instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long long Block::GetTime(const Cluster* pCluster) const
{
assert(pCluster);
const long long tc = GetTimeCode(pCluster);
const Segment* const pSegment = pCluster->m_pSegment;
const SegmentInfo* const pInfo = pSegment->GetInfo();
assert(pInfo);
const long long scale = pInfo->GetTimeCodeScale();
assert(scale >= 1);
const long long ns = tc * scale;
return ns;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,363
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::OnJobNotification(DWORD message,
DWORD pid) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
switch (message) {
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_ACTIVE_PROCESS_ZERO:
CHECK(SetEvent(process_exit_event_));
break;
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_NEW_PROCESS:
worker_process_.Set(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,561
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _TIFFmalloc(tmsize_t s)
{
return (malloc((size_t) s));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: The _TIFFmalloc function in tif_unix.c in LibTIFF 4.0.3 does not reject a zero size, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) via a crafted TIFF image that is mishandled by the TIFFWriteScanline function in tif_write.c, as demonstrated by tiffdither.
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
|
Medium
| 169,459
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
r = vapic_enter(vcpu);
if (r) {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
return r;
}
r = 1;
while (r > 0) {
if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE &&
!vcpu->arch.apf.halted)
r = vcpu_enter_guest(vcpu);
else {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
kvm_vcpu_block(vcpu);
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_UNHALT, vcpu)) {
kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu);
switch(vcpu->arch.mp_state) {
case KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED:
vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted = false;
vcpu->arch.mp_state =
KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
case KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE:
vcpu->arch.apf.halted = false;
break;
case KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED:
break;
default:
r = -EINTR;
break;
}
}
}
if (r <= 0)
break;
clear_bit(KVM_REQ_PENDING_TIMER, &vcpu->requests);
if (kvm_cpu_has_pending_timer(vcpu))
kvm_inject_pending_timer_irqs(vcpu);
if (dm_request_for_irq_injection(vcpu)) {
r = -EINTR;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
++vcpu->stat.request_irq_exits;
}
kvm_check_async_pf_completion(vcpu);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
r = -EINTR;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
++vcpu->stat.signal_exits;
}
if (need_resched()) {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
kvm_resched(vcpu);
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
}
}
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
vapic_exit(vcpu);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.12.5 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a VAPIC synchronization operation involving a page-end address.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
High
| 165,947
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void sum_init(int csum_type, int seed)
{
char s[4];
if (csum_type < 0)
csum_type = parse_csum_name(NULL, 0);
cursum_type = csum_type;
switch (csum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5:
md5_begin(&md);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
mdfour_begin(&md);
sumresidue = 0;
break;
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
break;
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
mdfour_begin(&md);
sumresidue = 0;
SIVAL(s, 0, seed);
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-354
Summary: rsync 3.1.3-development before 2017-10-24 mishandles archaic checksums, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions. NOTE: the rsync development branch has significant use beyond the rsync developers, e.g., the code has been copied for use in various GitHub projects.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,646
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BaseShadow::log_except(const char *msg)
{
ShadowExceptionEvent event;
bool exception_already_logged = false;
if(!msg) msg = "";
sprintf(event.message, msg);
if ( BaseShadow::myshadow_ptr ) {
BaseShadow *shadow = BaseShadow::myshadow_ptr;
event.recvd_bytes = shadow->bytesSent();
event.sent_bytes = shadow->bytesReceived();
exception_already_logged = shadow->exception_already_logged;
if (shadow->began_execution) {
event.began_execution = TRUE;
}
} else {
event.recvd_bytes = 0.0;
event.sent_bytes = 0.0;
}
if (!exception_already_logged && !uLog.writeEventNoFsync (&event,NULL))
{
::dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Unable to log ULOG_SHADOW_EXCEPTION event\n");
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,377
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadVIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define VFF_CM_genericRGB 15
#define VFF_CM_ntscRGB 1
#define VFF_CM_NONE 0
#define VFF_DEP_DECORDER 0x4
#define VFF_DEP_NSORDER 0x8
#define VFF_DES_RAW 0
#define VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_NONE 0
#define VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE 7
#define VFF_MS_NONE 0
#define VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND 1
#define VFF_MS_SHARED 3
#define VFF_TYP_BIT 0
#define VFF_TYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_TYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_TYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_TYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_TYP_DOUBLE 9
typedef struct _ViffInfo
{
unsigned char
identifier,
file_type,
release,
version,
machine_dependency,
reserve[3];
char
comment[512];
unsigned int
rows,
columns,
subrows;
int
x_offset,
y_offset;
float
x_bits_per_pixel,
y_bits_per_pixel;
unsigned int
location_type,
location_dimension,
number_of_images,
number_data_bands,
data_storage_type,
data_encode_scheme,
map_scheme,
map_storage_type,
map_rows,
map_columns,
map_subrows,
map_enable,
maps_per_cycle,
color_space_model;
} ViffInfo;
double
min_value,
scale_factor,
value;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_pixel,
max_packets,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
unsigned long
lsb_first;
ViffInfo
viff_info;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read VIFF header (1024 bytes).
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
do
{
/*
Verify VIFF identifier.
*/
if ((count != 1) || ((unsigned char) viff_info.identifier != 0xab))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NotAVIFFImage");
/*
Initialize VIFF image.
*/
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.file_type),&viff_info.file_type);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.release),&viff_info.release);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.version),&viff_info.version);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.machine_dependency),
&viff_info.machine_dependency);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.reserve),viff_info.reserve);
(void) ReadBlob(image,512,(unsigned char *) viff_info.comment);
viff_info.comment[511]='\0';
if (strlen(viff_info.comment) > 4)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",viff_info.comment);
if ((viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_DECORDER) ||
(viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_NSORDER))
image->endian=LSBEndian;
else
image->endian=MSBEndian;
viff_info.rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.x_offset=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
viff_info.y_offset=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.y_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_dimension=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_of_images=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_data_bands=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_encode_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_enable=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.maps_per_cycle=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.color_space_model=ReadBlobLong(image);
for (i=0; i < 420; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
image->columns=viff_info.rows;
image->rows=viff_info.columns;
image->depth=viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? 8UL :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
/*
Verify that we can read this VIFF image.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) viff_info.columns*viff_info.rows;
if (number_pixels != (size_t) number_pixels)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (number_pixels == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageColumnOrRowSizeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.number_data_bands < 1) || (viff_info.number_data_bands > 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_BIT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.data_encode_scheme != VFF_DES_RAW)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_NONE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"MapStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_NONE) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_ntscRGB) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_genericRGB))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColorspaceModelIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.location_type != VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"LocationTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.number_of_images != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"NumberOfImagesIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.map_rows == 0)
viff_info.map_scheme=VFF_MS_NONE;
switch ((int) viff_info.map_scheme)
{
case VFF_MS_NONE:
{
if (viff_info.number_data_bands < 3)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
image->colors=2;
else
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE)
image->colors=256UL;
else
image->colors=image->depth <= 8 ? 256UL : 65536UL;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND:
case VFF_MS_SHARED:
{
unsigned char
*viff_colormap;
/*
Allocate VIFF colormap.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
image->colors=viff_info.map_columns;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (viff_info.map_rows >
(viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap));
if (viff_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Read VIFF raster colormap.
*/
(void) ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*viff_info.map_rows,
viff_colormap);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
default: break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (viff_info.map_rows*image->colors); i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*viff_colormap[i]; break;
}
if (i < (ssize_t) image->colors)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
value);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
}
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (2*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) value);
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) value);
}
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(viff_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->matte=viff_info.number_data_bands == 4 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
image->storage_class=
(viff_info.number_data_bands < 3 ? PseudoClass : DirectClass);
image->columns=viff_info.rows;
image->rows=viff_info.columns;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Allocate VIFF pixels.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
if (CheckMemoryOverflow((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL,image->rows) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
max_packets=((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL)*image->rows;
}
else
{
if (CheckMemoryOverflow(number_pixels,viff_info.number_data_bands) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
max_packets=(size_t) (number_pixels*viff_info.number_data_bands);
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(number_pixels,
max_packets),bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets,pixels);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
default: break;
}
min_value=0.0;
scale_factor=1.0;
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE))
{
double
max_value;
/*
Determine scale factor.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[0]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[0]; break;
}
max_value=value;
min_value=value;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (value > max_value)
max_value=value;
else
if (value < min_value)
min_value=value;
}
if ((min_value == 0) && (max_value == 0))
scale_factor=0;
else
if (min_value == max_value)
{
scale_factor=(MagickRealType) QuantumRange/min_value;
min_value=0;
}
else
scale_factor=(MagickRealType) QuantumRange/(max_value-min_value);
}
/*
Convert pixels to Quantum size.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE)
{
value=(value-min_value)*scale_factor;
if (value > QuantumRange)
value=QuantumRange;
else
if (value < 0)
value=0;
}
*p=(unsigned char) ((Quantum) value);
p++;
}
/*
Convert VIFF raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelGreen(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelBlue(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,quantum);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (int) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelGreen(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
SetPixelBlue(q,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,quantum);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,*p++);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+2*number_pixels)));
if (image->colors != 0)
{
ssize_t
index;
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelRed(q);
SetPixelRed(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index)].red);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelGreen(q);
SetPixelGreen(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index)].green);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelRed(q);
SetPixelBlue(q,image->colormap[(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index)].blue);
}
SetPixelOpacity(q,image->matte != MagickFalse ? QuantumRange-
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels*3)) : OpaqueOpacity);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
if ((count != 0) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: magick/memory.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via vectors involving *too many exceptions,* which trigger a buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
|
Low
| 168,540
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static lba512_t lba512_muldiv(lba512_t block_count, lba512_t mul_by, int div_by)
{
lba512_t bc_quot, bc_rem;
/* x * m / d == x / d * m + (x % d) * m / d */
bc_quot = block_count >> div_by;
bc_rem = block_count - (bc_quot << div_by);
return bc_quot * mul_by + ((bc_rem * mul_by) >> div_by);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Das U-Boot versions 2016.09 through 2019.07-rc4 can memset() too much data while reading a crafted ext4 filesystem, which results in a stack buffer overflow and likely code execution.
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
|
Medium
| 169,641
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BufferMeta(size_t size)
: mSize(size),
mIsBackup(false) {
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
|
Low
| 173,522
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), nullptr, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(DangerousPatternTLS().Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be\u4e36\u4e40\u4e41\u4e3f])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u4e00\u3127])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"(\u0131[\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"(\u3099|\u309A|)"
R"([ijl]\u0307)",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
DangerousPatternTLS().Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of confusable characters in URL Formatter in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Restrict Latin Small Letter Thorn (U+00FE) to Icelandic domains
This character (þ) can be confused with both b and p when used in a domain
name. IDN spoof checker doesn't have a good way of flagging a character as
confusable with multiple characters, so it can't catch spoofs containing
this character. As a practical fix, this CL restricts this character to
domains under Iceland's ccTLD (.is). With this change, a domain name containing
"þ" with a non-.is TLD will be displayed in punycode in the UI.
This change affects less than 10 real world domains with limited popularity.
Bug: 798892, 843352, 904327, 1017707
Change-Id: Ib07190dcde406bf62ce4413688a4fb4859a51030
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1879992
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christopher Thompson <cthomp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#709309}
|
Medium
| 172,727
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: omx_vdec::omx_vdec(): m_error_propogated(false),
m_state(OMX_StateInvalid),
m_app_data(NULL),
m_inp_mem_ptr(NULL),
m_out_mem_ptr(NULL),
input_flush_progress (false),
output_flush_progress (false),
input_use_buffer (false),
output_use_buffer (false),
ouput_egl_buffers(false),
m_use_output_pmem(OMX_FALSE),
m_out_mem_region_smi(OMX_FALSE),
m_out_pvt_entry_pmem(OMX_FALSE),
pending_input_buffers(0),
pending_output_buffers(0),
m_out_bm_count(0),
m_inp_bm_count(0),
m_inp_bPopulated(OMX_FALSE),
m_out_bPopulated(OMX_FALSE),
m_flags(0),
#ifdef _ANDROID_
m_heap_ptr(NULL),
#endif
m_inp_bEnabled(OMX_TRUE),
m_out_bEnabled(OMX_TRUE),
m_in_alloc_cnt(0),
m_platform_list(NULL),
m_platform_entry(NULL),
m_pmem_info(NULL),
h264_parser(NULL),
arbitrary_bytes (true),
psource_frame (NULL),
pdest_frame (NULL),
m_inp_heap_ptr (NULL),
m_phdr_pmem_ptr(NULL),
m_heap_inp_bm_count (0),
codec_type_parse ((codec_type)0),
first_frame_meta (true),
frame_count (0),
nal_count (0),
nal_length(0),
look_ahead_nal (false),
first_frame(0),
first_buffer(NULL),
first_frame_size (0),
m_device_file_ptr(NULL),
m_vc1_profile((vc1_profile_type)0),
h264_last_au_ts(LLONG_MAX),
h264_last_au_flags(0),
m_disp_hor_size(0),
m_disp_vert_size(0),
prev_ts(LLONG_MAX),
rst_prev_ts(true),
frm_int(0),
in_reconfig(false),
m_display_id(NULL),
client_extradata(0),
m_reject_avc_1080p_mp (0),
#ifdef _ANDROID_
m_enable_android_native_buffers(OMX_FALSE),
m_use_android_native_buffers(OMX_FALSE),
iDivXDrmDecrypt(NULL),
#endif
m_desc_buffer_ptr(NULL),
secure_mode(false),
m_other_extradata(NULL),
m_profile(0),
client_set_fps(false),
m_last_rendered_TS(-1),
m_queued_codec_config_count(0),
secure_scaling_to_non_secure_opb(false)
{
/* Assumption is that , to begin with , we have all the frames with decoder */
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("In %u bit OMX vdec Constructor", (unsigned int)sizeof(long) * 8);
memset(&m_debug,0,sizeof(m_debug));
#ifdef _ANDROID_
char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
property_get("vidc.debug.level", property_value, "1");
debug_level = atoi(property_value);
property_value[0] = '\0';
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("In OMX vdec Constructor");
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.perf", property_value, "0");
perf_flag = atoi(property_value);
if (perf_flag) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.perf is %d", perf_flag);
dec_time.start();
proc_frms = latency = 0;
}
prev_n_filled_len = 0;
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.ts", property_value, "0");
m_debug_timestamp = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.ts value is %d",m_debug_timestamp);
if (m_debug_timestamp) {
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(true);
time_stamp_dts.enable_debug_print(true);
}
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.concealedmb", property_value, "0");
m_debug_concealedmb = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.concealedmb value is %d",m_debug_concealedmb);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.profile.check", property_value, "0");
m_reject_avc_1080p_mp = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.profile.check value is %d",m_reject_avc_1080p_mp);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.log.in", property_value, "0");
m_debug.in_buffer_log = atoi(property_value);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.log.out", property_value, "0");
m_debug.out_buffer_log = atoi(property_value);
sprintf(m_debug.log_loc, "%s", BUFFER_LOG_LOC);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.log.loc", property_value, "");
if (*property_value)
strlcpy(m_debug.log_loc, property_value, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.120fps.enabled", property_value, "0");
if(atoi(property_value)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("feature 120 FPS decode enabled");
m_last_rendered_TS = 0;
}
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.dyn.disabled", property_value, "0");
m_disable_dynamic_buf_mode = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.dyn.disabled value is %d",m_disable_dynamic_buf_mode);
#endif
memset(&m_cmp,0,sizeof(m_cmp));
memset(&m_cb,0,sizeof(m_cb));
memset (&drv_ctx,0,sizeof(drv_ctx));
memset (&h264_scratch,0,sizeof (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE));
memset (m_hwdevice_name,0,sizeof(m_hwdevice_name));
memset(m_demux_offsets, 0, ( sizeof(OMX_U32) * 8192) );
memset(&m_custom_buffersize, 0, sizeof(m_custom_buffersize));
m_demux_entries = 0;
msg_thread_id = 0;
async_thread_id = 0;
msg_thread_created = false;
async_thread_created = false;
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
memset(&native_buffer, 0 ,(sizeof(struct nativebuffer) * MAX_NUM_INPUT_OUTPUT_BUFFERS));
#endif
memset(&drv_ctx.extradata_info, 0, sizeof(drv_ctx.extradata_info));
/* invalidate m_frame_pack_arrangement */
memset(&m_frame_pack_arrangement, 0, sizeof(OMX_QCOM_FRAME_PACK_ARRANGEMENT));
m_frame_pack_arrangement.cancel_flag = 1;
drv_ctx.timestamp_adjust = false;
drv_ctx.video_driver_fd = -1;
m_vendor_config.pData = NULL;
pthread_mutex_init(&m_lock, NULL);
pthread_mutex_init(&c_lock, NULL);
sem_init(&m_cmd_lock,0,0);
sem_init(&m_safe_flush, 0, 0);
streaming[CAPTURE_PORT] =
streaming[OUTPUT_PORT] = false;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
char extradata_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.extradata", extradata_value, "0");
m_debug_extradata = atoi(extradata_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.extradata value is %d",m_debug_extradata);
#endif
m_fill_output_msg = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_FTB;
client_buffers.set_vdec_client(this);
dynamic_buf_mode = false;
out_dynamic_list = NULL;
is_down_scalar_enabled = false;
m_smoothstreaming_mode = false;
m_smoothstreaming_width = 0;
m_smoothstreaming_height = 0;
is_q6_platform = false;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm-video-v4l2 vdec component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27890802.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
|
Low
| 173,753
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::WasHidden() {
if (host_->is_hidden())
return;
host_->WasHidden();
released_front_lock_ = NULL;
if (ShouldReleaseFrontSurface() &&
host_->is_accelerated_compositing_active()) {
current_surface_ = 0;
UpdateExternalTexture();
}
AdjustSurfaceProtection();
#if defined(OS_WIN)
aura::RootWindow* root_window = window_->GetRootWindow();
if (root_window) {
HWND parent = root_window->GetAcceleratedWidget();
LPARAM lparam = reinterpret_cast<LPARAM>(this);
EnumChildWindows(parent, HideWindowsCallback, lparam);
}
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,388
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void wdm_in_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct wdm_device *desc = urb->context;
int status = urb->status;
spin_lock(&desc->iuspin);
clear_bit(WDM_RESPONDING, &desc->flags);
if (status) {
switch (status) {
case -ENOENT:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ENOENT");
goto skip_error;
case -ECONNRESET:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ECONNRESET");
goto skip_error;
case -ESHUTDOWN:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ESHUTDOWN");
goto skip_error;
case -EPIPE:
dev_err(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -EPIPE\n");
break;
default:
dev_err(&desc->intf->dev,
"Unexpected error %d\n", status);
break;
}
}
desc->rerr = status;
desc->reslength = urb->actual_length;
memmove(desc->ubuf + desc->length, desc->inbuf, desc->reslength);
desc->length += desc->reslength;
skip_error:
wake_up(&desc->wait);
set_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock(&desc->iuspin);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the wdm_in_callback function in drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted cdc-wdm USB device.
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 166,103
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestCustomNamedGetter::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestCustomNamedGetter* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestCustomNamedGetter*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestCustomNamedGetter::s_info);
TestCustomNamedGetter* impl = static_cast<TestCustomNamedGetter*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
const String& str(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->anotherFunction(str);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,569
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MagickExport XMLTreeInfo *NewXMLTree(const char *xml,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
**attribute,
**attributes,
*tag,
*utf8;
int
c,
terminal;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
ignore_depth,
length;
ssize_t
j,
l;
XMLTreeRoot
*root;
/*
Convert xml-string to UTF8.
*/
if ((xml == (const char *) NULL) || (strlen(xml) == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionWarning,
"ParseError","root tag missing");
return((XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
}
root=(XMLTreeRoot *) NewXMLTreeTag((char *) NULL);
length=strlen(xml);
utf8=ConvertUTF16ToUTF8(xml,&length);
if (utf8 == (char *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionWarning,
"ParseError","UTF16 to UTF8 failed");
return((XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
}
terminal=utf8[length-1];
utf8[length-1]='\0';
p=utf8;
while ((*p != '\0') && (*p != '<'))
p++;
if (*p == '\0')
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionWarning,
"ParseError","root tag missing");
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
return((XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
}
attribute=(char **) NULL;
l=0;
ignore_depth=0;
for (p++; ; p++)
{
attributes=(char **) sentinel;
tag=p;
c=(*p);
if ((isalpha((int) ((unsigned char) *p)) !=0) || (*p == '_') ||
(*p == ':') || (c < '\0'))
{
/*
Tag.
*/
if (root->node == (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionWarning,"ParseError","root tag missing");
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
return(&root->root);
}
p+=strcspn(p,XMLWhitespace "/>");
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) *p)) != 0)
*p++='\0';
if (ignore_depth == 0)
{
if ((*p != '\0') && (*p != '/') && (*p != '>'))
{
/*
Find tag in default attributes list.
*/
i=0;
while ((root->attributes[i] != (char **) NULL) &&
(strcmp(root->attributes[i][0],tag) != 0))
i++;
attribute=root->attributes[i];
}
for (l=0; (*p != '\0') && (*p != '/') && (*p != '>'); l+=2)
{
/*
Attribute.
*/
if (l == 0)
attributes=(char **) AcquireQuantumMemory(4,
sizeof(*attributes));
else
attributes=(char **) ResizeQuantumMemory(attributes,
(size_t) (l+4),sizeof(*attributes));
if (attributes == (char **) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'","");
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
return(&root->root);
}
attributes[l+2]=(char *) NULL;
attributes[l+1]=(char *) NULL;
attributes[l]=p;
p+=strcspn(p,XMLWhitespace "=/>");
if ((*p != '=') && (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) *p)) == 0))
attributes[l]=ConstantString("");
else
{
*p++='\0';
p+=strspn(p,XMLWhitespace "=");
c=(*p);
if ((c == '"') || (c == '\''))
{
/*
Attributes value.
*/
p++;
attributes[l+1]=p;
while ((*p != '\0') && (*p != c))
p++;
if (*p != '\0')
*p++='\0';
else
{
attributes[l]=ConstantString("");
attributes[l+1]=ConstantString("");
(void) DestroyXMLTreeAttributes(attributes);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,
GetMagickModule(),OptionWarning,"ParseError",
"missing %c",c);
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
return(&root->root);
}
j=1;
while ((attribute != (char **) NULL) &&
(attribute[j] != (char *) NULL) &&
(strcmp(attribute[j],attributes[l]) != 0))
j+=3;
attributes[l+1]=ParseEntities(attributes[l+1],
root->entities,(attribute != (char **) NULL) &&
(attribute[j] != (char *) NULL) ? *attribute[j+2] :
' ');
}
attributes[l]=ConstantString(attributes[l]);
}
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) *p)) != 0)
p++;
}
}
else
{
while((*p != '\0') && (*p != '/') && (*p != '>'))
p++;
}
if (*p == '/')
{
/*
Self closing tag.
*/
*p++='\0';
if (((*p != '\0') && (*p != '>')) ||
((*p == '\0') && (terminal != '>')))
{
if (l != 0)
(void) DestroyXMLTreeAttributes(attributes);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionWarning,"ParseError","missing >");
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
return(&root->root);
}
if ((ignore_depth == 0) && (IsSkipTag(tag) == MagickFalse))
{
ParseOpenTag(root,tag,attributes);
(void) ParseCloseTag(root,tag,exception);
}
}
else
{
c=(*p);
if ((*p == '>') || ((*p == '\0') && (terminal == '>')))
{
*p='\0';
if ((ignore_depth == 0) && (IsSkipTag(tag) == MagickFalse))
ParseOpenTag(root,tag,attributes);
else
ignore_depth++;
*p=c;
}
else
{
if (l != 0)
(void) DestroyXMLTreeAttributes(attributes);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionWarning,"ParseError","missing >");
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
return(&root->root);
}
}
}
else
if (*p == '/')
{
/*
Close tag.
*/
tag=p+1;
p+=strcspn(tag,XMLWhitespace ">")+1;
c=(*p);
if ((c == '\0') && (terminal != '>'))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionWarning,"ParseError","missing >");
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
return(&root->root);
}
*p='\0';
if (ignore_depth == 0 && ParseCloseTag(root,tag,exception) !=
(XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
{
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
return(&root->root);
}
if (ignore_depth > 0)
ignore_depth--;
*p=c;
if (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) *p)) != 0)
p+=strspn(p,XMLWhitespace);
}
else
if (strncmp(p,"!--",3) == 0)
{
/*
Comment.
*/
p=strstr(p+3,"--");
if ((p == (char *) NULL) || ((*(p+=2) != '>') && (*p != '\0')) ||
((*p == '\0') && (terminal != '>')))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionWarning,"ParseError","unclosed <!--");
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
return(&root->root);
}
}
else
if (strncmp(p,"![CDATA[",8) == 0)
{
/*
Cdata.
*/
p=strstr(p,"]]>");
if (p != (char *) NULL)
{
p+=2;
if (ignore_depth == 0)
ParseCharacterContent(root,tag+8,(size_t) (p-tag-10),'c');
}
else
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionWarning,"ParseError","unclosed <![CDATA[");
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
return(&root->root);
}
}
else
if (strncmp(p,"!DOCTYPE",8) == 0)
{
/*
DTD.
*/
for (l=0; (*p != '\0') && (((l == 0) && (*p != '>')) ||
((l != 0) && ((*p != ']') ||
(*(p+strspn(p+1,XMLWhitespace)+1) != '>'))));
l=(ssize_t) ((*p == '[') ? 1 : l))
p+=strcspn(p+1,"[]>")+1;
if ((*p == '\0') && (terminal != '>'))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionWarning,"ParseError","unclosed <!DOCTYPE");
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
return(&root->root);
}
if (l != 0)
tag=strchr(tag,'[')+1;
if (l != 0)
{
status=ParseInternalDoctype(root,tag,(size_t) (p-tag),
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
return(&root->root);
}
p++;
}
}
else
if (*p == '?')
{
/*
Processing instructions.
*/
do
{
p=strchr(p,'?');
if (p == (char *) NULL)
break;
p++;
} while ((*p != '\0') && (*p != '>'));
if ((p == (char *) NULL) || ((*p == '\0') &&
(terminal != '>')))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionWarning,"ParseError","unclosed <?");
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
return(&root->root);
}
ParseProcessingInstructions(root,tag+1,(size_t) (p-tag-2));
}
else
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionWarning,"ParseError","unexpected <");
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
return(&root->root);
}
if ((p == (char *) NULL) || (*p == '\0'))
break;
*p++='\0';
tag=p;
if ((*p != '\0') && (*p != '<'))
{
/*
Tag character content.
*/
while ((*p != '\0') && (*p != '<'))
p++;
if (*p == '\0')
break;
if (ignore_depth == 0)
ParseCharacterContent(root,tag,(size_t) (p-tag),'&');
}
else
if (*p == '\0')
break;
}
utf8=DestroyString(utf8);
if (root->node == (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
return(&root->root);
if (root->node->tag == (char *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionWarning,
"ParseError","root tag missing");
return(&root->root);
}
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionWarning,
"ParseError","unclosed tag: `%s'",root->node->tag);
return(&root->root);
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Directory traversal vulnerability in magick/module.c in ImageMagick 6.9.4-7 allows remote attackers to load arbitrary modules via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
|
Low
| 168,643
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int start_decoder(vorb *f)
{
uint8 header[6], x,y;
int len,i,j,k, max_submaps = 0;
int longest_floorlist=0;
if (!start_page(f)) return FALSE;
if (!(f->page_flag & PAGEFLAG_first_page)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->page_flag & PAGEFLAG_last_page) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->page_flag & PAGEFLAG_continued_packet) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->segment_count != 1) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->segments[0] != 30) {
if (f->segments[0] == 64 &&
getn(f, header, 6) &&
header[0] == 'f' &&
header[1] == 'i' &&
header[2] == 's' &&
header[3] == 'h' &&
header[4] == 'e' &&
header[5] == 'a' &&
get8(f) == 'd' &&
get8(f) == '\0') return error(f, VORBIS_ogg_skeleton_not_supported);
else
return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
}
if (get8(f) != VORBIS_packet_id) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (!getn(f, header, 6)) return error(f, VORBIS_unexpected_eof);
if (!vorbis_validate(header)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (get32(f) != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
f->channels = get8(f); if (!f->channels) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (f->channels > STB_VORBIS_MAX_CHANNELS) return error(f, VORBIS_too_many_channels);
f->sample_rate = get32(f); if (!f->sample_rate) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
get32(f); // bitrate_maximum
get32(f); // bitrate_nominal
get32(f); // bitrate_minimum
x = get8(f);
{
int log0,log1;
log0 = x & 15;
log1 = x >> 4;
f->blocksize_0 = 1 << log0;
f->blocksize_1 = 1 << log1;
if (log0 < 6 || log0 > 13) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (log1 < 6 || log1 > 13) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (log0 > log1) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
x = get8(f);
if (!(x & 1)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_first_page);
if (!start_page(f)) return FALSE;
if (!start_packet(f)) return FALSE;
do {
len = next_segment(f);
skip(f, len);
f->bytes_in_seg = 0;
} while (len);
if (!start_packet(f)) return FALSE;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_NO_PUSHDATA_API
if (IS_PUSH_MODE(f)) {
if (!is_whole_packet_present(f, TRUE)) {
if (f->error == VORBIS_invalid_stream)
f->error = VORBIS_invalid_setup;
return FALSE;
}
}
#endif
crc32_init(); // always init it, to avoid multithread race conditions
if (get8_packet(f) != VORBIS_packet_setup) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
for (i=0; i < 6; ++i) header[i] = get8_packet(f);
if (!vorbis_validate(header)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
f->codebook_count = get_bits(f,8) + 1;
f->codebooks = (Codebook *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(*f->codebooks) * f->codebook_count);
if (f->codebooks == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memset(f->codebooks, 0, sizeof(*f->codebooks) * f->codebook_count);
for (i=0; i < f->codebook_count; ++i) {
uint32 *values;
int ordered, sorted_count;
int total=0;
uint8 *lengths;
Codebook *c = f->codebooks+i;
CHECK(f);
x = get_bits(f, 8); if (x != 0x42) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
x = get_bits(f, 8); if (x != 0x43) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
x = get_bits(f, 8); if (x != 0x56) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
x = get_bits(f, 8);
c->dimensions = (get_bits(f, 8)<<8) + x;
x = get_bits(f, 8);
y = get_bits(f, 8);
c->entries = (get_bits(f, 8)<<16) + (y<<8) + x;
ordered = get_bits(f,1);
c->sparse = ordered ? 0 : get_bits(f,1);
if (c->dimensions == 0 && c->entries != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (c->sparse)
lengths = (uint8 *) setup_temp_malloc(f, c->entries);
else
lengths = c->codeword_lengths = (uint8 *) setup_malloc(f, c->entries);
if (!lengths) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
if (ordered) {
int current_entry = 0;
int current_length = get_bits(f,5) + 1;
while (current_entry < c->entries) {
int limit = c->entries - current_entry;
int n = get_bits(f, ilog(limit));
if (current_entry + n > (int) c->entries) { return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup); }
memset(lengths + current_entry, current_length, n);
current_entry += n;
++current_length;
}
} else {
for (j=0; j < c->entries; ++j) {
int present = c->sparse ? get_bits(f,1) : 1;
if (present) {
lengths[j] = get_bits(f, 5) + 1;
++total;
if (lengths[j] == 32)
return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
} else {
lengths[j] = NO_CODE;
}
}
}
if (c->sparse && total >= c->entries >> 2) {
if (c->entries > (int) f->setup_temp_memory_required)
f->setup_temp_memory_required = c->entries;
c->codeword_lengths = (uint8 *) setup_malloc(f, c->entries);
if (c->codeword_lengths == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memcpy(c->codeword_lengths, lengths, c->entries);
setup_temp_free(f, lengths, c->entries); // note this is only safe if there have been no intervening temp mallocs!
lengths = c->codeword_lengths;
c->sparse = 0;
}
if (c->sparse) {
sorted_count = total;
} else {
sorted_count = 0;
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_NO_HUFFMAN_BINARY_SEARCH
for (j=0; j < c->entries; ++j)
if (lengths[j] > STB_VORBIS_FAST_HUFFMAN_LENGTH && lengths[j] != NO_CODE)
++sorted_count;
#endif
}
c->sorted_entries = sorted_count;
values = NULL;
CHECK(f);
if (!c->sparse) {
c->codewords = (uint32 *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(c->codewords[0]) * c->entries);
if (!c->codewords) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
} else {
unsigned int size;
if (c->sorted_entries) {
c->codeword_lengths = (uint8 *) setup_malloc(f, c->sorted_entries);
if (!c->codeword_lengths) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
c->codewords = (uint32 *) setup_temp_malloc(f, sizeof(*c->codewords) * c->sorted_entries);
if (!c->codewords) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
values = (uint32 *) setup_temp_malloc(f, sizeof(*values) * c->sorted_entries);
if (!values) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
}
size = c->entries + (sizeof(*c->codewords) + sizeof(*values)) * c->sorted_entries;
if (size > f->setup_temp_memory_required)
f->setup_temp_memory_required = size;
}
if (!compute_codewords(c, lengths, c->entries, values)) {
if (c->sparse) setup_temp_free(f, values, 0);
return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
if (c->sorted_entries) {
c->sorted_codewords = (uint32 *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(*c->sorted_codewords) * (c->sorted_entries+1));
if (c->sorted_codewords == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
c->sorted_values = ( int *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(*c->sorted_values ) * (c->sorted_entries+1));
if (c->sorted_values == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
++c->sorted_values;
c->sorted_values[-1] = -1;
compute_sorted_huffman(c, lengths, values);
}
if (c->sparse) {
setup_temp_free(f, values, sizeof(*values)*c->sorted_entries);
setup_temp_free(f, c->codewords, sizeof(*c->codewords)*c->sorted_entries);
setup_temp_free(f, lengths, c->entries);
c->codewords = NULL;
}
compute_accelerated_huffman(c);
CHECK(f);
c->lookup_type = get_bits(f, 4);
if (c->lookup_type > 2) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (c->lookup_type > 0) {
uint16 *mults;
c->minimum_value = float32_unpack(get_bits(f, 32));
c->delta_value = float32_unpack(get_bits(f, 32));
c->value_bits = get_bits(f, 4)+1;
c->sequence_p = get_bits(f,1);
if (c->lookup_type == 1) {
c->lookup_values = lookup1_values(c->entries, c->dimensions);
} else {
c->lookup_values = c->entries * c->dimensions;
}
if (c->lookup_values == 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
mults = (uint16 *) setup_temp_malloc(f, sizeof(mults[0]) * c->lookup_values);
if (mults == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
for (j=0; j < (int) c->lookup_values; ++j) {
int q = get_bits(f, c->value_bits);
if (q == EOP) { setup_temp_free(f,mults,sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values); return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup); }
mults[j] = q;
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_CODEBOOK
if (c->lookup_type == 1) {
int len, sparse = c->sparse;
float last=0;
if (sparse) {
if (c->sorted_entries == 0) goto skip;
c->multiplicands = (codetype *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(c->multiplicands[0]) * c->sorted_entries * c->dimensions);
} else
c->multiplicands = (codetype *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(c->multiplicands[0]) * c->entries * c->dimensions);
if (c->multiplicands == NULL) { setup_temp_free(f,mults,sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values); return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem); }
len = sparse ? c->sorted_entries : c->entries;
for (j=0; j < len; ++j) {
unsigned int z = sparse ? c->sorted_values[j] : j;
unsigned int div=1;
for (k=0; k < c->dimensions; ++k) {
int off = (z / div) % c->lookup_values;
float val = mults[off];
val = mults[off]*c->delta_value + c->minimum_value + last;
c->multiplicands[j*c->dimensions + k] = val;
if (c->sequence_p)
last = val;
if (k+1 < c->dimensions) {
if (div > UINT_MAX / (unsigned int) c->lookup_values) {
setup_temp_free(f, mults,sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values);
return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
div *= c->lookup_values;
}
}
}
c->lookup_type = 2;
}
else
#endif
{
float last=0;
CHECK(f);
c->multiplicands = (codetype *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(c->multiplicands[0]) * c->lookup_values);
if (c->multiplicands == NULL) { setup_temp_free(f, mults,sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values); return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem); }
for (j=0; j < (int) c->lookup_values; ++j) {
float val = mults[j] * c->delta_value + c->minimum_value + last;
c->multiplicands[j] = val;
if (c->sequence_p)
last = val;
}
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_CODEBOOK
skip:;
#endif
setup_temp_free(f, mults, sizeof(mults[0])*c->lookup_values);
CHECK(f);
}
CHECK(f);
}
x = get_bits(f, 6) + 1;
for (i=0; i < x; ++i) {
uint32 z = get_bits(f, 16);
if (z != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
f->floor_count = get_bits(f, 6)+1;
f->floor_config = (Floor *) setup_malloc(f, f->floor_count * sizeof(*f->floor_config));
if (f->floor_config == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
for (i=0; i < f->floor_count; ++i) {
f->floor_types[i] = get_bits(f, 16);
if (f->floor_types[i] > 1) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (f->floor_types[i] == 0) {
Floor0 *g = &f->floor_config[i].floor0;
g->order = get_bits(f,8);
g->rate = get_bits(f,16);
g->bark_map_size = get_bits(f,16);
g->amplitude_bits = get_bits(f,6);
g->amplitude_offset = get_bits(f,8);
g->number_of_books = get_bits(f,4) + 1;
for (j=0; j < g->number_of_books; ++j)
g->book_list[j] = get_bits(f,8);
return error(f, VORBIS_feature_not_supported);
} else {
stbv__floor_ordering p[31*8+2];
Floor1 *g = &f->floor_config[i].floor1;
int max_class = -1;
g->partitions = get_bits(f, 5);
for (j=0; j < g->partitions; ++j) {
g->partition_class_list[j] = get_bits(f, 4);
if (g->partition_class_list[j] > max_class)
max_class = g->partition_class_list[j];
}
for (j=0; j <= max_class; ++j) {
g->class_dimensions[j] = get_bits(f, 3)+1;
g->class_subclasses[j] = get_bits(f, 2);
if (g->class_subclasses[j]) {
g->class_masterbooks[j] = get_bits(f, 8);
if (g->class_masterbooks[j] >= f->codebook_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
for (k=0; k < 1 << g->class_subclasses[j]; ++k) {
g->subclass_books[j][k] = get_bits(f,8)-1;
if (g->subclass_books[j][k] >= f->codebook_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
}
g->floor1_multiplier = get_bits(f,2)+1;
g->rangebits = get_bits(f,4);
g->Xlist[0] = 0;
g->Xlist[1] = 1 << g->rangebits;
g->values = 2;
for (j=0; j < g->partitions; ++j) {
int c = g->partition_class_list[j];
for (k=0; k < g->class_dimensions[c]; ++k) {
g->Xlist[g->values] = get_bits(f, g->rangebits);
++g->values;
}
}
for (j=0; j < g->values; ++j) {
p[j].x = g->Xlist[j];
p[j].id = j;
}
qsort(p, g->values, sizeof(p[0]), point_compare);
for (j=0; j < g->values; ++j)
g->sorted_order[j] = (uint8) p[j].id;
for (j=2; j < g->values; ++j) {
int low,hi;
neighbors(g->Xlist, j, &low,&hi);
g->neighbors[j][0] = low;
g->neighbors[j][1] = hi;
}
if (g->values > longest_floorlist)
longest_floorlist = g->values;
}
}
f->residue_count = get_bits(f, 6)+1;
f->residue_config = (Residue *) setup_malloc(f, f->residue_count * sizeof(f->residue_config[0]));
if (f->residue_config == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memset(f->residue_config, 0, f->residue_count * sizeof(f->residue_config[0]));
for (i=0; i < f->residue_count; ++i) {
uint8 residue_cascade[64];
Residue *r = f->residue_config+i;
f->residue_types[i] = get_bits(f, 16);
if (f->residue_types[i] > 2) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
r->begin = get_bits(f, 24);
r->end = get_bits(f, 24);
if (r->end < r->begin) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
r->part_size = get_bits(f,24)+1;
r->classifications = get_bits(f,6)+1;
r->classbook = get_bits(f,8);
if (r->classbook >= f->codebook_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
for (j=0; j < r->classifications; ++j) {
uint8 high_bits=0;
uint8 low_bits=get_bits(f,3);
if (get_bits(f,1))
high_bits = get_bits(f,5);
residue_cascade[j] = high_bits*8 + low_bits;
}
r->residue_books = (short (*)[8]) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(r->residue_books[0]) * r->classifications);
if (r->residue_books == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
for (j=0; j < r->classifications; ++j) {
for (k=0; k < 8; ++k) {
if (residue_cascade[j] & (1 << k)) {
r->residue_books[j][k] = get_bits(f, 8);
if (r->residue_books[j][k] >= f->codebook_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
} else {
r->residue_books[j][k] = -1;
}
}
}
r->classdata = (uint8 **) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(*r->classdata) * f->codebooks[r->classbook].entries);
if (!r->classdata) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memset(r->classdata, 0, sizeof(*r->classdata) * f->codebooks[r->classbook].entries);
for (j=0; j < f->codebooks[r->classbook].entries; ++j) {
int classwords = f->codebooks[r->classbook].dimensions;
int temp = j;
r->classdata[j] = (uint8 *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(r->classdata[j][0]) * classwords);
if (r->classdata[j] == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
for (k=classwords-1; k >= 0; --k) {
r->classdata[j][k] = temp % r->classifications;
temp /= r->classifications;
}
}
}
f->mapping_count = get_bits(f,6)+1;
f->mapping = (Mapping *) setup_malloc(f, f->mapping_count * sizeof(*f->mapping));
if (f->mapping == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memset(f->mapping, 0, f->mapping_count * sizeof(*f->mapping));
for (i=0; i < f->mapping_count; ++i) {
Mapping *m = f->mapping + i;
int mapping_type = get_bits(f,16);
if (mapping_type != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
m->chan = (MappingChannel *) setup_malloc(f, f->channels * sizeof(*m->chan));
if (m->chan == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
if (get_bits(f,1))
m->submaps = get_bits(f,4)+1;
else
m->submaps = 1;
if (m->submaps > max_submaps)
max_submaps = m->submaps;
if (get_bits(f,1)) {
m->coupling_steps = get_bits(f,8)+1;
for (k=0; k < m->coupling_steps; ++k) {
m->chan[k].magnitude = get_bits(f, ilog(f->channels-1));
m->chan[k].angle = get_bits(f, ilog(f->channels-1));
if (m->chan[k].magnitude >= f->channels) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->chan[k].angle >= f->channels) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->chan[k].magnitude == m->chan[k].angle) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
} else
m->coupling_steps = 0;
if (get_bits(f,2)) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->submaps > 1) {
for (j=0; j < f->channels; ++j) {
m->chan[j].mux = get_bits(f, 4);
if (m->chan[j].mux >= m->submaps) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
} else
for (j=0; j < f->channels; ++j)
m->chan[j].mux = 0;
for (j=0; j < m->submaps; ++j) {
get_bits(f,8); // discard
m->submap_floor[j] = get_bits(f,8);
m->submap_residue[j] = get_bits(f,8);
if (m->submap_floor[j] >= f->floor_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->submap_residue[j] >= f->residue_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
}
f->mode_count = get_bits(f, 6)+1;
for (i=0; i < f->mode_count; ++i) {
Mode *m = f->mode_config+i;
m->blockflag = get_bits(f,1);
m->windowtype = get_bits(f,16);
m->transformtype = get_bits(f,16);
m->mapping = get_bits(f,8);
if (m->windowtype != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->transformtype != 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
if (m->mapping >= f->mapping_count) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_setup);
}
flush_packet(f);
f->previous_length = 0;
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i) {
f->channel_buffers[i] = (float *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(float) * f->blocksize_1);
f->previous_window[i] = (float *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(float) * f->blocksize_1/2);
f->finalY[i] = (int16 *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(int16) * longest_floorlist);
if (f->channel_buffers[i] == NULL || f->previous_window[i] == NULL || f->finalY[i] == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
memset(f->channel_buffers[i], 0, sizeof(float) * f->blocksize_1);
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_NO_DEFER_FLOOR
f->floor_buffers[i] = (float *) setup_malloc(f, sizeof(float) * f->blocksize_1/2);
if (f->floor_buffers[i] == NULL) return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
#endif
}
if (!init_blocksize(f, 0, f->blocksize_0)) return FALSE;
if (!init_blocksize(f, 1, f->blocksize_1)) return FALSE;
f->blocksize[0] = f->blocksize_0;
f->blocksize[1] = f->blocksize_1;
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDE_TABLE
if (integer_divide_table[1][1]==0)
for (i=0; i < DIVTAB_NUMER; ++i)
for (j=1; j < DIVTAB_DENOM; ++j)
integer_divide_table[i][j] = i / j;
#endif
{
uint32 imdct_mem = (f->blocksize_1 * sizeof(float) >> 1);
uint32 classify_mem;
int i,max_part_read=0;
for (i=0; i < f->residue_count; ++i) {
Residue *r = f->residue_config + i;
unsigned int actual_size = f->blocksize_1 / 2;
unsigned int limit_r_begin = r->begin < actual_size ? r->begin : actual_size;
unsigned int limit_r_end = r->end < actual_size ? r->end : actual_size;
int n_read = limit_r_end - limit_r_begin;
int part_read = n_read / r->part_size;
if (part_read > max_part_read)
max_part_read = part_read;
}
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_RESIDUE
classify_mem = f->channels * (sizeof(void*) + max_part_read * sizeof(uint8 *));
#else
classify_mem = f->channels * (sizeof(void*) + max_part_read * sizeof(int *));
#endif
f->temp_memory_required = classify_mem;
if (imdct_mem > f->temp_memory_required)
f->temp_memory_required = imdct_mem;
}
f->first_decode = TRUE;
if (f->alloc.alloc_buffer) {
assert(f->temp_offset == f->alloc.alloc_buffer_length_in_bytes);
if (f->setup_offset + sizeof(*f) + f->temp_memory_required > (unsigned) f->temp_offset)
return error(f, VORBIS_outofmem);
}
f->first_audio_page_offset = stb_vorbis_get_file_offset(f);
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A reachable assertion in the lookup1_values function in stb_vorbis through 2019-03-04 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by opening a crafted Ogg Vorbis file.
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point()
|
Medium
| 169,617
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct rmap_item *scan_get_next_rmap_item(struct page **page)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct mm_slot *slot;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct rmap_item *rmap_item;
if (list_empty(&ksm_mm_head.mm_list))
return NULL;
slot = ksm_scan.mm_slot;
if (slot == &ksm_mm_head) {
/*
* A number of pages can hang around indefinitely on per-cpu
* pagevecs, raised page count preventing write_protect_page
* from merging them. Though it doesn't really matter much,
* it is puzzling to see some stuck in pages_volatile until
* other activity jostles them out, and they also prevented
* LTP's KSM test from succeeding deterministically; so drain
* them here (here rather than on entry to ksm_do_scan(),
* so we don't IPI too often when pages_to_scan is set low).
*/
lru_add_drain_all();
root_unstable_tree = RB_ROOT;
spin_lock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next, struct mm_slot, mm_list);
ksm_scan.mm_slot = slot;
spin_unlock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
next_mm:
ksm_scan.address = 0;
ksm_scan.rmap_list = &slot->rmap_list;
}
mm = slot->mm;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (ksm_test_exit(mm))
vma = NULL;
else
vma = find_vma(mm, ksm_scan.address);
for (; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MERGEABLE))
continue;
if (ksm_scan.address < vma->vm_start)
ksm_scan.address = vma->vm_start;
if (!vma->anon_vma)
ksm_scan.address = vma->vm_end;
while (ksm_scan.address < vma->vm_end) {
if (ksm_test_exit(mm))
break;
*page = follow_page(vma, ksm_scan.address, FOLL_GET);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*page)) {
ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE;
cond_resched();
continue;
}
if (PageAnon(*page) ||
page_trans_compound_anon(*page)) {
flush_anon_page(vma, *page, ksm_scan.address);
flush_dcache_page(*page);
rmap_item = get_next_rmap_item(slot,
ksm_scan.rmap_list, ksm_scan.address);
if (rmap_item) {
ksm_scan.rmap_list =
&rmap_item->rmap_list;
ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE;
} else
put_page(*page);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return rmap_item;
}
put_page(*page);
ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE;
cond_resched();
}
}
if (ksm_test_exit(mm)) {
ksm_scan.address = 0;
ksm_scan.rmap_list = &slot->rmap_list;
}
/*
* Nuke all the rmap_items that are above this current rmap:
* because there were no VM_MERGEABLE vmas with such addresses.
*/
remove_trailing_rmap_items(slot, ksm_scan.rmap_list);
spin_lock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
ksm_scan.mm_slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next,
struct mm_slot, mm_list);
if (ksm_scan.address == 0) {
/*
* We've completed a full scan of all vmas, holding mmap_sem
* throughout, and found no VM_MERGEABLE: so do the same as
* __ksm_exit does to remove this mm from all our lists now.
* This applies either when cleaning up after __ksm_exit
* (but beware: we can reach here even before __ksm_exit),
* or when all VM_MERGEABLE areas have been unmapped (and
* mmap_sem then protects against race with MADV_MERGEABLE).
*/
hlist_del(&slot->link);
list_del(&slot->mm_list);
spin_unlock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
free_mm_slot(slot);
clear_bit(MMF_VM_MERGEABLE, &mm->flags);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmdrop(mm);
} else {
spin_unlock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
/* Repeat until we've completed scanning the whole list */
slot = ksm_scan.mm_slot;
if (slot != &ksm_mm_head)
goto next_mm;
ksm_scan.seqnr++;
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the scan_get_next_rmap_item function in mm/ksm.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.3, when Kernel SamePage Merging (KSM) is enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ksm: fix NULL pointer dereference in scan_get_next_rmap_item()
Andrea Righi reported a case where an exiting task can race against
ksmd::scan_get_next_rmap_item (http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/6/1/742) easily
triggering a NULL pointer dereference in ksmd.
ksm_scan.mm_slot == &ksm_mm_head with only one registered mm
CPU 1 (__ksm_exit) CPU 2 (scan_get_next_rmap_item)
list_empty() is false
lock slot == &ksm_mm_head
list_del(slot->mm_list)
(list now empty)
unlock
lock
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next)
(list is empty, so slot is still ksm_mm_head)
unlock
slot->mm == NULL ... Oops
Close this race by revalidating that the new slot is not simply the list
head again.
Andrea's test case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define BUFSIZE getpagesize()
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
void *ptr;
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, getpagesize(), BUFSIZE) < 0) {
perror("posix_memalign");
exit(1);
}
if (madvise(ptr, BUFSIZE, MADV_MERGEABLE) < 0) {
perror("madvise");
exit(1);
}
*(char *)NULL = 0;
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
High
| 165,871
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ChromePluginServiceFilter::IsPluginEnabled(
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const void* context,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& policy_url,
webkit::WebPluginInfo* plugin) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
const ProcessDetails* details = GetProcess(render_process_id);
if (details) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < details->overridden_plugins.size(); ++i) {
if (details->overridden_plugins[i].render_view_id == render_view_id &&
(details->overridden_plugins[i].url == url ||
details->overridden_plugins[i].url.is_empty())) {
bool use = details->overridden_plugins[i].plugin.path == plugin->path;
if (!use)
return false;
*plugin = details->overridden_plugins[i].plugin;
break;
}
}
}
ResourceContextMap::iterator prefs_it =
resource_context_map_.find(context);
if (prefs_it == resource_context_map_.end())
return false;
PluginPrefs* plugin_prefs = prefs_it->second.get();
if (!plugin_prefs->IsPluginEnabled(*plugin))
return false;
RestrictedPluginMap::const_iterator it =
restricted_plugins_.find(plugin->path);
if (it != restricted_plugins_.end()) {
if (it->second.first != plugin_prefs)
return false;
const GURL& origin = it->second.second;
if (!origin.is_empty() &&
(policy_url.scheme() != origin.scheme() ||
policy_url.host() != origin.host() ||
policy_url.port() != origin.port())) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 does not properly manage the interaction between the browser process and renderer processes during authorization of the loading of a plug-in, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via vectors involving a blocked plug-in.
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,470
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int jffs2_do_setattr (struct inode *inode, struct iattr *iattr)
{
struct jffs2_full_dnode *old_metadata, *new_metadata;
struct jffs2_inode_info *f = JFFS2_INODE_INFO(inode);
struct jffs2_sb_info *c = JFFS2_SB_INFO(inode->i_sb);
struct jffs2_raw_inode *ri;
union jffs2_device_node dev;
unsigned char *mdata = NULL;
int mdatalen = 0;
unsigned int ivalid;
uint32_t alloclen;
int ret;
D1(printk(KERN_DEBUG "jffs2_setattr(): ino #%lu\n", inode->i_ino));
ret = inode_change_ok(inode, iattr);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Special cases - we don't want more than one data node
for these types on the medium at any time. So setattr
/* Special cases - we don't want more than one data node
for these types on the medium at any time. So setattr
must read the original data associated with the node
(i.e. the device numbers or the target name) and write
it out again with the appropriate data attached */
if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode)) {
/* For these, we don't actually need to read the old node */
mdatalen = jffs2_encode_dev(&dev, inode->i_rdev);
mdata = (char *)&dev;
D1(printk(KERN_DEBUG "jffs2_setattr(): Writing %d bytes of kdev_t\n", mdatalen));
} else if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
down(&f->sem);
mdatalen = f->metadata->size;
mdata = kmalloc(f->metadata->size, GFP_USER);
if (!mdata) {
up(&f->sem);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ret = jffs2_read_dnode(c, f, f->metadata, mdata, 0, mdatalen);
if (ret) {
up(&f->sem);
kfree(mdata);
return ret;
}
up(&f->sem);
D1(printk(KERN_DEBUG "jffs2_setattr(): Writing %d bytes of symlink target\n", mdatalen));
}
ri = jffs2_alloc_raw_inode();
if (!ri) {
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
kfree(mdata);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ret = jffs2_reserve_space(c, sizeof(*ri) + mdatalen, &alloclen,
ALLOC_NORMAL, JFFS2_SUMMARY_INODE_SIZE);
if (ret) {
jffs2_free_raw_inode(ri);
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode & S_IFMT))
kfree(mdata);
return ret;
}
down(&f->sem);
ivalid = iattr->ia_valid;
ri->magic = cpu_to_je16(JFFS2_MAGIC_BITMASK);
ri->nodetype = cpu_to_je16(JFFS2_NODETYPE_INODE);
ri->totlen = cpu_to_je32(sizeof(*ri) + mdatalen);
ri->hdr_crc = cpu_to_je32(crc32(0, ri, sizeof(struct jffs2_unknown_node)-4));
ri->ino = cpu_to_je32(inode->i_ino);
ri->version = cpu_to_je32(++f->highest_version);
ri->uid = cpu_to_je16((ivalid & ATTR_UID)?iattr->ia_uid:inode->i_uid);
ri->gid = cpu_to_je16((ivalid & ATTR_GID)?iattr->ia_gid:inode->i_gid);
if (ivalid & ATTR_MODE)
if (iattr->ia_mode & S_ISGID &&
!in_group_p(je16_to_cpu(ri->gid)) && !capable(CAP_FSETID))
ri->mode = cpu_to_jemode(iattr->ia_mode & ~S_ISGID);
else
ri->mode = cpu_to_jemode(iattr->ia_mode);
else
ri->mode = cpu_to_jemode(inode->i_mode);
ri->isize = cpu_to_je32((ivalid & ATTR_SIZE)?iattr->ia_size:inode->i_size);
ri->atime = cpu_to_je32(I_SEC((ivalid & ATTR_ATIME)?iattr->ia_atime:inode->i_atime));
ri->mtime = cpu_to_je32(I_SEC((ivalid & ATTR_MTIME)?iattr->ia_mtime:inode->i_mtime));
ri->ctime = cpu_to_je32(I_SEC((ivalid & ATTR_CTIME)?iattr->ia_ctime:inode->i_ctime));
ri->offset = cpu_to_je32(0);
ri->csize = ri->dsize = cpu_to_je32(mdatalen);
ri->compr = JFFS2_COMPR_NONE;
if (ivalid & ATTR_SIZE && inode->i_size < iattr->ia_size) {
/* It's an extension. Make it a hole node */
ri->compr = JFFS2_COMPR_ZERO;
ri->dsize = cpu_to_je32(iattr->ia_size - inode->i_size);
ri->offset = cpu_to_je32(inode->i_size);
}
ri->node_crc = cpu_to_je32(crc32(0, ri, sizeof(*ri)-8));
if (mdatalen)
ri->data_crc = cpu_to_je32(crc32(0, mdata, mdatalen));
else
ri->data_crc = cpu_to_je32(0);
new_metadata = jffs2_write_dnode(c, f, ri, mdata, mdatalen, ALLOC_NORMAL);
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
kfree(mdata);
if (IS_ERR(new_metadata)) {
jffs2_complete_reservation(c);
jffs2_free_raw_inode(ri);
up(&f->sem);
return PTR_ERR(new_metadata);
}
/* It worked. Update the inode */
inode->i_atime = ITIME(je32_to_cpu(ri->atime));
inode->i_ctime = ITIME(je32_to_cpu(ri->ctime));
inode->i_mtime = ITIME(je32_to_cpu(ri->mtime));
inode->i_mode = jemode_to_cpu(ri->mode);
inode->i_uid = je16_to_cpu(ri->uid);
inode->i_gid = je16_to_cpu(ri->gid);
old_metadata = f->metadata;
if (ivalid & ATTR_SIZE && inode->i_size > iattr->ia_size)
jffs2_truncate_fragtree (c, &f->fragtree, iattr->ia_size);
if (ivalid & ATTR_SIZE && inode->i_size < iattr->ia_size) {
jffs2_add_full_dnode_to_inode(c, f, new_metadata);
inode->i_size = iattr->ia_size;
f->metadata = NULL;
} else {
f->metadata = new_metadata;
}
if (old_metadata) {
jffs2_mark_node_obsolete(c, old_metadata->raw);
jffs2_free_full_dnode(old_metadata);
}
jffs2_free_raw_inode(ri);
up(&f->sem);
jffs2_complete_reservation(c);
/* We have to do the vmtruncate() without f->sem held, since
some pages may be locked and waiting for it in readpage().
We are protected from a simultaneous write() extending i_size
back past iattr->ia_size, because do_truncate() holds the
generic inode semaphore. */
if (ivalid & ATTR_SIZE && inode->i_size > iattr->ia_size)
vmtruncate(inode, iattr->ia_size);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: JFFS2, as used on One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) build 542 and possibly other Linux systems, when POSIX ACL support is enabled, does not properly store permissions during (1) inode creation or (2) ACL setting, which might allow local users to access restricted files or directories after a remount of a filesystem, related to "legacy modes" and an inconsistency between dentry permissions and inode permissions.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,657
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BOOL rdp_decrypt(rdpRdp* rdp, STREAM* s, int length, UINT16 securityFlags)
{
BYTE cmac[8];
BYTE wmac[8];
if (rdp->settings->EncryptionMethods == ENCRYPTION_METHOD_FIPS)
{
UINT16 len;
BYTE version, pad;
BYTE* sig;
if (stream_get_left(s) < 12)
return FALSE;
stream_read_UINT16(s, len); /* 0x10 */
stream_read_BYTE(s, version); /* 0x1 */
stream_read_BYTE(s, pad);
sig = s->p;
stream_seek(s, 8); /* signature */
length -= 12;
if (!security_fips_decrypt(s->p, length, rdp))
{
printf("FATAL: cannot decrypt\n");
return FALSE; /* TODO */
}
if (!security_fips_check_signature(s->p, length - pad, sig, rdp))
{
printf("FATAL: invalid packet signature\n");
return FALSE; /* TODO */
}
/* is this what needs adjusting? */
s->size -= pad;
return TRUE;
}
if (stream_get_left(s) < 8)
return FALSE;
stream_read(s, wmac, sizeof(wmac));
length -= sizeof(wmac);
security_decrypt(s->p, length, rdp);
if (securityFlags & SEC_SECURE_CHECKSUM)
security_salted_mac_signature(rdp, s->p, length, FALSE, cmac);
else
security_mac_signature(rdp, s->p, length, cmac);
if (memcmp(wmac, cmac, sizeof(wmac)) != 0)
{
printf("WARNING: invalid packet signature\n");
/*
* Because Standard RDP Security is totally broken,
* and cannot protect against MITM, don't treat signature
* verification failure as critical. This at least enables
* us to work with broken RDP clients and servers that
* generate invalid signatures.
*/
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: FreeRDP before 1.1.0-beta1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
|
Low
| 167,606
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __init xfrm6_tunnel_spi_init(void)
{
xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem = kmem_cache_create("xfrm6_tunnel_spi",
sizeof(struct xfrm6_tunnel_spi),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN,
NULL);
if (!xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The tunnels implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34, when tunnel functionality is configured as a module, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending a packet during module loading.
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,882
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BufferQueueConsumer::dump(String8& result, const char* prefix) const {
mCore->dump(result, prefix);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libs/gui/BufferQueueConsumer.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for the android.permission.DUMP permission, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via a dump request, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27046057.
Commit Message: BQ: Add permission check to BufferQueueConsumer::dump
Bug 27046057
Change-Id: Id7bd8cf95045b497943ea39dde49e877aa6f5c4e
|
Low
| 174,232
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ChromeDownloadDelegate::RequestHTTPGetDownload(
const std::string& url,
const std::string& user_agent,
const std::string& content_disposition,
const std::string& mime_type,
const std::string& cookie,
const std::string& referer,
const base::string16& file_name,
int64_t content_length,
bool has_user_gesture,
bool must_download) {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jurl =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, url);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> juser_agent =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, user_agent);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jcontent_disposition =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, content_disposition);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jmime_type =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, mime_type);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jcookie =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, cookie);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jreferer =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, referer);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jfilename =
base::android::ConvertUTF16ToJavaString(env, file_name);
Java_ChromeDownloadDelegate_requestHttpGetDownload(
env, java_ref_, jurl, juser_agent, jcontent_disposition, jmime_type,
jcookie, jreferer, has_user_gesture, jfilename, content_length,
must_download);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The UnescapeURLWithAdjustmentsImpl implementation in net/base/escape.cc in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85 does not prevent display of Unicode LOCK characters in the omnibox, which makes it easier for remote attackers to spoof the SSL lock icon by placing one of these characters at the end of a URL, as demonstrated by the omnibox in localizations for right-to-left languages.
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
|
Low
| 171,880
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BlobURLRequestJob::CountSize() {
error_ = false;
pending_get_file_info_count_ = 0;
total_size_ = 0;
item_length_list_.resize(blob_data_->items().size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < blob_data_->items().size(); ++i) {
const BlobData::Item& item = blob_data_->items().at(i);
if (IsFileType(item.type())) {
++pending_get_file_info_count_;
GetFileStreamReader(i)->GetLength(
base::Bind(&BlobURLRequestJob::DidGetFileItemLength,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), i));
continue;
}
int64 item_length = static_cast<int64>(item.length());
item_length_list_[i] = item_length;
total_size_ += item_length;
}
if (pending_get_file_info_count_ == 0)
DidCountSize(net::OK);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a blob.
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,398
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: struct nfs_open_context *nfs_find_open_context(struct inode *inode, struct rpc_cred *cred, int mode)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(inode);
struct nfs_open_context *pos, *ctx = NULL;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
list_for_each_entry(pos, &nfsi->open_files, list) {
if (cred != NULL && pos->cred != cred)
continue;
if ((pos->mode & mode) == mode) {
ctx = get_nfs_open_context(pos);
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return ctx;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,682
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlBufCreateStatic(void *mem, size_t size) {
xmlBufPtr ret;
if ((mem == NULL) || (size == 0))
return(NULL);
ret = (xmlBufPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlBuf));
if (ret == NULL) {
xmlBufMemoryError(NULL, "creating buffer");
return(NULL);
}
if (size < INT_MAX) {
ret->compat_use = size;
ret->compat_size = size;
} else {
ret->compat_use = INT_MAX;
ret->compat_size = INT_MAX;
}
ret->use = size;
ret->size = size;
ret->alloc = XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE;
ret->content = (xmlChar *) mem;
ret->error = 0;
ret->buffer = NULL;
return(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An integer overflow in xmlmemory.c in libxml2 before 2.9.5, as used in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 and other products, allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted XML file.
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
|
Medium
| 172,949
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WindowOpenDisposition BrowserView::GetDispositionForPopupBounds(
const gfx::Rect& bounds) {
return WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_POPUP;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A missing check for popup window handling in Fullscreen in Google Chrome on macOS prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
|
Medium
| 173,207
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, addFile)
{
char *fname, *localname = NULL;
size_t fname_len, localname_len = 0;
php_stream *resource;
zval zresource;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|s", &fname, &fname_len, &localname, &localname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
#if PHP_API_VERSION < 20100412
if (PG(safe_mode) && (!php_checkuid(fname, NULL, CHECKUID_ALLOW_ONLY_FILE))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0, "phar error: unable to open file \"%s\" to add to phar archive, safe_mode restrictions prevent this", fname);
return;
}
#endif
if (!strstr(fname, "://") && php_check_open_basedir(fname)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0, "phar error: unable to open file \"%s\" to add to phar archive, open_basedir restrictions prevent this", fname);
return;
}
if (!(resource = php_stream_open_wrapper(fname, "rb", 0, NULL))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0, "phar error: unable to open file \"%s\" to add to phar archive", fname);
return;
}
if (localname) {
fname = localname;
fname_len = localname_len;
}
php_stream_to_zval(resource, &zresource);
phar_add_file(&(phar_obj->archive), fname, fname_len, NULL, 0, &zresource);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zresource);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The Phar extension in PHP before 5.5.34, 5.6.x before 5.6.20, and 7.x before 7.0.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted filename, as demonstrated by mishandling of \0 characters by the phar_analyze_path function in ext/phar/phar.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,070
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PlatformSensorProviderBase::FreeResourcesIfNeeded() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (sensor_map_.empty() && requests_map_.empty()) {
FreeResources();
shared_buffer_handle_.reset();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,840
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void DragController::PerformDrag(DragData* drag_data, LocalFrame& local_root) {
DCHECK(drag_data);
document_under_mouse_ =
local_root.DocumentAtPoint(LayoutPoint(drag_data->ClientPosition()));
std::unique_ptr<UserGestureIndicator> gesture = Frame::NotifyUserActivation(
document_under_mouse_ ? document_under_mouse_->GetFrame() : nullptr,
UserGestureToken::kNewGesture);
if ((drag_destination_action_ & kDragDestinationActionDHTML) &&
document_is_handling_drag_) {
bool prevented_default = false;
if (local_root.View()) {
DataTransfer* data_transfer =
CreateDraggingDataTransfer(kDataTransferReadable, drag_data);
data_transfer->SetSourceOperation(
drag_data->DraggingSourceOperationMask());
EventHandler& event_handler = local_root.GetEventHandler();
prevented_default = event_handler.PerformDragAndDrop(
CreateMouseEvent(drag_data), data_transfer) !=
WebInputEventResult::kNotHandled;
if (!prevented_default) {
const LayoutPoint point = local_root.View()->RootFrameToContents(
LayoutPoint(drag_data->ClientPosition()));
const HitTestResult result = event_handler.HitTestResultAtPoint(point);
prevented_default |=
IsHTMLPlugInElement(*result.InnerNode()) &&
ToHTMLPlugInElement(result.InnerNode())->CanProcessDrag();
}
data_transfer->SetAccessPolicy(kDataTransferNumb);
}
if (prevented_default) {
document_under_mouse_ = nullptr;
CancelDrag();
return;
}
}
if ((drag_destination_action_ & kDragDestinationActionEdit) &&
ConcludeEditDrag(drag_data)) {
document_under_mouse_ = nullptr;
return;
}
document_under_mouse_ = nullptr;
if (OperationForLoad(drag_data, local_root) != kDragOperationNone) {
if (page_->GetSettings().GetNavigateOnDragDrop()) {
ResourceRequest resource_request(drag_data->AsURL());
resource_request.SetRequestorOrigin(
SecurityOrigin::Create(KURL(drag_data->AsURL())));
page_->MainFrame()->Navigate(FrameLoadRequest(nullptr, resource_request));
}
local_root.GetEventHandler().ClearDragState();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An integer overflow leading to an incorrect capacity of a buffer in JavaScript in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
|
Medium
| 173,033
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML(const String& where, const String& markup, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment = document()->createDocumentFragment();
Element* contextElement = contextElementForInsertion(where, this, ec);
if (!contextElement)
return;
if (document()->isHTMLDocument())
fragment->parseHTML(markup, contextElement);
else {
if (!fragment->parseXML(markup, contextElement))
return;
}
insertAdjacent(where, fragment.get(), ec);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not prevent calls to functions in other frames, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site, related to a *cross-frame function leak.*
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,440
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool TextureManager::TextureInfo::ValidForTexture(
GLint face,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLenum type) const {
size_t face_index = GLTargetToFaceIndex(face);
if (level >= 0 && face_index < level_infos_.size() &&
static_cast<size_t>(level) < level_infos_[face_index].size()) {
const LevelInfo& info = level_infos_[GLTargetToFaceIndex(face)][level];
GLint right;
GLint top;
return SafeAdd(xoffset, width, &right) &&
SafeAdd(yoffset, height, &top) &&
xoffset >= 0 &&
yoffset >= 0 &&
right <= info.width &&
top <= info.height &&
format == info.internal_format &&
type == info.type;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the WebGL implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 on Mac OS X allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,752
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BITMAP_UPDATE* update_read_bitmap_update(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s)
{
UINT32 i;
BITMAP_UPDATE* bitmapUpdate = calloc(1, sizeof(BITMAP_UPDATE));
if (!bitmapUpdate)
goto fail;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 2)
goto fail;
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapUpdate->number); /* numberRectangles (2 bytes) */
WLog_Print(update->log, WLOG_TRACE, "BitmapUpdate: %"PRIu32"", bitmapUpdate->number);
if (bitmapUpdate->number > bitmapUpdate->count)
{
UINT16 count;
BITMAP_DATA* newdata;
count = bitmapUpdate->number * 2;
newdata = (BITMAP_DATA*) realloc(bitmapUpdate->rectangles,
sizeof(BITMAP_DATA) * count);
if (!newdata)
goto fail;
bitmapUpdate->rectangles = newdata;
ZeroMemory(&bitmapUpdate->rectangles[bitmapUpdate->count],
sizeof(BITMAP_DATA) * (count - bitmapUpdate->count));
bitmapUpdate->count = count;
}
/* rectangles */
for (i = 0; i < bitmapUpdate->number; i++)
{
if (!update_read_bitmap_data(update, s, &bitmapUpdate->rectangles[i]))
goto fail;
}
return bitmapUpdate;
fail:
free_bitmap_update(update->context, bitmapUpdate);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains an Integer Truncation that leads to a Heap-Based Buffer Overflow in function update_read_bitmap_update() and results in a memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
Low
| 169,293
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void __udf_read_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct fileEntry *fe;
struct extendedFileEntry *efe;
uint16_t ident;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb);
unsigned int link_count;
/*
* Set defaults, but the inode is still incomplete!
* Note: get_new_inode() sets the following on a new inode:
* i_sb = sb
* i_no = ino
* i_flags = sb->s_flags
* i_state = 0
* clean_inode(): zero fills and sets
* i_count = 1
* i_nlink = 1
* i_op = NULL;
*/
bh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, &iinfo->i_location, 0, &ident);
if (!bh) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed !bh\n", inode->i_ino);
make_bad_inode(inode);
return;
}
if (ident != TAG_IDENT_FE && ident != TAG_IDENT_EFE &&
ident != TAG_IDENT_USE) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed ident=%d\n",
inode->i_ino, ident);
brelse(bh);
make_bad_inode(inode);
return;
}
fe = (struct fileEntry *)bh->b_data;
efe = (struct extendedFileEntry *)bh->b_data;
if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4096)) {
struct buffer_head *ibh;
ibh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, &iinfo->i_location, 1,
&ident);
if (ident == TAG_IDENT_IE && ibh) {
struct buffer_head *nbh = NULL;
struct kernel_lb_addr loc;
struct indirectEntry *ie;
ie = (struct indirectEntry *)ibh->b_data;
loc = lelb_to_cpu(ie->indirectICB.extLocation);
if (ie->indirectICB.extLength &&
(nbh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, &loc, 0,
&ident))) {
if (ident == TAG_IDENT_FE ||
ident == TAG_IDENT_EFE) {
memcpy(&iinfo->i_location,
&loc,
sizeof(struct kernel_lb_addr));
brelse(bh);
brelse(ibh);
brelse(nbh);
__udf_read_inode(inode);
return;
}
brelse(nbh);
}
}
brelse(ibh);
} else if (fe->icbTag.strategyType != cpu_to_le16(4)) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "unsupported strategy type: %d\n",
le16_to_cpu(fe->icbTag.strategyType));
brelse(bh);
make_bad_inode(inode);
return;
}
if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4))
iinfo->i_strat4096 = 0;
else /* if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4096)) */
iinfo->i_strat4096 = 1;
iinfo->i_alloc_type = le16_to_cpu(fe->icbTag.flags) &
ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_MASK;
iinfo->i_unique = 0;
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = 0;
iinfo->i_lenExtents = 0;
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = 0;
iinfo->i_next_alloc_block = 0;
iinfo->i_next_alloc_goal = 0;
if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_EFE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 1;
iinfo->i_use = 0;
if (udf_alloc_i_data(inode, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry))) {
make_bad_inode(inode);
return;
}
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry),
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry));
} else if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_FE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 0;
iinfo->i_use = 0;
if (udf_alloc_i_data(inode, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct fileEntry))) {
make_bad_inode(inode);
return;
}
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct fileEntry),
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - sizeof(struct fileEntry));
} else if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_USE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 0;
iinfo->i_use = 1;
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(
((struct unallocSpaceEntry *)bh->b_data)->
lengthAllocDescs);
if (udf_alloc_i_data(inode, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry))) {
make_bad_inode(inode);
return;
}
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry),
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry));
return;
}
read_lock(&sbi->s_cred_lock);
i_uid_write(inode, le32_to_cpu(fe->uid));
if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UID_IGNORE) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UID_SET))
inode->i_uid = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_uid;
i_gid_write(inode, le32_to_cpu(fe->gid));
if (!gid_valid(inode->i_gid) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_GID_IGNORE) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_GID_SET))
inode->i_gid = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_gid;
if (fe->icbTag.fileType != ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY &&
sbi->s_fmode != UDF_INVALID_MODE)
inode->i_mode = sbi->s_fmode;
else if (fe->icbTag.fileType == ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY &&
sbi->s_dmode != UDF_INVALID_MODE)
inode->i_mode = sbi->s_dmode;
else
inode->i_mode = udf_convert_permissions(fe);
inode->i_mode &= ~sbi->s_umask;
read_unlock(&sbi->s_cred_lock);
link_count = le16_to_cpu(fe->fileLinkCount);
if (!link_count)
link_count = 1;
set_nlink(inode, link_count);
inode->i_size = le64_to_cpu(fe->informationLength);
iinfo->i_lenExtents = inode->i_size;
if (iinfo->i_efe == 0) {
inode->i_blocks = le64_to_cpu(fe->logicalBlocksRecorded) <<
(inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9);
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_atime, fe->accessTime))
inode->i_atime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_mtime,
fe->modificationTime))
inode->i_mtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_ctime, fe->attrTime))
inode->i_ctime = sbi->s_record_time;
iinfo->i_unique = le64_to_cpu(fe->uniqueID);
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = le32_to_cpu(fe->lengthExtendedAttr);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(fe->lengthAllocDescs);
iinfo->i_checkpoint = le32_to_cpu(fe->checkpoint);
} else {
inode->i_blocks = le64_to_cpu(efe->logicalBlocksRecorded) <<
(inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9);
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_atime, efe->accessTime))
inode->i_atime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_mtime,
efe->modificationTime))
inode->i_mtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&iinfo->i_crtime, efe->createTime))
iinfo->i_crtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_ctime, efe->attrTime))
inode->i_ctime = sbi->s_record_time;
iinfo->i_unique = le64_to_cpu(efe->uniqueID);
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = le32_to_cpu(efe->lengthExtendedAttr);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(efe->lengthAllocDescs);
iinfo->i_checkpoint = le32_to_cpu(efe->checkpoint);
}
switch (fe->icbTag.fileType) {
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY:
inode->i_op = &udf_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &udf_dir_operations;
inode->i_mode |= S_IFDIR;
inc_nlink(inode);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_REALTIME:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_REGULAR:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_UNDEF:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_VAT20:
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB)
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_adinicb_aops;
else
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_aops;
inode->i_op = &udf_file_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &udf_file_operations;
inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_BLOCK:
inode->i_mode |= S_IFBLK;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_CHAR:
inode->i_mode |= S_IFCHR;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_FIFO:
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode | S_IFIFO, 0);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_SOCKET:
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode | S_IFSOCK, 0);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_SYMLINK:
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_symlink_aops;
inode->i_op = &udf_symlink_inode_operations;
inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_MAIN:
udf_debug("METADATA FILE-----\n");
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_MIRROR:
udf_debug("METADATA MIRROR FILE-----\n");
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_BITMAP:
udf_debug("METADATA BITMAP FILE-----\n");
break;
default:
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed unknown file type=%d\n",
inode->i_ino, fe->icbTag.fileType);
make_bad_inode(inode);
return;
}
if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) {
struct deviceSpec *dsea =
(struct deviceSpec *)udf_get_extendedattr(inode, 12, 1);
if (dsea) {
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode,
MKDEV(le32_to_cpu(dsea->majorDeviceIdent),
le32_to_cpu(dsea->minorDeviceIdent)));
/* Developer ID ??? */
} else
make_bad_inode(inode);
}
brelse(bh);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The __udf_read_inode function in fs/udf/inode.c in the Linux kernel through 3.16.3 does not restrict the amount of ICB indirection, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop or stack consumption) via a UDF filesystem with a crafted inode.
Commit Message: udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs
We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.
Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
|
Medium
| 166,266
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static unsigned long ioapic_read_indirect(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long length)
{
unsigned long result = 0;
switch (ioapic->ioregsel) {
case IOAPIC_REG_VERSION:
result = ((((IOAPIC_NUM_PINS - 1) & 0xff) << 16)
| (IOAPIC_VERSION_ID & 0xff));
break;
case IOAPIC_REG_APIC_ID:
case IOAPIC_REG_ARB_ID:
result = ((ioapic->id & 0xf) << 24);
break;
default:
{
u32 redir_index = (ioapic->ioregsel - 0x10) >> 1;
u64 redir_content;
ASSERT(redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS);
redir_content = ioapic->redirtbl[redir_index].bits;
result = (ioapic->ioregsel & 0x1) ?
(redir_content >> 32) & 0xffffffff :
redir_content & 0xffffffff;
break;
}
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ioapic_read_indirect function in virt/kvm/ioapic.c in the Linux kernel through 3.8.4 does not properly handle a certain combination of invalid IOAPIC_REG_SELECT and IOAPIC_REG_WINDOW operations, which allows guest OS users to obtain sensitive information from host OS memory or cause a denial of service (host OS OOPS) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)
If the guest specifies a IOAPIC_REG_SELECT with an invalid value and follows
that with a read of the IOAPIC_REG_WINDOW KVM does not properly validate
that request. ioapic_read_indirect contains an
ASSERT(redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS), but the ASSERT has no effect in
non-debug builds. In recent kernels this allows a guest to cause a kernel
oops by reading invalid memory. In older kernels (pre-3.3) this allows a
guest to read from large ranges of host memory.
Tested: tested against apic unit tests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
|
High
| 166,114
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(SecurityOrigin* origin, const KURL& url, const KURL& srcURL)
{
if (origin && BlobURL::getOrigin(url) == "null")
originMap()->add(url.string(), origin);
if (isMainThread())
blobRegistry().registerBlobURL(url, srcURL);
else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url, srcURL));
callOnMainThread(®isterBlobURLFromTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,685
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool MultibufferDataSource::DidGetOpaqueResponseViaServiceWorker() const {
return url_data()->has_opaque_data();
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
Medium
| 172,623
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage::UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage(
sk_sp<SkImage> image) {
CHECK(image);
DCHECK(!image->isLazyGenerated());
paint_image_ =
CreatePaintImageBuilder()
.set_image(std::move(image), cc::PaintImage::GetNextContentId())
.TakePaintImage();
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
|
Medium
| 172,602
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CheckClientDownloadRequest::UploadBinary(
DownloadCheckResult result,
DownloadCheckResultReason reason) {
saved_result_ = result;
saved_reason_ = reason;
bool upload_for_dlp = ShouldUploadForDlpScan();
bool upload_for_malware = ShouldUploadForMalwareScan(reason);
auto request = std::make_unique<DownloadItemRequest>(
item_, /*read_immediately=*/true,
base::BindOnce(&CheckClientDownloadRequest::OnDeepScanningComplete,
weakptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(GetBrowserContext());
if (upload_for_dlp) {
DlpDeepScanningClientRequest dlp_request;
dlp_request.set_content_source(DlpDeepScanningClientRequest::FILE_DOWNLOAD);
request->set_request_dlp_scan(std::move(dlp_request));
}
if (upload_for_malware) {
MalwareDeepScanningClientRequest malware_request;
malware_request.set_population(
MalwareDeepScanningClientRequest::POPULATION_ENTERPRISE);
malware_request.set_download_token(
DownloadProtectionService::GetDownloadPingToken(item_));
request->set_request_malware_scan(std::move(malware_request));
}
request->set_dm_token(
policy::BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveDMToken());
service()->UploadForDeepScanning(profile, std::move(request));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.104 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
|
Medium
| 172,358
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MemBackendImpl::EvictIfNeeded() {
if (current_size_ <= max_size_)
return;
int target_size = std::max(0, max_size_ - kDefaultEvictionSize);
base::LinkNode<MemEntryImpl>* entry = lru_list_.head();
while (current_size_ > target_size && entry != lru_list_.end()) {
MemEntryImpl* to_doom = entry->value();
entry = entry->next();
if (!to_doom->InUse())
to_doom->Doom();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A double-eviction in the Incognito mode cache that lead to a user-after-free in Networking Disk Cache in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [MemCache] Fix bug while iterating LRU list in eviction
It was possible to reanalyze a previously doomed entry.
Bug: 827492
Change-Id: I5d34d2ae87c96e0d2099e926e6eb2c1b30b01d63
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/987919
Commit-Queue: Josh Karlin <jkarlin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547236}
|
Medium
| 172,700
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::readMetaData() {
if (mInitCheck != NO_INIT) {
return mInitCheck;
}
off64_t offset = 0;
status_t err;
bool sawMoovOrSidx = false;
while (!(sawMoovOrSidx && (mMdatFound || mMoofFound))) {
off64_t orig_offset = offset;
err = parseChunk(&offset, 0);
if (err != OK && err != UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
break;
} else if (offset <= orig_offset) {
ALOGE("did not advance: %lld->%lld", (long long)orig_offset, (long long)offset);
err = ERROR_MALFORMED;
break;
} else if (err == UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
sawMoovOrSidx = true;
}
}
if (mInitCheck == OK) {
if (mHasVideo) {
mFileMetaData->setCString(
kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_CONTAINER_MPEG4);
} else {
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "audio/mp4");
}
} else {
mInitCheck = err;
}
CHECK_NE(err, (status_t)NO_INIT);
uint64_t psshsize = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
psshsize += 20 + mPssh[i].datalen;
}
if (psshsize > 0 && psshsize <= UINT32_MAX) {
char *buf = (char*)malloc(psshsize);
char *ptr = buf;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
memcpy(ptr, mPssh[i].uuid, 20); // uuid + length
memcpy(ptr + 20, mPssh[i].data, mPssh[i].datalen);
ptr += (20 + mPssh[i].datalen);
}
mFileMetaData->setData(kKeyPssh, 'pssh', buf, psshsize);
free(buf);
}
return mInitCheck;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not check whether memory allocation succeeds, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 28471206.
Commit Message: Check malloc result to avoid NPD
Bug: 28471206
Change-Id: Id5d055d76893d6f53a2e524ff5f282d1ddca3345
|
Low
| 173,548
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void InspectorHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
host_ = frame_host;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,748
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void TestingPlatformSupport::cryptographicallyRandomValues(unsigned char* buffer, size_t length)
{
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, does not ensure that a proper cryptographicallyRandomValues random number generator is used, which makes it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
|
Medium
| 172,239
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int flashsv_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
int buf_size = avpkt->size;
FlashSVContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int h_blocks, v_blocks, h_part, v_part, i, j, ret;
GetBitContext gb;
int last_blockwidth = s->block_width;
int last_blockheight= s->block_height;
/* no supplementary picture */
if (buf_size == 0)
return 0;
if (buf_size < 4)
return -1;
init_get_bits(&gb, avpkt->data, buf_size * 8);
/* start to parse the bitstream */
s->block_width = 16 * (get_bits(&gb, 4) + 1);
s->image_width = get_bits(&gb, 12);
s->block_height = 16 * (get_bits(&gb, 4) + 1);
s->image_height = get_bits(&gb, 12);
if ( last_blockwidth != s->block_width
|| last_blockheight!= s->block_height)
av_freep(&s->blocks);
if (s->ver == 2) {
skip_bits(&gb, 6);
if (get_bits1(&gb)) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "iframe");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (get_bits1(&gb)) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Custom palette");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
}
/* calculate number of blocks and size of border (partial) blocks */
h_blocks = s->image_width / s->block_width;
h_part = s->image_width % s->block_width;
v_blocks = s->image_height / s->block_height;
v_part = s->image_height % s->block_height;
/* the block size could change between frames, make sure the buffer
* is large enough, if not, get a larger one */
if (s->block_size < s->block_width * s->block_height) {
int tmpblock_size = 3 * s->block_width * s->block_height;
s->tmpblock = av_realloc(s->tmpblock, tmpblock_size);
if (!s->tmpblock) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Can't allocate decompression buffer.\n");
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
if (s->ver == 2) {
s->deflate_block_size = calc_deflate_block_size(tmpblock_size);
if (s->deflate_block_size <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Can't determine deflate buffer size.\n");
return -1;
}
s->deflate_block = av_realloc(s->deflate_block, s->deflate_block_size);
if (!s->deflate_block) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Can't allocate deflate buffer.\n");
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
}
}
s->block_size = s->block_width * s->block_height;
/* initialize the image size once */
if (avctx->width == 0 && avctx->height == 0) {
avcodec_set_dimensions(avctx, s->image_width, s->image_height);
}
/* check for changes of image width and image height */
if (avctx->width != s->image_width || avctx->height != s->image_height) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Frame width or height differs from first frame!\n");
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "fh = %d, fv %d vs ch = %d, cv = %d\n",
avctx->height, avctx->width, s->image_height, s->image_width);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* we care for keyframes only in Screen Video v2 */
s->is_keyframe = (avpkt->flags & AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY) && (s->ver == 2);
if (s->is_keyframe) {
s->keyframedata = av_realloc(s->keyframedata, avpkt->size);
memcpy(s->keyframedata, avpkt->data, avpkt->size);
}
if(s->ver == 2 && !s->blocks)
s->blocks = av_mallocz((v_blocks + !!v_part) * (h_blocks + !!h_part)
* sizeof(s->blocks[0]));
av_dlog(avctx, "image: %dx%d block: %dx%d num: %dx%d part: %dx%d\n",
s->image_width, s->image_height, s->block_width, s->block_height,
h_blocks, v_blocks, h_part, v_part);
if ((ret = ff_reget_buffer(avctx, &s->frame)) < 0)
return ret;
/* loop over all block columns */
for (j = 0; j < v_blocks + (v_part ? 1 : 0); j++) {
int y_pos = j * s->block_height; // vertical position in frame
int cur_blk_height = (j < v_blocks) ? s->block_height : v_part;
/* loop over all block rows */
for (i = 0; i < h_blocks + (h_part ? 1 : 0); i++) {
int x_pos = i * s->block_width; // horizontal position in frame
int cur_blk_width = (i < h_blocks) ? s->block_width : h_part;
int has_diff = 0;
/* get the size of the compressed zlib chunk */
int size = get_bits(&gb, 16);
s->color_depth = 0;
s->zlibprime_curr = 0;
s->zlibprime_prev = 0;
s->diff_start = 0;
s->diff_height = cur_blk_height;
if (8 * size > get_bits_left(&gb)) {
av_frame_unref(&s->frame);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (s->ver == 2 && size) {
skip_bits(&gb, 3);
s->color_depth = get_bits(&gb, 2);
has_diff = get_bits1(&gb);
s->zlibprime_curr = get_bits1(&gb);
s->zlibprime_prev = get_bits1(&gb);
if (s->color_depth != 0 && s->color_depth != 2) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"%dx%d invalid color depth %d\n", i, j, s->color_depth);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (has_diff) {
if (!s->keyframe) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"inter frame without keyframe\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
s->diff_start = get_bits(&gb, 8);
s->diff_height = get_bits(&gb, 8);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"%dx%d diff start %d height %d\n",
i, j, s->diff_start, s->diff_height);
size -= 2;
}
if (s->zlibprime_prev)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%dx%d zlibprime_prev\n", i, j);
if (s->zlibprime_curr) {
int col = get_bits(&gb, 8);
int row = get_bits(&gb, 8);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%dx%d zlibprime_curr %dx%d\n", i, j, col, row);
size -= 2;
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "zlibprime_curr");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (!s->blocks && (s->zlibprime_curr || s->zlibprime_prev)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "no data available for zlib "
"priming\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
size--; // account for flags byte
}
if (has_diff) {
int k;
int off = (s->image_height - y_pos - 1) * s->frame.linesize[0];
for (k = 0; k < cur_blk_height; k++)
memcpy(s->frame.data[0] + off - k*s->frame.linesize[0] + x_pos*3,
s->keyframe + off - k*s->frame.linesize[0] + x_pos*3,
cur_blk_width * 3);
}
/* skip unchanged blocks, which have size 0 */
if (size) {
if (flashsv_decode_block(avctx, avpkt, &gb, size,
cur_blk_width, cur_blk_height,
x_pos, y_pos,
i + j * (h_blocks + !!h_part)))
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"error in decompression of block %dx%d\n", i, j);
}
}
}
if (s->is_keyframe && s->ver == 2) {
if (!s->keyframe) {
s->keyframe = av_malloc(s->frame.linesize[0] * avctx->height);
if (!s->keyframe) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot allocate image data\n");
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
}
memcpy(s->keyframe, s->frame.data[0], s->frame.linesize[0] * avctx->height);
}
if ((ret = av_frame_ref(data, &s->frame)) < 0)
return ret;
*got_frame = 1;
if ((get_bits_count(&gb) / 8) != buf_size)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "buffer not fully consumed (%d != %d)\n",
buf_size, (get_bits_count(&gb) / 8));
/* report that the buffer was completely consumed */
return buf_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The flashsv_decode_frame function in libavcodec/flashsv.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not properly validate a certain height value, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Flash Screen Video data.
Commit Message: avcodec/flashsv: check diff_start/height
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2844
Found-by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
Medium
| 165,924
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> overloadedMethod3Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.overloadedMethod3");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, strArg, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
imp->overloadedMethod(strArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,099
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void spl_ptr_heap_insert(spl_ptr_heap *heap, spl_ptr_heap_element elem, void *cmp_userdata TSRMLS_DC) { /* {{{ */
int i;
if (heap->count+1 > heap->max_size) {
/* we need to allocate more memory */
heap->elements = (void **) safe_erealloc(heap->elements, sizeof(spl_ptr_heap_element), (heap->max_size), (sizeof(spl_ptr_heap_element) * (heap->max_size)));
heap->max_size *= 2;
}
heap->ctor(elem TSRMLS_CC);
/* sifting up */
for(i = heap->count++; i > 0 && heap->cmp(heap->elements[(i-1)/2], elem, cmp_userdata TSRMLS_CC) < 0; i = (i-1)/2) {
heap->elements[i] = heap->elements[(i-1)/2];
}
if (EG(exception)) {
/* exception thrown during comparison */
}
heap->elements[i] = elem;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the spl_ptr_heap_insert function in ext/spl/spl_heap.c in PHP before 5.5.27 and 5.6.x before 5.6.11 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by triggering a failed SplMinHeap::compare operation.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,307
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::set_parameter(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE paramIndex,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR paramData)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
int ret=0;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
#endif
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (paramData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Param in Invalid paramData");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if ((m_state != OMX_StateLoaded) &&
BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_ENABLE_PENDING) &&
(m_out_bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) &&
BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_ENABLE_PENDING) &&
(m_inp_bEnabled == OMX_TRUE)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
switch ((unsigned long)paramIndex) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE);
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn;
portDefn = (OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition H= %d, W = %d",
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth);
if (OMX_DirOutput == portDefn->eDir) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition OP port");
bool port_format_changed = false;
m_display_id = portDefn->format.video.pNativeWindow;
unsigned int buffer_size;
/* update output port resolution with client supplied dimensions
in case scaling is enabled, else it follows input resolution set
*/
if (is_down_scalar_enabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("SetParam OP: WxH(%u x %u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
if (portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight != 0x0 &&
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth != 0x0) {
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_G_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Resolution failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
break;
}
if ((portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight != (unsigned int)fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height) ||
(portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth != (unsigned int)fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width)) {
port_format_changed = true;
}
update_resolution(portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
/* set crop info */
rectangle.nLeft = 0;
rectangle.nTop = 0;
rectangle.nWidth = portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth;
rectangle.nHeight = portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight;
eRet = is_video_session_supported();
if (eRet)
break;
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = %d , fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = %d",
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height, fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width);
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Resolution failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
}
if (eRet) {
break;
}
if (secure_mode) {
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_SECURE_SCALING_THRESHOLD;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_G_CTRL, &control) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed getting secure scaling threshold : %d, id was : %x", errno, control.id);
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
} else {
/* This is a workaround for a bug in fw which uses stride
* and slice instead of width and height to check against
* the threshold.
*/
OMX_U32 stride, slice;
if (drv_ctx.output_format == VDEC_YUV_FORMAT_NV12) {
stride = VENUS_Y_STRIDE(COLOR_FMT_NV12, portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth);
slice = VENUS_Y_SCANLINES(COLOR_FMT_NV12, portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
} else {
stride = portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth;
slice = portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Stride is %d, slice is %d, sxs is %d\n", stride, slice, stride * slice);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Threshold value is %d\n", control.value);
if (stride * slice <= (OMX_U32)control.value) {
secure_scaling_to_non_secure_opb = true;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Enabling secure scalar out of CPZ");
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NON_SECURE_OUTPUT2;
control.value = 1;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Enabling non-secure output2 failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
}
}
if (eRet) {
break;
}
if (!client_buffers.get_buffer_req(buffer_size)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error in getting buffer requirements");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
} else if (!port_format_changed) {
if ( portDefn->nBufferCountActual >= drv_ctx.op_buf.mincount &&
portDefn->nBufferSize >= drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size ) {
drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size = portDefn->nBufferSize;
drv_ctx.extradata_info.count = drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount;
drv_ctx.extradata_info.size = drv_ctx.extradata_info.count *
drv_ctx.extradata_info.buffer_size;
eRet = set_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone)
m_port_def = *portDefn;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OP Requirements(#%d: %u) Requested(#%u: %u)",
drv_ctx.op_buf.mincount, (unsigned int)drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size,
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
} else if (OMX_DirInput == portDefn->eDir) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition IP port");
bool port_format_changed = false;
if ((portDefn->format.video.xFramerate >> 16) > 0 &&
(portDefn->format.video.xFramerate >> 16) <= MAX_SUPPORTED_FPS) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: frame rate set by omx client : %u",
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.xFramerate >> 16);
Q16ToFraction(portDefn->format.video.xFramerate, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator,
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator);
if (!drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Numerator is zero setting to 30");
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = 30;
}
if (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator)
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = (int)
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator / drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator;
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator = 1;
frm_int = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator * 1e6 /
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: frm_int(%u) fps(%.2f)",
(unsigned int)frm_int, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator /
(float)drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator);
struct v4l2_outputparm oparm;
/*XXX: we're providing timing info as seconds per frame rather than frames
* per second.*/
oparm.timeperframe.numerator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator;
oparm.timeperframe.denominator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator;
struct v4l2_streamparm sparm;
sparm.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
sparm.parm.output = oparm;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_PARM, &sparm)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Unable to convey fps info to driver, performance might be affected");
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
break;
}
}
if (drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height !=
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight ||
drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width !=
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("SetParam IP: WxH(%u x %u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
port_format_changed = true;
OMX_U32 frameWidth = portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth;
OMX_U32 frameHeight = portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight;
if (frameHeight != 0x0 && frameWidth != 0x0) {
if (m_smoothstreaming_mode &&
((frameWidth * frameHeight) <
(m_smoothstreaming_width * m_smoothstreaming_height))) {
frameWidth = m_smoothstreaming_width;
frameHeight = m_smoothstreaming_height;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("NOTE: Setting resolution %u x %u "
"for adaptive-playback/smooth-streaming",
(unsigned int)frameWidth, (unsigned int)frameHeight);
}
update_resolution(frameWidth, frameHeight,
frameWidth, frameHeight);
eRet = is_video_session_supported();
if (eRet)
break;
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = output_capability;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = %d , fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = %d",fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height,fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width);
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Resolution failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
if (!is_down_scalar_enabled)
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
}
}
}
if (m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize
&& (portDefn->nBufferSize > m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Custom buffer size set by client: %d, trying to set: %d",
m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize, portDefn->nBufferSize);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
break;
}
if (portDefn->nBufferCountActual >= drv_ctx.ip_buf.mincount
|| portDefn->nBufferSize != drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size) {
port_format_changed = true;
vdec_allocatorproperty *buffer_prop = &drv_ctx.ip_buf;
drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size = (portDefn->nBufferSize + buffer_prop->alignment - 1) &
(~(buffer_prop->alignment - 1));
eRet = set_buffer_req(buffer_prop);
}
if (false == port_format_changed) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: IP Requirements(#%d: %u) Requested(#%u: %u)",
drv_ctx.ip_buf.mincount, (unsigned int)drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size,
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
} else if (portDefn->eDir == OMX_DirMax) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(" Set_parameter: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)portDefn->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)paramData;
int ret=0;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat 0x%x, port: %u",
portFmt->eColorFormat, (unsigned int)portFmt->nPortIndex);
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
if (1 == portFmt->nPortIndex) {
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
enum vdec_output_fromat op_format;
if (portFmt->eColorFormat == (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m ||
portFmt->eColorFormat == (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32mMultiView ||
portFmt->eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar ||
portFmt->eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar)
op_format = (enum vdec_output_fromat)VDEC_YUV_FORMAT_NV12;
else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
drv_ctx.output_format = op_format;
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set output format failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
/*TODO: How to handle this case */
} else {
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
}
}
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
if (!client_buffers.set_color_format(portFmt->eColorFormat)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set color format failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE);
OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexQcomParamPortDefinitionType %u",
(unsigned int)portFmt->nFramePackingFormat);
/* Input port */
if (portFmt->nPortIndex == 0) {
if (portFmt->nFramePackingFormat == OMX_QCOM_FramePacking_Arbitrary) {
if (secure_mode) {
arbitrary_bytes = false;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("setparameter: cannot set to arbitary bytes mode in secure session");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
arbitrary_bytes = true;
}
} else if (portFmt->nFramePackingFormat ==
OMX_QCOM_FramePacking_OnlyOneCompleteFrame) {
arbitrary_bytes = false;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.arbitrarybytes.mode", property_value, "0");
if (atoi(property_value)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("arbitrary_bytes enabled via property command");
arbitrary_bytes = true;
}
#endif
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown FramePacking format %u",
(unsigned int)portFmt->nFramePackingFormat);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (portFmt->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_IndexQcomParamPortDefinitionType OP Port");
if ( (portFmt->nMemRegion > OMX_QCOM_MemRegionInvalid &&
portFmt->nMemRegion < OMX_QCOM_MemRegionMax) &&
portFmt->nCacheAttr == OMX_QCOM_CacheAttrNone) {
m_out_mem_region_smi = OMX_TRUE;
if ((m_out_mem_region_smi && m_out_pvt_entry_pmem)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_IndexQcomParamPortDefinitionType OP Port: out pmem set");
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
}
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE);
OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *comp_role;
comp_role = (OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole %s",
comp_role->cRole);
if ((m_state == OMX_StateLoaded)&&
!BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Parameter called in valid state");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mvc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole, "video_decoder.mvc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole, "video_decoder.mvc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg2",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg2",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg2",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if ((!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.divx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) ||
(!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.divx311", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) ||
(!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.divx4", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))
) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.divx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.divx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if ( (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vc1",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) ||
(!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.wmv",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))
) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.vc1",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.vc1",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE) ||
(!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.vpx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole, "video_decoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole, "video_decoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown param %s", drv_ctx.kind);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidComponentName;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE);
if (m_state != OMX_StateLoaded) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE *priorityMgmtype = (OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupID);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: priorityMgmtype %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority);
m_priority_mgm.nGroupID = priorityMgmtype->nGroupID;
m_priority_mgm.nGroupPriority = priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE);
OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE *bufferSupplierType = (OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier %d",
bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier);
if (bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex == 0 || bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex ==1)
m_buffer_supplier.eBufferSupplier = bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier;
else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoMvc: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: QOMX_IndexParamVideoMvc %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoH263 %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4 %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg2: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg2 %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDecoderPictureOrder: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_DECODER_PICTURE_ORDER);
QOMX_VIDEO_DECODER_PICTURE_ORDER *pictureOrder =
(QOMX_VIDEO_DECODER_PICTURE_ORDER *)paramData;
struct v4l2_control control;
int pic_order,rc=0;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDecoderPictureOrder %d",
pictureOrder->eOutputPictureOrder);
if (pictureOrder->eOutputPictureOrder == QOMX_VIDEO_DISPLAY_ORDER) {
pic_order = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER_DISPLAY;
} else if (pictureOrder->eOutputPictureOrder == QOMX_VIDEO_DECODE_ORDER) {
pic_order = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER_DECODE;
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(false);
} else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER;
control.value = pic_order;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set picture order failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamConcealMBMapExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(VDEC_EXTRADATA_MB_ERROR_MAP, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamFrameInfoExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_FRAMEINFO_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_ExtraDataFrameDimension:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_FRAMEDIMENSION_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamInterlaceExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_INTERLACE_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264TimeInfo:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_TIMEINFO_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoFramePackingExtradata:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_FRAMEPACK_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_QP_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoInputBitsInfoExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_BITSINFO_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableExtnUserData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_EXTNUSER_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamMpeg2SeqDispExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_MPEG2SEQDISP_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDivx: {
QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_DIVXTYPE* divXType = (QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_DIVXTYPE *) paramData;
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexPlatformPvt: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_PLATFORMPRIVATE_EXTN);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexPlatformPvt OP Port");
OMX_QCOM_PLATFORMPRIVATE_EXTN* entryType = (OMX_QCOM_PLATFORMPRIVATE_EXTN *) paramData;
if (entryType->type != OMX_QCOM_PLATFORM_PRIVATE_PMEM) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: Platform Private entry type (%d) not supported.", entryType->type);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
m_out_pvt_entry_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
if ((m_out_mem_region_smi && m_out_pvt_entry_pmem)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexPlatformPvt OP Port: out pmem set");
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoSyncFrameDecodingMode: {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoSyncFrameDecodingMode");
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set idr only decoding for thumbnail mode");
struct v4l2_control control;
int rc;
drv_ctx.idr_only_decoding = 1;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER_DECODE;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set picture order failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_SYNC_FRAME_DECODE;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_SYNC_FRAME_DECODE_ENABLE;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Sync frame setting failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
/*Setting sync frame decoding on driver might change buffer
* requirements so update them here*/
if (get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.ip_buf)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Sync frame setting failed: falied to get buffer i/p requirements");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Sync frame setting failed: falied to get buffer o/p requirements");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE);
QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *extradataIndexType = (QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *) paramData;
if ((extradataIndexType->nIndex == OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) &&
(extradataIndexType->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) &&
(extradataIndexType->nPortIndex == 1)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType SmoothStreaming");
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_PORTDEF_EXTRADATA, false, extradataIndexType->bEnabled);
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamEnableSmoothStreaming: {
#ifndef SMOOTH_STREAMING_DISABLED
eRet = enable_smoothstreaming();
#else
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
#endif
}
break;
#if defined (_ANDROID_HONEYCOMB_) || defined (_ANDROID_ICS_)
/* Need to allow following two set_parameters even in Idle
* state. This is ANDROID architecture which is not in sync
* with openmax standard. */
case OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexEnableAndroidNativeBuffers: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams);
EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams* enableNativeBuffers = (EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams *) paramData;
if (enableNativeBuffers) {
m_enable_android_native_buffers = enableNativeBuffers->enable;
}
#if !defined(FLEXYUV_SUPPORTED)
if (m_enable_android_native_buffers) {
if(!client_buffers.set_color_format(getPreferredColorFormatDefaultMode(0))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set native color format!");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
#endif
}
break;
case OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexUseAndroidNativeBuffer: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, UseAndroidNativeBufferParams);
eRet = use_android_native_buffer(hComp, paramData);
}
break;
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexParamEnableTimeStampReorder: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_INDEXTIMESTAMPREORDER);
QOMX_INDEXTIMESTAMPREORDER *reorder = (QOMX_INDEXTIMESTAMPREORDER *)paramData;
if (drv_ctx.picture_order == (vdec_output_order)QOMX_VIDEO_DISPLAY_ORDER) {
if (reorder->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) {
frm_int =0;
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(true);
} else
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(false);
} else {
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(false);
if (reorder->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) {
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam) {
m_profile_lvl.eProfile = pParam->eProfile;
m_profile_lvl.eLevel = pParam->eLevel;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams);
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams *metabuffer =
(StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams *)paramData;
if (!metabuffer) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid param: %p", metabuffer);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
break;
}
if (m_disable_dynamic_buf_mode) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Dynamic buffer mode disabled by setprop");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
break;
}
if (metabuffer->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
struct v4l2_control control;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_ALLOC_MODE_OUTPUT;
if (metabuffer->bStoreMetaData == true) {
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_DYNAMIC;
} else {
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STATIC;
}
int rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL,&control);
if (!rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("%s buffer mode",
(metabuffer->bStoreMetaData == true)? "Enabled dynamic" : "Disabled dynamic");
dynamic_buf_mode = metabuffer->bStoreMetaData;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to %s buffer mode",
(metabuffer->bStoreMetaData == true)? "enable dynamic" : "disable dynamic");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(
"OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode not supported for port: %u",
(unsigned int)metabuffer->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDownScalar:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_INDEXDOWNSCALAR);
QOMX_INDEXDOWNSCALAR* pParam = (QOMX_INDEXDOWNSCALAR*)paramData;
struct v4l2_control control;
int rc;
if (pParam) {
is_down_scalar_enabled = pParam->bEnable;
if (is_down_scalar_enabled) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_OUTPUT_MODE;
control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_OUTPUT_SECONDARY;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDownScalar value = %d", pParam->bEnable);
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set down scalar on driver.");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_KEEP_ASPECT_RATIO;
control.value = 1;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set keep aspect ratio on driver.");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
break;
}
#ifdef ADAPTIVE_PLAYBACK_SUPPORTED
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoAdaptivePlaybackMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexPrepareForAdaptivePlayback");
PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams* pParams =
(PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams *) paramData;
if (pParams->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
if (!pParams->bEnable) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
if (pParams->nMaxFrameWidth > maxSmoothStreamingWidth
|| pParams->nMaxFrameHeight > maxSmoothStreamingHeight) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(
"Adaptive playback request exceeds max supported resolution : [%u x %u] vs [%u x %u]",
(unsigned int)pParams->nMaxFrameWidth, (unsigned int)pParams->nMaxFrameHeight,
(unsigned int)maxSmoothStreamingWidth, (unsigned int)maxSmoothStreamingHeight);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
} else {
eRet = enable_adaptive_playback(pParams->nMaxFrameWidth, pParams->nMaxFrameHeight);
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(
"Prepare for adaptive playback supported only on output port");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
break;
}
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoCustomBufferSize:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_CUSTOM_BUFFERSIZE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoCustomBufferSize");
QOMX_VIDEO_CUSTOM_BUFFERSIZE* pParam = (QOMX_VIDEO_CUSTOM_BUFFERSIZE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_BUFFER_SIZE_LIMIT;
control.value = pParam->nBufferSize;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set input buffer size");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.ip_buf);
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize = drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Successfully set custom input buffer size = %d",
m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to get buffer requirement");
}
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Custom buffer size in not supported on output port");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
break;
}
default: {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown param %d", paramIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
if (eRet != OMX_ErrorNone)
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: Error: 0x%x, setting param 0x%x", eRet, paramIndex);
return eRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 vdec component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 mishandles a buffer count, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27661749.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Do not allow changing theactual buffer count while still
holding allocation (Client can technically negotiate
buffer count on a free/disabled port)
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Security Vulnerability - Heap Overflow and Possible Local
Privilege Escalation in MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #3)
Bug: 27532282 27661749
Change-Id: I06dd680d43feaef3efdc87311e8a6703e234b523
|
Medium
| 173,787
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int parse_options(char *options, struct super_block *sb,
unsigned long *journal_devnum,
unsigned int *journal_ioprio,
ext4_fsblk_t *n_blocks_count, int is_remount)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
char *p;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int data_opt = 0;
int option;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
int qfmt;
#endif
if (!options)
return 1;
while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
int token;
if (!*p)
continue;
/*
* Initialize args struct so we know whether arg was
* found; some options take optional arguments.
*/
args[0].to = args[0].from = 0;
token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
switch (token) {
case Opt_bsd_df:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, deprecated_msg, p, "2.6.38");
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, MINIX_DF);
break;
case Opt_minix_df:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, deprecated_msg, p, "2.6.38");
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, MINIX_DF);
break;
case Opt_grpid:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, deprecated_msg, p, "2.6.38");
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, GRPID);
break;
case Opt_nogrpid:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, deprecated_msg, p, "2.6.38");
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, GRPID);
break;
case Opt_resuid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
sbi->s_resuid = option;
break;
case Opt_resgid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
sbi->s_resgid = option;
break;
case Opt_sb:
/* handled by get_sb_block() instead of here */
/* *sb_block = match_int(&args[0]); */
break;
case Opt_err_panic:
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_CONT);
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_RO);
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_PANIC);
break;
case Opt_err_ro:
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_CONT);
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_PANIC);
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_RO);
break;
case Opt_err_cont:
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_RO);
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_PANIC);
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_CONT);
break;
case Opt_nouid32:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, NO_UID32);
break;
case Opt_debug:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, DEBUG);
break;
case Opt_oldalloc:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, OLDALLOC);
break;
case Opt_orlov:
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, OLDALLOC);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_XATTR
case Opt_user_xattr:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, XATTR_USER);
break;
case Opt_nouser_xattr:
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, XATTR_USER);
break;
#else
case Opt_user_xattr:
case Opt_nouser_xattr:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "(no)user_xattr options not supported");
break;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
case Opt_acl:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, POSIX_ACL);
break;
case Opt_noacl:
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, POSIX_ACL);
break;
#else
case Opt_acl:
case Opt_noacl:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "(no)acl options not supported");
break;
#endif
case Opt_journal_update:
/* @@@ FIXME */
/* Eventually we will want to be able to create
a journal file here. For now, only allow the
user to specify an existing inode to be the
journal file. */
if (is_remount) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Cannot specify journal on remount");
return 0;
}
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, UPDATE_JOURNAL);
break;
case Opt_journal_dev:
if (is_remount) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Cannot specify journal on remount");
return 0;
}
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
*journal_devnum = option;
break;
case Opt_journal_checksum:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM);
break;
case Opt_journal_async_commit:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT);
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM);
break;
case Opt_noload:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, NOLOAD);
break;
case Opt_commit:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
if (option < 0)
return 0;
if (option == 0)
option = JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE;
sbi->s_commit_interval = HZ * option;
break;
case Opt_max_batch_time:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
if (option < 0)
return 0;
if (option == 0)
option = EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME;
sbi->s_max_batch_time = option;
break;
case Opt_min_batch_time:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
if (option < 0)
return 0;
sbi->s_min_batch_time = option;
break;
case Opt_data_journal:
data_opt = EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA;
goto datacheck;
case Opt_data_ordered:
data_opt = EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA;
goto datacheck;
case Opt_data_writeback:
data_opt = EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA;
datacheck:
if (is_remount) {
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) != data_opt) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Cannot change data mode on remount");
return 0;
}
} else {
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, DATA_FLAGS);
sbi->s_mount_opt |= data_opt;
}
break;
case Opt_data_err_abort:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, DATA_ERR_ABORT);
break;
case Opt_data_err_ignore:
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, DATA_ERR_ABORT);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
case Opt_usrjquota:
if (!set_qf_name(sb, USRQUOTA, &args[0]))
return 0;
break;
case Opt_grpjquota:
if (!set_qf_name(sb, GRPQUOTA, &args[0]))
return 0;
break;
case Opt_offusrjquota:
if (!clear_qf_name(sb, USRQUOTA))
return 0;
break;
case Opt_offgrpjquota:
if (!clear_qf_name(sb, GRPQUOTA))
return 0;
break;
case Opt_jqfmt_vfsold:
qfmt = QFMT_VFS_OLD;
goto set_qf_format;
case Opt_jqfmt_vfsv0:
qfmt = QFMT_VFS_V0;
goto set_qf_format;
case Opt_jqfmt_vfsv1:
qfmt = QFMT_VFS_V1;
set_qf_format:
if (sb_any_quota_loaded(sb) &&
sbi->s_jquota_fmt != qfmt) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Cannot change "
"journaled quota options when "
"quota turned on");
return 0;
}
sbi->s_jquota_fmt = qfmt;
break;
case Opt_quota:
case Opt_usrquota:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, QUOTA);
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, USRQUOTA);
break;
case Opt_grpquota:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, QUOTA);
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, GRPQUOTA);
break;
case Opt_noquota:
if (sb_any_quota_loaded(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Cannot change quota "
"options when quota turned on");
return 0;
}
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, QUOTA);
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, USRQUOTA);
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, GRPQUOTA);
break;
#else
case Opt_quota:
case Opt_usrquota:
case Opt_grpquota:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"quota options not supported");
break;
case Opt_usrjquota:
case Opt_grpjquota:
case Opt_offusrjquota:
case Opt_offgrpjquota:
case Opt_jqfmt_vfsold:
case Opt_jqfmt_vfsv0:
case Opt_jqfmt_vfsv1:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"journaled quota options not supported");
break;
case Opt_noquota:
break;
#endif
case Opt_abort:
sbi->s_mount_flags |= EXT4_MF_FS_ABORTED;
break;
case Opt_nobarrier:
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, BARRIER);
break;
case Opt_barrier:
if (args[0].from) {
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
} else
option = 1; /* No argument, default to 1 */
if (option)
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, BARRIER);
else
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, BARRIER);
break;
case Opt_ignore:
break;
case Opt_resize:
if (!is_remount) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"resize option only available "
"for remount");
return 0;
}
if (match_int(&args[0], &option) != 0)
return 0;
*n_blocks_count = option;
break;
case Opt_nobh:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, NOBH);
break;
case Opt_bh:
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, NOBH);
break;
case Opt_i_version:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, I_VERSION);
sb->s_flags |= MS_I_VERSION;
break;
case Opt_nodelalloc:
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, DELALLOC);
break;
case Opt_stripe:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
if (option < 0)
return 0;
sbi->s_stripe = option;
break;
case Opt_delalloc:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, DELALLOC);
break;
case Opt_block_validity:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, BLOCK_VALIDITY);
break;
case Opt_noblock_validity:
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, BLOCK_VALIDITY);
break;
case Opt_inode_readahead_blks:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
if (option < 0 || option > (1 << 30))
return 0;
if (!is_power_of_2(option)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"EXT4-fs: inode_readahead_blks"
" must be a power of 2");
return 0;
}
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks = option;
break;
case Opt_journal_ioprio:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
if (option < 0 || option > 7)
break;
*journal_ioprio = IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE,
option);
break;
case Opt_noauto_da_alloc:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt,NO_AUTO_DA_ALLOC);
break;
case Opt_auto_da_alloc:
if (args[0].from) {
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
} else
option = 1; /* No argument, default to 1 */
if (option)
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, NO_AUTO_DA_ALLOC);
else
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt,NO_AUTO_DA_ALLOC);
break;
case Opt_discard:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, DISCARD);
break;
case Opt_nodiscard:
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, DISCARD);
break;
default:
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unrecognized mount option \"%s\" "
"or missing value", p);
return 0;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
if (sbi->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA] || sbi->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA]) {
if (test_opt(sb, USRQUOTA) && sbi->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA])
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, USRQUOTA);
if (test_opt(sb, GRPQUOTA) && sbi->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA])
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, GRPQUOTA);
if (test_opt(sb, GRPQUOTA) || test_opt(sb, USRQUOTA)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "old and new quota "
"format mixing");
return 0;
}
if (!sbi->s_jquota_fmt) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "journaled quota format "
"not specified");
return 0;
}
} else {
if (sbi->s_jquota_fmt) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "journaled quota format "
"specified with no journaling "
"enabled");
return 0;
}
}
#endif
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 167,556
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct packet_type *pt, struct net_device *orig_dev)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct packet_sock *po;
struct sockaddr_ll *sll;
union tpacket_uhdr h;
u8 *skb_head = skb->data;
int skb_len = skb->len;
unsigned int snaplen, res;
unsigned long status = TP_STATUS_USER;
unsigned short macoff, netoff, hdrlen;
struct sk_buff *copy_skb = NULL;
struct timespec ts;
__u32 ts_status;
bool is_drop_n_account = false;
/* struct tpacket{2,3}_hdr is aligned to a multiple of TPACKET_ALIGNMENT.
* We may add members to them until current aligned size without forcing
* userspace to call getsockopt(..., PACKET_HDRLEN, ...).
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(TPACKET_ALIGN(sizeof(*h.h2)) != 32);
BUILD_BUG_ON(TPACKET_ALIGN(sizeof(*h.h3)) != 48);
if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_LOOPBACK)
goto drop;
sk = pt->af_packet_priv;
po = pkt_sk(sk);
if (!net_eq(dev_net(dev), sock_net(sk)))
goto drop;
if (dev->header_ops) {
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_DGRAM)
skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb_mac_header(skb));
else if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_OUTGOING) {
/* Special case: outgoing packets have ll header at head */
skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb));
}
}
snaplen = skb->len;
res = run_filter(skb, sk, snaplen);
if (!res)
goto drop_n_restore;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
status |= TP_STATUS_CSUMNOTREADY;
else if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_OUTGOING &&
(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE ||
skb_csum_unnecessary(skb)))
status |= TP_STATUS_CSUM_VALID;
if (snaplen > res)
snaplen = res;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
macoff = netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen) + 16 +
po->tp_reserve;
} else {
unsigned int maclen = skb_network_offset(skb);
netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen +
(maclen < 16 ? 16 : maclen)) +
po->tp_reserve;
if (po->has_vnet_hdr)
netoff += sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
macoff = netoff - maclen;
}
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
if (macoff + snaplen > po->rx_ring.frame_size) {
if (po->copy_thresh &&
atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) < sk->sk_rcvbuf) {
if (skb_shared(skb)) {
copy_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
} else {
copy_skb = skb_get(skb);
skb_head = skb->data;
}
if (copy_skb)
skb_set_owner_r(copy_skb, sk);
}
snaplen = po->rx_ring.frame_size - macoff;
if ((int)snaplen < 0)
snaplen = 0;
}
} else if (unlikely(macoff + snaplen >
GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len)) {
u32 nval;
nval = GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len - macoff;
pr_err_once("tpacket_rcv: packet too big, clamped from %u to %u. macoff=%u\n",
snaplen, nval, macoff);
snaplen = nval;
if (unlikely((int)snaplen < 0)) {
snaplen = 0;
macoff = GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len;
}
}
spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
h.raw = packet_current_rx_frame(po, skb,
TP_STATUS_KERNEL, (macoff+snaplen));
if (!h.raw)
goto drop_n_account;
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
packet_increment_rx_head(po, &po->rx_ring);
/*
* LOSING will be reported till you read the stats,
* because it's COR - Clear On Read.
* Anyways, moving it for V1/V2 only as V3 doesn't need this
* at packet level.
*/
if (po->stats.stats1.tp_drops)
status |= TP_STATUS_LOSING;
}
po->stats.stats1.tp_packets++;
if (copy_skb) {
status |= TP_STATUS_COPY;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, copy_skb);
}
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
if (virtio_net_hdr_from_skb(skb, h.raw + macoff -
sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr),
vio_le(), true)) {
spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
goto drop_n_account;
}
}
skb_copy_bits(skb, 0, h.raw + macoff, snaplen);
if (!(ts_status = tpacket_get_timestamp(skb, &ts, po->tp_tstamp)))
getnstimeofday(&ts);
status |= ts_status;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V1:
h.h1->tp_len = skb->len;
h.h1->tp_snaplen = snaplen;
h.h1->tp_mac = macoff;
h.h1->tp_net = netoff;
h.h1->tp_sec = ts.tv_sec;
h.h1->tp_usec = ts.tv_nsec / NSEC_PER_USEC;
hdrlen = sizeof(*h.h1);
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
h.h2->tp_len = skb->len;
h.h2->tp_snaplen = snaplen;
h.h2->tp_mac = macoff;
h.h2->tp_net = netoff;
h.h2->tp_sec = ts.tv_sec;
h.h2->tp_nsec = ts.tv_nsec;
if (skb_vlan_tag_present(skb)) {
h.h2->tp_vlan_tci = skb_vlan_tag_get(skb);
h.h2->tp_vlan_tpid = ntohs(skb->vlan_proto);
status |= TP_STATUS_VLAN_VALID | TP_STATUS_VLAN_TPID_VALID;
} else {
h.h2->tp_vlan_tci = 0;
h.h2->tp_vlan_tpid = 0;
}
memset(h.h2->tp_padding, 0, sizeof(h.h2->tp_padding));
hdrlen = sizeof(*h.h2);
break;
case TPACKET_V3:
/* tp_nxt_offset,vlan are already populated above.
* So DONT clear those fields here
*/
h.h3->tp_status |= status;
h.h3->tp_len = skb->len;
h.h3->tp_snaplen = snaplen;
h.h3->tp_mac = macoff;
h.h3->tp_net = netoff;
h.h3->tp_sec = ts.tv_sec;
h.h3->tp_nsec = ts.tv_nsec;
memset(h.h3->tp_padding, 0, sizeof(h.h3->tp_padding));
hdrlen = sizeof(*h.h3);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
sll = h.raw + TPACKET_ALIGN(hdrlen);
sll->sll_halen = dev_parse_header(skb, sll->sll_addr);
sll->sll_family = AF_PACKET;
sll->sll_hatype = dev->type;
sll->sll_protocol = skb->protocol;
sll->sll_pkttype = skb->pkt_type;
if (unlikely(po->origdev))
sll->sll_ifindex = orig_dev->ifindex;
else
sll->sll_ifindex = dev->ifindex;
smp_mb();
#if ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE == 1
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
u8 *start, *end;
end = (u8 *) PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long) h.raw +
macoff + snaplen);
for (start = h.raw; start < end; start += PAGE_SIZE)
flush_dcache_page(pgv_to_page(start));
}
smp_wmb();
#endif
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
__packet_set_status(po, h.raw, status);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
} else {
prb_clear_blk_fill_status(&po->rx_ring);
}
drop_n_restore:
if (skb_head != skb->data && skb_shared(skb)) {
skb->data = skb_head;
skb->len = skb_len;
}
drop:
if (!is_drop_n_account)
consume_skb(skb);
else
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
drop_n_account:
is_drop_n_account = true;
po->stats.stats1.tp_drops++;
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
kfree_skb(copy_skb);
goto drop_n_restore;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The tpacket_rcv function in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13 mishandles vnet headers, which might allow local users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow, and disk and memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: packet: Don't write vnet header beyond end of buffer
... which may happen with certain values of tp_reserve and maclen.
Fixes: 58d19b19cd99 ("packet: vnet_hdr support for tpacket_rcv")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 167,755
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭԏ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщฟ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടร] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зӡ] > 3"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of confusable characters in URL Formatter in Google Chrome prior to 67.0.3396.62 allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via IDN homographs via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Map U+04CF to lowercase L as well.
U+04CF (ӏ) has the confusability skeleton of 'i' (lowercase
I), but it can be confused for 'l' (lowercase L) or '1' (digit) if rendered
in some fonts.
If a host name contains it, calculate the confusability skeleton
twice, once with the default mapping to 'i' (lowercase I) and the 2nd
time with an alternative mapping to 'l'. Mapping them to 'l' (lowercase L)
also gets it treated as similar to digit 1 because the confusability
skeleton of digit 1 is 'l'.
Bug: 817247
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I7442b950c9457eea285e17f01d1f43c9acc5d79c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/974165
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#551263}
|
???
| 173,222
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void gdImageJpegCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quality)
{
struct jpeg_compress_struct cinfo;
struct jpeg_error_mgr jerr;
int i, j, jidx;
/* volatile so we can gdFree it on return from longjmp */
volatile JSAMPROW row = 0;
JSAMPROW rowptr[1];
jmpbuf_wrapper jmpbufw;
JDIMENSION nlines;
char comment[255];
memset (&cinfo, 0, sizeof (cinfo));
memset (&jerr, 0, sizeof (jerr));
cinfo.err = jpeg_std_error (&jerr);
cinfo.client_data = &jmpbufw;
if (setjmp (jmpbufw.jmpbuf) != 0) {
/* we're here courtesy of longjmp */
if (row) {
gdFree (row);
}
return;
}
cinfo.err->error_exit = fatal_jpeg_error;
jpeg_create_compress (&cinfo);
cinfo.image_width = im->sx;
cinfo.image_height = im->sy;
cinfo.input_components = 3; /* # of color components per pixel */
cinfo.in_color_space = JCS_RGB; /* colorspace of input image */
jpeg_set_defaults (&cinfo);
cinfo.density_unit = 1;
cinfo.X_density = im->res_x;
cinfo.Y_density = im->res_y;
if (quality >= 0) {
jpeg_set_quality (&cinfo, quality, TRUE);
}
/* If user requests interlace, translate that to progressive JPEG */
if (gdImageGetInterlaced (im)) {
jpeg_simple_progression (&cinfo);
}
jpeg_gdIOCtx_dest (&cinfo, outfile);
row = (JSAMPROW) safe_emalloc(cinfo.image_width * cinfo.input_components, sizeof(JSAMPLE), 0);
memset(row, 0, cinfo.image_width * cinfo.input_components * sizeof(JSAMPLE));
rowptr[0] = row;
jpeg_start_compress (&cinfo, TRUE);
if (quality >= 0) {
snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment)-1, "CREATOR: gd-jpeg v%s (using IJG JPEG v%d), quality = %d\n", GD_JPEG_VERSION, JPEG_LIB_VERSION, quality);
} else {
snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment)-1, "CREATOR: gd-jpeg v%s (using IJG JPEG v%d), default quality\n", GD_JPEG_VERSION, JPEG_LIB_VERSION);
}
jpeg_write_marker (&cinfo, JPEG_COM, (unsigned char *) comment, (unsigned int) strlen (comment));
if (im->trueColor) {
#if BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12
gd_error("gd-jpeg: error: jpeg library was compiled for 12-bit precision. This is mostly useless, because JPEGs on the web are 8-bit and such versions of the jpeg library won't read or write them. GD doesn't support these unusual images. Edit your jmorecfg.h file to specify the correct precision and completely 'make clean' and 'make install' libjpeg again. Sorry");
goto error;
#endif /* BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12 */
for (i = 0; i < im->sy; i++) {
for (jidx = 0, j = 0; j < im->sx; j++) {
int val = im->tpixels[i][j];
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetRed (val);
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetGreen (val);
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetBlue (val);
}
nlines = jpeg_write_scanlines (&cinfo, rowptr, 1);
if (nlines != 1) {
gd_error_ex(GD_WARNING, "gd_jpeg: warning: jpeg_write_scanlines returns %u -- expected 1", nlines);
}
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < im->sy; i++) {
for (jidx = 0, j = 0; j < im->sx; j++) {
int idx = im->pixels[i][j];
/* NB: Although gd RGB values are ints, their max value is
* 255 (see the documentation for gdImageColorAllocate())
* -- perfect for 8-bit JPEG encoding (which is the norm)
*/
#if BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 8
row[jidx++] = im->red[idx];
row[jidx++] = im->green[idx];
row[jidx++] = im->blue[idx];
#elif BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12
row[jidx++] = im->red[idx] << 4;
row[jidx++] = im->green[idx] << 4;
row[jidx++] = im->blue[idx] << 4;
#else
#error IJG JPEG library BITS_IN_JSAMPLE value must be 8 or 12
#endif
}
nlines = jpeg_write_scanlines (&cinfo, rowptr, 1);
if (nlines != 1) {
gd_error_ex(GD_WARNING, "gd_jpeg: warning: jpeg_write_scanlines returns %u -- expected 1", nlines);
}
}
}
jpeg_finish_compress (&cinfo);
jpeg_destroy_compress (&cinfo);
gdFree (row);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: The GD Graphics Library (aka LibGD) 2.2.5 has a double free in the gdImage*Ptr() functions in gd_gif_out.c, gd_jpeg.c, and gd_wbmp.c. NOTE: PHP is unaffected.
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
|
Low
| 169,735
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescription> RTCPeerConnection::localDescription(ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (m_readyState == ReadyStateClosing || m_readyState == ReadyStateClosed) {
ec = INVALID_STATE_ERR;
return 0;
}
RefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor> descriptor = m_peerHandler->localDescription();
if (!descriptor)
return 0;
RefPtr<RTCSessionDescription> desc = RTCSessionDescription::create(descriptor.release());
return desc.release();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,336
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BrowserContextDestroyer::RenderProcessHostDestroyed(
content::RenderProcessHost* host) {
DCHECK_GT(pending_hosts_, 0U);
if (--pending_hosts_ != 0) {
return;
}
//// static
if (content::RenderProcessHost::run_renderer_in_process()) {
FinishDestroyContext();
} else {
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&BrowserContextDestroyer::FinishDestroyContext,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A malicious webview could install long-lived unload handlers that re-use an incognito BrowserContext that is queued for destruction in versions of Oxide before 1.18.3.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,421
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_p_b_slice(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
WORD16 *pi2_vld_out;
UWORD32 i;
yuv_buf_t *ps_cur_frm_buf = &ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
UWORD32 u4_frm_offset = 0;
const dec_mb_params_t *ps_dec_mb_params;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
pi2_vld_out = ps_dec->ai2_vld_buf;
memset(ps_dec->ai2_pred_mv,0,sizeof(ps_dec->ai2_pred_mv));
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 1;
ps_dec->u2_picture_width = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure != FRAME_PICTURE)
{
ps_dec->u2_picture_width <<= 1;
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure == BOTTOM_FIELD)
{
u4_frm_offset = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
}
}
do
{
UWORD32 u4_x_offset, u4_y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_x_dst_offset = 0;
UWORD32 u4_y_dst_offset = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_out_p;
UWORD8 *pu1_pred;
WORD32 u4_pred_strd;
IMPEG2D_TRACE_MB_START(ps_dec->u2_mb_x, ps_dec->u2_mb_y);
if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == B_PIC)
impeg2d_dec_pnb_mb_params(ps_dec);
else
impeg2d_dec_p_mb_params(ps_dec);
IMPEG2D_TRACE_MB_START(ps_dec->u2_mb_x, ps_dec->u2_mb_y);
u4_x_dst_offset = u4_frm_offset + (ps_dec->u2_mb_x << 4);
u4_y_dst_offset = (ps_dec->u2_mb_y << 4) * ps_dec->u2_picture_width;
pu1_out_p = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_y + u4_x_dst_offset + u4_y_dst_offset;
if(ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb == 0)
{
UWORD32 offset_x, offset_y, stride;
UWORD16 index = (ps_dec->u2_motion_type);
/*only for non intra mb's*/
if(ps_dec->e_mb_pred == BIDIRECT)
{
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_bi_direct[index];
}
else
{
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back[index];
}
stride = ps_dec->u2_picture_width;
offset_x = u4_frm_offset + (ps_dec->u2_mb_x << 4);
offset_y = (ps_dec->u2_mb_y << 4);
ps_dec->s_dest_buf.pu1_y = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_y + offset_y * stride + offset_x;
stride = stride >> 1;
ps_dec->s_dest_buf.pu1_u = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_u + (offset_y >> 1) * stride
+ (offset_x >> 1);
ps_dec->s_dest_buf.pu1_v = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_v + (offset_y >> 1) * stride
+ (offset_x >> 1);
PROFILE_DISABLE_MC_IF0
ps_dec_mb_params->pf_mc(ps_dec);
}
for(i = 0; i < NUM_LUMA_BLKS; ++i)
{
if((ps_dec->u2_cbp & (1 << (BLOCKS_IN_MB - 1 - i))) != 0)
{
e_error = ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant(ps_dec, pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix,
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb, Y_LUMA, 0);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
u4_x_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_x_off[i];
if(ps_dec->u2_field_dct == 0)
u4_y_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_y_off_frm[i] ;
else
u4_y_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_y_off_fld[i] ;
IMPEG2D_IDCT_INP_STATISTICS(pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IDCT_IF0
{
WORD32 idx;
if(1 == (ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols | ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows))
idx = 0;
else
idx = 1;
if(0 == ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb)
{
pu1_pred = pu1_out_p + u4_y_offset * ps_dec->u2_picture_width + u4_x_offset;
u4_pred_strd = ps_dec->u2_picture_width << ps_dec->u2_field_dct;
}
else
{
pu1_pred = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_zerobuf;
u4_pred_strd = 8;
}
ps_dec->pf_idct_recon[idx * 2 + ps_dec->i4_last_value_one](pi2_vld_out,
ps_dec->ai2_idct_stg1,
pu1_pred,
pu1_out_p + u4_y_offset * ps_dec->u2_picture_width + u4_x_offset,
8,
u4_pred_strd,
ps_dec->u2_picture_width << ps_dec->u2_field_dct,
~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
}
}
}
/* For U and V blocks, divide the x and y offsets by 2. */
u4_x_dst_offset >>= 1;
u4_y_dst_offset >>= 2;
/* In case of chrominance blocks the DCT will be frame DCT */
/* i = 0, U component and i = 1 is V componet */
if((ps_dec->u2_cbp & 0x02) != 0)
{
pu1_out_p = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_u + u4_x_dst_offset + u4_y_dst_offset;
e_error = ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant(ps_dec, pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix,
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb, U_CHROMA, 0);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
IMPEG2D_IDCT_INP_STATISTICS(pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IDCT_IF0
{
WORD32 idx;
if(1 == (ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols | ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows))
idx = 0;
else
idx = 1;
if(0 == ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb)
{
pu1_pred = pu1_out_p;
u4_pred_strd = ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1;
}
else
{
pu1_pred = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_zerobuf;
u4_pred_strd = 8;
}
ps_dec->pf_idct_recon[idx * 2 + ps_dec->i4_last_value_one](pi2_vld_out,
ps_dec->ai2_idct_stg1,
pu1_pred,
pu1_out_p,
8,
u4_pred_strd,
ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1,
~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
}
}
if((ps_dec->u2_cbp & 0x01) != 0)
{
pu1_out_p = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_v + u4_x_dst_offset + u4_y_dst_offset;
e_error = ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant(ps_dec, pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix,
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb, V_CHROMA, 0);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
IMPEG2D_IDCT_INP_STATISTICS(pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IDCT_IF0
{
WORD32 idx;
if(1 == (ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols | ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows))
idx = 0;
else
idx = 1;
if(0 == ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb)
{
pu1_pred = pu1_out_p;
u4_pred_strd = ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1;
}
else
{
pu1_pred = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_zerobuf;
u4_pred_strd = 8;
}
ps_dec->pf_idct_recon[idx * 2 + ps_dec->i4_last_value_one](pi2_vld_out,
ps_dec->ai2_idct_stg1,
pu1_pred,
pu1_out_p,
8,
u4_pred_strd,
ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1,
~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
}
}
ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left--;
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mb_x++;
if(ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_offset > ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_max_offset)
{
return IMPEG2D_BITSTREAM_BUFF_EXCEEDED_ERR;
}
else if (ps_dec->u2_mb_x == ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb)
{
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mb_y++;
}
}
while(ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left != 0 && impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream,23) != 0x0);
return e_error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: decoder/impeg2d_dec_hdr.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file that triggers a certain negative value, aka internal bug 26070014.
Commit Message: Return error for wrong mb_type
If mb_type decoded returns an invalid type of MB, then return error
Bug: 26070014
Change-Id: I66abcad5de1352dd42d05b1a13bb4176153b133c
|
Low
| 174,608
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int get_rock_ridge_filename(struct iso_directory_record *de,
char *retname, struct inode *inode)
{
struct rock_state rs;
struct rock_ridge *rr;
int sig;
int retnamlen = 0;
int truncate = 0;
int ret = 0;
if (!ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock)
return 0;
*retname = 0;
init_rock_state(&rs, inode);
setup_rock_ridge(de, inode, &rs);
repeat:
while (rs.len > 2) { /* There may be one byte for padding somewhere */
rr = (struct rock_ridge *)rs.chr;
/*
* Ignore rock ridge info if rr->len is out of range, but
* don't return -EIO because that would make the file
* invisible.
*/
if (rr->len < 3)
goto out; /* Something got screwed up here */
sig = isonum_721(rs.chr);
if (rock_check_overflow(&rs, sig))
goto eio;
rs.chr += rr->len;
rs.len -= rr->len;
/*
* As above, just ignore the rock ridge info if rr->len
* is bogus.
*/
if (rs.len < 0)
goto out; /* Something got screwed up here */
switch (sig) {
case SIG('R', 'R'):
if ((rr->u.RR.flags[0] & RR_NM) == 0)
goto out;
break;
case SIG('S', 'P'):
if (check_sp(rr, inode))
goto out;
break;
case SIG('C', 'E'):
rs.cont_extent = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.extent);
rs.cont_offset = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.offset);
rs.cont_size = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.size);
break;
case SIG('N', 'M'):
if (truncate)
break;
if (rr->len < 5)
break;
/*
* If the flags are 2 or 4, this indicates '.' or '..'.
* We don't want to do anything with this, because it
* screws up the code that calls us. We don't really
* care anyways, since we can just use the non-RR
* name.
*/
if (rr->u.NM.flags & 6)
break;
if (rr->u.NM.flags & ~1) {
printk("Unsupported NM flag settings (%d)\n",
rr->u.NM.flags);
break;
}
if ((strlen(retname) + rr->len - 5) >= 254) {
truncate = 1;
break;
}
strncat(retname, rr->u.NM.name, rr->len - 5);
retnamlen += rr->len - 5;
break;
case SIG('R', 'E'):
kfree(rs.buffer);
return -1;
default:
break;
}
}
ret = rock_continue(&rs);
if (ret == 0)
goto repeat;
if (ret == 1)
return retnamlen; /* If 0, this file did not have a NM field */
out:
kfree(rs.buffer);
return ret;
eio:
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The get_rock_ridge_filename function in fs/isofs/rock.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.5 mishandles NM (aka alternate name) entries containing 0 characters, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted isofs filesystem.
Commit Message: get_rock_ridge_filename(): handle malformed NM entries
Payloads of NM entries are not supposed to contain NUL. When we run
into such, only the part prior to the first NUL goes into the
concatenation (i.e. the directory entry name being encoded by a bunch
of NM entries). We do stop when the amount collected so far + the
claimed amount in the current NM entry exceed 254. So far, so good,
but what we return as the total length is the sum of *claimed*
sizes, not the actual amount collected. And that can grow pretty
large - not unlimited, since you'd need to put CE entries in
between to be able to get more than the maximum that could be
contained in one isofs directory entry / continuation chunk and
we are stop once we'd encountered 32 CEs, but you can get about 8Kb
easily. And that's what will be passed to readdir callback as the
name length. 8Kb __copy_to_user() from a buffer allocated by
__get_free_page()
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 0.98pl6+ (yes, really)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Low
| 167,224
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::storeMetaDataInBuffers_l(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, MetadataBufferType *type) {
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26324358");
if (type != NULL) {
*type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
}
return BAD_VALUE;
}
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.storeMetaDataInBuffers");
OMX_STRING nativeBufferName = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.storeANWBufferInMetadata");
MetadataBufferType negotiatedType;
MetadataBufferType requestedType = type != NULL ? *type : kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.bStoreMetaData = enable;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err =
requestedType == kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer
? OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, nativeBufferName, &index)
: OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
OMX_ERRORTYPE xerr = err;
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
name = nativeBufferName; // set name for debugging
negotiatedType = requestedType;
}
}
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
xerr = err;
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
negotiatedType =
requestedType == kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer
? kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource : requestedType;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
}
}
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
if (err == OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex && portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
CLOGW("component does not support metadata mode; using fallback");
} else if (xerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(getExtensionIndex, xerr, "%s", name);
} else {
CLOG_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d type=%d", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, negotiatedType);
}
negotiatedType = mMetadataType[portIndex];
} else {
if (!enable) {
negotiatedType = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
}
mMetadataType[portIndex] = negotiatedType;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(storeMetaDataInBuffers, "%s:%u %srequested %s:%d negotiated %s:%d",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable ? "" : "UN",
asString(requestedType), requestedType, asString(negotiatedType), negotiatedType);
if (type != NULL) {
*type = negotiatedType;
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
|
Medium
| 174,140
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: AriaCurrentState AXNodeObject::ariaCurrentState() const {
const AtomicString& attributeValue =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kCurrent);
if (attributeValue.isNull())
return AriaCurrentStateUndefined;
if (attributeValue.isEmpty() || equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "false"))
return AriaCurrentStateFalse;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "true"))
return AriaCurrentStateTrue;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "page"))
return AriaCurrentStatePage;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "step"))
return AriaCurrentStateStep;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "location"))
return AriaCurrentStateLocation;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "date"))
return AriaCurrentStateDate;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "time"))
return AriaCurrentStateTime;
if (!attributeValue.isEmpty())
return AriaCurrentStateTrue;
return AXObject::ariaCurrentState();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
Medium
| 171,908
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Segment::DoLoadClusterUnknownSize(long long& pos, long& len) {
assert(m_pos < 0);
assert(m_pUnknownSize);
#if 0
assert(m_pUnknownSize->GetElementSize() < 0); //TODO: verify this
const long long element_start = m_pUnknownSize->m_element_start;
pos = -m_pos;
assert(pos > element_start);
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
long long element_size = -1;
for (;;) { //determine cluster size
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
{
element_size = total - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
{
element_size = segment_stop - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
if ((id == 0x0F43B675) || (id == 0x0C53BB6B)) { //Cluster ID or Cues ID
element_size = pos - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
#ifdef _DEBUG
switch (id)
{
case 0x20: //BlockGroup
case 0x23: //Simple Block
case 0x67: //TimeCode
case 0x2B: //PrevSize
break;
default:
assert(false);
break;
}
#endif
pos += len; //consume ID (of sub-element)
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field of element
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //not allowed for sub-elements
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop)) //weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; //consume payload of sub-element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
} //determine cluster size
assert(element_size >= 0);
m_pos = element_start + element_size;
m_pUnknownSize = 0;
return 2; //continue parsing
#else
const long status = m_pUnknownSize->Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) // error or underflow
return status;
if (status == 0) // parsed a block
return 2; // continue parsing
assert(status > 0); // nothing left to parse of this cluster
const long long start = m_pUnknownSize->m_element_start;
const long long size = m_pUnknownSize->GetElementSize();
assert(size >= 0);
pos = start + size;
m_pos = pos;
m_pUnknownSize = 0;
return 2; // continue parsing
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,809
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual scoped_refptr<ui::Texture> CreateTransportClient(
const gfx::Size& size,
float device_scale_factor,
uint64 transport_handle) {
if (!shared_context_.get())
return NULL;
scoped_refptr<ImageTransportClientTexture> image(
new ImageTransportClientTexture(shared_context_.get(),
size, device_scale_factor,
transport_handle));
return image;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,361
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WT_VoiceFilter (S_FILTER_CONTROL *pFilter, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pAudioBuffer;
EAS_I32 k;
EAS_I32 b1;
EAS_I32 b2;
EAS_I32 z1;
EAS_I32 z2;
EAS_I32 acc0;
EAS_I32 acc1;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pAudioBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
z1 = pFilter->z1;
z2 = pFilter->z2;
b1 = -pWTIntFrame->frame.b1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
b2 = -pWTIntFrame->frame.b2 >> 1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
k = pWTIntFrame->frame.k >> 1;
while (numSamples--)
{
/* do filter calculations */
acc0 = *pAudioBuffer;
acc1 = z1 * b1;
acc1 += z2 * b2;
acc0 = acc1 + k * acc0;
z2 = z1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
z1 = acc0 >> 14;
*pAudioBuffer++ = (EAS_I16) z1;
}
/* save delay values */
pFilter->z1 = (EAS_I16) z1;
pFilter->z2 = (EAS_I16) z2;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sonivox in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for a negative number of samples, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtengine.c and arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtsynth.c, aka internal bug 26366256.
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
|
Low
| 174,605
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::AllowPluginTypeForDocument(
const Document& document,
const String& type,
const String& type_attribute,
const KURL& url,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy) const {
if (document.GetContentSecurityPolicy() &&
!document.GetContentSecurityPolicy()->AllowPluginType(
type, type_attribute, url, reporting_policy))
return false;
LocalFrame* frame = document.GetFrame();
if (frame && frame->Tree().Parent() && document.IsPluginDocument()) {
ContentSecurityPolicy* parent_csp = frame->Tree()
.Parent()
->GetSecurityContext()
->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
if (parent_csp && !parent_csp->AllowPluginType(type, type_attribute, url,
reporting_policy))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect inheritance of a new document's policy in Content Security Policy in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
|
Medium
| 173,055
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: llc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *p, u_int length, u_int caplen,
const struct lladdr_info *src, const struct lladdr_info *dst)
{
uint8_t dsap_field, dsap, ssap_field, ssap;
uint16_t control;
int hdrlen;
int is_u;
if (caplen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (caplen);
}
if (length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (length);
}
dsap_field = *p;
ssap_field = *(p + 1);
/*
* OK, what type of LLC frame is this? The length
* of the control field depends on that - I frames
* have a two-byte control field, and U frames have
* a one-byte control field.
*/
control = *(p + 2);
if ((control & LLC_U_FMT) == LLC_U_FMT) {
/*
* U frame.
*/
is_u = 1;
hdrlen = 3; /* DSAP, SSAP, 1-byte control field */
} else {
/*
* The control field in I and S frames is
* 2 bytes...
*/
if (caplen < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (caplen);
}
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (length);
}
/*
* ...and is little-endian.
*/
control = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p + 2);
is_u = 0;
hdrlen = 4; /* DSAP, SSAP, 2-byte control field */
}
if (ssap_field == LLCSAP_GLOBAL && dsap_field == LLCSAP_GLOBAL) {
/*
* This is an Ethernet_802.3 IPX frame; it has an
* 802.3 header (i.e., an Ethernet header where the
* type/length field is <= ETHERMTU, i.e. it's a length
* field, not a type field), but has no 802.2 header -
* the IPX packet starts right after the Ethernet header,
* with a signature of two bytes of 0xFF (which is
* LLCSAP_GLOBAL).
*
* (It might also have been an Ethernet_802.3 IPX at
* one time, but got bridged onto another network,
* such as an 802.11 network; this has appeared in at
* least one capture file.)
*/
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IPX 802.3: "));
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
return (0); /* no LLC header */
}
dsap = dsap_field & ~LLC_IG;
ssap = ssap_field & ~LLC_GSAP;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "LLC, dsap %s (0x%02x) %s, ssap %s (0x%02x) %s",
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown", dsap),
dsap,
tok2str(llc_ig_flag_values, "Unknown", dsap_field & LLC_IG),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown", ssap),
ssap,
tok2str(llc_flag_values, "Unknown", ssap_field & LLC_GSAP)));
if (is_u) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ctrl 0x%02x: ", control));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ctrl 0x%04x: ", control));
}
}
/*
* Skip LLC header.
*/
p += hdrlen;
length -= hdrlen;
caplen -= hdrlen;
if (ssap == LLCSAP_SNAP && dsap == LLCSAP_SNAP
&& control == LLC_UI) {
/*
* XXX - what *is* the right bridge pad value here?
* Does anybody ever bridge one form of LAN traffic
* over a networking type that uses 802.2 LLC?
*/
if (!snap_print(ndo, p, length, caplen, src, dst, 2)) {
/*
* Unknown packet type; tell our caller, by
* returning a negative value, so they
* can print the raw packet.
*/
return (-(hdrlen + 5)); /* include LLC and SNAP header */
} else
return (hdrlen + 5); /* include LLC and SNAP header */
}
if (ssap == LLCSAP_8021D && dsap == LLCSAP_8021D &&
control == LLC_UI) {
stp_print(ndo, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (ssap == LLCSAP_IP && dsap == LLCSAP_IP &&
control == LLC_UI) {
/*
* This is an RFC 948-style IP packet, with
* an 802.3 header and an 802.2 LLC header
* with the source and destination SAPs being
* the IP SAP.
*/
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (ssap == LLCSAP_IPX && dsap == LLCSAP_IPX &&
control == LLC_UI) {
/*
* This is an Ethernet_802.2 IPX frame, with an 802.3
* header and an 802.2 LLC header with the source and
* destination SAPs being the IPX SAP.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IPX 802.2: "));
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
#ifdef ENABLE_SMB
if (ssap == LLCSAP_NETBEUI && dsap == LLCSAP_NETBEUI
&& (!(control & LLC_S_FMT) || control == LLC_U_FMT)) {
/*
* we don't actually have a full netbeui parser yet, but the
* smb parser can handle many smb-in-netbeui packets, which
* is very useful, so we call that
*
* We don't call it for S frames, however, just I frames
* (which are frames that don't have the low-order bit,
* LLC_S_FMT, set in the first byte of the control field)
* and UI frames (whose control field is just 3, LLC_U_FMT).
*/
netbeui_print(ndo, control, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
#endif
if (ssap == LLCSAP_ISONS && dsap == LLCSAP_ISONS
&& control == LLC_UI) {
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag) {
if (ssap == dsap) {
if (src == NULL || dst == NULL)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s %s ",
(src->addr_string)(ndo, src->addr),
(dst->addr_string)(ndo, dst->addr),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
} else {
if (src == NULL || dst == NULL)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s ",
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown SSAP 0x%02x", ssap),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %s > %s %s ",
(src->addr_string)(ndo, src->addr),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown SSAP 0x%02x", ssap),
(dst->addr_string)(ndo, dst->addr),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
}
}
if (is_u) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Unnumbered, %s, Flags [%s], length %u",
tok2str(llc_cmd_values, "%02x", LLC_U_CMD(control)),
tok2str(llc_flag_values,"?",(ssap_field & LLC_GSAP) | (control & LLC_U_POLL)),
length + hdrlen));
if ((control & ~LLC_U_POLL) == LLC_XID) {
if (length == 0) {
/*
* XID with no payload.
* This could, for example, be an SNA
* "short form" XID.
*/
return (hdrlen);
}
if (caplen < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
if (caplen > 0)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (*p == LLC_XID_FI) {
if (caplen < 3 || length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
if (caplen > 0)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %02x %02x", p[1], p[2]));
return (hdrlen);
}
}
} else {
if ((control & LLC_S_FMT) == LLC_S_FMT) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Supervisory, %s, rcv seq %u, Flags [%s], length %u",
tok2str(llc_supervisory_values,"?",LLC_S_CMD(control)),
LLC_IS_NR(control),
tok2str(llc_flag_values,"?",(ssap_field & LLC_GSAP) | (control & LLC_IS_POLL)),
length + hdrlen));
return (hdrlen); /* no payload to print */
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Information, send seq %u, rcv seq %u, Flags [%s], length %u",
LLC_I_NS(control),
LLC_IS_NR(control),
tok2str(llc_flag_values,"?",(ssap_field & LLC_GSAP) | (control & LLC_IS_POLL)),
length + hdrlen));
}
}
return (-hdrlen);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,953
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
{
unsigned short length;
unsigned short type;
unsigned short size;
unsigned char *data = *p;
int tlsext_servername = 0;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
# endif
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
# endif
if (data >= (d + n - 2))
goto ri_check;
n2s(data, length);
if (data + length != d + n) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
if (data + size > (d + n))
goto ri_check;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
tlsext_servername = 1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
ecpointformatlist_length;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
ecpointformatlist_length);
}
# if 0
fprintf(stderr,
"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
# endif
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
|| (size > 0)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
}
# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
if (size < 2) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
/* shouldn't really happen */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
}
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
/* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
} else {
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
}
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
# endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
/*
* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
* request message.
*/
if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
unsigned char *selected;
unsigned char selected_len;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
/* The data must be valid */
if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->
ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
size,
s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
# endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
unsigned len;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (!s->cert->alpn_sent) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
if (size < 4) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
/*-
* The extension data consists of:
* uint16 list_length
* uint8 proto_length;
* uint8 proto[proto_length];
*/
len = data[0];
len <<= 8;
len |= data[1];
if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
len = data[2];
if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
}
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
switch (data[0]) {
case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default:
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
return 0;
}
# endif
/*
* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
* custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
*/
else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
return 0;
data += size;
}
if (data != d + n) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
} else {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
*p = data;
ri_check:
/*
* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
* an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
* because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
* However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
* doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
* initial connect only.
*/
if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: OpenSSL through 1.0.2h incorrectly uses pointer arithmetic for heap-buffer boundary checks, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging unexpected malloc behavior, related to s3_srvr.c, ssl_sess.c, and t1_lib.c.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,205
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl;
int instance = 0;
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
char *rem_addr = NULL;
char *community = "public";
char Opts[256];
int arg;
char *command;
int i;
/* Get options at the command line (overide default values) */
strcpy(Opts, "i:d:h-");
while ((arg = getopt(argc, argv, Opts)) != EOF) {
switch (arg) {
case 'h':
case '-':
usage(argv[0]);
return(0);
case 'i':
instance = atol(optarg);
break;
case 'd':
rem_addr = optarg;
break;
default:
usage(argv[0]);
return(-1);
}
}
if(optind >= argc){
fprintf(stderr, "Command required\n");
usage(argv[0]);
return -1;
}
command = argv[optind++];
printf("Connecting to %s FM instance %d\n", (rem_addr==NULL) ? "LOCAL":rem_addr, instance);
if((res = fm_mgr_config_init(&hdl,instance, rem_addr, community)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialize the client handle: %d\n", res);
goto die_clean;
}
if((res = fm_mgr_config_connect(hdl)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to connect: (%d) %s\n",res,fm_mgr_get_error_str(res));
goto die_clean;
}
for(i=0;i<commandListLen;i++){
if(strcmp(command,commandList[i].name) == 0){
return commandList[i].cmdPtr(hdl, commandList[i].mgr, (argc - optind), &argv[optind]);
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "Command (%s) is not valid\n",command);
usage(argv[0]);
res = -1;
die_clean:
if (hdl) free(hdl);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race conditions in opa-fm before 10.4.0.0.196 and opa-ff before 10.4.0.0.197.
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
|
Medium
| 170,127
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: kadm5_randkey_principal_3(void *server_handle,
krb5_principal principal,
krb5_boolean keepold,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple,
krb5_keyblock **keyblocks,
int *n_keys)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
krb5_int32 now;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol;
int ret, last_pwd;
krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey;
krb5_kvno act_kvno;
int new_n_ks_tuple = 0;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL;
if (keyblocks)
*keyblocks = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
if (principal == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb)))
return(ret);
ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, adb.policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple,
&new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple);
if (ret)
goto done;
if (krb5_principal_compare(handle->context, principal, hist_princ)) {
/* If changing the history entry, the new entry must have exactly one
* key. */
if (keepold)
return KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL;
new_n_ks_tuple = 1;
}
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = krb5_dbe_crk(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple,
keepold, kdb);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno);
if (ret)
goto done;
kdb->attributes &= ~KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE;
ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now);
if (ret)
goto done;
if ((adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, adb.policy, &pol, &have_pol);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
if (have_pol) {
ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, &last_pwd);
if (ret)
goto done;
#if 0
/*
* The spec says this check is overridden if the caller has
* modify privilege. The admin server therefore makes this
* check itself (in chpass_principal_wrapper, misc.c). A
* local caller implicitly has all authorization bits.
*/
if((now - last_pwd) < pol.pw_min_life &&
!(kdb->attributes & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE)) {
ret = KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON;
goto done;
}
#endif
if (pol.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = now + pol.pw_max_life;
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
} else {
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now);
if (ret)
goto done;
/* unlock principal on this KDC */
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
if (keyblocks) {
ret = decrypt_key_data(handle->context,
kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data,
keyblocks, n_keys);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
/* key data changed, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT;
/* | KADM5_RANDKEY_USED */;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_chpass(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, principal, keepold,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, NULL);
if (ret)
goto done;
if ((ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb)))
goto done;
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_chpass(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, principal,
keepold, new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, NULL);
ret = KADM5_OK;
done:
free(new_ks_tuple);
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
if (have_pol)
kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-255
Summary: The kadm5_randkey_principal_3 function in lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13 sends old keys in a response to a -randkey -keepold request, which allows remote authenticated users to forge tickets by leveraging administrative access.
Commit Message: Return only new keys in randkey [CVE-2014-5351]
In kadmind's randkey operation, if a client specifies the keepold
flag, do not include the preserved old keys in the response.
CVE-2014-5351:
An authenticated remote attacker can retrieve the current keys for a
service principal when generating a new set of keys for that
principal. The attacker needs to be authenticated as a user who has
the elevated privilege for randomizing the keys of other principals.
Normally, when a Kerberos administrator randomizes the keys of a
service principal, kadmind returns only the new keys. This prevents
an administrator who lacks legitimate privileged access to a service
from forging tickets to authenticate to that service. If the
"keepold" flag to the kadmin randkey RPC operation is true, kadmind
retains the old keys in the KDC database as intended, but also
unexpectedly returns the old keys to the client, which exposes the
service to ticket forgery attacks from the administrator.
A mitigating factor is that legitimate clients of the affected service
will start failing to authenticate to the service once they begin to
receive service tickets encrypted in the new keys. The affected
service will be unable to decrypt the newly issued tickets, possibly
alerting the legitimate administrator of the affected service.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[tlyu@mit.edu: CVE description and CVSS score]
ticket: 8018 (new)
target_version: 1.13
tags: pullup
|
High
| 166,275
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: png_do_rgb_to_gray(png_structp png_ptr, png_row_infop row_info, png_bytep row)
{
png_uint_32 i;
png_uint_32 row_width = row_info->width;
int rgb_error = 0;
png_debug(1, "in png_do_rgb_to_gray");
if (
#ifdef PNG_USELESS_TESTS_SUPPORTED
row != NULL && row_info != NULL &&
#endif
(row_info->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR))
{
png_uint_32 rc = png_ptr->rgb_to_gray_red_coeff;
png_uint_32 gc = png_ptr->rgb_to_gray_green_coeff;
png_uint_32 bc = png_ptr->rgb_to_gray_blue_coeff;
if (row_info->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
{
if (row_info->bit_depth == 8)
{
#if defined(PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_READ_BACKGROUND_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->gamma_from_1 != NULL && png_ptr->gamma_to_1 != NULL)
{
png_bytep sp = row;
png_bytep dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
png_byte red = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[*(sp++)];
png_byte green = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[*(sp++)];
png_byte blue = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[*(sp++)];
if (red != green || red != blue)
{
rgb_error |= 1;
*(dp++) = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[
(rc*red + gc*green + bc*blue)>>15];
}
else
*(dp++) = *(sp - 1);
}
}
else
#endif
{
png_bytep sp = row;
png_bytep dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
png_byte red = *(sp++);
png_byte green = *(sp++);
png_byte blue = *(sp++);
if (red != green || red != blue)
{
rgb_error |= 1;
*(dp++) = (png_byte)((rc*red + gc*green + bc*blue)>>15);
}
else
*(dp++) = *(sp - 1);
}
}
}
else /* RGB bit_depth == 16 */
{
#if defined(PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_READ_BACKGROUND_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->gamma_16_to_1 != NULL &&
png_ptr->gamma_16_from_1 != NULL)
{
png_bytep sp = row;
png_bytep dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
png_uint_16 red, green, blue, w;
red = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp))<<8) | *(sp+1)); sp+=2;
green = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp))<<8) | *(sp+1)); sp+=2;
blue = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp))<<8) | *(sp+1)); sp+=2;
if (red == green && red == blue)
w = red;
else
{
png_uint_16 red_1 = png_ptr->gamma_16_to_1[(red&0xff) >>
png_ptr->gamma_shift][red>>8];
png_uint_16 green_1 =
png_ptr->gamma_16_to_1[(green&0xff) >>
png_ptr->gamma_shift][green>>8];
png_uint_16 blue_1 = png_ptr->gamma_16_to_1[(blue&0xff) >>
png_ptr->gamma_shift][blue>>8];
png_uint_16 gray16 = (png_uint_16)((rc*red_1 + gc*green_1
+ bc*blue_1)>>15);
w = png_ptr->gamma_16_from_1[(gray16&0xff) >>
png_ptr->gamma_shift][gray16 >> 8];
rgb_error |= 1;
}
*(dp++) = (png_byte)((w>>8) & 0xff);
*(dp++) = (png_byte)(w & 0xff);
}
}
else
#endif
{
png_bytep sp = row;
png_bytep dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
png_uint_16 red, green, blue, gray16;
red = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp))<<8) | *(sp+1)); sp+=2;
green = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp))<<8) | *(sp+1)); sp+=2;
blue = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp))<<8) | *(sp+1)); sp+=2;
if (red != green || red != blue)
rgb_error |= 1;
gray16 = (png_uint_16)((rc*red + gc*green + bc*blue)>>15);
*(dp++) = (png_byte)((gray16>>8) & 0xff);
*(dp++) = (png_byte)(gray16 & 0xff);
}
}
}
}
if (row_info->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
{
if (row_info->bit_depth == 8)
{
#if defined(PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_READ_BACKGROUND_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->gamma_from_1 != NULL && png_ptr->gamma_to_1 != NULL)
{
png_bytep sp = row;
png_bytep dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
png_byte red = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[*(sp++)];
png_byte green = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[*(sp++)];
png_byte blue = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[*(sp++)];
if (red != green || red != blue)
rgb_error |= 1;
*(dp++) = png_ptr->gamma_from_1
[(rc*red + gc*green + bc*blue)>>15];
*(dp++) = *(sp++); /* alpha */
}
}
else
#endif
{
png_bytep sp = row;
png_bytep dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
png_byte red = *(sp++);
png_byte green = *(sp++);
png_byte blue = *(sp++);
if (red != green || red != blue)
rgb_error |= 1;
*(dp++) = (png_byte)((rc*red + gc*green + bc*blue)>>15);
*(dp++) = *(sp++); /* alpha */
}
}
}
else /* RGBA bit_depth == 16 */
{
#if defined(PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_READ_BACKGROUND_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->gamma_16_to_1 != NULL &&
png_ptr->gamma_16_from_1 != NULL)
{
png_bytep sp = row;
png_bytep dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
png_uint_16 red, green, blue, w;
red = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp))<<8) | *(sp+1)); sp+=2;
green = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp))<<8) | *(sp+1)); sp+=2;
blue = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp))<<8) | *(sp+1)); sp+=2;
if (red == green && red == blue)
w = red;
else
{
png_uint_16 red_1 = png_ptr->gamma_16_to_1[(red&0xff) >>
png_ptr->gamma_shift][red>>8];
png_uint_16 green_1 =
png_ptr->gamma_16_to_1[(green&0xff) >>
png_ptr->gamma_shift][green>>8];
png_uint_16 blue_1 = png_ptr->gamma_16_to_1[(blue&0xff) >>
png_ptr->gamma_shift][blue>>8];
png_uint_16 gray16 = (png_uint_16)((rc * red_1
+ gc * green_1 + bc * blue_1)>>15);
w = png_ptr->gamma_16_from_1[(gray16&0xff) >>
png_ptr->gamma_shift][gray16 >> 8];
rgb_error |= 1;
}
*(dp++) = (png_byte)((w>>8) & 0xff);
*(dp++) = (png_byte)(w & 0xff);
*(dp++) = *(sp++); /* alpha */
*(dp++) = *(sp++);
}
}
else
#endif
{
png_bytep sp = row;
png_bytep dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
png_uint_16 red, green, blue, gray16;
red = (png_uint_16)((*(sp)<<8) | *(sp+1)); sp+=2;
green = (png_uint_16)((*(sp)<<8) | *(sp+1)); sp+=2;
blue = (png_uint_16)((*(sp)<<8) | *(sp+1)); sp+=2;
if (red != green || red != blue)
rgb_error |= 1;
gray16 = (png_uint_16)((rc*red + gc*green + bc*blue)>>15);
*(dp++) = (png_byte)((gray16>>8) & 0xff);
*(dp++) = (png_byte)(gray16 & 0xff);
*(dp++) = *(sp++); /* alpha */
*(dp++) = *(sp++);
}
}
}
}
row_info->channels -= (png_byte)2;
row_info->color_type &= ~PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR;
row_info->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(row_info->channels *
row_info->bit_depth);
row_info->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(row_info->pixel_depth, row_width);
}
return rgb_error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
Low
| 172,171
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long do_msgsnd(int msqid, long mtype, void __user *mtext,
size_t msgsz, int msgflg)
{
struct msg_queue *msq;
struct msg_msg *msg;
int err;
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
if (msgsz > ns->msg_ctlmax || (long) msgsz < 0 || msqid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (mtype < 1)
return -EINVAL;
msg = load_msg(mtext, msgsz);
if (IS_ERR(msg))
return PTR_ERR(msg);
msg->m_type = mtype;
msg->m_ts = msgsz;
msq = msg_lock_check(ns, msqid);
if (IS_ERR(msq)) {
err = PTR_ERR(msq);
goto out_free;
}
for (;;) {
struct msg_sender s;
err = -EACCES;
if (ipcperms(ns, &msq->q_perm, S_IWUGO))
goto out_unlock_free;
err = security_msg_queue_msgsnd(msq, msg, msgflg);
if (err)
goto out_unlock_free;
if (msgsz + msq->q_cbytes <= msq->q_qbytes &&
1 + msq->q_qnum <= msq->q_qbytes) {
break;
}
/* queue full, wait: */
if (msgflg & IPC_NOWAIT) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out_unlock_free;
}
ss_add(msq, &s);
ipc_rcu_getref(msq);
msg_unlock(msq);
schedule();
ipc_lock_by_ptr(&msq->q_perm);
ipc_rcu_putref(msq);
if (msq->q_perm.deleted) {
err = -EIDRM;
goto out_unlock_free;
}
ss_del(&s);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = -ERESTARTNOHAND;
goto out_unlock_free;
}
}
msq->q_lspid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
msq->q_stime = get_seconds();
if (!pipelined_send(msq, msg)) {
/* no one is waiting for this message, enqueue it */
list_add_tail(&msg->m_list, &msq->q_messages);
msq->q_cbytes += msgsz;
msq->q_qnum++;
atomic_add(msgsz, &ns->msg_bytes);
atomic_inc(&ns->msg_hdrs);
}
err = 0;
msg = NULL;
out_unlock_free:
msg_unlock(msq);
out_free:
if (msg != NULL)
free_msg(msg);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,967
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubbleForLocalSave(
const CreditCard& card,
const base::Closure& save_card_callback) {
is_uploading_ = false;
is_reshow_ = false;
should_cvc_be_requested_ = false;
legal_message_lines_.clear();
AutofillMetrics::LogSaveCardPromptMetric(
AutofillMetrics::SAVE_CARD_PROMPT_SHOW_REQUESTED, is_uploading_,
is_reshow_,
pref_service_->GetInteger(
prefs::kAutofillAcceptSaveCreditCardPromptState));
card_ = card;
save_card_callback_ = save_card_callback;
ShowBubble();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in credit card autofill in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux and Windows allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [autofill] Avoid duplicate instances of the SaveCardBubble.
autofill::SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubble() expects
(via DCHECK) to only be called when the save card bubble is
not already visible. This constraint is violated if the user
clicks multiple times on a submit button.
If the underlying page goes away, the last SaveCardBubbleView
created by the controller will be automatically cleaned up,
but any others are left visible on the screen... holding a
refence to a possibly-deleted controller.
This CL early exits the ShowBubbleFor*** and ReshowBubble logic
if the bubble is already visible.
BUG=708819
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2862933002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469768}
|
Medium
| 172,385
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void AwContents::ScrollContainerViewTo(gfx::Vector2d new_value) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> obj = java_ref_.get(env);
if (obj.is_null())
return;
Java_AwContents_scrollContainerViewTo(
env, obj.obj(), new_value.x(), new_value.y());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the StyleElement::removedFromDocument function in core/dom/StyleElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.114, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code that triggers tree mutation.
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
|
Low
| 171,617
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void assertObjectHasGCInfo(const void* payload, size_t gcInfoIndex) {
ASSERT(HeapObjectHeader::fromPayload(payload)->checkHeader());
#if !defined(COMPONENT_BUILD)
ASSERT(HeapObjectHeader::fromPayload(payload)->gcInfoIndex() == gcInfoIndex);
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Inline metadata in GarbageCollection in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
|
Medium
| 172,704
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void nfs4_return_incompatible_delegation(struct inode *inode, mode_t open_flags)
{
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(NFS_I(inode)->delegation);
if (delegation == NULL || (delegation->type & open_flags) == open_flags) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
nfs_inode_return_delegation(inode);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
Low
| 165,703
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void close_all_sockets(atransport* t) {
asocket* s;
/* this is a little gross, but since s->close() *will* modify
** the list out from under you, your options are limited.
*/
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
restart:
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->transport == t || (s->peer && s->peer->transport == t)) {
local_socket_close(s);
goto restart;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Java Debug Wire Protocol (JDWP) implementation in adb/sockets.cpp in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-09-01 mishandles socket close operations, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28347842.
Commit Message: adb: use asocket's close function when closing.
close_all_sockets was assuming that all registered local sockets used
local_socket_close as their close function. However, this is not true
for JDWP sockets.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I40a1174845cd33f15f30ce70828a7081cd5a087e
(cherry picked from commit 53eb31d87cb84a4212f4850bf745646e1fb12814)
|
High
| 173,405
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageHelperImageData(
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLint border,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLsizei depth,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
ImageData* pixels,
const IntRect& source_image_rect,
GLint unpack_image_height) {
const char* func_name = GetTexImageFunctionName(function_id);
if (isContextLost())
return;
DCHECK(pixels);
if (pixels->data()->BufferBase()->IsNeutered()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name,
"The source data has been neutered.");
return;
}
if (!ValidateTexImageBinding(func_name, function_id, target))
return;
TexImageFunctionType function_type;
if (function_id == kTexImage2D || function_id == kTexImage3D)
function_type = kTexImage;
else
function_type = kTexSubImage;
if (!ValidateTexFunc(func_name, function_type, kSourceImageData, target,
level, internalformat, pixels->width(), pixels->height(),
depth, border, format, type, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset))
return;
bool selecting_sub_rectangle = false;
if (!ValidateTexImageSubRectangle(
func_name, function_id, pixels, source_image_rect, depth,
unpack_image_height, &selecting_sub_rectangle)) {
return;
}
IntRect adjusted_source_image_rect = source_image_rect;
if (unpack_flip_y_) {
adjusted_source_image_rect.SetY(pixels->height() -
adjusted_source_image_rect.MaxY());
}
Vector<uint8_t> data;
bool need_conversion = true;
if (!unpack_flip_y_ && !unpack_premultiply_alpha_ && format == GL_RGBA &&
type == GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE && !selecting_sub_rectangle && depth == 1) {
need_conversion = false;
} else {
if (type == GL_UNSIGNED_INT_10F_11F_11F_REV) {
type = GL_FLOAT;
}
if (!WebGLImageConversion::ExtractImageData(
pixels->data()->Data(),
WebGLImageConversion::DataFormat::kDataFormatRGBA8, pixels->Size(),
adjusted_source_image_rect, depth, unpack_image_height, format,
type, unpack_flip_y_, unpack_premultiply_alpha_, data)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "bad image data");
return;
}
}
ScopedUnpackParametersResetRestore temporary_reset_unpack(this);
const uint8_t* bytes = need_conversion ? data.data() : pixels->data()->Data();
if (function_id == kTexImage2D) {
DCHECK_EQ(unpack_image_height, 0);
TexImage2DBase(
target, level, internalformat, adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(),
adjusted_source_image_rect.Height(), border, format, type, bytes);
} else if (function_id == kTexSubImage2D) {
DCHECK_EQ(unpack_image_height, 0);
ContextGL()->TexSubImage2D(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(),
adjusted_source_image_rect.Height(), format, type, bytes);
} else {
GLint upload_height = adjusted_source_image_rect.Height();
if (unpack_image_height) {
upload_height = unpack_image_height;
}
if (function_id == kTexImage3D) {
ContextGL()->TexImage3D(target, level, internalformat,
adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(), upload_height,
depth, border, format, type, bytes);
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(function_id, kTexSubImage3D);
ContextGL()->TexSubImage3D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset,
adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(),
upload_height, depth, format, type, bytes);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Improper deserialization in WebGL in Google Chrome on Mac prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: fix incorrect TexImage3D params w/ UNPACK_IMAGE_HEIGHT
Bug: 804123
Test: http://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2646
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ifbce9b93f0b35817881e1e34930cbac22a1e8b98
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1053573
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#558962}
|
???
| 173,151
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pgm_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int length,
register const u_char *bp2)
{
register const struct pgm_header *pgm;
register const struct ip *ip;
register char ch;
uint16_t sport, dport;
u_int nla_afnum;
char nla_buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
register const struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
uint8_t opt_type, opt_len;
uint32_t seq, opts_len, len, offset;
pgm = (const struct pgm_header *)bp;
ip = (const struct ip *)bp2;
if (IP_V(ip) == 6)
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2;
else
ip6 = NULL;
ch = '\0';
if (!ND_TTEST(pgm->pgm_dport)) {
if (ip6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: [|pgm]",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_src),
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_dst)));
return;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: [|pgm]",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst)));
return;
}
}
sport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_sport);
dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_dport);
if (ip6) {
if (ip6->ip6_nxt == IPPROTO_PGM) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s.%s > %s.%s: ",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_src),
tcpport_string(ndo, sport),
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: ",
tcpport_string(ndo, sport), tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
}
} else {
if (ip->ip_p == IPPROTO_PGM) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s.%s > %s.%s: ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src),
tcpport_string(ndo, sport),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: ",
tcpport_string(ndo, sport), tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
}
}
ND_TCHECK(*pgm);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "PGM, length %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_length)));
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x ",
pgm->pgm_gsid[0],
pgm->pgm_gsid[1],
pgm->pgm_gsid[2],
pgm->pgm_gsid[3],
pgm->pgm_gsid[4],
pgm->pgm_gsid[5]));
switch (pgm->pgm_type) {
case PGM_SPM: {
const struct pgm_spm *spm;
spm = (const struct pgm_spm *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*spm);
bp = (const u_char *) (spm + 1);
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&spm->pgms_nla_afi)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "SPM seq %u trail %u lead %u nla %s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&spm->pgms_seq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&spm->pgms_trailseq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&spm->pgms_leadseq),
nla_buf));
break;
}
case PGM_POLL: {
const struct pgm_poll *poll_msg;
poll_msg = (const struct pgm_poll *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*poll_msg);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "POLL seq %u round %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&poll_msg->pgmp_seq),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&poll_msg->pgmp_round)));
bp = (const u_char *) (poll_msg + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_POLR: {
const struct pgm_polr *polr;
uint32_t ivl, rnd, mask;
polr = (const struct pgm_polr *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*polr);
bp = (const u_char *) (polr + 1);
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&polr->pgmp_nla_afi)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
ivl = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
rnd = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
mask = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "POLR seq %u round %u nla %s ivl %u rnd 0x%08x "
"mask 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&polr->pgmp_seq),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&polr->pgmp_round), nla_buf, ivl, rnd, mask));
break;
}
case PGM_ODATA: {
const struct pgm_data *odata;
odata = (const struct pgm_data *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*odata);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ODATA trail %u seq %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&odata->pgmd_trailseq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&odata->pgmd_seq)));
bp = (const u_char *) (odata + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_RDATA: {
const struct pgm_data *rdata;
rdata = (const struct pgm_data *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*rdata);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RDATA trail %u seq %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&rdata->pgmd_trailseq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&rdata->pgmd_seq)));
bp = (const u_char *) (rdata + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_NAK:
case PGM_NULLNAK:
case PGM_NCF: {
const struct pgm_nak *nak;
char source_buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN], group_buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
nak = (const struct pgm_nak *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*nak);
bp = (const u_char *) (nak + 1);
/*
* Skip past the source, saving info along the way
* and stopping if we don't have enough.
*/
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&nak->pgmn_source_afi)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, source_buf, sizeof(source_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, source_buf, sizeof(source_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
/*
* Skip past the group, saving info along the way
* and stopping if we don't have enough.
*/
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, group_buf, sizeof(group_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, group_buf, sizeof(group_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
/*
* Options decoding can go here.
*/
switch (pgm->pgm_type) {
case PGM_NAK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NAK "));
break;
case PGM_NULLNAK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NNAK "));
break;
case PGM_NCF:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NCF "));
break;
default:
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%s -> %s), seq %u",
source_buf, group_buf, EXTRACT_32BITS(&nak->pgmn_seq)));
break;
}
case PGM_ACK: {
const struct pgm_ack *ack;
ack = (const struct pgm_ack *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*ack);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ACK seq %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ack->pgma_rx_max_seq)));
bp = (const u_char *) (ack + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_SPMR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "SPMR"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "UNKNOWN type 0x%02x", pgm->pgm_type));
break;
}
if (pgm->pgm_options & PGM_OPT_BIT_PRESENT) {
/*
* make sure there's enough for the first option header
*/
if (!ND_TTEST2(*bp, PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|OPT]"));
return;
}
/*
* That option header MUST be an OPT_LENGTH option
* (see the first paragraph of section 9.1 in RFC 3208).
*/
opt_type = *bp++;
if ((opt_type & PGM_OPT_MASK) != PGM_OPT_LENGTH) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[First option bad, should be PGM_OPT_LENGTH, is %u]", opt_type & PGM_OPT_MASK));
return;
}
opt_len = *bp++;
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_LENGTH option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
opts_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
if (opts_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad total option length %u < 4]", opts_len));
return;
}
bp += sizeof(uint16_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " OPTS LEN %d", opts_len));
opts_len -= 4;
while (opts_len) {
if (opts_len < PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Total option length leaves no room for final option]"));
return;
}
opt_type = *bp++;
opt_len = *bp++;
if (opt_len < PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad option, length %u < %u]", opt_len,
PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN));
break;
}
if (opts_len < opt_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Total option length leaves no room for final option]"));
return;
}
if (!ND_TTEST2(*bp, opt_len - 2)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|OPT]"));
return;
}
switch (opt_type & PGM_OPT_MASK) {
case PGM_OPT_LENGTH:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_LENGTH option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " OPTS LEN (extra?) %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += sizeof(uint16_t);
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_FRAGMENT:
if (opt_len != 16) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_FRAGMENT option, length %u != 16]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " FRAG seq %u off %u len %u", seq, offset, len));
opts_len -= 16;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NAK_LIST:
bp += 2;
opt_len -= sizeof(uint32_t); /* option header */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NAK LIST"));
while (opt_len) {
if (opt_len < sizeof(uint32_t)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Option length not a multiple of 4]"));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
opt_len -= sizeof(uint32_t);
opts_len -= sizeof(uint32_t);
}
break;
case PGM_OPT_JOIN:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_JOIN option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " JOIN %u", seq));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NAK_BO_IVL:
if (opt_len != 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_NAK_BO_IVL option, length %u != 12]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BACKOFF ivl %u ivlseq %u", offset, seq));
opts_len -= 12;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NAK_BO_RNG:
if (opt_len != 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_NAK_BO_RNG option, length %u != 12]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BACKOFF max %u min %u", offset, seq));
opts_len -= 12;
break;
case PGM_OPT_REDIRECT:
bp += 2;
nla_afnum = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (nla_afnum) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (opt_len != 4 + sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_REDIRECT option, length %u != 4 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
opts_len -= 4 + sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (opt_len != 4 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_REDIRECT option, length %u != 4 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
opts_len -= 4 + sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " REDIRECT %s", nla_buf));
break;
case PGM_OPT_PARITY_PRM:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PARITY_PRM option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PARITY MAXTGS %u", len));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_PARITY_GRP:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PARITY_GRP option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PARITY GROUP %u", seq));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_CURR_TGSIZE:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_CURR_TGSIZE option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PARITY ATGS %u", len));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NBR_UNREACH:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_NBR_UNREACH option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NBR_UNREACH"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_PATH_NLA:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PATH_NLA [%d]", opt_len));
bp += opt_len;
opts_len -= opt_len;
break;
case PGM_OPT_SYN:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_SYN option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " SYN"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_FIN:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_FIN option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " FIN"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_RST:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_RST option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RST"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_CR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " CR"));
bp += opt_len;
opts_len -= opt_len;
break;
case PGM_OPT_CRQST:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_CRQST option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " CRQST"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_PGMCC_DATA:
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
nla_afnum = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (nla_afnum) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PGMCC DATA %u %s", offset, nla_buf));
break;
case PGM_OPT_PGMCC_FEEDBACK:
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
nla_afnum = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (nla_afnum) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PGMCC FEEDBACK %u %s", offset, nla_buf));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " OPT_%02X [%d] ", opt_type, opt_len));
bp += opt_len;
opts_len -= opt_len;
break;
}
if (opt_type & PGM_OPT_END)
break;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [%u]", length));
if (ndo->ndo_packettype == PT_PGM_ZMTP1 &&
(pgm->pgm_type == PGM_ODATA || pgm->pgm_type == PGM_RDATA))
zmtp1_print_datagram(ndo, bp, EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_length));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pgm]"));
if (ch != '\0')
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The PGM parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-pgm.c:pgm_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13018/PGM: Add a missing bounds check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
Low
| 167,874
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int Reverb_setParameter (ReverbContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int16_t level;
int16_t ratio;
uint32_t time;
t_reverb_settings *pProperties;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
if (pContext->preset) {
if (param != REVERB_PARAM_PRESET) {
return -EINVAL;
}
uint16_t preset = *(uint16_t *)pValue;
ALOGV("set REVERB_PARAM_PRESET, preset %d", preset);
if (preset > REVERB_PRESET_LAST) {
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->nextPreset = preset;
return 0;
}
switch (param){
case REVERB_PARAM_PROPERTIES:
ALOGV("\tReverb_setParameter() REVERB_PARAM_PROPERTIES");
pProperties = (t_reverb_settings *) pValue;
ReverbSetRoomLevel(pContext, pProperties->roomLevel);
ReverbSetRoomHfLevel(pContext, pProperties->roomHFLevel);
ReverbSetDecayTime(pContext, pProperties->decayTime);
ReverbSetDecayHfRatio(pContext, pProperties->decayHFRatio);
ReverbSetReverbLevel(pContext, pProperties->reverbLevel);
ReverbSetDiffusion(pContext, pProperties->diffusion);
ReverbSetDensity(pContext, pProperties->density);
break;
case REVERB_PARAM_ROOM_LEVEL:
level = *(int16_t *)pValue;
ReverbSetRoomLevel(pContext, level);
break;
case REVERB_PARAM_ROOM_HF_LEVEL:
level = *(int16_t *)pValue;
ReverbSetRoomHfLevel(pContext, level);
break;
case REVERB_PARAM_DECAY_TIME:
time = *(uint32_t *)pValue;
ReverbSetDecayTime(pContext, time);
break;
case REVERB_PARAM_DECAY_HF_RATIO:
ratio = *(int16_t *)pValue;
ReverbSetDecayHfRatio(pContext, ratio);
break;
case REVERB_PARAM_REVERB_LEVEL:
level = *(int16_t *)pValue;
ReverbSetReverbLevel(pContext, level);
break;
case REVERB_PARAM_DIFFUSION:
ratio = *(int16_t *)pValue;
ReverbSetDiffusion(pContext, ratio);
break;
case REVERB_PARAM_DENSITY:
ratio = *(int16_t *)pValue;
ReverbSetDensity(pContext, ratio);
break;
break;
case REVERB_PARAM_REFLECTIONS_LEVEL:
case REVERB_PARAM_REFLECTIONS_DELAY:
case REVERB_PARAM_REVERB_DELAY:
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Reverb_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Reverb_setParameter */
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (libeffects). Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-63662938.
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking to Downmix and Reverb
Bug: 63662938
Bug: 63526567
Test: Added CTS tests
Change-Id: I8ed398cd62a9f461b0590e37f593daa3d8e4dbc4
(cherry picked from commit 804632afcdda6e80945bf27c384757bda50560cb)
|
Medium
| 173,980
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void fdctrl_handle_drive_specification_command(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
{
FDrive *cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
if (fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos - 1] & 0x80) {
/* Command parameters done */
if (fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos - 1] & 0x40) {
fdctrl->fifo[0] = fdctrl->fifo[1];
fdctrl->fifo[2] = 0;
fdctrl->fifo[3] = 0;
}
} else if (fdctrl->data_len > 7) {
/* ERROR */
fdctrl->fifo[0] = 0x80 |
(cur_drv->head << 2) | GET_CUR_DRV(fdctrl);
fdctrl_set_fifo(fdctrl, 1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Floppy Disk Controller (FDC) in QEMU, as used in Xen 4.5.x and earlier and KVM, allows local guest users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write and guest crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via the (1) FD_CMD_READ_ID, (2) FD_CMD_DRIVE_SPECIFICATION_COMMAND, or other unspecified commands, aka VENOM.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,706
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnAllowBindings(int enabled_bindings_flags) {
enabled_bindings_ |= enabled_bindings_flags;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not use a dedicated process for the loading of links found on an internal page, which might allow attackers to bypass intended sandbox restrictions via a crafted page.
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,018
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PPB_URLLoader_Impl::LastPluginRefWasDeleted(bool instance_destroyed) {
Resource::LastPluginRefWasDeleted(instance_destroyed);
if (instance_destroyed) {
loader_.reset();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to instantiation of the Pepper plug-in.
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,411
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int Equalizer_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int32_t preset;
int32_t band;
int32_t level;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
preset = (int32_t)(*(uint16_t *)pValue);
if ((preset >= EqualizerGetNumPresets())||(preset < 0)) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, preset);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
band = *pParamTemp;
level = (int32_t)(*(int16_t *)pValue);
if (band >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, band, level);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
if ((int)p[0] >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (p[0] >= 0) {
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, (int)p[0]);
} else {
if ((int)p[1] != FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, i, (int)p[2 + i]);
}
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_setParameter */
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in lvm/wrapper/Bundle/EffectBundle.cpp in libeffects in the Qualcomm audio post processor could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-32588016.
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Effect command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32448258
Bug: 32095626
Test: Use POC bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I69f24eac5866f8d9090fc4c0ebe58c2c297b63df
(cherry picked from commit 01183402d757f0c28bfd5e3b127b3809dfd67459)
|
Medium
| 174,060
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: float AudioParam::finalValue()
{
float value;
calculateFinalValues(&value, 1, false);
return value;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: modules/webaudio/BiquadDSPKernel.cpp in the Web Audio API implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94, does not properly consider concurrent threads during attempts to update biquad filter coefficients, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (read of uninitialized memory) via crafted API calls.
Commit Message: Initialize value since calculateFinalValues may fail to do so.
Fix threading issue where updateCoefficientsIfNecessary was not always
called from the audio thread. This causes the value not to be
initialized.
Thus,
o Initialize the variable to some value, just in case.
o Split updateCoefficientsIfNecessary into two functions with the code
that sets the coefficients pulled out in to the new function
updateCoefficients.
o Simplify updateCoefficientsIfNecessary since useSmoothing was always
true, and forceUpdate is not longer needed.
o Add process lock to prevent the audio thread from updating the
coefficients while they are being read in the main thread. The audio
thread will update them the next time around.
o Make getFrequencyResponse set the lock while reading the
coefficients of the biquad in preparation for computing the
frequency response.
BUG=389219
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/354213002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@177250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,659
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static u32 svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey(struct rpcrdma_msg *rdma_argp,
struct rpcrdma_write_array *wr_ary,
struct rpcrdma_write_array *rp_ary)
{
struct rpcrdma_read_chunk *rd_ary;
struct rpcrdma_segment *arg_ch;
rd_ary = (struct rpcrdma_read_chunk *)&rdma_argp->rm_body.rm_chunks[0];
if (rd_ary->rc_discrim != xdr_zero)
return be32_to_cpu(rd_ary->rc_target.rs_handle);
if (wr_ary && be32_to_cpu(wr_ary->wc_nchunks)) {
arg_ch = &wr_ary->wc_array[0].wc_target;
return be32_to_cpu(arg_ch->rs_handle);
}
if (rp_ary && be32_to_cpu(rp_ary->wc_nchunks)) {
arg_ch = &rp_ary->wc_array[0].wc_target;
return be32_to_cpu(arg_ch->rs_handle);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,171
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
const struct iphdr *iph;
const struct tcphdr *th;
bool refcounted;
struct sock *sk;
int ret;
if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST)
goto discard_it;
/* Count it even if it's bad */
__TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INSEGS);
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct tcphdr)))
goto discard_it;
th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
if (unlikely(th->doff < sizeof(struct tcphdr) / 4))
goto bad_packet;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff * 4))
goto discard_it;
/* An explanation is required here, I think.
* Packet length and doff are validated by header prediction,
* provided case of th->doff==0 is eliminated.
* So, we defer the checks. */
if (skb_checksum_init(skb, IPPROTO_TCP, inet_compute_pseudo))
goto csum_error;
th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
/* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location into TCP_SKB_CB()
* barrier() makes sure compiler wont play fool^Waliasing games.
*/
memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
barrier();
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
skb->len - th->doff * 4);
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0;
lookup:
sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source,
th->dest, &refcounted);
if (!sk)
goto no_tcp_socket;
process:
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
goto do_time_wait;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) {
struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
struct sock *nsk;
sk = req->rsk_listener;
if (unlikely(tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb))) {
sk_drops_add(sk, skb);
reqsk_put(req);
goto discard_it;
}
if (unlikely(sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)) {
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put(sk, req);
goto lookup;
}
/* We own a reference on the listener, increase it again
* as we might lose it too soon.
*/
sock_hold(sk);
refcounted = true;
nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
if (!nsk) {
reqsk_put(req);
goto discard_and_relse;
}
if (nsk == sk) {
reqsk_put(req);
} else if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) {
tcp_v4_send_reset(nsk, skb);
goto discard_and_relse;
} else {
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
}
if (unlikely(iph->ttl < inet_sk(sk)->min_ttl)) {
__NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_TCPMINTTLDROP);
goto discard_and_relse;
}
if (!xfrm4_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto discard_and_relse;
if (tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb))
goto discard_and_relse;
nf_reset(skb);
if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
goto discard_and_relse;
skb->dev = NULL;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
ret = tcp_v4_do_rcv(sk, skb);
goto put_and_return;
}
sk_incoming_cpu_update(sk);
bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
tcp_segs_in(tcp_sk(sk), skb);
ret = 0;
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
if (!tcp_prequeue(sk, skb))
ret = tcp_v4_do_rcv(sk, skb);
} else if (tcp_add_backlog(sk, skb)) {
goto discard_and_relse;
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
put_and_return:
if (refcounted)
sock_put(sk);
return ret;
no_tcp_socket:
if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto discard_it;
if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
csum_error:
__TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_CSUMERRORS);
bad_packet:
__TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS);
} else {
tcp_v4_send_reset(NULL, skb);
}
discard_it:
/* Discard frame. */
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
discard_and_relse:
sk_drops_add(sk, skb);
if (refcounted)
sock_put(sk);
goto discard_it;
do_time_wait:
if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) {
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
goto discard_it;
}
if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
goto csum_error;
}
switch (tcp_timewait_state_process(inet_twsk(sk), skb, th)) {
case TCP_TW_SYN: {
struct sock *sk2 = inet_lookup_listener(dev_net(skb->dev),
&tcp_hashinfo, skb,
__tcp_hdrlen(th),
iph->saddr, th->source,
iph->daddr, th->dest,
inet_iif(skb));
if (sk2) {
inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
sk = sk2;
refcounted = false;
goto process;
}
/* Fall through to ACK */
}
case TCP_TW_ACK:
tcp_v4_timewait_ack(sk, skb);
break;
case TCP_TW_RST:
tcp_v4_send_reset(sk, skb);
inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
goto discard_it;
case TCP_TW_SUCCESS:;
}
goto discard_it;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The TCP stack in the Linux kernel before 4.8.10 mishandles skb truncation, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted application that makes sendto system calls, related to net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c and net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c.
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,913
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateGraphicBufferInMeta_l(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id buffer, OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = (BufferMeta *)(header->pAppPrivate);
bufferMeta->setGraphicBuffer(graphicBuffer);
if (mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource
&& header->nAllocLen >= sizeof(VideoGrallocMetadata)) {
VideoGrallocMetadata &metadata = *(VideoGrallocMetadata *)(header->pBuffer);
metadata.eType = kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource;
metadata.pHandle = graphicBuffer == NULL ? NULL : graphicBuffer->handle;
} else if (mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer
&& header->nAllocLen >= sizeof(VideoNativeMetadata)) {
VideoNativeMetadata &metadata = *(VideoNativeMetadata *)(header->pBuffer);
metadata.eType = kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
metadata.pBuffer = graphicBuffer == NULL ? NULL : graphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer();
metadata.nFenceFd = -1;
} else {
CLOG_BUFFER(updateGraphicBufferInMeta, "%s:%u, %#x bad type (%d) or size (%u)",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer, mMetadataType[portIndex], header->nAllocLen);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
CLOG_BUFFER(updateGraphicBufferInMeta, "%s:%u, %#x := %p",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, buffer,
graphicBuffer == NULL ? NULL : graphicBuffer->handle);
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
|
Low
| 173,532
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode)
{
if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))
return true;
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER))
return true;
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The capabilities implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.14.8 does not properly consider that namespaces are inapplicable to inodes, which allows local users to bypass intended chmod restrictions by first creating a user namespace, as demonstrated by setting the setgid bit on a file with group ownership of root.
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
High
| 166,319
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::bindVertexArray(
WebGLVertexArrayObject* vertex_array) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (vertex_array &&
(vertex_array->IsDeleted() || !vertex_array->Validate(nullptr, this))) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "bindVertexArray",
"invalid vertexArray");
return;
}
if (vertex_array && !vertex_array->IsDefaultObject() &&
vertex_array->Object()) {
ContextGL()->BindVertexArrayOES(ObjectOrZero(vertex_array));
vertex_array->SetHasEverBeenBound();
SetBoundVertexArrayObject(vertex_array);
} else {
ContextGL()->BindVertexArrayOES(0);
SetBoundVertexArrayObject(nullptr);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
|
Medium
| 173,123
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PixarLogSetupDecode(TIFF* tif)
{
static const char module[] = "PixarLogSetupDecode";
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
PixarLogState* sp = DecoderState(tif);
tmsize_t tbuf_size;
assert(sp != NULL);
/* Make sure no byte swapping happens on the data
* after decompression. */
tif->tif_postdecode = _TIFFNoPostDecode;
/* for some reason, we can't do this in TIFFInitPixarLog */
sp->stride = (td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG ?
td->td_samplesperpixel : 1);
tbuf_size = multiply_ms(multiply_ms(multiply_ms(sp->stride, td->td_imagewidth),
td->td_rowsperstrip), sizeof(uint16));
/* add one more stride in case input ends mid-stride */
tbuf_size = add_ms(tbuf_size, sizeof(uint16) * sp->stride);
if (tbuf_size == 0)
return (0); /* TODO: this is an error return without error report through TIFFErrorExt */
sp->tbuf = (uint16 *) _TIFFmalloc(tbuf_size);
if (sp->tbuf == NULL)
return (0);
if (sp->user_datafmt == PIXARLOGDATAFMT_UNKNOWN)
sp->user_datafmt = PixarLogGuessDataFmt(td);
if (sp->user_datafmt == PIXARLOGDATAFMT_UNKNOWN) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"PixarLog compression can't handle bits depth/data format combination (depth: %d)",
td->td_bitspersample);
return (0);
}
if (inflateInit(&sp->stream) != Z_OK) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "%s", sp->stream.msg ? sp->stream.msg : "(null)");
return (0);
} else {
sp->state |= PLSTATE_INIT;
return (1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Buffer overflow in the PixarLogDecode function in tif_pixarlog.c in LibTIFF 4.0.6 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TIFF image, as demonstrated by overwriting the vgetparent function pointer with rgb2ycbcr.
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix potential buffer write overrun in
PixarLogDecode() on corrupted/unexpected images (reported by Mathias Svensson)
|
Medium
| 169,450
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int jpc_dec_process_siz(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
int compno;
int tileno;
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int htileno;
int vtileno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
dec->xstart = siz->xoff;
dec->ystart = siz->yoff;
dec->xend = siz->width;
dec->yend = siz->height;
dec->tilewidth = siz->tilewidth;
dec->tileheight = siz->tileheight;
dec->tilexoff = siz->tilexoff;
dec->tileyoff = siz->tileyoff;
dec->numcomps = siz->numcomps;
if (!(dec->cp = jpc_dec_cp_create(dec->numcomps))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(dec->cmpts = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_dec_cmpt_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno,
++cmpt) {
cmpt->prec = siz->comps[compno].prec;
cmpt->sgnd = siz->comps[compno].sgnd;
cmpt->hstep = siz->comps[compno].hsamp;
cmpt->vstep = siz->comps[compno].vsamp;
cmpt->width = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend, cmpt->hstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
cmpt->height = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend, cmpt->vstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
cmpt->hsubstep = 0;
cmpt->vsubstep = 0;
}
dec->image = 0;
dec->numhtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend - dec->tilexoff, dec->tilewidth);
dec->numvtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend - dec->tileyoff, dec->tileheight);
dec->numtiles = dec->numhtiles * dec->numvtiles;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("numtiles = %d; numhtiles = %d; numvtiles = %d;\n",
dec->numtiles, dec->numhtiles, dec->numvtiles));
if (!(dec->tiles = jas_alloc2(dec->numtiles, sizeof(jpc_dec_tile_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (tileno = 0, tile = dec->tiles; tileno < dec->numtiles; ++tileno,
++tile) {
htileno = tileno % dec->numhtiles;
vtileno = tileno / dec->numhtiles;
tile->realmode = 0;
tile->state = JPC_TILE_INIT;
tile->xstart = JAS_MAX(dec->tilexoff + htileno * dec->tilewidth,
dec->xstart);
tile->ystart = JAS_MAX(dec->tileyoff + vtileno * dec->tileheight,
dec->ystart);
tile->xend = JAS_MIN(dec->tilexoff + (htileno + 1) *
dec->tilewidth, dec->xend);
tile->yend = JAS_MIN(dec->tileyoff + (vtileno + 1) *
dec->tileheight, dec->yend);
tile->numparts = 0;
tile->partno = 0;
tile->pkthdrstream = 0;
tile->pkthdrstreampos = 0;
tile->pptstab = 0;
tile->cp = 0;
tile->pi = 0;
if (!(tile->tcomps = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps,
sizeof(jpc_dec_tcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts, tcomp = tile->tcomps;
compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++cmpt, ++tcomp) {
tcomp->rlvls = 0;
tcomp->numrlvls = 0;
tcomp->data = 0;
tcomp->xstart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->ystart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->xend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->yend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->tsfb = 0;
}
}
dec->pkthdrstreams = 0;
/* We should expect to encounter other main header marker segments
or an SOT marker segment next. */
dec->state = JPC_MH;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the jpc_dec_process_siz function in libjasper/jpc/jpc_dec.c in JasPer before 1.900.13 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted file, which triggers an assertion failure.
Commit Message: Fixed another integer overflow problem.
|
Medium
| 168,742
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct svc_rdma_req_map *alloc_req_map(gfp_t flags)
{
struct svc_rdma_req_map *map;
map = kmalloc(sizeof(*map), flags);
if (map)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&map->free);
return map;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,177
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DecodeTime(char *str, int *tmask, struct tm * tm, fsec_t *fsec)
{
char *cp;
*tmask = DTK_TIME_M;
tm->tm_hour = strtol(str, &cp, 10);
if (*cp != ':')
return -1;
str = cp + 1;
tm->tm_min = strtol(str, &cp, 10);
if (*cp == '\0')
{
tm->tm_sec = 0;
*fsec = 0;
}
else if (*cp != ':')
return -1;
else
{
str = cp + 1;
tm->tm_sec = strtol(str, &cp, 10);
if (*cp == '\0')
*fsec = 0;
else if (*cp == '.')
{
#ifdef HAVE_INT64_TIMESTAMP
char fstr[MAXDATELEN + 1];
/*
* OK, we have at most six digits to work with. Let's construct a
* string and then do the conversion to an integer.
*/
strncpy(fstr, (cp + 1), 7);
strcpy(fstr + strlen(fstr), "000000");
*(fstr + 6) = '\0';
*fsec = strtol(fstr, &cp, 10);
#else
str = cp;
*fsec = strtod(str, &cp);
#endif
if (*cp != '\0')
return -1;
}
else
return -1;
}
/* do a sanity check */
#ifdef HAVE_INT64_TIMESTAMP
if (tm->tm_hour < 0 || tm->tm_min < 0 || tm->tm_min > 59 ||
tm->tm_sec < 0 || tm->tm_sec > 59 || *fsec >= USECS_PER_SEC)
return -1;
#else
if (tm->tm_hour < 0 || tm->tm_min < 0 || tm->tm_min > 59 ||
tm->tm_sec < 0 || tm->tm_sec > 59 || *fsec >= 1)
return -1;
#endif
return 0;
} /* DecodeTime() */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in PostgreSQL before 8.4.20, 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via vectors related to an incorrect MAXDATELEN constant and datetime values involving (1) intervals, (2) timestamps, or (3) timezones, a different vulnerability than CVE-2014-0065.
Commit Message: Fix handling of wide datetime input/output.
Many server functions use the MAXDATELEN constant to size a buffer for
parsing or displaying a datetime value. It was much too small for the
longest possible interval output and slightly too small for certain
valid timestamp input, particularly input with a long timezone name.
The long input was rejected needlessly; the long output caused
interval_out() to overrun its buffer. ECPG's pgtypes library has a copy
of the vulnerable functions, which bore the same vulnerabilities along
with some of its own. In contrast to the server, certain long inputs
caused stack overflow rather than failing cleanly. Back-patch to 8.4
(all supported versions).
Reported by Daniel Schüssler, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0063
|
Low
| 166,465
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ssh_packet_set_compress_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int r;
const u_char *inblob, *outblob;
size_t inl, outl;
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &inblob, &inl)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &outblob, &outl)) != 0)
goto out;
if (inl == 0)
state->compression_in_started = 0;
else if (inl != sizeof(state->compression_in_stream)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
} else {
state->compression_in_started = 1;
memcpy(&state->compression_in_stream, inblob, inl);
}
if (outl == 0)
state->compression_out_started = 0;
else if (outl != sizeof(state->compression_out_stream)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
} else {
state->compression_out_started = 1;
memcpy(&state->compression_out_stream, outblob, outl);
}
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The shared memory manager (associated with pre-authentication compression) in sshd in OpenSSH before 7.4 does not ensure that a bounds check is enforced by all compilers, which might allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging access to a sandboxed privilege-separation process, related to the m_zback and m_zlib data structures.
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
|
Low
| 168,654
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FileReaderLoader::start(ScriptExecutionContext* scriptExecutionContext, Blob* blob)
{
m_urlForReading = BlobURL::createPublicURL(scriptExecutionContext->securityOrigin());
if (m_urlForReading.isEmpty()) {
failed(FileError::SECURITY_ERR);
return;
}
ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(scriptExecutionContext->securityOrigin(), m_urlForReading, blob->url());
ResourceRequest request(m_urlForReading);
request.setHTTPMethod("GET");
if (m_hasRange)
request.setHTTPHeaderField("Range", String::format("bytes=%d-%d", m_rangeStart, m_rangeEnd));
ThreadableLoaderOptions options;
options.sendLoadCallbacks = SendCallbacks;
options.sniffContent = DoNotSniffContent;
options.preflightPolicy = ConsiderPreflight;
options.allowCredentials = AllowStoredCredentials;
options.crossOriginRequestPolicy = DenyCrossOriginRequests;
options.contentSecurityPolicyEnforcement = DoNotEnforceContentSecurityPolicy;
if (m_client)
m_loader = ThreadableLoader::create(scriptExecutionContext, this, request, options);
else
ThreadableLoader::loadResourceSynchronously(scriptExecutionContext, request, *this, options);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,692
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> V8SchemaRegistry::GetSchema(const std::string& api) {
if (schema_cache_ != NULL) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> cached_schema = schema_cache_->Get(api);
if (!cached_schema.IsEmpty()) {
return cached_schema;
}
}
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = GetOrCreateContext(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context);
const base::DictionaryValue* schema =
ExtensionAPI::GetSharedInstance()->GetSchema(api);
CHECK(schema) << api;
std::unique_ptr<V8ValueConverter> v8_value_converter(
V8ValueConverter::create());
v8::Local<v8::Value> value = v8_value_converter->ToV8Value(schema, context);
CHECK(!value.IsEmpty());
v8::Local<v8::Object> v8_schema(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
v8_schema->SetIntegrityLevel(context, v8::IntegrityLevel::kFrozen);
schema_cache_->Set(api, v8_schema);
return handle_scope.Escape(v8_schema);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The createCustomType function in extensions/renderer/resources/binding.js in the extension bindings in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.79 does not validate module types, which might allow attackers to load arbitrary modules or obtain sensitive information by leveraging a poisoned definition.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Finish freezing schema
BUG=604901
BUG=603725
BUG=591164
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1906593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388945}
|
Medium
| 172,259
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ring_buffer_resize(struct ring_buffer *buffer, unsigned long size,
int cpu_id)
{
struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
unsigned long nr_pages;
int cpu, err = 0;
/*
* Always succeed at resizing a non-existent buffer:
*/
if (!buffer)
return size;
/* Make sure the requested buffer exists */
if (cpu_id != RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS &&
!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu_id, buffer->cpumask))
return size;
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
size *= BUF_PAGE_SIZE;
/* we need a minimum of two pages */
if (size < BUF_PAGE_SIZE * 2)
size = BUF_PAGE_SIZE * 2;
nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
/*
* Don't succeed if resizing is disabled, as a reader might be
* manipulating the ring buffer and is expecting a sane state while
* this is true.
*/
if (atomic_read(&buffer->resize_disabled))
return -EBUSY;
/* prevent another thread from changing buffer sizes */
mutex_lock(&buffer->mutex);
if (cpu_id == RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) {
/* calculate the pages to update */
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = nr_pages -
cpu_buffer->nr_pages;
/*
* nothing more to do for removing pages or no update
*/
if (cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update <= 0)
continue;
/*
* to add pages, make sure all new pages can be
* allocated without receiving ENOMEM
*/
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->new_pages);
if (__rb_allocate_pages(cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update,
&cpu_buffer->new_pages, cpu)) {
/* not enough memory for new pages */
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
}
get_online_cpus();
/*
* Fire off all the required work handlers
* We can't schedule on offline CPUs, but it's not necessary
* since we can change their buffer sizes without any race.
*/
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
if (!cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update)
continue;
/* Can't run something on an offline CPU. */
if (!cpu_online(cpu)) {
rb_update_pages(cpu_buffer);
cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0;
} else {
schedule_work_on(cpu,
&cpu_buffer->update_pages_work);
}
}
/* wait for all the updates to complete */
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
if (!cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update)
continue;
if (cpu_online(cpu))
wait_for_completion(&cpu_buffer->update_done);
cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0;
}
put_online_cpus();
} else {
/* Make sure this CPU has been intitialized */
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu_id, buffer->cpumask))
goto out;
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu_id];
if (nr_pages == cpu_buffer->nr_pages)
goto out;
cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = nr_pages -
cpu_buffer->nr_pages;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->new_pages);
if (cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update > 0 &&
__rb_allocate_pages(cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update,
&cpu_buffer->new_pages, cpu_id)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
get_online_cpus();
/* Can't run something on an offline CPU. */
if (!cpu_online(cpu_id))
rb_update_pages(cpu_buffer);
else {
schedule_work_on(cpu_id,
&cpu_buffer->update_pages_work);
wait_for_completion(&cpu_buffer->update_done);
}
cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0;
put_online_cpus();
}
out:
/*
* The ring buffer resize can happen with the ring buffer
* enabled, so that the update disturbs the tracing as little
* as possible. But if the buffer is disabled, we do not need
* to worry about that, and we can take the time to verify
* that the buffer is not corrupt.
*/
if (atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled)) {
atomic_inc(&buffer->record_disabled);
/*
* Even though the buffer was disabled, we must make sure
* that it is truly disabled before calling rb_check_pages.
* There could have been a race between checking
* record_disable and incrementing it.
*/
synchronize_sched();
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
rb_check_pages(cpu_buffer);
}
atomic_dec(&buffer->record_disabled);
}
mutex_unlock(&buffer->mutex);
return size;
out_err:
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
struct buffer_page *bpage, *tmp;
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0;
if (list_empty(&cpu_buffer->new_pages))
continue;
list_for_each_entry_safe(bpage, tmp, &cpu_buffer->new_pages,
list) {
list_del_init(&bpage->list);
free_buffer_page(bpage);
}
}
mutex_unlock(&buffer->mutex);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: The ring_buffer_resize function in kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c in the profiling subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6.1 mishandles certain integer calculations, which allows local users to gain privileges by writing to the /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb file.
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
Low
| 168,676
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void parse_hid_report_descriptor(struct gtco *device, char * report,
int length)
{
struct device *ddev = &device->intf->dev;
int x, i = 0;
/* Tag primitive vars */
__u8 prefix;
__u8 size;
__u8 tag;
__u8 type;
__u8 data = 0;
__u16 data16 = 0;
__u32 data32 = 0;
/* For parsing logic */
int inputnum = 0;
__u32 usage = 0;
/* Global Values, indexed by TAG */
__u32 globalval[TAG_GLOB_MAX];
__u32 oldval[TAG_GLOB_MAX];
/* Debug stuff */
char maintype = 'x';
char globtype[12];
int indent = 0;
char indentstr[10] = "";
dev_dbg(ddev, "======>>>>>>PARSE<<<<<<======\n");
/* Walk this report and pull out the info we need */
while (i < length) {
prefix = report[i];
/* Skip over prefix */
i++;
/* Determine data size and save the data in the proper variable */
size = PREF_SIZE(prefix);
switch (size) {
case 1:
data = report[i];
break;
case 2:
data16 = get_unaligned_le16(&report[i]);
break;
case 3:
size = 4;
data32 = get_unaligned_le32(&report[i]);
break;
}
/* Skip size of data */
i += size;
/* What we do depends on the tag type */
tag = PREF_TAG(prefix);
type = PREF_TYPE(prefix);
switch (type) {
case TYPE_MAIN:
strcpy(globtype, "");
switch (tag) {
case TAG_MAIN_INPUT:
/*
* The INPUT MAIN tag signifies this is
* information from a report. We need to
* figure out what it is and store the
* min/max values
*/
maintype = 'I';
if (data == 2)
strcpy(globtype, "Variable");
else if (data == 3)
strcpy(globtype, "Var|Const");
dev_dbg(ddev, "::::: Saving Report: %d input #%d Max: 0x%X(%d) Min:0x%X(%d) of %d bits\n",
globalval[TAG_GLOB_REPORT_ID], inputnum,
globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX], globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX],
globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN], globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN],
globalval[TAG_GLOB_REPORT_SZ] * globalval[TAG_GLOB_REPORT_CNT]);
/*
We can assume that the first two input items
are always the X and Y coordinates. After
that, we look for everything else by
local usage value
*/
switch (inputnum) {
case 0: /* X coord */
dev_dbg(ddev, "GER: X Usage: 0x%x\n", usage);
if (device->max_X == 0) {
device->max_X = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX];
device->min_X = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN];
}
break;
case 1: /* Y coord */
dev_dbg(ddev, "GER: Y Usage: 0x%x\n", usage);
if (device->max_Y == 0) {
device->max_Y = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX];
device->min_Y = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN];
}
break;
default:
/* Tilt X */
if (usage == DIGITIZER_USAGE_TILT_X) {
if (device->maxtilt_X == 0) {
device->maxtilt_X = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX];
device->mintilt_X = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN];
}
}
/* Tilt Y */
if (usage == DIGITIZER_USAGE_TILT_Y) {
if (device->maxtilt_Y == 0) {
device->maxtilt_Y = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX];
device->mintilt_Y = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN];
}
}
/* Pressure */
if (usage == DIGITIZER_USAGE_TIP_PRESSURE) {
if (device->maxpressure == 0) {
device->maxpressure = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX];
device->minpressure = globalval[TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN];
}
}
break;
}
inputnum++;
break;
case TAG_MAIN_OUTPUT:
maintype = 'O';
break;
case TAG_MAIN_FEATURE:
maintype = 'F';
break;
case TAG_MAIN_COL_START:
maintype = 'S';
if (data == 0) {
dev_dbg(ddev, "======>>>>>> Physical\n");
strcpy(globtype, "Physical");
} else
dev_dbg(ddev, "======>>>>>>\n");
/* Indent the debug output */
indent++;
for (x = 0; x < indent; x++)
indentstr[x] = '-';
indentstr[x] = 0;
/* Save global tags */
for (x = 0; x < TAG_GLOB_MAX; x++)
oldval[x] = globalval[x];
break;
case TAG_MAIN_COL_END:
dev_dbg(ddev, "<<<<<<======\n");
maintype = 'E';
indent--;
for (x = 0; x < indent; x++)
indentstr[x] = '-';
indentstr[x] = 0;
/* Copy global tags back */
for (x = 0; x < TAG_GLOB_MAX; x++)
globalval[x] = oldval[x];
break;
}
switch (size) {
case 1:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sMAINTAG:(%d) %c SIZE: %d Data: %s 0x%x\n",
indentstr, tag, maintype, size, globtype, data);
break;
case 2:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sMAINTAG:(%d) %c SIZE: %d Data: %s 0x%x\n",
indentstr, tag, maintype, size, globtype, data16);
break;
case 4:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sMAINTAG:(%d) %c SIZE: %d Data: %s 0x%x\n",
indentstr, tag, maintype, size, globtype, data32);
break;
}
break;
case TYPE_GLOBAL:
switch (tag) {
case TAG_GLOB_USAGE:
/*
* First time we hit the global usage tag,
* it should tell us the type of device
*/
if (device->usage == 0)
device->usage = data;
strcpy(globtype, "USAGE");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN:
strcpy(globtype, "LOG_MIN");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX:
strcpy(globtype, "LOG_MAX");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_PHYS_MIN:
strcpy(globtype, "PHYS_MIN");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_PHYS_MAX:
strcpy(globtype, "PHYS_MAX");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_UNIT_EXP:
strcpy(globtype, "EXP");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_UNIT:
strcpy(globtype, "UNIT");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_REPORT_SZ:
strcpy(globtype, "REPORT_SZ");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_REPORT_ID:
strcpy(globtype, "REPORT_ID");
/* New report, restart numbering */
inputnum = 0;
break;
case TAG_GLOB_REPORT_CNT:
strcpy(globtype, "REPORT_CNT");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_PUSH:
strcpy(globtype, "PUSH");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_POP:
strcpy(globtype, "POP");
break;
}
/* Check to make sure we have a good tag number
so we don't overflow array */
if (tag < TAG_GLOB_MAX) {
switch (size) {
case 1:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sGLOBALTAG:%s(%d) SIZE: %d Data: 0x%x\n",
indentstr, globtype, tag, size, data);
globalval[tag] = data;
break;
case 2:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sGLOBALTAG:%s(%d) SIZE: %d Data: 0x%x\n",
indentstr, globtype, tag, size, data16);
globalval[tag] = data16;
break;
case 4:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sGLOBALTAG:%s(%d) SIZE: %d Data: 0x%x\n",
indentstr, globtype, tag, size, data32);
globalval[tag] = data32;
break;
}
} else {
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sGLOBALTAG: ILLEGAL TAG:%d SIZE: %d\n",
indentstr, tag, size);
}
break;
case TYPE_LOCAL:
switch (tag) {
case TAG_GLOB_USAGE:
strcpy(globtype, "USAGE");
/* Always 1 byte */
usage = data;
break;
case TAG_GLOB_LOG_MIN:
strcpy(globtype, "MIN");
break;
case TAG_GLOB_LOG_MAX:
strcpy(globtype, "MAX");
break;
default:
strcpy(globtype, "UNKNOWN");
break;
}
switch (size) {
case 1:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sLOCALTAG:(%d) %s SIZE: %d Data: 0x%x\n",
indentstr, tag, globtype, size, data);
break;
case 2:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sLOCALTAG:(%d) %s SIZE: %d Data: 0x%x\n",
indentstr, tag, globtype, size, data16);
break;
case 4:
dev_dbg(ddev, "%sLOCALTAG:(%d) %s SIZE: %d Data: 0x%x\n",
indentstr, tag, globtype, size, data32);
break;
}
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The parse_hid_report_descriptor function in drivers/input/tablet/gtco.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.11 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted USB device.
Commit Message: Input: gtco - fix potential out-of-bound access
parse_hid_report_descriptor() has a while (i < length) loop, which
only guarantees that there's at least 1 byte in the buffer, but the
loop body can read multiple bytes which causes out-of-bounds access.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
|
Low
| 167,673
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void record_and_restart(struct perf_event *event, unsigned long val,
struct pt_regs *regs, int nmi)
{
u64 period = event->hw.sample_period;
s64 prev, delta, left;
int record = 0;
if (event->hw.state & PERF_HES_STOPPED) {
write_pmc(event->hw.idx, 0);
return;
}
/* we don't have to worry about interrupts here */
prev = local64_read(&event->hw.prev_count);
delta = check_and_compute_delta(prev, val);
local64_add(delta, &event->count);
/*
* See if the total period for this event has expired,
* and update for the next period.
*/
val = 0;
left = local64_read(&event->hw.period_left) - delta;
if (period) {
if (left <= 0) {
left += period;
if (left <= 0)
left = period;
record = 1;
event->hw.last_period = event->hw.sample_period;
}
if (left < 0x80000000LL)
val = 0x80000000LL - left;
}
write_pmc(event->hw.idx, val);
local64_set(&event->hw.prev_count, val);
local64_set(&event->hw.period_left, left);
perf_event_update_userpage(event);
/*
* Finally record data if requested.
*/
if (record) {
struct perf_sample_data data;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, ~0ULL);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR)
perf_get_data_addr(regs, &data.addr);
if (perf_event_overflow(event, nmi, &data, regs))
power_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,789
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::setConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const void *params, size_t size) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE extIndex = (OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)index;
CLOG_CONFIG(setConfig, "%s(%#x), %zu@%p)", asString(extIndex), index, size, params);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_SetConfig(
mHandle, index, const_cast<void *>(params));
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setConfig, err, "%s(%#x)", asString(extIndex), index);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
|
Medium
| 174,138
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: zsetdevice(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
gx_device *dev = gs_currentdevice(igs);
os_ptr op = osp;
int code = 0;
check_write_type(*op, t_device);
if (dev->LockSafetyParams) { /* do additional checking if locked */
if(op->value.pdevice != dev) /* don't allow a different device */
return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess);
}
dev->ShowpageCount = 0;
code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(igs, op->value.pdevice);
if (code < 0)
return code;
make_bool(op, code != 0); /* erase page if 1 */
invalidate_stack_devices(i_ctx_p);
clear_pagedevice(istate);
return code;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: An issue was discovered in Artifex Ghostscript before 9.26. LockSafetyParams is not checked correctly if another device is used.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,638
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ping_unhash(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk);
pr_debug("ping_unhash(isk=%p,isk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num);
if (sk_hashed(sk)) {
write_lock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
hlist_nulls_del(&sk->sk_nulls_node);
sock_put(sk);
isk->inet_num = 0;
isk->inet_sport = 0;
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, -1);
write_unlock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: The ping_unhash function in net/ipv4/ping.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.3 does not initialize a certain list data structure during an unhash operation, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) by leveraging the ability to make a SOCK_DGRAM socket system call for the IPPROTO_ICMP or IPPROTO_ICMPV6 protocol, and then making a connect system call after a disconnect.
Commit Message: ipv4: Missing sk_nulls_node_init() in ping_unhash().
If we don't do that, then the poison value is left in the ->pprev
backlink.
This can cause crashes if we do a disconnect, followed by a connect().
Tested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Wen Xu <hotdog3645@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,623
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r = EMULATE_DONE;
++vcpu->stat.insn_emulation_fail;
trace_kvm_emulate_insn_failed(vcpu);
if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
r = EMULATE_FAIL;
}
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in arch/x86/kvm/x86.c in the Linux kernel before 3.17.4 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application that performs an MMIO transaction or a PIO transaction to trigger a guest userspace emulation error report, a similar issue to CVE-2010-5313.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,252
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ip_options_echo(struct ip_options * dopt, struct sk_buff * skb)
{
struct ip_options *sopt;
unsigned char *sptr, *dptr;
int soffset, doffset;
int optlen;
__be32 daddr;
memset(dopt, 0, sizeof(struct ip_options));
sopt = &(IPCB(skb)->opt);
if (sopt->optlen == 0) {
dopt->optlen = 0;
return 0;
}
sptr = skb_network_header(skb);
dptr = dopt->__data;
daddr = skb_rtable(skb)->rt_spec_dst;
if (sopt->rr) {
optlen = sptr[sopt->rr+1];
soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2];
dopt->rr = dopt->optlen + sizeof(struct iphdr);
memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen);
if (sopt->rr_needaddr && soffset <= optlen) {
if (soffset + 3 > optlen)
return -EINVAL;
dptr[2] = soffset + 4;
dopt->rr_needaddr = 1;
}
dptr += optlen;
dopt->optlen += optlen;
}
if (sopt->ts) {
optlen = sptr[sopt->ts+1];
soffset = sptr[sopt->ts+2];
dopt->ts = dopt->optlen + sizeof(struct iphdr);
memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->ts, optlen);
if (soffset <= optlen) {
if (sopt->ts_needaddr) {
if (soffset + 3 > optlen)
return -EINVAL;
dopt->ts_needaddr = 1;
soffset += 4;
}
if (sopt->ts_needtime) {
if (soffset + 3 > optlen)
return -EINVAL;
if ((dptr[3]&0xF) != IPOPT_TS_PRESPEC) {
dopt->ts_needtime = 1;
soffset += 4;
} else {
dopt->ts_needtime = 0;
if (soffset + 7 <= optlen) {
__be32 addr;
memcpy(&addr, dptr+soffset-1, 4);
if (inet_addr_type(dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev), addr) != RTN_UNICAST) {
dopt->ts_needtime = 1;
soffset += 8;
}
}
}
}
dptr[2] = soffset;
}
dptr += optlen;
dopt->optlen += optlen;
}
if (sopt->srr) {
unsigned char * start = sptr+sopt->srr;
__be32 faddr;
optlen = start[1];
soffset = start[2];
doffset = 0;
if (soffset > optlen)
soffset = optlen + 1;
soffset -= 4;
if (soffset > 3) {
memcpy(&faddr, &start[soffset-1], 4);
for (soffset-=4, doffset=4; soffset > 3; soffset-=4, doffset+=4)
memcpy(&dptr[doffset-1], &start[soffset-1], 4);
/*
* RFC1812 requires to fix illegal source routes.
*/
if (memcmp(&ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&start[soffset + 3], 4) == 0)
doffset -= 4;
}
if (doffset > 3) {
memcpy(&start[doffset-1], &daddr, 4);
dopt->faddr = faddr;
dptr[0] = start[0];
dptr[1] = doffset+3;
dptr[2] = 4;
dptr += doffset+3;
dopt->srr = dopt->optlen + sizeof(struct iphdr);
dopt->optlen += doffset+3;
dopt->is_strictroute = sopt->is_strictroute;
}
}
if (sopt->cipso) {
optlen = sptr[sopt->cipso+1];
dopt->cipso = dopt->optlen+sizeof(struct iphdr);
memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->cipso, optlen);
dptr += optlen;
dopt->optlen += optlen;
}
while (dopt->optlen & 3) {
*dptr++ = IPOPT_END;
dopt->optlen++;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,557
|
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