instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RemovingFromRootWindow() {
host_->ParentChanged(0);
ui::Compositor* compositor = GetCompositor();
RunCompositingDidCommitCallbacks(compositor);
locks_pending_commit_.clear();
if (compositor && compositor->HasObserver(this))
compositor->RemoveObserver(this);
DetachFromInputMethod();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RemovingFromRootWindow() {
host_->ParentChanged(0);
ui::Compositor* compositor = GetCompositor();
RunCompositingDidCommitCallbacks();
locks_pending_commit_.clear();
if (compositor && compositor->HasObserver(this))
compositor->RemoveObserver(this);
DetachFromInputMethod();
}
| 171,382 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void *) gdImageWebpPtrEx (gdImagePtr im, int *size, int quality)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
if (out == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, quality);
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6912
CWE ID: CWE-415 | BGD_DECLARE(void *) gdImageWebpPtrEx (gdImagePtr im, int *size, int quality)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
if (out == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (_gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, quality)) {
rv = NULL;
} else {
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
}
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
| 168,820 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void generic_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
get_page(buf->page);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void generic_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf)
bool generic_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
return try_get_page(buf->page);
}
| 170,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
struct dev_pagemap *pgmap = NULL;
int nr_start = *nr, ret = 0;
pte_t *ptep, *ptem;
ptem = ptep = pte_offset_map(&pmd, addr);
do {
pte_t pte = gup_get_pte(ptep);
struct page *head, *page;
/*
* Similar to the PMD case below, NUMA hinting must take slow
* path using the pte_protnone check.
*/
if (pte_protnone(pte))
goto pte_unmap;
if (!pte_access_permitted(pte, write))
goto pte_unmap;
if (pte_devmap(pte)) {
pgmap = get_dev_pagemap(pte_pfn(pte), pgmap);
if (unlikely(!pgmap)) {
undo_dev_pagemap(nr, nr_start, pages);
goto pte_unmap;
}
} else if (pte_special(pte))
goto pte_unmap;
VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pte_pfn(pte)));
page = pte_page(pte);
head = compound_head(page);
if (!page_cache_get_speculative(head))
goto pte_unmap;
if (unlikely(pte_val(pte) != pte_val(*ptep))) {
put_page(head);
goto pte_unmap;
}
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound_head(page) != head, page);
SetPageReferenced(page);
pages[*nr] = page;
(*nr)++;
} while (ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
ret = 1;
pte_unmap:
if (pgmap)
put_dev_pagemap(pgmap);
pte_unmap(ptem);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
struct dev_pagemap *pgmap = NULL;
int nr_start = *nr, ret = 0;
pte_t *ptep, *ptem;
ptem = ptep = pte_offset_map(&pmd, addr);
do {
pte_t pte = gup_get_pte(ptep);
struct page *head, *page;
/*
* Similar to the PMD case below, NUMA hinting must take slow
* path using the pte_protnone check.
*/
if (pte_protnone(pte))
goto pte_unmap;
if (!pte_access_permitted(pte, write))
goto pte_unmap;
if (pte_devmap(pte)) {
pgmap = get_dev_pagemap(pte_pfn(pte), pgmap);
if (unlikely(!pgmap)) {
undo_dev_pagemap(nr, nr_start, pages);
goto pte_unmap;
}
} else if (pte_special(pte))
goto pte_unmap;
VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pte_pfn(pte)));
page = pte_page(pte);
head = try_get_compound_head(page, 1);
if (!head)
goto pte_unmap;
if (unlikely(pte_val(pte) != pte_val(*ptep))) {
put_page(head);
goto pte_unmap;
}
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound_head(page) != head, page);
SetPageReferenced(page);
pages[*nr] = page;
(*nr)++;
} while (ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
ret = 1;
pte_unmap:
if (pgmap)
put_dev_pagemap(pgmap);
pte_unmap(ptem);
return ret;
}
| 170,228 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SocketStreamDispatcherHost::SocketStreamDispatcherHost(
int render_process_id,
ResourceMessageFilter::URLRequestContextSelector* selector,
content::ResourceContext* resource_context)
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(ssl_delegate_weak_factory_(this)),
render_process_id_(render_process_id),
url_request_context_selector_(selector),
resource_context_(resource_context) {
DCHECK(selector);
net::WebSocketJob::EnsureInit();
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | SocketStreamDispatcherHost::SocketStreamDispatcherHost(
int render_process_id,
ResourceMessageFilter::URLRequestContextSelector* selector,
content::ResourceContext* resource_context)
: render_process_id_(render_process_id),
url_request_context_selector_(selector),
resource_context_(resource_context) {
DCHECK(selector);
net::WebSocketJob::EnsureInit();
}
| 170,993 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
int err;
struct sock_diag_req *req = nlmsg_data(nlh);
const struct sock_diag_handler *hndl;
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT;
else
err = hndl->dump(skb, nlh);
sock_diag_unlock_handler(hndl);
return err;
}
Commit Message: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
int err;
struct sock_diag_req *req = nlmsg_data(nlh);
const struct sock_diag_handler *hndl;
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT;
else
err = hndl->dump(skb, nlh);
sock_diag_unlock_handler(hndl);
return err;
}
| 166,128 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host,
ContentViewCoreImpl* content_view_core)
: host_(widget_host),
is_layer_attached_(true),
content_view_core_(NULL),
ime_adapter_android_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
cached_background_color_(SK_ColorWHITE),
texture_id_in_layer_(0) {
if (CompositorImpl::UsesDirectGL()) {
surface_texture_transport_.reset(new SurfaceTextureTransportClient());
layer_ = surface_texture_transport_->Initialize();
} else {
texture_layer_ = cc::TextureLayer::create(0);
layer_ = texture_layer_;
}
layer_->setContentsOpaque(true);
layer_->setIsDrawable(true);
host_->SetView(this);
SetContentViewCore(content_view_core);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host,
ContentViewCoreImpl* content_view_core)
: host_(widget_host),
is_layer_attached_(true),
content_view_core_(NULL),
ime_adapter_android_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
cached_background_color_(SK_ColorWHITE),
texture_id_in_layer_(0),
current_buffer_id_(0) {
if (CompositorImpl::UsesDirectGL()) {
surface_texture_transport_.reset(new SurfaceTextureTransportClient());
layer_ = surface_texture_transport_->Initialize();
} else {
texture_layer_ = cc::TextureLayer::create(0);
layer_ = texture_layer_;
}
layer_->setContentsOpaque(true);
layer_->setIsDrawable(true);
host_->SetView(this);
SetContentViewCore(content_view_core);
}
| 171,370 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int f2fs_trim_fs(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct fstrim_range *range)
{
__u64 start = F2FS_BYTES_TO_BLK(range->start);
__u64 end = start + F2FS_BYTES_TO_BLK(range->len) - 1;
unsigned int start_segno, end_segno;
struct cp_control cpc;
int err = 0;
if (start >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi) || range->len < sbi->blocksize)
return -EINVAL;
cpc.trimmed = 0;
if (end <= MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi))
goto out;
if (is_sbi_flag_set(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK)) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
"Found FS corruption, run fsck to fix.");
goto out;
}
/* start/end segment number in main_area */
start_segno = (start <= MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi)) ? 0 : GET_SEGNO(sbi, start);
end_segno = (end >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi)) ? MAIN_SEGS(sbi) - 1 :
GET_SEGNO(sbi, end);
cpc.reason = CP_DISCARD;
cpc.trim_minlen = max_t(__u64, 1, F2FS_BYTES_TO_BLK(range->minlen));
/* do checkpoint to issue discard commands safely */
for (; start_segno <= end_segno; start_segno = cpc.trim_end + 1) {
cpc.trim_start = start_segno;
if (sbi->discard_blks == 0)
break;
else if (sbi->discard_blks < BATCHED_TRIM_BLOCKS(sbi))
cpc.trim_end = end_segno;
else
cpc.trim_end = min_t(unsigned int,
rounddown(start_segno +
BATCHED_TRIM_SEGMENTS(sbi),
sbi->segs_per_sec) - 1, end_segno);
mutex_lock(&sbi->gc_mutex);
err = write_checkpoint(sbi, &cpc);
mutex_unlock(&sbi->gc_mutex);
if (err)
break;
schedule();
}
/* It's time to issue all the filed discards */
mark_discard_range_all(sbi);
f2fs_wait_discard_bios(sbi);
out:
range->len = F2FS_BLK_TO_BYTES(cpc.trimmed);
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int f2fs_trim_fs(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct fstrim_range *range)
{
__u64 start = F2FS_BYTES_TO_BLK(range->start);
__u64 end = start + F2FS_BYTES_TO_BLK(range->len) - 1;
unsigned int start_segno, end_segno;
struct cp_control cpc;
int err = 0;
if (start >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi) || range->len < sbi->blocksize)
return -EINVAL;
cpc.trimmed = 0;
if (end <= MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi))
goto out;
if (is_sbi_flag_set(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK)) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
"Found FS corruption, run fsck to fix.");
goto out;
}
/* start/end segment number in main_area */
start_segno = (start <= MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi)) ? 0 : GET_SEGNO(sbi, start);
end_segno = (end >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi)) ? MAIN_SEGS(sbi) - 1 :
GET_SEGNO(sbi, end);
cpc.reason = CP_DISCARD;
cpc.trim_minlen = max_t(__u64, 1, F2FS_BYTES_TO_BLK(range->minlen));
/* do checkpoint to issue discard commands safely */
for (; start_segno <= end_segno; start_segno = cpc.trim_end + 1) {
cpc.trim_start = start_segno;
if (sbi->discard_blks == 0)
break;
else if (sbi->discard_blks < BATCHED_TRIM_BLOCKS(sbi))
cpc.trim_end = end_segno;
else
cpc.trim_end = min_t(unsigned int,
rounddown(start_segno +
BATCHED_TRIM_SEGMENTS(sbi),
sbi->segs_per_sec) - 1, end_segno);
mutex_lock(&sbi->gc_mutex);
err = write_checkpoint(sbi, &cpc);
mutex_unlock(&sbi->gc_mutex);
if (err)
break;
schedule();
}
/* It's time to issue all the filed discards */
mark_discard_range_all(sbi);
f2fs_wait_discard_bios(sbi, false);
out:
range->len = F2FS_BLK_TO_BYTES(cpc.trimmed);
return err;
}
| 169,413 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int copy_to_user_auth(struct xfrm_algo_auth *auth, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct xfrm_algo *algo;
struct nlattr *nla;
nla = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH,
sizeof(*algo) + (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
if (!nla)
return -EMSGSIZE;
algo = nla_data(nla);
strcpy(algo->alg_name, auth->alg_name);
memcpy(algo->alg_key, auth->alg_key, (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
algo->alg_key_len = auth->alg_key_len;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_auth()
copy_to_user_auth() fails to initialize the remainder of alg_name and
therefore discloses up to 54 bytes of heap memory via netlink to
userland.
Use strncpy() instead of strcpy() to fill the trailing bytes of alg_name
with null bytes.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int copy_to_user_auth(struct xfrm_algo_auth *auth, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct xfrm_algo *algo;
struct nlattr *nla;
nla = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH,
sizeof(*algo) + (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
if (!nla)
return -EMSGSIZE;
algo = nla_data(nla);
strncpy(algo->alg_name, auth->alg_name, sizeof(algo->alg_name));
memcpy(algo->alg_key, auth->alg_key, (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
algo->alg_key_len = auth->alg_key_len;
return 0;
}
| 166,188 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_compose)
{
smart_str loc_name_s = {0};
smart_str *loc_name = &loc_name_s;
zval* arr = NULL;
HashTable* hash_arr = NULL;
int result = 0;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "a",
&arr) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_compose: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
hash_arr = HASH_OF( arr );
if( !hash_arr || zend_hash_num_elements( hash_arr ) == 0 )
RETURN_FALSE;
/* Check for grandfathered first */
result = append_key_value(loc_name, hash_arr, LOC_GRANDFATHERED_LANG_TAG);
if( result == SUCCESS){
RETURN_SMART_STR(loc_name);
}
if( !handleAppendResult( result, loc_name TSRMLS_CC)){
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Not grandfathered */
result = append_key_value(loc_name, hash_arr , LOC_LANG_TAG);
if( result == LOC_NOT_FOUND ){
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_compose: parameter array does not contain 'language' tag.", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
smart_str_free(loc_name);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if( !handleAppendResult( result, loc_name TSRMLS_CC)){
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Extlang */
result = append_multiple_key_values(loc_name, hash_arr , LOC_EXTLANG_TAG TSRMLS_CC);
if( !handleAppendResult( result, loc_name TSRMLS_CC)){
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Script */
result = append_key_value(loc_name, hash_arr , LOC_SCRIPT_TAG);
if( !handleAppendResult( result, loc_name TSRMLS_CC)){
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Region */
result = append_key_value( loc_name, hash_arr , LOC_REGION_TAG);
if( !handleAppendResult( result, loc_name TSRMLS_CC)){
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Variant */
result = append_multiple_key_values( loc_name, hash_arr , LOC_VARIANT_TAG TSRMLS_CC);
if( !handleAppendResult( result, loc_name TSRMLS_CC)){
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Private */
result = append_multiple_key_values( loc_name, hash_arr , LOC_PRIVATE_TAG TSRMLS_CC);
if( !handleAppendResult( result, loc_name TSRMLS_CC)){
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_SMART_STR(loc_name);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | PHP_FUNCTION(locale_compose)
{
smart_str loc_name_s = {0};
smart_str *loc_name = &loc_name_s;
zval* arr = NULL;
HashTable* hash_arr = NULL;
int result = 0;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "a",
&arr) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_compose: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
hash_arr = HASH_OF( arr );
if( !hash_arr || zend_hash_num_elements( hash_arr ) == 0 )
RETURN_FALSE;
/* Check for grandfathered first */
result = append_key_value(loc_name, hash_arr, LOC_GRANDFATHERED_LANG_TAG);
if( result == SUCCESS){
RETURN_SMART_STR(loc_name);
}
if( !handleAppendResult( result, loc_name TSRMLS_CC)){
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Not grandfathered */
result = append_key_value(loc_name, hash_arr , LOC_LANG_TAG);
if( result == LOC_NOT_FOUND ){
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_compose: parameter array does not contain 'language' tag.", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
smart_str_free(loc_name);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if( !handleAppendResult( result, loc_name TSRMLS_CC)){
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Extlang */
result = append_multiple_key_values(loc_name, hash_arr , LOC_EXTLANG_TAG TSRMLS_CC);
if( !handleAppendResult( result, loc_name TSRMLS_CC)){
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Script */
result = append_key_value(loc_name, hash_arr , LOC_SCRIPT_TAG);
if( !handleAppendResult( result, loc_name TSRMLS_CC)){
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Region */
result = append_key_value( loc_name, hash_arr , LOC_REGION_TAG);
if( !handleAppendResult( result, loc_name TSRMLS_CC)){
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Variant */
result = append_multiple_key_values( loc_name, hash_arr , LOC_VARIANT_TAG TSRMLS_CC);
if( !handleAppendResult( result, loc_name TSRMLS_CC)){
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Private */
result = append_multiple_key_values( loc_name, hash_arr , LOC_PRIVATE_TAG TSRMLS_CC);
if( !handleAppendResult( result, loc_name TSRMLS_CC)){
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_SMART_STR(loc_name);
}
| 167,191 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: perform_gamma_threshold_tests(png_modifier *pm)
{
png_byte colour_type = 0;
png_byte bit_depth = 0;
unsigned int palette_number = 0;
/* Don't test more than one instance of each palette - it's pointless, in
* fact this test is somewhat excessive since libpng doesn't make this
* decision based on colour type or bit depth!
*/
while (next_format(&colour_type, &bit_depth, &palette_number, 1/*gamma*/))
if (palette_number == 0)
{
double test_gamma = 1.0;
while (test_gamma >= .4)
{
/* There's little point testing the interlacing vs non-interlacing,
* but this can be set from the command line.
*/
gamma_threshold_test(pm, colour_type, bit_depth, pm->interlace_type,
test_gamma, 1/test_gamma);
test_gamma *= .95;
}
/* And a special test for sRGB */
gamma_threshold_test(pm, colour_type, bit_depth, pm->interlace_type,
.45455, 2.2);
if (fail(pm))
return;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | perform_gamma_threshold_tests(png_modifier *pm)
{
png_byte colour_type = 0;
png_byte bit_depth = 0;
unsigned int palette_number = 0;
/* Don't test more than one instance of each palette - it's pointless, in
* fact this test is somewhat excessive since libpng doesn't make this
* decision based on colour type or bit depth!
*
* CHANGED: now test two palettes and, as a side effect, images with and
* without tRNS.
*/
while (next_format(&colour_type, &bit_depth, &palette_number,
pm->test_lbg_gamma_threshold, pm->test_tRNS))
if (palette_number < 2)
{
double test_gamma = 1.0;
while (test_gamma >= .4)
{
/* There's little point testing the interlacing vs non-interlacing,
* but this can be set from the command line.
*/
gamma_threshold_test(pm, colour_type, bit_depth, pm->interlace_type,
test_gamma, 1/test_gamma);
test_gamma *= .95;
}
/* And a special test for sRGB */
gamma_threshold_test(pm, colour_type, bit_depth, pm->interlace_type,
.45455, 2.2);
if (fail(pm))
return;
}
}
| 173,682 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalGetParameter(OMX_INDEXTYPE index,
OMX_PTR param) {
const int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitrate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *)param;
if (bitrate->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
bitrate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
if (mBitrateControlMode == VPX_VBR) {
bitrate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
} else if (mBitrateControlMode == VPX_CBR) {
bitrate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateConstant;
} else {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE *vp8Params =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE *)param;
if (vp8Params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
vp8Params->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_VP8ProfileMain;
vp8Params->eLevel = mLevel;
vp8Params->nDCTPartitions = mDCTPartitions;
vp8Params->bErrorResilientMode = mErrorResilience;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAndroidVp8Encoder: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ANDROID_VP8ENCODERTYPE *vp8AndroidParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ANDROID_VP8ENCODERTYPE *)param;
if (vp8AndroidParams->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
vp8AndroidParams->nKeyFrameInterval = mKeyFrameInterval;
vp8AndroidParams->eTemporalPattern = mTemporalPatternType;
vp8AndroidParams->nTemporalLayerCount = mTemporalLayers;
vp8AndroidParams->nMinQuantizer = mMinQuantizer;
vp8AndroidParams->nMaxQuantizer = mMaxQuantizer;
memcpy(vp8AndroidParams->nTemporalLayerBitrateRatio,
mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio, sizeof(mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio));
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, param);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalGetParameter(OMX_INDEXTYPE index,
OMX_PTR param) {
const int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitrate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *)param;
if (!isValidOMXParam(bitrate)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (bitrate->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
bitrate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
if (mBitrateControlMode == VPX_VBR) {
bitrate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
} else if (mBitrateControlMode == VPX_CBR) {
bitrate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateConstant;
} else {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE *vp8Params =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE *)param;
if (!isValidOMXParam(vp8Params)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (vp8Params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
vp8Params->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_VP8ProfileMain;
vp8Params->eLevel = mLevel;
vp8Params->nDCTPartitions = mDCTPartitions;
vp8Params->bErrorResilientMode = mErrorResilience;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAndroidVp8Encoder: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ANDROID_VP8ENCODERTYPE *vp8AndroidParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ANDROID_VP8ENCODERTYPE *)param;
if (!isValidOMXParam(vp8AndroidParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (vp8AndroidParams->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
vp8AndroidParams->nKeyFrameInterval = mKeyFrameInterval;
vp8AndroidParams->eTemporalPattern = mTemporalPatternType;
vp8AndroidParams->nTemporalLayerCount = mTemporalLayers;
vp8AndroidParams->nMinQuantizer = mMinQuantizer;
vp8AndroidParams->nMaxQuantizer = mMaxQuantizer;
memcpy(vp8AndroidParams->nTemporalLayerBitrateRatio,
mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio, sizeof(mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio));
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, param);
}
}
| 174,213 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t aio_setup_vectored_rw(struct kiocb *kiocb,
int rw, char __user *buf,
unsigned long *nr_segs,
size_t *len,
struct iovec **iovec,
bool compat)
{
ssize_t ret;
*nr_segs = *len;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (compat)
ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(rw,
(struct compat_iovec __user *)buf,
*nr_segs, UIO_FASTIOV, *iovec, iovec);
else
#endif
ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(rw,
(struct iovec __user *)buf,
*nr_segs, UIO_FASTIOV, *iovec, iovec);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* len now reflect bytes instead of segs */
*len = ret;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: aio: lift iov_iter_init() into aio_setup_..._rw()
the only non-trivial detail is that we do it before rw_verify_area(),
so we'd better cap the length ourselves in aio_setup_single_rw()
case (for vectored case rw_copy_check_uvector() will do that for us).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: | static ssize_t aio_setup_vectored_rw(struct kiocb *kiocb,
int rw, char __user *buf,
unsigned long *nr_segs,
size_t *len,
struct iovec **iovec,
bool compat,
struct iov_iter *iter)
{
ssize_t ret;
*nr_segs = *len;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (compat)
ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(rw,
(struct compat_iovec __user *)buf,
*nr_segs, UIO_FASTIOV, *iovec, iovec);
else
#endif
ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(rw,
(struct iovec __user *)buf,
*nr_segs, UIO_FASTIOV, *iovec, iovec);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* len now reflect bytes instead of segs */
*len = ret;
iov_iter_init(iter, rw, *iovec, *nr_segs, *len);
return 0;
}
| 170,003 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static const ut8 *r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit(Sdb *s, const ut8 *obuf,
RBinDwarfCompUnit *cu, const RBinDwarfDebugAbbrev *da,
size_t offset, const ut8 *debug_str, size_t debug_str_len) {
const ut8 *buf = obuf, *buf_end = obuf + (cu->hdr.length - 7);
ut64 abbr_code;
size_t i;
if (cu->hdr.length > debug_str_len) {
return NULL;
}
while (buf && buf < buf_end && buf >= obuf) {
if (cu->length && cu->capacity == cu->length) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_cu (cu);
}
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, buf_end - buf, &abbr_code);
if (abbr_code > da->length || !buf) {
return NULL;
}
r_bin_dwarf_init_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
if (!abbr_code) {
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = 0;
cu->length++;
buf++;
continue;
}
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = abbr_code;
cu->dies[cu->length].tag = da->decls[abbr_code - 1].tag;
abbr_code += offset;
if (da->capacity < abbr_code) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < da->decls[abbr_code - 1].length; i++) {
if (cu->dies[cu->length].length == cu->dies[cu->length].capacity) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
}
if (i >= cu->dies[cu->length].capacity || i >= da->decls[abbr_code - 1].capacity) {
eprintf ("Warning: malformed dwarf attribute capacity doesn't match length\n");
break;
}
memset (&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i], 0, sizeof (cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i]));
buf = r_bin_dwarf_parse_attr_value (buf, buf_end - buf,
&da->decls[abbr_code - 1].specs[i],
&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i],
&cu->hdr, debug_str, debug_str_len);
if (cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].name == DW_AT_comp_dir) {
const char *name = cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].encoding.str_struct.string;
sdb_set (s, "DW_AT_comp_dir", name, 0);
}
cu->dies[cu->length].length++;
}
cu->length++;
}
return buf;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10465 - Avoid string on low addresses (workaround) for corrupted dwarf
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static const ut8 *r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit(Sdb *s, const ut8 *obuf,
RBinDwarfCompUnit *cu, const RBinDwarfDebugAbbrev *da,
size_t offset, const ut8 *debug_str, size_t debug_str_len) {
const ut8 *buf = obuf, *buf_end = obuf + (cu->hdr.length - 7);
ut64 abbr_code;
size_t i;
if (cu->hdr.length > debug_str_len) {
return NULL;
}
while (buf && buf < buf_end && buf >= obuf) {
if (cu->length && cu->capacity == cu->length) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_cu (cu);
}
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, buf_end - buf, &abbr_code);
if (abbr_code > da->length || !buf) {
return NULL;
}
r_bin_dwarf_init_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
if (!abbr_code) {
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = 0;
cu->length++;
buf++;
continue;
}
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = abbr_code;
cu->dies[cu->length].tag = da->decls[abbr_code - 1].tag;
abbr_code += offset;
if (da->capacity < abbr_code) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < da->decls[abbr_code - 1].length; i++) {
if (cu->dies[cu->length].length == cu->dies[cu->length].capacity) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
}
if (i >= cu->dies[cu->length].capacity || i >= da->decls[abbr_code - 1].capacity) {
eprintf ("Warning: malformed dwarf attribute capacity doesn't match length\n");
break;
}
memset (&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i], 0, sizeof (cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i]));
buf = r_bin_dwarf_parse_attr_value (buf, buf_end - buf,
&da->decls[abbr_code - 1].specs[i],
&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i],
&cu->hdr, debug_str, debug_str_len);
if (cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].name == DW_AT_comp_dir) {
const char *name = cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].encoding.str_struct.string;
if (name > 1024) { // solve some null derefs
sdb_set (s, "DW_AT_comp_dir", name, 0);
} else {
eprintf ("Invalid string pointer at %p\n", name);
}
}
cu->dies[cu->length].length++;
}
cu->length++;
}
return buf;
}
| 169,150 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal(Node& root, NodeVector& postInsertionNotificationTargets)
{
EventDispatchForbiddenScope assertNoEventDispatch;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
for (Node& node : NodeTraversal::inclusiveDescendantsOf(root)) {
if (!inDocument() && !node.isContainerNode())
continue;
if (Node::InsertionShouldCallDidNotifySubtreeInsertions == node.insertedInto(this))
postInsertionNotificationTargets.append(&node);
for (ShadowRoot* shadowRoot = node.youngestShadowRoot(); shadowRoot; shadowRoot = shadowRoot->olderShadowRoot())
notifyNodeInsertedInternal(*shadowRoot, postInsertionNotificationTargets);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
R=tkent@chromium.org
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240}
CWE ID: | void ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal(Node& root, NodeVector& postInsertionNotificationTargets)
{
EventDispatchForbiddenScope assertNoEventDispatch;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
for (Node& node : NodeTraversal::inclusiveDescendantsOf(root)) {
// into detached subtrees that are not in a shadow tree.
if (!inDocument() && !isInShadowTree() && !node.isContainerNode())
continue;
if (Node::InsertionShouldCallDidNotifySubtreeInsertions == node.insertedInto(this))
postInsertionNotificationTargets.append(&node);
for (ShadowRoot* shadowRoot = node.youngestShadowRoot(); shadowRoot; shadowRoot = shadowRoot->olderShadowRoot())
notifyNodeInsertedInternal(*shadowRoot, postInsertionNotificationTargets);
}
}
| 171,772 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: read_packet(int fd, gss_buffer_t buf, int timeout, int first)
{
int ret;
static uint32_t len = 0;
static char len_buf[4];
static int len_buf_pos = 0;
static char * tmpbuf = 0;
static int tmpbuf_pos = 0;
if (first) {
len_buf_pos = 0;
return -2;
}
if (len_buf_pos < 4) {
ret = timed_read(fd, &len_buf[len_buf_pos], 4 - len_buf_pos,
timeout);
if (ret == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
return -2;
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("%s", strerror(errno)));
return -1;
}
if (ret == 0) { /* EOF */
/* Failure to read ANY length just means we're done */
if (len_buf_pos == 0)
return 0;
/*
* Otherwise, we got EOF mid-length, and that's
* a protocol error.
*/
LOG(LOG_INFO, ("EOF reading packet len"));
return -1;
}
len_buf_pos += ret;
}
/* Not done reading the length? */
if (len_buf_pos != 4)
return -2;
/* We have the complete length */
len = ntohl(*(uint32_t *)len_buf);
/*
* We make sure recvd length is reasonable, allowing for some
* slop in enc overhead, beyond the actual maximum number of
* bytes of decrypted payload.
*/
if (len > GSTD_MAXPACKETCONTENTS + 512) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("ridiculous length, %ld", len));
return -1;
}
if (!tmpbuf) {
if ((tmpbuf = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
LOG(LOG_CRIT, ("malloc failure, %ld bytes", len));
return -1;
}
}
ret = timed_read(fd, tmpbuf + tmpbuf_pos, len - tmpbuf_pos, timeout);
if (ret == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
return -2;
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("%s", strerror(errno)));
return -1;
}
if (ret == 0) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("EOF while reading packet (len=%d)", len));
return -1;
}
tmpbuf_pos += ret;
if (tmpbuf_pos == len) {
buf->length = len;
buf->value = tmpbuf;
len = len_buf_pos = tmpbuf_pos = 0;
tmpbuf = NULL;
LOG(LOG_DEBUG, ("read packet of length %d", buf->length));
return 1;
}
return -2;
}
Commit Message: knc: fix a couple of memory leaks.
One of these can be remotely triggered during the authentication
phase which leads to a remote DoS possibility.
Pointed out by: Imre Rad <radimre83@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | read_packet(int fd, gss_buffer_t buf, int timeout, int first)
{
int ret;
static uint32_t len = 0;
static char len_buf[4];
static int len_buf_pos = 0;
static char * tmpbuf = 0;
static int tmpbuf_pos = 0;
if (first) {
len_buf_pos = 0;
return -2;
}
if (len_buf_pos < 4) {
ret = timed_read(fd, &len_buf[len_buf_pos], 4 - len_buf_pos,
timeout);
if (ret == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
return -2;
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("%s", strerror(errno)));
goto bail;
}
if (ret == 0) { /* EOF */
/* Failure to read ANY length just means we're done */
if (len_buf_pos == 0)
return 0;
/*
* Otherwise, we got EOF mid-length, and that's
* a protocol error.
*/
LOG(LOG_INFO, ("EOF reading packet len"));
goto bail;
}
len_buf_pos += ret;
}
/* Not done reading the length? */
if (len_buf_pos != 4)
return -2;
/* We have the complete length */
len = ntohl(*(uint32_t *)len_buf);
/*
* We make sure recvd length is reasonable, allowing for some
* slop in enc overhead, beyond the actual maximum number of
* bytes of decrypted payload.
*/
if (len > GSTD_MAXPACKETCONTENTS + 512) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("ridiculous length, %ld", len));
goto bail;
}
if (!tmpbuf) {
if ((tmpbuf = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
LOG(LOG_CRIT, ("malloc failure, %ld bytes", len));
goto bail;
}
}
ret = timed_read(fd, tmpbuf + tmpbuf_pos, len - tmpbuf_pos, timeout);
if (ret == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
return -2;
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("%s", strerror(errno)));
goto bail;
}
if (ret == 0) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("EOF while reading packet (len=%d)", len));
goto bail;
}
tmpbuf_pos += ret;
if (tmpbuf_pos == len) {
buf->length = len;
buf->value = tmpbuf;
len = len_buf_pos = tmpbuf_pos = 0;
tmpbuf = NULL;
LOG(LOG_DEBUG, ("read packet of length %d", buf->length));
return 1;
}
return -2;
bail:
free(tmpbuf);
tmpbuf = NULL;
return -1;
}
| 169,433 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebpCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quality)
{
uint8_t *argb;
int x, y;
uint8_t *p;
uint8_t *out;
size_t out_size;
if (im == NULL) {
return;
}
if (!gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
gd_error("Paletter image not supported by webp");
return;
}
if (quality == -1) {
quality = 80;
}
argb = (uint8_t *)gdMalloc(gdImageSX(im) * 4 * gdImageSY(im));
if (!argb) {
return;
}
p = argb;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
register int c;
register char a;
c = im->tpixels[y][x];
a = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c);
if (a == 127) {
a = 0;
} else {
a = 255 - ((a << 1) + (a >> 6));
}
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetRed(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetGreen(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetBlue(c);
*(p++) = a;
}
}
out_size = WebPEncodeRGBA(argb, gdImageSX(im), gdImageSY(im), gdImageSX(im) * 4, quality, &out);
if (out_size == 0) {
gd_error("gd-webp encoding failed");
goto freeargb;
}
gdPutBuf(out, out_size, outfile);
free(out);
freeargb:
gdFree(argb);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'pull-request/296'
CWE ID: CWE-190 | BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebpCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quality)
{
uint8_t *argb;
int x, y;
uint8_t *p;
uint8_t *out;
size_t out_size;
if (im == NULL) {
return;
}
if (!gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
gd_error("Paletter image not supported by webp");
return;
}
if (quality == -1) {
quality = 80;
}
if (overflow2(gdImageSX(im), 4)) {
return;
}
if (overflow2(gdImageSX(im) * 4, gdImageSY(im))) {
return;
}
argb = (uint8_t *)gdMalloc(gdImageSX(im) * 4 * gdImageSY(im));
if (!argb) {
return;
}
p = argb;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
register int c;
register char a;
c = im->tpixels[y][x];
a = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c);
if (a == 127) {
a = 0;
} else {
a = 255 - ((a << 1) + (a >> 6));
}
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetRed(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetGreen(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetBlue(c);
*(p++) = a;
}
}
out_size = WebPEncodeRGBA(argb, gdImageSX(im), gdImageSY(im), gdImageSX(im) * 4, quality, &out);
if (out_size == 0) {
gd_error("gd-webp encoding failed");
goto freeargb;
}
gdPutBuf(out, out_size, outfile);
free(out);
freeargb:
gdFree(argb);
}
| 166,927 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mark_context_stack(mrb_state *mrb, struct mrb_context *c)
{
size_t i;
size_t e;
if (c->stack == NULL) return;
e = c->stack - c->stbase;
if (c->ci) e += c->ci->nregs;
if (c->stbase + e > c->stend) e = c->stend - c->stbase;
for (i=0; i<e; i++) {
mrb_value v = c->stbase[i];
if (!mrb_immediate_p(v)) {
if (mrb_basic_ptr(v)->tt == MRB_TT_FREE) {
c->stbase[i] = mrb_nil_value();
}
else {
mrb_gc_mark(mrb, mrb_basic_ptr(v));
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Clear unused stack region that may refer freed objects; fix #3596
CWE ID: CWE-416 | mark_context_stack(mrb_state *mrb, struct mrb_context *c)
{
size_t i;
size_t e;
mrb_value nil;
if (c->stack == NULL) return;
e = c->stack - c->stbase;
if (c->ci) e += c->ci->nregs;
if (c->stbase + e > c->stend) e = c->stend - c->stbase;
for (i=0; i<e; i++) {
mrb_value v = c->stbase[i];
if (!mrb_immediate_p(v)) {
mrb_gc_mark(mrb, mrb_basic_ptr(v));
}
}
e = c->stend - c->stbase;
nil = mrb_nil_value();
for (; i<e; i++) {
c->stbase[i] = nil;
}
}
| 168,094 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetExternalFileEntry(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
//// TODO(zelidrag): Make this magic work on other platforms when file browser
//// matures enough on ChromeOS.
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
CHECK(args.Length() == 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsObject());
v8::Local<v8::Object> file_def = args[0]->ToObject();
std::string file_system_name(
*v8::String::Utf8Value(file_def->Get(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(args.GetIsolate(), "fileSystemName"))));
GURL file_system_root(
*v8::String::Utf8Value(file_def->Get(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(args.GetIsolate(), "fileSystemRoot"))));
std::string file_full_path(
*v8::String::Utf8Value(file_def->Get(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(args.GetIsolate(), "fileFullPath"))));
bool is_directory = file_def->Get(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
args.GetIsolate(), "fileIsDirectory"))->ToBoolean()->Value();
blink::WebDOMFileSystem::EntryType entry_type =
is_directory ? blink::WebDOMFileSystem::EntryTypeDirectory
: blink::WebDOMFileSystem::EntryTypeFile;
blink::WebLocalFrame* webframe =
blink::WebLocalFrame::frameForContext(context()->v8_context());
args.GetReturnValue().Set(
blink::WebDOMFileSystem::create(
webframe,
blink::WebFileSystemTypeExternal,
blink::WebString::fromUTF8(file_system_name),
file_system_root)
.createV8Entry(blink::WebString::fromUTF8(file_full_path),
entry_type,
args.Holder(),
args.GetIsolate()));
#endif
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | void FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetExternalFileEntry(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args,
ScriptContext* context) {
//// TODO(zelidrag): Make this magic work on other platforms when file browser
//// matures enough on ChromeOS.
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
CHECK(args.Length() == 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsObject());
v8::Local<v8::Object> file_def = args[0]->ToObject();
std::string file_system_name(
*v8::String::Utf8Value(file_def->Get(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(args.GetIsolate(), "fileSystemName"))));
GURL file_system_root(
*v8::String::Utf8Value(file_def->Get(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(args.GetIsolate(), "fileSystemRoot"))));
std::string file_full_path(
*v8::String::Utf8Value(file_def->Get(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(args.GetIsolate(), "fileFullPath"))));
bool is_directory = file_def->Get(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
args.GetIsolate(), "fileIsDirectory"))->ToBoolean()->Value();
blink::WebDOMFileSystem::EntryType entry_type =
is_directory ? blink::WebDOMFileSystem::EntryTypeDirectory
: blink::WebDOMFileSystem::EntryTypeFile;
blink::WebLocalFrame* webframe =
blink::WebLocalFrame::frameForContext(context->v8_context());
args.GetReturnValue().Set(
blink::WebDOMFileSystem::create(
webframe,
blink::WebFileSystemTypeExternal,
blink::WebString::fromUTF8(file_system_name),
file_system_root)
.createV8Entry(blink::WebString::fromUTF8(file_full_path),
entry_type,
args.Holder(),
args.GetIsolate()));
#endif
}
| 173,273 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: video_usercopy(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg,
v4l2_kioctl func)
{
char sbuf[128];
void *mbuf = NULL;
void *parg = NULL;
long err = -EINVAL;
int is_ext_ctrl;
size_t ctrls_size = 0;
void __user *user_ptr = NULL;
is_ext_ctrl = (cmd == VIDIOC_S_EXT_CTRLS || cmd == VIDIOC_G_EXT_CTRLS ||
cmd == VIDIOC_TRY_EXT_CTRLS);
/* Copy arguments into temp kernel buffer */
switch (_IOC_DIR(cmd)) {
case _IOC_NONE:
parg = NULL;
break;
case _IOC_READ:
case _IOC_WRITE:
case (_IOC_WRITE | _IOC_READ):
if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) <= sizeof(sbuf)) {
parg = sbuf;
} else {
/* too big to allocate from stack */
mbuf = kmalloc(_IOC_SIZE(cmd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (NULL == mbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
parg = mbuf;
}
err = -EFAULT;
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
if (copy_from_user(parg, (void __user *)arg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)))
goto out;
break;
}
if (is_ext_ctrl) {
struct v4l2_ext_controls *p = parg;
/* In case of an error, tell the caller that it wasn't
a specific control that caused it. */
p->error_idx = p->count;
user_ptr = (void __user *)p->controls;
if (p->count) {
ctrls_size = sizeof(struct v4l2_ext_control) * p->count;
/* Note: v4l2_ext_controls fits in sbuf[] so mbuf is still NULL. */
mbuf = kmalloc(ctrls_size, GFP_KERNEL);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (NULL == mbuf)
goto out_ext_ctrl;
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(mbuf, user_ptr, ctrls_size))
goto out_ext_ctrl;
p->controls = mbuf;
}
}
/* call driver */
err = func(file, cmd, parg);
if (err == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
err = -EINVAL;
if (is_ext_ctrl) {
struct v4l2_ext_controls *p = parg;
p->controls = (void *)user_ptr;
if (p->count && err == 0 && copy_to_user(user_ptr, mbuf, ctrls_size))
err = -EFAULT;
goto out_ext_ctrl;
}
if (err < 0)
goto out;
out_ext_ctrl:
/* Copy results into user buffer */
switch (_IOC_DIR(cmd)) {
case _IOC_READ:
case (_IOC_WRITE | _IOC_READ):
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, parg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
out:
kfree(mbuf);
return err;
}
Commit Message: [media] v4l: Share code between video_usercopy and video_ioctl2
The two functions are mostly identical. They handle the copy_from_user
and copy_to_user operations related with V4L2 ioctls and call the real
ioctl handler.
Create a __video_usercopy function that implements the core of
video_usercopy and video_ioctl2, and call that function from both.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | video_usercopy(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg,
| 168,916 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_current_data(zend_object_iterator *iter, zval ***data TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator = (spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter;
*data = &iterator->current;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_current_data(zend_object_iterator *iter, zval ***data TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator = (spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter;
*data = &iterator->current;
}
| 167,070 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static unsigned int seedsize(struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct rng_alg *ralg = container_of(alg, struct rng_alg, base);
return alg->cra_rng.rng_make_random ?
alg->cra_rng.seedsize : ralg->seedsize;
}
Commit Message: crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static unsigned int seedsize(struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct rng_alg *ralg = container_of(alg, struct rng_alg, base);
return ralg->seedsize;
}
| 167,735 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jpc_siz_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->caps) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->width) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->height) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->xoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->yoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilewidth) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileheight) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilexoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileyoff) ||
jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->numcomps)) {
return -1;
}
if (!siz->width || !siz->height || !siz->tilewidth ||
!siz->tileheight || !siz->numcomps || siz->numcomps > 16384) {
return -1;
}
if (siz->tilexoff >= siz->width || siz->tileyoff >= siz->height) {
jas_eprintf("all tiles are outside the image area\n");
return -1;
}
if (!(siz->comps = jas_alloc2(siz->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_sizcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].hsamp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].vsamp)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].hsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].hsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid XRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].hsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].vsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].vsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid YRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].vsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
siz->comps[i].sgnd = (tmp >> 7) & 1;
siz->comps[i].prec = (tmp & 0x7f) + 1;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Added some missing sanity checks on the data in a SIZ marker segment.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int jpc_siz_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
siz->comps = 0;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->caps) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->width) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->height) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->xoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->yoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilewidth) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileheight) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilexoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileyoff) ||
jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->numcomps)) {
goto error;
}
if (!siz->width || !siz->height) {
jas_eprintf("reference grid cannot have zero area\n");
goto error;
}
if (!siz->tilewidth || !siz->tileheight) {
jas_eprintf("tile cannot have zero area\n");
goto error;
}
if (!siz->numcomps || siz->numcomps > 16384) {
jas_eprintf("number of components not in permissible range\n");
goto error;
}
if (siz->xoff >= siz->width) {
jas_eprintf("XOsiz not in permissible range\n");
goto error;
}
if (siz->yoff >= siz->height) {
jas_eprintf("YOsiz not in permissible range\n");
goto error;
}
if (siz->tilexoff > siz->xoff || siz->tilexoff + siz->tilewidth <= siz->xoff) {
jas_eprintf("XTOsiz not in permissible range\n");
goto error;
}
if (siz->tileyoff > siz->yoff || siz->tileyoff + siz->tileheight <= siz->yoff) {
jas_eprintf("YTOsiz not in permissible range\n");
goto error;
}
if (!(siz->comps = jas_alloc2(siz->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_sizcomp_t)))) {
goto error;
}
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].hsamp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].vsamp)) {
goto error;
}
if (siz->comps[i].hsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].hsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid XRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].hsamp);
goto error;
}
if (siz->comps[i].vsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].vsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid YRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].vsamp);
goto error;
}
siz->comps[i].sgnd = (tmp >> 7) & 1;
siz->comps[i].prec = (tmp & 0x7f) + 1;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
goto error;
}
return 0;
error:
if (siz->comps) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
}
return -1;
}
| 168,731 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ResourceTracker::CleanupInstanceData(PP_Instance instance,
bool delete_instance) {
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(instance, PP_ID_TYPE_INSTANCE))
<< instance << " is not a PP_Instance.";
InstanceMap::iterator found = instance_map_.find(instance);
if (found == instance_map_.end()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
InstanceData& data = *found->second;
ResourceSet::iterator cur_res = data.resources.begin();
while (cur_res != data.resources.end()) {
ResourceMap::iterator found_resource = live_resources_.find(*cur_res);
if (found_resource == live_resources_.end()) {
NOTREACHED();
} else {
Resource* resource = found_resource->second.first;
resource->LastPluginRefWasDeleted(true);
live_resources_.erase(*cur_res);
}
ResourceSet::iterator current = cur_res++;
data.resources.erase(current);
}
DCHECK(data.resources.empty());
VarSet::iterator cur_var = data.object_vars.begin();
while (cur_var != data.object_vars.end()) {
VarSet::iterator current = cur_var++;
PP_Var object_pp_var;
object_pp_var.type = PP_VARTYPE_OBJECT;
object_pp_var.value.as_id = *current;
scoped_refptr<ObjectVar> object_var(ObjectVar::FromPPVar(object_pp_var));
if (object_var.get())
object_var->InstanceDeleted();
live_vars_.erase(*current);
data.object_vars.erase(*current);
}
DCHECK(data.object_vars.empty());
if (delete_instance)
instance_map_.erase(found);
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ResourceTracker::CleanupInstanceData(PP_Instance instance,
bool delete_instance) {
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(instance, PP_ID_TYPE_INSTANCE))
<< instance << " is not a PP_Instance.";
InstanceMap::iterator found = instance_map_.find(instance);
if (found == instance_map_.end()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
InstanceData& data = *found->second;
ResourceSet::iterator cur_res = data.ref_resources.begin();
while (cur_res != data.ref_resources.end()) {
ResourceMap::iterator found_resource = live_resources_.find(*cur_res);
if (found_resource == live_resources_.end()) {
NOTREACHED();
} else {
Resource* resource = found_resource->second.first;
resource->LastPluginRefWasDeleted();
live_resources_.erase(*cur_res);
}
ResourceSet::iterator current = cur_res++;
data.ref_resources.erase(current);
}
DCHECK(data.ref_resources.empty());
VarSet::iterator cur_var = data.object_vars.begin();
while (cur_var != data.object_vars.end()) {
VarSet::iterator current = cur_var++;
PP_Var object_pp_var;
object_pp_var.type = PP_VARTYPE_OBJECT;
object_pp_var.value.as_id = *current;
scoped_refptr<ObjectVar> object_var(ObjectVar::FromPPVar(object_pp_var));
if (object_var.get())
object_var->InstanceDeleted();
live_vars_.erase(*current);
data.object_vars.erase(*current);
}
DCHECK(data.object_vars.empty());
// Clear any resources that still reference this instance.
for (std::set<Resource*>::iterator res = data.assoc_resources.begin();
res != data.assoc_resources.end();
++res)
(*res)->ClearInstance();
data.assoc_resources.clear();
if (delete_instance)
instance_map_.erase(found);
}
| 170,417 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static reactor_status_t run_reactor(reactor_t *reactor, int iterations) {
assert(reactor != NULL);
reactor->run_thread = pthread_self();
reactor->is_running = true;
struct epoll_event events[MAX_EVENTS];
for (int i = 0; iterations == 0 || i < iterations; ++i) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&reactor->list_lock);
list_clear(reactor->invalidation_list);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&reactor->list_lock);
int ret;
do {
ret = epoll_wait(reactor->epoll_fd, events, MAX_EVENTS, -1);
} while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);
if (ret == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s error in epoll_wait: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
reactor->is_running = false;
return REACTOR_STATUS_ERROR;
}
for (int j = 0; j < ret; ++j) {
if (events[j].data.ptr == NULL) {
eventfd_t value;
eventfd_read(reactor->event_fd, &value);
reactor->is_running = false;
return REACTOR_STATUS_STOP;
}
reactor_object_t *object = (reactor_object_t *)events[j].data.ptr;
pthread_mutex_lock(&reactor->list_lock);
if (list_contains(reactor->invalidation_list, object)) {
pthread_mutex_unlock(&reactor->list_lock);
continue;
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&object->lock);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&reactor->list_lock);
reactor->object_removed = false;
if (events[j].events & (EPOLLIN | EPOLLHUP | EPOLLRDHUP | EPOLLERR) && object->read_ready)
object->read_ready(object->context);
if (!reactor->object_removed && events[j].events & EPOLLOUT && object->write_ready)
object->write_ready(object->context);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&object->lock);
if (reactor->object_removed) {
pthread_mutex_destroy(&object->lock);
osi_free(object);
}
}
}
reactor->is_running = false;
return REACTOR_STATUS_DONE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static reactor_status_t run_reactor(reactor_t *reactor, int iterations) {
assert(reactor != NULL);
reactor->run_thread = pthread_self();
reactor->is_running = true;
struct epoll_event events[MAX_EVENTS];
for (int i = 0; iterations == 0 || i < iterations; ++i) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&reactor->list_lock);
list_clear(reactor->invalidation_list);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&reactor->list_lock);
int ret;
do {
ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(epoll_wait(reactor->epoll_fd, events, MAX_EVENTS, -1));
} while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);
if (ret == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s error in epoll_wait: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
reactor->is_running = false;
return REACTOR_STATUS_ERROR;
}
for (int j = 0; j < ret; ++j) {
if (events[j].data.ptr == NULL) {
eventfd_t value;
eventfd_read(reactor->event_fd, &value);
reactor->is_running = false;
return REACTOR_STATUS_STOP;
}
reactor_object_t *object = (reactor_object_t *)events[j].data.ptr;
pthread_mutex_lock(&reactor->list_lock);
if (list_contains(reactor->invalidation_list, object)) {
pthread_mutex_unlock(&reactor->list_lock);
continue;
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&object->lock);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&reactor->list_lock);
reactor->object_removed = false;
if (events[j].events & (EPOLLIN | EPOLLHUP | EPOLLRDHUP | EPOLLERR) && object->read_ready)
object->read_ready(object->context);
if (!reactor->object_removed && events[j].events & EPOLLOUT && object->write_ready)
object->write_ready(object->context);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&object->lock);
if (reactor->object_removed) {
pthread_mutex_destroy(&object->lock);
osi_free(object);
}
}
}
reactor->is_running = false;
return REACTOR_STATUS_DONE;
}
| 173,482 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: check_rpcsec_auth(struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
gss_ctx_id_t ctx;
krb5_context kctx;
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
gss_name_t name;
krb5_principal princ;
int ret, success;
krb5_data *c1, *c2, *realm;
gss_buffer_desc gss_str;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
size_t slen;
char *sdots;
success = 0;
handle = (kadm5_server_handle_t)global_server_handle;
if (rqstp->rq_cred.oa_flavor != RPCSEC_GSS)
return 0;
ctx = rqstp->rq_svccred;
maj_stat = gss_inquire_context(&min_stat, ctx, NULL, &name,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("check_rpcsec_auth: failed "
"inquire_context, stat=%u"), maj_stat);
log_badauth(maj_stat, min_stat, rqstp->rq_xprt, NULL);
goto fail_name;
}
kctx = handle->context;
ret = gss_to_krb5_name_1(rqstp, kctx, name, &princ, &gss_str);
if (ret == 0)
goto fail_name;
slen = gss_str.length;
trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
/*
* Since we accept with GSS_C_NO_NAME, the client can authenticate
* against the entire kdb. Therefore, ensure that the service
* name is something reasonable.
*/
if (krb5_princ_size(kctx, princ) != 2)
goto fail_princ;
c1 = krb5_princ_component(kctx, princ, 0);
c2 = krb5_princ_component(kctx, princ, 1);
realm = krb5_princ_realm(kctx, princ);
if (strncmp(handle->params.realm, realm->data, realm->length) == 0
&& strncmp("kadmin", c1->data, c1->length) == 0) {
if (strncmp("history", c2->data, c2->length) == 0)
goto fail_princ;
else
success = 1;
}
fail_princ:
if (!success) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("bad service principal %.*s%s"),
(int) slen, (char *) gss_str.value, sdots);
}
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gss_str);
krb5_free_principal(kctx, princ);
fail_name:
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &name);
return success;
}
Commit Message: Fix kadmind server validation [CVE-2014-9422]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In kadmind's check_rpcsec_auth(), use
data_eq_string() instead of strncmp() to check components of the
server principal, so that we don't erroneously match left substrings
of "kadmin", "history", or the realm.
ticket: 8057 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-284 | check_rpcsec_auth(struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
gss_ctx_id_t ctx;
krb5_context kctx;
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
gss_name_t name;
krb5_principal princ;
int ret, success;
krb5_data *c1, *c2, *realm;
gss_buffer_desc gss_str;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
size_t slen;
char *sdots;
success = 0;
handle = (kadm5_server_handle_t)global_server_handle;
if (rqstp->rq_cred.oa_flavor != RPCSEC_GSS)
return 0;
ctx = rqstp->rq_svccred;
maj_stat = gss_inquire_context(&min_stat, ctx, NULL, &name,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("check_rpcsec_auth: failed "
"inquire_context, stat=%u"), maj_stat);
log_badauth(maj_stat, min_stat, rqstp->rq_xprt, NULL);
goto fail_name;
}
kctx = handle->context;
ret = gss_to_krb5_name_1(rqstp, kctx, name, &princ, &gss_str);
if (ret == 0)
goto fail_name;
slen = gss_str.length;
trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
/*
* Since we accept with GSS_C_NO_NAME, the client can authenticate
* against the entire kdb. Therefore, ensure that the service
* name is something reasonable.
*/
if (krb5_princ_size(kctx, princ) != 2)
goto fail_princ;
c1 = krb5_princ_component(kctx, princ, 0);
c2 = krb5_princ_component(kctx, princ, 1);
realm = krb5_princ_realm(kctx, princ);
success = data_eq_string(*realm, handle->params.realm) &&
data_eq_string(*c1, "kadmin") && !data_eq_string(*c2, "history");
fail_princ:
if (!success) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("bad service principal %.*s%s"),
(int) slen, (char *) gss_str.value, sdots);
}
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gss_str);
krb5_free_principal(kctx, princ);
fail_name:
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &name);
return success;
}
| 166,789 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev1_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *p, const u_char *ep)
{
int totlen;
uint32_t t;
if (p[0] & 0x80)
totlen = 4;
else
totlen = 4 + EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (ep < p + totlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|attr]"));
return ep + 1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
t = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[0]) & 0x7fff;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=#%d ", t));
if (p[0] & 0x80) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"value="));
t = p[2];
rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[2], 2);
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"len=%d value=", EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2])));
rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[4], EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
return p + totlen;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13039/IKEv1: Do more bounds checking.
Have ikev1_attrmap_print() and ikev1_attr_print() do full bounds
checking, and return null on a bounds overflow. Have their callers
check for a null return.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev1_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *p, const u_char *ep)
ikev1_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *p, const u_char *ep2)
{
int totlen;
uint32_t t;
ND_TCHECK(p[0]);
if (p[0] & 0x80)
totlen = 4;
else {
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&p[2]);
totlen = 4 + EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
}
if (ep2 < p + totlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|attr]"));
return ep2 + 1;
}
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&p[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
t = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[0]) & 0x7fff;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"type=#%d ", t));
if (p[0] & 0x80) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"value="));
t = p[2];
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[2], 2)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
goto trunc;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"len=%d value=", totlen - 4));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)&p[4], totlen - 4)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
goto trunc;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
return p + totlen;
trunc:
return NULL;
}
| 167,839 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: InputMethodLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetInputMethodLibrary() {
return input_method_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | InputMethodLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetInputMethodLibrary() {
| 170,623 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY DeleteSecurityContext(PCtxtHandle phContext)
{
char* Name;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
SecurityFunctionTableA* table;
Name = (char*) sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(phContext);
if (!Name)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
table = sspi_GetSecurityFunctionTableAByNameA(Name);
if (!table)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
if (table->DeleteSecurityContext == NULL)
return SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION;
status = table->DeleteSecurityContext(phContext);
return status;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY DeleteSecurityContext(PCtxtHandle phContext)
{
char* Name = NULL;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
SecurityFunctionTableA* table;
Name = (char*) sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(phContext);
if (!Name)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
table = sspi_GetSecurityFunctionTableAByNameA(Name);
if (!table)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
if (table->DeleteSecurityContext == NULL)
return SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION;
status = table->DeleteSecurityContext(phContext);
return status;
}
| 167,603 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void gx_ttfReader__Read(ttfReader *self, void *p, int n)
{
gx_ttfReader *r = (gx_ttfReader *)self;
const byte *q;
if (!r->error) {
if (r->extra_glyph_index != -1) {
q = r->glyph_data.bits.data + r->pos;
r->error = (r->glyph_data.bits.size - r->pos < n ?
gs_note_error(gs_error_invalidfont) : 0);
if (r->error == 0)
memcpy(p, q, n);
unsigned int cnt;
for (cnt = 0; cnt < (uint)n; cnt += r->error) {
r->error = r->pfont->data.string_proc(r->pfont, (ulong)r->pos + cnt, (ulong)n - cnt, &q);
if (r->error < 0)
break;
else if ( r->error == 0) {
memcpy((char *)p + cnt, q, n - cnt);
break;
} else {
memcpy((char *)p + cnt, q, r->error);
}
}
}
}
if (r->error) {
memset(p, 0, n);
return;
}
r->pos += n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void gx_ttfReader__Read(ttfReader *self, void *p, int n)
{
gx_ttfReader *r = (gx_ttfReader *)self;
const byte *q;
if (!r->error) {
if (r->extra_glyph_index != -1) {
q = r->glyph_data.bits.data + r->pos;
r->error = ((r->pos >= r->glyph_data.bits.size ||
r->glyph_data.bits.size - r->pos < n) ?
gs_note_error(gs_error_invalidfont) : 0);
if (r->error == 0)
memcpy(p, q, n);
unsigned int cnt;
for (cnt = 0; cnt < (uint)n; cnt += r->error) {
r->error = r->pfont->data.string_proc(r->pfont, (ulong)r->pos + cnt, (ulong)n - cnt, &q);
if (r->error < 0)
break;
else if ( r->error == 0) {
memcpy((char *)p + cnt, q, n - cnt);
break;
} else {
memcpy((char *)p + cnt, q, r->error);
}
}
}
}
if (r->error) {
memset(p, 0, n);
return;
}
r->pos += n;
}
| 164,779 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::didFocusOnControl()
{
element()->setFocus(true);
}
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::didFocusOnControl()
{
if (!containsFocusedShadowElement())
return;
element()->setFocus(true);
}
| 171,212 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserEventRouter::DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(
WebContents* contents, DictionaryValue* changed_properties) {
DCHECK(changed_properties);
DCHECK(contents);
scoped_ptr<ListValue> args_base(new ListValue());
args_base->AppendInteger(ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabId(contents));
args_base->Append(changed_properties);
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(contents->GetBrowserContext());
scoped_ptr<Event> event(new Event(events::kOnTabUpdated, args_base.Pass()));
event->restrict_to_profile = profile;
event->user_gesture = EventRouter::USER_GESTURE_NOT_ENABLED;
event->will_dispatch_callback =
base::Bind(&WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent, contents);
ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->event_router()->BroadcastEvent(event.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void BrowserEventRouter::DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(
WebContents* contents, scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> changed_properties) {
DCHECK(changed_properties);
DCHECK(contents);
scoped_ptr<ListValue> args_base(new ListValue());
args_base->AppendInteger(ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabId(contents));
// Second arg: An object containing the changes to the tab state. Filled in
// by WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent as a copy of changed_properties, if the
// extension has the tabs permission.
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(contents->GetBrowserContext());
scoped_ptr<Event> event(new Event(events::kOnTabUpdated, args_base.Pass()));
event->restrict_to_profile = profile;
event->user_gesture = EventRouter::USER_GESTURE_NOT_ENABLED;
event->will_dispatch_callback =
base::Bind(&WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent,
contents, changed_properties.get());
ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->event_router()->BroadcastEvent(event.Pass());
}
| 171,449 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int get_rx_bufs(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
struct vring_used_elem *heads,
int datalen,
unsigned *iovcount,
struct vhost_log *log,
unsigned *log_num,
unsigned int quota)
{
unsigned int out, in;
int seg = 0;
int headcount = 0;
unsigned d;
int r, nlogs = 0;
while (datalen > 0 && headcount < quota) {
if (unlikely(seg >= UIO_MAXIOV)) {
r = -ENOBUFS;
goto err;
}
d = vhost_get_vq_desc(vq->dev, vq, vq->iov + seg,
ARRAY_SIZE(vq->iov) - seg, &out,
&in, log, log_num);
if (d == vq->num) {
r = 0;
goto err;
}
if (unlikely(out || in <= 0)) {
vq_err(vq, "unexpected descriptor format for RX: "
"out %d, in %d\n", out, in);
r = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
if (unlikely(log)) {
nlogs += *log_num;
log += *log_num;
}
heads[headcount].id = d;
heads[headcount].len = iov_length(vq->iov + seg, in);
datalen -= heads[headcount].len;
++headcount;
seg += in;
}
heads[headcount - 1].len += datalen;
*iovcount = seg;
if (unlikely(log))
*log_num = nlogs;
return headcount;
err:
vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount);
return r;
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix total length when packets are too short
When mergeable buffers are disabled, and the
incoming packet is too large for the rx buffer,
get_rx_bufs returns success.
This was intentional in order for make recvmsg
truncate the packet and then handle_rx would
detect err != sock_len and drop it.
Unfortunately we pass the original sock_len to
recvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully
validated.
Fix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop
immediately.
CVE-2014-0077
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int get_rx_bufs(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
struct vring_used_elem *heads,
int datalen,
unsigned *iovcount,
struct vhost_log *log,
unsigned *log_num,
unsigned int quota)
{
unsigned int out, in;
int seg = 0;
int headcount = 0;
unsigned d;
int r, nlogs = 0;
while (datalen > 0 && headcount < quota) {
if (unlikely(seg >= UIO_MAXIOV)) {
r = -ENOBUFS;
goto err;
}
d = vhost_get_vq_desc(vq->dev, vq, vq->iov + seg,
ARRAY_SIZE(vq->iov) - seg, &out,
&in, log, log_num);
if (d == vq->num) {
r = 0;
goto err;
}
if (unlikely(out || in <= 0)) {
vq_err(vq, "unexpected descriptor format for RX: "
"out %d, in %d\n", out, in);
r = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
if (unlikely(log)) {
nlogs += *log_num;
log += *log_num;
}
heads[headcount].id = d;
heads[headcount].len = iov_length(vq->iov + seg, in);
datalen -= heads[headcount].len;
++headcount;
seg += in;
}
heads[headcount - 1].len += datalen;
*iovcount = seg;
if (unlikely(log))
*log_num = nlogs;
/* Detect overrun */
if (unlikely(datalen > 0)) {
r = UIO_MAXIOV + 1;
goto err;
}
return headcount;
err:
vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount);
return r;
}
| 166,460 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: decrypt_response(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, unsigned char *out, size_t * out_len)
{
size_t cipher_len;
size_t i;
unsigned char iv[16] = { 0 };
unsigned char plaintext[4096] = { 0 };
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
/* no cipher */
if (in[0] == 0x99)
return 0;
/* parse cipher length */
if (0x01 == in[2] && 0x82 != in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[1];
i = 3;
}
else if (0x01 == in[3] && 0x81 == in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[2];
i = 4;
}
else if (0x01 == in[4] && 0x82 == in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[2] * 0x100;
cipher_len += in[3];
i = 5;
}
else {
return -1;
}
if (cipher_len < 2 || i+cipher_len > inlen || cipher_len > sizeof plaintext)
return -1;
/* decrypt */
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == exdata->smtype)
aes128_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], cipher_len - 1, plaintext);
else
des3_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], cipher_len - 1, plaintext);
/* unpadding */
while (0x80 != plaintext[cipher_len - 2] && (cipher_len - 2 > 0))
cipher_len--;
if (2 == cipher_len)
return -1;
memcpy(out, plaintext, cipher_len - 2);
*out_len = cipher_len - 2;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | decrypt_response(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, unsigned char *out, size_t * out_len)
{
size_t cipher_len;
size_t i;
unsigned char iv[16] = { 0 };
unsigned char plaintext[4096] = { 0 };
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
/* no cipher */
if (in[0] == 0x99)
return 0;
/* parse cipher length */
if (0x01 == in[2] && 0x82 != in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[1];
i = 3;
}
else if (0x01 == in[3] && 0x81 == in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[2];
i = 4;
}
else if (0x01 == in[4] && 0x82 == in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[2] * 0x100;
cipher_len += in[3];
i = 5;
}
else {
return -1;
}
if (cipher_len < 2 || i+cipher_len > inlen || cipher_len > sizeof plaintext)
return -1;
/* decrypt */
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == exdata->smtype)
aes128_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], cipher_len - 1, plaintext);
else
des3_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], cipher_len - 1, plaintext);
/* unpadding */
while (0x80 != plaintext[cipher_len - 2] && (cipher_len - 2 > 0))
cipher_len--;
if (2 == cipher_len || *out_len < cipher_len - 2)
return -1;
memcpy(out, plaintext, cipher_len - 2);
*out_len = cipher_len - 2;
return 0;
}
| 169,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: NodeIterator::NodeIterator(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> rootNode, unsigned whatToShow, PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<NodeFilter> filter)
: NodeIteratorBase(rootNode, whatToShow, filter)
, m_referenceNode(root(), true)
{
root()->document().attachNodeIterator(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix detached Attr nodes interaction with NodeIterator
- Don't register NodeIterator to document when attaching to Attr node.
-- NodeIterator is registered to its document to receive updateForNodeRemoval notifications.
-- However it wouldn't make sense on Attr nodes, as they never have children.
BUG=572537
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1577213003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#369687}
CWE ID: | NodeIterator::NodeIterator(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> rootNode, unsigned whatToShow, PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<NodeFilter> filter)
: NodeIteratorBase(rootNode, whatToShow, filter)
, m_referenceNode(root(), true)
{
// If NodeIterator target is Attr node, don't subscribe for nodeWillBeRemoved, as it would never have child nodes.
if (!root()->isAttributeNode())
root()->document().attachNodeIterator(this);
}
| 172,142 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void btif_fetch_local_bdaddr(bt_bdaddr_t *local_addr)
{
char val[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
uint8_t valid_bda = FALSE;
int val_size = 0;
const uint8_t null_bdaddr[BD_ADDR_LEN] = {0,0,0,0,0,0};
/* Get local bdaddr storage path from property */
if (property_get(PROPERTY_BT_BDADDR_PATH, val, NULL))
{
int addr_fd;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s, local bdaddr is stored in %s", __func__, val);
if ((addr_fd = open(val, O_RDONLY)) != -1)
{
memset(val, 0, sizeof(val));
read(addr_fd, val, FACTORY_BT_BDADDR_STORAGE_LEN);
/* If this is not a reserved/special bda, then use it */
if ((string_to_bdaddr(val, local_addr)) &&
(memcmp(local_addr->address, null_bdaddr, BD_ADDR_LEN) != 0))
{
valid_bda = TRUE;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Got Factory BDA %s", __func__, val);
}
close(addr_fd);
}
}
if(!valid_bda)
{
val_size = sizeof(val);
if(btif_config_get_str("Adapter", "Address", val, &val_size))
{
string_to_bdaddr(val, local_addr);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("local bdaddr from bt_config.xml is %s", val);
return;
}
}
/* No factory BDADDR found. Look for previously generated random BDA */
if (!valid_bda) {
valid_bda = btif_fetch_property(PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY, local_addr);
}
/* No BDADDR found in file. Look for BDA in factory property */
if (!valid_bda) {
valid_bda = btif_fetch_property(FACTORY_BT_ADDR_PROPERTY, local_addr);
}
/* Generate new BDA if necessary */
if (!valid_bda)
{
bdstr_t bdstr;
/* Seed the random number generator */
srand((unsigned int) (time(0)));
/* No autogen BDA. Generate one now. */
local_addr->address[0] = 0x22;
local_addr->address[1] = 0x22;
local_addr->address[2] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
local_addr->address[3] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
local_addr->address[4] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
local_addr->address[5] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
/* Convert to ascii, and store as a persistent property */
bdaddr_to_string(local_addr, bdstr, sizeof(bdstr));
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("No preset BDA. Generating BDA: %s for prop %s",
(char*)bdstr, PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY);
if (property_set(PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY, (char*)bdstr) < 0)
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("Failed to set random BDA in prop %s",PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY);
}
bdstr_t bdstr;
bdaddr_to_string(local_addr, bdstr, sizeof(bdstr));
val_size = sizeof(val);
if (btif_config_get_str("Adapter", "Address", val, &val_size))
{
if (strcmp(bdstr, val) ==0)
{
return;
}
}
btif_config_set_str("Adapter", "Address", bdstr);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void btif_fetch_local_bdaddr(bt_bdaddr_t *local_addr)
{
char val[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
uint8_t valid_bda = FALSE;
int val_size = 0;
const uint8_t null_bdaddr[BD_ADDR_LEN] = {0,0,0,0,0,0};
/* Get local bdaddr storage path from property */
if (property_get(PROPERTY_BT_BDADDR_PATH, val, NULL))
{
int addr_fd;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s, local bdaddr is stored in %s", __func__, val);
if ((addr_fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(val, O_RDONLY))) != -1)
{
memset(val, 0, sizeof(val));
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(addr_fd, val, FACTORY_BT_BDADDR_STORAGE_LEN));
/* If this is not a reserved/special bda, then use it */
if ((string_to_bdaddr(val, local_addr)) &&
(memcmp(local_addr->address, null_bdaddr, BD_ADDR_LEN) != 0))
{
valid_bda = TRUE;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Got Factory BDA %s", __func__, val);
}
close(addr_fd);
}
}
if(!valid_bda)
{
val_size = sizeof(val);
if(btif_config_get_str("Adapter", "Address", val, &val_size))
{
string_to_bdaddr(val, local_addr);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("local bdaddr from bt_config.xml is %s", val);
return;
}
}
/* No factory BDADDR found. Look for previously generated random BDA */
if (!valid_bda) {
valid_bda = btif_fetch_property(PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY, local_addr);
}
/* No BDADDR found in file. Look for BDA in factory property */
if (!valid_bda) {
valid_bda = btif_fetch_property(FACTORY_BT_ADDR_PROPERTY, local_addr);
}
/* Generate new BDA if necessary */
if (!valid_bda)
{
bdstr_t bdstr;
/* Seed the random number generator */
srand((unsigned int) (time(0)));
/* No autogen BDA. Generate one now. */
local_addr->address[0] = 0x22;
local_addr->address[1] = 0x22;
local_addr->address[2] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
local_addr->address[3] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
local_addr->address[4] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
local_addr->address[5] = (uint8_t) ((rand() >> 8) & 0xFF);
/* Convert to ascii, and store as a persistent property */
bdaddr_to_string(local_addr, bdstr, sizeof(bdstr));
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("No preset BDA. Generating BDA: %s for prop %s",
(char*)bdstr, PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY);
if (property_set(PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY, (char*)bdstr) < 0)
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("Failed to set random BDA in prop %s",PERSIST_BDADDR_PROPERTY);
}
bdstr_t bdstr;
bdaddr_to_string(local_addr, bdstr, sizeof(bdstr));
val_size = sizeof(val);
if (btif_config_get_str("Adapter", "Address", val, &val_size))
{
if (strcmp(bdstr, val) ==0)
{
return;
}
}
btif_config_set_str("Adapter", "Address", bdstr);
}
| 173,435 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: process_demand_active(STREAM s)
{
uint8 type;
uint16 len_src_descriptor, len_combined_caps;
/* at this point we need to ensure that we have ui created */
rd_create_ui();
in_uint32_le(s, g_rdp_shareid);
in_uint16_le(s, len_src_descriptor);
in_uint16_le(s, len_combined_caps);
in_uint8s(s, len_src_descriptor);
logger(Protocol, Debug, "process_demand_active(), shareid=0x%x", g_rdp_shareid);
rdp_process_server_caps(s, len_combined_caps);
rdp_send_confirm_active();
rdp_send_synchronise();
rdp_send_control(RDP_CTL_COOPERATE);
rdp_send_control(RDP_CTL_REQUEST_CONTROL);
rdp_recv(&type); /* RDP_PDU_SYNCHRONIZE */
rdp_recv(&type); /* RDP_CTL_COOPERATE */
rdp_recv(&type); /* RDP_CTL_GRANT_CONTROL */
rdp_send_input(0, RDP_INPUT_SYNCHRONIZE, 0,
g_numlock_sync ? ui_get_numlock_state(read_keyboard_state()) : 0, 0);
if (g_rdp_version >= RDP_V5)
{
rdp_enum_bmpcache2();
rdp_send_fonts(3);
}
else
{
rdp_send_fonts(1);
rdp_send_fonts(2);
}
rdp_recv(&type); /* RDP_PDU_UNKNOWN 0x28 (Fonts?) */
reset_order_state();
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | process_demand_active(STREAM s)
{
uint8 type;
uint16 len_src_descriptor, len_combined_caps;
struct stream packet = *s;
/* at this point we need to ensure that we have ui created */
rd_create_ui();
in_uint32_le(s, g_rdp_shareid);
in_uint16_le(s, len_src_descriptor);
in_uint16_le(s, len_combined_caps);
if (!s_check_rem(s, len_src_descriptor))
{
rdp_protocol_error("rdp_demand_active(), consume of source descriptor from stream would overrun", &packet);
}
in_uint8s(s, len_src_descriptor);
logger(Protocol, Debug, "process_demand_active(), shareid=0x%x", g_rdp_shareid);
rdp_process_server_caps(s, len_combined_caps);
rdp_send_confirm_active();
rdp_send_synchronise();
rdp_send_control(RDP_CTL_COOPERATE);
rdp_send_control(RDP_CTL_REQUEST_CONTROL);
rdp_recv(&type); /* RDP_PDU_SYNCHRONIZE */
rdp_recv(&type); /* RDP_CTL_COOPERATE */
rdp_recv(&type); /* RDP_CTL_GRANT_CONTROL */
rdp_send_input(0, RDP_INPUT_SYNCHRONIZE, 0,
g_numlock_sync ? ui_get_numlock_state(read_keyboard_state()) : 0, 0);
if (g_rdp_version >= RDP_V5)
{
rdp_enum_bmpcache2();
rdp_send_fonts(3);
}
else
{
rdp_send_fonts(1);
rdp_send_fonts(2);
}
rdp_recv(&type); /* RDP_PDU_UNKNOWN 0x28 (Fonts?) */
reset_order_state();
}
| 169,803 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
xmlChar cur;
xmlChar stop;
int count = 0;
xmlParserInputState oldstate = ctxt->instate;
SHRINK;
if (RAW == '"') {
NEXT;
stop = '"';
} else if (RAW == '\'') {
NEXT;
stop = '\'';
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PUBLIC_LITERAL;
cur = CUR;
while ((IS_PUBIDCHAR_CH(cur)) && (cur != stop)) { /* checked */
if (len + 1 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
buf = tmp;
}
buf[len++] = cur;
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
count = 0;
}
NEXT;
cur = CUR;
if (cur == 0) {
GROW;
SHRINK;
cur = CUR;
}
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (cur != stop) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
} else {
NEXT;
}
ctxt->instate = oldstate;
return(buf);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
xmlChar cur;
xmlChar stop;
int count = 0;
xmlParserInputState oldstate = ctxt->instate;
SHRINK;
if (RAW == '"') {
NEXT;
stop = '"';
} else if (RAW == '\'') {
NEXT;
stop = '\'';
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PUBLIC_LITERAL;
cur = CUR;
while ((IS_PUBIDCHAR_CH(cur)) && (cur != stop)) { /* checked */
if (len + 1 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
buf = tmp;
}
buf[len++] = cur;
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
count = 0;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
}
NEXT;
cur = CUR;
if (cur == 0) {
GROW;
SHRINK;
cur = CUR;
}
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (cur != stop) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
} else {
NEXT;
}
ctxt->instate = oldstate;
return(buf);
}
| 171,301 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void fht16x16_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht16x16_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void fht16x16_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
void idct16x16_ref(const tran_low_t *in, uint8_t *dest, int stride,
int /*tx_type*/) {
vpx_idct16x16_256_add_c(in, dest, stride);
}
void fht16x16_ref(const int16_t *in, tran_low_t *out, int stride,
int tx_type) {
vp9_fht16x16_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
| 174,530 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xps_select_font_encoding(xps_font_t *font, int idx)
{
byte *cmapdata, *entry;
int pid, eid;
if (idx < 0 || idx >= font->cmapsubcount)
return;
cmapdata = font->data + font->cmaptable;
entry = cmapdata + 4 + idx * 8;
pid = u16(entry + 0);
eid = u16(entry + 2);
font->cmapsubtable = font->cmaptable + u32(entry + 4);
font->usepua = (pid == 3 && eid == 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | xps_select_font_encoding(xps_font_t *font, int idx)
{
byte *cmapdata, *entry;
int pid, eid;
if (idx < 0 || idx >= font->cmapsubcount)
return 0;
cmapdata = font->data + font->cmaptable;
entry = cmapdata + 4 + idx * 8;
pid = u16(entry + 0);
eid = u16(entry + 2);
font->cmapsubtable = font->cmaptable + u32(entry + 4);
if (font->cmapsubtable >= font->length) {
font->cmapsubtable = 0;
return 0;
}
font->usepua = (pid == 3 && eid == 0);
return 1;
}
| 164,782 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagegammacorrect)
{
zval *IM;
gdImagePtr im;
int i;
double input, output;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rdd", &IM, &input, &output) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
int x, y, c;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
c = gdImageGetPixel(im, x, y);
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y,
gdTrueColorAlpha(
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetRed(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5),
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetGreen(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5),
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetBlue(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5),
gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c)
)
);
}
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
for (i = 0; i < gdImageColorsTotal(im); i++) {
im->red[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->red[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
im->green[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->green[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
im->blue[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->blue[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72730 - imagegammacorrect allows arbitrary write access
CWE ID: CWE-787 | PHP_FUNCTION(imagegammacorrect)
{
zval *IM;
gdImagePtr im;
int i;
double input, output;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rdd", &IM, &input, &output) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ( input <= 0.0 || output <= 0.0 ) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Gamma values should be positive");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
int x, y, c;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
c = gdImageGetPixel(im, x, y);
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y,
gdTrueColorAlpha(
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetRed(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5),
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetGreen(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5),
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetBlue(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5),
gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c)
)
);
}
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
for (i = 0; i < gdImageColorsTotal(im); i++) {
im->red[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->red[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
im->green[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->green[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
im->blue[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->blue[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
| 166,952 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::CheckFramebufferValid(
Framebuffer* framebuffer,
GLenum target, const char* func_name) {
if (!framebuffer) {
if (backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_) {
glClearColor(0, 0, 0, (GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(
offscreen_target_color_format_) & 0x0008) != 0 ? 0 : 1);
state_.SetDeviceColorMask(GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE);
glClearStencil(0);
state_.SetDeviceStencilMaskSeparate(GL_FRONT, -1);
state_.SetDeviceStencilMaskSeparate(GL_BACK, -1);
glClearDepth(1.0f);
state_.SetDeviceDepthMask(GL_TRUE);
state_.SetDeviceCapabilityState(GL_SCISSOR_TEST, false);
glClear(backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_);
backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_ = 0;
RestoreClearState();
}
return true;
}
if (framebuffer_manager()->IsComplete(framebuffer)) {
return true;
}
GLenum completeness = framebuffer->IsPossiblyComplete();
if (completeness != GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, func_name, "framebuffer incomplete");
return false;
}
if (renderbuffer_manager()->HaveUnclearedRenderbuffers() ||
texture_manager()->HaveUnclearedMips()) {
if (!framebuffer->IsCleared()) {
if (framebuffer->GetStatus(texture_manager(), target) !=
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, func_name,
"framebuffer incomplete (clear)");
return false;
}
ClearUnclearedAttachments(target, framebuffer);
}
}
if (!framebuffer_manager()->IsComplete(framebuffer)) {
if (framebuffer->GetStatus(texture_manager(), target) !=
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, func_name,
"framebuffer incomplete (check)");
return false;
}
framebuffer_manager()->MarkAsComplete(framebuffer);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool GLES2DecoderImpl::CheckFramebufferValid(
Framebuffer* framebuffer,
GLenum target, const char* func_name) {
if (!framebuffer) {
if (backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_) {
glClearColor(0, 0, 0, (GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(
offscreen_target_color_format_) & 0x0008) != 0 ? 0 : 1);
state_.SetDeviceColorMask(GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE);
glClearStencil(0);
state_.SetDeviceStencilMaskSeparate(GL_FRONT, -1);
state_.SetDeviceStencilMaskSeparate(GL_BACK, -1);
glClearDepth(1.0f);
state_.SetDeviceDepthMask(GL_TRUE);
state_.SetDeviceCapabilityState(GL_SCISSOR_TEST, false);
bool reset_draw_buffer = false;
if ((backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_ | GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT) != 0 &&
group_->draw_buffer() == GL_NONE) {
reset_draw_buffer = true;
GLenum buf = GL_BACK;
if (GetBackbufferServiceId() != 0) // emulated backbuffer
buf = GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0;
glDrawBuffersARB(1, &buf);
}
glClear(backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_);
if (reset_draw_buffer) {
GLenum buf = GL_NONE;
glDrawBuffersARB(1, &buf);
}
backbuffer_needs_clear_bits_ = 0;
RestoreClearState();
}
return true;
}
if (framebuffer_manager()->IsComplete(framebuffer)) {
return true;
}
GLenum completeness = framebuffer->IsPossiblyComplete();
if (completeness != GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, func_name, "framebuffer incomplete");
return false;
}
if (renderbuffer_manager()->HaveUnclearedRenderbuffers() ||
texture_manager()->HaveUnclearedMips()) {
if (!framebuffer->IsCleared()) {
if (framebuffer->GetStatus(texture_manager(), target) !=
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, func_name,
"framebuffer incomplete (clear)");
return false;
}
ClearUnclearedAttachments(target, framebuffer);
}
}
if (!framebuffer_manager()->IsComplete(framebuffer)) {
if (framebuffer->GetStatus(texture_manager(), target) !=
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, func_name,
"framebuffer incomplete (check)");
return false;
}
framebuffer_manager()->MarkAsComplete(framebuffer);
}
return true;
}
| 171,657 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
char *dest, *src;
char separator = '\0';
dest = src = a->name;
if (*src == '\0') {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid empty pathname");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
#if defined(__CYGWIN__)
cleanup_pathname_win(a);
#endif
/* Skip leading '/'. */
if (*src == '/') {
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Path is absolute");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
separator = *src++;
}
/* Scan the pathname one element at a time. */
for (;;) {
/* src points to first char after '/' */
if (src[0] == '\0') {
break;
} else if (src[0] == '/') {
/* Found '//', ignore second one. */
src++;
continue;
} else if (src[0] == '.') {
if (src[1] == '\0') {
/* Ignore trailing '.' */
break;
} else if (src[1] == '/') {
/* Skip './'. */
src += 2;
continue;
} else if (src[1] == '.') {
if (src[2] == '/' || src[2] == '\0') {
/* Conditionally warn about '..' */
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Path contains '..'");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
}
/*
* Note: Under no circumstances do we
* remove '..' elements. In
* particular, restoring
* '/foo/../bar/' should create the
* 'foo' dir as a side-effect.
*/
}
}
/* Copy current element, including leading '/'. */
if (separator)
*dest++ = '/';
while (*src != '\0' && *src != '/') {
*dest++ = *src++;
}
if (*src == '\0')
break;
/* Skip '/' separator. */
separator = *src++;
}
/*
* We've just copied zero or more path elements, not including the
* final '/'.
*/
if (dest == a->name) {
/*
* Nothing got copied. The path must have been something
* like '.' or '/' or './' or '/././././/./'.
*/
if (separator)
*dest++ = '/';
else
*dest++ = '.';
}
/* Terminate the result. */
*dest = '\0';
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fixes for Issue #745 and Issue #746 from Doran Moppert.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
cleanup_pathname_fsobj(char *path, int *error_number, struct archive_string *error_string, int flags)
{
char *dest, *src;
char separator = '\0';
dest = src = path;
if (*src == '\0') {
if (error_number) *error_number = ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC;
if (error_string)
archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
"Invalid empty pathname");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
#if defined(__CYGWIN__)
cleanup_pathname_win(a);
#endif
/* Skip leading '/'. */
if (*src == '/') {
if (flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
if (error_number) *error_number = ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC;
if (error_string)
archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
"Path is absolute");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
separator = *src++;
}
/* Scan the pathname one element at a time. */
for (;;) {
/* src points to first char after '/' */
if (src[0] == '\0') {
break;
} else if (src[0] == '/') {
/* Found '//', ignore second one. */
src++;
continue;
} else if (src[0] == '.') {
if (src[1] == '\0') {
/* Ignore trailing '.' */
break;
} else if (src[1] == '/') {
/* Skip './'. */
src += 2;
continue;
} else if (src[1] == '.') {
if (src[2] == '/' || src[2] == '\0') {
/* Conditionally warn about '..' */
if (flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT) {
if (error_number) *error_number = ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC;
if (error_string)
archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
"Path contains '..'");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
}
/*
* Note: Under no circumstances do we
* remove '..' elements. In
* particular, restoring
* '/foo/../bar/' should create the
* 'foo' dir as a side-effect.
*/
}
}
/* Copy current element, including leading '/'. */
if (separator)
*dest++ = '/';
while (*src != '\0' && *src != '/') {
*dest++ = *src++;
}
if (*src == '\0')
break;
/* Skip '/' separator. */
separator = *src++;
}
/*
* We've just copied zero or more path elements, not including the
* final '/'.
*/
if (dest == path) {
/*
* Nothing got copied. The path must have been something
* like '.' or '/' or './' or '/././././/./'.
*/
if (separator)
*dest++ = '/';
else
*dest++ = '.';
}
/* Terminate the result. */
*dest = '\0';
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
| 167,136 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PresentationConnectionProxy::OnClose() {
DCHECK(target_connection_ptr_);
source_connection_->didChangeState(
blink::WebPresentationConnectionState::Closed);
target_connection_ptr_->DidChangeState(
content::PRESENTATION_CONNECTION_STATE_CLOSED);
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID: | void PresentationConnectionProxy::OnClose() {
DCHECK(target_connection_ptr_);
source_connection_->didClose();
target_connection_ptr_->DidChangeState(
content::PRESENTATION_CONNECTION_STATE_CLOSED);
}
| 172,045 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::DisplayPinCode(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
const std::string& pincode) {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(device_path == object_path_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": DisplayPinCode: " << pincode;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_DISPLAY_PINCODE,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
pairing_delegate_->DisplayPinCode(this, pincode);
pairing_delegate_used_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::DisplayPinCode(
| 171,223 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebContents* PrintPreviewDialogController::CreatePrintPreviewDialog(
WebContents* initiator) {
base::AutoReset<bool> auto_reset(&is_creating_print_preview_dialog_, true);
ConstrainedWebDialogDelegate* web_dialog_delegate =
ShowConstrainedWebDialog(initiator->GetBrowserContext(),
new PrintPreviewDialogDelegate(initiator),
initiator);
WebContents* preview_dialog = web_dialog_delegate->GetWebContents();
GURL print_url(chrome::kChromeUIPrintURL);
content::HostZoomMap::Get(preview_dialog->GetSiteInstance())
->SetZoomLevelForHostAndScheme(print_url.scheme(), print_url.host(), 0);
PrintViewManager::CreateForWebContents(preview_dialog);
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::CreateForWebContents(
preview_dialog);
preview_dialog_map_[preview_dialog] = initiator;
waiting_for_new_preview_page_ = true;
task_manager::WebContentsTags::CreateForPrintingContents(preview_dialog);
AddObservers(initiator);
AddObservers(preview_dialog);
return preview_dialog;
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | WebContents* PrintPreviewDialogController::CreatePrintPreviewDialog(
WebContents* initiator) {
base::AutoReset<bool> auto_reset(&is_creating_print_preview_dialog_, true);
ConstrainedWebDialogDelegate* web_dialog_delegate =
ShowConstrainedWebDialog(initiator->GetBrowserContext(),
new PrintPreviewDialogDelegate(initiator),
initiator);
WebContents* preview_dialog = web_dialog_delegate->GetWebContents();
GURL print_url(chrome::kChromeUIPrintURL);
content::HostZoomMap::Get(preview_dialog->GetSiteInstance())
->SetZoomLevelForHostAndScheme(print_url.scheme(), print_url.host(), 0);
PrintViewManager::CreateForWebContents(preview_dialog);
CreateCompositeClientIfNeeded(preview_dialog, true /* for_preview */);
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::CreateForWebContents(
preview_dialog);
preview_dialog_map_[preview_dialog] = initiator;
waiting_for_new_preview_page_ = true;
task_manager::WebContentsTags::CreateForPrintingContents(preview_dialog);
AddObservers(initiator);
AddObservers(preview_dialog);
return preview_dialog;
}
| 171,887 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ProcPseudoramiXGetScreenSize(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReq);
WindowPtr pWin;
xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply rep;
register int rc;
TRACE;
if (stuff->screen >= pseudoramiXNumScreens)
return BadMatch;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReq);
rc = dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->window, client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
rep.type = X_Reply;
rep.length = 0;
rep.sequenceNumber = client->sequence;
/* screen dimensions */
rep.width = pseudoramiXScreens[stuff->screen].w;
rep.height = pseudoramiXScreens[stuff->screen].h;
rep.window = stuff->window;
rep.screen = stuff->screen;
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl(&rep.length);
swapl(&rep.width);
swapl(&rep.height);
swapl(&rep.window);
swapl(&rep.screen);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply),&rep);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ProcPseudoramiXGetScreenSize(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReq);
WindowPtr pWin;
xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply rep;
register int rc;
TRACE;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReq);
if (stuff->screen >= pseudoramiXNumScreens)
return BadMatch;
rc = dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->window, client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
rep.type = X_Reply;
rep.length = 0;
rep.sequenceNumber = client->sequence;
/* screen dimensions */
rep.width = pseudoramiXScreens[stuff->screen].w;
rep.height = pseudoramiXScreens[stuff->screen].h;
rep.window = stuff->window;
rep.screen = stuff->screen;
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl(&rep.length);
swapl(&rep.width);
swapl(&rep.height);
swapl(&rep.window);
swapl(&rep.screen);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply),&rep);
return Success;
}
| 165,437 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebsiteSettingsPopupView::WebsiteSettingsPopupView(
views::View* anchor_view,
gfx::NativeView parent_window,
Profile* profile,
content::WebContents* web_contents,
const GURL& url,
const content::SSLStatus& ssl)
: BubbleDelegateView(anchor_view, views::BubbleBorder::TOP_LEFT),
web_contents_(web_contents),
header_(nullptr),
tabbed_pane_(nullptr),
permissions_tab_(nullptr),
site_data_content_(nullptr),
cookie_dialog_link_(nullptr),
permissions_content_(nullptr),
connection_tab_(nullptr),
identity_info_content_(nullptr),
certificate_dialog_link_(nullptr),
reset_decisions_button_(nullptr),
help_center_content_(nullptr),
cert_id_(0),
help_center_link_(nullptr),
connection_info_content_(nullptr),
weak_factory_(this) {
set_parent_window(parent_window);
set_anchor_view_insets(gfx::Insets(kLocationIconVerticalMargin, 0,
kLocationIconVerticalMargin, 0));
views::GridLayout* layout = new views::GridLayout(this);
SetLayoutManager(layout);
const int content_column = 0;
views::ColumnSet* column_set = layout->AddColumnSet(content_column);
column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::FILL,
views::GridLayout::FILL,
1,
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF,
0,
0);
header_ = new PopupHeaderView(this);
layout->StartRow(1, content_column);
layout->AddView(header_);
layout->AddPaddingRow(1, kHeaderMarginBottom);
tabbed_pane_ = new views::TabbedPane();
layout->StartRow(1, content_column);
layout->AddView(tabbed_pane_);
permissions_tab_ = CreatePermissionsTab();
tabbed_pane_->AddTabAtIndex(
TAB_ID_PERMISSIONS,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBSITE_SETTINGS_TAB_LABEL_PERMISSIONS),
permissions_tab_);
connection_tab_ = CreateConnectionTab();
tabbed_pane_->AddTabAtIndex(
TAB_ID_CONNECTION,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBSITE_SETTINGS_TAB_LABEL_CONNECTION),
connection_tab_);
DCHECK_EQ(tabbed_pane_->GetTabCount(), NUM_TAB_IDS);
tabbed_pane_->set_listener(this);
set_margins(gfx::Insets(kPopupMarginTop, kPopupMarginLeft,
kPopupMarginBottom, kPopupMarginRight));
views::BubbleDelegateView::CreateBubble(this);
presenter_.reset(new WebsiteSettings(
this, profile,
TabSpecificContentSettings::FromWebContents(web_contents),
InfoBarService::FromWebContents(web_contents), url, ssl,
content::CertStore::GetInstance()));
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID: | WebsiteSettingsPopupView::WebsiteSettingsPopupView(
views::View* anchor_view,
gfx::NativeView parent_window,
Profile* profile,
content::WebContents* web_contents,
const GURL& url,
const content::SSLStatus& ssl)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
BubbleDelegateView(anchor_view, views::BubbleBorder::TOP_LEFT),
web_contents_(web_contents),
header_(nullptr),
tabbed_pane_(nullptr),
permissions_tab_(nullptr),
site_data_content_(nullptr),
cookie_dialog_link_(nullptr),
permissions_content_(nullptr),
connection_tab_(nullptr),
identity_info_content_(nullptr),
certificate_dialog_link_(nullptr),
reset_decisions_button_(nullptr),
help_center_content_(nullptr),
cert_id_(0),
help_center_link_(nullptr),
connection_info_content_(nullptr),
weak_factory_(this) {
set_parent_window(parent_window);
set_anchor_view_insets(gfx::Insets(kLocationIconVerticalMargin, 0,
kLocationIconVerticalMargin, 0));
views::GridLayout* layout = new views::GridLayout(this);
SetLayoutManager(layout);
const int content_column = 0;
views::ColumnSet* column_set = layout->AddColumnSet(content_column);
column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::FILL,
views::GridLayout::FILL,
1,
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF,
0,
0);
header_ = new PopupHeaderView(this);
layout->StartRow(1, content_column);
layout->AddView(header_);
layout->AddPaddingRow(1, kHeaderMarginBottom);
tabbed_pane_ = new views::TabbedPane();
layout->StartRow(1, content_column);
layout->AddView(tabbed_pane_);
permissions_tab_ = CreatePermissionsTab();
tabbed_pane_->AddTabAtIndex(
TAB_ID_PERMISSIONS,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBSITE_SETTINGS_TAB_LABEL_PERMISSIONS),
permissions_tab_);
connection_tab_ = CreateConnectionTab();
tabbed_pane_->AddTabAtIndex(
TAB_ID_CONNECTION,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBSITE_SETTINGS_TAB_LABEL_CONNECTION),
connection_tab_);
DCHECK_EQ(tabbed_pane_->GetTabCount(), NUM_TAB_IDS);
tabbed_pane_->set_listener(this);
set_margins(gfx::Insets(kPopupMarginTop, kPopupMarginLeft,
kPopupMarginBottom, kPopupMarginRight));
views::BubbleDelegateView::CreateBubble(this);
presenter_.reset(new WebsiteSettings(
this, profile, TabSpecificContentSettings::FromWebContents(web_contents),
web_contents, url, ssl, content::CertStore::GetInstance()));
}
void WebsiteSettingsPopupView::RenderFrameDeleted(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
if (render_frame_host == web_contents_->GetMainFrame()) {
GetWidget()->Close();
}
}
| 171,779 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const BlockEntry* Cues::GetBlock(
const CuePoint* pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition* pTP) const
{
if (pCP == NULL)
return NULL;
if (pTP == NULL)
return NULL;
return m_pSegment->GetBlock(*pCP, *pTP);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const BlockEntry* Cues::GetBlock(
if (pTP == NULL)
return NULL;
return m_pSegment->GetBlock(*pCP, *pTP);
}
| 174,287 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
struct cifs_ses *ses)
{
NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob = (NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *)pbuffer;
__u32 flags;
memset(pbuffer, 0, sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE));
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmNegotiate;
/* BB is NTLMV2 session security format easier to use here? */
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC;
if (ses->server->sign) {
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
if (!ses->server->session_estab ||
ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
}
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
/* Domain name is sent on the Challenge not Negotiate NTLMSSP request */
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | void build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
struct cifs_ses *ses)
{
NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob = (NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *)pbuffer;
__u32 flags;
memset(pbuffer, 0, sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE));
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmNegotiate;
/* BB is NTLMV2 session security format easier to use here? */
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
if (ses->server->sign)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
if (!ses->server->session_estab || ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
/* Domain name is sent on the Challenge not Negotiate NTLMSSP request */
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
}
| 169,360 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void fe_netjoin_deinit(void)
{
while (joinservers != NULL)
netjoin_server_remove(joinservers->data);
if (join_tag != -1) {
g_source_remove(join_tag);
signal_remove("print starting", (SIGNAL_FUNC) sig_print_starting);
}
signal_remove("setup changed", (SIGNAL_FUNC) read_settings);
signal_remove("message quit", (SIGNAL_FUNC) msg_quit);
signal_remove("message join", (SIGNAL_FUNC) msg_join);
signal_remove("message irc mode", (SIGNAL_FUNC) msg_mode);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'netjoin-timeout' into 'master'
fe-netjoin: remove irc servers on "server disconnected" signal
Closes #7
See merge request !10
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void fe_netjoin_deinit(void)
{
while (joinservers != NULL)
netjoin_server_remove(joinservers->data);
if (join_tag != -1) {
g_source_remove(join_tag);
signal_remove("print starting", (SIGNAL_FUNC) sig_print_starting);
}
signal_remove("setup changed", (SIGNAL_FUNC) read_settings);
signal_remove("server disconnected", (SIGNAL_FUNC) sig_server_disconnected);
signal_remove("message quit", (SIGNAL_FUNC) msg_quit);
signal_remove("message join", (SIGNAL_FUNC) msg_join);
signal_remove("message irc mode", (SIGNAL_FUNC) msg_mode);
}
| 168,290 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void copy_to_user_policy(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p, int dir)
{
memcpy(&p->sel, &xp->selector, sizeof(p->sel));
memcpy(&p->lft, &xp->lft, sizeof(p->lft));
memcpy(&p->curlft, &xp->curlft, sizeof(p->curlft));
p->priority = xp->priority;
p->index = xp->index;
p->sel.family = xp->family;
p->dir = dir;
p->action = xp->action;
p->flags = xp->flags;
p->share = XFRM_SHARE_ANY; /* XXX xp->share */
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_policy()
The memory reserved to dump the xfrm policy includes multiple padding
bytes added by the compiler for alignment (padding bytes in struct
xfrm_selector and struct xfrm_userpolicy_info). Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the buffer to avoid the heap info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void copy_to_user_policy(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p, int dir)
{
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
memcpy(&p->sel, &xp->selector, sizeof(p->sel));
memcpy(&p->lft, &xp->lft, sizeof(p->lft));
memcpy(&p->curlft, &xp->curlft, sizeof(p->curlft));
p->priority = xp->priority;
p->index = xp->index;
p->sel.family = xp->family;
p->dir = dir;
p->action = xp->action;
p->flags = xp->flags;
p->share = XFRM_SHARE_ANY; /* XXX xp->share */
}
| 169,902 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void LocalFileSystem::deleteFileSystemInternal(
PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> context,
FileSystemType type,
PassRefPtr<CallbackWrapper> callbacks)
{
if (!fileSystem()) {
fileSystemNotAvailable(context, callbacks);
return;
}
KURL storagePartition = KURL(KURL(), context->securityOrigin()->toString());
fileSystem()->deleteFileSystem(storagePartition, static_cast<WebFileSystemType>(type), callbacks->release());
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void LocalFileSystem::deleteFileSystemInternal(
PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> context,
FileSystemType type,
CallbackWrapper* callbacks)
{
if (!fileSystem()) {
fileSystemNotAvailable(context, callbacks);
return;
}
KURL storagePartition = KURL(KURL(), context->securityOrigin()->toString());
fileSystem()->deleteFileSystem(storagePartition, static_cast<WebFileSystemType>(type), callbacks->release());
}
| 171,425 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jp2_bpcc_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_bpcc_t *bpcc = &box->data.bpcc;
unsigned int i;
bpcc->numcmpts = box->datalen;
if (!(bpcc->bpcs = jas_alloc2(bpcc->numcmpts, sizeof(uint_fast8_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < bpcc->numcmpts; ++i) {
if (jp2_getuint8(in, &bpcc->bpcs[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int jp2_bpcc_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_bpcc_t *bpcc = &box->data.bpcc;
unsigned int i;
bpcc->bpcs = 0;
bpcc->numcmpts = box->datalen;
if (!(bpcc->bpcs = jas_alloc2(bpcc->numcmpts, sizeof(uint_fast8_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < bpcc->numcmpts; ++i) {
if (jp2_getuint8(in, &bpcc->bpcs[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 168,320 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: internalEntityProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
ENTITY *entity;
const char *textStart, *textEnd;
const char *next;
enum XML_Error result;
OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *openEntity = parser->m_openInternalEntities;
if (! openEntity)
return XML_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_STATE;
entity = openEntity->entity;
textStart = ((char *)entity->textPtr) + entity->processed;
textEnd = (char *)(entity->textPtr + entity->textLen);
/* Set a safe default value in case 'next' does not get set */
next = textStart;
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok
= XmlPrologTok(parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next);
result = doProlog(parser, parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd,
tok, next, &next, XML_FALSE);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
result = doContent(parser, openEntity->startTagLevel,
parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next,
XML_FALSE);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
else if (textEnd != next
&& parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED) {
entity->processed = (int)(next - (char *)entity->textPtr);
return result;
} else {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
/* put openEntity back in list of free instances */
openEntity->next = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity;
}
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok;
parser->m_processor = prologProcessor;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
{
parser->m_processor = contentProcessor;
/* see externalEntityContentProcessor vs contentProcessor */
return doContent(parser, parser->m_parentParser ? 1 : 0, parser->m_encoding,
s, end, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
}
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | internalEntityProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
ENTITY *entity;
const char *textStart, *textEnd;
const char *next;
enum XML_Error result;
OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *openEntity = parser->m_openInternalEntities;
if (! openEntity)
return XML_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_STATE;
entity = openEntity->entity;
textStart = ((char *)entity->textPtr) + entity->processed;
textEnd = (char *)(entity->textPtr + entity->textLen);
/* Set a safe default value in case 'next' does not get set */
next = textStart;
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok
= XmlPrologTok(parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next);
result = doProlog(parser, parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd,
tok, next, &next, XML_FALSE, XML_TRUE);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
result = doContent(parser, openEntity->startTagLevel,
parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next,
XML_FALSE);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
else if (textEnd != next
&& parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED) {
entity->processed = (int)(next - (char *)entity->textPtr);
return result;
} else {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
/* put openEntity back in list of free instances */
openEntity->next = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity;
}
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok;
parser->m_processor = prologProcessor;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer, XML_TRUE);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
{
parser->m_processor = contentProcessor;
/* see externalEntityContentProcessor vs contentProcessor */
return doContent(parser, parser->m_parentParser ? 1 : 0, parser->m_encoding,
s, end, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
}
}
| 169,531 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XGetModifierMapping(register Display *dpy)
{
xGetModifierMappingReply rep;
register xReq *req;
unsigned long nbytes;
XModifierKeymap *res;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq(GetModifierMapping, req);
(void) _XReply (dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse);
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
nbytes = (unsigned long)rep.length << 2;
res = Xmalloc(sizeof (XModifierKeymap));
if (res)
} else
res = NULL;
if ((! res) || (! res->modifiermap)) {
Xfree(res);
res = (XModifierKeymap *) NULL;
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
} else {
_XReadPad(dpy, (char *) res->modifiermap, (long) nbytes);
res->max_keypermod = rep.numKeyPerModifier;
}
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (res);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | XGetModifierMapping(register Display *dpy)
{
xGetModifierMappingReply rep;
register xReq *req;
unsigned long nbytes;
XModifierKeymap *res;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq(GetModifierMapping, req);
(void) _XReply (dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse);
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2) &&
(rep.length >> 1) == rep.numKeyPerModifier) {
nbytes = (unsigned long)rep.length << 2;
res = Xmalloc(sizeof (XModifierKeymap));
if (res)
} else
res = NULL;
if ((! res) || (! res->modifiermap)) {
Xfree(res);
res = (XModifierKeymap *) NULL;
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
} else {
_XReadPad(dpy, (char *) res->modifiermap, (long) nbytes);
res->max_keypermod = rep.numKeyPerModifier;
}
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (res);
}
| 164,924 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static BOOLEAN flush_incoming_que_on_wr_signal_l(l2cap_socket *sock)
{
uint8_t *buf;
uint32_t len;
while (packet_get_head_l(sock, &buf, &len)) {
int sent = send(sock->our_fd, buf, len, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (sent == (signed)len)
osi_free(buf);
else if (sent >= 0) {
packet_put_head_l(sock, buf + sent, len - sent);
osi_free(buf);
if (!sent) /* special case if other end not keeping up */
return TRUE;
}
else {
packet_put_head_l(sock, buf, len);
osi_free(buf);
return errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EAGAIN;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static BOOLEAN flush_incoming_que_on_wr_signal_l(l2cap_socket *sock)
{
uint8_t *buf;
uint32_t len;
while (packet_get_head_l(sock, &buf, &len)) {
int sent = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(sock->our_fd, buf, len, MSG_DONTWAIT));
if (sent == (signed)len)
osi_free(buf);
else if (sent >= 0) {
packet_put_head_l(sock, buf + sent, len - sent);
osi_free(buf);
if (!sent) /* special case if other end not keeping up */
return TRUE;
}
else {
packet_put_head_l(sock, buf, len);
osi_free(buf);
return errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EAGAIN;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
| 173,454 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::ChangeNetworkStateFromLoadingToIdle() {
progress_event_timer_.Stop();
if (GetWebMediaPlayer() && GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidLoadingProgress())
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::progress);
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::suspend);
SetNetworkState(kNetworkIdle);
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void HTMLMediaElement::ChangeNetworkStateFromLoadingToIdle() {
progress_event_timer_.Stop();
if (!MediaShouldBeOpaque()) {
// Schedule one last progress event so we guarantee that at least one is
// fired for files that load very quickly.
if (GetWebMediaPlayer() && GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidLoadingProgress())
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::progress);
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::suspend);
SetNetworkState(kNetworkIdle);
}
}
| 173,161 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: tPacketIndicationType ParaNdis_PrepareReceivedPacket(
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext,
pRxNetDescriptor pBuffersDesc,
PUINT pnCoalescedSegmentsCount)
{
PMDL pMDL = pBuffersDesc->Holder;
PNET_BUFFER_LIST pNBL = NULL;
*pnCoalescedSegmentsCount = 1;
if (pMDL)
{
ULONG nBytesStripped = 0;
PNET_PACKET_INFO pPacketInfo = &pBuffersDesc->PacketInfo;
if (pContext->ulPriorityVlanSetting && pPacketInfo->hasVlanHeader)
{
nBytesStripped = ParaNdis_StripVlanHeaderMoveHead(pPacketInfo);
}
ParaNdis_PadPacketToMinimalLength(pPacketInfo);
ParaNdis_AdjustRxBufferHolderLength(pBuffersDesc, nBytesStripped);
pNBL = NdisAllocateNetBufferAndNetBufferList(pContext->BufferListsPool, 0, 0, pMDL, nBytesStripped, pPacketInfo->dataLength);
if (pNBL)
{
virtio_net_hdr_basic *pHeader = (virtio_net_hdr_basic *) pBuffersDesc->PhysicalPages[0].Virtual;
tChecksumCheckResult csRes;
pNBL->SourceHandle = pContext->MiniportHandle;
NBLSetRSSInfo(pContext, pNBL, pPacketInfo);
NBLSet8021QInfo(pContext, pNBL, pPacketInfo);
pNBL->MiniportReserved[0] = pBuffersDesc;
#if PARANDIS_SUPPORT_RSC
if(pHeader->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE)
{
*pnCoalescedSegmentsCount = PktGetTCPCoalescedSegmentsCount(pPacketInfo, pContext->MaxPacketSize.nMaxDataSize);
NBLSetRSCInfo(pContext, pNBL, pPacketInfo, *pnCoalescedSegmentsCount);
}
else
#endif
{
csRes = ParaNdis_CheckRxChecksum(
pContext,
pHeader->flags,
&pBuffersDesc->PhysicalPages[PARANDIS_FIRST_RX_DATA_PAGE],
pPacketInfo->dataLength,
nBytesStripped);
if (csRes.value)
{
NDIS_TCP_IP_CHECKSUM_NET_BUFFER_LIST_INFO qCSInfo;
qCSInfo.Value = NULL;
qCSInfo.Receive.IpChecksumFailed = csRes.flags.IpFailed;
qCSInfo.Receive.IpChecksumSucceeded = csRes.flags.IpOK;
qCSInfo.Receive.TcpChecksumFailed = csRes.flags.TcpFailed;
qCSInfo.Receive.TcpChecksumSucceeded = csRes.flags.TcpOK;
qCSInfo.Receive.UdpChecksumFailed = csRes.flags.UdpFailed;
qCSInfo.Receive.UdpChecksumSucceeded = csRes.flags.UdpOK;
NET_BUFFER_LIST_INFO(pNBL, TcpIpChecksumNetBufferListInfo) = qCSInfo.Value;
DPrintf(1, ("Reporting CS %X->%X\n", csRes.value, (ULONG)(ULONG_PTR)qCSInfo.Value));
}
}
pNBL->Status = NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
#if defined(ENABLE_HISTORY_LOG)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult packetReview = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(
RtlOffsetToPointer(pPacketInfo->headersBuffer, ETH_HEADER_SIZE),
pPacketInfo->dataLength,
pcrIpChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrUdpChecksum,
__FUNCTION__
);
ParaNdis_DebugHistory(pContext, hopPacketReceived, pNBL, pPacketInfo->dataLength, (ULONG)(ULONG_PTR)qInfo.Value, packetReview.value);
}
#endif
}
}
return pNBL;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | tPacketIndicationType ParaNdis_PrepareReceivedPacket(
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext,
pRxNetDescriptor pBuffersDesc,
PUINT pnCoalescedSegmentsCount)
{
PMDL pMDL = pBuffersDesc->Holder;
PNET_BUFFER_LIST pNBL = NULL;
*pnCoalescedSegmentsCount = 1;
if (pMDL)
{
ULONG nBytesStripped = 0;
PNET_PACKET_INFO pPacketInfo = &pBuffersDesc->PacketInfo;
if (pContext->ulPriorityVlanSetting && pPacketInfo->hasVlanHeader)
{
nBytesStripped = ParaNdis_StripVlanHeaderMoveHead(pPacketInfo);
}
ParaNdis_PadPacketToMinimalLength(pPacketInfo);
ParaNdis_AdjustRxBufferHolderLength(pBuffersDesc, nBytesStripped);
pNBL = NdisAllocateNetBufferAndNetBufferList(pContext->BufferListsPool, 0, 0, pMDL, nBytesStripped, pPacketInfo->dataLength);
if (pNBL)
{
virtio_net_hdr_basic *pHeader = (virtio_net_hdr_basic *) pBuffersDesc->PhysicalPages[0].Virtual;
tChecksumCheckResult csRes;
pNBL->SourceHandle = pContext->MiniportHandle;
NBLSetRSSInfo(pContext, pNBL, pPacketInfo);
NBLSet8021QInfo(pContext, pNBL, pPacketInfo);
pNBL->MiniportReserved[0] = pBuffersDesc;
#if PARANDIS_SUPPORT_RSC
if(pHeader->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE)
{
*pnCoalescedSegmentsCount = PktGetTCPCoalescedSegmentsCount(pPacketInfo, pContext->MaxPacketSize.nMaxDataSize);
NBLSetRSCInfo(pContext, pNBL, pPacketInfo, *pnCoalescedSegmentsCount);
}
else
#endif
{
csRes = ParaNdis_CheckRxChecksum(
pContext,
pHeader->flags,
&pBuffersDesc->PhysicalPages[PARANDIS_FIRST_RX_DATA_PAGE],
pPacketInfo->dataLength,
nBytesStripped, TRUE);
if (csRes.value)
{
NDIS_TCP_IP_CHECKSUM_NET_BUFFER_LIST_INFO qCSInfo;
qCSInfo.Value = NULL;
qCSInfo.Receive.IpChecksumFailed = csRes.flags.IpFailed;
qCSInfo.Receive.IpChecksumSucceeded = csRes.flags.IpOK;
qCSInfo.Receive.TcpChecksumFailed = csRes.flags.TcpFailed;
qCSInfo.Receive.TcpChecksumSucceeded = csRes.flags.TcpOK;
qCSInfo.Receive.UdpChecksumFailed = csRes.flags.UdpFailed;
qCSInfo.Receive.UdpChecksumSucceeded = csRes.flags.UdpOK;
NET_BUFFER_LIST_INFO(pNBL, TcpIpChecksumNetBufferListInfo) = qCSInfo.Value;
DPrintf(1, ("Reporting CS %X->%X\n", csRes.value, (ULONG)(ULONG_PTR)qCSInfo.Value));
}
}
pNBL->Status = NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
#if defined(ENABLE_HISTORY_LOG)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult packetReview = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(
RtlOffsetToPointer(pPacketInfo->headersBuffer, ETH_HEADER_SIZE),
pPacketInfo->dataLength,
pcrIpChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrUdpChecksum,
__FUNCTION__
);
ParaNdis_DebugHistory(pContext, hopPacketReceived, pNBL, pPacketInfo->dataLength, (ULONG)(ULONG_PTR)qInfo.Value, packetReview.value);
}
#endif
}
}
return pNBL;
}
| 170,146 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long AudioTrack::Parse(Segment* pSegment, const Info& info,
long long element_start, long long element_size,
AudioTrack*& pResult) {
if (pResult)
return -1;
if (info.type != Track::kAudio)
return -1;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
double rate = 8000.0; // MKV default
long long channels = 1;
long long bit_depth = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x35) { // Sample Rate
status = UnserializeFloat(pReader, pos, size, rate);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (rate <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x1F) { // Channel Count
channels = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (channels <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x2264) { // Bit Depth
bit_depth = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (bit_depth <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
AudioTrack* const pTrack =
new (std::nothrow) AudioTrack(pSegment, element_start, element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status) {
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pTrack->m_rate = rate;
pTrack->m_channels = channels;
pTrack->m_bitDepth = bit_depth;
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long AudioTrack::Parse(Segment* pSegment, const Info& info,
long long element_start, long long element_size,
AudioTrack*& pResult) {
if (pResult)
return -1;
if (info.type != Track::kAudio)
return -1;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
double rate = 8000.0; // MKV default
long long channels = 1;
long long bit_depth = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x35) { // Sample Rate
status = UnserializeFloat(pReader, pos, size, rate);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (rate <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x1F) { // Channel Count
channels = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (channels <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x2264) { // Bit Depth
bit_depth = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (bit_depth <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
AudioTrack* const pTrack =
new (std::nothrow) AudioTrack(pSegment, element_start, element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status) {
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pTrack->m_rate = rate;
pTrack->m_channels = channels;
pTrack->m_bitDepth = bit_depth;
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; // success
}
| 173,844 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
int al;
size_t i;
/* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
}
/* If sigalgs received process it. */
if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
/* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto err;
}
} else
ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
return 1;
err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
int al;
size_t i;
/* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
}
/* If sigalgs received process it. */
if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
/* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto err;
}
} else
ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
return 1;
err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
| 164,804 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BufferMeta(const sp<GraphicBuffer> &graphicBuffer)
: mGraphicBuffer(graphicBuffer),
mIsBackup(false) {
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119 | BufferMeta(const sp<GraphicBuffer> &graphicBuffer)
BufferMeta(const sp<GraphicBuffer> &graphicBuffer, OMX_U32 portIndex)
: mGraphicBuffer(graphicBuffer),
mIsBackup(false),
mPortIndex(portIndex) {
}
| 173,523 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void JNI_WebApkUpdateManager_StoreWebApkUpdateRequestToFile(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_update_request_path,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_start_url,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_scope,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_name,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_short_name,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_primary_icon_url,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& java_primary_icon_bitmap,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_badge_icon_url,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& java_badge_icon_bitmap,
const JavaParamRef<jobjectArray>& java_icon_urls,
const JavaParamRef<jobjectArray>& java_icon_hashes,
jint java_display_mode,
jint java_orientation,
jlong java_theme_color,
jlong java_background_color,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_web_manifest_url,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_webapk_package,
jint java_webapk_version,
jboolean java_is_manifest_stale,
jint java_update_reason,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& java_callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
std::string update_request_path =
ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_update_request_path);
ShortcutInfo info(GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_start_url)));
info.scope = GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_scope));
info.name = ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(env, java_name);
info.short_name = ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(env, java_short_name);
info.user_title = info.short_name;
info.display = static_cast<blink::WebDisplayMode>(java_display_mode);
info.orientation =
static_cast<blink::WebScreenOrientationLockType>(java_orientation);
info.theme_color = (int64_t)java_theme_color;
info.background_color = (int64_t)java_background_color;
info.best_primary_icon_url =
GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_primary_icon_url));
info.best_badge_icon_url =
GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_badge_icon_url));
info.manifest_url = GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_web_manifest_url));
base::android::AppendJavaStringArrayToStringVector(env, java_icon_urls,
&info.icon_urls);
std::vector<std::string> icon_hashes;
base::android::AppendJavaStringArrayToStringVector(env, java_icon_hashes,
&icon_hashes);
std::map<std::string, std::string> icon_url_to_murmur2_hash;
for (size_t i = 0; i < info.icon_urls.size(); ++i)
icon_url_to_murmur2_hash[info.icon_urls[i]] = icon_hashes[i];
gfx::JavaBitmap java_primary_icon_bitmap_lock(java_primary_icon_bitmap);
SkBitmap primary_icon =
gfx::CreateSkBitmapFromJavaBitmap(java_primary_icon_bitmap_lock);
primary_icon.setImmutable();
SkBitmap badge_icon;
if (!java_badge_icon_bitmap.is_null()) {
gfx::JavaBitmap java_badge_icon_bitmap_lock(java_badge_icon_bitmap);
gfx::CreateSkBitmapFromJavaBitmap(java_badge_icon_bitmap_lock);
badge_icon.setImmutable();
}
std::string webapk_package;
ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_webapk_package, &webapk_package);
WebApkUpdateReason update_reason =
static_cast<WebApkUpdateReason>(java_update_reason);
WebApkInstaller::StoreUpdateRequestToFile(
base::FilePath(update_request_path), info, primary_icon, badge_icon,
webapk_package, std::to_string(java_webapk_version),
icon_url_to_murmur2_hash, java_is_manifest_stale, update_reason,
base::BindOnce(&base::android::RunBooleanCallbackAndroid,
ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject>(java_callback)));
}
Commit Message: [Android WebAPK] Send share target information in WebAPK updates
This CL plumbs through share target information for WebAPK updates.
Chromium detects Web Manifest updates (including Web Manifest share
target updates) and requests an update.
Currently, depending on whether the Web Manifest is for an intranet
site, the updated WebAPK would either:
- no longer be able handle share intents (even if the Web Manifest
share target information was not deleted)
- be created with the same share intent handlers as the current WebAPK
(regardless of whether the Web Manifest share target information has
changed).
This CL plumbs through the share target information from
WebApkUpdateDataFetcher#onDataAvailable() to
WebApkUpdateManager::StoreWebApkUpdateRequestToFile()
BUG=912945
Change-Id: Ie416570533abc848eeb23de8c197b44f2a1fd028
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369709
Commit-Queue: Peter Kotwicz <pkotwicz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616429}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void JNI_WebApkUpdateManager_StoreWebApkUpdateRequestToFile(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_update_request_path,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_start_url,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_scope,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_name,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_short_name,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_primary_icon_url,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& java_primary_icon_bitmap,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_badge_icon_url,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& java_badge_icon_bitmap,
const JavaParamRef<jobjectArray>& java_icon_urls,
const JavaParamRef<jobjectArray>& java_icon_hashes,
jint java_display_mode,
jint java_orientation,
jlong java_theme_color,
jlong java_background_color,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_share_target_action,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_share_target_param_title,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_share_target_param_text,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_share_target_param_url,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_web_manifest_url,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_webapk_package,
jint java_webapk_version,
jboolean java_is_manifest_stale,
jint java_update_reason,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& java_callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
std::string update_request_path =
ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_update_request_path);
ShortcutInfo info(GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_start_url)));
info.scope = GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_scope));
info.name = ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(env, java_name);
info.short_name = ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(env, java_short_name);
info.user_title = info.short_name;
info.display = static_cast<blink::WebDisplayMode>(java_display_mode);
info.orientation =
static_cast<blink::WebScreenOrientationLockType>(java_orientation);
info.theme_color = (int64_t)java_theme_color;
info.background_color = (int64_t)java_background_color;
info.best_primary_icon_url =
GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_primary_icon_url));
info.best_badge_icon_url =
GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_badge_icon_url));
info.manifest_url = GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_web_manifest_url));
GURL share_target_action =
GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_share_target_action));
if (!share_target_action.is_empty()) {
info.share_target = ShareTarget();
info.share_target->action = share_target_action;
info.share_target->params.title =
ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(java_share_target_param_title);
info.share_target->params.text =
ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(java_share_target_param_text);
info.share_target->params.url =
ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(java_share_target_param_url);
}
base::android::AppendJavaStringArrayToStringVector(env, java_icon_urls,
&info.icon_urls);
std::vector<std::string> icon_hashes;
base::android::AppendJavaStringArrayToStringVector(env, java_icon_hashes,
&icon_hashes);
std::map<std::string, std::string> icon_url_to_murmur2_hash;
for (size_t i = 0; i < info.icon_urls.size(); ++i)
icon_url_to_murmur2_hash[info.icon_urls[i]] = icon_hashes[i];
gfx::JavaBitmap java_primary_icon_bitmap_lock(java_primary_icon_bitmap);
SkBitmap primary_icon =
gfx::CreateSkBitmapFromJavaBitmap(java_primary_icon_bitmap_lock);
primary_icon.setImmutable();
SkBitmap badge_icon;
if (!java_badge_icon_bitmap.is_null()) {
gfx::JavaBitmap java_badge_icon_bitmap_lock(java_badge_icon_bitmap);
gfx::CreateSkBitmapFromJavaBitmap(java_badge_icon_bitmap_lock);
badge_icon.setImmutable();
}
std::string webapk_package;
ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_webapk_package, &webapk_package);
WebApkUpdateReason update_reason =
static_cast<WebApkUpdateReason>(java_update_reason);
WebApkInstaller::StoreUpdateRequestToFile(
base::FilePath(update_request_path), info, primary_icon, badge_icon,
webapk_package, std::to_string(java_webapk_version),
icon_url_to_murmur2_hash, java_is_manifest_stale, update_reason,
base::BindOnce(&base::android::RunBooleanCallbackAndroid,
ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject>(java_callback)));
}
| 172,073 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void *listen_fn_(UNUSED_ATTR void *context) {
prctl(PR_SET_NAME, (unsigned long)LISTEN_THREAD_NAME_, 0, 0, 0);
listen_socket_ = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (listen_socket_ == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s socket creation failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto cleanup;
}
int enable = 1;
if (setsockopt(listen_socket_, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &enable, sizeof(enable)) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to set SO_REUSEADDR: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto cleanup;
}
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(LOCALHOST_);
addr.sin_port = htons(LISTEN_PORT_);
if (bind(listen_socket_, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to bind listen socket: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto cleanup;
}
if (listen(listen_socket_, 10) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to listen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto cleanup;
}
for (;;) {
int client_socket = accept(listen_socket_, NULL, NULL);
if (client_socket == -1) {
if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EBADF) {
break;
}
LOG_WARN("%s error accepting socket: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
continue;
}
/* When a new client connects, we have to send the btsnoop file header. This allows
a decoder to treat the session as a new, valid btsnoop file. */
pthread_mutex_lock(&client_socket_lock_);
safe_close_(&client_socket_);
client_socket_ = client_socket;
send(client_socket_, "btsnoop\0\0\0\0\1\0\0\x3\xea", 16, 0);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&client_socket_lock_);
}
cleanup:
safe_close_(&listen_socket_);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void *listen_fn_(UNUSED_ATTR void *context) {
prctl(PR_SET_NAME, (unsigned long)LISTEN_THREAD_NAME_, 0, 0, 0);
listen_socket_ = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (listen_socket_ == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s socket creation failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto cleanup;
}
int enable = 1;
if (setsockopt(listen_socket_, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &enable, sizeof(enable)) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to set SO_REUSEADDR: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto cleanup;
}
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(LOCALHOST_);
addr.sin_port = htons(LISTEN_PORT_);
if (bind(listen_socket_, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to bind listen socket: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto cleanup;
}
if (listen(listen_socket_, 10) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to listen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto cleanup;
}
for (;;) {
int client_socket = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(accept(listen_socket_, NULL, NULL));
if (client_socket == -1) {
if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EBADF) {
break;
}
LOG_WARN("%s error accepting socket: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
continue;
}
/* When a new client connects, we have to send the btsnoop file header. This allows
a decoder to treat the session as a new, valid btsnoop file. */
pthread_mutex_lock(&client_socket_lock_);
safe_close_(&client_socket_);
client_socket_ = client_socket;
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(client_socket_, "btsnoop\0\0\0\0\1\0\0\x3\xea", 16, 0));
pthread_mutex_unlock(&client_socket_lock_);
}
cleanup:
safe_close_(&listen_socket_);
return NULL;
}
| 173,475 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ScriptLoader::executeScript(const ScriptSourceCode& sourceCode)
{
ASSERT(m_alreadyStarted);
if (sourceCode.isEmpty())
return;
RefPtr<Document> elementDocument(m_element->document());
RefPtr<Document> contextDocument = elementDocument->contextDocument().get();
if (!contextDocument)
return;
LocalFrame* frame = contextDocument->frame();
bool shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy = (frame && frame->script().shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy()) || elementDocument->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowScriptNonce(m_element->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::nonceAttr)) || elementDocument->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowScriptHash(sourceCode.source());
if (!m_isExternalScript && (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !elementDocument->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowInlineScript(elementDocument->url(), m_startLineNumber)))
return;
if (m_isExternalScript && m_resource && !m_resource->mimeTypeAllowedByNosniff()) {
contextDocument->addConsoleMessage(SecurityMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel, "Refused to execute script from '" + m_resource->url().elidedString() + "' because its MIME type ('" + m_resource->mimeType() + "') is not executable, and strict MIME type checking is enabled.");
return;
}
if (frame) {
const bool isImportedScript = contextDocument != elementDocument;
IgnoreDestructiveWriteCountIncrementer ignoreDestructiveWriteCountIncrementer(m_isExternalScript || isImportedScript ? contextDocument.get() : 0);
if (isHTMLScriptLoader(m_element))
contextDocument->pushCurrentScript(toHTMLScriptElement(m_element));
AccessControlStatus corsCheck = NotSharableCrossOrigin;
if (sourceCode.resource() && sourceCode.resource()->passesAccessControlCheck(m_element->document().securityOrigin()))
corsCheck = SharableCrossOrigin;
frame->script().executeScriptInMainWorld(sourceCode, corsCheck);
if (isHTMLScriptLoader(m_element)) {
ASSERT(contextDocument->currentScript() == m_element);
contextDocument->popCurrentScript();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Apply 'x-content-type-options' check to dynamically inserted script.
BUG=348581
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/185593011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void ScriptLoader::executeScript(const ScriptSourceCode& sourceCode)
{
ASSERT(m_alreadyStarted);
if (sourceCode.isEmpty())
return;
RefPtr<Document> elementDocument(m_element->document());
RefPtr<Document> contextDocument = elementDocument->contextDocument().get();
if (!contextDocument)
return;
LocalFrame* frame = contextDocument->frame();
bool shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy = (frame && frame->script().shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy()) || elementDocument->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowScriptNonce(m_element->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::nonceAttr)) || elementDocument->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowScriptHash(sourceCode.source());
if (!m_isExternalScript && (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !elementDocument->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowInlineScript(elementDocument->url(), m_startLineNumber)))
return;
if (m_isExternalScript) {
ScriptResource* resource = m_resource ? m_resource.get() : sourceCode.resource();
if (resource && !resource->mimeTypeAllowedByNosniff()) {
contextDocument->addConsoleMessage(SecurityMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel, "Refused to execute script from '" + resource->url().elidedString() + "' because its MIME type ('" + resource->mimeType() + "') is not executable, and strict MIME type checking is enabled.");
return;
}
}
if (frame) {
const bool isImportedScript = contextDocument != elementDocument;
IgnoreDestructiveWriteCountIncrementer ignoreDestructiveWriteCountIncrementer(m_isExternalScript || isImportedScript ? contextDocument.get() : 0);
if (isHTMLScriptLoader(m_element))
contextDocument->pushCurrentScript(toHTMLScriptElement(m_element));
AccessControlStatus corsCheck = NotSharableCrossOrigin;
if (sourceCode.resource() && sourceCode.resource()->passesAccessControlCheck(m_element->document().securityOrigin()))
corsCheck = SharableCrossOrigin;
frame->script().executeScriptInMainWorld(sourceCode, corsCheck);
if (isHTMLScriptLoader(m_element)) {
ASSERT(contextDocument->currentScript() == m_element);
contextDocument->popCurrentScript();
}
}
}
| 171,408 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FrameSelection::SelectAll(SetSelectionBy set_selection_by) {
if (isHTMLSelectElement(GetDocument().FocusedElement())) {
HTMLSelectElement* select_element =
toHTMLSelectElement(GetDocument().FocusedElement());
if (select_element->CanSelectAll()) {
select_element->SelectAll();
return;
}
}
Node* root = nullptr;
Node* select_start_target = nullptr;
if (set_selection_by == SetSelectionBy::kUser && IsHidden()) {
root = GetDocument().documentElement();
select_start_target = GetDocument().body();
} else if (ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().IsContentEditable()) {
root = HighestEditableRoot(ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Start());
if (Node* shadow_root = NonBoundaryShadowTreeRootNode(
ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Start()))
select_start_target = shadow_root->OwnerShadowHost();
else
select_start_target = root;
} else {
root = NonBoundaryShadowTreeRootNode(
ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Start());
if (root) {
select_start_target = root->OwnerShadowHost();
} else {
root = GetDocument().documentElement();
select_start_target = GetDocument().body();
}
}
if (!root || EditingIgnoresContent(*root))
return;
if (select_start_target) {
const Document& expected_document = GetDocument();
if (select_start_target->DispatchEvent(Event::CreateCancelableBubble(
EventTypeNames::selectstart)) != DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled)
return;
if (!IsAvailable()) {
return;
}
if (!root->isConnected() || expected_document != root->GetDocument())
return;
}
SetSelection(SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SelectAllChildren(*root)
.SetIsHandleVisible(IsHandleVisible())
.Build());
SelectFrameElementInParentIfFullySelected();
NotifyTextControlOfSelectionChange(SetSelectionBy::kUser);
if (IsHandleVisible()) {
ContextMenuAllowedScope scope;
frame_->GetEventHandler().ShowNonLocatedContextMenu(nullptr,
kMenuSourceTouch);
}
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void FrameSelection::SelectAll(SetSelectionBy set_selection_by) {
if (isHTMLSelectElement(GetDocument().FocusedElement())) {
HTMLSelectElement* select_element =
toHTMLSelectElement(GetDocument().FocusedElement());
if (select_element->CanSelectAll()) {
select_element->SelectAll();
return;
}
}
Node* root = nullptr;
Node* select_start_target = nullptr;
if (set_selection_by == SetSelectionBy::kUser && IsHidden()) {
root = GetDocument().documentElement();
select_start_target = GetDocument().body();
} else if (ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().IsContentEditable()) {
root = HighestEditableRoot(ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Start());
if (Node* shadow_root = NonBoundaryShadowTreeRootNode(
ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Start()))
select_start_target = shadow_root->OwnerShadowHost();
else
select_start_target = root;
} else {
root = NonBoundaryShadowTreeRootNode(
ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Start());
if (root) {
select_start_target = root->OwnerShadowHost();
} else {
root = GetDocument().documentElement();
select_start_target = GetDocument().body();
}
}
if (!root || EditingIgnoresContent(*root))
return;
if (select_start_target) {
const Document& expected_document = GetDocument();
if (select_start_target->DispatchEvent(Event::CreateCancelableBubble(
EventTypeNames::selectstart)) != DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled)
return;
if (!IsAvailable()) {
return;
}
if (!root->isConnected() || expected_document != root->GetDocument())
return;
}
SetSelection(SelectionInDOMTree::Builder().SelectAllChildren(*root).Build(),
SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetShouldShowHandle(IsHandleVisible())
.Build());
SelectFrameElementInParentIfFullySelected();
NotifyTextControlOfSelectionChange(SetSelectionBy::kUser);
if (IsHandleVisible()) {
ContextMenuAllowedScope scope;
frame_->GetEventHandler().ShowNonLocatedContextMenu(nullptr,
kMenuSourceTouch);
}
}
| 171,759 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline signed int ReadPropertyMSBLong(const unsigned char **p,
size_t *length)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
signed int
signed_value;
} quantum;
int
c;
register ssize_t
i;
unsigned char
buffer[4];
size_t
value;
if (*length < 4)
return(-1);
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
c=(int) (*(*p)++);
(*length)--;
buffer[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
value=(size_t) (buffer[0] << 24);
value|=buffer[1] << 16;
value|=buffer[2] << 8;
value|=buffer[3];
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffffffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static inline signed int ReadPropertyMSBLong(const unsigned char **p,
size_t *length)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
signed int
signed_value;
} quantum;
int
c;
register ssize_t
i;
unsigned char
buffer[4];
unsigned int
value;
if (*length < 4)
return(-1);
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
c=(int) (*(*p)++);
(*length)--;
buffer[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
value=(unsigned int) buffer[0] << 24;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[1] << 16;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[2] << 8;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[3];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffffffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
| 169,952 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftOpus::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch ((int)index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidOpus:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *opusParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *)params;
if (opusParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
opusParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
opusParams->nSampleRate = kRate;
opusParams->nBitRate = 0;
if (!isConfigured()) {
opusParams->nChannels = 1;
} else {
opusParams->nChannels = mHeader->channels;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = kRate;
if (!isConfigured()) {
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
} else {
pcmParams->nChannels = mHeader->channels;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftOpus::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch ((int)index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidOpus:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *opusParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(opusParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (opusParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
opusParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
opusParams->nSampleRate = kRate;
opusParams->nBitRate = 0;
if (!isConfigured()) {
opusParams->nChannels = 1;
} else {
opusParams->nChannels = mHeader->channels;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = kRate;
if (!isConfigured()) {
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
} else {
pcmParams->nChannels = mHeader->channels;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,216 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
{
CERT *c = s->cert;
c->mask_a = 0;
c->mask_k = 0;
/* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
else
c->mask_ssl = 0;
ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
/* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
* signature algorithms.
*/
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (!s->psk_client_callback)
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
c->valid = 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
{
CERT *c = s->cert;
c->mask_a = 0;
c->mask_k = 0;
/* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
else
c->mask_ssl = 0;
ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
/* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
* signature algorithms.
*/
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (!s->psk_client_callback)
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
}
#endif
c->valid = 1;
}
| 165,023 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GDataRootDirectory::GDataRootDirectory()
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(GDataDirectory(NULL, this)),
fake_search_directory_(new GDataDirectory(NULL, NULL)),
largest_changestamp_(0), serialized_size_(0) {
title_ = kGDataRootDirectory;
SetFileNameFromTitle();
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | GDataRootDirectory::GDataRootDirectory()
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(GDataDirectory(NULL, this)),
fake_search_directory_(new GDataDirectory(NULL, NULL)),
largest_changestamp_(0), serialized_size_(0) {
title_ = kGDataRootDirectory;
SetFileNameFromTitle();
resource_id_ = kGDataRootDirectoryResourceId;
// Add self to the map so the root directory can be looked up by the
// resource ID.
AddEntryToResourceMap(this);
}
| 170,777 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: fm_mgr_config_init
(
OUT p_fm_config_conx_hdlt *p_hdl,
IN int instance,
OPTIONAL IN char *rem_address,
OPTIONAL IN char *community
)
{
fm_config_conx_hdl *hdl;
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res = FM_CONF_OK;
if ( (hdl = calloc(1,sizeof(fm_config_conx_hdl))) == NULL )
{
res = FM_CONF_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
hdl->instance = instance;
*p_hdl = hdl;
if(!rem_address || (strcmp(rem_address,"localhost") == 0))
{
if ( fm_mgr_config_mgr_connect(hdl, FM_MGR_SM) == FM_CONF_INIT_ERR )
{
res = FM_CONF_INIT_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if ( fm_mgr_config_mgr_connect(hdl, FM_MGR_PM) == FM_CONF_INIT_ERR )
{
res = FM_CONF_INIT_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if ( fm_mgr_config_mgr_connect(hdl, FM_MGR_FE) == FM_CONF_INIT_ERR )
{
res = FM_CONF_INIT_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
}
return res;
cleanup:
if ( hdl ) {
free(hdl);
hdl = NULL;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | fm_mgr_config_init
(
OUT p_fm_config_conx_hdlt *p_hdl,
IN int instance,
OPTIONAL IN char *rem_address,
OPTIONAL IN char *community
)
{
fm_config_conx_hdl *hdl;
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res = FM_CONF_OK;
if ( (hdl = calloc(1,sizeof(fm_config_conx_hdl))) == NULL )
{
res = FM_CONF_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
hdl->instance = instance;
*p_hdl = hdl;
if(!rem_address || (strcmp(rem_address,"localhost") == 0))
{
if ( fm_mgr_config_mgr_connect(hdl, FM_MGR_SM) == FM_CONF_INIT_ERR )
{
res = FM_CONF_INIT_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if ( fm_mgr_config_mgr_connect(hdl, FM_MGR_PM) == FM_CONF_INIT_ERR )
{
res = FM_CONF_INIT_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if ( fm_mgr_config_mgr_connect(hdl, FM_MGR_FE) == FM_CONF_INIT_ERR )
{
res = FM_CONF_INIT_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
}
cleanup:
return res;
}
| 170,130 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: kvm_irqfd(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irqfd *args)
{
if (args->flags & ~(KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN | KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_RESAMPLE))
return -EINVAL;
if (args->flags & KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN)
return kvm_irqfd_deassign(kvm, args);
return kvm_irqfd_assign(kvm, args);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Don't accept obviously wrong gsi values via KVM_IRQFD
We cannot add routes for gsi values >= KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES -- see
kvm_set_irq_routing(). Hence, there is no sense in accepting them
via KVM_IRQFD. Prevent them from entering the system in the first
place.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | kvm_irqfd(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irqfd *args)
{
if (args->flags & ~(KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN | KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_RESAMPLE))
return -EINVAL;
if (args->gsi >= KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES)
return -EINVAL;
if (args->flags & KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN)
return kvm_irqfd_deassign(kvm, args);
return kvm_irqfd_assign(kvm, args);
}
| 167,620 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void _php_mb_regex_set_options(OnigOptionType options, OnigSyntaxType *syntax, OnigOptionType *prev_options, OnigSyntaxType **prev_syntax TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (prev_options != NULL) {
*prev_options = MBREX(regex_default_options);
}
if (prev_syntax != NULL) {
*prev_syntax = MBREX(regex_default_syntax);
}
MBREX(regex_default_options) = options;
MBREX(regex_default_syntax) = syntax;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415 | static void _php_mb_regex_set_options(OnigOptionType options, OnigSyntaxType *syntax, OnigOptionType *prev_options, OnigSyntaxType **prev_syntax TSRMLS_DC)
static void _php_mb_regex_set_options(OnigOptionType options, OnigSyntaxType *syntax, OnigOptionType *prev_options, OnigSyntaxType **prev_syntax TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (prev_options != NULL) {
*prev_options = MBREX(regex_default_options);
}
if (prev_syntax != NULL) {
*prev_syntax = MBREX(regex_default_syntax);
}
MBREX(regex_default_options) = options;
MBREX(regex_default_syntax) = syntax;
}
| 167,121 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static spl_filesystem_object * spl_filesystem_object_create_info(spl_filesystem_object *source, char *file_path, int file_path_len, int use_copy, zend_class_entry *ce, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
zval *arg1;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
if (!file_path || !file_path_len) {
#if defined(PHP_WIN32)
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot create SplFileInfo for empty path");
if (file_path && !use_copy) {
efree(file_path);
}
#else
if (file_path && !use_copy) {
efree(file_path);
}
file_path_len = 1;
file_path = "/";
#endif
return NULL;
}
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
ce = ce ? ce : source->info_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileInfo) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, file_path, file_path_len, use_copy);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
} else {
spl_filesystem_info_set_filename(intern, file_path, file_path_len, use_copy TSRMLS_CC);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return intern;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static spl_filesystem_object * spl_filesystem_object_create_info(spl_filesystem_object *source, char *file_path, int file_path_len, int use_copy, zend_class_entry *ce, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
zval *arg1;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
if (!file_path || !file_path_len) {
#if defined(PHP_WIN32)
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot create SplFileInfo for empty path");
if (file_path && !use_copy) {
efree(file_path);
}
#else
if (file_path && !use_copy) {
efree(file_path);
}
file_path_len = 1;
file_path = "/";
#endif
return NULL;
}
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
ce = ce ? ce : source->info_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileInfo) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, file_path, file_path_len, use_copy);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
} else {
spl_filesystem_info_set_filename(intern, file_path, file_path_len, use_copy TSRMLS_CC);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return intern;
} /* }}} */
| 167,081 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS(
scoped_ptr<CloudPolicyStore> store,
scoped_ptr<CloudExternalDataManager> external_data_manager,
const base::FilePath& component_policy_cache_path,
bool wait_for_policy_fetch,
base::TimeDelta initial_policy_fetch_timeout,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& task_runner,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& file_task_runner,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& io_task_runner)
: CloudPolicyManager(
PolicyNamespaceKey(dm_protocol::kChromeUserPolicyType, std::string()),
store.get(),
task_runner,
file_task_runner,
io_task_runner),
store_(store.Pass()),
external_data_manager_(external_data_manager.Pass()),
component_policy_cache_path_(component_policy_cache_path),
wait_for_policy_fetch_(wait_for_policy_fetch),
policy_fetch_timeout_(false, false) {
time_init_started_ = base::Time::Now();
if (wait_for_policy_fetch_) {
policy_fetch_timeout_.Start(
FROM_HERE,
initial_policy_fetch_timeout,
base::Bind(&UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::OnBlockingFetchTimeout,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS(
scoped_ptr<CloudPolicyStore> store,
scoped_ptr<CloudExternalDataManager> external_data_manager,
const base::FilePath& component_policy_cache_path,
bool wait_for_policy_fetch,
base::TimeDelta initial_policy_fetch_timeout,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& task_runner,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& file_task_runner,
const scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner>& io_task_runner)
: CloudPolicyManager(
PolicyNamespaceKey(dm_protocol::kChromeUserPolicyType, std::string()),
store.get(),
task_runner,
file_task_runner,
io_task_runner),
store_(store.Pass()),
external_data_manager_(external_data_manager.Pass()),
component_policy_cache_path_(component_policy_cache_path),
wait_for_policy_fetch_(wait_for_policy_fetch),
policy_fetch_timeout_(false, false) {
time_init_started_ = base::Time::Now();
if (wait_for_policy_fetch_ && !initial_policy_fetch_timeout.is_max()) {
policy_fetch_timeout_.Start(
FROM_HERE,
initial_policy_fetch_timeout,
base::Bind(&UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::OnBlockingFetchTimeout,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
}
| 171,149 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_write_PLTE(png_structp png_ptr, png_colorp palette, png_uint_32 num_pal)
{
#ifdef PNG_USE_LOCAL_ARRAYS
PNG_PLTE;
#endif
png_uint_32 i;
png_colorp pal_ptr;
png_byte buf[3];
png_debug(1, "in png_write_PLTE");
if ((
#ifdef PNG_MNG_FEATURES_SUPPORTED
!(png_ptr->mng_features_permitted & PNG_FLAG_MNG_EMPTY_PLTE) &&
#endif
num_pal == 0) || num_pal > 256)
{
if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
png_error(png_ptr, "Invalid number of colors in palette");
}
else
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Invalid number of colors in palette");
return;
}
}
if (!(png_ptr->color_type&PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR))
{
png_warning(png_ptr,
"Ignoring request to write a PLTE chunk in grayscale PNG");
return;
}
png_ptr->num_palette = (png_uint_16)num_pal;
png_debug1(3, "num_palette = %d", png_ptr->num_palette);
png_write_chunk_start(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_PLTE,
(png_uint_32)(num_pal * 3));
#ifdef PNG_POINTER_INDEXING_SUPPORTED
for (i = 0, pal_ptr = palette; i < num_pal; i++, pal_ptr++)
{
buf[0] = pal_ptr->red;
buf[1] = pal_ptr->green;
buf[2] = pal_ptr->blue;
png_write_chunk_data(png_ptr, buf, (png_size_t)3);
}
#else
/* This is a little slower but some buggy compilers need to do this
* instead
*/
pal_ptr=palette;
for (i = 0; i < num_pal; i++)
{
buf[0] = pal_ptr[i].red;
buf[1] = pal_ptr[i].green;
buf[2] = pal_ptr[i].blue;
png_write_chunk_data(png_ptr, buf, (png_size_t)3);
}
#endif
png_write_chunk_end(png_ptr);
png_ptr->mode |= PNG_HAVE_PLTE;
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | png_write_PLTE(png_structp png_ptr, png_colorp palette, png_uint_32 num_pal)
{
#ifdef PNG_USE_LOCAL_ARRAYS
PNG_PLTE;
#endif
png_uint_32 max_palette_length, i;
png_colorp pal_ptr;
png_byte buf[3];
png_debug(1, "in png_write_PLTE");
max_palette_length = (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) ?
(1 << png_ptr->bit_depth) : PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH;
if ((
#ifdef PNG_MNG_FEATURES_SUPPORTED
!(png_ptr->mng_features_permitted & PNG_FLAG_MNG_EMPTY_PLTE) &&
#endif
num_pal == 0) || num_pal > max_palette_length)
{
if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
png_error(png_ptr, "Invalid number of colors in palette");
}
else
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Invalid number of colors in palette");
return;
}
}
if (!(png_ptr->color_type&PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR))
{
png_warning(png_ptr,
"Ignoring request to write a PLTE chunk in grayscale PNG");
return;
}
png_ptr->num_palette = (png_uint_16)num_pal;
png_debug1(3, "num_palette = %d", png_ptr->num_palette);
png_write_chunk_start(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_PLTE,
(png_uint_32)(num_pal * 3));
#ifdef PNG_POINTER_INDEXING_SUPPORTED
for (i = 0, pal_ptr = palette; i < num_pal; i++, pal_ptr++)
{
buf[0] = pal_ptr->red;
buf[1] = pal_ptr->green;
buf[2] = pal_ptr->blue;
png_write_chunk_data(png_ptr, buf, (png_size_t)3);
}
#else
/* This is a little slower but some buggy compilers need to do this
* instead
*/
pal_ptr=palette;
for (i = 0; i < num_pal; i++)
{
buf[0] = pal_ptr[i].red;
buf[1] = pal_ptr[i].green;
buf[2] = pal_ptr[i].blue;
png_write_chunk_data(png_ptr, buf, (png_size_t)3);
}
#endif
png_write_chunk_end(png_ptr);
png_ptr->mode |= PNG_HAVE_PLTE;
}
| 172,193 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs::ContextualSearchParams::ContextualSearchParams(
int version,
const std::string& selection,
const std::string& base_page_url,
int now_on_tap_version)
: version(version),
start(base::string16::npos),
end(base::string16::npos),
selection(selection),
base_page_url(base_page_url),
now_on_tap_version(now_on_tap_version) {}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs::ContextualSearchParams::ContextualSearchParams(
int version,
const std::string& selection,
const std::string& base_page_url,
int contextual_cards_version)
: version(version),
start(base::string16::npos),
end(base::string16::npos),
selection(selection),
base_page_url(base_page_url),
| 171,646 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
const unsigned char *limit)
{
unsigned short type, size;
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
0x01, /* 1 point format */
0x00, /* uncompressed */
};
/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
};
if (data >= (limit - 2))
return;
data += 2;
if (data > (limit - 4))
return;
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
return;
if (data + size > limit)
return;
data += size;
if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
return;
if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
return;
if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
return;
} else {
const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
if (data + len != limit)
return;
if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
return;
}
s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
const unsigned char *limit)
{
unsigned short type, size;
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
0x01, /* 1 point format */
0x00, /* uncompressed */
};
/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
};
if (limit - data <= 2)
return;
data += 2;
if (limit - data < 4)
return;
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
return;
if (limit - data < size)
return;
data += size;
if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
return;
if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
return;
if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
return;
} else {
const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
if (limit - data != (int)(len))
return;
if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
return;
}
s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
}
| 165,202 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CastConfigDelegateChromeos::StopCasting(const std::string& activity_id) {
ExecuteJavaScript("backgroundSetup.stopCastMirroring('user-stop');");
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void CastConfigDelegateChromeos::StopCasting(const std::string& activity_id) {
void CastConfigDelegateChromeos::StopCasting() {
ExecuteJavaScript("backgroundSetup.stopCastMirroring('user-stop');");
// TODO(jdufault): Remove this after stopCastMirroring is properly exported.
// The current beta/release versions of the cast extension do not export
// stopCastMirroring, so we will also try to call the minified version.
// See crbug.com/489929.
ExecuteJavaScript("backgroundSetup.Qu('user-stop');");
}
| 171,627 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jp2_cmap_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_cmap_t *cmap = &box->data.cmap;
jp2_cmapent_t *ent;
unsigned int i;
cmap->numchans = (box->datalen) / 4;
if (!(cmap->ents = jas_alloc2(cmap->numchans, sizeof(jp2_cmapent_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < cmap->numchans; ++i) {
ent = &cmap->ents[i];
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &ent->cmptno) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &ent->map) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &ent->pcol)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int jp2_cmap_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_cmap_t *cmap = &box->data.cmap;
jp2_cmapent_t *ent;
unsigned int i;
cmap->ents = 0;
cmap->numchans = (box->datalen) / 4;
if (!(cmap->ents = jas_alloc2(cmap->numchans, sizeof(jp2_cmapent_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < cmap->numchans; ++i) {
ent = &cmap->ents[i];
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &ent->cmptno) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &ent->map) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &ent->pcol)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 168,322 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: beep_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
if (l_strnstart("MSG", 4, (const char *)bp, length)) /* A REQuest */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP MSG"));
else if (l_strnstart("RPY ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP RPY"));
else if (l_strnstart("ERR ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ERR"));
else if (l_strnstart("ANS ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ANS"));
else if (l_strnstart("NUL ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP NUL"));
else if (l_strnstart("SEQ ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP SEQ"));
else if (l_strnstart("END", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP END"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP (payload or undecoded)"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13010/BEEP: Do bounds checking when comparing strings.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | beep_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
if (l_strnstart(ndo, "MSG", 4, (const char *)bp, length)) /* A REQuest */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP MSG"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "RPY ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP RPY"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "ERR ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ERR"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "ANS ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ANS"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "NUL ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP NUL"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "SEQ ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP SEQ"));
else if (l_strnstart(ndo, "END", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP END"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP (payload or undecoded)"));
}
| 167,884 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: zsetcolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
es_ptr ep;
const gs_color_space * pcs = gs_currentcolorspace(igs);
gs_client_color cc;
int n_comps, n_numeric_comps, num_offset = 0, code, depth;
PS_colour_space_t *space;
/* initialize the client color pattern pointer for GC */
cc.pattern = 0;
/* check for a pattern color space */
if ((n_comps = cs_num_components(pcs)) < 0) {
n_comps = -n_comps;
if (r_has_type(op, t_dictionary)) {
ref *pImpl, pPatInst;
code = dict_find_string(op, "Implementation", &pImpl);
if (code != 0) {
code = array_get(imemory, pImpl, 0, &pPatInst);
if (code < 0)
return code;
n_numeric_comps = ( pattern_instance_uses_base_space(cc.pattern)
? n_comps - 1
: 0 );
} else
n_numeric_comps = 0;
} else
n_numeric_comps = 0;
num_offset = 1;
} else
n_numeric_comps = n_comps;
/* gather the numeric operands */
code = float_params(op - num_offset, n_numeric_comps, cc.paint.values);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* The values are copied to graphic state and compared with */
/* other colors by memcmp() in gx_hld_saved_color_equal() */
/* This is the easiest way to avoid indeterminism */
memset(cc.paint.values + n_numeric_comps, 0,
sizeof(cc.paint.values) - sizeof(*cc.paint.values)*n_numeric_comps);
code = get_space_object(i_ctx_p, &istate->colorspace[0].array, &space);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (space->validatecomponents) {
code = space->validatecomponents(i_ctx_p,
&istate->colorspace[0].array,
cc.paint.values, n_numeric_comps);
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
/* pass the color to the graphic library */
if ((code = gs_setcolor(igs, &cc)) >= 0) {
if (n_comps > n_numeric_comps) {
istate->pattern[0] = *op; /* save pattern dict or null */
}
}
/* Check the color spaces, to see if we need to run any tint transform
* procedures. Some Adobe applications *eg Photoshop) expect that the
* tint transform will be run and use this to set up duotone DeviceN
* spaces.
*/
code = validate_spaces(i_ctx_p, &istate->colorspace[0].array, &depth);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Set up for the continuation procedure which will do the work */
/* Make sure the exec stack has enough space */
check_estack(5);
/* A place holder for data potentially used by transform functions */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store the 'depth' of the space returned during checking above */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store the 'stage' of processing (initially 0) */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store a pointer to the color space stored on the operand stack
* as the stack may grow unpredictably making further access
* to the space difficult
*/
ep = esp += 1;
*ep = istate->colorspace[0].array;
/* Finally, the actual continuation routine */
push_op_estack(setcolor_cont);
return o_push_estack;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | zsetcolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
es_ptr ep;
const gs_color_space * pcs = gs_currentcolorspace(igs);
gs_client_color cc;
int n_comps, n_numeric_comps, num_offset = 0, code, depth;
PS_colour_space_t *space;
/* initialize the client color pattern pointer for GC */
cc.pattern = 0;
/* check for a pattern color space */
if ((n_comps = cs_num_components(pcs)) < 0) {
n_comps = -n_comps;
if (r_has_type(op, t_dictionary)) {
ref *pImpl, pPatInst;
if ((code = dict_find_string(op, "Implementation", &pImpl)) < 0)
return code;
if (code > 0) {
code = array_get(imemory, pImpl, 0, &pPatInst);
if (code < 0)
return code;
n_numeric_comps = ( pattern_instance_uses_base_space(cc.pattern)
? n_comps - 1
: 0 );
} else
n_numeric_comps = 0;
} else
n_numeric_comps = 0;
num_offset = 1;
} else
n_numeric_comps = n_comps;
/* gather the numeric operands */
code = float_params(op - num_offset, n_numeric_comps, cc.paint.values);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* The values are copied to graphic state and compared with */
/* other colors by memcmp() in gx_hld_saved_color_equal() */
/* This is the easiest way to avoid indeterminism */
memset(cc.paint.values + n_numeric_comps, 0,
sizeof(cc.paint.values) - sizeof(*cc.paint.values)*n_numeric_comps);
code = get_space_object(i_ctx_p, &istate->colorspace[0].array, &space);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (space->validatecomponents) {
code = space->validatecomponents(i_ctx_p,
&istate->colorspace[0].array,
cc.paint.values, n_numeric_comps);
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
/* pass the color to the graphic library */
if ((code = gs_setcolor(igs, &cc)) >= 0) {
if (n_comps > n_numeric_comps) {
istate->pattern[0] = *op; /* save pattern dict or null */
}
}
/* Check the color spaces, to see if we need to run any tint transform
* procedures. Some Adobe applications *eg Photoshop) expect that the
* tint transform will be run and use this to set up duotone DeviceN
* spaces.
*/
code = validate_spaces(i_ctx_p, &istate->colorspace[0].array, &depth);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Set up for the continuation procedure which will do the work */
/* Make sure the exec stack has enough space */
check_estack(5);
/* A place holder for data potentially used by transform functions */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store the 'depth' of the space returned during checking above */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store the 'stage' of processing (initially 0) */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store a pointer to the color space stored on the operand stack
* as the stack may grow unpredictably making further access
* to the space difficult
*/
ep = esp += 1;
*ep = istate->colorspace[0].array;
/* Finally, the actual continuation routine */
push_op_estack(setcolor_cont);
return o_push_estack;
}
| 164,697 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: perform_formatting_test(png_store *volatile ps)
{
#ifdef PNG_TIME_RFC1123_SUPPORTED
/* The handle into the formatting code is the RFC1123 support; this test does
* nothing if that is compiled out.
*/
context(ps, fault);
Try
{
png_const_charp correct = "29 Aug 2079 13:53:60 +0000";
png_const_charp result;
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10600
char timestring[29];
# endif
png_structp pp;
png_time pt;
pp = set_store_for_write(ps, NULL, "libpng formatting test");
if (pp == NULL)
Throw ps;
/* Arbitrary settings: */
pt.year = 2079;
pt.month = 8;
pt.day = 29;
pt.hour = 13;
pt.minute = 53;
pt.second = 60; /* a leap second */
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10600
result = png_convert_to_rfc1123(pp, &pt);
# else
if (png_convert_to_rfc1123_buffer(timestring, &pt))
result = timestring;
else
result = NULL;
# endif
if (result == NULL)
png_error(pp, "png_convert_to_rfc1123 failed");
if (strcmp(result, correct) != 0)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char msg[128];
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "png_convert_to_rfc1123(");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, correct);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, ") returned: '");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, result);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "'");
png_error(pp, msg);
}
store_write_reset(ps);
}
Catch(fault)
{
store_write_reset(fault);
}
#else
UNUSED(ps)
#endif
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | perform_formatting_test(png_store *volatile ps)
perform_formatting_test(png_store *ps)
{
#ifdef PNG_TIME_RFC1123_SUPPORTED
/* The handle into the formatting code is the RFC1123 support; this test does
* nothing if that is compiled out.
*/
context(ps, fault);
Try
{
png_const_charp correct = "29 Aug 2079 13:53:60 +0000";
png_const_charp result;
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10600
char timestring[29];
# endif
png_structp pp;
png_time pt;
pp = set_store_for_write(ps, NULL, "libpng formatting test");
if (pp == NULL)
Throw ps;
/* Arbitrary settings: */
pt.year = 2079;
pt.month = 8;
pt.day = 29;
pt.hour = 13;
pt.minute = 53;
pt.second = 60; /* a leap second */
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10600
result = png_convert_to_rfc1123(pp, &pt);
# else
if (png_convert_to_rfc1123_buffer(timestring, &pt))
result = timestring;
else
result = NULL;
# endif
if (result == NULL)
png_error(pp, "png_convert_to_rfc1123 failed");
if (strcmp(result, correct) != 0)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char msg[128];
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "png_convert_to_rfc1123(");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, correct);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, ") returned: '");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, result);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "'");
png_error(pp, msg);
}
store_write_reset(ps);
}
Catch(fault)
{
store_write_reset(fault);
}
#else
UNUSED(ps)
#endif
}
| 173,678 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool UnprivilegedProcessDelegate::CreateConnectedIpcChannel(
const std::string& channel_name,
IPC::Listener* delegate,
ScopedHandle* client_out,
scoped_ptr<IPC::ChannelProxy>* server_out) {
scoped_ptr<IPC::ChannelProxy> server;
if (!CreateIpcChannel(channel_name, kDaemonIpcSecurityDescriptor,
io_task_runner_, delegate, &server)) {
return false;
}
std::string pipe_name(kChromePipeNamePrefix);
pipe_name.append(channel_name);
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes;
security_attributes.nLength = sizeof(security_attributes);
security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor = NULL;
security_attributes.bInheritHandle = TRUE;
ScopedHandle client;
client.Set(CreateFile(UTF8ToUTF16(pipe_name).c_str(),
GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
0,
&security_attributes,
OPEN_EXISTING,
SECURITY_SQOS_PRESENT | SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION |
FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED,
NULL));
if (!client.IsValid())
return false;
*client_out = client.Pass();
*server_out = server.Pass();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool UnprivilegedProcessDelegate::CreateConnectedIpcChannel(
| 171,544 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jbig2_page_add_result(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Page *page, Jbig2Image *image, int x, int y, Jbig2ComposeOp op)
{
/* ensure image exists first */
if (page->image == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, -1, "page info possibly missing, no image defined");
return 0;
}
/* grow the page to accomodate a new stripe if necessary */
if (page->striped) {
int new_height = y + image->height + page->end_row;
if (page->image->height < new_height) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, -1, "growing page buffer to %d rows " "to accomodate new stripe", new_height);
jbig2_image_resize(ctx, page->image, page->image->width, new_height);
}
}
jbig2_image_compose(ctx, page->image, image, x, y + page->end_row, op);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | jbig2_page_add_result(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Page *page, Jbig2Image *image, int x, int y, Jbig2ComposeOp op)
{
/* ensure image exists first */
if (page->image == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, -1, "page info possibly missing, no image defined");
return 0;
}
/* grow the page to accomodate a new stripe if necessary */
if (page->striped) {
uint32_t new_height = y + image->height + page->end_row;
if (page->image->height < new_height) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, -1, "growing page buffer to %d rows " "to accomodate new stripe", new_height);
jbig2_image_resize(ctx, page->image, page->image->width, new_height);
}
}
jbig2_image_compose(ctx, page->image, image, x, y + page->end_row, op);
return 0;
}
| 165,496 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mountpoint_last(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path)
{
int error = 0;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct dentry *dir = nd->path.dentry;
/* If we're in rcuwalk, drop out of it to handle last component */
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
if (unlazy_walk(nd, NULL)) {
error = -ECHILD;
goto out;
}
}
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
if (unlikely(nd->last_type != LAST_NORM)) {
error = handle_dots(nd, nd->last_type);
if (error)
goto out;
dentry = dget(nd->path.dentry);
goto done;
}
mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
dentry = d_lookup(dir, &nd->last);
if (!dentry) {
/*
* No cached dentry. Mounted dentries are pinned in the cache,
* so that means that this dentry is probably a symlink or the
* path doesn't actually point to a mounted dentry.
*/
dentry = d_alloc(dir, &nd->last);
if (!dentry) {
error = -ENOMEM;
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
goto out;
}
dentry = lookup_real(dir->d_inode, dentry, nd->flags);
error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
done:
if (!dentry->d_inode || d_is_negative(dentry)) {
error = -ENOENT;
dput(dentry);
goto out;
}
path->dentry = dentry;
path->mnt = mntget(nd->path.mnt);
if (should_follow_link(dentry, nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW))
return 1;
follow_mount(path);
error = 0;
out:
terminate_walk(nd);
return error;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | mountpoint_last(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path)
{
int error = 0;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct dentry *dir = nd->path.dentry;
/* If we're in rcuwalk, drop out of it to handle last component */
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
if (unlazy_walk(nd, NULL)) {
error = -ECHILD;
goto out;
}
}
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
if (unlikely(nd->last_type != LAST_NORM)) {
error = handle_dots(nd, nd->last_type);
if (error)
goto out;
dentry = dget(nd->path.dentry);
goto done;
}
mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
dentry = d_lookup(dir, &nd->last);
if (!dentry) {
/*
* No cached dentry. Mounted dentries are pinned in the cache,
* so that means that this dentry is probably a symlink or the
* path doesn't actually point to a mounted dentry.
*/
dentry = d_alloc(dir, &nd->last);
if (!dentry) {
error = -ENOMEM;
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
goto out;
}
dentry = lookup_real(dir->d_inode, dentry, nd->flags);
error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
done:
if (!dentry->d_inode || d_is_negative(dentry)) {
error = -ENOENT;
dput(dentry);
goto out;
}
path->dentry = dentry;
path->mnt = nd->path.mnt;
if (should_follow_link(dentry, nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW))
return 1;
mntget(path->mnt);
follow_mount(path);
error = 0;
out:
terminate_walk(nd);
return error;
}
| 166,285 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::useGraphicBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
if (OMX_GetExtensionIndex(
mHandle,
const_cast<OMX_STRING>("OMX.google.android.index.useAndroidNativeBuffer2"),
&index) == OMX_ErrorNone) {
return useGraphicBuffer2_l(portIndex, graphicBuffer, buffer);
}
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.useAndroidNativeBuffer");
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = new BufferMeta(graphicBuffer);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_VERSIONTYPE ver;
ver.s.nVersionMajor = 1;
ver.s.nVersionMinor = 0;
ver.s.nRevision = 0;
ver.s.nStep = 0;
UseAndroidNativeBufferParams params = {
sizeof(UseAndroidNativeBufferParams), ver, portIndex, bufferMeta,
&header, graphicBuffer,
};
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u meta=%p GB=%p", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, bufferMeta, graphicBuffer->handle);
delete bufferMeta;
bufferMeta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, bufferMeta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
CLOG_BUFFER(useGraphicBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "GB=%p", graphicBuffer->handle));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::useGraphicBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
if (OMX_GetExtensionIndex(
mHandle,
const_cast<OMX_STRING>("OMX.google.android.index.useAndroidNativeBuffer2"),
&index) == OMX_ErrorNone) {
return useGraphicBuffer2_l(portIndex, graphicBuffer, buffer);
}
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.useAndroidNativeBuffer");
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = new BufferMeta(graphicBuffer, portIndex);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_VERSIONTYPE ver;
ver.s.nVersionMajor = 1;
ver.s.nVersionMinor = 0;
ver.s.nRevision = 0;
ver.s.nStep = 0;
UseAndroidNativeBufferParams params = {
sizeof(UseAndroidNativeBufferParams), ver, portIndex, bufferMeta,
&header, graphicBuffer,
};
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u meta=%p GB=%p", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, bufferMeta, graphicBuffer->handle);
delete bufferMeta;
bufferMeta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, bufferMeta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
CLOG_BUFFER(useGraphicBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "GB=%p", graphicBuffer->handle));
return OK;
}
| 173,534 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gss_krb5int_export_lucid_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
krb5_error_code kret = 0;
OM_uint32 retval;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_t ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
void *lctx = NULL;
int version = 0;
gss_buffer_desc rep;
/* Assume failure */
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = 0;
*data_set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
retval = generic_gss_oid_decompose(minor_status,
GSS_KRB5_EXPORT_LUCID_SEC_CONTEXT_OID,
GSS_KRB5_EXPORT_LUCID_SEC_CONTEXT_OID_LENGTH,
desired_object,
&version);
if (GSS_ERROR(retval))
return retval;
/* Externalize a structure of the right version */
switch (version) {
case 1:
kret = make_external_lucid_ctx_v1((krb5_pointer)ctx,
version, &lctx);
break;
default:
kret = (OM_uint32) KG_LUCID_VERSION;
break;
}
if (kret)
goto error_out;
rep.value = &lctx;
rep.length = sizeof(lctx);
retval = generic_gss_add_buffer_set_member(minor_status, &rep, data_set);
if (GSS_ERROR(retval))
goto error_out;
error_out:
if (*minor_status == 0)
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) kret;
return(retval);
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | gss_krb5int_export_lucid_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
krb5_error_code kret = 0;
OM_uint32 retval;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_t ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
void *lctx = NULL;
int version = 0;
gss_buffer_desc rep;
/* Assume failure */
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = 0;
*data_set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
}
retval = generic_gss_oid_decompose(minor_status,
GSS_KRB5_EXPORT_LUCID_SEC_CONTEXT_OID,
GSS_KRB5_EXPORT_LUCID_SEC_CONTEXT_OID_LENGTH,
desired_object,
&version);
if (GSS_ERROR(retval))
return retval;
/* Externalize a structure of the right version */
switch (version) {
case 1:
kret = make_external_lucid_ctx_v1((krb5_pointer)ctx,
version, &lctx);
break;
default:
kret = (OM_uint32) KG_LUCID_VERSION;
break;
}
if (kret)
goto error_out;
rep.value = &lctx;
rep.length = sizeof(lctx);
retval = generic_gss_add_buffer_set_member(minor_status, &rep, data_set);
if (GSS_ERROR(retval))
goto error_out;
error_out:
if (*minor_status == 0)
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) kret;
return(retval);
}
| 166,821 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool FrameSelection::IsHandleVisible() const {
return GetSelectionInDOMTree().IsHandleVisible();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool FrameSelection::IsHandleVisible() const {
| 171,755 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UserActivityDetector::MaybeNotify() {
base::TimeTicks now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (last_observer_notification_time_.is_null() ||
(now - last_observer_notification_time_).InSecondsF() >=
kNotifyIntervalSec) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(UserActivityObserver, observers_, OnUserActivity());
last_observer_notification_time_ = now;
}
}
Commit Message: ash: Make UserActivityDetector ignore synthetic mouse events
This may have been preventing us from suspending (e.g.
mouse event is synthesized in response to lock window being
shown so Chrome tells powerd that the user is active).
BUG=133419
TEST=added
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10574044
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143437 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void UserActivityDetector::MaybeNotify() {
base::TimeTicks now =
!now_for_test_.is_null() ? now_for_test_ : base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (last_observer_notification_time_.is_null() ||
(now - last_observer_notification_time_).InSecondsF() >=
kNotifyIntervalSec) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(UserActivityObserver, observers_, OnUserActivity());
last_observer_notification_time_ = now;
}
}
| 170,719 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
video_ = new libvpx_test::WebMVideoSource(kVP9TestFile);
ASSERT_TRUE(video_ != NULL);
video_->Init();
video_->Begin();
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t cfg = {0};
decoder_ = new libvpx_test::VP9Decoder(cfg, 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(decoder_ != NULL);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void SetUp() {
video_ = new libvpx_test::WebMVideoSource(kVP9TestFile);
ASSERT_TRUE(video_ != NULL);
video_->Init();
video_->Begin();
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t cfg = vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t();
decoder_ = new libvpx_test::VP9Decoder(cfg, 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(decoder_ != NULL);
}
| 174,546 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT3(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
ssize_t
j,
y;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
unsigned char
alpha;
size_t
a0,
a1,
bits,
code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, Min(4, dds_info->width - x),
Min(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read alpha values (8 bytes) */
a0 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
a1 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickTrue);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (bits >> ((4*j+i)*2)) & 0x3;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
/*
Extract alpha value: multiply 0..15 by 17 to get range 0..255
*/
if (j < 2)
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a0 >> (4*(4*j+i))) & 0xf);
else
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a1 >> (4*(4*(j-2)+i))) & 0xf);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
alpha));
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
SkipDXTMipmaps(image, dds_info, 16);
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT3(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
ssize_t
j,
y;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
unsigned char
alpha;
size_t
a0,
a1,
bits,
code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, MagickMin(4, dds_info->width - x),
MagickMin(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read alpha values (8 bytes) */
a0 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
a1 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickTrue);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (bits >> ((4*j+i)*2)) & 0x3;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
/*
Extract alpha value: multiply 0..15 by 17 to get range 0..255
*/
if (j < 2)
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a0 >> (4*(4*j+i))) & 0xf);
else
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a1 >> (4*(4*(j-2)+i))) & 0xf);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
alpha));
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
return(SkipDXTMipmaps(image,dds_info,16,exception));
}
| 168,900 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::GetCurrentPrintPreviewStatus(
const std::string& preview_ui_addr,
int request_id,
bool* cancel) {
int current_id = -1;
if (!g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Get(preview_ui_addr, ¤t_id)) {
*cancel = true;
return;
}
*cancel = (request_id != current_id);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintPreviewUI::GetCurrentPrintPreviewStatus(
void PrintPreviewUI::GetCurrentPrintPreviewStatus(int32 preview_ui_id,
int request_id,
bool* cancel) {
int current_id = -1;
if (!g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Get(preview_ui_id, ¤t_id)) {
*cancel = true;
return;
}
*cancel = (request_id != current_id);
}
| 170,833 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ASessionDescription::getFormatType(
size_t index, unsigned long *PT,
AString *desc, AString *params) const {
AString format;
getFormat(index, &format);
const char *lastSpacePos = strrchr(format.c_str(), ' ');
CHECK(lastSpacePos != NULL);
char *end;
unsigned long x = strtoul(lastSpacePos + 1, &end, 10);
CHECK_GT(end, lastSpacePos + 1);
CHECK_EQ(*end, '\0');
*PT = x;
char key[20];
sprintf(key, "a=rtpmap:%lu", x);
CHECK(findAttribute(index, key, desc));
sprintf(key, "a=fmtp:%lu", x);
if (!findAttribute(index, key, params)) {
params->clear();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix corruption via buffer overflow in mediaserver
change unbound sprintf() to snprintf() so network-provided values
can't overflow the buffers.
Applicable to all K/L/M/N branches.
Bug: 25747670
Change-Id: Id6a5120c2d08a6fbbd47deffb680ecf82015f4f6
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void ASessionDescription::getFormatType(
size_t index, unsigned long *PT,
AString *desc, AString *params) const {
AString format;
getFormat(index, &format);
const char *lastSpacePos = strrchr(format.c_str(), ' ');
CHECK(lastSpacePos != NULL);
char *end;
unsigned long x = strtoul(lastSpacePos + 1, &end, 10);
CHECK_GT(end, lastSpacePos + 1);
CHECK_EQ(*end, '\0');
*PT = x;
char key[32];
snprintf(key, sizeof(key), "a=rtpmap:%lu", x);
CHECK(findAttribute(index, key, desc));
snprintf(key, sizeof(key), "a=fmtp:%lu", x);
if (!findAttribute(index, key, params)) {
params->clear();
}
}
| 173,411 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void jslGetTokenString(char *str, size_t len) {
if (lex->tk == LEX_ID) {
strncpy(str, "ID:", len);
strncat(str, jslGetTokenValueAsString(), len);
} else if (lex->tk == LEX_STR) {
strncpy(str, "String:'", len);
strncat(str, jslGetTokenValueAsString(), len);
strncat(str, "'", len);
} else
jslTokenAsString(lex->tk, str, len);
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void jslGetTokenString(char *str, size_t len) {
if (lex->tk == LEX_ID) {
espruino_snprintf(str, len, "ID:%s", jslGetTokenValueAsString());
} else if (lex->tk == LEX_STR) {
espruino_snprintf(str, len, "String:'%s'", jslGetTokenValueAsString());
} else
jslTokenAsString(lex->tk, str, len);
}
| 169,211 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::generatorObjectLocation(v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { object };
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = callDebuggerMethod("getGeneratorObjectLocation", 1, argv).ToLocalChecked();
if (!location->IsObject())
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = m_debuggerContext.Get(m_isolate);
if (!markAsInternal(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(location), V8InternalValueType::kLocation))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
return location;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::generatorObjectLocation(v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::generatorObjectLocation(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { object };
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = callDebuggerMethod("getGeneratorObjectLocation", 1, argv).ToLocalChecked();
v8::Local<v8::Value> copied;
if (!copyValueFromDebuggerContext(m_isolate, debuggerContext(), context, location).ToLocal(&copied) || !copied->IsObject())
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
if (!markAsInternal(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(copied), V8InternalValueType::kLocation))
return v8::Null(m_isolate);
return copied;
}
| 172,067 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SetManualFallbacksForFilling(bool enabled) {
if (enabled) {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFilling);
} else {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndDisableFeature(
password_manager::features::kEnableManualFallbacksFilling);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void SetManualFallbacksForFilling(bool enabled) {
if (enabled) {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
password_manager::features::kManualFallbacksFilling);
} else {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndDisableFeature(
password_manager::features::kManualFallbacksFilling);
}
}
| 171,750 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int __init init_ext2_fs(void)
{
int err = init_ext2_xattr();
if (err)
return err;
err = init_inodecache();
if (err)
goto out1;
err = register_filesystem(&ext2_fs_type);
if (err)
goto out;
return 0;
out:
destroy_inodecache();
out1:
exit_ext2_xattr();
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | static int __init init_ext2_fs(void)
{
int err;
err = init_inodecache();
if (err)
return err;
err = register_filesystem(&ext2_fs_type);
if (err)
goto out;
return 0;
out:
destroy_inodecache();
return err;
}
| 169,975 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setSyncSampleParams(off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mSyncSampleOffset >= 0 || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t numSyncSamples = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (numSyncSamples < 2) {
ALOGV("Table of sync samples is empty or has only a single entry!");
}
uint64_t allocSize = (uint64_t)numSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > kMaxTotalSize) {
ALOGE("Sync sample table size too large.");
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mTotalSize += allocSize;
if (mTotalSize > kMaxTotalSize) {
ALOGE("Sync sample table size would make sample table too large.\n"
" Requested sync sample table size = %llu\n"
" Eventual sample table size >= %llu\n"
" Allowed sample table size = %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)allocSize,
(unsigned long long)mTotalSize,
(unsigned long long)kMaxTotalSize);
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mSyncSamples = new (std::nothrow) uint32_t[numSyncSamples];
if (!mSyncSamples) {
ALOGE("Cannot allocate sync sample table with %llu entries.",
(unsigned long long)numSyncSamples);
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, mSyncSamples,
(size_t)allocSize) != (ssize_t)allocSize) {
delete mSyncSamples;
mSyncSamples = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < numSyncSamples; ++i) {
if (mSyncSamples[i] == 0) {
ALOGE("b/32423862, unexpected zero value in stss");
continue;
}
mSyncSamples[i] = ntohl(mSyncSamples[i]) - 1;
}
mSyncSampleOffset = data_offset;
mNumSyncSamples = numSyncSamples;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix 'potential memory leak' compiler warning.
This CL fixes the following compiler warning:
frameworks/av/media/libstagefright/SampleTable.cpp:569:9: warning:
Memory allocated by 'new[]' should be deallocated by 'delete[]', not
'delete'.
Bug: 33137046
Test: Compiled with change; no warning generated.
Change-Id: I29abd90e02bf482fa840d1f7206ebbdacf7dfa37
(cherry picked from commit 158c197b668ad684f92829db6a31bee3aec794ba)
(cherry picked from commit 37c428cd521351837fccb6864f509f996820b234)
CWE ID: CWE-772 | status_t SampleTable::setSyncSampleParams(off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mSyncSampleOffset >= 0 || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t numSyncSamples = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (numSyncSamples < 2) {
ALOGV("Table of sync samples is empty or has only a single entry!");
}
uint64_t allocSize = (uint64_t)numSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > kMaxTotalSize) {
ALOGE("Sync sample table size too large.");
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mTotalSize += allocSize;
if (mTotalSize > kMaxTotalSize) {
ALOGE("Sync sample table size would make sample table too large.\n"
" Requested sync sample table size = %llu\n"
" Eventual sample table size >= %llu\n"
" Allowed sample table size = %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)allocSize,
(unsigned long long)mTotalSize,
(unsigned long long)kMaxTotalSize);
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mSyncSamples = new (std::nothrow) uint32_t[numSyncSamples];
if (!mSyncSamples) {
ALOGE("Cannot allocate sync sample table with %llu entries.",
(unsigned long long)numSyncSamples);
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, mSyncSamples,
(size_t)allocSize) != (ssize_t)allocSize) {
delete[] mSyncSamples;
mSyncSamples = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < numSyncSamples; ++i) {
if (mSyncSamples[i] == 0) {
ALOGE("b/32423862, unexpected zero value in stss");
continue;
}
mSyncSamples[i] = ntohl(mSyncSamples[i]) - 1;
}
mSyncSampleOffset = data_offset;
mNumSyncSamples = numSyncSamples;
return OK;
}
| 173,992 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CrosMock::SetSpeechSynthesisLibraryExpectations() {
InSequence s;
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, StopSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, Speak(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, IsSpeaking())
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(true));
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, StopSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, Speak(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, IsSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.WillOnce(Return(false))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void CrosMock::SetSpeechSynthesisLibraryExpectations() {
InSequence s;
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, StopSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, SetSpeakProperties(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, Speak(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, IsSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, StopSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, SetSpeakProperties(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, Speak(_))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_speech_synthesis_library_, IsSpeaking())
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.WillOnce(Return(true))
.WillOnce(Return(false))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
}
| 170,372 |
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