instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pDataPages,
ULONG ulDataLength,
ULONG ulStartOffset,
ULONG flags,
LPCSTR caller)
{
IPHeader *pIpHeader = (IPHeader *) RtlOffsetToPointer(pDataPages[0].Virtual, ulStartOffset);
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = QualifyIpPacket(pIpHeader, ulDataLength);
if (res.ipStatus == ppresNotIP || res.ipCheckSum == ppresIPTooShort)
return res;
if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV4)
{
if (flags & pcrIpChecksum)
res = VerifyIpChecksum(&pIpHeader->v4, res, (flags & pcrFixIPChecksum) != 0);
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV4Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV4Checksum));
}
}
}
}
else if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV6Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV6Checksum));
}
}
}
}
PrintOutParsingResult(res, 1, caller);
return res;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pDataPages,
ULONG ulDataLength,
ULONG ulStartOffset,
ULONG flags,
BOOLEAN verifyLength,
LPCSTR caller)
{
IPHeader *pIpHeader = (IPHeader *) RtlOffsetToPointer(pDataPages[0].Virtual, ulStartOffset);
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = QualifyIpPacket(pIpHeader, ulDataLength, verifyLength);
if (res.ipStatus == ppresNotIP || res.ipCheckSum == ppresIPTooShort)
return res;
if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV4)
{
if (flags & pcrIpChecksum)
res = VerifyIpChecksum(&pIpHeader->v4, res, (flags & pcrFixIPChecksum) != 0);
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV4Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV4Checksum));
}
}
}
}
else if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV6Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV6Checksum));
}
}
}
}
PrintOutParsingResult(res, 1, caller);
return res;
}
| 170,143 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid::AddNewContents(
WebContents* source,
WebContents* new_contents,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const gfx::Rect& initial_rect,
bool user_gesture,
bool* was_blocked) {
DCHECK_NE(disposition, SAVE_TO_DISK);
DCHECK_NE(disposition, CURRENT_TAB);
TabHelpers::AttachTabHelpers(new_contents);
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> obj = GetJavaDelegate(env);
AddWebContentsResult add_result =
ADD_WEB_CONTENTS_RESULT_STOP_LOAD_AND_DELETE;
if (!obj.is_null()) {
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> jsource;
if (source)
jsource = source->GetJavaWebContents();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> jnew_contents;
if (new_contents)
jnew_contents = new_contents->GetJavaWebContents();
add_result = static_cast<AddWebContentsResult>(
Java_ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid_addNewContents(
env,
obj.obj(),
jsource.obj(),
jnew_contents.obj(),
static_cast<jint>(disposition),
NULL,
user_gesture));
}
if (was_blocked)
*was_blocked = !(add_result == ADD_WEB_CONTENTS_RESULT_PROCEED);
if (add_result == ADD_WEB_CONTENTS_RESULT_STOP_LOAD_AND_DELETE)
delete new_contents;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
TBR=tedchoc@chromium.org,jbudorick@chromium.org,sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid::AddNewContents(
WebContents* source,
WebContents* new_contents,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const gfx::Rect& initial_rect,
bool user_gesture,
bool* was_blocked) {
DCHECK_NE(disposition, SAVE_TO_DISK);
DCHECK_NE(disposition, CURRENT_TAB);
TabHelpers::AttachTabHelpers(new_contents);
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> obj = GetJavaDelegate(env);
bool handled = false;
if (!obj.is_null()) {
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> jsource;
if (source)
jsource = source->GetJavaWebContents();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> jnew_contents;
if (new_contents)
jnew_contents = new_contents->GetJavaWebContents();
handled = Java_ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid_addNewContents(
env,
obj.obj(),
jsource.obj(),
jnew_contents.obj(),
static_cast<jint>(disposition),
NULL,
user_gesture);
}
if (was_blocked)
*was_blocked = !handled;
if (!handled)
delete new_contents;
}
| 171,137 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int accept_server_socket(int sfd)
{
struct sockaddr_un remote;
struct pollfd pfd;
int fd;
socklen_t len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_un);
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("accept fd %d", sfd);
/* make sure there is data to process */
pfd.fd = sfd;
pfd.events = POLLIN;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, 0) == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("accept poll timeout");
return -1;
}
if ((fd = accept(sfd, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &len)) == -1)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("sock accept failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return fd;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static int accept_server_socket(int sfd)
{
struct sockaddr_un remote;
struct pollfd pfd;
int fd;
socklen_t len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_un);
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("accept fd %d", sfd);
/* make sure there is data to process */
pfd.fd = sfd;
pfd.events = POLLIN;
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(poll(&pfd, 1, 0)) == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("accept poll timeout");
return -1;
}
if ((fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(accept(sfd, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &len))) == -1)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("sock accept failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return fd;
}
| 173,495 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ssdp_recv(int sd)
{
ssize_t len;
struct sockaddr sa;
socklen_t salen;
char buf[MAX_PKT_SIZE];
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
len = recvfrom(sd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT, &sa, &salen);
if (len > 0) {
buf[len] = 0;
if (sa.sa_family != AF_INET)
return;
if (strstr(buf, "M-SEARCH *")) {
size_t i;
char *ptr, *type;
struct ifsock *ifs;
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&sa;
ifs = find_outbound(&sa);
if (!ifs) {
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "No matching socket for client %s", inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
return;
}
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "Matching socket for client %s", inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
type = strcasestr(buf, "\r\nST:");
if (!type) {
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "No Search Type (ST:) found in M-SEARCH *, assuming " SSDP_ST_ALL);
type = SSDP_ST_ALL;
send_message(ifs, type, &sa);
return;
}
type = strchr(type, ':');
if (!type)
return;
type++;
while (isspace(*type))
type++;
ptr = strstr(type, "\r\n");
if (!ptr)
return;
*ptr = 0;
for (i = 0; supported_types[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(supported_types[i], type)) {
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "M-SEARCH * ST: %s from %s port %d", type,
inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr), ntohs(sin->sin_port));
send_message(ifs, type, &sa);
return;
}
}
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "M-SEARCH * for unsupported ST: %s from %s", type,
inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void ssdp_recv(int sd)
{
ssize_t len;
struct sockaddr sa;
socklen_t salen;
char buf[MAX_PKT_SIZE + 1];
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
len = recvfrom(sd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, MSG_DONTWAIT, &sa, &salen);
if (len > 0) {
if (sa.sa_family != AF_INET)
return;
if (strstr(buf, "M-SEARCH *")) {
size_t i;
char *ptr, *type;
struct ifsock *ifs;
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&sa;
ifs = find_outbound(&sa);
if (!ifs) {
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "No matching socket for client %s", inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
return;
}
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "Matching socket for client %s", inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
type = strcasestr(buf, "\r\nST:");
if (!type) {
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "No Search Type (ST:) found in M-SEARCH *, assuming " SSDP_ST_ALL);
type = SSDP_ST_ALL;
send_message(ifs, type, &sa);
return;
}
type = strchr(type, ':');
if (!type)
return;
type++;
while (isspace(*type))
type++;
ptr = strstr(type, "\r\n");
if (!ptr)
return;
*ptr = 0;
for (i = 0; supported_types[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(supported_types[i], type)) {
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "M-SEARCH * ST: %s from %s port %d", type,
inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr), ntohs(sin->sin_port));
send_message(ifs, type, &sa);
return;
}
}
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "M-SEARCH * for unsupported ST: %s from %s", type,
inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
}
}
}
| 169,584 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ptrace_siblings(pid_t pid, pid_t main_tid, std::set<pid_t>& tids) {
char task_path[64];
//// Attach to a thread, and verify that it's still a member of the given process
snprintf(task_path, sizeof(task_path), "/proc/%d/task", pid);
std::unique_ptr<DIR, int (*)(DIR*)> d(opendir(task_path), closedir);
if (!d) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: failed to open /proc/%d/task: %s", pid, strerror(errno));
return;
}
struct dirent* de;
while ((de = readdir(d.get())) != NULL) {
if (!strcmp(de->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(de->d_name, "..")) {
continue;
}
char* end;
pid_t tid = strtoul(de->d_name, &end, 10);
if (*end) {
continue;
}
if (tid == main_tid) {
continue;
}
if (ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, tid, 0, 0) < 0) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: ptrace attach to %d failed: %s", tid, strerror(errno));
continue;
}
tids.insert(tid);
}
}
Commit Message: debuggerd: verify that traced threads belong to the right process.
Fix two races in debuggerd's PTRACE_ATTACH logic:
1. The target thread in a crash dump request could exit between the
/proc/<pid>/task/<tid> check and the PTRACE_ATTACH.
2. Sibling threads could exit between listing /proc/<pid>/task and the
PTRACE_ATTACH.
Bug: http://b/29555636
Change-Id: I4dfe1ea30e2c211d2389321bd66e3684dd757591
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void ptrace_siblings(pid_t pid, pid_t main_tid, std::set<pid_t>& tids) {
//// Attach to a thread, and verify that it's still a member of the given process
static bool ptrace_attach_thread(pid_t pid, pid_t tid) {
if (ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, tid, 0, 0) != 0) {
return false;
}
// Make sure that the task we attached to is actually part of the pid we're dumping.
if (!pid_contains_tid(pid, tid)) {
if (ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, tid, 0, 0) != 0) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: failed to detach from thread '%d'", tid);
exit(1);
}
return false;
}
return true;
}
static void ptrace_siblings(pid_t pid, pid_t main_tid, std::set<pid_t>& tids) {
char task_path[PATH_MAX];
if (snprintf(task_path, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%d/task", pid) >= PATH_MAX) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: task path overflow (pid = %d)\n", pid);
abort();
}
std::unique_ptr<DIR, int (*)(DIR*)> d(opendir(task_path), closedir);
if (!d) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: failed to open /proc/%d/task: %s", pid, strerror(errno));
return;
}
struct dirent* de;
while ((de = readdir(d.get())) != NULL) {
if (!strcmp(de->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(de->d_name, "..")) {
continue;
}
char* end;
pid_t tid = strtoul(de->d_name, &end, 10);
if (*end) {
continue;
}
if (tid == main_tid) {
continue;
}
if (!ptrace_attach_thread(pid, tid)) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: ptrace attach to %d failed: %s", tid, strerror(errno));
continue;
}
tids.insert(tid);
}
}
| 173,406 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _gnutls_recv_handshake_header (gnutls_session_t session,
gnutls_handshake_description_t type,
gnutls_handshake_description_t * recv_type)
{
int ret;
uint32_t length32 = 0;
uint8_t *dataptr = NULL; /* for realloc */
size_t handshake_header_size = HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SIZE;
/* if we have data into the buffer then return them, do not read the next packet.
* In order to return we need a full TLS handshake header, or in case of a version 2
* packet, then we return the first byte.
*/
if (session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size ==
handshake_header_size || (session->internals.v2_hello != 0
&& type == GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO
&& session->internals.
handshake_header_buffer.packet_length > 0))
{
*recv_type = session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.recv_type;
return session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.packet_length;
}
ret =
_gnutls_handshake_io_recv_int (session, GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE,
type, dataptr, SSL2_HEADERS);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
/* The case ret==0 is caught here.
*/
if (ret != SSL2_HEADERS)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH;
}
session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size = SSL2_HEADERS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | _gnutls_recv_handshake_header (gnutls_session_t session,
gnutls_handshake_description_t type,
gnutls_handshake_description_t * recv_type)
{
int ret;
uint32_t length32 = 0;
uint8_t *dataptr = NULL; /* for realloc */
size_t handshake_header_size = HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SIZE;
/* if we have data into the buffer then return them, do not read the next packet.
* In order to return we need a full TLS handshake header, or in case of a version 2
* packet, then we return the first byte.
*/
if (session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size ==
handshake_header_size || (session->internals.v2_hello != 0
&& type == GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO
&& session->internals.
handshake_header_buffer.packet_length > 0))
{
*recv_type = session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.recv_type;
if (*recv_type != type)
{
gnutls_assert ();
_gnutls_handshake_log
("HSK[%x]: Handshake type mismatch (under attack?)\n", session);
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE_PACKET;
}
return session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.packet_length;
}
ret =
_gnutls_handshake_io_recv_int (session, GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE,
type, dataptr, SSL2_HEADERS);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
/* The case ret==0 is caught here.
*/
if (ret != SSL2_HEADERS)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH;
}
session->internals.handshake_header_buffer.header_size = SSL2_HEADERS;
}
| 165,147 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfs4_open_revalidate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int openflags, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct path path = {
.mnt = nd->path.mnt,
.dentry = dentry,
};
struct rpc_cred *cred;
struct nfs4_state *state;
cred = rpc_lookup_cred();
if (IS_ERR(cred))
return PTR_ERR(cred);
state = nfs4_do_open(dir, &path, openflags, NULL, cred);
put_rpccred(cred);
if (IS_ERR(state)) {
switch (PTR_ERR(state)) {
case -EPERM:
case -EACCES:
case -EDQUOT:
case -ENOSPC:
case -EROFS:
lookup_instantiate_filp(nd, (struct dentry *)state, NULL);
return 1;
default:
goto out_drop;
}
}
if (state->inode == dentry->d_inode) {
nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
nfs4_intent_set_file(nd, &path, state);
return 1;
}
nfs4_close_sync(&path, state, openflags);
out_drop:
d_drop(dentry);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | nfs4_open_revalidate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int openflags, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct path path = {
.mnt = nd->path.mnt,
.dentry = dentry,
};
struct rpc_cred *cred;
struct nfs4_state *state;
fmode_t fmode = openflags & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE);
cred = rpc_lookup_cred();
if (IS_ERR(cred))
return PTR_ERR(cred);
state = nfs4_do_open(dir, &path, fmode, openflags, NULL, cred);
put_rpccred(cred);
if (IS_ERR(state)) {
switch (PTR_ERR(state)) {
case -EPERM:
case -EACCES:
case -EDQUOT:
case -ENOSPC:
case -EROFS:
lookup_instantiate_filp(nd, (struct dentry *)state, NULL);
return 1;
default:
goto out_drop;
}
}
if (state->inode == dentry->d_inode) {
nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
nfs4_intent_set_file(nd, &path, state, fmode);
return 1;
}
nfs4_close_sync(&path, state, fmode);
out_drop:
d_drop(dentry);
return 0;
}
| 165,699 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ext4_xattr_cache_insert(struct mb_cache *ext4_mb_cache, struct buffer_head *bh)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_hash);
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
int error;
ce = mb_cache_entry_alloc(ext4_mb_cache, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ce) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "out of memory");
return;
}
error = mb_cache_entry_insert(ce, bh->b_bdev, bh->b_blocknr, hash);
if (error) {
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
if (error == -EBUSY) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "already in cache");
error = 0;
}
} else {
ea_bdebug(bh, "inserting [%x]", (int)hash);
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
}
}
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | ext4_xattr_cache_insert(struct mb_cache *ext4_mb_cache, struct buffer_head *bh)
ext4_xattr_cache_insert(struct mb2_cache *ext4_mb_cache, struct buffer_head *bh)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_hash);
int error;
error = mb2_cache_entry_create(ext4_mb_cache, GFP_NOFS, hash,
bh->b_blocknr);
if (error) {
if (error == -EBUSY)
ea_bdebug(bh, "already in cache");
} else
ea_bdebug(bh, "inserting [%x]", (int)hash);
}
| 169,992 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t Parcel::readUtf8FromUtf16(std::string* str) const {
size_t utf16Size = 0;
const char16_t* src = readString16Inplace(&utf16Size);
if (!src) {
return UNEXPECTED_NULL;
}
if (utf16Size == 0u) {
str->clear();
return NO_ERROR;
}
ssize_t utf8Size = utf16_to_utf8_length(src, utf16Size);
if (utf8Size < 0) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
str->resize(utf8Size + 1);
utf16_to_utf8(src, utf16Size, &((*str)[0]));
str->resize(utf8Size);
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t Parcel::readUtf8FromUtf16(std::string* str) const {
size_t utf16Size = 0;
const char16_t* src = readString16Inplace(&utf16Size);
if (!src) {
return UNEXPECTED_NULL;
}
if (utf16Size == 0u) {
str->clear();
return NO_ERROR;
}
// Allow for closing '\0'
ssize_t utf8Size = utf16_to_utf8_length(src, utf16Size) + 1;
if (utf8Size < 1) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
// spare byte around for the trailing null, we still pass the size including the trailing null
str->resize(utf8Size);
utf16_to_utf8(src, utf16Size, &((*str)[0]), utf8Size);
str->resize(utf8Size - 1);
return NO_ERROR;
}
| 174,158 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int touch_file(const char *path, bool parents, usec_t stamp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd;
int r;
assert(path);
if (parents)
mkdir_parents(path, 0755);
fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY, mode > 0 ? mode : 0644);
if (fd < 0)
return -errno;
if (mode > 0) {
r = fchmod(fd, mode);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (uid != UID_INVALID || gid != GID_INVALID) {
r = fchown(fd, uid, gid);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (stamp != USEC_INFINITY) {
struct timespec ts[2];
timespec_store(&ts[0], stamp);
ts[1] = ts[0];
r = futimens(fd, ts);
} else
r = futimens(fd, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int touch_file(const char *path, bool parents, usec_t stamp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd;
int r;
assert(path);
if (parents)
mkdir_parents(path, 0755);
fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY, mode > 0 ? mode : 0644);
if (fd < 0)
return -errno;
if (mode != MODE_INVALID) {
r = fchmod(fd, mode);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (uid != UID_INVALID || gid != GID_INVALID) {
r = fchown(fd, uid, gid);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
if (stamp != USEC_INFINITY) {
struct timespec ts[2];
timespec_store(&ts[0], stamp);
ts[1] = ts[0];
r = futimens(fd, ts);
} else
r = futimens(fd, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
| 170,105 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(const KURL& url)
{
if (BlobURL::getOrigin(url) == "null")
originMap()->remove(url.string());
if (isMainThread())
blobRegistry().unregisterBlobURL(url);
else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url));
callOnMainThread(&unregisterBlobURLTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void ThreadableBlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(const KURL& url)
void BlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(const KURL& url)
{
if (BlobURL::getOrigin(url) == "null")
originMap()->remove(url.string());
if (isMainThread()) {
if (WebBlobRegistry* registry = blobRegistry())
registry->unregisterBlobURL(url);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url));
callOnMainThread(&unregisterBlobURLTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
| 170,690 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PrintMsg_Print_Params::PrintMsg_Print_Params()
: page_size(),
content_size(),
printable_area(),
margin_top(0),
margin_left(0),
dpi(0),
scale_factor(1.0f),
rasterize_pdf(false),
document_cookie(0),
selection_only(false),
supports_alpha_blend(false),
preview_ui_id(-1),
preview_request_id(0),
is_first_request(false),
print_scaling_option(blink::kWebPrintScalingOptionSourceSize),
print_to_pdf(false),
display_header_footer(false),
title(),
url(),
should_print_backgrounds(false),
printed_doc_type(printing::SkiaDocumentType::PDF) {}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PrintMsg_Print_Params::PrintMsg_Print_Params()
: page_size(),
content_size(),
printable_area(),
margin_top(0),
margin_left(0),
dpi(0),
scale_factor(1.0f),
rasterize_pdf(false),
document_cookie(0),
selection_only(false),
supports_alpha_blend(false),
preview_ui_id(-1),
preview_request_id(0),
is_first_request(false),
print_scaling_option(blink::kWebPrintScalingOptionSourceSize),
print_to_pdf(false),
display_header_footer(false),
title(),
url(),
header_template(),
footer_template(),
should_print_backgrounds(false),
printed_doc_type(printing::SkiaDocumentType::PDF) {}
| 172,897 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: iperf_json_printf(const char *format, ...)
{
cJSON* o;
va_list argp;
const char *cp;
char name[100];
char* np;
cJSON* j;
o = cJSON_CreateObject();
if (o == NULL)
return NULL;
va_start(argp, format);
np = name;
for (cp = format; *cp != '\0'; ++cp) {
switch (*cp) {
case ' ':
break;
case ':':
*np = '\0';
break;
case '%':
++cp;
switch (*cp) {
case 'b':
j = cJSON_CreateBool(va_arg(argp, int));
break;
case 'd':
j = cJSON_CreateInt(va_arg(argp, int64_t));
break;
case 'f':
j = cJSON_CreateFloat(va_arg(argp, double));
break;
case 's':
j = cJSON_CreateString(va_arg(argp, char *));
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
if (j == NULL)
return NULL;
cJSON_AddItemToObject(o, name, j);
np = name;
break;
default:
*np++ = *cp;
break;
}
}
va_end(argp);
return o;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | iperf_json_printf(const char *format, ...)
{
cJSON* o;
va_list argp;
const char *cp;
char name[100];
char* np;
cJSON* j;
o = cJSON_CreateObject();
if (o == NULL)
return NULL;
va_start(argp, format);
np = name;
for (cp = format; *cp != '\0'; ++cp) {
switch (*cp) {
case ' ':
break;
case ':':
*np = '\0';
break;
case '%':
++cp;
switch (*cp) {
case 'b':
j = cJSON_CreateBool(va_arg(argp, int));
break;
case 'd':
j = cJSON_CreateNumber(va_arg(argp, int64_t));
break;
case 'f':
j = cJSON_CreateNumber(va_arg(argp, double));
break;
case 's':
j = cJSON_CreateString(va_arg(argp, char *));
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
if (j == NULL)
return NULL;
cJSON_AddItemToObject(o, name, j);
np = name;
break;
default:
*np++ = *cp;
break;
}
}
va_end(argp);
return o;
}
| 167,318 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GraphicsContext::drawFocusRing(const Path& path, int width, int offset, const Color& color)
{
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void GraphicsContext::drawFocusRing(const Path& path, int width, int offset, const Color& color)
{
notImplemented();
}
| 170,425 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(libvpx_test::VideoSource *video) {
frame_flags_ &= ~(VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_GF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF);
if (droppable_nframes_ > 0 &&
(cfg_.g_pass == VPX_RC_LAST_PASS || cfg_.g_pass == VPX_RC_ONE_PASS)) {
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < droppable_nframes_; ++i) {
if (droppable_frames_[i] == video->frame()) {
std::cout << " Encoding droppable frame: "
<< droppable_frames_[i] << "\n";
frame_flags_ |= (VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_GF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF);
return;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(libvpx_test::VideoSource *video) {
//
// Frame flags and layer id for temporal layers.
// For two layers, test pattern is:
// 1 3
// 0 2 .....
// LAST is updated on base/layer 0, GOLDEN updated on layer 1.
// Non-zero pattern_switch parameter means pattern will switch to
// not using LAST for frame_num >= pattern_switch.
int SetFrameFlags(int frame_num,
int num_temp_layers,
int pattern_switch) {
int frame_flags = 0;
if (num_temp_layers == 2) {
if (frame_num % 2 == 0) {
if (frame_num < pattern_switch || pattern_switch == 0) {
// Layer 0: predict from LAST and ARF, update LAST.
frame_flags = VP8_EFLAG_NO_REF_GF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_GF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF;
} else {
// Layer 0: predict from GF and ARF, update GF.
frame_flags = VP8_EFLAG_NO_REF_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF;
}
} else {
if (frame_num < pattern_switch || pattern_switch == 0) {
// Layer 1: predict from L, GF, and ARF, update GF.
frame_flags = VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST;
} else {
// Layer 1: predict from GF and ARF, update GF.
frame_flags = VP8_EFLAG_NO_REF_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF;
}
}
}
return frame_flags;
}
virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
frame_flags_ &= ~(VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_GF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF);
// For temporal layer case.
if (cfg_.ts_number_layers > 1) {
frame_flags_ = SetFrameFlags(video->frame(),
cfg_.ts_number_layers,
pattern_switch_);
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < droppable_nframes_; ++i) {
if (droppable_frames_[i] == video->frame()) {
std::cout << "Encoding droppable frame: "
<< droppable_frames_[i] << "\n";
}
}
} else {
if (droppable_nframes_ > 0 &&
(cfg_.g_pass == VPX_RC_LAST_PASS || cfg_.g_pass == VPX_RC_ONE_PASS)) {
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < droppable_nframes_; ++i) {
if (droppable_frames_[i] == video->frame()) {
std::cout << "Encoding droppable frame: "
<< droppable_frames_[i] << "\n";
frame_flags_ |= (VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_GF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF);
return;
}
}
}
}
}
| 174,542 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ID3::removeUnsynchronizationV2_4(bool iTunesHack) {
size_t oldSize = mSize;
size_t offset = 0;
while (mSize >= 10 && offset <= mSize - 10) {
if (!memcmp(&mData[offset], "\0\0\0\0", 4)) {
break;
}
size_t dataSize;
if (iTunesHack) {
dataSize = U32_AT(&mData[offset + 4]);
} else if (!ParseSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], &dataSize)) {
return false;
}
if (dataSize > mSize - 10 - offset) {
return false;
}
uint16_t flags = U16_AT(&mData[offset + 8]);
uint16_t prevFlags = flags;
if (flags & 1) {
if (mSize < 14 || mSize - 14 < offset || dataSize < 4) {
return false;
}
memmove(&mData[offset + 10], &mData[offset + 14], mSize - offset - 14);
mSize -= 4;
dataSize -= 4;
flags &= ~1;
}
if ((flags & 2) && (dataSize >= 2)) {
size_t readOffset = offset + 11;
size_t writeOffset = offset + 11;
for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < dataSize; ++i) {
if (mData[readOffset - 1] == 0xff
&& mData[readOffset] == 0x00) {
++readOffset;
--mSize;
--dataSize;
}
mData[writeOffset++] = mData[readOffset++];
}
if (readOffset <= oldSize) {
memmove(&mData[writeOffset], &mData[readOffset], oldSize - readOffset);
} else {
ALOGE("b/34618607 (%zu %zu %zu %zu)", readOffset, writeOffset, oldSize, mSize);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "34618607");
}
}
flags &= ~2;
if (flags != prevFlags || iTunesHack) {
WriteSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], dataSize);
mData[offset + 8] = flags >> 8;
mData[offset + 9] = flags & 0xff;
}
offset += 10 + dataSize;
}
memset(&mData[mSize], 0, oldSize - mSize);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix edge case when applying id3 unsynchronization
Bug: 63100526
Test: opened poc, other files
Change-Id: I0a51a2a11d0ea84ede0c075de650a7118f0e00c5
(cherry picked from commit 3e70296461c5f260988ab21854a6f43fdafea764)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | bool ID3::removeUnsynchronizationV2_4(bool iTunesHack) {
size_t oldSize = mSize;
size_t offset = 0;
while (mSize >= 10 && offset <= mSize - 10) {
if (!memcmp(&mData[offset], "\0\0\0\0", 4)) {
break;
}
size_t dataSize;
if (iTunesHack) {
dataSize = U32_AT(&mData[offset + 4]);
} else if (!ParseSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], &dataSize)) {
return false;
}
if (dataSize > mSize - 10 - offset) {
return false;
}
uint16_t flags = U16_AT(&mData[offset + 8]);
uint16_t prevFlags = flags;
if (flags & 1) {
if (mSize < 14 || mSize - 14 < offset || dataSize < 4) {
return false;
}
memmove(&mData[offset + 10], &mData[offset + 14], mSize - offset - 14);
mSize -= 4;
dataSize -= 4;
flags &= ~1;
}
if ((flags & 2) && (dataSize >= 2)) {
size_t readOffset = offset + 11;
size_t writeOffset = offset + 11;
for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < dataSize; ++i) {
if (mData[readOffset - 1] == 0xff
&& mData[readOffset] == 0x00) {
++readOffset;
--mSize;
--dataSize;
}
if (i + 1 < dataSize) {
// Only move data if there's actually something to move.
// This handles the special case of the data being only [0xff, 0x00]
// which should be converted to just 0xff if unsynchronization is on.
mData[writeOffset++] = mData[readOffset++];
}
}
if (readOffset <= oldSize) {
memmove(&mData[writeOffset], &mData[readOffset], oldSize - readOffset);
} else {
ALOGE("b/34618607 (%zu %zu %zu %zu)", readOffset, writeOffset, oldSize, mSize);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "34618607");
}
}
flags &= ~2;
if (flags != prevFlags || iTunesHack) {
WriteSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], dataSize);
mData[offset + 8] = flags >> 8;
mData[offset + 9] = flags & 0xff;
}
offset += 10 + dataSize;
}
memset(&mData[mSize], 0, oldSize - mSize);
return true;
}
| 174,108 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static unsigned long ioapic_read_indirect(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long length)
{
unsigned long result = 0;
switch (ioapic->ioregsel) {
case IOAPIC_REG_VERSION:
result = ((((IOAPIC_NUM_PINS - 1) & 0xff) << 16)
| (IOAPIC_VERSION_ID & 0xff));
break;
case IOAPIC_REG_APIC_ID:
case IOAPIC_REG_ARB_ID:
result = ((ioapic->id & 0xf) << 24);
break;
default:
{
u32 redir_index = (ioapic->ioregsel - 0x10) >> 1;
u64 redir_content;
ASSERT(redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS);
redir_content = ioapic->redirtbl[redir_index].bits;
result = (ioapic->ioregsel & 0x1) ?
(redir_content >> 32) & 0xffffffff :
redir_content & 0xffffffff;
break;
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)
If the guest specifies a IOAPIC_REG_SELECT with an invalid value and follows
that with a read of the IOAPIC_REG_WINDOW KVM does not properly validate
that request. ioapic_read_indirect contains an
ASSERT(redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS), but the ASSERT has no effect in
non-debug builds. In recent kernels this allows a guest to cause a kernel
oops by reading invalid memory. In older kernels (pre-3.3) this allows a
guest to read from large ranges of host memory.
Tested: tested against apic unit tests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static unsigned long ioapic_read_indirect(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long length)
{
unsigned long result = 0;
switch (ioapic->ioregsel) {
case IOAPIC_REG_VERSION:
result = ((((IOAPIC_NUM_PINS - 1) & 0xff) << 16)
| (IOAPIC_VERSION_ID & 0xff));
break;
case IOAPIC_REG_APIC_ID:
case IOAPIC_REG_ARB_ID:
result = ((ioapic->id & 0xf) << 24);
break;
default:
{
u32 redir_index = (ioapic->ioregsel - 0x10) >> 1;
u64 redir_content;
if (redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS)
redir_content =
ioapic->redirtbl[redir_index].bits;
else
redir_content = ~0ULL;
result = (ioapic->ioregsel & 0x1) ?
(redir_content >> 32) & 0xffffffff :
redir_content & 0xffffffff;
break;
}
}
return result;
}
| 166,114 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool adapter_enable_disable() {
int error;
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->enable(), adapter_state_changed);
TASSERT(error == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "Error enabling Bluetooth: %d", error);
TASSERT(adapter_get_state() == BT_STATE_ON, "Adapter did not turn on.");
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->disable(), adapter_state_changed);
TASSERT(error == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "Error disabling Bluetooth: %d", error);
TASSERT(adapter_get_state() == BT_STATE_OFF, "Adapter did not turn off.");
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool adapter_enable_disable() {
int error;
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->enable(false), adapter_state_changed);
TASSERT(error == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "Error enabling Bluetooth: %d", error);
TASSERT(adapter_get_state() == BT_STATE_ON, "Adapter did not turn on.");
CALL_AND_WAIT(error = bt_interface->disable(), adapter_state_changed);
TASSERT(error == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "Error disabling Bluetooth: %d", error);
TASSERT(adapter_get_state() == BT_STATE_OFF, "Adapter did not turn off.");
return true;
}
| 173,556 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const Chapters::Atom* Chapters::Edition::GetAtom(int index) const
{
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
if (index >= m_atoms_count)
return NULL;
return m_atoms + index;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const Chapters::Atom* Chapters::Edition::GetAtom(int index) const
const Chapters::Display* Chapters::Atom::GetDisplay(int index) const {
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
if (index >= m_displays_count)
return NULL;
return m_displays + index;
}
| 174,281 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftFlacEncoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
ALOGV("SoftFlacEncoder::internalSetParameter(OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm)");
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams = (OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0 && pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
ALOGE("SoftFlacEncoder::internalSetParameter() Error #1");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (pcmParams->nChannels < 1 || pcmParams->nChannels > 2) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
ALOGV("will encode %d channels at %dHz", mNumChannels, mSampleRate);
return configureEncoder();
}
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
ALOGV("SoftFlacEncoder::internalSetParameter(OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole)");
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.flac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
ALOGE("SoftFlacEncoder::internalSetParameter(OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole)"
"error");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioFlac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_FLACTYPE *flacParams = (OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_FLACTYPE *)params;
mCompressionLevel = flacParams->nCompressionLevel; // range clamping done inside encoder
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *defParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
if (defParams->nPortIndex == 0) {
if (defParams->nBufferSize > kMaxInputBufferSize) {
ALOGE("Input buffer size must be at most %d bytes",
kMaxInputBufferSize);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
default:
ALOGV("SoftFlacEncoder::internalSetParameter(default)");
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftFlacEncoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
ALOGV("SoftFlacEncoder::internalSetParameter(OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm)");
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams = (OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0 && pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
ALOGE("SoftFlacEncoder::internalSetParameter() Error #1");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (pcmParams->nChannels < 1 || pcmParams->nChannels > 2) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
ALOGV("will encode %d channels at %dHz", mNumChannels, mSampleRate);
return configureEncoder();
}
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
ALOGV("SoftFlacEncoder::internalSetParameter(OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole)");
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(roleParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.flac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
ALOGE("SoftFlacEncoder::internalSetParameter(OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole)"
"error");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioFlac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_FLACTYPE *flacParams = (OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_FLACTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(flacParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
mCompressionLevel = flacParams->nCompressionLevel; // range clamping done inside encoder
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *defParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(defParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (defParams->nPortIndex == 0) {
if (defParams->nBufferSize > kMaxInputBufferSize) {
ALOGE("Input buffer size must be at most %d bytes",
kMaxInputBufferSize);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
default:
ALOGV("SoftFlacEncoder::internalSetParameter(default)");
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,204 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size) {
return malloc(size);
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size) {
void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size, u32 num) {
if (size > UINT32_MAX / num) {
ALOGE("can't allocate %u * %u bytes", size, num);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27855419");
return NULL;
}
return malloc(size * num);
}
| 173,875 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pvscsi_ring_init_data(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *ri)
{
int i;
uint32_t txr_len_log2, rxr_len_log2;
uint32_t req_ring_size, cmp_ring_size;
m->rs_pa = ri->ringsStatePPN << VMW_PAGE_SHIFT;
if ((ri->reqRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES)
|| (ri->cmpRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES)) {
return -1;
}
req_ring_size = ri->reqRingNumPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_REQ_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
cmp_ring_size = ri->cmpRingNumPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_CMP_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
txr_len_log2 = pvscsi_log2(req_ring_size - 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | pvscsi_ring_init_data(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *ri)
{
int i;
uint32_t txr_len_log2, rxr_len_log2;
uint32_t req_ring_size, cmp_ring_size;
m->rs_pa = ri->ringsStatePPN << VMW_PAGE_SHIFT;
req_ring_size = ri->reqRingNumPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_REQ_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
cmp_ring_size = ri->cmpRingNumPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_CMP_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
txr_len_log2 = pvscsi_log2(req_ring_size - 1);
}
| 164,937 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DefragIPv4NoDataTest(void)
{
DefragContext *dc = NULL;
Packet *p = NULL;
int id = 12;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
dc = DefragContextNew();
if (dc == NULL)
goto end;
/* This packet has an offset > 0, more frags set to 0 and no data. */
p = BuildTestPacket(id, 1, 0, 'A', 0);
if (p == NULL)
goto end;
/* We do not expect a packet returned. */
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
/* The fragment should have been ignored so no fragments should
* have been allocated from the pool. */
if (dc->frag_pool->outstanding != 0)
return 0;
ret = 1;
end:
if (dc != NULL)
DefragContextDestroy(dc);
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | DefragIPv4NoDataTest(void)
{
DefragContext *dc = NULL;
Packet *p = NULL;
int id = 12;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
dc = DefragContextNew();
if (dc == NULL)
goto end;
/* This packet has an offset > 0, more frags set to 0 and no data. */
p = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 1, 0, 'A', 0);
if (p == NULL)
goto end;
/* We do not expect a packet returned. */
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
/* The fragment should have been ignored so no fragments should
* have been allocated from the pool. */
if (dc->frag_pool->outstanding != 0)
return 0;
ret = 1;
end:
if (dc != NULL)
DefragContextDestroy(dc);
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
| 168,296 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct ipt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct ipt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
| 167,212 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_set_oid_output_format)
{
long a1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &a1) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
switch((int) a1) {
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_SUFFIX:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_MODULE:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_FULL:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_NUMERIC:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_UCD:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_NONE:
netsnmp_ds_set_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT, a1);
RETURN_TRUE;
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown SNMP output print format '%d'", (int) a1);
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_set_oid_output_format)
{
long a1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &a1) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
switch((int) a1) {
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_SUFFIX:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_MODULE:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_FULL:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_NUMERIC:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_UCD:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_NONE:
netsnmp_ds_set_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT, a1);
RETURN_TRUE;
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown SNMP output print format '%d'", (int) a1);
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
}
| 164,971 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfssvc_decode_readargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_readargs *args)
{
unsigned int len;
int v;
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
args->offset = ntohl(*p++);
len = args->count = ntohl(*p++);
p++; /* totalcount - unused */
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, NFSSVC_MAXBLKSIZE_V2);
/* set up somewhere to store response.
* We take pages, put them on reslist and include in iovec
*/
v=0;
while (len > 0) {
struct page *p = *(rqstp->rq_next_page++);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = page_address(p);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = min_t(unsigned int, len, PAGE_SIZE);
len -= rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len;
v++;
}
args->vlen = v;
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | nfssvc_decode_readargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_readargs *args)
{
unsigned int len;
int v;
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
args->offset = ntohl(*p++);
len = args->count = ntohl(*p++);
p++; /* totalcount - unused */
if (!xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p))
return 0;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, NFSSVC_MAXBLKSIZE_V2);
/* set up somewhere to store response.
* We take pages, put them on reslist and include in iovec
*/
v=0;
while (len > 0) {
struct page *p = *(rqstp->rq_next_page++);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = page_address(p);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = min_t(unsigned int, len, PAGE_SIZE);
len -= rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len;
v++;
}
args->vlen = v;
return 1;
}
| 168,150 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: check_interlace_type(int PNG_CONST interlace_type)
{
if (interlace_type != PNG_INTERLACE_NONE)
{
/* This is an internal error - --interlace tests should be skipped, not
* attempted.
*/
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: no interlace support\n");
exit(99);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | check_interlace_type(int PNG_CONST interlace_type)
check_interlace_type(int const interlace_type)
{
/* Prior to 1.7.0 libpng does not support the write of an interlaced image
* unless PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED, even with do_interlace so the
* code here does the pixel interlace itself, so:
*/
if (interlace_type != PNG_INTERLACE_NONE)
{
/* This is an internal error - --interlace tests should be skipped, not
* attempted.
*/
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: no interlace support\n");
exit(99);
}
}
| 173,605 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void IndexedDBTransaction::Abort(const IndexedDBDatabaseError& error) {
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBTransaction::Abort", "txn.id", id());
DCHECK(!processing_event_queue_);
if (state_ == FINISHED)
return;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebCore.IndexedDB.TransactionAbortReason",
ExceptionCodeToUmaEnum(error.code()),
UmaIDBExceptionExclusiveMaxValue);
timeout_timer_.Stop();
state_ = FINISHED;
should_process_queue_ = false;
if (backing_store_transaction_begun_)
transaction_->Rollback();
while (!abort_task_stack_.empty())
abort_task_stack_.pop().Run();
preemptive_task_queue_.clear();
pending_preemptive_events_ = 0;
task_queue_.clear();
CloseOpenCursors();
transaction_->Reset();
database_->transaction_coordinator().DidFinishTransaction(this);
#ifndef NDEBUG
DCHECK(!database_->transaction_coordinator().IsActive(this));
#endif
if (callbacks_.get())
callbacks_->OnAbort(*this, error);
database_->TransactionFinished(this, false);
connection_->RemoveTransaction(id_);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | void IndexedDBTransaction::Abort(const IndexedDBDatabaseError& error) {
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBTransaction::Abort", "txn.id", id());
DCHECK(!processing_event_queue_);
if (state_ == FINISHED)
return;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebCore.IndexedDB.TransactionAbortReason",
ExceptionCodeToUmaEnum(error.code()),
UmaIDBExceptionExclusiveMaxValue);
timeout_timer_.Stop();
state_ = FINISHED;
should_process_queue_ = false;
if (backing_store_transaction_begun_)
transaction_->Rollback();
while (!abort_task_stack_.empty())
abort_task_stack_.pop().Run();
preemptive_task_queue_.clear();
pending_preemptive_events_ = 0;
task_queue_.clear();
CloseOpenCursors();
transaction_->Reset();
database_->transaction_coordinator().DidFinishTransaction(this);
#ifndef NDEBUG
DCHECK(!database_->transaction_coordinator().IsActive(this));
#endif
if (callbacks_.get())
callbacks_->OnAbort(*this, error);
database_->TransactionFinished(this, false);
// Note: During force-close situations, the connection can be destroyed during
// the |IndexedDBDatabase::TransactionFinished| call
if (connection_)
connection_->RemoveTransaction(id_);
}
| 173,219 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int nbd_negotiate_drop_sync(QIOChannel *ioc, size_t size)
{
ssize_t ret;
uint8_t *buffer = g_malloc(MIN(65536, size));
while (size > 0) {
size_t count = MIN(65536, size);
ret = nbd_negotiate_read(ioc, buffer, count);
if (ret < 0) {
g_free(buffer);
return ret;
}
size -= count;
}
g_free(buffer);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int nbd_negotiate_drop_sync(QIOChannel *ioc, size_t size)
| 165,453 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PluginInfoMessageFilter::PluginsLoaded(
const GetPluginInfo_Params& params,
IPC::Message* reply_msg,
const std::vector<WebPluginInfo>& plugins) {
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Output output;
scoped_ptr<PluginMetadata> plugin_metadata;
if (context_.FindEnabledPlugin(params.render_view_id, params.url,
params.top_origin_url, params.mime_type,
&output.status, &output.plugin,
&output.actual_mime_type,
&plugin_metadata)) {
context_.DecidePluginStatus(params, output.plugin, plugin_metadata.get(),
&output.status);
}
if (plugin_metadata) {
output.group_identifier = plugin_metadata->identifier();
output.group_name = plugin_metadata->name();
}
context_.GrantAccess(output.status, output.plugin.path);
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, output);
Send(reply_msg);
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | void PluginInfoMessageFilter::PluginsLoaded(
const GetPluginInfo_Params& params,
IPC::Message* reply_msg,
const std::vector<WebPluginInfo>& plugins) {
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Output output;
scoped_ptr<PluginMetadata> plugin_metadata;
if (context_.FindEnabledPlugin(params.render_view_id, params.url,
params.top_origin_url, params.mime_type,
&output.status, &output.plugin,
&output.actual_mime_type,
&plugin_metadata)) {
context_.DecidePluginStatus(params, output.plugin, plugin_metadata.get(),
&output.status);
}
if (plugin_metadata) {
output.group_identifier = plugin_metadata->identifier();
output.group_name = plugin_metadata->name();
}
context_.MaybeGrantAccess(output.status, output.plugin.path);
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, output);
Send(reply_msg);
}
| 171,473 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PrintMsg_Print_Params::PrintMsg_Print_Params()
: page_size(),
content_size(),
printable_area(),
margin_top(0),
margin_left(0),
dpi(0),
min_shrink(0),
max_shrink(0),
desired_dpi(0),
document_cookie(0),
selection_only(false),
supports_alpha_blend(false),
preview_ui_addr(),
preview_request_id(0),
is_first_request(false),
print_scaling_option(WebKit::WebPrintScalingOptionSourceSize),
print_to_pdf(false),
display_header_footer(false),
date(),
title(),
url() {
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | PrintMsg_Print_Params::PrintMsg_Print_Params()
: page_size(),
content_size(),
printable_area(),
margin_top(0),
margin_left(0),
dpi(0),
min_shrink(0),
max_shrink(0),
desired_dpi(0),
document_cookie(0),
selection_only(false),
supports_alpha_blend(false),
preview_ui_id(-1),
preview_request_id(0),
is_first_request(false),
print_scaling_option(WebKit::WebPrintScalingOptionSourceSize),
print_to_pdf(false),
display_header_footer(false),
date(),
title(),
url() {
}
| 170,845 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
formatParams->eEncoding =
(formatParams->nPortIndex == 0)
? OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM : OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
aacParams->nBitRate = mBitRate;
aacParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
aacParams->nAACtools = 0;
aacParams->nAACERtools = 0;
aacParams->eAACProfile = OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectMain;
aacParams->eAACStreamFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
aacParams->eChannelMode = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeStereo;
aacParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
aacParams->nSampleRate = mSampleRate;
aacParams->nFrameLength = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
formatParams->eEncoding =
(formatParams->nPortIndex == 0)
? OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM : OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(aacParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
aacParams->nBitRate = mBitRate;
aacParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
aacParams->nAACtools = 0;
aacParams->nAACERtools = 0;
aacParams->eAACProfile = OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectMain;
aacParams->eAACStreamFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
aacParams->eChannelMode = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeStereo;
aacParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
aacParams->nSampleRate = mSampleRate;
aacParams->nFrameLength = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,188 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void skb_complete_tx_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *hwtstamps)
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
if (!skb_may_tx_timestamp(sk, false))
return;
/* Take a reference to prevent skb_orphan() from freeing the socket,
* but only if the socket refcount is not zero.
*/
if (likely(atomic_inc_not_zero(&sk->sk_refcnt))) {
*skb_hwtstamps(skb) = *hwtstamps;
__skb_complete_tx_timestamp(skb, sk, SCM_TSTAMP_SND);
sock_put(sk);
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: mark skbs with SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS can be enabled and disabled
while packets are collected on the error queue.
So, checking SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS in sk->sk_tsflags
is not enough to safely assume that the skb contains
OPT_STATS data.
Add a bit in sock_exterr_skb to indicate whether the
skb contains opt_stats data.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void skb_complete_tx_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *hwtstamps)
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
if (!skb_may_tx_timestamp(sk, false))
return;
/* Take a reference to prevent skb_orphan() from freeing the socket,
* but only if the socket refcount is not zero.
*/
if (likely(atomic_inc_not_zero(&sk->sk_refcnt))) {
*skb_hwtstamps(skb) = *hwtstamps;
__skb_complete_tx_timestamp(skb, sk, SCM_TSTAMP_SND, false);
sock_put(sk);
}
}
| 170,073 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK(args.Length() == 2);
CHECK(args[0]->IsInt32());
CHECK(args[1]->IsFunction());
int frame_id = args[0]->Int32Value();
content::RenderFrame* frame = content::RenderFrame::FromRoutingID(frame_id);
if (!frame) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No render frame found to register LoadWatcher.";
return;
}
new LoadWatcher(context(), frame, args[1].As<v8::Function>());
args.GetReturnValue().Set(true);
}
Commit Message: Fix re-entrancy and lifetime issue in RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated
BUG=585268,568130
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1684953002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374758}
CWE ID: | void RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK(args.Length() == 2);
CHECK(args[0]->IsInt32());
CHECK(args[1]->IsFunction());
int frame_id = args[0]->Int32Value();
content::RenderFrame* frame = content::RenderFrame::FromRoutingID(frame_id);
if (!frame) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No render frame found to register LoadWatcher.";
return;
}
v8::Global<v8::Function> v8_callback(context()->isolate(),
args[1].As<v8::Function>());
base::Callback<void(bool)> callback(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameObserverNatives::InvokeCallback,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), base::Passed(&v8_callback)));
if (ExtensionFrameHelper::Get(frame)->did_create_current_document_element()) {
// If the document element is already created, then we can call the callback
// immediately (though use PostTask to ensure that the callback is called
// asynchronously).
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(callback, true));
} else {
new LoadWatcher(frame, callback);
}
args.GetReturnValue().Set(true);
}
| 172,146 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pcf_read_TOC( FT_Stream stream,
PCF_Face face )
{
FT_Error error;
PCF_Toc toc = &face->toc;
PCF_Table tables;
FT_Memory memory = FT_FACE( face )->memory;
FT_UInt n;
if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK ( 0 ) ||
FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS ( pcf_toc_header, toc ) )
return FT_THROW( Cannot_Open_Resource );
if ( toc->version != PCF_FILE_VERSION ||
toc->count > FT_ARRAY_MAX( face->toc.tables ) ||
toc->count == 0 )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( face->toc.tables, toc->count ) )
return FT_THROW( Out_Of_Memory );
tables = face->toc.tables;
for ( n = 0; n < toc->count; n++ )
{
if ( FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS( pcf_table_header, tables ) )
goto Exit;
tables++;
}
/* Sort tables and check for overlaps. Because they are almost */
/* always ordered already, an in-place bubble sort with simultaneous */
/* boundary checking seems appropriate. */
tables = face->toc.tables;
for ( n = 0; n < toc->count - 1; n++ )
{
FT_UInt i, have_change;
have_change = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < toc->count - 1 - n; i++ )
{
PCF_TableRec tmp;
if ( tables[i].offset > tables[i + 1].offset )
{
tmp = tables[i];
tables[i] = tables[i + 1];
tables[i + 1] = tmp;
have_change = 1;
}
if ( ( tables[i].size > tables[i + 1].offset ) ||
( tables[i].offset > tables[i + 1].offset - tables[i].size ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Offset );
goto Exit;
}
}
if ( !have_change )
break;
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
{
FT_TRACE4(( " %d: type=%s, format=0x%X, "
"size=%ld (0x%lX), offset=%ld (0x%lX)\n",
i, name,
tables[i].format,
tables[i].size, tables[i].size,
tables[i].offset, tables[i].offset ));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | pcf_read_TOC( FT_Stream stream,
PCF_Face face )
{
FT_Error error;
PCF_Toc toc = &face->toc;
PCF_Table tables;
FT_Memory memory = FT_FACE( face )->memory;
FT_UInt n;
if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK ( 0 ) ||
FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS ( pcf_toc_header, toc ) )
return FT_THROW( Cannot_Open_Resource );
if ( toc->version != PCF_FILE_VERSION ||
toc->count > FT_ARRAY_MAX( face->toc.tables ) ||
toc->count == 0 )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( face->toc.tables, toc->count ) )
return FT_THROW( Out_Of_Memory );
tables = face->toc.tables;
for ( n = 0; n < toc->count; n++ )
{
if ( FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS( pcf_table_header, tables ) )
goto Exit;
tables++;
}
/* Sort tables and check for overlaps. Because they are almost */
/* always ordered already, an in-place bubble sort with simultaneous */
/* boundary checking seems appropriate. */
tables = face->toc.tables;
for ( n = 0; n < toc->count - 1; n++ )
{
FT_UInt i, have_change;
have_change = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < toc->count - 1 - n; i++ )
{
PCF_TableRec tmp;
if ( tables[i].offset > tables[i + 1].offset )
{
tmp = tables[i];
tables[i] = tables[i + 1];
tables[i + 1] = tmp;
have_change = 1;
}
if ( ( tables[i].size > tables[i + 1].offset ) ||
( tables[i].offset > tables[i + 1].offset - tables[i].size ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Offset );
goto Exit;
}
}
if ( !have_change )
break;
}
/* we now check whether the `size' and `offset' values are reasonable: */
/* `offset' + `size' must not exceed the stream size */
tables = face->toc.tables;
for ( n = 0; n < toc->count; n++ )
{
/* we need two checks to avoid overflow */
if ( ( tables->size > stream->size ) ||
( tables->offset > stream->size - tables->size ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Table );
goto Exit;
}
tables++;
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
{
FT_TRACE4(( " %d: type=%s, format=0x%X, "
"size=%ld (0x%lX), offset=%ld (0x%lX)\n",
i, name,
tables[i].format,
tables[i].size, tables[i].size,
tables[i].offset, tables[i].offset ));
}
}
| 164,843 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void copy_to_user_state(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_usersa_info *p)
{
memcpy(&p->id, &x->id, sizeof(p->id));
memcpy(&p->sel, &x->sel, sizeof(p->sel));
memcpy(&p->lft, &x->lft, sizeof(p->lft));
memcpy(&p->curlft, &x->curlft, sizeof(p->curlft));
memcpy(&p->stats, &x->stats, sizeof(p->stats));
memcpy(&p->saddr, &x->props.saddr, sizeof(p->saddr));
p->mode = x->props.mode;
p->replay_window = x->props.replay_window;
p->reqid = x->props.reqid;
p->family = x->props.family;
p->flags = x->props.flags;
p->seq = x->km.seq;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_state()
The memory reserved to dump the xfrm state includes the padding bytes of
struct xfrm_usersa_info added by the compiler for alignment (7 for
amd64, 3 for i386). Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the buffer
to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void copy_to_user_state(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_usersa_info *p)
{
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
memcpy(&p->id, &x->id, sizeof(p->id));
memcpy(&p->sel, &x->sel, sizeof(p->sel));
memcpy(&p->lft, &x->lft, sizeof(p->lft));
memcpy(&p->curlft, &x->curlft, sizeof(p->curlft));
memcpy(&p->stats, &x->stats, sizeof(p->stats));
memcpy(&p->saddr, &x->props.saddr, sizeof(p->saddr));
p->mode = x->props.mode;
p->replay_window = x->props.replay_window;
p->reqid = x->props.reqid;
p->family = x->props.family;
p->flags = x->props.flags;
p->seq = x->km.seq;
}
| 166,189 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CameraSource::releaseQueuedFrames() {
List<sp<IMemory> >::iterator it;
while (!mFramesReceived.empty()) {
it = mFramesReceived.begin();
releaseRecordingFrame(*it);
mFramesReceived.erase(it);
++mNumFramesDropped;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void CameraSource::releaseQueuedFrames() {
List<sp<IMemory> >::iterator it;
while (!mFramesReceived.empty()) {
it = mFramesReceived.begin();
// b/28466701
adjustOutgoingANWBuffer(it->get());
releaseRecordingFrame(*it);
mFramesReceived.erase(it);
++mNumFramesDropped;
}
}
| 173,509 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: NodeIterator::~NodeIterator()
{
root()->document().detachNodeIterator(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix detached Attr nodes interaction with NodeIterator
- Don't register NodeIterator to document when attaching to Attr node.
-- NodeIterator is registered to its document to receive updateForNodeRemoval notifications.
-- However it wouldn't make sense on Attr nodes, as they never have children.
BUG=572537
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1577213003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#369687}
CWE ID: | NodeIterator::~NodeIterator()
{
if (!root()->isAttributeNode())
root()->document().detachNodeIterator(this);
}
| 172,143 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void LocalFileSystem::resolveURL(ExecutionContext* context, const KURL& fileSystemURL, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> contextPtr(context);
RefPtr<CallbackWrapper> wrapper = adoptRef(new CallbackWrapper(callbacks));
requestFileSystemAccessInternal(context,
bind(&LocalFileSystem::resolveURLInternal, this, contextPtr, fileSystemURL, wrapper),
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemNotAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, wrapper));
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void LocalFileSystem::resolveURL(ExecutionContext* context, const KURL& fileSystemURL, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> contextPtr(context);
CallbackWrapper* wrapper = new CallbackWrapper(callbacks);
requestFileSystemAccessInternal(context,
bind(&LocalFileSystem::resolveURLInternal, this, contextPtr, fileSystemURL, wrapper),
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemNotAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, wrapper));
}
| 171,430 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
{
int result = -1;
if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type)
return -1;
switch (a->type) {
case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
break;
case V_ASN1_NULL:
result = 0; /* They do not have content. */
break;
case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_SET:
case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
case V_ASN1_OTHER:
default:
result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)a->value.ptr,
(ASN1_STRING *)b->value.ptr);
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
{
int result = -1;
if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type)
return -1;
switch (a->type) {
case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
break;
case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
break;
case V_ASN1_NULL:
result = 0; /* They do not have content. */
break;
case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_SET:
case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
case V_ASN1_OTHER:
default:
result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)a->value.ptr,
(ASN1_STRING *)b->value.ptr);
break;
}
return result;
}
| 164,811 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static av_cold int xpm_decode_close(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
XPMDecContext *x = avctx->priv_data;
av_freep(&x->pixels);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/xpmdec: Fix multiple pointer/memory issues
Most of these were found through code review in response to
fixing 1466/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5961584419536896
There is thus no testcase for most of this.
The initial issue was Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static av_cold int xpm_decode_close(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
XPMDecContext *x = avctx->priv_data;
av_freep(&x->pixels);
av_freep(&x->buf);
x->buf_size = 0;
return 0;
}
| 168,077 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr(PVSCSIRingInfo *mgr)
{
uint32_t ready_ptr = RS_GET_FIELD(mgr, reqProdIdx);
if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr) {
uint32_t next_ready_ptr =
mgr->consumed_ptr++ & mgr->txr_len_mask;
uint32_t next_ready_page =
return mgr->req_ring_pages_pa[next_ready_page] +
inpage_idx * sizeof(PVSCSIRingReqDesc);
} else {
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr(PVSCSIRingInfo *mgr)
{
uint32_t ready_ptr = RS_GET_FIELD(mgr, reqProdIdx);
uint32_t ring_size = PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_PAGES_REQ_RING
* PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_REQ_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr
&& ready_ptr - mgr->consumed_ptr < ring_size) {
uint32_t next_ready_ptr =
mgr->consumed_ptr++ & mgr->txr_len_mask;
uint32_t next_ready_page =
return mgr->req_ring_pages_pa[next_ready_page] +
inpage_idx * sizeof(PVSCSIRingReqDesc);
} else {
return 0;
}
}
| 164,929 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *defParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
if (defParams->nPortIndex >= mPorts.size()) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (defParams->nSize != sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE)) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
PortInfo *port =
&mPorts.editItemAt(defParams->nPortIndex);
if (defParams->nBufferSize > port->mDef.nBufferSize) {
port->mDef.nBufferSize = defParams->nBufferSize;
}
if (defParams->nBufferCountActual < port->mDef.nBufferCountMin) {
ALOGW("component requires at least %u buffers (%u requested)",
port->mDef.nBufferCountMin, defParams->nBufferCountActual);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
port->mDef.nBufferCountActual = defParams->nBufferCountActual;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *defParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(defParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (defParams->nPortIndex >= mPorts.size()) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (defParams->nSize != sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE)) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
PortInfo *port =
&mPorts.editItemAt(defParams->nPortIndex);
if (defParams->nBufferSize > port->mDef.nBufferSize) {
port->mDef.nBufferSize = defParams->nBufferSize;
}
if (defParams->nBufferCountActual < port->mDef.nBufferCountMin) {
ALOGW("component requires at least %u buffers (%u requested)",
port->mDef.nBufferCountMin, defParams->nBufferCountActual);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
port->mDef.nBufferCountActual = defParams->nBufferCountActual;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
| 174,223 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void sum_update(const char *p, int32 len)
{
switch (cursum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5:
md5_update(&md, (uchar *)p, len);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
if (len + sumresidue < CSUM_CHUNK) {
memcpy(md.buffer + sumresidue, p, len);
sumresidue += len;
}
if (sumresidue) {
int32 i = CSUM_CHUNK - sumresidue;
memcpy(md.buffer + sumresidue, p, i);
mdfour_update(&md, (uchar *)md.buffer, CSUM_CHUNK);
len -= i;
p += i;
}
while (len >= CSUM_CHUNK) {
mdfour_update(&md, (uchar *)p, CSUM_CHUNK);
len -= CSUM_CHUNK;
p += CSUM_CHUNK;
}
sumresidue = len;
if (sumresidue)
memcpy(md.buffer, p, sumresidue);
break;
case CSUM_NONE:
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-354 | void sum_update(const char *p, int32 len)
{
switch (cursum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5:
md5_update(&md, (uchar *)p, len);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC:
if (len + sumresidue < CSUM_CHUNK) {
memcpy(md.buffer + sumresidue, p, len);
sumresidue += len;
}
if (sumresidue) {
int32 i = CSUM_CHUNK - sumresidue;
memcpy(md.buffer + sumresidue, p, i);
mdfour_update(&md, (uchar *)md.buffer, CSUM_CHUNK);
len -= i;
p += i;
}
while (len >= CSUM_CHUNK) {
mdfour_update(&md, (uchar *)p, CSUM_CHUNK);
len -= CSUM_CHUNK;
p += CSUM_CHUNK;
}
sumresidue = len;
if (sumresidue)
memcpy(md.buffer, p, sumresidue);
break;
case CSUM_NONE:
break;
}
}
| 164,640 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::getConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonOutputCrop:
{
OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE *rectParams = (OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE *)params;
if (rectParams->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
rectParams->nLeft = mCropLeft;
rectParams->nTop = mCropTop;
rectParams->nWidth = mCropWidth;
rectParams->nHeight = mCropHeight;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::getConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonOutputCrop:
{
OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE *rectParams = (OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(rectParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (rectParams->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
rectParams->nLeft = mCropLeft;
rectParams->nTop = mCropTop;
rectParams->nWidth = mCropWidth;
rectParams->nHeight = mCropHeight;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
| 174,224 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ShellWindowFrameView::OnPaint(gfx::Canvas* canvas) {
SkPaint paint;
paint.setAntiAlias(false);
paint.setStyle(SkPaint::kFill_Style);
paint.setColor(SK_ColorWHITE);
gfx::Path path;
const int radius = 1;
path.moveTo(0, radius);
path.lineTo(radius, 0);
path.lineTo(width() - radius - 1, 0);
path.lineTo(width(), radius + 1);
path.lineTo(width(), kCaptionHeight);
path.lineTo(0, kCaptionHeight);
path.close();
canvas->DrawPath(path, paint);
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void ShellWindowFrameView::OnPaint(gfx::Canvas* canvas) {
if (is_frameless_)
return;
SkPaint paint;
paint.setAntiAlias(false);
paint.setStyle(SkPaint::kFill_Style);
paint.setColor(SK_ColorWHITE);
gfx::Path path;
const int radius = 1;
path.moveTo(0, radius);
path.lineTo(radius, 0);
path.lineTo(width() - radius - 1, 0);
path.lineTo(width(), radius + 1);
path.lineTo(width(), kCaptionHeight);
path.lineTo(0, kCaptionHeight);
path.close();
canvas->DrawPath(path, paint);
}
| 170,717 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, current)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
} else if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object_create_type(0, intern, SPL_FS_INFO, NULL, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
RETURN_ZVAL(getThis(), 1, 0);
/*RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);*/
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, current)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
} else if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object_create_type(0, intern, SPL_FS_INFO, NULL, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
RETURN_ZVAL(getThis(), 1, 0);
/*RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);*/
}
}
| 167,036 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool IsManualFallbackForFillingEnabled() {
return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFilling) &&
!IsPreLollipopAndroid();
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static bool IsManualFallbackForFillingEnabled() {
return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
password_manager::features::kManualFallbacksFilling) &&
!IsPreLollipopAndroid();
}
| 171,748 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: stringprep_utf8_nfkc_normalize (const char *str, ssize_t len)
{
return g_utf8_normalize (str, len, G_NORMALIZE_NFKC);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | stringprep_utf8_nfkc_normalize (const char *str, ssize_t len)
{
size_t n;
if (len < 0)
n = strlen (str);
else
n = len;
if (u8_check ((const uint8_t *) str, n))
return NULL;
return g_utf8_normalize (str, len, G_NORMALIZE_NFKC);
}
| 164,984 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline void write_s3row_data(
const entity_stage3_row *r,
unsigned orig_cp,
enum entity_charset charset,
zval *arr)
{
char key[9] = ""; /* two unicode code points in UTF-8 */
char entity[LONGEST_ENTITY_LENGTH + 2] = {'&'};
size_t written_k1;
written_k1 = write_octet_sequence(key, charset, orig_cp);
if (!r->ambiguous) {
size_t l = r->data.ent.entity_len;
memcpy(&entity[1], r->data.ent.entity, l);
entity[l + 1] = ';';
add_assoc_stringl_ex(arr, key, written_k1 + 1, entity, l + 2, 1);
} else {
unsigned i,
num_entries;
const entity_multicodepoint_row *mcpr = r->data.multicodepoint_table;
if (mcpr[0].leading_entry.default_entity != NULL) {
size_t l = mcpr[0].leading_entry.default_entity_len;
memcpy(&entity[1], mcpr[0].leading_entry.default_entity, l);
entity[l + 1] = ';';
add_assoc_stringl_ex(arr, key, written_k1 + 1, entity, l + 2, 1);
}
num_entries = mcpr[0].leading_entry.size;
for (i = 1; i <= num_entries; i++) {
size_t l,
written_k2;
unsigned uni_cp,
spe_cp;
uni_cp = mcpr[i].normal_entry.second_cp;
l = mcpr[i].normal_entry.entity_len;
if (!CHARSET_UNICODE_COMPAT(charset)) {
if (map_from_unicode(uni_cp, charset, &spe_cp) == FAILURE)
continue; /* non representable in this charset */
} else {
spe_cp = uni_cp;
}
written_k2 = write_octet_sequence(&key[written_k1], charset, spe_cp);
memcpy(&entity[1], mcpr[i].normal_entry.entity, l);
entity[l + 1] = ';';
entity[l + 1] = '\0';
add_assoc_stringl_ex(arr, key, written_k1 + written_k2 + 1, entity, l + 1, 1);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static inline void write_s3row_data(
const entity_stage3_row *r,
unsigned orig_cp,
enum entity_charset charset,
zval *arr)
{
char key[9] = ""; /* two unicode code points in UTF-8 */
char entity[LONGEST_ENTITY_LENGTH + 2] = {'&'};
size_t written_k1;
written_k1 = write_octet_sequence(key, charset, orig_cp);
if (!r->ambiguous) {
size_t l = r->data.ent.entity_len;
memcpy(&entity[1], r->data.ent.entity, l);
entity[l + 1] = ';';
add_assoc_stringl_ex(arr, key, written_k1 + 1, entity, l + 2, 1);
} else {
unsigned i,
num_entries;
const entity_multicodepoint_row *mcpr = r->data.multicodepoint_table;
if (mcpr[0].leading_entry.default_entity != NULL) {
size_t l = mcpr[0].leading_entry.default_entity_len;
memcpy(&entity[1], mcpr[0].leading_entry.default_entity, l);
entity[l + 1] = ';';
add_assoc_stringl_ex(arr, key, written_k1 + 1, entity, l + 2, 1);
}
num_entries = mcpr[0].leading_entry.size;
for (i = 1; i <= num_entries; i++) {
size_t l,
written_k2;
unsigned uni_cp,
spe_cp;
uni_cp = mcpr[i].normal_entry.second_cp;
l = mcpr[i].normal_entry.entity_len;
if (!CHARSET_UNICODE_COMPAT(charset)) {
if (map_from_unicode(uni_cp, charset, &spe_cp) == FAILURE)
continue; /* non representable in this charset */
} else {
spe_cp = uni_cp;
}
written_k2 = write_octet_sequence(&key[written_k1], charset, spe_cp);
memcpy(&entity[1], mcpr[i].normal_entry.entity, l);
entity[l + 1] = ';';
entity[l + 1] = '\0';
add_assoc_stringl_ex(arr, key, written_k1 + written_k2 + 1, entity, l + 1, 1);
}
}
}
| 167,181 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionTtsController::FinishCurrentUtterance() {
if (current_utterance_) {
current_utterance_->FinishAndDestroy();
current_utterance_ = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ExtensionTtsController::FinishCurrentUtterance() {
bool can_enqueue = false;
if (options->HasKey(constants::kEnqueueKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetBoolean(constants::kEnqueueKey, &can_enqueue));
}
| 170,378 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: V8ContextNativeHandler::V8ContextNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context,
Dispatcher* dispatcher)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context),
context_(context),
dispatcher_(dispatcher) {
RouteFunction("GetAvailability",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::GetAvailability,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetModuleSystem",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::GetModuleSystem,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"RunWithNativesEnabledModuleSystem",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabledModuleSystem,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Add a test that getModuleSystem() doesn't work cross origin
BUG=504011
R=kalman@chromium.org
TBR=fukino@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1241443004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | V8ContextNativeHandler::V8ContextNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context,
Dispatcher* dispatcher)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context),
context_(context),
dispatcher_(dispatcher) {
RouteFunction("GetAvailability",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::GetAvailability,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetModuleSystem",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::GetModuleSystem,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"RunWithNativesEnabled",
base::Bind(&V8ContextNativeHandler::RunWithNativesEnabled,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 171,949 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> unPremulSkImageToPremul(SkImage* input) {
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::Make(input->width(), input->height(),
kN32_SkColorType, kPremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!dstPixels)
return nullptr;
return newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<size_t>(input->width()) * info.bytesPerPixel());
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static sk_sp<SkImage> unPremulSkImageToPremul(SkImage* input) {
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::Make(input->width(), input->height(),
kN32_SkColorType, kPremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!dstPixels)
return nullptr;
return newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<unsigned>(input->width()) * info.bytesPerPixel());
}
| 172,507 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev2_auth_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct ikev2_auth a;
const char *v2_auth[]={ "invalid", "rsasig",
"shared-secret", "dsssig" };
const u_char *authdata = (const u_char*)ext + sizeof(a);
unsigned int len;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&a, ext, sizeof(a));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), a.h.critical);
len = ntohs(a.h.len);
/*
* Our caller has ensured that the length is >= 4.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%u method=%s", len-4,
STR_OR_ID(a.auth_method, v2_auth)));
if (len > 4) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " authdata=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)authdata, len - sizeof(a)))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ") "));
} else if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, authdata, ep))
goto trunc;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev2_auth_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct ikev2_auth a;
const char *v2_auth[]={ "invalid", "rsasig",
"shared-secret", "dsssig" };
const u_char *authdata = (const u_char*)ext + sizeof(a);
unsigned int len;
ND_TCHECK2(*ext, sizeof(a));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&a, ext, sizeof(a));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), a.h.critical);
len = ntohs(a.h.len);
/*
* Our caller has ensured that the length is >= 4.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%u method=%s", len-4,
STR_OR_ID(a.auth_method, v2_auth)));
if (len > 4) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " authdata=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)authdata, len - sizeof(a)))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ") "));
} else if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, authdata, ep))
goto trunc;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,797 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::wstring GetSwitchValueFromCommandLine(const std::wstring& command_line,
const std::wstring& switch_name) {
assert(!command_line.empty());
assert(!switch_name.empty());
std::vector<std::wstring> as_array = TokenizeCommandLineToArray(command_line);
std::wstring switch_with_equal = L"--" + switch_name + L"=";
for (size_t i = 1; i < as_array.size(); ++i) {
const std::wstring& arg = as_array[i];
if (arg.compare(0, switch_with_equal.size(), switch_with_equal) == 0)
return arg.substr(switch_with_equal.size());
}
return std::wstring();
}
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
R=wfh@chromium.org
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77 | std::wstring GetSwitchValueFromCommandLine(const std::wstring& command_line,
const std::wstring& switch_name) {
static constexpr wchar_t kSwitchTerminator[] = L"--";
assert(!command_line.empty());
assert(!switch_name.empty());
std::vector<std::wstring> as_array = TokenizeCommandLineToArray(command_line);
std::wstring switch_with_equal = L"--" + switch_name + L"=";
auto end = std::find(as_array.cbegin(), as_array.cend(), kSwitchTerminator);
for (auto scan = as_array.cbegin(); scan != end; ++scan) {
const std::wstring& arg = *scan;
if (arg.compare(0, switch_with_equal.size(), switch_with_equal) == 0)
return arg.substr(switch_with_equal.size());
}
return std::wstring();
}
| 173,062 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::OnJobNotification(DWORD message,
DWORD pid) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
switch (message) {
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_ACTIVE_PROCESS_ZERO:
CHECK(SetEvent(process_exit_event_));
break;
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_NEW_PROCESS:
worker_process_.Set(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::OnJobNotification(DWORD message,
DWORD pid) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
switch (message) {
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_ACTIVE_PROCESS_ZERO:
CHECK(SetEvent(process_exit_event_));
break;
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_NEW_PROCESS:
worker_process_.Set(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
break;
}
}
| 171,561 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int msPostGISLayerSetTimeFilter(layerObj *lp, const char *timestring, const char *timefield)
{
char **atimes, **aranges = NULL;
int numtimes=0,i=0,numranges=0;
size_t buffer_size = 512;
char buffer[512], bufferTmp[512];
buffer[0] = '\0';
bufferTmp[0] = '\0';
if (!lp || !timestring || !timefield)
return MS_FALSE;
/* discrete time */
if (strstr(timestring, ",") == NULL &&
strstr(timestring, "/") == NULL) { /* discrete time */
createPostgresTimeCompareSimple(timefield, timestring, buffer, buffer_size);
} else {
/* multiple times, or ranges */
atimes = msStringSplit (timestring, ',', &numtimes);
if (atimes == NULL || numtimes < 1)
return MS_FALSE;
strlcat(buffer, "(", buffer_size);
for(i=0; i<numtimes; i++) {
if(i!=0) {
strlcat(buffer, " OR ", buffer_size);
}
strlcat(buffer, "(", buffer_size);
aranges = msStringSplit(atimes[i], '/', &numranges);
if(!aranges) return MS_FALSE;
if(numranges == 1) {
/* we don't have range, just a simple time */
createPostgresTimeCompareSimple(timefield, atimes[i], bufferTmp, buffer_size);
strlcat(buffer, bufferTmp, buffer_size);
} else if(numranges == 2) {
/* we have a range */
createPostgresTimeCompareRange(timefield, aranges[0], aranges[1], bufferTmp, buffer_size);
strlcat(buffer, bufferTmp, buffer_size);
} else {
return MS_FALSE;
}
msFreeCharArray(aranges, numranges);
strlcat(buffer, ")", buffer_size);
}
strlcat(buffer, ")", buffer_size);
msFreeCharArray(atimes, numtimes);
}
if(!*buffer) {
return MS_FALSE;
}
if(lp->filteritem) free(lp->filteritem);
lp->filteritem = msStrdup(timefield);
if (&lp->filter) {
/* if the filter is set and it's a string type, concatenate it with
the time. If not just free it */
if (lp->filter.type == MS_EXPRESSION) {
snprintf(bufferTmp, buffer_size, "(%s) and %s", lp->filter.string, buffer);
loadExpressionString(&lp->filter, bufferTmp);
} else {
freeExpression(&lp->filter);
loadExpressionString(&lp->filter, buffer);
}
}
return MS_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | int msPostGISLayerSetTimeFilter(layerObj *lp, const char *timestring, const char *timefield)
{
char **atimes, **aranges = NULL;
int numtimes=0,i=0,numranges=0;
size_t buffer_size = 512;
char buffer[512], bufferTmp[512];
buffer[0] = '\0';
bufferTmp[0] = '\0';
if (!lp || !timestring || !timefield)
return MS_FALSE;
if( strchr(timestring,'\'') || strchr(timestring, '\\') ) {
msSetError(MS_MISCERR, "Invalid time filter.", "msPostGISLayerSetTimeFilter()");
return MS_FALSE;
}
/* discrete time */
if (strstr(timestring, ",") == NULL &&
strstr(timestring, "/") == NULL) { /* discrete time */
createPostgresTimeCompareSimple(timefield, timestring, buffer, buffer_size);
} else {
/* multiple times, or ranges */
atimes = msStringSplit (timestring, ',', &numtimes);
if (atimes == NULL || numtimes < 1)
return MS_FALSE;
strlcat(buffer, "(", buffer_size);
for(i=0; i<numtimes; i++) {
if(i!=0) {
strlcat(buffer, " OR ", buffer_size);
}
strlcat(buffer, "(", buffer_size);
aranges = msStringSplit(atimes[i], '/', &numranges);
if(!aranges) return MS_FALSE;
if(numranges == 1) {
/* we don't have range, just a simple time */
createPostgresTimeCompareSimple(timefield, atimes[i], bufferTmp, buffer_size);
strlcat(buffer, bufferTmp, buffer_size);
} else if(numranges == 2) {
/* we have a range */
createPostgresTimeCompareRange(timefield, aranges[0], aranges[1], bufferTmp, buffer_size);
strlcat(buffer, bufferTmp, buffer_size);
} else {
return MS_FALSE;
}
msFreeCharArray(aranges, numranges);
strlcat(buffer, ")", buffer_size);
}
strlcat(buffer, ")", buffer_size);
msFreeCharArray(atimes, numtimes);
}
if(!*buffer) {
return MS_FALSE;
}
if(lp->filteritem) free(lp->filteritem);
lp->filteritem = msStrdup(timefield);
if (&lp->filter) {
/* if the filter is set and it's a string type, concatenate it with
the time. If not just free it */
if (lp->filter.type == MS_EXPRESSION) {
snprintf(bufferTmp, buffer_size, "(%s) and %s", lp->filter.string, buffer);
loadExpressionString(&lp->filter, bufferTmp);
} else {
freeExpression(&lp->filter);
loadExpressionString(&lp->filter, buffer);
}
}
return MS_TRUE;
}
| 166,525 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
const char *server,
const char *share,
const struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
bool show_sessetup,
bool force_encrypt,
int max_protocol,
int port,
int name_type,
struct cli_state **pcli)
{
struct cli_state *c = NULL;
char *servicename;
char *sharename;
char *newserver, *newshare;
const char *username;
const char *password;
const char *domain;
NTSTATUS status;
int flags = 0;
/* make a copy so we don't modify the global string 'service' */
servicename = talloc_strdup(ctx,share);
sharename += 2;
if (server == NULL) {
server = sharename;
}
sharename = strchr_m(sharename,'\\');
if (!sharename) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
*sharename = 0;
sharename++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
const char *server,
const char *share,
const struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
bool show_sessetup,
bool force_encrypt,
int max_protocol,
int port,
int name_type,
struct cli_state **pcli)
{
struct cli_state *c = NULL;
char *servicename;
char *sharename;
char *newserver, *newshare;
const char *username;
const char *password;
const char *domain;
NTSTATUS status;
int flags = 0;
int signing_state = get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(auth_info);
if (force_encrypt) {
signing_state = SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
}
/* make a copy so we don't modify the global string 'service' */
servicename = talloc_strdup(ctx,share);
sharename += 2;
if (server == NULL) {
server = sharename;
}
sharename = strchr_m(sharename,'\\');
if (!sharename) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
*sharename = 0;
sharename++;
}
| 164,676 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SelectionInDOMTree ConvertToSelectionInDOMTree(
const SelectionInFlatTree& selection_in_flat_tree) {
return SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetAffinity(selection_in_flat_tree.Affinity())
.SetBaseAndExtent(ToPositionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree.Base()),
ToPositionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree.Extent()))
.SetIsDirectional(selection_in_flat_tree.IsDirectional())
.SetIsHandleVisible(selection_in_flat_tree.IsHandleVisible())
.Build();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | SelectionInDOMTree ConvertToSelectionInDOMTree(
const SelectionInFlatTree& selection_in_flat_tree) {
return SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetAffinity(selection_in_flat_tree.Affinity())
.SetBaseAndExtent(ToPositionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree.Base()),
ToPositionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree.Extent()))
.SetIsDirectional(selection_in_flat_tree.IsDirectional())
.Build();
}
| 171,762 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool_t xdr_krb5_tl_data(XDR *xdrs, krb5_tl_data **tl_data_head)
{
krb5_tl_data *tl, *tl2;
bool_t more;
unsigned int len;
switch (xdrs->x_op) {
case XDR_FREE:
tl = tl2 = *tl_data_head;
while (tl) {
tl2 = tl->tl_data_next;
free(tl->tl_data_contents);
free(tl);
tl = tl2;
}
break;
case XDR_ENCODE:
tl = *tl_data_head;
while (1) {
more = (tl != NULL);
if (!xdr_bool(xdrs, &more))
return FALSE;
if (tl == NULL)
break;
if (!xdr_krb5_int16(xdrs, &tl->tl_data_type))
return FALSE;
len = tl->tl_data_length;
if (!xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **) &tl->tl_data_contents, &len, ~0))
return FALSE;
tl = tl->tl_data_next;
}
break;
case XDR_DECODE:
tl = NULL;
while (1) {
if (!xdr_bool(xdrs, &more))
return FALSE;
if (more == FALSE)
break;
tl2 = (krb5_tl_data *) malloc(sizeof(krb5_tl_data));
if (tl2 == NULL)
return FALSE;
memset(tl2, 0, sizeof(krb5_tl_data));
if (!xdr_krb5_int16(xdrs, &tl2->tl_data_type))
return FALSE;
if (!xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **)&tl2->tl_data_contents, &len, ~0))
return FALSE;
tl2->tl_data_length = len;
tl2->tl_data_next = tl;
tl = tl2;
}
*tl_data_head = tl;
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | bool_t xdr_krb5_tl_data(XDR *xdrs, krb5_tl_data **tl_data_head)
{
krb5_tl_data *tl, *tl2;
bool_t more;
unsigned int len;
switch (xdrs->x_op) {
case XDR_FREE:
tl = tl2 = *tl_data_head;
while (tl) {
tl2 = tl->tl_data_next;
free(tl->tl_data_contents);
free(tl);
tl = tl2;
}
*tl_data_head = NULL;
break;
case XDR_ENCODE:
tl = *tl_data_head;
while (1) {
more = (tl != NULL);
if (!xdr_bool(xdrs, &more))
return FALSE;
if (tl == NULL)
break;
if (!xdr_krb5_int16(xdrs, &tl->tl_data_type))
return FALSE;
len = tl->tl_data_length;
if (!xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **) &tl->tl_data_contents, &len, ~0))
return FALSE;
tl = tl->tl_data_next;
}
break;
case XDR_DECODE:
tl = NULL;
while (1) {
if (!xdr_bool(xdrs, &more))
return FALSE;
if (more == FALSE)
break;
tl2 = (krb5_tl_data *) malloc(sizeof(krb5_tl_data));
if (tl2 == NULL)
return FALSE;
memset(tl2, 0, sizeof(krb5_tl_data));
if (!xdr_krb5_int16(xdrs, &tl2->tl_data_type))
return FALSE;
if (!xdr_bytes(xdrs, (char **)&tl2->tl_data_contents, &len, ~0))
return FALSE;
tl2->tl_data_length = len;
tl2->tl_data_next = tl;
tl = tl2;
}
*tl_data_head = tl;
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 166,791 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
bool is_in_page,
bool replace_entry,
NavigationHandleImpl* handle) {
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl> new_entry;
bool update_virtual_url = false;
if (is_in_page && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry = new FrameNavigationEntry(
params.frame_unique_name, params.item_sequence_number,
params.document_sequence_number, rfh->GetSiteInstance(), nullptr,
params.url, params.referrer, params.method, params.post_id);
new_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry()->CloneAndReplace(
frame_entry, true, rfh->frame_tree_node(),
delegate_->GetFrameTree()->root());
CHECK(frame_entry->HasOneRef());
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
}
if (!new_entry &&
PendingEntryMatchesHandle(handle) && pending_entry_index_ == -1 &&
(!pending_entry_->site_instance() ||
pending_entry_->site_instance() == rfh->GetSiteInstance())) {
new_entry = pending_entry_->Clone();
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
if (!new_entry) {
new_entry = base::WrapUnique(new NavigationEntryImpl);
GURL url = params.url;
bool needs_update = false;
BrowserURLHandlerImpl::GetInstance()->RewriteURLIfNecessary(
&url, browser_context_, &needs_update);
new_entry->set_update_virtual_url_with_url(needs_update);
update_virtual_url = needs_update;
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
new_entry->set_page_type(params.url_is_unreachable ? PAGE_TYPE_ERROR
: PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
new_entry->SetURL(params.url);
if (update_virtual_url)
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(new_entry.get(), params.url);
new_entry->SetReferrer(params.referrer);
new_entry->SetTransitionType(params.transition);
new_entry->set_site_instance(
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(rfh->GetSiteInstance()));
new_entry->SetOriginalRequestURL(params.original_request_url);
new_entry->SetIsOverridingUserAgent(params.is_overriding_user_agent);
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry =
new_entry->GetFrameEntry(rfh->frame_tree_node());
frame_entry->set_frame_unique_name(params.frame_unique_name);
frame_entry->set_item_sequence_number(params.item_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_document_sequence_number(params.document_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_method(params.method);
frame_entry->set_post_id(params.post_id);
if (is_in_page && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
new_entry->SetTitle(GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetTitle());
new_entry->GetFavicon() = GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetFavicon();
}
DCHECK(!params.history_list_was_cleared || !replace_entry);
if (params.history_list_was_cleared) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
entries_.clear();
last_committed_entry_index_ = -1;
}
InsertOrReplaceEntry(std::move(new_entry), replace_entry);
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
bool is_in_page,
bool replace_entry,
NavigationHandleImpl* handle) {
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl> new_entry;
bool update_virtual_url = false;
if (is_in_page && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry = new FrameNavigationEntry(
params.frame_unique_name, params.item_sequence_number,
params.document_sequence_number, rfh->GetSiteInstance(), nullptr,
params.url, params.referrer, params.method, params.post_id);
new_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry()->CloneAndReplace(
frame_entry, true, rfh->frame_tree_node(),
delegate_->GetFrameTree()->root());
CHECK(frame_entry->HasOneRef());
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
MaybeDumpCopiedNonSameOriginEntry("New page navigation", params, is_in_page,
GetLastCommittedEntry());
}
if (!new_entry &&
PendingEntryMatchesHandle(handle) && pending_entry_index_ == -1 &&
(!pending_entry_->site_instance() ||
pending_entry_->site_instance() == rfh->GetSiteInstance())) {
new_entry = pending_entry_->Clone();
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
if (!new_entry) {
new_entry = base::WrapUnique(new NavigationEntryImpl);
GURL url = params.url;
bool needs_update = false;
BrowserURLHandlerImpl::GetInstance()->RewriteURLIfNecessary(
&url, browser_context_, &needs_update);
new_entry->set_update_virtual_url_with_url(needs_update);
update_virtual_url = needs_update;
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
}
new_entry->set_page_type(params.url_is_unreachable ? PAGE_TYPE_ERROR
: PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
new_entry->SetURL(params.url);
if (update_virtual_url)
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(new_entry.get(), params.url);
new_entry->SetReferrer(params.referrer);
new_entry->SetTransitionType(params.transition);
new_entry->set_site_instance(
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(rfh->GetSiteInstance()));
new_entry->SetOriginalRequestURL(params.original_request_url);
new_entry->SetIsOverridingUserAgent(params.is_overriding_user_agent);
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry =
new_entry->GetFrameEntry(rfh->frame_tree_node());
frame_entry->set_frame_unique_name(params.frame_unique_name);
frame_entry->set_item_sequence_number(params.item_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_document_sequence_number(params.document_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_method(params.method);
frame_entry->set_post_id(params.post_id);
if (is_in_page && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
new_entry->SetTitle(GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetTitle());
new_entry->GetFavicon() = GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetFavicon();
}
DCHECK(!params.history_list_was_cleared || !replace_entry);
if (params.history_list_was_cleared) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
entries_.clear();
last_committed_entry_index_ = -1;
}
InsertOrReplaceEntry(std::move(new_entry), replace_entry);
}
| 172,411 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void __skb_complete_tx_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk,
int tstype)
{
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
int err;
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
memset(serr, 0, sizeof(*serr));
serr->ee.ee_errno = ENOMSG;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_TIMESTAMPING;
serr->ee.ee_info = tstype;
if (sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID) {
serr->ee.ee_data = skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
serr->ee.ee_data -= sk->sk_tskey;
}
err = sock_queue_err_skb(sk, skb);
if (err)
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: tcp: mark skbs with SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS can be enabled and disabled
while packets are collected on the error queue.
So, checking SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS in sk->sk_tsflags
is not enough to safely assume that the skb contains
OPT_STATS data.
Add a bit in sock_exterr_skb to indicate whether the
skb contains opt_stats data.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void __skb_complete_tx_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk,
int tstype,
bool opt_stats)
{
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
int err;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct sock_exterr_skb) > sizeof(skb->cb));
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
memset(serr, 0, sizeof(*serr));
serr->ee.ee_errno = ENOMSG;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_TIMESTAMPING;
serr->ee.ee_info = tstype;
serr->opt_stats = opt_stats;
if (sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID) {
serr->ee.ee_data = skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
serr->ee.ee_data -= sk->sk_tskey;
}
err = sock_queue_err_skb(sk, skb);
if (err)
kfree_skb(skb);
}
| 170,071 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item;
SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (item) {
/* Check if epoch is current. */
if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
*/
return 1;
}
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
return (0);
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
return (0);
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) <
0)
return -1;
}
}
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
* Application data protocol
* none of our business
*/
s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch;
s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1;
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item;
SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
int replayok = 1;
item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (item) {
/* Check if epoch is current. */
if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
return 1; /* Nothing to do. */
rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
*/
return 1;
}
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
return (0);
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if (bitmap == NULL) {
/*
* Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the
* current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot
* be the case because we already checked the epoch above
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
#endif
{
/*
* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this
* check once already when we first received the record - but
* we might have updated the window since then due to
* records we subsequently processed.
*/
replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap);
}
if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
/* dump this record */
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
continue;
}
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0)
return 0;
}
}
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
* Application data protocol
* none of our business
*/
s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch;
s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1;
return 1;
}
| 165,194 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DownloadRequestLimiter::TabDownloadState::SetDownloadStatusAndNotifyImpl(
DownloadStatus status,
ContentSetting setting) {
DCHECK((GetSettingFromDownloadStatus(status) == setting) ||
(GetDownloadStatusFromSetting(setting) == status))
<< "status " << status << " and setting " << setting
<< " do not correspond to each other";
ContentSetting last_setting = GetSettingFromDownloadStatus(status_);
DownloadUiStatus last_ui_status = ui_status_;
status_ = status;
ui_status_ = GetUiStatusFromDownloadStatus(status_, download_seen_);
if (!web_contents())
return;
if (last_setting == setting && last_ui_status == ui_status_)
return;
content::NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_WEB_CONTENT_SETTINGS_CHANGED,
content::Source<content::WebContents>(web_contents()),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
Commit Message: Don't reset TabDownloadState on history back/forward
Currently performing forward/backward on a tab will reset the TabDownloadState.
Which allows javascript code to do trigger multiple downloads.
This CL disables that behavior by not resetting the TabDownloadState on
forward/back.
It is still possible to reset the TabDownloadState through user gesture
or using browser initiated download.
BUG=848535
Change-Id: I7f9bf6e8fb759b4dcddf5ac0c214e8c6c9f48863
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1108959
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#574437}
CWE ID: | void DownloadRequestLimiter::TabDownloadState::SetDownloadStatusAndNotifyImpl(
DownloadStatus status,
ContentSetting setting) {
DCHECK((GetSettingFromDownloadStatus(status) == setting) ||
(GetDownloadStatusFromSetting(setting) == status))
<< "status " << status << " and setting " << setting
<< " do not correspond to each other";
ContentSetting last_setting = GetSettingFromDownloadStatus(status_);
DownloadUiStatus last_ui_status = ui_status_;
status_ = status;
ui_status_ = GetUiStatusFromDownloadStatus(status_, download_seen_);
if (!web_contents())
return;
if (status_ == PROMPT_BEFORE_DOWNLOAD || status_ == DOWNLOADS_NOT_ALLOWED) {
if (!initial_page_host_.empty())
restricted_hosts_.emplace(initial_page_host_);
}
if (last_setting == setting && last_ui_status == ui_status_)
return;
content::NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_WEB_CONTENT_SETTINGS_CHANGED,
content::Source<content::WebContents>(web_contents()),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
| 173,190 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::Cancel() {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Cancel";
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
pairing_delegate_->DismissDisplayOrConfirm();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::Cancel() {
| 171,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Layer::SetScrollOffset(gfx::Vector2d scroll_offset) {
DCHECK(IsPropertyChangeAllowed());
if (layer_tree_host()) {
scroll_offset = layer_tree_host()->DistributeScrollOffsetToViewports(
scroll_offset, this);
}
if (scroll_offset_ == scroll_offset)
return;
scroll_offset_ = scroll_offset;
SetNeedsCommit();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void Layer::SetScrollOffset(gfx::Vector2d scroll_offset) {
DCHECK(IsPropertyChangeAllowed());
if (scroll_offset_ == scroll_offset)
return;
scroll_offset_ = scroll_offset;
SetNeedsCommit();
}
| 171,198 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jas_matrix_t *jas_matrix_create(int numrows, int numcols)
{
jas_matrix_t *matrix;
int i;
if (!(matrix = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_matrix_t)))) {
return 0;
}
matrix->flags_ = 0;
matrix->numrows_ = numrows;
matrix->numcols_ = numcols;
matrix->rows_ = 0;
matrix->maxrows_ = numrows;
matrix->data_ = 0;
matrix->datasize_ = numrows * numcols;
if (matrix->maxrows_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->rows_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->maxrows_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t *)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
if (matrix->datasize_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->data_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->datasize_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
matrix->rows_[i] = &matrix->data_[i * matrix->numcols_];
}
for (i = 0; i < matrix->datasize_; ++i) {
matrix->data_[i] = 0;
}
matrix->xstart_ = 0;
matrix->ystart_ = 0;
matrix->xend_ = matrix->numcols_;
matrix->yend_ = matrix->numrows_;
return matrix;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a problem with a null pointer dereference in the BMP decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | jas_matrix_t *jas_matrix_create(int numrows, int numcols)
{
jas_matrix_t *matrix;
int i;
if (numrows < 0 || numcols < 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!(matrix = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_matrix_t)))) {
return 0;
}
matrix->flags_ = 0;
matrix->numrows_ = numrows;
matrix->numcols_ = numcols;
matrix->rows_ = 0;
matrix->maxrows_ = numrows;
matrix->data_ = 0;
matrix->datasize_ = numrows * numcols;
if (matrix->maxrows_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->rows_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->maxrows_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t *)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
if (matrix->datasize_ > 0) {
if (!(matrix->data_ = jas_alloc2(matrix->datasize_,
sizeof(jas_seqent_t)))) {
jas_matrix_destroy(matrix);
return 0;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
matrix->rows_[i] = &matrix->data_[i * matrix->numcols_];
}
for (i = 0; i < matrix->datasize_; ++i) {
matrix->data_[i] = 0;
}
matrix->xstart_ = 0;
matrix->ystart_ = 0;
matrix->xend_ = matrix->numcols_;
matrix->yend_ = matrix->numrows_;
return matrix;
}
| 168,755 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& MediaMetadataRetriever::getService()
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(sServiceLock);
if (sService == 0) {
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
sp<IBinder> binder;
do {
binder = sm->getService(String16("media.player"));
if (binder != 0) {
break;
}
ALOGW("MediaPlayerService not published, waiting...");
usleep(500000); // 0.5 s
} while (true);
if (sDeathNotifier == NULL) {
sDeathNotifier = new DeathNotifier();
}
binder->linkToDeath(sDeathNotifier);
sService = interface_cast<IMediaPlayerService>(binder);
}
ALOGE_IF(sService == 0, "no MediaPlayerService!?");
return sService;
}
Commit Message: Get service by value instead of reference
to prevent a cleared service binder from being used.
Bug: 26040840
Change-Id: Ifb5483c55b172d3553deb80dbe27f2204b86ecdb
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& MediaMetadataRetriever::getService()
const sp<IMediaPlayerService> MediaMetadataRetriever::getService()
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(sServiceLock);
if (sService == 0) {
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
sp<IBinder> binder;
do {
binder = sm->getService(String16("media.player"));
if (binder != 0) {
break;
}
ALOGW("MediaPlayerService not published, waiting...");
usleep(500000); // 0.5 s
} while (true);
if (sDeathNotifier == NULL) {
sDeathNotifier = new DeathNotifier();
}
binder->linkToDeath(sDeathNotifier);
sService = interface_cast<IMediaPlayerService>(binder);
}
ALOGE_IF(sService == 0, "no MediaPlayerService!?");
return sService;
}
| 173,912 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long mkvparser::GetUIntLength(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long& len) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
int status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
len = 1;
if (pos >= available)
return pos; // too few bytes available
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
assert(status == 0);
if (b == 0) // we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m)) {
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long long mkvparser::GetUIntLength(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long ReadID(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long& len) {
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0 || len < 1 || len > 4) {
// An ID must be at least 1 byte long, and cannot exceed 4.
// See EBMLMaxIDLength: http://www.matroska.org/technical/specs/index.html
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
return id;
}
long long GetUIntLength(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long& len) {
if (!pReader || pos < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long long total, available;
int status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
if (status < 0 || (total >= 0 && available > total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
len = 1;
if (pos >= available)
return pos; // too few bytes available
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status != 0)
return status;
if (b == 0) // we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m)) {
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
return 0; // success
}
| 173,824 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long mkvparser::GetUIntLength(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long& len)
{
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
int status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
len = 1;
if (pos >= available)
return pos; //too few bytes available
//// TODO(vigneshv): This function assumes that unsigned values never have their
//// high bit set.
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
assert(status == 0);
if (b == 0) //we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m))
{
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
return 0; //success
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long mkvparser::GetUIntLength(
long long mkvparser::GetUIntLength(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long& len) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
int status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
len = 1;
if (pos >= available)
return pos; // too few bytes available
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
assert(status == 0);
if (b == 0) // we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m)) {
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
return 0; // success
}
//// TODO(vigneshv): This function assumes that unsigned values never have their
//// high bit set.
long long mkvparser::UnserializeUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
if ((size <= 0) || (size > 8))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long long result = 0;
for (long long i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
| 174,377 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void nfs4_open_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *data = calldata;
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp = data->owner;
if (nfs_wait_on_sequence(data->o_arg.seqid, task) != 0)
return;
/*
* Check if we still need to send an OPEN call, or if we can use
* a delegation instead.
*/
if (data->state != NULL) {
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
if (can_open_cached(data->state, data->o_arg.open_flags & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE|O_EXCL)))
goto out_no_action;
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(NFS_I(data->state->inode)->delegation);
if (delegation != NULL &&
test_bit(NFS_DELEGATION_NEED_RECLAIM, &delegation->flags) == 0) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_no_action;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
/* Update sequence id. */
data->o_arg.id = sp->so_owner_id.id;
data->o_arg.clientid = sp->so_client->cl_clientid;
if (data->o_arg.claim == NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_PREVIOUS) {
task->tk_msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_OPEN_NOATTR];
nfs_copy_fh(&data->o_res.fh, data->o_arg.fh);
}
data->timestamp = jiffies;
rpc_call_start(task);
return;
out_no_action:
task->tk_action = NULL;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | static void nfs4_open_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *data = calldata;
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp = data->owner;
if (nfs_wait_on_sequence(data->o_arg.seqid, task) != 0)
return;
/*
* Check if we still need to send an OPEN call, or if we can use
* a delegation instead.
*/
if (data->state != NULL) {
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
if (can_open_cached(data->state, data->o_arg.fmode, data->o_arg.open_flags))
goto out_no_action;
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(NFS_I(data->state->inode)->delegation);
if (delegation != NULL &&
test_bit(NFS_DELEGATION_NEED_RECLAIM, &delegation->flags) == 0) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_no_action;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
/* Update sequence id. */
data->o_arg.id = sp->so_owner_id.id;
data->o_arg.clientid = sp->so_client->cl_clientid;
if (data->o_arg.claim == NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_PREVIOUS) {
task->tk_msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_OPEN_NOATTR];
nfs_copy_fh(&data->o_res.fh, data->o_arg.fh);
}
data->timestamp = jiffies;
rpc_call_start(task);
return;
out_no_action:
task->tk_action = NULL;
}
| 165,695 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: make_transform_images(png_store *ps)
{
png_byte colour_type = 0;
png_byte bit_depth = 0;
unsigned int palette_number = 0;
/* This is in case of errors. */
safecat(ps->test, sizeof ps->test, 0, "make standard images");
/* Use next_format to enumerate all the combinations we test, including
* generating multiple low bit depth palette images.
*/
while (next_format(&colour_type, &bit_depth, &palette_number, 0))
{
int interlace_type;
for (interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_NONE;
interlace_type < INTERLACE_LAST; ++interlace_type)
{
char name[FILE_NAME_SIZE];
standard_name(name, sizeof name, 0, colour_type, bit_depth,
palette_number, interlace_type, 0, 0, 0);
make_transform_image(ps, colour_type, bit_depth, palette_number,
interlace_type, name);
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | make_transform_images(png_store *ps)
make_transform_images(png_modifier *pm)
{
png_byte colour_type = 0;
png_byte bit_depth = 0;
unsigned int palette_number = 0;
/* This is in case of errors. */
safecat(pm->this.test, sizeof pm->this.test, 0, "make standard images");
/* Use next_format to enumerate all the combinations we test, including
* generating multiple low bit depth palette images. Non-A images (palette
* and direct) are created with and without tRNS chunks.
*/
while (next_format(&colour_type, &bit_depth, &palette_number, 1, 1))
{
int interlace_type;
for (interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_NONE;
interlace_type < INTERLACE_LAST; ++interlace_type)
{
char name[FILE_NAME_SIZE];
standard_name(name, sizeof name, 0, colour_type, bit_depth,
palette_number, interlace_type, 0, 0, do_own_interlace);
make_transform_image(&pm->this, colour_type, bit_depth, palette_number,
interlace_type, name);
}
}
}
| 173,666 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RegisterProperties(const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
current_ime_properties_ = prop_list;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
PropertyListChanged(this,
current_ime_properties_));
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void RegisterProperties(const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
void RegisterProperties(const input_method::ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
current_ime_properties_ = prop_list;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(InputMethodLibrary::Observer, observers_,
PropertyListChanged(this,
current_ime_properties_));
}
| 170,501 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int svc_rdma_sendto(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
struct svc_xprt *xprt = rqstp->rq_xprt;
struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma =
container_of(xprt, struct svcxprt_rdma, sc_xprt);
struct rpcrdma_msg *rdma_argp;
struct rpcrdma_msg *rdma_resp;
struct rpcrdma_write_array *wr_ary, *rp_ary;
int ret;
int inline_bytes;
struct page *res_page;
struct svc_rdma_req_map *vec;
u32 inv_rkey;
__be32 *p;
dprintk("svcrdma: sending response for rqstp=%p\n", rqstp);
/* Get the RDMA request header. The receive logic always
* places this at the start of page 0.
*/
rdma_argp = page_address(rqstp->rq_pages[0]);
svc_rdma_get_write_arrays(rdma_argp, &wr_ary, &rp_ary);
inv_rkey = 0;
if (rdma->sc_snd_w_inv)
inv_rkey = svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey(rdma_argp, wr_ary, rp_ary);
/* Build an req vec for the XDR */
vec = svc_rdma_get_req_map(rdma);
ret = svc_rdma_map_xdr(rdma, &rqstp->rq_res, vec, wr_ary != NULL);
if (ret)
goto err0;
inline_bytes = rqstp->rq_res.len;
/* Create the RDMA response header. xprt->xpt_mutex,
* acquired in svc_send(), serializes RPC replies. The
* code path below that inserts the credit grant value
* into each transport header runs only inside this
* critical section.
*/
ret = -ENOMEM;
res_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!res_page)
goto err0;
rdma_resp = page_address(res_page);
p = &rdma_resp->rm_xid;
*p++ = rdma_argp->rm_xid;
*p++ = rdma_argp->rm_vers;
*p++ = rdma->sc_fc_credits;
*p++ = rp_ary ? rdma_nomsg : rdma_msg;
/* Start with empty chunks */
*p++ = xdr_zero;
*p++ = xdr_zero;
*p = xdr_zero;
/* Send any write-chunk data and build resp write-list */
if (wr_ary) {
ret = send_write_chunks(rdma, wr_ary, rdma_resp, rqstp, vec);
if (ret < 0)
goto err1;
inline_bytes -= ret + xdr_padsize(ret);
}
/* Send any reply-list data and update resp reply-list */
if (rp_ary) {
ret = send_reply_chunks(rdma, rp_ary, rdma_resp, rqstp, vec);
if (ret < 0)
goto err1;
inline_bytes -= ret;
}
/* Post a fresh Receive buffer _before_ sending the reply */
ret = svc_rdma_post_recv(rdma, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret)
goto err1;
ret = send_reply(rdma, rqstp, res_page, rdma_resp, vec,
inline_bytes, inv_rkey);
if (ret < 0)
goto err0;
svc_rdma_put_req_map(rdma, vec);
dprintk("svcrdma: send_reply returns %d\n", ret);
return ret;
err1:
put_page(res_page);
err0:
svc_rdma_put_req_map(rdma, vec);
pr_err("svcrdma: Could not send reply, err=%d. Closing transport.\n",
ret);
set_bit(XPT_CLOSE, &rdma->sc_xprt.xpt_flags);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | int svc_rdma_sendto(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
struct svc_xprt *xprt = rqstp->rq_xprt;
struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma =
container_of(xprt, struct svcxprt_rdma, sc_xprt);
__be32 *p, *rdma_argp, *rdma_resp, *wr_lst, *rp_ch;
struct xdr_buf *xdr = &rqstp->rq_res;
struct page *res_page;
int ret;
/* Find the call's chunk lists to decide how to send the reply.
* Receive places the Call's xprt header at the start of page 0.
*/
rdma_argp = page_address(rqstp->rq_pages[0]);
svc_rdma_get_write_arrays(rdma_argp, &wr_lst, &rp_ch);
dprintk("svcrdma: preparing response for XID 0x%08x\n",
be32_to_cpup(rdma_argp));
/* Create the RDMA response header. xprt->xpt_mutex,
* acquired in svc_send(), serializes RPC replies. The
* code path below that inserts the credit grant value
* into each transport header runs only inside this
* critical section.
*/
ret = -ENOMEM;
res_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!res_page)
goto err0;
rdma_resp = page_address(res_page);
p = rdma_resp;
*p++ = *rdma_argp;
*p++ = *(rdma_argp + 1);
*p++ = rdma->sc_fc_credits;
*p++ = rp_ch ? rdma_nomsg : rdma_msg;
/* Start with empty chunks */
*p++ = xdr_zero;
*p++ = xdr_zero;
*p = xdr_zero;
if (wr_lst) {
/* XXX: Presume the client sent only one Write chunk */
ret = svc_rdma_send_write_chunk(rdma, wr_lst, xdr);
if (ret < 0)
goto err2;
svc_rdma_xdr_encode_write_list(rdma_resp, wr_lst, ret);
}
if (rp_ch) {
ret = svc_rdma_send_reply_chunk(rdma, rp_ch, wr_lst, xdr);
if (ret < 0)
goto err2;
svc_rdma_xdr_encode_reply_chunk(rdma_resp, rp_ch, ret);
}
ret = svc_rdma_post_recv(rdma, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret)
goto err1;
ret = svc_rdma_send_reply_msg(rdma, rdma_argp, rdma_resp, rqstp,
wr_lst, rp_ch);
if (ret < 0)
goto err0;
return 0;
err2:
if (ret != -E2BIG)
goto err1;
ret = svc_rdma_post_recv(rdma, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret)
goto err1;
ret = svc_rdma_send_error_msg(rdma, rdma_resp, rqstp);
if (ret < 0)
goto err0;
return 0;
err1:
put_page(res_page);
err0:
pr_err("svcrdma: Could not send reply, err=%d. Closing transport.\n",
ret);
set_bit(XPT_CLOSE, &xprt->xpt_flags);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
| 168,175 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SoftVPX::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
bool EOSseen = false;
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
EOSseen = true;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
}
if (mImg == NULL) {
if (vpx_codec_decode(
(vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx,
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset,
inHeader->nFilledLen,
NULL,
0)) {
ALOGE("on2 decoder failed to decode frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter);
}
if (mImg != NULL) {
CHECK_EQ(mImg->fmt, IMG_FMT_I420);
uint32_t width = mImg->d_w;
uint32_t height = mImg->d_h;
bool portWillReset = false;
handlePortSettingsChange(&portWillReset, width, height);
if (portWillReset) {
return;
}
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nFlags = EOSseen ? OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS : 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer;
const uint8_t *srcY = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_Y];
const uint8_t *srcU = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_U];
const uint8_t *srcV = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_V];
size_t srcYStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_Y];
size_t srcUStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_U];
size_t srcVStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_V];
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mImg = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE - Remove deprecated image defines
libvpx has always supported the VPX_ prefixed versions of these defines.
The unprefixed versions have been removed in the most recent release.
https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libvpx/+/9cdaa3d72eade9ad162ef8f78a93bd8f85c6de10
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: I8a656f2262f117d7a95271f45100b8c6fd0a470f
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void SoftVPX::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
bool EOSseen = false;
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
EOSseen = true;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
}
if (mImg == NULL) {
if (vpx_codec_decode(
(vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx,
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset,
inHeader->nFilledLen,
NULL,
0)) {
ALOGE("on2 decoder failed to decode frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter);
}
if (mImg != NULL) {
CHECK_EQ(mImg->fmt, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420);
uint32_t width = mImg->d_w;
uint32_t height = mImg->d_h;
bool portWillReset = false;
handlePortSettingsChange(&portWillReset, width, height);
if (portWillReset) {
return;
}
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nFlags = EOSseen ? OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS : 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer;
const uint8_t *srcY = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y];
const uint8_t *srcU = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_U];
const uint8_t *srcV = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_V];
size_t srcYStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y];
size_t srcUStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_U];
size_t srcVStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_V];
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mImg = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
| 173,899 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void btsnoop_net_write(const void *data, size_t length) {
#if (!defined(BT_NET_DEBUG) || (BT_NET_DEBUG != TRUE))
return; // Disable using network sockets for security reasons
#endif
pthread_mutex_lock(&client_socket_lock_);
if (client_socket_ != -1) {
if (send(client_socket_, data, length, 0) == -1 && errno == ECONNRESET) {
safe_close_(&client_socket_);
}
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&client_socket_lock_);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void btsnoop_net_write(const void *data, size_t length) {
#if (!defined(BT_NET_DEBUG) || (BT_NET_DEBUG != TRUE))
return; // Disable using network sockets for security reasons
#endif
pthread_mutex_lock(&client_socket_lock_);
if (client_socket_ != -1) {
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(client_socket_, data, length, 0)) == -1 && errno == ECONNRESET) {
safe_close_(&client_socket_);
}
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&client_socket_lock_);
}
| 173,474 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_end_of_pic(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num)
{
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
WORD32 ret;
ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic = 1;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = 0xffff;
ps_dec->u2_mby = 0;
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_err->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return ERROR_NEW_FRAME_EXPECTED;
}
}
H264_MUTEX_LOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_processing(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* ih264d_decode_pic_order_cnt - calculate the Pic Order Cnt */
/* Needed to detect end of picture */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
if((0 == u1_is_idr_slice) && ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
ps_dec->u2_prev_ref_frame_num = ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
if(u1_is_idr_slice || ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5)
ps_dec->u2_prev_ref_frame_num = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_gaps_in_frame_num_value_allowed_flag)
{
ret = ih264d_decode_gaps_in_frame_num(ps_dec, u2_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst;
ps_prev_poc->u2_frame_num = ps_cur_poc->u2_frame_num;
ps_prev_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5;
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0];
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1];
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_cur_poc->u1_bot_field;
}
}
H264_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Initialize first_pb_nal_in_pic for error slices
first_pb_nal_in_pic was uninitialized for error clips
Bug: 29023649
Change-Id: Ie4e0a94059c5f675bf619e31534846e2c2ca58ae
CWE ID: CWE-172 | WORD32 ih264d_end_of_pic(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num)
{
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
WORD32 ret;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = 0xffff;
ps_dec->u2_mby = 0;
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_err->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return ERROR_NEW_FRAME_EXPECTED;
}
}
H264_MUTEX_LOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_processing(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* ih264d_decode_pic_order_cnt - calculate the Pic Order Cnt */
/* Needed to detect end of picture */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
if((0 == u1_is_idr_slice) && ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
ps_dec->u2_prev_ref_frame_num = ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
if(u1_is_idr_slice || ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5)
ps_dec->u2_prev_ref_frame_num = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_gaps_in_frame_num_value_allowed_flag)
{
ret = ih264d_decode_gaps_in_frame_num(ps_dec, u2_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst;
ps_prev_poc->u2_frame_num = ps_cur_poc->u2_frame_num;
ps_prev_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5;
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0];
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1];
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_cur_poc->u1_bot_field;
}
}
H264_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
return OK;
}
| 173,515 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jbig2_immediate_generic_region(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment, const byte *segment_data)
{
Jbig2RegionSegmentInfo rsi;
byte seg_flags;
int8_t gbat[8];
int offset;
int gbat_bytes = 0;
Jbig2GenericRegionParams params;
int code = 0;
Jbig2Image *image = NULL;
Jbig2WordStream *ws = NULL;
Jbig2ArithState *as = NULL;
Jbig2ArithCx *GB_stats = NULL;
/* 7.4.6 */
if (segment->data_length < 18)
return jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Segment too short");
jbig2_get_region_segment_info(&rsi, segment_data);
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_INFO, segment->number, "generic region: %d x %d @ (%d, %d), flags = %02x", rsi.width, rsi.height, rsi.x, rsi.y, rsi.flags);
/* 7.4.6.2 */
seg_flags = segment_data[17];
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_INFO, segment->number, "segment flags = %02x", seg_flags);
if ((seg_flags & 1) && (seg_flags & 6))
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "MMR is 1, but GBTEMPLATE is not 0");
/* 7.4.6.3 */
if (!(seg_flags & 1)) {
gbat_bytes = (seg_flags & 6) ? 2 : 8;
if (18 + gbat_bytes > segment->data_length)
return jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Segment too short");
memcpy(gbat, segment_data + 18, gbat_bytes);
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_INFO, segment->number, "gbat: %d, %d", gbat[0], gbat[1]);
}
offset = 18 + gbat_bytes;
/* Table 34 */
params.MMR = seg_flags & 1;
params.GBTEMPLATE = (seg_flags & 6) >> 1;
params.TPGDON = (seg_flags & 8) >> 3;
params.USESKIP = 0;
memcpy(params.gbat, gbat, gbat_bytes);
image = jbig2_image_new(ctx, rsi.width, rsi.height);
if (image == NULL)
return jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "unable to allocate generic image");
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "allocated %d x %d image buffer for region decode results", rsi.width, rsi.height);
if (params.MMR) {
code = jbig2_decode_generic_mmr(ctx, segment, ¶ms, segment_data + offset, segment->data_length - offset, image);
} else {
int stats_size = jbig2_generic_stats_size(ctx, params.GBTEMPLATE);
GB_stats = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2ArithCx, stats_size);
if (GB_stats == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "unable to allocate GB_stats in jbig2_immediate_generic_region");
goto cleanup;
}
memset(GB_stats, 0, stats_size);
ws = jbig2_word_stream_buf_new(ctx, segment_data + offset, segment->data_length - offset);
if (ws == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "unable to allocate ws in jbig2_immediate_generic_region");
goto cleanup;
}
as = jbig2_arith_new(ctx, ws);
if (as == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "unable to allocate as in jbig2_immediate_generic_region");
goto cleanup;
}
code = jbig2_decode_generic_region(ctx, segment, ¶ms, as, image, GB_stats);
}
if (code >= 0)
jbig2_page_add_result(ctx, &ctx->pages[ctx->current_page], image, rsi.x, rsi.y, rsi.op);
else
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "error while decoding immediate_generic_region");
cleanup:
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, as);
jbig2_word_stream_buf_free(ctx, ws);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, GB_stats);
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | jbig2_immediate_generic_region(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment, const byte *segment_data)
{
Jbig2RegionSegmentInfo rsi;
byte seg_flags;
int8_t gbat[8];
int offset;
uint32_t gbat_bytes = 0;
Jbig2GenericRegionParams params;
int code = 0;
Jbig2Image *image = NULL;
Jbig2WordStream *ws = NULL;
Jbig2ArithState *as = NULL;
Jbig2ArithCx *GB_stats = NULL;
/* 7.4.6 */
if (segment->data_length < 18)
return jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Segment too short");
jbig2_get_region_segment_info(&rsi, segment_data);
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_INFO, segment->number, "generic region: %d x %d @ (%d, %d), flags = %02x", rsi.width, rsi.height, rsi.x, rsi.y, rsi.flags);
/* 7.4.6.2 */
seg_flags = segment_data[17];
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_INFO, segment->number, "segment flags = %02x", seg_flags);
if ((seg_flags & 1) && (seg_flags & 6))
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "MMR is 1, but GBTEMPLATE is not 0");
/* 7.4.6.3 */
if (!(seg_flags & 1)) {
gbat_bytes = (seg_flags & 6) ? 2 : 8;
if (18 + gbat_bytes > segment->data_length)
return jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Segment too short");
memcpy(gbat, segment_data + 18, gbat_bytes);
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_INFO, segment->number, "gbat: %d, %d", gbat[0], gbat[1]);
}
offset = 18 + gbat_bytes;
/* Table 34 */
params.MMR = seg_flags & 1;
params.GBTEMPLATE = (seg_flags & 6) >> 1;
params.TPGDON = (seg_flags & 8) >> 3;
params.USESKIP = 0;
memcpy(params.gbat, gbat, gbat_bytes);
image = jbig2_image_new(ctx, rsi.width, rsi.height);
if (image == NULL)
return jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "unable to allocate generic image");
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "allocated %d x %d image buffer for region decode results", rsi.width, rsi.height);
if (params.MMR) {
code = jbig2_decode_generic_mmr(ctx, segment, ¶ms, segment_data + offset, segment->data_length - offset, image);
} else {
int stats_size = jbig2_generic_stats_size(ctx, params.GBTEMPLATE);
GB_stats = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2ArithCx, stats_size);
if (GB_stats == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "unable to allocate GB_stats in jbig2_immediate_generic_region");
goto cleanup;
}
memset(GB_stats, 0, stats_size);
ws = jbig2_word_stream_buf_new(ctx, segment_data + offset, segment->data_length - offset);
if (ws == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "unable to allocate ws in jbig2_immediate_generic_region");
goto cleanup;
}
as = jbig2_arith_new(ctx, ws);
if (as == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "unable to allocate as in jbig2_immediate_generic_region");
goto cleanup;
}
code = jbig2_decode_generic_region(ctx, segment, ¶ms, as, image, GB_stats);
}
if (code >= 0)
jbig2_page_add_result(ctx, &ctx->pages[ctx->current_page], image, rsi.x, rsi.y, rsi.op);
else
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "error while decoding immediate_generic_region");
cleanup:
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, as);
jbig2_word_stream_buf_free(ctx, ws);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, GB_stats);
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
return code;
}
| 165,486 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTServer::getPrimaryServicesImpl(
ScriptState* scriptState,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
String servicesUUID) {
if (!connected()) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
DOMException::create(NetworkError, kGATTServerNotConnected));
}
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
AddToActiveAlgorithms(resolver);
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothService* service = m_device->bluetooth()->service();
WTF::Optional<String> uuid = WTF::nullopt;
if (!servicesUUID.isEmpty())
uuid = servicesUUID;
service->RemoteServerGetPrimaryServices(
device()->id(), quantity, uuid,
convertToBaseCallback(
WTF::bind(&BluetoothRemoteGATTServer::GetPrimaryServicesCallback,
wrapPersistent(this), quantity, wrapPersistent(resolver))));
return promise;
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTServer::getPrimaryServicesImpl(
ScriptState* scriptState,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
String servicesUUID) {
if (!connected()) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
DOMException::create(NetworkError, kGATTServerNotConnected));
}
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
AddToActiveAlgorithms(resolver);
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothService* service = m_device->bluetooth()->service();
service->RemoteServerGetPrimaryServices(
device()->id(), quantity, servicesUUID,
convertToBaseCallback(
WTF::bind(&BluetoothRemoteGATTServer::GetPrimaryServicesCallback,
wrapPersistent(this), quantity, wrapPersistent(resolver))));
return promise;
}
| 172,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void TestAppInstancesHelper(const std::string& app_name) {
LOG(INFO) << "Start of test.";
extensions::ProcessMap* process_map =
extensions::ProcessMap::Get(browser()->profile());
ASSERT_TRUE(LoadExtension(
test_data_dir_.AppendASCII(app_name)));
const Extension* extension = GetSingleLoadedExtension();
GURL base_url = GetTestBaseURL(app_name);
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURLWithDisposition(
browser(), base_url.Resolve("path1/empty.html"),
WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB,
ui_test_utils::BROWSER_TEST_WAIT_FOR_NAVIGATION);
LOG(INFO) << "Nav 1.";
EXPECT_TRUE(process_map->Contains(
browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(1)->
GetRenderProcessHost()->GetID()));
EXPECT_FALSE(browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(1)->GetWebUI());
content::WindowedNotificationObserver tab_added_observer(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_TAB_ADDED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
chrome::NewTab(browser());
tab_added_observer.Wait();
LOG(INFO) << "New tab.";
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(),
base_url.Resolve("path2/empty.html"));
LOG(INFO) << "Nav 2.";
EXPECT_TRUE(process_map->Contains(
browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(2)->
GetRenderProcessHost()->GetID()));
EXPECT_FALSE(browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(2)->GetWebUI());
ASSERT_EQ(3, browser()->tab_strip_model()->count());
WebContents* tab1 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(1);
WebContents* tab2 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(2);
EXPECT_NE(tab1->GetRenderProcessHost(), tab2->GetRenderProcessHost());
ASSERT_EQ(1u, chrome::GetBrowserCount(browser()->profile()));
OpenWindow(tab1, base_url.Resolve("path1/empty.html"), true, NULL);
LOG(INFO) << "WindowOpenHelper 1.";
OpenWindow(tab2, base_url.Resolve("path2/empty.html"), true, NULL);
LOG(INFO) << "End of test.";
UnloadExtension(extension->id());
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
CWE ID: | void TestAppInstancesHelper(const std::string& app_name) {
LOG(INFO) << "Start of test.";
extensions::ProcessMap* process_map =
extensions::ProcessMap::Get(browser()->profile());
ASSERT_TRUE(LoadExtension(
test_data_dir_.AppendASCII(app_name)));
const Extension* extension = GetSingleLoadedExtension();
GURL base_url = GetTestBaseURL(app_name);
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURLWithDisposition(
browser(), base_url.Resolve("path1/empty.html"),
WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB,
ui_test_utils::BROWSER_TEST_WAIT_FOR_NAVIGATION);
LOG(INFO) << "Nav 1.";
EXPECT_TRUE(process_map->Contains(
browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(1)->
GetRenderProcessHost()->GetID()));
EXPECT_FALSE(browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(1)->GetWebUI());
content::WindowedNotificationObserver tab_added_observer(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_TAB_ADDED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
chrome::NewTab(browser());
tab_added_observer.Wait();
LOG(INFO) << "New tab.";
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(),
base_url.Resolve("path2/empty.html"));
LOG(INFO) << "Nav 2.";
EXPECT_TRUE(process_map->Contains(
browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(2)->
GetRenderProcessHost()->GetID()));
EXPECT_FALSE(browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(2)->GetWebUI());
ASSERT_EQ(3, browser()->tab_strip_model()->count());
WebContents* tab1 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(1);
WebContents* tab2 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(2);
EXPECT_NE(tab1->GetRenderProcessHost(), tab2->GetRenderProcessHost());
ASSERT_EQ(1u, chrome::GetBrowserCount(browser()->profile()));
OpenWindow(tab1, base_url.Resolve("path1/empty.html"), true, true, NULL);
LOG(INFO) << "WindowOpenHelper 1.";
OpenWindow(tab2, base_url.Resolve("path2/empty.html"), true, true, NULL);
LOG(INFO) << "End of test.";
UnloadExtension(extension->id());
}
| 172,956 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: netdutils::Status XfrmController::ipSecSetEncapSocketOwner(const android::base::unique_fd& socket,
int newUid, uid_t callerUid) {
ALOGD("XfrmController:%s, line=%d", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
const int fd = socket.get();
struct stat info;
if (fstat(fd, &info)) {
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(errno, "Failed to stat socket file descriptor");
}
if (info.st_uid != callerUid) {
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EPERM, "fchown disabled for non-owner calls");
}
if (S_ISSOCK(info.st_mode) == 0) {
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EINVAL, "File descriptor was not a socket");
}
int optval;
socklen_t optlen;
netdutils::Status status =
getSyscallInstance().getsockopt(Fd(socket), IPPROTO_UDP, UDP_ENCAP, &optval, &optlen);
if (status != netdutils::status::ok) {
return status;
}
if (optval != UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP && optval != UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE) {
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EINVAL, "Socket did not have UDP-encap sockopt set");
}
if (fchown(fd, newUid, -1)) {
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(errno, "Failed to fchown socket file descriptor");
}
return netdutils::status::ok;
}
Commit Message: Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
CWE ID: CWE-909 | netdutils::Status XfrmController::ipSecSetEncapSocketOwner(const android::base::unique_fd& socket,
int newUid, uid_t callerUid) {
ALOGD("XfrmController:%s, line=%d", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
const int fd = socket.get();
struct stat info;
if (fstat(fd, &info)) {
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(errno, "Failed to stat socket file descriptor");
}
if (info.st_uid != callerUid) {
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EPERM, "fchown disabled for non-owner calls");
}
if (S_ISSOCK(info.st_mode) == 0) {
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EINVAL, "File descriptor was not a socket");
}
int optval;
socklen_t optlen = sizeof(optval);
netdutils::Status status =
getSyscallInstance().getsockopt(Fd(socket), IPPROTO_UDP, UDP_ENCAP, &optval, &optlen);
if (status != netdutils::status::ok) {
return status;
}
if (optval != UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP && optval != UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE) {
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EINVAL, "Socket did not have UDP-encap sockopt set");
}
if (fchown(fd, newUid, -1)) {
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(errno, "Failed to fchown socket file descriptor");
}
return netdutils::status::ok;
}
| 174,073 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> CloneVideoFrameWithLayout(
const VideoFrame* const src_frame,
const VideoFrameLayout& dst_layout) {
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->IsMappable());
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->format() == dst_layout.format());
auto dst_frame = VideoFrame::CreateFrameWithLayout(
dst_layout, src_frame->visible_rect(), src_frame->natural_size(),
src_frame->timestamp(), false /* zero_initialize_memory*/);
if (!dst_frame) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create VideoFrame";
return nullptr;
}
const size_t num_planes = VideoFrame::NumPlanes(dst_layout.format());
LOG_ASSERT(dst_layout.planes().size() == num_planes);
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->layout().planes().size() == num_planes);
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_planes; ++i) {
libyuv::CopyPlane(
src_frame->data(i), src_frame->layout().planes()[i].stride,
dst_frame->data(i), dst_frame->layout().planes()[i].stride,
VideoFrame::Columns(i, dst_frame->format(),
dst_frame->natural_size().width()),
VideoFrame::Rows(i, dst_frame->format(),
dst_frame->natural_size().height()));
}
return dst_frame;
}
Commit Message: media/gpu/test: ImageProcessorClient: Use bytes for width and height in libyuv::CopyPlane()
|width| is in bytes in libyuv::CopyPlane(). We formerly pass width in pixels.
This should matter when a pixel format is used whose pixel is composed of
more than one bytes.
Bug: None
Test: image_processor_test
Change-Id: I98e90be70c8d0128319172d4d19f3a8017b65d78
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1553129
Commit-Queue: Hirokazu Honda <hiroh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#648117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> CloneVideoFrameWithLayout(
const VideoFrame* const src_frame,
const VideoFrameLayout& dst_layout) {
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->IsMappable());
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->format() == dst_layout.format());
auto dst_frame = VideoFrame::CreateFrameWithLayout(
dst_layout, src_frame->visible_rect(), src_frame->natural_size(),
src_frame->timestamp(), false /* zero_initialize_memory*/);
if (!dst_frame) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create VideoFrame";
return nullptr;
}
const size_t num_planes = VideoFrame::NumPlanes(dst_layout.format());
LOG_ASSERT(dst_layout.planes().size() == num_planes);
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->layout().planes().size() == num_planes);
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_planes; ++i) {
// |width| in libyuv::CopyPlane() is in bytes, not pixels.
gfx::Size plane_size = VideoFrame::PlaneSize(dst_frame->format(), i,
dst_frame->natural_size());
libyuv::CopyPlane(
src_frame->data(i), src_frame->layout().planes()[i].stride,
dst_frame->data(i), dst_frame->layout().planes()[i].stride,
plane_size.width(), plane_size.height());
}
return dst_frame;
}
| 172,397 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: setElementTypePrefix(XML_Parser parser, ELEMENT_TYPE *elementType)
{
DTD * const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
const XML_Char *name;
for (name = elementType->name; *name; name++) {
if (*name == XML_T(ASCII_COLON)) {
PREFIX *prefix;
const XML_Char *s;
for (s = elementType->name; s != name; s++) {
if (!poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, *s))
return 0;
}
if (!poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, XML_T('\0')))
return 0;
prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes, poolStart(&dtd->pool),
sizeof(PREFIX));
if (!prefix)
return 0;
if (prefix->name == poolStart(&dtd->pool))
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
else
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
elementType->prefix = prefix;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | setElementTypePrefix(XML_Parser parser, ELEMENT_TYPE *elementType)
{
DTD * const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
const XML_Char *name;
for (name = elementType->name; *name; name++) {
if (*name == XML_T(ASCII_COLON)) {
PREFIX *prefix;
const XML_Char *s;
for (s = elementType->name; s != name; s++) {
if (!poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, *s))
return 0;
}
if (!poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, XML_T('\0')))
return 0;
prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes, poolStart(&dtd->pool),
sizeof(PREFIX));
if (!prefix)
return 0;
if (prefix->name == poolStart(&dtd->pool))
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
else
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
elementType->prefix = prefix;
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
| 169,775 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int sysMapFD(int fd, MemMapping* pMap)
{
off_t start;
size_t length;
void* memPtr;
assert(pMap != NULL);
if (getFileStartAndLength(fd, &start, &length) < 0)
return -1;
memPtr = mmap(NULL, length, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, start);
if (memPtr == MAP_FAILED) {
LOGW("mmap(%d, R, PRIVATE, %d, %d) failed: %s\n", (int) length,
fd, (int) start, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
pMap->addr = memPtr;
pMap->length = length;
pMap->range_count = 1;
pMap->ranges = malloc(sizeof(MappedRange));
pMap->ranges[0].addr = memPtr;
pMap->ranges[0].length = length;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows in recovery procedure.
Bug: 26960931
Change-Id: Ieae45caccfb4728fcf514f0d920976585d8e6caf
(cherry picked from commit 4f2df162c6ab4a71ca86e4b38735b681729c353b)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static int sysMapFD(int fd, MemMapping* pMap)
{
off_t start;
size_t length;
void* memPtr;
assert(pMap != NULL);
if (getFileStartAndLength(fd, &start, &length) < 0)
return -1;
memPtr = mmap(NULL, length, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, start);
if (memPtr == MAP_FAILED) {
LOGW("mmap(%d, R, PRIVATE, %d, %d) failed: %s\n", (int) length,
fd, (int) start, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
pMap->addr = memPtr;
pMap->length = length;
pMap->range_count = 1;
pMap->ranges = malloc(sizeof(MappedRange));
if (pMap->ranges == NULL) {
LOGE("malloc failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
munmap(memPtr, length);
return -1;
}
pMap->ranges[0].addr = memPtr;
pMap->ranges[0].length = length;
return 0;
}
| 173,904 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: rpl_dio_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
const struct nd_rpl_dio *dio = (const struct nd_rpl_dio *)bp;
const char *dagid_str;
ND_TCHECK(*dio);
dagid_str = ip6addr_string (ndo, dio->rpl_dagid);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [dagid:%s,seq:%u,instance:%u,rank:%u,%smop:%s,prf:%u]",
dagid_str,
dio->rpl_dtsn,
dio->rpl_instanceid,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dio->rpl_dagrank),
RPL_DIO_GROUNDED(dio->rpl_mopprf) ? "grounded,":"",
tok2str(rpl_mop_values, "mop%u", RPL_DIO_MOP(dio->rpl_mopprf)),
RPL_DIO_PRF(dio->rpl_mopprf)));
if(ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const struct rpl_dio_genoption *opt = (const struct rpl_dio_genoption *)&dio[1];
rpl_dio_printopt(ndo, opt, length);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|truncated]"));
return;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | rpl_dio_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
const struct nd_rpl_dio *dio = (const struct nd_rpl_dio *)bp;
const char *dagid_str;
ND_TCHECK(*dio);
dagid_str = ip6addr_string (ndo, dio->rpl_dagid);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [dagid:%s,seq:%u,instance:%u,rank:%u,%smop:%s,prf:%u]",
dagid_str,
dio->rpl_dtsn,
dio->rpl_instanceid,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dio->rpl_dagrank),
RPL_DIO_GROUNDED(dio->rpl_mopprf) ? "grounded,":"",
tok2str(rpl_mop_values, "mop%u", RPL_DIO_MOP(dio->rpl_mopprf)),
RPL_DIO_PRF(dio->rpl_mopprf)));
if(ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const struct rpl_dio_genoption *opt = (const struct rpl_dio_genoption *)&dio[1];
rpl_dio_printopt(ndo, opt, length);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", rpl_tstr));
return;
}
| 169,830 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SimilarToTopDomains(base::StringPiece16 hostname) {
size_t hostname_length = hostname.length() - (hostname.back() == '.' ? 1 : 0);
icu::UnicodeString ustr_host(FALSE, hostname.data(), hostname_length);
if (lgc_letters_n_ascii_.span(ustr_host, 0, USET_SPAN_CONTAINED) ==
ustr_host.length())
diacritic_remover_.get()->transliterate(ustr_host);
extra_confusable_mapper_.get()->transliterate(ustr_host);
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
icu::UnicodeString ustr_skeleton;
uspoof_getSkeletonUnicodeString(checker_, 0, ustr_host, ustr_skeleton,
&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status))
return false;
std::string skeleton;
return LookupMatchInTopDomains(ustr_skeleton.toUTF8String(skeleton));
}
Commit Message: Map U+04CF to lowercase L as well.
U+04CF (ӏ) has the confusability skeleton of 'i' (lowercase
I), but it can be confused for 'l' (lowercase L) or '1' (digit) if rendered
in some fonts.
If a host name contains it, calculate the confusability skeleton
twice, once with the default mapping to 'i' (lowercase I) and the 2nd
time with an alternative mapping to 'l'. Mapping them to 'l' (lowercase L)
also gets it treated as similar to digit 1 because the confusability
skeleton of digit 1 is 'l'.
Bug: 817247
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I7442b950c9457eea285e17f01d1f43c9acc5d79c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/974165
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#551263}
CWE ID: | bool IDNSpoofChecker::SimilarToTopDomains(base::StringPiece16 hostname) {
size_t hostname_length = hostname.length() - (hostname.back() == '.' ? 1 : 0);
icu::UnicodeString host(FALSE, hostname.data(), hostname_length);
if (lgc_letters_n_ascii_.span(host, 0, USET_SPAN_CONTAINED) == host.length())
diacritic_remover_.get()->transliterate(host);
extra_confusable_mapper_.get()->transliterate(host);
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
icu::UnicodeString skeleton;
// Map U+04CF (ӏ) to lowercase L in addition to what uspoof_getSkeleton does
// (mapping it to lowercase I).
int32_t u04cf_pos;
if ((u04cf_pos = host.indexOf(0x4CF)) != -1) {
icu::UnicodeString host_alt(host);
size_t length = host_alt.length();
char16_t* buffer = host_alt.getBuffer(-1);
for (char16_t* uc = buffer + u04cf_pos ; uc < buffer + length; ++uc) {
if (*uc == 0x4CF)
*uc = 0x6C; // Lowercase L
}
host_alt.releaseBuffer(length);
uspoof_getSkeletonUnicodeString(checker_, 0, host_alt, skeleton, &status);
if (U_SUCCESS(status) && LookupMatchInTopDomains(skeleton))
return true;
}
uspoof_getSkeletonUnicodeString(checker_, 0, host, skeleton, &status);
return U_SUCCESS(status) && LookupMatchInTopDomains(skeleton);
}
| 173,224 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool Editor::insertTextWithoutSendingTextEvent(const String& text,
bool selectInsertedText,
TextEvent* triggeringEvent) {
if (text.isEmpty())
return false;
const VisibleSelection& selection = selectionForCommand(triggeringEvent);
if (!selection.isContentEditable())
return false;
spellChecker().updateMarkersForWordsAffectedByEditing(
isSpaceOrNewline(text[0]));
TypingCommand::insertText(
*selection.start().document(), text, selection,
selectInsertedText ? TypingCommand::SelectInsertedText : 0,
triggeringEvent && triggeringEvent->isComposition()
? TypingCommand::TextCompositionConfirm
: TypingCommand::TextCompositionNone);
if (LocalFrame* editedFrame = selection.start().document()->frame()) {
if (Page* page = editedFrame->page()) {
LocalFrame* focusedOrMainFrame =
toLocalFrame(page->focusController().focusedOrMainFrame());
focusedOrMainFrame->selection().revealSelection(
ScrollAlignment::alignCenterIfNeeded);
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID: | bool Editor::insertTextWithoutSendingTextEvent(const String& text,
bool selectInsertedText,
TextEvent* triggeringEvent) {
if (text.isEmpty())
return false;
const VisibleSelection& selection = selectionForCommand(triggeringEvent);
if (!selection.isContentEditable())
return false;
spellChecker().updateMarkersForWordsAffectedByEditing(
isSpaceOrNewline(text[0]));
TypingCommand::insertText(
*selection.start().document(), text, selection.asSelection(),
selectInsertedText ? TypingCommand::SelectInsertedText : 0,
triggeringEvent && triggeringEvent->isComposition()
? TypingCommand::TextCompositionConfirm
: TypingCommand::TextCompositionNone);
if (LocalFrame* editedFrame = selection.start().document()->frame()) {
if (Page* page = editedFrame->page()) {
LocalFrame* focusedOrMainFrame =
toLocalFrame(page->focusController().focusedOrMainFrame());
focusedOrMainFrame->selection().revealSelection(
ScrollAlignment::alignCenterIfNeeded);
}
}
return true;
}
| 172,030 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: set_value(png_bytep row, size_t rowbytes, png_uint_32 x, unsigned int bit_depth,
png_uint_32 value, png_const_bytep gamma_table, double conv)
{
unsigned int mask = (1U << bit_depth)-1;
x *= bit_depth; /* Maximum x is 4*1024, maximum bit_depth is 16 */
if (value <= mask)
{
png_uint_32 offset = x >> 3;
if (offset < rowbytes && (bit_depth < 16 || offset+1 < rowbytes))
{
row += offset;
switch (bit_depth)
{
case 1:
case 2:
case 4:
/* Don't gamma correct - values get smashed */
{
unsigned int shift = (8 - bit_depth) - (x & 0x7U);
mask <<= shift;
value = (value << shift) & mask;
*row = (png_byte)((*row & ~mask) | value);
}
return;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: bad bit depth (internal error)\n");
exit(1);
case 16:
value = (unsigned int)floor(65535*pow(value/65535.,conv)+.5);
*row++ = (png_byte)(value >> 8);
*row = (png_byte)value;
return;
case 8:
*row = gamma_table[value];
return;
}
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: row buffer overflow (internal error)\n");
exit(1);
}
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: component overflow (internal error)\n");
exit(1);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | set_value(png_bytep row, size_t rowbytes, png_uint_32 x, unsigned int bit_depth,
png_uint_32 value, png_const_bytep gamma_table, double conv)
{
unsigned int mask = (1U << bit_depth)-1;
x *= bit_depth; /* Maximum x is 4*1024, maximum bit_depth is 16 */
if (value <= mask)
{
png_uint_32 offset = x >> 3;
if (offset < rowbytes && (bit_depth < 16 || offset+1 < rowbytes))
{
row += offset;
switch (bit_depth)
{
case 1:
case 2:
case 4:
/* Don't gamma correct - values get smashed */
{
unsigned int shift = (8 - bit_depth) - (x & 0x7U);
mask <<= shift;
value = (value << shift) & mask;
*row = (png_byte)((*row & ~mask) | value);
}
return;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: bad bit depth (internal error)\n");
exit(1);
case 16:
value = flooru(65535*pow(value/65535.,conv)+.5);
*row++ = (png_byte)(value >> 8);
*row = (png_byte)value;
return;
case 8:
*row = gamma_table[value];
return;
}
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: row buffer overflow (internal error)\n");
exit(1);
}
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: component overflow (internal error)\n");
exit(1);
}
}
| 173,585 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int wvlan_set_station_nickname(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
union iwreq_data *wrqu,
char *extra)
{
struct wl_private *lp = wl_priv(dev);
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DBG_FUNC("wvlan_set_station_nickname");
DBG_ENTER(DbgInfo);
wl_lock(lp, &flags);
memset(lp->StationName, 0, sizeof(lp->StationName));
memcpy(lp->StationName, extra, wrqu->data.length);
/* Commit the adapter parameters */
wl_apply(lp);
wl_unlock(lp, &flags);
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return ret;
} /* wvlan_set_station_nickname */
Commit Message: staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int wvlan_set_station_nickname(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
union iwreq_data *wrqu,
char *extra)
{
struct wl_private *lp = wl_priv(dev);
unsigned long flags;
size_t len;
int ret = 0;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DBG_FUNC("wvlan_set_station_nickname");
DBG_ENTER(DbgInfo);
wl_lock(lp, &flags);
memset(lp->StationName, 0, sizeof(lp->StationName));
len = min_t(size_t, wrqu->data.length, sizeof(lp->StationName));
strlcpy(lp->StationName, extra, len);
/* Commit the adapter parameters */
wl_apply(lp);
wl_unlock(lp, &flags);
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return ret;
} /* wvlan_set_station_nickname */
| 165,963 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: l2tp_bearer_cap_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_BEARER_CAP_ANALOG_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_BEARER_CAP_DIGITAL_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "D"));
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | l2tp_bearer_cap_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
l2tp_bearer_cap_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_BEARER_CAP_ANALOG_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_BEARER_CAP_DIGITAL_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "D"));
}
}
| 167,891 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void initializeHolderIfNeeded(ScriptState* scriptState, v8::Local<v8::Object> classObject, v8::Local<v8::Value> holder)
{
RELEASE_ASSERT(!holder.IsEmpty());
RELEASE_ASSERT(holder->IsObject());
v8::Local<v8::Object> holderObject = v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(holder);
v8::Isolate* isolate = scriptState->isolate();
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = scriptState->context();
auto privateIsInitialized = V8PrivateProperty::getPrivateScriptRunnerIsInitialized(isolate);
if (privateIsInitialized.hasValue(context, holderObject))
return; // Already initialized.
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> initializeFunction;
if (classObject->Get(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, "initialize")).ToLocal(&initializeFunction) && initializeFunction->IsFunction()) {
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> result;
if (!V8ScriptRunner::callFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(initializeFunction), scriptState->getExecutionContext(), holder, 0, 0, isolate).ToLocal(&result)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Object constructor threw an exception.\n");
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
}
if (classObject->GetPrototype() != holderObject->GetPrototype()) {
if (!v8CallBoolean(classObject->SetPrototype(context, holderObject->GetPrototype()))) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: SetPrototype failed.\n");
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
}
if (!v8CallBoolean(holderObject->SetPrototype(context, classObject))) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: SetPrototype failed.\n");
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
privateIsInitialized.set(context, holderObject, v8Boolean(true, isolate));
}
Commit Message: Blink-in-JS should not run micro tasks
If Blink-in-JS runs micro tasks, there's a risk of causing a UXSS bug
(see 645211 for concrete steps).
This CL makes Blink-in-JS use callInternalFunction (instead of callFunction)
to avoid running micro tasks after Blink-in-JS' callbacks.
BUG=645211
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2330843002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#417874}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | static void initializeHolderIfNeeded(ScriptState* scriptState, v8::Local<v8::Object> classObject, v8::Local<v8::Value> holder)
{
RELEASE_ASSERT(!holder.IsEmpty());
RELEASE_ASSERT(holder->IsObject());
v8::Local<v8::Object> holderObject = v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(holder);
v8::Isolate* isolate = scriptState->isolate();
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = scriptState->context();
auto privateIsInitialized = V8PrivateProperty::getPrivateScriptRunnerIsInitialized(isolate);
if (privateIsInitialized.hasValue(context, holderObject))
return; // Already initialized.
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> initializeFunction;
if (classObject->Get(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, "initialize")).ToLocal(&initializeFunction) && initializeFunction->IsFunction()) {
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> result;
if (!V8ScriptRunner::callInternalFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(initializeFunction), holder, 0, 0, isolate).ToLocal(&result)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Object constructor threw an exception.\n");
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
}
if (classObject->GetPrototype() != holderObject->GetPrototype()) {
if (!v8CallBoolean(classObject->SetPrototype(context, holderObject->GetPrototype()))) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: SetPrototype failed.\n");
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
}
if (!v8CallBoolean(holderObject->SetPrototype(context, classObject))) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: SetPrototype failed.\n");
dumpV8Message(context, block.Message());
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
privateIsInitialized.set(context, holderObject, v8Boolean(true, isolate));
}
| 172,074 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: raptor_libxml_getEntity(void* user_data, const xmlChar *name) {
raptor_sax2* sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)user_data;
return libxml2_getEntity(sax2->xc, name);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | raptor_libxml_getEntity(void* user_data, const xmlChar *name) {
raptor_libxml_getEntity(void* user_data, const xmlChar *name)
{
raptor_sax2* sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)user_data;
xmlParserCtxtPtr xc = sax2->xc;
xmlEntityPtr ret = NULL;
if(!xc)
return NULL;
if(!xc->inSubset) {
/* looks for hardcoded set of entity names - lt, gt etc. */
ret = xmlGetPredefinedEntity(name);
if(ret) {
RAPTOR_DEBUG2("Entity '%s' found in predefined set\n", name);
return ret;
}
}
/* This section uses xmlGetDocEntity which looks for entities in
* memory only, never from a file or URI
*/
if(xc->myDoc && (xc->myDoc->standalone == 1)) {
RAPTOR_DEBUG2("Entity '%s' document is standalone\n", name);
/* Document is standalone: no entities are required to interpret doc */
if(xc->inSubset == 2) {
xc->myDoc->standalone = 0;
ret = xmlGetDocEntity(xc->myDoc, name);
xc->myDoc->standalone = 1;
} else {
ret = xmlGetDocEntity(xc->myDoc, name);
if(!ret) {
xc->myDoc->standalone = 0;
ret = xmlGetDocEntity(xc->myDoc, name);
xc->myDoc->standalone = 1;
}
}
} else {
ret = xmlGetDocEntity(xc->myDoc, name);
}
if(ret && !ret->children &&
(ret->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY)) {
/* Entity is an external general parsed entity. It may be in a
* catalog file, user file or user URI
*/
int val = 0;
xmlNodePtr children;
int load_entity = 0;
load_entity = RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(sax2, RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES);
if(load_entity)
load_entity = raptor_sax2_check_load_uri_string(sax2, ret->URI);
if(!load_entity) {
RAPTOR_DEBUG2("Not getting entity URI %s by policy\n", ret->URI);
children = xmlNewText((const xmlChar*)"");
} else {
/* Disable SAX2 handlers so that the SAX2 events do not all get
* sent to callbacks during dealing with the entity parsing.
*/
sax2->enabled = 0;
val = xmlParseCtxtExternalEntity(xc, ret->URI, ret->ExternalID, &children);
sax2->enabled = 1;
}
if(!val) {
xmlAddChildList((xmlNodePtr)ret, children);
} else {
xc->validate = 0;
return NULL;
}
ret->owner = 1;
/* Mark this entity as having been checked - never do this again */
if(!ret->checked)
ret->checked = 1;
}
return ret;
}
| 165,658 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport void RemoveDuplicateLayers(Image **images,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register Image
*curr,
*next;
RectangleInfo
bounds;
assert((*images) != (const Image *) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",(*images)->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
curr=GetFirstImageInList(*images);
for (; (next=GetNextImageInList(curr)) != (Image *) NULL; curr=next)
{
if ( curr->columns != next->columns || curr->rows != next->rows
|| curr->page.x != next->page.x || curr->page.y != next->page.y )
continue;
bounds=CompareImageBounds(curr,next,CompareAnyLayer,exception);
if ( bounds.x < 0 ) {
/*
the two images are the same, merge time delays and delete one.
*/
size_t time;
time = curr->delay*1000/curr->ticks_per_second;
time += next->delay*1000/next->ticks_per_second;
next->ticks_per_second = 100L;
next->delay = time*curr->ticks_per_second/1000;
next->iterations = curr->iterations;
*images = curr;
(void) DeleteImageFromList(images);
}
}
*images = GetFirstImageInList(*images);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629
CWE ID: CWE-369 | MagickExport void RemoveDuplicateLayers(Image **images,
MagickExport void RemoveDuplicateLayers(Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
RectangleInfo
bounds;
register Image
*image,
*next;
assert((*images) != (const Image *) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
(*images)->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=GetFirstImageInList(*images);
for ( ; (next=GetNextImageInList(image)) != (Image *) NULL; image=next)
{
if ((image->columns != next->columns) || (image->rows != next->rows) ||
(image->page.x != next->page.x) || (image->page.y != next->page.y))
continue;
bounds=CompareImageBounds(image,next,CompareAnyLayer,exception);
if (bounds.x < 0)
{
/*
Two images are the same, merge time delays and delete one.
*/
size_t
time;
time=1000*image->delay*PerceptibleReciprocal(image->ticks_per_second);
time+=1000*next->delay*PerceptibleReciprocal(next->ticks_per_second);
next->ticks_per_second=100L;
next->delay=time*image->ticks_per_second/1000;
next->iterations=image->iterations;
*images=image;
(void) DeleteImageFromList(images);
}
}
*images=GetFirstImageInList(*images);
}
| 169,588 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PaintImage AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::PaintImageForCurrentFrame() {
CheckThread();
if (!IsValid())
return PaintImage();
sk_sp<SkImage> image;
if (original_skia_image_ &&
original_skia_image_thread_id_ ==
Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->ThreadId()) {
image = original_skia_image_;
} else {
CreateImageFromMailboxIfNeeded();
image = texture_holder_->GetSkImage();
}
return CreatePaintImageBuilder()
.set_image(image, paint_image_content_id_)
.set_completion_state(PaintImage::CompletionState::DONE)
.TakePaintImage();
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | PaintImage AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::PaintImageForCurrentFrame() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (!IsValid())
return PaintImage();
sk_sp<SkImage> image;
if (original_skia_image_ &&
original_skia_image_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread()) {
image = original_skia_image_;
} else {
CreateImageFromMailboxIfNeeded();
image = texture_holder_->GetSkImage();
}
return CreatePaintImageBuilder()
.set_image(image, paint_image_content_id_)
.set_completion_state(PaintImage::CompletionState::DONE)
.TakePaintImage();
}
| 172,596 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::finalizeStream(const KURL& url)
{
if (isMainThread()) {
blobRegistry().finalizeStream(url);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url));
callOnMainThread(&finalizeStreamTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void ThreadableBlobRegistry::finalizeStream(const KURL& url)
void BlobRegistry::finalizeStream(const KURL& url)
{
if (isMainThread()) {
if (WebBlobRegistry* registry = blobRegistry())
registry->finalizeStream(url);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url));
callOnMainThread(&finalizeStreamTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
| 170,682 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SoftAVC::setDecodeArgs(
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip,
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader,
size_t timeStampIx) {
size_t sizeY = outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight();
size_t sizeUV;
uint8_t *pBuf;
ps_dec_ip->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t);
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
ps_dec_ip->e_cmd = IVD_CMD_VIDEO_DECODE;
/* When in flush and after EOS with zero byte input,
* inHeader is set to zero. Hence check for non-null */
if (inHeader) {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = timeStampIx;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer =
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = inHeader->nFilledLen;
} else {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = 0;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer = NULL;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = 0;
}
if (outHeader) {
pBuf = outHeader->pBuffer;
} else {
pBuf = mFlushOutBuffer;
}
sizeUV = sizeY / 4;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[0] = sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[1] = sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[2] = sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0] = pBuf;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1] = pBuf + sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2] = pBuf + sizeY + sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs = 3;
return;
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void SoftAVC::setDecodeArgs(
bool SoftAVC::setDecodeArgs(
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip,
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader,
size_t timeStampIx) {
size_t sizeY = outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight();
size_t sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t);
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
ps_dec_ip->e_cmd = IVD_CMD_VIDEO_DECODE;
/* When in flush and after EOS with zero byte input,
* inHeader is set to zero. Hence check for non-null */
if (inHeader) {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = timeStampIx;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer =
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = inHeader->nFilledLen;
} else {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = 0;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer = NULL;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = 0;
}
sizeUV = sizeY / 4;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[0] = sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[1] = sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[2] = sizeUV;
uint8_t *pBuf;
if (outHeader) {
if (outHeader->nAllocLen < sizeY + (sizeUV * 2)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27569635");
return false;
}
pBuf = outHeader->pBuffer;
} else {
// mFlushOutBuffer always has the right size.
pBuf = mFlushOutBuffer;
}
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0] = pBuf;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1] = pBuf + sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2] = pBuf + sizeY + sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs = 3;
return true;
}
| 174,180 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool extract_sockaddr(char *url, char **sockaddr_url, char **sockaddr_port)
{
char *url_begin, *url_end, *ipv6_begin, *ipv6_end, *port_start = NULL;
char url_address[256], port[6];
int url_len, port_len = 0;
*sockaddr_url = url;
url_begin = strstr(url, "//");
if (!url_begin)
url_begin = url;
else
url_begin += 2;
/* Look for numeric ipv6 entries */
ipv6_begin = strstr(url_begin, "[");
ipv6_end = strstr(url_begin, "]");
if (ipv6_begin && ipv6_end && ipv6_end > ipv6_begin)
url_end = strstr(ipv6_end, ":");
else
url_end = strstr(url_begin, ":");
if (url_end) {
url_len = url_end - url_begin;
port_len = strlen(url_begin) - url_len - 1;
if (port_len < 1)
return false;
port_start = url_end + 1;
} else
url_len = strlen(url_begin);
if (url_len < 1)
return false;
sprintf(url_address, "%.*s", url_len, url_begin);
if (port_len) {
char *slash;
snprintf(port, 6, "%.*s", port_len, port_start);
slash = strchr(port, '/');
if (slash)
*slash = '\0';
} else
strcpy(port, "80");
*sockaddr_port = strdup(port);
*sockaddr_url = strdup(url_address);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool extract_sockaddr(char *url, char **sockaddr_url, char **sockaddr_port)
{
char *url_begin, *url_end, *ipv6_begin, *ipv6_end, *port_start = NULL;
char url_address[256], port[6];
int url_len, port_len = 0;
*sockaddr_url = url;
url_begin = strstr(url, "//");
if (!url_begin)
url_begin = url;
else
url_begin += 2;
/* Look for numeric ipv6 entries */
ipv6_begin = strstr(url_begin, "[");
ipv6_end = strstr(url_begin, "]");
if (ipv6_begin && ipv6_end && ipv6_end > ipv6_begin)
url_end = strstr(ipv6_end, ":");
else
url_end = strstr(url_begin, ":");
if (url_end) {
url_len = url_end - url_begin;
port_len = strlen(url_begin) - url_len - 1;
if (port_len < 1)
return false;
port_start = url_end + 1;
} else
url_len = strlen(url_begin);
if (url_len < 1)
return false;
snprintf(url_address, 254, "%.*s", url_len, url_begin);
if (port_len) {
char *slash;
snprintf(port, 6, "%.*s", port_len, port_start);
slash = strchr(port, '/');
if (slash)
*slash = '\0';
} else
strcpy(port, "80");
*sockaddr_port = strdup(port);
*sockaddr_url = strdup(url_address);
return true;
}
| 166,304 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppLauncherHandler::FillAppDictionary(base::DictionaryValue* dictionary) {
base::AutoReset<bool> auto_reset(&ignore_changes_, true);
base::ListValue* list = new base::ListValue();
Profile* profile = Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui());
PrefService* prefs = profile->GetPrefs();
for (std::set<std::string>::iterator it = visible_apps_.begin();
it != visible_apps_.end(); ++it) {
const Extension* extension = extension_service_->GetInstalledExtension(*it);
if (extension && extensions::ui_util::ShouldDisplayInNewTabPage(
extension, profile)) {
base::DictionaryValue* app_info = GetAppInfo(extension);
list->Append(app_info);
}
}
dictionary->Set("apps", list);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableAppWindowLaunch", true);
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableCreateAppShortcut", true);
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableCreateAppShortcut", true);
#endif
const base::ListValue* app_page_names =
prefs->GetList(prefs::kNtpAppPageNames);
if (!app_page_names || !app_page_names->GetSize()) {
ListPrefUpdate update(prefs, prefs::kNtpAppPageNames);
base::ListValue* list = update.Get();
list->Set(0, new base::StringValue(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_APP_DEFAULT_PAGE_NAME)));
dictionary->Set("appPageNames",
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(list->DeepCopy()));
} else {
dictionary->Set("appPageNames",
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(app_page_names->DeepCopy()));
}
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void AppLauncherHandler::FillAppDictionary(base::DictionaryValue* dictionary) {
base::AutoReset<bool> auto_reset(&ignore_changes_, true);
base::ListValue* list = new base::ListValue();
Profile* profile = Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui());
PrefService* prefs = profile->GetPrefs();
for (std::set<std::string>::iterator it = visible_apps_.begin();
it != visible_apps_.end(); ++it) {
const Extension* extension = extension_service_->GetInstalledExtension(*it);
if (extension && extensions::ui_util::ShouldDisplayInNewTabPage(
extension, profile)) {
base::DictionaryValue* app_info = GetAppInfo(extension);
list->Append(app_info);
}
}
dictionary->Set("apps", list);
const base::ListValue* app_page_names =
prefs->GetList(prefs::kNtpAppPageNames);
if (!app_page_names || !app_page_names->GetSize()) {
ListPrefUpdate update(prefs, prefs::kNtpAppPageNames);
base::ListValue* list = update.Get();
list->Set(0, new base::StringValue(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_APP_DEFAULT_PAGE_NAME)));
dictionary->Set("appPageNames",
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(list->DeepCopy()));
} else {
dictionary->Set("appPageNames",
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(app_page_names->DeepCopy()));
}
}
| 171,147 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::OnCompositorSurfaceBuffersSwappedNoHost(
int32 surface_id,
uint64 surface_handle,
int32 route_id,
const gfx::Size& size,
int32 gpu_process_host_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host",
"RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnCompositorSurfaceBuffersSwappedNoHost");
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(route_id,
gpu_process_host_id,
false,
0);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderProcessHostImpl::OnCompositorSurfaceBuffersSwappedNoHost(
int32 surface_id,
uint64 surface_handle,
int32 route_id,
const gfx::Size& size,
int32 gpu_process_host_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host",
"RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnCompositorSurfaceBuffersSwappedNoHost");
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(route_id,
gpu_process_host_id,
surface_handle,
0);
}
| 171,365 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: t1_parse_font_matrix( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Matrix* matrix = &face->type1.font_matrix;
FT_Vector* offset = &face->type1.font_offset;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
FT_Int result;
result = T1_ToFixedArray( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
if ( result < 0 )
{
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
if ( temp_scale == 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_parse_font_matrix: invalid font matrix\n" ));
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
root->units_per_EM = (FT_UShort)FT_DivFix( 1000, temp_scale );
/* we need to scale the values by 1.0/temp_scale */
if ( temp_scale != 0x10000L )
{
temp[0] = FT_DivFix( temp[0], temp_scale );
temp[1] = FT_DivFix( temp[1], temp_scale );
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = temp[3] < 0 ? -0x10000L : 0x10000L;
}
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
/* note that the offsets must be expressed in integer font units */
offset->x = temp[4] >> 16;
offset->y = temp[5] >> 16;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | t1_parse_font_matrix( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Matrix* matrix = &face->type1.font_matrix;
FT_Vector* offset = &face->type1.font_offset;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
FT_Int result;
result = T1_ToFixedArray( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
if ( result < 6 )
{
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
if ( temp_scale == 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_parse_font_matrix: invalid font matrix\n" ));
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
root->units_per_EM = (FT_UShort)FT_DivFix( 1000, temp_scale );
/* we need to scale the values by 1.0/temp_scale */
if ( temp_scale != 0x10000L )
{
temp[0] = FT_DivFix( temp[0], temp_scale );
temp[1] = FT_DivFix( temp[1], temp_scale );
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = temp[3] < 0 ? -0x10000L : 0x10000L;
}
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
/* note that the offsets must be expressed in integer font units */
offset->x = temp[4] >> 16;
offset->y = temp[5] >> 16;
}
| 165,342 |
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