instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 93
3.53k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::ZeroTest() {
for (int i = 0; i <= 255; ++i) {
memset(src_, i, block_size_);
for (int j = 0; j <= 255; ++j) {
memset(ref_, j, block_size_);
unsigned int sse;
unsigned int var;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse));
EXPECT_EQ(0u, var) << "src values: " << i << "ref values: " << j;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::ZeroTest() {
for (int i = 0; i <= 255; ++i) {
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
memset(src_, i, block_size_);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
vpx_memset16(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_), i << (bit_depth_ - 8),
block_size_);
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
for (int j = 0; j <= 255; ++j) {
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
memset(ref_, j, block_size_);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
vpx_memset16(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_), j << (bit_depth_ - 8),
block_size_);
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
unsigned int sse;
unsigned int var;
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
var = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse));
EXPECT_EQ(0u, var) << "src values: " << i << " ref values: " << j;
}
}
}
| 174,593
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: GDataRootDirectory::GDataRootDirectory()
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(GDataDirectory(NULL, this)),
fake_search_directory_(new GDataDirectory(NULL, NULL)),
largest_changestamp_(0), serialized_size_(0) {
title_ = kGDataRootDirectory;
SetFileNameFromTitle();
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
GDataRootDirectory::GDataRootDirectory()
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(GDataDirectory(NULL, this)),
fake_search_directory_(new GDataDirectory(NULL, NULL)),
largest_changestamp_(0), serialized_size_(0) {
title_ = kGDataRootDirectory;
SetFileNameFromTitle();
resource_id_ = kGDataRootDirectoryResourceId;
// Add self to the map so the root directory can be looked up by the
// resource ID.
AddEntryToResourceMap(this);
}
| 170,777
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: P2PQuicTransportImpl::P2PQuicTransportImpl(
P2PQuicTransportConfig p2p_transport_config,
std::unique_ptr<net::QuicChromiumConnectionHelper> helper,
std::unique_ptr<quic::QuicConnection> connection,
const quic::QuicConfig& quic_config,
quic::QuicClock* clock)
: quic::QuicSession(connection.get(),
nullptr /* visitor */,
quic_config,
quic::CurrentSupportedVersions()),
helper_(std::move(helper)),
connection_(std::move(connection)),
perspective_(p2p_transport_config.is_server
? quic::Perspective::IS_SERVER
: quic::Perspective::IS_CLIENT),
packet_transport_(p2p_transport_config.packet_transport),
delegate_(p2p_transport_config.delegate),
clock_(clock) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(delegate_);
DCHECK(clock_);
DCHECK(packet_transport_);
DCHECK_GT(p2p_transport_config.certificates.size(), 0u);
if (p2p_transport_config.can_respond_to_crypto_handshake) {
InitializeCryptoStream();
}
certificate_ = p2p_transport_config.certificates[0];
packet_transport_->SetReceiveDelegate(this);
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
P2PQuicTransportImpl::P2PQuicTransportImpl(
P2PQuicTransportConfig p2p_transport_config,
std::unique_ptr<net::QuicChromiumConnectionHelper> helper,
std::unique_ptr<quic::QuicConnection> connection,
const quic::QuicConfig& quic_config,
quic::QuicClock* clock)
: quic::QuicSession(connection.get(),
nullptr /* visitor */,
quic_config,
quic::CurrentSupportedVersions()),
helper_(std::move(helper)),
connection_(std::move(connection)),
perspective_(p2p_transport_config.is_server
? quic::Perspective::IS_SERVER
: quic::Perspective::IS_CLIENT),
packet_transport_(p2p_transport_config.packet_transport),
delegate_(p2p_transport_config.delegate),
clock_(clock),
stream_write_buffer_size_(p2p_transport_config.stream_write_buffer_size) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(delegate_);
DCHECK(clock_);
DCHECK(packet_transport_);
DCHECK_GT(stream_write_buffer_size_, 0u);
DCHECK_GT(p2p_transport_config.certificates.size(), 0u);
if (p2p_transport_config.can_respond_to_crypto_handshake) {
InitializeCryptoStream();
}
certificate_ = p2p_transport_config.certificates[0];
packet_transport_->SetReceiveDelegate(this);
}
| 172,266
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void encode_frame(vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec,
vpx_image_t *img,
int frame_index,
int flags,
VpxVideoWriter *writer) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt = NULL;
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(codec, img, frame_index, 1,
flags, VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK)
die_codec(codec, "Failed to encode frame");
while ((pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(codec, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
const int keyframe = (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) != 0;
if (!vpx_video_writer_write_frame(writer,
pkt->data.frame.buf,
pkt->data.frame.sz,
pkt->data.frame.pts)) {
die_codec(codec, "Failed to write compressed frame");
}
printf(keyframe ? "K" : ".");
fflush(stdout);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void encode_frame(vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec,
static int encode_frame(vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec,
vpx_image_t *img,
int frame_index,
int flags,
VpxVideoWriter *writer) {
int got_pkts = 0;
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt = NULL;
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(codec, img, frame_index, 1,
flags, VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK)
die_codec(codec, "Failed to encode frame");
while ((pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(codec, &iter)) != NULL) {
got_pkts = 1;
if (pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
const int keyframe = (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) != 0;
if (!vpx_video_writer_write_frame(writer,
pkt->data.frame.buf,
pkt->data.frame.sz,
pkt->data.frame.pts)) {
die_codec(codec, "Failed to write compressed frame");
}
printf(keyframe ? "K" : ".");
fflush(stdout);
}
}
return got_pkts;
}
| 174,488
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RunInvTxfm(int16_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
inv_txfm_(out, dst, stride, tx_type_);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void RunInvTxfm(int16_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
void RunInvTxfm(tran_low_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
inv_txfm_(out, dst, stride, tx_type_);
}
| 174,525
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: u_char *_our_safe_pcap_next(pcap_t *pcap, struct pcap_pkthdr *pkthdr,
const char *funcname, const int line, const char *file)
{
u_char *pktdata = (u_char *)pcap_next(pcap, pkthdr);
if (pktdata) {
if (pkthdr->len > MAXPACKET) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: %u is greater than maximum %u\n",
file, funcname, line, pkthdr->len, MAXPACKET);
exit(-1);
}
if (pkthdr->len < pkthdr->caplen) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: packet length %u is less than capture length %u\n",
file, funcname, line, pkthdr->len, pkthdr->caplen);
exit(-1);
}
}
return pktdata;
}
Commit Message: Bug #520 Fix heap overflow on zero or 0xFFFF packet length
Add check for packets that report zero packet length. Example
of fix:
src/tcpprep --auto=bridge --pcap=poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow --cachefile=/dev/null
Warning: poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow was captured using a snaplen of 17 bytes. This may mean you have truncated packets.
safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in tcpprep.c:process_raw_packets() line 334: packet length=0 capture length=0
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
u_char *_our_safe_pcap_next(pcap_t *pcap, struct pcap_pkthdr *pkthdr,
const char *funcname, const int line, const char *file)
{
u_char *pktdata = (u_char *)pcap_next(pcap, pkthdr);
if (pktdata) {
if (pkthdr->len > MAXPACKET) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: %u is greater than maximum %u\n",
file, funcname, line, pkthdr->len, MAXPACKET);
exit(-1);
}
if (!pkthdr->len || pkthdr->len < pkthdr->caplen) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: packet length=%u capture length=%u\n",
file, funcname, line, pkthdr->len, pkthdr->caplen);
exit(-1);
}
}
return pktdata;
}
| 168,946
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void rpc_init_task(struct rpc_task *task, const struct rpc_task_setup *task_setup_data)
{
memset(task, 0, sizeof(*task));
atomic_set(&task->tk_count, 1);
task->tk_flags = task_setup_data->flags;
task->tk_ops = task_setup_data->callback_ops;
task->tk_calldata = task_setup_data->callback_data;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&task->tk_task);
/* Initialize retry counters */
task->tk_garb_retry = 2;
task->tk_cred_retry = 2;
task->tk_priority = task_setup_data->priority - RPC_PRIORITY_LOW;
task->tk_owner = current->tgid;
/* Initialize workqueue for async tasks */
task->tk_workqueue = task_setup_data->workqueue;
if (task->tk_ops->rpc_call_prepare != NULL)
task->tk_action = rpc_prepare_task;
/* starting timestamp */
task->tk_start = ktime_get();
dprintk("RPC: new task initialized, procpid %u\n",
task_pid_nr(current));
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void rpc_init_task(struct rpc_task *task, const struct rpc_task_setup *task_setup_data)
{
memset(task, 0, sizeof(*task));
atomic_set(&task->tk_count, 1);
task->tk_flags = task_setup_data->flags;
task->tk_ops = task_setup_data->callback_ops;
task->tk_calldata = task_setup_data->callback_data;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&task->tk_task);
/* Initialize retry counters */
task->tk_garb_retry = 2;
task->tk_cred_retry = 2;
task->tk_rebind_retry = 2;
task->tk_priority = task_setup_data->priority - RPC_PRIORITY_LOW;
task->tk_owner = current->tgid;
/* Initialize workqueue for async tasks */
task->tk_workqueue = task_setup_data->workqueue;
if (task->tk_ops->rpc_call_prepare != NULL)
task->tk_action = rpc_prepare_task;
/* starting timestamp */
task->tk_start = ktime_get();
dprintk("RPC: new task initialized, procpid %u\n",
task_pid_nr(current));
}
| 166,223
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CuePoint::TrackPosition::Parse(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long start_,
long long size_)
{
const long long stop = start_ + size_;
long long pos = start_;
m_track = -1;
m_pos = -1;
m_block = 1; //default
while (pos < stop)
{
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); //TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; //consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; //consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x77) //CueTrack ID
m_track = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x71) //CueClusterPos ID
m_pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x1378) //CueBlockNumber
m_block = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(m_pos >= 0);
assert(m_track > 0);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void CuePoint::TrackPosition::Parse(
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x77) // CueTrack ID
m_track = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x71) // CueClusterPos ID
m_pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x1378) // CueBlockNumber
m_block = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(m_pos >= 0);
assert(m_track > 0);
// assert(m_block > 0);
}
| 174,414
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: std::string utf16ToUtf8(const StringPiece16& utf16) {
ssize_t utf8Length = utf16_to_utf8_length(utf16.data(), utf16.length());
if (utf8Length <= 0) {
return {};
}
std::string utf8;
utf8.resize(utf8Length);
utf16_to_utf8(utf16.data(), utf16.length(), &*utf8.begin());
return utf8;
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Test: ran libaapt2_tests64
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I1ebc017af623b6514cf0c493e8cd8e1d59ea26c3
(cherry picked from commit 4781057e78f63e0e99af109cebf3b6a78f4bfbb6)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
std::string utf16ToUtf8(const StringPiece16& utf16) {
ssize_t utf8Length = utf16_to_utf8_length(utf16.data(), utf16.length());
if (utf8Length <= 0) {
return {};
}
std::string utf8;
// Make room for '\0' explicitly.
utf8.resize(utf8Length + 1);
utf16_to_utf8(utf16.data(), utf16.length(), &*utf8.begin(), utf8Length + 1);
utf8.resize(utf8Length);
return utf8;
}
| 174,160
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
{
int result = -1;
if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type)
return -1;
switch (a->type) {
case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
break;
case V_ASN1_NULL:
result = 0; /* They do not have content. */
break;
case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_SET:
case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
case V_ASN1_OTHER:
default:
result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)a->value.ptr,
(ASN1_STRING *)b->value.ptr);
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
|
int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
{
int result = -1;
if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type)
return -1;
switch (a->type) {
case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
break;
case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
break;
case V_ASN1_NULL:
result = 0; /* They do not have content. */
break;
case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_SET:
case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
case V_ASN1_OTHER:
default:
result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)a->value.ptr,
(ASN1_STRING *)b->value.ptr);
break;
}
return result;
}
| 164,811
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline struct old_rng_alg *crypto_old_rng_alg(struct crypto_rng *tfm)
{
return &crypto_rng_tfm(tfm)->__crt_alg->cra_rng;
}
Commit Message: crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
static inline struct old_rng_alg *crypto_old_rng_alg(struct crypto_rng *tfm)
| 167,730
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_cabac_init(cab_ctxt_t *ps_cabac,
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm,
WORD32 qp,
WORD32 cabac_init_idc,
const UWORD8 *pu1_init_ctxt)
{
/* Sanity checks */
ASSERT(ps_cabac != NULL);
ASSERT(ps_bitstrm != NULL);
ASSERT((qp >= 0) && (qp < 52));
ASSERT((cabac_init_idc >= 0) && (cabac_init_idc < 3));
UNUSED(qp);
UNUSED(cabac_init_idc);
/* CABAC engine uses 32 bit range instead of 9 bits as specified by
* the spec. This is done to reduce number of renormalizations
*/
/* cabac engine initialization */
#if FULLRANGE
ps_cabac->u4_range = (UWORD32)510 << RANGE_SHIFT;
BITS_GET(ps_cabac->u4_ofst, ps_bitstrm->pu4_buf, ps_bitstrm->u4_bit_ofst,
ps_bitstrm->u4_cur_word, ps_bitstrm->u4_nxt_word, (9 + RANGE_SHIFT));
#else
ps_cabac->u4_range = (UWORD32)510;
BITS_GET(ps_cabac->u4_ofst, ps_bitstrm->pu4_buf, ps_bitstrm->u4_bit_ofst,
ps_bitstrm->u4_cur_word, ps_bitstrm->u4_nxt_word, 9);
#endif
/* cabac context initialization based on init idc and slice qp */
memcpy(ps_cabac->au1_ctxt_models,
pu1_init_ctxt,
IHEVC_CAB_CTXT_END);
DEBUG_RANGE_OFST("init", ps_cabac->u4_range, ps_cabac->u4_ofst);
return ((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: Return error from cabac init if offset is greater than range
When the offset was greater than range, the bitstream was read
more than the valid range in leaf-level cabac parsing modules.
Error check was added to cabac init to fix this issue. Additionally
end of slice and slice error were signalled to suppress further
parsing of current slice.
Bug: 34897036
Change-Id: I1263f1d1219684ffa6e952c76e5a08e9a933c9d2
(cherry picked from commit 3b175da88a1807d19cdd248b74bce60e57f05c6a)
(cherry picked from commit b92314c860d01d754ef579eafe55d7377962b3ba)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_cabac_init(cab_ctxt_t *ps_cabac,
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm,
WORD32 qp,
WORD32 cabac_init_idc,
const UWORD8 *pu1_init_ctxt)
{
/* Sanity checks */
ASSERT(ps_cabac != NULL);
ASSERT(ps_bitstrm != NULL);
ASSERT((qp >= 0) && (qp < 52));
ASSERT((cabac_init_idc >= 0) && (cabac_init_idc < 3));
UNUSED(qp);
UNUSED(cabac_init_idc);
/* CABAC engine uses 32 bit range instead of 9 bits as specified by
* the spec. This is done to reduce number of renormalizations
*/
/* cabac engine initialization */
#if FULLRANGE
ps_cabac->u4_range = (UWORD32)510 << RANGE_SHIFT;
BITS_GET(ps_cabac->u4_ofst, ps_bitstrm->pu4_buf, ps_bitstrm->u4_bit_ofst,
ps_bitstrm->u4_cur_word, ps_bitstrm->u4_nxt_word, (9 + RANGE_SHIFT));
#else
ps_cabac->u4_range = (UWORD32)510;
BITS_GET(ps_cabac->u4_ofst, ps_bitstrm->pu4_buf, ps_bitstrm->u4_bit_ofst,
ps_bitstrm->u4_cur_word, ps_bitstrm->u4_nxt_word, 9);
#endif
/* cabac context initialization based on init idc and slice qp */
memcpy(ps_cabac->au1_ctxt_models,
pu1_init_ctxt,
IHEVC_CAB_CTXT_END);
DEBUG_RANGE_OFST("init", ps_cabac->u4_range, ps_cabac->u4_ofst);
/*
* If the offset is greater than or equal to range, return fail.
*/
if(ps_cabac->u4_ofst >= ps_cabac->u4_range)
{
return ((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_FAIL);
}
return ((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS);
}
| 174,029
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void php_html_entities(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int all)
{
char *str, *hint_charset = NULL;
int str_len, hint_charset_len = 0;
size_t new_len;
long flags = ENT_COMPAT;
char *replaced;
zend_bool double_encode = 1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|ls!b", &str, &str_len, &flags, &hint_charset, &hint_charset_len, &double_encode) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
replaced = php_escape_html_entities_ex(str, str_len, &new_len, all, (int) flags, hint_charset, double_encode TSRMLS_CC);
RETVAL_STRINGL(replaced, (int)new_len, 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static void php_html_entities(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int all)
{
char *str, *hint_charset = NULL;
int str_len, hint_charset_len = 0;
size_t new_len;
long flags = ENT_COMPAT;
char *replaced;
zend_bool double_encode = 1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|ls!b", &str, &str_len, &flags, &hint_charset, &hint_charset_len, &double_encode) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
replaced = php_escape_html_entities_ex(str, str_len, &new_len, all, (int) flags, hint_charset, double_encode TSRMLS_CC);
if (new_len > INT_MAX) {
efree(replaced);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_STRINGL(replaced, (int)new_len, 0);
}
| 167,175
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CreatePersistentMemoryAllocator() {
GlobalHistogramAllocator::GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram();
GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithLocalMemory(
kAllocatorMemorySize, 0, "SparseHistogramAllocatorTest");
allocator_ = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get()->memory_allocator();
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void CreatePersistentMemoryAllocator() {
GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithLocalMemory(
kAllocatorMemorySize, 0, "SparseHistogramAllocatorTest");
allocator_ = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get()->memory_allocator();
}
| 172,138
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
size_t i, j;
i = c->num;
if (i != 0) {
if (i + len < MDC2_BLOCK) {
/* partial block */
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, len);
c->num += (int)len;
return 1;
} else {
/* filled one */
j = MDC2_BLOCK - i;
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, j);
len -= j;
in += j;
c->num = 0;
mdc2_body(c, &(c->data[0]), MDC2_BLOCK);
}
}
i = len & ~((size_t)MDC2_BLOCK - 1);
if (i > 0)
mdc2_body(c, in, i);
j = len - i;
if (j > 0) {
memcpy(&(c->data[0]), &(in[i]), j);
c->num = (int)j;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
size_t i, j;
i = c->num;
if (i != 0) {
if (len < MDC2_BLOCK - i) {
/* partial block */
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, len);
c->num += (int)len;
return 1;
} else {
/* filled one */
j = MDC2_BLOCK - i;
memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, j);
len -= j;
in += j;
c->num = 0;
mdc2_body(c, &(c->data[0]), MDC2_BLOCK);
}
}
i = len & ~((size_t)MDC2_BLOCK - 1);
if (i > 0)
mdc2_body(c, in, i);
j = len - i;
if (j > 0) {
memcpy(&(c->data[0]), &(in[i]), j);
c->num = (int)j;
}
return 1;
}
| 164,965
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int is_integer(char *string)
{
if (isdigit(string[0]) || string[0] == '-' || string[0] == '+') {
while (*++string && isdigit(*string))
; /* deliberately empty */
if (!*string)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes.
- Don't overflow the small cs_start buffer (reported by Niels
Thykier via the debian tracker (Jakub Wilk), found with a
fuzzer ("American fuzzy lop")).
- Cast arguments to <ctype.h> functions to unsigned char.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int is_integer(char *string)
{
if (isdigit((unsigned char) string[0]) || string[0] == '-' || string[0] == '+') {
while (*++string && isdigit((unsigned char) *string))
; /* deliberately empty */
if (!*string)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,621
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: epass2003_sm_unwrap_apdu(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_apdu *sm, struct sc_apdu *plain)
{
int r;
size_t len = 0;
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
r = sc_check_sw(card, sm->sw1, sm->sw2);
if (r == SC_SUCCESS) {
if (exdata->sm) {
if (0 != decrypt_response(card, sm->resp, sm->resplen, plain->resp, &len))
return SC_ERROR_CARD_CMD_FAILED;
}
else {
memcpy(plain->resp, sm->resp, sm->resplen);
len = sm->resplen;
}
}
plain->resplen = len;
plain->sw1 = sm->sw1;
plain->sw2 = sm->sw2;
sc_log(card->ctx,
"unwrapped APDU: resplen %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u, SW %02X%02X",
plain->resplen, plain->sw1, plain->sw2);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
|
epass2003_sm_unwrap_apdu(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_apdu *sm, struct sc_apdu *plain)
{
int r;
size_t len = 0;
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
r = sc_check_sw(card, sm->sw1, sm->sw2);
if (r == SC_SUCCESS) {
if (exdata->sm) {
len = plain->resplen;
if (0 != decrypt_response(card, sm->resp, sm->resplen, plain->resp, &len))
return SC_ERROR_CARD_CMD_FAILED;
}
else {
memcpy(plain->resp, sm->resp, sm->resplen);
len = sm->resplen;
}
}
plain->resplen = len;
plain->sw1 = sm->sw1;
plain->sw2 = sm->sw2;
sc_log(card->ctx,
"unwrapped APDU: resplen %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u, SW %02X%02X",
plain->resplen, plain->sw1, plain->sw2);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
| 169,073
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int hashtable_set(hashtable_t *hashtable,
const char *key, size_t serial,
json_t *value)
{
pair_t *pair;
bucket_t *bucket;
size_t hash, index;
/* rehash if the load ratio exceeds 1 */
if(hashtable->size >= num_buckets(hashtable))
if(hashtable_do_rehash(hashtable))
return -1;
hash = hash_str(key);
index = hash % num_buckets(hashtable);
bucket = &hashtable->buckets[index];
pair = hashtable_find_pair(hashtable, bucket, key, hash);
if(pair)
{
json_decref(pair->value);
pair->value = value;
}
else
{
/* offsetof(...) returns the size of pair_t without the last,
flexible member. This way, the correct amount is
allocated. */
pair = jsonp_malloc(offsetof(pair_t, key) + strlen(key) + 1);
if(!pair)
return -1;
pair->hash = hash;
pair->serial = serial;
strcpy(pair->key, key);
pair->value = value;
list_init(&pair->list);
insert_to_bucket(hashtable, bucket, &pair->list);
hashtable->size++;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310
|
int hashtable_set(hashtable_t *hashtable,
const char *key, size_t serial,
json_t *value)
{
pair_t *pair;
bucket_t *bucket;
size_t hash, index;
/* rehash if the load ratio exceeds 1 */
if(hashtable->size >= hashsize(hashtable->order))
if(hashtable_do_rehash(hashtable))
return -1;
hash = hash_str(key);
index = hash & hashmask(hashtable->order);
bucket = &hashtable->buckets[index];
pair = hashtable_find_pair(hashtable, bucket, key, hash);
if(pair)
{
json_decref(pair->value);
pair->value = value;
}
else
{
/* offsetof(...) returns the size of pair_t without the last,
flexible member. This way, the correct amount is
allocated. */
pair = jsonp_malloc(offsetof(pair_t, key) + strlen(key) + 1);
if(!pair)
return -1;
pair->hash = hash;
pair->serial = serial;
strcpy(pair->key, key);
pair->value = value;
list_init(&pair->list);
insert_to_bucket(hashtable, bucket, &pair->list);
hashtable->size++;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,533
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void ldap_encode_response(struct asn1_data *data, struct ldap_Result *result)
{
asn1_write_enumerated(data, result->resultcode);
asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->dn,
(result->dn) ? strlen(result->dn) : 0);
asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->errormessage,
(result->errormessage) ?
strlen(result->errormessage) : 0);
if (result->referral) {
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(3));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->referral,
strlen(result->referral));
asn1_pop_tag(data);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void ldap_encode_response(struct asn1_data *data, struct ldap_Result *result)
static bool ldap_encode_response(struct asn1_data *data, struct ldap_Result *result)
{
if (!asn1_write_enumerated(data, result->resultcode)) return false;
if (!asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->dn,
(result->dn) ? strlen(result->dn) : 0)) return false;
if (!asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->errormessage,
(result->errormessage) ?
strlen(result->errormessage) : 0)) return false;
if (result->referral) {
if (!asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(3))) return false;
if (!asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->referral,
strlen(result->referral))) return false;
if (!asn1_pop_tag(data)) return false;
}
return true;
}
| 164,593
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t SoundTriggerHwService::Module::startRecognition(sound_model_handle_t handle,
const sp<IMemory>& dataMemory)
{
ALOGV("startRecognition() model handle %d", handle);
if (!captureHotwordAllowed()) {
return PERMISSION_DENIED;
}
if (dataMemory != 0 && dataMemory->pointer() == NULL) {
ALOGE("startRecognition() dataMemory is non-0 but has NULL pointer()");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
AutoMutex lock(mLock);
if (mServiceState == SOUND_TRIGGER_STATE_DISABLED) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
sp<Model> model = getModel(handle);
if (model == 0) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if ((dataMemory == 0) ||
(dataMemory->size() < sizeof(struct sound_trigger_recognition_config))) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (model->mState == Model::STATE_ACTIVE) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
struct sound_trigger_recognition_config *config =
(struct sound_trigger_recognition_config *)dataMemory->pointer();
config->capture_handle = model->mCaptureIOHandle;
config->capture_device = model->mCaptureDevice;
status_t status = mHwDevice->start_recognition(mHwDevice, handle, config,
SoundTriggerHwService::recognitionCallback,
this);
if (status == NO_ERROR) {
model->mState = Model::STATE_ACTIVE;
model->mConfig = *config;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: soundtrigger: add size check on sound model and recogntion data
Bug: 30148546
Change-Id: I082f535a853c96571887eeea37c6d41ecee7d8c0
(cherry picked from commit bb00d8f139ff51336ab3c810d35685003949bcf8)
(cherry picked from commit ef0c91518446e65533ca8bab6726a845f27c73fd)
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
status_t SoundTriggerHwService::Module::startRecognition(sound_model_handle_t handle,
const sp<IMemory>& dataMemory)
{
ALOGV("startRecognition() model handle %d", handle);
if (!captureHotwordAllowed()) {
return PERMISSION_DENIED;
}
if (dataMemory == 0 || dataMemory->pointer() == NULL) {
ALOGE("startRecognition() dataMemory is 0 or has NULL pointer()");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
struct sound_trigger_recognition_config *config =
(struct sound_trigger_recognition_config *)dataMemory->pointer();
if (config->data_offset < sizeof(struct sound_trigger_recognition_config) ||
config->data_size > (UINT_MAX - config->data_offset) ||
dataMemory->size() < config->data_offset ||
config->data_size > (dataMemory->size() - config->data_offset)) {
ALOGE("startRecognition() data_size is too big");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
AutoMutex lock(mLock);
if (mServiceState == SOUND_TRIGGER_STATE_DISABLED) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
sp<Model> model = getModel(handle);
if (model == 0) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (model->mState == Model::STATE_ACTIVE) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
config->capture_handle = model->mCaptureIOHandle;
config->capture_device = model->mCaptureDevice;
status_t status = mHwDevice->start_recognition(mHwDevice, handle, config,
SoundTriggerHwService::recognitionCallback,
this);
if (status == NO_ERROR) {
model->mState = Model::STATE_ACTIVE;
model->mConfig = *config;
}
return status;
}
| 173,400
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool DebugOnStart::FindArgument(wchar_t* command_line, const char* argument_c) {
wchar_t argument[50];
for (int i = 0; argument_c[i]; ++i)
argument[i] = argument_c[i];
int argument_len = lstrlen(argument);
int command_line_len = lstrlen(command_line);
while (command_line_len > argument_len) {
wchar_t first_char = command_line[0];
wchar_t last_char = command_line[argument_len+1];
if ((first_char == L'-' || first_char == L'/') &&
(last_char == L' ' || last_char == 0 || last_char == L'=')) {
command_line[argument_len+1] = 0;
if (lstrcmpi(command_line+1, argument) == 0) {
command_line[argument_len+1] = last_char;
return true;
}
command_line[argument_len+1] = last_char;
}
++command_line;
--command_line_len;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix null-termination on string copy in debug-on-start code.
BUG=73740
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6549019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75629 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool DebugOnStart::FindArgument(wchar_t* command_line, const char* argument_c) {
wchar_t argument[50] = {};
for (int i = 0; argument_c[i]; ++i)
argument[i] = argument_c[i];
int argument_len = lstrlen(argument);
int command_line_len = lstrlen(command_line);
while (command_line_len > argument_len) {
wchar_t first_char = command_line[0];
wchar_t last_char = command_line[argument_len+1];
if ((first_char == L'-' || first_char == L'/') &&
(last_char == L' ' || last_char == 0 || last_char == L'=')) {
command_line[argument_len+1] = 0;
if (lstrcmpi(command_line+1, argument) == 0) {
command_line[argument_len+1] = last_char;
return true;
}
command_line[argument_len+1] = last_char;
}
++command_line;
--command_line_len;
}
return false;
}
| 170,650
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: png_get_copyright(png_structp png_ptr)
{
PNG_UNUSED(png_ptr) /* Silence compiler warning about unused png_ptr */
#ifdef PNG_STRING_COPYRIGHT
return PNG_STRING_COPYRIGHT
#else
#ifdef __STDC__
return ((png_charp) PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"libpng version 1.2.52 - November 20, 2014" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Glenn Randers-Pehrson" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc." \
PNG_STRING_NEWLINE);
#else
return ((png_charp) "libpng version 1.2.52 - November 20, 2014\
Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Glenn Randers-Pehrson\
Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger\
Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc.");
#endif
#endif
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
png_get_copyright(png_structp png_ptr)
{
PNG_UNUSED(png_ptr) /* Silence compiler warning about unused png_ptr */
#ifdef PNG_STRING_COPYRIGHT
return PNG_STRING_COPYRIGHT
#else
#ifdef __STDC__
return ((png_charp) PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"libpng version 1.2.54 - November 12, 2015" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1998-2015 Glenn Randers-Pehrson" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc." \
PNG_STRING_NEWLINE);
#else
return ((png_charp) "libpng version 1.2.54 - November 12, 2015\
Copyright (c) 1998-2015 Glenn Randers-Pehrson\
Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger\
Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc.");
#endif
#endif
}
| 172,162
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void NetworkHandler::GetCookies(Maybe<Array<String>> protocol_urls,
std::unique_ptr<GetCookiesCallback> callback) {
if (!host_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
std::vector<GURL> urls = ComputeCookieURLs(host_, protocol_urls);
scoped_refptr<CookieRetriever> retriever =
new CookieRetriever(std::move(callback));
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&CookieRetriever::RetrieveCookiesOnIO, retriever,
base::Unretained(
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetURLRequestContext()),
urls));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void NetworkHandler::GetCookies(Maybe<Array<String>> protocol_urls,
std::unique_ptr<GetCookiesCallback> callback) {
if (!host_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
std::vector<GURL> urls = ComputeCookieURLs(host_, protocol_urls);
scoped_refptr<CookieRetriever> retriever =
new CookieRetriever(std::move(callback));
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&CookieRetriever::RetrieveCookiesOnIO, retriever,
base::Unretained(storage_partition_->GetURLRequestContext()), urls));
}
| 172,757
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int fetch_uidl(char *line, void *data)
{
int i, index;
struct Context *ctx = (struct Context *) data;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
char *endp = NULL;
errno = 0;
index = strtol(line, &endp, 10);
if (errno)
return -1;
while (*endp == ' ')
endp++;
memmove(line, endp, strlen(endp) + 1);
for (i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
if (mutt_str_strcmp(line, ctx->hdrs[i]->data) == 0)
break;
if (i == ctx->msgcount)
{
mutt_debug(1, "new header %d %s\n", index, line);
if (i >= ctx->hdrmax)
mx_alloc_memory(ctx);
ctx->msgcount++;
ctx->hdrs[i] = mutt_header_new();
ctx->hdrs[i]->data = mutt_str_strdup(line);
}
else if (ctx->hdrs[i]->index != index - 1)
pop_data->clear_cache = true;
ctx->hdrs[i]->refno = index;
ctx->hdrs[i]->index = index - 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Ensure UID in fetch_uidl
CWE ID: CWE-824
|
static int fetch_uidl(char *line, void *data)
{
int i, index;
struct Context *ctx = (struct Context *) data;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
char *endp = NULL;
errno = 0;
index = strtol(line, &endp, 10);
if (errno)
return -1;
while (*endp == ' ')
endp++;
memmove(line, endp, strlen(endp) + 1);
/* uid must be at least be 1 byte */
if (strlen(line) == 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
if (mutt_str_strcmp(line, ctx->hdrs[i]->data) == 0)
break;
if (i == ctx->msgcount)
{
mutt_debug(1, "new header %d %s\n", index, line);
if (i >= ctx->hdrmax)
mx_alloc_memory(ctx);
ctx->msgcount++;
ctx->hdrs[i] = mutt_header_new();
ctx->hdrs[i]->data = mutt_str_strdup(line);
}
else if (ctx->hdrs[i]->index != index - 1)
pop_data->clear_cache = true;
ctx->hdrs[i]->refno = index;
ctx->hdrs[i]->index = index - 1;
return 0;
}
| 169,136
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool asn1_write_OctetString(struct asn1_data *data, const void *p, size_t length)
{
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
asn1_write(data, p, length);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool asn1_write_OctetString(struct asn1_data *data, const void *p, size_t length)
{
if (!asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) return false;
if (!asn1_write(data, p, length)) return false;
return asn1_pop_tag(data);
}
| 164,591
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintingMessageFilter::OnUpdatePrintSettingsReply(
scoped_refptr<printing::PrinterQuery> printer_query,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params params;
if (printer_query->last_status() != printing::PrintingContext::OK) {
params.Reset();
} else {
RenderParamsFromPrintSettings(printer_query->settings(), ¶ms.params);
params.params.document_cookie = printer_query->cookie();
params.pages =
printing::PageRange::GetPages(printer_query->settings().ranges);
}
PrintHostMsg_UpdatePrintSettings::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, params);
Send(reply_msg);
if (printer_query->cookie() && printer_query->settings().dpi())
print_job_manager_->QueuePrinterQuery(printer_query.get());
else
printer_query->StopWorker();
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void PrintingMessageFilter::OnUpdatePrintSettingsReply(
scoped_refptr<printing::PrinterQuery> printer_query,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params params;
if (!printer_query.get() ||
printer_query->last_status() != printing::PrintingContext::OK) {
params.Reset();
} else {
RenderParamsFromPrintSettings(printer_query->settings(), ¶ms.params);
params.params.document_cookie = printer_query->cookie();
params.pages =
printing::PageRange::GetPages(printer_query->settings().ranges);
}
PrintHostMsg_UpdatePrintSettings::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, params);
Send(reply_msg);
if (printer_query.get()) {
if (printer_query->cookie() && printer_query->settings().dpi())
print_job_manager_->QueuePrinterQuery(printer_query.get());
else
printer_query->StopWorker();
}
}
| 170,256
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(recvfrom, int, fd, void __user *, ubuf, size_t, size,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int __user *, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct iovec iov;
struct msghdr msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err, err2;
int fput_needed;
if (size > INT_MAX)
size = INT_MAX;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
iov.iov_len = size;
iov.iov_base = ubuf;
iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, READ, &iov, 1, size);
/* Save some cycles and don't copy the address if not needed */
msg.msg_name = addr ? (struct sockaddr *)&address : NULL;
/* We assume all kernel code knows the size of sockaddr_storage */
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
err = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, size, flags);
if (err >= 0 && addr != NULL) {
err2 = move_addr_to_user(&address,
msg.msg_namelen, addr, addr_len);
if (err2 < 0)
err = err2;
}
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(recvfrom, int, fd, void __user *, ubuf, size_t, size,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int __user *, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct iovec iov;
struct msghdr msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err, err2;
int fput_needed;
if (size > INT_MAX)
size = INT_MAX;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ubuf, size)))
return -EFAULT;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
iov.iov_len = size;
iov.iov_base = ubuf;
iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, READ, &iov, 1, size);
/* Save some cycles and don't copy the address if not needed */
msg.msg_name = addr ? (struct sockaddr *)&address : NULL;
/* We assume all kernel code knows the size of sockaddr_storage */
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
err = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, size, flags);
if (err >= 0 && addr != NULL) {
err2 = move_addr_to_user(&address,
msg.msg_namelen, addr, addr_len);
if (err2 < 0)
err = err2;
}
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
| 167,571
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void unmarshallAudioAttributes(const Parcel& parcel, audio_attributes_t *attributes)
{
attributes->usage = (audio_usage_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->content_type = (audio_content_type_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->source = (audio_source_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->flags = (audio_flags_mask_t) parcel.readInt32();
const bool hasFlattenedTag = (parcel.readInt32() == kAudioAttributesMarshallTagFlattenTags);
if (hasFlattenedTag) {
String16 tags = parcel.readString16();
ssize_t realTagSize = utf16_to_utf8_length(tags.string(), tags.size());
if (realTagSize <= 0) {
strcpy(attributes->tags, "");
} else {
size_t tagSize = realTagSize > AUDIO_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS_MAX_SIZE - 1 ?
AUDIO_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS_MAX_SIZE - 1 : realTagSize;
utf16_to_utf8(tags.string(), tagSize, attributes->tags);
}
} else {
ALOGE("unmarshallAudioAttributes() received unflattened tags, ignoring tag values");
strcpy(attributes->tags, "");
}
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I3518416e89ed901021970958fb6005fd69129f7c
(cherry picked from commit 1d3f4278b2666d1a145af2f54782c993aa07d1d9)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void unmarshallAudioAttributes(const Parcel& parcel, audio_attributes_t *attributes)
{
attributes->usage = (audio_usage_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->content_type = (audio_content_type_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->source = (audio_source_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->flags = (audio_flags_mask_t) parcel.readInt32();
const bool hasFlattenedTag = (parcel.readInt32() == kAudioAttributesMarshallTagFlattenTags);
if (hasFlattenedTag) {
String16 tags = parcel.readString16();
ssize_t realTagSize = utf16_to_utf8_length(tags.string(), tags.size());
if (realTagSize <= 0) {
strcpy(attributes->tags, "");
} else {
size_t tagSize = realTagSize > AUDIO_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS_MAX_SIZE - 1 ?
AUDIO_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS_MAX_SIZE - 1 : realTagSize;
utf16_to_utf8(tags.string(), tagSize, attributes->tags,
sizeof(attributes->tags) / sizeof(attributes->tags[0]));
}
} else {
ALOGE("unmarshallAudioAttributes() received unflattened tags, ignoring tag values");
strcpy(attributes->tags, "");
}
}
| 174,159
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static uint8_t excluded_channels(bitfile *ld, drc_info *drc)
{
uint8_t i, n = 0;
uint8_t num_excl_chan = 7;
for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
{
drc->exclude_mask[i] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,103,"excluded_channels(): exclude_mask"));
}
n++;
while ((drc->additional_excluded_chns[n-1] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,104,"excluded_channels(): additional_excluded_chns"))) == 1)
{
for (i = num_excl_chan; i < num_excl_chan+7; i++)
{
drc->exclude_mask[i] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,105,"excluded_channels(): exclude_mask"));
}
n++;
num_excl_chan += 7;
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: Fix a couple buffer overflows
https://hackerone.com/reports/502816
https://hackerone.com/reports/507858
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/contrib/src/faad2/faad2-fix-overflows.patch
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static uint8_t excluded_channels(bitfile *ld, drc_info *drc)
{
uint8_t i, n = 0;
uint8_t num_excl_chan = 7;
for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
{
drc->exclude_mask[i] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,103,"excluded_channels(): exclude_mask"));
}
n++;
while ((drc->additional_excluded_chns[n-1] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,104,"excluded_channels(): additional_excluded_chns"))) == 1)
{
if (i >= MAX_CHANNELS - num_excl_chan - 7)
return n;
for (i = num_excl_chan; i < num_excl_chan+7; i++)
{
drc->exclude_mask[i] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,105,"excluded_channels(): exclude_mask"));
}
n++;
num_excl_chan += 7;
}
return n;
}
| 169,536
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: TileIndependenceTest()
: EncoderTest(GET_PARAM(0)),
md5_fw_order_(),
md5_inv_order_(),
n_tiles_(GET_PARAM(1)) {
init_flags_ = VPX_CODEC_USE_PSNR;
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t cfg;
cfg.w = 704;
cfg.h = 144;
cfg.threads = 1;
fw_dec_ = codec_->CreateDecoder(cfg, 0);
inv_dec_ = codec_->CreateDecoder(cfg, 0);
inv_dec_->Control(VP9_INVERT_TILE_DECODE_ORDER, 1);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
TileIndependenceTest()
: EncoderTest(GET_PARAM(0)),
md5_fw_order_(),
md5_inv_order_(),
n_tiles_(GET_PARAM(1)) {
init_flags_ = VPX_CODEC_USE_PSNR;
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t cfg = vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t();
cfg.w = 704;
cfg.h = 144;
cfg.threads = 1;
fw_dec_ = codec_->CreateDecoder(cfg, 0);
inv_dec_ = codec_->CreateDecoder(cfg, 0);
inv_dec_->Control(VP9_INVERT_TILE_DECODE_ORDER, 1);
}
| 174,584
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: DisplaySourceCustomBindings::DisplaySourceCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context),
weak_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction("StartSession",
base::Bind(&DisplaySourceCustomBindings::StartSession,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("TerminateSession",
base::Bind(&DisplaySourceCustomBindings::TerminateSession,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
DisplaySourceCustomBindings::DisplaySourceCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context),
weak_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction("StartSession", "displaySource",
base::Bind(&DisplaySourceCustomBindings::StartSession,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("TerminateSession", "displaySource",
base::Bind(&DisplaySourceCustomBindings::TerminateSession,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
| 172,248
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: AppResult::AppResult(Profile* profile,
const std::string& app_id,
AppListControllerDelegate* controller,
bool is_recommendation)
: profile_(profile),
app_id_(app_id),
controller_(controller),
extension_registry_(NULL) {
set_id(extensions::Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(app_id_).spec());
if (app_list::switches::IsExperimentalAppListEnabled())
set_display_type(is_recommendation ? DISPLAY_RECOMMENDATION : DISPLAY_TILE);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_service()
->GetInstalledExtension(app_id_);
DCHECK(extension);
is_platform_app_ = extension->is_platform_app();
icon_.reset(
new extensions::IconImage(profile_,
extension,
extensions::IconsInfo::GetIcons(extension),
GetPreferredIconDimension(),
extensions::util::GetDefaultAppIcon(),
this));
UpdateIcon();
StartObservingExtensionRegistry();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
|
AppResult::AppResult(Profile* profile,
const std::string& app_id,
AppListControllerDelegate* controller,
bool is_recommendation)
: profile_(profile),
app_id_(app_id),
controller_(controller),
extension_registry_(NULL) {
set_id(extensions::Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(app_id_).spec());
if (app_list::switches::IsExperimentalAppListEnabled())
set_display_type(is_recommendation ? DISPLAY_RECOMMENDATION : DISPLAY_TILE);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_)->GetInstalledExtension(
app_id_);
DCHECK(extension);
is_platform_app_ = extension->is_platform_app();
icon_.reset(
new extensions::IconImage(profile_,
extension,
extensions::IconsInfo::GetIcons(extension),
GetPreferredIconDimension(),
extensions::util::GetDefaultAppIcon(),
this));
UpdateIcon();
StartObservingExtensionRegistry();
}
| 171,725
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void php_snmp_error(zval *object, const char *docref, int type, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
php_snmp_object *snmp_object = NULL;
if (object) {
snmp_object = Z_SNMP_P(object);
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
memset(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, 0, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr));
} else {
va_start(args, format);
vsnprintf(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr) - 1, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
snmp_object->snmp_errno = type;
}
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
return;
}
if (object && (snmp_object->exceptions_enabled & type)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(php_snmp_exception_ce, type, snmp_object->snmp_errstr);
} else {
va_start(args, format);
php_verror(docref, "", E_WARNING, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static void php_snmp_error(zval *object, const char *docref, int type, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
php_snmp_object *snmp_object = NULL;
if (object) {
snmp_object = Z_SNMP_P(object);
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
memset(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, 0, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr));
} else {
va_start(args, format);
vsnprintf(snmp_object->snmp_errstr, sizeof(snmp_object->snmp_errstr) - 1, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
snmp_object->snmp_errno = type;
}
if (type == PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_NOERROR) {
return;
}
if (object && (snmp_object->exceptions_enabled & type)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(php_snmp_exception_ce, type, "%s", snmp_object->snmp_errstr);
} else {
va_start(args, format);
php_verror(docref, "", E_WARNING, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
}
| 165,074
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int NsSetParameter (preproc_effect_t *effect, void *pParam, void *pValue)
{
int status = 0;
return status;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
int NsSetParameter (preproc_effect_t *effect, void *pParam, void *pValue)
int NsSetParameter (preproc_effect_t *effect __unused,
void *pParam __unused,
void *pValue __unused)
{
int status = 0;
return status;
}
| 173,352
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void InitChromeDriverLogging(const CommandLine& command_line) {
bool success = InitLogging(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL("chromedriver.log"),
logging::LOG_TO_BOTH_FILE_AND_SYSTEM_DEBUG_LOG,
logging::LOCK_LOG_FILE,
logging::DELETE_OLD_LOG_FILE,
logging::DISABLE_DCHECK_FOR_NON_OFFICIAL_RELEASE_BUILDS);
if (!success) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to initialize logging";
}
logging::SetLogItems(false, // enable_process_id
false, // enable_thread_id
true, // enable_timestamp
false); // enable_tickcount
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kLoggingLevel)) {
std::string log_level = command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kLoggingLevel);
int level = 0;
if (base::StringToInt(log_level, &level)) {
logging::SetMinLogLevel(level);
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Bad log level: " << log_level;
}
}
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void InitChromeDriverLogging(const CommandLine& command_line) {
| 170,461
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int php_stream_temp_seek(php_stream *stream, off_t offset, int whence, off_t *newoffs TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
int ret;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (!ts->innerstream) {
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
}
ret = php_stream_seek(ts->innerstream, offset, whence);
*newoffs = php_stream_tell(ts->innerstream);
stream->eof = ts->innerstream->eof;
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int php_stream_temp_seek(php_stream *stream, off_t offset, int whence, off_t *newoffs TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
int ret;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (!ts->innerstream) {
*newoffs = -1;
return -1;
}
ret = php_stream_seek(ts->innerstream, offset, whence);
*newoffs = php_stream_tell(ts->innerstream);
stream->eof = ts->innerstream->eof;
return ret;
}
| 165,481
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static pdf_creator_t *new_creator(int *n_elements)
{
pdf_creator_t *daddy;
static const pdf_creator_t creator_template[] =
{
{"Title", ""},
{"Author", ""},
{"Subject", ""},
{"Keywords", ""},
{"Creator", ""},
{"Producer", ""},
{"CreationDate", ""},
{"ModDate", ""},
{"Trapped", ""},
};
daddy = malloc(sizeof(creator_template));
memcpy(daddy, creator_template, sizeof(creator_template));
if (n_elements)
*n_elements = sizeof(creator_template) / sizeof(creator_template[0]);
return daddy;
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
static pdf_creator_t *new_creator(int *n_elements)
{
pdf_creator_t *daddy;
static const pdf_creator_t creator_template[] =
{
{"Title", ""},
{"Author", ""},
{"Subject", ""},
{"Keywords", ""},
{"Creator", ""},
{"Producer", ""},
{"CreationDate", ""},
{"ModDate", ""},
{"Trapped", ""},
};
daddy = safe_calloc(sizeof(creator_template));
memcpy(daddy, creator_template, sizeof(creator_template));
if (n_elements)
*n_elements = sizeof(creator_template) / sizeof(creator_template[0]);
return daddy;
}
| 169,570
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: flx_set_palette_vector (FlxColorSpaceConverter * flxpal, guint start, guint num,
guchar * newpal, gint scale)
{
guint grab;
g_return_if_fail (flxpal != NULL);
g_return_if_fail (start < 0x100);
grab = ((start + num) > 0x100 ? 0x100 - start : num);
if (scale) {
gint i = 0;
start *= 3;
while (grab) {
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
grab--;
}
} else {
memcpy (&flxpal->palvec[start * 3], newpal, grab * 3);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
flx_set_palette_vector (FlxColorSpaceConverter * flxpal, guint start, guint num,
guchar * newpal, gint scale)
{
guint grab;
g_return_if_fail (flxpal != NULL);
g_return_if_fail (start < 0x100);
grab = ((start + num) > 0x100 ? 0x100 - start : num);
if (scale) {
gint i = 0;
start *= 3;
while (grab) {
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
flxpal->palvec[start++] = newpal[i++] << scale;
grab--;
}
} else {
memcpy (&flxpal->palvec[start * 3], newpal, grab * 3);
}
}
| 165,245
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: set_interface_var(const char *iface,
const char *var, const char *name,
uint32_t val)
{
FILE *fp;
char spath[64+IFNAMSIZ]; /* XXX: magic constant */
if (snprintf(spath, sizeof(spath), var, iface) >= sizeof(spath))
return -1;
if (access(spath, F_OK) != 0)
return -1;
fp = fopen(spath, "w");
if (!fp) {
if (name)
flog(LOG_ERR, "failed to set %s (%u) for %s: %s",
name, val, iface, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
fprintf(fp, "%u", val);
fclose(fp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: set_interface_var() doesn't check interface name and blindly does
fopen(path "/" ifname, "w") on it. As "ifname" is an untrusted input, it
should be checked for ".." and/or "/" in it. Otherwise, an infected
unprivileged daemon may overwrite contents of file named "mtu",
"hoplimit", etc. in arbitrary location with arbitrary 32-bit value in
decimal representation ("%d"). If an attacker has a local account or
may create arbitrary symlinks with these names in any location (e.g.
/tmp), any file may be overwritten with a decimal value.
CWE ID: CWE-22
|
set_interface_var(const char *iface,
const char *var, const char *name,
uint32_t val)
{
FILE *fp;
char spath[64+IFNAMSIZ]; /* XXX: magic constant */
if (snprintf(spath, sizeof(spath), var, iface) >= sizeof(spath))
return -1;
/* No path traversal */
if (strstr(name, "..") || strchr(name, '/'))
return -1;
if (access(spath, F_OK) != 0)
return -1;
fp = fopen(spath, "w");
if (!fp) {
if (name)
flog(LOG_ERR, "failed to set %s (%u) for %s: %s",
name, val, iface, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
fprintf(fp, "%u", val);
fclose(fp);
return 0;
}
| 166,550
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int nfs4_intent_set_file(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct file *filp;
int ret;
/* If the open_intent is for execute, we have an extra check to make */
if (nd->intent.open.flags & FMODE_EXEC) {
ret = nfs_may_open(state->inode,
state->owner->so_cred,
nd->intent.open.flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_close;
}
filp = lookup_instantiate_filp(nd, path->dentry, NULL);
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
struct nfs_open_context *ctx;
ctx = nfs_file_open_context(filp);
ctx->state = state;
return 0;
}
ret = PTR_ERR(filp);
out_close:
nfs4_close_sync(path, state, nd->intent.open.flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
|
static int nfs4_intent_set_file(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state)
static int nfs4_intent_set_file(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, fmode_t fmode)
{
struct file *filp;
int ret;
/* If the open_intent is for execute, we have an extra check to make */
if (fmode & FMODE_EXEC) {
ret = nfs_may_open(state->inode,
state->owner->so_cred,
nd->intent.open.flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_close;
}
filp = lookup_instantiate_filp(nd, path->dentry, NULL);
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
struct nfs_open_context *ctx;
ctx = nfs_file_open_context(filp);
ctx->state = state;
return 0;
}
ret = PTR_ERR(filp);
out_close:
nfs4_close_sync(path, state, fmode & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE));
return ret;
}
| 165,693
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::SimulateAttrib0(GLuint max_vertex_accessed) {
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2)
return false;
const VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_.GetVertexAttribInfo(0);
bool attrib_0_used = current_program_->GetAttribInfoByLocation(0) != NULL;
if (info->enabled() && attrib_0_used) {
return false;
}
typedef VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo::Vec4 Vec4;
glBindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, attrib_0_buffer_id_);
GLsizei num_vertices = max_vertex_accessed + 1;
GLsizei size_needed = num_vertices * sizeof(Vec4); // NOLINT
if (size_needed > attrib_0_size_) {
glBufferData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, size_needed, NULL, GL_DYNAMIC_DRAW);
attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ = false;
}
if (attrib_0_used &&
(!attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ ||
(info->value().v[0] != attrib_0_value_.v[0] ||
info->value().v[1] != attrib_0_value_.v[1] ||
info->value().v[2] != attrib_0_value_.v[2] ||
info->value().v[3] != attrib_0_value_.v[3]))) {
std::vector<Vec4> temp(num_vertices, info->value());
glBufferSubData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0, size_needed, &temp[0].v[0]);
attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ = true;
attrib_0_value_ = info->value();
attrib_0_size_ = size_needed;
}
glVertexAttribPointer(0, 4, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, NULL);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::SimulateAttrib0(GLuint max_vertex_accessed) {
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::SimulateAttrib0(
GLuint max_vertex_accessed, bool* simulated) {
DCHECK(simulated);
*simulated = false;
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2)
return true;
const VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_.GetVertexAttribInfo(0);
bool attrib_0_used = current_program_->GetAttribInfoByLocation(0) != NULL;
if (info->enabled() && attrib_0_used) {
return true;
}
// Make a buffer with a single repeated vec4 value enough to
// simulate the constant value that is supposed to be here.
// This is required to emulate GLES2 on GL.
typedef VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo::Vec4 Vec4;
GLuint num_vertices = max_vertex_accessed + 1;
GLuint size_needed = 0;
if (num_vertices == 0 ||
!SafeMultiply(num_vertices, static_cast<GLuint>(sizeof(Vec4)),
&size_needed) ||
size_needed > 0x7FFFFFFFU) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glDrawXXX: Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
CopyRealGLErrorsToWrapper();
glBindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, attrib_0_buffer_id_);
if (static_cast<GLsizei>(size_needed) > attrib_0_size_) {
glBufferData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, size_needed, NULL, GL_DYNAMIC_DRAW);
GLenum error = glGetError();
if (error != GL_NO_ERROR) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glDrawXXX: Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ = false;
}
if (attrib_0_used &&
(!attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ ||
(info->value().v[0] != attrib_0_value_.v[0] ||
info->value().v[1] != attrib_0_value_.v[1] ||
info->value().v[2] != attrib_0_value_.v[2] ||
info->value().v[3] != attrib_0_value_.v[3]))) {
std::vector<Vec4> temp(num_vertices, info->value());
glBufferSubData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0, size_needed, &temp[0].v[0]);
attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ = true;
attrib_0_value_ = info->value();
attrib_0_size_ = size_needed;
}
glVertexAttribPointer(0, 4, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, NULL);
*simulated = true;
return true;
}
| 170,332
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DOMHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
host_ = frame_host;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void DOMHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
void DOMHandler::SetRenderer(int process_host_id,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
host_ = frame_host;
}
| 172,745
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static __u8 *sp_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 107 && rdesc[104] == 0x26 && rdesc[105] == 0x80 &&
rdesc[106] == 0x03) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Sunplus Wireless Desktop report descriptor\n");
rdesc[105] = rdesc[110] = 0x03;
rdesc[106] = rdesc[111] = 0x21;
}
return rdesc;
}
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static __u8 *sp_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 112 && rdesc[104] == 0x26 && rdesc[105] == 0x80 &&
rdesc[106] == 0x03) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Sunplus Wireless Desktop report descriptor\n");
rdesc[105] = rdesc[110] = 0x03;
rdesc[106] = rdesc[111] = 0x21;
}
return rdesc;
}
| 166,375
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void NetworkHandler::SetCookie(const std::string& name,
const std::string& value,
Maybe<std::string> url,
Maybe<std::string> domain,
Maybe<std::string> path,
Maybe<bool> secure,
Maybe<bool> http_only,
Maybe<std::string> same_site,
Maybe<double> expires,
std::unique_ptr<SetCookieCallback> callback) {
if (!process_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
if (!url.isJust() && !domain.isJust()) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams(
"At least one of the url and domain needs to be specified"));
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&SetCookieOnIO,
base::Unretained(
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetURLRequestContext()),
name, value, url.fromMaybe(""), domain.fromMaybe(""),
path.fromMaybe(""), secure.fromMaybe(false),
http_only.fromMaybe(false), same_site.fromMaybe(""),
expires.fromMaybe(-1),
base::BindOnce(&CookieSetOnIO, std::move(callback))));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void NetworkHandler::SetCookie(const std::string& name,
const std::string& value,
Maybe<std::string> url,
Maybe<std::string> domain,
Maybe<std::string> path,
Maybe<bool> secure,
Maybe<bool> http_only,
Maybe<std::string> same_site,
Maybe<double> expires,
std::unique_ptr<SetCookieCallback> callback) {
if (!storage_partition_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
if (!url.isJust() && !domain.isJust()) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams(
"At least one of the url and domain needs to be specified"));
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&SetCookieOnIO,
base::Unretained(storage_partition_->GetURLRequestContext()), name,
value, url.fromMaybe(""), domain.fromMaybe(""), path.fromMaybe(""),
secure.fromMaybe(false), http_only.fromMaybe(false),
same_site.fromMaybe(""), expires.fromMaybe(-1),
base::BindOnce(&CookieSetOnIO, std::move(callback))));
}
| 172,760
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static float *get_window(vorb *f, int len)
{
len <<= 1;
if (len == f->blocksize_0) return f->window[0];
if (len == f->blocksize_1) return f->window[1];
assert(0);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point()
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static float *get_window(vorb *f, int len)
{
len <<= 1;
if (len == f->blocksize_0) return f->window[0];
if (len == f->blocksize_1) return f->window[1];
return NULL;
}
| 169,615
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: test_standard(png_modifier* PNG_CONST pm, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
int bdlo, int PNG_CONST bdhi)
{
for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo)
{
int interlace_type;
for (interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_NONE;
interlace_type < INTERLACE_LAST; ++interlace_type)
{
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
interlace_type, 0, 0, 0), 0/*do_interlace*/, pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
}
}
return 1; /* keep going */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
test_standard(png_modifier* PNG_CONST pm, png_byte PNG_CONST colour_type,
test_standard(png_modifier* const pm, png_byte const colour_type,
int bdlo, int const bdhi)
{
for (; bdlo <= bdhi; ++bdlo)
{
int interlace_type;
for (interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_NONE;
interlace_type < INTERLACE_LAST; ++interlace_type)
{
standard_test(&pm->this, FILEID(colour_type, DEPTH(bdlo), 0/*palette*/,
interlace_type, 0, 0, 0), do_read_interlace, pm->use_update_info);
if (fail(pm))
return 0;
}
}
return 1; /* keep going */
}
| 173,710
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void RegisterPropertiesHandler(
void* object, const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->RegisterProperties(prop_list);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void RegisterPropertiesHandler(
// IBusController override.
virtual void OnRegisterImeProperties(
const input_method::ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
RegisterProperties(prop_list);
}
| 170,502
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void VP8XChunk::height(XMP_Uns32 val)
{
PutLE24(&this->data[7], val - 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void VP8XChunk::height(XMP_Uns32 val)
{
PutLE24(&this->data[7], val > 0 ? val - 1 : 0);
}
| 165,365
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: IOHandler::IOHandler(DevToolsIOContext* io_context)
: DevToolsDomainHandler(IO::Metainfo::domainName),
io_context_(io_context),
process_host_(nullptr),
weak_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
IOHandler::IOHandler(DevToolsIOContext* io_context)
: DevToolsDomainHandler(IO::Metainfo::domainName),
io_context_(io_context),
browser_context_(nullptr),
storage_partition_(nullptr),
weak_factory_(this) {}
| 172,749
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int vivid_fb_ioctl(struct fb_info *info, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vivid_dev *dev = (struct vivid_dev *)info->par;
switch (cmd) {
case FBIOGET_VBLANK: {
struct fb_vblank vblank;
vblank.flags = FB_VBLANK_HAVE_COUNT | FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VCOUNT |
FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VSYNC;
vblank.count = 0;
vblank.vcount = 0;
vblank.hcount = 0;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &vblank, sizeof(vblank)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
default:
dprintk(dev, 1, "Unknown ioctl %08x\n", cmd);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] media/vivid-osd: fix info leak in ioctl
The vivid_fb_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
struct fb_vblank after the ->hcount member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speirofr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static int vivid_fb_ioctl(struct fb_info *info, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vivid_dev *dev = (struct vivid_dev *)info->par;
switch (cmd) {
case FBIOGET_VBLANK: {
struct fb_vblank vblank;
memset(&vblank, 0, sizeof(vblank));
vblank.flags = FB_VBLANK_HAVE_COUNT | FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VCOUNT |
FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VSYNC;
vblank.count = 0;
vblank.vcount = 0;
vblank.hcount = 0;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &vblank, sizeof(vblank)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
default:
dprintk(dev, 1, "Unknown ioctl %08x\n", cmd);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,575
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void TabStripGtk::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
GenerateIdealBounds();
StartRemoveTabAnimation(index, contents->web_contents());
GetTabAt(index)->set_closing(true);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void TabStripGtk::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
void TabStripGtk::TabDetachedAt(WebContents* contents, int index) {
GenerateIdealBounds();
StartRemoveTabAnimation(index, contents);
GetTabAt(index)->set_closing(true);
}
| 171,516
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mdecrypt_generic)
{
zval *mcryptind;
char *data;
int data_len;
php_mcrypt *pm;
char* data_s;
int block_size, data_size;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs", &mcryptind, &data, &data_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pm, php_mcrypt * , &mcryptind, -1, "MCrypt", le_mcrypt);
PHP_MCRYPT_INIT_CHECK
if (data_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "An empty string was passed");
RETURN_FALSE
}
/* Check blocksize */
if (mcrypt_enc_is_block_mode(pm->td) == 1) { /* It's a block algorithm */
block_size = mcrypt_enc_get_block_size(pm->td);
data_size = (((data_len - 1) / block_size) + 1) * block_size;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
} else { /* It's not a block algorithm */
data_size = data_len;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
}
mdecrypt_generic(pm->td, data_s, data_size);
RETVAL_STRINGL(data_s, data_size, 1);
efree(data_s);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
PHP_FUNCTION(mdecrypt_generic)
{
zval *mcryptind;
char *data;
int data_len;
php_mcrypt *pm;
char* data_s;
int block_size, data_size;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs", &mcryptind, &data, &data_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pm, php_mcrypt * , &mcryptind, -1, "MCrypt", le_mcrypt);
PHP_MCRYPT_INIT_CHECK
if (data_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "An empty string was passed");
RETURN_FALSE
}
/* Check blocksize */
if (mcrypt_enc_is_block_mode(pm->td) == 1) { /* It's a block algorithm */
block_size = mcrypt_enc_get_block_size(pm->td);
data_size = (((data_len - 1) / block_size) + 1) * block_size;
if (data_size <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Integer overflow in data size");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
} else { /* It's not a block algorithm */
data_size = data_len;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
}
mdecrypt_generic(pm->td, data_s, data_size);
RETVAL_STRINGL(data_s, data_size, 1);
efree(data_s);
}
| 167,092
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: AudioTrack::AudioTrack(
Segment* pSegment,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
Track(pSegment, element_start, element_size)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
AudioTrack::AudioTrack(
| 174,239
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long long Cluster::GetElementSize() const
{
return m_element_size;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long long Cluster::GetElementSize() const
| 174,312
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void f2fs_wait_discard_bios(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
__issue_discard_cmd(sbi, false);
__drop_discard_cmd(sbi);
__wait_discard_cmd(sbi, false);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void f2fs_wait_discard_bios(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
void f2fs_wait_discard_bios(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool umount)
{
__issue_discard_cmd(sbi, false);
__drop_discard_cmd(sbi);
__wait_discard_cmd(sbi, !umount);
}
| 169,414
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void * calloc(size_t n, size_t lb)
{
if (lb && n > SIZE_MAX / lb)
return NULL;
# if defined(GC_LINUX_THREADS) /* && !defined(USE_PROC_FOR_LIBRARIES) */
/* libpthread allocated some memory that is only pointed to by */
/* mmapped thread stacks. Make sure it's not collectable. */
{
static GC_bool lib_bounds_set = FALSE;
ptr_t caller = (ptr_t)__builtin_return_address(0);
/* This test does not need to ensure memory visibility, since */
/* the bounds will be set when/if we create another thread. */
if (!EXPECT(lib_bounds_set, TRUE)) {
GC_init_lib_bounds();
lib_bounds_set = TRUE;
}
if (((word)caller >= (word)GC_libpthread_start
&& (word)caller < (word)GC_libpthread_end)
|| ((word)caller >= (word)GC_libld_start
&& (word)caller < (word)GC_libld_end))
return GC_malloc_uncollectable(n*lb);
/* The two ranges are actually usually adjacent, so there may */
/* be a way to speed this up. */
}
# endif
return((void *)REDIRECT_MALLOC(n*lb));
}
Commit Message: Fix calloc-related code to prevent SIZE_MAX redefinition in sys headers
* malloc.c: Include limits.h for SIZE_MAX.
* malloc.c (SIZE_MAX, calloc): Define GC_SIZE_MAX instead of SIZE_MAX.
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
void * calloc(size_t n, size_t lb)
{
if (lb && n > GC_SIZE_MAX / lb)
return NULL;
# if defined(GC_LINUX_THREADS) /* && !defined(USE_PROC_FOR_LIBRARIES) */
/* libpthread allocated some memory that is only pointed to by */
/* mmapped thread stacks. Make sure it's not collectable. */
{
static GC_bool lib_bounds_set = FALSE;
ptr_t caller = (ptr_t)__builtin_return_address(0);
/* This test does not need to ensure memory visibility, since */
/* the bounds will be set when/if we create another thread. */
if (!EXPECT(lib_bounds_set, TRUE)) {
GC_init_lib_bounds();
lib_bounds_set = TRUE;
}
if (((word)caller >= (word)GC_libpthread_start
&& (word)caller < (word)GC_libpthread_end)
|| ((word)caller >= (word)GC_libld_start
&& (word)caller < (word)GC_libld_end))
return GC_malloc_uncollectable(n*lb);
/* The two ranges are actually usually adjacent, so there may */
/* be a way to speed this up. */
}
# endif
return((void *)REDIRECT_MALLOC(n*lb));
}
| 169,880
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: selaGetCombName(SELA *sela,
l_int32 size,
l_int32 direction)
{
char *selname;
char combname[L_BUF_SIZE];
l_int32 i, nsels, sx, sy, found;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selaGetCombName");
if (!sela)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sela not defined", procName, NULL);
if (direction != L_HORIZ && direction != L_VERT)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("invalid direction", procName, NULL);
/* Derive the comb name we're looking for */
if (direction == L_HORIZ)
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dh", size);
else /* direction == L_VERT */
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dv", size);
found = FALSE;
nsels = selaGetCount(sela);
for (i = 0; i < nsels; i++) {
sel = selaGetSel(sela, i);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, NULL, NULL);
if (sy != 1 && sx != 1) /* 2-D; not a comb */
continue;
selname = selGetName(sel);
if (!strcmp(selname, combname)) {
found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found)
return stringNew(selname);
else
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sel not found", procName, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
selaGetCombName(SELA *sela,
l_int32 size,
l_int32 direction)
{
char *selname;
char combname[L_BUFSIZE];
l_int32 i, nsels, sx, sy, found;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selaGetCombName");
if (!sela)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sela not defined", procName, NULL);
if (direction != L_HORIZ && direction != L_VERT)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("invalid direction", procName, NULL);
/* Derive the comb name we're looking for */
if (direction == L_HORIZ)
snprintf(combname, L_BUFSIZE, "sel_comb_%dh", size);
else /* direction == L_VERT */
snprintf(combname, L_BUFSIZE, "sel_comb_%dv", size);
found = FALSE;
nsels = selaGetCount(sela);
for (i = 0; i < nsels; i++) {
sel = selaGetSel(sela, i);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, NULL, NULL);
if (sy != 1 && sx != 1) /* 2-D; not a comb */
continue;
selname = selGetName(sel);
if (!strcmp(selname, combname)) {
found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found)
return stringNew(selname);
else
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sel not found", procName, NULL);
}
| 169,330
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
BUG_ON(task_stack_end_corrupted(prev));
#endif
if (unlikely(in_atomic_preempt_off())) {
__schedule_bug(prev);
preempt_count_set(PREEMPT_DISABLED);
}
rcu_sleep_check();
profile_hit(SCHED_PROFILING, __builtin_return_address(0));
schedstat_inc(this_rq(), sched_count);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
if (task_stack_end_corrupted(prev))
panic("corrupted stack end detected inside scheduler\n");
#endif
if (unlikely(in_atomic_preempt_off())) {
__schedule_bug(prev);
preempt_count_set(PREEMPT_DISABLED);
}
rcu_sleep_check();
profile_hit(SCHED_PROFILING, __builtin_return_address(0));
schedstat_inc(this_rq(), sched_count);
}
| 167,445
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnError(PipelineStatus status) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK_NE(status, PIPELINE_OK);
if (suppress_destruction_errors_)
return;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (status == PipelineStatus::DEMUXER_ERROR_DETECTED_HLS) {
renderer_factory_selector_->SetUseMediaPlayer(true);
pipeline_controller_.Stop();
SetMemoryReportingState(false);
main_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&WebMediaPlayerImpl::StartPipeline, AsWeakPtr()));
return;
}
#endif
ReportPipelineError(load_type_, status, media_log_.get());
media_log_->AddEvent(media_log_->CreatePipelineErrorEvent(status));
media_metrics_provider_->OnError(status);
if (watch_time_reporter_)
watch_time_reporter_->OnError(status);
if (ready_state_ == WebMediaPlayer::kReadyStateHaveNothing) {
SetNetworkState(WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError);
} else {
SetNetworkState(PipelineErrorToNetworkState(status));
}
pipeline_controller_.Stop();
UpdatePlayState();
}
Commit Message: Fix HasSingleSecurityOrigin for HLS
HLS manifests can request segments from a different origin than the
original manifest's origin. We do not inspect HLS manifests within
Chromium, and instead delegate to Android's MediaPlayer. This means we
need to be conservative, and always assume segments might come from a
different origin. HasSingleSecurityOrigin should always return false
when decoding HLS.
Bug: 864283
Change-Id: Ie16849ac6f29ae7eaa9caf342ad0509a226228ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142691
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Thomas Guilbert <tguilbert@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576378}
CWE ID: CWE-346
|
void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnError(PipelineStatus status) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK_NE(status, PIPELINE_OK);
if (suppress_destruction_errors_)
return;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (status == PipelineStatus::DEMUXER_ERROR_DETECTED_HLS) {
demuxer_found_hls_ = true;
renderer_factory_selector_->SetUseMediaPlayer(true);
pipeline_controller_.Stop();
SetMemoryReportingState(false);
main_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&WebMediaPlayerImpl::StartPipeline, AsWeakPtr()));
return;
}
#endif
ReportPipelineError(load_type_, status, media_log_.get());
media_log_->AddEvent(media_log_->CreatePipelineErrorEvent(status));
media_metrics_provider_->OnError(status);
if (watch_time_reporter_)
watch_time_reporter_->OnError(status);
if (ready_state_ == WebMediaPlayer::kReadyStateHaveNothing) {
SetNetworkState(WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError);
} else {
SetNetworkState(PipelineErrorToNetworkState(status));
}
pipeline_controller_.Stop();
UpdatePlayState();
}
| 173,179
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mbind, compat_ulong_t, start, compat_ulong_t, len,
compat_ulong_t, mode, compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
compat_ulong_t, maxnode, compat_ulong_t, flags)
{
long err = 0;
unsigned long __user *nm = NULL;
unsigned long nr_bits, alloc_size;
nodemask_t bm;
nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode-1, MAX_NUMNODES);
alloc_size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
if (nmask) {
err = compat_get_bitmap(nodes_addr(bm), nmask, nr_bits);
nm = compat_alloc_user_space(alloc_size);
err |= copy_to_user(nm, nodes_addr(bm), alloc_size);
}
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
return sys_mbind(start, len, mode, nm, nr_bits+1, flags);
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mbind, compat_ulong_t, start, compat_ulong_t, len,
compat_ulong_t, mode, compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
compat_ulong_t, maxnode, compat_ulong_t, flags)
{
unsigned long __user *nm = NULL;
unsigned long nr_bits, alloc_size;
nodemask_t bm;
nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode-1, MAX_NUMNODES);
alloc_size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
if (nmask) {
if (compat_get_bitmap(nodes_addr(bm), nmask, nr_bits))
return -EFAULT;
nm = compat_alloc_user_space(alloc_size);
if (copy_to_user(nm, nodes_addr(bm), alloc_size))
return -EFAULT;
}
return sys_mbind(start, len, mode, nm, nr_bits+1, flags);
}
| 168,258
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: my_object_get_property (GObject *object,
guint prop_id,
GValue *value,
GParamSpec *pspec)
{
MyObject *mobject;
mobject = MY_OBJECT (object);
switch (prop_id)
{
case PROP_THIS_IS_A_STRING:
g_value_set_string (value, mobject->this_is_a_string);
break;
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID (object, prop_id, pspec);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
my_object_get_property (GObject *object,
| 165,102
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::RegisterUKMProviders() {
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::NetworkMetricsProvider>(
content::CreateNetworkConnectionTrackerAsyncGetter(),
std::make_unique<metrics::NetworkQualityEstimatorProviderImpl>()));
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<ChromeOSMetricsProvider>());
#endif // !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<variations::FieldTrialsProvider>(nullptr,
kUKMFieldTrialSuffix));
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79
|
void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::RegisterUKMProviders() {
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::NetworkMetricsProvider>(
content::CreateNetworkConnectionTrackerAsyncGetter(),
std::make_unique<metrics::NetworkQualityEstimatorProviderImpl>()));
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<ChromeOSMetricsProvider>());
#endif // !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::GPUMetricsProvider>());
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::CPUMetricsProvider>());
metrics_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<metrics::ScreenInfoMetricsProvider>());
ukm_service_->RegisterMetricsProvider(
std::make_unique<variations::FieldTrialsProvider>(nullptr,
kUKMFieldTrialSuffix));
}
| 172,071
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int interface_get_command(QXLInstance *sin, struct QXLCommandExt *ext)
{
SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd = container_of(sin, SimpleSpiceDisplay, qxl);
info->num_memslots = NUM_MEMSLOTS;
info->num_memslots_groups = NUM_MEMSLOTS_GROUPS;
info->internal_groupslot_id = 0;
info->qxl_ram_size = ssd->bufsize;
info->n_surfaces = ssd->num_surfaces;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static int interface_get_command(QXLInstance *sin, struct QXLCommandExt *ext)
{
SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd = container_of(sin, SimpleSpiceDisplay, qxl);
info->num_memslots = NUM_MEMSLOTS;
info->num_memslots_groups = NUM_MEMSLOTS_GROUPS;
info->internal_groupslot_id = 0;
info->qxl_ram_size = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
info->n_surfaces = ssd->num_surfaces;
}
| 165,150
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, int *ok)
{
/*-
* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
* if so:
* (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
* (2) update s->init_num
*/
pitem *item;
hm_fragment *frag;
int al;
*ok = 0;
item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
if (item == NULL)
return 0;
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
/* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
frag->msg_header.frag_len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, int *ok)
{
/*-
* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
* if so:
* (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
* (2) update s->init_num
*/
pitem *item;
hm_fragment *frag;
int al;
*ok = 0;
do {
item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
if (item == NULL)
return 0;
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
if (frag->msg_header.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) {
/* This is a stale message that has been buffered so clear it */
pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
item = NULL;
frag = NULL;
}
} while (item == NULL);
/* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
frag->msg_header.frag_len);
}
| 165,197
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto)
{
if (upto)
{
BIO *tbio;
do
{
tbio = BIO_pop(f);
BIO_free(f);
f = tbio;
}
while (f != upto);
}
else
BIO_free_all(f);
}
Commit Message: Canonicalise input in CMS_verify.
If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto)
{
if (upto)
{
BIO *tbio;
do
{
tbio = BIO_pop(f);
BIO_free(f);
f = tbio;
}
while (f && f != upto);
}
else
BIO_free_all(f);
}
| 166,690
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: AMediaCodecCryptoInfo *AMediaCodecCryptoInfo_new(
int numsubsamples,
uint8_t key[16],
uint8_t iv[16],
cryptoinfo_mode_t mode,
size_t *clearbytes,
size_t *encryptedbytes) {
size_t cryptosize = sizeof(AMediaCodecCryptoInfo) + sizeof(size_t) * numsubsamples * 2;
AMediaCodecCryptoInfo *ret = (AMediaCodecCryptoInfo*) malloc(cryptosize);
if (!ret) {
ALOGE("couldn't allocate %zu bytes", cryptosize);
return NULL;
}
ret->numsubsamples = numsubsamples;
memcpy(ret->key, key, 16);
memcpy(ret->iv, iv, 16);
ret->mode = mode;
ret->pattern.encryptBlocks = 0;
ret->pattern.skipBlocks = 0;
ret->clearbytes = (size_t*) (ret + 1); // point immediately after the struct
ret->encryptedbytes = ret->clearbytes + numsubsamples; // point after the clear sizes
memcpy(ret->clearbytes, clearbytes, numsubsamples * sizeof(size_t));
memcpy(ret->encryptedbytes, encryptedbytes, numsubsamples * sizeof(size_t));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Check for overflow of crypto size
Bug: 111603051
Test: CTS
Change-Id: Ib5b1802b9b35769a25c16e2b977308cf7a810606
(cherry picked from commit d1fd02761236b35a336434367131f71bef7405c9)
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
AMediaCodecCryptoInfo *AMediaCodecCryptoInfo_new(
int numsubsamples,
uint8_t key[16],
uint8_t iv[16],
cryptoinfo_mode_t mode,
size_t *clearbytes,
size_t *encryptedbytes) {
size_t cryptosize;
// = sizeof(AMediaCodecCryptoInfo) + sizeof(size_t) * numsubsamples * 2;
if (__builtin_mul_overflow(sizeof(size_t) * 2, numsubsamples, &cryptosize) ||
__builtin_add_overflow(cryptosize, sizeof(AMediaCodecCryptoInfo), &cryptosize)) {
ALOGE("crypto size overflow");
return NULL;
}
AMediaCodecCryptoInfo *ret = (AMediaCodecCryptoInfo*) malloc(cryptosize);
if (!ret) {
ALOGE("couldn't allocate %zu bytes", cryptosize);
return NULL;
}
ret->numsubsamples = numsubsamples;
memcpy(ret->key, key, 16);
memcpy(ret->iv, iv, 16);
ret->mode = mode;
ret->pattern.encryptBlocks = 0;
ret->pattern.skipBlocks = 0;
ret->clearbytes = (size_t*) (ret + 1); // point immediately after the struct
ret->encryptedbytes = ret->clearbytes + numsubsamples; // point after the clear sizes
memcpy(ret->clearbytes, clearbytes, numsubsamples * sizeof(size_t));
memcpy(ret->encryptedbytes, encryptedbytes, numsubsamples * sizeof(size_t));
return ret;
}
| 174,093
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetLoginLibrary(
LoginLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->login_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetLoginLibrary(
| 170,640
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ShelfLayoutManager::AutoHideState ShelfLayoutManager::CalculateAutoHideState(
VisibilityState visibility_state) const {
if (visibility_state != AUTO_HIDE || !launcher_widget())
return AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
Shell* shell = Shell::GetInstance();
if (shell->GetAppListTargetVisibility())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (shell->system_tray() && shell->system_tray()->should_show_launcher())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_ && launcher_->IsShowingMenu())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_widget()->IsActive() || status_->IsActive())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (event_filter_.get() && event_filter_->in_mouse_drag())
return AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
aura::RootWindow* root = launcher_widget()->GetNativeView()->GetRootWindow();
bool mouse_over_launcher =
launcher_widget()->GetWindowScreenBounds().Contains(
root->last_mouse_location());
return mouse_over_launcher ? AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN : AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ShelfLayoutManager::AutoHideState ShelfLayoutManager::CalculateAutoHideState(
VisibilityState visibility_state) const {
if (visibility_state != AUTO_HIDE || !launcher_widget())
return AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
Shell* shell = Shell::GetInstance();
if (shell->GetAppListTargetVisibility())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (shell->system_tray() && shell->system_tray()->should_show_launcher())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_ && launcher_->IsShowingMenu())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_ && launcher_->IsShowingOverflowBubble())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_widget()->IsActive() || status_->IsActive())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (event_filter_.get() && event_filter_->in_mouse_drag())
return AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
aura::RootWindow* root = launcher_widget()->GetNativeView()->GetRootWindow();
bool mouse_over_launcher =
launcher_widget()->GetWindowScreenBounds().Contains(
root->last_mouse_location());
return mouse_over_launcher ? AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN : AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
}
| 170,898
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void MaybeCreateIBus() {
if (ibus_) {
return;
}
ibus_init();
ibus_ = ibus_bus_new();
if (!ibus_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ibus_bus_new() failed";
return;
}
ConnectIBusSignals();
ibus_bus_set_watch_dbus_signal(ibus_, TRUE);
ibus_bus_set_watch_ibus_signal(ibus_, TRUE);
if (ibus_bus_is_connected(ibus_)) {
LOG(INFO) << "IBus connection is ready.";
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void MaybeCreateIBus() {
if (ibus_) {
return;
}
ibus_init();
ibus_ = ibus_bus_new();
if (!ibus_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ibus_bus_new() failed";
return;
}
ConnectIBusSignals();
ibus_bus_set_watch_dbus_signal(ibus_, TRUE);
ibus_bus_set_watch_ibus_signal(ibus_, TRUE);
if (ibus_bus_is_connected(ibus_)) {
VLOG(1) << "IBus connection is ready.";
}
}
| 170,541
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static gboolean prplcb_xfer_new_send_cb(gpointer data, gint fd, b_input_condition cond)
{
PurpleXfer *xfer = data;
struct im_connection *ic = purple_ic_by_pa(xfer->account);
struct prpl_xfer_data *px = xfer->ui_data;
PurpleBuddy *buddy;
const char *who;
buddy = purple_find_buddy(xfer->account, xfer->who);
who = buddy ? purple_buddy_get_name(buddy) : xfer->who;
/* TODO(wilmer): After spreading some more const goodness in BitlBee,
remove the evil cast below. */
px->ft = imcb_file_send_start(ic, (char *) who, xfer->filename, xfer->size);
px->ft->data = px;
px->ft->accept = prpl_xfer_accept;
px->ft->canceled = prpl_xfer_canceled;
px->ft->free = prpl_xfer_free;
px->ft->write_request = prpl_xfer_write_request;
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: purple: Fix crash on ft requests from unknown contacts
Followup to 701ab81 (included in 3.5) which was a partial fix which only
improved things for non-libpurple file transfers (that is, just jabber)
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
static gboolean prplcb_xfer_new_send_cb(gpointer data, gint fd, b_input_condition cond)
{
PurpleXfer *xfer = data;
struct im_connection *ic = purple_ic_by_pa(xfer->account);
struct prpl_xfer_data *px = xfer->ui_data;
PurpleBuddy *buddy;
const char *who;
buddy = purple_find_buddy(xfer->account, xfer->who);
who = buddy ? purple_buddy_get_name(buddy) : xfer->who;
/* TODO(wilmer): After spreading some more const goodness in BitlBee,
remove the evil cast below. */
px->ft = imcb_file_send_start(ic, (char *) who, xfer->filename, xfer->size);
if (!px->ft) {
return FALSE;
}
px->ft->data = px;
px->ft->accept = prpl_xfer_accept;
px->ft->canceled = prpl_xfer_canceled;
px->ft->free = prpl_xfer_free;
px->ft->write_request = prpl_xfer_write_request;
return FALSE;
}
| 168,380
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int rm_read_multi(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb,
AVStream *st, char *mime)
{
int number_of_streams = avio_rb16(pb);
int number_of_mdpr;
int i, ret;
unsigned size2;
for (i = 0; i<number_of_streams; i++)
avio_rb16(pb);
number_of_mdpr = avio_rb16(pb);
if (number_of_mdpr != 1) {
avpriv_request_sample(s, "MLTI with multiple (%d) MDPR", number_of_mdpr);
}
for (i = 0; i < number_of_mdpr; i++) {
AVStream *st2;
if (i > 0) {
st2 = avformat_new_stream(s, NULL);
if (!st2) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
return ret;
}
st2->id = st->id + (i<<16);
st2->codecpar->bit_rate = st->codecpar->bit_rate;
st2->start_time = st->start_time;
st2->duration = st->duration;
st2->codecpar->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_DATA;
st2->priv_data = ff_rm_alloc_rmstream();
if (!st2->priv_data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
} else
st2 = st;
size2 = avio_rb32(pb);
ret = ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata(s, s->pb, st2, st2->priv_data,
size2, mime);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rmdec: Do not pass mime type in rm_read_multi() to ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata()
Fixes: use after free()
Fixes: rmdec-crash-ffe85b4cab1597d1cfea6955705e53f1f5c8a362
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
static int rm_read_multi(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb,
AVStream *st, char *mime)
{
int number_of_streams = avio_rb16(pb);
int number_of_mdpr;
int i, ret;
unsigned size2;
for (i = 0; i<number_of_streams; i++)
avio_rb16(pb);
number_of_mdpr = avio_rb16(pb);
if (number_of_mdpr != 1) {
avpriv_request_sample(s, "MLTI with multiple (%d) MDPR", number_of_mdpr);
}
for (i = 0; i < number_of_mdpr; i++) {
AVStream *st2;
if (i > 0) {
st2 = avformat_new_stream(s, NULL);
if (!st2) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
return ret;
}
st2->id = st->id + (i<<16);
st2->codecpar->bit_rate = st->codecpar->bit_rate;
st2->start_time = st->start_time;
st2->duration = st->duration;
st2->codecpar->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_DATA;
st2->priv_data = ff_rm_alloc_rmstream();
if (!st2->priv_data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
} else
st2 = st;
size2 = avio_rb32(pb);
ret = ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata(s, s->pb, st2, st2->priv_data,
size2, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,924
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void local_socket_close_locked(asocket* s) {
D("entered local_socket_close_locked. LS(%d) fd=%d", s->id, s->fd);
if (s->peer) {
D("LS(%d): closing peer. peer->id=%d peer->fd=%d", s->id, s->peer->id, s->peer->fd);
/* Note: it's important to call shutdown before disconnecting from
* the peer, this ensures that remote sockets can still get the id
* of the local socket they're connected to, to send a CLOSE()
* protocol event. */
if (s->peer->shutdown) {
s->peer->shutdown(s->peer);
}
s->peer->peer = 0;
if (s->peer->close == local_socket_close) {
local_socket_close_locked(s->peer);
} else {
s->peer->close(s->peer);
}
s->peer = 0;
}
/* If we are already closing, or if there are no
** pending packets, destroy immediately
*/
if (s->closing || s->has_write_error || s->pkt_first == NULL) {
int id = s->id;
local_socket_destroy(s);
D("LS(%d): closed", id);
return;
}
/* otherwise, put on the closing list
*/
D("LS(%d): closing", s->id);
s->closing = 1;
fdevent_del(&s->fde, FDE_READ);
remove_socket(s);
D("LS(%d): put on socket_closing_list fd=%d", s->id, s->fd);
insert_local_socket(s, &local_socket_closing_list);
CHECK_EQ(FDE_WRITE, s->fde.state & FDE_WRITE);
}
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
static void local_socket_close_locked(asocket* s) {
static void local_socket_close(asocket* s) {
D("entered local_socket_close. LS(%d) fd=%d", s->id, s->fd);
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
if (s->peer) {
D("LS(%d): closing peer. peer->id=%d peer->fd=%d", s->id, s->peer->id, s->peer->fd);
/* Note: it's important to call shutdown before disconnecting from
* the peer, this ensures that remote sockets can still get the id
* of the local socket they're connected to, to send a CLOSE()
* protocol event. */
if (s->peer->shutdown) {
s->peer->shutdown(s->peer);
}
s->peer->peer = nullptr;
s->peer->close(s->peer);
s->peer = nullptr;
}
/* If we are already closing, or if there are no
** pending packets, destroy immediately
*/
if (s->closing || s->has_write_error || s->pkt_first == NULL) {
int id = s->id;
local_socket_destroy(s);
D("LS(%d): closed", id);
return;
}
/* otherwise, put on the closing list
*/
D("LS(%d): closing", s->id);
s->closing = 1;
fdevent_del(&s->fde, FDE_READ);
remove_socket(s);
D("LS(%d): put on socket_closing_list fd=%d", s->id, s->fd);
insert_local_socket(s, &local_socket_closing_list);
CHECK_EQ(FDE_WRITE, s->fde.state & FDE_WRITE);
}
| 174,154
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const Cluster* Segment::FindOrPreloadCluster(long long requested_pos)
{
if (requested_pos < 0)
return 0;
Cluster** const ii = m_clusters;
Cluster** i = ii;
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** const jj = ii + count;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j)
{
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pCluster = *k;
assert(pCluster);
const long long pos = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(pos >= 0);
if (pos < requested_pos)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > requested_pos)
j = k;
else
return pCluster;
}
assert(i == j);
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(
this,
-1,
requested_pos);
assert(pCluster);
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_clusters;
PreloadCluster(pCluster, idx);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const Cluster* Segment::FindOrPreloadCluster(long long requested_pos)
Cluster** const ii = m_clusters;
Cluster** i = ii;
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** const jj = ii + count;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j) {
// INVARIANT:
//[ii, i) < pTP->m_pos
//[i, j) ?
//[j, jj) > pTP->m_pos
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pCluster = *k;
assert(pCluster);
// const long long pos_ = pCluster->m_pos;
// assert(pos_);
// const long long pos = pos_ * ((pos_ < 0) ? -1 : 1);
const long long pos = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(pos >= 0);
if (pos < requested_pos)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > requested_pos)
j = k;
else
return pCluster;
}
assert(i == j);
// assert(Cluster::HasBlockEntries(this, tp.m_pos));
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this, -1, requested_pos);
//-1);
assert(pCluster);
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_clusters;
PreloadCluster(pCluster, idx);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
| 174,280
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: exsltStrXpathCtxtRegister (xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *prefix)
{
if (ctxt
&& prefix
&& !xmlXPathRegisterNs(ctxt,
prefix,
(const xmlChar *) EXSLT_STRINGS_NAMESPACE)
&& !xmlXPathRegisterFuncNS(ctxt,
(const xmlChar *) "encode-uri",
(const xmlChar *) EXSLT_STRINGS_NAMESPACE,
exsltStrEncodeUriFunction)
&& !xmlXPathRegisterFuncNS(ctxt,
(const xmlChar *) "decode-uri",
(const xmlChar *) EXSLT_STRINGS_NAMESPACE,
exsltStrDecodeUriFunction)
&& !xmlXPathRegisterFuncNS(ctxt,
(const xmlChar *) "padding",
(const xmlChar *) EXSLT_STRINGS_NAMESPACE,
exsltStrPaddingFunction)
&& !xmlXPathRegisterFuncNS(ctxt,
(const xmlChar *) "align",
(const xmlChar *) EXSLT_STRINGS_NAMESPACE,
exsltStrAlignFunction)
&& !xmlXPathRegisterFuncNS(ctxt,
(const xmlChar *) "concat",
(const xmlChar *) EXSLT_STRINGS_NAMESPACE,
exsltStrConcatFunction)
&& !xmlXPathRegisterFuncNS(ctxt,
(const xmlChar *) "replace",
(const xmlChar *) EXSLT_STRINGS_NAMESPACE,
exsltStrReplaceFunction)) {
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
exsltStrXpathCtxtRegister (xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *prefix)
{
if (ctxt
&& prefix
&& !xmlXPathRegisterNs(ctxt,
prefix,
(const xmlChar *) EXSLT_STRINGS_NAMESPACE)
&& !xmlXPathRegisterFuncNS(ctxt,
(const xmlChar *) "encode-uri",
(const xmlChar *) EXSLT_STRINGS_NAMESPACE,
exsltStrEncodeUriFunction)
&& !xmlXPathRegisterFuncNS(ctxt,
(const xmlChar *) "decode-uri",
(const xmlChar *) EXSLT_STRINGS_NAMESPACE,
exsltStrDecodeUriFunction)
&& !xmlXPathRegisterFuncNS(ctxt,
(const xmlChar *) "padding",
(const xmlChar *) EXSLT_STRINGS_NAMESPACE,
exsltStrPaddingFunction)
&& !xmlXPathRegisterFuncNS(ctxt,
(const xmlChar *) "align",
(const xmlChar *) EXSLT_STRINGS_NAMESPACE,
exsltStrAlignFunction)
&& !xmlXPathRegisterFuncNS(ctxt,
(const xmlChar *) "concat",
(const xmlChar *) EXSLT_STRINGS_NAMESPACE,
exsltStrConcatFunction)) {
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
| 173,297
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void MessageService::OpenChannelToNativeApp(
int source_process_id,
int source_routing_id,
int receiver_port_id,
const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& native_app_name,
const std::string& channel_name,
const std::string& connect_message) {
content::RenderProcessHost* source =
content::RenderProcessHost::FromID(source_process_id);
if (!source)
return;
WebContents* source_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
source_process_id, source_routing_id);
std::string tab_json = "null";
if (source_contents) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> tab_value(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
source_contents, ExtensionTabUtil::INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS));
base::JSONWriter::Write(tab_value.get(), &tab_json);
}
scoped_ptr<MessageChannel> channel(new MessageChannel());
channel->opener.reset(new ExtensionMessagePort(source, MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL,
source_extension_id));
NativeMessageProcessHost::MessageType type =
channel_name == "chrome.runtime.sendNativeMessage" ?
NativeMessageProcessHost::TYPE_SEND_MESSAGE_REQUEST :
NativeMessageProcessHost::TYPE_CONNECT;
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(
content::BrowserThread::FILE,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&NativeMessageProcessHost::Create,
base::WeakPtr<NativeMessageProcessHost::Client>(
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
native_app_name, connect_message, receiver_port_id,
type,
base::Bind(&MessageService::FinalizeOpenChannelToNativeApp,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
receiver_port_id,
channel_name,
base::Passed(&channel),
tab_json)));
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void MessageService::OpenChannelToNativeApp(
int source_process_id,
int source_routing_id,
int receiver_port_id,
const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& native_app_name,
const std::string& channel_name,
const std::string& connect_message) {
content::RenderProcessHost* source =
content::RenderProcessHost::FromID(source_process_id);
if (!source)
return;
WebContents* source_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
source_process_id, source_routing_id);
std::string tab_json = "null";
if (source_contents) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> tab_value(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
source_contents));
base::JSONWriter::Write(tab_value.get(), &tab_json);
}
scoped_ptr<MessageChannel> channel(new MessageChannel());
channel->opener.reset(new ExtensionMessagePort(source, MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL,
source_extension_id));
NativeMessageProcessHost::MessageType type =
channel_name == "chrome.runtime.sendNativeMessage" ?
NativeMessageProcessHost::TYPE_SEND_MESSAGE_REQUEST :
NativeMessageProcessHost::TYPE_CONNECT;
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(
content::BrowserThread::FILE,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&NativeMessageProcessHost::Create,
base::WeakPtr<NativeMessageProcessHost::Client>(
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
native_app_name, connect_message, receiver_port_id,
type,
base::Bind(&MessageService::FinalizeOpenChannelToNativeApp,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
receiver_port_id,
channel_name,
base::Passed(&channel),
tab_json)));
}
| 171,447
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static enum led_brightness k90_backlight_get(struct led_classdev *led_cdev)
{
int ret;
struct k90_led *led = container_of(led_cdev, struct k90_led, cdev);
struct device *dev = led->cdev.dev->parent;
struct usb_interface *usbif = to_usb_interface(dev->parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif);
int brightness;
char data[8];
ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0),
K90_REQUEST_STATUS,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_VENDOR |
USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, 0, data, 8,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "Failed to get K90 initial state (error %d).\n",
ret);
return -EIO;
}
brightness = data[4];
if (brightness < 0 || brightness > 3) {
dev_warn(dev,
"Read invalid backlight brightness: %02hhx.\n",
data[4]);
return -EIO;
}
return brightness;
}
Commit Message: HID: corsair: fix DMA buffers on stack
Not all platforms support DMA to the stack, and specifically since v4.9
this is no longer supported on x86 with VMAP_STACK either.
Note that the macro-mode buffer was larger than necessary.
Fixes: 6f78193ee9ea ("HID: corsair: Add Corsair Vengeance K90 driver")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static enum led_brightness k90_backlight_get(struct led_classdev *led_cdev)
{
int ret;
struct k90_led *led = container_of(led_cdev, struct k90_led, cdev);
struct device *dev = led->cdev.dev->parent;
struct usb_interface *usbif = to_usb_interface(dev->parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif);
int brightness;
char *data;
data = kmalloc(8, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0),
K90_REQUEST_STATUS,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_VENDOR |
USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, 0, data, 8,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "Failed to get K90 initial state (error %d).\n",
ret);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
brightness = data[4];
if (brightness < 0 || brightness > 3) {
dev_warn(dev,
"Read invalid backlight brightness: %02hhx.\n",
data[4]);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
ret = brightness;
out:
kfree(data);
return ret;
}
| 168,393
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void IGDstartelt(void * d, const char * name, int l)
{
struct IGDdatas * datas = (struct IGDdatas *)d;
memcpy( datas->cureltname, name, l);
datas->cureltname[l] = '\0';
datas->level++;
if( (l==7) && !memcmp(name, "service", l) ) {
datas->tmp.controlurl[0] = '\0';
datas->tmp.eventsuburl[0] = '\0';
datas->tmp.scpdurl[0] = '\0';
datas->tmp.servicetype[0] = '\0';
}
}
Commit Message: igd_desc_parse.c: fix buffer overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void IGDstartelt(void * d, const char * name, int l)
{
struct IGDdatas * datas = (struct IGDdatas *)d;
if(l >= MINIUPNPC_URL_MAXSIZE)
l = MINIUPNPC_URL_MAXSIZE-1;
memcpy(datas->cureltname, name, l);
datas->cureltname[l] = '\0';
datas->level++;
if( (l==7) && !memcmp(name, "service", l) ) {
datas->tmp.controlurl[0] = '\0';
datas->tmp.eventsuburl[0] = '\0';
datas->tmp.scpdurl[0] = '\0';
datas->tmp.servicetype[0] = '\0';
}
}
| 166,592
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ConvolveFunctions(convolve_fn_t h8, convolve_fn_t h8_avg,
convolve_fn_t v8, convolve_fn_t v8_avg,
convolve_fn_t hv8, convolve_fn_t hv8_avg)
: h8_(h8), v8_(v8), hv8_(hv8), h8_avg_(h8_avg), v8_avg_(v8_avg),
hv8_avg_(hv8_avg) {}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ConvolveFunctions(convolve_fn_t h8, convolve_fn_t h8_avg,
| 174,503
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: header_put_be_8byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, sf_count_t x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 8)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = 0 ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
} ;
} /* header_put_be_8byte */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
header_put_be_8byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, sf_count_t x)
| 170,049
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xmlStopParser(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
if (ctxt == NULL)
return;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
if (ctxt->input != NULL) {
ctxt->input->cur = BAD_CAST"";
ctxt->input->base = ctxt->input->cur;
}
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
xmlStopParser(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
if (ctxt == NULL)
return;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
ctxt->errNo = XML_ERR_USER_STOP;
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
if (ctxt->input != NULL) {
ctxt->input->cur = BAD_CAST"";
ctxt->input->base = ctxt->input->cur;
}
}
| 171,310
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int hci_uart_set_proto(struct hci_uart *hu, int id)
{
const struct hci_uart_proto *p;
int err;
p = hci_uart_get_proto(id);
if (!p)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
hu->proto = p;
set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
err = hci_uart_register_dev(hu);
if (err) {
clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
return err;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Postpone HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit set in hci_uart_set_proto()
task A: task B:
hci_uart_set_proto flush_to_ldisc
- p->open(hu) -> h5_open //alloc h5 - receive_buf
- set_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY - tty_port_default_receive_buf
- hci_uart_register_dev - tty_ldisc_receive_buf
- hci_uart_tty_receive
- test_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
- h5_recv
- clear_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY while() {
- p->open(hu) -> h5_close //free h5
- h5_rx_3wire_hdr
- h5_reset() //use-after-free
}
It could use ioctl to set hci uart proto, but there is
a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fail in
hci_uart_set_proto(), see stack above, fix this by setting
HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit only when hci_uart_register_dev()
return success.
Reported-by: syzbot+899a33dc0fa0dbaf06a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
static int hci_uart_set_proto(struct hci_uart *hu, int id)
{
const struct hci_uart_proto *p;
int err;
p = hci_uart_get_proto(id);
if (!p)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
hu->proto = p;
err = hci_uart_register_dev(hu);
if (err) {
return err;
}
set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
return 0;
}
| 169,528
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref)
{
atomic_inc(&map->refcnt);
if (uref)
atomic_inc(&map->usercnt);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
|
void bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref)
/* prog's and map's refcnt limit */
#define BPF_MAX_REFCNT 32768
struct bpf_map *bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref)
{
if (atomic_inc_return(&map->refcnt) > BPF_MAX_REFCNT) {
atomic_dec(&map->refcnt);
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
}
if (uref)
atomic_inc(&map->usercnt);
return map;
}
| 167,253
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::Print(WebKit::WebFrame* frame, WebKit::WebNode* node) {
if (print_web_view_)
return;
scoped_ptr<PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint> prepare;
if (!InitPrintSettingsAndPrepareFrame(frame, node, &prepare))
return; // Failed to init print page settings.
int expected_page_count = 0;
bool use_browser_overlays = true;
expected_page_count = prepare->GetExpectedPageCount();
if (expected_page_count)
use_browser_overlays = prepare->ShouldUseBrowserOverlays();
prepare.reset();
if (!expected_page_count) {
DidFinishPrinting(OK); // Release resources and fail silently.
return;
}
if (!GetPrintSettingsFromUser(frame, expected_page_count,
use_browser_overlays)) {
DidFinishPrinting(OK); // Release resources and fail silently.
return;
}
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(frame, node, NULL)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
ResetScriptedPrintCount();
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::Print(WebKit::WebFrame* frame, WebKit::WebNode* node) {
if (print_web_view_)
return;
scoped_ptr<PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint> prepare;
if (!InitPrintSettingsAndPrepareFrame(frame, node, &prepare)) {
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
return; // Failed to init print page settings.
}
int expected_page_count = 0;
bool use_browser_overlays = true;
expected_page_count = prepare->GetExpectedPageCount();
if (expected_page_count)
use_browser_overlays = prepare->ShouldUseBrowserOverlays();
prepare.reset();
if (!expected_page_count) {
DidFinishPrinting(OK); // Release resources and fail silently.
return;
}
if (!GetPrintSettingsFromUser(frame, expected_page_count,
use_browser_overlays)) {
DidFinishPrinting(OK); // Release resources and fail silently.
return;
}
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(frame, node, NULL)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
ResetScriptedPrintCount();
}
| 170,263
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(radius_get_vendor_attr)
{
int res;
const void *data;
int len;
u_int32_t vendor;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &data, &len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
res = rad_get_vendor_attr(&vendor, &data, (size_t *) &len);
if (res == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
array_init(return_value);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "attr", res);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "vendor", vendor);
add_assoc_stringl(return_value, "data", (char *) data, len, 1);
return;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
PHP_FUNCTION(radius_get_vendor_attr)
{
const void *data, *raw;
int len;
u_int32_t vendor;
unsigned char type;
size_t data_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &raw, &len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (rad_get_vendor_attr(&vendor, &type, &data, &data_len, raw, len) == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
array_init(return_value);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "attr", type);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "vendor", vendor);
add_assoc_stringl(return_value, "data", (char *) data, data_len, 1);
return;
}
}
| 166,077
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AudioOutputDevice::Stop() {
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(audio_thread_lock_);
audio_thread_->Stop(MessageLoop::current());
audio_thread_.reset();
}
message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&AudioOutputDevice::ShutDownOnIOThread, this));
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void AudioOutputDevice::Stop() {
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(audio_thread_lock_);
audio_thread_.Stop(MessageLoop::current());
}
message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&AudioOutputDevice::ShutDownOnIOThread, this));
}
| 170,707
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ProcEstablishConnection(ClientPtr client)
{
const char *reason;
char *auth_proto, *auth_string;
xConnClientPrefix *prefix;
REQUEST(xReq);
prefix = (xConnClientPrefix *) ((char *) stuff + sz_xReq);
auth_proto = (char *) prefix + sz_xConnClientPrefix;
auth_string = auth_proto + pad_to_int32(prefix->nbytesAuthProto);
if ((prefix->majorVersion != X_PROTOCOL) ||
(prefix->minorVersion != X_PROTOCOL_REVISION))
reason = "Protocol version mismatch";
else
return (SendConnSetup(client, reason));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
ProcEstablishConnection(ClientPtr client)
{
const char *reason;
char *auth_proto, *auth_string;
xConnClientPrefix *prefix;
REQUEST(xReq);
prefix = (xConnClientPrefix *) ((char *) stuff + sz_xReq);
auth_proto = (char *) prefix + sz_xConnClientPrefix;
auth_string = auth_proto + pad_to_int32(prefix->nbytesAuthProto);
if ((client->req_len << 2) != sz_xReq + sz_xConnClientPrefix +
pad_to_int32(prefix->nbytesAuthProto) +
pad_to_int32(prefix->nbytesAuthString))
reason = "Bad length";
else if ((prefix->majorVersion != X_PROTOCOL) ||
(prefix->minorVersion != X_PROTOCOL_REVISION))
reason = "Protocol version mismatch";
else
return (SendConnSetup(client, reason));
}
| 165,448
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: l2tp_call_errors_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
uint16_t val_h, val_l;
ptr++; /* skip "Reserved" */
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CRCErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FrameErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "HardOver=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BufOver=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Timeout=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AlignErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
l2tp_call_errors_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
l2tp_call_errors_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
uint16_t val_h, val_l;
if (length < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
ptr++; /* skip "Reserved" */
length -= 2;
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CRCErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FrameErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "HardOver=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BufOver=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++; length -= 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Timeout=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AlignErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
}
| 167,893
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xps_true_callback_glyph_name(gs_font *pfont, gs_glyph glyph, gs_const_string *pstr)
{
/* This function is copied verbatim from plfont.c */
int table_length;
int table_offset;
ulong format;
uint numGlyphs;
uint glyph_name_index;
const byte *postp; /* post table pointer */
/* guess if the font type is not truetype */
if ( pfont->FontType != ft_TrueType )
{
pstr->size = strlen((char*)pstr->data);
return 0;
}
else
{
return gs_throw1(-1, "glyph index %lu out of range", (ulong)glyph);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
xps_true_callback_glyph_name(gs_font *pfont, gs_glyph glyph, gs_const_string *pstr)
{
/* This function is copied verbatim from plfont.c */
int table_length;
int table_offset;
ulong format;
int numGlyphs;
uint glyph_name_index;
const byte *postp; /* post table pointer */
if (glyph >= GS_MIN_GLYPH_INDEX) {
glyph -= GS_MIN_GLYPH_INDEX;
}
/* guess if the font type is not truetype */
if ( pfont->FontType != ft_TrueType )
{
pstr->size = strlen((char*)pstr->data);
return 0;
}
else
{
return gs_throw1(-1, "glyph index %lu out of range", (ulong)glyph);
}
}
| 164,784
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, NULL ) );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
NULL, NULL, NULL ) );
}
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
size_t),
void *p_rng_blind )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng_blind != NULL );
return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL ) );
}
| 169,508
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Horizontal_Sweep_Span( RAS_ARGS Short y,
FT_F26Dot6 x1,
FT_F26Dot6 x2,
PProfile left,
PProfile right )
{
FT_UNUSED( left );
FT_UNUSED( right );
if ( x2 - x1 < ras.precision )
{
Long e1, e2;
e1 = CEILING( x1 );
e2 = FLOOR ( x2 );
if ( e1 == e2 )
{
Byte f1;
PByte bits;
bits = ras.bTarget + ( y >> 3 );
f1 = (Byte)( 0x80 >> ( y & 7 ) );
e1 = TRUNC( e1 );
if ( e1 >= 0 && e1 < ras.target.rows )
{
PByte p;
p = bits - e1 * ras.target.pitch;
if ( ras.target.pitch > 0 )
p += ( ras.target.rows - 1 ) * ras.target.pitch;
p[0] |= f1;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
Horizontal_Sweep_Span( RAS_ARGS Short y,
FT_F26Dot6 x1,
FT_F26Dot6 x2,
PProfile left,
PProfile right )
{
FT_UNUSED( left );
FT_UNUSED( right );
if ( x2 - x1 < ras.precision )
{
Long e1, e2;
e1 = CEILING( x1 );
e2 = FLOOR ( x2 );
if ( e1 == e2 )
{
Byte f1;
PByte bits;
bits = ras.bTarget + ( y >> 3 );
f1 = (Byte)( 0x80 >> ( y & 7 ) );
e1 = TRUNC( e1 );
if ( e1 >= 0 && (ULong)e1 < ras.target.rows )
{
PByte p;
p = bits - e1 * ras.target.pitch;
if ( ras.target.pitch > 0 )
p += ( ras.target.rows - 1 ) * ras.target.pitch;
p[0] |= f1;
}
}
}
}
| 164,853
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BlockEntry::BlockEntry(Cluster* p, long idx) :
m_pCluster(p),
m_index(idx)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
BlockEntry::BlockEntry(Cluster* p, long idx) :
BlockEntry::~BlockEntry() {}
bool BlockEntry::EOS() const { return (GetKind() == kBlockEOS); }
const Cluster* BlockEntry::GetCluster() const { return m_pCluster; }
long BlockEntry::GetIndex() const { return m_index; }
SimpleBlock::SimpleBlock(Cluster* pCluster, long idx, long long start,
long long size)
: BlockEntry(pCluster, idx), m_block(start, size, 0) {}
long SimpleBlock::Parse() { return m_block.Parse(m_pCluster); }
BlockEntry::Kind SimpleBlock::GetKind() const { return kBlockSimple; }
const Block* SimpleBlock::GetBlock() const { return &m_block; }
BlockGroup::BlockGroup(Cluster* pCluster, long idx, long long block_start,
long long block_size, long long prev, long long next,
long long duration, long long discard_padding)
: BlockEntry(pCluster, idx),
m_block(block_start, block_size, discard_padding),
m_prev(prev),
m_next(next),
m_duration(duration) {}
long BlockGroup::Parse() {
const long status = m_block.Parse(m_pCluster);
if (status)
return status;
m_block.SetKey((m_prev > 0) && (m_next <= 0));
return 0;
}
| 174,241
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: transform_disable(PNG_CONST char *name)
{
image_transform *list = image_transform_first;
while (list != &image_transform_end)
{
if (strcmp(list->name, name) == 0)
{
list->enable = 0;
return;
}
list = list->list;
}
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: --transform-disable=%s: unknown transform\n",
name);
exit(99);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
transform_disable(PNG_CONST char *name)
transform_disable(const char *name)
{
image_transform *list = image_transform_first;
while (list != &image_transform_end)
{
if (strcmp(list->name, name) == 0)
{
list->enable = 0;
return;
}
list = list->list;
}
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: --transform-disable=%s: unknown transform\n",
name);
exit(99);
}
| 173,711
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
{
while (!list_empty(keys)) {
struct key *key =
list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link);
list_del(&key->graveyard_link);
kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
key_check(key);
/* Throw away the key data */
if (key->type->destroy)
key->type->destroy(key);
security_key_free(key);
/* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
key->user->qnkeys--;
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
}
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
key_user_put(key->user);
kfree(key->description);
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC_X;
#endif
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull key handling fixes from David Howells:
"Here are two patches, the first of which at least should go upstream
immediately:
(1) Prevent a user-triggerable crash in the keyrings destructor when a
negatively instantiated keyring is garbage collected. I have also
seen this triggered for user type keys.
(2) Prevent the user from using requesting that a keyring be created
and instantiated through an upcall. Doing so is probably safe
since the keyring type ignores the arguments to its instantiation
function - but we probably shouldn't let keyrings be created in
this manner"
* 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring
KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
{
while (!list_empty(keys)) {
struct key *key =
list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link);
list_del(&key->graveyard_link);
kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
key_check(key);
/* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags) &&
!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags) &&
key->type->destroy)
key->type->destroy(key);
security_key_free(key);
/* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
key->user->qnkeys--;
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
}
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
key_user_put(key->user);
kfree(key->description);
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC_X;
#endif
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
}
}
| 166,576
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
int32 route_id, int gpu_host_id, bool presented, uint32 sync_point) {
GpuProcessHostUIShim* ui_shim = GpuProcessHostUIShim::FromID(gpu_host_id);
if (ui_shim)
ui_shim->Send(new AcceleratedSurfaceMsg_BufferPresented(route_id,
presented,
sync_point));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
int32 route_id, int gpu_host_id, uint64 surface_handle, uint32 sync_point) {
GpuProcessHostUIShim* ui_shim = GpuProcessHostUIShim::FromID(gpu_host_id);
if (ui_shim)
ui_shim->Send(new AcceleratedSurfaceMsg_BufferPresented(route_id,
surface_handle,
sync_point));
}
| 171,366
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void command_port_read_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_serial_port *command_port = urb->context;
struct whiteheat_command_private *command_info;
int status = urb->status;
unsigned char *data = urb->transfer_buffer;
int result;
command_info = usb_get_serial_port_data(command_port);
if (!command_info) {
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - command_info is NULL, exiting.\n", __func__);
return;
}
if (status) {
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - nonzero urb status: %d\n", __func__, status);
if (status != -ENOENT)
command_info->command_finished = WHITEHEAT_CMD_FAILURE;
wake_up(&command_info->wait_command);
return;
}
usb_serial_debug_data(&command_port->dev, __func__, urb->actual_length, data);
if (data[0] == WHITEHEAT_CMD_COMPLETE) {
command_info->command_finished = WHITEHEAT_CMD_COMPLETE;
wake_up(&command_info->wait_command);
} else if (data[0] == WHITEHEAT_CMD_FAILURE) {
command_info->command_finished = WHITEHEAT_CMD_FAILURE;
wake_up(&command_info->wait_command);
} else if (data[0] == WHITEHEAT_EVENT) {
/* These are unsolicited reports from the firmware, hence no
waiting command to wakeup */
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - event received\n", __func__);
} else if (data[0] == WHITEHEAT_GET_DTR_RTS) {
memcpy(command_info->result_buffer, &data[1],
urb->actual_length - 1);
command_info->command_finished = WHITEHEAT_CMD_COMPLETE;
wake_up(&command_info->wait_command);
} else
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - bad reply from firmware\n", __func__);
/* Continue trying to always read */
result = usb_submit_urb(command_port->read_urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (result)
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - failed resubmitting read urb, error %d\n",
__func__, result);
}
Commit Message: USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response
This patch fixes a potential security issue in the whiteheat USB driver
which might allow a local attacker to cause kernel memory corrpution. This
is due to an unchecked memcpy into a fixed size buffer (of 64 bytes). On
EHCI and XHCI busses it's possible to craft responses greater than 64
bytes leading a buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: James Forshaw <forshaw@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void command_port_read_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_serial_port *command_port = urb->context;
struct whiteheat_command_private *command_info;
int status = urb->status;
unsigned char *data = urb->transfer_buffer;
int result;
command_info = usb_get_serial_port_data(command_port);
if (!command_info) {
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - command_info is NULL, exiting.\n", __func__);
return;
}
if (!urb->actual_length) {
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - empty response, exiting.\n", __func__);
return;
}
if (status) {
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - nonzero urb status: %d\n", __func__, status);
if (status != -ENOENT)
command_info->command_finished = WHITEHEAT_CMD_FAILURE;
wake_up(&command_info->wait_command);
return;
}
usb_serial_debug_data(&command_port->dev, __func__, urb->actual_length, data);
if (data[0] == WHITEHEAT_CMD_COMPLETE) {
command_info->command_finished = WHITEHEAT_CMD_COMPLETE;
wake_up(&command_info->wait_command);
} else if (data[0] == WHITEHEAT_CMD_FAILURE) {
command_info->command_finished = WHITEHEAT_CMD_FAILURE;
wake_up(&command_info->wait_command);
} else if (data[0] == WHITEHEAT_EVENT) {
/* These are unsolicited reports from the firmware, hence no
waiting command to wakeup */
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - event received\n", __func__);
} else if ((data[0] == WHITEHEAT_GET_DTR_RTS) &&
(urb->actual_length - 1 <= sizeof(command_info->result_buffer))) {
memcpy(command_info->result_buffer, &data[1],
urb->actual_length - 1);
command_info->command_finished = WHITEHEAT_CMD_COMPLETE;
wake_up(&command_info->wait_command);
} else
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - bad reply from firmware\n", __func__);
/* Continue trying to always read */
result = usb_submit_urb(command_port->read_urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (result)
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - failed resubmitting read urb, error %d\n",
__func__, result);
}
| 166,369
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ContextualSearchParams()
: version(-1),
start(base::string16::npos),
end(base::string16::npos),
now_on_tap_version(0) {}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
|
ContextualSearchParams()
: version(-1),
start(base::string16::npos),
end(base::string16::npos),
| 171,645
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void nlmclnt_unlock_callback(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nlm_rqst *req = data;
u32 status = ntohl(req->a_res.status);
if (RPC_ASSASSINATED(task))
goto die;
if (task->tk_status < 0) {
dprintk("lockd: unlock failed (err = %d)\n", -task->tk_status);
goto retry_rebind;
}
if (status == NLM_LCK_DENIED_GRACE_PERIOD) {
rpc_delay(task, NLMCLNT_GRACE_WAIT);
goto retry_unlock;
}
if (status != NLM_LCK_GRANTED)
printk(KERN_WARNING "lockd: unexpected unlock status: %d\n", status);
die:
return;
retry_rebind:
nlm_rebind_host(req->a_host);
retry_unlock:
rpc_restart_call(task);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void nlmclnt_unlock_callback(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nlm_rqst *req = data;
u32 status = ntohl(req->a_res.status);
if (RPC_ASSASSINATED(task))
goto die;
if (task->tk_status < 0) {
dprintk("lockd: unlock failed (err = %d)\n", -task->tk_status);
switch (task->tk_status) {
case -EACCES:
case -EIO:
goto die;
default:
goto retry_rebind;
}
}
if (status == NLM_LCK_DENIED_GRACE_PERIOD) {
rpc_delay(task, NLMCLNT_GRACE_WAIT);
goto retry_unlock;
}
if (status != NLM_LCK_GRANTED)
printk(KERN_WARNING "lockd: unexpected unlock status: %d\n", status);
die:
return;
retry_rebind:
nlm_rebind_host(req->a_host);
retry_unlock:
rpc_restart_call(task);
}
| 166,221
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::DisplayPasskey(
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device,
int passkey,
int entered) {
}
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void BluetoothOptionsHandler::DisplayPasskey(
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device,
int passkey,
int entered) {
DictionaryValue params;
params.SetString("pairing", "bluetoothRemotePasskey");
params.SetInteger("passkey", passkey);
params.SetInteger("entered", entered);
SendDeviceNotification(device, ¶ms);
}
| 170,967
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, rewind)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_filesystem_file_rewind(getThis(), intern TSRMLS_CC);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplFileObject::eof()
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, rewind)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_filesystem_file_rewind(getThis(), intern TSRMLS_CC);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplFileObject::eof()
| 167,051
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void ConvertLoopSlice(ModSample &src, ModSample &dest, SmpLength start, SmpLength len, bool loop)
{
if(!src.HasSampleData()) return;
dest.FreeSample();
dest = src;
dest.nLength = len;
dest.pSample = nullptr;
if(!dest.AllocateSample())
{
return;
}
if(len != src.nLength)
MemsetZero(dest.cues);
std::memcpy(dest.pSample8, src.pSample8 + start, len);
dest.uFlags.set(CHN_LOOP, loop);
if(loop)
{
dest.nLoopStart = 0;
dest.nLoopEnd = len;
} else
{
dest.nLoopStart = 0;
dest.nLoopEnd = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: [Fix] STP: Possible out-of-bounds memory read with malformed STP files (caught with afl-fuzz).
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@9567 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static void ConvertLoopSlice(ModSample &src, ModSample &dest, SmpLength start, SmpLength len, bool loop)
{
if(!src.HasSampleData()
|| start >= src.nLength
|| src.nLength - start < len)
{
return;
}
dest.FreeSample();
dest = src;
dest.nLength = len;
dest.pSample = nullptr;
if(!dest.AllocateSample())
{
return;
}
if(len != src.nLength)
MemsetZero(dest.cues);
std::memcpy(dest.pSample8, src.pSample8 + start, len);
dest.uFlags.set(CHN_LOOP, loop);
if(loop)
{
dest.nLoopStart = 0;
dest.nLoopEnd = len;
} else
{
dest.nLoopStart = 0;
dest.nLoopEnd = 0;
}
}
| 169,338
|
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