instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *prev;
int error;
address &= PAGE_MASK;
error = security_mmap_addr(address);
if (error)
return error;
/* Enforce stack_guard_gap */
prev = vma->vm_prev;
/* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
if (prev && !(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) &&
(prev->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
if (address - prev->vm_end < stack_guard_gap)
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated. */
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* vma->vm_start/vm_end cannot change under us because the caller
* is required to hold the mmap_sem in read mode. We need the
* anon_vma lock to serialize against concurrent expand_stacks.
*/
anon_vma_lock_write(vma->anon_vma);
/* Somebody else might have raced and expanded it already */
if (address < vma->vm_start) {
unsigned long size, grow;
size = vma->vm_end - address;
grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
error = -ENOMEM;
if (grow <= vma->vm_pgoff) {
error = acct_stack_growth(vma, size, grow);
if (!error) {
/*
* vma_gap_update() doesn't support concurrent
* updates, but we only hold a shared mmap_sem
* lock here, so we need to protect against
* concurrent vma expansions.
* anon_vma_lock_write() doesn't help here, as
* we don't guarantee that all growable vmas
* in a mm share the same root anon vma.
* So, we reuse mm->page_table_lock to guard
* against concurrent vma expansions.
*/
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
mm->locked_vm += grow;
vm_stat_account(mm, vma->vm_flags, grow);
anon_vma_interval_tree_pre_update_vma(vma);
vma->vm_start = address;
vma->vm_pgoff -= grow;
anon_vma_interval_tree_post_update_vma(vma);
vma_gap_update(vma);
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
perf_event_mmap(vma);
}
}
}
anon_vma_unlock_write(vma->anon_vma);
khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(vma, vma->vm_flags);
validate_mm(mm);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.20.14, expand_downwards in mm/mmap.c lacks a check for the mmap minimum address, which makes it easier for attackers to exploit kernel NULL pointer dereferences on non-SMAP platforms. This is related to a capability check for the wrong task.
Commit Message: mm: enforce min addr even if capable() in expand_downwards()
security_mmap_addr() does a capability check with current_cred(), but
we can reach this code from contexts like a VFS write handler where
current_cred() must not be used.
This can be abused on systems without SMAP to make NULL pointer
dereferences exploitable again.
Fixes: 8869477a49c3 ("security: protect from stack expansion into low vm addresses")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 169,722
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ImportGrayQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
bit;
unsigned int
pixel;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 1:
{
register Quantum
black,
white;
black=0;
white=QuantumRange;
if (quantum_info->min_is_white != MagickFalse)
{
black=QuantumRange;
white=0;
}
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) number_pixels-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
SetPixelGray(image,((*p) & (1 << (7-bit))) == 0 ? black : white,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (number_pixels % 8); bit++)
{
SetPixelGray(image,((*p) & (0x01 << (7-bit))) == 0 ? black : white,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (bit != 0)
p++;
break;
}
case 4:
{
register unsigned char
pixel;
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) number_pixels-1); x+=2)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ((*p >> 4) & 0xf);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
pixel=(unsigned char) ((*p) & 0xf);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (number_pixels % 2); bit++)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) (*p++ >> 4);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
if (quantum_info->min_is_white != MagickFalse)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 10:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
if (image->endian == LSBEndian)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (number_pixels-2); x+=3)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff,
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff,
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff,
range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
if (x++ < (ssize_t) (number_pixels-1))
{
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff,
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (x++ < (ssize_t) number_pixels)
{
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff,
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (number_pixels-2); x+=3)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff,range),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff,range),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff,range),
q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
if (x++ < (ssize_t) (number_pixels-1))
{
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff,
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (x++ < (ssize_t) number_pixels)
{
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff,
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 12:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (number_pixels-1); x+=2)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (number_pixels % 2); bit++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (pixel >> 4),
range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (bit != 0)
p++;
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
if (quantum_info->min_is_white != MagickFalse)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
float
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 64:
{
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
double
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.1-0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or have other unspecified impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
|
Medium
| 168,623
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void *) gdImageWebpPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
if (out == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, -1);
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the gdImageWebPtr function in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.4 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via large width and height values.
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6912
|
Low
| 168,819
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void inet_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_error_queue);
sk_mem_reclaim(sk);
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE) {
pr_err("Attempt to release TCP socket in state %d %p\n",
sk->sk_state, sk);
return;
}
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
pr_err("Attempt to release alive inet socket %p\n", sk);
return;
}
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc));
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc));
WARN_ON(sk->sk_wmem_queued);
WARN_ON(sk->sk_forward_alloc);
kfree(inet->opt);
dst_release(rcu_dereference_check(sk->sk_dst_cache, 1));
sk_refcnt_debug_dec(sk);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
High
| 165,545
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool asn1_read_BOOLEAN(struct asn1_data *data, bool *v)
{
uint8_t tmp = 0;
asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_BOOLEAN);
asn1_read_uint8(data, &tmp);
if (tmp == 0xFF) {
*v = true;
} else {
*v = false;
}
asn1_end_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The LDAP server in the AD domain controller in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22 does not check return values to ensure successful ASN.1 memory allocation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and daemon crash) via crafted packets.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,583
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: l2tp_framing_type_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_TYPE_ASYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_TYPE_SYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "S"));
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,895
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(
char *key,
char *value,
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list)
{
struct iscsi_extra_response *extra_response;
if (strlen(value) > VALUE_MAXLEN) {
pr_err("Value for notunderstood key \"%s\" exceeds %d,"
" protocol error.\n", key, VALUE_MAXLEN);
return -1;
}
extra_response = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iscsi_extra_response), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!extra_response) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for"
" struct iscsi_extra_response.\n");
return -1;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&extra_response->er_list);
strncpy(extra_response->key, key, strlen(key) + 1);
strncpy(extra_response->value, NOTUNDERSTOOD,
strlen(NOTUNDERSTOOD) + 1);
list_add_tail(&extra_response->er_list,
¶m_list->extra_response_list);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the iscsi_add_notunderstood_response function in drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.c in the iSCSI target subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.9.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and OOPS) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a long key that is not properly handled during construction of an error-response packet.
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
|
Medium
| 166,050
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void IBusBusConnectedCallback(IBusBus* bus, gpointer user_data) {
LOG(WARNING) << "IBus connection is recovered.";
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->MaybeRestoreConnections();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,536
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::RegisterMetricsServiceProviders() {
PrefService* local_state = g_browser_process->local_state();
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<SubprocessMetricsProvider>());
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<ExtensionsMetricsProvider>(metrics_state_manager_));
#endif
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::NetworkMetricsProvider>(
content::CreateNetworkConnectionTrackerAsyncGetter(),
std::make_unique<metrics::NetworkQualityEstimatorProviderImpl>()));
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<OmniboxMetricsProvider>(
base::Bind(&chrome::IsIncognitoSessionActive)));
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<ChromeStabilityMetricsProvider>(local_state));
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::GPUMetricsProvider>());
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::ScreenInfoMetricsProvider>());
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(CreateFileMetricsProvider(
metrics_state_manager_->IsMetricsReportingEnabled()));
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::DriveMetricsProvider>(
chrome::FILE_LOCAL_STATE));
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::CallStackProfileMetricsProvider>());
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::SamplingMetricsProvider>());
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<translate::TranslateRankerMetricsProvider>());
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::ComponentMetricsProvider>(
g_browser_process->component_updater()));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<AndroidMetricsProvider>());
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<PageLoadMetricsProvider>());
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
#if defined(OS_WIN)
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<GoogleUpdateMetricsProviderWin>());
base::FilePath user_data_dir;
base::FilePath crash_dir;
if (!base::PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_USER_DATA, &user_data_dir) ||
!base::PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_CRASH_DUMPS, &crash_dir)) {
user_data_dir = base::FilePath();
crash_dir = base::FilePath();
}
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<browser_watcher::WatcherMetricsProviderWin>(
chrome::GetBrowserExitCodesRegistryPath(), user_data_dir, crash_dir,
base::Bind(&GetExecutableVersionDetails)));
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<AntiVirusMetricsProvider>());
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
plugin_metrics_provider_ = new PluginMetricsProvider(local_state);
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::unique_ptr<metrics::MetricsProvider>(plugin_metrics_provider_));
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<ChromeOSMetricsProvider>());
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<SigninStatusMetricsProviderChromeOS>());
if (metrics::GetMetricsReportingDefaultState(local_state) ==
metrics::EnableMetricsDefault::DEFAULT_UNKNOWN) {
metrics::RecordMetricsReportingDefaultState(
local_state, metrics::EnableMetricsDefault::OPT_OUT);
}
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<chromeos::PrinterMetricsProvider>());
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
SigninStatusMetricsProvider::CreateInstance(
std::make_unique<ChromeSigninStatusMetricsProviderDelegate>()));
#endif // !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<syncer::DeviceCountMetricsProvider>(
base::Bind(&browser_sync::ChromeSyncClient::GetDeviceInfoTrackers)));
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<HttpsEngagementMetricsProvider>());
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<CertificateReportingMetricsProvider>());
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<UpgradeMetricsProvider>());
#endif //! defined(OS_ANDROID) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<PowerMetricsProvider>());
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_CROS_ASSISTANT)
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<AssistantServiceMetricsProvider>());
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_CROS_ASSISTANT)
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Developer Tools (aka DevTools) subsystem in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the settings parameter in a chrome-devtools-frontend.appspot.com URL's query string.
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
|
Medium
| 172,070
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadPALMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
totalOffset,
seekNextDepth;
MagickPixelPacket
transpix;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
size_t
bytes_per_row,
flags,
bits_per_pixel,
version,
nextDepthOffset,
transparentIndex,
compressionType,
byte,
mask,
redbits,
greenbits,
bluebits,
one,
pad,
size,
bit;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*lastrow,
*one_row,
*ptr;
unsigned short
color16;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
totalOffset=0;
do
{
image->columns=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
image->rows=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
bytes_per_row=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
flags=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
bits_per_pixel=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((bits_per_pixel != 1) && (bits_per_pixel != 2) &&
(bits_per_pixel != 4) && (bits_per_pixel != 8) &&
(bits_per_pixel != 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedBitsPerPixel");
version=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((version != 0) && (version != 1) && (version != 2))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"FileFormatVersionMismatch");
nextDepthOffset=(size_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
transparentIndex=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
compressionType=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((compressionType != PALM_COMPRESSION_NONE) &&
(compressionType != PALM_COMPRESSION_SCANLINE ) &&
(compressionType != PALM_COMPRESSION_RLE))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
pad=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) pad;
/*
Initialize image colormap.
*/
one=1;
if ((bits_per_pixel < 16) &&
(AcquireImageColormap(image,one << bits_per_pixel) == MagickFalse))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&transpix);
if (bits_per_pixel == 16) /* Direct Color */
{
redbits=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image); /* # of bits of red */
(void) redbits;
greenbits=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image); /* # of bits of green */
(void) greenbits;
bluebits=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image); /* # of bits of blue */
(void) bluebits;
ReadBlobByte(image); /* reserved by Palm */
ReadBlobByte(image); /* reserved by Palm */
transpix.red=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange*ReadBlobByte(image)/31);
transpix.green=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange*ReadBlobByte(image)/63);
transpix.blue=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange*ReadBlobByte(image)/31);
}
if (bits_per_pixel == 8)
{
IndexPacket
index;
if (flags & PALM_HAS_COLORMAP_FLAG)
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
{
ReadBlobByte(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(size_t) (255-i));
image->colormap[(int) index].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[(int) index].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[(int) index].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
}
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (1L << bits_per_pixel); i++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(size_t) (255-i));
image->colormap[(int) index].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(
PalmPalette[i][0]);
image->colormap[(int) index].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(
PalmPalette[i][1]);
image->colormap[(int) index].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(
PalmPalette[i][2]);
}
}
if (flags & PALM_IS_COMPRESSED_FLAG)
size=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) size;
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
if (bits_per_pixel < 16)
{
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->depth=8;
}
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(image);
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
one_row=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(bytes_per_row,
2*image->columns),sizeof(*one_row));
if (one_row == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
lastrow=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (compressionType == PALM_COMPRESSION_SCANLINE)
{
lastrow=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(bytes_per_row,
2*image->columns),sizeof(*lastrow));
if (lastrow == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
mask=(size_t) (1U << bits_per_pixel)-1;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if ((flags & PALM_IS_COMPRESSED_FLAG) == 0)
{
/* TODO move out of loop! */
image->compression=NoCompression;
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_row,one_row);
if (count != (ssize_t) bytes_per_row)
break;
}
else
{
if (compressionType == PALM_COMPRESSION_RLE)
{
/* TODO move out of loop! */
image->compression=RLECompression;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) bytes_per_row; )
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (count < 0)
break;
count=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) bytes_per_row-i);
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(one_row+i,(int) byte,(size_t) count);
i+=count;
}
}
else
if (compressionType == PALM_COMPRESSION_SCANLINE)
{
size_t
one;
/* TODO move out of loop! */
one=1;
image->compression=FaxCompression;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) bytes_per_row; i+=8)
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (count < 0)
break;
byte=(size_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) bytes_per_row-i,8);
for (bit=0; bit < byte; bit++)
{
if ((y == 0) || (count & (one << (7 - bit))))
one_row[i+bit]=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
else
one_row[i+bit]=lastrow[i+bit];
}
}
(void) CopyMagickMemory(lastrow, one_row, bytes_per_row);
}
}
ptr=one_row;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
if (bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
if (image->columns > (2*bytes_per_row))
{
one_row=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(one_row);
if (compressionType == PALM_COMPRESSION_SCANLINE)
lastrow=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(lastrow);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
color16=(*ptr++ << 8);
color16|=(*ptr++);
SetPixelRed(q,(QuantumRange*((color16 >> 11) & 0x1f))/0x1f);
SetPixelGreen(q,(QuantumRange*((color16 >> 5) & 0x3f))/0x3f);
SetPixelBlue(q,(QuantumRange*((color16 >> 0) & 0x1f))/0x1f);
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
}
else
{
bit=8-bits_per_pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if ((size_t) (ptr-one_row) >= bytes_per_row)
{
one_row=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(one_row);
if (compressionType == PALM_COMPRESSION_SCANLINE)
lastrow=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(lastrow);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
index=(IndexPacket) (mask-(((*ptr) & (mask << bit)) >> bit));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
if (bit)
bit-=bits_per_pixel;
else
{
ptr++;
bit=8-bits_per_pixel;
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (flags & PALM_HAS_TRANSPARENCY_FLAG)
{
IndexPacket index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(mask-transparentIndex));
if (bits_per_pixel != 16)
SetMagickPixelPacket(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,
(const IndexPacket *) NULL,&transpix);
(void) TransparentPaintImage(image,&transpix,(Quantum)
TransparentOpacity,MagickFalse);
}
one_row=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(one_row);
if (compressionType == PALM_COMPRESSION_SCANLINE)
lastrow=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(lastrow);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image. Copied from coders/pnm.c
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (nextDepthOffset != 0)
{
/*
Skip to next image.
*/
totalOffset+=(MagickOffsetType) (nextDepthOffset*4);
if (totalOffset >= (MagickOffsetType) GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader")
else
seekNextDepth=SeekBlob(image,totalOffset,SEEK_SET);
if (seekNextDepth != totalOffset)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Allocate next image structure. Copied from coders/pnm.c
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (nextDepthOffset != 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.6-2 has a memory leak vulnerability in WritePALMImage in coders/palm.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/574
|
Medium
| 167,973
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GCInfoTable::Init() {
CHECK(!g_gc_info_table);
Resize();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition in Oilpan in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
|
High
| 173,135
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gs_main_finit(gs_main_instance * minst, int exit_status, int code)
{
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p;
gs_dual_memory_t dmem = {0};
int exit_code;
ref error_object;
char *tempnames;
/* NB: need to free gs_name_table
*/
/*
* Previous versions of this code closed the devices in the
* device list here. Since these devices are now prototypes,
* they cannot be opened, so they do not need to be closed;
* alloc_restore_all will close dynamically allocated devices.
*/
tempnames = gs_main_tempnames(minst);
/* by the time we get here, we *must* avoid any random redefinitions of
* operators etc, so we push systemdict onto the top of the dict stack.
* We do this in C to avoid running into any other re-defininitions in the
* Postscript world.
*/
gs_finit_push_systemdict(i_ctx_p);
/* We have to disable BGPrint before we call interp_reclaim() to prevent the
* parent rendering thread initialising for the next page, whilst we are
* removing objects it may want to access - for example, the I/O device table.
* We also have to mess with the BeginPage/EndPage procs so that we don't
* trigger a spurious extra page to be emitted.
*/
if (minst->init_done >= 2) {
gs_main_run_string(minst,
"/BGPrint /GetDeviceParam .special_op \
{{ <</BeginPage {pop} /EndPage {pop pop //false } \
/BGPrint false /NumRenderingThreads 0>> setpagedevice} if} if \
serverdict /.jobsavelevel get 0 eq {/quit} {/stop} ifelse \
.systemvar exec",
0 , &exit_code, &error_object);
}
/*
* Close the "main" device, because it may need to write out
* data before destruction. pdfwrite needs so.
*/
if (minst->init_done >= 2) {
int code = 0;
if (idmemory->reclaim != 0) {
code = interp_reclaim(&minst->i_ctx_p, avm_global);
if (code < 0) {
ref error_name;
if (tempnames)
free(tempnames);
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) >= 0) {
char err_str[32] = {0};
name_string_ref(imemory, &error_name, &error_name);
memcpy(err_str, error_name.value.const_bytes, r_size(&error_name));
emprintf2(imemory, "ERROR: %s (%d) reclaiming the memory while the interpreter finalization.\n", err_str, code);
}
else {
emprintf1(imemory, "UNKNOWN ERROR %d reclaiming the memory while the interpreter finalization.\n", code);
}
#ifdef MEMENTO_SQUEEZE_BUILD
if (code != gs_error_VMerror ) return gs_error_Fatal;
#else
return gs_error_Fatal;
#endif
}
i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; /* interp_reclaim could change it. */
}
if (i_ctx_p->pgs != NULL && i_ctx_p->pgs->device != NULL) {
gx_device *pdev = i_ctx_p->pgs->device;
const char * dname = pdev->dname;
if (code < 0) {
ref error_name;
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) >= 0) {
char err_str[32] = {0};
name_string_ref(imemory, &error_name, &error_name);
memcpy(err_str, error_name.value.const_bytes, r_size(&error_name));
emprintf3(imemory, "ERROR: %s (%d) on closing %s device.\n", err_str, code, dname);
}
else {
emprintf2(imemory, "UNKNOWN ERROR %d closing %s device.\n", code, dname);
}
}
rc_decrement(pdev, "gs_main_finit"); /* device might be freed */
if (exit_status == 0 || exit_status == gs_error_Quit)
exit_status = code;
}
/* Flush stdout and stderr */
gs_main_run_string(minst,
"(%stdout) (w) file closefile (%stderr) (w) file closefile \
serverdict /.jobsavelevel get 0 eq {/quit} {/stop} ifelse .systemexec \
systemdict /savedinitialgstate .forceundef",
0 , &exit_code, &error_object);
}
gp_readline_finit(minst->readline_data);
i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; /* get current interp context */
if (gs_debug_c(':')) {
print_resource_usage(minst, &gs_imemory, "Final");
dmprintf1(minst->heap, "%% Exiting instance 0x%p\n", minst);
}
/* Do the equivalent of a restore "past the bottom". */
/* This will release all memory, close all open files, etc. */
if (minst->init_done >= 1) {
gs_memory_t *mem_raw = i_ctx_p->memory.current->non_gc_memory;
i_plugin_holder *h = i_ctx_p->plugin_list;
dmem = *idmemory;
code = alloc_restore_all(i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
emprintf1(mem_raw,
"ERROR %d while the final restore. See gs/psi/ierrors.h for code explanation.\n",
code);
i_iodev_finit(&dmem);
i_plugin_finit(mem_raw, h);
}
/* clean up redirected stdout */
if (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2
&& (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 != minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout)
&& (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 != minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstderr)) {
fclose(minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2);
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 = (FILE *)NULL;
}
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->stdout_is_redirected = 0;
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->stdout_to_stderr = 0;
/* remove any temporary files, after ghostscript has closed files */
if (tempnames) {
char *p = tempnames;
while (*p) {
unlink(p);
p += strlen(p) + 1;
}
free(tempnames);
}
gs_lib_finit(exit_status, code, minst->heap);
gs_free_object(minst->heap, minst->lib_path.container.value.refs, "lib_path array");
ialloc_finit(&dmem);
return exit_status;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In Artifex Ghostscript before 9.24, attackers able to supply crafted PostScript files could use incorrect free logic in pagedevice replacement to crash the interpreter.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,695
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct vm_area_struct *vma_to_resize(unsigned long addr,
unsigned long old_len, unsigned long new_len, unsigned long *p)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (!vma || vma->vm_start > addr)
goto Efault;
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
goto Einval;
/* We can't remap across vm area boundaries */
if (old_len > vma->vm_end - addr)
goto Efault;
if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_PFNMAP)) {
if (new_len > old_len)
goto Efault;
}
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT;
lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK);
locked += new_len - old_len;
if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
goto Eagain;
}
if (!may_expand_vm(mm, (new_len - old_len) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
goto Enomem;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_ACCOUNT) {
unsigned long charged = (new_len - old_len) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (security_vm_enough_memory(charged))
goto Efault;
*p = charged;
}
return vma;
Efault: /* very odd choice for most of the cases, but... */
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
Einval:
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
Enomem:
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
Eagain:
return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the vma_to_resize function in mm/mremap.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG_ON and system crash) via a crafted mremap system call that expands a memory mapping.
Commit Message: mm: avoid wrapping vm_pgoff in mremap()
The normal mmap paths all avoid creating a mapping where the pgoff
inside the mapping could wrap around due to overflow. However, an
expanding mremap() can take such a non-wrapping mapping and make it
bigger and cause a wrapping condition.
Noticed by Robert Swiecki when running a system call fuzzer, where it
caused a BUG_ON() due to terminally confusing the vma_prio_tree code. A
vma dumping patch by Hugh then pinpointed the crazy wrapped case.
Reported-and-tested-by: Robert Swiecki <robert@swiecki.net>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,859
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WriteFromUrlOperation::Download(const base::Closure& continuation) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::FILE);
if (IsCancelled()) {
return;
}
download_continuation_ = continuation;
SetStage(image_writer_api::STAGE_DOWNLOAD);
url_fetcher_ = net::URLFetcher::Create(url_, net::URLFetcher::GET, this);
url_fetcher_->SetRequestContext(request_context_);
url_fetcher_->SaveResponseToFileAtPath(
image_path_, BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::FILE));
AddCleanUpFunction(
base::Bind(&WriteFromUrlOperation::DestroyUrlFetcher, this));
url_fetcher_->Start();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the GPU process implementation in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the continued availability of a GPUChannelHost data structure during Blink shutdown, related to content/browser/gpu/browser_gpu_channel_host_factory.cc and content/renderer/render_thread_impl.cc.
Commit Message: Network traffic annotation added to extensions::image_writer::WriteFromUrlOperation.
Network traffic annotation is added to network request of extensions::image_writer::WriteFromUrlOperation.
BUG=656607
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2691963002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#451456}
|
Low
| 171,962
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool RenderMenuList::multiple()
{
return toHTMLSelectElement(node())->multiple();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly implement script object wrappers, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: PopupMenuClient::multiple() should be const
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76771
Patch by Benjamin Poulain <bpoulain@apple.com> on 2012-01-21
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
* platform/PopupMenuClient.h:
(WebCore::PopupMenuClient::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMenuList::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@105570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 170,300
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _gcry_ecc_eddsa_sign (gcry_mpi_t input, ECC_secret_key *skey,
gcry_mpi_t r_r, gcry_mpi_t s, int hashalgo, gcry_mpi_t pk)
{
int rc;
mpi_ec_t ctx = NULL;
int b;
unsigned int tmp;
unsigned char *digest = NULL;
gcry_buffer_t hvec[3];
const void *mbuf;
size_t mlen;
unsigned char *rawmpi = NULL;
unsigned int rawmpilen;
unsigned char *encpk = NULL; /* Encoded public key. */
unsigned int encpklen;
mpi_point_struct I; /* Intermediate value. */
mpi_point_struct Q; /* Public key. */
gcry_mpi_t a, x, y, r;
memset (hvec, 0, sizeof hvec);
if (!mpi_is_opaque (input))
return GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
/* Initialize some helpers. */
point_init (&I);
point_init (&Q);
a = mpi_snew (0);
x = mpi_new (0);
y = mpi_new (0);
r = mpi_new (0);
ctx = _gcry_mpi_ec_p_internal_new (skey->E.model, skey->E.dialect, 0,
skey->E.p, skey->E.a, skey->E.b);
b = (ctx->nbits+7)/8;
if (b != 256/8) {
rc = GPG_ERR_INTERNAL; /* We only support 256 bit. */
goto leave;
}
rc = _gcry_ecc_eddsa_compute_h_d (&digest, skey->d, ctx);
if (rc)
goto leave;
_gcry_mpi_set_buffer (a, digest, 32, 0);
/* Compute the public key if it has not been supplied as optional
parameter. */
if (pk)
{
rc = _gcry_ecc_eddsa_decodepoint (pk, ctx, &Q, &encpk, &encpklen);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex ("* e_pk", encpk, encpklen);
if (!_gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (&Q, ctx))
{
rc = GPG_ERR_BROKEN_PUBKEY;
goto leave;
}
}
else
{
_gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (&Q, a, &skey->E.G, ctx);
rc = _gcry_ecc_eddsa_encodepoint (&Q, ctx, x, y, 0, &encpk, &encpklen);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex (" e_pk", encpk, encpklen);
}
/* Compute R. */
mbuf = mpi_get_opaque (input, &tmp);
mlen = (tmp +7)/8;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex (" m", mbuf, mlen);
hvec[0].data = digest;
hvec[0].off = 32;
hvec[0].len = 32;
hvec[1].data = (char*)mbuf;
hvec[1].len = mlen;
rc = _gcry_md_hash_buffers (hashalgo, 0, digest, hvec, 2);
if (rc)
goto leave;
reverse_buffer (digest, 64);
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex (" r", digest, 64);
_gcry_mpi_set_buffer (r, digest, 64, 0);
_gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (&I, r, &skey->E.G, ctx);
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printpnt (" r", &I, ctx);
/* Convert R into affine coordinates and apply encoding. */
rc = _gcry_ecc_eddsa_encodepoint (&I, ctx, x, y, 0, &rawmpi, &rawmpilen);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex (" e_r", rawmpi, rawmpilen);
/* S = r + a * H(encodepoint(R) + encodepoint(pk) + m) mod n */
hvec[0].data = rawmpi; /* (this is R) */
hvec[0].off = 0;
hvec[0].len = rawmpilen;
hvec[1].data = encpk;
hvec[1].off = 0;
hvec[1].len = encpklen;
hvec[2].data = (char*)mbuf;
hvec[2].off = 0;
hvec[2].len = mlen;
rc = _gcry_md_hash_buffers (hashalgo, 0, digest, hvec, 3);
if (rc)
goto leave;
/* No more need for RAWMPI thus we now transfer it to R_R. */
mpi_set_opaque (r_r, rawmpi, rawmpilen*8);
rawmpi = NULL;
reverse_buffer (digest, 64);
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex (" H(R+)", digest, 64);
_gcry_mpi_set_buffer (s, digest, 64, 0);
mpi_mulm (s, s, a, skey->E.n);
mpi_addm (s, s, r, skey->E.n);
rc = eddsa_encodempi (s, b, &rawmpi, &rawmpilen);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex (" e_s", rawmpi, rawmpilen);
mpi_set_opaque (s, rawmpi, rawmpilen*8);
rawmpi = NULL;
rc = 0;
leave:
_gcry_mpi_release (a);
_gcry_mpi_release (x);
_gcry_mpi_release (y);
_gcry_mpi_release (r);
xfree (digest);
_gcry_mpi_ec_free (ctx);
point_free (&I);
point_free (&Q);
xfree (encpk);
xfree (rawmpi);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In Libgcrypt before 1.7.7, an attacker who learns the EdDSA session key (from side-channel observation during the signing process) can easily recover the long-term secret key. 1.7.7 makes a cipher/ecc-eddsa.c change to store this session key in secure memory, to ensure that constant-time point operations are used in the MPI library.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,790
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int read_header(FFV1Context *f)
{
uint8_t state[CONTEXT_SIZE];
int i, j, context_count = -1; //-1 to avoid warning
RangeCoder *const c = &f->slice_context[0]->c;
memset(state, 128, sizeof(state));
if (f->version < 2) {
int chroma_planes, chroma_h_shift, chroma_v_shift, transparency;
unsigned v= get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (v >= 2) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid version %d in ver01 header\n", v);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
f->version = v;
f->ac = f->avctx->coder_type = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (f->ac > 1) {
for (i = 1; i < 256; i++)
f->state_transition[i] = get_symbol(c, state, 1) + c->one_state[i];
}
f->colorspace = get_symbol(c, state, 0); //YUV cs type
if (f->version > 0)
f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
chroma_planes = get_rac(c, state);
chroma_h_shift = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
chroma_v_shift = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
transparency = get_rac(c, state);
if (f->plane_count) {
if ( chroma_planes != f->chroma_planes
|| chroma_h_shift!= f->chroma_h_shift
|| chroma_v_shift!= f->chroma_v_shift
|| transparency != f->transparency) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid change of global parameters\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
f->chroma_planes = chroma_planes;
f->chroma_h_shift = chroma_h_shift;
f->chroma_v_shift = chroma_v_shift;
f->transparency = transparency;
f->plane_count = 2 + f->transparency;
}
if (f->colorspace == 0) {
if (!f->transparency && !f->chroma_planes) {
if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample <= 8)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY8;
else
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY16;
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample<=8 && !f->transparency) {
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P; break;
case 0x01: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P; break;
case 0x20: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV411P; break;
case 0x22: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV410P; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample <= 8 && f->transparency) {
switch(16*f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 9) {
f->packed_at_lsb = 1;
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P9; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P9; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P9; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 10) {
f->packed_at_lsb = 1;
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P10; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P10; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P10; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else {
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P16; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P16; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P16; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
}
} else if (f->colorspace == 1) {
if (f->chroma_h_shift || f->chroma_v_shift) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"chroma subsampling not supported in this colorspace\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
if ( f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 9)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP9;
else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 10)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP10;
else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 12)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP12;
else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 14)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP14;
else
if (f->transparency) f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_RGB32;
else f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_0RGB32;
} else {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "colorspace not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
av_dlog(f->avctx, "%d %d %d\n",
f->chroma_h_shift, f->chroma_v_shift, f->avctx->pix_fmt);
if (f->version < 2) {
context_count = read_quant_tables(c, f->quant_table);
if (context_count < 0) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "read_quant_table error\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
} else if (f->version < 3) {
f->slice_count = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
} else {
const uint8_t *p = c->bytestream_end;
for (f->slice_count = 0;
f->slice_count < MAX_SLICES && 3 < p - c->bytestream_start;
f->slice_count++) {
int trailer = 3 + 5*!!f->ec;
int size = AV_RB24(p-trailer);
if (size + trailer > p - c->bytestream_start)
break;
p -= size + trailer;
}
}
if (f->slice_count > (unsigned)MAX_SLICES || f->slice_count <= 0) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "slice count %d is invalid\n", f->slice_count);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
for (j = 0; j < f->slice_count; j++) {
FFV1Context *fs = f->slice_context[j];
fs->ac = f->ac;
fs->packed_at_lsb = f->packed_at_lsb;
fs->slice_damaged = 0;
if (f->version == 2) {
fs->slice_x = get_symbol(c, state, 0) * f->width ;
fs->slice_y = get_symbol(c, state, 0) * f->height;
fs->slice_width = (get_symbol(c, state, 0) + 1) * f->width + fs->slice_x;
fs->slice_height = (get_symbol(c, state, 0) + 1) * f->height + fs->slice_y;
fs->slice_x /= f->num_h_slices;
fs->slice_y /= f->num_v_slices;
fs->slice_width = fs->slice_width / f->num_h_slices - fs->slice_x;
fs->slice_height = fs->slice_height / f->num_v_slices - fs->slice_y;
if ((unsigned)fs->slice_width > f->width ||
(unsigned)fs->slice_height > f->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if ( (unsigned)fs->slice_x + (uint64_t)fs->slice_width > f->width
|| (unsigned)fs->slice_y + (uint64_t)fs->slice_height > f->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
for (i = 0; i < f->plane_count; i++) {
PlaneContext *const p = &fs->plane[i];
if (f->version == 2) {
int idx = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (idx > (unsigned)f->quant_table_count) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"quant_table_index out of range\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
p->quant_table_index = idx;
memcpy(p->quant_table, f->quant_tables[idx],
sizeof(p->quant_table));
context_count = f->context_count[idx];
} else {
memcpy(p->quant_table, f->quant_table, sizeof(p->quant_table));
}
if (f->version <= 2) {
av_assert0(context_count >= 0);
if (p->context_count < context_count) {
av_freep(&p->state);
av_freep(&p->vlc_state);
}
p->context_count = context_count;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The read_header function in libavcodec/ffv1dec.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not properly enforce certain bit-count and colorspace constraints, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted FFV1 data.
Commit Message: ffv1dec: Check bits_per_raw_sample and colorspace for equality in ver 0/1 headers
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
Medium
| 165,917
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ExtensionTtsController::SetPlatformImpl(
ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl* platform_impl) {
platform_impl_ = platform_impl;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,386
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void calc_coeff(double mu[4], const int index[4], int prefilter, double r2, double mul)
{
double mul2 = mul * mul, mul3 = mul2 * mul;
double kernel[] = {
(5204 + 2520 * mul + 1092 * mul2 + 3280 * mul3) / 12096,
(2943 - 210 * mul - 273 * mul2 - 2460 * mul3) / 12096,
( 486 - 924 * mul - 546 * mul2 + 984 * mul3) / 12096,
( 17 - 126 * mul + 273 * mul2 - 164 * mul3) / 12096,
};
double mat_freq[13];
memcpy(mat_freq, kernel, sizeof(kernel));
memset(mat_freq + 4, 0, sizeof(mat_freq) - sizeof(kernel));
int n = 6;
coeff_filter(mat_freq, n, kernel);
for (int k = 0; k < 2 * prefilter; ++k)
coeff_blur121(mat_freq, ++n);
double vec_freq[13];
n = index[3] + prefilter + 3;
calc_gauss(vec_freq, n, r2);
memset(vec_freq + n + 1, 0, sizeof(vec_freq) - (n + 1) * sizeof(vec_freq[0]));
n -= 3;
coeff_filter(vec_freq, n, kernel);
for (int k = 0; k < prefilter; ++k)
coeff_blur121(vec_freq, --n);
double mat[4][4];
calc_matrix(mat, mat_freq, index);
double vec[4];
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
vec[i] = mat_freq[0] - mat_freq[index[i]] - vec_freq[0] + vec_freq[index[i]];
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
double res = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < 4; ++j)
res += mat[i][j] * vec[j];
mu[i] = FFMAX(0, res);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the calc_coeff function in libass/ass_blur.c in libass before 0.13.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix blur coefficient calculation buffer overflow
Found by fuzzer test case id:000082,sig:11,src:002579,op:havoc,rep:8.
Correctness should be checked, but this fixes the overflow for good.
|
Low
| 168,775
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void set_cfg_option(char *opt_string)
{
char *sep, *sep2, szSec[1024], szKey[1024], szVal[1024];
sep = strchr(opt_string, ':');
if (!sep) {
fprintf(stderr, "Badly formatted option %s - expected Section:Name=Value\n", opt_string);
return;
}
{
const size_t sepIdx = sep - opt_string;
strncpy(szSec, opt_string, sepIdx);
szSec[sepIdx] = 0;
}
sep ++;
sep2 = strchr(sep, '=');
if (!sep2) {
fprintf(stderr, "Badly formatted option %s - expected Section:Name=Value\n", opt_string);
return;
}
{
const size_t sepIdx = sep2 - sep;
strncpy(szKey, sep, sepIdx);
szKey[sepIdx] = 0;
strcpy(szVal, sep2+1);
}
if (!stricmp(szKey, "*")) {
if (stricmp(szVal, "null")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Badly formatted option %s - expected Section:*=null\n", opt_string);
return;
}
gf_cfg_del_section(cfg_file, szSec);
return;
}
if (!stricmp(szVal, "null")) {
szVal[0]=0;
}
gf_cfg_set_key(cfg_file, szSec, szKey, szVal[0] ? szVal : NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: GPAC version 0.7.1 and earlier has a buffer overflow vulnerability in the cat_multiple_files function in applications/mp4box/fileimport.c when MP4Box is used for a local directory containing crafted filenames.
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
|
Medium
| 169,791
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static BIGNUM *srp_Calc_k(BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
{
/* k = SHA1(N | PAD(g)) -- tls-srp draft 8 */
unsigned char digest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char *tmp;
EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
int longg ;
int longN = BN_num_bytes(N);
if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(longN)) == NULL)
return NULL;
BN_bn2bin(N,tmp) ;
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, tmp, longN);
memset(tmp, 0, longN);
longg = BN_bn2bin(g,tmp) ;
/* use the zeros behind to pad on left */
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, tmp + longg, longN-longg);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, tmp, longg);
OPENSSL_free(tmp);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctxt, digest, NULL);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctxt);
return BN_bin2bn(digest, sizeof(digest), NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in crypto/srp/srp_lib.c in the SRP implementation in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1i allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an invalid SRP (1) g, (2) A, or (3) B parameter.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,173
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SyslogsLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetSyslogsLibrary() {
return syslogs_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,631
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetEntryURL(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK(args.Length() == 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsObject());
const blink::WebURL& url =
blink::WebDOMFileSystem::createFileSystemURL(args[0]);
args.GetReturnValue().Set(v8_helpers::ToV8StringUnsafe(
args.GetIsolate(), url.string().utf8().c_str()));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
|
Medium
| 173,272
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: image_transform_mod_end(PNG_CONST image_transform *this, image_pixel *that,
png_const_structp pp, PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int scale = (1U<<that->sample_depth)-1;
UNUSED(this)
UNUSED(pp)
UNUSED(display)
/* At the end recalculate the digitized red green and blue values according
* to the current sample_depth of the pixel.
*
* The sample value is simply scaled to the maximum, checking for over
* and underflow (which can both happen for some image transforms,
* including simple size scaling, though libpng doesn't do that at present.
*/
that->red = sample_scale(that->redf, scale);
/* The error value is increased, at the end, according to the lowest sBIT
* value seen. Common sense tells us that the intermediate integer
* representations are no more accurate than +/- 0.5 in the integral values,
* the sBIT allows the implementation to be worse than this. In addition the
* PNG specification actually permits any error within the range (-1..+1),
* but that is ignored here. Instead the final digitized value is compared,
* below to the digitized value of the error limits - this has the net effect
* of allowing (almost) +/-1 in the output value. It's difficult to see how
* any algorithm that digitizes intermediate results can be more accurate.
*/
that->rede += 1./(2*((1U<<that->red_sBIT)-1));
if (that->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
{
that->green = sample_scale(that->greenf, scale);
that->blue = sample_scale(that->bluef, scale);
that->greene += 1./(2*((1U<<that->green_sBIT)-1));
that->bluee += 1./(2*((1U<<that->blue_sBIT)-1));
}
else
{
that->blue = that->green = that->red;
that->bluef = that->greenf = that->redf;
that->bluee = that->greene = that->rede;
}
if ((that->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) ||
that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
that->alpha = sample_scale(that->alphaf, scale);
that->alphae += 1./(2*((1U<<that->alpha_sBIT)-1));
}
else
{
that->alpha = scale; /* opaque */
that->alpha = 1; /* Override this. */
that->alphae = 0; /* It's exact ;-) */
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,623
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes,
int create_empty_fragment)
{
unsigned char *outbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], *plen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
int prefix_len = 0;
int eivlen;
size_t align = 0;
SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned int totlen = 0;
unsigned int j;
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
totlen += pipelens[j];
/*
* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
* will happen with non blocking IO
*/
if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen));
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
if (i <= 0)
return (i);
/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
}
if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
return -1;
if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
return 0;
sess = s->session;
if ((sess == NULL) ||
(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
mac_size = 0;
} else {
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
if (mac_size < 0)
goto err;
}
/*
* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
*/
if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
/*
* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
* http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
*/
if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
/*
* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
* prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
* 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
* payload)
*/
unsigned int tmppipelen = 0;
prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1);
if (prefix_len <= 0)
goto err;
if (prefix_len >
(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
/* insufficient space */
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
}
if (create_empty_fragment) {
wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
/*
* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
* multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
* payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
*/
align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
#endif
outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
} else if (prefix_len) {
wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
+ prefix_len;
} else {
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
#endif
outbuf[j] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
}
}
/* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (eivlen <= 1)
eivlen = 0;
}
/* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
else
eivlen = 0;
} else
eivlen = 0;
totlen = 0;
/* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
/* write the header */
*(outbuf[j]++) = type & 0xff;
SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type);
*(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8);
/*
* Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
* and record version number > TLS 1.0
*/
if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
&& !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
*(outbuf[j]++) = 0x1;
else
*(outbuf[j]++) = s->version & 0xff;
/* field where we are to write out packet length */
plen[j] = outbuf[j];
outbuf[j] += 2;
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j] + eivlen);
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], (int)pipelens[j]);
SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
totlen += pipelens[j];
/*
* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
*/
/* first we compress */
if (s->compress != NULL) {
if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
} else {
memcpy(wr[j].data, wr[j].input, wr[j].length);
SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
}
/*
* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
* wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
* wb->buf
*/
if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
&(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]),
1) < 0)
goto err;
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
}
SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j]);
SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
if (eivlen) {
/*
* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
*/
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], eivlen);
}
}
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
goto err;
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
outbuf[j] + wr[j].length, 1) < 0)
goto err;
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
}
/* record length after mac and block padding */
s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]), plen[j]);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen[j] - 5, 5, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
/*
* we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
* wr->length long
*/
SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for
* debugging */
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
if (create_empty_fragment) {
/*
* we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
* out anything here
*/
if (j > 0) {
/* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr);
}
/* now let's set up wb */
SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]));
}
/*
* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
* retries later
*/
s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
/* we now just need to write the buffer */
return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen);
err:
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then this can cause OpenSSL 1.1.0 before 1.1.0e to crash (dependent on ciphersuite). Both clients and servers are affected.
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
Low
| 168,420
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
ASN1_BOOLEAN *tbool = NULL;
ASN1_STRING *strtmp;
ASN1_OBJECT *otmp;
int utype;
const unsigned char *cont;
unsigned char c;
int len;
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
pf = it->funcs;
if (pf && pf->prim_i2c)
return pf->prim_i2c(pval, cout, putype, it);
/* Should type be omitted? */
if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE)
|| (it->utype != V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) {
if (!*pval)
return -1;
}
if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) {
/* If MSTRING type set the underlying type */
strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
utype = strtmp->type;
*putype = utype;
} else if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
/* If ANY set type and pointer to value */
ASN1_TYPE *typ;
typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval;
utype = typ->type;
*putype = utype;
pval = &typ->value.asn1_value;
} else
utype = *putype;
switch (utype) {
case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
otmp = (ASN1_OBJECT *)*pval;
cont = otmp->data;
len = otmp->length;
break;
case V_ASN1_NULL:
cont = NULL;
len = 0;
break;
case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
tbool = (ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval;
if (*tbool == -1)
return -1;
if (it->utype != V_ASN1_ANY) {
/*
* Default handling if value == size field then omit
*/
if (*tbool && (it->size > 0))
return -1;
if (!*tbool && !it->size)
return -1;
}
c = (unsigned char)*tbool;
cont = &c;
len = 1;
break;
case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
return i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING((ASN1_BIT_STRING *)*pval,
cout ? &cout : NULL);
break;
case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
/*
* These are all have the same content format as ASN1_INTEGER
*/
* These are all have the same content format as ASN1_INTEGER
*/
return i2c_ASN1_INTEGER((ASN1_INTEGER *)*pval, cout ? &cout : NULL);
break;
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_SET:
default:
/* All based on ASN1_STRING and handled the same */
strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
/* Special handling for NDEF */
if ((it->size == ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
&& (strtmp->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
if (cout) {
strtmp->data = cout;
strtmp->length = 0;
}
/* Special return code */
return -2;
}
cont = strtmp->data;
len = strtmp->length;
break;
}
if (cout && len)
memcpy(cout, cont, len);
return len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ASN.1 implementation in OpenSSL before 1.0.1o and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2c allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (buffer underflow and memory corruption) via an ANY field in crafted serialized data, aka the "negative zero" issue.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,213
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
const char *section_name = "";
const char *link_section_name = "";
char *end = NULL;
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
ut8 dfs[sizeof (Elf_(Verdef))] = {0};
Sdb *sdb;
int cnt, i;
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return false;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if (shdr->sh_size < 1) {
return false;
}
Elf_(Verdef) *defs = calloc (shdr->sh_size, sizeof (char));
if (!defs) {
return false;
}
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (link_shdr && bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!defs) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory (Check Elf_(Verdef))\n");
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
end = (char *)defs + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
for (cnt = 0, i = 0; i >= 0 && cnt < shdr->sh_info && ((char *)defs + i < end); ++cnt) {
Sdb *sdb_verdef = sdb_new0 ();
char *vstart = ((char*)defs) + i;
char key[32] = {0};
Elf_(Verdef) *verdef = (Elf_(Verdef)*)vstart;
Elf_(Verdaux) aux = {0};
int j = 0;
int isum = 0;
r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset + i, dfs, sizeof (Elf_(Verdef)));
verdef->vd_version = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_flags = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_ndx = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_cnt = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_hash = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_aux = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_next = READ32 (dfs, j)
int vdaux = verdef->vd_aux;
if (vdaux < 1) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
vstart += vdaux;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
j = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, j)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
isum = i + verdef->vd_aux;
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "idx", i, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_version", verdef->vd_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_ndx", verdef->vd_ndx, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_cnt", verdef->vd_cnt, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "flags", get_ver_flags (verdef->vd_flags), 0);
for (j = 1; j < verdef->vd_cnt; ++j) {
int k;
Sdb *sdb_parent = sdb_new0 ();
isum += aux.vda_next;
vstart += aux.vda_next;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof(Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
k = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "idx", isum, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "parent", j, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_parent, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "parent%d", j - 1);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_verdef, key, sdb_parent);
}
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "verdef%d", cnt);
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_verdef);
if (!verdef->vd_next) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
if ((st32)verdef->vd_next < 1) {
eprintf ("Warning: Invalid vd_next in the ELF version\n");
break;
}
i += verdef->vd_next;
}
free (defs);
return sdb;
out_error:
free (defs);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In radare 2.0.1, a memory corruption vulnerability exists in store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef() and store_versioninfo_gnu_verneed() in libr/bin/format/elf/elf.c, as demonstrated by an invalid free. This error is due to improper sh_size validation when allocating memory.
Commit Message: Fixed crash in elf.c with 32bit r2 when shdr->sh_size > max size_t
|
Medium
| 167,689
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ft_bitmap_assure_buffer( FT_Memory memory,
FT_Bitmap* bitmap,
FT_UInt xpixels,
FT_UInt ypixels )
{
FT_Error error;
int pitch;
int new_pitch;
FT_UInt bpp;
FT_Int i, width, height;
unsigned char* buffer = NULL;
width = bitmap->width;
height = bitmap->rows;
pitch = bitmap->pitch;
if ( pitch < 0 )
pitch = -pitch;
switch ( bitmap->pixel_mode )
{
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_MONO:
bpp = 1;
new_pitch = ( width + xpixels + 7 ) >> 3;
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY2:
bpp = 2;
new_pitch = ( width + xpixels + 3 ) >> 2;
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY4:
bpp = 4;
new_pitch = ( width + xpixels + 1 ) >> 1;
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_LCD:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_LCD_V:
bpp = 8;
new_pitch = ( width + xpixels );
break;
default:
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Glyph_Format );
}
/* if no need to allocate memory */
if ( ypixels == 0 && new_pitch <= pitch )
{
/* zero the padding */
FT_Int bit_width = pitch * 8;
FT_Int bit_last = ( width + xpixels ) * bpp;
if ( bit_last < bit_width )
{
FT_Byte* line = bitmap->buffer + ( bit_last >> 3 );
FT_Byte* end = bitmap->buffer + pitch;
FT_Int shift = bit_last & 7;
FT_UInt mask = 0xFF00U >> shift;
FT_Int count = height;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, line += pitch, end += pitch )
{
FT_Byte* write = line;
if ( shift > 0 )
{
write[0] = (FT_Byte)( write[0] & mask );
write++;
}
if ( write < end )
FT_MEM_ZERO( write, end - write );
}
}
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
/* otherwise allocate new buffer */
if ( FT_QALLOC_MULT( buffer, new_pitch, bitmap->rows + ypixels ) )
return error;
/* new rows get added at the top of the bitmap, */
/* thus take care of the flow direction */
if ( bitmap->pitch > 0 )
{
FT_Int len = ( width * bpp + 7 ) >> 3;
for ( i = 0; i < bitmap->rows; i++ )
FT_MEM_COPY( buffer + new_pitch * ( ypixels + i ),
bitmap->buffer + pitch * i, len );
}
else
{
FT_Int len = ( width * bpp + 7 ) >> 3;
for ( i = 0; i < bitmap->rows; i++ )
FT_MEM_COPY( buffer + new_pitch * i,
bitmap->buffer + pitch * i, len );
}
FT_FREE( bitmap->buffer );
bitmap->buffer = buffer;
if ( bitmap->pitch < 0 )
new_pitch = -new_pitch;
/* set pitch only, width and height are left untouched */
bitmap->pitch = new_pitch;
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Load_SBit_Png function in sfnt/pngshim.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 does not restrict the rows and pitch values of PNG data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact by embedding a PNG file in a .ttf font file.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,850
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t SampleTable::setTimeToSampleParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mTimeToSample != NULL || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mTimeToSampleCount = U32_AT(&header[4]);
uint64_t allocSize = mTimeToSampleCount * 2 * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mTimeToSample = new uint32_t[mTimeToSampleCount * 2];
size_t size = sizeof(uint32_t) * mTimeToSampleCount * 2;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, mTimeToSample, size) < (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mTimeToSampleCount * 2; ++i) {
mTimeToSample[i] = ntohl(mTimeToSample[i]);
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: SampleTable.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I does not properly consider integer promotion, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (integer overflow and memory corruption) via crafted atoms in MP4 data, aka internal bug 20139950, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-1538. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2014-7915, CVE-2014-7916, and/or CVE-2014-7917.
Commit Message: Fix several ineffective integer overflow checks
Commit edd4a76 (which addressed bugs 15328708, 15342615, 15342751) added
several integer overflow checks. Unfortunately, those checks fail to take into
account integer promotion rules and are thus themselves subject to an integer
overflow. Cast the sizeof() operator to a uint64_t to force promotion while
multiplying.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit e2e812e58e8d2716b00d7d82db99b08d3afb4b32)
Change-Id: I080eb3fa147601f18cedab86e0360406c3963d7b
|
Low
| 173,339
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: smb2_flush(smb_request_t *sr)
{
smb_ofile_t *of = NULL;
uint16_t StructSize;
uint16_t reserved1;
uint32_t reserved2;
smb2fid_t smb2fid;
uint32_t status;
int rc = 0;
/*
* SMB2 Flush request
*/
rc = smb_mbc_decodef(
&sr->smb_data, "wwlqq",
&StructSize, /* w */
&reserved1, /* w */
&reserved2, /* l */
&smb2fid.persistent, /* q */
&smb2fid.temporal); /* q */
if (rc)
return (SDRC_ERROR);
if (StructSize != 24)
return (SDRC_ERROR);
status = smb2sr_lookup_fid(sr, &smb2fid);
if (status) {
smb2sr_put_error(sr, status);
return (SDRC_SUCCESS);
}
of = sr->fid_ofile;
/*
* XXX - todo:
* Flush named pipe should drain writes.
*/
if ((of->f_node->flags & NODE_FLAGS_WRITE_THROUGH) == 0)
(void) smb_fsop_commit(sr, of->f_cr, of->f_node);
/*
* SMB2 Flush reply
*/
(void) smb_mbc_encodef(
&sr->reply, "wwl",
4, /* StructSize */ /* w */
0); /* reserved */ /* w */
return (SDRC_SUCCESS);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: illumos smbsrv NULL pointer dereference allows system crash.
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <matt.barden@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <evan.layton@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
|
Low
| 168,825
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ikev1_ke_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_KE)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," key len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_KE)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IKEv2 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Low
| 167,792
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool XmlReader::LoadFile(const std::string& file_path) {
const int kParseOptions = XML_PARSE_RECOVER | // recover on errors
XML_PARSE_NONET | // forbid network access
XML_PARSE_NOXXE; // no external entities
reader_ = xmlReaderForFile(file_path.c_str(), NULL, kParseOptions);
return reader_ != NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An integer overflow in xmlmemory.c in libxml2 before 2.9.5, as used in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 and other products, allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted XML file.
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
|
Medium
| 172,945
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: sample(png_const_bytep row, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth,
png_uint_32 x, unsigned int sample_index)
{
png_uint_32 bit_index, result;
/* Find a sample index for the desired sample: */
x *= bit_depth;
bit_index = x;
if ((colour_type & 1) == 0) /* !palette */
{
if (colour_type & 2)
bit_index *= 3;
if (colour_type & 4)
bit_index += x; /* Alpha channel */
/* Multiple channels; select one: */
if (colour_type & (2+4))
bit_index += sample_index * bit_depth;
}
/* Return the sample from the row as an integer. */
row += bit_index >> 3;
result = *row;
if (bit_depth == 8)
return result;
else if (bit_depth > 8)
return (result << 8) + *++row;
/* Less than 8 bits per sample. */
bit_index &= 7;
return (result >> (8-bit_index-bit_depth)) & ((1U<<bit_depth)-1);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,692
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void perf_log_throttle(struct perf_event *event, int enable)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_sample_data sample;
int ret;
struct {
struct perf_event_header header;
u64 time;
u64 id;
u64 stream_id;
} throttle_event = {
.header = {
.type = PERF_RECORD_THROTTLE,
.misc = 0,
.size = sizeof(throttle_event),
},
.time = perf_clock(),
.id = primary_event_id(event),
.stream_id = event->id,
};
if (enable)
throttle_event.header.type = PERF_RECORD_UNTHROTTLE;
perf_event_header__init_id(&throttle_event.header, &sample, event);
ret = perf_output_begin(&handle, event,
throttle_event.header.size, 1, 0);
if (ret)
return;
perf_output_put(&handle, throttle_event);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, &handle, &sample);
perf_output_end(&handle);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,836
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ProcessControlLaunchFailed() {
ADD_FAILURE();
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::RunLoop::QuitCurrentWhenIdleClosureDeprecated());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-94
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.89 on Windows and OS X and before 53.0.2785.92 on Linux relies on an IFRAME source URL to identify an associated extension, which allows remote attackers to conduct extension-bindings injection attacks by leveraging script access to a resource that initially has the about:blank URL.
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
|
Medium
| 172,052
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void IOHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
process_host_ = process_host;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,751
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: const std::string& AppControllerImpl::MaybeGetAndroidPackageName(
const std::string& app_id) {
const auto& package_name_it = android_package_map_.find(app_id);
if (package_name_it != android_package_map_.end()) {
return package_name_it->second;
}
ArcAppListPrefs* arc_prefs_ = ArcAppListPrefs::Get(profile_);
if (!arc_prefs_) {
return base::EmptyString();
}
std::unique_ptr<ArcAppListPrefs::AppInfo> arc_info =
arc_prefs_->GetApp(app_id);
if (!arc_info) {
return base::EmptyString();
}
android_package_map_[app_id] = arc_info->package_name;
return android_package_map_[app_id];
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted PDF files.
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
|
Medium
| 172,086
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ChromeNetworkDelegate::OnCompleted(net::URLRequest* request,
bool started) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("net", "URLRequest", request);
if (request->status().status() == net::URLRequestStatus::SUCCESS) {
int64 received_content_length = request->received_response_content_length();
bool is_http = request->url().SchemeIs("http");
bool is_https = request->url().SchemeIs("https");
if (!request->was_cached() && // Don't record cached content
received_content_length && // Zero-byte responses aren't useful.
(is_http || is_https)) { // Only record for HTTP or HTTPS urls.
int64 original_content_length =
request->response_info().headers->GetInt64HeaderValue(
"x-original-content-length");
bool via_data_reduction_proxy =
request->response_info().headers->HasHeaderValue(
"via", "1.1 Chrome Compression Proxy");
int64 adjusted_original_content_length = original_content_length;
if (adjusted_original_content_length == -1)
adjusted_original_content_length = received_content_length;
base::TimeDelta freshness_lifetime =
request->response_info().headers->GetFreshnessLifetime(
request->response_info().response_time);
AccumulateContentLength(received_content_length,
adjusted_original_content_length,
via_data_reduction_proxy);
RecordContentLengthHistograms(received_content_length,
original_content_length,
freshness_lifetime);
DVLOG(2) << __FUNCTION__
<< " received content length: " << received_content_length
<< " original content length: " << original_content_length
<< " url: " << request->url();
}
bool is_redirect = request->response_headers() &&
net::HttpResponseHeaders::IsRedirectResponseCode(
request->response_headers()->response_code());
if (!is_redirect) {
ExtensionWebRequestEventRouter::GetInstance()->OnCompleted(
profile_, extension_info_map_.get(), request);
}
} else if (request->status().status() == net::URLRequestStatus::FAILED ||
request->status().status() == net::URLRequestStatus::CANCELED) {
ExtensionWebRequestEventRouter::GetInstance()->OnErrorOccurred(
profile_, extension_info_map_.get(), request, started);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
ForwardProxyErrors(request, event_router_.get(), profile_);
ForwardRequestStatus(REQUEST_DONE, request, profile_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,332
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int parse_packet (sockent_t *se, /* {{{ */
void *buffer, size_t buffer_size, int flags,
const char *username)
{
int status;
value_list_t vl = VALUE_LIST_INIT;
notification_t n;
#if HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
int packet_was_signed = (flags & PP_SIGNED);
int packet_was_encrypted = (flags & PP_ENCRYPTED);
int printed_ignore_warning = 0;
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGCRYPT */
memset (&vl, '\0', sizeof (vl));
memset (&n, '\0', sizeof (n));
status = 0;
while ((status == 0) && (0 < buffer_size)
&& ((unsigned int) buffer_size > sizeof (part_header_t)))
{
uint16_t pkg_length;
uint16_t pkg_type;
memcpy ((void *) &pkg_type,
(void *) buffer,
sizeof (pkg_type));
memcpy ((void *) &pkg_length,
(void *) (buffer + sizeof (pkg_type)),
sizeof (pkg_length));
pkg_length = ntohs (pkg_length);
pkg_type = ntohs (pkg_type);
if (pkg_length > buffer_size)
break;
/* Ensure that this loop terminates eventually */
if (pkg_length < (2 * sizeof (uint16_t)))
break;
if (pkg_type == TYPE_ENCR_AES256)
{
status = parse_part_encr_aes256 (se,
&buffer, &buffer_size, flags);
if (status != 0)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: Decrypting AES256 "
"part failed "
"with status %i.", status);
break;
}
}
#if HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
else if ((se->data.server.security_level == SECURITY_LEVEL_ENCRYPT)
&& (packet_was_encrypted == 0))
{
if (printed_ignore_warning == 0)
{
INFO ("network plugin: Unencrypted packet or "
"part has been ignored.");
printed_ignore_warning = 1;
}
buffer = ((char *) buffer) + pkg_length;
continue;
}
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGCRYPT */
else if (pkg_type == TYPE_SIGN_SHA256)
{
status = parse_part_sign_sha256 (se,
&buffer, &buffer_size, flags);
if (status != 0)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: Verifying HMAC-SHA-256 "
"signature failed "
"with status %i.", status);
break;
}
}
#if HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
else if ((se->data.server.security_level == SECURITY_LEVEL_SIGN)
&& (packet_was_encrypted == 0)
&& (packet_was_signed == 0))
{
if (printed_ignore_warning == 0)
{
INFO ("network plugin: Unsigned packet or "
"part has been ignored.");
printed_ignore_warning = 1;
}
buffer = ((char *) buffer) + pkg_length;
continue;
}
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGCRYPT */
else if (pkg_type == TYPE_VALUES)
{
status = parse_part_values (&buffer, &buffer_size,
&vl.values, &vl.values_len);
if (status != 0)
break;
network_dispatch_values (&vl, username);
sfree (vl.values);
}
else if (pkg_type == TYPE_TIME)
{
uint64_t tmp = 0;
status = parse_part_number (&buffer, &buffer_size,
&tmp);
if (status == 0)
{
vl.time = TIME_T_TO_CDTIME_T (tmp);
n.time = TIME_T_TO_CDTIME_T (tmp);
}
}
else if (pkg_type == TYPE_TIME_HR)
{
uint64_t tmp = 0;
status = parse_part_number (&buffer, &buffer_size,
&tmp);
if (status == 0)
{
vl.time = (cdtime_t) tmp;
n.time = (cdtime_t) tmp;
}
}
else if (pkg_type == TYPE_INTERVAL)
{
uint64_t tmp = 0;
status = parse_part_number (&buffer, &buffer_size,
&tmp);
if (status == 0)
vl.interval = TIME_T_TO_CDTIME_T (tmp);
}
else if (pkg_type == TYPE_INTERVAL_HR)
{
uint64_t tmp = 0;
status = parse_part_number (&buffer, &buffer_size,
&tmp);
if (status == 0)
vl.interval = (cdtime_t) tmp;
}
else if (pkg_type == TYPE_HOST)
{
status = parse_part_string (&buffer, &buffer_size,
vl.host, sizeof (vl.host));
if (status == 0)
sstrncpy (n.host, vl.host, sizeof (n.host));
}
else if (pkg_type == TYPE_PLUGIN)
{
status = parse_part_string (&buffer, &buffer_size,
vl.plugin, sizeof (vl.plugin));
if (status == 0)
sstrncpy (n.plugin, vl.plugin,
sizeof (n.plugin));
}
else if (pkg_type == TYPE_PLUGIN_INSTANCE)
{
status = parse_part_string (&buffer, &buffer_size,
vl.plugin_instance,
sizeof (vl.plugin_instance));
if (status == 0)
sstrncpy (n.plugin_instance,
vl.plugin_instance,
sizeof (n.plugin_instance));
}
else if (pkg_type == TYPE_TYPE)
{
status = parse_part_string (&buffer, &buffer_size,
vl.type, sizeof (vl.type));
if (status == 0)
sstrncpy (n.type, vl.type, sizeof (n.type));
}
else if (pkg_type == TYPE_TYPE_INSTANCE)
{
status = parse_part_string (&buffer, &buffer_size,
vl.type_instance,
sizeof (vl.type_instance));
if (status == 0)
sstrncpy (n.type_instance, vl.type_instance,
sizeof (n.type_instance));
}
else if (pkg_type == TYPE_MESSAGE)
{
status = parse_part_string (&buffer, &buffer_size,
n.message, sizeof (n.message));
if (status != 0)
{
/* do nothing */
}
else if ((n.severity != NOTIF_FAILURE)
&& (n.severity != NOTIF_WARNING)
&& (n.severity != NOTIF_OKAY))
{
INFO ("network plugin: "
"Ignoring notification with "
"unknown severity %i.",
n.severity);
}
else if (n.time <= 0)
{
INFO ("network plugin: "
"Ignoring notification with "
"time == 0.");
}
else if (strlen (n.message) <= 0)
{
INFO ("network plugin: "
"Ignoring notification with "
"an empty message.");
}
else
{
network_dispatch_notification (&n);
}
}
else if (pkg_type == TYPE_SEVERITY)
{
uint64_t tmp = 0;
status = parse_part_number (&buffer, &buffer_size,
&tmp);
if (status == 0)
n.severity = (int) tmp;
}
else
{
DEBUG ("network plugin: parse_packet: Unknown part"
" type: 0x%04hx", pkg_type);
buffer = ((char *) buffer) + pkg_length;
}
} /* while (buffer_size > sizeof (part_header_t)) */
if (status == 0 && buffer_size > 0)
WARNING ("network plugin: parse_packet: Received truncated "
"packet, try increasing `MaxPacketSize'");
return (status);
} /* }}} int parse_packet */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the parse_packet function in network.c in collectd before 5.4.3 and 5.x before 5.5.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted network packet.
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
|
Low
| 167,002
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: GpuChannelHost* BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishGpuChannelSync(
CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
if (gpu_channel_.get()) {
if (gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kLost)
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
else
return gpu_channel_.get();
}
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance();
EstablishRequest request;
GetIOLoopProxy()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishGpuChannelOnIO,
base::Unretained(this),
&request,
cause_for_gpu_launch));
request.event.Wait();
if (request.channel_handle.name.empty() ||
request.gpu_process_handle == base::kNullProcessHandle)
return NULL;
base::ProcessHandle browser_process_for_gpu;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
DuplicateHandle(base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(),
base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(),
request.gpu_process_handle,
&browser_process_for_gpu,
PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE,
FALSE,
0);
#else
browser_process_for_gpu = base::GetCurrentProcessHandle();
#endif
gpu_channel_ = new GpuChannelHost(this, gpu_host_id_, gpu_client_id_);
gpu_channel_->set_gpu_info(request.gpu_info);
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(request.gpu_info);
gpu_channel_->Connect(request.channel_handle, browser_process_for_gpu);
return gpu_channel_.get();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,917
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CloudPolicyController::SetState(
CloudPolicyController::ControllerState new_state) {
state_ = new_state;
backend_.reset(); // Discard any pending requests.
base::Time now(base::Time::NowFromSystemTime());
base::Time refresh_at;
base::Time last_refresh(cache_->last_policy_refresh_time());
if (last_refresh.is_null())
last_refresh = now;
bool inform_notifier_done = false;
switch (state_) {
case STATE_TOKEN_UNMANAGED:
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::UNMANAGED,
CloudPolicySubsystem::NO_DETAILS,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
case STATE_TOKEN_UNAVAILABLE:
case STATE_TOKEN_VALID:
refresh_at = now;
break;
case STATE_POLICY_VALID:
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ =
kPolicyRefreshErrorDelayInMilliseconds;
refresh_at =
last_refresh + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(GetRefreshDelay());
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::SUCCESS,
CloudPolicySubsystem::NO_DETAILS,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
case STATE_TOKEN_ERROR:
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::BAD_DMTOKEN,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
inform_notifier_done = true;
case STATE_POLICY_ERROR:
if (!inform_notifier_done) {
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::POLICY_NETWORK_ERROR,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
}
refresh_at = now + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_);
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ =
std::min(effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ * 2,
policy_refresh_rate_ms_);
break;
case STATE_POLICY_UNAVAILABLE:
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_ = policy_refresh_rate_ms_;
refresh_at = now + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(
effective_policy_refresh_error_delay_ms_);
notifier_->Inform(CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR,
CloudPolicySubsystem::POLICY_NETWORK_ERROR,
PolicyNotifier::POLICY_CONTROLLER);
break;
}
scheduler_->CancelDelayedWork();
if (!refresh_at.is_null()) {
int64 delay = std::max<int64>((refresh_at - now).InMilliseconds(), 0);
scheduler_->PostDelayedWork(
base::Bind(&CloudPolicyController::DoWork, base::Unretained(this)),
delay);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the Google V8 bindings.
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,281
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline int handle_dots(struct nameidata *nd, int type)
{
if (type == LAST_DOTDOT) {
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
return follow_dotdot_rcu(nd);
} else
follow_dotdot(nd);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The prepend_path function in fs/dcache.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2.4 does not properly handle rename actions inside a bind mount, which allows local users to bypass an intended container protection mechanism by renaming a directory, related to a *double-chroot attack.*
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
Medium
| 166,637
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Track::EOSBlock::EOSBlock() :
BlockEntry(NULL, LONG_MIN)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,272
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int btrfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(old_dir)->root;
struct btrfs_root *dest = BTRFS_I(new_dir)->root;
struct inode *new_inode = new_dentry->d_inode;
struct inode *old_inode = old_dentry->d_inode;
struct timespec ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
u64 index = 0;
u64 root_objectid;
int ret;
u64 old_ino = btrfs_ino(old_inode);
if (btrfs_ino(new_dir) == BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID)
return -EPERM;
/* we only allow rename subvolume link between subvolumes */
if (old_ino != BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID && root != dest)
return -EXDEV;
if (old_ino == BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID ||
(new_inode && btrfs_ino(new_inode) == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID))
return -ENOTEMPTY;
if (S_ISDIR(old_inode->i_mode) && new_inode &&
new_inode->i_size > BTRFS_EMPTY_DIR_SIZE)
return -ENOTEMPTY;
/*
* we're using rename to replace one file with another.
* and the replacement file is large. Start IO on it now so
* we don't add too much work to the end of the transaction
*/
if (new_inode && S_ISREG(old_inode->i_mode) && new_inode->i_size &&
old_inode->i_size > BTRFS_ORDERED_OPERATIONS_FLUSH_LIMIT)
filemap_flush(old_inode->i_mapping);
/* close the racy window with snapshot create/destroy ioctl */
if (old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)
down_read(&root->fs_info->subvol_sem);
/*
* We want to reserve the absolute worst case amount of items. So if
* both inodes are subvols and we need to unlink them then that would
* require 4 item modifications, but if they are both normal inodes it
* would require 5 item modifications, so we'll assume their normal
* inodes. So 5 * 2 is 10, plus 1 for the new link, so 11 total items
* should cover the worst case number of items we'll modify.
*/
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 20);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
goto out_notrans;
}
if (dest != root)
btrfs_record_root_in_trans(trans, dest);
ret = btrfs_set_inode_index(new_dir, &index);
if (ret)
goto out_fail;
if (unlikely(old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)) {
/* force full log commit if subvolume involved. */
root->fs_info->last_trans_log_full_commit = trans->transid;
} else {
ret = btrfs_insert_inode_ref(trans, dest,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len,
old_ino,
btrfs_ino(new_dir), index);
if (ret)
goto out_fail;
/*
* this is an ugly little race, but the rename is required
* to make sure that if we crash, the inode is either at the
* old name or the new one. pinning the log transaction lets
* us make sure we don't allow a log commit to come in after
* we unlink the name but before we add the new name back in.
*/
btrfs_pin_log_trans(root);
}
/*
* make sure the inode gets flushed if it is replacing
* something.
*/
if (new_inode && new_inode->i_size && S_ISREG(old_inode->i_mode))
btrfs_add_ordered_operation(trans, root, old_inode);
inode_inc_iversion(old_dir);
inode_inc_iversion(new_dir);
inode_inc_iversion(old_inode);
old_dir->i_ctime = old_dir->i_mtime = ctime;
new_dir->i_ctime = new_dir->i_mtime = ctime;
old_inode->i_ctime = ctime;
if (old_dentry->d_parent != new_dentry->d_parent)
btrfs_record_unlink_dir(trans, old_dir, old_inode, 1);
if (unlikely(old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)) {
root_objectid = BTRFS_I(old_inode)->root->root_key.objectid;
ret = btrfs_unlink_subvol(trans, root, old_dir, root_objectid,
old_dentry->d_name.name,
old_dentry->d_name.len);
} else {
ret = __btrfs_unlink_inode(trans, root, old_dir,
old_dentry->d_inode,
old_dentry->d_name.name,
old_dentry->d_name.len);
if (!ret)
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, old_inode);
}
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_fail;
}
if (new_inode) {
inode_inc_iversion(new_inode);
new_inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
if (unlikely(btrfs_ino(new_inode) ==
BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID)) {
root_objectid = BTRFS_I(new_inode)->location.objectid;
ret = btrfs_unlink_subvol(trans, dest, new_dir,
root_objectid,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len);
BUG_ON(new_inode->i_nlink == 0);
} else {
ret = btrfs_unlink_inode(trans, dest, new_dir,
new_dentry->d_inode,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len);
}
if (!ret && new_inode->i_nlink == 0) {
ret = btrfs_orphan_add(trans, new_dentry->d_inode);
BUG_ON(ret);
}
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_fail;
}
}
fixup_inode_flags(new_dir, old_inode);
ret = btrfs_add_link(trans, new_dir, old_inode,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len, 0, index);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_fail;
}
if (old_ino != BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID) {
struct dentry *parent = new_dentry->d_parent;
btrfs_log_new_name(trans, old_inode, old_dir, parent);
btrfs_end_log_trans(root);
}
out_fail:
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
out_notrans:
if (old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)
up_read(&root->fs_info->subvol_sem);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The CRC32C feature in the Btrfs implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.8-rc1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (prevention of file creation) by leveraging the ability to write to a directory important to the victim, and creating a file with a crafted name that is associated with a specific CRC32C hash value.
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
|
High
| 166,194
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_decode_slice(UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD8 u1_nal_ref_idc,
dec_struct_t *ps_dec /* Decoder parameters */
)
{
dec_bit_stream_t * ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pps;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
pocstruct_t s_tmp_poc;
WORD32 i_delta_poc[2];
WORD32 i4_poc = 0;
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frame_num;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag, u1_redundant_pic_cnt = 0, u1_slice_type;
UWORD32 u4_idr_pic_id = 0;
UWORD8 u1_bottom_field_flag, u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
UWORD8 u1_nal_unit_type;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
WORD8 i1_is_end_of_poc;
WORD32 ret, end_of_frame;
WORD32 prev_slice_err, num_mb_skipped;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc;
UWORD32 u4_temp;
WORD32 i_temp;
UWORD32 u4_call_end_of_pic = 0;
/* read FirstMbInSlice and slice type*/
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_dpb_commands_read_slc = 0;
u2_first_mb_in_slice = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice
> (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
/*we currently don not support ASO*/
if(((u2_first_mb_in_slice << ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
<= ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr) && (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: first_mb_in_slice",u2_first_mb_in_slice);
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > 9)
return ERROR_INV_SLC_TYPE_T;
u1_slice_type = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_type",(u1_slice_type));
ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 0;
/* Find Out the Slice Type is 5 to 9 or not then Set the Flag */
/* u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 1 .Which tells that all the slices in the Pic*/
/* will be of same type of current */
if(u1_slice_type > 4)
{
u1_slice_type -= 5;
ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9 = 1;
}
{
UWORD32 skip;
if((ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_PB)
|| (ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_PB))
{
UWORD32 u4_bit_stream_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
skip = 0;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
}
else if((I_SLICE == u1_slice_type)
&& (1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames))
{
skip = 0;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
}
/* If one frame worth of data is already skipped, do not skip the next one */
if((0 == u2_first_mb_in_slice) && (1 == ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped))
{
skip = 0;
}
if(skip)
{
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 1;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_PB;
return 0;
}
else
{
/* If the previous NAL was skipped, then
do not process that buffer in this call.
Return to app and process it in the next call.
This is necessary to handle cases where I/IDR is not complete in
the current buffer and application intends to fill the remaining part of the bitstream
later. This ensures we process only frame worth of data in every call */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 1;
return 0;
}
}
}
}
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp & MASK_ERR_PIC_SET_ID)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
/* discard slice if pic param is invalid */
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: pic_parameter_set_id", u4_temp);
ps_pps = &ps_dec->ps_pps[u4_temp];
if(FALSE == ps_pps->u1_is_valid)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_seq = ps_pps->ps_sps;
if(!ps_seq)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
if(FALSE == ps_seq->u1_is_valid)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
/* Get the frame num */
u2_frame_num = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm,
ps_seq->u1_bits_in_frm_num);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: frame_num", u2_frame_num);
/* Get the field related flags */
if(!ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
{
u1_field_pic_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: field_pic_flag", u1_field_pic_flag);
u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan_fld;
u1_bottom_field_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: bottom_field_flag", u1_bottom_field_flag);
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan;
}
}
else
{
u1_field_pic_flag = 0;
u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan = (UWORD8 *)gau1_ih264d_inv_scan;
}
u1_nal_unit_type = SLICE_NAL;
if(u1_is_idr_slice)
{
if(0 == u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
u1_nal_unit_type = IDR_SLICE_NAL;
u4_idr_pic_id = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_idr_pic_id > 65535)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: ", u4_idr_pic_id);
}
/* read delta pic order count information*/
i_delta_poc[0] = i_delta_poc[1] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = 0;
u1_pic_order_cnt_type = ps_seq->u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
if(u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 0)
{
i_temp = ih264d_get_bits_h264(
ps_bitstrm,
ps_seq->u1_log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus);
if(i_temp < 0 || i_temp >= ps_seq->i4_max_pic_order_cntLsb)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: pic_order_cnt_lsb", s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb);
if((ps_pps->u1_pic_order_present_flag == 1) && (!u1_field_pic_flag))
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom);
}
}
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = 0;
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = 0;
if(u1_pic_order_cnt_type == 1
&& (!ps_seq->u1_delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag))
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst,
pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt[0]",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0]);
if(ps_pps->u1_pic_order_present_flag && !u1_field_pic_flag)
{
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = ih264d_sev(
pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: delta_pic_order_cnt[1]",
s_tmp_poc.i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1]);
}
}
if(ps_pps->u1_redundant_pic_cnt_present_flag)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(u4_temp > MAX_REDUNDANT_PIC_CNT)
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u4_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: redundant_pic_cnt", u1_redundant_pic_cnt);
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check if the slice is part of new picture */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* First slice of a picture is always considered as part of new picture */
i1_is_end_of_poc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag &= MASK_REJECT_CUR_PIC;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 2)
{
i1_is_end_of_poc = ih264d_is_end_of_pic(u2_frame_num, u1_nal_ref_idc,
&s_tmp_poc, &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc,
ps_cur_slice, u1_pic_order_cnt_type,
u1_nal_unit_type, u4_idr_pic_id,
u1_field_pic_flag,
u1_bottom_field_flag);
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Check for error in slice and parse the missing/corrupted MB's */
/* as skip-MB's in an inserted P-slice */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
u1_mbaff = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag && (!u1_field_pic_flag);
prev_slice_err = 0;
if(i1_is_end_of_poc || ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
if(u2_frame_num != ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num
&& ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded != 0
&& ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded
!= (TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY))
{
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 1;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic)
{
prev_slice_err = 1;
}
else
{
prev_slice_err = 2;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded ==TOP_FIELD_ONLY)
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 1;
else
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
u1_is_idr_slice = ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL;
}
else if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice > 0)
{
prev_slice_err = 1;
num_mb_skipped = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
ps_cur_slice->u4_idr_pic_id = u4_idr_pic_id;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_cur_slice->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb =
s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u1_redundant_pic_cnt;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = u1_nal_ref_idc;
ps_cur_slice->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag
&& (!u1_field_pic_flag);
}
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic)
{
/* if valid slice header is not decoded do start of pic processing
* since in the current process call, frame num is not updated in the slice structure yet
* ih264d_is_end_of_pic is checked with valid frame num of previous process call,
* although i1_is_end_of_poc is set there could be more slices in the frame,
* so conceal only till cur slice */
prev_slice_err = 1;
num_mb_skipped = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
}
else
{
/* since i1_is_end_of_poc is set ,means new frame num is encountered. so conceal the current frame
* completely */
prev_slice_err = 2;
num_mb_skipped = (ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
}
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
}
}
else
{
if((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff) > ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded)
{
prev_slice_err = 2;
num_mb_skipped = (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
ps_cur_poc = &s_tmp_poc;
}
else if((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff) < ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded)
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
}
if(prev_slice_err)
{
ret = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num, ps_cur_poc, prev_slice_err);
if(ps_dec->u1_dangling_field == 1)
{
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 1 - ps_dec->u1_second_field;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC;
}
if(prev_slice_err == 2)
{
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
/* return if all MBs in frame are parsed*/
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
return ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return ERROR_NEW_FRAME_EXPECTED;
}
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
i1_is_end_of_poc = 0;
}
if (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
}
if((ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 0) && (ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0))
{
ps_dec->ps_decode_cur_slice++;
}
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* If the slice is part of new picture, do End of Pic processing. */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
UWORD8 uc_mbs_exceed = 0;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
== (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1))
{
/*u2_total_mbs_coded is forced to u2_max_mb_addr+ 1 at the end of decode ,so
,if it is first slice in pic dont consider u2_total_mbs_coded to detect new picture */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 0)
uc_mbs_exceed = 1;
}
if(i1_is_end_of_poc || uc_mbs_exceed)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded)
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
#if WIN32
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT(" ------ PIC SKIPPED ------\n");
#endif
return RET_LAST_SKIP;
}
else
{
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
}
}
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5)
{
WORD32 i4_temp_poc;
WORD32 i4_top_field_order_poc, i4_bot_field_order_poc;
if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag) // or a complementary field pair
{
i4_top_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
i4_bot_field_order_poc =
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
i4_temp_poc = MIN(i4_top_field_order_poc,
i4_bot_field_order_poc);
}
else if(!ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
i4_temp_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
else
i4_temp_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt = i4_temp_poc
- ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt = i4_temp_poc
- ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = i4_temp_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = i4_temp_poc;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
ret = ih264d_decode_pic_order_cnt(u1_is_idr_slice, u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc,
&s_tmp_poc, ps_cur_slice, ps_pps,
u1_nal_ref_idc,
u1_bottom_field_flag,
u1_field_pic_flag, &i4_poc);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/* Display seq no calculations */
if(i4_poc >= ps_dec->i4_max_poc)
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = i4_poc;
/* IDR Picture or POC wrap around */
if(i4_poc == 0)
{
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq
+ ps_dec->i4_max_poc
+ ps_dec->u1_max_dec_frame_buffering + 1;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
}
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Copy the values read from the bitstream to the slice header and then*/
/* If the slice is first slice in picture, then do Start of Picture */
/* processing. */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_cur_slice->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = i_delta_poc[0];
ps_cur_slice->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = i_delta_poc[1];
ps_cur_slice->u4_idr_pic_id = u4_idr_pic_id;
ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = u1_slice_type;
ps_cur_slice->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = s_tmp_poc.i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = u1_nal_unit_type;
ps_cur_slice->u1_redundant_pic_cnt = u1_redundant_pic_cnt;
ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = u1_nal_ref_idc;
ps_cur_slice->u1_pic_order_cnt_type = u1_pic_order_cnt_type;
if(ps_seq->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag =
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag;
else
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag = 1;
if(u1_slice_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag = ih264d_get_bit_h264(
ps_bitstrm);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag",
ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag);
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag)
ps_cur_slice->pf_decodeDirect = ih264d_decode_spatial_direct;
else
ps_cur_slice->pf_decodeDirect = ih264d_decode_temporal_direct;
if(!((ps_pps->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag) && (!u1_field_pic_flag)))
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaffB;
}
else
{
if(!((ps_pps->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag) && (!u1_field_pic_flag)))
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic == 2)
{
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice == 0)
{
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, i4_poc, &s_tmp_poc, u2_frame_num, ps_pps);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
/* INITIALIZATION of fn ptrs for MC and formMbPartInfo functions */
{
UWORD8 uc_nofield_nombaff;
uc_nofield_nombaff = ((ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag == 0)
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag == 0)
&& (u1_slice_type != B_SLICE)
&& (ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_wted_pred_flag == 0));
/* Initialise MC and formMbPartInfo fn ptrs one time based on profile_idc */
if(uc_nofield_nombaff)
{
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
}
else
{
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_mp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_mp;
}
}
/*
* Decide whether to decode the current picture or not
*/
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_err->u4_frm_sei_sync == u2_frame_num)
{
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
ps_err->u4_frm_sei_sync = SYNC_FRM_DEFAULT;
}
ps_err->u4_cur_frm = u2_frame_num;
}
/* Decision for decoding if the picture is to be skipped */
{
WORD32 i4_skip_b_pic, i4_skip_p_pic;
i4_skip_b_pic = (ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask & B_SLC_BIT)
&& (B_SLICE == u1_slice_type) && (0 == u1_nal_ref_idc);
i4_skip_p_pic = (ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask & P_SLC_BIT)
&& (P_SLICE == u1_slice_type) && (0 == u1_nal_ref_idc);
/**************************************************************/
/* Skip the B picture if skip mask is set for B picture and */
/* Current B picture is a non reference B picture or there is */
/* no user for reference B picture */
/**************************************************************/
if(i4_skip_b_pic)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= B_SLC_BIT;
/* Don't decode the picture in SKIP-B mode if that picture is B */
/* and also it is not to be used as a reference picture */
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 1;
return OK;
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Skip the P picture if skip mask is set for P picture and */
/* Current P picture is a non reference P picture or there is */
/* no user for reference P picture */
/**************************************************************/
if(i4_skip_p_pic)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= P_SLC_BIT;
/* Don't decode the picture in SKIP-P mode if that picture is P */
/* and also it is not to be used as a reference picture */
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 1;
return OK;
}
}
{
UWORD16 u2_mb_x, u2_mb_y;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst = ((u2_first_mb_in_slice
<< ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag) * SUB_BLK_SIZE)
- SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_aff;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic;
UWORD16 u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
u2_frm_wd_in_mbs = ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
u1_mb_aff = ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
u1_field_pic = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
{
UWORD32 x_offset;
UWORD32 y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_frame_stride;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_trns_addr; // = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
}
else
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
}
u2_mb_x = MOD(u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frm_wd_in_mbs);
u2_mb_y = DIV(u2_first_mb_in_slice, u2_frm_wd_in_mbs);
u2_mb_y <<= u1_mb_aff;
if((u2_mb_x > u2_frm_wd_in_mbs - 1)
|| (u2_mb_y > ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs - 1))
{
return ERROR_CORRUPTED_SLICE;
}
u4_frame_stride = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y << u1_field_pic;
x_offset = u2_mb_x << 4;
y_offset = (u2_mb_y * u4_frame_stride) << 4;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
u4_frame_stride = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv << u1_field_pic;
x_offset >>= 1;
y_offset = (u2_mb_y * u4_frame_stride) << 3;
x_offset *= YUV420SP_FACTOR;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3 + x_offset
+ y_offset;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_y = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_u = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_v = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic
+ (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic
+ (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff);
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv
+ ((u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mb_aff) << 4);
}
}
else
{
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_trns_addr;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse;
}
else
{
ps_trns_addr = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
}
u2_mb_x = 0xffff;
u2_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_y = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_y;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_u = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_u;
ps_trns_addr->pu1_mb_v = ps_trns_addr->pu1_dest_v;
}
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->u2_mbx =
(MOD(u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby =
(DIV(u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_seq->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby <<= ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
}
/* RBSP stop bit is used for CABAC decoding*/
ps_bitstrm->u4_max_ofst += ps_dec->ps_cur_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode;
ps_dec->u1_B = (u1_slice_type == B_SLICE);
ps_dec->u4_next_mb_skip = 0;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 1;
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MIN(MAX_FRAMES, ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init);
num_entries = 2 * ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = ( void *)pu1_buf;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
if(u1_slice_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= I_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type != B_SLICE && ps_dec->i4_pic_type != P_SLICE)
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = I_SLICE;
}
else if(u1_slice_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= P_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_pslice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = u1_slice_type;
if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type != B_SLICE)
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = P_SLICE;
}
else if(u1_slice_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ |= B_SLC_BIT;
ret = ih264d_parse_bslice(ps_dec, u2_first_mb_in_slice);
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = u1_slice_type;
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = B_SLICE;
}
else
return ERROR_INV_SLC_TYPE_T;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done)
{
/* set to zero to indicate a valid slice has been decoded */
/* first slice header successfully decoded */
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 0;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 0;
}
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/* storing last Mb X and MbY of the slice */
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
/* End of Picture detection */
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >= (ps_seq->u2_max_mb_addr + 1))
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if((ps_err->u1_err_flag & REJECT_PB_PICS)
&& (ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type == PIC_TYPE_I))
{
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
}
}
PRINT_BIN_BIT_RATIO(ps_dec)
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in libavc in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-33641588.
Commit Message: Decoder: Moved end of pic processing to end of decode call
ih264d_end_of_pic() was called after parsing slice of a new picture.
This is now being done at the end of decode of the current picture.
decode_gaps_in_frame_num which needs frame_num of new slice is now
done after decoding frame_num in new slice.
This helps in handling errors in picaff streams with gaps in frames
Bug: 33588051
Bug: 33641588
Bug: 34097231
Change-Id: I1a26e611aaa2c19e2043e05a210849bd21b22220
|
Medium
| 174,057
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void _php_mb_regex_globals_dtor(zend_mb_regex_globals *pglobals TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_hash_destroy(&pglobals->ht_rc);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec function in php_mbregex.c in the mbstring extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) by leveraging a callback exception.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
|
Low
| 167,119
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> itemCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestEventTarget.item");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestEventTarget* imp = V8TestEventTarget::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
{
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, index, toUInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (UNLIKELY(index < 0)) {
ec = INDEX_SIZE_ERR;
goto fail;
}
return toV8(imp->item(index), args.GetIsolate());
}
fail:
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,071
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: Resource::~Resource() {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to instantiation of the Pepper plug-in.
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,415
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void WallpaperManager::StartLoadAndSetDefaultWallpaper(
const base::FilePath& path,
const wallpaper::WallpaperLayout layout,
MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder on_finish,
std::unique_ptr<user_manager::UserImage>* result_out) {
user_image_loader::StartWithFilePath(
task_runner_, path, ImageDecoder::ROBUST_JPEG_CODEC,
0, // Do not crop.
base::Bind(&WallpaperManager::OnDefaultWallpaperDecoded,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), path, layout,
base::Unretained(result_out),
base::Passed(std::move(on_finish))));
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The XSSAuditor::canonicalize function in core/html/parser/XSSAuditor.cpp in the XSS auditor in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly choose a truncation point, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via an unspecified linear-time attack.
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
Low
| 171,971
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static ssize_t hfi1_file_write(struct file *fp, const char __user *data,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
const struct hfi1_cmd __user *ucmd;
struct hfi1_filedata *fd = fp->private_data;
struct hfi1_ctxtdata *uctxt = fd->uctxt;
struct hfi1_cmd cmd;
struct hfi1_user_info uinfo;
struct hfi1_tid_info tinfo;
unsigned long addr;
ssize_t consumed = 0, copy = 0, ret = 0;
void *dest = NULL;
__u64 user_val = 0;
int uctxt_required = 1;
int must_be_root = 0;
if (count < sizeof(cmd)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bail;
}
ucmd = (const struct hfi1_cmd __user *)data;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, ucmd, sizeof(cmd))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto bail;
}
consumed = sizeof(cmd);
switch (cmd.type) {
case HFI1_CMD_ASSIGN_CTXT:
uctxt_required = 0; /* assigned user context not required */
copy = sizeof(uinfo);
dest = &uinfo;
break;
case HFI1_CMD_SDMA_STATUS_UPD:
case HFI1_CMD_CREDIT_UPD:
copy = 0;
break;
case HFI1_CMD_TID_UPDATE:
case HFI1_CMD_TID_FREE:
case HFI1_CMD_TID_INVAL_READ:
copy = sizeof(tinfo);
dest = &tinfo;
break;
case HFI1_CMD_USER_INFO:
case HFI1_CMD_RECV_CTRL:
case HFI1_CMD_POLL_TYPE:
case HFI1_CMD_ACK_EVENT:
case HFI1_CMD_CTXT_INFO:
case HFI1_CMD_SET_PKEY:
case HFI1_CMD_CTXT_RESET:
copy = 0;
user_val = cmd.addr;
break;
case HFI1_CMD_EP_INFO:
case HFI1_CMD_EP_ERASE_CHIP:
case HFI1_CMD_EP_ERASE_RANGE:
case HFI1_CMD_EP_READ_RANGE:
case HFI1_CMD_EP_WRITE_RANGE:
uctxt_required = 0; /* assigned user context not required */
must_be_root = 1; /* validate user */
copy = 0;
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bail;
}
/* If the command comes with user data, copy it. */
if (copy) {
if (copy_from_user(dest, (void __user *)cmd.addr, copy)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto bail;
}
consumed += copy;
}
/*
* Make sure there is a uctxt when needed.
*/
if (uctxt_required && !uctxt) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bail;
}
/* only root can do these operations */
if (must_be_root && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto bail;
}
switch (cmd.type) {
case HFI1_CMD_ASSIGN_CTXT:
ret = assign_ctxt(fp, &uinfo);
if (ret < 0)
goto bail;
ret = setup_ctxt(fp);
if (ret)
goto bail;
ret = user_init(fp);
break;
case HFI1_CMD_CTXT_INFO:
ret = get_ctxt_info(fp, (void __user *)(unsigned long)
user_val, cmd.len);
break;
case HFI1_CMD_USER_INFO:
ret = get_base_info(fp, (void __user *)(unsigned long)
user_val, cmd.len);
break;
case HFI1_CMD_SDMA_STATUS_UPD:
break;
case HFI1_CMD_CREDIT_UPD:
if (uctxt && uctxt->sc)
sc_return_credits(uctxt->sc);
break;
case HFI1_CMD_TID_UPDATE:
ret = hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup(fp, &tinfo);
if (!ret) {
/*
* Copy the number of tidlist entries we used
* and the length of the buffer we registered.
* These fields are adjacent in the structure so
* we can copy them at the same time.
*/
addr = (unsigned long)cmd.addr +
offsetof(struct hfi1_tid_info, tidcnt);
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)addr, &tinfo.tidcnt,
sizeof(tinfo.tidcnt) +
sizeof(tinfo.length)))
ret = -EFAULT;
}
break;
case HFI1_CMD_TID_INVAL_READ:
ret = hfi1_user_exp_rcv_invalid(fp, &tinfo);
if (ret)
break;
addr = (unsigned long)cmd.addr +
offsetof(struct hfi1_tid_info, tidcnt);
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)addr, &tinfo.tidcnt,
sizeof(tinfo.tidcnt)))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case HFI1_CMD_TID_FREE:
ret = hfi1_user_exp_rcv_clear(fp, &tinfo);
if (ret)
break;
addr = (unsigned long)cmd.addr +
offsetof(struct hfi1_tid_info, tidcnt);
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)addr, &tinfo.tidcnt,
sizeof(tinfo.tidcnt)))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case HFI1_CMD_RECV_CTRL:
ret = manage_rcvq(uctxt, fd->subctxt, (int)user_val);
break;
case HFI1_CMD_POLL_TYPE:
uctxt->poll_type = (typeof(uctxt->poll_type))user_val;
break;
case HFI1_CMD_ACK_EVENT:
ret = user_event_ack(uctxt, fd->subctxt, user_val);
break;
case HFI1_CMD_SET_PKEY:
if (HFI1_CAP_IS_USET(PKEY_CHECK))
ret = set_ctxt_pkey(uctxt, fd->subctxt, user_val);
else
ret = -EPERM;
break;
case HFI1_CMD_CTXT_RESET: {
struct send_context *sc;
struct hfi1_devdata *dd;
if (!uctxt || !uctxt->dd || !uctxt->sc) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/*
* There is no protection here. User level has to
* guarantee that no one will be writing to the send
* context while it is being re-initialized.
* If user level breaks that guarantee, it will break
* it's own context and no one else's.
*/
dd = uctxt->dd;
sc = uctxt->sc;
/*
* Wait until the interrupt handler has marked the
* context as halted or frozen. Report error if we time
* out.
*/
wait_event_interruptible_timeout(
sc->halt_wait, (sc->flags & SCF_HALTED),
msecs_to_jiffies(SEND_CTXT_HALT_TIMEOUT));
if (!(sc->flags & SCF_HALTED)) {
ret = -ENOLCK;
break;
}
/*
* If the send context was halted due to a Freeze,
* wait until the device has been "unfrozen" before
* resetting the context.
*/
if (sc->flags & SCF_FROZEN) {
wait_event_interruptible_timeout(
dd->event_queue,
!(ACCESS_ONCE(dd->flags) & HFI1_FROZEN),
msecs_to_jiffies(SEND_CTXT_HALT_TIMEOUT));
if (dd->flags & HFI1_FROZEN) {
ret = -ENOLCK;
break;
}
if (dd->flags & HFI1_FORCED_FREEZE) {
/*
* Don't allow context reset if we are into
* forced freeze
*/
ret = -ENODEV;
break;
}
sc_disable(sc);
ret = sc_enable(sc);
hfi1_rcvctrl(dd, HFI1_RCVCTRL_CTXT_ENB,
uctxt->ctxt);
} else {
ret = sc_restart(sc);
}
if (!ret)
sc_return_credits(sc);
break;
}
case HFI1_CMD_EP_INFO:
case HFI1_CMD_EP_ERASE_CHIP:
case HFI1_CMD_EP_ERASE_RANGE:
case HFI1_CMD_EP_READ_RANGE:
case HFI1_CMD_EP_WRITE_RANGE:
ret = handle_eprom_command(fp, &cmd);
break;
}
if (ret >= 0)
ret = consumed;
bail:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The InfiniBand (aka IB) stack in the Linux kernel before 4.5.3 incorrectly relies on the write system call, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (kernel memory write operation) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a uAPI interface.
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 167,242
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MediaStreamDispatcherHost::~MediaStreamDispatcherHost() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
bindings_.CloseAllBindings();
CancelAllRequests();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
Medium
| 173,098
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void tokenadd(struct jv_parser* p, char c) {
assert(p->tokenpos <= p->tokenlen);
if (p->tokenpos == p->tokenlen) {
p->tokenlen = p->tokenlen*2 + 256;
p->tokenbuf = jv_mem_realloc(p->tokenbuf, p->tokenlen);
}
assert(p->tokenpos < p->tokenlen);
p->tokenbuf[p->tokenpos++] = c;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Off-by-one error in the tokenadd function in jv_parse.c in jq allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a long JSON-encoded number, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Heap buffer overflow in tokenadd() (fix #105)
This was an off-by one: the NUL terminator byte was not allocated on
resize. This was triggered by JSON-encoded numbers longer than 256
bytes.
|
Low
| 167,477
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long Segment::ParseCues(
long long off,
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
if (m_pCues)
return 0; //success
if (off < 0)
return -1;
long long total, avail;
const int status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = m_start + off;
if ((total < 0) || (pos >= total))
return 1; //don't bother parsing cues
const long long element_start = pos;
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //underflow (weird)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id != 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume ID
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //underflow (weird)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
if (size == 0) //weird, although technically not illegal
return 1; //done
pos += len; //consume length of size of element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
const long long element_stop = pos + size;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (element_stop > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && (element_stop > total))
return 1; //don't bother parsing anymore
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if (element_stop > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long element_size = element_stop - element_start;
m_pCues = new (std::nothrow) Cues(
this,
pos,
size,
element_start,
element_size);
assert(m_pCues); //TODO
return 0; //success
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
Low
| 174,421
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: INLINE void impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(void* pv_ctxt, UWORD32 u4_no_of_bits)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = (stream_t *)pv_ctxt;
FLUSH_BITS(ps_stream->u4_offset,ps_stream->u4_buf,ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_no_of_bits,ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: libmpeg2 in libstagefright in Android 6.x before 2016-03-01 allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via crafted Bitstream data, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 25765591.
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
|
Low
| 173,941
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void testTimeout(void* self)
{
CCLayerTreeHostTest* test = static_cast<CCLayerTreeHostTest*>(self);
if (!test->m_running)
return;
test->m_timedOut = true;
test->endTest();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 does not properly handle Google V8 hidden objects, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 170,297
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HostCache::Set(const Key& key,
const Entry& entry,
base::TimeTicks now,
base::TimeDelta ttl) {
TRACE_EVENT0(kNetTracingCategory, "HostCache::Set");
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (caching_is_disabled())
return;
auto it = entries_.find(key);
if (it != entries_.end()) {
bool is_stale = it->second.IsStale(now, network_changes_);
RecordSet(is_stale ? SET_UPDATE_STALE : SET_UPDATE_VALID, now, &it->second,
entry);
entries_.erase(it);
} else {
if (size() == max_entries_)
EvictOneEntry(now);
RecordSet(SET_INSERT, now, nullptr, entry);
}
AddEntry(Key(key), Entry(entry, now, ttl, network_changes_));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
|
Low
| 172,009
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int UDPSocketWin::DoBind(const IPEndPoint& address) {
SockaddrStorage storage;
if (!address.ToSockAddr(storage.addr, &storage.addr_len))
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
int rv = bind(socket_, storage.addr, storage.addr_len);
if (rv == 0)
return OK;
int last_error = WSAGetLastError();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Net.UdpSocketBindErrorFromWinOS", last_error);
if (last_error == WSAEACCES || last_error == WSAEINVAL)
return ERR_ADDRESS_IN_USE;
return MapSystemError(last_error);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of input.
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,317
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HttpBridge::MakeAsynchronousPost() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
base::AutoLock lock(fetch_state_lock_);
DCHECK(!fetch_state_.request_completed);
if (fetch_state_.aborted)
return;
fetch_state_.url_poster = new URLFetcher(url_for_request_,
URLFetcher::POST, this);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_request_context(context_getter_for_request_);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_upload_data(content_type_, request_content_);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_extra_request_headers(extra_headers_);
fetch_state_.url_poster->set_load_flags(net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_COOKIES);
fetch_state_.url_poster->Start();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to media selectors.
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,428
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int l2tp_ip6_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *) uaddr;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
__be32 v4addr = 0;
int addr_type;
int err;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->l2tp_family != AF_INET6)
return -EINVAL;
if (addr_len < sizeof(*addr))
return -EINVAL;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&addr->l2tp_addr);
/* l2tp_ip6 sockets are IPv6 only */
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
/* L2TP is point-point, not multicast */
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
err = -EADDRINUSE;
read_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
if (__l2tp_ip6_bind_lookup(net, &addr->l2tp_addr,
sk->sk_bound_dev_if, addr->l2tp_conn_id))
goto out_in_use;
read_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
lock_sock(sk);
err = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE)
goto out_unlock;
/* Check if the address belongs to the host. */
rcu_read_lock();
if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) {
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
addr->l2tp_scope_id) {
/* Override any existing binding, if another
* one is supplied by user.
*/
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = addr->l2tp_scope_id;
}
/* Binding to link-local address requires an
interface */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
goto out_unlock_rcu;
err = -ENODEV;
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (!dev)
goto out_unlock_rcu;
}
/* ipv4 addr of the socket is invalid. Only the
* unspecified and mapped address have a v4 equivalent.
*/
v4addr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!ipv6_chk_addr(sock_net(sk), &addr->l2tp_addr, dev, 0))
goto out_unlock_rcu;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = inet->inet_saddr = v4addr;
sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = addr->l2tp_addr;
np->saddr = addr->l2tp_addr;
l2tp_ip6_sk(sk)->conn_id = addr->l2tp_conn_id;
write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
sk_add_bind_node(sk, &l2tp_ip6_bind_table);
sk_del_node_init(sk);
write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
out_unlock_rcu:
rcu_read_unlock();
out_unlock:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
out_in_use:
read_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in the L2TPv3 IP Encapsulation feature in the Linux kernel before 4.8.14 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by making multiple bind system calls without properly ascertaining whether a socket has the SOCK_ZAPPED status, related to net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c and net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c.
Commit Message: l2tp: fix racy SOCK_ZAPPED flag check in l2tp_ip{,6}_bind()
Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
[<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
[< inline >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
[<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
[< inline >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
[< inline >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
[< inline >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
[<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
[<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.
Fixes: c51ce49735c1 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 168,490
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool HTMLFormControlElement::isAutofocusable() const
{
if (!fastHasAttribute(autofocusAttr))
return false;
if (hasTagName(inputTag))
return !toHTMLInputElement(this)->isInputTypeHidden();
if (hasTagName(selectTag))
return true;
if (hasTagName(keygenTag))
return true;
if (hasTagName(buttonTag))
return true;
if (hasTagName(textareaTag))
return true;
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large number of SVG parameters.
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,343
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int perf_event_refresh(struct perf_event *event, int refresh)
{
/*
* not supported on inherited events
*/
if (event->attr.inherit || !is_sampling_event(event))
return -EINVAL;
atomic_add(refresh, &event->event_limit);
perf_event_enable(event);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/events/core.c in the performance subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.0 mismanages locks during certain migrations, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 31095224.
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
Medium
| 166,987
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
size_t len;
((void) ssl);
/*
* PSK parameters:
*
* opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
*/
len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1];
*p += 2;
if( (*p) + len > end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message "
"(psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
/*
* Note: we currently ignore the PKS identity hint, as we only allow one
* PSK to be provisionned on the client. This could be changed later if
* someone needs that feature.
*/
*p += len;
ret = 0;
return( ret );
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: ARM mbed TLS before 2.1.11, before 2.7.2, and before 2.8.0 has a buffer over-read in ssl_parse_server_psk_hint() that could cause a crash on invalid input.
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read
|
Low
| 169,265
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintNode(const WebKit::WebNode& node) {
if (node.isNull() || !node.document().frame()) {
return;
}
if (is_preview_enabled_) {
print_preview_context_.InitWithNode(node);
RequestPrintPreview(PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_CONTEXT_NODE);
} else {
WebKit::WebNode duplicate_node(node);
Print(duplicate_node.document().frame(), duplicate_node);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to printing.
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,697
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void LockScreenMediaControlsView::ButtonPressed(views::Button* sender,
const ui::Event& event) {
if (sender == close_button_) {
Dismiss();
return;
}
if (!base::Contains(enabled_actions_,
media_message_center::GetActionFromButtonTag(*sender)) ||
!media_session_id_.has_value()) {
return;
}
media_session::PerformMediaSessionAction(
media_message_center::GetActionFromButtonTag(*sender),
media_controller_remote_);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
|
High
| 172,337
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void copy_to_user_policy(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p, int dir)
{
memcpy(&p->sel, &xp->selector, sizeof(p->sel));
memcpy(&p->lft, &xp->lft, sizeof(p->lft));
memcpy(&p->curlft, &xp->curlft, sizeof(p->curlft));
p->priority = xp->priority;
p->index = xp->index;
p->sel.family = xp->family;
p->dir = dir;
p->action = xp->action;
p->flags = xp->flags;
p->share = XFRM_SHARE_ANY; /* XXX xp->share */
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Commit Message: xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_policy()
The memory reserved to dump the xfrm policy includes multiple padding
bytes added by the compiler for alignment (padding bytes in struct
xfrm_selector and struct xfrm_userpolicy_info). Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the buffer to avoid the heap info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 169,902
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void HTMLScriptRunner::executePendingScriptAndDispatchEvent(PendingScript& pendingScript, PendingScript::Type pendingScriptType)
{
bool errorOccurred = false;
double loadFinishTime = pendingScript.resource() && pendingScript.resource()->url().protocolIsInHTTPFamily() ? pendingScript.resource()->loadFinishTime() : 0;
ScriptSourceCode sourceCode = pendingScript.getSource(documentURLForScriptExecution(m_document), errorOccurred);
pendingScript.stopWatchingForLoad(this);
if (!isExecutingScript()) {
Microtask::performCheckpoint();
if (pendingScriptType == PendingScript::ParsingBlocking) {
m_hasScriptsWaitingForResources = !m_document->isScriptExecutionReady();
if (m_hasScriptsWaitingForResources)
return;
}
}
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Element> element = pendingScript.releaseElementAndClear();
double compilationFinishTime = 0;
if (ScriptLoader* scriptLoader = toScriptLoaderIfPossible(element.get())) {
NestingLevelIncrementer nestingLevelIncrementer(m_scriptNestingLevel);
IgnoreDestructiveWriteCountIncrementer ignoreDestructiveWriteCountIncrementer(m_document);
if (errorOccurred)
scriptLoader->dispatchErrorEvent();
else {
ASSERT(isExecutingScript());
if (!scriptLoader->executeScript(sourceCode, &compilationFinishTime)) {
scriptLoader->dispatchErrorEvent();
} else {
element->dispatchEvent(createScriptLoadEvent());
}
}
}
const double epsilon = 1;
if (pendingScriptType == PendingScript::ParsingBlocking && !m_parserBlockingScriptAlreadyLoaded && compilationFinishTime > epsilon && loadFinishTime > epsilon) {
Platform::current()->histogramCustomCounts("WebCore.Scripts.ParsingBlocking.TimeBetweenLoadedAndCompiled", (compilationFinishTime - loadFinishTime) * 1000, 0, 10000, 50);
}
ASSERT(!isExecutingScript());
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: core/loader/ImageLoader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, does not properly determine the V8 context of a microtask, which allows remote attackers to bypass Content Security Policy (CSP) restrictions by providing an image from an unintended source.
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,946
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeFactor() {
if (lex->tk==LEX_ID) {
JsVar *a = jspGetNamedVariable(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex));
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_ID);
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
if (lex->tk==LEX_TEMPLATE_LITERAL)
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Tagged template literals not supported");
else if (lex->tk==LEX_ARROW_FUNCTION && jsvIsName(a)) {
JsVar *funcVar = jspeArrowFunction(0,a);
jsvUnLock(a);
a=funcVar;
}
#endif
return a;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_INT) {
JsVar *v = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
v = jsvNewFromLongInteger(stringToInt(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex)));
}
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_INT);
return v;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_FLOAT) {
JsVar *v = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
v = jsvNewFromFloat(stringToFloat(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex)));
}
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_FLOAT);
return v;
} else if (lex->tk=='(') {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH('(');
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
#ifdef SAVE_ON_FLASH
JsVar *a = jspeExpression();
if (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE) JSP_MATCH_WITH_RETURN(')',a);
return a;
#else
return jspeExpressionOrArrowFunction();
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_TRUE) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_TRUE);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewFromBool(true) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_FALSE) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_FALSE);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewFromBool(false) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_NULL) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_NULL);
return JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE ? jsvNewWithFlags(JSV_NULL) : 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_UNDEFINED) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_UNDEFINED);
return 0;
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_STR) {
JsVar *a = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE)
a = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_STR);
return a;
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_TEMPLATE_LITERAL) {
return jspeTemplateLiteral();
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_REGEX) {
JsVar *a = 0;
#ifdef SAVE_ON_FLASH
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "RegEx are not supported in this version of Espruino\n");
#else
JsVar *regex = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
size_t regexEnd = 0, regexLen = 0;
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&it, regex, 0);
while (jsvStringIteratorHasChar(&it)) {
regexLen++;
if (jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&it)=='/')
regexEnd = regexLen;
jsvStringIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
JsVar *flags = 0;
if (regexEnd < regexLen)
flags = jsvNewFromStringVar(regex, regexEnd, JSVAPPENDSTRINGVAR_MAXLENGTH);
JsVar *regexSource = jsvNewFromStringVar(regex, 1, regexEnd-2);
a = jswrap_regexp_constructor(regexSource, flags);
jsvUnLock3(regex, flags, regexSource);
#endif
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_REGEX);
return a;
} else if (lex->tk=='{') {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorObject();
} else if (lex->tk=='[') {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorArray();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_FUNCTION) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_FUNCTION);
return jspeFunctionDefinition(true);
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_CLASS) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_CLASS);
return jspeClassDefinition(true);
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_SUPER) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_SUPER);
/* This is kind of nasty, since super appears to do
three different things.
* In the constructor it references the extended class's constructor
* in a method it references the constructor's prototype.
* in a static method it references the extended class's constructor (but this is different)
*/
if (jsvIsObject(execInfo.thisVar)) {
JsVar *proto1 = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.thisVar, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0); // if we're in a method, get __proto__ first
JsVar *proto2 = jsvIsObject(proto1) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto1, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0) : 0; // still in method, get __proto__.__proto__
jsvUnLock(proto1);
if (!proto2) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
}
if (lex->tk=='(') return proto2; // eg. used in a constructor
JsVar *proto3 = jsvIsFunction(proto2) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto2, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, 0) : 0;
jsvUnLock(proto2);
return proto3;
} else if (jsvIsFunction(execInfo.thisVar)) {
JsVar *proto1 = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.thisVar, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, 0);
JsVar *proto2 = jsvIsObject(proto1) ? jsvObjectGetChild(proto1, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0) : 0;
jsvUnLock(proto1);
if (!proto2) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
}
return proto2;
}
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Calling 'super' outside of class");
return 0;
#endif
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_THIS) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_THIS);
return jsvLockAgain( execInfo.thisVar ? execInfo.thisVar : execInfo.root );
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_DELETE) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorDelete();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_TYPEOF) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
return jspeFactorTypeOf();
} else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_VOID) {
if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_VOID);
jsvUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression());
return 0;
}
JSP_MATCH(LEX_EOF);
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Unexpected end of Input\n");
return 0;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspePostfixExpression(JsVar *a) {
while (lex->tk==LEX_PLUSPLUS || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSMINUS) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
JsVar *one = jsvNewFromInteger(1);
JsVar *oldValue = jsvAsNumberAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(a)); // keep the old value (but convert to number)
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(oldValue, one, op==LEX_PLUSPLUS ? '+' : '-');
jsvUnLock(one);
jspReplaceWith(a, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = oldValue;
}
}
return a;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspePostfixExpression() {
JsVar *a;
if (lex->tk==LEX_PLUSPLUS || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSMINUS) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
a = jspePostfixExpression();
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
JsVar *one = jsvNewFromInteger(1);
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(a, one, op==LEX_PLUSPLUS ? '+' : '-');
jsvUnLock(one);
jspReplaceWith(a, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
}
} else
a = jspeFactorFunctionCall();
return __jspePostfixExpression(a);
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeUnaryExpression() {
if (lex->tk=='!' || lex->tk=='~' || lex->tk=='-' || lex->tk=='+') {
short tk = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(tk);
if (!JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
return jspeUnaryExpression();
}
if (tk=='!') { // logical not
return jsvNewFromBool(!jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression())));
} else if (tk=='~') { // bitwise not
return jsvNewFromInteger(~jsvGetIntegerAndUnLock(jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression())));
} else if (tk=='-') { // unary minus
return jsvNegateAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression()); // names already skipped
} else if (tk=='+') { // unary plus (convert to number)
JsVar *v = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression());
JsVar *r = jsvAsNumber(v); // names already skipped
jsvUnLock(v);
return r;
}
assert(0);
return 0;
} else
return jspePostfixExpression();
}
unsigned int jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(int op) {
switch (op) {
case LEX_OROR: return 1; break;
case LEX_ANDAND: return 2; break;
case '|' : return 3; break;
case '^' : return 4; break;
case '&' : return 5; break;
case LEX_EQUAL:
case LEX_NEQUAL:
case LEX_TYPEEQUAL:
case LEX_NTYPEEQUAL: return 6;
case LEX_LEQUAL:
case LEX_GEQUAL:
case '<':
case '>':
case LEX_R_INSTANCEOF: return 7;
case LEX_R_IN: return (execInfo.execute&EXEC_FOR_INIT)?0:7;
case LEX_LSHIFT:
case LEX_RSHIFT:
case LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNED: return 8;
case '+':
case '-': return 9;
case '*':
case '/':
case '%': return 10;
default: return 0;
}
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeBinaryExpression(JsVar *a, unsigned int lastPrecedence) {
/* This one's a bit strange. Basically all the ops have their own precedence, it's not
* like & and | share the same precedence. We don't want to recurse for each one,
* so instead we do this.
*
* We deal with an expression in recursion ONLY if it's of higher precedence
* than the current one, otherwise we stick in the while loop.
*/
unsigned int precedence = jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(lex->tk);
while (precedence && precedence>lastPrecedence) {
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
if (op==LEX_ANDAND || op==LEX_OROR) {
bool aValue = jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(a));
if ((!aValue && op==LEX_ANDAND) ||
(aValue && op==LEX_OROR)) {
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(__jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence));
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
} else {
jsvUnLock(a);
a = __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence);
}
} else { // else it's a more 'normal' logical expression - just use Maths
JsVar *b = __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),precedence);
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
if (op==LEX_R_IN) {
JsVar *av = jsvSkipName(a); // needle
JsVar *bv = jsvSkipName(b); // haystack
if (jsvIsArray(bv) || jsvIsObject(bv)) { // search keys, NOT values
av = jsvAsArrayIndexAndUnLock(av);
JsVar *varFound = jspGetVarNamedField( bv, av, true);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = jsvNewFromBool(varFound!=0);
jsvUnLock(varFound);
} else {// else it will be undefined
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Cannot use 'in' operator to search a %t", bv);
jsvUnLock(a);
a = 0;
}
jsvUnLock2(av, bv);
} else if (op==LEX_R_INSTANCEOF) {
bool inst = false;
JsVar *av = jsvSkipName(a);
JsVar *bv = jsvSkipName(b);
if (!jsvIsFunction(bv)) {
jsExceptionHere(JSET_ERROR, "Expecting a function on RHS in instanceof check, got %t", bv);
} else {
if (jsvIsObject(av) || jsvIsFunction(av)) {
JsVar *bproto = jspGetNamedField(bv, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, false);
JsVar *proto = jsvObjectGetChild(av, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0);
while (proto) {
if (proto == bproto) inst=true;
JsVar *childProto = jsvObjectGetChild(proto, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, 0);
jsvUnLock(proto);
proto = childProto;
}
if (jspIsConstructor(bv, "Object")) inst = true;
jsvUnLock(bproto);
}
if (!inst) {
const char *name = jswGetBasicObjectName(av);
if (name) {
inst = jspIsConstructor(bv, name);
}
if (!inst && (jsvIsArray(av) || jsvIsArrayBuffer(av)) &&
jspIsConstructor(bv, "Object"))
inst = true;
}
}
jsvUnLock3(av, bv, a);
a = jsvNewFromBool(inst);
} else { // --------------------------------------------- NORMAL
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(a, b, op);
jsvUnLock(a); a = res;
}
}
jsvUnLock(b);
}
precedence = jspeGetBinaryExpressionPrecedence(lex->tk);
}
return a;
}
JsVar *jspeBinaryExpression() {
return __jspeBinaryExpression(jspeUnaryExpression(),0);
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeConditionalExpression(JsVar *lhs) {
if (lex->tk=='?') {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH('?');
if (!JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_MATCH(':');
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
} else {
bool first = jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(lhs));
jsvUnLock(lhs);
if (first) {
lhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
JSP_MATCH(':');
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
} else {
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
jspSetNoExecute();
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
JSP_MATCH(':');
lhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
}
}
}
return lhs;
}
JsVar *jspeConditionalExpression() {
return __jspeConditionalExpression(jspeBinaryExpression());
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeAssignmentExpression(JsVar *lhs) {
if (lex->tk=='=' || lex->tk==LEX_PLUSEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_MULEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_DIVEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_MODEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_ANDEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_OREQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_XOREQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL) {
JsVar *rhs;
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
rhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
rhs = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(rhs); // ensure we get rid of any references on the RHS
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE && lhs) {
if (op=='=') {
/* If we're assigning to this and we don't have a parent,
* add it to the symbol table root */
if (!jsvGetRefs(lhs) && jsvIsName(lhs)) {
if (!jsvIsArrayBufferName(lhs) && !jsvIsNewChild(lhs))
jsvAddName(execInfo.root, lhs);
}
jspReplaceWith(lhs, rhs);
} else {
if (op==LEX_PLUSEQUAL) op='+';
else if (op==LEX_MINUSEQUAL) op='-';
else if (op==LEX_MULEQUAL) op='*';
else if (op==LEX_DIVEQUAL) op='/';
else if (op==LEX_MODEQUAL) op='%';
else if (op==LEX_ANDEQUAL) op='&';
else if (op==LEX_OREQUAL) op='|';
else if (op==LEX_XOREQUAL) op='^';
else if (op==LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL) op=LEX_RSHIFT;
else if (op==LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL) op=LEX_LSHIFT;
else if (op==LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL) op=LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNED;
if (op=='+' && jsvIsName(lhs)) {
JsVar *currentValue = jsvSkipName(lhs);
if (jsvIsString(currentValue) && !jsvIsFlatString(currentValue) && jsvGetRefs(currentValue)==1 && rhs!=currentValue) {
/* A special case for string += where this is the only use of the string
* and we're not appending to ourselves. In this case we can do a
* simple append (rather than clone + append)*/
JsVar *str = jsvAsString(rhs, false);
jsvAppendStringVarComplete(currentValue, str);
jsvUnLock(str);
op = 0;
}
jsvUnLock(currentValue);
}
if (op) {
/* Fallback which does a proper add */
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(lhs,rhs,op);
jspReplaceWith(lhs, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
}
}
}
jsvUnLock(rhs);
}
return lhs;
}
JsVar *jspeAssignmentExpression() {
return __jspeAssignmentExpression(jspeConditionalExpression());
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeExpression() {
while (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE) {
JsVar *a = jspeAssignmentExpression();
if (lex->tk!=',') return a;
jsvCheckReferenceError(a);
jsvUnLock(a);
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(',');
}
return 0;
}
/** Parse a block `{ ... }` but assume brackets are already parsed */
NO_INLINE void jspeBlockNoBrackets() {
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
while (lex->tk && lex->tk!='}') {
JsVar *a = jspeStatement();
jsvCheckReferenceError(a);
jsvUnLock(a);
if (JSP_HAS_ERROR) {
if (lex && !(execInfo.execute&EXEC_ERROR_LINE_REPORTED)) {
execInfo.execute = (JsExecFlags)(execInfo.execute | EXEC_ERROR_LINE_REPORTED);
JsVar *stackTrace = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.hiddenRoot, JSPARSE_STACKTRACE_VAR, JSV_STRING_0);
if (stackTrace) {
jsvAppendPrintf(stackTrace, "at ");
jspAppendStackTrace(stackTrace);
jsvUnLock(stackTrace);
}
}
}
if (JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE)
return;
}
} else {
int brackets = 0;
while (lex->tk && (brackets || lex->tk != '}')) {
if (lex->tk == '{') brackets++;
if (lex->tk == '}') brackets--;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(lex->tk);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Espruino before 1.99 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) and a potential Information Disclosure with user crafted input files via a Buffer Overflow or Out-of-bounds Read during syntax parsing of certain for loops in jsparse.c.
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
|
Medium
| 169,209
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long SegmentInfo::Parse() {
assert(m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8 == NULL);
assert(m_pWritingAppAsUTF8 == NULL);
assert(m_pTitleAsUTF8 == NULL);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
m_timecodeScale = 1000000;
m_duration = -1;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x0AD7B1) { // Timecode Scale
m_timecodeScale = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_timecodeScale <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x0489) { // Segment duration
const long status = UnserializeFloat(pReader, pos, size, m_duration);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (m_duration < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x0D80) { // MuxingApp
const long status =
UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x1741) { // WritingApp
const long status =
UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_pWritingAppAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x3BA9) { // Title
const long status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_pTitleAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
Medium
| 173,842
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void nbd_recv_coroutines_enter_all(NBDClientSession *s)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_NBD_REQUESTS; i++) {
qemu_coroutine_enter(s->recv_coroutine[i]);
qemu_coroutine_enter(s->recv_coroutine[i]);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An assertion-failure flaw was found in Qemu before 2.10.1, in the Network Block Device (NBD) server's initial connection negotiation, where the I/O coroutine was undefined. This could crash the qemu-nbd server if a client sent unexpected data during connection negotiation. A remote user or process could use this flaw to crash the qemu-nbd server resulting in denial of service.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,449
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԗԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥก] > n; œ > ce;"
"[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщพฟພຟ] > w;"
"[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
"[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടรຣຮ] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зҙӡउওဒვპ] > 3; [บບ] > u"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Incorrect handling of a confusable character in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Mapping several Indic characters to confusables.
A number of characters from several Indian scripts are confusable,
especially with numbers. This change maps these characters to their
ASCII lookalike to allow fallback to punycode when displaying probable
spoofing URLs.
Bug: 849421
Bug: 892646
Bug: 896722
Change-Id: I6d463642f3541454dc39bf4b32b8291417697c52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1295179
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#602032}
|
Medium
| 173,115
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CastCastView::ButtonPressed(views::Button* sender,
const ui::Event& event) {
DCHECK(sender == stop_button_);
StopCast();
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the DocumentLoader::maybeCreateArchive function in core/loader/DocumentLoader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.114, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via crafted MHTML content, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
|
Medium
| 171,623
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: image_transform_default_ini(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that)
{
this->next->ini(this->next, that);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,621
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CL_InitRef( void ) {
refimport_t ri;
refexport_t *ret;
#ifdef USE_RENDERER_DLOPEN
GetRefAPI_t GetRefAPI;
char dllName[MAX_OSPATH];
#endif
Com_Printf( "----- Initializing Renderer ----\n" );
#ifdef USE_RENDERER_DLOPEN
cl_renderer = Cvar_Get("cl_renderer", "opengl1", CVAR_ARCHIVE | CVAR_LATCH);
Com_sprintf(dllName, sizeof(dllName), "renderer_mp_%s_" ARCH_STRING DLL_EXT, cl_renderer->string);
if(!(rendererLib = Sys_LoadDll(dllName, qfalse)) && strcmp(cl_renderer->string, cl_renderer->resetString))
{
Com_Printf("failed:\n\"%s\"\n", Sys_LibraryError());
Cvar_ForceReset("cl_renderer");
Com_sprintf(dllName, sizeof(dllName), "renderer_mp_opengl1_" ARCH_STRING DLL_EXT);
rendererLib = Sys_LoadDll(dllName, qfalse);
}
if(!rendererLib)
{
Com_Printf("failed:\n\"%s\"\n", Sys_LibraryError());
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Failed to load renderer");
}
GetRefAPI = Sys_LoadFunction(rendererLib, "GetRefAPI");
if(!GetRefAPI)
{
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Can't load symbol GetRefAPI: '%s'", Sys_LibraryError());
}
#endif
ri.Cmd_AddCommand = Cmd_AddCommand;
ri.Cmd_RemoveCommand = Cmd_RemoveCommand;
ri.Cmd_Argc = Cmd_Argc;
ri.Cmd_Argv = Cmd_Argv;
ri.Cmd_ExecuteText = Cbuf_ExecuteText;
ri.Printf = CL_RefPrintf;
ri.Error = Com_Error;
ri.Milliseconds = CL_ScaledMilliseconds;
#ifdef ZONE_DEBUG
ri.Z_MallocDebug = CL_RefMallocDebug;
#else
ri.Z_Malloc = CL_RefMalloc;
#endif
ri.Free = Z_Free;
ri.Tag_Free = CL_RefTagFree;
ri.Hunk_Clear = Hunk_ClearToMark;
#ifdef HUNK_DEBUG
ri.Hunk_AllocDebug = Hunk_AllocDebug;
#else
ri.Hunk_Alloc = Hunk_Alloc;
#endif
ri.Hunk_AllocateTempMemory = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory;
ri.Hunk_FreeTempMemory = Hunk_FreeTempMemory;
ri.CM_ClusterPVS = CM_ClusterPVS;
ri.CM_DrawDebugSurface = CM_DrawDebugSurface;
ri.FS_ReadFile = FS_ReadFile;
ri.FS_FreeFile = FS_FreeFile;
ri.FS_WriteFile = FS_WriteFile;
ri.FS_FreeFileList = FS_FreeFileList;
ri.FS_ListFiles = FS_ListFiles;
ri.FS_FileIsInPAK = FS_FileIsInPAK;
ri.FS_FileExists = FS_FileExists;
ri.Cvar_Get = Cvar_Get;
ri.Cvar_Set = Cvar_Set;
ri.Cvar_SetValue = Cvar_SetValue;
ri.Cvar_CheckRange = Cvar_CheckRange;
ri.Cvar_VariableIntegerValue = Cvar_VariableIntegerValue;
ri.CIN_UploadCinematic = CIN_UploadCinematic;
ri.CIN_PlayCinematic = CIN_PlayCinematic;
ri.CIN_RunCinematic = CIN_RunCinematic;
ri.CL_WriteAVIVideoFrame = CL_WriteAVIVideoFrame;
ri.IN_Init = IN_Init;
ri.IN_Shutdown = IN_Shutdown;
ri.IN_Restart = IN_Restart;
ri.ftol = Q_ftol;
ri.Sys_SetEnv = Sys_SetEnv;
ri.Sys_GLimpSafeInit = Sys_GLimpSafeInit;
ri.Sys_GLimpInit = Sys_GLimpInit;
ri.Sys_LowPhysicalMemory = Sys_LowPhysicalMemory;
ret = GetRefAPI( REF_API_VERSION, &ri );
if ( !ret ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Couldn't initialize refresh" );
}
re = *ret;
Com_Printf( "---- Renderer Initialization Complete ----\n" );
Cvar_Set( "cl_paused", "0" );
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: In ioquake3 before 2017-03-14, the auto-downloading feature has insufficient content restrictions. This also affects Quake III Arena, OpenArena, OpenJK, iortcw, and other id Tech 3 (aka Quake 3 engine) forks. A malicious auto-downloaded file can trigger loading of crafted auto-downloaded files as native code DLLs. A malicious auto-downloaded file can contain configuration defaults that override the user's. Executable bytecode in a malicious auto-downloaded file can set configuration variables to values that will result in unwanted native code DLLs being loaded, resulting in sandbox escape.
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
|
Medium
| 170,082
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: copy_move_file (CopyMoveJob *copy_job,
GFile *src,
GFile *dest_dir,
gboolean same_fs,
gboolean unique_names,
char **dest_fs_type,
SourceInfo *source_info,
TransferInfo *transfer_info,
GHashTable *debuting_files,
GdkPoint *position,
gboolean overwrite,
gboolean *skipped_file,
gboolean readonly_source_fs)
{
GFile *dest, *new_dest;
g_autofree gchar *dest_uri = NULL;
GError *error;
GFileCopyFlags flags;
char *primary, *secondary, *details;
int response;
ProgressData pdata;
gboolean would_recurse, is_merge;
CommonJob *job;
gboolean res;
int unique_name_nr;
gboolean handled_invalid_filename;
job = (CommonJob *) copy_job;
if (should_skip_file (job, src))
{
*skipped_file = TRUE;
return;
}
unique_name_nr = 1;
/* another file in the same directory might have handled the invalid
* filename condition for us
*/
handled_invalid_filename = *dest_fs_type != NULL;
if (unique_names)
{
dest = get_unique_target_file (src, dest_dir, same_fs, *dest_fs_type, unique_name_nr++);
}
else if (copy_job->target_name != NULL)
{
dest = get_target_file_with_custom_name (src, dest_dir, *dest_fs_type, same_fs,
copy_job->target_name);
}
else
{
dest = get_target_file (src, dest_dir, *dest_fs_type, same_fs);
}
/* Don't allow recursive move/copy into itself.
* (We would get a file system error if we proceeded but it is nicer to
* detect and report it at this level) */
if (test_dir_is_parent (dest_dir, src))
{
if (job->skip_all_error)
{
goto out;
}
/* the run_warning() frees all strings passed in automatically */
primary = copy_job->is_move ? g_strdup (_("You cannot move a folder into itself."))
: g_strdup (_("You cannot copy a folder into itself."));
secondary = g_strdup (_("The destination folder is inside the source folder."));
response = run_cancel_or_skip_warning (job,
primary,
secondary,
NULL,
source_info->num_files,
source_info->num_files - transfer_info->num_files);
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response == 1) /* skip all */
{
job->skip_all_error = TRUE;
}
else if (response == 2) /* skip */
{ /* do nothing */
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
goto out;
}
/* Don't allow copying over the source or one of the parents of the source.
*/
if (test_dir_is_parent (src, dest))
{
if (job->skip_all_error)
{
goto out;
}
/* the run_warning() frees all strings passed in automatically */
primary = copy_job->is_move ? g_strdup (_("You cannot move a file over itself."))
: g_strdup (_("You cannot copy a file over itself."));
secondary = g_strdup (_("The source file would be overwritten by the destination."));
response = run_cancel_or_skip_warning (job,
primary,
secondary,
NULL,
source_info->num_files,
source_info->num_files - transfer_info->num_files);
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response == 1) /* skip all */
{
job->skip_all_error = TRUE;
}
else if (response == 2) /* skip */
{ /* do nothing */
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
goto out;
}
retry:
error = NULL;
flags = G_FILE_COPY_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS;
if (overwrite)
{
flags |= G_FILE_COPY_OVERWRITE;
}
if (readonly_source_fs)
{
flags |= G_FILE_COPY_TARGET_DEFAULT_PERMS;
}
pdata.job = copy_job;
pdata.last_size = 0;
pdata.source_info = source_info;
pdata.transfer_info = transfer_info;
if (copy_job->is_move)
{
res = g_file_move (src, dest,
flags,
job->cancellable,
copy_file_progress_callback,
&pdata,
&error);
}
else
{
res = g_file_copy (src, dest,
flags,
job->cancellable,
copy_file_progress_callback,
&pdata,
&error);
}
if (res)
{
GFile *real;
real = map_possibly_volatile_file_to_real (dest, job->cancellable, &error);
if (real == NULL)
{
res = FALSE;
}
else
{
g_object_unref (dest);
dest = real;
}
}
if (res)
{
transfer_info->num_files++;
report_copy_progress (copy_job, source_info, transfer_info);
if (debuting_files)
{
dest_uri = g_file_get_uri (dest);
if (position)
{
nautilus_file_changes_queue_schedule_position_set (dest, *position, job->screen_num);
}
else if (eel_uri_is_desktop (dest_uri))
{
nautilus_file_changes_queue_schedule_position_remove (dest);
}
g_hash_table_replace (debuting_files, g_object_ref (dest), GINT_TO_POINTER (TRUE));
}
if (copy_job->is_move)
{
nautilus_file_changes_queue_file_moved (src, dest);
}
else
{
nautilus_file_changes_queue_file_added (dest);
}
/* If copying a trusted desktop file to the desktop,
* mark it as trusted. */
if (copy_job->desktop_location != NULL &&
g_file_equal (copy_job->desktop_location, dest_dir) &&
is_trusted_desktop_file (src, job->cancellable))
{
mark_desktop_file_trusted (job,
job->cancellable,
dest,
FALSE);
}
if (job->undo_info != NULL)
{
nautilus_file_undo_info_ext_add_origin_target_pair (NAUTILUS_FILE_UNDO_INFO_EXT (job->undo_info),
src, dest);
}
g_object_unref (dest);
return;
}
if (!handled_invalid_filename &&
IS_IO_ERROR (error, INVALID_FILENAME))
{
handled_invalid_filename = TRUE;
g_assert (*dest_fs_type == NULL);
*dest_fs_type = query_fs_type (dest_dir, job->cancellable);
if (unique_names)
{
new_dest = get_unique_target_file (src, dest_dir, same_fs, *dest_fs_type, unique_name_nr);
}
else
{
new_dest = get_target_file (src, dest_dir, *dest_fs_type, same_fs);
}
if (!g_file_equal (dest, new_dest))
{
g_object_unref (dest);
dest = new_dest;
g_error_free (error);
goto retry;
}
else
{
g_object_unref (new_dest);
}
}
/* Conflict */
if (!overwrite &&
IS_IO_ERROR (error, EXISTS))
{
gboolean is_merge;
FileConflictResponse *response;
g_error_free (error);
if (unique_names)
{
g_object_unref (dest);
dest = get_unique_target_file (src, dest_dir, same_fs, *dest_fs_type, unique_name_nr++);
goto retry;
}
is_merge = FALSE;
if (is_dir (dest) && is_dir (src))
{
is_merge = TRUE;
}
if ((is_merge && job->merge_all) ||
(!is_merge && job->replace_all))
{
overwrite = TRUE;
goto retry;
}
if (job->skip_all_conflict)
{
goto out;
}
response = handle_copy_move_conflict (job, src, dest, dest_dir);
if (response->id == GTK_RESPONSE_CANCEL ||
response->id == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
file_conflict_response_free (response);
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response->id == CONFLICT_RESPONSE_SKIP)
{
if (response->apply_to_all)
{
job->skip_all_conflict = TRUE;
}
file_conflict_response_free (response);
}
else if (response->id == CONFLICT_RESPONSE_REPLACE) /* merge/replace */
{
if (response->apply_to_all)
{
if (is_merge)
{
job->merge_all = TRUE;
}
else
{
job->replace_all = TRUE;
}
}
overwrite = TRUE;
file_conflict_response_free (response);
goto retry;
}
else if (response->id == CONFLICT_RESPONSE_RENAME)
{
g_object_unref (dest);
dest = get_target_file_for_display_name (dest_dir,
response->new_name);
file_conflict_response_free (response);
goto retry;
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
}
else if (overwrite &&
IS_IO_ERROR (error, IS_DIRECTORY))
{
gboolean existing_file_deleted;
DeleteExistingFileData data;
g_error_free (error);
data.job = job;
data.source = src;
existing_file_deleted =
delete_file_recursively (dest,
job->cancellable,
existing_file_removed_callback,
&data);
if (existing_file_deleted)
{
goto retry;
}
}
/* Needs to recurse */
else if (IS_IO_ERROR (error, WOULD_RECURSE) ||
IS_IO_ERROR (error, WOULD_MERGE))
{
is_merge = error->code == G_IO_ERROR_WOULD_MERGE;
would_recurse = error->code == G_IO_ERROR_WOULD_RECURSE;
g_error_free (error);
if (overwrite && would_recurse)
{
error = NULL;
/* Copying a dir onto file, first remove the file */
if (!g_file_delete (dest, job->cancellable, &error) &&
!IS_IO_ERROR (error, NOT_FOUND))
{
if (job->skip_all_error)
{
g_error_free (error);
goto out;
}
if (copy_job->is_move)
{
primary = f (_("Error while moving “%B”."), src);
}
else
{
primary = f (_("Error while copying “%B”."), src);
}
secondary = f (_("Could not remove the already existing file with the same name in %F."), dest_dir);
details = error->message;
/* setting TRUE on show_all here, as we could have
* another error on the same file later.
*/
response = run_warning (job,
primary,
secondary,
details,
TRUE,
CANCEL, SKIP_ALL, SKIP,
NULL);
g_error_free (error);
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response == 1) /* skip all */
{
job->skip_all_error = TRUE;
}
else if (response == 2) /* skip */
{ /* do nothing */
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
goto out;
}
if (error)
{
g_error_free (error);
error = NULL;
}
nautilus_file_changes_queue_file_removed (dest);
}
if (is_merge)
{
/* On merge we now write in the target directory, which may not
* be in the same directory as the source, even if the parent is
* (if the merged directory is a mountpoint). This could cause
* problems as we then don't transcode filenames.
* We just set same_fs to FALSE which is safe but a bit slower. */
same_fs = FALSE;
}
if (!copy_move_directory (copy_job, src, &dest, same_fs,
would_recurse, dest_fs_type,
source_info, transfer_info,
debuting_files, skipped_file,
readonly_source_fs))
{
/* destination changed, since it was an invalid file name */
g_assert (*dest_fs_type != NULL);
handled_invalid_filename = TRUE;
goto retry;
}
g_object_unref (dest);
return;
}
else if (IS_IO_ERROR (error, CANCELLED))
{
g_error_free (error);
}
/* Other error */
else
{
if (job->skip_all_error)
{
g_error_free (error);
goto out;
}
primary = f (_("Error while copying “%B”."), src);
secondary = f (_("There was an error copying the file into %F."), dest_dir);
details = error->message;
response = run_cancel_or_skip_warning (job,
primary,
secondary,
details,
source_info->num_files,
source_info->num_files - transfer_info->num_files);
g_error_free (error);
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response == 1) /* skip all */
{
job->skip_all_error = TRUE;
}
else if (response == 2) /* skip */
{ /* do nothing */
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
}
out:
*skipped_file = TRUE; /* Or aborted, but same-same */
g_object_unref (dest);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: GNOME Nautilus before 3.23.90 allows attackers to spoof a file type by using the .desktop file extension, as demonstrated by an attack in which a .desktop file's Name field ends in .pdf but this file's Exec field launches a malicious *sh -c* command. In other words, Nautilus provides no UI indication that a file actually has the potentially unsafe .desktop extension; instead, the UI only shows the .pdf extension. One (slightly) mitigating factor is that an attack requires the .desktop file to have execute permission. The solution is to ask the user to confirm that the file is supposed to be treated as a .desktop file, and then remember the user's answer in the metadata::trusted field.
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
Low
| 167,747
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
const char *dev_name, void *raw_data)
{
struct super_block *s;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi;
struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *root_info;
const char *err = "Getting sb failed";
struct inode *inode;
struct path path;
uid_t check_ruid;
int rc;
sbi = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
rc = ecryptfs_parse_options(sbi, raw_data, &check_ruid);
if (rc) {
err = "Error parsing options";
goto out;
}
s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(s)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(s);
goto out;
}
rc = bdi_setup_and_register(&sbi->bdi, "ecryptfs", BDI_CAP_MAP_COPY);
if (rc)
goto out1;
ecryptfs_set_superblock_private(s, sbi);
s->s_bdi = &sbi->bdi;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of sbi after that point */
sbi = NULL;
s->s_op = &ecryptfs_sops;
s->s_d_op = &ecryptfs_dops;
err = "Reading sb failed";
rc = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &path);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "kern_path() failed\n");
goto out1;
}
if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_type == &ecryptfs_fs_type) {
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_ERR "Mount on filesystem of type "
"eCryptfs explicitly disallowed due to "
"known incompatibilities\n");
goto out_free;
}
if (check_ruid && !uid_eq(path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid, current_uid())) {
rc = -EPERM;
printk(KERN_ERR "Mount of device (uid: %d) not owned by "
"requested user (uid: %d)\n",
i_uid_read(path.dentry->d_inode),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()));
goto out_free;
}
ecryptfs_set_superblock_lower(s, path.dentry->d_sb);
/**
* Set the POSIX ACL flag based on whether they're enabled in the lower
* mount. Force a read-only eCryptfs mount if the lower mount is ro.
* Allow a ro eCryptfs mount even when the lower mount is rw.
*/
s->s_flags = flags & ~MS_POSIXACL;
s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & (MS_RDONLY | MS_POSIXACL);
s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
s->s_magic = ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
inode = ecryptfs_get_inode(path.dentry->d_inode, s);
rc = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto out_free;
s->s_root = d_make_root(inode);
if (!s->s_root) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
root_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_dentry_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!root_info)
goto out_free;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of root_info */
ecryptfs_set_dentry_private(s->s_root, root_info);
root_info->lower_path = path;
s->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
return dget(s->s_root);
out_free:
path_put(&path);
out1:
deactivate_locked_super(s);
out:
if (sbi) {
ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat(&sbi->mount_crypt_stat);
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, sbi);
}
printk(KERN_ERR "%s; rc = [%d]\n", err, rc);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The eCryptfs subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.18 allows local users to gain privileges via a large filesystem stack that includes an overlayfs layer, related to fs/ecryptfs/main.c and fs/overlayfs/super.c.
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
|
Medium
| 168,895
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static PassRefPtr<StaticBitmapImage> cropImage(
Image* image,
const ParsedOptions& parsedOptions,
AlphaDisposition imageFormat = PremultiplyAlpha,
ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceOption colorSpaceOp =
ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceApplied) {
ASSERT(image);
IntRect imgRect(IntPoint(), IntSize(image->width(), image->height()));
const IntRect srcRect = intersection(imgRect, parsedOptions.cropRect);
if (srcRect.isEmpty() && !parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha) {
SkImageInfo info =
SkImageInfo::Make(parsedOptions.resizeWidth, parsedOptions.resizeHeight,
kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer = ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(
static_cast<size_t>(info.width()) * info.height(),
info.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
return StaticBitmapImage::create(newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<size_t>(info.width()) * info.bytesPerPixel()));
}
sk_sp<SkImage> skiaImage = image->imageForCurrentFrame();
if ((((!parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha && !skiaImage->isOpaque()) ||
!skiaImage) &&
image->data() && imageFormat == PremultiplyAlpha) ||
colorSpaceOp == ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceIgnored) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageDecoder> decoder(ImageDecoder::create(
image->data(), true,
parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha ? ImageDecoder::AlphaPremultiplied
: ImageDecoder::AlphaNotPremultiplied,
colorSpaceOp));
if (!decoder)
return nullptr;
skiaImage = ImageBitmap::getSkImageFromDecoder(std::move(decoder));
if (!skiaImage)
return nullptr;
}
if (parsedOptions.cropRect == srcRect && !parsedOptions.shouldScaleInput) {
sk_sp<SkImage> croppedSkImage = skiaImage->makeSubset(srcRect);
if (parsedOptions.flipY)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(flipSkImageVertically(
croppedSkImage.get(), parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha
? PremultiplyAlpha
: DontPremultiplyAlpha));
if (parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha && imageFormat == DontPremultiplyAlpha)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(
unPremulSkImageToPremul(croppedSkImage.get()));
croppedSkImage->preroll();
return StaticBitmapImage::create(std::move(croppedSkImage));
}
sk_sp<SkSurface> surface = SkSurface::MakeRasterN32Premul(
parsedOptions.resizeWidth, parsedOptions.resizeHeight);
if (!surface)
return nullptr;
if (srcRect.isEmpty())
return StaticBitmapImage::create(surface->makeImageSnapshot());
SkScalar dstLeft = std::min(0, -parsedOptions.cropRect.x());
SkScalar dstTop = std::min(0, -parsedOptions.cropRect.y());
if (parsedOptions.cropRect.x() < 0)
dstLeft = -parsedOptions.cropRect.x();
if (parsedOptions.cropRect.y() < 0)
dstTop = -parsedOptions.cropRect.y();
if (parsedOptions.flipY) {
surface->getCanvas()->translate(0, surface->height());
surface->getCanvas()->scale(1, -1);
}
if (parsedOptions.shouldScaleInput) {
SkRect drawSrcRect = SkRect::MakeXYWH(
parsedOptions.cropRect.x(), parsedOptions.cropRect.y(),
parsedOptions.cropRect.width(), parsedOptions.cropRect.height());
SkRect drawDstRect = SkRect::MakeXYWH(0, 0, parsedOptions.resizeWidth,
parsedOptions.resizeHeight);
SkPaint paint;
paint.setFilterQuality(parsedOptions.resizeQuality);
surface->getCanvas()->drawImageRect(skiaImage, drawSrcRect, drawDstRect,
&paint);
} else {
surface->getCanvas()->drawImage(skiaImage, dstLeft, dstTop);
}
skiaImage = surface->makeImageSnapshot();
if (parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha) {
if (imageFormat == DontPremultiplyAlpha)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(
unPremulSkImageToPremul(skiaImage.get()));
return StaticBitmapImage::create(std::move(skiaImage));
}
return StaticBitmapImage::create(premulSkImageToUnPremul(skiaImage.get()));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Bad casting in bitmap manipulation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
|
Medium
| 172,500
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int read_fragment_table(long long *directory_table_end)
{
int res, i;
int bytes = SQUASHFS_FRAGMENT_BYTES(sBlk.s.fragments);
int indexes = SQUASHFS_FRAGMENT_INDEXES(sBlk.s.fragments);
long long fragment_table_index[indexes];
TRACE("read_fragment_table: %d fragments, reading %d fragment indexes "
"from 0x%llx\n", sBlk.s.fragments, indexes,
sBlk.s.fragment_table_start);
if(sBlk.s.fragments == 0) {
*directory_table_end = sBlk.s.fragment_table_start;
return TRUE;
}
fragment_table = malloc(bytes);
if(fragment_table == NULL)
EXIT_UNSQUASH("read_fragment_table: failed to allocate "
"fragment table\n");
res = read_fs_bytes(fd, sBlk.s.fragment_table_start,
SQUASHFS_FRAGMENT_INDEX_BYTES(sBlk.s.fragments),
fragment_table_index);
if(res == FALSE) {
ERROR("read_fragment_table: failed to read fragment table "
"index\n");
return FALSE;
}
SQUASHFS_INSWAP_FRAGMENT_INDEXES(fragment_table_index, indexes);
for(i = 0; i < indexes; i++) {
int expected = (i + 1) != indexes ? SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE :
bytes & (SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE - 1);
int length = read_block(fd, fragment_table_index[i], NULL,
expected, ((char *) fragment_table) + (i *
SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE));
TRACE("Read fragment table block %d, from 0x%llx, length %d\n",
i, fragment_table_index[i], length);
if(length == FALSE) {
ERROR("read_fragment_table: failed to read fragment "
"table index\n");
return FALSE;
}
}
for(i = 0; i < sBlk.s.fragments; i++)
SQUASHFS_INSWAP_FRAGMENT_ENTRY(&fragment_table[i]);
*directory_table_end = fragment_table_index[0];
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the read_fragment_table_4 function in unsquash-4.c in Squashfs and sasquatch allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted input, which triggers a stack-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
|
Medium
| 168,881
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pvscsi_convert_sglist(PVSCSIRequest *r)
{
int chunk_size;
uint64_t data_length = r->req.dataLen;
PVSCSISGState sg = r->sg;
while (data_length) {
while (!sg.resid) {
pvscsi_get_next_sg_elem(&sg);
trace_pvscsi_convert_sglist(r->req.context, r->sg.dataAddr,
r->sg.resid);
}
assert(data_length > 0);
chunk_size = MIN((unsigned) data_length, sg.resid);
if (chunk_size) {
qemu_sglist_add(&r->sgl, sg.dataAddr, chunk_size);
}
sg.dataAddr += chunk_size;
data_length -= chunk_size;
sg.resid -= chunk_size;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The pvscsi_convert_sglist function in hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and QEMU process crash) by leveraging an incorrect cast.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,936
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int list_locations(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf,
enum track_item alloc)
{
int len = 0;
unsigned long i;
struct loc_track t = { 0, 0, NULL };
int node;
if (!alloc_loc_track(&t, PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct location),
GFP_TEMPORARY))
return sprintf(buf, "Out of memory\n");
/* Push back cpu slabs */
flush_all(s);
for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY) {
struct kmem_cache_node *n = get_node(s, node);
unsigned long flags;
struct page *page;
if (!atomic_long_read(&n->nr_slabs))
continue;
spin_lock_irqsave(&n->list_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(page, &n->partial, lru)
process_slab(&t, s, page, alloc);
list_for_each_entry(page, &n->full, lru)
process_slab(&t, s, page, alloc);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&n->list_lock, flags);
}
for (i = 0; i < t.count; i++) {
struct location *l = &t.loc[i];
if (len > PAGE_SIZE - 100)
break;
len += sprintf(buf + len, "%7ld ", l->count);
if (l->addr)
len += sprint_symbol(buf + len, (unsigned long)l->addr);
else
len += sprintf(buf + len, "<not-available>");
if (l->sum_time != l->min_time) {
unsigned long remainder;
len += sprintf(buf + len, " age=%ld/%ld/%ld",
l->min_time,
div_long_long_rem(l->sum_time, l->count, &remainder),
l->max_time);
} else
len += sprintf(buf + len, " age=%ld",
l->min_time);
if (l->min_pid != l->max_pid)
len += sprintf(buf + len, " pid=%ld-%ld",
l->min_pid, l->max_pid);
else
len += sprintf(buf + len, " pid=%ld",
l->min_pid);
if (num_online_cpus() > 1 && !cpus_empty(l->cpus) &&
len < PAGE_SIZE - 60) {
len += sprintf(buf + len, " cpus=");
len += cpulist_scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 50,
l->cpus);
}
if (num_online_nodes() > 1 && !nodes_empty(l->nodes) &&
len < PAGE_SIZE - 60) {
len += sprintf(buf + len, " nodes=");
len += nodelist_scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 50,
l->nodes);
}
len += sprintf(buf + len, "\n");
}
free_loc_track(&t);
if (!t.count)
len += sprintf(buf, "No data\n");
return len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The div_long_long_rem implementation in include/asm-x86/div64.h in the Linux kernel before 2.6.26 on the x86 platform allows local users to cause a denial of service (Divide Error Fault and panic) via a clock_gettime system call.
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,758
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, count)
{
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(zend_hash_num_elements(&phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The phar_convert_to_other function in ext/phar/phar_object.c in PHP before 5.4.43, 5.5.x before 5.5.27, and 5.6.x before 5.6.11 does not validate a file pointer before a close operation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TAR archive that is mishandled in a Phar::convertToData call.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,295
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GCInfoTable::EnsureGCInfoIndex(const GCInfo* gc_info,
size_t* gc_info_index_slot) {
DCHECK(gc_info);
DCHECK(gc_info_index_slot);
DEFINE_THREAD_SAFE_STATIC_LOCAL(Mutex, mutex, ());
MutexLocker locker(mutex);
if (*gc_info_index_slot)
return;
int index = ++gc_info_index_;
size_t gc_info_index = static_cast<size_t>(index);
CHECK(gc_info_index < GCInfoTable::kMaxIndex);
if (gc_info_index >= gc_info_table_size_)
Resize();
g_gc_info_table[gc_info_index] = gc_info;
ReleaseStore(reinterpret_cast<int*>(gc_info_index_slot), index);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition in Oilpan in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
|
High
| 173,134
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: native_handle* Parcel::readNativeHandle() const
{
int numFds, numInts;
status_t err;
err = readInt32(&numFds);
if (err != NO_ERROR) return 0;
err = readInt32(&numInts);
if (err != NO_ERROR) return 0;
native_handle* h = native_handle_create(numFds, numInts);
if (!h) {
return 0;
}
for (int i=0 ; err==NO_ERROR && i<numFds ; i++) {
h->data[i] = dup(readFileDescriptor());
if (h->data[i] < 0) err = BAD_VALUE;
}
err = read(h->data + numFds, sizeof(int)*numInts);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
native_handle_close(h);
native_handle_delete(h);
h = 0;
}
return h;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libs/binder/Parcel.cpp in the Parcels Framework APIs in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not validate the return value of the dup system call, which allows attackers to bypass an isolation protection mechanism via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28395952.
Commit Message: Correctly handle dup() failure in Parcel::readNativeHandle
bail out if dup() fails, instead of creating an invalid native_handle_t
Bug: 28395952
Change-Id: Ia1a6198c0f45165b9c6a55a803e5f64d8afa0572
|
Low
| 173,744
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int sgi_timer_set(struct k_itimer *timr, int flags,
struct itimerspec * new_setting,
struct itimerspec * old_setting)
{
unsigned long when, period, irqflags;
int err = 0;
cnodeid_t nodeid;
struct mmtimer *base;
struct rb_node *n;
if (old_setting)
sgi_timer_get(timr, old_setting);
sgi_timer_del(timr);
when = timespec_to_ns(new_setting->it_value);
period = timespec_to_ns(new_setting->it_interval);
if (when == 0)
/* Clear timer */
return 0;
base = kmalloc(sizeof(struct mmtimer), GFP_KERNEL);
if (base == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (flags & TIMER_ABSTIME) {
struct timespec n;
unsigned long now;
getnstimeofday(&n);
now = timespec_to_ns(n);
if (when > now)
when -= now;
else
/* Fire the timer immediately */
when = 0;
}
/*
* Convert to sgi clock period. Need to keep rtc_time() as near as possible
* to getnstimeofday() in order to be as faithful as possible to the time
* specified.
*/
when = (when + sgi_clock_period - 1) / sgi_clock_period + rtc_time();
period = (period + sgi_clock_period - 1) / sgi_clock_period;
/*
* We are allocating a local SHub comparator. If we would be moved to another
* cpu then another SHub may be local to us. Prohibit that by switching off
* preemption.
*/
preempt_disable();
nodeid = cpu_to_node(smp_processor_id());
/* Lock the node timer structure */
spin_lock_irqsave(&timers[nodeid].lock, irqflags);
base->timer = timr;
base->cpu = smp_processor_id();
timr->it.mmtimer.clock = TIMER_SET;
timr->it.mmtimer.node = nodeid;
timr->it.mmtimer.incr = period;
timr->it.mmtimer.expires = when;
n = timers[nodeid].next;
/* Add the new struct mmtimer to node's timer list */
mmtimer_add_list(base);
if (timers[nodeid].next == n) {
/* No need to reprogram comparator for now */
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timers[nodeid].lock, irqflags);
preempt_enable();
return err;
}
/* We need to reprogram the comparator */
if (n)
mmtimer_disable_int(cnodeid_to_nasid(nodeid), COMPARATOR);
mmtimer_set_next_timer(nodeid);
/* Unlock the node timer structure */
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timers[nodeid].lock, irqflags);
preempt_enable();
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The div_long_long_rem implementation in include/asm-x86/div64.h in the Linux kernel before 2.6.26 on the x86 platform allows local users to cause a denial of service (Divide Error Fault and panic) via a clock_gettime system call.
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,752
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int trigger_fpga_config(void)
{
int ret = 0;
/* if the FPGA is already configured, we do not want to
* reconfigure it */
skip = 0;
if (fpga_done()) {
printf("PCIe FPGA config: skipped\n");
skip = 1;
return 0;
}
if (check_boco2()) {
/* we have a BOCO2, this has to be triggered here */
/* make sure the FPGA_can access the EEPROM */
ret = boco_clear_bits(SPI_REG, CFG_EEPROM);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* trigger the config start */
ret = boco_clear_bits(SPI_REG, FPGA_PROG | FPGA_INIT_B);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* small delay for the pulse */
udelay(10);
/* up signal for pulse end */
ret = boco_set_bits(SPI_REG, FPGA_PROG);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* finally, raise INIT_B to remove the config delay */
ret = boco_set_bits(SPI_REG, FPGA_INIT_B);
if (ret)
return ret;
} else {
/* we do it the old way, with the gpio pin */
kw_gpio_set_valid(KM_XLX_PROGRAM_B_PIN, 1);
kw_gpio_direction_output(KM_XLX_PROGRAM_B_PIN, 0);
/* small delay for the pulse */
udelay(10);
kw_gpio_direction_input(KM_XLX_PROGRAM_B_PIN);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Das U-Boot versions 2016.09 through 2019.07-rc4 can memset() too much data while reading a crafted ext4 filesystem, which results in a stack buffer overflow and likely code execution.
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
|
Medium
| 169,627
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int parse_video_info(AVIOContext *pb, AVStream *st)
{
uint16_t size_asf; // ASF-specific Format Data size
uint32_t size_bmp; // BMP_HEADER-specific Format Data size
unsigned int tag;
st->codecpar->width = avio_rl32(pb);
st->codecpar->height = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, 1); // skip reserved flags
size_asf = avio_rl16(pb);
tag = ff_get_bmp_header(pb, st, &size_bmp);
st->codecpar->codec_tag = tag;
st->codecpar->codec_id = ff_codec_get_id(ff_codec_bmp_tags, tag);
size_bmp = FFMAX(size_asf, size_bmp);
if (size_bmp > BMP_HEADER_SIZE) {
int ret;
st->codecpar->extradata_size = size_bmp - BMP_HEADER_SIZE;
if (!(st->codecpar->extradata = av_malloc(st->codecpar->extradata_size +
AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE))) {
st->codecpar->extradata_size = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
memset(st->codecpar->extradata + st->codecpar->extradata_size , 0,
AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if ((ret = avio_read(pb, st->codecpar->extradata,
st->codecpar->extradata_size)) < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: FFmpeg before commit 2b46ebdbff1d8dec7a3d8ea280a612b91a582869 contains a Buffer Overflow vulnerability in asf_o format demuxer that can result in heap-buffer-overflow that may result in remote code execution. This attack appears to be exploitable via specially crafted ASF file that has to be provided as input to FFmpeg. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 2b46ebdbff1d8dec7a3d8ea280a612b91a582869 and later.
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
Medium
| 168,926
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void frag_kfree_skb(struct netns_frags *nf, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
atomic_sub(skb->truesize, &nf->mem);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: The ip6_frag_queue function in net/ipv6/reassembly.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.36 allows remote attackers to bypass intended network restrictions via overlapping IPv6 fragments.
Commit Message: ipv6: discard overlapping fragment
RFC5722 prohibits reassembling fragments when some data overlaps.
Bug spotted by Zhang Zuotao <zuotao.zhang@6wind.com>.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 165,538
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void PlatformSensorProviderWin::CreateSensorInternal(
mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (!StartSensorThread()) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
switch (type) {
case mojom::SensorType::LINEAR_ACCELERATION: {
auto linear_acceleration_fusion_algorithm = std::make_unique<
LinearAccelerationFusionAlgorithmUsingAccelerometer>();
PlatformSensorFusion::Create(
std::move(mapping), this,
std::move(linear_acceleration_fusion_algorithm), callback);
break;
}
default: {
base::PostTaskAndReplyWithResult(
sensor_thread_->task_runner().get(), FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&PlatformSensorProviderWin::CreateSensorReader,
base::Unretained(this), type),
base::Bind(&PlatformSensorProviderWin::SensorReaderCreated,
base::Unretained(this), type, base::Passed(&mapping),
callback));
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
Medium
| 172,847
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BrowserEventRouter::TabUpdated(WebContents* contents, bool did_navigate) {
TabEntry* entry = GetTabEntry(contents);
DictionaryValue* changed_properties = NULL;
DCHECK(entry);
if (did_navigate)
changed_properties = entry->DidNavigate(contents);
else
changed_properties = entry->UpdateLoadState(contents);
if (changed_properties)
DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(contents, changed_properties);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not ensure that an extension has the tabs (aka APIPermission::kTab) permission before providing a URL to this extension, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,452
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo *image_info,
const int argc,const char **argv,Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
ImageInfo
*mogrify_info;
MagickStatusType
status;
PixelInterpolateMethod
interpolate_method;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
index;
/*
Apply options to the image list.
*/
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(images != (Image **) NULL);
assert((*images)->previous == (Image *) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
(*images)->filename);
if ((argc <= 0) || (*argv == (char *) NULL))
return(MagickTrue);
interpolate_method=UndefinedInterpolatePixel;
mogrify_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(mogrify_info);
status=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) argc; i++)
{
if (*images == (Image *) NULL)
break;
option=argv[i];
if (IsCommandOption(option) == MagickFalse)
continue;
count=ParseCommandOption(MagickCommandOptions,MagickFalse,option);
count=MagickMax(count,0L);
if ((i+count) >= (ssize_t) argc)
break;
status=MogrifyImageInfo(mogrify_info,(int) count+1,argv+i,exception);
switch (*(option+1))
{
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare("affinity",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("append",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*append_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
append_image=AppendImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,exception);
if (append_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=append_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("average",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*average_image;
/*
Average an image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
average_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MeanEvaluateOperator,
exception);
if (average_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=average_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channel-fx",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*channel_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
channel_image=ChannelFxImage(*images,argv[i+1],exception);
if (channel_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=channel_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*clut_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
clut_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (clut_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) ClutImage(image,clut_image,interpolate_method,exception);
clut_image=DestroyImage(clut_image);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("coalesce",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*coalesce_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
coalesce_image=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (coalesce_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=coalesce_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("combine",option+1) == 0)
{
ColorspaceType
colorspace;
Image
*combine_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
colorspace=(*images)->colorspace;
if ((*images)->number_channels < GetImageListLength(*images))
colorspace=sRGBColorspace;
if (*option == '+')
colorspace=(ColorspaceType) ParseCommandOption(
MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
combine_image=CombineImages(*images,colorspace,exception);
if (combine_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=combine_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("compare",option+1) == 0)
{
double
distortion;
Image
*difference_image,
*image,
*reconstruct_image;
MetricType
metric;
/*
Mathematically and visually annotate the difference between an
image and its reconstruction.
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
reconstruct_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (reconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
metric=UndefinedErrorMetric;
option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"metric");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
difference_image=CompareImages(image,reconstruct_image,metric,
&distortion,exception);
if (difference_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
reconstruct_image=DestroyImage(reconstruct_image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=difference_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("complex",option+1) == 0)
{
ComplexOperator
op;
Image
*complex_images;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
op=(ComplexOperator) ParseCommandOption(MagickComplexOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
complex_images=ComplexImages(*images,op,exception);
if (complex_images == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=complex_images;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("composite",option+1) == 0)
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
const char*
value;
MagickBooleanType
clip_to_self;
Image
*mask_image,
*new_images,
*source_image;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/* Compose value from "-compose" option only */
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose");
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
compose=OverCompositeOp; /* use Over not source_image->compose */
else
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
/* Get "clip-to-self" expert setting (false is normal) */
clip_to_self=GetCompositeClipToSelf(compose);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose:clip-to-self");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
clip_to_self=IsStringTrue(value);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose:outside-overlay");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
clip_to_self=IsStringFalse(value); /* deprecated */
new_images=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
source_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (source_image == (Image *) NULL)
break; /* FUTURE - produce Exception, rather than silent fail */
/* FUTURE: this should not be here! - should be part of -geometry */
if (source_image->geometry != (char *) NULL)
{
RectangleInfo
resize_geometry;
(void) ParseRegionGeometry(source_image,source_image->geometry,
&resize_geometry,exception);
if ((source_image->columns != resize_geometry.width) ||
(source_image->rows != resize_geometry.height))
{
Image
*resize_image;
resize_image=ResizeImage(source_image,resize_geometry.width,
resize_geometry.height,source_image->filter,exception);
if (resize_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
source_image=DestroyImage(source_image);
source_image=resize_image;
}
}
}
SetGeometry(source_image,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(source_image->geometry,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(new_images->columns,new_images->rows,
new_images->gravity,&geometry);
mask_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (mask_image == (Image *) NULL)
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
else
{
if ((compose == DisplaceCompositeOp) ||
(compose == DistortCompositeOp))
{
status&=CompositeImage(source_image,mask_image,
CopyGreenCompositeOp,MagickTrue,0,0,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
}
else
{
Image
*clone_image;
clone_image=CloneImage(new_images,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,mask_image,
CopyAlphaCompositeOp,MagickTrue,0,0,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(clone_image,new_images,
OverCompositeOp,clip_to_self,0,0,exception);
new_images=DestroyImageList(new_images);
new_images=clone_image;
}
mask_image=DestroyImage(mask_image);
}
source_image=DestroyImage(source_image);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=new_images;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("copy",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*source_image;
OffsetInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Copy image pixels.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
(void) ParsePageGeometry(*images,argv[i+2],&geometry,exception);
offset.x=geometry.x;
offset.y=geometry.y;
source_image=(*images);
if (source_image->next != (Image *) NULL)
source_image=source_image->next;
(void) ParsePageGeometry(source_image,argv[i+1],&geometry,
exception);
status=CopyImagePixels(*images,source_image,&geometry,&offset,
exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("deconstruct",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*deconstruct_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
deconstruct_image=CompareImagesLayers(*images,CompareAnyLayer,
exception);
if (deconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=deconstruct_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("delete",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
DeleteImages(images,"-1",exception);
else
DeleteImages(images,argv[i+1],exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("dither",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
{
quantize_info->dither_method=NoDitherMethod;
break;
}
quantize_info->dither_method=(DitherMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickDitherOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("duplicate",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*duplicate_images;
if (*option == '+')
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,1,"-1",exception);
else
{
const char
*p;
size_t
number_duplicates;
number_duplicates=(size_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=strchr(argv[i+1],',');
if (p == (const char *) NULL)
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,
"-1",exception);
else
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,p,
exception);
}
AppendImageToList(images, duplicate_images);
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare("evaluate-sequence",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*evaluate_image;
MagickEvaluateOperator
op;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
op=(MagickEvaluateOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickEvaluateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
evaluate_image=EvaluateImages(*images,op,exception);
if (evaluate_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=evaluate_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare("fft",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image;
/*
Implements the discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
fourier_image=ForwardFourierTransformImage(*images,*option == '-' ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("flatten",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*flatten_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
flatten_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,FlattenLayer,exception);
if (flatten_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=flatten_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("fx",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fx_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
fx_image=FxImage(*images,argv[i+1],exception);
if (fx_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fx_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("hald-clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*hald_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
hald_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (hald_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) HaldClutImage(image,hald_image,exception);
hald_image=DestroyImage(hald_image);
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("ift",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image,
*magnitude_image,
*phase_image;
/*
Implements the inverse fourier discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
magnitude_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
phase_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (phase_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
fourier_image=InverseFourierTransformImage(magnitude_image,
phase_image,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("insert",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q;
index=0;
if (*option != '+')
index=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=RemoveLastImageFromList(images);
if (p == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
q=p;
if (index == 0)
PrependImageToList(images,q);
else
if (index == (ssize_t) GetImageListLength(*images))
AppendImageToList(images,q);
else
{
q=GetImageFromList(*images,index-1);
if (q == (Image *) NULL)
{
p=DestroyImage(p);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InsertImageInList(&q,p);
}
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("interpolate",option+1) == 0)
{
interpolate_method=(PixelInterpolateMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickInterpolateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("layers",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*layers;
LayerMethod
method;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
layers=(Image *) NULL;
method=(LayerMethod) ParseCommandOption(MagickLayerOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
switch (method)
{
case CoalesceLayer:
{
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case CompareAnyLayer:
case CompareClearLayer:
case CompareOverlayLayer:
default:
{
layers=CompareImagesLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case MergeLayer:
case FlattenLayer:
case MosaicLayer:
case TrimBoundsLayer:
{
layers=MergeImageLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case DisposeLayer:
{
layers=DisposeImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeImageLayer:
{
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizePlusLayer:
{
layers=OptimizePlusImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeTransLayer:
{
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveDupsLayer:
{
RemoveDuplicateLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveZeroLayer:
{
RemoveZeroDelayLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeLayer:
{
/*
General Purpose, GIF Animation Optimizer.
*/
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=(Image *) NULL;
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
case CompositeLayer:
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
Image
*source;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Split image sequence at the first 'NULL:' image.
*/
source=(*images);
while (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
source=GetNextImageInList(source);
if ((source != (Image *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(source->magick,"NULL") == 0))
break;
}
if (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL) ||
(GetNextImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL))
source=(Image *) NULL;
else
{
/*
Separate the two lists, junk the null: image.
*/
source=SplitImageList(source->previous);
DeleteImageFromList(&source);
}
}
if (source == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"MissingNullSeparator","layers Composite");
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
/*
Adjust offset with gravity and virtual canvas.
*/
SetGeometry(*images,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry((*images)->geometry,&geometry);
geometry.width=source->page.width != 0 ?
source->page.width : source->columns;
geometry.height=source->page.height != 0 ?
source->page.height : source->rows;
GravityAdjustGeometry((*images)->page.width != 0 ?
(*images)->page.width : (*images)->columns,
(*images)->page.height != 0 ? (*images)->page.height :
(*images)->rows,(*images)->gravity,&geometry);
compose=OverCompositeOp;
option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,option);
CompositeLayers(*images,compose,source,geometry.x,geometry.y,
exception);
source=DestroyImageList(source);
break;
}
}
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare("map",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("maximum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*maximum_image;
/*
Maximum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
maximum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MaxEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (maximum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=maximum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("minimum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*minimum_image;
/*
Minimum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
minimum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MinEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (minimum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=minimum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("morph",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*morph_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
morph_image=MorphImages(*images,StringToUnsignedLong(argv[i+1]),
exception);
if (morph_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=morph_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("mosaic",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*mosaic_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
mosaic_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,MosaicLayer,exception);
if (mosaic_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=mosaic_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("poly",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*args,
token[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*p;
double
*arguments;
Image
*polynomial_image;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
number_arguments;
/*
Polynomial image.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
args=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1],
exception);
if (args == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; *p != '\0'; x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
}
number_arguments=(size_t) x;
arguments=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_arguments,
sizeof(*arguments));
if (arguments == (double *) NULL)
ThrowWandFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed",(*images)->filename);
(void) memset(arguments,0,number_arguments*
sizeof(*arguments));
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; (x < (ssize_t) number_arguments) && (*p != '\0'); x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
arguments[x]=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
}
args=DestroyString(args);
polynomial_image=PolynomialImage(*images,number_arguments >> 1,
arguments,exception);
arguments=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
if (polynomial_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=polynomial_image;
}
if (LocaleCompare("print",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*string;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
string=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1],
exception);
if (string == (char *) NULL)
break;
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%s",string);
string=DestroyString(string);
}
if (LocaleCompare("process",option+1) == 0)
{
char
**arguments;
int
j,
number_arguments;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
arguments=StringToArgv(argv[i+1],&number_arguments);
if (arguments == (char **) NULL)
break;
if ((argc > 1) && (strchr(arguments[1],'=') != (char *) NULL))
{
char
breaker,
quote,
*token;
const char
*argument;
int
next,
token_status;
size_t
length;
TokenInfo
*token_info;
/*
Support old style syntax, filter="-option arg".
*/
length=strlen(argv[i+1]);
token=(char *) NULL;
if (~length >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
token=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*token));
if (token == (char *) NULL)
break;
next=0;
argument=argv[i+1];
token_info=AcquireTokenInfo();
token_status=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,length,argument,"",
"=","\"",'\0',&breaker,&next,"e);
token_info=DestroyTokenInfo(token_info);
if (token_status == 0)
{
const char
*arg;
arg=(&(argument[next]));
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(token,&(*images),1,&arg,
exception);
}
token=DestroyString(token);
break;
}
(void) SubstituteString(&arguments[1],"-","");
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(arguments[1],&(*images),
number_arguments-2,(const char **) arguments+2,exception);
for (j=0; j < number_arguments; j++)
arguments[j]=DestroyString(arguments[j]);
arguments=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("reverse",option+1) == 0)
{
ReverseImageList(images);
break;
}
break;
}
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare("smush",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*smush_image;
ssize_t
offset;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
offset=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
smush_image=SmushImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,offset,exception);
if (smush_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=smush_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("swap",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q,
*u,
*v;
ssize_t
swap_index;
index=(-1);
swap_index=(-2);
if (*option != '+')
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
swap_index=(-1);
flags=ParseGeometry(argv[i+1],&geometry_info);
index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
swap_index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma;
}
p=GetImageFromList(*images,index);
q=GetImageFromList(*images,swap_index);
if ((p == (Image *) NULL) || (q == (Image *) NULL))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",(*images)->filename);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (p == q)
break;
u=CloneImage(p,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (u == (Image *) NULL)
break;
v=CloneImage(q,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (v == (Image *) NULL)
{
u=DestroyImage(u);
break;
}
ReplaceImageInList(&p,v);
ReplaceImageInList(&q,u);
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("write",option+1) == 0)
{
char
key[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*write_images;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MagickPathExtent,"cache:%s",
argv[i+1]);
(void) DeleteImageRegistry(key);
write_images=(*images);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=CloneImageList(*images,exception);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=WriteImages(write_info,write_images,argv[i+1],exception);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=DestroyImageList(write_images);
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
i+=count;
}
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
mogrify_info=DestroyImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=MogrifyImageInfo(image_info,argc,argv,exception);
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks at AcquireMagickMemory because of a wand/mogrify.c error.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1623
|
Medium
| 170,195
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DictionaryValue* ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
const WebContents* contents,
TabStripModel* tab_strip,
int tab_index,
IncludePrivacySensitiveFields include_privacy_sensitive_fields) {
if (!tab_strip)
ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabStripModel(contents, &tab_strip, &tab_index);
DictionaryValue* result = new DictionaryValue();
bool is_loading = contents->IsLoading();
result->SetInteger(keys::kIdKey, GetTabId(contents));
result->SetInteger(keys::kIndexKey, tab_index);
result->SetInteger(keys::kWindowIdKey, GetWindowIdOfTab(contents));
result->SetString(keys::kStatusKey, GetTabStatusText(is_loading));
result->SetBoolean(keys::kActiveKey,
tab_strip && tab_index == tab_strip->active_index());
result->SetBoolean(keys::kSelectedKey,
tab_strip && tab_index == tab_strip->active_index());
result->SetBoolean(keys::kHighlightedKey,
tab_strip && tab_strip->IsTabSelected(tab_index));
result->SetBoolean(keys::kPinnedKey,
tab_strip && tab_strip->IsTabPinned(tab_index));
result->SetBoolean(keys::kIncognitoKey,
contents->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord());
if (include_privacy_sensitive_fields == INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS) {
result->SetString(keys::kUrlKey, contents->GetURL().spec());
result->SetString(keys::kTitleKey, contents->GetTitle());
if (!is_loading) {
NavigationEntry* entry = contents->GetController().GetActiveEntry();
if (entry && entry->GetFavicon().valid)
result->SetString(keys::kFaviconUrlKey, entry->GetFavicon().url.spec());
}
}
if (tab_strip) {
WebContents* opener = tab_strip->GetOpenerOfWebContentsAt(tab_index);
if (opener)
result->SetInteger(keys::kOpenerTabIdKey, GetTabId(opener));
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not ensure that an extension has the tabs (aka APIPermission::kTab) permission before providing a URL to this extension, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,455
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
unsigned long cs;
int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &ctxt->_eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
if (ctxt->op_bytes == 4)
ctxt->_eip = (u32)ctxt->_eip;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &cs, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
/* Outer-privilege level return is not implemented */
if (ctxt->mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 && (cs & 3) > cpl)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
rc = load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, (u16)cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during loading the new RIP, we are left in
unconsistent state. Therefore, this patch saves on 64-bit the old CS
descriptor and restores it if loading RIP failed.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
Low
| 166,340
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent()
{
if (!m_useFallbackContent)
return;
m_useFallbackContent = false;
reattachFallbackContent();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-361
Summary: The ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent function in WebKit/Source/core/html/forms/ImageInputType.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.87, does not properly maintain the user agent shadow DOM, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent should recreate UA shadow tree.
Once the fallback shadow tree was created, it was never recreated even if
ensurePrimaryContent was called. Such situation happens by updating |src|
attribute.
BUG=589838
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1732753004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#377804}
|
Medium
| 172,285
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: krb5_encode_krbsecretkey(krb5_key_data *key_data_in, int n_key_data,
krb5_kvno mkvno) {
struct berval **ret = NULL;
int currkvno;
int num_versions = 1;
int i, j, last;
krb5_error_code err = 0;
krb5_key_data *key_data;
if (n_key_data <= 0)
return NULL;
/* Make a shallow copy of the key data so we can alter it. */
key_data = k5calloc(n_key_data, sizeof(*key_data), &err);
if (key_data_in == NULL)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(key_data, key_data_in, n_key_data * sizeof(*key_data));
/* Unpatched krb5 1.11 and 1.12 cannot decode KrbKey sequences with no salt
* field. For compatibility, always encode a salt field. */
for (i = 0; i < n_key_data; i++) {
if (key_data[i].key_data_ver == 1) {
key_data[i].key_data_ver = 2;
key_data[i].key_data_type[1] = KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL;
key_data[i].key_data_length[1] = 0;
key_data[i].key_data_contents[1] = NULL;
}
}
/* Find the number of key versions */
for (i = 0; i < n_key_data - 1; i++)
if (key_data[i].key_data_kvno != key_data[i + 1].key_data_kvno)
num_versions++;
ret = (struct berval **) calloc (num_versions + 1, sizeof (struct berval *));
if (ret == NULL) {
err = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0, last = 0, j = 0, currkvno = key_data[0].key_data_kvno; i < n_key_data; i++) {
krb5_data *code;
if (i == n_key_data - 1 || key_data[i + 1].key_data_kvno != currkvno) {
ret[j] = k5alloc(sizeof(struct berval), &err);
if (ret[j] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
err = asn1_encode_sequence_of_keys(key_data + last,
(krb5_int16)i - last + 1,
mkvno, &code);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
/*CHECK_NULL(ret[j]); */
ret[j]->bv_len = code->length;
ret[j]->bv_val = code->data;
free(code);
j++;
last = i + 1;
if (i < n_key_data - 1)
currkvno = key_data[i + 1].key_data_kvno;
}
}
ret[num_versions] = NULL;
cleanup:
free(key_data);
if (err != 0) {
if (ret != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i <= num_versions; i++)
if (ret[i] != NULL)
free (ret[i]);
free (ret);
ret = NULL;
}
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_principal2.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.12.x and 1.13.x before 1.13.1, when the KDC uses LDAP, allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) by creating a database entry for a keyless principal, as demonstrated by a kadmin *add_principal -nokey* or *purgekeys -all* command.
Commit Message: Support keyless principals in LDAP [CVE-2014-5354]
Operations like "kadmin -q 'addprinc -nokey foo'" or
"kadmin -q 'purgekeys -all foo'" result in principal entries with
no keys present, so krb5_encode_krbsecretkey() would just return
NULL, which then got unconditionally dereferenced in
krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod().
Apply some fixes to krb5_encode_krbsecretkey() to handle zero-key
principals better, correct the test for an allocation failure, and
slightly restructure the cleanup handler to be shorter and more
appropriate for the usage. Once it no longer short-circuits when
n_key_data is zero, it will produce an array of length two with both
entries NULL, which is treated as an empty list by the LDAP library,
the correct behavior for a keyless principal.
However, attributes with empty values are only handled by the LDAP
library for Modify operations, not Add operations (which only get
a sequence of Attribute, with no operation field). Therefore, only
add an empty krbprincipalkey to the modlist when we will be performing a
Modify, and not when we will be performing an Add, which is conditional
on the (misspelled) create_standalone_prinicipal boolean.
CVE-2014-5354:
In MIT krb5, when kadmind is configured to use LDAP for the KDC
database, an authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL
dereference by inserting into the database a principal entry which
contains no long-term keys.
In order for the LDAP KDC backend to translate a principal entry
from the database abstraction layer into the form expected by the
LDAP schema, the principal's keys are encoded into a
NULL-terminated array of length-value entries to be stored in the
LDAP database. However, the subroutine which produced this array
did not correctly handle the case where no keys were present,
returning NULL instead of an empty array, and the array was
unconditionally dereferenced while adding to the list of LDAP
operations to perform.
Versions of MIT krb5 prior to 1.12 did not expose a way for
principal entries to have no long-term key material, and
therefore are not vulnerable.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8041 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.13.1
subject: kadmind with ldap backend crashes when putting keyless entries
|
Medium
| 166,272
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: MediaRecorder::MediaRecorder(const String16& opPackageName) : mSurfaceMediaSource(NULL)
{
ALOGV("constructor");
const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& service(getMediaPlayerService());
if (service != NULL) {
mMediaRecorder = service->createMediaRecorder(opPackageName);
}
if (mMediaRecorder != NULL) {
mCurrentState = MEDIA_RECORDER_IDLE;
}
doCleanUp();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libmedia in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 has certain incorrect declarations, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference or memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28166152.
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
|
Low
| 173,540
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: TestOpenCallback()
: callback_(
base::Bind(&TestOpenCallback::SetResult, base::Unretained(this))) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 43.0.2357.65 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Update helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest for OnceCallback
Helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest.cc don't fit to OnceCallback
migration, as they are copied and passed to others.
This CL updates them to pass new callbacks for each use to avoid the
copy of callbacks.
Bug: 714018
Change-Id: Ifb70901439ae92b6b049b84534283c39ebc40ee0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/527549
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478549}
|
Low
| 171,976
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: unsigned int get_random_int(void)
{
struct keydata *keyptr;
__u32 *hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
int ret;
keyptr = get_keyptr();
hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + get_cycles();
ret = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) IPv4 and (2) IPv6 implementations in the Linux kernel before 3.1 use a modified MD4 algorithm to generate sequence numbers and Fragment Identification values, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) or hijack network sessions by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 165,761
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item;
item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (item)
{
/* Check if epoch is current. */
if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
{
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
return(0);
dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
}
}
/* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
* have been processed */
s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
return(1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Memory leak in the dtls1_buffer_record function in d1_pkt.c in OpenSSL 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by sending many duplicate records for the next epoch, leading to failure of replay detection.
Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
|
Low
| 166,747
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PS_SERIALIZER_DECODE_FUNC(php) /* {{{ */
{
const char *p, *q;
char *name;
const char *endptr = val + vallen;
zval *current;
int namelen;
int has_value;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
p = val;
while (p < endptr) {
zval **tmp;
q = p;
while (*q != PS_DELIMITER) {
if (++q >= endptr) goto break_outer_loop;
}
if (p[0] == PS_UNDEF_MARKER) {
p++;
has_value = 0;
} else {
has_value = 1;
}
namelen = q - p;
name = estrndup(p, namelen);
q++;
if (zend_hash_find(&EG(symbol_table), name, namelen + 1, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
if ((Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_ARRAY && Z_ARRVAL_PP(tmp) == &EG(symbol_table)) || *tmp == PS(http_session_vars)) {
goto skip;
}
}
if (has_value) {
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(current);
if (php_var_unserialize(¤t, (const unsigned char **) &q, (const unsigned char *) endptr, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_set_session_var(name, namelen, current, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
efree(name);
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return FAILURE;
}
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
}
PS_ADD_VARL(name, namelen);
skip:
efree(name);
p = q;
}
break_outer_loop:
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-74
Summary: ext/session/session.c in PHP before 5.6.25 and 7.x before 7.0.10 skips invalid session names in a way that triggers incorrect parsing, which allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary-type session data by leveraging control of a session name, as demonstrated by object injection.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72681 - consume data even if we're not storing them
|
Low
| 166,959
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
WORD32 num_mb_skip,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc,
WORD32 prev_slice_err)
{
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2;
UWORD32 u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 i2_mb_skip_run;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD32 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD16 u2_total_mbs_coded;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info;
WORD32 ret;
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return 0;
}
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_long_term_reference_flag = 0;
if(prev_slice_err == 1)
{
/* first slice - missing/header corruption */
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
if(!ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
ih264d_end_of_pic(ps_dec, u1_is_idr_slice,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc.u2_frame_num =
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
}
{
WORD32 i, j, poc = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = 0;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic != NULL)
poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc + 2;
j = 0;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS; i++)
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].u1_is_valid == TRUE)
j = i;
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = 1;
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, poc, ps_cur_poc,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->ps_pps[j]);
if(ret != OK)
{
return ret;
}
}
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][0]->u1_pic_buf_id = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
}
else
{
dec_slice_struct_t *ps_parse_cur_slice;
ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf + ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done
&& ps_parse_cur_slice == ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice)
{
u1_num_mbs = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs - 1;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info - 1;
}
else
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info
+ ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_prev_nmb - 1;
}
}
ps_dec->u2_mby = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity =
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst -= SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
if (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == P_SLICE
|| ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next)
&& (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = 1;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 1;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
return 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf
+ ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
}
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations to new slice */
/******************************************************/
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MAX_FRAMES;
if((1 >= ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_num_ref_frames) &&
(0 == ps_dec->i4_display_delay))
{
num_entries = 1;
}
num_entries = ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
if(BASE_PROFILE_IDC != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_profile_idc)
{
num_entries *= 2;
}
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = (volatile void **)pu1_buf;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded << u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations specific to P slice */
/******************************************************/
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_pmb;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
/******************************************************/
/* Parsing / decoding the slice */
/******************************************************/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_slice_end = 0;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
u1_decode_nmb = 0;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
i2_cur_mb_addr = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
i2_mb_skip_run = num_mb_skip;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
break;
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/**************************************************************/
/* mb_x, mb_y, neighbor availablity, */
if (u1_mbaff)
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
else
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
{
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
}
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_mc_mode = PRED_16x16;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
/* Storing Skip partition info */
ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CAVLC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
i2_mb_skip_run--;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
if (u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
u1_num_mbs++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = !i2_mb_skip_run;
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbs_next,
u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Mbs in slice: %d\n", ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice);
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
/* incremented here only if first slice is inserted */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The H.264 decoder in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not initialize certain slice data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28165661.
Commit Message: Fix slice params for interlaced video
Bug: 28165661
Change-Id: I912a86bd78ebf0617fd2bc6eb2b5a61afc17bf53
|
Low
| 173,761
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xps_init_truetype_font(xps_context_t *ctx, xps_font_t *font)
{
int code = 0;
font->font = (void*) gs_alloc_struct(ctx->memory, gs_font_type42, &st_gs_font_type42, "xps_font type42");
if (!font->font)
return gs_throw(gs_error_VMerror, "out of memory");
/* no shortage of things to initialize */
{
gs_font_type42 *p42 = (gs_font_type42*) font->font;
/* Common to all fonts: */
p42->next = 0;
p42->prev = 0;
p42->memory = ctx->memory;
p42->dir = ctx->fontdir; /* NB also set by gs_definefont later */
p42->base = font->font; /* NB also set by gs_definefont later */
p42->is_resource = false;
gs_notify_init(&p42->notify_list, gs_memory_stable(ctx->memory));
p42->id = gs_next_ids(ctx->memory, 1);
p42->client_data = font; /* that's us */
/* this is overwritten in grid_fit() */
gs_make_identity(&p42->FontMatrix);
gs_make_identity(&p42->orig_FontMatrix); /* NB ... original or zeroes? */
p42->FontType = ft_TrueType;
p42->BitmapWidths = false;
p42->ExactSize = fbit_use_outlines;
p42->InBetweenSize = fbit_use_outlines;
p42->TransformedChar = fbit_use_outlines;
p42->WMode = 0;
p42->PaintType = 0;
p42->StrokeWidth = 0;
p42->is_cached = 0;
p42->procs.define_font = gs_no_define_font;
p42->procs.make_font = gs_no_make_font;
p42->procs.font_info = gs_type42_font_info;
p42->procs.same_font = gs_default_same_font;
p42->procs.encode_char = xps_true_callback_encode_char;
p42->procs.decode_glyph = xps_true_callback_decode_glyph;
p42->procs.enumerate_glyph = gs_type42_enumerate_glyph;
p42->procs.glyph_info = gs_type42_glyph_info;
p42->procs.glyph_outline = gs_type42_glyph_outline;
p42->procs.glyph_name = xps_true_callback_glyph_name;
p42->procs.init_fstack = gs_default_init_fstack;
p42->procs.next_char_glyph = gs_default_next_char_glyph;
p42->procs.build_char = xps_true_callback_build_char;
memset(p42->font_name.chars, 0, sizeof(p42->font_name.chars));
xps_load_sfnt_name(font, (char*)p42->font_name.chars);
p42->font_name.size = strlen((char*)p42->font_name.chars);
memset(p42->key_name.chars, 0, sizeof(p42->key_name.chars));
strcpy((char*)p42->key_name.chars, (char*)p42->font_name.chars);
p42->key_name.size = strlen((char*)p42->key_name.chars);
/* Base font specific: */
p42->FontBBox.p.x = 0;
p42->FontBBox.p.y = 0;
p42->FontBBox.q.x = 0;
p42->FontBBox.q.y = 0;
uid_set_UniqueID(&p42->UID, p42->id);
p42->encoding_index = ENCODING_INDEX_UNKNOWN;
p42->nearest_encoding_index = ENCODING_INDEX_ISOLATIN1;
p42->FAPI = 0;
p42->FAPI_font_data = 0;
/* Type 42 specific: */
p42->data.string_proc = xps_true_callback_string_proc;
p42->data.proc_data = font;
gs_type42_font_init(p42, font->subfontid);
p42->data.get_glyph_index = xps_true_get_glyph_index;
}
if ((code = gs_definefont(ctx->fontdir, font->font)) < 0) {
return(code);
}
code = xps_fapi_passfont (font->font, NULL, NULL, font->data, font->length);
return code;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The xps_load_sfnt_name function in xps/xpsfont.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,786
|
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