instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 93
3.53k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void FaviconSource::SendDefaultResponse(int request_id) {
if (!default_favicon_.get()) {
default_favicon_ =
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().LoadDataResourceBytes(
IDR_DEFAULT_FAVICON);
}
SendResponse(request_id, default_favicon_);
}
Commit Message: ntp4: show larger favicons in most visited page
extend favicon source to provide larger icons. For now, larger means at most 32x32. Also, the only icon we actually support at this resolution is the default (globe).
BUG=none
TEST=manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7300017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91517 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void FaviconSource::SendDefaultResponse(int request_id) {
RefCountedMemory* bytes = NULL;
if (request_size_map_[request_id] == 32) {
if (!default_favicon_large_.get()) {
default_favicon_large_ =
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().LoadDataResourceBytes(
IDR_DEFAULT_LARGE_FAVICON);
}
bytes = default_favicon_large_;
} else {
if (!default_favicon_.get()) {
default_favicon_ =
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().LoadDataResourceBytes(
IDR_DEFAULT_FAVICON);
}
bytes = default_favicon_;
}
request_size_map_.erase(request_id);
SendResponse(request_id, bytes);
}
| 170,367
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void InitializeOriginStatFromOriginRequestSummary(
OriginStat* origin,
const OriginRequestSummary& summary) {
origin->set_origin(summary.origin.spec());
origin->set_number_of_hits(1);
origin->set_average_position(summary.first_occurrence + 1);
origin->set_always_access_network(summary.always_access_network);
origin->set_accessed_network(summary.accessed_network);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
void InitializeOriginStatFromOriginRequestSummary(
OriginStat* origin,
const OriginRequestSummary& summary) {
origin->set_origin(summary.origin.GetURL().spec());
origin->set_number_of_hits(1);
origin->set_average_position(summary.first_occurrence + 1);
origin->set_always_access_network(summary.always_access_network);
origin->set_accessed_network(summary.accessed_network);
}
| 172,379
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: UserInitiatedInfo CreateUserInitiatedInfo(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle,
PageLoadTracker* committed_load) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsRendererInitiated())
return UserInitiatedInfo::BrowserInitiated();
return UserInitiatedInfo::RenderInitiated(
navigation_handle->HasUserGesture());
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79
|
UserInitiatedInfo CreateUserInitiatedInfo(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle,
PageLoadTracker* committed_load) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsRendererInitiated())
return UserInitiatedInfo::BrowserInitiated();
return UserInitiatedInfo::RenderInitiated(
navigation_handle->HasUserGesture(),
!navigation_handle->NavigationInputStart().is_null());
}
| 172,495
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int yr_re_ast_create(
RE_AST** re_ast)
{
*re_ast = (RE_AST*) yr_malloc(sizeof(RE_AST));
if (*re_ast == NULL)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
(*re_ast)->flags = 0;
(*re_ast)->root_node = NULL;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #674. Move regexp limits to limits.h.
CWE ID: CWE-674
|
int yr_re_ast_create(
RE_AST** re_ast)
{
*re_ast = (RE_AST*) yr_malloc(sizeof(RE_AST));
if (*re_ast == NULL)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
(*re_ast)->flags = 0;
(*re_ast)->levels = 0;
(*re_ast)->root_node = NULL;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
| 168,102
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: explicit RemoveDownloadsTester(TestingProfile* testing_profile)
: download_manager_(new content::MockDownloadManager()),
chrome_download_manager_delegate_(testing_profile) {
content::BrowserContext::SetDownloadManagerForTesting(
testing_profile, base::WrapUnique(download_manager_));
EXPECT_EQ(download_manager_,
content::BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(testing_profile));
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_, GetDelegate())
.WillOnce(Return(&chrome_download_manager_delegate_));
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_, Shutdown());
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
explicit RemoveDownloadsTester(TestingProfile* testing_profile)
: download_manager_(new content::MockDownloadManager()) {
content::BrowserContext::SetDownloadManagerForTesting(
testing_profile, base::WrapUnique(download_manager_));
std::unique_ptr<ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate> delegate =
std::make_unique<ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate>(testing_profile);
chrome_download_manager_delegate_ = delegate.get();
service_ =
DownloadCoreServiceFactory::GetForBrowserContext(testing_profile);
service_->SetDownloadManagerDelegateForTesting(std::move(delegate));
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_, GetBrowserContext())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(testing_profile));
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_, Shutdown());
}
| 173,167
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void red_channel_pipes_add_type(RedChannel *channel, int pipe_item_type)
{
RingItem *link;
RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) {
red_channel_client_pipe_add_type(
SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link),
pipe_item_type);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void red_channel_pipes_add_type(RedChannel *channel, int pipe_item_type)
{
RingItem *link, *next;
RING_FOREACH_SAFE(link, next, &channel->clients) {
red_channel_client_pipe_add_type(
SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link),
pipe_item_type);
}
}
| 164,664
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Response StorageHandler::UntrackCacheStorageForOrigin(
const std::string& origin) {
if (!process_)
return Response::InternalError();
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid())
return Response::InvalidParams(origin + " is not a valid URL");
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CacheStorageObserver::UntrackOriginOnIOThread,
base::Unretained(GetCacheStorageObserver()),
url::Origin::Create(origin_url)));
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
Response StorageHandler::UntrackCacheStorageForOrigin(
const std::string& origin) {
if (!storage_partition_)
return Response::InternalError();
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid())
return Response::InvalidParams(origin + " is not a valid URL");
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CacheStorageObserver::UntrackOriginOnIOThread,
base::Unretained(GetCacheStorageObserver()),
url::Origin::Create(origin_url)));
return Response::OK();
}
| 172,778
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static SCSIRequest *scsi_new_request(SCSIDevice *d, uint32_t tag,
uint32_t lun, void *hba_private)
{
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, d);
SCSIRequest *req;
SCSIDiskReq *r;
req = scsi_req_alloc(&scsi_disk_reqops, &s->qdev, tag, lun, hba_private);
r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
r->iov.iov_base = qemu_blockalign(s->bs, SCSI_DMA_BUF_SIZE);
return req;
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static SCSIRequest *scsi_new_request(SCSIDevice *d, uint32_t tag,
uint32_t lun, void *hba_private)
{
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, d);
SCSIRequest *req;
req = scsi_req_alloc(&scsi_disk_reqops, &s->qdev, tag, lun, hba_private);
return req;
}
| 166,555
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::RetainOriginalSkImage() {
DCHECK(texture_holder_->IsSkiaTextureHolder());
original_skia_image_ = texture_holder_->GetSkImage();
original_skia_image_context_provider_wrapper_ = ContextProviderWrapper();
DCHECK(original_skia_image_);
Thread* thread = Platform::Current()->CurrentThread();
original_skia_image_thread_id_ = thread->ThreadId();
original_skia_image_task_runner_ = thread->GetTaskRunner();
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::RetainOriginalSkImage() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(texture_holder_->IsSkiaTextureHolder());
original_skia_image_ = texture_holder_->GetSkImage();
original_skia_image_context_provider_wrapper_ = ContextProviderWrapper();
DCHECK(original_skia_image_);
Thread* thread = Platform::Current()->CurrentThread();
original_skia_image_task_runner_ = thread->GetTaskRunner();
}
| 172,597
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: struct vfsmount *collect_mounts(struct path *path)
{
struct mount *tree;
namespace_lock();
tree = copy_tree(real_mount(path->mnt), path->dentry,
CL_COPY_ALL | CL_PRIVATE);
namespace_unlock();
if (IS_ERR(tree))
return ERR_CAST(tree);
return &tree->mnt;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Fail collect_mounts when applied to unmounted mounts
The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c
In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into
collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree
pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path. In those cases
collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and
if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts
it is reasonable to fail early.
The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path
check. But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with
the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears
reasonable.
Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit
unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts
that appear in the mount tree.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID:
|
struct vfsmount *collect_mounts(struct path *path)
{
struct mount *tree;
namespace_lock();
if (!check_mnt(real_mount(path->mnt)))
tree = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
else
tree = copy_tree(real_mount(path->mnt), path->dentry,
CL_COPY_ALL | CL_PRIVATE);
namespace_unlock();
if (IS_ERR(tree))
return ERR_CAST(tree);
return &tree->mnt;
}
| 167,563
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void nfs4_close_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata = data;
struct nfs4_state *state = calldata->state;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(calldata->inode);
if (RPC_ASSASSINATED(task))
return;
/* hmm. we are done with the inode, and in the process of freeing
* the state_owner. we keep this around to process errors
*/
switch (task->tk_status) {
case 0:
nfs_set_open_stateid(state, &calldata->res.stateid, 0);
renew_lease(server, calldata->timestamp);
break;
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
if (calldata->arg.open_flags == 0)
break;
default:
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, server, state) == -EAGAIN) {
rpc_restart_call(task);
return;
}
}
nfs_refresh_inode(calldata->inode, calldata->res.fattr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
|
static void nfs4_close_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata = data;
struct nfs4_state *state = calldata->state;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(calldata->inode);
if (RPC_ASSASSINATED(task))
return;
/* hmm. we are done with the inode, and in the process of freeing
* the state_owner. we keep this around to process errors
*/
switch (task->tk_status) {
case 0:
nfs_set_open_stateid(state, &calldata->res.stateid, 0);
renew_lease(server, calldata->timestamp);
break;
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
if (calldata->arg.fmode == 0)
break;
default:
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, server, state) == -EAGAIN) {
rpc_restart_call(task);
return;
}
}
nfs_refresh_inode(calldata->inode, calldata->res.fattr);
}
| 165,689
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: parse_object(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
{
/*
* an object is a possibly empty sequence of object fields, separated by
* commas and surrounded by curly braces.
*/
json_struct_action ostart = sem->object_start;
json_struct_action oend = sem->object_end;
JsonTokenType tok;
if (ostart != NULL)
(*ostart) (sem->semstate);
* itself. Note that we increment this after we call the semantic routine
* for the object start and restore it before we call the routine for the
* object end.
*/
lex->lex_level++;
/* we know this will succeeed, just clearing the token */
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_OBJECT_START, lex, JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_START);
tok = lex_peek(lex);
switch (tok)
{
case JSON_TOKEN_STRING:
parse_object_field(lex, sem);
while (lex_accept(lex, JSON_TOKEN_COMMA, NULL))
parse_object_field(lex, sem);
break;
case JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_END:
break;
default:
/* case of an invalid initial token inside the object */
report_parse_error(JSON_PARSE_OBJECT_START, lex);
}
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_OBJECT_NEXT, lex, JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_END);
lex->lex_level--;
if (oend != NULL)
(*oend) (sem->semstate);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
parse_object(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
{
/*
* an object is a possibly empty sequence of object fields, separated by
* commas and surrounded by curly braces.
*/
json_struct_action ostart = sem->object_start;
json_struct_action oend = sem->object_end;
JsonTokenType tok;
check_stack_depth();
if (ostart != NULL)
(*ostart) (sem->semstate);
* itself. Note that we increment this after we call the semantic routine
* for the object start and restore it before we call the routine for the
* object end.
*/
lex->lex_level++;
/* we know this will succeeed, just clearing the token */
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_OBJECT_START, lex, JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_START);
tok = lex_peek(lex);
switch (tok)
{
case JSON_TOKEN_STRING:
parse_object_field(lex, sem);
while (lex_accept(lex, JSON_TOKEN_COMMA, NULL))
parse_object_field(lex, sem);
break;
case JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_END:
break;
default:
/* case of an invalid initial token inside the object */
report_parse_error(JSON_PARSE_OBJECT_START, lex);
}
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_OBJECT_NEXT, lex, JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_END);
lex->lex_level--;
if (oend != NULL)
(*oend) (sem->semstate);
}
| 164,680
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: DefragVlanTest(void)
{
Packet *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL, *r = NULL;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
p1 = BuildTestPacket(1, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
if (p1 == NULL)
goto end;
p2 = BuildTestPacket(1, 1, 0, 'B', 8);
if (p2 == NULL)
goto end;
/* With no VLAN IDs set, packets should re-assemble. */
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL)) == NULL)
goto end;
SCFree(r);
/* With mismatched VLANs, packets should not re-assemble. */
p1->vlan_id[0] = 1;
p2->vlan_id[0] = 2;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
/* Pass. */
ret = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL)
SCFree(p1);
if (p2 != NULL)
SCFree(p2);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
|
DefragVlanTest(void)
{
Packet *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL, *r = NULL;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
p1 = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, 1, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
if (p1 == NULL)
goto end;
p2 = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, 1, 1, 0, 'B', 8);
if (p2 == NULL)
goto end;
/* With no VLAN IDs set, packets should re-assemble. */
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL)) == NULL)
goto end;
SCFree(r);
/* With mismatched VLANs, packets should not re-assemble. */
p1->vlan_id[0] = 1;
p2->vlan_id[0] = 2;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
/* Pass. */
ret = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL)
SCFree(p1);
if (p2 != NULL)
SCFree(p2);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
| 168,306
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void send(node_t *node, node_t *child, byte *fout) {
if (node->parent) {
send(node->parent, node, fout);
}
if (child) {
if (node->right == child) {
add_bit(1, fout);
} else {
add_bit(0, fout);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void send(node_t *node, node_t *child, byte *fout) {
static void send(node_t *node, node_t *child, byte *fout, int maxoffset) {
if (node->parent) {
send(node->parent, node, fout, maxoffset);
}
if (child) {
if (bloc >= maxoffset) {
bloc = maxoffset + 1;
return;
}
if (node->right == child) {
add_bit(1, fout);
} else {
add_bit(0, fout);
}
}
}
| 167,997
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Block::Lacing Block::GetLacing() const
{
const int value = int(m_flags & 0x06) >> 1;
return static_cast<Lacing>(value);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
Block::Lacing Block::GetLacing() const
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, len, buf);
return status;
}
| 174,335
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void scsi_write_complete(void * opaque, int ret)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = (SCSIDiskReq *)opaque;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
uint32_t len;
uint32_t n;
if (r->req.aiocb != NULL) {
r->req.aiocb = NULL;
bdrv_acct_done(s->bs, &r->acct);
}
if (ret) {
if (scsi_handle_rw_error(r, -ret, SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_WRITE)) {
return;
}
}
n = r->iov.iov_len / 512;
r->sector += n;
r->sector_count -= n;
if (r->sector_count == 0) {
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
} else {
len = r->sector_count * 512;
if (len > SCSI_DMA_BUF_SIZE) {
len = SCSI_DMA_BUF_SIZE;
}
r->iov.iov_len = len;
DPRINTF("Write complete tag=0x%x more=%d\n", r->req.tag, len);
scsi_req_data(&r->req, len);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: commonize iovec creation between reads and writes
Also, consistently use qiov.size instead of iov.iov_len.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void scsi_write_complete(void * opaque, int ret)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = (SCSIDiskReq *)opaque;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
uint32_t n;
if (r->req.aiocb != NULL) {
r->req.aiocb = NULL;
bdrv_acct_done(s->bs, &r->acct);
}
if (ret) {
if (scsi_handle_rw_error(r, -ret, SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_WRITE)) {
return;
}
}
n = r->qiov.size / 512;
r->sector += n;
r->sector_count -= n;
if (r->sector_count == 0) {
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
} else {
scsi_init_iovec(r);
DPRINTF("Write complete tag=0x%x more=%d\n", r->req.tag, r->qiov.size);
scsi_req_data(&r->req, r->qiov.size);
}
}
| 169,922
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: magic_setparam(struct magic_set *ms, int param, const void *val)
{
switch (param) {
case MAGIC_PARAM_INDIR_MAX:
ms->indir_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_NAME_MAX:
ms->name_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_PHNUM_MAX:
ms->elf_phnum_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_SHNUM_MAX:
ms->elf_shnum_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
default:
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
magic_setparam(struct magic_set *ms, int param, const void *val)
{
switch (param) {
case MAGIC_PARAM_INDIR_MAX:
ms->indir_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_NAME_MAX:
ms->name_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_PHNUM_MAX:
ms->elf_phnum_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_SHNUM_MAX:
ms->elf_shnum_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_NOTES_MAX:
ms->elf_notes_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
default:
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
}
| 166,775
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GKI_delay(UINT32 timeout_ms) {
struct timespec delay;
delay.tv_sec = timeout_ms / 1000;
delay.tv_nsec = 1000 * 1000 * (timeout_ms % 1000);
int err;
do {
err = nanosleep(&delay, &delay);
} while (err == -1 && errno == EINTR);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
void GKI_delay(UINT32 timeout_ms) {
struct timespec delay;
delay.tv_sec = timeout_ms / 1000;
delay.tv_nsec = 1000 * 1000 * (timeout_ms % 1000);
int err;
do {
err = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(nanosleep(&delay, &delay));
} while (err == -1 && errno == EINTR);
}
| 173,471
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: method_invocation_get_uid (GDBusMethodInvocation *context)
{
const gchar *sender;
PolkitSubject *busname;
PolkitSubject *process;
uid_t uid;
sender = g_dbus_method_invocation_get_sender (context);
busname = polkit_system_bus_name_new (sender);
process = polkit_system_bus_name_get_process_sync (POLKIT_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (busname), NULL, NULL);
uid = polkit_unix_process_get_uid (POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (process));
g_object_unref (busname);
g_object_unref (process);
return uid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
method_invocation_get_uid (GDBusMethodInvocation *context)
| 165,010
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: HeadlessWebContentsImpl::HeadlessWebContentsImpl(
content::WebContents* web_contents,
HeadlessBrowserContextImpl* browser_context)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
web_contents_delegate_(new HeadlessWebContentsImpl::Delegate(this)),
web_contents_(web_contents),
agent_host_(content::DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(web_contents)),
inject_mojo_services_into_isolated_world_(false),
browser_context_(browser_context),
render_process_host_(web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_BASIC_PRINTING) && !defined(CHROME_MULTIPLE_DLL_CHILD)
HeadlessPrintManager::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
//// TODO(weili): Add support for printing OOPIFs.
#endif
web_contents->GetMutableRendererPrefs()->accept_languages =
browser_context->options()->accept_language();
web_contents_->SetDelegate(web_contents_delegate_.get());
render_process_host_->AddObserver(this);
agent_host_->AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
HeadlessWebContentsImpl::HeadlessWebContentsImpl(
content::WebContents* web_contents,
HeadlessBrowserContextImpl* browser_context)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
web_contents_delegate_(new HeadlessWebContentsImpl::Delegate(this)),
web_contents_(web_contents),
agent_host_(content::DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(web_contents)),
inject_mojo_services_into_isolated_world_(false),
browser_context_(browser_context),
render_process_host_(web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_BASIC_PRINTING) && !defined(CHROME_MULTIPLE_DLL_CHILD)
HeadlessPrintManager::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
//// TODO(weili): Add support for printing OOPIFs.
#endif
web_contents->GetMutableRendererPrefs()->accept_languages =
browser_context->options()->accept_language();
web_contents_->SetDelegate(web_contents_delegate_.get());
render_process_host_->AddObserver(this);
agent_host_->AddObserver(this);
}
| 171,896
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline size_t GetPSDRowSize(Image *image)
{
if (image->depth == 1)
return((image->columns+7)/8);
else
return(image->columns*GetPSDPacketSize(image));
}
Commit Message: Fixed head buffer overflow reported in: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/98
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static inline size_t GetPSDRowSize(Image *image)
{
if (image->depth == 1)
return(((image->columns+7)/8)*GetPSDPacketSize(image));
else
return(image->columns*GetPSDPacketSize(image));
}
| 168,804
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg)
{
int nid;
long ret;
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
switch (cmd) {
case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
ret = p7->detached = (int)larg;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
os = p7->d.sign->contents->d.data;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
}
} else {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL,
PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE);
ret = 0;
}
break;
case PKCS7_OP_GET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
if (!p7->d.sign || !p7->d.sign->contents->d.ptr)
ret = 1;
else
ret = 0;
p7->detached = ret;
} else {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL,
PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE);
ret = 0;
}
break;
default:
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL, PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_OPERATION);
ret = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg)
{
int nid;
long ret;
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
switch (cmd) {
/* NOTE(emilia): does not support detached digested data. */
case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
ret = p7->detached = (int)larg;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
os = p7->d.sign->contents->d.data;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
}
} else {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL,
PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE);
ret = 0;
}
break;
case PKCS7_OP_GET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
if (!p7->d.sign || !p7->d.sign->contents->d.ptr)
ret = 1;
else
ret = 0;
p7->detached = ret;
} else {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL,
PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE);
ret = 0;
}
break;
default:
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL, PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_OPERATION);
ret = 0;
}
| 164,808
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: header_put_be_3byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 3)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
} ;
} /* header_put_be_3byte */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
header_put_be_3byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = x ;
} /* header_put_be_3byte */
| 170,048
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: base::string16 TranslateInfoBarDelegate::GetLanguageDisplayableName(
const std::string& language_code) {
return l10n_util::GetDisplayNameForLocale(
language_code, g_browser_process->GetApplicationLocale(), true);
}
Commit Message: Remove dependency of TranslateInfobarDelegate on profile
This CL uses TranslateTabHelper instead of Profile and also cleans up
some unused code and irrelevant dependencies.
BUG=371845
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/286973003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@270758 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
base::string16 TranslateInfoBarDelegate::GetLanguageDisplayableName(
| 171,173
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::Initialize(
const media::VideoCodecProfile profile,
IPC::Message* init_done_msg,
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process) {
DCHECK(!video_decode_accelerator_.get());
DCHECK(!init_done_msg_);
DCHECK(init_done_msg);
init_done_msg_ = init_done_msg;
#if (defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)) || defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(stub_ && stub_->decoder());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN7) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
DLOG(INFO) << "Initializing DXVA HW decoder for windows.";
DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator(this, renderer_process);
#else // OS_WIN
OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
video_decoder->SetEglState(
gfx::GLSurfaceEGL::GetHardwareDisplay(),
stub_->decoder()->GetGLContext()->GetHandle());
#endif // OS_WIN
video_decode_accelerator_ = video_decoder;
if (!video_decode_accelerator_->Initialize(profile))
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#else // Update RenderViewImpl::createMediaPlayer when adding clauses.
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::Initialize(
const media::VideoCodecProfile profile,
IPC::Message* init_done_msg) {
DCHECK(!video_decode_accelerator_.get());
DCHECK(!init_done_msg_);
DCHECK(init_done_msg);
init_done_msg_ = init_done_msg;
#if (defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)) || defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(stub_ && stub_->decoder());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN7) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
DLOG(INFO) << "Initializing DXVA HW decoder for windows.";
DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
#else // OS_WIN
OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
video_decoder->SetEglState(
gfx::GLSurfaceEGL::GetHardwareDisplay(),
stub_->decoder()->GetGLContext()->GetHandle());
#endif // OS_WIN
video_decode_accelerator_ = video_decoder;
if (!video_decode_accelerator_->Initialize(profile))
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#else // Update RenderViewImpl::createMediaPlayer when adding clauses.
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)
}
| 170,942
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CoordinatorImpl::UnregisterClientProcess(
mojom::ClientProcess* client_process) {
QueuedRequest* request = GetCurrentRequest();
if (request != nullptr) {
auto it = request->pending_responses.begin();
while (it != request->pending_responses.end()) {
std::set<QueuedRequest::PendingResponse>::iterator current = it++;
if (current->client != client_process)
continue;
RemovePendingResponse(client_process, current->type);
request->failed_memory_dump_count++;
}
FinalizeGlobalMemoryDumpIfAllManagersReplied();
}
for (auto& pair : in_progress_vm_region_requests_) {
QueuedVmRegionRequest* request = pair.second.get();
auto it = request->pending_responses.begin();
while (it != request->pending_responses.end()) {
auto current = it++;
if (*current == client_process) {
request->pending_responses.erase(current);
}
}
}
for (auto& pair : in_progress_vm_region_requests_) {
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&CoordinatorImpl::FinalizeVmRegionDumpIfAllManagersReplied,
base::Unretained(this), pair.second->dump_guid));
}
size_t num_deleted = clients_.erase(client_process);
DCHECK(num_deleted == 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void CoordinatorImpl::UnregisterClientProcess(
mojom::ClientProcess* client_process) {
QueuedRequest* request = GetCurrentRequest();
if (request != nullptr) {
auto it = request->pending_responses.begin();
while (it != request->pending_responses.end()) {
std::set<QueuedRequest::PendingResponse>::iterator current = it++;
if (current->client != client_process)
continue;
RemovePendingResponse(client_process, current->type);
request->failed_memory_dump_count++;
}
FinalizeGlobalMemoryDumpIfAllManagersReplied();
}
for (auto& pair : in_progress_vm_region_requests_) {
QueuedVmRegionRequest* request = pair.second.get();
auto it = request->pending_responses.begin();
while (it != request->pending_responses.end()) {
auto current = it++;
if (*current == client_process) {
request->pending_responses.erase(current);
}
}
}
for (auto& pair : in_progress_vm_region_requests_) {
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&CoordinatorImpl::FinalizeVmRegionDumpIfAllManagersReplied,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), pair.second->dump_guid));
}
size_t num_deleted = clients_.erase(client_process);
DCHECK(num_deleted == 1);
}
| 173,216
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_get_iv_size)
{
char *cipher;
char *module;
int cipher_len, module_len;
char *cipher_dir_string;
char *module_dir_string;
MCRYPT td;
MCRYPT_GET_INI
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss",
&cipher, &cipher_len, &module, &module_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
td = mcrypt_module_open(cipher, cipher_dir_string, module, module_dir_string);
if (td != MCRYPT_FAILED) {
RETVAL_LONG(mcrypt_enc_get_iv_size(td));
mcrypt_module_close(td);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, MCRYPT_OPEN_MODULE_FAILED);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_get_iv_size)
{
char *cipher;
char *module;
int cipher_len, module_len;
char *cipher_dir_string;
char *module_dir_string;
MCRYPT td;
MCRYPT_GET_INI
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss",
&cipher, &cipher_len, &module, &module_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
td = mcrypt_module_open(cipher, cipher_dir_string, module, module_dir_string);
if (td != MCRYPT_FAILED) {
RETVAL_LONG(mcrypt_enc_get_iv_size(td));
mcrypt_module_close(td);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, MCRYPT_OPEN_MODULE_FAILED);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| 167,105
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int yr_re_match(
RE* re,
const char* target)
{
return yr_re_exec(
re->code,
(uint8_t*) target,
strlen(target),
re->flags | RE_FLAGS_SCAN,
NULL,
NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #646 (#648)
* Fix issue #646 and some edge cases with wide regexps using \b and \B
* Rename function IS_WORD_CHAR to _yr_re_is_word_char
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
int yr_re_match(
RE* re,
const char* target)
{
return yr_re_exec(
re->code,
(uint8_t*) target,
strlen(target),
0,
re->flags | RE_FLAGS_SCAN,
NULL,
NULL);
}
| 168,203
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Chapters::Display::Init()
{
m_string = NULL;
m_language = NULL;
m_country = NULL;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void Chapters::Display::Init()
| 174,388
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: file_check_mem(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned int level)
{
size_t len;
if (level >= ms->c.len) {
len = (ms->c.len += 20) * sizeof(*ms->c.li);
ms->c.li = CAST(struct level_info *, (ms->c.li == NULL) ?
malloc(len) :
realloc(ms->c.li, len));
if (ms->c.li == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, len);
return -1;
}
}
ms->c.li[level].got_match = 0;
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
ms->c.li[level].last_match = 0;
ms->c.li[level].last_cond = COND_NONE;
#endif /* ENABLE_CONDITIONALS */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: PR/454: Fix memory corruption when the continuation level jumps by more than
20 in a single step.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
file_check_mem(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned int level)
{
size_t len;
if (level >= ms->c.len) {
len = (ms->c.len = 20 + level) * sizeof(*ms->c.li);
ms->c.li = CAST(struct level_info *, (ms->c.li == NULL) ?
malloc(len) :
realloc(ms->c.li, len));
if (ms->c.li == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, len);
return -1;
}
}
ms->c.li[level].got_match = 0;
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
ms->c.li[level].last_match = 0;
ms->c.li[level].last_cond = COND_NONE;
#endif /* ENABLE_CONDITIONALS */
return 0;
}
| 167,475
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int svc_rdma_init(void)
{
dprintk("SVCRDMA Module Init, register RPC RDMA transport\n");
dprintk("\tsvcrdma_ord : %d\n", svcrdma_ord);
dprintk("\tmax_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_requests);
dprintk("\tsq_depth : %u\n",
svcrdma_max_requests * RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT);
dprintk("\tmax_bc_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_bc_requests);
dprintk("\tmax_inline : %d\n", svcrdma_max_req_size);
svc_rdma_wq = alloc_workqueue("svc_rdma", 0, 0);
if (!svc_rdma_wq)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!svcrdma_table_header)
svcrdma_table_header =
register_sysctl_table(svcrdma_root_table);
/* Register RDMA with the SVC transport switch */
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_class);
#if defined(CONFIG_SUNRPC_BACKCHANNEL)
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_bc_class);
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
int svc_rdma_init(void)
{
dprintk("SVCRDMA Module Init, register RPC RDMA transport\n");
dprintk("\tsvcrdma_ord : %d\n", svcrdma_ord);
dprintk("\tmax_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_requests);
dprintk("\tmax_bc_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_bc_requests);
dprintk("\tmax_inline : %d\n", svcrdma_max_req_size);
svc_rdma_wq = alloc_workqueue("svc_rdma", 0, 0);
if (!svc_rdma_wq)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!svcrdma_table_header)
svcrdma_table_header =
register_sysctl_table(svcrdma_root_table);
/* Register RDMA with the SVC transport switch */
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_class);
#if defined(CONFIG_SUNRPC_BACKCHANNEL)
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_bc_class);
#endif
return 0;
}
| 168,156
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
{
char description[16];
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = &key_type_request_key_auth,
.index_key.description = description,
.cred = current_cred(),
.match_data.cmp = user_match,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
};
struct key *authkey;
key_ref_t authkey_ref;
sprintf(description, "%x", target_id);
authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
if (authkey == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN))
authkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
goto error;
}
authkey = key_ref_to_ptr(authkey_ref);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) {
key_put(authkey);
authkey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
}
error:
return authkey;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
{
char description[16];
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = &key_type_request_key_auth,
.index_key.description = description,
.cred = current_cred(),
.match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
};
struct key *authkey;
key_ref_t authkey_ref;
sprintf(description, "%x", target_id);
authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
if (authkey == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN))
authkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
goto error;
}
authkey = key_ref_to_ptr(authkey_ref);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) {
key_put(authkey);
authkey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
}
error:
return authkey;
}
| 168,442
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ChooserContextBase::GetGrantedObjects(const GURL& requesting_origin,
const GURL& embedding_origin) {
DCHECK_EQ(requesting_origin, requesting_origin.GetOrigin());
DCHECK_EQ(embedding_origin, embedding_origin.GetOrigin());
if (!CanRequestObjectPermission(requesting_origin, embedding_origin))
return {};
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<Object>> results;
auto* info = new content_settings::SettingInfo();
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> setting =
GetWebsiteSetting(requesting_origin, embedding_origin, info);
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> objects;
if (!setting->Remove(kObjectListKey, &objects))
return results;
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> object_list =
base::ListValue::From(std::move(objects));
if (!object_list)
return results;
for (auto& object : *object_list) {
base::DictionaryValue* object_dict;
if (object.GetAsDictionary(&object_dict) && IsValidObject(*object_dict)) {
results.push_back(std::make_unique<Object>(
requesting_origin, embedding_origin, object_dict, info->source,
host_content_settings_map_->is_incognito()));
}
}
return results;
}
Commit Message: Fix memory leak in ChooserContextBase::GetGrantedObjects.
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: Ia163d503a4207859cd41c847c9d5f67e77580fbc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1456080
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Marek Haranczyk <mharanczyk@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629919}
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
ChooserContextBase::GetGrantedObjects(const GURL& requesting_origin,
const GURL& embedding_origin) {
DCHECK_EQ(requesting_origin, requesting_origin.GetOrigin());
DCHECK_EQ(embedding_origin, embedding_origin.GetOrigin());
if (!CanRequestObjectPermission(requesting_origin, embedding_origin))
return {};
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<Object>> results;
content_settings::SettingInfo info;
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> setting =
GetWebsiteSetting(requesting_origin, embedding_origin, &info);
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> objects;
if (!setting->Remove(kObjectListKey, &objects))
return results;
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> object_list =
base::ListValue::From(std::move(objects));
if (!object_list)
return results;
for (auto& object : *object_list) {
base::DictionaryValue* object_dict;
if (object.GetAsDictionary(&object_dict) && IsValidObject(*object_dict)) {
results.push_back(std::make_unique<Object>(
requesting_origin, embedding_origin, object_dict, info.source,
host_content_settings_map_->is_incognito()));
}
}
return results;
}
| 172,055
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_palette_to_rgb(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_set(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_palette_to_rgb(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
| 173,640
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction UsbFindDevicesFunction::Run() {
scoped_ptr<extensions::core_api::usb::FindDevices::Params> parameters =
FindDevices::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(parameters.get());
vendor_id_ = parameters->options.vendor_id;
product_id_ = parameters->options.product_id;
interface_id_ = parameters->options.interface_id.get()
? *parameters->options.interface_id.get()
: UsbDevicePermissionData::ANY_INTERFACE;
UsbDevicePermission::CheckParam param(vendor_id_, product_id_, interface_id_);
if (!extension()->permissions_data()->CheckAPIPermissionWithParam(
APIPermission::kUsbDevice, ¶m)) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorPermissionDenied));
}
UsbService* service = device::DeviceClient::Get()->GetUsbService();
if (!service) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorInitService));
}
service->GetDevices(
base::Bind(&UsbFindDevicesFunction::OnGetDevicesComplete, this));
return RespondLater();
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction UsbFindDevicesFunction::Run() {
scoped_ptr<extensions::core_api::usb::FindDevices::Params> parameters =
FindDevices::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(parameters.get());
vendor_id_ = parameters->options.vendor_id;
product_id_ = parameters->options.product_id;
int interface_id = parameters->options.interface_id.get()
? *parameters->options.interface_id.get()
: UsbDevicePermissionData::ANY_INTERFACE;
UsbDevicePermission::CheckParam param(vendor_id_, product_id_, interface_id);
if (!extension()->permissions_data()->CheckAPIPermissionWithParam(
APIPermission::kUsbDevice, ¶m)) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorPermissionDenied));
}
UsbService* service = device::DeviceClient::Get()->GetUsbService();
if (!service) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorInitService));
}
service->GetDevices(
base::Bind(&UsbFindDevicesFunction::OnGetDevicesComplete, this));
return RespondLater();
}
| 171,704
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ScreenLockLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetScreenLockLibrary() {
return screen_lock_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
ScreenLockLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetScreenLockLibrary() {
| 170,629
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long mkvparser::UnserializeInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long size,
long long& result) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
assert(size > 0);
assert(size <= 8);
{
signed char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, (unsigned char*)&b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result = b;
++pos;
}
for (long i = 1; i < size; ++i) {
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
long mkvparser::UnserializeInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long size,
long UnserializeInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long long size,
long long& result_ref) {
if (!pReader || pos < 0 || size < 1 || size > 8)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
signed char first_byte = 0;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, (unsigned char*)&first_byte);
if (status < 0)
return status;
unsigned long long result = first_byte;
++pos;
for (long i = 1; i < size; ++i) {
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
result_ref = static_cast<long long>(result);
return 0;
}
| 173,866
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void FaviconWebUIHandler::HandleGetFaviconDominantColor(const ListValue* args) {
std::string path;
CHECK(args->GetString(0, &path));
DCHECK(StartsWithASCII(path, "chrome://favicon/", false)) << "path is "
<< path;
path = path.substr(arraysize("chrome://favicon/") - 1);
double id;
CHECK(args->GetDouble(1, &id));
FaviconService* favicon_service =
web_ui_->GetProfile()->GetFaviconService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (!favicon_service || path.empty())
return;
FaviconService::Handle handle = favicon_service->GetFaviconForURL(
GURL(path),
history::FAVICON,
&consumer_,
NewCallback(this, &FaviconWebUIHandler::OnFaviconDataAvailable));
consumer_.SetClientData(favicon_service, handle, static_cast<int>(id));
}
Commit Message: ntp4: show larger favicons in most visited page
extend favicon source to provide larger icons. For now, larger means at most 32x32. Also, the only icon we actually support at this resolution is the default (globe).
BUG=none
TEST=manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7300017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91517 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void FaviconWebUIHandler::HandleGetFaviconDominantColor(const ListValue* args) {
std::string path;
CHECK(args->GetString(0, &path));
DCHECK(StartsWithASCII(path, "chrome://favicon/size/32/", false)) <<
"path is " << path;
path = path.substr(arraysize("chrome://favicon/size/32/") - 1);
double id;
CHECK(args->GetDouble(1, &id));
FaviconService* favicon_service =
web_ui_->GetProfile()->GetFaviconService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (!favicon_service || path.empty())
return;
FaviconService::Handle handle = favicon_service->GetFaviconForURL(
GURL(path),
history::FAVICON,
&consumer_,
NewCallback(this, &FaviconWebUIHandler::OnFaviconDataAvailable));
consumer_.SetClientData(favicon_service, handle, static_cast<int>(id));
}
| 170,369
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BITMAP_UPDATE* update_read_bitmap_update(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s)
{
UINT32 i;
BITMAP_UPDATE* bitmapUpdate = calloc(1, sizeof(BITMAP_UPDATE));
if (!bitmapUpdate)
goto fail;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 2)
goto fail;
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapUpdate->number); /* numberRectangles (2 bytes) */
WLog_Print(update->log, WLOG_TRACE, "BitmapUpdate: %"PRIu32"", bitmapUpdate->number);
if (bitmapUpdate->number > bitmapUpdate->count)
{
UINT16 count;
BITMAP_DATA* newdata;
count = bitmapUpdate->number * 2;
newdata = (BITMAP_DATA*) realloc(bitmapUpdate->rectangles,
sizeof(BITMAP_DATA) * count);
if (!newdata)
goto fail;
bitmapUpdate->rectangles = newdata;
ZeroMemory(&bitmapUpdate->rectangles[bitmapUpdate->count],
sizeof(BITMAP_DATA) * (count - bitmapUpdate->count));
bitmapUpdate->count = count;
}
/* rectangles */
for (i = 0; i < bitmapUpdate->number; i++)
{
if (!update_read_bitmap_data(update, s, &bitmapUpdate->rectangles[i]))
goto fail;
}
return bitmapUpdate;
fail:
free_bitmap_update(update->context, bitmapUpdate);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
BITMAP_UPDATE* update_read_bitmap_update(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s)
{
UINT32 i;
BITMAP_UPDATE* bitmapUpdate = calloc(1, sizeof(BITMAP_UPDATE));
if (!bitmapUpdate)
goto fail;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 2)
goto fail;
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapUpdate->number); /* numberRectangles (2 bytes) */
WLog_Print(update->log, WLOG_TRACE, "BitmapUpdate: %"PRIu32"", bitmapUpdate->number);
if (bitmapUpdate->number > bitmapUpdate->count)
{
UINT32 count = bitmapUpdate->number * 2;
BITMAP_DATA* newdata = (BITMAP_DATA*) realloc(bitmapUpdate->rectangles,
sizeof(BITMAP_DATA) * count);
if (!newdata)
goto fail;
bitmapUpdate->rectangles = newdata;
ZeroMemory(&bitmapUpdate->rectangles[bitmapUpdate->count],
sizeof(BITMAP_DATA) * (count - bitmapUpdate->count));
bitmapUpdate->count = count;
}
/* rectangles */
for (i = 0; i < bitmapUpdate->number; i++)
{
if (!update_read_bitmap_data(update, s, &bitmapUpdate->rectangles[i]))
goto fail;
}
return bitmapUpdate;
fail:
free_bitmap_update(update->context, bitmapUpdate);
return NULL;
}
| 169,293
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void mp_decode_to_lua_array(lua_State *L, mp_cur *c, size_t len) {
assert(len <= UINT_MAX);
int index = 1;
lua_newtable(L);
while(len--) {
lua_pushnumber(L,index++);
mp_decode_to_lua_type(L,c);
if (c->err) return;
lua_settable(L,-3);
}
}
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void mp_decode_to_lua_array(lua_State *L, mp_cur *c, size_t len) {
assert(len <= UINT_MAX);
int index = 1;
lua_newtable(L);
luaL_checkstack(L, 1, "in function mp_decode_to_lua_array");
while(len--) {
lua_pushnumber(L,index++);
mp_decode_to_lua_type(L,c);
if (c->err) return;
lua_settable(L,-3);
}
}
| 169,238
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ChromeNetworkDelegate::AccumulateContentLength(
int64 received_content_length, int64 original_content_length,
bool via_data_reduction_proxy) {
DCHECK_GE(received_content_length, 0);
DCHECK_GE(original_content_length, 0);
StoreAccumulatedContentLength(received_content_length,
original_content_length,
via_data_reduction_proxy);
received_content_length_ += received_content_length;
original_content_length_ += original_content_length;
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void ChromeNetworkDelegate::AccumulateContentLength(
int64 received_content_length, int64 original_content_length,
chrome_browser_net::DataReductionRequestType data_reduction_type) {
DCHECK_GE(received_content_length, 0);
DCHECK_GE(original_content_length, 0);
StoreAccumulatedContentLength(received_content_length,
original_content_length,
data_reduction_type);
received_content_length_ += received_content_length;
original_content_length_ += original_content_length;
}
| 171,331
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int blk_rq_map_user_iov(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq,
struct rq_map_data *map_data,
const struct iov_iter *iter, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
bool copy = false;
unsigned long align = q->dma_pad_mask | queue_dma_alignment(q);
struct bio *bio = NULL;
struct iov_iter i;
int ret;
if (map_data)
copy = true;
else if (iov_iter_alignment(iter) & align)
copy = true;
else if (queue_virt_boundary(q))
copy = queue_virt_boundary(q) & iov_iter_gap_alignment(iter);
i = *iter;
do {
ret =__blk_rq_map_user_iov(rq, map_data, &i, gfp_mask, copy);
if (ret)
goto unmap_rq;
if (!bio)
bio = rq->bio;
} while (iov_iter_count(&i));
if (!bio_flagged(bio, BIO_USER_MAPPED))
rq->cmd_flags |= REQ_COPY_USER;
return 0;
unmap_rq:
__blk_rq_unmap_user(bio);
rq->bio = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: Don't feed anything but regular iovec's to blk_rq_map_user_iov
In theory we could map other things, but there's a reason that function
is called "user_iov". Using anything else (like splice can do) just
confuses it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
int blk_rq_map_user_iov(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq,
struct rq_map_data *map_data,
const struct iov_iter *iter, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
bool copy = false;
unsigned long align = q->dma_pad_mask | queue_dma_alignment(q);
struct bio *bio = NULL;
struct iov_iter i;
int ret;
if (!iter_is_iovec(iter))
goto fail;
if (map_data)
copy = true;
else if (iov_iter_alignment(iter) & align)
copy = true;
else if (queue_virt_boundary(q))
copy = queue_virt_boundary(q) & iov_iter_gap_alignment(iter);
i = *iter;
do {
ret =__blk_rq_map_user_iov(rq, map_data, &i, gfp_mask, copy);
if (ret)
goto unmap_rq;
if (!bio)
bio = rq->bio;
} while (iov_iter_count(&i));
if (!bio_flagged(bio, BIO_USER_MAPPED))
rq->cmd_flags |= REQ_COPY_USER;
return 0;
unmap_rq:
__blk_rq_unmap_user(bio);
fail:
rq->bio = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
| 166,858
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ThreadHeap::WriteBarrier(void* value) {
DCHECK(thread_state_->IsIncrementalMarking());
DCHECK(value);
DCHECK_NE(value, reinterpret_cast<void*>(-1));
BasePage* const page = PageFromObject(value);
HeapObjectHeader* const header =
page->IsLargeObjectPage()
? static_cast<LargeObjectPage*>(page)->GetHeapObjectHeader()
: static_cast<NormalPage*>(page)->FindHeaderFromAddress(
reinterpret_cast<Address>(const_cast<void*>(value)));
if (header->IsMarked())
return;
header->Mark();
marking_worklist_->Push(
WorklistTaskId::MainThread,
{header->Payload(), ThreadHeap::GcInfo(header->GcInfoIndex())->trace_});
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void ThreadHeap::WriteBarrier(void* value) {
DCHECK(thread_state_->IsIncrementalMarking());
DCHECK(value);
DCHECK_NE(value, reinterpret_cast<void*>(-1));
BasePage* const page = PageFromObject(value);
HeapObjectHeader* const header =
page->IsLargeObjectPage()
? static_cast<LargeObjectPage*>(page)->GetHeapObjectHeader()
: static_cast<NormalPage*>(page)->FindHeaderFromAddress(
reinterpret_cast<Address>(const_cast<void*>(value)));
if (header->IsMarked())
return;
header->Mark();
marking_worklist_->Push(
WorklistTaskId::MainThread,
{header->Payload(),
GCInfoTable::Get().GCInfoFromIndex(header->GcInfoIndex())->trace_});
}
| 173,138
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void MostVisitedSitesBridge::SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& j_observer,
jint num_sites) {
java_observer_.reset(new JavaObserver(env, j_observer));
most_visited_->SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(java_observer_.get(), num_sites);
}
Commit Message: Rename MostVisitedSites.MostVisitedURLsObserver to Observer.
BUG=677672
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2697543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#449958}
CWE ID: CWE-17
|
void MostVisitedSitesBridge::SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(
void MostVisitedSitesBridge::SetObserver(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& j_observer,
jint num_sites) {
java_observer_.reset(new JavaObserver(env, j_observer));
most_visited_->SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(java_observer_.get(), num_sites);
}
| 172,036
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateFloat( double num )
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item();
if ( item ) {
item->type = cJSON_Number;
item->valuefloat = num;
item->valueint = num;
}
return item;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
cJSON *cJSON_CreateFloat( double num )
| 167,272
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidProceedOnInterstitial() {
DCHECK(!(ShowingInterstitialPage() &&
GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page()->pause_throbber()));
if (ShowingInterstitialPage() && frame_tree_.IsLoading())
LoadingStateChanged(true, true, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void WebContentsImpl::DidProceedOnInterstitial() {
DCHECK(!(ShowingInterstitialPage() && interstitial_page_->pause_throbber()));
if (ShowingInterstitialPage() && frame_tree_.IsLoading())
LoadingStateChanged(true, true, nullptr);
}
| 172,326
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: WebsiteSettings* website_settings() {
if (!website_settings_.get()) {
website_settings_.reset(new WebsiteSettings(
mock_ui(), profile(), tab_specific_content_settings(),
infobar_service(), url(), ssl(), cert_store()));
}
return website_settings_.get();
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID:
|
WebsiteSettings* website_settings() {
if (!website_settings_.get()) {
website_settings_.reset(new WebsiteSettings(
mock_ui(), profile(), tab_specific_content_settings(),
web_contents(), url(), ssl(), cert_store()));
}
return website_settings_.get();
}
| 171,782
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int nfs_readlink_reply(unsigned char *pkt, unsigned len)
{
uint32_t *data;
char *path;
int rlen;
int ret;
ret = rpc_check_reply(pkt, 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
data = (uint32_t *)(pkt + sizeof(struct rpc_reply));
data++;
rlen = ntohl(net_read_uint32(data)); /* new path length */
data++;
path = (char *)data;
} else {
memcpy(nfs_path, path, rlen);
nfs_path[rlen] = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int nfs_readlink_reply(unsigned char *pkt, unsigned len)
{
uint32_t *data;
char *path;
unsigned int rlen;
int ret;
ret = rpc_check_reply(pkt, 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
data = (uint32_t *)(pkt + sizeof(struct rpc_reply));
data++;
rlen = ntohl(net_read_uint32(data)); /* new path length */
rlen = max_t(unsigned int, rlen,
len - sizeof(struct rpc_reply) - sizeof(uint32_t));
data++;
path = (char *)data;
} else {
memcpy(nfs_path, path, rlen);
nfs_path[rlen] = 0;
}
| 164,625
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: aiff_read_chanmap (SF_PRIVATE * psf, unsigned dword)
{ const AIFF_CAF_CHANNEL_MAP * map_info ;
unsigned channel_bitmap, channel_decriptions, bytesread ;
int layout_tag ;
bytesread = psf_binheader_readf (psf, "444", &layout_tag, &channel_bitmap, &channel_decriptions) ;
if ((map_info = aiff_caf_of_channel_layout_tag (layout_tag)) == NULL)
return 0 ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " Tag : %x\n", layout_tag) ;
if (map_info)
psf_log_printf (psf, " Layout : %s\n", map_info->name) ;
if (bytesread < dword)
psf_binheader_readf (psf, "j", dword - bytesread) ;
if (map_info->channel_map != NULL)
{ size_t chanmap_size = psf->sf.channels * sizeof (psf->channel_map [0]) ;
free (psf->channel_map) ;
if ((psf->channel_map = malloc (chanmap_size)) == NULL)
return SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
memcpy (psf->channel_map, map_info->channel_map, chanmap_size) ;
} ;
return 0 ;
} /* aiff_read_chanmap */
Commit Message: src/aiff.c: Fix a buffer read overflow
Secunia Advisory SA76717.
Found by: Laurent Delosieres, Secunia Research at Flexera Software
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
aiff_read_chanmap (SF_PRIVATE * psf, unsigned dword)
{ const AIFF_CAF_CHANNEL_MAP * map_info ;
unsigned channel_bitmap, channel_decriptions, bytesread ;
int layout_tag ;
bytesread = psf_binheader_readf (psf, "444", &layout_tag, &channel_bitmap, &channel_decriptions) ;
if ((map_info = aiff_caf_of_channel_layout_tag (layout_tag)) == NULL)
return 0 ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " Tag : %x\n", layout_tag) ;
if (map_info)
psf_log_printf (psf, " Layout : %s\n", map_info->name) ;
if (bytesread < dword)
psf_binheader_readf (psf, "j", dword - bytesread) ;
if (map_info->channel_map != NULL)
{ size_t chanmap_size = SF_MIN (psf->sf.channels, layout_tag & 0xffff) * sizeof (psf->channel_map [0]) ;
free (psf->channel_map) ;
if ((psf->channel_map = malloc (chanmap_size)) == NULL)
return SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
memcpy (psf->channel_map, map_info->channel_map, chanmap_size) ;
} ;
return 0 ;
} /* aiff_read_chanmap */
| 168,312
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnUnregisterAgentError(
const std::string& error_name,
const std::string& error_message) {
LOG(WARNING) << object_path_.value() << ": Failed to unregister agent: "
<< error_name << ": " << error_message;
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnUnregisterAgentError(
| 171,231
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const SeekHead* Segment::GetSeekHead() const
{
return m_pSeekHead;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const SeekHead* Segment::GetSeekHead() const
| 174,353
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool NormalPageArena::shrinkObject(HeapObjectHeader* header, size_t newSize) {
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
ASSERT(header->payloadSize() > newSize);
size_t allocationSize = ThreadHeap::allocationSizeFromSize(newSize);
ASSERT(header->size() > allocationSize);
size_t shrinkSize = header->size() - allocationSize;
if (isObjectAllocatedAtAllocationPoint(header)) {
m_currentAllocationPoint -= shrinkSize;
setRemainingAllocationSize(m_remainingAllocationSize + shrinkSize);
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(m_currentAllocationPoint, shrinkSize);
header->setSize(allocationSize);
return true;
}
ASSERT(shrinkSize >= sizeof(HeapObjectHeader));
ASSERT(header->gcInfoIndex() > 0);
Address shrinkAddress = header->payloadEnd() - shrinkSize;
HeapObjectHeader* freedHeader = new (NotNull, shrinkAddress)
HeapObjectHeader(shrinkSize, header->gcInfoIndex());
freedHeader->markPromptlyFreed();
ASSERT(pageFromObject(reinterpret_cast<Address>(header)) ==
findPageFromAddress(reinterpret_cast<Address>(header)));
m_promptlyFreedSize += shrinkSize;
header->setSize(allocationSize);
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(shrinkAddress + sizeof(HeapObjectHeader),
shrinkSize - sizeof(HeapObjectHeader));
return false;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool NormalPageArena::shrinkObject(HeapObjectHeader* header, size_t newSize) {
header->checkHeader();
ASSERT(header->payloadSize() > newSize);
size_t allocationSize = ThreadHeap::allocationSizeFromSize(newSize);
ASSERT(header->size() > allocationSize);
size_t shrinkSize = header->size() - allocationSize;
if (isObjectAllocatedAtAllocationPoint(header)) {
m_currentAllocationPoint -= shrinkSize;
setRemainingAllocationSize(m_remainingAllocationSize + shrinkSize);
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(m_currentAllocationPoint, shrinkSize);
header->setSize(allocationSize);
return true;
}
ASSERT(shrinkSize >= sizeof(HeapObjectHeader));
ASSERT(header->gcInfoIndex() > 0);
Address shrinkAddress = header->payloadEnd() - shrinkSize;
HeapObjectHeader* freedHeader = new (NotNull, shrinkAddress)
HeapObjectHeader(shrinkSize, header->gcInfoIndex());
freedHeader->markPromptlyFreed();
ASSERT(pageFromObject(reinterpret_cast<Address>(header)) ==
findPageFromAddress(reinterpret_cast<Address>(header)));
m_promptlyFreedSize += shrinkSize;
header->setSize(allocationSize);
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(shrinkAddress + sizeof(HeapObjectHeader),
shrinkSize - sizeof(HeapObjectHeader));
return false;
}
| 172,715
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void br_mdb_notify(struct net_device *dev, struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct br_ip *group, int type)
{
struct br_mdb_entry entry;
entry.ifindex = port->dev->ifindex;
entry.addr.proto = group->proto;
entry.addr.u.ip4 = group->u.ip4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
entry.addr.u.ip6 = group->u.ip6;
#endif
__br_mdb_notify(dev, &entry, type);
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix mdb info leaks
The bridging code discloses heap and stack bytes via the RTM_GETMDB
netlink interface and via the notify messages send to group RTNLGRP_MDB
afer a successful add/del.
Fix both cases by initializing all unset members/padding bytes with
memset(0).
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void br_mdb_notify(struct net_device *dev, struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct br_ip *group, int type)
{
struct br_mdb_entry entry;
memset(&entry, 0, sizeof(entry));
entry.ifindex = port->dev->ifindex;
entry.addr.proto = group->proto;
entry.addr.u.ip4 = group->u.ip4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
entry.addr.u.ip6 = group->u.ip6;
#endif
__br_mdb_notify(dev, &entry, type);
}
| 166,054
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: RenderFrameObserverNatives::RenderFrameObserverNatives(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context), weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction(
"OnDocumentElementCreated",
base::Bind(&RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
RenderFrameObserverNatives::RenderFrameObserverNatives(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context), weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction(
"OnDocumentElementCreated", "app.window",
base::Bind(&RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,252
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(RecursiveDirectoryIterator, getChildren)
{
zval *zpath, *zflags;
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object *subdir;
char slash = SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS) ? '/' : DEFAULT_SLASH;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(zflags);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(zpath);
ZVAL_LONG(zflags, intern->flags);
ZVAL_STRINGL(zpath, intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
spl_instantiate_arg_ex2(Z_OBJCE_P(getThis()), &return_value, 0, zpath, zflags TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zpath);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zflags);
subdir = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(return_value TSRMLS_CC);
if (subdir) {
if (intern->u.dir.sub_path && intern->u.dir.sub_path[0]) {
subdir->u.dir.sub_path_len = spprintf(&subdir->u.dir.sub_path, 0, "%s%c%s", intern->u.dir.sub_path, slash, intern->u.dir.entry.d_name);
} else {
subdir->u.dir.sub_path_len = strlen(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name);
subdir->u.dir.sub_path = estrndup(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, subdir->u.dir.sub_path_len);
}
subdir->info_class = intern->info_class;
subdir->file_class = intern->file_class;
subdir->oth = intern->oth;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SPL_METHOD(RecursiveDirectoryIterator, getChildren)
{
zval *zpath, *zflags;
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object *subdir;
char slash = SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_UNIXPATHS) ? '/' : DEFAULT_SLASH;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(zflags);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(zpath);
ZVAL_LONG(zflags, intern->flags);
ZVAL_STRINGL(zpath, intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
spl_instantiate_arg_ex2(Z_OBJCE_P(getThis()), &return_value, 0, zpath, zflags TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zpath);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zflags);
subdir = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(return_value TSRMLS_CC);
if (subdir) {
if (intern->u.dir.sub_path && intern->u.dir.sub_path[0]) {
subdir->u.dir.sub_path_len = spprintf(&subdir->u.dir.sub_path, 0, "%s%c%s", intern->u.dir.sub_path, slash, intern->u.dir.entry.d_name);
} else {
subdir->u.dir.sub_path_len = strlen(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name);
subdir->u.dir.sub_path = estrndup(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, subdir->u.dir.sub_path_len);
}
subdir->info_class = intern->info_class;
subdir->file_class = intern->file_class;
subdir->oth = intern->oth;
}
}
| 167,045
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ChromeOSCancelHandwriting(InputMethodStatusConnection* connection,
int n_strokes) {
g_return_if_fail(connection);
connection->CancelHandwriting(n_strokes);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void ChromeOSCancelHandwriting(InputMethodStatusConnection* connection,
IBusController::~IBusController() {
}
| 170,520
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SelectionEditor::NodeChildrenWillBeRemoved(ContainerNode& container) {
if (selection_.IsNone())
return;
const Position old_base = selection_.base_;
const Position old_extent = selection_.extent_;
const Position& new_base =
ComputePositionForChildrenRemoval(old_base, container);
const Position& new_extent =
ComputePositionForChildrenRemoval(old_extent, container);
if (new_base == old_base && new_extent == old_extent)
return;
selection_ = SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(new_base, new_extent)
.SetIsHandleVisible(selection_.IsHandleVisible())
.Build();
MarkCacheDirty();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void SelectionEditor::NodeChildrenWillBeRemoved(ContainerNode& container) {
if (selection_.IsNone())
return;
const Position old_base = selection_.base_;
const Position old_extent = selection_.extent_;
const Position& new_base =
ComputePositionForChildrenRemoval(old_base, container);
const Position& new_extent =
ComputePositionForChildrenRemoval(old_extent, container);
if (new_base == old_base && new_extent == old_extent)
return;
selection_ = SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(new_base, new_extent)
.Build();
MarkCacheDirty();
}
| 171,764
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: base::MessageLoopProxy* ProxyChannelDelegate::GetIPCMessageLoop() {
return RenderThread::Get()->GetIOMessageLoopProxy().get();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
base::MessageLoopProxy* ProxyChannelDelegate::GetIPCMessageLoop() {
| 170,733
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: DocumentInit& DocumentInit::WithPreviousDocumentCSP(
const ContentSecurityPolicy* previous_csp) {
DCHECK(!previous_csp_);
previous_csp_ = previous_csp;
return *this;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
DocumentInit& DocumentInit::WithPreviousDocumentCSP(
| 173,054
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: standard_info_part2(standard_display *dp, png_const_structp pp,
png_const_infop pi, int nImages)
{
/* Record cbRow now that it can be found. */
dp->pixel_size = bit_size(pp, png_get_color_type(pp, pi),
png_get_bit_depth(pp, pi));
dp->bit_width = png_get_image_width(pp, pi) * dp->pixel_size;
dp->cbRow = png_get_rowbytes(pp, pi);
/* Validate the rowbytes here again. */
if (dp->cbRow != (dp->bit_width+7)/8)
png_error(pp, "bad png_get_rowbytes calculation");
/* Then ensure there is enough space for the output image(s). */
store_ensure_image(dp->ps, pp, nImages, dp->cbRow, dp->h);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
standard_info_part2(standard_display *dp, png_const_structp pp,
png_const_infop pi, int nImages)
{
/* Record cbRow now that it can be found. */
{
png_byte ct = png_get_color_type(pp, pi);
png_byte bd = png_get_bit_depth(pp, pi);
if (bd >= 8 && (ct == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB || ct == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY) &&
dp->filler)
ct |= 4; /* handle filler as faked alpha channel */
dp->pixel_size = bit_size(pp, ct, bd);
}
dp->bit_width = png_get_image_width(pp, pi) * dp->pixel_size;
dp->cbRow = png_get_rowbytes(pp, pi);
/* Validate the rowbytes here again. */
if (dp->cbRow != (dp->bit_width+7)/8)
png_error(pp, "bad png_get_rowbytes calculation");
/* Then ensure there is enough space for the output image(s). */
store_ensure_image(dp->ps, pp, nImages, dp->cbRow, dp->h);
}
| 173,699
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: views::View* AutofillDialogViews::CreateFootnoteView() {
footnote_view_ = new LayoutPropagationView();
footnote_view_->SetLayoutManager(
new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kVertical,
kDialogEdgePadding,
kDialogEdgePadding,
0));
footnote_view_->SetBorder(
views::Border::CreateSolidSidedBorder(1, 0, 0, 0, kSubtleBorderColor));
footnote_view_->set_background(
views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kShadingColor));
legal_document_view_ = new views::StyledLabel(base::string16(), this);
footnote_view_->AddChildView(legal_document_view_);
footnote_view_->SetVisible(false);
return footnote_view_;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
views::View* AutofillDialogViews::CreateFootnoteView() {
footnote_view_ = new LayoutPropagationView();
footnote_view_->SetLayoutManager(
new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kVertical,
kDialogEdgePadding,
kDialogEdgePadding,
0));
footnote_view_->SetBorder(
views::Border::CreateSolidSidedBorder(1, 0, 0, 0, kSubtleBorderColor));
footnote_view_->set_background(
views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kLightShadingColor));
legal_document_view_ = new views::StyledLabel(base::string16(), this);
footnote_view_->AddChildView(legal_document_view_);
footnote_view_->SetVisible(false);
return footnote_view_;
}
| 171,139
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: interlace_row(png_bytep buffer, png_const_bytep imageRow,
unsigned int pixel_size, png_uint_32 w, int pass)
{
png_uint_32 xin, xout, xstep;
/* Note that this can, trivially, be optimized to a memcpy on pass 7, the
* code is presented this way to make it easier to understand. In practice
* consult the code in the libpng source to see other ways of doing this.
*/
xin = PNG_PASS_START_COL(pass);
xstep = 1U<<PNG_PASS_COL_SHIFT(pass);
for (xout=0; xin<w; xin+=xstep)
{
pixel_copy(buffer, xout, imageRow, xin, pixel_size);
++xout;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
interlace_row(png_bytep buffer, png_const_bytep imageRow,
| 173,659
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::clear_error() {
error_ = std::string();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::clear_error() {
| 170,393
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::empty_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret1 = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned int nBufferIndex ;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB: buffer = %p, buffer->pBuffer[%p]", buffer, buffer->pBuffer);
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Empty this buffer in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (buffer == NULL || (buffer->nSize != sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::etb--> buffer is null or buffer size is invalid");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (buffer->nVersion.nVersion != OMX_SPEC_VERSION) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::etb--> OMX Version Invalid");
return OMX_ErrorVersionMismatch;
}
if (buffer->nInputPortIndex != (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Bad port index to call empty_this_buffer");
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (!m_sInPortDef.bEnabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Cannot call empty_this_buffer while I/P port is disabled");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
nBufferIndex = buffer - ((!meta_mode_enable)?m_inp_mem_ptr:meta_buffer_hdr);
if (nBufferIndex > m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual ) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETB: Invalid buffer index[%d]", nBufferIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
m_etb_count++;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("DBG: i/p nTimestamp = %u", (unsigned)buffer->nTimeStamp);
post_event ((unsigned long)hComp,(unsigned long)buffer,m_input_msg_id);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27903498
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem #3)
CRs-Fixed: 1010088
Change-Id: I898b42034c0add621d4f9d8e02ca0ed4403d4fd3
CWE ID:
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::empty_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret1 = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned int nBufferIndex ;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB: buffer = %p, buffer->pBuffer[%p]", buffer, buffer->pBuffer);
if (m_state != OMX_StateExecuting &&
m_state != OMX_StatePause &&
m_state != OMX_StateIdle) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Empty this buffer in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (buffer == NULL || (buffer->nSize != sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::etb--> buffer is null or buffer size is invalid");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (buffer->nVersion.nVersion != OMX_SPEC_VERSION) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::etb--> OMX Version Invalid");
return OMX_ErrorVersionMismatch;
}
if (buffer->nInputPortIndex != (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Bad port index to call empty_this_buffer");
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (!m_sInPortDef.bEnabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Cannot call empty_this_buffer while I/P port is disabled");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
nBufferIndex = buffer - ((!meta_mode_enable)?m_inp_mem_ptr:meta_buffer_hdr);
if (nBufferIndex > m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual ) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETB: Invalid buffer index[%d]", nBufferIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
m_etb_count++;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("DBG: i/p nTimestamp = %u", (unsigned)buffer->nTimeStamp);
post_event ((unsigned long)hComp,(unsigned long)buffer,m_input_msg_id);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
| 173,745
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int test(char *URL)
{
int errors = 0;
(void)URL; /* not used */
errors += test_weird_arguments();
errors += test_unsigned_short_formatting();
errors += test_signed_short_formatting();
errors += test_unsigned_int_formatting();
errors += test_signed_int_formatting();
errors += test_unsigned_long_formatting();
errors += test_signed_long_formatting();
errors += test_curl_off_t_formatting();
errors += test_string_formatting();
if(errors)
return TEST_ERR_MAJOR_BAD;
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: printf: fix floating point buffer overflow issues
... and add a bunch of floating point printf tests
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
int test(char *URL)
{
int errors = 0;
(void)URL; /* not used */
errors += test_weird_arguments();
errors += test_unsigned_short_formatting();
errors += test_signed_short_formatting();
errors += test_unsigned_int_formatting();
errors += test_signed_int_formatting();
errors += test_unsigned_long_formatting();
errors += test_signed_long_formatting();
errors += test_curl_off_t_formatting();
errors += test_string_formatting();
errors += test_float_formatting();
if(errors)
return TEST_ERR_MAJOR_BAD;
else
return 0;
}
| 169,438
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::finalizeStream(const KURL& url)
{
if (isMainThread()) {
blobRegistry().finalizeStream(url);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url));
callOnMainThread(&finalizeStreamTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
|
void ThreadableBlobRegistry::finalizeStream(const KURL& url)
void BlobRegistry::finalizeStream(const KURL& url)
{
if (isMainThread()) {
if (WebBlobRegistry* registry = blobRegistry())
registry->finalizeStream(url);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url));
callOnMainThread(&finalizeStreamTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
| 170,682
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: jbig2_image_new(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, int width, int height)
{
Jbig2Image *image;
int stride;
int64_t check;
image = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2Image, 1);
if (image == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "could not allocate image structure in jbig2_image_new");
return NULL;
}
stride = ((width - 1) >> 3) + 1; /* generate a byte-aligned stride */
/* check for integer multiplication overflow */
check = ((int64_t) stride) * ((int64_t) height);
if (check != (int)check) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "integer multiplication overflow from stride(%d)*height(%d)", stride, height);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, image);
return NULL;
}
/* Add 1 to accept runs that exceed image width and clamped to width+1 */
image->data = jbig2_new(ctx, uint8_t, (int)check + 1);
if (image->data == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "could not allocate image data buffer! [stride(%d)*height(%d) bytes]", stride, height);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, image);
return NULL;
}
image->width = width;
image->height = height;
image->stride = stride;
image->refcount = 1;
return image;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
jbig2_image_new(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, int width, int height)
jbig2_image_new(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, uint32_t width, uint32_t height)
{
Jbig2Image *image;
uint32_t stride;
int64_t check;
image = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2Image, 1);
if (image == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "could not allocate image structure in jbig2_image_new");
return NULL;
}
stride = ((width - 1) >> 3) + 1; /* generate a byte-aligned stride */
/* check for integer multiplication overflow */
check = ((int64_t) stride) * ((int64_t) height);
if (check != (int)check) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "integer multiplication overflow from stride(%d)*height(%d)", stride, height);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, image);
return NULL;
}
/* Add 1 to accept runs that exceed image width and clamped to width+1 */
image->data = jbig2_new(ctx, uint8_t, (int)check + 1);
if (image->data == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "could not allocate image data buffer! [stride(%d)*height(%d) bytes]", stride, height);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, image);
return NULL;
}
image->width = width;
image->height = height;
image->stride = stride;
image->refcount = 1;
return image;
}
| 165,491
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct extent_tree *et;
struct extent_node *en;
struct extent_info ei;
if (!f2fs_may_extent_tree(inode)) {
/* drop largest extent */
if (i_ext && i_ext->len) {
i_ext->len = 0;
return true;
}
return false;
}
et = __grab_extent_tree(inode);
if (!i_ext || !i_ext->len)
return false;
get_extent_info(&ei, i_ext);
write_lock(&et->lock);
if (atomic_read(&et->node_cnt))
goto out;
en = __init_extent_tree(sbi, et, &ei);
if (en) {
spin_lock(&sbi->extent_lock);
list_add_tail(&en->list, &sbi->extent_list);
spin_unlock(&sbi->extent_lock);
}
out:
write_unlock(&et->lock);
return false;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a bug caused by NULL extent tree
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount
-sbi->mount_opt.opt = 0;
<--- -f2fs_iget
-do_read_inode
-f2fs_init_extent_tree
-F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree is NULL
-default_options && parse_options
-remount return
<--- -f2fs_map_blocks
-f2fs_lookup_extent_tree
-f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !et);
The same problem with f2fs_new_inode.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)
static bool __f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct extent_tree *et;
struct extent_node *en;
struct extent_info ei;
if (!f2fs_may_extent_tree(inode)) {
/* drop largest extent */
if (i_ext && i_ext->len) {
i_ext->len = 0;
return true;
}
return false;
}
et = __grab_extent_tree(inode);
if (!i_ext || !i_ext->len)
return false;
get_extent_info(&ei, i_ext);
write_lock(&et->lock);
if (atomic_read(&et->node_cnt))
goto out;
en = __init_extent_tree(sbi, et, &ei);
if (en) {
spin_lock(&sbi->extent_lock);
list_add_tail(&en->list, &sbi->extent_list);
spin_unlock(&sbi->extent_lock);
}
out:
write_unlock(&et->lock);
return false;
}
| 169,416
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent(WebContents* contents,
Profile* profile,
const Extension* extension,
ListValue* event_args) {
DictionaryValue* tab_value = ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
contents, extension);
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
static void WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent(WebContents* contents,
static void WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent(
WebContents* contents,
const DictionaryValue* changed_properties,
Profile* profile,
const Extension* extension,
ListValue* event_args) {
// Overwrite the second argument with the appropriate properties dictionary,
// depending on extension permissions.
DictionaryValue* properties_value = changed_properties->DeepCopy();
ExtensionTabUtil::ScrubTabValueForExtension(contents, extension,
properties_value);
event_args->Set(1, properties_value);
// Overwrite the third arg with our tab value as seen by this extension.
DictionaryValue* tab_value = ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
contents, extension);
}
| 171,453
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size)
{
#if defined(CHECK_MEMORY_USAGE)
/* Note that if the decoder has to free and reallocate some of the buffers
* the total value will be invalid */
static u32 numBytes = 0;
numBytes += size;
DEBUG(("Allocated %d bytes, total %d\n", size, numBytes));
#endif
return malloc(size);
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size)
void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size, u32 num)
{
if (size > UINT32_MAX / num) {
return NULL;
}
#if defined(CHECK_MEMORY_USAGE)
/* Note that if the decoder has to free and reallocate some of the buffers
* the total value will be invalid */
static u32 numBytes = 0;
numBytes += size * num;
DEBUG(("Allocated %d bytes, total %d\n", size, numBytes));
#endif
return malloc(size * num);
}
| 173,871
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::UnregisterAgent() {
if (!agent_.get())
return;
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
DCHECK(pincode_callback_.is_null());
DCHECK(passkey_callback_.is_null());
DCHECK(confirmation_callback_.is_null());
pairing_delegate_->DismissDisplayOrConfirm();
pairing_delegate_ = NULL;
agent_.reset();
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Unregistering pairing agent";
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAgentManagerClient()->
UnregisterAgent(
dbus::ObjectPath(kAgentPath),
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnUnregisterAgentError,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::UnregisterAgent() {
| 171,241
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AppResult::Open(int event_flags) {
RecordHistogram(APP_SEARCH_RESULT);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_service()
->GetInstalledExtension(app_id_);
if (!extension)
return;
if (!extensions::util::IsAppLaunchable(app_id_, profile_))
return;
if (RunExtensionEnableFlow())
return;
if (display_type() != DISPLAY_RECOMMENDATION) {
extensions::RecordAppListSearchLaunch(extension);
content::RecordAction(
base::UserMetricsAction("AppList_ClickOnAppFromSearch"));
}
controller_->ActivateApp(
profile_,
extension,
AppListControllerDelegate::LAUNCH_FROM_APP_LIST_SEARCH,
event_flags);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
|
void AppResult::Open(int event_flags) {
RecordHistogram(APP_SEARCH_RESULT);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_)->GetInstalledExtension(
app_id_);
if (!extension)
return;
if (!extensions::util::IsAppLaunchable(app_id_, profile_))
return;
if (RunExtensionEnableFlow())
return;
if (display_type() != DISPLAY_RECOMMENDATION) {
extensions::RecordAppListSearchLaunch(extension);
content::RecordAction(
base::UserMetricsAction("AppList_ClickOnAppFromSearch"));
}
controller_->ActivateApp(
profile_,
extension,
AppListControllerDelegate::LAUNCH_FROM_APP_LIST_SEARCH,
event_flags);
}
| 171,726
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
const GURL& current_url,
const GURL& new_url) {
if (current_url.is_empty()) {
if (new_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme))
return true;
return false;
}
if (current_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme) ||
new_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme)) {
if (current_url.GetOrigin() != new_url.GetOrigin())
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
SiteInstance* site_instance,
const GURL& current_url,
const GURL& new_url) {
if (current_url.is_empty()) {
if (new_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme))
return true;
return false;
}
if (current_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme) ||
new_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme)) {
if (current_url.GetOrigin() != new_url.GetOrigin())
return true;
}
// The checks below only matter if we can retrieve which extensions are
// installed.
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(site_instance->GetBrowserContext());
ExtensionService* service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->extension_service();
if (!service)
return false;
// We must swap if the URL is for an extension and we are not using an
// extension process.
const Extension* new_extension =
service->extensions()->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(ExtensionURLInfo(new_url));
// Ignore all hosted apps except the Chrome Web Store, since they do not
// require their own BrowsingInstance (e.g., postMessage is ok).
if (new_extension &&
new_extension->is_hosted_app() &&
new_extension->id() != extension_misc::kWebStoreAppId)
new_extension = NULL;
if (new_extension &&
site_instance->HasProcess() &&
!service->process_map()->Contains(new_extension->id(),
site_instance->GetProcess()->GetID()))
return true;
return false;
}
| 171,436
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: z2grestore(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
if (!restore_page_device(igs, gs_gstate_saved(igs)))
return gs_grestore(igs);
return push_callout(i_ctx_p, "%grestorepagedevice");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
z2grestore(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
int code = restore_page_device(i_ctx_p, igs, gs_gstate_saved(igs));
if (code < 0) return code;
if (code == 0)
return gs_grestore(igs);
return push_callout(i_ctx_p, "%grestorepagedevice");
}
| 164,691
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void _xml_add_to_info(xml_parser *parser,char *name)
{
zval **element, *values;
if (! parser->info) {
return;
}
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->info),name,strlen(name) + 1,(void **) &element) == FAILURE) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(values);
array_init(values);
zend_hash_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->info), name, strlen(name)+1, (void *) &values, sizeof(zval*), (void **) &element);
}
add_next_index_long(*element,parser->curtag);
parser->curtag++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void _xml_add_to_info(xml_parser *parser,char *name)
{
zval **element, *values;
if (! parser->info) {
return;
}
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->info),name,strlen(name) + 1,(void **) &element) == FAILURE) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(values);
array_init(values);
zend_hash_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->info), name, strlen(name)+1, (void *) &values, sizeof(zval*), (void **) &element);
}
add_next_index_long(*element,parser->curtag);
parser->curtag++;
}
| 165,039
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: M_bool M_fs_path_ishidden(const char *path, M_fs_info_t *info)
{
M_list_str_t *path_parts;
size_t len;
M_bool ret = M_FALSE;
(void)info;
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
return M_FALSE;
}
/* Hidden. Check if the first character of the last part of the path. Either the file or directory name itself
* starts with a '.'. */
path_parts = M_fs_path_componentize_path(path, M_FS_SYSTEM_UNIX);
len = M_list_str_len(path_parts);
if (len > 0) {
if (*M_list_str_at(path_parts, len-1) == '.') {
ret = M_TRUE;
}
}
M_list_str_destroy(path_parts);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732
|
M_bool M_fs_path_ishidden(const char *path, M_fs_info_t *info)
{
M_list_str_t *path_parts;
size_t len;
M_bool ret = M_FALSE;
(void)info;
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
return M_FALSE;
}
/* Hidden. Check if the first character of the last part of the path. Either the file or directory name itself
* starts with a '.'. */
path_parts = M_fs_path_componentize_path(path, M_FS_SYSTEM_UNIX);
len = M_list_str_len(path_parts);
if (len > 0) {
if (*M_list_str_at(path_parts, len-1) == '.') {
ret = M_TRUE;
}
}
M_list_str_destroy(path_parts);
return ret;
}
| 169,145
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int32_t PPB_Flash_MessageLoop_Impl::InternalRun(
const RunFromHostProxyCallback& callback) {
if (state_->run_called()) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(PP_ERROR_FAILED);
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
}
state_->set_run_called();
state_->set_run_callback(callback);
scoped_refptr<State> state_protector(state_);
{
base::MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower allow(
base::MessageLoop::current());
base::MessageLoop::current()->Run();
}
return state_protector->result();
}
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
int32_t PPB_Flash_MessageLoop_Impl::InternalRun(
const RunFromHostProxyCallback& callback) {
if (state_->run_called()) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(PP_ERROR_FAILED);
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
}
state_->set_run_called();
state_->set_run_callback(callback);
scoped_refptr<State> state_protector(state_);
{
base::MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower allow(
base::MessageLoop::current());
blink::WebView::willEnterModalLoop();
base::MessageLoop::current()->Run();
blink::WebView::didExitModalLoop();
}
return state_protector->result();
}
| 172,123
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: explicit LogoDelegateImpl(
std::unique_ptr<image_fetcher::ImageDecoder> image_decoder)
: image_decoder_(std::move(image_decoder)) {}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
explicit LogoDelegateImpl(
| 171,954
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AppControllerImpl::LaunchHomeUrl(const std::string& suffix,
LaunchHomeUrlCallback callback) {
if (url_prefix_.empty()) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, "No URL prefix.");
return;
}
GURL url(url_prefix_ + suffix);
if (!url.is_valid()) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, "Invalid URL.");
return;
}
arc::mojom::AppInstance* app_instance =
arc::ArcServiceManager::Get()
? ARC_GET_INSTANCE_FOR_METHOD(
arc::ArcServiceManager::Get()->arc_bridge_service()->app(),
LaunchIntent)
: nullptr;
if (!app_instance) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, "ARC bridge not available.");
return;
}
app_instance->LaunchIntent(url.spec(), display::kDefaultDisplayId);
std::move(callback).Run(true, base::nullopt);
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void AppControllerImpl::LaunchHomeUrl(const std::string& suffix,
void AppControllerService::LaunchHomeUrl(const std::string& suffix,
LaunchHomeUrlCallback callback) {
if (url_prefix_.empty()) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, "No URL prefix.");
return;
}
GURL url(url_prefix_ + suffix);
if (!url.is_valid()) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, "Invalid URL.");
return;
}
arc::mojom::AppInstance* app_instance =
arc::ArcServiceManager::Get()
? ARC_GET_INSTANCE_FOR_METHOD(
arc::ArcServiceManager::Get()->arc_bridge_service()->app(),
LaunchIntent)
: nullptr;
if (!app_instance) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, "ARC bridge not available.");
return;
}
app_instance->LaunchIntent(url.spec(), display::kDefaultDisplayId);
std::move(callback).Run(true, base::nullopt);
}
| 172,085
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static size_t optsize (lua_State *L, char opt, const char **fmt) {
switch (opt) {
case 'B': case 'b': return sizeof(char);
case 'H': case 'h': return sizeof(short);
case 'L': case 'l': return sizeof(long);
case 'T': return sizeof(size_t);
case 'f': return sizeof(float);
case 'd': return sizeof(double);
case 'x': return 1;
case 'c': return getnum(L, fmt, 1);
case 'i': case 'I': {
int sz = getnum(L, fmt, sizeof(int));
if (sz > MAXINTSIZE)
luaL_error(L, "integral size %d is larger than limit of %d",
sz, MAXINTSIZE);
return sz;
}
default: return 0; /* other cases do not need alignment */
}
}
Commit Message: Security: update Lua struct package for security.
During an auditing Apple found that the "struct" Lua package
we ship with Redis (http://www.inf.puc-rio.br/~roberto/struct/) contains
a security problem. A bound-checking statement fails because of integer
overflow. The bug exists since we initially integrated this package with
Lua, when scripting was introduced, so every version of Redis with
EVAL/EVALSHA capabilities exposed is affected.
Instead of just fixing the bug, the library was updated to the latest
version shipped by the author.
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static size_t optsize (lua_State *L, char opt, const char **fmt) {
switch (opt) {
case 'B': case 'b': return sizeof(char);
case 'H': case 'h': return sizeof(short);
case 'L': case 'l': return sizeof(long);
case 'T': return sizeof(size_t);
case 'f': return sizeof(float);
case 'd': return sizeof(double);
case 'x': return 1;
case 'c': return getnum(fmt, 1);
case 'i': case 'I': {
int sz = getnum(fmt, sizeof(int));
if (sz > MAXINTSIZE)
luaL_error(L, "integral size %d is larger than limit of %d",
sz, MAXINTSIZE);
return sz;
}
default: return 0; /* other cases do not need alignment */
}
}
| 170,166
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int virtio_gpu_object_create(struct virtio_gpu_device *vgdev,
unsigned long size, bool kernel, bool pinned,
struct virtio_gpu_object **bo_ptr)
{
struct virtio_gpu_object *bo;
enum ttm_bo_type type;
size_t acc_size;
int ret;
if (kernel)
type = ttm_bo_type_kernel;
else
type = ttm_bo_type_device;
*bo_ptr = NULL;
acc_size = ttm_bo_dma_acc_size(&vgdev->mman.bdev, size,
sizeof(struct virtio_gpu_object));
bo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct virtio_gpu_object), GFP_KERNEL);
if (bo == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
size = roundup(size, PAGE_SIZE);
ret = drm_gem_object_init(vgdev->ddev, &bo->gem_base, size);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
bo->dumb = false;
virtio_gpu_init_ttm_placement(bo, pinned);
ret = ttm_bo_init(&vgdev->mman.bdev, &bo->tbo, size, type,
&bo->placement, 0, !kernel, NULL, acc_size,
NULL, NULL, &virtio_gpu_ttm_bo_destroy);
/* ttm_bo_init failure will call the destroy */
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
*bo_ptr = bo;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: drm/virtio: don't leak bo on drm_gem_object_init failure
Reported-by: 李强 <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170406155941.458-1-kraxel@redhat.com
CWE ID: CWE-772
|
int virtio_gpu_object_create(struct virtio_gpu_device *vgdev,
unsigned long size, bool kernel, bool pinned,
struct virtio_gpu_object **bo_ptr)
{
struct virtio_gpu_object *bo;
enum ttm_bo_type type;
size_t acc_size;
int ret;
if (kernel)
type = ttm_bo_type_kernel;
else
type = ttm_bo_type_device;
*bo_ptr = NULL;
acc_size = ttm_bo_dma_acc_size(&vgdev->mman.bdev, size,
sizeof(struct virtio_gpu_object));
bo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct virtio_gpu_object), GFP_KERNEL);
if (bo == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
size = roundup(size, PAGE_SIZE);
ret = drm_gem_object_init(vgdev->ddev, &bo->gem_base, size);
if (ret != 0) {
kfree(bo);
return ret;
}
bo->dumb = false;
virtio_gpu_init_ttm_placement(bo, pinned);
ret = ttm_bo_init(&vgdev->mman.bdev, &bo->tbo, size, type,
&bo->placement, 0, !kernel, NULL, acc_size,
NULL, NULL, &virtio_gpu_ttm_bo_destroy);
/* ttm_bo_init failure will call the destroy */
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
*bo_ptr = bo;
return 0;
}
| 168,060
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BrightnessLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetBrightnessLibrary() {
return brightness_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
BrightnessLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetBrightnessLibrary() {
| 170,620
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: views::View* CardUnmaskPromptViews::CreateFootnoteView() {
if (!controller_->CanStoreLocally())
return nullptr;
storage_row_ = new FadeOutView();
views::BoxLayout* storage_row_layout = new views::BoxLayout(
views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal, kEdgePadding, kEdgePadding, 0);
storage_row_->SetLayoutManager(storage_row_layout);
storage_row_->SetBorder(
views::Border::CreateSolidSidedBorder(1, 0, 0, 0, kSubtleBorderColor));
storage_row_->set_background(
views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kShadingColor));
storage_checkbox_ = new views::Checkbox(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_AUTOFILL_CARD_UNMASK_PROMPT_STORAGE_CHECKBOX));
storage_checkbox_->SetChecked(controller_->GetStoreLocallyStartState());
storage_row_->AddChildView(storage_checkbox_);
storage_row_layout->SetFlexForView(storage_checkbox_, 1);
storage_row_->AddChildView(new TooltipIcon(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_AUTOFILL_CARD_UNMASK_PROMPT_STORAGE_TOOLTIP)));
return storage_row_;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
views::View* CardUnmaskPromptViews::CreateFootnoteView() {
if (!controller_->CanStoreLocally())
return nullptr;
storage_row_ = new FadeOutView();
views::BoxLayout* storage_row_layout = new views::BoxLayout(
views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal, kEdgePadding, kEdgePadding, 0);
storage_row_->SetLayoutManager(storage_row_layout);
storage_row_->SetBorder(
views::Border::CreateSolidSidedBorder(1, 0, 0, 0, kSubtleBorderColor));
storage_row_->set_background(
views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kLightShadingColor));
storage_checkbox_ = new views::Checkbox(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_AUTOFILL_CARD_UNMASK_PROMPT_STORAGE_CHECKBOX));
storage_checkbox_->SetChecked(controller_->GetStoreLocallyStartState());
storage_row_->AddChildView(storage_checkbox_);
storage_row_layout->SetFlexForView(storage_checkbox_, 1);
storage_row_->AddChildView(new TooltipIcon(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_AUTOFILL_CARD_UNMASK_PROMPT_STORAGE_TOOLTIP)));
return storage_row_;
}
| 171,141
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SoftMPEG4Encoder::~SoftMPEG4Encoder() {
ALOGV("Destruct SoftMPEG4Encoder");
releaseEncoder();
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
CHECK(outQueue.empty());
CHECK(inQueue.empty());
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID:
|
SoftMPEG4Encoder::~SoftMPEG4Encoder() {
ALOGV("Destruct SoftMPEG4Encoder");
onReset();
releaseEncoder();
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
CHECK(outQueue.empty());
CHECK(inQueue.empty());
}
| 174,011
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: tt_cmap12_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p;
FT_ULong length;
FT_ULong num_groups;
if ( table + 16 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
p = table + 4;
length = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
p = table + 12;
p = table + 12;
num_groups = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( table + length > valid->limit || length < 16 + 12 * num_groups )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check groups, they must be in increasing order */
for ( n = 0; n < num_groups; n++ )
{
start = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
end = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
start_id = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( start > end )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( n > 0 && start <= last )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
if ( start_id + end - start >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
}
last = end;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
tt_cmap12_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p;
FT_ULong length;
FT_ULong num_groups;
if ( table + 16 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
p = table + 4;
length = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
p = table + 12;
p = table + 12;
num_groups = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( length > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - table ) ||
length < 16 + 12 * num_groups )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check groups, they must be in increasing order */
for ( n = 0; n < num_groups; n++ )
{
start = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
end = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
start_id = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( start > end )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( n > 0 && start <= last )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
if ( start_id + end - start >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
}
last = end;
}
}
| 164,740
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnGetTransferBuffer(
int32 id,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
if (!channel_->renderer_process())
return;
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer = base::SharedMemoryHandle();
uint32 size = 0;
gpu::Buffer buffer = command_buffer_->GetTransferBuffer(id);
if (buffer.shared_memory) {
buffer.shared_memory->ShareToProcess(channel_->renderer_process(),
&transfer_buffer);
size = buffer.size;
}
GpuCommandBufferMsg_GetTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
transfer_buffer,
size);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnGetTransferBuffer(
int32 id,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer = base::SharedMemoryHandle();
uint32 size = 0;
gpu::Buffer buffer = command_buffer_->GetTransferBuffer(id);
if (buffer.shared_memory) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
transfer_buffer = NULL;
sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle(buffer.shared_memory->handle(),
channel_->renderer_pid(), &transfer_buffer, FILE_MAP_READ |
FILE_MAP_WRITE, 0);
CHECK(transfer_buffer != NULL);
#else
buffer.shared_memory->ShareToProcess(channel_->renderer_pid(),
&transfer_buffer);
#endif
size = buffer.size;
}
GpuCommandBufferMsg_GetTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
transfer_buffer,
size);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
| 170,937
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline unsigned short ReadPropertyUnsignedShort(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
unsigned short
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned short) ((buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[0]);
return((unsigned short) (value & 0xffff));
}
value=(unsigned short) ((((unsigned char *) buffer)[0] << 8) |
((unsigned char *) buffer)[1]);
return((unsigned short) (value & 0xffff));
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static inline unsigned short ReadPropertyUnsignedShort(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
unsigned short
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned short) buffer[1] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[0];
return(value & 0xffff);
}
value=(unsigned short) buffer[0] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[1];
return(value & 0xffff);
}
| 169,957
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: header_put_marker (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 4)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
} ;
} /* header_put_marker */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
header_put_marker (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = x ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 24) ;
} /* header_put_marker */
| 170,060
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long mkvparser::UnserializeString(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size_, char*& str) {
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
if (size_ >= LONG_MAX) // we need (size+1) chars
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long size = static_cast<long>(size_);
str = new (std::nothrow) char[size + 1];
if (str == NULL)
return -1;
unsigned char* const buf = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(str);
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, size, buf);
if (status) {
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
return status;
}
str[size] = '\0';
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
long mkvparser::UnserializeString(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long UnserializeString(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long long size,
char*& str) {
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
if (size >= LONG_MAX || size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
// +1 for '\0' terminator
const long required_size = static_cast<long>(size) + 1;
str = SafeArrayAlloc<char>(1, required_size);
if (str == NULL)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char* const buf = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(str);
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, size, buf);
if (status) {
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
return status;
}
str[required_size - 1] = '\0';
return 0;
}
| 173,867
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void unset_active_map(const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *cfg,
vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec) {
vpx_active_map_t map = {0};
map.rows = (cfg->g_h + 15) / 16;
map.cols = (cfg->g_w + 15) / 16;
map.active_map = NULL;
if (vpx_codec_control(codec, VP8E_SET_ACTIVEMAP, &map))
die_codec(codec, "Failed to set active map");
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void unset_active_map(const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *cfg,
vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec) {
vpx_active_map_t map = {0, 0, 0};
map.rows = (cfg->g_h + 15) / 16;
map.cols = (cfg->g_w + 15) / 16;
map.active_map = NULL;
if (vpx_codec_control(codec, VP8E_SET_ACTIVEMAP, &map))
die_codec(codec, "Failed to set active map");
}
| 174,485
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Session* SessionManager::GetSession(const std::string& id) const {
std::map<std::string, Session*>::const_iterator it;
base::AutoLock lock(map_lock_);
it = map_.find(id);
if (it == map_.end()) {
VLOG(1) << "No such session with ID " << id;
return NULL;
}
return it->second;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
Session* SessionManager::GetSession(const std::string& id) const {
std::map<std::string, Session*>::const_iterator it;
base::AutoLock lock(map_lock_);
it = map_.find(id);
if (it == map_.end())
return NULL;
return it->second;
}
| 170,463
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const Track* Tracks::GetTrackByNumber(long tn) const
{
if (tn < 0)
return NULL;
Track** i = m_trackEntries;
Track** const j = m_trackEntriesEnd;
while (i != j)
{
Track* const pTrack = *i++;
if (pTrack == NULL)
continue;
if (tn == pTrack->GetNumber())
return pTrack;
}
return NULL; //not found
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const Track* Tracks::GetTrackByNumber(long tn) const
| 174,371
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Chapters::~Chapters() {
while (m_editions_count > 0) {
Edition& e = m_editions[--m_editions_count];
e.Clear();
}
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
Chapters::~Chapters() {
while (m_editions_count > 0) {
Edition& e = m_editions[--m_editions_count];
e.Clear();
}
delete[] m_editions;
}
| 173,869
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
Commit Message: scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
Don't allow spoofing pids over unix domain sockets in the corner
cases where a user has created a user namespace but has not yet
created a pid namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
ns_capable(current->nsproxy->pid_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
| 166,093
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Chapters::Display::~Display()
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
Chapters::Display::~Display()
| 174,464
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const CuePoint::TrackPosition* CuePoint::Find(const Track* pTrack) const
{
assert(pTrack);
const long long n = pTrack->GetNumber();
const TrackPosition* i = m_track_positions;
const TrackPosition* const j = i + m_track_positions_count;
while (i != j)
{
const TrackPosition& p = *i++;
if (p.m_track == n)
return &p;
}
return NULL; //no matching track number found
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const CuePoint::TrackPosition* CuePoint::Find(const Track* pTrack) const
const long long n = pTrack->GetNumber();
const TrackPosition* i = m_track_positions;
const TrackPosition* const j = i + m_track_positions_count;
while (i != j) {
const TrackPosition& p = *i++;
if (p.m_track == n)
return &p;
}
return NULL; // no matching track number found
}
| 174,278
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::InitializeURLRequest(
net::URLRequest* request,
const Referrer& referrer,
bool is_download,
int render_process_host_id,
int render_view_routing_id,
int render_frame_routing_id,
PreviewsState previews_state,
ResourceContext* context) {
DCHECK(io_thread_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(!request->is_pending());
Referrer::SetReferrerForRequest(request, referrer);
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = CreateRequestInfo(
render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id, render_frame_routing_id,
previews_state, is_download, context);
info->AssociateWithRequest(request);
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::InitializeURLRequest(
net::URLRequest* request,
const Referrer& referrer,
bool is_download,
int render_process_host_id,
int render_view_routing_id,
int render_frame_routing_id,
int frame_tree_node_id,
PreviewsState previews_state,
ResourceContext* context) {
DCHECK(io_thread_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(!request->is_pending());
Referrer::SetReferrerForRequest(request, referrer);
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = CreateRequestInfo(
render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id, render_frame_routing_id,
frame_tree_node_id, previews_state, is_download, context);
info->AssociateWithRequest(request);
}
| 173,027
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_cfb)
{
zval **mode;
char *cipher, *key, *data, *iv = NULL;
int cipher_len, key_len, data_len, iv_len = 0;
MCRYPT_GET_CRYPT_ARGS
convert_to_long_ex(mode);
php_mcrypt_do_crypt(cipher, key, key_len, data, data_len, "cfb", iv, iv_len, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), Z_LVAL_PP(mode), return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_cfb)
{
zval **mode;
char *cipher, *key, *data, *iv = NULL;
int cipher_len, key_len, data_len, iv_len = 0;
MCRYPT_GET_CRYPT_ARGS
convert_to_long_ex(mode);
php_mcrypt_do_crypt(cipher, key, key_len, data, data_len, "cfb", iv, iv_len, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), Z_LVAL_PP(mode), return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
| 167,109
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ikev1_sub_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_char np, const struct isakmp_gen *ext, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi, uint32_t proto, int depth)
{
const u_char *cp;
int i;
struct isakmp_gen e;
cp = (const u_char *)ext;
while (np) {
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_TCHECK2(*ext, ntohs(e.len));
depth++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n"));
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
cp = ike_sub0_print(ndo, np, ext, ep, phase, doi, proto, depth);
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
depth--;
if (cp == NULL) {
/* Zero-length subitem */
return NULL;
}
np = e.np;
ext = (const struct isakmp_gen *)cp;
}
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(np)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
ikev1_sub_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_char np, const struct isakmp_gen *ext, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi, uint32_t proto, int depth)
{
const u_char *cp;
int i;
struct isakmp_gen e;
cp = (const u_char *)ext;
while (np) {
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_TCHECK2(*ext, ntohs(e.len));
depth++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n"));
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
cp = ike_sub0_print(ndo, np, ext, ep, phase, doi, proto, depth);
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
depth--;
if (cp == NULL) {
/* Zero-length subitem */
return NULL;
}
np = e.np;
ext = (const struct isakmp_gen *)cp;
}
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(np)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,794
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static struct ucma_multicast* ucma_alloc_multicast(struct ucma_context *ctx)
{
struct ucma_multicast *mc;
mc = kzalloc(sizeof(*mc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mc)
return NULL;
mutex_lock(&mut);
mc->id = idr_alloc(&multicast_idr, mc, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
if (mc->id < 0)
goto error;
mc->ctx = ctx;
list_add_tail(&mc->list, &ctx->mc_list);
return mc;
error:
kfree(mc);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@beyondsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
static struct ucma_multicast* ucma_alloc_multicast(struct ucma_context *ctx)
{
struct ucma_multicast *mc;
mc = kzalloc(sizeof(*mc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mc)
return NULL;
mutex_lock(&mut);
mc->id = idr_alloc(&multicast_idr, NULL, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
if (mc->id < 0)
goto error;
mc->ctx = ctx;
list_add_tail(&mc->list, &ctx->mc_list);
return mc;
error:
kfree(mc);
return NULL;
}
| 169,109
|
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