instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 93
3.53k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: standard_display_init(standard_display *dp, png_store* ps, png_uint_32 id,
int do_interlace, int use_update_info)
{
memset(dp, 0, sizeof *dp);
dp->ps = ps;
dp->colour_type = COL_FROM_ID(id);
dp->bit_depth = DEPTH_FROM_ID(id);
if (dp->bit_depth < 1 || dp->bit_depth > 16)
internal_error(ps, "internal: bad bit depth");
if (dp->colour_type == 3)
dp->red_sBIT = dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->alpha_sBIT = 8;
else
dp->red_sBIT = dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->alpha_sBIT =
dp->bit_depth;
dp->interlace_type = INTERLACE_FROM_ID(id);
check_interlace_type(dp->interlace_type);
dp->id = id;
/* All the rest are filled in after the read_info: */
dp->w = 0;
dp->h = 0;
dp->npasses = 0;
dp->pixel_size = 0;
dp->bit_width = 0;
dp->cbRow = 0;
dp->do_interlace = do_interlace;
dp->is_transparent = 0;
dp->speed = ps->speed;
dp->use_update_info = use_update_info;
dp->npalette = 0;
/* Preset the transparent color to black: */
memset(&dp->transparent, 0, sizeof dp->transparent);
/* Preset the palette to full intensity/opaque througout: */
memset(dp->palette, 0xff, sizeof dp->palette);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
standard_display_init(standard_display *dp, png_store* ps, png_uint_32 id,
int do_interlace, int use_update_info)
{
memset(dp, 0, sizeof *dp);
dp->ps = ps;
dp->colour_type = COL_FROM_ID(id);
dp->bit_depth = DEPTH_FROM_ID(id);
if (dp->bit_depth < 1 || dp->bit_depth > 16)
internal_error(ps, "internal: bad bit depth");
if (dp->colour_type == 3)
dp->red_sBIT = dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->alpha_sBIT = 8;
else
dp->red_sBIT = dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->alpha_sBIT =
dp->bit_depth;
dp->interlace_type = INTERLACE_FROM_ID(id);
check_interlace_type(dp->interlace_type);
dp->id = id;
/* All the rest are filled in after the read_info: */
dp->w = 0;
dp->h = 0;
dp->npasses = 0;
dp->pixel_size = 0;
dp->bit_width = 0;
dp->cbRow = 0;
dp->do_interlace = do_interlace;
dp->littleendian = 0;
dp->is_transparent = 0;
dp->speed = ps->speed;
dp->use_update_info = use_update_info;
dp->npalette = 0;
/* Preset the transparent color to black: */
memset(&dp->transparent, 0, sizeof dp->transparent);
/* Preset the palette to full intensity/opaque througout: */
memset(dp->palette, 0xff, sizeof dp->palette);
}
| 173,697
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ProcessControlLaunchFailed() {
ADD_FAILURE();
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::RunLoop::QuitCurrentWhenIdleClosureDeprecated());
}
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
CWE ID: CWE-94
|
void ProcessControlLaunchFailed() {
void ProcessControlLaunchFailed(base::OnceClosure on_done) {
ADD_FAILURE();
std::move(on_done).Run();
}
| 172,052
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ref_param_read_signal_error(gs_param_list * plist, gs_param_name pkey, int code)
{
iparam_list *const iplist = (iparam_list *) plist;
iparam_loc loc;
ref_param_read(iplist, pkey, &loc, -1); /* can't fail */
*loc.presult = code;
switch (ref_param_read_get_policy(plist, pkey)) {
case gs_param_policy_ignore:
return 0;
return_error(gs_error_configurationerror);
default:
return code;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
|
ref_param_read_signal_error(gs_param_list * plist, gs_param_name pkey, int code)
{
iparam_list *const iplist = (iparam_list *) plist;
iparam_loc loc = {0};
ref_param_read(iplist, pkey, &loc, -1);
if (loc.presult)
*loc.presult = code;
switch (ref_param_read_get_policy(plist, pkey)) {
case gs_param_policy_ignore:
return 0;
return_error(gs_error_configurationerror);
default:
return code;
}
}
| 164,705
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DestroySkImageOnOriginalThread(
sk_sp<SkImage> image,
base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper> context_provider_wrapper,
std::unique_ptr<gpu::SyncToken> sync_token) {
if (context_provider_wrapper &&
image->isValid(
context_provider_wrapper->ContextProvider()->GetGrContext())) {
if (sync_token->HasData()) {
context_provider_wrapper->ContextProvider()
->ContextGL()
->WaitSyncTokenCHROMIUM(sync_token->GetData());
}
image->getTexture()->textureParamsModified();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void DestroySkImageOnOriginalThread(
sk_sp<SkImage> image,
base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper> context_provider_wrapper,
std::unique_ptr<gpu::SyncToken> sync_token) {
if (context_provider_wrapper &&
image->isValid(
context_provider_wrapper->ContextProvider()->GetGrContext())) {
if (sync_token->HasData()) {
context_provider_wrapper->ContextProvider()
->ContextGL()
->WaitSyncTokenCHROMIUM(sync_token->GetData());
}
image->getTexture()->textureParamsModified();
}
image.reset();
}
| 172,593
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
const tuple<int, int, SubpelVarianceFunctionType>& params =
this->GetParam();
log2width_ = get<0>(params);
width_ = 1 << log2width_;
log2height_ = get<1>(params);
height_ = 1 << log2height_;
subpel_variance_ = get<2>(params);
rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
block_size_ = width_ * height_;
src_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(vpx_memalign(16, block_size_));
sec_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(vpx_memalign(16, block_size_));
ref_ = new uint8_t[block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1];
ASSERT_TRUE(src_ != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(sec_ != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(ref_ != NULL);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
virtual void SetUp() {
const tuple<int, int, MseFunctionType>& params = this->GetParam();
log2width_ = get<0>(params);
width_ = 1 << log2width_;
log2height_ = get<1>(params);
height_ = 1 << log2height_;
mse_ = get<2>(params);
rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
block_size_ = width_ * height_;
src_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(vpx_memalign(16, block_size_));
ref_ = new uint8_t[block_size_];
ASSERT_TRUE(src_ != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(ref_ != NULL);
}
| 174,590
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: views::NonClientFrameView* ShellWindowViews::CreateNonClientFrameView(
views::Widget* widget) {
ShellWindowFrameView* frame_view = new ShellWindowFrameView();
frame_view->Init(window_);
return frame_view;
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79
|
views::NonClientFrameView* ShellWindowViews::CreateNonClientFrameView(
views::Widget* widget) {
ShellWindowFrameView* frame_view =
new ShellWindowFrameView(use_custom_frame_);
frame_view->Init(window_);
return frame_view;
}
| 170,710
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int accept_server_socket(int sfd)
{
struct sockaddr_un remote;
struct pollfd pfd;
int fd;
socklen_t len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_un);
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("accept fd %d", sfd);
/* make sure there is data to process */
pfd.fd = sfd;
pfd.events = POLLIN;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, 0) == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("accept poll timeout");
return -1;
}
if ((fd = accept(sfd, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &len)) == -1)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("sock accept failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return fd;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
static int accept_server_socket(int sfd)
{
struct sockaddr_un remote;
struct pollfd pfd;
int fd;
socklen_t len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_un);
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("accept fd %d", sfd);
/* make sure there is data to process */
pfd.fd = sfd;
pfd.events = POLLIN;
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(poll(&pfd, 1, 0)) == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("accept poll timeout");
return -1;
}
if ((fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(accept(sfd, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &len))) == -1)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("sock accept failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return fd;
}
| 173,495
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int parse_rock_ridge_inode(struct iso_directory_record *de, struct inode *inode)
{
int result = parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(de, inode, 0);
/*
* if rockridge flag was reset and we didn't look for attributes
* behind eventual XA attributes, have a look there
*/
if ((ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock_offset == -1)
&& (ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock == 2)) {
result = parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(de, inode, 14);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix unbounded recursion when processing relocated directories
We did not check relocated directory in any way when processing Rock
Ridge 'CL' tag. Thus a corrupted isofs image can possibly have a CL
entry pointing to another CL entry leading to possibly unbounded
recursion in kernel code and thus stack overflow or deadlocks (if there
is a loop created from CL entries).
Fix the problem by not allowing CL entry to point to a directory entry
with CL entry (such use makes no good sense anyway) and by checking
whether CL entry doesn't point to itself.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chris Evans <cevans@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
int parse_rock_ridge_inode(struct iso_directory_record *de, struct inode *inode)
int parse_rock_ridge_inode(struct iso_directory_record *de, struct inode *inode,
int relocated)
{
int flags = relocated ? RR_RELOC_DE : 0;
int result = parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(de, inode, flags);
/*
* if rockridge flag was reset and we didn't look for attributes
* behind eventual XA attributes, have a look there
*/
if ((ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock_offset == -1)
&& (ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock == 2)) {
result = parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(de, inode,
flags | RR_REGARD_XA);
}
return result;
}
| 166,270
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Block::Block(long long start, long long size_, long long discard_padding) :
m_start(start),
m_size(size_),
m_track(0),
m_timecode(-1),
m_flags(0),
m_frames(NULL),
m_frame_count(-1),
m_discard_padding(discard_padding)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
Block::Block(long long start, long long size_, long long discard_padding) :
| 174,240
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SimpleBlock::SimpleBlock(
Cluster* pCluster,
long idx,
long long start,
long long size) :
BlockEntry(pCluster, idx),
m_block(start, size, 0)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
SimpleBlock::SimpleBlock(
| 174,444
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SoftAACEncoder::~SoftAACEncoder() {
delete[] mInputFrame;
mInputFrame = NULL;
if (mEncoderHandle) {
CHECK_EQ(VO_ERR_NONE, mApiHandle->Uninit(mEncoderHandle));
mEncoderHandle = NULL;
}
delete mApiHandle;
mApiHandle = NULL;
delete mMemOperator;
mMemOperator = NULL;
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID:
|
SoftAACEncoder::~SoftAACEncoder() {
onReset();
if (mEncoderHandle) {
CHECK_EQ(VO_ERR_NONE, mApiHandle->Uninit(mEncoderHandle));
mEncoderHandle = NULL;
}
delete mApiHandle;
mApiHandle = NULL;
delete mMemOperator;
mMemOperator = NULL;
}
| 174,008
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::Destroy(bool also_delete) {
DCHECK(!destroyed_);
destroyed_ = true;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_HOST_DESTROYED, Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
if (view_) {
view_->Destroy();
view_.reset();
}
process_->RemoveRoute(routing_id_);
g_routing_id_widget_map.Get().erase(
RenderWidgetHostID(process_->GetID(), routing_id_));
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RenderWidgetDeleted(this);
if (also_delete)
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID:
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::Destroy(bool also_delete) {
DCHECK(!destroyed_);
destroyed_ = true;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_HOST_DESTROYED, Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
if (view_) {
view_->Destroy();
view_.reset();
}
process_->RemoveRoute(routing_id_);
g_routing_id_widget_map.Get().erase(
RenderWidgetHostID(process_->GetID(), routing_id_));
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RenderWidgetDeleted(this);
if (also_delete) {
CHECK(!owner_delegate_);
delete this;
}
}
| 172,116
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Splash::vertFlipImage(SplashBitmap *img, int width, int height,
int nComps) {
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guchar *p0, *p1;
int w;
w = width * nComps;
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guchar *p0, *p1;
int w;
w = width * nComps;
lineBuf = (Guchar *)gmalloc(w);
p0 += width, p1 -= width) {
memcpy(lineBuf, p0, width);
memcpy(p0, p1, width);
memcpy(p1, lineBuf, width);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void Splash::vertFlipImage(SplashBitmap *img, int width, int height,
int nComps) {
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guchar *p0, *p1;
int w;
w = width * nComps;
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guchar *p0, *p1;
int w;
if (unlikely(img->data == NULL)) {
error(errInternal, -1, "img->data is NULL in Splash::vertFlipImage");
return;
}
w = width * nComps;
lineBuf = (Guchar *)gmalloc(w);
p0 += width, p1 -= width) {
memcpy(lineBuf, p0, width);
memcpy(p0, p1, width);
memcpy(p1, lineBuf, width);
}
}
| 164,736
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(linkinfo)
{
char *link;
size_t link_len;
zend_stat_t sb;
int ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p", &link, &link_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ret = VCWD_STAT(link, &sb);
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
RETURN_LONG(Z_L(-1));
}
RETURN_LONG((zend_long) sb.st_dev);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #76459 windows linkinfo lacks openbasedir check
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
PHP_FUNCTION(linkinfo)
{
char *link;
char *dirname;
size_t link_len;
zend_stat_t sb;
int ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p", &link, &link_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
dirname = estrndup(link, link_len);
php_dirname(dirname, link_len);
if (php_check_open_basedir(dirname)) {
efree(dirname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ret = VCWD_STAT(link, &sb);
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
efree(dirname);
RETURN_LONG(Z_L(-1));
}
efree(dirname);
RETURN_LONG((zend_long) sb.st_dev);
}
| 169,107
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::startLoad(FrameLoadRequest& frameLoadRequest, FrameLoadType type, NavigationPolicy navigationPolicy)
{
ASSERT(client()->hasWebView());
if (m_frame->document()->pageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() != Document::NoDismissal)
return;
NavigationType navigationType = determineNavigationType(type, frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest().httpBody() || frameLoadRequest.form(), frameLoadRequest.triggeringEvent());
frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest().setRequestContext(determineRequestContextFromNavigationType(navigationType));
frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest().setFrameType(m_frame->isMainFrame() ? WebURLRequest::FrameTypeTopLevel : WebURLRequest::FrameTypeNested);
ResourceRequest& request = frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest();
if (!shouldContinueForNavigationPolicy(request, frameLoadRequest.substituteData(), nullptr, frameLoadRequest.shouldCheckMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy(), navigationType, navigationPolicy, type == FrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem, frameLoadRequest.clientRedirect() == ClientRedirectPolicy::ClientRedirect))
return;
if (!shouldClose(navigationType == NavigationTypeReload))
return;
m_frame->document()->cancelParsing();
detachDocumentLoader(m_provisionalDocumentLoader);
if (!m_frame->host())
return;
m_provisionalDocumentLoader = client()->createDocumentLoader(m_frame, request, frameLoadRequest.substituteData().isValid() ? frameLoadRequest.substituteData() : defaultSubstituteDataForURL(request.url()));
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->setNavigationType(navigationType);
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->setReplacesCurrentHistoryItem(type == FrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem);
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->setIsClientRedirect(frameLoadRequest.clientRedirect() == ClientRedirectPolicy::ClientRedirect);
InspectorInstrumentation::didStartProvisionalLoad(m_frame);
m_frame->navigationScheduler().cancel();
m_checkTimer.stop();
m_loadType = type;
if (frameLoadRequest.form())
client()->dispatchWillSubmitForm(frameLoadRequest.form());
m_progressTracker->progressStarted();
if (m_provisionalDocumentLoader->isClientRedirect())
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->appendRedirect(m_frame->document()->url());
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->appendRedirect(m_provisionalDocumentLoader->request().url());
double triggeringEventTime = frameLoadRequest.triggeringEvent() ? frameLoadRequest.triggeringEvent()->platformTimeStamp() : 0;
client()->dispatchDidStartProvisionalLoad(triggeringEventTime);
ASSERT(m_provisionalDocumentLoader);
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->startLoadingMainResource();
takeObjectSnapshot();
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
void FrameLoader::startLoad(FrameLoadRequest& frameLoadRequest, FrameLoadType type, NavigationPolicy navigationPolicy)
{
ASSERT(client()->hasWebView());
if (m_frame->document()->pageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() != Document::NoDismissal)
return;
NavigationType navigationType = determineNavigationType(type, frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest().httpBody() || frameLoadRequest.form(), frameLoadRequest.triggeringEvent());
frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest().setRequestContext(determineRequestContextFromNavigationType(navigationType));
frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest().setFrameType(m_frame->isMainFrame() ? WebURLRequest::FrameTypeTopLevel : WebURLRequest::FrameTypeNested);
ResourceRequest& request = frameLoadRequest.resourceRequest();
if (!shouldContinueForNavigationPolicy(request, frameLoadRequest.substituteData(), nullptr, frameLoadRequest.shouldCheckMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy(), navigationType, navigationPolicy, type == FrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem, frameLoadRequest.clientRedirect() == ClientRedirectPolicy::ClientRedirect))
return;
if (!shouldClose(navigationType == NavigationTypeReload))
return;
m_frame->document()->cancelParsing();
if (m_provisionalDocumentLoader) {
FrameNavigationDisabler navigationDisabler(*m_frame);
detachDocumentLoader(m_provisionalDocumentLoader);
}
if (!m_frame->host())
return;
m_provisionalDocumentLoader = client()->createDocumentLoader(m_frame, request, frameLoadRequest.substituteData().isValid() ? frameLoadRequest.substituteData() : defaultSubstituteDataForURL(request.url()));
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->setNavigationType(navigationType);
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->setReplacesCurrentHistoryItem(type == FrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem);
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->setIsClientRedirect(frameLoadRequest.clientRedirect() == ClientRedirectPolicy::ClientRedirect);
InspectorInstrumentation::didStartProvisionalLoad(m_frame);
m_frame->navigationScheduler().cancel();
m_checkTimer.stop();
m_loadType = type;
if (frameLoadRequest.form())
client()->dispatchWillSubmitForm(frameLoadRequest.form());
m_progressTracker->progressStarted();
if (m_provisionalDocumentLoader->isClientRedirect())
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->appendRedirect(m_frame->document()->url());
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->appendRedirect(m_provisionalDocumentLoader->request().url());
double triggeringEventTime = frameLoadRequest.triggeringEvent() ? frameLoadRequest.triggeringEvent()->platformTimeStamp() : 0;
client()->dispatchDidStartProvisionalLoad(triggeringEventTime);
ASSERT(m_provisionalDocumentLoader);
m_provisionalDocumentLoader->startLoadingMainResource();
takeObjectSnapshot();
}
| 172,258
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: make_random_bytes(png_uint_32* seed, void* pv, size_t size)
{
png_uint_32 u0 = seed[0], u1 = seed[1];
png_bytep bytes = png_voidcast(png_bytep, pv);
/* There are thirty-three bits; the next bit in the sequence is bit-33 XOR
* bit-20. The top 1 bit is in u1, the bottom 32 are in u0.
*/
size_t i;
for (i=0; i<size; ++i)
{
/* First generate 8 new bits then shift them in at the end. */
png_uint_32 u = ((u0 >> (20-8)) ^ ((u1 << 7) | (u0 >> (32-7)))) & 0xff;
u1 <<= 8;
u1 |= u0 >> 24;
u0 <<= 8;
u0 |= u;
*bytes++ = (png_byte)u;
}
seed[0] = u0;
seed[1] = u1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
make_random_bytes(png_uint_32* seed, void* pv, size_t size)
{
png_uint_32 u0 = seed[0], u1 = seed[1];
png_bytep bytes = voidcast(png_bytep, pv);
/* There are thirty-three bits; the next bit in the sequence is bit-33 XOR
* bit-20. The top 1 bit is in u1, the bottom 32 are in u0.
*/
size_t i;
for (i=0; i<size; ++i)
{
/* First generate 8 new bits then shift them in at the end. */
png_uint_32 u = ((u0 >> (20-8)) ^ ((u1 << 7) | (u0 >> (32-7)))) & 0xff;
u1 <<= 8;
u1 |= u0 >> 24;
u0 <<= 8;
u0 |= u;
*bytes++ = (png_byte)u;
}
seed[0] = u0;
seed[1] = u1;
}
| 173,736
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: my_object_emit_frobnicate (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
{
g_signal_emit (obj, signals[FROBNICATE], 0, 42);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
my_object_emit_frobnicate (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
| 165,094
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static Maybe<bool> IncludesValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> object,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *object));
Handle<Map> original_map = handle(object->map(), isolate);
Handle<FixedArray> parameter_map(FixedArray::cast(object->elements()),
isolate);
bool search_for_hole = value->IsUndefined(isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
uint32_t entry = GetEntryForIndexImpl(isolate, *object, *parameter_map, k,
ALL_PROPERTIES);
if (entry == kMaxUInt32) {
if (search_for_hole) return Just(true);
continue;
}
Handle<Object> element_k =
Subclass::GetImpl(isolate, *parameter_map, entry);
if (element_k->IsAccessorPair()) {
LookupIterator it(isolate, object, k, LookupIterator::OWN);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(isolate, element_k,
Object::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<bool>());
if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) return Just(true);
if (object->map() != *original_map) {
return IncludesValueSlowPath(isolate, object, value, k + 1, length);
}
} else if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) {
return Just(true);
}
}
return Just(false);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
|
static Maybe<bool> IncludesValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> object,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *object));
Handle<Map> original_map(object->map(), isolate);
Handle<FixedArray> parameter_map(FixedArray::cast(object->elements()),
isolate);
bool search_for_hole = value->IsUndefined(isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
DCHECK_EQ(object->map(), *original_map);
uint32_t entry = GetEntryForIndexImpl(isolate, *object, *parameter_map, k,
ALL_PROPERTIES);
if (entry == kMaxUInt32) {
if (search_for_hole) return Just(true);
continue;
}
Handle<Object> element_k =
Subclass::GetImpl(isolate, *parameter_map, entry);
if (element_k->IsAccessorPair()) {
LookupIterator it(isolate, object, k, LookupIterator::OWN);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(isolate, element_k,
Object::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<bool>());
if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) return Just(true);
if (object->map() != *original_map) {
return IncludesValueSlowPath(isolate, object, value, k + 1, length);
}
} else if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) {
return Just(true);
}
}
return Just(false);
}
| 174,097
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ExtensionUninstaller::Run() {
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_service()->
GetInstalledExtension(app_id_);
if (!extension) {
CleanUp();
return;
}
controller_->OnShowChildDialog();
dialog_.reset(extensions::ExtensionUninstallDialog::Create(
profile_, controller_->GetAppListWindow(), this));
dialog_->ConfirmUninstall(extension,
extensions::UNINSTALL_REASON_USER_INITIATED);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
|
void ExtensionUninstaller::Run() {
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_)->GetInstalledExtension(
app_id_);
if (!extension) {
CleanUp();
return;
}
controller_->OnShowChildDialog();
dialog_.reset(extensions::ExtensionUninstallDialog::Create(
profile_, controller_->GetAppListWindow(), this));
dialog_->ConfirmUninstall(extension,
extensions::UNINSTALL_REASON_USER_INITIATED);
}
| 171,724
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void ConnectionChangeHandler(void* object, bool connected) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->ime_connected_ = connected;
if (connected) {
input_method_library->pending_config_requests_.clear();
input_method_library->pending_config_requests_.insert(
input_method_library->current_config_values_.begin(),
input_method_library->current_config_values_.end());
input_method_library->FlushImeConfig();
input_method_library->ChangeInputMethod(
input_method_library->previous_input_method().id);
input_method_library->ChangeInputMethod(
input_method_library->current_input_method().id);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void ConnectionChangeHandler(void* object, bool connected) {
// IBusController override.
virtual void OnConnectionChange(bool connected) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
ime_connected_ = connected;
if (connected) {
pending_config_requests_.clear();
pending_config_requests_.insert(
current_config_values_.begin(),
current_config_values_.end());
FlushImeConfig();
ChangeInputMethod(previous_input_method().id);
ChangeInputMethod(current_input_method().id);
}
}
| 170,482
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int bdrv_check_request(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t sector_num,
int nb_sectors)
{
return bdrv_check_byte_request(bs, sector_num * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE,
nb_sectors * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static int bdrv_check_request(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t sector_num,
int nb_sectors)
{
if (nb_sectors > INT_MAX / BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE) {
return -EIO;
}
return bdrv_check_byte_request(bs, sector_num * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE,
nb_sectors * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
}
| 165,408
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: flac_read_loop (SF_PRIVATE *psf, unsigned len)
{ FLAC_PRIVATE* pflac = (FLAC_PRIVATE*) psf->codec_data ;
pflac->pos = 0 ;
pflac->len = len ;
pflac->remain = len ;
/* First copy data that has already been decoded and buffered. */
if (pflac->frame != NULL && pflac->bufferpos < pflac->frame->header.blocksize)
flac_buffer_copy (psf) ;
/* Decode some more. */
while (pflac->pos < pflac->len)
{ if (FLAC__stream_decoder_process_single (pflac->fsd) == 0)
break ;
if (FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state (pflac->fsd) >= FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM)
break ;
} ;
pflac->ptr = NULL ;
return pflac->pos ;
} /* flac_read_loop */
Commit Message: src/flac.c: Improve error handling
Especially when dealing with corrupt or malicious files.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
flac_read_loop (SF_PRIVATE *psf, unsigned len)
{ FLAC_PRIVATE* pflac = (FLAC_PRIVATE*) psf->codec_data ;
FLAC__StreamDecoderState state ;
pflac->pos = 0 ;
pflac->len = len ;
pflac->remain = len ;
state = FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state (pflac->fsd) ;
if (state > FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state returned %s\n", FLAC__StreamDecoderStateString [state]) ;
/* Current frame is busted, so NULL the pointer. */
pflac->frame = NULL ;
} ;
/* First copy data that has already been decoded and buffered. */
if (pflac->frame != NULL && pflac->bufferpos < pflac->frame->header.blocksize)
flac_buffer_copy (psf) ;
/* Decode some more. */
while (pflac->pos < pflac->len)
{ if (FLAC__stream_decoder_process_single (pflac->fsd) == 0)
break ;
state = FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state (pflac->fsd) ;
if (state >= FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state returned %s\n", FLAC__StreamDecoderStateString [state]) ;
/* Current frame is busted, so NULL the pointer. */
pflac->frame = NULL ;
break ;
} ;
} ;
pflac->ptr = NULL ;
return pflac->pos ;
} /* flac_read_loop */
| 168,255
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void __exit exit_ext2_fs(void)
{
unregister_filesystem(&ext2_fs_type);
destroy_inodecache();
exit_ext2_xattr();
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19
|
static void __exit exit_ext2_fs(void)
{
unregister_filesystem(&ext2_fs_type);
destroy_inodecache();
}
| 169,972
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ExtensionTtsController::~ExtensionTtsController() {
FinishCurrentUtterance();
ClearUtteranceQueue();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
ExtensionTtsController::~ExtensionTtsController() {
| 170,396
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AppControllerImpl::GetApps(
mojom::AppController::GetAppsCallback callback) {
std::vector<chromeos::kiosk_next_home::mojom::AppPtr> app_list;
app_service_proxy_->AppRegistryCache().ForEachApp(
[this, &app_list](const apps::AppUpdate& update) {
app_list.push_back(CreateAppPtr(update));
});
std::move(callback).Run(std::move(app_list));
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void AppControllerImpl::GetApps(
void AppControllerService::GetApps(
mojom::AppController::GetAppsCallback callback) {
std::vector<chromeos::kiosk_next_home::mojom::AppPtr> app_list;
app_service_proxy_->AppRegistryCache().ForEachApp(
[this, &app_list](const apps::AppUpdate& update) {
app_list.push_back(CreateAppPtr(update));
});
std::move(callback).Run(std::move(app_list));
}
| 172,082
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void MediaControlTimelineElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event) {
if (event->isMouseEvent() &&
toMouseEvent(event)->button() !=
static_cast<short>(WebPointerProperties::Button::Left))
return;
if (!isConnected() || !document().isActive())
return;
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mousedown) {
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.ScrubbingBegin"));
mediaControls().beginScrubbing();
}
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseup) {
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.ScrubbingEnd"));
mediaControls().endScrubbing();
}
MediaControlInputElement::defaultEventHandler(event);
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseover ||
event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseout ||
event->type() == EventTypeNames::mousemove)
return;
double time = value().toDouble();
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::input) {
if (mediaElement().seekable()->contain(time))
mediaElement().setCurrentTime(time);
}
LayoutSliderItem slider = LayoutSliderItem(toLayoutSlider(layoutObject()));
if (!slider.isNull() && slider.inDragMode())
mediaControls().updateCurrentTimeDisplay();
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void MediaControlTimelineElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event) {
if (event->isMouseEvent() &&
toMouseEvent(event)->button() !=
static_cast<short>(WebPointerProperties::Button::Left))
return;
if (!isConnected() || !document().isActive())
return;
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mousedown) {
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.ScrubbingBegin"));
mediaControls().beginScrubbing();
}
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::mouseup) {
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.ScrubbingEnd"));
mediaControls().endScrubbing();
}
MediaControlInputElement::defaultEventHandler(event);
if (event->type() != EventTypeNames::input)
return;
double time = value().toDouble();
// FIXME: This will need to take the timeline offset into consideration
// once that concept is supported, see https://crbug.com/312699
if (mediaElement().seekable()->contain(time))
mediaElement().setCurrentTime(time);
LayoutSliderItem slider = LayoutSliderItem(toLayoutSlider(layoutObject()));
if (!slider.isNull() && slider.inDragMode())
mediaControls().updateCurrentTimeDisplay();
}
| 171,898
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool PPVarToNPVariant(PP_Var var, NPVariant* result) {
switch (var.type) {
case PP_VARTYPE_UNDEFINED:
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_NULL:
NULL_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_BOOL:
BOOLEAN_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_bool, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_INT32:
INT32_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_int, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_DOUBLE:
DOUBLE_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_double, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_STRING: {
scoped_refptr<StringVar> string(StringVar::FromPPVar(var));
if (!string) {
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
return false;
}
const std::string& value = string->value();
STRINGN_TO_NPVARIANT(base::strdup(value.c_str()), value.size(), *result);
break;
}
case PP_VARTYPE_OBJECT: {
scoped_refptr<ObjectVar> object(ObjectVar::FromPPVar(var));
if (!object) {
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
return false;
}
OBJECT_TO_NPVARIANT(WebBindings::retainObject(object->np_object()),
*result);
break;
}
case PP_VARTYPE_ARRAY:
case PP_VARTYPE_DICTIONARY:
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in ppapi code
BUG=77493
TEST=attached test
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6883059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@82172 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool PPVarToNPVariant(PP_Var var, NPVariant* result) {
switch (var.type) {
case PP_VARTYPE_UNDEFINED:
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_NULL:
NULL_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_BOOL:
BOOLEAN_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_bool, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_INT32:
INT32_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_int, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_DOUBLE:
DOUBLE_TO_NPVARIANT(var.value.as_double, *result);
break;
case PP_VARTYPE_STRING: {
scoped_refptr<StringVar> string(StringVar::FromPPVar(var));
if (!string) {
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
return false;
}
const std::string& value = string->value();
char* c_string = static_cast<char*>(malloc(value.size()));
memcpy(c_string, value.data(), value.size());
STRINGN_TO_NPVARIANT(c_string, value.size(), *result);
break;
}
case PP_VARTYPE_OBJECT: {
scoped_refptr<ObjectVar> object(ObjectVar::FromPPVar(var));
if (!object) {
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
return false;
}
OBJECT_TO_NPVARIANT(WebBindings::retainObject(object->np_object()),
*result);
break;
}
case PP_VARTYPE_ARRAY:
case PP_VARTYPE_DICTIONARY:
VOID_TO_NPVARIANT(*result);
break;
}
return true;
}
| 170,554
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void fht16x16_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht16x16_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void fht16x16_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
void idct16x16_ref(const tran_low_t *in, uint8_t *dest, int stride,
int /*tx_type*/) {
vpx_idct16x16_256_add_c(in, dest, stride);
}
void fht16x16_ref(const int16_t *in, tran_low_t *out, int stride,
int tx_type) {
vp9_fht16x16_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
| 174,530
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PluginModule::InitAsProxiedNaCl(
scoped_ptr<PluginDelegate::OutOfProcessProxy> out_of_process_proxy,
PP_Instance instance) {
nacl_ipc_proxy_ = true;
InitAsProxied(out_of_process_proxy.release());
out_of_process_proxy_->AddInstance(instance);
PluginInstance* plugin_instance = host_globals->GetInstance(instance);
if (!plugin_instance)
return;
plugin_instance->ResetAsProxied();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void PluginModule::InitAsProxiedNaCl(
PluginDelegate::OutOfProcessProxy* out_of_process_proxy,
PP_Instance instance) {
InitAsProxied(out_of_process_proxy);
out_of_process_proxy_->AddInstance(instance);
PluginInstance* plugin_instance = host_globals->GetInstance(instance);
if (!plugin_instance)
return;
plugin_instance->ResetAsProxied();
}
| 170,745
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int vcc_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct atm_vcc *vcc;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, error = -EINVAL;
if (sock->state != SS_CONNECTED)
return -ENOTCONN;
/* only handle MSG_DONTWAIT and MSG_PEEK */
if (flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_PEEK))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
vcc = ATM_SD(sock);
if (test_bit(ATM_VF_RELEASED, &vcc->flags) ||
test_bit(ATM_VF_CLOSE, &vcc->flags) ||
!test_bit(ATM_VF_READY, &vcc->flags))
return 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &error);
if (!skb)
return error;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
error = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (error)
return error;
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
pr_debug("%d -= %d\n", atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc),
skb->truesize);
atm_return(vcc, skb->truesize);
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return copied;
}
Commit Message: atm: update msg_namelen in vcc_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about vcc_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
int vcc_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct atm_vcc *vcc;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, error = -EINVAL;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
if (sock->state != SS_CONNECTED)
return -ENOTCONN;
/* only handle MSG_DONTWAIT and MSG_PEEK */
if (flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_PEEK))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
vcc = ATM_SD(sock);
if (test_bit(ATM_VF_RELEASED, &vcc->flags) ||
test_bit(ATM_VF_CLOSE, &vcc->flags) ||
!test_bit(ATM_VF_READY, &vcc->flags))
return 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &error);
if (!skb)
return error;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
error = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (error)
return error;
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
pr_debug("%d -= %d\n", atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc),
skb->truesize);
atm_return(vcc, skb->truesize);
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return copied;
}
| 166,045
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: selReadStream(FILE *fp)
{
char *selname;
char linebuf[L_BUF_SIZE];
l_int32 sy, sx, cy, cx, i, j, version, ignore;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selReadStream");
if (!fp)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("stream not defined", procName, NULL);
if (fscanf(fp, " Sel Version %d\n", &version) != 1)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("not a sel file", procName, NULL);
if (version != SEL_VERSION_NUMBER)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("invalid sel version", procName, NULL);
if (fgets(linebuf, L_BUF_SIZE, fp) == NULL)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("error reading into linebuf", procName, NULL);
selname = stringNew(linebuf);
sscanf(linebuf, " ------ %s ------", selname);
if (fscanf(fp, " sy = %d, sx = %d, cy = %d, cx = %d\n",
&sy, &sx, &cy, &cx) != 4) {
LEPT_FREE(selname);
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("dimensions not read", procName, NULL);
}
if ((sel = selCreate(sy, sx, selname)) == NULL) {
LEPT_FREE(selname);
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("sel not made", procName, NULL);
}
selSetOrigin(sel, cy, cx);
for (i = 0; i < sy; i++) {
ignore = fscanf(fp, " ");
for (j = 0; j < sx; j++)
ignore = fscanf(fp, "%1d", &sel->data[i][j]);
ignore = fscanf(fp, "\n");
}
ignore = fscanf(fp, "\n");
LEPT_FREE(selname);
return sel;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
selReadStream(FILE *fp)
{
char *selname;
char linebuf[L_BUFSIZE];
l_int32 sy, sx, cy, cx, i, j, version, ignore;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selReadStream");
if (!fp)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("stream not defined", procName, NULL);
if (fscanf(fp, " Sel Version %d\n", &version) != 1)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("not a sel file", procName, NULL);
if (version != SEL_VERSION_NUMBER)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("invalid sel version", procName, NULL);
if (fgets(linebuf, L_BUFSIZE, fp) == NULL)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("error reading into linebuf", procName, NULL);
selname = stringNew(linebuf);
sscanf(linebuf, " ------ %200s ------", selname);
if (fscanf(fp, " sy = %d, sx = %d, cy = %d, cx = %d\n",
&sy, &sx, &cy, &cx) != 4) {
LEPT_FREE(selname);
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("dimensions not read", procName, NULL);
}
if ((sel = selCreate(sy, sx, selname)) == NULL) {
LEPT_FREE(selname);
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("sel not made", procName, NULL);
}
selSetOrigin(sel, cy, cx);
for (i = 0; i < sy; i++) {
ignore = fscanf(fp, " ");
for (j = 0; j < sx; j++)
ignore = fscanf(fp, "%1d", &sel->data[i][j]);
ignore = fscanf(fp, "\n");
}
ignore = fscanf(fp, "\n");
LEPT_FREE(selname);
return sel;
}
| 169,329
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int burl_normalize_2F_to_slash_fix (buffer *b, int qs, int i)
{
char * const s = b->ptr;
const int blen = (int)buffer_string_length(b);
const int used = qs < 0 ? blen : qs;
int j = i;
for (; i < used; ++i, ++j) {
s[j] = s[i];
if (s[i] == '%' && s[i+1] == '2' && s[i+2] == 'F') {
s[j] = '/';
i+=2;
}
}
if (qs >= 0) {
memmove(s+j, s+qs, blen - qs);
j += blen - qs;
}
buffer_string_set_length(b, j);
return qs;
}
Commit Message: [core] fix abort in http-parseopts (fixes #2945)
fix abort in server.http-parseopts with url-path-2f-decode enabled
(thx stze)
x-ref:
"Security - SIGABRT during GET request handling with url-path-2f-decode enabled"
https://redmine.lighttpd.net/issues/2945
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static int burl_normalize_2F_to_slash_fix (buffer *b, int qs, int i)
{
char * const s = b->ptr;
const int blen = (int)buffer_string_length(b);
const int used = qs < 0 ? blen : qs;
int j = i;
for (; i < used; ++i, ++j) {
s[j] = s[i];
if (s[i] == '%' && s[i+1] == '2' && s[i+2] == 'F') {
s[j] = '/';
i+=2;
}
}
if (qs >= 0) {
const int qslen = blen - qs;
memmove(s+j, s+qs, (size_t)qslen);
qs = j;
j += qslen;
}
buffer_string_set_length(b, j);
return qs;
}
| 169,709
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static x86newTokenType getToken(const char *str, size_t *begin, size_t *end) {
while (begin && isspace ((ut8)str[*begin])) {
++(*begin);
}
if (!str[*begin]) { // null byte
*end = *begin;
return TT_EOF;
} else if (isalpha ((ut8)str[*begin])) { // word token
*end = *begin;
while (end && isalnum ((ut8)str[*end])) {
++(*end);
}
return TT_WORD;
} else if (isdigit ((ut8)str[*begin])) { // number token
*end = *begin;
while (end && isalnum ((ut8)str[*end])) { // accept alphanumeric characters, because hex.
++(*end);
}
return TT_NUMBER;
} else { // special character: [, ], +, *, ...
*end = *begin + 1;
return TT_SPECIAL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #12239 - crash in the x86.nz assembler ##asm (#12252)
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static x86newTokenType getToken(const char *str, size_t *begin, size_t *end) {
if (*begin > strlen (str)) {
return TT_EOF;
}
while (begin && str[*begin] && isspace ((ut8)str[*begin])) {
++(*begin);
}
if (!str[*begin]) { // null byte
*end = *begin;
return TT_EOF;
}
if (isalpha ((ut8)str[*begin])) { // word token
*end = *begin;
while (end && str[*end] && isalnum ((ut8)str[*end])) {
++(*end);
}
return TT_WORD;
}
if (isdigit ((ut8)str[*begin])) { // number token
*end = *begin;
while (end && isalnum ((ut8)str[*end])) { // accept alphanumeric characters, because hex.
++(*end);
}
return TT_NUMBER;
} else { // special character: [, ], +, *, ...
*end = *begin + 1;
return TT_SPECIAL;
}
}
| 168,970
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRegisterTransferBuffer(
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer,
size_t size,
int32 id_request,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
base::SharedMemory shared_memory(transfer_buffer,
false,
channel_->renderer_process());
#else
#endif
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
int32 id = command_buffer_->RegisterTransferBuffer(&shared_memory,
size,
id_request);
GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRegisterTransferBuffer(
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer,
size_t size,
int32 id_request,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
int32 id = command_buffer_->RegisterTransferBuffer(&shared_memory,
size,
id_request);
GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
| 170,938
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: gamma_display_init(gamma_display *dp, png_modifier *pm, png_uint_32 id,
double file_gamma, double screen_gamma, png_byte sbit, int threshold_test,
int use_input_precision, int scale16, int expand16,
int do_background, PNG_CONST png_color_16 *pointer_to_the_background_color,
double background_gamma)
{
/* Standard fields */
standard_display_init(&dp->this, &pm->this, id, 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
/* Parameter fields */
dp->pm = pm;
dp->file_gamma = file_gamma;
dp->screen_gamma = screen_gamma;
dp->background_gamma = background_gamma;
dp->sbit = sbit;
dp->threshold_test = threshold_test;
dp->use_input_precision = use_input_precision;
dp->scale16 = scale16;
dp->expand16 = expand16;
dp->do_background = do_background;
if (do_background && pointer_to_the_background_color != 0)
dp->background_color = *pointer_to_the_background_color;
else
memset(&dp->background_color, 0, sizeof dp->background_color);
/* Local variable fields */
dp->maxerrout = dp->maxerrpc = dp->maxerrabs = 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
gamma_display_init(gamma_display *dp, png_modifier *pm, png_uint_32 id,
double file_gamma, double screen_gamma, png_byte sbit, int threshold_test,
int use_input_precision, int scale16, int expand16,
int do_background, const png_color_16 *pointer_to_the_background_color,
double background_gamma)
{
/* Standard fields */
standard_display_init(&dp->this, &pm->this, id, do_read_interlace,
pm->use_update_info);
/* Parameter fields */
dp->pm = pm;
dp->file_gamma = file_gamma;
dp->screen_gamma = screen_gamma;
dp->background_gamma = background_gamma;
dp->sbit = sbit;
dp->threshold_test = threshold_test;
dp->use_input_precision = use_input_precision;
dp->scale16 = scale16;
dp->expand16 = expand16;
dp->do_background = do_background;
if (do_background && pointer_to_the_background_color != 0)
dp->background_color = *pointer_to_the_background_color;
else
memset(&dp->background_color, 0, sizeof dp->background_color);
/* Local variable fields */
dp->maxerrout = dp->maxerrpc = dp->maxerrabs = 0;
}
| 173,611
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Reset() {
events_.clear();
tap_ = false;
tap_down_ = false;
tap_cancel_ = false;
begin_ = false;
end_ = false;
scroll_begin_ = false;
scroll_update_ = false;
scroll_end_ = false;
pinch_begin_ = false;
pinch_update_ = false;
pinch_end_ = false;
long_press_ = false;
fling_ = false;
two_finger_tap_ = false;
show_press_ = false;
swipe_left_ = false;
swipe_right_ = false;
swipe_up_ = false;
swipe_down_ = false;
scroll_begin_position_.SetPoint(0, 0);
tap_location_.SetPoint(0, 0);
gesture_end_location_.SetPoint(0, 0);
scroll_x_ = 0;
scroll_y_ = 0;
scroll_velocity_x_ = 0;
scroll_velocity_y_ = 0;
velocity_x_ = 0;
velocity_y_ = 0;
scroll_x_hint_ = 0;
scroll_y_hint_ = 0;
tap_count_ = 0;
scale_ = 0;
flags_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void Reset() {
events_.clear();
tap_ = false;
tap_down_ = false;
tap_cancel_ = false;
begin_ = false;
end_ = false;
scroll_begin_ = false;
scroll_update_ = false;
scroll_end_ = false;
pinch_begin_ = false;
pinch_update_ = false;
pinch_end_ = false;
long_press_ = false;
fling_ = false;
two_finger_tap_ = false;
show_press_ = false;
swipe_left_ = false;
swipe_right_ = false;
swipe_up_ = false;
swipe_down_ = false;
scroll_begin_position_.SetPoint(0, 0);
tap_location_.SetPoint(0, 0);
gesture_end_location_.SetPoint(0, 0);
scroll_x_ = 0;
scroll_y_ = 0;
scroll_velocity_x_ = 0;
scroll_velocity_y_ = 0;
velocity_x_ = 0;
velocity_y_ = 0;
scroll_x_hint_ = 0;
scroll_y_hint_ = 0;
tap_count_ = 0;
scale_ = 0;
flags_ = 0;
latency_info_.Clear();
}
| 171,203
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const char* Chapters::Display::GetString() const
{
return m_string;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const char* Chapters::Display::GetString() const
| 174,359
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: TestOpenCallback()
: callback_(
base::Bind(&TestOpenCallback::SetResult, base::Unretained(this))) {}
Commit Message: Update helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest for OnceCallback
Helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest.cc don't fit to OnceCallback
migration, as they are copied and passed to others.
This CL updates them to pass new callbacks for each use to avoid the
copy of callbacks.
Bug: 714018
Change-Id: Ifb70901439ae92b6b049b84534283c39ebc40ee0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/527549
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478549}
CWE ID:
|
TestOpenCallback()
| 171,976
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void scsi_read_complete(void * opaque, int ret)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = (SCSIDiskReq *)opaque;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
int n;
if (r->req.aiocb != NULL) {
r->req.aiocb = NULL;
bdrv_acct_done(s->bs, &r->acct);
}
if (ret) {
if (scsi_handle_rw_error(r, -ret, SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_READ)) {
return;
}
}
DPRINTF("Data ready tag=0x%x len=%zd\n", r->req.tag, r->iov.iov_len);
n = r->iov.iov_len / 512;
r->sector += n;
r->sector_count -= n;
scsi_req_data(&r->req, r->iov.iov_len);
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: commonize iovec creation between reads and writes
Also, consistently use qiov.size instead of iov.iov_len.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void scsi_read_complete(void * opaque, int ret)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = (SCSIDiskReq *)opaque;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
int n;
if (r->req.aiocb != NULL) {
r->req.aiocb = NULL;
bdrv_acct_done(s->bs, &r->acct);
}
if (ret) {
if (scsi_handle_rw_error(r, -ret, SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_READ)) {
return;
}
}
DPRINTF("Data ready tag=0x%x len=%zd\n", r->req.tag, r->qiov.size);
n = r->qiov.size / 512;
r->sector += n;
r->sector_count -= n;
scsi_req_data(&r->req, r->qiov.size);
}
| 169,920
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void MidiManagerUsb::DispatchSendMidiData(MidiManagerClient* client,
uint32_t port_index,
const std::vector<uint8>& data,
double timestamp) {
DCHECK_LT(port_index, output_streams_.size());
output_streams_[port_index]->Send(data);
client->AccumulateMidiBytesSent(data.size());
}
Commit Message: MidiManagerUsb should not trust indices provided by renderer.
MidiManagerUsb::DispatchSendMidiData takes |port_index| parameter. As it is
provided by a renderer possibly under the control of an attacker, we must
validate the given index before using it.
BUG=456516
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/907793002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#315303}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void MidiManagerUsb::DispatchSendMidiData(MidiManagerClient* client,
uint32_t port_index,
const std::vector<uint8>& data,
double timestamp) {
if (port_index >= output_streams_.size()) {
// |port_index| is provided by a renderer so we can't believe that it is
// in the valid range.
// TODO(toyoshim): Move this check to MidiHost and kill the renderer when
// it fails.
return;
}
output_streams_[port_index]->Send(data);
client->AccumulateMidiBytesSent(data.size());
}
| 172,014
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int copy_cred(struct svc_cred *target, struct svc_cred *source)
{
int ret;
ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_principal, source->cr_principal);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = strdup_if_nonnull(&target->cr_raw_principal,
source->cr_raw_principal);
if (ret)
return ret;
target->cr_flavor = source->cr_flavor;
target->cr_uid = source->cr_uid;
target->cr_gid = source->cr_gid;
target->cr_group_info = source->cr_group_info;
get_group_info(target->cr_group_info);
target->cr_gss_mech = source->cr_gss_mech;
if (source->cr_gss_mech)
gss_mech_get(source->cr_gss_mech);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
static int copy_cred(struct svc_cred *target, struct svc_cred *source)
{
target->cr_principal = kstrdup(source->cr_principal, GFP_KERNEL);
target->cr_raw_principal = kstrdup(source->cr_raw_principal,
GFP_KERNEL);
if ((source->cr_principal && ! target->cr_principal) ||
(source->cr_raw_principal && ! target->cr_raw_principal))
return -ENOMEM;
target->cr_flavor = source->cr_flavor;
target->cr_uid = source->cr_uid;
target->cr_gid = source->cr_gid;
target->cr_group_info = source->cr_group_info;
get_group_info(target->cr_group_info);
target->cr_gss_mech = source->cr_gss_mech;
if (source->cr_gss_mech)
gss_mech_get(source->cr_gss_mech);
return 0;
}
| 168,145
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DCTStream::init()
{
jpeg_std_error(&jerr);
jerr.error_exit = &exitErrorHandler;
src.pub.init_source = str_init_source;
src.pub.fill_input_buffer = str_fill_input_buffer;
src.pub.skip_input_data = str_skip_input_data;
src.pub.resync_to_restart = jpeg_resync_to_restart;
src.pub.term_source = str_term_source;
src.pub.next_input_byte = NULL;
src.str = str;
src.index = 0;
src.abort = false;
current = NULL;
limit = NULL;
limit = NULL;
cinfo.err = &jerr;
jpeg_create_decompress(&cinfo);
cinfo.src = (jpeg_source_mgr *)&src;
row_buffer = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void DCTStream::init()
{
jpeg_std_error(&jerr);
jerr.error_exit = &exitErrorHandler;
src.pub.init_source = str_init_source;
src.pub.fill_input_buffer = str_fill_input_buffer;
src.pub.skip_input_data = str_skip_input_data;
src.pub.resync_to_restart = jpeg_resync_to_restart;
src.pub.term_source = str_term_source;
src.pub.next_input_byte = NULL;
src.str = str;
src.index = 0;
current = NULL;
limit = NULL;
limit = NULL;
cinfo.err = &jerr;
jpeg_create_decompress(&cinfo);
cinfo.src = (jpeg_source_mgr *)&src;
row_buffer = NULL;
}
| 165,393
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SeekHead::~SeekHead()
{
delete[] m_entries;
delete[] m_void_elements;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
SeekHead::~SeekHead()
SeekHead::~SeekHead() {
delete[] m_entries;
delete[] m_void_elements;
}
| 174,469
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebpEx (gdImagePtr im, FILE * outFile, int quality)
{
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewFileCtx(outFile);
if (out == NULL) {
return;
}
gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, quality);
out->gd_free(out);
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6912
CWE ID: CWE-415
|
BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebpEx (gdImagePtr im, FILE * outFile, int quality)
{
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewFileCtx(outFile);
if (out == NULL) {
return;
}
_gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, quality);
out->gd_free(out);
}
| 168,818
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool SiteInstanceImpl::DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url) {
if (SiteIsolationPolicy::UseDedicatedProcessesForAllSites())
return true;
if (url.SchemeIs(kChromeErrorScheme))
return true;
GURL site_url = SiteInstance::GetSiteForURL(browser_context, url);
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
if (policy->IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(site_url)))
return true;
if (GetContentClient()->browser()->DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess(
browser_context, site_url)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Allow origin lock for WebUI pages.
Returning true for WebUI pages in DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess helps
to keep enforcing a SiteInstance swap during chrome://foo ->
chrome://bar navigation, even after relaxing
BrowsingInstance::GetSiteInstanceForURL to consider RPH::IsSuitableHost
(see https://crrev.com/c/783470 for that fixes process sharing in
isolated(b(c),d(c)) scenario).
I've manually tested this CL by visiting the following URLs:
- chrome://welcome/
- chrome://settings
- chrome://extensions
- chrome://history
- chrome://help and chrome://chrome (both redirect to chrome://settings/help)
Bug: 510588, 847127
Change-Id: I55073bce00f32cb8bc5c1c91034438ff9a3f8971
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1237392
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595259}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool SiteInstanceImpl::DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url) {
if (SiteIsolationPolicy::UseDedicatedProcessesForAllSites())
return true;
// Always require a dedicated process for isolated origins.
GURL site_url = SiteInstance::GetSiteForURL(browser_context, url);
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
if (policy->IsIsolatedOrigin(url::Origin::Create(site_url)))
return true;
if (site_url.SchemeIs(kChromeErrorScheme))
return true;
// Isolate kChromeUIScheme pages from one another and from other kinds of
// schemes.
if (site_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme))
return true;
if (GetContentClient()->browser()->DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess(
browser_context, site_url)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
| 173,281
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void fanout_release(struct sock *sk)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f;
f = po->fanout;
if (!f)
return;
mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
po->fanout = NULL;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&f->sk_ref)) {
list_del(&f->list);
dev_remove_pack(&f->prot_hook);
fanout_release_data(f);
kfree(f);
}
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
if (po->rollover)
kfree_rcu(po->rollover, rcu);
}
Commit Message: packet: fix races in fanout_add()
Multiple threads can call fanout_add() at the same time.
We need to grab fanout_mutex earlier to avoid races that could
lead to one thread freeing po->rollover that was set by another thread.
Do the same in fanout_release(), for peace of mind, and to help us
finding lockdep issues earlier.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
static void fanout_release(struct sock *sk)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f;
mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
f = po->fanout;
if (f) {
po->fanout = NULL;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&f->sk_ref)) {
list_del(&f->list);
dev_remove_pack(&f->prot_hook);
fanout_release_data(f);
kfree(f);
}
if (po->rollover)
kfree_rcu(po->rollover, rcu);
}
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
}
| 168,347
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool SessionManager::Remove(const std::string& id) {
std::map<std::string, Session*>::iterator it;
Session* session;
base::AutoLock lock(map_lock_);
it = map_.find(id);
if (it == map_.end()) {
VLOG(1) << "No such session with ID " << id;
return false;
}
session = it->second;
map_.erase(it);
return true;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool SessionManager::Remove(const std::string& id) {
std::map<std::string, Session*>::iterator it;
Session* session;
base::AutoLock lock(map_lock_);
it = map_.find(id);
if (it == map_.end())
return false;
session = it->second;
map_.erase(it);
return true;
}
| 170,464
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: png_get_asm_flags (png_structp png_ptr)
{
/* Obsolete, to be removed from libpng-1.4.0 */
return (png_ptr? 0L: 0L);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
png_get_asm_flags (png_structp png_ptr)
{
/* Obsolete, to be removed from libpng-1.4.0 */
PNG_UNUSED(png_ptr)
return 0L;
}
| 172,165
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MagickExport void *AcquireQuantumMemory(const size_t count,const size_t quantum)
{
size_t
extent;
if (CheckMemoryOverflow(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
return((void *) NULL);
extent=count*quantum;
return(AcquireMagickMemory(extent));
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
MagickExport void *AcquireQuantumMemory(const size_t count,const size_t quantum)
{
size_t
extent;
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
return((void *) NULL);
extent=count*quantum;
return(AcquireMagickMemory(extent));
}
| 168,543
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void MaybeStopInputMethodDaemon(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value) &&
enable_auto_ime_shutdown_) {
StopInputMethodDaemon();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void MaybeStopInputMethodDaemon(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const input_method::ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value) &&
enable_auto_ime_shutdown_) {
StopInputMethodDaemon();
}
}
| 170,500
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
unsigned int total, fsmeta;
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi);
struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(sbi);
unsigned int ovp_segments, reserved_segments;
total = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count);
fsmeta = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ckpt);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_sit);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_nat);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(ckpt->rsvd_segment_count);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ssa);
if (unlikely(fsmeta >= total))
return 1;
ovp_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->overprov_segment_count);
reserved_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->rsvd_segment_count);
if (unlikely(fsmeta < F2FS_MIN_SEGMENTS ||
ovp_segments == 0 || reserved_segments == 0)) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
"Wrong layout: check mkfs.f2fs version");
return 1;
}
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR, "A bug case: need to run fsck");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check checkpoint segno and blkoff
Make sure segno and blkoff read from raw image are valid.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
[Jaegeuk Kim: adjust minor coding style]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-129
|
int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
unsigned int total, fsmeta;
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi);
struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(sbi);
unsigned int ovp_segments, reserved_segments;
unsigned int main_segs, blocks_per_seg;
int i;
total = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count);
fsmeta = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ckpt);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_sit);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_nat);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(ckpt->rsvd_segment_count);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ssa);
if (unlikely(fsmeta >= total))
return 1;
ovp_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->overprov_segment_count);
reserved_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->rsvd_segment_count);
if (unlikely(fsmeta < F2FS_MIN_SEGMENTS ||
ovp_segments == 0 || reserved_segments == 0)) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
"Wrong layout: check mkfs.f2fs version");
return 1;
}
main_segs = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_main);
blocks_per_seg = sbi->blocks_per_seg;
for (i = 0; i < NR_CURSEG_NODE_TYPE; i++) {
if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_segno[i]) >= main_segs ||
le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_blkoff[i]) >= blocks_per_seg)
return 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < NR_CURSEG_DATA_TYPE; i++) {
if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_segno[i]) >= main_segs ||
le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_blkoff[i]) >= blocks_per_seg)
return 1;
}
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR, "A bug case: need to run fsck");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,064
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool mkvparser::Match(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long& pos,
unsigned long id_,
long long& val)
{
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
const long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
if (status < 0)
return false;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
if ((unsigned long)id != id_)
return false;
pos += len; //consume id
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert(size <= 8);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
pos += len; //consume length of size of payload
val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
assert(val >= 0);
pos += size; //consume size of payload
return true;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool mkvparser::Match(
long long total, available;
const long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
if (status < 0)
return false;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
if ((unsigned long)id != id_)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert(size <= 8);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
pos += len; // consume length of size of payload
val = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
assert(val >= 0);
pos += size; // consume size of payload
return true;
}
| 174,398
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: white_point(PNG_CONST color_encoding *encoding)
{
CIE_color white;
white.X = encoding->red.X + encoding->green.X + encoding->blue.X;
white.Y = encoding->red.Y + encoding->green.Y + encoding->blue.Y;
white.Z = encoding->red.Z + encoding->green.Z + encoding->blue.Z;
return white;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
white_point(PNG_CONST color_encoding *encoding)
white_point(const color_encoding *encoding)
{
CIE_color white;
white.X = encoding->red.X + encoding->green.X + encoding->blue.X;
white.Y = encoding->red.Y + encoding->green.Y + encoding->blue.Y;
white.Z = encoding->red.Z + encoding->green.Z + encoding->blue.Z;
return white;
}
| 173,718
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Response PageHandler::SetDownloadBehavior(const std::string& behavior,
Maybe<std::string> download_path) {
WebContentsImpl* web_contents = GetWebContents();
if (!web_contents)
return Response::InternalError();
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Allow &&
!download_path.isJust())
return Response::Error("downloadPath not provided");
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Default) {
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::RemoveFromWebContents(web_contents);
download_manager_delegate_ = nullptr;
return Response::OK();
}
content::BrowserContext* browser_context = web_contents->GetBrowserContext();
DCHECK(browser_context);
content::DownloadManager* download_manager =
content::BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(browser_context);
download_manager_delegate_ =
DevToolsDownloadManagerDelegate::TakeOver(download_manager);
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper* download_helper =
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents);
download_helper->SetDownloadBehavior(
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::DownloadBehavior::DENY);
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Allow) {
download_helper->SetDownloadBehavior(
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::DownloadBehavior::ALLOW);
download_helper->SetDownloadPath(download_path.fromJust());
}
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
Response PageHandler::SetDownloadBehavior(const std::string& behavior,
Maybe<std::string> download_path) {
if (!allow_set_download_behavior_)
return Response::Error("Not allowed.");
WebContentsImpl* web_contents = GetWebContents();
if (!web_contents)
return Response::InternalError();
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Allow &&
!download_path.isJust())
return Response::Error("downloadPath not provided");
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Default) {
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::RemoveFromWebContents(web_contents);
download_manager_delegate_ = nullptr;
return Response::OK();
}
content::BrowserContext* browser_context = web_contents->GetBrowserContext();
DCHECK(browser_context);
content::DownloadManager* download_manager =
content::BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(browser_context);
download_manager_delegate_ =
DevToolsDownloadManagerDelegate::TakeOver(download_manager);
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper* download_helper =
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents);
download_helper->SetDownloadBehavior(
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::DownloadBehavior::DENY);
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Allow) {
download_helper->SetDownloadBehavior(
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::DownloadBehavior::ALLOW);
download_helper->SetDownloadPath(download_path.fromJust());
}
return Response::OK();
}
| 172,608
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
{
struct loop_device *lo = disk->private_data;
int err;
if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
return;
mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
/*
* In autoclear mode, stop the loop thread
* and remove configuration after last close.
*/
err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
if (!err)
return;
} else if (lo->lo_state == Lo_bound) {
/*
* Otherwise keep thread (if running) and config,
* but flush possible ongoing bios in thread.
*/
blk_mq_freeze_queue(lo->lo_queue);
blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(lo->lo_queue);
}
mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
static void __lo_release(struct loop_device *lo)
{
int err;
if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
return;
mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
/*
* In autoclear mode, stop the loop thread
* and remove configuration after last close.
*/
err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
if (!err)
return;
} else if (lo->lo_state == Lo_bound) {
/*
* Otherwise keep thread (if running) and config,
* but flush possible ongoing bios in thread.
*/
blk_mq_freeze_queue(lo->lo_queue);
blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(lo->lo_queue);
}
mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
}
| 169,352
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderMessageFilter::OnCreateWindow(
const ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params& params,
int* route_id,
int* surface_id,
int64* cloned_session_storage_namespace_id) {
bool no_javascript_access;
bool can_create_window =
GetContentClient()->browser()->CanCreateWindow(
GURL(params.opener_url),
GURL(params.opener_security_origin),
params.window_container_type,
resource_context_,
render_process_id_,
&no_javascript_access);
if (!can_create_window) {
*route_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
*surface_id = 0;
return;
}
scoped_refptr<SessionStorageNamespaceImpl> cloned_namespace =
new SessionStorageNamespaceImpl(dom_storage_context_,
params.session_storage_namespace_id);
*cloned_session_storage_namespace_id = cloned_namespace->id();
render_widget_helper_->CreateNewWindow(params,
no_javascript_access,
peer_handle(),
route_id,
surface_id,
cloned_namespace);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void RenderMessageFilter::OnCreateWindow(
const ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params& params,
int* route_id,
int* surface_id,
int64* cloned_session_storage_namespace_id) {
bool no_javascript_access;
bool can_create_window =
GetContentClient()->browser()->CanCreateWindow(
params.opener_url,
params.opener_security_origin,
params.window_container_type,
resource_context_,
render_process_id_,
&no_javascript_access);
if (!can_create_window) {
*route_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
*surface_id = 0;
return;
}
scoped_refptr<SessionStorageNamespaceImpl> cloned_namespace =
new SessionStorageNamespaceImpl(dom_storage_context_,
params.session_storage_namespace_id);
*cloned_session_storage_namespace_id = cloned_namespace->id();
render_widget_helper_->CreateNewWindow(params,
no_javascript_access,
peer_handle(),
route_id,
surface_id,
cloned_namespace);
}
| 171,497
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_expand(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_png_set_expand_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_expand_set(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_expand(pp);
if (that->this.has_tRNS)
that->this.is_transparent = 1;
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
| 173,634
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SplitString(const std::wstring& str,
wchar_t c,
std::vector<std::wstring>* r) {
SplitStringT(str, c, true, r);
}
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void SplitString(const std::wstring& str,
| 170,555
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int SpdyProxyClientSocket::DoReadReplyComplete(int result) {
if (result < 0)
return result;
if (response_.headers->GetParsedHttpVersion() < HttpVersion(1, 0))
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
net_log_.AddEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_HTTP_TRANSACTION_READ_TUNNEL_RESPONSE_HEADERS,
base::Bind(&HttpResponseHeaders::NetLogCallback, response_.headers));
switch (response_.headers->response_code()) {
case 200: // OK
next_state_ = STATE_OPEN;
return OK;
case 302: // Found / Moved Temporarily
if (SanitizeProxyRedirect(&response_, request_.url)) {
redirect_has_load_timing_info_ =
spdy_stream_->GetLoadTimingInfo(&redirect_load_timing_info_);
spdy_stream_->DetachDelegate();
next_state_ = STATE_DISCONNECTED;
return ERR_HTTPS_PROXY_TUNNEL_RESPONSE;
} else {
LogBlockedTunnelResponse();
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
case 407: // Proxy Authentication Required
next_state_ = STATE_OPEN;
return HandleProxyAuthChallenge(auth_.get(), &response_, net_log_);
default:
LogBlockedTunnelResponse();
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19
|
int SpdyProxyClientSocket::DoReadReplyComplete(int result) {
if (result < 0)
return result;
if (response_.headers->GetParsedHttpVersion() < HttpVersion(1, 0))
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
net_log_.AddEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_HTTP_TRANSACTION_READ_TUNNEL_RESPONSE_HEADERS,
base::Bind(&HttpResponseHeaders::NetLogCallback, response_.headers));
switch (response_.headers->response_code()) {
case 200: // OK
next_state_ = STATE_OPEN;
return OK;
case 302: // Found / Moved Temporarily
if (!SanitizeProxyRedirect(&response_)) {
LogBlockedTunnelResponse();
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
redirect_has_load_timing_info_ =
spdy_stream_->GetLoadTimingInfo(&redirect_load_timing_info_);
// Note that this triggers a RST_STREAM_CANCEL.
spdy_stream_->DetachDelegate();
next_state_ = STATE_DISCONNECTED;
return ERR_HTTPS_PROXY_TUNNEL_RESPONSE;
case 407: // Proxy Authentication Required
next_state_ = STATE_OPEN;
if (!SanitizeProxyAuth(&response_)) {
LogBlockedTunnelResponse();
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
return HandleProxyAuthChallenge(auth_.get(), &response_, net_log_);
default:
LogBlockedTunnelResponse();
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
}
| 172,041
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::Core(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> caller_task_runner,
scoped_ptr<WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate> launcher_delegate,
WorkerProcessIpcDelegate* worker_delegate)
: caller_task_runner_(caller_task_runner),
launcher_delegate_(launcher_delegate.Pass()),
worker_delegate_(worker_delegate),
ipc_enabled_(false),
launch_backoff_(&kDefaultBackoffPolicy),
stopping_(false) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
ipc_error_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_success_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::Core(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> caller_task_runner,
scoped_ptr<WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate> launcher_delegate,
WorkerProcessIpcDelegate* worker_delegate)
: caller_task_runner_(caller_task_runner),
launcher_delegate_(launcher_delegate.Pass()),
worker_delegate_(worker_delegate),
get_named_pipe_client_pid_(NULL),
ipc_enabled_(false),
launch_backoff_(&kDefaultBackoffPolicy),
stopping_(false) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
ipc_error_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_success_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
}
| 171,547
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int fuse_notify_inval_entry(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size,
struct fuse_copy_state *cs)
{
struct fuse_notify_inval_entry_out outarg;
int err = -ENOMEM;
char *buf;
struct qstr name;
buf = kzalloc(FUSE_NAME_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
goto err;
err = -EINVAL;
if (size < sizeof(outarg))
goto err;
err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &outarg, sizeof(outarg));
if (err)
goto err;
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (outarg.namelen > FUSE_NAME_MAX)
goto err;
name.name = buf;
name.len = outarg.namelen;
err = fuse_copy_one(cs, buf, outarg.namelen + 1);
if (err)
goto err;
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
buf[outarg.namelen] = 0;
name.hash = full_name_hash(name.name, name.len);
down_read(&fc->killsb);
err = -ENOENT;
if (fc->sb)
err = fuse_reverse_inval_entry(fc->sb, outarg.parent, &name);
up_read(&fc->killsb);
kfree(buf);
return err;
err:
kfree(buf);
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
return err;
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int fuse_notify_inval_entry(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size,
struct fuse_copy_state *cs)
{
struct fuse_notify_inval_entry_out outarg;
int err = -ENOMEM;
char *buf;
struct qstr name;
buf = kzalloc(FUSE_NAME_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
goto err;
err = -EINVAL;
if (size < sizeof(outarg))
goto err;
err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &outarg, sizeof(outarg));
if (err)
goto err;
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (outarg.namelen > FUSE_NAME_MAX)
goto err;
err = -EINVAL;
if (size != sizeof(outarg) + outarg.namelen + 1)
goto err;
name.name = buf;
name.len = outarg.namelen;
err = fuse_copy_one(cs, buf, outarg.namelen + 1);
if (err)
goto err;
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
buf[outarg.namelen] = 0;
name.hash = full_name_hash(name.name, name.len);
down_read(&fc->killsb);
err = -ENOENT;
if (fc->sb)
err = fuse_reverse_inval_entry(fc->sb, outarg.parent, &name);
up_read(&fc->killsb);
kfree(buf);
return err;
err:
kfree(buf);
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
return err;
}
| 165,747
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ATSParser::PSISection::isCRCOkay() const {
if (!isComplete()) {
return false;
}
uint8_t* data = mBuffer->data();
if ((data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
return true;
}
unsigned sectionLength = U16_AT(data + 1) & 0xfff;
ALOGV("sectionLength %u, skip %u", sectionLength, mSkipBytes);
sectionLength -= mSkipBytes;
uint32_t crc = 0xffffffff;
for(unsigned i = 0; i < sectionLength + 4 /* crc */; i++) {
uint8_t b = data[i];
int index = ((crc >> 24) ^ (b & 0xff)) & 0xff;
crc = CRC_TABLE[index] ^ (crc << 8);
}
ALOGV("crc: %08x\n", crc);
return (crc == 0);
}
Commit Message: Check section size when verifying CRC
Bug: 28333006
Change-Id: Ief7a2da848face78f0edde21e2f2009316076679
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool ATSParser::PSISection::isCRCOkay() const {
if (!isComplete()) {
return false;
}
uint8_t* data = mBuffer->data();
if ((data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
return true;
}
unsigned sectionLength = U16_AT(data + 1) & 0xfff;
ALOGV("sectionLength %u, skip %u", sectionLength, mSkipBytes);
if(sectionLength < mSkipBytes) {
ALOGE("b/28333006");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "28333006");
return false;
}
sectionLength -= mSkipBytes;
uint32_t crc = 0xffffffff;
for(unsigned i = 0; i < sectionLength + 4 /* crc */; i++) {
uint8_t b = data[i];
int index = ((crc >> 24) ^ (b & 0xff)) & 0xff;
crc = CRC_TABLE[index] ^ (crc << 8);
}
ALOGV("crc: %08x\n", crc);
return (crc == 0);
}
| 173,769
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(
char *key,
char *value,
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list)
{
struct iscsi_extra_response *extra_response;
if (strlen(value) > VALUE_MAXLEN) {
pr_err("Value for notunderstood key \"%s\" exceeds %d,"
" protocol error.\n", key, VALUE_MAXLEN);
return -1;
}
extra_response = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iscsi_extra_response), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!extra_response) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for"
" struct iscsi_extra_response.\n");
return -1;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&extra_response->er_list);
strncpy(extra_response->key, key, strlen(key) + 1);
strncpy(extra_response->value, NOTUNDERSTOOD,
strlen(NOTUNDERSTOOD) + 1);
list_add_tail(&extra_response->er_list,
¶m_list->extra_response_list);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(
char *key,
char *value,
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list)
{
struct iscsi_extra_response *extra_response;
if (strlen(value) > VALUE_MAXLEN) {
pr_err("Value for notunderstood key \"%s\" exceeds %d,"
" protocol error.\n", key, VALUE_MAXLEN);
return -1;
}
extra_response = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iscsi_extra_response), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!extra_response) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for"
" struct iscsi_extra_response.\n");
return -1;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&extra_response->er_list);
strlcpy(extra_response->key, key, sizeof(extra_response->key));
strlcpy(extra_response->value, NOTUNDERSTOOD,
sizeof(extra_response->value));
list_add_tail(&extra_response->er_list,
¶m_list->extra_response_list);
return 0;
}
| 166,050
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BufferMeta(size_t size)
: mSize(size),
mIsBackup(false) {
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
BufferMeta(size_t size)
BufferMeta(size_t size, OMX_U32 portIndex)
: mSize(size),
mIsBackup(false),
mPortIndex(portIndex) {
}
| 173,522
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void QuicStreamHost::Finish() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(p2p_stream_);
p2p_stream_->Finish();
writeable_ = false;
if (!readable_ && !writeable_) {
Delete();
}
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
void QuicStreamHost::Finish() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(p2p_stream_);
std::vector<uint8_t> data;
p2p_stream_->WriteData(data, true);
writeable_ = false;
if (!readable_ && !writeable_) {
Delete();
}
}
| 172,269
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Browser::TabDetachedAtImpl(TabContents* contents, int index,
DetachType type) {
if (type == DETACH_TYPE_DETACH) {
if (contents == chrome::GetActiveTabContents(this)) {
LocationBar* location_bar = window()->GetLocationBar();
if (location_bar)
location_bar->SaveStateToContents(contents->web_contents());
}
if (!tab_strip_model_->closing_all())
SyncHistoryWithTabs(0);
}
SetAsDelegate(contents->web_contents(), NULL);
RemoveScheduledUpdatesFor(contents->web_contents());
if (find_bar_controller_.get() && index == active_index()) {
find_bar_controller_->ChangeWebContents(NULL);
}
search_delegate_->OnTabDetached(contents->web_contents());
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void Browser::TabDetachedAtImpl(TabContents* contents, int index,
void Browser::TabDetachedAtImpl(content::WebContents* contents,
int index,
DetachType type) {
if (type == DETACH_TYPE_DETACH) {
if (contents == chrome::GetActiveWebContents(this)) {
LocationBar* location_bar = window()->GetLocationBar();
if (location_bar)
location_bar->SaveStateToContents(contents);
}
if (!tab_strip_model_->closing_all())
SyncHistoryWithTabs(0);
}
SetAsDelegate(contents, NULL);
RemoveScheduledUpdatesFor(contents);
if (find_bar_controller_.get() && index == active_index()) {
find_bar_controller_->ChangeWebContents(NULL);
}
search_delegate_->OnTabDetached(contents);
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents));
}
| 171,508
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int btsock_thread_post_cmd(int h, int type, const unsigned char* data, int size, uint32_t user_id)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("cmd socket is not created. socket thread may not initialized");
return FALSE;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_USER_PRIVATE, 0, type, size, user_id};
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("post cmd type:%d, size:%d, h:%d, ", type, size, h);
sock_cmd_t* cmd_send = &cmd;
int size_send = sizeof(cmd);
if(data && size)
{
size_send = sizeof(cmd) + size;
cmd_send = (sock_cmd_t*)alloca(size_send);
if(cmd_send)
{
*cmd_send = cmd;
memcpy(cmd_send + 1, data, size);
}
else
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("alloca failed at h:%d, cmd type:%d, size:%d", h, type, size_send);
return FALSE;
}
}
return send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, cmd_send, size_send, 0) == size_send;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
int btsock_thread_post_cmd(int h, int type, const unsigned char* data, int size, uint32_t user_id)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("cmd socket is not created. socket thread may not initialized");
return FALSE;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_USER_PRIVATE, 0, type, size, user_id};
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("post cmd type:%d, size:%d, h:%d, ", type, size, h);
sock_cmd_t* cmd_send = &cmd;
int size_send = sizeof(cmd);
if(data && size)
{
size_send = sizeof(cmd) + size;
cmd_send = (sock_cmd_t*)alloca(size_send);
if(cmd_send)
{
*cmd_send = cmd;
memcpy(cmd_send + 1, data, size);
}
else
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("alloca failed at h:%d, cmd type:%d, size:%d", h, type, size_send);
return FALSE;
}
}
return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, cmd_send, size_send, 0)) == size_send;
}
| 173,462
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PredictorEncodeTile(TIFF* tif, uint8* bp0, tmsize_t cc0, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "PredictorEncodeTile";
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
uint8 *working_copy;
tmsize_t cc = cc0, rowsize;
unsigned char* bp;
int result_code;
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->encodepfunc != NULL);
assert(sp->encodetile != NULL);
/*
* Do predictor manipulation in a working buffer to avoid altering
* the callers buffer. http://trac.osgeo.org/gdal/ticket/1965
*/
working_copy = (uint8*) _TIFFmalloc(cc0);
if( working_copy == NULL )
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Out of memory allocating " TIFF_SSIZE_FORMAT " byte temp buffer.",
cc0 );
return 0;
}
memcpy( working_copy, bp0, cc0 );
bp = working_copy;
rowsize = sp->rowsize;
assert(rowsize > 0);
if((cc0%rowsize)!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "PredictorEncodeTile",
"%s", "(cc0%rowsize)!=0");
return 0;
}
while (cc > 0) {
(*sp->encodepfunc)(tif, bp, rowsize);
cc -= rowsize;
bp += rowsize;
}
result_code = (*sp->encodetile)(tif, working_copy, cc0, s);
_TIFFfree( working_copy );
return result_code;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predic.c: fix memory leaks in error code paths added in
previous commit (fix for MSVR 35105)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
PredictorEncodeTile(TIFF* tif, uint8* bp0, tmsize_t cc0, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "PredictorEncodeTile";
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
uint8 *working_copy;
tmsize_t cc = cc0, rowsize;
unsigned char* bp;
int result_code;
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->encodepfunc != NULL);
assert(sp->encodetile != NULL);
/*
* Do predictor manipulation in a working buffer to avoid altering
* the callers buffer. http://trac.osgeo.org/gdal/ticket/1965
*/
working_copy = (uint8*) _TIFFmalloc(cc0);
if( working_copy == NULL )
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Out of memory allocating " TIFF_SSIZE_FORMAT " byte temp buffer.",
cc0 );
return 0;
}
memcpy( working_copy, bp0, cc0 );
bp = working_copy;
rowsize = sp->rowsize;
assert(rowsize > 0);
if((cc0%rowsize)!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "PredictorEncodeTile",
"%s", "(cc0%rowsize)!=0");
_TIFFfree( working_copy );
return 0;
}
while (cc > 0) {
(*sp->encodepfunc)(tif, bp, rowsize);
cc -= rowsize;
bp += rowsize;
}
result_code = (*sp->encodetile)(tif, working_copy, cc0, s);
_TIFFfree( working_copy );
return result_code;
}
| 169,937
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WtsConsoleSessionProcessDriver::OnChannelConnected() {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void WtsConsoleSessionProcessDriver::OnChannelConnected() {
void WtsConsoleSessionProcessDriver::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
}
| 171,554
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ObjectBackedNativeHandler::RouteFunction(
const std::string& name,
const std::string& feature_name,
const HandlerFunction& handler_function) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context_->v8_context());
v8::Local<v8::Object> data = v8::Object::New(isolate);
SetPrivate(data, kHandlerFunction,
v8::External::New(isolate, new HandlerFunction(handler_function)));
SetPrivate(data, kFeatureName,
v8_helpers::ToV8StringUnsafe(isolate, feature_name));
v8::Local<v8::FunctionTemplate> function_template =
v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, Router, data);
v8::Local<v8::ObjectTemplate>::New(isolate, object_template_)
->Set(isolate, name.c_str(), function_template);
router_data_.Append(data);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
|
void ObjectBackedNativeHandler::RouteFunction(
const std::string& name,
const std::string& feature_name,
const HandlerFunction& handler_function) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context_->v8_context());
v8::Local<v8::Object> data = v8::Object::New(isolate);
SetPrivate(data, kHandlerFunction,
v8::External::New(isolate, new HandlerFunction(handler_function)));
DCHECK(feature_name.empty() ||
ExtensionAPI::GetSharedInstance()->GetFeatureDependency(feature_name))
<< feature_name;
SetPrivate(data, kFeatureName,
v8_helpers::ToV8StringUnsafe(isolate, feature_name));
v8::Local<v8::FunctionTemplate> function_template =
v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, Router, data);
v8::Local<v8::ObjectTemplate>::New(isolate, object_template_)
->Set(isolate, name.c_str(), function_template);
router_data_.Append(data);
}
| 173,278
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long mkvparser::UnserializeInt(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long size,
long long& result)
{
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
assert(size > 0);
assert(size <= 8);
{
signed char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, (unsigned char*)&b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result = b;
++pos;
}
for (long i = 1; i < size; ++i)
{
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return 0; //success
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long mkvparser::UnserializeInt(
if (size_ >= LONG_MAX) // we need (size+1) chars
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long size = static_cast<long>(size_);
str = new (std::nothrow) char[size + 1];
if (str == NULL)
return -1;
unsigned char* const buf = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(str);
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, size, buf);
| 174,448
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void FakeBluetoothAgentManagerClient::UnregisterAgent(
const dbus::ObjectPath& agent_path,
const base::Closure& callback,
const ErrorCallback& error_callback) {
VLOG(1) << "UnregisterAgent: " << agent_path.value();
if (service_provider_ != NULL) {
error_callback.Run(bluetooth_agent_manager::kErrorInvalidArguments,
"Agent still registered");
} else {
callback.Run();
}
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void FakeBluetoothAgentManagerClient::UnregisterAgent(
const dbus::ObjectPath& agent_path,
const base::Closure& callback,
const ErrorCallback& error_callback) {
VLOG(1) << "UnregisterAgent: " << agent_path.value();
if (service_provider_ == NULL) {
error_callback.Run(bluetooth_agent_manager::kErrorDoesNotExist,
"No agent registered");
} else if (service_provider_->object_path_ != agent_path) {
error_callback.Run(bluetooth_agent_manager::kErrorDoesNotExist,
"Agent still registered");
} else {
callback.Run();
}
}
| 171,213
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool GetURLRowForAutocompleteMatch(Profile* profile,
const AutocompleteMatch& match,
history::URLRow* url_row) {
DCHECK(url_row);
HistoryService* history_service =
profile->GetHistoryService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (!history_service)
return false;
history::URLDatabase* url_db = history_service->InMemoryDatabase();
return url_db && (url_db->GetRowForURL(match.destination_url, url_row) != 0);
}
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool GetURLRowForAutocompleteMatch(Profile* profile,
| 170,958
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void nfs4_return_incompatible_delegation(struct inode *inode, mode_t open_flags)
{
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(NFS_I(inode)->delegation);
if (delegation == NULL || (delegation->type & open_flags) == open_flags) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
nfs_inode_return_delegation(inode);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
|
static void nfs4_return_incompatible_delegation(struct inode *inode, mode_t open_flags)
static void nfs4_return_incompatible_delegation(struct inode *inode, fmode_t fmode)
{
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(NFS_I(inode)->delegation);
if (delegation == NULL || (delegation->type & fmode) == fmode) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
nfs_inode_return_delegation(inode);
}
| 165,703
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_args *args)
{
struct rds_iovec vec;
struct rds_iovec __user *local_vec;
int tot_pages = 0;
unsigned int nr_pages;
unsigned int i;
local_vec = (struct rds_iovec __user *)(unsigned long) args->local_vec_addr;
/* figure out the number of pages in the vector */
for (i = 0; i < args->nr_local; i++) {
if (copy_from_user(&vec, &local_vec[i],
sizeof(struct rds_iovec)))
return -EFAULT;
nr_pages = rds_pages_in_vec(&vec);
if (nr_pages == 0)
return -EINVAL;
tot_pages += nr_pages;
/*
* nr_pages for one entry is limited to (UINT_MAX>>PAGE_SHIFT)+1,
* so tot_pages cannot overflow without first going negative.
*/
if (tot_pages < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
return tot_pages * sizeof(struct scatterlist);
}
Commit Message: RDS: Heap OOB write in rds_message_alloc_sgs()
When args->nr_local is 0, nr_pages gets also 0 due some size
calculation via rds_rm_size(), which is later used to allocate
pages for DMA, this bug produces a heap Out-Of-Bound write access
to a specific memory region.
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_args *args)
{
struct rds_iovec vec;
struct rds_iovec __user *local_vec;
int tot_pages = 0;
unsigned int nr_pages;
unsigned int i;
local_vec = (struct rds_iovec __user *)(unsigned long) args->local_vec_addr;
if (args->nr_local == 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* figure out the number of pages in the vector */
for (i = 0; i < args->nr_local; i++) {
if (copy_from_user(&vec, &local_vec[i],
sizeof(struct rds_iovec)))
return -EFAULT;
nr_pages = rds_pages_in_vec(&vec);
if (nr_pages == 0)
return -EINVAL;
tot_pages += nr_pages;
/*
* nr_pages for one entry is limited to (UINT_MAX>>PAGE_SHIFT)+1,
* so tot_pages cannot overflow without first going negative.
*/
if (tot_pages < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
return tot_pages * sizeof(struct scatterlist);
}
| 169,354
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::addInnerRoundedRectClip(const IntRect& rect, int thickness)
{
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void GraphicsContext::addInnerRoundedRectClip(const IntRect& rect, int thickness)
void GraphicsContext::addInnerRoundedRectClip(const IntRect& r, int thickness)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
FloatRect rect(r);
clip(rect);
Path path;
path.addEllipse(rect);
rect.inflate(-thickness);
path.addEllipse(rect);
clipPath(path, RULE_EVENODD);
}
| 170,420
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SendHandwritingStroke(const HandwritingStroke& stroke) {
if (stroke.size() < 2) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Empty stroke data or a single dot is passed.";
return;
}
IBusInputContext* context = GetInputContext(input_context_path_, ibus_);
if (!context) {
return;
}
const size_t raw_stroke_size = stroke.size() * 2;
scoped_array<double> raw_stroke(new double[raw_stroke_size]);
for (size_t n = 0; n < stroke.size(); ++n) {
raw_stroke[n * 2] = stroke[n].first; // x
raw_stroke[n * 2 + 1] = stroke[n].second; // y
}
ibus_input_context_process_hand_writing_event(
context, raw_stroke.get(), raw_stroke_size);
g_object_unref(context);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void SendHandwritingStroke(const HandwritingStroke& stroke) {
// IBusController override.
virtual void SendHandwritingStroke(const HandwritingStroke& stroke) {
if (stroke.size() < 2) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Empty stroke data or a single dot is passed.";
return;
}
IBusInputContext* context = GetInputContext(input_context_path_, ibus_);
if (!context) {
return;
}
const size_t raw_stroke_size = stroke.size() * 2;
scoped_array<double> raw_stroke(new double[raw_stroke_size]);
for (size_t n = 0; n < stroke.size(); ++n) {
raw_stroke[n * 2] = stroke[n].first; // x
raw_stroke[n * 2 + 1] = stroke[n].second; // y
}
ibus_input_context_process_hand_writing_event(
context, raw_stroke.get(), raw_stroke_size);
g_object_unref(context);
}
| 170,546
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: struct crypto_template *crypto_lookup_template(const char *name)
{
return try_then_request_module(__crypto_lookup_template(name), "%s",
name);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
struct crypto_template *crypto_lookup_template(const char *name)
{
return try_then_request_module(__crypto_lookup_template(name),
"crypto-%s", name);
}
| 166,771
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: read_pbm_integer(j_compress_ptr cinfo, FILE *infile, unsigned int maxval)
/* Read an unsigned decimal integer from the PPM file */
/* Swallows one trailing character after the integer */
/* Note that on a 16-bit-int machine, only values up to 64k can be read. */
/* This should not be a problem in practice. */
{
register int ch;
register unsigned int val;
/* Skip any leading whitespace */
do {
ch = pbm_getc(infile);
if (ch == EOF)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
} while (ch == ' ' || ch == '\t' || ch == '\n' || ch == '\r');
if (ch < '0' || ch > '9')
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_NONNUMERIC);
val = ch - '0';
while ((ch = pbm_getc(infile)) >= '0' && ch <= '9') {
val *= 10;
val += ch - '0';
}
if (val > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE);
return val;
}
Commit Message: cjpeg: Fix OOB read caused by malformed 8-bit BMP
... in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the
number of palette entries.
Fix partly borrowed from jpeg-9c. This commit also adopts Guido's
JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE enum value in lieu of our project-specific
JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE enum value.
Fixes #258
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
read_pbm_integer(j_compress_ptr cinfo, FILE *infile, unsigned int maxval)
/* Read an unsigned decimal integer from the PPM file */
/* Swallows one trailing character after the integer */
/* Note that on a 16-bit-int machine, only values up to 64k can be read. */
/* This should not be a problem in practice. */
{
register int ch;
register unsigned int val;
/* Skip any leading whitespace */
do {
ch = pbm_getc(infile);
if (ch == EOF)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
} while (ch == ' ' || ch == '\t' || ch == '\n' || ch == '\r');
if (ch < '0' || ch > '9')
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_NONNUMERIC);
val = ch - '0';
while ((ch = pbm_getc(infile)) >= '0' && ch <= '9') {
val *= 10;
val += ch - '0';
}
if (val > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE);
return val;
}
| 169,840
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_opendata_alloc(struct path *path,
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp, int flags,
const struct iattr *attrs)
{
struct dentry *parent = dget_parent(path->dentry);
struct inode *dir = parent->d_inode;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs4_opendata *p;
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
if (p == NULL)
goto err;
p->o_arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&sp->so_seqid);
if (p->o_arg.seqid == NULL)
goto err_free;
p->path.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
p->path.dentry = dget(path->dentry);
p->dir = parent;
p->owner = sp;
atomic_inc(&sp->so_count);
p->o_arg.fh = NFS_FH(dir);
p->o_arg.open_flags = flags,
p->o_arg.clientid = server->nfs_client->cl_clientid;
p->o_arg.id = sp->so_owner_id.id;
p->o_arg.name = &p->path.dentry->d_name;
p->o_arg.server = server;
p->o_arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
p->o_arg.claim = NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_NULL;
if (flags & O_EXCL) {
u32 *s = (u32 *) p->o_arg.u.verifier.data;
s[0] = jiffies;
s[1] = current->pid;
} else if (flags & O_CREAT) {
p->o_arg.u.attrs = &p->attrs;
memcpy(&p->attrs, attrs, sizeof(p->attrs));
}
p->c_arg.fh = &p->o_res.fh;
p->c_arg.stateid = &p->o_res.stateid;
p->c_arg.seqid = p->o_arg.seqid;
nfs4_init_opendata_res(p);
kref_init(&p->kref);
return p;
err_free:
kfree(p);
err:
dput(parent);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
|
static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_opendata_alloc(struct path *path,
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp, fmode_t fmode, int flags,
const struct iattr *attrs)
{
struct dentry *parent = dget_parent(path->dentry);
struct inode *dir = parent->d_inode;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs4_opendata *p;
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
if (p == NULL)
goto err;
p->o_arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&sp->so_seqid);
if (p->o_arg.seqid == NULL)
goto err_free;
p->path.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
p->path.dentry = dget(path->dentry);
p->dir = parent;
p->owner = sp;
atomic_inc(&sp->so_count);
p->o_arg.fh = NFS_FH(dir);
p->o_arg.open_flags = flags;
p->o_arg.fmode = fmode & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE);
p->o_arg.clientid = server->nfs_client->cl_clientid;
p->o_arg.id = sp->so_owner_id.id;
p->o_arg.name = &p->path.dentry->d_name;
p->o_arg.server = server;
p->o_arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
p->o_arg.claim = NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_NULL;
if (flags & O_EXCL) {
u32 *s = (u32 *) p->o_arg.u.verifier.data;
s[0] = jiffies;
s[1] = current->pid;
} else if (flags & O_CREAT) {
p->o_arg.u.attrs = &p->attrs;
memcpy(&p->attrs, attrs, sizeof(p->attrs));
}
p->c_arg.fh = &p->o_res.fh;
p->c_arg.stateid = &p->o_res.stateid;
p->c_arg.seqid = p->o_arg.seqid;
nfs4_init_opendata_res(p);
kref_init(&p->kref);
return p;
err_free:
kfree(p);
err:
dput(parent);
return NULL;
}
| 165,700
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void fht4x4_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht4x4_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void fht4x4_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
void fht4x4_ref(const int16_t *in, tran_low_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht4x4_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
| 174,558
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal(Node& root, NodeVector& postInsertionNotificationTargets)
{
EventDispatchForbiddenScope assertNoEventDispatch;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
for (Node& node : NodeTraversal::inclusiveDescendantsOf(root)) {
if (!inDocument() && !node.isContainerNode())
continue;
if (Node::InsertionShouldCallDidNotifySubtreeInsertions == node.insertedInto(this))
postInsertionNotificationTargets.append(&node);
for (ShadowRoot* shadowRoot = node.youngestShadowRoot(); shadowRoot; shadowRoot = shadowRoot->olderShadowRoot())
notifyNodeInsertedInternal(*shadowRoot, postInsertionNotificationTargets);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
R=tkent@chromium.org
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240}
CWE ID:
|
void ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal(Node& root, NodeVector& postInsertionNotificationTargets)
{
EventDispatchForbiddenScope assertNoEventDispatch;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
for (Node& node : NodeTraversal::inclusiveDescendantsOf(root)) {
// into detached subtrees that are not in a shadow tree.
if (!inDocument() && !isInShadowTree() && !node.isContainerNode())
continue;
if (Node::InsertionShouldCallDidNotifySubtreeInsertions == node.insertedInto(this))
postInsertionNotificationTargets.append(&node);
for (ShadowRoot* shadowRoot = node.youngestShadowRoot(); shadowRoot; shadowRoot = shadowRoot->olderShadowRoot())
notifyNodeInsertedInternal(*shadowRoot, postInsertionNotificationTargets);
}
}
| 171,772
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const Chapters* Segment::GetChapters() const
{
return m_pChapters;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const Chapters* Segment::GetChapters() const
| 174,290
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: wb_prep(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pkt_prep *prep, u_int len)
{
int n;
const struct pgstate *ps;
const u_char *ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-prep:"));
if (len < sizeof(*prep)) {
return (-1);
}
n = EXTRACT_32BITS(&prep->pp_n);
ps = (const struct pgstate *)(prep + 1);
while (--n >= 0 && !ND_TTEST(*ps)) {
const struct id_off *io, *ie;
char c = '<';
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u/%s:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->slot),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ps->page.p_sid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->page.p_uid)));
io = (struct id_off *)(ps + 1);
for (ie = io + ps->nid; io < ie && !ND_TTEST(*io); ++io) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s:%u", c, ipaddr_string(ndo, &io->id),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&io->off)));
c = ',';
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
ps = (struct pgstate *)io;
}
return ((u_char *)ps <= ep? 0 : -1);
}
Commit Message: whiteboard: fixup a few reversed tests (GH #446)
This is a follow-up to commit 3a3ec26.
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
wb_prep(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pkt_prep *prep, u_int len)
{
int n;
const struct pgstate *ps;
const u_char *ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-prep:"));
if (len < sizeof(*prep)) {
return (-1);
}
n = EXTRACT_32BITS(&prep->pp_n);
ps = (const struct pgstate *)(prep + 1);
while (--n >= 0 && ND_TTEST(*ps)) {
const struct id_off *io, *ie;
char c = '<';
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u/%s:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->slot),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ps->page.p_sid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->page.p_uid)));
io = (struct id_off *)(ps + 1);
for (ie = io + ps->nid; io < ie && ND_TTEST(*io); ++io) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s:%u", c, ipaddr_string(ndo, &io->id),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&io->off)));
c = ',';
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
ps = (struct pgstate *)io;
}
return ((u_char *)ps <= ep? 0 : -1);
}
| 168,893
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static php_mb_regex_t *php_mbregex_compile_pattern(const char *pattern, int patlen, OnigOptionType options, OnigEncoding enc, OnigSyntaxType *syntax TSRMLS_DC)
{
int err_code = 0;
int found = 0;
php_mb_regex_t *retval = NULL, **rc = NULL;
OnigErrorInfo err_info;
OnigUChar err_str[ONIG_MAX_ERROR_MESSAGE_LEN];
found = zend_hash_find(&MBREX(ht_rc), (char *)pattern, patlen+1, (void **) &rc);
if (found == FAILURE || (*rc)->options != options || (*rc)->enc != enc || (*rc)->syntax != syntax) {
if ((err_code = onig_new(&retval, (OnigUChar *)pattern, (OnigUChar *)(pattern + patlen), options, enc, syntax, &err_info)) != ONIG_NORMAL) {
onig_error_code_to_str(err_str, err_code, err_info);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "mbregex compile err: %s", err_str);
retval = NULL;
goto out;
}
zend_hash_update(&MBREX(ht_rc), (char *) pattern, patlen + 1, (void *) &retval, sizeof(retval), NULL);
} else if (found == SUCCESS) {
retval = *rc;
}
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415
|
static php_mb_regex_t *php_mbregex_compile_pattern(const char *pattern, int patlen, OnigOptionType options, OnigEncoding enc, OnigSyntaxType *syntax TSRMLS_DC)
{
int err_code = 0;
int found = 0;
php_mb_regex_t *retval = NULL, **rc = NULL;
OnigErrorInfo err_info;
OnigUChar err_str[ONIG_MAX_ERROR_MESSAGE_LEN];
found = zend_hash_find(&MBREX(ht_rc), (char *)pattern, patlen+1, (void **) &rc);
if (found == FAILURE || (*rc)->options != options || (*rc)->enc != enc || (*rc)->syntax != syntax) {
if ((err_code = onig_new(&retval, (OnigUChar *)pattern, (OnigUChar *)(pattern + patlen), options, enc, syntax, &err_info)) != ONIG_NORMAL) {
onig_error_code_to_str(err_str, err_code, err_info);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "mbregex compile err: %s", err_str);
retval = NULL;
goto out;
}
zend_hash_update(&MBREX(ht_rc), (char *) pattern, patlen + 1, (void *) &retval, sizeof(retval), NULL);
} else if (found == SUCCESS) {
retval = *rc;
}
out:
return retval;
}
| 167,123
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS(
scoped_ptr<CloudPolicyStore> store,
scoped_ptr<CloudExternalDataManager> external_data_manager,
const base::FilePath& component_policy_cache_path,
bool wait_for_policy_fetch,
base::TimeDelta initial_policy_fetch_timeout,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& task_runner,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& file_task_runner,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& io_task_runner)
: CloudPolicyManager(
PolicyNamespaceKey(dm_protocol::kChromeUserPolicyType, std::string()),
store.get(),
task_runner,
file_task_runner,
io_task_runner),
store_(store.Pass()),
external_data_manager_(external_data_manager.Pass()),
component_policy_cache_path_(component_policy_cache_path),
wait_for_policy_fetch_(wait_for_policy_fetch),
policy_fetch_timeout_(false, false) {
time_init_started_ = base::Time::Now();
if (wait_for_policy_fetch_) {
policy_fetch_timeout_.Start(
FROM_HERE,
initial_policy_fetch_timeout,
base::Bind(&UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::OnBlockingFetchTimeout,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS(
scoped_ptr<CloudPolicyStore> store,
scoped_ptr<CloudExternalDataManager> external_data_manager,
const base::FilePath& component_policy_cache_path,
bool wait_for_policy_fetch,
base::TimeDelta initial_policy_fetch_timeout,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& task_runner,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& file_task_runner,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& io_task_runner)
: CloudPolicyManager(
PolicyNamespaceKey(dm_protocol::kChromeUserPolicyType, std::string()),
store.get(),
task_runner,
file_task_runner,
io_task_runner),
store_(store.Pass()),
external_data_manager_(external_data_manager.Pass()),
component_policy_cache_path_(component_policy_cache_path),
wait_for_policy_fetch_(wait_for_policy_fetch),
policy_fetch_timeout_(false, false) {
time_init_started_ = base::Time::Now();
if (wait_for_policy_fetch_ && !initial_policy_fetch_timeout.is_max()) {
policy_fetch_timeout_.Start(
FROM_HERE,
initial_policy_fetch_timeout,
base::Bind(&UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::OnBlockingFetchTimeout,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
}
| 171,149
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void ProxyLocaltimeCallToBrowser(time_t input, struct tm* output,
char* timezone_out,
size_t timezone_out_len) {
base::Pickle request;
request.WriteInt(LinuxSandbox::METHOD_LOCALTIME);
request.WriteString(
std::string(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&input), sizeof(input)));
uint8_t reply_buf[512];
const ssize_t r = base::UnixDomainSocket::SendRecvMsg(
GetSandboxFD(), reply_buf, sizeof(reply_buf), NULL, request);
if (r == -1) {
memset(output, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
return;
}
base::Pickle reply(reinterpret_cast<char*>(reply_buf), r);
base::PickleIterator iter(reply);
std::string result;
std::string timezone;
if (!iter.ReadString(&result) ||
!iter.ReadString(&timezone) ||
result.size() != sizeof(struct tm)) {
memset(output, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
return;
}
memcpy(output, result.data(), sizeof(struct tm));
if (timezone_out_len) {
const size_t copy_len = std::min(timezone_out_len - 1, timezone.size());
memcpy(timezone_out, timezone.data(), copy_len);
timezone_out[copy_len] = 0;
output->tm_zone = timezone_out;
} else {
base::AutoLock lock(g_timezones_lock.Get());
auto ret_pair = g_timezones.Get().insert(timezone);
output->tm_zone = ret_pair.first->c_str();
}
}
Commit Message: Serialize struct tm in a safe way.
BUG=765512
Change-Id: If235b8677eb527be2ac0fe621fc210e4116a7566
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/679441
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void ProxyLocaltimeCallToBrowser(time_t input, struct tm* output,
char* timezone_out,
size_t timezone_out_len) {
base::Pickle request;
request.WriteInt(LinuxSandbox::METHOD_LOCALTIME);
request.WriteString(
std::string(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&input), sizeof(input)));
memset(output, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
uint8_t reply_buf[512];
const ssize_t r = base::UnixDomainSocket::SendRecvMsg(
GetSandboxFD(), reply_buf, sizeof(reply_buf), NULL, request);
if (r == -1) {
return;
}
base::Pickle reply(reinterpret_cast<char*>(reply_buf), r);
base::PickleIterator iter(reply);
if (!ReadTimeStruct(&iter, output, timezone_out, timezone_out_len)) {
memset(output, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
}
}
| 172,926
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int nested_vmx_check_permission(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
|
static int nested_vmx_check_permission(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu)) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
if (!to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
| 169,176
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: nvmet_fc_find_target_queue(struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport,
u64 connection_id)
{
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc;
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *queue;
u64 association_id = nvmet_fc_getassociationid(connection_id);
u16 qid = nvmet_fc_getqueueid(connection_id);
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tgtport->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(assoc, &tgtport->assoc_list, a_list) {
if (association_id == assoc->association_id) {
queue = assoc->queues[qid];
if (queue &&
(!atomic_read(&queue->connected) ||
!nvmet_fc_tgt_q_get(queue)))
queue = NULL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags);
return queue;
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
nvmet_fc_find_target_queue(struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport,
u64 connection_id)
{
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc;
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *queue;
u64 association_id = nvmet_fc_getassociationid(connection_id);
u16 qid = nvmet_fc_getqueueid(connection_id);
unsigned long flags;
if (qid > NVMET_NR_QUEUES)
return NULL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tgtport->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(assoc, &tgtport->assoc_list, a_list) {
if (association_id == assoc->association_id) {
queue = assoc->queues[qid];
if (queue &&
(!atomic_read(&queue->connected) ||
!nvmet_fc_tgt_q_get(queue)))
queue = NULL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags);
return queue;
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags);
return NULL;
}
| 169,859
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ServiceWorkerHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
process_ = process_host;
if (!process_host) {
ClearForceUpdate();
context_ = nullptr;
return;
}
StoragePartition* partition = process_host->GetStoragePartition();
DCHECK(partition);
context_ = static_cast<ServiceWorkerContextWrapper*>(
partition->GetServiceWorkerContext());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void ServiceWorkerHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
void ServiceWorkerHandler::SetRenderer(int process_host_id,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
RenderProcessHost* process_host = RenderProcessHost::FromID(process_host_id);
if (!process_host) {
ClearForceUpdate();
context_ = nullptr;
return;
}
storage_partition_ =
static_cast<StoragePartitionImpl*>(process_host->GetStoragePartition());
DCHECK(storage_partition_);
context_ = static_cast<ServiceWorkerContextWrapper*>(
storage_partition_->GetServiceWorkerContext());
}
| 172,769
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& MediaMetadataRetriever::getService()
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(sServiceLock);
if (sService == 0) {
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
sp<IBinder> binder;
do {
binder = sm->getService(String16("media.player"));
if (binder != 0) {
break;
}
ALOGW("MediaPlayerService not published, waiting...");
usleep(500000); // 0.5 s
} while (true);
if (sDeathNotifier == NULL) {
sDeathNotifier = new DeathNotifier();
}
binder->linkToDeath(sDeathNotifier);
sService = interface_cast<IMediaPlayerService>(binder);
}
ALOGE_IF(sService == 0, "no MediaPlayerService!?");
return sService;
}
Commit Message: Get service by value instead of reference
to prevent a cleared service binder from being used.
Bug: 26040840
Change-Id: Ifb5483c55b172d3553deb80dbe27f2204b86ecdb
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& MediaMetadataRetriever::getService()
const sp<IMediaPlayerService> MediaMetadataRetriever::getService()
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(sServiceLock);
if (sService == 0) {
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
sp<IBinder> binder;
do {
binder = sm->getService(String16("media.player"));
if (binder != 0) {
break;
}
ALOGW("MediaPlayerService not published, waiting...");
usleep(500000); // 0.5 s
} while (true);
if (sDeathNotifier == NULL) {
sDeathNotifier = new DeathNotifier();
}
binder->linkToDeath(sDeathNotifier);
sService = interface_cast<IMediaPlayerService>(binder);
}
ALOGE_IF(sService == 0, "no MediaPlayerService!?");
return sService;
}
| 173,912
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool FakePluginServiceFilter::IsPluginEnabled(int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const void* context,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& policy_url,
webkit::WebPluginInfo* plugin) {
std::map<FilePath, bool>::iterator it = plugin_state_.find(plugin->path);
if (it == plugin_state_.end()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "No plug-in state for '" << plugin->path.value() << "'";
return false;
}
return it->second;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
|
bool FakePluginServiceFilter::IsPluginEnabled(int render_process_id,
bool FakePluginServiceFilter::IsPluginAvailable(int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const void* context,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& policy_url,
webkit::WebPluginInfo* plugin) {
std::map<FilePath, bool>::iterator it = plugin_state_.find(plugin->path);
if (it == plugin_state_.end()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "No plug-in state for '" << plugin->path.value() << "'";
return false;
}
return it->second;
}
| 171,474
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs,
int bits_per_pixel, int depth,
int big_endian_flag, int true_color_flag,
int red_max, int green_max, int blue_max,
int red_shift, int green_shift, int blue_shift)
{
if (!true_color_flag) {
vnc_client_error(vs);
return;
}
vs->client_pf.rmax = red_max;
vs->client_pf.rbits = hweight_long(red_max);
vs->client_pf.rshift = red_shift;
vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel / 8;
vs->client_pf.depth = bits_per_pixel == 32 ? 24 : bits_per_pixel;
vs->client_be = big_endian_flag;
set_pixel_conversion(vs);
graphic_hw_invalidate(NULL);
graphic_hw_update(NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs,
int bits_per_pixel, int depth,
int big_endian_flag, int true_color_flag,
int red_max, int green_max, int blue_max,
int red_shift, int green_shift, int blue_shift)
{
if (!true_color_flag) {
vnc_client_error(vs);
return;
}
switch (bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
break;
default:
vnc_client_error(vs);
return;
}
vs->client_pf.rmax = red_max;
vs->client_pf.rbits = hweight_long(red_max);
vs->client_pf.rshift = red_shift;
vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel / 8;
vs->client_pf.depth = bits_per_pixel == 32 ? 24 : bits_per_pixel;
vs->client_be = big_endian_flag;
set_pixel_conversion(vs);
graphic_hw_invalidate(NULL);
graphic_hw_update(NULL);
}
| 164,902
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() {
return GetInputMethodDescriptorsForTesting();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() {
virtual input_method::InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() {
return GetInputMethodDescriptorsForTesting();
}
| 170,487
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: VOID ixheaacd_shiftrountine_with_rnd_hq(WORD32 *qmf_real, WORD32 *qmf_imag,
WORD32 *filter_states, WORD32 len,
WORD32 shift) {
WORD32 *filter_states_rev = filter_states + len;
WORD32 treal, timag;
WORD32 j;
for (j = (len - 1); j >= 0; j -= 2) {
WORD32 r1, r2, i1, i2;
i2 = qmf_imag[j];
r2 = qmf_real[j];
r1 = *qmf_real++;
i1 = *qmf_imag++;
timag = ixheaacd_add32(i1, r1);
timag = (ixheaacd_shl32_sat(timag, shift));
filter_states_rev[j] = timag;
treal = ixheaacd_sub32(i2, r2);
treal = (ixheaacd_shl32_sat(treal, shift));
filter_states[j] = treal;
treal = ixheaacd_sub32(i1, r1);
treal = (ixheaacd_shl32_sat(treal, shift));
*filter_states++ = treal;
timag = ixheaacd_add32(i2, r2);
timag = (ixheaacd_shl32_sat(timag, shift));
*filter_states_rev++ = timag;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
VOID ixheaacd_shiftrountine_with_rnd_hq(WORD32 *qmf_real, WORD32 *qmf_imag,
WORD32 *filter_states, WORD32 len,
WORD32 shift) {
WORD32 *filter_states_rev = filter_states + len;
WORD32 treal, timag;
WORD32 j;
for (j = (len - 1); j >= 0; j -= 2) {
WORD32 r1, r2, i1, i2;
i2 = qmf_imag[j];
r2 = qmf_real[j];
r1 = *qmf_real++;
i1 = *qmf_imag++;
timag = ixheaacd_add32_sat(i1, r1);
timag = (ixheaacd_shl32_sat(timag, shift));
filter_states_rev[j] = timag;
treal = ixheaacd_sub32_sat(i2, r2);
treal = (ixheaacd_shl32_sat(treal, shift));
filter_states[j] = treal;
treal = ixheaacd_sub32_sat(i1, r1);
treal = (ixheaacd_shl32_sat(treal, shift));
*filter_states++ = treal;
timag = ixheaacd_add32_sat(i2, r2);
timag = (ixheaacd_shl32_sat(timag, shift));
*filter_states_rev++ = timag;
}
}
| 174,089
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost::OnLockRequest(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
blink::WebScreenOrientationLockType orientation,
int request_id) {
if (current_lock_) {
NotifyLockError(current_lock_->request_id,
blink::WebLockOrientationErrorCanceled);
}
current_lock_ = new LockInformation(request_id,
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID());
if (!provider_) {
NotifyLockError(request_id,
blink::WebLockOrientationErrorNotAvailable);
return;
}
provider_->LockOrientation(request_id, orientation);
}
Commit Message: Cleanups in ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost.
BUG=None
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/408213003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost::OnLockRequest(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
blink::WebScreenOrientationLockType orientation,
int request_id) {
if (current_lock_) {
NotifyLockError(current_lock_->request_id,
blink::WebLockOrientationErrorCanceled);
}
if (!provider_) {
NotifyLockError(request_id,
blink::WebLockOrientationErrorNotAvailable);
return;
}
current_lock_ = new LockInformation(request_id,
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID());
provider_->LockOrientation(request_id, orientation);
}
| 171,177
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ExtensionOptionsGuest::DidNavigateMainFrame(
const content::LoadCommittedDetails& details,
const content::FrameNavigateParams& params) {
if (attached()) {
auto guest_zoom_controller =
ui_zoom::ZoomController::FromWebContents(web_contents());
guest_zoom_controller->SetZoomMode(
ui_zoom::ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_ISOLATED);
SetGuestZoomLevelToMatchEmbedder();
if (params.url.GetOrigin() != options_page_.GetOrigin()) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost(),
bad_message::EOG_BAD_ORIGIN);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
void ExtensionOptionsGuest::DidNavigateMainFrame(
const content::LoadCommittedDetails& details,
const content::FrameNavigateParams& params) {
if (attached()) {
auto guest_zoom_controller =
ui_zoom::ZoomController::FromWebContents(web_contents());
guest_zoom_controller->SetZoomMode(
ui_zoom::ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_ISOLATED);
SetGuestZoomLevelToMatchEmbedder();
if (!url::IsSameOriginWith(params.url, options_page_)) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost(),
bad_message::EOG_BAD_ORIGIN);
}
}
}
| 172,282
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void TestBlinkPlatformSupport::cryptographicallyRandomValues(
unsigned char* buffer,
size_t length) {
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310
|
void TestBlinkPlatformSupport::cryptographicallyRandomValues(
unsigned char* buffer,
size_t length) {
base::RandBytes(buffer, length);
}
| 172,238
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BOOLEAN UIPC_Send(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, UINT16 msg_evt, UINT8 *p_buf,
UINT16 msglen)
{
UNUSED(msg_evt);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("UIPC_Send : ch_id:%d %d bytes", ch_id, msglen);
UIPC_LOCK();
if (write(uipc_main.ch[ch_id].fd, p_buf, msglen) < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("failed to write (%s)", strerror(errno));
}
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
BOOLEAN UIPC_Send(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, UINT16 msg_evt, UINT8 *p_buf,
UINT16 msglen)
{
UNUSED(msg_evt);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("UIPC_Send : ch_id:%d %d bytes", ch_id, msglen);
UIPC_LOCK();
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(write(uipc_main.ch[ch_id].fd, p_buf, msglen)) < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("failed to write (%s)", strerror(errno));
}
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return FALSE;
}
| 173,494
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PaintImage AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::PaintImageForCurrentFrame() {
CheckThread();
if (!IsValid())
return PaintImage();
sk_sp<SkImage> image;
if (original_skia_image_ &&
original_skia_image_thread_id_ ==
Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->ThreadId()) {
image = original_skia_image_;
} else {
CreateImageFromMailboxIfNeeded();
image = texture_holder_->GetSkImage();
}
return CreatePaintImageBuilder()
.set_image(image, paint_image_content_id_)
.set_completion_state(PaintImage::CompletionState::DONE)
.TakePaintImage();
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
PaintImage AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::PaintImageForCurrentFrame() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (!IsValid())
return PaintImage();
sk_sp<SkImage> image;
if (original_skia_image_ &&
original_skia_image_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread()) {
image = original_skia_image_;
} else {
CreateImageFromMailboxIfNeeded();
image = texture_holder_->GetSkImage();
}
return CreatePaintImageBuilder()
.set_image(image, paint_image_content_id_)
.set_completion_state(PaintImage::CompletionState::DONE)
.TakePaintImage();
}
| 172,596
|
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