(cd, -1, id) && cd->disk) {
cd->present = 1;
k++;
} else
pi_release(cd->pi);
}
} else {
for (unit = 0, cd = pcd; unit < PCD_UNITS; unit++, cd++) {
int *conf = *drives[unit];
if (!conf[D_PRT])
continue;
if (!pi_init(cd->pi, 0, conf[D_PRT], conf[D_MOD],
conf[D_UNI], conf[D_PRO], conf[D_DLY],
pcd_buffer, PI_PCD, verbose, cd->name))
continue;
if (!pcd_probe(cd, conf[D_SLV], id) && cd->disk) {
cd->present = 1;
k++;
} else
pi_release(cd->pi);
}
}
if (k)
return 0;
printk("%s: No CD-ROM drive found\n", name);
for (unit = 0, cd = pcd; unit < PCD_UNITS; unit++, cd++) {
blk_cleanup_queue(cd->disk->queue);
cd->disk->queue = NULL;
blk_mq_free_tag_set(&cd->tag_set);
put_disk(cd->disk);
}
pi_unregister_driver(par_drv);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.9. There is a NULL pointer dereference for a cd data structure if alloc_disk fails in drivers/block/paride/pf.c.
Commit Message: paride/pcd: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference and mem leak
Syzkaller report this:
pcd: pcd version 1.07, major 46, nice 0
pcd0: Autoprobe failed
pcd: No CD-ROM drive found
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 4525 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pcd_init+0x95c/0x1000 [pcd]
Code: c4 ab f7 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 56 a3 da f7 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 39 a3 da f7 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 cc b2
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e84df880 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc155a088 RCX: ffffffffc1508935
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffc900014f0000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee658b8 R09: ffffed103ee658b8
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee658b7 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc155a778 R14: ffffffffc155a4a8 R15: 0000000000000003
FS: 00007fe71bee3700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055a7334441a8 CR3: 00000001e9674003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1508000
? 0xffffffffc1508000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe71bee2c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fe71bee2c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe71bee36bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pcd(+) paride solos_pci atm ts_fsm rtc_mt6397 mac80211 nhc_mobility nhc_udp nhc_ipv6 nhc_hop nhc_dest nhc_fragment nhc_routing 6lowpan rtc_cros_ec memconsole intel_xhci_usb_role_switch roles rtc_wm8350 usbcore industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio asc7621 dm_era dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_mod tpm gnss_ubx gnss_serial serdev gnss max2165 cpufreq_dt hid_penmount hid menf21bmc_wdt rc_core n_tracesink ide_gd_mod cdns_csi2tx v4l2_fwnode videodev media pinctrl_lewisburg pinctrl_intel iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun joydev mousedev ppdev kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd
ide_pci_generic piix input_leds cryptd glue_helper psmouse ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt ata_generic i2c_piix4 agpgart pata_acpi parport_pc parport floppy rtc_cmos sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: bmc150_magn]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace d873691c3cd69f56 ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pcd_init_units, cd->disk will be
NULL, however in pcd_detect and pcd_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 81b74ac68c28 ("paride/pcd: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
Low
| 169,517
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cib_remote_signon(cib_t * cib, const char *name, enum cib_conn_type type)
{
int rc = pcmk_ok;
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
if (private->passwd == NULL) {
struct termios settings;
int rc;
rc = tcgetattr(0, &settings);
settings.c_lflag &= ~ECHO;
rc = tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &settings);
fprintf(stderr, "Password: ");
private->passwd = calloc(1, 1024);
rc = scanf("%s", private->passwd);
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
/* fprintf(stderr, "entered: '%s'\n", buffer); */
if (rc < 1) {
private->passwd = NULL;
}
settings.c_lflag |= ECHO;
rc = tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &settings);
}
if (private->server == NULL || private->user == NULL) {
rc = -EINVAL;
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok) {
rc = cib_tls_signon(cib, &(private->command));
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok) {
rc = cib_tls_signon(cib, &(private->callback));
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok) {
xmlNode *hello =
cib_create_op(0, private->callback.token, CRM_OP_REGISTER, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
crm_xml_add(hello, F_CIB_CLIENTNAME, name);
crm_send_remote_msg(private->command.session, hello, private->command.encrypted);
free_xml(hello);
}
if (rc == pcmk_ok) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Opened connection to %s:%d\n", name, private->server, private->port);
cib->state = cib_connected_command;
cib->type = cib_command;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Connection to %s:%d failed: %s\n",
name, private->server, private->port, pcmk_strerror(rc));
}
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Pacemaker 1.1.10, when remote Cluster Information Base (CIB) configuration or resource management is enabled, does not limit the duration of connections to the blocking sockets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection blocking).
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
Medium
| 166,153
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftOpus::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch ((int)index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidOpus:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *opusParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *)params;
if (opusParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
opusParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
opusParams->nSampleRate = kRate;
opusParams->nBitRate = 0;
if (!isConfigured()) {
opusParams->nChannels = 1;
} else {
opusParams->nChannels = mHeader->channels;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = kRate;
if (!isConfigured()) {
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
} else {
pcmParams->nChannels = mHeader->channels;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,216
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ResetState() {
nav_handle1_.reset();
nav_handle2_.reset();
nav_handle3_.reset();
throttle1_.reset();
throttle2_.reset();
throttle3_.reset();
contents1_.reset();
contents2_.reset();
contents3_.reset();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the formfiller implementation in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document, related to improper tracking of the destruction of (1) IPWL_FocusHandler and (2) IPWL_Provider objects.
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
|
Medium
| 172,231
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Document::Document(const DocumentInit& initializer, DocumentClassFlags documentClasses)
: ContainerNode(0, CreateDocument)
, TreeScope(this)
, m_styleResolverThrowawayTimer(this, &Document::styleResolverThrowawayTimerFired)
, m_styleResolverAccessCount(0)
, m_lastStyleResolverAccessCount(0)
, m_didCalculateStyleResolver(false)
, m_ignorePendingStylesheets(false)
, m_evaluateMediaQueriesOnStyleRecalc(false)
, m_needsNotifyRemoveAllPendingStylesheet(false)
, m_hasNodesWithPlaceholderStyle(false)
, m_pendingSheetLayout(NoLayoutWithPendingSheets)
, m_frame(initializer.frame())
, m_domWindow(0)
, m_import(initializer.import())
, m_activeParserCount(0)
, m_contextFeatures(ContextFeatures::defaultSwitch())
, m_wellFormed(false)
, m_printing(false)
, m_paginatedForScreen(false)
, m_compatibilityMode(NoQuirksMode)
, m_compatibilityModeLocked(false)
, m_didPostCheckFocusedElementTask(false)
, m_domTreeVersion(++s_globalTreeVersion)
, m_listenerTypes(0)
, m_mutationObserverTypes(0)
, m_styleEngine(StyleEngine::create(*this))
, m_visitedLinkState(VisitedLinkState::create(*this))
, m_visuallyOrdered(false)
, m_readyState(Complete)
, m_bParsing(false)
, m_styleRecalcTimer(this, &Document::styleRecalcTimerFired)
, m_inStyleRecalc(false)
, m_gotoAnchorNeededAfterStylesheetsLoad(false)
, m_containsValidityStyleRules(false)
, m_updateFocusAppearanceRestoresSelection(false)
, m_ignoreDestructiveWriteCount(0)
, m_titleSetExplicitly(false)
, m_markers(adoptPtr(new DocumentMarkerController))
, m_updateFocusAppearanceTimer(this, &Document::updateFocusAppearanceTimerFired)
, m_cssTarget(0)
, m_loadEventProgress(LoadEventNotRun)
, m_startTime(currentTime())
, m_overMinimumLayoutThreshold(false)
, m_scriptRunner(ScriptRunner::create(this))
, m_xmlVersion("1.0")
, m_xmlStandalone(StandaloneUnspecified)
, m_hasXMLDeclaration(0)
, m_designMode(inherit)
, m_hasAnnotatedRegions(false)
, m_annotatedRegionsDirty(false)
, m_useSecureKeyboardEntryWhenActive(false)
, m_documentClasses(documentClasses)
, m_isViewSource(false)
, m_sawElementsInKnownNamespaces(false)
, m_isSrcdocDocument(false)
, m_isMobileDocument(false)
, m_renderer(0)
, m_eventQueue(DocumentEventQueue::create(this))
, m_weakFactory(this)
, m_contextDocument(initializer.contextDocument())
, m_idAttributeName(idAttr)
, m_hasFullscreenElementStack(false)
, m_loadEventDelayCount(0)
, m_loadEventDelayTimer(this, &Document::loadEventDelayTimerFired)
, m_referrerPolicy(ReferrerPolicyDefault)
, m_directionSetOnDocumentElement(false)
, m_writingModeSetOnDocumentElement(false)
, m_didAllowNavigationViaBeforeUnloadConfirmationPanel(false)
, m_writeRecursionIsTooDeep(false)
, m_writeRecursionDepth(0)
, m_lastHandledUserGestureTimestamp(0)
, m_textAutosizer(TextAutosizer::create(this))
, m_registrationContext(initializer.registrationContext(this))
, m_pendingTasksTimer(this, &Document::pendingTasksTimerFired)
, m_scheduledTasksAreSuspended(false)
, m_sharedObjectPoolClearTimer(this, &Document::sharedObjectPoolClearTimerFired)
#ifndef NDEBUG
, m_didDispatchViewportPropertiesChanged(false)
#endif
, m_timeline(DocumentTimeline::create(this))
, m_templateDocumentHost(0)
, m_fonts(0)
, m_didAssociateFormControlsTimer(this, &Document::didAssociateFormControlsTimerFired)
{
setClient(this);
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
if (m_frame) {
provideContextFeaturesToDocumentFrom(this, m_frame->page());
m_fetcher = m_frame->loader()->activeDocumentLoader()->fetcher();
}
if (!m_fetcher)
m_fetcher = ResourceFetcher::create(0);
m_fetcher->setDocument(this);
if (initializer.shouldSetURL())
setURL(initializer.url());
initSecurityContext(initializer);
initDNSPrefetch();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(m_nodeListCounts); i++)
m_nodeListCounts[i] = 0;
InspectorCounters::incrementCounter(InspectorCounters::DocumentCounter);
m_lifecyle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Inactive);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 does not properly perform a cast of an unspecified variable during handling of the INPUT element, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact via a crafted HTML document.
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,699
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pop_decoder_state (DECODER_STATE ds)
{
if (!ds->idx)
{
fprintf (stderr, "ERROR: decoder stack underflow!\n");
abort ();
}
ds->cur = ds->stack[--ds->idx];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: ber-decoder.c in Libksba before 1.3.3 does not properly handle decoder stack overflows, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (abort) via crafted BER data.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,051
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PreconnectManager::Start(const GURL& url,
std::vector<PreconnectRequest> requests) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
const std::string host = url.host();
if (preresolve_info_.find(host) != preresolve_info_.end())
return;
auto iterator_and_whether_inserted = preresolve_info_.emplace(
host, std::make_unique<PreresolveInfo>(url, requests.size()));
PreresolveInfo* info = iterator_and_whether_inserted.first->second.get();
for (auto request_it = requests.begin(); request_it != requests.end();
++request_it) {
DCHECK(request_it->origin.GetOrigin() == request_it->origin);
PreresolveJobId job_id = preresolve_jobs_.Add(
std::make_unique<PreresolveJob>(std::move(*request_it), info));
queued_jobs_.push_back(job_id);
}
TryToLaunchPreresolveJobs();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
|
Medium
| 172,377
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParseEndTag2(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *prefix,
const xmlChar *URI, int line, int nsNr, int tlen) {
const xmlChar *name;
GROW;
if ((RAW != '<') || (NXT(1) != '/')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LTSLASH_REQUIRED, NULL);
return;
}
SKIP(2);
if ((tlen > 0) && (xmlStrncmp(ctxt->input->cur, ctxt->name, tlen) == 0)) {
if (ctxt->input->cur[tlen] == '>') {
ctxt->input->cur += tlen + 1;
goto done;
}
ctxt->input->cur += tlen;
name = (xmlChar*)1;
} else {
if (prefix == NULL)
name = xmlParseNameAndCompare(ctxt, ctxt->name);
else
name = xmlParseQNameAndCompare(ctxt, ctxt->name, prefix);
}
/*
* We should definitely be at the ending "S? '>'" part
*/
GROW;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((!IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW)) || (RAW != '>')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED, NULL);
} else
NEXT1;
/*
* [ WFC: Element Type Match ]
* The Name in an element's end-tag must match the element type in the
* start-tag.
*
*/
if (name != (xmlChar*)1) {
if (name == NULL) name = BAD_CAST "unparseable";
if ((line == 0) && (ctxt->node != NULL))
line = ctxt->node->line;
xmlFatalErrMsgStrIntStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_TAG_NAME_MISMATCH,
"Opening and ending tag mismatch: %s line %d and %s\n",
ctxt->name, line, name);
}
/*
* SAX: End of Tag
*/
done:
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->endElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElementNs(ctxt->userData, ctxt->name, prefix, URI);
spacePop(ctxt);
if (nsNr != 0)
nsPop(ctxt, nsNr);
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,287
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
void *ptr)
{
EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx);
switch(type) {
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
if (actx == NULL)
actx = ctx->cipher_data
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size());
if (actx == NULL) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
return 0;
}
actx->len.aad = 0;
actx->len.text = 0;
actx->aad = 0;
actx->mac_inited = 0;
actx->tag_len = 0;
actx->nonce_len = 12;
actx->tls_payload_length = NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
if (actx) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dst = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)ptr;
dst->cipher_data =
OPENSSL_memdup(actx, sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size());
if (dst->cipher_data == NULL) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL, EVP_R_COPY_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE)
return 0;
actx->nonce_len = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED:
if (arg != 12)
return 0;
actx->nonce[0] = actx->key.counter[1]
= CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr);
actx->nonce[1] = actx->key.counter[2]
= CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr+4);
actx->nonce[2] = actx->key.counter[3]
= CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr+8);
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
if (arg <= 0 || arg > POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)
return 0;
if (ptr != NULL) {
memcpy(actx->tag, ptr, arg);
actx->tag_len = arg;
}
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
if (arg <= 0 || arg > POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE || !ctx->encrypt)
return 0;
memcpy(ptr, actx->tag, arg);
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return 0;
{
unsigned int len;
unsigned char *aad = ptr, temp[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE];
len = aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2] << 8 |
aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 1];
if (!ctx->encrypt) {
len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; /* discount attached tag */
memcpy(temp, aad, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2);
aad = temp;
temp[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8);
temp[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 1] = (unsigned char)len;
}
actx->tls_payload_length = len;
/*
* merge record sequence number as per
* draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-03
*/
actx->key.counter[1] = actx->nonce[0];
actx->key.counter[2] = actx->nonce[1] ^ CHACHA_U8TOU32(aad);
actx->key.counter[3] = actx->nonce[2] ^ CHACHA_U8TOU32(aad+4);
actx->mac_inited = 0;
chacha20_poly1305_cipher(ctx, NULL, aad, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN);
return POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; /* tag length */
}
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY:
/* no-op */
return 1;
default:
return -1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: If an SSL/TLS server or client is running on a 32-bit host, and a specific cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that server or client to perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash. For OpenSSL 1.1.0, the crash can be triggered when using CHACHA20/POLY1305; users should upgrade to 1.1.0d. For Openssl 1.0.2, the crash can be triggered when using RC4-MD5; users who have not disabled that algorithm should update to 1.0.2k.
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
|
Low
| 168,432
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CameraSource::releaseQueuedFrames() {
List<sp<IMemory> >::iterator it;
while (!mFramesReceived.empty()) {
it = mFramesReceived.begin();
releaseRecordingFrame(*it);
mFramesReceived.erase(it);
++mNumFramesDropped;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The camera APIs in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allow attackers to bypass intended access restrictions and obtain sensitive information about ANW buffer addresses via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28466701.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
|
Medium
| 173,509
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WebString WebPageSerializer::generateMetaCharsetDeclaration(const WebString& charset)
{
String charsetString = "<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=" + static_cast<const String&>(charset) + "\">";
return charsetString;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The page serializer in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 mishandles Mark of the Web (MOTW) comments for URLs containing a *--* sequence, which might allow remote attackers to inject HTML via a crafted URL, as demonstrated by an initial http://example.com?-- substring.
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
|
Medium
| 171,788
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void Predict(MB_PREDICTION_MODE mode) {
mbptr_->mode_info_context->mbmi.mode = mode;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(pred_fn_(mbptr_,
data_ptr_[0] - kStride,
data_ptr_[0] - 1, kStride,
data_ptr_[0], kStride));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,566
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParseNameAndCompare(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar const *other) {
register const xmlChar *cmp = other;
register const xmlChar *in;
const xmlChar *ret;
GROW;
in = ctxt->input->cur;
while (*in != 0 && *in == *cmp) {
++in;
++cmp;
ctxt->input->col++;
}
if (*cmp == 0 && (*in == '>' || IS_BLANK_CH (*in))) {
/* success */
ctxt->input->cur = in;
return (const xmlChar*) 1;
}
/* failure (or end of input buffer), check with full function */
ret = xmlParseName (ctxt);
/* strings coming from the dictionnary direct compare possible */
if (ret == other) {
return (const xmlChar*) 1;
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,296
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Chapters::Atom::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x00) { // Display ID
status = ParseDisplay(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
} else if (id == 0x1654) { // StringUID ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_string_uid);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
} else if (id == 0x33C4) { // UID ID
long long val;
status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, size, val);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
m_uid = static_cast<unsigned long long>(val);
} else if (id == 0x11) { // TimeStart ID
const long long val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (val < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(val);
m_start_timecode = val;
} else if (id == 0x12) { // TimeEnd ID
const long long val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (val < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(val);
m_stop_timecode = val;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,840
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void smp_process_keypress_notification(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = (uint8_t*)p_data;
uint8_t reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
p_cb->status = *(uint8_t*)p_data;
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
if (p != NULL) {
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_keypress_notification, p);
} else {
p_cb->peer_keypress_notification = BTM_SP_KEY_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_PEER_KEYPR_NOT_EVT;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In smp_process_keypress_notification of smp_act.cc, there is a possible out of bounds read due to an incorrect bounds check. This could lead to remote information disclosure over Bluetooth with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-7.0 Android-7.1.1 Android-7.1.2 Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android ID: A-111936834
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix OOB read before buffer length check
Bug: 111936834
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ib98528fb62db0d724ebd9112d071e367f78e369d
(cherry picked from commit 4548f34c90803c6544f6bed03399f2eabeab2a8e)
|
Low
| 174,077
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> postMessageCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestActiveDOMObject.postMessage");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestActiveDOMObject* imp = V8TestActiveDOMObject::toNative(args.Holder());
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, message, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
imp->postMessage(message);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,067
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline struct old_rng_alg *crypto_old_rng_alg(struct crypto_rng *tfm)
{
return &crypto_rng_tfm(tfm)->__crt_alg->cra_rng;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The rngapi_reset function in crypto/rng.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference).
Commit Message: crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
Low
| 167,730
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateNativeHandleInMeta(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<NativeHandle>& nativeHandle, OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, portIndex);
if (header == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = (BufferMeta *)(header->pAppPrivate);
sp<ABuffer> data = bufferMeta->getBuffer(
header, false /* backup */, false /* limit */);
bufferMeta->setNativeHandle(nativeHandle);
if (mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeNativeHandleSource
&& data->capacity() >= sizeof(VideoNativeHandleMetadata)) {
VideoNativeHandleMetadata &metadata = *(VideoNativeHandleMetadata *)(data->data());
metadata.eType = mMetadataType[portIndex];
metadata.pHandle =
nativeHandle == NULL ? NULL : const_cast<native_handle*>(nativeHandle->handle());
} else {
CLOG_ERROR(updateNativeHandleInMeta, BAD_VALUE, "%s:%u, %#x bad type (%d) or size (%zu)",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer, mMetadataType[portIndex], data->capacity());
return BAD_VALUE;
}
CLOG_BUFFER(updateNativeHandleInMeta, "%s:%u, %#x := %p",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer,
nativeHandle == NULL ? NULL : nativeHandle->handle());
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: IOMX: do not convert ANWB to gralloc source in emptyBuffer
Bug: 29422020
Bug: 31412859
Change-Id: If48e3e0b6f1af99a459fdc3f6f03744bbf0dc375
(cherry picked from commit 534bb6132a6a664f90b42b3ef81298b42efb3dc2)
|
Medium
| 174,146
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::Initialize(
const media::VideoCodecProfile profile,
IPC::Message* init_done_msg,
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process) {
DCHECK(!video_decode_accelerator_.get());
DCHECK(!init_done_msg_);
DCHECK(init_done_msg);
init_done_msg_ = init_done_msg;
#if (defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)) || defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(stub_ && stub_->decoder());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN7) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
DLOG(INFO) << "Initializing DXVA HW decoder for windows.";
DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator(this, renderer_process);
#else // OS_WIN
OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
video_decoder->SetEglState(
gfx::GLSurfaceEGL::GetHardwareDisplay(),
stub_->decoder()->GetGLContext()->GetHandle());
#endif // OS_WIN
video_decode_accelerator_ = video_decoder;
if (!video_decode_accelerator_->Initialize(profile))
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#else // Update RenderViewImpl::createMediaPlayer when adding clauses.
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,942
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int crypto_report_cipher(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_cipher rcipher;
strlcpy(rcipher.type, "cipher", sizeof(rcipher.type));
rcipher.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
rcipher.min_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize;
rcipher.max_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_CIPHER,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_cipher), &rcipher))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.19.3. crypto_report_one() and related functions in crypto/crypto_user.c (the crypto user configuration API) do not fully initialize structures that are copied to userspace, potentially leaking sensitive memory to user programs. NOTE: this is a CVE-2013-2547 regression but with easier exploitability because the attacker does not need a capability (however, the system must have the CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER kconfig option).
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix leaking uninitialized memory to userspace
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace. The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this. As a minimal fix, change it back.
Fixes: 4473710df1f8 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
???
| 168,965
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TopSitesImpl::SetTopSites(const MostVisitedURLList& new_top_sites,
const CallLocation location) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
MostVisitedURLList top_sites(new_top_sites);
size_t num_forced_urls = MergeCachedForcedURLs(&top_sites);
AddPrepopulatedPages(&top_sites, num_forced_urls);
TopSitesDelta delta;
DiffMostVisited(cache_->top_sites(), top_sites, &delta);
TopSitesBackend::RecordHistogram record_or_not =
TopSitesBackend::RECORD_HISTOGRAM_NO;
if (location == CALL_LOCATION_FROM_ON_GOT_MOST_VISITED_THUMBNAILS &&
!histogram_recorded_) {
size_t delta_size =
delta.deleted.size() + delta.added.size() + delta.moved.size();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100("History.FirstSetTopSitesDeltaSize", delta_size);
record_or_not = TopSitesBackend::RECORD_HISTOGRAM_YES;
histogram_recorded_ = true;
}
bool should_notify_observers = false;
if (!delta.deleted.empty() || !delta.added.empty() || !delta.moved.empty()) {
backend_->UpdateTopSites(delta, record_or_not);
should_notify_observers = true;
}
if (!should_notify_observers)
should_notify_observers = DoTitlesDiffer(cache_->top_sites(), top_sites);
cache_->SetTopSites(top_sites);
if (!temp_images_.empty()) {
for (const MostVisitedURL& mv : top_sites) {
const GURL& canonical_url = cache_->GetCanonicalURL(mv.url);
for (TempImages::iterator it = temp_images_.begin();
it != temp_images_.end(); ++it) {
if (canonical_url == cache_->GetCanonicalURL(it->first)) {
bool success = SetPageThumbnailEncoded(
mv.url, it->second.thumbnail.get(), it->second.thumbnail_score);
if (success) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Thumbnails.AddedToTopSites",
THUMBNAIL_PROMOTED_TEMP_TO_REGULAR,
THUMBNAIL_EVENT_COUNT);
}
temp_images_.erase(it);
break;
}
}
}
}
if (top_sites.size() - num_forced_urls >= kNonForcedTopSitesNumber)
temp_images_.clear();
ResetThreadSafeCache();
ResetThreadSafeImageCache();
if (should_notify_observers) {
if (location == CALL_LOCATION_FROM_FORCED_URLS)
NotifyTopSitesChanged(TopSitesObserver::ChangeReason::FORCED_URL);
else
NotifyTopSitesChanged(TopSitesObserver::ChangeReason::MOST_VISITED);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in New Tab Page in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a local attacker to view website thumbnail images after clearing browser data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
|
Medium
| 172,694
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static entity_table_opt determine_entity_table(int all, int doctype)
{
entity_table_opt retval = {NULL};
assert(!(doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_XML1 && all));
if (all) {
retval.ms_table = (doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML5) ?
entity_ms_table_html5 : entity_ms_table_html4;
} else {
retval.table = (doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML401) ?
stage3_table_be_noapos_00000 : stage3_table_be_apos_00000;
}
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
|
Low
| 167,170
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::allocate_input_buffer(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_INOUT OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE** bufferHdr,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 bytes)
{
(void)hComp, (void)port;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned i = 0;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("allocate_input_buffer()::");
if (bytes != m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Buffer size mismatch error: bytes[%u] != nBufferSize[%u]",
(unsigned int)bytes, (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (!m_inp_mem_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("%s: size = %u, actual cnt %u", __FUNCTION__,
(unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize, (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
m_inp_mem_ptr = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE*) \
calloc( (sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE)), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_inp_mem_ptr == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_inp_mem_ptr");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Successfully allocated m_inp_mem_ptr = %p", m_inp_mem_ptr);
m_pInput_pmem = (struct pmem *) calloc(sizeof (struct pmem), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pInput_pmem == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pInput_pmem");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pInput_ion = (struct venc_ion *) calloc(sizeof (struct venc_ion), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pInput_ion == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pInput_ion");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
for (i=0; i< m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = -1;
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd =-1;
m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd =-1;
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data.handle = 0;
#endif
}
}
for (i=0; i< m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
if (BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_inp_bm_count,i)) {
break;
}
}
if (i < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
*bufferHdr = (m_inp_mem_ptr + i);
(*bufferHdr)->nSize = sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
(*bufferHdr)->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
(*bufferHdr)->nAllocLen = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
(*bufferHdr)->pAppPrivate = appData;
(*bufferHdr)->nInputPortIndex = PORT_INDEX_IN;
(*bufferHdr)->pInputPortPrivate = (OMX_PTR)&m_pInput_pmem[i];
#ifdef USE_ION
#ifdef _MSM8974_
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,0);
#else
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,ION_FLAG_CACHED);
#endif
if (m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ION device open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd;
#else
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
if (m_pInput_pmem[i].fd == 0) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
}
if (m_pInput_pmem[i].fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: /dev/pmem_adsp open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
m_pInput_pmem[i].size = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
m_pInput_pmem[i].offset = 0;
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (OMX_U8 *)SECURE_BUFPTR;
if(!secure_session) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)mmap(NULL,
m_pInput_pmem[i].size,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,m_pInput_pmem[i].fd,0);
if (m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer == MAP_FAILED) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: mmap FAILED= %d", errno);
close(m_pInput_pmem[i].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pInput_ion[i]);
#endif
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
} else {
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = malloc(sizeof(OMX_U32) + sizeof(native_handle_t*));
}
(*bufferHdr)->pBuffer = (OMX_U8 *)m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Virtual address in allocate buffer is %p", m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer);
BITMASK_SET(&m_inp_bm_count,i);
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat && (dev_use_buf(&m_pInput_pmem[i],PORT_INDEX_IN,i) != true)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_use_buf FAILED for i/p buf");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: All i/p buffers are allocated, invalid allocate buf call"
"for index [%d]", i);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
return eRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp in mediaserver in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allocates an incorrect amount of memory, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816964.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix wrong nAllocLen
Set nAllocLen to the size of the opaque handle itself.
Bug: 28816964
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: Id410e324bee291d4a0018dddb97eda9bbcded099
|
Low
| 173,519
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::WorkerRestarted(
SharedWorkerHost* worker_host) {
DCHECK_EQ(WORKER_TERMINATED, state_);
DCHECK(!worker_host_);
state_ = WORKER_NOT_READY;
worker_host_ = worker_host;
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->SetRenderer(GetProcess(), nullptr);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,791
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded(PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor> descriptor)
{
if (m_successCallback) {
RefPtr<RTCSessionDescription> sessionDescription = RTCSessionDescription::create(descriptor);
m_successCallback->handleEvent(sessionDescription.get());
}
clear();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,344
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jas_image_t *jpg_decode(jas_stream_t *in, char *optstr)
{
struct jpeg_decompress_struct cinfo;
struct jpeg_error_mgr jerr;
FILE *input_file;
jpg_dest_t dest_mgr_buf;
jpg_dest_t *dest_mgr = &dest_mgr_buf;
JDIMENSION num_scanlines;
jas_image_t *image;
int ret;
jpg_dec_importopts_t opts;
size_t size;
if (jpg_dec_parseopts(optstr, &opts)) {
goto error;
}
memset(&cinfo, 0, sizeof(struct jpeg_decompress_struct));
memset(dest_mgr, 0, sizeof(jpg_dest_t));
dest_mgr->data = 0;
image = 0;
input_file = 0;
if (!(input_file = tmpfile())) {
jas_eprintf("cannot make temporary file\n");
goto error;
}
if (jpg_copystreamtofile(input_file, in)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot copy stream\n");
goto error;
}
rewind(input_file);
/* Allocate and initialize a JPEG decompression object. */
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_std_error(%p)\n", &jerr));
cinfo.err = jpeg_std_error(&jerr);
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_create_decompress(%p)\n", &cinfo));
jpeg_create_decompress(&cinfo);
/* Specify the data source for decompression. */
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_stdio_src(%p, %p)\n", &cinfo, input_file));
jpeg_stdio_src(&cinfo, input_file);
/* Read the file header to obtain the image information. */
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_read_header(%p, TRUE)\n", &cinfo));
ret = jpeg_read_header(&cinfo, TRUE);
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_read_header return value %d\n", ret));
if (ret != JPEG_HEADER_OK) {
jas_eprintf("jpeg_read_header did not return JPEG_HEADER_OK\n");
}
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"header: image_width %d; image_height %d; num_components %d\n",
cinfo.image_width, cinfo.image_height, cinfo.num_components)
);
/* Start the decompressor. */
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_start_decompress(%p)\n", &cinfo));
ret = jpeg_start_decompress(&cinfo);
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_start_decompress return value %d\n", ret));
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"header: output_width %d; output_height %d; output_components %d\n",
cinfo.output_width, cinfo.output_height, cinfo.output_components)
);
if (opts.max_size) {
if (!jas_safe_size_mul(cinfo.output_width, cinfo.output_height,
&size) ||
!jas_safe_size_mul(size, cinfo.output_components, &size)) {
goto error;
}
if (size > opts.max_size) {
jas_eprintf("image is too large\n");
goto error;
}
}
/* Create an image object to hold the decoded data. */
if (!(image = jpg_mkimage(&cinfo))) {
jas_eprintf("jpg_mkimage failed\n");
goto error;
}
/* Initialize the data sink object. */
dest_mgr->image = image;
if (!(dest_mgr->data = jas_matrix_create(1, cinfo.output_width))) {
jas_eprintf("jas_matrix_create failed\n");
goto error;
}
dest_mgr->start_output = jpg_start_output;
dest_mgr->put_pixel_rows = jpg_put_pixel_rows;
dest_mgr->finish_output = jpg_finish_output;
dest_mgr->buffer = (*cinfo.mem->alloc_sarray)
((j_common_ptr) &cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE,
cinfo.output_width * cinfo.output_components, (JDIMENSION) 1);
dest_mgr->buffer_height = 1;
dest_mgr->error = 0;
/* Process the compressed data. */
(*dest_mgr->start_output)(&cinfo, dest_mgr);
while (cinfo.output_scanline < cinfo.output_height) {
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_read_scanlines(%p, %p, %lu)\n", &cinfo,
dest_mgr->buffer, JAS_CAST(unsigned long, dest_mgr->buffer_height)));
num_scanlines = jpeg_read_scanlines(&cinfo, dest_mgr->buffer,
dest_mgr->buffer_height);
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_read_scanlines return value %lu\n",
JAS_CAST(unsigned long, num_scanlines)));
(*dest_mgr->put_pixel_rows)(&cinfo, dest_mgr, num_scanlines);
}
(*dest_mgr->finish_output)(&cinfo, dest_mgr);
/* Complete the decompression process. */
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_finish_decompress(%p)\n", &cinfo));
jpeg_finish_decompress(&cinfo);
/* Destroy the JPEG decompression object. */
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jpeg_destroy_decompress(%p)\n", &cinfo));
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&cinfo);
jas_matrix_destroy(dest_mgr->data);
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("fclose(%p)\n", input_file));
fclose(input_file);
input_file = 0;
if (dest_mgr->error) {
jas_eprintf("error during decoding\n");
goto error;
}
return image;
error:
if (dest_mgr->data) {
jas_matrix_destroy(dest_mgr->data);
}
if (image) {
jas_image_destroy(image);
}
if (input_file) {
fclose(input_file);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,722
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<SymmetricKey> CopyDefaultPaddingKey() {
return SymmetricKey::Import(kPaddingKeyAlgorithm, (*GetPaddingKey())->key());
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
Medium
| 172,999
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, getStub)
{
size_t len;
char *buf;
php_stream *fp;
php_stream_filter *filter = NULL;
phar_entry_info *stub;
phar_entry_info *stub;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest), ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1, (void **)&stub)) {
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->fp && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_brandnew && !(stub->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK)) {
fp = phar_obj->arc.archive->fp;
} else {
if (!(fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(phar_obj->arc.archive->fname, "rb", 0, NULL))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: unable to open phar \"%s\"", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
if (stub->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK) {
char *filter_name;
if ((filter_name = phar_decompress_filter(stub, 0)) != NULL) {
filter = php_stream_filter_create(filter_name, NULL, php_stream_is_persistent(fp) TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
filter = NULL;
}
if (!filter) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: unable to read stub of phar \"%s\" (cannot create %s filter)", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname, phar_decompress_filter(stub, 1));
return;
}
php_stream_filter_append(&fp->readfilters, filter);
}
}
if (!fp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Unable to read stub");
return;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, stub->offset_abs, SEEK_SET);
len = stub->uncompressed_filesize;
goto carry_on;
} else {
RETURN_STRINGL("", 0, 1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The phar_convert_to_other function in ext/phar/phar_object.c in PHP before 5.4.43, 5.5.x before 5.5.27, and 5.6.x before 5.6.11 does not validate a file pointer before a close operation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TAR archive that is mishandled in a Phar::convertToData call.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,296
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: header_gets (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char *ptr, int bufsize)
{ int k ;
for (k = 0 ; k < bufsize - 1 ; k++)
{ if (psf->headindex < psf->headend)
{ ptr [k] = psf->header [psf->headindex] ;
psf->headindex ++ ;
}
else
{ psf->headend += psf_fread (psf->header + psf->headend, 1, 1, psf) ;
ptr [k] = psf->header [psf->headindex] ;
psf->headindex = psf->headend ;
} ;
if (ptr [k] == '\n')
break ;
} ;
ptr [k] = 0 ;
return k ;
} /* header_gets */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
|
Medium
| 170,047
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int do_hidp_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
{
struct hidp_connadd_req ca;
struct hidp_conndel_req cd;
struct hidp_connlist_req cl;
struct hidp_conninfo ci;
struct socket *csock;
struct socket *isock;
int err;
BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %p", cmd, argp);
switch (cmd) {
case HIDPCONNADD:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&ca, argp, sizeof(ca)))
return -EFAULT;
csock = sockfd_lookup(ca.ctrl_sock, &err);
if (!csock)
return err;
isock = sockfd_lookup(ca.intr_sock, &err);
if (!isock) {
sockfd_put(csock);
return err;
}
err = hidp_connection_add(&ca, csock, isock);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))
err = -EFAULT;
sockfd_put(csock);
sockfd_put(isock);
return err;
case HIDPCONNDEL:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&cd, argp, sizeof(cd)))
return -EFAULT;
return hidp_connection_del(&cd);
case HIDPGETCONNLIST:
if (copy_from_user(&cl, argp, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
if (cl.cnum <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
err = hidp_get_connlist(&cl);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &cl, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
case HIDPGETCONNINFO:
if (copy_from_user(&ci, argp, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
err = hidp_get_conninfo(&ci);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ci, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-77
Summary: The do_hidp_sock_ioctl function in net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c in the Linux kernel before 5.0.15 allows a local user to obtain potentially sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a HIDPCONNADD command, because a name field may not end with a '0' character.
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hidp: fix buffer overflow
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially
sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command.
This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
Low
| 169,676
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int git_delta_apply(
void **out,
size_t *out_len,
const unsigned char *base,
size_t base_len,
const unsigned char *delta,
size_t delta_len)
{
const unsigned char *delta_end = delta + delta_len;
size_t base_sz, res_sz, alloc_sz;
unsigned char *res_dp;
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
/*
* Check that the base size matches the data we were given;
* if not we would underflow while accessing data from the
* base object, resulting in data corruption or segfault.
*/
if ((hdr_sz(&base_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) || (base_sz != base_len)) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
if (hdr_sz(&res_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta: base size does not match given data");
return -1;
}
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloc_sz, res_sz, 1);
res_dp = git__malloc(alloc_sz);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(res_dp);
res_dp[res_sz] = '\0';
*out = res_dp;
*out_len = res_sz;
while (delta < delta_end) {
unsigned char cmd = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x80) {
/* cmd is a copy instruction; copy from the base. */
size_t off = 0, len = 0;
if (cmd & 0x01) off = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x02) off |= *delta++ << 8UL;
if (cmd & 0x04) off |= *delta++ << 16UL;
if (cmd & 0x08) off |= ((unsigned) *delta++ << 24UL);
if (cmd & 0x10) len = *delta++;
if (cmd & 0x20) len |= *delta++ << 8UL;
if (cmd & 0x40) len |= *delta++ << 16UL;
if (!len) len = 0x10000;
if (base_len < off + len || res_sz < len)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, base + off, len);
res_dp += len;
res_sz -= len;
} else if (cmd) {
/*
* cmd is a literal insert instruction; copy from
* the delta stream itself.
*/
if (delta_end - delta < cmd || res_sz < cmd)
goto fail;
memcpy(res_dp, delta, cmd);
delta += cmd;
res_dp += cmd;
res_sz -= cmd;
} else {
/* cmd == 0 is reserved for future encodings. */
goto fail;
}
}
if (delta != delta_end || res_sz)
goto fail;
return 0;
fail:
git__free(*out);
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
giterr_set(GITERR_INVALID, "failed to apply delta");
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: A flaw was found in libgit2 before version 0.27.3. A missing check in git_delta_apply function in delta.c file, may lead to an out-of-bound read while reading a binary delta file. An attacker may use this flaw to cause a Denial of Service.
Commit Message: delta: fix out-of-bounds read of delta
When computing the offset and length of the delta base, we repeatedly
increment the `delta` pointer without checking whether we have advanced
past its end already, which can thus result in an out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by repeatedly checking whether we have reached the end. Add a
test which would cause Valgrind to produce an error.
Reported-by: Riccardo Schirone <rschiron@redhat.com>
Test-provided-by: Riccardo Schirone <rschiron@redhat.com>
|
Medium
| 169,244
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ReverbConvolverStage::ReverbConvolverStage(const float* impulseResponse, size_t, size_t reverbTotalLatency, size_t stageOffset, size_t stageLength,
size_t fftSize, size_t renderPhase, size_t renderSliceSize, ReverbAccumulationBuffer* accumulationBuffer, bool directMode)
: m_accumulationBuffer(accumulationBuffer)
, m_accumulationReadIndex(0)
, m_inputReadIndex(0)
, m_directMode(directMode)
{
ASSERT(impulseResponse);
ASSERT(accumulationBuffer);
if (!m_directMode) {
m_fftKernel = adoptPtr(new FFTFrame(fftSize));
m_fftKernel->doPaddedFFT(impulseResponse + stageOffset, stageLength);
m_fftConvolver = adoptPtr(new FFTConvolver(fftSize));
} else {
m_directKernel = adoptPtr(new AudioFloatArray(fftSize / 2));
m_directKernel->copyToRange(impulseResponse + stageOffset, 0, fftSize / 2);
m_directConvolver = adoptPtr(new DirectConvolver(renderSliceSize));
}
m_temporaryBuffer.allocate(renderSliceSize);
size_t totalDelay = stageOffset + reverbTotalLatency;
size_t halfSize = fftSize / 2;
if (!m_directMode) {
ASSERT(totalDelay >= halfSize);
if (totalDelay >= halfSize)
totalDelay -= halfSize;
}
int maxPreDelayLength = std::min(halfSize, totalDelay);
m_preDelayLength = totalDelay > 0 ? renderPhase % maxPreDelayLength : 0;
if (m_preDelayLength > totalDelay)
m_preDelayLength = 0;
m_postDelayLength = totalDelay - m_preDelayLength;
m_preReadWriteIndex = 0;
m_framesProcessed = 0; // total frames processed so far
size_t delayBufferSize = m_preDelayLength < fftSize ? fftSize : m_preDelayLength;
delayBufferSize = delayBufferSize < renderSliceSize ? renderSliceSize : delayBufferSize;
m_preDelayBuffer.allocate(delayBufferSize);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ReverbConvolverStage::ReverbConvolverStage function in core/platform/audio/ReverbConvolverStage.cpp in the Web Audio implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.66, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via vectors related to the impulseResponse array.
Commit Message: Don't read past the end of the impulseResponse array
BUG=281480
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23689004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,191
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor> RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium::remoteDescription()
{
if (!m_webHandler)
return 0;
return m_webHandler->remoteDescription();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,353
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bgp_update_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *dat, int length)
{
struct bgp bgp;
const u_char *p;
int withdrawn_routes_len;
int len;
int i;
ND_TCHECK2(dat[0], BGP_SIZE);
if (length < BGP_SIZE)
goto trunc;
memcpy(&bgp, dat, BGP_SIZE);
p = dat + BGP_SIZE; /*XXX*/
length -= BGP_SIZE;
/* Unfeasible routes */
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 2);
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
withdrawn_routes_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
length -= 2;
if (withdrawn_routes_len) {
/*
* Without keeping state from the original NLRI message,
* it's not possible to tell if this a v4 or v6 route,
* so only try to decode it if we're not v6 enabled.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], withdrawn_routes_len);
if (length < withdrawn_routes_len)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Withdrawn routes: %d bytes", withdrawn_routes_len));
p += withdrawn_routes_len;
length -= withdrawn_routes_len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 2);
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
len = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
length -= 2;
if (withdrawn_routes_len == 0 && len == 0 && length == 0) {
/* No withdrawn routes, no path attributes, no NLRI */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t End-of-Rib Marker (empty NLRI)"));
return;
}
if (len) {
/* do something more useful!*/
while (len) {
int aflags, atype, alenlen, alen;
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
aflags = *p;
atype = *(p + 1);
p += 2;
len -= 2;
length -= 2;
alenlen = bgp_attr_lenlen(aflags, p);
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], alenlen);
if (len < alenlen)
goto trunc;
if (length < alenlen)
goto trunc;
alen = bgp_attr_len(aflags, p);
p += alenlen;
len -= alenlen;
length -= alenlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_attr_values, "Unknown Attribute",
atype),
atype,
alen));
if (aflags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s%s%s%s",
aflags & 0x80 ? "O" : "",
aflags & 0x40 ? "T" : "",
aflags & 0x20 ? "P" : "",
aflags & 0x10 ? "E" : ""));
if (aflags & 0xf)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+%x", aflags & 0xf));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]: "));
}
if (len < alen)
goto trunc;
if (length < alen)
goto trunc;
if (!bgp_attr_print(ndo, atype, p, alen))
goto trunc;
p += alen;
len -= alen;
length -= alen;
}
}
if (length) {
/*
* XXX - what if they're using the "Advertisement of
* Multiple Paths in BGP" feature:
*
* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-idr-add-paths/
*
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-idr-add-paths-06
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Updated routes:"));
while (length) {
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
i = decode_prefix4(ndo, p, length, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i == -1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
break;
} else if (i == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (i == -3)
goto trunc; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
p += i;
length -= i;
}
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-674
Summary: The BGP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 allows stack consumption in print-bgp.c:bgp_attr_print() because of unlimited recursion.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16300/BGP: prevent stack exhaustion
Enforce a limit on how many times bgp_attr_print() can recurse.
This fixes a stack exhaustion discovered by Include Security working
under the Mozilla SOS program in 2018 by means of code audit.
|
Low
| 169,817
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: T42_Open_Face( T42_Face face )
{
T42_LoaderRec loader;
T42_Parser parser;
T1_Font type1 = &face->type1;
FT_Memory memory = face->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
t42_loader_init( &loader, face );
parser = &loader.parser;
if ( FT_ALLOC( face->ttf_data, 12 ) )
goto Exit;
error = t42_parser_init( parser,
face->root.stream,
memory,
if ( error )
goto Exit;
if ( type1->font_type != 42 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T42_Open_Face: cannot handle FontType %d\n",
type1->font_type ));
error = FT_THROW( Unknown_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
/* now, propagate the charstrings and glyphnames tables */
/* to the Type1 data */
type1->num_glyphs = loader.num_glyphs;
if ( !loader.charstrings.init )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T42_Open_Face: no charstrings array in face\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
loader.charstrings.init = 0;
type1->charstrings_block = loader.charstrings.block;
type1->charstrings = loader.charstrings.elements;
type1->charstrings_len = loader.charstrings.lengths;
/* we copy the glyph names `block' and `elements' fields; */
/* the `lengths' field must be released later */
type1->glyph_names_block = loader.glyph_names.block;
type1->glyph_names = (FT_String**)loader.glyph_names.elements;
loader.glyph_names.block = 0;
loader.glyph_names.elements = 0;
/* we must now build type1.encoding when we have a custom array */
if ( type1->encoding_type == T1_ENCODING_TYPE_ARRAY )
{
FT_Int charcode, idx, min_char, max_char;
FT_Byte* glyph_name;
/* OK, we do the following: for each element in the encoding */
/* table, look up the index of the glyph having the same name */
/* as defined in the CharStrings array. */
/* The index is then stored in type1.encoding.char_index, and */
/* the name in type1.encoding.char_name */
min_char = 0;
max_char = 0;
charcode = 0;
for ( ; charcode < loader.encoding_table.max_elems; charcode++ )
{
FT_Byte* char_name;
type1->encoding.char_index[charcode] = 0;
type1->encoding.char_name [charcode] = (char *)".notdef";
char_name = loader.encoding_table.elements[charcode];
if ( char_name )
for ( idx = 0; idx < type1->num_glyphs; idx++ )
{
glyph_name = (FT_Byte*)type1->glyph_names[idx];
if ( ft_strcmp( (const char*)char_name,
(const char*)glyph_name ) == 0 )
{
type1->encoding.char_index[charcode] = (FT_UShort)idx;
type1->encoding.char_name [charcode] = (char*)glyph_name;
/* Change min/max encoded char only if glyph name is */
/* not /.notdef */
if ( ft_strcmp( (const char*)".notdef",
(const char*)glyph_name ) != 0 )
{
if ( charcode < min_char )
min_char = charcode;
if ( charcode >= max_char )
max_char = charcode + 1;
}
break;
}
}
}
type1->encoding.code_first = min_char;
type1->encoding.code_last = max_char;
type1->encoding.num_chars = loader.num_chars;
}
Exit:
t42_loader_done( &loader );
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: type42/t42parse.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 does not consider that scanning can be incomplete without triggering an error, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted Type42 font.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,861
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int nfs4_intent_set_file(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct file *filp;
int ret;
/* If the open_intent is for execute, we have an extra check to make */
if (nd->intent.open.flags & FMODE_EXEC) {
ret = nfs_may_open(state->inode,
state->owner->so_cred,
nd->intent.open.flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_close;
}
filp = lookup_instantiate_filp(nd, path->dentry, NULL);
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
struct nfs_open_context *ctx;
ctx = nfs_file_open_context(filp);
ctx->state = state;
return 0;
}
ret = PTR_ERR(filp);
out_close:
nfs4_close_sync(path, state, nd->intent.open.flags);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,693
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: check_interlace_type(int PNG_CONST interlace_type)
{
if (interlace_type != PNG_INTERLACE_NONE)
{
/* This is an internal error - --interlace tests should be skipped, not
* attempted.
*/
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: no interlace support\n");
exit(99);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,605
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void skcipher_release(void *private)
{
crypto_free_skcipher(private);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: crypto/algif_skcipher.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.2 does not verify that a setkey operation has been performed on an AF_ALG socket before an accept system call is processed, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a crafted application that does not supply a key, related to the lrw_crypt function in crypto/lrw.c.
Commit Message: crypto: algif_skcipher - Require setkey before accept(2)
Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them
without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that
the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been
done on the socket yet.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
|
Low
| 167,456
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Add(int original_content_length, int received_content_length) {
AddInt64ToListPref(
kNumDaysInHistory - 1, original_content_length, original_update_.Get());
AddInt64ToListPref(
kNumDaysInHistory - 1, received_content_length, received_update_.Get());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,321
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int raw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct ipcm_cookie ipc;
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
struct flowi4 fl4;
int free = 0;
__be32 daddr;
__be32 saddr;
u8 tos;
int err;
struct ip_options_data opt_copy;
struct raw_frag_vec rfv;
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > 0xFFFF)
goto out;
/*
* Check the flags.
*/
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB) /* Mirror BSD error message */
goto out; /* compatibility */
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
if (msg->msg_namelen) {
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in *, usin, msg->msg_name);
err = -EINVAL;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*usin))
goto out;
if (usin->sin_family != AF_INET) {
pr_info_once("%s: %s forgot to set AF_INET. Fix it!\n",
__func__, current->comm);
err = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (usin->sin_family)
goto out;
}
daddr = usin->sin_addr.s_addr;
/* ANK: I did not forget to get protocol from port field.
* I just do not know, who uses this weirdness.
* IP_HDRINCL is much more convenient.
*/
} else {
err = -EDESTADDRREQ;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
}
ipc.sockc.tsflags = sk->sk_tsflags;
ipc.addr = inet->inet_saddr;
ipc.opt = NULL;
ipc.tx_flags = 0;
ipc.ttl = 0;
ipc.tos = -1;
ipc.oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sk, msg, &ipc, false);
if (unlikely(err)) {
kfree(ipc.opt);
goto out;
}
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
}
saddr = ipc.addr;
ipc.addr = daddr;
if (!ipc.opt) {
struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
rcu_read_lock();
inet_opt = rcu_dereference(inet->inet_opt);
if (inet_opt) {
memcpy(&opt_copy, inet_opt,
sizeof(*inet_opt) + inet_opt->opt.optlen);
ipc.opt = &opt_copy.opt;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
if (ipc.opt) {
err = -EINVAL;
/* Linux does not mangle headers on raw sockets,
* so that IP options + IP_HDRINCL is non-sense.
*/
if (inet->hdrincl)
goto done;
if (ipc.opt->opt.srr) {
if (!daddr)
goto done;
daddr = ipc.opt->opt.faddr;
}
}
tos = get_rtconn_flags(&ipc, sk);
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTROUTE)
tos |= RTO_ONLINK;
if (ipv4_is_multicast(daddr)) {
if (!ipc.oif)
ipc.oif = inet->mc_index;
if (!saddr)
saddr = inet->mc_addr;
} else if (!ipc.oif)
ipc.oif = inet->uc_index;
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, ipc.oif, sk->sk_mark, tos,
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE,
inet->hdrincl ? IPPROTO_RAW : sk->sk_protocol,
inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk) |
(inet->hdrincl ? FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH : 0),
daddr, saddr, 0, 0, sk->sk_uid);
if (!inet->hdrincl) {
rfv.msg = msg;
rfv.hlen = 0;
err = raw_probe_proto_opt(&rfv, &fl4);
if (err)
goto done;
}
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
rt = NULL;
goto done;
}
err = -EACCES;
if (rt->rt_flags & RTCF_BROADCAST && !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST))
goto done;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
if (inet->hdrincl)
err = raw_send_hdrinc(sk, &fl4, msg, len,
&rt, msg->msg_flags, &ipc.sockc);
else {
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, ipc.sockc.tsflags, &ipc.tx_flags);
if (!ipc.addr)
ipc.addr = fl4.daddr;
lock_sock(sk);
err = ip_append_data(sk, &fl4, raw_getfrag,
&rfv, len, 0,
&ipc, &rt, msg->msg_flags);
if (err)
ip_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) {
err = ip_push_pending_frames(sk, &fl4);
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !inet->recverr)
err = 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
done:
if (free)
kfree(ipc.opt);
ip_rt_put(rt);
out:
if (err < 0)
return err;
return len;
do_confirm:
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE)
dst_confirm_neigh(&rt->dst, &fl4.daddr);
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto done;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The raw_sendmsg() function in net/ipv4/raw.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.6 has a race condition in inet->hdrincl that leads to uninitialized stack pointer usage; this allows a local user to execute code and gain privileges.
Commit Message: net: ipv4: fix for a race condition in raw_sendmsg
inet->hdrincl is racy, and could lead to uninitialized stack pointer
usage, so its value should be read only once.
Fixes: c008ba5bdc9f ("ipv4: Avoid reading user iov twice after raw_probe_proto_opt")
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 167,653
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ps_parser_skip_PS_token( PS_Parser parser )
{
/* Note: PostScript allows any non-delimiting, non-whitespace */
/* character in a name (PS Ref Manual, 3rd ed, p31). */
/* PostScript delimiters are (, ), <, >, [, ], {, }, /, and %. */
FT_Byte* cur = parser->cursor;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->limit;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
skip_spaces( &cur, limit ); /* this also skips comments */
if ( cur >= limit )
goto Exit;
/* self-delimiting, single-character tokens */
if ( *cur == '[' || *cur == ']' )
{
cur++;
goto Exit;
}
/* skip balanced expressions (procedures and strings) */
if ( *cur == '{' ) /* {...} */
{
error = skip_procedure( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '(' ) /* (...) */
{
error = skip_literal_string( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '<' ) /* <...> */
{
if ( cur + 1 < limit && *(cur + 1) == '<' ) /* << */
{
cur++;
cur++;
}
else
error = skip_string( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '>' )
{
cur++;
if ( cur >= limit || *cur != '>' ) /* >> */
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_skip_PS_token:"
" unexpected closing delimiter `>'\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
cur++;
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '/' )
cur++;
/* anything else */
while ( cur < limit )
{
/* *cur might be invalid (e.g., ')' or '}'), but this */
/* is handled by the test `cur == parser->cursor' below */
if ( IS_PS_DELIM( *cur ) )
break;
cur++;
}
Exit:
if ( cur < limit && cur == parser->cursor )
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_skip_PS_token:"
" current token is `%c' which is self-delimiting\n"
" "
" but invalid at this point\n",
*cur ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
parser->error = error;
parser->cursor = cur;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeType before 2.6.1 has a buffer over-read in skip_comment in psaux/psobjs.c because ps_parser_skip_PS_token is mishandled in an FT_New_Memory_Face operation.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,427
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static UINT drdynvc_order_recv(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, wStream* s)
{
int value;
int Cmd;
int Sp;
int cbChId;
Stream_Read_UINT8(s, value);
Cmd = (value & 0xf0) >> 4;
Sp = (value & 0x0c) >> 2;
cbChId = (value & 0x03) >> 0;
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "order_recv: Cmd=0x%x, Sp=%d cbChId=%d", Cmd, Sp, cbChId);
switch (Cmd)
{
case CAPABILITY_REQUEST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_capability_request(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case CREATE_REQUEST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_create_request(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case DATA_FIRST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_data_first(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case DATA_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_data(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case CLOSE_REQUEST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_close_request(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
default:
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "unknown drdynvc cmd 0x%x", Cmd);
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: FreeRDP FreeRDP 2.0.0-rc3 released version before commit 205c612820dac644d665b5bb1cdf437dc5ca01e3 contains a Other/Unknown vulnerability in channels/drdynvc/client/drdynvc_main.c, drdynvc_process_capability_request that can result in The RDP server can read the client's memory.. This attack appear to be exploitable via RDPClient must connect the rdp server with echo option. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in after commit 205c612820dac644d665b5bb1cdf437dc5ca01e3.
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
|
Low
| 168,933
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int dv_extract_audio_info(DVDemuxContext* c, uint8_t* frame)
{
const uint8_t* as_pack;
int freq, stype, smpls, quant, i, ach;
as_pack = dv_extract_pack(frame, dv_audio_source);
if (!as_pack || !c->sys) { /* No audio ? */
c->ach = 0;
return 0;
}
smpls = as_pack[1] & 0x3f; /* samples in this frame - min. samples */
freq = (as_pack[4] >> 3) & 0x07; /* 0 - 48kHz, 1 - 44,1kHz, 2 - 32kHz */
stype = (as_pack[3] & 0x1f); /* 0 - 2CH, 2 - 4CH, 3 - 8CH */
quant = as_pack[4] & 0x07; /* 0 - 16bit linear, 1 - 12bit nonlinear */
/* note: ach counts PAIRS of channels (i.e. stereo channels) */
ach = ((int[4]){ 1, 0, 2, 4})[stype];
if (ach == 1 && quant && freq == 2)
if (!c->ast[i])
break;
avpriv_set_pts_info(c->ast[i], 64, 1, 30000);
c->ast[i]->codec->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO;
c->ast[i]->codec->codec_id = CODEC_ID_PCM_S16LE;
av_init_packet(&c->audio_pkt[i]);
c->audio_pkt[i].size = 0;
c->audio_pkt[i].data = c->audio_buf[i];
c->audio_pkt[i].stream_index = c->ast[i]->index;
c->audio_pkt[i].flags |= AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The dv_extract_audio function in libavcodec in FFmpeg 0.7.x before 0.7.12 and 0.8.x before 0.8.11 and in Libav 0.5.x before 0.5.9, 0.6.x before 0.6.6, 0.7.x before 0.7.5, and 0.8.x before 0.8.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted DV file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,243
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *ComplexImages(const Image *images,const ComplexOperator op,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ComplexImageTag "Complex/Image"
CacheView
*Ai_view,
*Ar_view,
*Bi_view,
*Br_view,
*Ci_view,
*Cr_view;
const char
*artifact;
const Image
*Ai_image,
*Ar_image,
*Bi_image,
*Br_image;
double
snr;
Image
*Ci_image,
*complex_images,
*Cr_image,
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
ssize_t
y;
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->next == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),ImageError,
"ImageSequenceRequired","`%s'",images->filename);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=CloneImage(images,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return(image);
}
image->depth=32UL;
complex_images=NewImageList();
AppendImageToList(&complex_images,image);
image=CloneImage(images,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
complex_images=DestroyImageList(complex_images);
return(complex_images);
}
AppendImageToList(&complex_images,image);
/*
Apply complex mathematics to image pixels.
*/
artifact=GetImageArtifact(image,"complex:snr");
snr=0.0;
if (artifact != (const char *) NULL)
snr=StringToDouble(artifact,(char **) NULL);
Ar_image=images;
Ai_image=images->next;
Br_image=images;
Bi_image=images->next;
if ((images->next->next != (Image *) NULL) &&
(images->next->next->next != (Image *) NULL))
{
Br_image=images->next->next;
Bi_image=images->next->next->next;
}
Cr_image=complex_images;
Ci_image=complex_images->next;
Ar_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Ar_image,exception);
Ai_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Ai_image,exception);
Br_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Br_image,exception);
Bi_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Bi_image,exception);
Cr_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(Cr_image,exception);
Ci_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(Ci_image,exception);
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(progress,status) \
magick_number_threads(Cr_image,complex_images,Cr_image->rows,1L)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) Cr_image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict Ai,
*magick_restrict Ar,
*magick_restrict Bi,
*magick_restrict Br;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict Ci,
*magick_restrict Cr;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
Ar=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Ar_view,0,y,Cr_image->columns,1,exception);
Ai=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Ai_view,0,y,Cr_image->columns,1,exception);
Br=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Br_view,0,y,Cr_image->columns,1,exception);
Bi=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Bi_view,0,y,Cr_image->columns,1,exception);
Cr=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Cr_view,0,y,Cr_image->columns,1,exception);
Ci=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Ci_view,0,y,Ci_image->columns,1,exception);
if ((Ar == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (Ai == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(Br == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (Bi == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(Cr == (Quantum *) NULL) || (Ci == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) Cr_image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(Cr_image); i++)
{
switch (op)
{
case AddComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=Ar[i]+Br[i];
Ci[i]=Ai[i]+Bi[i];
break;
}
case ConjugateComplexOperator:
default:
{
Cr[i]=Ar[i];
Ci[i]=(-Bi[i]);
break;
}
case DivideComplexOperator:
{
double
gamma;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal((double) Br[i]*Br[i]+Bi[i]*Bi[i]+snr);
Cr[i]=gamma*((double) Ar[i]*Br[i]+(double) Ai[i]*Bi[i]);
Ci[i]=gamma*((double) Ai[i]*Br[i]-(double) Ar[i]*Bi[i]);
break;
}
case MagnitudePhaseComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=sqrt((double) Ar[i]*Ar[i]+(double) Ai[i]*Ai[i]);
Ci[i]=atan2((double) Ai[i],(double) Ar[i])/(2.0*MagickPI)+0.5;
break;
}
case MultiplyComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=QuantumScale*((double) Ar[i]*Br[i]-(double) Ai[i]*Bi[i]);
Ci[i]=QuantumScale*((double) Ai[i]*Br[i]+(double) Ar[i]*Bi[i]);
break;
}
case RealImaginaryComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=Ar[i]*cos(2.0*MagickPI*(Ai[i]-0.5));
Ci[i]=Ar[i]*sin(2.0*MagickPI*(Ai[i]-0.5));
break;
}
case SubtractComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=Ar[i]-Br[i];
Ci[i]=Ai[i]-Bi[i];
break;
}
}
}
Ar+=GetPixelChannels(Ar_image);
Ai+=GetPixelChannels(Ai_image);
Br+=GetPixelChannels(Br_image);
Bi+=GetPixelChannels(Bi_image);
Cr+=GetPixelChannels(Cr_image);
Ci+=GetPixelChannels(Ci_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Ci_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Cr_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (images->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(images,ComplexImageTag,progress,images->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
Cr_view=DestroyCacheView(Cr_view);
Ci_view=DestroyCacheView(Ci_view);
Br_view=DestroyCacheView(Br_view);
Bi_view=DestroyCacheView(Bi_view);
Ar_view=DestroyCacheView(Ar_view);
Ai_view=DestroyCacheView(Ai_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
complex_images=DestroyImageList(complex_images);
return(complex_images);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer over-read in MagickCore/fourier.c in ComplexImages.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1597
|
Medium
| 169,599
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: FilePath ExtensionPrefs::GetExtensionPath(const std::string& extension_id) {
const DictionaryValue* dict = GetExtensionPref(extension_id);
std::string path;
if (!dict->GetString(kPrefPath, &path))
return FilePath();
return install_directory_.Append(FilePath::FromWStringHack(UTF8ToWide(path)));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle boxes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Coverity: Add a missing NULL check.
BUG=none
TEST=none
CID=16813
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7216034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,309
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int crypto_report_kpp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_kpp rkpp;
strlcpy(rkpp.type, "kpp", sizeof(rkpp.type));
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_KPP,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_kpp), &rkpp))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.19.3. crypto_report_one() and related functions in crypto/crypto_user.c (the crypto user configuration API) do not fully initialize structures that are copied to userspace, potentially leaking sensitive memory to user programs. NOTE: this is a CVE-2013-2547 regression but with easier exploitability because the attacker does not need a capability (however, the system must have the CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER kconfig option).
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix leaking uninitialized memory to userspace
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace. The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this. As a minimal fix, change it back.
Fixes: 4473710df1f8 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
???
| 168,967
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: sf_open_fd (int fd, int mode, SF_INFO *sfinfo, int close_desc)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
if ((SF_CONTAINER (sfinfo->format)) == SF_FORMAT_SD2)
{ sf_errno = SFE_SD2_FD_DISALLOWED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
if ((psf = calloc (1, sizeof (SF_PRIVATE))) == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf_init_files (psf) ;
copy_filename (psf, "") ;
psf->file.mode = mode ;
psf_set_file (psf, fd) ;
psf->is_pipe = psf_is_pipe (psf) ;
psf->fileoffset = psf_ftell (psf) ;
if (! close_desc)
psf->file.do_not_close_descriptor = SF_TRUE ;
return psf_open_file (psf, sfinfo) ;
} /* sf_open_fd */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *header_read()* function (common.c) when handling ID3 tags can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via a specially crafted FLAC file.
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
|
Medium
| 170,068
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ikev1_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_n *p;
struct ikev1_pl_n n;
const u_char *cp;
const u_char *ep2;
uint32_t doi;
uint32_t proto;
static const char *notify_error_str[] = {
NULL, "INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE",
"DOI-NOT-SUPPORTED", "SITUATION-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"INVALID-COOKIE", "INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION",
"INVALID-MINOR-VERSION", "INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"INVALID-FLAGS", "INVALID-MESSAGE-ID",
"INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID", "INVALID-SPI",
"INVALID-TRANSFORM-ID", "ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN", "BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX",
"PAYLOAD-MALFORMED", "INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION",
"INVALID-ID-INFORMATION", "INVALID-CERT-ENCODING",
"INVALID-CERTIFICATE", "CERT-TYPE-UNSUPPORTED",
"INVALID-CERT-AUTHORITY", "INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION",
"AUTHENTICATION-FAILED", "INVALID-SIGNATURE",
"ADDRESS-NOTIFICATION", "NOTIFY-SA-LIFETIME",
"CERTIFICATE-UNAVAILABLE", "UNSUPPORTED-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"UNEQUAL-PAYLOAD-LENGTHS",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_error_str[] = {
"RESERVED",
};
static const char *notify_status_str[] = {
"CONNECTED",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_status_str[] = {
"RESPONDER-LIFETIME", "REPLAY-STATUS",
"INITIAL-CONTACT",
};
/* NOTE: these macro must be called with x in proper range */
/* 0 - 8191 */
#define NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((x), notify_error_str)
/* 8192 - 16383 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 8192), ipsec_notify_error_str)
/* 16384 - 24575 */
#define NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 16384), notify_status_str)
/* 24576 - 32767 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 24576), ipsec_notify_status_str)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
doi = ntohl(n.doi);
proto = n.prot_id;
if (doi != 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=%d", doi));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%d", proto));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=ipsec"));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%s", PROTOIDSTR(proto)));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 32768)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
if (cp < ep) {
switch (ntohs(n.type)) {
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_RESPONDER_LIFETIME:
{
const struct attrmap *map = oakley_t_map;
size_t nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo," attrs=("));
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp, ep2, map, nmap);
if (cp == NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
goto trunc;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_REPLAY_STATUS:
ND_PRINT((ndo," status=("));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"replay detection %sabled",
EXTRACT_32BITS(cp) ? "en" : "dis"));
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
default:
/*
* XXX - fill in more types here; see, for example,
* draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," data=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(cp), ep - cp))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
} else {
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, cp, ep))
goto trunc;
}
break;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IKEv1 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c:ikev1_n_print().
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14469/ISAKMP: Add a missing bounds check
In ikev1_n_print() check bounds before trying to fetch the replay detection
status.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 169,842
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WebRunnerBrowserContext::~WebRunnerBrowserContext() {
if (resource_context_) {
content::BrowserThread::DeleteSoon(content::BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
std::move(resource_context_));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PendingScript::notifyFinished function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/PendingScript.cpp in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 relies on memory-cache information about integrity-check occurrences instead of integrity-check successes, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Subresource Integrity (aka SRI) protection mechanism by triggering two loads of the same resource.
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
|
Low
| 172,156
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadHDRImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
format[MaxTextExtent],
keyword[MaxTextExtent],
tag[MaxTextExtent],
value[MaxTextExtent];
double
gamma;
Image
*image;
int
c;
MagickBooleanType
status,
value_expected;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*end,
pixel[4],
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Decode image header.
*/
image->columns=0;
image->rows=0;
*format='\0';
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
while (isgraph(c) && (image->columns == 0) && (image->rows == 0))
{
if (c == (int) '#')
{
char
*comment;
register char
*p;
size_t
length;
/*
Read comment-- any text between # and end-of-line.
*/
length=MaxTextExtent;
comment=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (p=comment; comment != (char *) NULL; p++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((c == EOF) || (c == (int) '\n'))
break;
if ((size_t) (p-comment+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
comment=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(comment,length+
MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=comment+strlen(comment);
}
*p=(char) c;
}
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
*p='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment,exception);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
if (isalnum(c) == MagickFalse)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
{
register char
*p;
/*
Determine a keyword and its value.
*/
p=keyword;
do
{
if ((size_t) (p-keyword) < (MaxTextExtent-1))
*p++=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (isalnum(c) || (c == '_'));
*p='\0';
value_expected=MagickFalse;
while ((isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0) || (c == '='))
{
if (c == '=')
value_expected=MagickTrue;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"Y") == 0)
value_expected=MagickTrue;
if (value_expected == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=value;
while ((c != '\n') && (c != '\0'))
{
if ((size_t) (p-value) < (MaxTextExtent-1))
*p++=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
*p='\0';
/*
Assign a value to the specified keyword.
*/
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"format") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(format,value,MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MaxTextExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gamma") == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MaxTextExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"primaries") == 0)
{
float
chromaticity[6],
white_point[2];
(void) sscanf(value,"%g %g %g %g %g %g %g %g",
&chromaticity[0],&chromaticity[1],&chromaticity[2],
&chromaticity[3],&chromaticity[4],&chromaticity[5],
&white_point[0],&white_point[1]);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=chromaticity[1];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=chromaticity[2];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=chromaticity[3];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=chromaticity[4];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=chromaticity[5];
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=white_point[0],
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=white_point[1];
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MaxTextExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
case 'Y':
case 'y':
{
char
target[] = "Y";
if (strcmp(keyword,target) == 0)
{
int
height,
width;
(void) sscanf(value,"%d +X %d",&height,&width);
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
break;
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MaxTextExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(tag,MaxTextExtent,"hdr:%s",keyword);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,tag,value,exception);
break;
}
}
}
if ((image->columns == 0) && (image->rows == 0))
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
if ((LocaleCompare(format,"32-bit_rle_rgbe") != 0) &&
(LocaleCompare(format,"32-bit_rle_xyze") != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace,exception);
if (LocaleCompare(format,"32-bit_rle_xyze") == 0)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,XYZColorspace,exception);
image->compression=(image->columns < 8) || (image->columns > 0x7ffff) ?
NoCompression : RLECompression;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Read RGBE (red+green+blue+exponent) pixels.
*/
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,4*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if (image->compression != RLECompression)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4*image->columns*sizeof(*pixels),pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) (4*image->columns*sizeof(*pixels)))
break;
}
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4*sizeof(*pixel),pixel);
if (count != 4)
break;
if ((size_t) ((((size_t) pixel[2]) << 8) | pixel[3]) != image->columns)
{
(void) memcpy(pixels,pixel,4*sizeof(*pixel));
count=ReadBlob(image,4*(image->columns-1)*sizeof(*pixels),pixels+4);
image->compression=NoCompression;
}
else
{
p=pixels;
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
end=&pixels[(i+1)*image->columns];
while (p < end)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,2*sizeof(*pixel),pixel);
if (count < 1)
break;
if (pixel[0] > 128)
{
count=(ssize_t) pixel[0]-128;
if ((count == 0) || (count > (ssize_t) (end-p)))
break;
while (count-- > 0)
*p++=pixel[1];
}
else
{
count=(ssize_t) pixel[0];
if ((count == 0) || (count > (ssize_t) (end-p)))
break;
*p++=pixel[1];
if (--count > 0)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) count*sizeof(*p),p);
if (count < 1)
break;
p+=count;
}
}
}
}
}
}
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
i=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
pixel[0]=pixels[x];
pixel[1]=pixels[x+image->columns];
pixel[2]=pixels[x+2*image->columns];
pixel[3]=pixels[x+3*image->columns];
}
else
{
pixel[0]=pixels[i++];
pixel[1]=pixels[i++];
pixel[2]=pixels[i++];
pixel[3]=pixels[i++];
}
SetPixelRed(image,0,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,0,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,0,q);
if (pixel[3] != 0)
{
gamma=pow(2.0,pixel[3]-(128.0+8.0));
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*gamma*pixel[0]),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*gamma*pixel[1]),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*gamma*pixel[2]),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ReadHDRImage function in coders/hdr.c in ImageMagick 6.x and 7.x allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a crafted HDR file.
Commit Message: Fixed infinite loop and added checks for the sscanf result.
|
Medium
| 168,856
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::drawFocusRing(const Path& path, int width, int offset, const Color& color)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving floating styles.
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,425
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int __usb_get_extra_descriptor(char *buffer, unsigned size,
unsigned char type, void **ptr)
{
struct usb_descriptor_header *header;
while (size >= sizeof(struct usb_descriptor_header)) {
header = (struct usb_descriptor_header *)buffer;
if (header->bLength < 2) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"%s: bogus descriptor, type %d length %d\n",
usbcore_name,
header->bDescriptorType,
header->bLength);
return -1;
}
if (header->bDescriptorType == type) {
*ptr = header;
return 0;
}
buffer += header->bLength;
size -= header->bLength;
}
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.19.9. The USB subsystem mishandles size checks during the reading of an extra descriptor, related to __usb_get_extra_descriptor in drivers/usb/core/usb.c.
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Low
| 168,960
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int hpel_motion(MpegEncContext *s,
uint8_t *dest, uint8_t *src,
int src_x, int src_y,
op_pixels_func *pix_op,
int motion_x, int motion_y)
{
int dxy = 0;
int emu = 0;
src_x += motion_x >> 1;
src_y += motion_y >> 1;
/* WARNING: do no forget half pels */
src_x = av_clip(src_x, -16, s->width); // FIXME unneeded for emu?
if (src_x != s->width)
dxy |= motion_x & 1;
src_y = av_clip(src_y, -16, s->height);
if (src_y != s->height)
dxy |= (motion_y & 1) << 1;
src += src_y * s->linesize + src_x;
if (s->unrestricted_mv) {
if ((unsigned)src_x > FFMAX(s->h_edge_pos - (motion_x & 1) - 8, 0) ||
(unsigned)src_y > FFMAX(s->v_edge_pos - (motion_y & 1) - 8, 0)) {
s->vdsp.emulated_edge_mc(s->sc.edge_emu_buffer, src,
s->linesize, s->linesize,
9, 9,
src_x, src_y, s->h_edge_pos,
s->v_edge_pos);
src = s->sc.edge_emu_buffer;
emu = 1;
}
}
pix_op[dxy](dest, src, s->linesize, 8);
return emu;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The put_no_rnd_pixels8_xy2_mmx function in x86/rnd_template.c in libav 11.7 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) via a crafted MP3 file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,927
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: jas_seq2d_t *jas_seq2d_copy(jas_seq2d_t *x)
{
jas_matrix_t *y;
int i;
int j;
y = jas_seq2d_create(jas_seq2d_xstart(x), jas_seq2d_ystart(x),
jas_seq2d_xend(x), jas_seq2d_yend(x));
assert(y);
for (i = 0; i < x->numrows_; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < x->numcols_; ++j) {
*jas_matrix_getref(y, i, j) = jas_matrix_get(x, i, j);
}
}
return y;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,708
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: XRRGetMonitors(Display *dpy, Window window, Bool get_active, int *nmonitors)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XRRFindDisplay(dpy);
xRRGetMonitorsReply rep;
xRRGetMonitorsReq *req;
int nbytes, nbytesRead, rbytes;
int nmon, noutput;
int m, o;
char *buf, *buf_head;
xRRMonitorInfo *xmon;
CARD32 *xoutput;
XRRMonitorInfo *mon = NULL;
RROutput *output;
RRCheckExtension (dpy, info, NULL);
*nmonitors = -1;
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq (RRGetMonitors, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->randrReqType = X_RRGetMonitors;
req->window = window;
req->get_active = get_active;
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse))
{
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
return NULL;
}
nbytes = (long) rep.length << 2;
nmon = rep.nmonitors;
noutput = rep.noutputs;
rbytes = nmon * sizeof (XRRMonitorInfo) + noutput * sizeof(RROutput);
buf = buf_head = Xmalloc (nbytesRead);
mon = Xmalloc (rbytes);
if (buf == NULL || mon == NULL) {
Xfree(buf);
Xfree(mon);
_XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
}
_XReadPad(dpy, buf, nbytesRead);
output = (RROutput *) (mon + nmon);
for (m = 0; m < nmon; m++) {
xmon = (xRRMonitorInfo *) buf;
mon[m].name = xmon->name;
mon[m].primary = xmon->primary;
mon[m].automatic = xmon->automatic;
mon[m].noutput = xmon->noutput;
mon[m].x = xmon->x;
mon[m].y = xmon->y;
mon[m].width = xmon->width;
mon[m].height = xmon->height;
mon[m].mwidth = xmon->widthInMillimeters;
mon[m].mheight = xmon->heightInMillimeters;
mon[m].outputs = output;
buf += SIZEOF (xRRMonitorInfo);
xoutput = (CARD32 *) buf;
for (o = 0; o < xmon->noutput; o++)
output[o] = xoutput[o];
output += xmon->noutput;
buf += xmon->noutput * 4;
}
Xfree(buf_head);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: X.org libXrandr before 1.5.1 allows remote X servers to trigger out-of-bounds write operations by leveraging mishandling of reply data.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,914
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void update_open_stateflags(struct nfs4_state *state, mode_t open_flags)
{
switch (open_flags) {
case FMODE_WRITE:
state->n_wronly++;
break;
case FMODE_READ:
state->n_rdonly++;
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
state->n_rdwr++;
}
nfs4_state_set_mode_locked(state, state->state | open_flags);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,707
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int mp_get_count(struct sb_uart_state *state, struct serial_icounter_struct *icnt)
{
struct serial_icounter_struct icount;
struct sb_uart_icount cnow;
struct sb_uart_port *port = state->port;
spin_lock_irq(&port->lock);
memcpy(&cnow, &port->icount, sizeof(struct sb_uart_icount));
spin_unlock_irq(&port->lock);
icount.cts = cnow.cts;
icount.dsr = cnow.dsr;
icount.rng = cnow.rng;
icount.dcd = cnow.dcd;
icount.rx = cnow.rx;
icount.tx = cnow.tx;
icount.frame = cnow.frame;
icount.overrun = cnow.overrun;
icount.parity = cnow.parity;
icount.brk = cnow.brk;
icount.buf_overrun = cnow.buf_overrun;
return copy_to_user(icnt, &icount, sizeof(icount)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The mp_get_count function in drivers/staging/sb105x/sb_pci_mp.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a TIOCGICOUNT ioctl call.
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,961
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PromoResourceService::ScheduleNotification(double promo_start,
double promo_end) {
if (promo_start > 0 && promo_end > 0) {
const int64 ms_until_start =
static_cast<int64>((base::Time::FromDoubleT(
promo_start) - base::Time::Now()).InMilliseconds());
const int64 ms_until_end =
static_cast<int64>((base::Time::FromDoubleT(
promo_end) - base::Time::Now()).InMilliseconds());
if (ms_until_start > 0) {
PostNotification(ms_until_start);
} else if (ms_until_end > 0) {
if (ms_until_start <= 0) {
PostNotification(0);
}
PostNotification(ms_until_end);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Refresh promo notifications as they're fetched
The "guard" existed for notification scheduling was preventing
"turn-off a promo" and "update a promo" scenarios.
Yet I do not believe it was adding any actual safety: if things
on a server backend go wrong, the clients will be affected one
way or the other, and it is better to have an option to shut
the malformed promo down "as quickly as possible" (~in 12-24 hours).
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10696204
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,784
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void Chapters::Edition::Init()
{
m_atoms = NULL;
m_atoms_size = 0;
m_atoms_count = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,386
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiVP8Accelerator::OutputPicture(
const scoped_refptr<VP8Picture>& pic) {
scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface> dec_surface =
VP8PictureToVaapiDecodeSurface(pic);
dec_surface->set_visible_rect(pic->visible_rect);
vaapi_dec_->SurfaceReady(dec_surface);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
|
High
| 172,805
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ahci_populate_sglist(AHCIDevice *ad, QEMUSGList *sglist, int offset)
{
AHCICmdHdr *cmd = ad->cur_cmd;
uint32_t opts = le32_to_cpu(cmd->opts);
int sglist_alloc_hint = opts >> AHCI_CMD_HDR_PRDT_LEN;
dma_addr_t prdt_len = (sglist_alloc_hint * sizeof(AHCI_SG));
dma_addr_t real_prdt_len = prdt_len;
uint8_t *prdt;
uint8_t *prdt;
int i;
int r = 0;
int sum = 0;
int off_idx = -1;
int off_pos = -1;
int tbl_entry_size;
IDEBus *bus = &ad->port;
BusState *qbus = BUS(bus);
if (!sglist_alloc_hint) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "no sg list given by guest: 0x%08x\n", opts);
return -1;
if (prdt_len < real_prdt_len) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "mapped less than expected\n");
r = -1;
goto out;
}
/* Get entries in the PRDT, init a qemu sglist accordingly */
if (sglist_alloc_hint > 0) {
AHCI_SG *tbl = (AHCI_SG *)prdt;
sum = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sglist_alloc_hint; i++) {
/* flags_size is zero-based */
tbl_entry_size = prdt_tbl_entry_size(&tbl[i]);
if (offset <= (sum + tbl_entry_size)) {
off_idx = i;
off_pos = offset - sum;
break;
}
sum += tbl_entry_size;
}
if ((off_idx == -1) || (off_pos < 0) || (off_pos > tbl_entry_size)) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "%s: Incorrect offset! "
"off_idx: %d, off_pos: %d\n",
__func__, off_idx, off_pos);
r = -1;
goto out;
}
}
if ((off_idx == -1) || (off_pos < 0) || (off_pos > tbl_entry_size)) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "%s: Incorrect offset! "
"off_idx: %d, off_pos: %d\n",
__func__, off_idx, off_pos);
r = -1;
goto out;
qemu_sglist_add(sglist, le64_to_cpu(tbl[i].addr),
prdt_tbl_entry_size(&tbl[i]));
}
}
out:
dma_memory_unmap(ad->hba->as, prdt, prdt_len,
DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE, prdt_len);
/* flags_size is zero-based */
qemu_sglist_add(sglist, le64_to_cpu(tbl[i].addr),
prdt_tbl_entry_size(&tbl[i]));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The (1) BMDMA and (2) AHCI HBA interfaces in the IDE functionality in QEMU 1.0 through 2.1.3 have multiple interpretations of a function's return value, which allows guest OS users to cause a host OS denial of service (memory consumption or infinite loop, and system crash) via a PRDT with zero complete sectors, related to the bmdma_prepare_buf and ahci_dma_prepare_buf functions.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,838
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_video_decode(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
/* ! */
dec_struct_t * ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)(dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle);
WORD32 i4_err_status = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf = NULL;
WORD32 buflen;
UWORD32 u4_max_ofst, u4_length_of_start_code = 0;
UWORD32 bytes_consumed = 0;
UWORD32 cur_slice_is_nonref = 0;
UWORD32 u4_next_is_aud;
UWORD32 u4_first_start_code_found = 0;
WORD32 ret = 0,api_ret_value = IV_SUCCESS;
WORD32 header_data_left = 0,frame_data_left = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_bitstrm_buf;
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
ithread_set_name((void*)"Parse_thread");
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
{
UWORD32 u4_size;
u4_size = ps_dec_op->u4_size;
memset(ps_dec_op, 0, sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->u4_size = u4_size;
}
ps_dec->pv_dec_out = ps_dec_op;
ps_dec->process_called = 1;
if(ps_dec->init_done != 1)
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
if(0 == ps_dec->u1_flushfrm)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = NULL;
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_size
>= offsetof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t, s_out_buffer))
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code = 1;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = FMT_CONV_NUM_ROWS;
ps_dec->u4_stop_threads = 0;
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf
&& ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |=
IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ERROR_FRAME_LIMIT_OVER;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* ! */
ps_dec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = -1;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec->i4_frametype = -1;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
/* In case the deocder is not in flush mode(in shared mode),
then decoder has to pick up a buffer to write current frame.
Check if a frame is available in such cases */
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag == 1 && ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf == 1
&& ps_dec->u1_flushfrm == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
WORD32 disp_avail = 0, free_id;
/* Check if at least one buffer is available with the codec */
/* If not then return to application with error */
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->u1_pic_bufs; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i]
|| 1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
{
disp_avail = 1;
break;
}
}
if(0 == disp_avail)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
while(1)
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_pic_buf;
ps_pic_buf = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, &free_id);
if(ps_pic_buf == NULL)
{
UWORD32 i, display_queued = 0;
/* check if any buffer was given for display which is not returned yet */
for(i = 0; i < (MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW); i++)
{
if(0 != ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i])
{
display_queued = 1;
break;
}
}
/* If some buffer is queued for display, then codec has to singal an error and wait
for that buffer to be returned.
If nothing is queued for display then codec has ownership of all display buffers
and it can reuse any of the existing buffers and continue decoding */
if(1 == display_queued)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
else
{
/* If the buffer is with display, then mark it as in use and then look for a buffer again */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[free_id])
{
ih264_buf_mgr_set_status(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
else
{
/**
* Found a free buffer for present call. Release it now.
* Will be again obtained later.
*/
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
break;
}
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_flushfrm && ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = ps_dec->u4_output_present;
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_progressive_frame_flag;
ps_dec_op->e_output_format =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.e_output_format;
ps_dec_op->s_disp_frm_buf = ps_dec->s_disp_op.s_disp_frm_buf;
ps_dec_op->e4_fld_type = ps_dec->s_disp_op.e4_fld_type;
ps_dec_op->u4_ts = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_disp_buf_id = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_disp_buf_id;
/*In the case of flush ,since no frame is decoded set pic type as invalid*/
ps_dec_op->u4_is_ref_flag = -1;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
else
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if(ps_dec->u1_res_changed == 1)
{
/*if resolution has changed and all buffers have been flushed, reset decoder*/
ih264d_init_decoder(ps_dec);
}
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_dec_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_recon_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 2;
ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic = 1;
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
DEBUG_THREADS_PRINTF(" Starting process call\n");
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 0;
do
{
pu1_buf = (UWORD8*)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer
+ ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
u4_max_ofst = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes
- ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->ps_mem_tab[MEM_REC_BITSBUF].pv_base;
u4_next_is_aud = 0;
buflen = ih264d_find_start_code(pu1_buf, 0, u4_max_ofst,
&u4_length_of_start_code,
&u4_next_is_aud);
if(buflen == -1)
buflen = 0;
/* Ignore bytes beyond the allocated size of intermediate buffer */
/* Since 8 bytes are read ahead, ensure 8 bytes are free at the
end of the buffer, which will be memset to 0 after emulation prevention */
buflen = MIN(buflen, (WORD32)(ps_dec->ps_mem_tab[MEM_REC_BITSBUF].u4_mem_size - 8));
bytes_consumed = buflen + u4_length_of_start_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed += bytes_consumed;
if(buflen >= MAX_NAL_UNIT_SIZE)
{
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec, ps_dec_op);
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT(
"\nNal Size exceeded %d, Processing Stopped..\n",
MAX_NAL_UNIT_SIZE);
ps_dec->i4_error_code = 1 << IVD_CORRUPTEDDATA;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = -1;
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/*signal end of frame decode for curren frame*/
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded == 3)
{
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded =
ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1;
}
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return IV_FAIL;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
continue;
}
}
{
UWORD8 u1_firstbyte, u1_nal_ref_idc;
if(ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_B)
{
u1_firstbyte = *(pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code);
u1_nal_ref_idc = (UWORD8)(NAL_REF_IDC(u1_firstbyte));
if(u1_nal_ref_idc == 0)
{
/*skip non reference frames*/
cur_slice_is_nonref = 1;
continue;
}
else
{
if(1 == cur_slice_is_nonref)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -=
bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_B_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code =
IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size =
sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
}
}
if(buflen)
{
memcpy(pu1_bitstrm_buf, pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code,
buflen);
u4_first_start_code_found = 1;
}
else
{
/*start code not found*/
if(u4_first_start_code_found == 0)
{
/*no start codes found in current process call*/
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA;
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec,
ps_dec_op);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ps_dec->i4_error_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
continue;
}
}
else
{
/* a start code has already been found earlier in the same process call*/
frame_data_left = 0;
header_data_left = 0;
continue;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 0;
ret = ih264d_parse_nal_unit(dec_hdl, ps_dec_op,
pu1_bitstrm_buf, buflen);
if(ret != OK)
{
UWORD32 error = ih264d_map_error(ret);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = error | ret;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_STREAM_WIDTH_HEIGHT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
break;
}
if((ret == ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME) || (ret == ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC))
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
if(ret == ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC)
{
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_return_to_app)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
header_data_left = ((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1)
&& (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
frame_data_left = (((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
&& ((ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done == 0)
|| (u4_next_is_aud == 1)))
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
}
while(( header_data_left == 1)||(frame_data_left == 1));
if((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded < ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
WORD32 num_mb_skipped;
WORD32 prev_slice_err;
pocstruct_t temp_poc;
WORD32 ret1;
WORD32 ht_in_mbs;
ht_in_mbs = ps_dec->u2_pic_ht >> (4 + ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag);
num_mb_skipped = (ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
else
prev_slice_err = 2;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
ret1 = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL, ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&temp_poc, prev_slice_err);
if((ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T) || (ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T) ||
(ret1 == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
ret = ret1;
}
}
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_STREAM_WIDTH_HEIGHT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
/* signal the decode thread */
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
/* dont consume bitstream for change in resolution case */
if(ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
}
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 2)
{
/*do deblocking of all mbs*/
if((ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk == 0) &&(ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk == 1) && (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0))
{
UWORD32 u4_num_mbs,u4_max_addr;
tfr_ctxt_t s_tfr_ctxt;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_tfr_cxt = &s_tfr_ctxt;
pad_mgr_t *ps_pad_mgr = &ps_dec->s_pad_mgr;
/*BS is done for all mbs while parsing*/
u4_max_addr = (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs) - 1;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = u4_max_addr + 1;
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec, ps_pad_mgr, ps_tfr_cxt,
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
u4_num_mbs = u4_max_addr
- ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num + 1;
DEBUG_PERF_PRINTF("mbs left for deblocking= %d \n",u4_num_mbs);
if(u4_num_mbs != 0)
ih264d_check_mb_map_deblk(ps_dec, u4_num_mbs,
ps_tfr_cxt,1);
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
}
}
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
}
DATA_SYNC();
if((ps_dec_op->u4_error_code & 0xff)
!= ERROR_DYNAMIC_RESOLUTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
}
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& (ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC != i4_err_status))
{
/*
* For field pictures, set the bottom and top picture decoded u4_flag correctly.
*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= TOP_FIELD_ONLY;
}
}
/* if new frame in not found (if we are still getting slices from previous frame)
* ih264d_deblock_display is not called. Such frames will not be added to reference /display
*/
if (((ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC) == 0)
&& (ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 1))
{
/* Calling Function to deblock Picture and Display */
ret = ih264d_deblock_display(ps_dec);
}
/*set to complete ,as we dont support partial frame decode*/
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded == 3)
{
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1;
}
/*Update the i4_frametype at the end of picture*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_IDR_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_B_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_P_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_I_FRAME;
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Shouldn't come here\n");
}
ps_dec->i4_content_type = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded + 2;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded
- ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
{
/* In case the decoder is configured to run in low delay mode,
* then get display buffer and then format convert.
* Note in this mode, format conversion does not run paralelly in a thread and adds to the codec cycles
*/
if((0 == ps_dec->u4_num_reorder_frames_at_init)
&& ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
}
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec, ps_dec_op);
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_output_present &&
(ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row < ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht))
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht
- ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) == 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 1;
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_is_valid)))
{
if((0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
&& (0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag))
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 0;
}
}
if((TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY) == ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = 0;
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Do End of Pic processing. */
/* Should be called only if frame was decoded in previous process call*/
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 1)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded)
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
else
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
}
/*Data memory barrier instruction,so that yuv write by the library is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("The num bytes consumed: %d\n",
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed);
return api_ret_value;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libavc in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-33551775.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed initialization of first_slice_in_pic
To handle some errors, first_slice_in_pic was being set to 2.
This is now cleaned up and first_slice_in_pic is set to 1 only once per pic.
This will ensure picture level initializations are done only once even in case
of error clips
Bug: 33717589
Bug: 33551775
Bug: 33716442
Bug: 33677995
Change-Id: If341436b3cbaa724017eedddd88c2e6fac36d8ba
|
Medium
| 174,037
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: magic_setparam(struct magic_set *ms, int param, const void *val)
{
switch (param) {
case MAGIC_PARAM_INDIR_MAX:
ms->indir_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_NAME_MAX:
ms->name_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_PHNUM_MAX:
ms->elf_phnum_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_SHNUM_MAX:
ms->elf_shnum_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
default:
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The ELF parser in file 5.08 through 5.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a large number of notes.
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
|
Low
| 166,775
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void OnZipAnalysisFinished(const zip_analyzer::Results& results) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK_EQ(ClientDownloadRequest::ZIPPED_EXECUTABLE, type_);
if (!service_)
return;
if (results.success) {
zipped_executable_ = results.has_executable;
archived_binary_.CopyFrom(results.archived_binary);
DVLOG(1) << "Zip analysis finished for " << item_->GetFullPath().value()
<< ", has_executable=" << results.has_executable
<< " has_archive=" << results.has_archive;
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "Zip analysis failed for " << item_->GetFullPath().value();
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("SBClientDownload.ZipFileHasExecutable",
zipped_executable_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("SBClientDownload.ZipFileHasArchiveButNoExecutable",
results.has_archive && !zipped_executable_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("SBClientDownload.ExtractZipFeaturesTime",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - zip_analysis_start_time_);
for (const auto& file_extension : results.archived_archive_filetypes)
RecordArchivedArchiveFileExtensionType(file_extension);
if (!zipped_executable_ && !results.has_archive) {
PostFinishTask(UNKNOWN, REASON_ARCHIVE_WITHOUT_BINARIES);
return;
}
if (!zipped_executable_ && results.has_archive)
type_ = ClientDownloadRequest::ZIPPED_ARCHIVE;
OnFileFeatureExtractionDone();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.117 allow attackers to bypass the sandbox protection mechanism after obtaining renderer access, or have other impact, via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
|
Low
| 171,713
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void php_wddx_serialize_object(wddx_packet *packet, zval *obj)
{
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
zval **ent, *fname, **varname;
zval *retval = NULL;
const char *key;
ulong idx;
char tmp_buf[WDDX_BUF_LEN];
HashTable *objhash, *sleephash;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__sleep", 1);
/*
* We try to call __sleep() method on object. It's supposed to return an
* array of property names to be serialized.
*/
if (call_user_function_ex(CG(function_table), &obj, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 1, NULL TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
if (retval && (sleephash = HASH_OF(retval))) {
PHP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES;
PHP_SET_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES(obj);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_S);
snprintf(tmp_buf, WDDX_BUF_LEN, WDDX_VAR_S, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR);
php_wddx_add_chunk(packet, tmp_buf);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_S);
php_wddx_add_chunk_ex(packet, class_name, name_len);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_E);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_VAR_E);
PHP_CLEANUP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES();
objhash = HASH_OF(obj);
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(sleephash);
zend_hash_get_current_data(sleephash, (void **)&varname) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward(sleephash)) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(varname) != IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "__sleep should return an array only containing the names of instance-variables to serialize.");
continue;
}
if (zend_hash_find(objhash, Z_STRVAL_PP(varname), Z_STRLEN_PP(varname)+1, (void **)&ent) == SUCCESS) {
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, Z_STRVAL_PP(varname), Z_STRLEN_PP(varname) TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_E);
}
} else {
uint key_len;
PHP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES;
PHP_SET_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES(obj);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_S);
snprintf(tmp_buf, WDDX_BUF_LEN, WDDX_VAR_S, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR);
php_wddx_add_chunk(packet, tmp_buf);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_S);
php_wddx_add_chunk_ex(packet, class_name, name_len);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_E);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_VAR_E);
PHP_CLEANUP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES();
objhash = HASH_OF(obj);
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(objhash);
zend_hash_get_current_data(objhash, (void**)&ent) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward(objhash)) {
if (*ent == obj) {
continue;
}
if (zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(objhash, &key, &key_len, &idx, 0, NULL) == HASH_KEY_IS_STRING) {
const char *class_name, *prop_name;
zend_unmangle_property_name(key, key_len-1, &class_name, &prop_name);
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, prop_name, strlen(prop_name)+1 TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
key_len = slprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "%ld", idx);
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, tmp_buf, key_len TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_E);
}
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: ext/wddx/wddx.c in PHP before 5.6.28 and 7.x before 7.0.13 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via crafted serialized data in a wddxPacket XML document, as demonstrated by a PDORow string.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
|
Low
| 168,670
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int dnxhd_find_frame_end(DNXHDParserContext *dctx,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
ParseContext *pc = &dctx->pc;
uint64_t state = pc->state64;
int pic_found = pc->frame_start_found;
int i = 0;
if (!pic_found) {
for (i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix(state & 0xffffffffff00LL) != 0) {
i++;
pic_found = 1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (pic_found && !dctx->remaining) {
if (!buf_size) /* EOF considered as end of frame */
return 0;
for (; i < buf_size; i++) {
dctx->cur_byte++;
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (dctx->cur_byte == 24) {
dctx->h = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 26) {
dctx->w = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 42) {
int cid = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (cid <= 0)
continue;
dctx->remaining = avpriv_dnxhd_get_frame_size(cid);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0) {
dctx->remaining = dnxhd_get_hr_frame_size(cid, dctx->w, dctx->h);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0)
return dctx->remaining;
}
if (buf_size - i + 47 >= dctx->remaining) {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
} else {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
}
}
}
} else if (pic_found) {
if (dctx->remaining > buf_size) {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
} else {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
}
}
pc->frame_start_found = pic_found;
pc->state64 = state;
return END_NOT_FOUND;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The dnxhd decoder in FFmpeg before 3.2.6, and 3.3.x before 3.3.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted mov file.
Commit Message: avcodec/dnxhd_parser: Do not return invalid value from dnxhd_find_frame_end() on error
Fixes: Null pointer dereference
Fixes: CVE-2017-9608
Found-by: Yihan Lian
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 611b35627488a8d0763e75c25ee0875c5b7987dd)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 170,046
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct reloc_t* MACH0_(get_relocs)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct reloc_t *relocs;
int i = 0, len;
ulebr ur = {NULL};
int wordsize = MACH0_(get_bits)(bin) / 8;
if (bin->dyld_info) {
ut8 *opcodes,*end, type = 0, rel_type = 0;
int lib_ord, seg_idx = -1, sym_ord = -1;
size_t j, count, skip, bind_size, lazy_size;
st64 addend = 0;
ut64 segmentAddress = 0LL;
ut64 addr = 0LL;
ut8 done = 0;
#define CASE(T) case (T / 8): rel_type = R_BIN_RELOC_ ## T; break
switch (wordsize) {
CASE(8);
CASE(16);
CASE(32);
CASE(64);
default: return NULL;
}
#undef CASE
bind_size = bin->dyld_info->bind_size;
lazy_size = bin->dyld_info->lazy_bind_size;
if (!bind_size || !lazy_size) {
return NULL;
}
if ((bind_size + lazy_size)<1) {
return NULL;
}
if (bin->dyld_info->bind_off > bin->size || bin->dyld_info->bind_off + bind_size > bin->size)
return NULL;
if (bin->dyld_info->lazy_bind_off > bin->size || \
bin->dyld_info->lazy_bind_off + lazy_size > bin->size)
return NULL;
if (bin->dyld_info->bind_off+bind_size+lazy_size > bin->size)
return NULL;
if (!(relocs = calloc (1, (1 + bind_size + lazy_size) * sizeof (struct reloc_t))))
return NULL;
opcodes = calloc (1, bind_size + lazy_size + 1);
if (!opcodes) {
free (relocs);
return NULL;
}
len = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, bin->dyld_info->bind_off, opcodes, bind_size);
i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, bin->dyld_info->lazy_bind_off, opcodes + bind_size, lazy_size);
if (len < 1 || i < 1) {
bprintf ("Error: read (dyld_info bind) at 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n",
(ut64)(size_t)bin->dyld_info->bind_off);
free (opcodes);
relocs[i].last = 1;
return relocs;
}
i = 0;
for (ur.p = opcodes, end = opcodes + bind_size + lazy_size ; (ur.p+2 < end) && !done; ) {
ut8 imm = *ur.p & BIND_IMMEDIATE_MASK, op = *ur.p & BIND_OPCODE_MASK;
++ur.p;
switch (op) {
#define ULEB() read_uleb128 (&ur,end)
#define SLEB() read_sleb128 (&ur,end)
case BIND_OPCODE_DONE:
done = 1;
break;
case BIND_OPCODE_SET_DYLIB_ORDINAL_IMM:
lib_ord = imm;
break;
case BIND_OPCODE_SET_DYLIB_ORDINAL_ULEB:
lib_ord = ULEB();
break;
case BIND_OPCODE_SET_DYLIB_SPECIAL_IMM:
lib_ord = imm? (st8)(BIND_OPCODE_MASK | imm) : 0;
break;
case BIND_OPCODE_SET_SYMBOL_TRAILING_FLAGS_IMM: {
char *sym_name = (char*)ur.p;
while (*ur.p++ && ur.p<end) {
/* empty loop */
}
sym_ord = -1;
if (bin->symtab && bin->dysymtab.nundefsym < 0xffff)
for (j = 0; j < bin->dysymtab.nundefsym; j++) {
int stridx = 0;
int iundefsym = bin->dysymtab.iundefsym;
if (iundefsym>=0 && iundefsym < bin->nsymtab) {
int sidx = iundefsym +j;
if (sidx<0 || sidx>= bin->nsymtab)
continue;
stridx = bin->symtab[sidx].n_strx;
if (stridx < 0 || stridx >= bin->symstrlen)
continue;
}
if (!strcmp ((char *)bin->symstr + stridx, sym_name)) {
sym_ord = j;
break;
}
}
break;
}
case BIND_OPCODE_SET_TYPE_IMM:
type = imm;
break;
case BIND_OPCODE_SET_ADDEND_SLEB:
addend = SLEB();
break;
case BIND_OPCODE_SET_SEGMENT_AND_OFFSET_ULEB:
seg_idx = imm;
if (seg_idx < 0 || seg_idx >= bin->nsegs) {
bprintf ("Error: BIND_OPCODE_SET_SEGMENT_AND_OFFSET_ULEB"
" has unexistent segment %d\n", seg_idx);
addr = 0LL;
return 0; // early exit to avoid future mayhem
} else {
addr = bin->segs[seg_idx].vmaddr + ULEB();
segmentAddress = bin->segs[seg_idx].vmaddr \
+ bin->segs[seg_idx].vmsize;
}
break;
case BIND_OPCODE_ADD_ADDR_ULEB:
addr += ULEB();
break;
#define DO_BIND() do {\
if (sym_ord < 0 || seg_idx < 0 ) break;\
if (i >= (bind_size + lazy_size)) break;\
relocs[i].addr = addr;\
relocs[i].offset = addr - bin->segs[seg_idx].vmaddr + bin->segs[seg_idx].fileoff;\
if (type == BIND_TYPE_TEXT_PCREL32)\
relocs[i].addend = addend - (bin->baddr + addr);\
else relocs[i].addend = addend;\
/* library ordinal ??? */ \
relocs[i].ord = lib_ord;\
relocs[i].ord = sym_ord;\
relocs[i].type = rel_type;\
relocs[i++].last = 0;\
} while (0)
case BIND_OPCODE_DO_BIND:
if (addr >= segmentAddress) {
bprintf ("Error: Malformed DO bind opcode\n");
goto beach;
}
DO_BIND();
addr += wordsize;
break;
case BIND_OPCODE_DO_BIND_ADD_ADDR_ULEB:
if (addr >= segmentAddress) {
bprintf ("Error: Malformed ADDR ULEB bind opcode\n");
goto beach;
}
DO_BIND();
addr += ULEB() + wordsize;
break;
case BIND_OPCODE_DO_BIND_ADD_ADDR_IMM_SCALED:
if (addr >= segmentAddress) {
bprintf ("Error: Malformed IMM SCALED bind opcode\n");
goto beach;
}
DO_BIND();
addr += (ut64)imm * (ut64)wordsize + wordsize;
break;
case BIND_OPCODE_DO_BIND_ULEB_TIMES_SKIPPING_ULEB:
count = ULEB();
skip = ULEB();
for (j = 0; j < count; j++) {
if (addr >= segmentAddress) {
bprintf ("Error: Malformed ULEB TIMES bind opcode\n");
goto beach;
}
DO_BIND();
addr += skip + wordsize;
}
break;
#undef DO_BIND
#undef ULEB
#undef SLEB
default:
bprintf ("Error: unknown bind opcode 0x%02x in dyld_info\n", *ur.p);
free (opcodes);
relocs[i].last = 1;
return relocs;
}
}
free (opcodes);
} else {
int j;
if (!bin->symtab || !bin->symstr || !bin->sects || !bin->indirectsyms)
return NULL;
if (!(relocs = malloc ((bin->dysymtab.nundefsym + 1) * sizeof(struct reloc_t))))
return NULL;
for (j = 0; j < bin->dysymtab.nundefsym; j++) {
if (parse_import_ptr(bin, &relocs[i], bin->dysymtab.iundefsym + j)) {
relocs[i].ord = j;
relocs[i++].last = 0;
}
}
}
beach:
relocs[i].last = 1;
return relocs;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The get_relocs_64 function in libr/bin/format/mach0/mach0.c in radare2 1.3.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) via a crafted Mach0 file.
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
|
Medium
| 168,236
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::MediaLoadingFailed(WebMediaPlayer::NetworkState error,
const String& message) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "MediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this << ", "
<< static_cast<int>(error) << ", message='" << message
<< "')";
StopPeriodicTimers();
if (ready_state_ < kHaveMetadata &&
load_state_ == kLoadingFromSourceElement) {
if (current_source_node_) {
current_source_node_->ScheduleErrorEvent();
} else {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - error event not sent, <source> was removed";
}
ForgetResourceSpecificTracks();
if (HavePotentialSourceChild()) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - scheduling next <source>";
ScheduleNextSourceChild();
} else {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - no more <source> elements, waiting";
WaitForSourceChange();
}
return;
}
if (error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError &&
ready_state_ >= kHaveMetadata) {
MediaEngineError(MediaError::Create(MediaError::kMediaErrNetwork, message));
} else if (error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateDecodeError) {
MediaEngineError(MediaError::Create(MediaError::kMediaErrDecode, message));
} else if ((error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError ||
error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError) &&
load_state_ == kLoadingFromSrcAttr) {
if (message.IsEmpty()) {
NoneSupported(BuildElementErrorMessage(
error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError ? "Format error"
: "Network error"));
} else {
NoneSupported(message);
}
}
UpdateDisplayState();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Information leak in media engine in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
|
Medium
| 173,162
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_get_algo_block_size)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir)
RETURN_LONG(mcrypt_module_get_algo_block_size(module, dir));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
|
Low
| 167,099
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: opj_image_t* bmptoimage(const char *filename, opj_cparameters_t *parameters)
{
opj_image_cmptparm_t cmptparm[4]; /* maximum of 4 components */
OPJ_UINT8 lut_R[256], lut_G[256], lut_B[256];
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT[3];
opj_image_t * image = NULL;
FILE *IN;
OPJ_BITMAPFILEHEADER File_h;
OPJ_BITMAPINFOHEADER Info_h;
OPJ_UINT32 i, palette_len, numcmpts = 1U;
OPJ_BOOL l_result = OPJ_FALSE;
OPJ_UINT8* pData = NULL;
OPJ_UINT32 stride;
pLUT[0] = lut_R; pLUT[1] = lut_G; pLUT[2] = lut_B;
IN = fopen(filename, "rb");
if (!IN)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s for reading !!\n", filename);
return NULL;
}
if (!bmp_read_file_header(IN, &File_h)) {
fclose(IN);
return NULL;
}
if (!bmp_read_info_header(IN, &Info_h)) {
fclose(IN);
return NULL;
}
/* Load palette */
if (Info_h.biBitCount <= 8U)
{
memset(&lut_R[0], 0, sizeof(lut_R));
memset(&lut_G[0], 0, sizeof(lut_G));
memset(&lut_B[0], 0, sizeof(lut_B));
palette_len = Info_h.biClrUsed;
if((palette_len == 0U) && (Info_h.biBitCount <= 8U)) {
palette_len = (1U << Info_h.biBitCount);
}
if (palette_len > 256U) {
palette_len = 256U;
}
if (palette_len > 0U) {
OPJ_UINT8 has_color = 0U;
for (i = 0U; i < palette_len; i++) {
lut_B[i] = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
lut_G[i] = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
lut_R[i] = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
(void)getc(IN); /* padding */
has_color |= (lut_B[i] ^ lut_G[i]) | (lut_G[i] ^ lut_R[i]);
}
if(has_color) {
numcmpts = 3U;
}
}
} else {
numcmpts = 3U;
if ((Info_h.biCompression == 3) && (Info_h.biAlphaMask != 0U)) {
numcmpts++;
}
}
stride = ((Info_h.biWidth * Info_h.biBitCount + 31U) / 32U) * 4U; /* rows are aligned on 32bits */
if (Info_h.biBitCount == 4 && Info_h.biCompression == 2) { /* RLE 4 gets decoded as 8 bits data for now... */
stride = ((Info_h.biWidth * 8U + 31U) / 32U) * 4U;
}
pData = (OPJ_UINT8 *) calloc(1, stride * Info_h.biHeight * sizeof(OPJ_UINT8));
if (pData == NULL) {
fclose(IN);
return NULL;
}
/* Place the cursor at the beginning of the image information */
fseek(IN, 0, SEEK_SET);
fseek(IN, (long)File_h.bfOffBits, SEEK_SET);
switch (Info_h.biCompression) {
case 0:
case 3:
/* read raw data */
l_result = bmp_read_raw_data(IN, pData, stride, Info_h.biWidth, Info_h.biHeight);
break;
case 1:
/* read rle8 data */
l_result = bmp_read_rle8_data(IN, pData, stride, Info_h.biWidth, Info_h.biHeight);
break;
case 2:
/* read rle4 data */
l_result = bmp_read_rle4_data(IN, pData, stride, Info_h.biWidth, Info_h.biHeight);
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Unsupported BMP compression\n");
l_result = OPJ_FALSE;
break;
}
if (!l_result) {
free(pData);
fclose(IN);
return NULL;
}
/* create the image */
memset(&cmptparm[0], 0, sizeof(cmptparm));
for(i = 0; i < 4U; i++)
{
cmptparm[i].prec = 8;
cmptparm[i].bpp = 8;
cmptparm[i].sgnd = 0;
cmptparm[i].dx = (OPJ_UINT32)parameters->subsampling_dx;
cmptparm[i].dy = (OPJ_UINT32)parameters->subsampling_dy;
cmptparm[i].w = Info_h.biWidth;
cmptparm[i].h = Info_h.biHeight;
}
image = opj_image_create(numcmpts, &cmptparm[0], (numcmpts == 1U) ? OPJ_CLRSPC_GRAY : OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB);
if(!image) {
fclose(IN);
free(pData);
return NULL;
}
if (numcmpts == 4U) {
image->comps[3].alpha = 1;
}
/* set image offset and reference grid */
image->x0 = (OPJ_UINT32)parameters->image_offset_x0;
image->y0 = (OPJ_UINT32)parameters->image_offset_y0;
image->x1 = image->x0 + (Info_h.biWidth - 1U) * (OPJ_UINT32)parameters->subsampling_dx + 1U;
image->y1 = image->y0 + (Info_h.biHeight - 1U) * (OPJ_UINT32)parameters->subsampling_dy + 1U;
/* Read the data */
if (Info_h.biBitCount == 24 && Info_h.biCompression == 0) { /*RGB */
bmp24toimage(pData, stride, image);
}
else if (Info_h.biBitCount == 8 && Info_h.biCompression == 0) { /* RGB 8bpp Indexed */
bmp8toimage(pData, stride, image, pLUT);
}
else if (Info_h.biBitCount == 8 && Info_h.biCompression == 1) { /*RLE8*/
bmp8toimage(pData, stride, image, pLUT);
}
else if (Info_h.biBitCount == 4 && Info_h.biCompression == 2) { /*RLE4*/
bmp8toimage(pData, stride, image, pLUT); /* RLE 4 gets decoded as 8 bits data for now */
}
else if (Info_h.biBitCount == 32 && Info_h.biCompression == 0) { /* RGBX */
bmpmask32toimage(pData, stride, image, 0x00FF0000U, 0x0000FF00U, 0x000000FFU, 0x00000000U);
}
else if (Info_h.biBitCount == 32 && Info_h.biCompression == 3) { /* bitmask */
bmpmask32toimage(pData, stride, image, Info_h.biRedMask, Info_h.biGreenMask, Info_h.biBlueMask, Info_h.biAlphaMask);
}
else if (Info_h.biBitCount == 16 && Info_h.biCompression == 0) { /* RGBX */
bmpmask16toimage(pData, stride, image, 0x7C00U, 0x03E0U, 0x001FU, 0x0000U);
}
else if (Info_h.biBitCount == 16 && Info_h.biCompression == 3) { /* bitmask */
if ((Info_h.biRedMask == 0U) && (Info_h.biGreenMask == 0U) && (Info_h.biBlueMask == 0U)) {
Info_h.biRedMask = 0xF800U;
Info_h.biGreenMask = 0x07E0U;
Info_h.biBlueMask = 0x001FU;
}
bmpmask16toimage(pData, stride, image, Info_h.biRedMask, Info_h.biGreenMask, Info_h.biBlueMask, Info_h.biAlphaMask);
}
else {
opj_image_destroy(image);
image = NULL;
fprintf(stderr, "Other system than 24 bits/pixels or 8 bits (no RLE coding) is not yet implemented [%d]\n", Info_h.biBitCount);
}
free(pData);
fclose(IN);
return image;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow vulnerability in the bmp24toimage function in convertbmp.c in OpenJPEG before 2.2.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted bmp file.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #834 from trylab/issue833
Fix issue 833.
|
Medium
| 168,454
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: retrieve_url (struct url * orig_parsed, const char *origurl, char **file,
char **newloc, const char *refurl, int *dt, bool recursive,
struct iri *iri, bool register_status)
{
uerr_t result;
char *url;
bool location_changed;
bool iri_fallbacked = 0;
int dummy;
char *mynewloc, *proxy;
struct url *u = orig_parsed, *proxy_url;
int up_error_code; /* url parse error code */
char *local_file = NULL;
int redirection_count = 0;
bool method_suspended = false;
char *saved_body_data = NULL;
char *saved_method = NULL;
char *saved_body_file_name = NULL;
/* If dt is NULL, use local storage. */
if (!dt)
{
dt = &dummy;
dummy = 0;
}
url = xstrdup (origurl);
if (newloc)
*newloc = NULL;
if (file)
*file = NULL;
if (!refurl)
refurl = opt.referer;
redirected:
/* (also for IRI fallbacking) */
result = NOCONERROR;
mynewloc = NULL;
xfree(local_file);
proxy_url = NULL;
proxy = getproxy (u);
if (proxy)
{
struct iri *pi = iri_new ();
set_uri_encoding (pi, opt.locale, true);
pi->utf8_encode = false;
/* Parse the proxy URL. */
proxy_url = url_parse (proxy, &up_error_code, pi, true);
if (!proxy_url)
{
char *error = url_error (proxy, up_error_code);
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Error parsing proxy URL %s: %s.\n"),
proxy, error);
xfree (url);
xfree (error);
xfree (proxy);
iri_free (pi);
RESTORE_METHOD;
result = PROXERR;
goto bail;
}
if (proxy_url->scheme != SCHEME_HTTP && proxy_url->scheme != u->scheme)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Error in proxy URL %s: Must be HTTP.\n"), proxy);
url_free (proxy_url);
xfree (url);
xfree (proxy);
iri_free (pi);
RESTORE_METHOD;
result = PROXERR;
goto bail;
}
iri_free(pi);
xfree (proxy);
}
if (u->scheme == SCHEME_HTTP
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
|| u->scheme == SCHEME_HTTPS
#endif
|| (proxy_url && proxy_url->scheme == SCHEME_HTTP))
{
#ifdef HAVE_HSTS
#ifdef TESTING
/* we don't link against main.o when we're testing */
hsts_store_t hsts_store = NULL;
#else
extern hsts_store_t hsts_store;
#endif
if (opt.hsts && hsts_store)
{
if (hsts_match (hsts_store, u))
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "URL transformed to HTTPS due to an HSTS policy\n");
}
#endif
result = http_loop (u, orig_parsed, &mynewloc, &local_file, refurl, dt,
proxy_url, iri);
}
else if (u->scheme == SCHEME_FTP
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
|| u->scheme == SCHEME_FTPS
#endif
)
{
/* If this is a redirection, temporarily turn off opt.ftp_glob
and opt.recursive, both being undesirable when following
redirects. */
bool oldrec = recursive, glob = opt.ftp_glob;
if (redirection_count)
oldrec = glob = false;
result = ftp_loop (u, &local_file, dt, proxy_url, recursive, glob);
recursive = oldrec;
/* There is a possibility of having HTTP being redirected to
according to the suffix. The HTML suffixes are `.html',
`.htm' and a few others, case-insensitive. */
if (redirection_count && local_file && (u->scheme == SCHEME_FTP
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
|| u->scheme == SCHEME_FTPS
#endif
))
{
if (has_html_suffix_p (local_file))
*dt |= TEXTHTML;
}
}
if (proxy_url)
{
url_free (proxy_url);
proxy_url = NULL;
}
location_changed = (result == NEWLOCATION || result == NEWLOCATION_KEEP_POST);
if (location_changed)
{
char *construced_newloc;
struct url *newloc_parsed;
assert (mynewloc != NULL);
xfree (local_file);
/* The HTTP specs only allow absolute URLs to appear in
redirects, but a ton of boneheaded webservers and CGIs out
there break the rules and use relative URLs, and popular
browsers are lenient about this, so wget should be too. */
construced_newloc = uri_merge (url, mynewloc);
xfree (mynewloc);
mynewloc = construced_newloc;
#ifdef ENABLE_IRI
/* Reset UTF-8 encoding state, set the URI encoding and reset
the content encoding. */
iri->utf8_encode = opt.enable_iri;
if (opt.encoding_remote)
set_uri_encoding (iri, opt.encoding_remote, true);
set_content_encoding (iri, NULL);
xfree (iri->orig_url);
#endif
/* Now, see if this new location makes sense. */
newloc_parsed = url_parse (mynewloc, &up_error_code, iri, true);
if (!newloc_parsed)
{
char *error = url_error (mynewloc, up_error_code);
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "%s: %s.\n", escnonprint_uri (mynewloc),
error);
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
xfree (url);
xfree (mynewloc);
xfree (error);
RESTORE_METHOD;
goto bail;
}
/* Now mynewloc will become newloc_parsed->url, because if the
Location contained relative paths like .././something, we
don't want that propagating as url. */
xfree (mynewloc);
mynewloc = xstrdup (newloc_parsed->url);
/* Check for max. number of redirections. */
if (++redirection_count > opt.max_redirect)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("%d redirections exceeded.\n"),
opt.max_redirect);
url_free (newloc_parsed);
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
xfree (url);
xfree (mynewloc);
RESTORE_METHOD;
result = WRONGCODE;
goto bail;
}
xfree (url);
url = mynewloc;
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
u = newloc_parsed;
/* If we're being redirected from POST, and we received a
redirect code different than 307, we don't want to POST
again. Many requests answer POST with a redirection to an
index page; that redirection is clearly a GET. We "suspend"
POST data for the duration of the redirections, and restore
it when we're done.
RFC2616 HTTP/1.1 introduces code 307 Temporary Redirect
specifically to preserve the method of the request.
*/
if (result != NEWLOCATION_KEEP_POST && !method_suspended)
SUSPEND_METHOD;
goto redirected;
}
else
{
xfree(mynewloc);
}
/* Try to not encode in UTF-8 if fetching failed */
if (!(*dt & RETROKF) && iri->utf8_encode)
{
iri->utf8_encode = false;
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
u = url_parse (origurl, NULL, iri, true);
if (u)
{
DEBUGP (("[IRI fallbacking to non-utf8 for %s\n", quote (url)));
xfree (url);
url = xstrdup (u->url);
iri_fallbacked = 1;
goto redirected;
}
else
DEBUGP (("[Couldn't fallback to non-utf8 for %s\n", quote (url)));
}
if (local_file && u && (*dt & RETROKF || opt.content_on_error))
{
register_download (u->url, local_file);
if (!opt.spider && redirection_count && 0 != strcmp (origurl, u->url))
register_redirection (origurl, u->url);
if (*dt & TEXTHTML)
register_html (local_file);
if (*dt & TEXTCSS)
register_css (local_file);
}
if (file)
*file = local_file ? local_file : NULL;
else
xfree (local_file);
if (orig_parsed != u)
{
url_free (u);
}
if (redirection_count || iri_fallbacked)
{
if (newloc)
*newloc = url;
else
xfree (url);
}
else
{
if (newloc)
*newloc = NULL;
xfree (url);
}
RESTORE_METHOD;
bail:
if (register_status)
inform_exit_status (result);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: GNU wget before 1.18 allows remote servers to write to arbitrary files by redirecting a request from HTTP to a crafted FTP resource.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,016
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
free_arg_pages(bprm);
if (bprm->cred) {
mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
abort_creds(bprm->cred);
}
kfree(bprm);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The load_script function in fs/binfmt_script.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.2 does not properly handle recursion, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack
If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.
Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.
After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.
This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.
For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:
http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 166,199
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport void *DetachBlob(BlobInfo *blob_info)
{
void
*data;
assert(blob_info != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
if (blob_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
if (blob_info->mapped != MagickFalse)
{
(void) UnmapBlob(blob_info->data,blob_info->length);
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,blob_info->length);
}
blob_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
blob_info->length=0;
blob_info->offset=0;
blob_info->eof=MagickFalse;
blob_info->error=0;
blob_info->exempt=MagickFalse;
blob_info->type=UndefinedStream;
blob_info->file_info.file=(FILE *) NULL;
data=blob_info->data;
blob_info->data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
blob_info->stream=(StreamHandler) NULL;
blob_info->custom_stream=(CustomStreamInfo *) NULL;
return(data);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In ImageMagick 7.x before 7.0.8-42 and 6.x before 6.9.10-42, there is a use after free vulnerability in the UnmapBlob function that allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by sending a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
|
Medium
| 170,190
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fread)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
long length = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &length) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (length <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Length parameter must be greater than 0");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value) = emalloc(length + 1);
Z_STRLEN_P(return_value) = php_stream_read(intern->u.file.stream, Z_STRVAL_P(return_value), length);
/* needed because recv/read/gzread doesnt put a null at the end*/
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value)[Z_STRLEN_P(return_value)] = 0;
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_STRING;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,067
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePICTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MaxCount 128
#define PictCropRegionOp 0x01
#define PictEndOfPictureOp 0xff
#define PictJPEGOp 0x8200
#define PictInfoOp 0x0C00
#define PictInfoSize 512
#define PictPixmapOp 0x9A
#define PictPICTOp 0x98
#define PictVersion 0x11
const StringInfo
*profile;
double
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
PICTPixmap
pixmap;
PICTRectangle
bounds,
crop_rectangle,
destination_rectangle,
frame_rectangle,
size_rectangle,
source_rectangle;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
count,
storage_class;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*buffer,
*packed_scanline,
*scanline;
unsigned short
base_address,
row_bytes,
transfer_mode;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if ((image->columns > 65535L) || (image->rows > 65535L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
/*
Initialize image info.
*/
size_rectangle.top=0;
size_rectangle.left=0;
size_rectangle.bottom=(short) image->rows;
size_rectangle.right=(short) image->columns;
frame_rectangle=size_rectangle;
crop_rectangle=size_rectangle;
source_rectangle=size_rectangle;
destination_rectangle=size_rectangle;
base_address=0xff;
row_bytes=(unsigned short) (image->columns | 0x8000);
bounds.top=0;
bounds.left=0;
bounds.bottom=(short) image->rows;
bounds.right=(short) image->columns;
pixmap.version=0;
pixmap.pack_type=0;
pixmap.pack_size=0;
pixmap.pixel_type=0;
pixmap.bits_per_pixel=8;
pixmap.component_count=1;
pixmap.component_size=8;
pixmap.plane_bytes=0;
pixmap.table=0;
pixmap.reserved=0;
transfer_mode=0;
x_resolution=image->resolution.x != 0.0 ? image->resolution.x :
DefaultResolution;
y_resolution=image->resolution.y != 0.0 ? image->resolution.y :
DefaultResolution;
storage_class=image->storage_class;
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
storage_class=DirectClass;
if (storage_class == DirectClass)
{
pixmap.component_count=image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 4 : 3;
pixmap.pixel_type=16;
pixmap.bits_per_pixel=32;
pixmap.pack_type=0x04;
transfer_mode=0x40;
row_bytes=(unsigned short) ((4*image->columns) | 0x8000);
}
/*
Allocate memory.
*/
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
if (storage_class == DirectClass)
bytes_per_line*=image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 4 : 3;
buffer=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(PictInfoSize,sizeof(*buffer));
packed_scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
(row_bytes+MaxCount),sizeof(*packed_scanline));
scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_bytes,sizeof(*scanline));
if ((buffer == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(packed_scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(scanline,0,row_bytes);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(packed_scanline,0,(size_t) (row_bytes+MaxCount));
/*
Write header, header size, size bounding box, version, and reserved.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(buffer,0,PictInfoSize);
(void) WriteBlob(image,PictInfoSize,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictVersion);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x02ff); /* version #2 */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictInfoOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0xFFFE0000UL);
/*
Write full size of the file, resolution, frame bounding box, and reserved.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) x_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) y_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000L);
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"iptc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x1f2);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(GetStringInfoLength(profile)+4));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"8BIM");
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
}
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xe0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(GetStringInfoLength(profile)+4));
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xe0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,4);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000002UL);
}
/*
Write crop region opcode and crop bounding box.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictCropRegionOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.right);
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
{
Image
*jpeg_image;
ImageInfo
*jpeg_info;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*blob;
jpeg_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (jpeg_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
jpeg_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_info->magick,"JPEG",MagickPathExtent);
length=0;
blob=(unsigned char *) ImageToBlob(jpeg_info,jpeg_image,&length,
exception);
jpeg_info=DestroyImageInfo(jpeg_info);
if (blob == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
jpeg_image=DestroyImage(jpeg_image);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictJPEGOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) length+154);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00010000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00010000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x40000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00400000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,768);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00566A70UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x65670000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000001UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00016170UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x706C0000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,768);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) x_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) y_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x87AC0001UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x0B466F74UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x6F202D20UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x4A504547UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x0018FFFFUL);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,blob);
if ((length & 0x01) != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
}
/*
Write picture opcode, row bytes, and picture bounding box, and version.
*/
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictPICTOp);
else
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictPixmapOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(size_t) base_address);
}
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (row_bytes | 0x8000));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.right);
/*
Write pack type, pack size, resolution, pixel type, and pixel size.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.version);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.pack_type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.pack_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (x_resolution+0.5));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (y_resolution+0.5));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.pixel_type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.bits_per_pixel);
/*
Write component count, size, plane bytes, table size, and reserved.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.component_count);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.component_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.plane_bytes);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.table);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.reserved);
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
/*
Write image colormap.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000L); /* color seed */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0L); /* color flags */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (image->colors-1));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) i);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].red));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].green));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].blue));
}
}
/*
Write source and destination rectangle.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) transfer_mode);
/*
Write picture data.
*/
count=0;
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
scanline[x]=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(image,p);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,(size_t) (row_bytes & 0x7FFF),
packed_scanline);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
{
(void) ResetMagickMemory(scanline,0,row_bytes);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,(size_t) (row_bytes & 0x7FFF),
packed_scanline);
}
else
{
register unsigned char
*blue,
*green,
*opacity,
*red;
red=scanline;
green=scanline+image->columns;
blue=scanline+2*image->columns;
opacity=scanline+3*image->columns;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
red=scanline;
green=scanline+image->columns;
blue=scanline+2*image->columns;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
opacity=scanline;
red=scanline+image->columns;
green=scanline+2*image->columns;
blue=scanline+3*image->columns;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*red++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p));
*green++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p));
*blue++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p));
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
*opacity++=ScaleQuantumToChar((Quantum) (GetPixelAlpha(image,p)));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,bytes_per_line & 0x7FFF,
packed_scanline);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictEndOfPictureOp);
offset=TellBlob(image);
offset=SeekBlob(image,512,SEEK_SET);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) offset);
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
packed_scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(packed_scanline);
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer truncation issue in coders/pict.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.5-0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted .pict file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,864
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static TEE_Result set_rmem_param(const struct optee_msg_param_rmem *rmem,
struct param_mem *mem)
{
uint64_t shm_ref = READ_ONCE(rmem->shm_ref);
mem->mobj = mobj_reg_shm_get_by_cookie(shm_ref);
if (!mem->mobj)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
mem->offs = READ_ONCE(rmem->offs);
mem->size = READ_ONCE(rmem->size);
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Linaro/OP-TEE OP-TEE Prior to version v3.4.0 is affected by: Boundary checks. The impact is: This could lead to corruption of any memory which the TA can access. The component is: optee_os. The fixed version is: v3.4.0.
Commit Message: core: ensure that supplied range matches MOBJ
In set_rmem_param() if the MOBJ is found by the cookie it's verified to
represent non-secure shared memory. Prior to this patch the supplied
sub-range to be used of the MOBJ was not checked here and relied on
later checks further down the chain. Those checks seems to be enough
for user TAs, but not for pseudo TAs where the size isn't checked.
This patch adds a check for offset and size to see that they remain
inside the memory covered by the MOBJ.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0004: "Unchecked parameters are passed through from
REE".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
|
Low
| 169,474
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long ZEXPORT inflateMark(strm)
z_streamp strm;
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
if (strm == Z_NULL || strm->state == Z_NULL) return -1L << 16;
state = (struct inflate_state FAR *)strm->state;
return ((long)(state->back) << 16) +
(state->mode == COPY ? state->length :
(state->mode == MATCH ? state->was - state->length : 0));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The inflateMark function in inflate.c in zlib 1.2.8 might allow context-dependent attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving left shifts of negative integers.
Commit Message: Avoid shifts of negative values inflateMark().
The C standard says that bit shifts of negative integers is
undefined. This casts to unsigned values to assure a known
result.
|
Medium
| 168,673
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: UserSelectionScreen::UpdateAndReturnUserListForWebUI() {
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> users_list =
std::make_unique<base::ListValue>();
const AccountId owner = GetOwnerAccountId();
const bool is_signin_to_add = IsSigninToAdd();
users_to_send_ = PrepareUserListForSending(users_, owner, is_signin_to_add);
user_auth_type_map_.clear();
for (user_manager::UserList::const_iterator it = users_to_send_.begin();
it != users_to_send_.end(); ++it) {
const AccountId& account_id = (*it)->GetAccountId();
bool is_owner = (account_id == owner);
const bool is_public_account =
((*it)->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT);
const proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType initial_auth_type =
is_public_account
? proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::EXPAND_THEN_USER_CLICK
: (ShouldForceOnlineSignIn(*it)
? proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::ONLINE_SIGN_IN
: proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::OFFLINE_PASSWORD);
user_auth_type_map_[account_id] = initial_auth_type;
auto user_dict = std::make_unique<base::DictionaryValue>();
const std::vector<std::string>* public_session_recommended_locales =
public_session_recommended_locales_.find(account_id) ==
public_session_recommended_locales_.end()
? nullptr
: &public_session_recommended_locales_[account_id];
FillUserDictionary(*it, is_owner, is_signin_to_add, initial_auth_type,
public_session_recommended_locales, user_dict.get());
user_dict->SetBoolean(kKeyCanRemove, CanRemoveUser(*it));
users_list->Append(std::move(user_dict));
}
return users_list;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in browser/extensions/api/webrtc_audio_private/webrtc_audio_private_api.cc in the WebRTC Audio Private API implementation in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect reliance on the resource context pointer.
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
|
Low
| 172,205
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const char* SegmentInfo::GetWritingAppAsUTF8() const
{
return m_pWritingAppAsUTF8;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,383
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static __u8 *sp_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 107 && rdesc[104] == 0x26 && rdesc[105] == 0x80 &&
rdesc[106] == 0x03) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Sunplus Wireless Desktop report descriptor\n");
rdesc[105] = rdesc[110] = 0x03;
rdesc[106] = rdesc[111] = 0x21;
}
return rdesc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The report_fixup functions in the HID subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.16.2 might allow physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted device that provides a small report descriptor, related to (1) drivers/hid/hid-cherry.c, (2) drivers/hid/hid-kye.c, (3) drivers/hid/hid-lg.c, (4) drivers/hid/hid-monterey.c, (5) drivers/hid/hid-petalynx.c, and (6) drivers/hid/hid-sunplus.c.
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
Medium
| 166,375
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ndp_sock_open(struct ndp *ndp)
{
int sock;
int ret;
int err;
int val;
sock = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMPV6);
if (sock == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to create ICMP6 socket.");
return -errno;
}
val = 1;
ret = setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RECVPKTINFO,
&val, sizeof(val));
if (ret == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to setsockopt IPV6_RECVPKTINFO.");
err = -errno;
goto close_sock;
}
val = 255;
ret = setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS,
&val, sizeof(val));
if (ret == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to setsockopt IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS.");
err = -errno;
goto close_sock;
}
ndp->sock = sock;
return 0;
close_sock:
close(sock);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: libndp before 1.6, as used in NetworkManager, does not properly validate the origin of Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) messages, which allows remote attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks or cause a denial of service (network connectivity disruption) by advertising a node as a router from a non-local network.
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
|
Medium
| 167,349
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void TearDown() {
vpx_svc_release(&svc_);
delete(decoder_);
if (codec_initialized_) vpx_codec_destroy(&codec_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,582
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int usb_enumerate_device_otg(struct usb_device *udev)
{
int err = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_USB_OTG
/*
* OTG-aware devices on OTG-capable root hubs may be able to use SRP,
* to wake us after we've powered off VBUS; and HNP, switching roles
* "host" to "peripheral". The OTG descriptor helps figure this out.
*/
if (!udev->bus->is_b_host
&& udev->config
&& udev->parent == udev->bus->root_hub) {
struct usb_otg_descriptor *desc = NULL;
struct usb_bus *bus = udev->bus;
unsigned port1 = udev->portnum;
/* descriptor may appear anywhere in config */
err = __usb_get_extra_descriptor(udev->rawdescriptors[0],
le16_to_cpu(udev->config[0].desc.wTotalLength),
USB_DT_OTG, (void **) &desc);
if (err || !(desc->bmAttributes & USB_OTG_HNP))
return 0;
dev_info(&udev->dev, "Dual-Role OTG device on %sHNP port\n",
(port1 == bus->otg_port) ? "" : "non-");
/* enable HNP before suspend, it's simpler */
if (port1 == bus->otg_port) {
bus->b_hnp_enable = 1;
err = usb_control_msg(udev,
usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
USB_REQ_SET_FEATURE, 0,
USB_DEVICE_B_HNP_ENABLE,
0, NULL, 0,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (err < 0) {
/*
* OTG MESSAGE: report errors here,
* customize to match your product.
*/
dev_err(&udev->dev, "can't set HNP mode: %d\n",
err);
bus->b_hnp_enable = 0;
}
} else if (desc->bLength == sizeof
(struct usb_otg_descriptor)) {
/* Set a_alt_hnp_support for legacy otg device */
err = usb_control_msg(udev,
usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
USB_REQ_SET_FEATURE, 0,
USB_DEVICE_A_ALT_HNP_SUPPORT,
0, NULL, 0,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (err < 0)
dev_err(&udev->dev,
"set a_alt_hnp_support failed: %d\n",
err);
}
}
#endif
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.19.9. The USB subsystem mishandles size checks during the reading of an extra descriptor, related to __usb_get_extra_descriptor in drivers/usb/core/usb.c.
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Low
| 168,959
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Curves16Data* CurvesAlloc(cmsContext ContextID, int nCurves, int nElements, cmsToneCurve** G)
{
int i, j;
Curves16Data* c16;
c16 = _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(Curves16Data));
if (c16 == NULL) return NULL;
c16 ->nCurves = nCurves;
c16 ->nElements = nElements;
c16 ->Curves = _cmsCalloc(ContextID, nCurves, sizeof(cmsUInt16Number*));
if (c16 ->Curves == NULL) return NULL;
for (i=0; i < nCurves; i++) {
c16->Curves[i] = _cmsCalloc(ContextID, nElements, sizeof(cmsUInt16Number));
if (nElements == 256) {
for (j=0; j < nElements; j++) {
c16 ->Curves[i][j] = cmsEvalToneCurve16(G[i], FROM_8_TO_16(j));
}
}
else {
for (j=0; j < nElements; j++) {
c16 ->Curves[i][j] = cmsEvalToneCurve16(G[i], (cmsUInt16Number) j);
}
}
}
return c16;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Little CMS (lcms2) before 2.5, as used in OpenJDK 7 and possibly other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) via vectors related to (1) cmsStageAllocLabV2ToV4curves, (2) cmsPipelineDup, (3) cmsAllocProfileSequenceDescription, (4) CurvesAlloc, and (5) cmsnamed.
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
|
Low
| 166,544
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PreconnectRequest::PreconnectRequest(
const GURL& origin,
int num_sockets,
const net::NetworkIsolationKey& network_isolation_key)
: origin(origin),
num_sockets(num_sockets),
network_isolation_key(network_isolation_key) {
DCHECK_GE(num_sockets, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
|
Medium
| 172,381
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlXPathCompOpEval(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlXPathStepOpPtr op)
{
int total = 0;
int equal, ret;
xmlXPathCompExprPtr comp;
xmlXPathObjectPtr arg1, arg2;
xmlNodePtr bak;
xmlDocPtr bakd;
int pp;
int cs;
CHECK_ERROR0;
comp = ctxt->comp;
switch (op->op) {
case XPATH_OP_END:
return (0);
case XPATH_OP_AND:
bakd = ctxt->context->doc;
bak = ctxt->context->node;
pp = ctxt->context->proximityPosition;
cs = ctxt->context->contextSize;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
xmlXPathBooleanFunction(ctxt, 1);
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->boolval == 0))
return (total);
arg2 = valuePop(ctxt);
ctxt->context->doc = bakd;
ctxt->context->node = bak;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = pp;
ctxt->context->contextSize = cs;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch2]);
if (ctxt->error) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(arg2);
return(0);
}
xmlXPathBooleanFunction(ctxt, 1);
arg1 = valuePop(ctxt);
arg1->boolval &= arg2->boolval;
valuePush(ctxt, arg1);
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, arg2);
return (total);
case XPATH_OP_OR:
bakd = ctxt->context->doc;
bak = ctxt->context->node;
pp = ctxt->context->proximityPosition;
cs = ctxt->context->contextSize;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
xmlXPathBooleanFunction(ctxt, 1);
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->boolval == 1))
return (total);
arg2 = valuePop(ctxt);
ctxt->context->doc = bakd;
ctxt->context->node = bak;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = pp;
ctxt->context->contextSize = cs;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch2]);
if (ctxt->error) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(arg2);
return(0);
}
xmlXPathBooleanFunction(ctxt, 1);
arg1 = valuePop(ctxt);
arg1->boolval |= arg2->boolval;
valuePush(ctxt, arg1);
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, arg2);
return (total);
case XPATH_OP_EQUAL:
bakd = ctxt->context->doc;
bak = ctxt->context->node;
pp = ctxt->context->proximityPosition;
cs = ctxt->context->contextSize;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
ctxt->context->doc = bakd;
ctxt->context->node = bak;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = pp;
ctxt->context->contextSize = cs;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch2]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
if (op->value)
equal = xmlXPathEqualValues(ctxt);
else
equal = xmlXPathNotEqualValues(ctxt);
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathCacheNewBoolean(ctxt->context, equal));
return (total);
case XPATH_OP_CMP:
bakd = ctxt->context->doc;
bak = ctxt->context->node;
pp = ctxt->context->proximityPosition;
cs = ctxt->context->contextSize;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
ctxt->context->doc = bakd;
ctxt->context->node = bak;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = pp;
ctxt->context->contextSize = cs;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch2]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
ret = xmlXPathCompareValues(ctxt, op->value, op->value2);
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathCacheNewBoolean(ctxt->context, ret));
return (total);
case XPATH_OP_PLUS:
bakd = ctxt->context->doc;
bak = ctxt->context->node;
pp = ctxt->context->proximityPosition;
cs = ctxt->context->contextSize;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
if (op->ch2 != -1) {
ctxt->context->doc = bakd;
ctxt->context->node = bak;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = pp;
ctxt->context->contextSize = cs;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch2]);
}
CHECK_ERROR0;
if (op->value == 0)
xmlXPathSubValues(ctxt);
else if (op->value == 1)
xmlXPathAddValues(ctxt);
else if (op->value == 2)
xmlXPathValueFlipSign(ctxt);
else if (op->value == 3) {
CAST_TO_NUMBER;
CHECK_TYPE0(XPATH_NUMBER);
}
return (total);
case XPATH_OP_MULT:
bakd = ctxt->context->doc;
bak = ctxt->context->node;
pp = ctxt->context->proximityPosition;
cs = ctxt->context->contextSize;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
ctxt->context->doc = bakd;
ctxt->context->node = bak;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = pp;
ctxt->context->contextSize = cs;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch2]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
if (op->value == 0)
xmlXPathMultValues(ctxt);
else if (op->value == 1)
xmlXPathDivValues(ctxt);
else if (op->value == 2)
xmlXPathModValues(ctxt);
return (total);
case XPATH_OP_UNION:
bakd = ctxt->context->doc;
bak = ctxt->context->node;
pp = ctxt->context->proximityPosition;
cs = ctxt->context->contextSize;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
ctxt->context->doc = bakd;
ctxt->context->node = bak;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = pp;
ctxt->context->contextSize = cs;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch2]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
CHECK_TYPE0(XPATH_NODESET);
arg2 = valuePop(ctxt);
CHECK_TYPE0(XPATH_NODESET);
arg1 = valuePop(ctxt);
if ((arg1->nodesetval == NULL) ||
((arg2->nodesetval != NULL) &&
(arg2->nodesetval->nodeNr != 0)))
{
arg1->nodesetval = xmlXPathNodeSetMerge(arg1->nodesetval,
arg2->nodesetval);
}
valuePush(ctxt, arg1);
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, arg2);
return (total);
case XPATH_OP_ROOT:
xmlXPathRoot(ctxt);
return (total);
case XPATH_OP_NODE:
if (op->ch1 != -1)
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
if (op->ch2 != -1)
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch2]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathCacheNewNodeSet(ctxt->context,
ctxt->context->node));
return (total);
case XPATH_OP_RESET:
if (op->ch1 != -1)
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
if (op->ch2 != -1)
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch2]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
ctxt->context->node = NULL;
return (total);
case XPATH_OP_COLLECT:{
if (op->ch1 == -1)
return (total);
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
total += xmlXPathNodeCollectAndTest(ctxt, op, NULL, NULL, 0);
return (total);
}
case XPATH_OP_VALUE:
valuePush(ctxt,
xmlXPathCacheObjectCopy(ctxt->context,
(xmlXPathObjectPtr) op->value4));
return (total);
case XPATH_OP_VARIABLE:{
xmlXPathObjectPtr val;
if (op->ch1 != -1)
total +=
xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
if (op->value5 == NULL) {
val = xmlXPathVariableLookup(ctxt->context, op->value4);
if (val == NULL) {
ctxt->error = XPATH_UNDEF_VARIABLE_ERROR;
return(0);
}
valuePush(ctxt, val);
} else {
const xmlChar *URI;
URI = xmlXPathNsLookup(ctxt->context, op->value5);
if (URI == NULL) {
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"xmlXPathCompOpEval: variable %s bound to undefined prefix %s\n",
(char *) op->value4, (char *)op->value5);
return (total);
}
val = xmlXPathVariableLookupNS(ctxt->context,
op->value4, URI);
if (val == NULL) {
ctxt->error = XPATH_UNDEF_VARIABLE_ERROR;
return(0);
}
valuePush(ctxt, val);
}
return (total);
}
case XPATH_OP_FUNCTION:{
xmlXPathFunction func;
const xmlChar *oldFunc, *oldFuncURI;
int i;
if (op->ch1 != -1)
total +=
xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
if (ctxt->valueNr < op->value) {
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"xmlXPathCompOpEval: parameter error\n");
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_OPERAND;
return (total);
}
for (i = 0; i < op->value; i++)
if (ctxt->valueTab[(ctxt->valueNr - 1) - i] == NULL) {
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"xmlXPathCompOpEval: parameter error\n");
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_OPERAND;
return (total);
}
if (op->cache != NULL)
XML_CAST_FPTR(func) = op->cache;
else {
const xmlChar *URI = NULL;
if (op->value5 == NULL)
func =
xmlXPathFunctionLookup(ctxt->context,
op->value4);
else {
URI = xmlXPathNsLookup(ctxt->context, op->value5);
if (URI == NULL) {
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"xmlXPathCompOpEval: function %s bound to undefined prefix %s\n",
(char *)op->value4, (char *)op->value5);
return (total);
}
func = xmlXPathFunctionLookupNS(ctxt->context,
op->value4, URI);
}
if (func == NULL) {
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"xmlXPathCompOpEval: function %s not found\n",
(char *)op->value4);
XP_ERROR0(XPATH_UNKNOWN_FUNC_ERROR);
}
op->cache = XML_CAST_FPTR(func);
op->cacheURI = (void *) URI;
}
oldFunc = ctxt->context->function;
oldFuncURI = ctxt->context->functionURI;
ctxt->context->function = op->value4;
ctxt->context->functionURI = op->cacheURI;
func(ctxt, op->value);
ctxt->context->function = oldFunc;
ctxt->context->functionURI = oldFuncURI;
return (total);
}
case XPATH_OP_ARG:
bakd = ctxt->context->doc;
bak = ctxt->context->node;
pp = ctxt->context->proximityPosition;
cs = ctxt->context->contextSize;
if (op->ch1 != -1)
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
ctxt->context->contextSize = cs;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = pp;
ctxt->context->node = bak;
ctxt->context->doc = bakd;
CHECK_ERROR0;
if (op->ch2 != -1) {
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch2]);
ctxt->context->doc = bakd;
ctxt->context->node = bak;
CHECK_ERROR0;
}
return (total);
case XPATH_OP_PREDICATE:
case XPATH_OP_FILTER:{
xmlXPathObjectPtr res;
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj, tmp;
xmlNodeSetPtr newset = NULL;
xmlNodeSetPtr oldset;
xmlNodePtr oldnode;
xmlDocPtr oldDoc;
int i;
/*
* Optimization for ()[1] selection i.e. the first elem
*/
if ((op->ch1 != -1) && (op->ch2 != -1) &&
#ifdef XP_OPTIMIZED_FILTER_FIRST
/*
* FILTER TODO: Can we assume that the inner processing
* will result in an ordered list if we have an
* XPATH_OP_FILTER?
* What about an additional field or flag on
* xmlXPathObject like @sorted ? This way we wouln'd need
* to assume anything, so it would be more robust and
* easier to optimize.
*/
((comp->steps[op->ch1].op == XPATH_OP_SORT) || /* 18 */
(comp->steps[op->ch1].op == XPATH_OP_FILTER)) && /* 17 */
#else
(comp->steps[op->ch1].op == XPATH_OP_SORT) &&
#endif
(comp->steps[op->ch2].op == XPATH_OP_VALUE)) { /* 12 */
xmlXPathObjectPtr val;
val = comp->steps[op->ch2].value4;
if ((val != NULL) && (val->type == XPATH_NUMBER) &&
(val->floatval == 1.0)) {
xmlNodePtr first = NULL;
total +=
xmlXPathCompOpEvalFirst(ctxt,
&comp->steps[op->ch1],
&first);
CHECK_ERROR0;
/*
* The nodeset should be in document order,
* Keep only the first value
*/
if ((ctxt->value != NULL) &&
(ctxt->value->type == XPATH_NODESET) &&
(ctxt->value->nodesetval != NULL) &&
(ctxt->value->nodesetval->nodeNr > 1))
ctxt->value->nodesetval->nodeNr = 1;
return (total);
}
}
/*
* Optimization for ()[last()] selection i.e. the last elem
*/
if ((op->ch1 != -1) && (op->ch2 != -1) &&
(comp->steps[op->ch1].op == XPATH_OP_SORT) &&
(comp->steps[op->ch2].op == XPATH_OP_SORT)) {
int f = comp->steps[op->ch2].ch1;
if ((f != -1) &&
(comp->steps[f].op == XPATH_OP_FUNCTION) &&
(comp->steps[f].value5 == NULL) &&
(comp->steps[f].value == 0) &&
(comp->steps[f].value4 != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual
(comp->steps[f].value4, BAD_CAST "last"))) {
xmlNodePtr last = NULL;
total +=
xmlXPathCompOpEvalLast(ctxt,
&comp->steps[op->ch1],
&last);
CHECK_ERROR0;
/*
* The nodeset should be in document order,
* Keep only the last value
*/
if ((ctxt->value != NULL) &&
(ctxt->value->type == XPATH_NODESET) &&
(ctxt->value->nodesetval != NULL) &&
(ctxt->value->nodesetval->nodeTab != NULL) &&
(ctxt->value->nodesetval->nodeNr > 1)) {
ctxt->value->nodesetval->nodeTab[0] =
ctxt->value->nodesetval->nodeTab[ctxt->
value->
nodesetval->
nodeNr -
1];
ctxt->value->nodesetval->nodeNr = 1;
}
return (total);
}
}
/*
* Process inner predicates first.
* Example "index[parent::book][1]":
* ...
* PREDICATE <-- we are here "[1]"
* PREDICATE <-- process "[parent::book]" first
* SORT
* COLLECT 'parent' 'name' 'node' book
* NODE
* ELEM Object is a number : 1
*/
if (op->ch1 != -1)
total +=
xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
if (op->ch2 == -1)
return (total);
if (ctxt->value == NULL)
return (total);
oldnode = ctxt->context->node;
#ifdef LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED
/*
* Hum are we filtering the result of an XPointer expression
*/
if (ctxt->value->type == XPATH_LOCATIONSET) {
xmlLocationSetPtr newlocset = NULL;
xmlLocationSetPtr oldlocset;
/*
* Extract the old locset, and then evaluate the result of the
* expression for all the element in the locset. use it to grow
* up a new locset.
*/
CHECK_TYPE0(XPATH_LOCATIONSET);
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
oldlocset = obj->user;
ctxt->context->node = NULL;
if ((oldlocset == NULL) || (oldlocset->locNr == 0)) {
ctxt->context->contextSize = 0;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = 0;
if (op->ch2 != -1)
total +=
xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt,
&comp->steps[op->ch2]);
res = valuePop(ctxt);
if (res != NULL) {
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, res);
}
valuePush(ctxt, obj);
CHECK_ERROR0;
return (total);
}
newlocset = xmlXPtrLocationSetCreate(NULL);
for (i = 0; i < oldlocset->locNr; i++) {
/*
* Run the evaluation with a node list made of a
* single item in the nodelocset.
*/
ctxt->context->node = oldlocset->locTab[i]->user;
ctxt->context->contextSize = oldlocset->locNr;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = i + 1;
tmp = xmlXPathCacheNewNodeSet(ctxt->context,
ctxt->context->node);
valuePush(ctxt, tmp);
if (op->ch2 != -1)
total +=
xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt,
&comp->steps[op->ch2]);
if (ctxt->error != XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
return(0);
}
/*
* The result of the evaluation need to be tested to
* decided whether the filter succeeded or not
*/
res = valuePop(ctxt);
if (xmlXPathEvaluatePredicateResult(ctxt, res)) {
xmlXPtrLocationSetAdd(newlocset,
xmlXPathObjectCopy
(oldlocset->locTab[i]));
}
/*
* Cleanup
*/
if (res != NULL) {
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, res);
}
if (ctxt->value == tmp) {
res = valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, res);
}
ctxt->context->node = NULL;
}
/*
* The result is used as the new evaluation locset.
*/
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, obj);
ctxt->context->node = NULL;
ctxt->context->contextSize = -1;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = -1;
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPtrWrapLocationSet(newlocset));
ctxt->context->node = oldnode;
return (total);
}
#endif /* LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED */
/*
* Extract the old set, and then evaluate the result of the
* expression for all the element in the set. use it to grow
* up a new set.
*/
CHECK_TYPE0(XPATH_NODESET);
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
oldset = obj->nodesetval;
oldnode = ctxt->context->node;
oldDoc = ctxt->context->doc;
ctxt->context->node = NULL;
if ((oldset == NULL) || (oldset->nodeNr == 0)) {
ctxt->context->contextSize = 0;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = 0;
/*
if (op->ch2 != -1)
total +=
xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt,
&comp->steps[op->ch2]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
res = valuePop(ctxt);
if (res != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(res);
*/
valuePush(ctxt, obj);
ctxt->context->node = oldnode;
CHECK_ERROR0;
} else {
tmp = NULL;
/*
* Initialize the new set.
* Also set the xpath document in case things like
* key() evaluation are attempted on the predicate
*/
newset = xmlXPathNodeSetCreate(NULL);
/*
* SPEC XPath 1.0:
* "For each node in the node-set to be filtered, the
* PredicateExpr is evaluated with that node as the
* context node, with the number of nodes in the
* node-set as the context size, and with the proximity
* position of the node in the node-set with respect to
* the axis as the context position;"
* @oldset is the node-set" to be filtered.
*
* SPEC XPath 1.0:
* "only predicates change the context position and
* context size (see [2.4 Predicates])."
* Example:
* node-set context pos
* nA 1
* nB 2
* nC 3
* After applying predicate [position() > 1] :
* node-set context pos
* nB 1
* nC 2
*
* removed the first node in the node-set, then
* the context position of the
*/
for (i = 0; i < oldset->nodeNr; i++) {
/*
* Run the evaluation with a node list made of
* a single item in the nodeset.
*/
ctxt->context->node = oldset->nodeTab[i];
if ((oldset->nodeTab[i]->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL) &&
(oldset->nodeTab[i]->doc != NULL))
ctxt->context->doc = oldset->nodeTab[i]->doc;
if (tmp == NULL) {
tmp = xmlXPathCacheNewNodeSet(ctxt->context,
ctxt->context->node);
} else {
xmlXPathNodeSetAddUnique(tmp->nodesetval,
ctxt->context->node);
}
valuePush(ctxt, tmp);
ctxt->context->contextSize = oldset->nodeNr;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = i + 1;
/*
* Evaluate the predicate against the context node.
* Can/should we optimize position() predicates
* here (e.g. "[1]")?
*/
if (op->ch2 != -1)
total +=
xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt,
&comp->steps[op->ch2]);
if (ctxt->error != XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK) {
xmlXPathFreeNodeSet(newset);
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
return(0);
}
/*
* The result of the evaluation needs to be tested to
* decide whether the filter succeeded or not
*/
/*
* OPTIMIZE TODO: Can we use
* xmlXPathNodeSetAdd*Unique()* instead?
*/
res = valuePop(ctxt);
if (xmlXPathEvaluatePredicateResult(ctxt, res)) {
xmlXPathNodeSetAdd(newset, oldset->nodeTab[i]);
}
/*
* Cleanup
*/
if (res != NULL) {
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, res);
}
if (ctxt->value == tmp) {
valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(tmp->nodesetval, 1);
/*
* Don't free the temporary nodeset
* in order to avoid massive recreation inside this
* loop.
*/
} else
tmp = NULL;
ctxt->context->node = NULL;
}
if (tmp != NULL)
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, tmp);
/*
* The result is used as the new evaluation set.
*/
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, obj);
ctxt->context->node = NULL;
ctxt->context->contextSize = -1;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = -1;
/* may want to move this past the '}' later */
ctxt->context->doc = oldDoc;
valuePush(ctxt,
xmlXPathCacheWrapNodeSet(ctxt->context, newset));
}
ctxt->context->node = oldnode;
return (total);
}
case XPATH_OP_SORT:
if (op->ch1 != -1)
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
CHECK_ERROR0;
if ((ctxt->value != NULL) &&
(ctxt->value->type == XPATH_NODESET) &&
(ctxt->value->nodesetval != NULL) &&
(ctxt->value->nodesetval->nodeNr > 1))
{
xmlXPathNodeSetSort(ctxt->value->nodesetval);
}
return (total);
#ifdef LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED
case XPATH_OP_RANGETO:{
xmlXPathObjectPtr range;
xmlXPathObjectPtr res, obj;
xmlXPathObjectPtr tmp;
xmlLocationSetPtr newlocset = NULL;
xmlLocationSetPtr oldlocset;
xmlNodeSetPtr oldset;
int i, j;
if (op->ch1 != -1)
total +=
xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[op->ch1]);
if (op->ch2 == -1)
return (total);
if (ctxt->value->type == XPATH_LOCATIONSET) {
/*
* Extract the old locset, and then evaluate the result of the
* expression for all the element in the locset. use it to grow
* up a new locset.
*/
CHECK_TYPE0(XPATH_LOCATIONSET);
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
oldlocset = obj->user;
if ((oldlocset == NULL) || (oldlocset->locNr == 0)) {
ctxt->context->node = NULL;
ctxt->context->contextSize = 0;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = 0;
total += xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt,&comp->steps[op->ch2]);
res = valuePop(ctxt);
if (res != NULL) {
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, res);
}
valuePush(ctxt, obj);
CHECK_ERROR0;
return (total);
}
newlocset = xmlXPtrLocationSetCreate(NULL);
for (i = 0; i < oldlocset->locNr; i++) {
/*
* Run the evaluation with a node list made of a
* single item in the nodelocset.
*/
ctxt->context->node = oldlocset->locTab[i]->user;
ctxt->context->contextSize = oldlocset->locNr;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = i + 1;
tmp = xmlXPathCacheNewNodeSet(ctxt->context,
ctxt->context->node);
valuePush(ctxt, tmp);
if (op->ch2 != -1)
total +=
xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt,
&comp->steps[op->ch2]);
if (ctxt->error != XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
return(0);
}
res = valuePop(ctxt);
if (res->type == XPATH_LOCATIONSET) {
xmlLocationSetPtr rloc =
(xmlLocationSetPtr)res->user;
for (j=0; j<rloc->locNr; j++) {
range = xmlXPtrNewRange(
oldlocset->locTab[i]->user,
oldlocset->locTab[i]->index,
rloc->locTab[j]->user2,
rloc->locTab[j]->index2);
if (range != NULL) {
xmlXPtrLocationSetAdd(newlocset, range);
}
}
} else {
range = xmlXPtrNewRangeNodeObject(
(xmlNodePtr)oldlocset->locTab[i]->user, res);
if (range != NULL) {
xmlXPtrLocationSetAdd(newlocset,range);
}
}
/*
* Cleanup
*/
if (res != NULL) {
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, res);
}
if (ctxt->value == tmp) {
res = valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, res);
}
ctxt->context->node = NULL;
}
} else { /* Not a location set */
CHECK_TYPE0(XPATH_NODESET);
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
oldset = obj->nodesetval;
ctxt->context->node = NULL;
newlocset = xmlXPtrLocationSetCreate(NULL);
if (oldset != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < oldset->nodeNr; i++) {
/*
* Run the evaluation with a node list made of a single item
* in the nodeset.
*/
ctxt->context->node = oldset->nodeTab[i];
/*
* OPTIMIZE TODO: Avoid recreation for every iteration.
*/
tmp = xmlXPathCacheNewNodeSet(ctxt->context,
ctxt->context->node);
valuePush(ctxt, tmp);
if (op->ch2 != -1)
total +=
xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt,
&comp->steps[op->ch2]);
if (ctxt->error != XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
return(0);
}
res = valuePop(ctxt);
range =
xmlXPtrNewRangeNodeObject(oldset->nodeTab[i],
res);
if (range != NULL) {
xmlXPtrLocationSetAdd(newlocset, range);
}
/*
* Cleanup
*/
if (res != NULL) {
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, res);
}
if (ctxt->value == tmp) {
res = valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, res);
}
ctxt->context->node = NULL;
}
}
}
/*
* The result is used as the new evaluation set.
*/
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, obj);
ctxt->context->node = NULL;
ctxt->context->contextSize = -1;
ctxt->context->proximityPosition = -1;
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPtrWrapLocationSet(newlocset));
return (total);
}
#endif /* LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Double free vulnerability in libxml2, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to XPath handling.
Commit Message: Apply libxml fix for undefined namespaces.
BUG=93472
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7747031
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@98359 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,319
|
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