instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 93
3.53k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static AVFrame *get_video_buffer(AVFilterLink *inlink, int w, int h)
{
PadContext *s = inlink->dst->priv;
AVFrame *frame = ff_get_video_buffer(inlink->dst->outputs[0],
w + (s->w - s->in_w),
h + (s->h - s->in_h));
int plane;
if (!frame)
return NULL;
frame->width = w;
frame->height = h;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane]; plane++) {
int hsub = s->draw.hsub[plane];
int vsub = s->draw.vsub[plane];
frame->data[plane] += (s->x >> hsub) * s->draw.pixelstep[plane] +
(s->y >> vsub) * frame->linesize[plane];
}
return frame;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static AVFrame *get_video_buffer(AVFilterLink *inlink, int w, int h)
{
PadContext *s = inlink->dst->priv;
AVFrame *frame = ff_get_video_buffer(inlink->dst->outputs[0],
w + (s->w - s->in_w),
h + (s->h - s->in_h));
int plane;
if (!frame)
return NULL;
frame->width = w;
frame->height = h;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane] && frame->linesize[plane]; plane++) {
int hsub = s->draw.hsub[plane];
int vsub = s->draw.vsub[plane];
frame->data[plane] += (s->x >> hsub) * s->draw.pixelstep[plane] +
(s->y >> vsub) * frame->linesize[plane];
}
return frame;
}
| 166,006
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: std::string print_valuetype(Value::ValueType e) {
switch (e) {
case Value::TYPE_NULL:
return "NULL ";
case Value::TYPE_BOOLEAN:
return "BOOL";
case Value::TYPE_INTEGER:
return "INT";
case Value::TYPE_DOUBLE:
return "DOUBLE";
case Value::TYPE_STRING:
return "STRING";
case Value::TYPE_BINARY:
return "BIN";
case Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY:
return "DICT";
case Value::TYPE_LIST:
return "LIST";
default:
return "ERROR";
}
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
std::string print_valuetype(Value::ValueType e) {
| 170,467
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static long ioctl_file_dedupe_range(struct file *file, void __user *arg)
{
struct file_dedupe_range __user *argp = arg;
struct file_dedupe_range *same = NULL;
int ret;
unsigned long size;
u16 count;
if (get_user(count, &argp->dest_count)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
size = offsetof(struct file_dedupe_range __user, info[count]);
same = memdup_user(argp, size);
if (IS_ERR(same)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(same);
same = NULL;
goto out;
}
ret = vfs_dedupe_file_range(file, same);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = copy_to_user(argp, same, size);
if (ret)
ret = -EFAULT;
out:
kfree(same);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: vfs: ioctl: prevent double-fetch in dedupe ioctl
This prevents a double-fetch from user space that can lead to to an
undersized allocation and heap overflow.
Fixes: 54dbc1517237 ("vfs: hoist the btrfs deduplication ioctl to the vfs")
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static long ioctl_file_dedupe_range(struct file *file, void __user *arg)
{
struct file_dedupe_range __user *argp = arg;
struct file_dedupe_range *same = NULL;
int ret;
unsigned long size;
u16 count;
if (get_user(count, &argp->dest_count)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
size = offsetof(struct file_dedupe_range __user, info[count]);
same = memdup_user(argp, size);
if (IS_ERR(same)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(same);
same = NULL;
goto out;
}
same->dest_count = count;
ret = vfs_dedupe_file_range(file, same);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = copy_to_user(argp, same, size);
if (ret)
ret = -EFAULT;
out:
kfree(same);
return ret;
}
| 166,997
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static bool getCoverageFormat12(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kNGroupsOffset = 12;
const size_t kFirstGroupOffset = 16;
const size_t kGroupSize = 12;
const size_t kStartCharCodeOffset = 0;
const size_t kEndCharCodeOffset = 4;
if (kFirstGroupOffset > size) {
return false;
}
uint32_t nGroups = readU32(data, kNGroupsOffset);
if (kFirstGroupOffset + nGroups * kGroupSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < nGroups; i++) {
uint32_t groupOffset = kFirstGroupOffset + i * kGroupSize;
uint32_t start = readU32(data, groupOffset + kStartCharCodeOffset);
uint32_t end = readU32(data, groupOffset + kEndCharCodeOffset);
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1); // file is inclusive, vector is exclusive
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in parsing fonts
A malformed TTF can cause size calculations to overflow. This patch
checks the maximum reasonable value so that the total size fits in 32
bits. It also adds some explicit casting to avoid possible technical
undefined behavior when parsing sized unsigned values.
Bug: 25645298
Change-Id: Id4716132041a6f4f1fbb73ec4e445391cf7d9616
(cherry picked from commit 183c9ec2800baa2ce099ee260c6cbc6121cf1274)
CWE ID: CWE-19
|
static bool getCoverageFormat12(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kNGroupsOffset = 12;
const size_t kFirstGroupOffset = 16;
const size_t kGroupSize = 12;
const size_t kStartCharCodeOffset = 0;
const size_t kEndCharCodeOffset = 4;
const size_t kMaxNGroups = 0xfffffff0 / kGroupSize; // protection against overflow
// For all values < kMaxNGroups, kFirstGroupOffset + nGroups * kGroupSize fits in 32 bits.
if (kFirstGroupOffset > size) {
return false;
}
uint32_t nGroups = readU32(data, kNGroupsOffset);
if (nGroups >= kMaxNGroups || kFirstGroupOffset + nGroups * kGroupSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < nGroups; i++) {
uint32_t groupOffset = kFirstGroupOffset + i * kGroupSize;
uint32_t start = readU32(data, groupOffset + kStartCharCodeOffset);
uint32_t end = readU32(data, groupOffset + kEndCharCodeOffset);
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1); // file is inclusive, vector is exclusive
}
return true;
}
| 173,965
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void TearDown() {
vpx_svc_release(&svc_);
delete(decoder_);
if (codec_initialized_) vpx_codec_destroy(&codec_);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
virtual void TearDown() {
ReleaseEncoder();
delete(decoder_);
}
void InitializeEncoder() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res =
vpx_svc_init(&svc_, &codec_, vpx_codec_vp9_cx(), &codec_enc_);
EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
vpx_codec_control(&codec_, VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, 4); // Make the test faster
vpx_codec_control(&codec_, VP9E_SET_TILE_COLUMNS, tile_columns_);
vpx_codec_control(&codec_, VP9E_SET_TILE_ROWS, tile_rows_);
codec_initialized_ = true;
}
void ReleaseEncoder() {
vpx_svc_release(&svc_);
if (codec_initialized_) vpx_codec_destroy(&codec_);
codec_initialized_ = false;
}
void GetStatsData(std::string *const stats_buf) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *cx_pkt;
while ((cx_pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(&codec_, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (cx_pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_STATS_PKT) {
EXPECT_GT(cx_pkt->data.twopass_stats.sz, 0U);
ASSERT_TRUE(cx_pkt->data.twopass_stats.buf != NULL);
stats_buf->append(static_cast<char*>(cx_pkt->data.twopass_stats.buf),
cx_pkt->data.twopass_stats.sz);
}
}
}
void Pass1EncodeNFrames(const int n, const int layers,
std::string *const stats_buf) {
vpx_codec_err_t res;
ASSERT_GT(n, 0);
ASSERT_GT(layers, 0);
svc_.spatial_layers = layers;
codec_enc_.g_pass = VPX_RC_FIRST_PASS;
InitializeEncoder();
libvpx_test::I420VideoSource video(test_file_name_,
codec_enc_.g_w, codec_enc_.g_h,
codec_enc_.g_timebase.den,
codec_enc_.g_timebase.num, 0, 30);
video.Begin();
for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
res = vpx_svc_encode(&svc_, &codec_, video.img(), video.pts(),
video.duration(), VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
GetStatsData(stats_buf);
video.Next();
}
// Flush encoder and test EOS packet.
res = vpx_svc_encode(&svc_, &codec_, NULL, video.pts(),
video.duration(), VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
GetStatsData(stats_buf);
ReleaseEncoder();
}
void StoreFrames(const size_t max_frame_received,
struct vpx_fixed_buf *const outputs,
size_t *const frame_received) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *cx_pkt;
while ((cx_pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(&codec_, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (cx_pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
const size_t frame_size = cx_pkt->data.frame.sz;
EXPECT_GT(frame_size, 0U);
ASSERT_TRUE(cx_pkt->data.frame.buf != NULL);
ASSERT_LT(*frame_received, max_frame_received);
if (*frame_received == 0)
EXPECT_EQ(1, !!(cx_pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY));
outputs[*frame_received].buf = malloc(frame_size + 16);
ASSERT_TRUE(outputs[*frame_received].buf != NULL);
memcpy(outputs[*frame_received].buf, cx_pkt->data.frame.buf,
frame_size);
outputs[*frame_received].sz = frame_size;
++(*frame_received);
}
}
}
void Pass2EncodeNFrames(std::string *const stats_buf,
const int n, const int layers,
struct vpx_fixed_buf *const outputs) {
vpx_codec_err_t res;
size_t frame_received = 0;
ASSERT_TRUE(outputs != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(n, 0);
ASSERT_GT(layers, 0);
svc_.spatial_layers = layers;
codec_enc_.rc_target_bitrate = 500;
if (codec_enc_.g_pass == VPX_RC_LAST_PASS) {
ASSERT_TRUE(stats_buf != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(stats_buf->size(), 0U);
codec_enc_.rc_twopass_stats_in.buf = &(*stats_buf)[0];
codec_enc_.rc_twopass_stats_in.sz = stats_buf->size();
}
InitializeEncoder();
libvpx_test::I420VideoSource video(test_file_name_,
codec_enc_.g_w, codec_enc_.g_h,
codec_enc_.g_timebase.den,
codec_enc_.g_timebase.num, 0, 30);
video.Begin();
for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
res = vpx_svc_encode(&svc_, &codec_, video.img(), video.pts(),
video.duration(), VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
StoreFrames(n, outputs, &frame_received);
video.Next();
}
// Flush encoder.
res = vpx_svc_encode(&svc_, &codec_, NULL, 0,
video.duration(), VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
StoreFrames(n, outputs, &frame_received);
EXPECT_EQ(frame_received, static_cast<size_t>(n));
ReleaseEncoder();
}
void DecodeNFrames(const struct vpx_fixed_buf *const inputs, const int n) {
int decoded_frames = 0;
int received_frames = 0;
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(n, 0);
for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs[i].buf != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(inputs[i].sz, 0U);
const vpx_codec_err_t res_dec =
decoder_->DecodeFrame(static_cast<const uint8_t *>(inputs[i].buf),
inputs[i].sz);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res_dec) << decoder_->DecodeError();
++decoded_frames;
DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder_->GetDxData();
while (dec_iter.Next() != NULL) {
++received_frames;
}
}
EXPECT_EQ(decoded_frames, n);
EXPECT_EQ(received_frames, n);
}
void DropEnhancementLayers(struct vpx_fixed_buf *const inputs,
const int num_super_frames,
const int remained_spatial_layers) {
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(num_super_frames, 0);
ASSERT_GT(remained_spatial_layers, 0);
for (int i = 0; i < num_super_frames; ++i) {
uint32_t frame_sizes[8] = {0};
int frame_count = 0;
int frames_found = 0;
int frame;
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs[i].buf != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(inputs[i].sz, 0U);
vpx_codec_err_t res =
vp9_parse_superframe_index(static_cast<const uint8_t*>(inputs[i].buf),
inputs[i].sz, frame_sizes, &frame_count,
NULL, NULL);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
if (frame_count == 0) {
// There's no super frame but only a single frame.
ASSERT_EQ(1, remained_spatial_layers);
} else {
// Found a super frame.
uint8_t *frame_data = static_cast<uint8_t*>(inputs[i].buf);
uint8_t *frame_start = frame_data;
for (frame = 0; frame < frame_count; ++frame) {
// Looking for a visible frame.
if (frame_data[0] & 0x02) {
++frames_found;
if (frames_found == remained_spatial_layers)
break;
}
frame_data += frame_sizes[frame];
}
ASSERT_LT(frame, frame_count) << "Couldn't find a visible frame. "
<< "remained_spatial_layers: " << remained_spatial_layers
<< " super_frame: " << i;
if (frame == frame_count - 1)
continue;
frame_data += frame_sizes[frame];
// We need to add one more frame for multiple frame contexts.
uint8_t marker =
static_cast<const uint8_t*>(inputs[i].buf)[inputs[i].sz - 1];
const uint32_t mag = ((marker >> 3) & 0x3) + 1;
const size_t index_sz = 2 + mag * frame_count;
const size_t new_index_sz = 2 + mag * (frame + 1);
marker &= 0x0f8;
marker |= frame;
// Copy existing frame sizes.
memmove(frame_data + 1, frame_start + inputs[i].sz - index_sz + 1,
new_index_sz - 2);
// New marker.
frame_data[0] = marker;
frame_data += (mag * (frame + 1) + 1);
*frame_data++ = marker;
inputs[i].sz = frame_data - frame_start;
}
}
}
void FreeBitstreamBuffers(struct vpx_fixed_buf *const inputs, const int n) {
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(n, 0);
for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
free(inputs[i].buf);
inputs[i].buf = NULL;
inputs[i].sz = 0;
}
}
| 174,582
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int PrintPreviewDataService::GetAvailableDraftPageCount(
const std::string& preview_ui_addr_str) {
if (data_store_map_.find(preview_ui_addr_str) != data_store_map_.end())
return data_store_map_[preview_ui_addr_str]->GetAvailableDraftPageCount();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
int PrintPreviewDataService::GetAvailableDraftPageCount(
int PrintPreviewDataService::GetAvailableDraftPageCount(int32 preview_ui_id) {
PreviewDataStoreMap::const_iterator it = data_store_map_.find(preview_ui_id);
return (it == data_store_map_.end()) ?
0 : it->second->GetAvailableDraftPageCount();
}
| 170,820
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void __sock_recv_timestamp(struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int need_software_tstamp = sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP);
struct scm_timestamping tss;
int empty = 1;
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *shhwtstamps =
skb_hwtstamps(skb);
/* Race occurred between timestamp enabling and packet
receiving. Fill in the current time for now. */
if (need_software_tstamp && skb->tstamp == 0)
__net_timestamp(skb);
if (need_software_tstamp) {
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS)) {
struct timeval tv;
skb_get_timestamp(skb, &tv);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMP,
sizeof(tv), &tv);
} else {
struct timespec ts;
skb_get_timestampns(skb, &ts);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMPNS,
sizeof(ts), &ts);
}
}
memset(&tss, 0, sizeof(tss));
if ((sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SOFTWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(skb->tstamp, tss.ts + 0))
empty = 0;
if (shhwtstamps &&
(sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(shhwtstamps->hwtstamp, tss.ts + 2))
empty = 0;
if (!empty) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET,
SCM_TIMESTAMPING, sizeof(tss), &tss);
if (skb_is_err_queue(skb) && skb->len &&
(sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS))
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS,
skb->len, skb->data);
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: mark skbs with SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS can be enabled and disabled
while packets are collected on the error queue.
So, checking SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS in sk->sk_tsflags
is not enough to safely assume that the skb contains
OPT_STATS data.
Add a bit in sock_exterr_skb to indicate whether the
skb contains opt_stats data.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
void __sock_recv_timestamp(struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int need_software_tstamp = sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP);
struct scm_timestamping tss;
int empty = 1;
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *shhwtstamps =
skb_hwtstamps(skb);
/* Race occurred between timestamp enabling and packet
receiving. Fill in the current time for now. */
if (need_software_tstamp && skb->tstamp == 0)
__net_timestamp(skb);
if (need_software_tstamp) {
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS)) {
struct timeval tv;
skb_get_timestamp(skb, &tv);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMP,
sizeof(tv), &tv);
} else {
struct timespec ts;
skb_get_timestampns(skb, &ts);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMPNS,
sizeof(ts), &ts);
}
}
memset(&tss, 0, sizeof(tss));
if ((sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SOFTWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(skb->tstamp, tss.ts + 0))
empty = 0;
if (shhwtstamps &&
(sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(shhwtstamps->hwtstamp, tss.ts + 2))
empty = 0;
if (!empty) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET,
SCM_TIMESTAMPING, sizeof(tss), &tss);
if (skb_is_err_queue(skb) && skb->len &&
SKB_EXT_ERR(skb)->opt_stats)
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS,
skb->len, skb->data);
}
}
| 170,074
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: struct addr_t* MACH0_(get_entrypoint)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct addr_t *entry;
int i;
if (!bin->entry && !bin->sects) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(entry = calloc (1, sizeof (struct addr_t)))) {
return NULL;
}
if (bin->entry) {
entry->addr = entry_to_vaddr (bin);
entry->offset = addr_to_offset (bin, entry->addr);
entry->haddr = sdb_num_get (bin->kv, "mach0.entry.offset", 0);
}
if (!bin->entry || entry->offset == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsects; i++) {
if (!strncmp (bin->sects[i].sectname, "__text", 6)) {
entry->offset = (ut64)bin->sects[i].offset;
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "mach0.entry", entry->offset, 0);
entry->addr = (ut64)bin->sects[i].addr;
if (!entry->addr) { // workaround for object files
entry->addr = entry->offset;
}
break;
}
}
bin->entry = entry->addr;
}
return entry;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
struct addr_t* MACH0_(get_entrypoint)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct addr_t *entry;
int i;
if (!bin->entry && !bin->sects) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(entry = calloc (1, sizeof (struct addr_t)))) {
return NULL;
}
if (bin->entry) {
entry->addr = entry_to_vaddr (bin);
entry->offset = addr_to_offset (bin, entry->addr);
entry->haddr = sdb_num_get (bin->kv, "mach0.entry.offset", 0);
}
if (!bin->entry || entry->offset == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsects; i++) {
if (!strncmp (bin->sects[i].sectname, "__text", 6)) {
entry->offset = (ut64)bin->sects[i].offset;
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "mach0.entry", entry->offset, 0);
entry->addr = (ut64)bin->sects[i].addr;
if (!entry->addr) { // workaround for object files
entry->addr = entry->offset;
}
break;
}
}
bin->entry = entry->addr;
}
return entry;
}
| 168,233
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: name_len(netdissect_options *ndo,
const unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *maxbuf)
{
const unsigned char *s0 = s;
unsigned char c;
if (s >= maxbuf)
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1);
c = *s;
if ((c & 0xC0) == 0xC0)
return(2);
while (*s) {
if (s >= maxbuf)
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1);
s += (*s) + 1;
}
return(PTR_DIFF(s, s0) + 1);
trunc:
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12893/SMB/CIFS: Add a bounds check in name_len().
After we advance the pointer by the length value in the buffer, make
sure it points to something in the captured data.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
name_len(netdissect_options *ndo,
const unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *maxbuf)
{
const unsigned char *s0 = s;
unsigned char c;
if (s >= maxbuf)
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1);
c = *s;
if ((c & 0xC0) == 0xC0)
return(2);
while (*s) {
if (s >= maxbuf)
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1);
s += (*s) + 1;
ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1);
}
return(PTR_DIFF(s, s0) + 1);
trunc:
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
}
| 167,961
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: asn1_get_bit_der (const unsigned char *der, int der_len,
int *ret_len, unsigned char *str, int str_size,
int *bit_len)
{
int len_len, len_byte;
if (der_len <= 0)
return ASN1_GENERIC_ERROR;
len_byte = asn1_get_length_der (der, der_len, &len_len) - 1;
if (len_byte < 0)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
*ret_len = len_byte + len_len + 1;
*bit_len = len_byte * 8 - der[len_len];
if (str_size >= len_byte)
memcpy (str, der + len_len + 1, len_byte);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
asn1_get_bit_der (const unsigned char *der, int der_len,
int *ret_len, unsigned char *str, int str_size,
int *bit_len)
{
int len_len = 0, len_byte;
if (der_len <= 0)
return ASN1_GENERIC_ERROR;
len_byte = asn1_get_length_der (der, der_len, &len_len) - 1;
if (len_byte < 0)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
*ret_len = len_byte + len_len + 1;
*bit_len = len_byte * 8 - der[len_len];
if (*bit_len <= 0)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
if (str_size >= len_byte)
memcpy (str, der + len_len + 1, len_byte);
}
| 165,177
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: jbig2_sd_count_referred(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment)
{
int index;
Jbig2Segment *rsegment;
int n_dicts = 0;
for (index = 0; index < segment->referred_to_segment_count; index++) {
rsegment = jbig2_find_segment(ctx, segment->referred_to_segments[index]);
if (rsegment && ((rsegment->flags & 63) == 0) &&
rsegment->result && (((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->n_symbols > 0) && ((*((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->glyphs) != NULL))
n_dicts++;
}
return (n_dicts);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
jbig2_sd_count_referred(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment)
{
int index;
Jbig2Segment *rsegment;
uint32_t n_dicts = 0;
for (index = 0; index < segment->referred_to_segment_count; index++) {
rsegment = jbig2_find_segment(ctx, segment->referred_to_segments[index]);
if (rsegment && ((rsegment->flags & 63) == 0) &&
rsegment->result && (((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->n_symbols > 0) && ((*((Jbig2SymbolDict *) rsegment->result)->glyphs) != NULL))
n_dicts++;
}
return (n_dicts);
}
| 165,500
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayer::setDataSource(
const sp<IMediaHTTPService> &httpService,
const char *url, const KeyedVector<String8, String8> *headers)
{
ALOGV("setDataSource(%s)", url);
status_t err = BAD_VALUE;
if (url != NULL) {
const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& service(getMediaPlayerService());
if (service != 0) {
sp<IMediaPlayer> player(service->create(this, mAudioSessionId));
if ((NO_ERROR != doSetRetransmitEndpoint(player)) ||
(NO_ERROR != player->setDataSource(httpService, url, headers))) {
player.clear();
}
err = attachNewPlayer(player);
}
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
status_t MediaPlayer::setDataSource(
const sp<IMediaHTTPService> &httpService,
const char *url, const KeyedVector<String8, String8> *headers)
{
ALOGV("setDataSource(%s)", url);
status_t err = BAD_VALUE;
if (url != NULL) {
const sp<IMediaPlayerService> service(getMediaPlayerService());
if (service != 0) {
sp<IMediaPlayer> player(service->create(this, mAudioSessionId));
if ((NO_ERROR != doSetRetransmitEndpoint(player)) ||
(NO_ERROR != player->setDataSource(httpService, url, headers))) {
player.clear();
}
err = attachNewPlayer(player);
}
}
return err;
}
| 173,537
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::LoadBlobAsync(
Blob* blob) {
loader_->Start(blob->GetBlobDataHandle());
}
Commit Message: Fix UAP in ImageBitmapLoader/FileReaderLoader
FileReaderLoader stores its client as a raw pointer, so in cases like
ImageBitmapLoader where the FileReaderLoaderClient really is garbage
collected we have to make sure to destroy the FileReaderLoader when
the ExecutionContext that owns it is destroyed.
Bug: 913970
Change-Id: I40b02115367cf7bf5bbbbb8e9b57874d2510f861
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374511
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616342}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::LoadBlobAsync(
void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::LoadBlobAsync(Blob* blob) {
loader_->Start(blob->GetBlobDataHandle());
}
| 173,068
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long long mkvparser::UnserializeUInt(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size)
{
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
if ((size <= 0) || (size > 8))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long long result = 0;
for (long long i = 0; i < size; ++i)
{
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long long mkvparser::UnserializeUInt(
if ((size_ != 4) && (size_ != 8))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long size = static_cast<long>(size_);
unsigned char buf[8];
const int status = pReader->Read(pos, size, buf);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 4) {
union {
float f;
unsigned long ff;
};
ff = 0;
for (int i = 0;;) {
ff |= buf[i];
if (++i >= 4)
break;
ff <<= 8;
}
result = f;
} else {
assert(size == 8);
union {
double d;
unsigned long long dd;
};
dd = 0;
for (int i = 0;;) {
dd |= buf[i];
if (++i >= 8)
break;
dd <<= 8;
}
result = d;
}
return 0;
}
| 174,450
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline signed int ReadPropertyMSBLong(const unsigned char **p,
size_t *length)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
signed int
signed_value;
} quantum;
int
c;
register ssize_t
i;
unsigned char
buffer[4];
size_t
value;
if (*length < 4)
return(-1);
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
c=(int) (*(*p)++);
(*length)--;
buffer[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
value=(size_t) (buffer[0] << 24);
value|=buffer[1] << 16;
value|=buffer[2] << 8;
value|=buffer[3];
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffffffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static inline signed int ReadPropertyMSBLong(const unsigned char **p,
size_t *length)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
signed int
signed_value;
} quantum;
int
c;
register ssize_t
i;
unsigned char
buffer[4];
unsigned int
value;
if (*length < 4)
return(-1);
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
c=(int) (*(*p)++);
(*length)--;
buffer[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
value=(unsigned int) buffer[0] << 24;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[1] << 16;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[2] << 8;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[3];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffffffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
| 169,952
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ssh_packet_set_compress_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int r;
const u_char *inblob, *outblob;
size_t inl, outl;
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &inblob, &inl)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &outblob, &outl)) != 0)
goto out;
if (inl == 0)
state->compression_in_started = 0;
else if (inl != sizeof(state->compression_in_stream)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
} else {
state->compression_in_started = 1;
memcpy(&state->compression_in_stream, inblob, inl);
}
if (outl == 0)
state->compression_out_started = 0;
else if (outl != sizeof(state->compression_out_stream)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
} else {
state->compression_out_started = 1;
memcpy(&state->compression_out_stream, outblob, outl);
}
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ssh_packet_set_compress_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
| 168,654
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::generatorObjectLocation(v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { object };
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = callDebuggerMethod("getGeneratorObjectLocation", 1, argv).ToLocalChecked();
if (!location->IsObject())
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = m_debuggerContext.Get(m_isolate);
if (!markAsInternal(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(location), V8InternalValueType::kLocation))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
return location;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
|
v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::generatorObjectLocation(v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::generatorObjectLocation(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { object };
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = callDebuggerMethod("getGeneratorObjectLocation", 1, argv).ToLocalChecked();
v8::Local<v8::Value> copied;
if (!copyValueFromDebuggerContext(m_isolate, debuggerContext(), context, location).ToLocal(&copied) || !copied->IsObject())
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!markAsInternal(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(copied), V8InternalValueType::kLocation))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
return copied;
}
| 172,067
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: RCMS *r_pkcs7_parse_cms (const ut8 *buffer, ut32 length) {
RASN1Object *object;
RCMS *container;
if (!buffer || !length) {
return NULL;
}
container = R_NEW0 (RCMS);
if (!container) {
return NULL;
}
object = r_asn1_create_object (buffer, length);
if (!object || object->list.length != 2 || !object->list.objects[0] || object->list.objects[1]->list.length != 1) {
r_asn1_free_object (object);
free (container);
return NULL;
}
container->contentType = r_asn1_stringify_oid (object->list.objects[0]->sector, object->list.objects[0]->length);
r_pkcs7_parse_signeddata (&container->signedData, object->list.objects[1]->list.objects[0]);
r_asn1_free_object (object);
return container;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7152 - Null deref in cms
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
RCMS *r_pkcs7_parse_cms (const ut8 *buffer, ut32 length) {
RASN1Object *object;
RCMS *container;
if (!buffer || !length) {
return NULL;
}
container = R_NEW0 (RCMS);
if (!container) {
return NULL;
}
object = r_asn1_create_object (buffer, length);
if (!object || object->list.length != 2 || !object->list.objects ||
!object->list.objects[0] || !object->list.objects[1] ||
object->list.objects[1]->list.length != 1) {
r_asn1_free_object (object);
free (container);
return NULL;
}
container->contentType = r_asn1_stringify_oid (object->list.objects[0]->sector, object->list.objects[0]->length);
r_pkcs7_parse_signeddata (&container->signedData, object->list.objects[1]->list.objects[0]);
r_asn1_free_object (object);
return container;
}
| 168,287
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: scoped_ptr<cc::CompositorFrame> SynchronousCompositorImpl::DemandDrawHw(
gfx::Size surface_size,
const gfx::Transform& transform,
gfx::Rect viewport,
gfx::Rect clip,
gfx::Rect viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
const gfx::Transform& transform_for_tile_priority) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(output_surface_);
DCHECK(begin_frame_source_);
scoped_ptr<cc::CompositorFrame> frame =
output_surface_->DemandDrawHw(surface_size,
transform,
viewport,
clip,
viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
transform_for_tile_priority);
if (frame.get())
UpdateFrameMetaData(frame->metadata);
return frame.Pass();
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
scoped_ptr<cc::CompositorFrame> SynchronousCompositorImpl::DemandDrawHw(
const gfx::Size& surface_size,
const gfx::Transform& transform,
const gfx::Rect& viewport,
const gfx::Rect& clip,
const gfx::Rect& viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
const gfx::Transform& transform_for_tile_priority) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(output_surface_);
DCHECK(begin_frame_source_);
scoped_ptr<cc::CompositorFrame> frame =
output_surface_->DemandDrawHw(surface_size,
transform,
viewport,
clip,
viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
transform_for_tile_priority);
if (frame.get())
UpdateFrameMetaData(frame->metadata);
return frame.Pass();
}
| 171,619
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void TearDownTestCase() {
vpx_free(input_ - 1);
input_ = NULL;
vpx_free(output_);
output_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void TearDownTestCase() {
vpx_free(input_ - 1);
input_ = NULL;
vpx_free(output_);
output_ = NULL;
vpx_free(output_ref_);
output_ref_ = NULL;
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
vpx_free(input16_ - 1);
input16_ = NULL;
vpx_free(output16_);
output16_ = NULL;
vpx_free(output16_ref_);
output16_ref_ = NULL;
#endif
}
| 174,507
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: lspci_process(STREAM s)
{
unsigned int pkglen;
static char *rest = NULL;
char *buf;
pkglen = s->end - s->p;
/* str_handle_lines requires null terminated strings */
buf = xmalloc(pkglen + 1);
STRNCPY(buf, (char *) s->p, pkglen + 1);
str_handle_lines(buf, &rest, lspci_process_line, NULL);
xfree(buf);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
lspci_process(STREAM s)
{
unsigned int pkglen;
static char *rest = NULL;
char *buf;
struct stream packet = *s;
if (!s_check(s))
{
rdp_protocol_error("lspci_process(), stream is in unstable state", &packet);
}
pkglen = s->end - s->p;
/* str_handle_lines requires null terminated strings */
buf = xmalloc(pkglen + 1);
STRNCPY(buf, (char *) s->p, pkglen + 1);
str_handle_lines(buf, &rest, lspci_process_line, NULL);
xfree(buf);
}
| 169,798
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: random_32(void)
{
for(;;)
{
png_byte mark[4];
png_uint_32 result;
store_pool_mark(mark);
result = png_get_uint_32(mark);
if (result != 0)
return result;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
random_32(void)
{
for (;;)
{
png_byte mark[4];
png_uint_32 result;
store_pool_mark(mark);
result = png_get_uint_32(mark);
if (result != 0)
return result;
}
}
| 173,687
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void HostCache::RecordSet(SetOutcome outcome,
base::TimeTicks now,
const Entry* old_entry,
const Entry& new_entry) {
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_ENUM("Set", outcome, MAX_SET_OUTCOME);
switch (outcome) {
case SET_INSERT:
case SET_UPDATE_VALID:
break;
case SET_UPDATE_STALE: {
EntryStaleness stale;
old_entry->GetStaleness(now, network_changes_, &stale);
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_TIME("UpdateStale.ExpiredBy", stale.expired_by);
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_COUNT("UpdateStale.NetworkChanges",
stale.network_changes);
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_COUNT("UpdateStale.StaleHits", stale.stale_hits);
if (old_entry->error() == OK && new_entry.error() == OK) {
AddressListDeltaType delta = FindAddressListDeltaType(
old_entry->addresses(), new_entry.addresses());
RecordUpdateStale(delta, stale);
}
break;
}
case MAX_SET_OUTCOME:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
CWE ID:
|
void HostCache::RecordSet(SetOutcome outcome,
base::TimeTicks now,
const Entry* old_entry,
const Entry& new_entry,
AddressListDeltaType delta) {
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_ENUM("Set", outcome, MAX_SET_OUTCOME);
switch (outcome) {
case SET_INSERT:
case SET_UPDATE_VALID:
break;
case SET_UPDATE_STALE: {
EntryStaleness stale;
old_entry->GetStaleness(now, network_changes_, &stale);
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_TIME("UpdateStale.ExpiredBy", stale.expired_by);
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_COUNT("UpdateStale.NetworkChanges",
stale.network_changes);
CACHE_HISTOGRAM_COUNT("UpdateStale.StaleHits", stale.stale_hits);
if (old_entry->error() == OK && new_entry.error() == OK) {
RecordUpdateStale(delta, stale);
}
break;
}
case MAX_SET_OUTCOME:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
| 172,008
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const Chapters::Atom* Chapters::Edition::GetAtom(int index) const
{
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
if (index >= m_atoms_count)
return NULL;
return m_atoms + index;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const Chapters::Atom* Chapters::Edition::GetAtom(int index) const
const Chapters::Display* Chapters::Atom::GetDisplay(int index) const {
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
if (index >= m_displays_count)
return NULL;
return m_displays + index;
}
| 174,281
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Response StorageHandler::UntrackIndexedDBForOrigin(const std::string& origin) {
if (!process_)
return Response::InternalError();
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid())
return Response::InvalidParams(origin + " is not a valid URL");
GetIndexedDBObserver()->TaskRunner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&IndexedDBObserver::UntrackOriginOnIDBThread,
base::Unretained(GetIndexedDBObserver()),
url::Origin::Create(origin_url)));
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
Response StorageHandler::UntrackIndexedDBForOrigin(const std::string& origin) {
if (!storage_partition_)
return Response::InternalError();
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid())
return Response::InvalidParams(origin + " is not a valid URL");
GetIndexedDBObserver()->TaskRunner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&IndexedDBObserver::UntrackOriginOnIDBThread,
base::Unretained(GetIndexedDBObserver()),
url::Origin::Create(origin_url)));
return Response::OK();
}
| 172,779
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: AccessControlStatus ScriptResource::CalculateAccessControlStatus() const {
if (GetCORSStatus() == CORSStatus::kServiceWorkerOpaque)
return kOpaqueResource;
if (IsSameOriginOrCORSSuccessful())
return kSharableCrossOrigin;
return kNotSharableCrossOrigin;
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
AccessControlStatus ScriptResource::CalculateAccessControlStatus() const {
AccessControlStatus ScriptResource::CalculateAccessControlStatus(
const SecurityOrigin* security_origin) const {
if (GetResponse().WasFetchedViaServiceWorker()) {
if (GetCORSStatus() == CORSStatus::kServiceWorkerOpaque)
return kOpaqueResource;
return kSharableCrossOrigin;
}
if (security_origin && PassesAccessControlCheck(*security_origin))
return kSharableCrossOrigin;
return kNotSharableCrossOrigin;
}
| 172,889
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .Xauthority in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: replace copy_file with copy_file_as_user
CWE ID: CWE-269
|
static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
| 170,095
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: KeyboardLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetKeyboardLibrary() {
return keyboard_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
KeyboardLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetKeyboardLibrary() {
| 170,624
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: smb_com_flush(smb_request_t *sr)
{
smb_ofile_t *file;
smb_llist_t *flist;
int rc;
if (smb_flush_required == 0) {
rc = smbsr_encode_empty_result(sr);
return ((rc == 0) ? SDRC_SUCCESS : SDRC_ERROR);
}
if (sr->smb_fid != 0xffff) {
smbsr_lookup_file(sr);
if (sr->fid_ofile == NULL) {
smbsr_error(sr, NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE,
ERRDOS, ERRbadfid);
return (SDRC_ERROR);
}
smb_flush_file(sr, sr->fid_ofile);
} else {
flist = &sr->tid_tree->t_ofile_list;
smb_llist_enter(flist, RW_READER);
file = smb_llist_head(flist);
while (file) {
mutex_enter(&file->f_mutex);
smb_flush_file(sr, file);
mutex_exit(&file->f_mutex);
file = smb_llist_next(flist, file);
}
smb_llist_exit(flist);
}
rc = smbsr_encode_empty_result(sr);
return ((rc == 0) ? SDRC_SUCCESS : SDRC_ERROR);
}
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <matt.barden@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <evan.layton@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
smb_com_flush(smb_request_t *sr)
{
smb_ofile_t *file;
smb_llist_t *flist;
int rc;
if (smb_flush_required == 0) {
rc = smbsr_encode_empty_result(sr);
return ((rc == 0) ? SDRC_SUCCESS : SDRC_ERROR);
}
if (sr->smb_fid != 0xffff) {
smbsr_lookup_file(sr);
if (sr->fid_ofile == NULL) {
smbsr_error(sr, NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE,
ERRDOS, ERRbadfid);
return (SDRC_ERROR);
}
smb_ofile_flush(sr, sr->fid_ofile);
} else {
flist = &sr->tid_tree->t_ofile_list;
smb_llist_enter(flist, RW_READER);
file = smb_llist_head(flist);
while (file) {
mutex_enter(&file->f_mutex);
smb_ofile_flush(sr, file);
mutex_exit(&file->f_mutex);
file = smb_llist_next(flist, file);
}
smb_llist_exit(flist);
}
rc = smbsr_encode_empty_result(sr);
return ((rc == 0) ? SDRC_SUCCESS : SDRC_ERROR);
}
| 168,826
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void xen_netbk_fill_frags(struct xen_netbk *netbk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
int nr_frags = shinfo->nr_frags;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_frags; i++) {
skb_frag_t *frag = shinfo->frags + i;
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp;
struct page *page;
u16 pending_idx;
pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(frag);
txp = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
page = virt_to_page(idx_to_kaddr(netbk, pending_idx));
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, txp->offset, txp->size);
skb->len += txp->size;
skb->data_len += txp->size;
skb->truesize += txp->size;
/* Take an extra reference to offset xen_netbk_idx_release */
get_page(netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx]);
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
}
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void xen_netbk_fill_frags(struct xen_netbk *netbk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
int nr_frags = shinfo->nr_frags;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_frags; i++) {
skb_frag_t *frag = shinfo->frags + i;
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp;
struct page *page;
u16 pending_idx;
pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(frag);
txp = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
page = virt_to_page(idx_to_kaddr(netbk, pending_idx));
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, txp->offset, txp->size);
skb->len += txp->size;
skb->data_len += txp->size;
skb->truesize += txp->size;
/* Take an extra reference to offset xen_netbk_idx_release */
get_page(netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx]);
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx, XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY);
}
}
| 166,167
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataSaverEnabledByUser() const {
//// static
if (params::ShouldForceEnableDataReductionProxy())
return true;
if (spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.GetPrefName().empty())
return false;
return spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.GetValue();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataSaverEnabledByUser() const {
//// static
bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataSaverEnabledByUser(PrefService* prefs) {
if (params::ShouldForceEnableDataReductionProxy())
return true;
return prefs && prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kDataSaverEnabled);
}
| 172,556
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool Cluster::EOS() const
//// long long element_size)
{
return (m_pSegment == NULL);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool Cluster::EOS() const
pEntry = NULL;
if (index < 0)
return -1; // generic error
if (m_entries_count < 0)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count <= m_entries_size);
if (index < m_entries_count) {
pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
return 1; // found entry
}
if (m_element_size < 0) // we don't know cluster end yet
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; // underflow
const long long element_stop = m_element_start + m_element_size;
if (m_pos >= element_stop)
return 0; // nothing left to parse
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL; // underflow, since more remains to be parsed
}
Cluster* Cluster::Create(Segment* pSegment, long idx, long long off)
//// long long element_size)
{
assert(pSegment);
assert(off >= 0);
const long long element_start = pSegment->m_start + off;
Cluster* const pCluster = new Cluster(pSegment, idx, element_start);
// element_size);
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
| 174,270
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: _gnutls_recv_handshake_header (gnutls_session_t session,
gnutls_handshake_description_t type,
gnutls_handshake_description_t * recv_type)
{
int ret;
uint32_t length32 = 0;
uint8_t *dataptr = NULL; /* for realloc */
size_t handshake_header_size = HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SIZE;
/* if we have data into the buffer then return them, do not read the next packet.
* In order to return we need a full TLS handshake header, or in case of a version 2
* packet, then we return the first byte.
*/
if (session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size ==
handshake_header_size || (session->internals.v2_hello != 0
&& type == GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO
&& session->internals.
handshake_header_buffer.packet_length > 0))
{
*recv_type = session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.recv_type;
return session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.packet_length;
}
ret =
_gnutls_handshake_io_recv_int (session, GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE,
type, dataptr, SSL2_HEADERS);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
/* The case ret==0 is caught here.
*/
if (ret != SSL2_HEADERS)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH;
}
session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size = SSL2_HEADERS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
_gnutls_recv_handshake_header (gnutls_session_t session,
gnutls_handshake_description_t type,
gnutls_handshake_description_t * recv_type)
{
int ret;
uint32_t length32 = 0;
uint8_t *dataptr = NULL; /* for realloc */
size_t handshake_header_size = HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SIZE;
/* if we have data into the buffer then return them, do not read the next packet.
* In order to return we need a full TLS handshake header, or in case of a version 2
* packet, then we return the first byte.
*/
if (session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size ==
handshake_header_size || (session->internals.v2_hello != 0
&& type == GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO
&& session->internals.
handshake_header_buffer.packet_length > 0))
{
*recv_type = session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.recv_type;
if (*recv_type != type)
{
gnutls_assert ();
_gnutls_handshake_log
("HSK[%x]: Handshake type mismatch (under attack?)\n", session);
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE_PACKET;
}
return session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.packet_length;
}
ret =
_gnutls_handshake_io_recv_int (session, GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE,
type, dataptr, SSL2_HEADERS);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
/* The case ret==0 is caught here.
*/
if (ret != SSL2_HEADERS)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH;
}
session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size = SSL2_HEADERS;
}
| 165,147
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: __ext4_set_acl(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, int type,
struct posix_acl *acl)
{
int name_index;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
int error;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
if (error < 0)
return error;
else {
inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
if (error == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
value = ext4_acl_to_disk(acl, &size);
if (IS_ERR(value))
return (int)PTR_ERR(value);
}
error = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, name_index, "",
value, size, 0);
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
|
__ext4_set_acl(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, int type,
struct posix_acl *acl)
{
int name_index;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
int error;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
if (error)
return error;
inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
value = ext4_acl_to_disk(acl, &size);
if (IS_ERR(value))
return (int)PTR_ERR(value);
}
error = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, name_index, "",
value, size, 0);
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
| 166,970
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void TearDown() {
delete[] src_;
delete[] ref_;
libvpx_test::ClearSystemState();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
virtual void TearDown() {
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
vpx_free(src_);
delete[] ref_;
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
vpx_free(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_));
delete[] CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_);
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
libvpx_test::ClearSystemState();
}
| 174,591
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long long mkvparser::UnserializeUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
if ((size <= 0) || (size > 8))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long long result = 0;
for (long long i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
long long mkvparser::UnserializeUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long UnserializeUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long long size) {
if (!pReader || pos < 0 || (size <= 0) || (size > 8))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long long result = 0;
for (long long i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
| 173,868
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(libvpx_test::VideoSource *video) {
frame_flags_ &= ~(VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_GF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF);
if (droppable_nframes_ > 0 &&
(cfg_.g_pass == VPX_RC_LAST_PASS || cfg_.g_pass == VPX_RC_ONE_PASS)) {
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < droppable_nframes_; ++i) {
if (droppable_frames_[i] == video->frame()) {
std::cout << " Encoding droppable frame: "
<< droppable_frames_[i] << "\n";
frame_flags_ |= (VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_GF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF);
return;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(libvpx_test::VideoSource *video) {
//
// Frame flags and layer id for temporal layers.
// For two layers, test pattern is:
// 1 3
// 0 2 .....
// LAST is updated on base/layer 0, GOLDEN updated on layer 1.
// Non-zero pattern_switch parameter means pattern will switch to
// not using LAST for frame_num >= pattern_switch.
int SetFrameFlags(int frame_num,
int num_temp_layers,
int pattern_switch) {
int frame_flags = 0;
if (num_temp_layers == 2) {
if (frame_num % 2 == 0) {
if (frame_num < pattern_switch || pattern_switch == 0) {
// Layer 0: predict from LAST and ARF, update LAST.
frame_flags = VP8_EFLAG_NO_REF_GF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_GF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF;
} else {
// Layer 0: predict from GF and ARF, update GF.
frame_flags = VP8_EFLAG_NO_REF_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF;
}
} else {
if (frame_num < pattern_switch || pattern_switch == 0) {
// Layer 1: predict from L, GF, and ARF, update GF.
frame_flags = VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST;
} else {
// Layer 1: predict from GF and ARF, update GF.
frame_flags = VP8_EFLAG_NO_REF_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF;
}
}
}
return frame_flags;
}
virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
frame_flags_ &= ~(VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_GF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF);
// For temporal layer case.
if (cfg_.ts_number_layers > 1) {
frame_flags_ = SetFrameFlags(video->frame(),
cfg_.ts_number_layers,
pattern_switch_);
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < droppable_nframes_; ++i) {
if (droppable_frames_[i] == video->frame()) {
std::cout << "Encoding droppable frame: "
<< droppable_frames_[i] << "\n";
}
}
} else {
if (droppable_nframes_ > 0 &&
(cfg_.g_pass == VPX_RC_LAST_PASS || cfg_.g_pass == VPX_RC_ONE_PASS)) {
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < droppable_nframes_; ++i) {
if (droppable_frames_[i] == video->frame()) {
std::cout << "Encoding droppable frame: "
<< droppable_frames_[i] << "\n";
frame_flags_ |= (VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_GF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF);
return;
}
}
}
}
}
| 174,542
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SocketStream::CheckPrivacyMode() {
if (context_.get() && context_->network_delegate()) {
bool enable = context_->network_delegate()->CanEnablePrivacyMode(url_,
url_);
privacy_mode_ = enable ? kPrivacyModeEnabled : kPrivacyModeDisabled;
if (enable)
server_ssl_config_.channel_id_enabled = false;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void SocketStream::CheckPrivacyMode() {
if (context_ && context_->network_delegate()) {
bool enable = context_->network_delegate()->CanEnablePrivacyMode(url_,
url_);
privacy_mode_ = enable ? kPrivacyModeEnabled : kPrivacyModeDisabled;
if (enable)
server_ssl_config_.channel_id_enabled = false;
}
}
| 171,251
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void bdt_enable(void)
{
bdt_log("ENABLE BT");
if (bt_enabled) {
bdt_log("Bluetooth is already enabled");
return;
}
status = sBtInterface->enable();
check_return_status(status);
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void bdt_enable(void)
{
bdt_log("ENABLE BT");
if (bt_enabled) {
bdt_log("Bluetooth is already enabled");
return;
}
status = sBtInterface->enable(false);
check_return_status(status);
}
| 173,555
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri = ri->d.ktri;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = ktri->pkey;
unsigned char *ek = NULL;
size_t eklen;
int ret = 0;
CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY);
return 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311
|
static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri = ri->d.ktri;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = ktri->pkey;
unsigned char *ek = NULL;
size_t eklen;
int ret = 0;
size_t fixlen = 0;
CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY);
return 0;
return 0;
}
| 165,137
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: explicit ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout(
const base::Callback<void(const SkBitmap&)>& image_decoded_callback)
: image_decoded_callback_(image_decoded_callback),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
explicit ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout(
| 171,953
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void *_zend_shared_memdup(void *source, size_t size, zend_bool free_source)
{
void *old_p, *retval;
if ((old_p = zend_hash_index_find_ptr(&xlat_table, (zend_ulong)source)) != NULL) {
/* we already duplicated this pointer */
return old_p;
}
retval = ZCG(mem);
ZCG(mem) = (void*)(((char*)ZCG(mem)) + ZEND_ALIGNED_SIZE(size));
memcpy(retval, source, size);
if (free_source) {
efree(source);
}
zend_shared_alloc_register_xlat_entry(source, retval);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void *_zend_shared_memdup(void *source, size_t size, zend_bool free_source)
{
void *old_p, *retval;
if ((old_p = zend_hash_index_find_ptr(&xlat_table, (zend_ulong)source)) != NULL) {
/* we already duplicated this pointer */
return old_p;
}
retval = ZCG(mem);
ZCG(mem) = (void*)(((char*)ZCG(mem)) + ZEND_ALIGNED_SIZE(size));
memcpy(retval, source, size);
zend_shared_alloc_register_xlat_entry(source, retval);
if (free_source) {
efree(source);
}
return retval;
}
| 164,770
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void IOHandler::Read(
const std::string& handle,
Maybe<int> offset,
Maybe<int> max_size,
std::unique_ptr<ReadCallback> callback) {
static const size_t kDefaultChunkSize = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
static const char kBlobPrefix[] = "blob:";
scoped_refptr<DevToolsIOContext::ROStream> stream =
io_context_->GetByHandle(handle);
if (!stream && process_host_ &&
StartsWith(handle, kBlobPrefix, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
BrowserContext* browser_context = process_host_->GetBrowserContext();
ChromeBlobStorageContext* blob_context =
ChromeBlobStorageContext::GetFor(browser_context);
StoragePartition* storage_partition = process_host_->GetStoragePartition();
std::string uuid = handle.substr(strlen(kBlobPrefix));
stream =
io_context_->OpenBlob(blob_context, storage_partition, handle, uuid);
}
if (!stream) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams("Invalid stream handle"));
return;
}
stream->Read(
offset.fromMaybe(-1), max_size.fromMaybe(kDefaultChunkSize),
base::BindOnce(&IOHandler::ReadComplete, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::Passed(std::move(callback))));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void IOHandler::Read(
const std::string& handle,
Maybe<int> offset,
Maybe<int> max_size,
std::unique_ptr<ReadCallback> callback) {
static const size_t kDefaultChunkSize = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
static const char kBlobPrefix[] = "blob:";
scoped_refptr<DevToolsIOContext::ROStream> stream =
io_context_->GetByHandle(handle);
if (!stream && browser_context_ &&
StartsWith(handle, kBlobPrefix, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
ChromeBlobStorageContext* blob_context =
ChromeBlobStorageContext::GetFor(browser_context_);
std::string uuid = handle.substr(strlen(kBlobPrefix));
stream =
io_context_->OpenBlob(blob_context, storage_partition_, handle, uuid);
}
if (!stream) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams("Invalid stream handle"));
return;
}
stream->Read(
offset.fromMaybe(-1), max_size.fromMaybe(kDefaultChunkSize),
base::BindOnce(&IOHandler::ReadComplete, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::Passed(std::move(callback))));
}
| 172,750
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateStringArray( const char **strings, int count )
{
int i;
cJSON *n = 0, *p = 0, *a = cJSON_CreateArray();
for ( i = 0; a && i < count; ++i ) {
n = cJSON_CreateString( strings[i] );
if ( ! i )
a->child = n;
else
suffix_object( p, n );
p = n;
}
return a;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
cJSON *cJSON_CreateStringArray( const char **strings, int count )
cJSON *cJSON_CreateNull(void) {cJSON *item=cJSON_New_Item();if(item)item->type=cJSON_NULL;return item;}
cJSON *cJSON_CreateTrue(void) {cJSON *item=cJSON_New_Item();if(item)item->type=cJSON_True;return item;}
cJSON *cJSON_CreateFalse(void) {cJSON *item=cJSON_New_Item();if(item)item->type=cJSON_False;return item;}
cJSON *cJSON_CreateBool(int b) {cJSON *item=cJSON_New_Item();if(item)item->type=b?cJSON_True:cJSON_False;return item;}
cJSON *cJSON_CreateNumber(double num) {cJSON *item=cJSON_New_Item();if(item){item->type=cJSON_Number;item->valuedouble=num;item->valueint=(int64_t)num;}return item;}
cJSON *cJSON_CreateString(const char *string) {cJSON *item=cJSON_New_Item();if(item){item->type=cJSON_String;item->valuestring=cJSON_strdup(string);if(!item->valuestring){cJSON_Delete(item);return 0;}}return item;}
cJSON *cJSON_CreateArray(void) {cJSON *item=cJSON_New_Item();if(item)item->type=cJSON_Array;return item;}
cJSON *cJSON_CreateObject(void) {cJSON *item=cJSON_New_Item();if(item)item->type=cJSON_Object;return item;}
/* Create Arrays: */
cJSON *cJSON_CreateIntArray(const int *numbers,int count) {int i;cJSON *n=0,*p=0,*a=cJSON_CreateArray();for(i=0;a && i<count;i++){n=cJSON_CreateNumber(numbers[i]);if(!n){cJSON_Delete(a);return 0;}if(!i)a->child=n;else suffix_object(p,n);p=n;}return a;}
cJSON *cJSON_CreateFloatArray(const float *numbers,int count) {int i;cJSON *n=0,*p=0,*a=cJSON_CreateArray();for(i=0;a && i<count;i++){n=cJSON_CreateNumber(numbers[i]);if(!n){cJSON_Delete(a);return 0;}if(!i)a->child=n;else suffix_object(p,n);p=n;}return a;}
cJSON *cJSON_CreateDoubleArray(const double *numbers,int count) {int i;cJSON *n=0,*p=0,*a=cJSON_CreateArray();for(i=0;a && i<count;i++){n=cJSON_CreateNumber(numbers[i]);if(!n){cJSON_Delete(a);return 0;}if(!i)a->child=n;else suffix_object(p,n);p=n;}return a;}
cJSON *cJSON_CreateStringArray(const char **strings,int count) {int i;cJSON *n=0,*p=0,*a=cJSON_CreateArray();for(i=0;a && i<count;i++){n=cJSON_CreateString(strings[i]);if(!n){cJSON_Delete(a);return 0;}if(!i)a->child=n;else suffix_object(p,n);p=n;}return a;}
/* Duplication */
cJSON *cJSON_Duplicate(cJSON *item,int recurse)
{
cJSON *newitem,*cptr,*nptr=0,*newchild;
/* Bail on bad ptr */
if (!item) return 0;
/* Create new item */
newitem=cJSON_New_Item();
if (!newitem) return 0;
/* Copy over all vars */
newitem->type=item->type&(~cJSON_IsReference),newitem->valueint=item->valueint,newitem->valuedouble=item->valuedouble;
if (item->valuestring) {newitem->valuestring=cJSON_strdup(item->valuestring); if (!newitem->valuestring) {cJSON_Delete(newitem);return 0;}}
if (item->string) {newitem->string=cJSON_strdup(item->string); if (!newitem->string) {cJSON_Delete(newitem);return 0;}}
/* If non-recursive, then we're done! */
if (!recurse) return newitem;
/* Walk the ->next chain for the child. */
cptr=item->child;
while (cptr)
{
newchild=cJSON_Duplicate(cptr,1); /* Duplicate (with recurse) each item in the ->next chain */
if (!newchild) {cJSON_Delete(newitem);return 0;}
if (nptr) {nptr->next=newchild,newchild->prev=nptr;nptr=newchild;} /* If newitem->child already set, then crosswire ->prev and ->next and move on */
else {newitem->child=newchild;nptr=newchild;} /* Set newitem->child and move to it */
cptr=cptr->next;
}
return newitem;
}
void cJSON_Minify(char *json)
{
char *into=json;
while (*json)
{
if (*json==' ') json++;
else if (*json=='\t') json++; /* Whitespace characters. */
else if (*json=='\r') json++;
else if (*json=='\n') json++;
else if (*json=='/' && json[1]=='/') while (*json && *json!='\n') json++; /* double-slash comments, to end of line. */
else if (*json=='/' && json[1]=='*') {while (*json && !(*json=='*' && json[1]=='/')) json++;json+=2;} /* multiline comments. */
else if (*json=='\"'){*into++=*json++;while (*json && *json!='\"'){if (*json=='\\') *into++=*json++;*into++=*json++;}*into++=*json++;} /* string literals, which are \" sensitive. */
else *into++=*json++; /* All other characters. */
}
*into=0; /* and null-terminate. */
}
| 167,279
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool AXARIAGridCell::isAriaColumnHeader() const {
const AtomicString& role = getAttribute(HTMLNames::roleAttr);
return equalIgnoringCase(role, "columnheader");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
bool AXARIAGridCell::isAriaColumnHeader() const {
const AtomicString& role = getAttribute(HTMLNames::roleAttr);
return equalIgnoringASCIICase(role, "columnheader");
}
| 171,901
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BaseRenderingContext2D::BaseRenderingContext2D()
: clip_antialiasing_(kNotAntiAliased) {
state_stack_.push_back(CanvasRenderingContext2DState::Create());
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
BaseRenderingContext2D::BaseRenderingContext2D()
: clip_antialiasing_(kNotAntiAliased), origin_tainted_by_content_(false) {
state_stack_.push_back(CanvasRenderingContext2DState::Create());
}
| 172,904
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ImageTransportClientTexture(
WebKit::WebGraphicsContext3D* host_context,
const gfx::Size& size,
float device_scale_factor,
uint64 surface_id)
: ui::Texture(true, size, device_scale_factor),
host_context_(host_context),
texture_id_(surface_id) {
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
ImageTransportClientTexture(
| 171,362
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void XMLHttpRequest::didTimeout()
{
RefPtr<XMLHttpRequest> protect(this);
internalAbort();
clearResponse();
clearRequest();
m_error = true;
m_exceptionCode = TimeoutError;
if (!m_async) {
m_state = DONE;
m_exceptionCode = TimeoutError;
return;
}
changeState(DONE);
if (!m_uploadComplete) {
m_uploadComplete = true;
if (m_upload && m_uploadEventsAllowed)
m_upload->dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().timeoutEvent));
}
m_progressEventThrottle.dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().timeoutEvent));
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void XMLHttpRequest::didTimeout()
void XMLHttpRequest::handleDidTimeout()
{
RefPtr<XMLHttpRequest> protect(this);
internalAbort();
m_exceptionCode = TimeoutError;
handleDidFailGeneric();
if (!m_async) {
m_state = DONE;
return;
}
changeState(DONE);
dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(eventNames().timeoutEvent);
}
| 171,167
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const wchar_t* GetIntegrityLevelString(IntegrityLevel integrity_level) {
switch (integrity_level) {
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_SYSTEM:
return L"S-1-16-16384";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_HIGH:
return L"S-1-16-12288";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM:
return L"S-1-16-8192";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM_LOW:
return L"S-1-16-6144";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW:
return L"S-1-16-4096";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_BELOW_LOW:
return L"S-1-16-2048";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST:
return NULL;
}
NOTREACHED();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
const wchar_t* GetIntegrityLevelString(IntegrityLevel integrity_level) {
switch (integrity_level) {
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_SYSTEM:
return L"S-1-16-16384";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_HIGH:
return L"S-1-16-12288";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM:
return L"S-1-16-8192";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM_LOW:
return L"S-1-16-6144";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW:
return L"S-1-16-4096";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_BELOW_LOW:
return L"S-1-16-2048";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED:
return L"S-1-16-0";
case INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST:
return NULL;
}
NOTREACHED();
return NULL;
}
| 170,913
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps)
{
int start = 0;
u32 prev_legacy, cur_legacy;
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
prev_legacy = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
cur_legacy = ps->flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
if (!prev_legacy && cur_legacy)
start = 1;
memcpy(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels, &ps->channels,
sizeof(kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels));
kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags = ps->flags;
kvm_pit_load_count(kvm, 0, kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels[0].count, start);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
|
static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps)
{
int start = 0;
int i;
u32 prev_legacy, cur_legacy;
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
prev_legacy = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
cur_legacy = ps->flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
if (!prev_legacy && cur_legacy)
start = 1;
memcpy(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels, &ps->channels,
sizeof(kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels));
kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags = ps->flags;
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
kvm_pit_load_count(kvm, i, kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels[i].count, start);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
return 0;
}
| 167,561
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
debug3("%s", __func__);
authctxt->user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
buffer_clear(m);
if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
buffer_put_int(m, 1);
} else {
buffer_put_int(m, 0);
}
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
debug3("%s", __func__);
sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
buffer_clear(m);
if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
buffer_put_int(m, 1);
} else {
buffer_put_int(m, 0);
}
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
return (0);
}
| 166,585
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void TestingPlatformSupport::cryptographicallyRandomValues(unsigned char* buffer, size_t length)
{
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310
|
void TestingPlatformSupport::cryptographicallyRandomValues(unsigned char* buffer, size_t length)
{
RELEASE_ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
| 172,239
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: get_control(png_const_structrp png_ptr)
{
/* This just returns the (file*). The chunk and idat control structures
* don't always exist.
*/
struct control *control = png_voidcast(struct control*,
png_get_error_ptr(png_ptr));
return &control->file;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
get_control(png_const_structrp png_ptr)
{
/* This just returns the (file*). The chunk and idat control structures
* don't always exist.
*/
struct control *control = voidcast(struct control*,
png_get_error_ptr(png_ptr));
return &control->file;
}
| 173,732
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_16_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(colour_type)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
/* expand_16 does something unless the bit depth is already 16. */
return bit_depth < 16;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_png_set_expand_16_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(colour_type)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
/* expand_16 does something unless the bit depth is already 16. */
return bit_depth < 16;
}
| 173,626
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static double calcerr(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* Error in the linear composition arithmetic - only relevant when
* composition actually happens (0 < alpha < 1).
*/
if ((pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
return pm->maxcalc16;
else if (pm->assume_16_bit_calculations)
return pm->maxcalcG;
else
return pm->maxcalc8;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
static double calcerr(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
static double calcerr(const png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* Error in the linear composition arithmetic - only relevant when
* composition actually happens (0 < alpha < 1).
*/
if ((pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
return pm->maxcalc16;
else if (pm->assume_16_bit_calculations)
return pm->maxcalcG;
else
return pm->maxcalc8;
}
| 173,604
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static double outlog(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* The command line parameters are either 8 bit (0..255) or 16 bit (0..65535)
* and so must be adjusted for low bit depth grayscale:
*/
if (out_depth <= 8)
{
if (pm->log8 == 0) /* switched off */
return 256;
if (out_depth < 8)
return pm->log8 / 255 * ((1<<out_depth)-1);
return pm->log8;
}
if ((pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
{
if (pm->log16 == 0)
return 65536;
return pm->log16;
}
/* This is the case where the value was calculated at 8-bit precision then
* scaled to 16 bits.
*/
if (pm->log8 == 0)
return 65536;
return pm->log8 * 257;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
static double outlog(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
static double outlog(const png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* The command line parameters are either 8 bit (0..255) or 16 bit (0..65535)
* and so must be adjusted for low bit depth grayscale:
*/
if (out_depth <= 8)
{
if (pm->log8 == 0) /* switched off */
return 256;
if (out_depth < 8)
return pm->log8 / 255 * ((1<<out_depth)-1);
return pm->log8;
}
if ((pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
{
if (pm->log16 == 0)
return 65536;
return pm->log16;
}
/* This is the case where the value was calculated at 8-bit precision then
* scaled to 16 bits.
*/
if (pm->log8 == 0)
return 65536;
return pm->log8 * 257;
}
| 173,675
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AutofillDialogViews::SectionContainer::SetActive(bool active) {
bool is_active = active && proxy_button_->visible();
if (is_active == !!background())
return;
set_background(is_active ?
views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kShadingColor) :
NULL);
SchedulePaint();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void AutofillDialogViews::SectionContainer::SetActive(bool active) {
bool is_active = active && proxy_button_->visible();
if (is_active == !!background())
return;
set_background(
is_active ? views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kLightShadingColor)
: NULL);
SchedulePaint();
}
| 171,140
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_pixel_setf(image_pixel *this, unsigned int max)
{
this->redf = this->red / (double)max;
this->greenf = this->green / (double)max;
this->bluef = this->blue / (double)max;
this->alphaf = this->alpha / (double)max;
if (this->red < max)
this->rede = this->redf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->rede = 0;
if (this->green < max)
this->greene = this->greenf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->greene = 0;
if (this->blue < max)
this->bluee = this->bluef * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->bluee = 0;
if (this->alpha < max)
this->alphae = this->alphaf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->alphae = 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_pixel_setf(image_pixel *this, unsigned int max)
image_pixel_setf(image_pixel *this, unsigned int rMax, unsigned int gMax,
unsigned int bMax, unsigned int aMax)
{
this->redf = this->red / (double)rMax;
this->greenf = this->green / (double)gMax;
this->bluef = this->blue / (double)bMax;
this->alphaf = this->alpha / (double)aMax;
if (this->red < rMax)
this->rede = this->redf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->rede = 0;
if (this->green < gMax)
this->greene = this->greenf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->greene = 0;
if (this->blue < bMax)
this->bluee = this->bluef * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->bluee = 0;
if (this->alpha < aMax)
this->alphae = this->alphaf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->alphae = 0;
}
| 173,618
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int php_stream_memory_stat(php_stream *stream, php_stream_statbuf *ssb TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
time_t timestamp = 0;
php_stream_memory_data *ms = (php_stream_memory_data*)stream->abstract;
assert(ms != NULL);
memset(ssb, 0, sizeof(php_stream_statbuf));
/* read-only across the board */
ssb->sb.st_mode = ms->mode & TEMP_STREAM_READONLY ? 0444 : 0666;
ssb->sb.st_size = ms->fsize;
ssb->sb.st_mode |= S_IFREG; /* regular file */
#ifdef NETWARE
ssb->sb.st_mtime.tv_sec = timestamp;
ssb->sb.st_atime.tv_sec = timestamp;
ssb->sb.st_ctime.tv_sec = timestamp;
#else
ssb->sb.st_mtime = timestamp;
ssb->sb.st_atime = timestamp;
ssb->sb.st_ctime = timestamp;
#endif
ssb->sb.st_nlink = 1;
ssb->sb.st_rdev = -1;
/* this is only for APC, so use /dev/null device - no chance of conflict there! */
ssb->sb.st_dev = 0xC;
/* generate unique inode number for alias/filename, so no phars will conflict */
ssb->sb.st_ino = 0;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
ssb->sb.st_blksize = -1;
#endif
#if !defined(PHP_WIN32) && !defined(__BEOS__)
ssb->sb.st_blocks = -1;
#endif
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int php_stream_memory_stat(php_stream *stream, php_stream_statbuf *ssb TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
time_t timestamp = 0;
php_stream_memory_data *ms = (php_stream_memory_data*)stream->abstract;
assert(ms != NULL);
memset(ssb, 0, sizeof(php_stream_statbuf));
/* read-only across the board */
ssb->sb.st_mode = ms->mode & TEMP_STREAM_READONLY ? 0444 : 0666;
ssb->sb.st_size = ms->fsize;
ssb->sb.st_mode |= S_IFREG; /* regular file */
#ifdef NETWARE
ssb->sb.st_mtime.tv_sec = timestamp;
ssb->sb.st_atime.tv_sec = timestamp;
ssb->sb.st_ctime.tv_sec = timestamp;
#else
ssb->sb.st_mtime = timestamp;
ssb->sb.st_atime = timestamp;
ssb->sb.st_ctime = timestamp;
#endif
ssb->sb.st_nlink = 1;
ssb->sb.st_rdev = -1;
/* this is only for APC, so use /dev/null device - no chance of conflict there! */
ssb->sb.st_dev = 0xC;
/* generate unique inode number for alias/filename, so no phars will conflict */
ssb->sb.st_ino = 0;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
ssb->sb.st_blksize = -1;
#endif
#if !defined(PHP_WIN32) && !defined(__BEOS__)
ssb->sb.st_blocks = -1;
#endif
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
| 165,477
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CanOnlyDiscardOnceTest(DiscardReason reason) {
LifecycleUnit* background_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* foreground_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &background_lifecycle_unit,
&foreground_lifecycle_unit);
content::WebContents* initial_web_contents =
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0);
ExpectCanDiscardTrueAllReasons(background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, true));
background_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_NE(initial_web_contents, tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0));
EXPECT_FALSE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, false));
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetController().Reload(
content::ReloadType::NORMAL, false);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_TRUE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivial(background_lifecycle_unit,
DiscardReason::kExternal);
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivial(background_lifecycle_unit,
DiscardReason::kProactive);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ExpectCanDiscardTrue(background_lifecycle_unit, DiscardReason::kUrgent);
#else
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivial(background_lifecycle_unit,
DiscardReason::kUrgent);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
|
void CanOnlyDiscardOnceTest(DiscardReason reason) {
LifecycleUnit* background_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* foreground_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &background_lifecycle_unit,
&foreground_lifecycle_unit);
content::WebContents* initial_web_contents =
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0);
ExpectCanDiscardTrueAllReasons(background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(::testing::_, true));
background_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
::testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_NE(initial_web_contents, tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0));
EXPECT_FALSE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(::testing::_, false));
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetController().Reload(
content::ReloadType::NORMAL, false);
::testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_TRUE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivial(background_lifecycle_unit,
DiscardReason::kExternal);
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivial(background_lifecycle_unit,
DiscardReason::kProactive);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ExpectCanDiscardTrue(background_lifecycle_unit, DiscardReason::kUrgent);
#else
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivial(background_lifecycle_unit,
DiscardReason::kUrgent);
#endif
}
| 172,220
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Document::open(Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support open().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use open().");
return;
}
if (entered_document) {
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPortAndSuborigin(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call open() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
SetSecurityOrigin(entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin());
if (this != entered_document) {
KURL new_url = entered_document->Url();
new_url.SetFragmentIdentifier(String());
SetURL(new_url);
}
cookie_url_ = entered_document->CookieURL();
}
open();
}
Commit Message: Inherit referrer and policy when creating a nested browsing context
BUG=763194
R=estark@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ide3950269adf26ba221f573dfa088e95291ab676
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/732652
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark <estark@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511211}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void Document::open(Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support open().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use open().");
return;
}
if (entered_document) {
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPortAndSuborigin(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call open() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
SetSecurityOrigin(entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin());
if (this != entered_document) {
KURL new_url = entered_document->Url();
new_url.SetFragmentIdentifier(String());
SetURL(new_url);
SetReferrerPolicy(entered_document->GetReferrerPolicy());
}
cookie_url_ = entered_document->CookieURL();
}
open();
}
| 172,691
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: get_cdtext_generic (void *p_user_data)
{
generic_img_private_t *p_env = p_user_data;
uint8_t *p_cdtext_data = NULL;
size_t len;
if (!p_env) return NULL;
if (p_env->b_cdtext_error) return NULL;
if (NULL == p_env->cdtext) {
p_cdtext_data = read_cdtext_generic (p_env);
if (NULL != p_cdtext_data) {
len = CDIO_MMC_GET_LEN16(p_cdtext_data)-2;
p_env->cdtext = cdtext_init();
if(len <= 0 || 0 != cdtext_data_init (p_env->cdtext, &p_cdtext_data[4], len)) {
p_env->b_cdtext_error = true;
cdtext_destroy (p_env->cdtext);
free(p_env->cdtext);
p_env->cdtext = NULL;
}
}
free(p_cdtext_data);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-415
|
get_cdtext_generic (void *p_user_data)
{
generic_img_private_t *p_env = p_user_data;
uint8_t *p_cdtext_data = NULL;
size_t len;
if (!p_env) return NULL;
if (p_env->b_cdtext_error) return NULL;
if (NULL == p_env->cdtext) {
p_cdtext_data = read_cdtext_generic (p_env);
if (NULL != p_cdtext_data) {
len = CDIO_MMC_GET_LEN16(p_cdtext_data)-2;
p_env->cdtext = cdtext_init();
if(len <= 0 || 0 != cdtext_data_init (p_env->cdtext, &p_cdtext_data[4], len)) {
p_env->b_cdtext_error = true;
free(p_env->cdtext);
p_env->cdtext = NULL;
}
}
free(p_cdtext_data);
}
}
| 165,370
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
int ok = 0;
BIGNUM *q = NULL;
*ret = 0;
q = BN_new();
if (q == NULL)
goto err;
BN_set_word(q, 1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
BN_copy(q, dh->p);
BN_sub_word(q, 1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) >= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
ok = 1;
err:
if (q != NULL)
BN_free(q);
return (ok);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
int ok = 0;
BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
*ret = 0;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto err;
BN_set_word(tmp, 1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
BN_copy(tmp, dh->p);
BN_sub_word(tmp, 1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) >= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
if (dh->q != NULL) {
/* Check pub_key^q == 1 mod p */
if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_is_one(tmp))
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return (ok);
}
| 165,258
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintingMessageFilter::OnUpdatePrintSettings(
int document_cookie, const DictionaryValue& job_settings,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
scoped_refptr<printing::PrinterQuery> printer_query;
print_job_manager_->PopPrinterQuery(document_cookie, &printer_query);
if (printer_query.get()) {
CancelableTask* task = NewRunnableMethod(
this,
&PrintingMessageFilter::OnUpdatePrintSettingsReply,
printer_query,
reply_msg);
printer_query->SetSettings(job_settings, task);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void PrintingMessageFilter::OnUpdatePrintSettings(
int document_cookie, const DictionaryValue& job_settings,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
scoped_refptr<printing::PrinterQuery> printer_query;
if (!print_job_manager_->printing_enabled()) {
// Reply with NULL query.
OnUpdatePrintSettingsReply(printer_query, reply_msg);
return;
}
print_job_manager_->PopPrinterQuery(document_cookie, &printer_query);
if (!printer_query.get())
printer_query = new printing::PrinterQuery;
CancelableTask* task = NewRunnableMethod(
this,
&PrintingMessageFilter::OnUpdatePrintSettingsReply,
printer_query,
reply_msg);
printer_query->SetSettings(job_settings, task);
}
| 170,255
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_socket(struct sock *sk,
struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct dst_entry *dst;
memset(fl6, 0, sizeof(*fl6));
fl6->flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
fl6->daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6->saddr = np->saddr;
fl6->flowlabel = np->flow_label;
IP6_ECN_flow_xmit(sk, fl6->flowlabel);
fl6->flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6->flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6->fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
fl6->fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6));
final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
dst = __inet6_csk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (!dst) {
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, final_p);
if (!IS_ERR(dst))
__inet6_csk_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
}
return dst;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
static struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_socket(struct sock *sk,
struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct dst_entry *dst;
memset(fl6, 0, sizeof(*fl6));
fl6->flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
fl6->daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6->saddr = np->saddr;
fl6->flowlabel = np->flow_label;
IP6_ECN_flow_xmit(sk, fl6->flowlabel);
fl6->flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6->flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6->fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
fl6->fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6));
rcu_read_lock();
final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
rcu_read_unlock();
dst = __inet6_csk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (!dst) {
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, final_p);
if (!IS_ERR(dst))
__inet6_csk_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
}
return dst;
}
| 167,333
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int GetAvailableDraftPageCount() {
int page_data_map_size = page_data_map_.size();
if (page_data_map_.find(printing::COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX) !=
page_data_map_.end()) {
page_data_map_size--;
}
return page_data_map_size;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
int GetAvailableDraftPageCount() {
int page_data_map_size = page_data_map_.size();
if (ContainsKey(page_data_map_, printing::COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX))
page_data_map_size--;
return page_data_map_size;
}
| 170,819
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool BaseSettingChange::Init(Profile* profile) {
DCHECK(profile);
profile_ = profile;
return true;
}
Commit Message: [protector] Refactoring of --no-protector code.
*) On DSE change, new provider is not pushed to Sync.
*) Simplified code in BrowserInit.
BUG=None
TEST=protector.py
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10065016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132398 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool BaseSettingChange::Init(Profile* profile) {
DCHECK(profile && !profile_);
profile_ = profile;
return true;
}
| 170,756
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_accept_from_http)
{
UEnumeration *available;
char *http_accept = NULL;
int http_accept_len;
UErrorCode status = 0;
int len;
char resultLocale[INTL_MAX_LOCALE_LEN+1];
UAcceptResult outResult;
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &http_accept, &http_accept_len) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_accept_from_http: unable to parse input parameters", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
available = ures_openAvailableLocales(NULL, &status);
INTL_CHECK_STATUS(status, "locale_accept_from_http: failed to retrieve locale list");
len = uloc_acceptLanguageFromHTTP(resultLocale, INTL_MAX_LOCALE_LEN,
&outResult, http_accept, available, &status);
uenum_close(available);
INTL_CHECK_STATUS(status, "locale_accept_from_http: failed to find acceptable locale");
if (len < 0 || outResult == ULOC_ACCEPT_FAILED) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(resultLocale, len, 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
PHP_FUNCTION(locale_accept_from_http)
{
UEnumeration *available;
char *http_accept = NULL;
int http_accept_len;
UErrorCode status = 0;
int len;
char resultLocale[INTL_MAX_LOCALE_LEN+1];
UAcceptResult outResult;
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &http_accept, &http_accept_len) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_accept_from_http: unable to parse input parameters", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
available = ures_openAvailableLocales(NULL, &status);
INTL_CHECK_STATUS(status, "locale_accept_from_http: failed to retrieve locale list");
len = uloc_acceptLanguageFromHTTP(resultLocale, INTL_MAX_LOCALE_LEN,
&outResult, http_accept, available, &status);
uenum_close(available);
INTL_CHECK_STATUS(status, "locale_accept_from_http: failed to find acceptable locale");
if (len < 0 || outResult == ULOC_ACCEPT_FAILED) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(resultLocale, len, 1);
}
| 167,195
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY DeleteSecurityContext(PCtxtHandle phContext)
{
char* Name;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
SecurityFunctionTableA* table;
Name = (char*) sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(phContext);
if (!Name)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
table = sspi_GetSecurityFunctionTableAByNameA(Name);
if (!table)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
if (table->DeleteSecurityContext == NULL)
return SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION;
status = table->DeleteSecurityContext(phContext);
return status;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY DeleteSecurityContext(PCtxtHandle phContext)
{
char* Name = NULL;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
SecurityFunctionTableA* table;
Name = (char*) sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(phContext);
if (!Name)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
table = sspi_GetSecurityFunctionTableAByNameA(Name);
if (!table)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
if (table->DeleteSecurityContext == NULL)
return SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION;
status = table->DeleteSecurityContext(phContext);
return status;
}
| 167,603
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GpuChannel::OnInitialize(base::ProcessHandle renderer_process) {
DCHECK(!renderer_process_);
if (base::GetProcId(renderer_process) == renderer_pid_)
renderer_process_ = renderer_process;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void GpuChannel::OnInitialize(base::ProcessHandle renderer_process) {
| 170,934
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Cues::PreloadCuePoint(long& cue_points_size, long long pos) const {
assert(m_count == 0);
if (m_preload_count >= cue_points_size) {
const long n = (cue_points_size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2 * cue_points_size;
CuePoint** const qq = new CuePoint* [n];
CuePoint** q = qq; // beginning of target
CuePoint** p = m_cue_points; // beginning of source
CuePoint** const pp = p + m_preload_count; // end of source
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_cue_points;
m_cue_points = qq;
cue_points_size = n;
}
CuePoint* const pCP = new CuePoint(m_preload_count, pos);
m_cue_points[m_preload_count++] = pCP;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void Cues::PreloadCuePoint(long& cue_points_size, long long pos) const {
bool Cues::PreloadCuePoint(long& cue_points_size, long long pos) const {
if (m_count != 0)
return false;
if (m_preload_count >= cue_points_size) {
const long n = (cue_points_size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2 * cue_points_size;
CuePoint** const qq = new (std::nothrow) CuePoint*[n];
if (qq == NULL)
return false;
CuePoint** q = qq; // beginning of target
CuePoint** p = m_cue_points; // beginning of source
CuePoint** const pp = p + m_preload_count; // end of source
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_cue_points;
m_cue_points = qq;
cue_points_size = n;
}
CuePoint* const pCP = new (std::nothrow) CuePoint(m_preload_count, pos);
if (pCP == NULL)
return false;
m_cue_points[m_preload_count++] = pCP;
return true;
}
| 173,861
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::useGraphicBuffer2_l(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer) {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetParameter(mHandle, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition;
CLOG_ERROR(getParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u",
asString(index), index, portString(portIndex), portIndex);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = new BufferMeta(graphicBuffer);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = NULL;
OMX_U8* bufferHandle = const_cast<OMX_U8*>(
reinterpret_cast<const OMX_U8*>(graphicBuffer->handle));
err = OMX_UseBuffer(
mHandle,
&header,
portIndex,
bufferMeta,
def.nBufferSize,
bufferHandle);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, err, BUFFER_FMT(portIndex, "%u@%p", def.nBufferSize, bufferHandle));
delete bufferMeta;
bufferMeta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pBuffer, bufferHandle);
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, bufferMeta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
CLOG_BUFFER(useGraphicBuffer2, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%u@%p", def.nBufferSize, bufferHandle));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::useGraphicBuffer2_l(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer) {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetParameter(mHandle, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition;
CLOG_ERROR(getParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u",
asString(index), index, portString(portIndex), portIndex);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = new BufferMeta(graphicBuffer, portIndex);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = NULL;
OMX_U8* bufferHandle = const_cast<OMX_U8*>(
reinterpret_cast<const OMX_U8*>(graphicBuffer->handle));
err = OMX_UseBuffer(
mHandle,
&header,
portIndex,
bufferMeta,
def.nBufferSize,
bufferHandle);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, err, BUFFER_FMT(portIndex, "%u@%p", def.nBufferSize, bufferHandle));
delete bufferMeta;
bufferMeta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pBuffer, bufferHandle);
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, bufferMeta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
CLOG_BUFFER(useGraphicBuffer2, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%u@%p", def.nBufferSize, bufferHandle));
return OK;
}
| 173,535
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(PrintWebViewHelper, message)
#if defined(ENABLE_BASIC_PRINTING)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintPages, OnPrintPages)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintForSystemDialog, OnPrintForSystemDialog)
#endif // ENABLE_BASIC_PRINTING
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_InitiatePrintPreview, OnInitiatePrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintPreview, OnPrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintForPrintPreview, OnPrintForPrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintingDone, OnPrintingDone)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_SetScriptedPrintingBlocked,
SetScriptedPrintBlocked)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
|
bool PrintWebViewHelper::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
// The class is not designed to handle recursive messages. This is not
// expected during regular flow. However, during rendering of content for
// printing, lower level code may run nested message loop. E.g. PDF may has
// script to show message box http://crbug.com/502562. In that moment browser
// may receive updated printer capabilities and decide to restart print
// preview generation. When this happened message handling function may
// choose to ignore message or safely crash process.
++ipc_nesting_level_;
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(PrintWebViewHelper, message)
#if defined(ENABLE_BASIC_PRINTING)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintPages, OnPrintPages)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintForSystemDialog, OnPrintForSystemDialog)
#endif // ENABLE_BASIC_PRINTING
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_InitiatePrintPreview, OnInitiatePrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintPreview, OnPrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintForPrintPreview, OnPrintForPrintPreview)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_PrintingDone, OnPrintingDone)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PrintMsg_SetScriptedPrintingBlocked,
SetScriptedPrintBlocked)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
--ipc_nesting_level_;
return handled;
}
| 171,872
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PreresolveJob::PreresolveJob(PreconnectRequest preconnect_request,
PreresolveInfo* info)
: url(std::move(preconnect_request.origin)),
num_sockets(preconnect_request.num_sockets),
allow_credentials(preconnect_request.allow_credentials),
network_isolation_key(
std::move(preconnect_request.network_isolation_key)),
info(info) {
DCHECK_GE(num_sockets, 0);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
PreresolveJob::PreresolveJob(PreconnectRequest preconnect_request,
PreresolveInfo* info)
: url(preconnect_request.origin.GetURL()),
num_sockets(preconnect_request.num_sockets),
allow_credentials(preconnect_request.allow_credentials),
network_isolation_key(
std::move(preconnect_request.network_isolation_key)),
info(info) {
DCHECK_GE(num_sockets, 0);
}
| 172,376
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void TransportTexture::OnTexturesCreated(std::vector<int> textures) {
bool ret = decoder_->MakeCurrent();
if (!ret) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to switch context";
return;
}
output_textures_->clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < textures.size(); ++i) {
uint32 gl_texture = 0;
ret = decoder_->GetServiceTextureId(textures[i], &gl_texture);
DCHECK(ret) << "Cannot translate client texture ID to service ID";
output_textures_->push_back(gl_texture);
texture_map_.insert(std::make_pair(gl_texture, textures[i]));
}
create_task_->Run();
create_task_.reset();
output_textures_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void TransportTexture::OnTexturesCreated(std::vector<int> textures) {
void TransportTexture::OnTexturesCreated(const std::vector<int>& textures) {
bool ret = decoder_->MakeCurrent();
if (!ret) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to switch context";
return;
}
output_textures_->clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < textures.size(); ++i) {
uint32 gl_texture = 0;
ret = decoder_->GetServiceTextureId(textures[i], &gl_texture);
DCHECK(ret) << "Cannot translate client texture ID to service ID";
output_textures_->push_back(gl_texture);
texture_map_.insert(std::make_pair(gl_texture, textures[i]));
}
create_task_->Run();
create_task_.reset();
output_textures_ = NULL;
}
| 170,313
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int can_open_delegated(struct nfs_delegation *delegation, mode_t open_flags)
{
if ((delegation->type & open_flags) != open_flags)
return 0;
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATION_NEED_RECLAIM, &delegation->flags))
return 0;
nfs_mark_delegation_referenced(delegation);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
|
static int can_open_delegated(struct nfs_delegation *delegation, mode_t open_flags)
static int can_open_delegated(struct nfs_delegation *delegation, fmode_t fmode)
{
if ((delegation->type & fmode) != fmode)
return 0;
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATION_NEED_RECLAIM, &delegation->flags))
return 0;
nfs_mark_delegation_referenced(delegation);
return 1;
}
| 165,687
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DevToolsSession::AddHandler(
std::unique_ptr<protocol::DevToolsDomainHandler> handler) {
handler->Wire(dispatcher_.get());
handler->SetRenderer(process_, host_);
handlers_[handler->name()] = std::move(handler);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void DevToolsSession::AddHandler(
std::unique_ptr<protocol::DevToolsDomainHandler> handler) {
handler->Wire(dispatcher_.get());
handler->SetRenderer(process_host_id_, host_);
handlers_[handler->name()] = std::move(handler);
}
| 172,740
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
unsigned int count;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
count = kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Make sure that id->index does not overflow
The ALSA control code expects that the range of assigned indices to a control is
continuous and does not overflow. Currently there are no checks to enforce this.
If a control with a overflowing index range is created that control becomes
effectively inaccessible and unremovable since snd_ctl_find_id() will not be
able to find it. This patch adds a check that makes sure that controls with a
overflowing index range can not be created.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
unsigned int count;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
if (id.index > UINT_MAX - kcontrol->count)
goto error;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
count = kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
| 169,905
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool asn1_write_BOOLEAN(struct asn1_data *data, bool v)
{
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_BOOLEAN);
asn1_write_uint8(data, v ? 0xFF : 0);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool asn1_write_BOOLEAN(struct asn1_data *data, bool v)
{
if (!asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_BOOLEAN)) return false;
if (!asn1_write_uint8(data, v ? 0xFF : 0)) return false;
return asn1_pop_tag(data);
}
| 164,585
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int key_verify(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, PKCS11_KEY *authkey)
{
int ok = 0;
unsigned char challenge[30];
unsigned char signature[256];
unsigned int siglen = sizeof signature;
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha1();
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
EVP_PKEY *privkey = PKCS11_get_private_key(authkey);
EVP_PKEY *pubkey = PKCS11_get_public_key(authkey);
/* Verify a SHA-1 hash of random data, signed by the key.
*
* Note that this will not work keys that aren't eligible for signing.
* Unfortunately, libp11 currently has no way of checking
* C_GetAttributeValue(CKA_SIGN), see
* https://github.com/OpenSC/libp11/issues/219. Since we don't want to
* implement try and error, we live with this limitation */
if (1 != randomize(pamh, challenge, sizeof challenge)) {
goto err;
}
if (NULL == pubkey || NULL == privkey || NULL == md_ctx || NULL == md
|| !EVP_SignInit(md_ctx, md)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, challenge, sizeof challenge)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, signature, &siglen, privkey)
|| !EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx)
|| !EVP_VerifyInit(md_ctx, md)
|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, challenge, sizeof challenge)
|| 1 != EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, signature, siglen, pubkey)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "Error verifying key: %s\n",
ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_get_error()));
prompt(flags, pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, NULL, _("Error verifying key"));
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (NULL != pubkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
if (NULL != privkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(privkey);
if (NULL != md_ctx) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
}
return ok;
}
Commit Message: Use EVP_PKEY_size() to allocate correct size of signature buffer. (#18)
Do not use fixed buffer size for signature, EVP_SignFinal() requires
buffer for signature at least EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes in size.
Fixes crash when using 4K RSA signatures (https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/16, https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/15)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int key_verify(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, PKCS11_KEY *authkey)
{
int ok = 0;
unsigned char challenge[30];
unsigned char *signature = NULL;
unsigned int siglen;
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha1();
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
EVP_PKEY *privkey = PKCS11_get_private_key(authkey);
EVP_PKEY *pubkey = PKCS11_get_public_key(authkey);
if (NULL == privkey)
goto err;
siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(privkey);
if (siglen <= 0)
goto err;
signature = malloc(siglen);
if (NULL == signature)
goto err;
/* Verify a SHA-1 hash of random data, signed by the key.
*
* Note that this will not work keys that aren't eligible for signing.
* Unfortunately, libp11 currently has no way of checking
* C_GetAttributeValue(CKA_SIGN), see
* https://github.com/OpenSC/libp11/issues/219. Since we don't want to
* implement try and error, we live with this limitation */
if (1 != randomize(pamh, challenge, sizeof challenge)) {
goto err;
}
if (NULL == pubkey || NULL == privkey || NULL == md_ctx || NULL == md
|| !EVP_SignInit(md_ctx, md)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, challenge, sizeof challenge)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, signature, &siglen, privkey)
|| !EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx)
|| !EVP_VerifyInit(md_ctx, md)
|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, challenge, sizeof challenge)
|| 1 != EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, signature, siglen, pubkey)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "Error verifying key: %s\n",
ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_get_error()));
prompt(flags, pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, NULL, _("Error verifying key"));
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
free(signature);
if (NULL != pubkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
if (NULL != privkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(privkey);
if (NULL != md_ctx) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
}
return ok;
}
| 169,513
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xid_map_enter(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct sunrpc_msg *rp, const u_char *bp)
{
const struct ip *ip = NULL;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL;
struct xid_map_entry *xmep;
if (!ND_TTEST(rp->rm_call.cb_vers))
return (0);
switch (IP_V((const struct ip *)bp)) {
case 4:
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
break;
case 6:
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp;
break;
default:
return (1);
}
xmep = &xid_map[xid_map_next];
if (++xid_map_next >= XIDMAPSIZE)
xid_map_next = 0;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->xid, &rp->rm_xid, sizeof(xmep->xid));
if (ip) {
xmep->ipver = 4;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(ip->ip_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(ip->ip_dst));
}
else if (ip6) {
xmep->ipver = 6;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip6->ip6_src, sizeof(ip6->ip6_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip6->ip6_dst, sizeof(ip6->ip6_dst));
}
xmep->proc = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_proc);
xmep->vers = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_vers);
return (1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13005/NFS: Add two bounds checks before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
xid_map_enter(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct sunrpc_msg *rp, const u_char *bp)
{
const struct ip *ip = NULL;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL;
struct xid_map_entry *xmep;
if (!ND_TTEST(rp->rm_call.cb_vers))
return (0);
switch (IP_V((const struct ip *)bp)) {
case 4:
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
break;
case 6:
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp;
break;
default:
return (1);
}
xmep = &xid_map[xid_map_next];
if (++xid_map_next >= XIDMAPSIZE)
xid_map_next = 0;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->xid, &rp->rm_xid, sizeof(xmep->xid));
if (ip) {
xmep->ipver = 4;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(ip->ip_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(ip->ip_dst));
}
else if (ip6) {
xmep->ipver = 6;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip6->ip6_src, sizeof(ip6->ip6_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip6->ip6_dst, sizeof(ip6->ip6_dst));
}
if (!ND_TTEST(rp->rm_call.cb_proc))
return (0);
xmep->proc = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_proc);
if (!ND_TTEST(rp->rm_call.cb_vers))
return (0);
xmep->vers = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_vers);
return (1);
}
| 167,903
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SavePayload(size_t handle, uint32_t *payload, uint32_t index)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)handle;
if (mp4 == NULL) return;
uint32_t *MP4buffer = NULL;
if (index < mp4->indexcount && mp4->mediafp && payload)
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, mp4->metaoffsets[index], SEEK_SET);
fwrite(payload, 1, mp4->metasizes[index], mp4->mediafp);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
void SavePayload(size_t handle, uint32_t *payload, uint32_t index)
void LongSeek(mp4object *mp4, int64_t offset)
{
if (mp4 && offset)
{
if (mp4->filepos + offset < mp4->filesize)
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, offset, SEEK_CUR);
mp4->filepos += offset;
}
else
{
mp4->filepos = mp4->filesize;
}
}
}
| 169,552
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void _php_mb_regex_set_options(OnigOptionType options, OnigSyntaxType *syntax, OnigOptionType *prev_options, OnigSyntaxType **prev_syntax TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (prev_options != NULL) {
*prev_options = MBREX(regex_default_options);
}
if (prev_syntax != NULL) {
*prev_syntax = MBREX(regex_default_syntax);
}
MBREX(regex_default_options) = options;
MBREX(regex_default_syntax) = syntax;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415
|
static void _php_mb_regex_set_options(OnigOptionType options, OnigSyntaxType *syntax, OnigOptionType *prev_options, OnigSyntaxType **prev_syntax TSRMLS_DC)
static void _php_mb_regex_set_options(OnigOptionType options, OnigSyntaxType *syntax, OnigOptionType *prev_options, OnigSyntaxType **prev_syntax TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (prev_options != NULL) {
*prev_options = MBREX(regex_default_options);
}
if (prev_syntax != NULL) {
*prev_syntax = MBREX(regex_default_syntax);
}
MBREX(regex_default_options) = options;
MBREX(regex_default_syntax) = syntax;
}
| 167,121
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void llc_cmsg_rcv(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(skb->sk);
if (llc->cmsg_flags & LLC_CMSG_PKTINFO) {
struct llc_pktinfo info;
info.lpi_ifindex = llc_sk(skb->sk)->dev->ifindex;
llc_pdu_decode_dsap(skb, &info.lpi_sap);
llc_pdu_decode_da(skb, info.lpi_mac);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_LLC, LLC_OPT_PKTINFO, sizeof(info), &info);
}
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in llc
The stack object “info” has a total size of 12 bytes. Its last byte
is padding which is not initialized and leaked via “put_cmsg”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static void llc_cmsg_rcv(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(skb->sk);
if (llc->cmsg_flags & LLC_CMSG_PKTINFO) {
struct llc_pktinfo info;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.lpi_ifindex = llc_sk(skb->sk)->dev->ifindex;
llc_pdu_decode_dsap(skb, &info.lpi_sap);
llc_pdu_decode_da(skb, info.lpi_mac);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_LLC, LLC_OPT_PKTINFO, sizeof(info), &info);
}
}
| 167,258
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: user_change_icon_file_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
User *user,
GDBusMethodInvocation *context,
gpointer data)
{
g_autofree gchar *filename = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) file = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFileInfo) info = NULL;
guint32 mode;
GFileType type;
guint64 size;
filename = g_strdup (data);
if (filename == NULL ||
*filename == '\0') {
g_autofree gchar *dest_path = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) dest = NULL;
g_autoptr(GError) error = NULL;
g_clear_pointer (&filename, g_free);
dest_path = g_build_filename (ICONDIR, accounts_user_get_user_name (ACCOUNTS_USER (user)), NULL);
dest = g_file_new_for_path (dest_path);
if (!g_file_delete (dest, NULL, &error) &&
!g_error_matches (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_FOUND)) {
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "failed to remove user icon, %s", error->message);
return;
}
goto icon_saved;
}
file = g_file_new_for_path (filename);
info = g_file_query_info (file, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_SIZE,
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
|
user_change_icon_file_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
User *user,
GDBusMethodInvocation *context,
gpointer data)
{
g_autofree gchar *filename = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) file = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFileInfo) info = NULL;
guint32 mode;
GFileType type;
guint64 size;
filename = g_strdup (data);
if (filename == NULL ||
*filename == '\0') {
g_autofree gchar *dest_path = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) dest = NULL;
g_autoptr(GError) error = NULL;
g_clear_pointer (&filename, g_free);
dest_path = g_build_filename (ICONDIR, accounts_user_get_user_name (ACCOUNTS_USER (user)), NULL);
dest = g_file_new_for_path (dest_path);
if (!g_file_delete (dest, NULL, &error) &&
!g_error_matches (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_FOUND)) {
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "failed to remove user icon, %s", error->message);
return;
}
goto icon_saved;
}
file = g_file_new_for_path (filename);
g_clear_pointer (&filename, g_free);
/* Canonicalize path so we can call g_str_has_prefix on it
* below without concern for ../ path components moving outside
* the prefix
*/
filename = g_file_get_path (file);
info = g_file_query_info (file, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_SIZE,
return;
}
| 164,759
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
int retval;
/* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */
bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) &&
!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_uid) &&
kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_gid)) {
/* Set-uid? */
if (mode & S_ISUID) {
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->cred->euid = inode->i_uid;
}
/* Set-gid? */
/*
* If setgid is set but no group execute bit then this
* is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid
* executable.
*/
if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->cred->egid = inode->i_gid;
}
}
/* fill in binprm security blob */
retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
bprm->cred_prepared = 1;
memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
return kernel_read(bprm->file, 0, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
}
Commit Message: fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables
This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a
setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid
root.
This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int retval;
bprm_fill_uid(bprm);
/* fill in binprm security blob */
retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
bprm->cred_prepared = 1;
memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
return kernel_read(bprm->file, 0, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
}
| 166,625
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static const uint8_t *get_signature(const uint8_t *asn1_sig, int *len)
{
int offset = 0;
const uint8_t *ptr = NULL;
if (asn1_next_obj(asn1_sig, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0 ||
asn1_skip_obj(asn1_sig, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE))
goto end_get_sig;
if (asn1_sig[offset++] != ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
goto end_get_sig;
*len = get_asn1_length(asn1_sig, &offset);
ptr = &asn1_sig[offset]; /* all ok */
end_get_sig:
return ptr;
}
Commit Message: Apply CVE fixes for X509 parsing
Apply patches developed by Sze Yiu which correct a vulnerability in
X509 parsing. See CVE-2018-16150 and CVE-2018-16149 for more info.
CWE ID: CWE-347
|
static const uint8_t *get_signature(const uint8_t *asn1_sig, int *len)
| 169,085
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void locationAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* proxyImp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->location());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void locationAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* proxyImp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<TestNode> imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->location());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
| 171,683
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int ntlm_read_message_fields(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 8)
return -1;
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, fields->Len); /* Len (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, fields->MaxLen); /* MaxLen (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, fields->BufferOffset); /* BufferOffset (4 bytes) */
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
int ntlm_read_message_fields(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
static int ntlm_read_message_fields(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 8)
return -1;
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, fields->Len); /* Len (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, fields->MaxLen); /* MaxLen (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, fields->BufferOffset); /* BufferOffset (4 bytes) */
return 1;
}
| 169,276
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_self_test)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir);
if (mcrypt_module_self_test(module, dir) == 0) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_self_test)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir);
if (mcrypt_module_self_test(module, dir) == 0) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| 167,095
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: explicit SyncInternal(const std::string& name)
: name_(name),
weak_ptr_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
enable_sync_tabs_for_other_clients_(false),
registrar_(NULL),
change_delegate_(NULL),
initialized_(false),
testing_mode_(NON_TEST),
observing_ip_address_changes_(false),
traffic_recorder_(kMaxMessagesToRecord, kMaxMessageSizeToRecord),
encryptor_(NULL),
unrecoverable_error_handler_(NULL),
report_unrecoverable_error_function_(NULL),
created_on_loop_(MessageLoop::current()),
nigori_overwrite_count_(0) {
for (int i = syncable::FIRST_REAL_MODEL_TYPE;
i < syncable::MODEL_TYPE_COUNT; ++i) {
notification_info_map_.insert(
std::make_pair(syncable::ModelTypeFromInt(i), NotificationInfo()));
}
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getNotificationState",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetNotificationState);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getNotificationInfo",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetNotificationInfo);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getRootNodeDetails",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetRootNodeDetails);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getNodeSummariesById",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetNodeSummariesById);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getNodeDetailsById",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetNodeDetailsById);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getAllNodes",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetAllNodes);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getChildNodeIds",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetChildNodeIds);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getClientServerTraffic",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetClientServerTraffic);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
explicit SyncInternal(const std::string& name)
: name_(name),
weak_ptr_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
registrar_(NULL),
change_delegate_(NULL),
initialized_(false),
testing_mode_(NON_TEST),
observing_ip_address_changes_(false),
traffic_recorder_(kMaxMessagesToRecord, kMaxMessageSizeToRecord),
encryptor_(NULL),
unrecoverable_error_handler_(NULL),
report_unrecoverable_error_function_(NULL),
created_on_loop_(MessageLoop::current()),
nigori_overwrite_count_(0) {
for (int i = syncable::FIRST_REAL_MODEL_TYPE;
i < syncable::MODEL_TYPE_COUNT; ++i) {
notification_info_map_.insert(
std::make_pair(syncable::ModelTypeFromInt(i), NotificationInfo()));
}
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getNotificationState",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetNotificationState);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getNotificationInfo",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetNotificationInfo);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getRootNodeDetails",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetRootNodeDetails);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getNodeSummariesById",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetNodeSummariesById);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getNodeDetailsById",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetNodeDetailsById);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getAllNodes",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetAllNodes);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getChildNodeIds",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetChildNodeIds);
BindJsMessageHandler(
"getClientServerTraffic",
&SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetClientServerTraffic);
}
| 170,797
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::FlipVertically(
uint8* framebuffer,
unsigned int width,
unsigned int height) {
uint8* scanline = scanline_.get();
if (!scanline)
return;
unsigned int row_bytes = width * 4;
unsigned int count = height / 2;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
uint8* row_a = framebuffer + i * row_bytes;
uint8* row_b = framebuffer + (height - i - 1) * row_bytes;
memcpy(scanline, row_b, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_b, row_a, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_a, scanline, row_bytes);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix mismanagement in handling of temporary scanline for vertical flip.
BUG=116637
TEST=manual test from bug report with ASAN
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9617038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125301 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::FlipVertically(
uint8* framebuffer,
unsigned int width,
unsigned int height) {
if (width == 0)
return;
scanline_.resize(width * 4);
uint8* scanline = &scanline_[0];
unsigned int row_bytes = width * 4;
unsigned int count = height / 2;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
uint8* row_a = framebuffer + i * row_bytes;
uint8* row_b = framebuffer + (height - i - 1) * row_bytes;
memcpy(scanline, row_b, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_b, row_a, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_a, scanline, row_bytes);
}
}
| 171,063
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ProxyClientSocket::SanitizeProxyRedirect(HttpResponseInfo* response,
const GURL& url) {
//// static
DCHECK(response && response->headers.get());
std::string location;
if (!response->headers->IsRedirect(&location))
return false;
std::string fake_response_headers =
base::StringPrintf("HTTP/1.0 302 Found\n"
"Location: %s\n"
"Content-length: 0\n"
"Connection: close\n"
"\n",
location.c_str());
std::string raw_headers =
HttpUtil::AssembleRawHeaders(fake_response_headers.data(),
fake_response_headers.length());
response->headers = new HttpResponseHeaders(raw_headers);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19
|
bool ProxyClientSocket::SanitizeProxyRedirect(HttpResponseInfo* response,
bool ProxyClientSocket::SanitizeProxyAuth(HttpResponseInfo* response) {
DCHECK(response && response->headers.get());
scoped_refptr<HttpResponseHeaders> old_headers = response->headers;
const char kHeaders[] = "HTTP/1.1 407 Proxy Authentication Required\n\n";
scoped_refptr<HttpResponseHeaders> new_headers = new HttpResponseHeaders(
HttpUtil::AssembleRawHeaders(kHeaders, arraysize(kHeaders)));
new_headers->ReplaceStatusLine(old_headers->GetStatusLine());
CopyHeaderValues(old_headers, new_headers, "Connection");
CopyHeaderValues(old_headers, new_headers, "Proxy-Authenticate");
response->headers = new_headers;
return true;
}
//// static
bool ProxyClientSocket::SanitizeProxyRedirect(HttpResponseInfo* response) {
DCHECK(response && response->headers.get());
std::string location;
if (!response->headers->IsRedirect(&location))
return false;
// Return minimal headers; set "Content-Length: 0" to ignore response body.
std::string fake_response_headers = base::StringPrintf(
"HTTP/1.0 302 Found\n"
"Location: %s\n"
"Content-Length: 0\n"
"Connection: close\n"
"\n",
location.c_str());
std::string raw_headers =
HttpUtil::AssembleRawHeaders(fake_response_headers.data(),
fake_response_headers.length());
response->headers = new HttpResponseHeaders(raw_headers);
return true;
}
| 172,040
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: DictionaryValue* NigoriSpecificsToValue(
const sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics& proto) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
SET(encrypted, EncryptedDataToValue);
SET_BOOL(using_explicit_passphrase);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_bookmarks);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_preferences);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_autofill_profile);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_autofill);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_themes);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_typed_urls);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_extension_settings);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_extensions);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_sessions);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_app_settings);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_apps);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_search_engines);
SET_BOOL(sync_tabs);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_everything);
SET_REP(device_information, DeviceInformationToValue);
SET_BOOL(sync_tab_favicons);
return value;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
DictionaryValue* NigoriSpecificsToValue(
const sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics& proto) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
SET(encrypted, EncryptedDataToValue);
SET_BOOL(using_explicit_passphrase);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_bookmarks);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_preferences);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_autofill_profile);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_autofill);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_themes);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_typed_urls);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_extension_settings);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_extensions);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_sessions);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_app_settings);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_apps);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_search_engines);
SET_BOOL(encrypt_everything);
SET_REP(device_information, DeviceInformationToValue);
SET_BOOL(sync_tab_favicons);
return value;
}
| 170,800
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
const vpx_rational_t tb = video->timebase();
timebase_ = static_cast<double>(tb.num) / tb.den;
duration_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 0)
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_NOISE_SENSITIVITY, denoiser_on_);
if (denoiser_offon_test_) {
ASSERT_GT(denoiser_offon_period_, 0)
<< "denoiser_offon_period_ is not positive.";
if ((video->frame() + 1) % denoiser_offon_period_ == 0) {
// Flip denoiser_on_ periodically
denoiser_on_ ^= 1;
}
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_NOISE_SENSITIVITY, denoiser_on_);
}
const vpx_rational_t tb = video->timebase();
timebase_ = static_cast<double>(tb.num) / tb.den;
duration_ = 0;
}
| 174,515
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int svc_can_register(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "add";
if (uid >= AID_APP) {
return 0; /* Don't allow apps to register services */
}
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: ServiceManager: Allow system services running as secondary users to add services
This should be reverted when all system services have been cleaned up to not
do this. A process looking up a service while running in the background will
see the service registered by the active user (assuming the service is
registered on every user switch), not the service registered by the user that
the process itself belongs to.
BUG: 30795333
Change-Id: I1b74d58be38ed358f43c163692f9e704f8f31dbe
(cherry picked from commit e6bbe69ba739c8a08837134437aaccfea5f1d943)
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
static int svc_can_register(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "add";
if (multiuser_get_app_id(uid) >= AID_APP) {
return 0; /* Don't allow apps to register services */
}
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
| 173,403
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(const std::string& input_method_id) {
const chromeos::InputMethodDescriptor* descriptor =
chromeos::input_method::GetInputMethodDescriptorFromId(
input_method_id);
if (descriptor) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethod(*descriptor);
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Descriptor is not found for: " << input_method_id;
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void ChangeCurrentInputMethodFromId(const std::string& input_method_id) {
const input_method::InputMethodDescriptor* descriptor =
input_method::GetInputMethodDescriptorFromId(
input_method_id);
if (descriptor) {
ChangeCurrentInputMethod(*descriptor);
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Descriptor is not found for: " << input_method_id;
}
}
| 170,479
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: nfs4_open_revalidate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int openflags, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct path path = {
.mnt = nd->path.mnt,
.dentry = dentry,
};
struct rpc_cred *cred;
struct nfs4_state *state;
cred = rpc_lookup_cred();
if (IS_ERR(cred))
return PTR_ERR(cred);
state = nfs4_do_open(dir, &path, openflags, NULL, cred);
put_rpccred(cred);
if (IS_ERR(state)) {
switch (PTR_ERR(state)) {
case -EPERM:
case -EACCES:
case -EDQUOT:
case -ENOSPC:
case -EROFS:
lookup_instantiate_filp(nd, (struct dentry *)state, NULL);
return 1;
default:
goto out_drop;
}
}
if (state->inode == dentry->d_inode) {
nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
nfs4_intent_set_file(nd, &path, state);
return 1;
}
nfs4_close_sync(&path, state, openflags);
out_drop:
d_drop(dentry);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
|
nfs4_open_revalidate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int openflags, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct path path = {
.mnt = nd->path.mnt,
.dentry = dentry,
};
struct rpc_cred *cred;
struct nfs4_state *state;
fmode_t fmode = openflags & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE);
cred = rpc_lookup_cred();
if (IS_ERR(cred))
return PTR_ERR(cred);
state = nfs4_do_open(dir, &path, fmode, openflags, NULL, cred);
put_rpccred(cred);
if (IS_ERR(state)) {
switch (PTR_ERR(state)) {
case -EPERM:
case -EACCES:
case -EDQUOT:
case -ENOSPC:
case -EROFS:
lookup_instantiate_filp(nd, (struct dentry *)state, NULL);
return 1;
default:
goto out_drop;
}
}
if (state->inode == dentry->d_inode) {
nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
nfs4_intent_set_file(nd, &path, state, fmode);
return 1;
}
nfs4_close_sync(&path, state, fmode);
out_drop:
d_drop(dentry);
return 0;
}
| 165,699
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: std::string ContextualSearchDelegate::BuildRequestUrl(std::string selection) {
if (!template_url_service_ ||
!template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider()) {
return std::string();
}
std::string selected_text(net::EscapeQueryParamValue(selection, true));
TemplateURL* template_url = template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs search_terms_args =
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs(base::string16());
int now_on_tap_version =
field_trial_->IsNowOnTapBarIntegrationEnabled() ? kNowOnTapVersion : 0;
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs::ContextualSearchParams params(
kContextualSearchRequestVersion, selected_text, std::string(),
now_on_tap_version);
search_terms_args.contextual_search_params = params;
std::string request(
template_url->contextual_search_url_ref().ReplaceSearchTerms(
search_terms_args,
template_url_service_->search_terms_data(),
NULL));
std::string replacement_url = field_trial_->GetResolverURLPrefix();
if (!replacement_url.empty()) {
size_t pos = request.find(kContextualSearchServerEndpoint);
if (pos != std::string::npos) {
request.replace(0, pos + strlen(kContextualSearchServerEndpoint),
replacement_url);
}
}
return request;
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
|
std::string ContextualSearchDelegate::BuildRequestUrl(std::string selection) {
if (!template_url_service_ ||
!template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider()) {
return std::string();
}
std::string selected_text(net::EscapeQueryParamValue(selection, true));
TemplateURL* template_url = template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs search_terms_args =
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs(base::string16());
int contextual_cards_version =
field_trial_->IsContextualCardsBarIntegrationEnabled()
? kContextualCardsVersion : 0;
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs::ContextualSearchParams params(
kContextualSearchRequestVersion, selected_text, std::string(),
contextual_cards_version);
search_terms_args.contextual_search_params = params;
std::string request(
template_url->contextual_search_url_ref().ReplaceSearchTerms(
search_terms_args,
template_url_service_->search_terms_data(),
NULL));
std::string replacement_url = field_trial_->GetResolverURLPrefix();
if (!replacement_url.empty()) {
size_t pos = request.find(kContextualSearchServerEndpoint);
if (pos != std::string::npos) {
request.replace(0, pos + strlen(kContextualSearchServerEndpoint),
replacement_url);
}
}
return request;
}
| 171,641
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int get_registers(rtl8150_t * dev, u16 indx, u16 size, void *data)
{
return usb_control_msg(dev->udev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev->udev, 0),
RTL8150_REQ_GET_REGS, RTL8150_REQT_READ,
indx, 0, data, size, 500);
}
Commit Message: rtl8150: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int get_registers(rtl8150_t * dev, u16 indx, u16 size, void *data)
{
void *buf;
int ret;
buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_NOIO);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = usb_control_msg(dev->udev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev->udev, 0),
RTL8150_REQ_GET_REGS, RTL8150_REQT_READ,
indx, 0, buf, size, 500);
if (ret > 0 && ret <= size)
memcpy(data, buf, ret);
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
| 168,214
|
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