instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.3k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::getDescriptorsImpl(
ScriptState* scriptState,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
const String& descriptor) {
if (!getGatt()->connected()) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::CreateDOMException(
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::ExceptionType::kGATTServerNotConnected));
}
if (!getGatt()->device()->isValidCharacteristic(
m_characteristic->instance_id)) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::CreateDOMException(
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::ExceptionType::kInvalidCharacteristic));
}
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
getGatt()->AddToActiveAlgorithms(resolver);
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothService* service = m_device->bluetooth()->service();
WTF::Optional<String> uuid = WTF::nullopt;
if (!descriptor.isEmpty())
uuid = descriptor;
service->RemoteCharacteristicGetDescriptors(
m_characteristic->instance_id, quantity, uuid,
convertToBaseCallback(
WTF::bind(&BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::GetDescriptorsCallback,
wrapPersistent(this), m_characteristic->instance_id,
quantity, wrapPersistent(resolver))));
return promise;
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::getDescriptorsImpl(
ScriptState* scriptState,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
const String& descriptorsUUID) {
if (!getGatt()->connected()) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::CreateDOMException(
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::ExceptionType::kGATTServerNotConnected));
}
if (!getGatt()->device()->isValidCharacteristic(
m_characteristic->instance_id)) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::CreateDOMException(
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::ExceptionType::kInvalidCharacteristic));
}
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
getGatt()->AddToActiveAlgorithms(resolver);
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothService* service = m_device->bluetooth()->service();
service->RemoteCharacteristicGetDescriptors(
m_characteristic->instance_id, quantity, descriptorsUUID,
convertToBaseCallback(
WTF::bind(&BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::GetDescriptorsCallback,
wrapPersistent(this), m_characteristic->instance_id,
quantity, wrapPersistent(resolver))));
return promise;
}
| 172,021
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: chdlc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int proto;
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s, ethertype %s (0x%04x), length %u: ",
tok2str(chdlc_cast_values, "0x%02x", p[0]),
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown", proto),
proto,
length));
}
length -= CHDLC_HDRLEN;
p += CHDLC_HDRLEN;
switch (proto) {
case ETHERTYPE_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case CHDLC_TYPE_SLARP:
chdlc_slarp_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
#if 0
case CHDLC_TYPE_CDP:
chdlc_cdp_print(p, length);
break;
#endif
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS:
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS_MULTI:
mpls_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_ISO:
/* is the fudge byte set ? lets verify by spotting ISO headers */
if (*(p+1) == 0x81 ||
*(p+1) == 0x82 ||
*(p+1) == 0x83)
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1, ndo->ndo_snapend - p - 1);
else
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, ndo->ndo_snapend - p);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown CHDLC protocol (0x%04x)", proto));
break;
}
return (CHDLC_HDRLEN);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13687/CHDLC: Improve bounds and length checks.
Prevent a possible buffer overread in chdlc_print() and replace the
custom check in chdlc_if_print() with a standard check in chdlc_print()
so that the latter certainly does not over-read even when reached via
juniper_chdlc_print(). Add length checks.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
chdlc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int proto;
const u_char *bp = p;
if (length < CHDLC_HDRLEN)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, CHDLC_HDRLEN);
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s, ethertype %s (0x%04x), length %u: ",
tok2str(chdlc_cast_values, "0x%02x", p[0]),
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown", proto),
proto,
length));
}
length -= CHDLC_HDRLEN;
p += CHDLC_HDRLEN;
switch (proto) {
case ETHERTYPE_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case CHDLC_TYPE_SLARP:
chdlc_slarp_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
#if 0
case CHDLC_TYPE_CDP:
chdlc_cdp_print(p, length);
break;
#endif
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS:
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS_MULTI:
mpls_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_ISO:
/* is the fudge byte set ? lets verify by spotting ISO headers */
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(p);
if (*(p+1) == 0x81 ||
*(p+1) == 0x82 ||
*(p+1) == 0x83)
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1, ndo->ndo_snapend - p - 1);
else
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, ndo->ndo_snapend - p);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown CHDLC protocol (0x%04x)", proto));
break;
}
return (CHDLC_HDRLEN);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|chdlc]"));
return ndo->ndo_snapend - bp;
}
| 170,022
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t ESDS::parseESDescriptor(size_t offset, size_t size) {
if (size < 3) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
offset += 2; // skip ES_ID
size -= 2;
unsigned streamDependenceFlag = mData[offset] & 0x80;
unsigned URL_Flag = mData[offset] & 0x40;
unsigned OCRstreamFlag = mData[offset] & 0x20;
++offset;
--size;
if (streamDependenceFlag) {
offset += 2;
size -= 2;
}
if (URL_Flag) {
if (offset >= size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
unsigned URLlength = mData[offset];
offset += URLlength + 1;
size -= URLlength + 1;
}
if (OCRstreamFlag) {
offset += 2;
size -= 2;
if ((offset >= size || mData[offset] != kTag_DecoderConfigDescriptor)
&& offset - 2 < size
&& mData[offset - 2] == kTag_DecoderConfigDescriptor) {
offset -= 2;
size += 2;
ALOGW("Found malformed 'esds' atom, ignoring missing OCR_ES_Id.");
}
}
if (offset >= size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t tag;
size_t sub_offset, sub_size;
status_t err = skipDescriptorHeader(
offset, size, &tag, &sub_offset, &sub_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (tag != kTag_DecoderConfigDescriptor) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
err = parseDecoderConfigDescriptor(sub_offset, sub_size);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer underflow in ESDS processing
Several arithmetic operations within parseESDescriptor could underflow, leading
to an out-of-bounds read operation. Ensure that subtractions from 'size' do not
cause it to wrap around.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit 07c0f59d6c48874982d2b5c713487612e5af465a)
Change-Id: I377d21051e07ca654ea1f7037120429d3f71924a
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
status_t ESDS::parseESDescriptor(size_t offset, size_t size) {
if (size < 3) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
offset += 2; // skip ES_ID
size -= 2;
unsigned streamDependenceFlag = mData[offset] & 0x80;
unsigned URL_Flag = mData[offset] & 0x40;
unsigned OCRstreamFlag = mData[offset] & 0x20;
++offset;
--size;
if (streamDependenceFlag) {
if (size < 2)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
offset += 2;
size -= 2;
}
if (URL_Flag) {
if (offset >= size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
unsigned URLlength = mData[offset];
if (URLlength >= size)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
offset += URLlength + 1;
size -= URLlength + 1;
}
if (OCRstreamFlag) {
if (size < 2)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
offset += 2;
size -= 2;
if ((offset >= size || mData[offset] != kTag_DecoderConfigDescriptor)
&& offset - 2 < size
&& mData[offset - 2] == kTag_DecoderConfigDescriptor) {
offset -= 2;
size += 2;
ALOGW("Found malformed 'esds' atom, ignoring missing OCR_ES_Id.");
}
}
if (offset >= size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t tag;
size_t sub_offset, sub_size;
status_t err = skipDescriptorHeader(
offset, size, &tag, &sub_offset, &sub_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (tag != kTag_DecoderConfigDescriptor) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
err = parseDecoderConfigDescriptor(sub_offset, sub_size);
return err;
}
| 173,370
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SavePackage::OnReceivedSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage(
const std::vector<GURL>& resources_list,
const std::vector<Referrer>& referrers_list,
const std::vector<GURL>& frames_list) {
if (wait_state_ != RESOURCES_LIST)
return;
DCHECK(resources_list.size() == referrers_list.size());
all_save_items_count_ = static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()) +
static_cast<int>(frames_list.size());
if (download_ && download_->IsInProgress())
download_->SetTotalBytes(all_save_items_count_);
if (all_save_items_count_) {
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = resources_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveFileCreateInfo::SaveFileSource save_source = u.SchemeIsFile() ?
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_FILE :
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_NET;
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(u, referrers_list[i],
this, save_source);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(frames_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = frames_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(
u, Referrer(), this, SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_DOM);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
wait_state_ = NET_FILES;
DoSavingProcess();
} else {
Cancel(true);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void SavePackage::OnReceivedSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage(
const std::vector<GURL>& resources_list,
const std::vector<Referrer>& referrers_list,
const std::vector<GURL>& frames_list) {
if (wait_state_ != RESOURCES_LIST)
return;
if (resources_list.size() != referrers_list.size())
return;
all_save_items_count_ = static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()) +
static_cast<int>(frames_list.size());
if (download_ && download_->IsInProgress())
download_->SetTotalBytes(all_save_items_count_);
if (all_save_items_count_) {
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = resources_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveFileCreateInfo::SaveFileSource save_source = u.SchemeIsFile() ?
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_FILE :
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_NET;
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(u, referrers_list[i],
this, save_source);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(frames_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = frames_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(
u, Referrer(), this, SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_DOM);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
wait_state_ = NET_FILES;
DoSavingProcess();
} else {
Cancel(true);
}
}
| 171,400
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ParamTraits<SkBitmap>::Read(const base::Pickle* m,
base::PickleIterator* iter,
SkBitmap* r) {
const char* fixed_data;
int fixed_data_size = 0;
if (!iter->ReadData(&fixed_data, &fixed_data_size) ||
(fixed_data_size <= 0)) {
return false;
}
if (fixed_data_size != sizeof(SkBitmap_Data))
return false; // Message is malformed.
const char* variable_data;
int variable_data_size = 0;
if (!iter->ReadData(&variable_data, &variable_data_size) ||
(variable_data_size < 0)) {
return false;
}
const SkBitmap_Data* bmp_data =
reinterpret_cast<const SkBitmap_Data*>(fixed_data);
return bmp_data->InitSkBitmapFromData(r, variable_data, variable_data_size);
}
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562}
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
bool ParamTraits<SkBitmap>::Read(const base::Pickle* m,
base::PickleIterator* iter,
SkBitmap* r) {
SkImageInfo image_info;
if (!ReadParam(m, iter, &image_info))
return false;
const char* bitmap_data;
int bitmap_data_size = 0;
if (!iter->ReadData(&bitmap_data, &bitmap_data_size))
return false;
// ReadData() only returns true if bitmap_data_size >= 0.
if (!r->tryAllocPixels(image_info))
return false;
if (static_cast<size_t>(bitmap_data_size) != r->computeByteSize())
return false;
memcpy(r->getPixels(), bitmap_data, bitmap_data_size);
return true;
}
| 172,894
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RemoveActionCallback(const ActionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get());
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
std::vector<ActionCallback>* callbacks = g_callbacks.Pointer();
for (size_t i = 0; i < callbacks->size(); ++i) {
if ((*callbacks)[i].Equals(callback)) {
callbacks->erase(callbacks->begin() + i);
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Convert Uses of base::RepeatingCallback<>::Equals to Use == or != in //base
Staging this change because some conversions will have semantic changes.
BUG=937566
Change-Id: I2d4950624c0fab00e107814421a161e43da965cc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1507245
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639702}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void RemoveActionCallback(const ActionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get());
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
std::vector<ActionCallback>* callbacks = g_callbacks.Pointer();
for (size_t i = 0; i < callbacks->size(); ++i) {
if ((*callbacks)[i] == callback) {
callbacks->erase(callbacks->begin() + i);
return;
}
}
}
| 172,099
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void sycc420_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
int *d0, *d1, *d2, *r, *g, *b, *nr, *ng, *nb;
const int *y, *cb, *cr, *ny;
unsigned int maxw, maxh, max;
int offset, upb;
unsigned int i, j;
upb = (int)img->comps[0].prec;
offset = 1<<(upb - 1); upb = (1<<upb)-1;
maxw = (unsigned int)img->comps[0].w; maxh = (unsigned int)img->comps[0].h;
max = maxw * maxh;
y = img->comps[0].data;
cb = img->comps[1].data;
cr = img->comps[2].data;
d0 = r = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
d1 = g = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
d2 = b = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
if(r == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) goto fails;
for(i=0U; i < (maxh & ~(unsigned int)1U); i += 2U)
{
ny = y + maxw;
nr = r + maxw; ng = g + maxw; nb = b + maxw;
for(j=0; j < (maxw & ~(unsigned int)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if(j < maxw)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb; ++cb; ++cr;
}
y += maxw; r += maxw; g += maxw; b += maxw;
}
if(i < maxh)
{
for(j=0U; j < (maxw & ~(unsigned int)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if(j < maxw)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
}
}
free(img->comps[0].data); img->comps[0].data = d0;
free(img->comps[1].data); img->comps[1].data = d1;
free(img->comps[2].data); img->comps[2].data = d2;
#if defined(USE_JPWL) || defined(USE_MJ2)
img->comps[1].w = maxw; img->comps[1].h = maxh;
img->comps[2].w = maxw; img->comps[2].h = maxh;
#else
img->comps[1].w = (OPJ_UINT32)maxw; img->comps[1].h = (OPJ_UINT32)maxh;
img->comps[2].w = (OPJ_UINT32)maxw; img->comps[2].h = (OPJ_UINT32)maxh;
#endif
img->comps[1].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[2].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[1].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
img->comps[2].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
return;
fails:
if(r) free(r);
if(g) free(g);
if(b) free(b);
}/* sycc420_to_rgb() */
Commit Message: Fix Out-Of-Bounds Read in sycc42x_to_rgb function (#745)
42x Images with an odd x0/y0 lead to subsampled component starting at the
2nd column/line.
That is offset = comp->dx * comp->x0 - image->x0 = 1
Fix #726
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static void sycc420_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
int *d0, *d1, *d2, *r, *g, *b, *nr, *ng, *nb;
const int *y, *cb, *cr, *ny;
size_t maxw, maxh, max, offx, loopmaxw, offy, loopmaxh;
int offset, upb;
size_t i;
upb = (int)img->comps[0].prec;
offset = 1<<(upb - 1); upb = (1<<upb)-1;
maxw = (size_t)img->comps[0].w; maxh = (size_t)img->comps[0].h;
max = maxw * maxh;
y = img->comps[0].data;
cb = img->comps[1].data;
cr = img->comps[2].data;
d0 = r = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d1 = g = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d2 = b = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
if (r == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) goto fails;
/* if img->x0 is odd, then first column shall use Cb/Cr = 0 */
offx = img->x0 & 1U;
loopmaxw = maxw - offx;
/* if img->y0 is odd, then first line shall use Cb/Cr = 0 */
offy = img->y0 & 1U;
loopmaxh = maxh - offy;
if (offy > 0U) {
size_t j;
for(j=0; j < maxw; ++j)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, 0, 0, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
}
}
for(i=0U; i < (loopmaxh & ~(size_t)1U); i += 2U)
{
size_t j;
ny = y + maxw;
nr = r + maxw; ng = g + maxw; nb = b + maxw;
if (offx > 0U) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, 0, 0, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb;
}
for(j=0; j < (loopmaxw & ~(size_t)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if(j < loopmaxw)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny; ++nr; ++ng; ++nb; ++cb; ++cr;
}
y += maxw; r += maxw; g += maxw; b += maxw;
}
if(i < loopmaxh)
{
size_t j;
for(j=0U; j < (maxw & ~(size_t)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if(j < maxw)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
}
}
free(img->comps[0].data); img->comps[0].data = d0;
free(img->comps[1].data); img->comps[1].data = d1;
free(img->comps[2].data); img->comps[2].data = d2;
img->comps[1].w = img->comps[2].w = img->comps[0].w;
img->comps[1].h = img->comps[2].h = img->comps[0].h;
img->comps[1].dx = img->comps[2].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[1].dy = img->comps[2].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
return;
fails:
free(r);
free(g);
free(b);
}/* sycc420_to_rgb() */
| 168,839
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void locationAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* proxyImp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->location());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void locationAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* proxyImp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<TestNode> imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->location());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
| 171,683
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: StorageHandler::IndexedDBObserver* StorageHandler::GetIndexedDBObserver() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!indexed_db_observer_) {
indexed_db_observer_ = std::make_unique<IndexedDBObserver>(
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
static_cast<IndexedDBContextImpl*>(
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetIndexedDBContext()));
}
return indexed_db_observer_.get();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
StorageHandler::IndexedDBObserver* StorageHandler::GetIndexedDBObserver() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!indexed_db_observer_) {
indexed_db_observer_ = std::make_unique<IndexedDBObserver>(
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
static_cast<IndexedDBContextImpl*>(
storage_partition_->GetIndexedDBContext()));
}
return indexed_db_observer_.get();
}
| 172,772
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Track::EOSBlock::EOSBlock() :
BlockEntry(NULL, LONG_MIN)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
Track::EOSBlock::EOSBlock() :
| 174,272
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int xfrm_dump_policy_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk = (struct xfrm_policy_walk *) &cb->args[1];
struct net *net = sock_net(cb->skb->sk);
xfrm_policy_walk_done(walk, net);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
static int xfrm_dump_policy_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk = (struct xfrm_policy_walk *)cb->args;
struct net *net = sock_net(cb->skb->sk);
xfrm_policy_walk_done(walk, net);
return 0;
}
| 167,663
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(readgzfile)
{
char *filename;
int filename_len;
int flags = REPORT_ERRORS;
php_stream *stream;
int size;
long use_include_path = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|l", &filename, &filename_len, &use_include_path) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (use_include_path) {
flags |= USE_PATH;
}
stream = php_stream_gzopen(NULL, filename, "rb", flags, NULL, NULL STREAMS_CC TSRMLS_CC);
if (!stream) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
size = php_stream_passthru(stream);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_LONG(size);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
static PHP_FUNCTION(readgzfile)
{
char *filename;
int filename_len;
int flags = REPORT_ERRORS;
php_stream *stream;
int size;
long use_include_path = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p|l", &filename, &filename_len, &use_include_path) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (use_include_path) {
flags |= USE_PATH;
}
stream = php_stream_gzopen(NULL, filename, "rb", flags, NULL, NULL STREAMS_CC TSRMLS_CC);
if (!stream) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
size = php_stream_passthru(stream);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_LONG(size);
}
| 165,320
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_list_algorithms)
{
char **modules;
char *lib_dir = MCG(algorithms_dir);
int lib_dir_len;
int i, count;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|s",
&lib_dir, &lib_dir_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
modules = mcrypt_list_algorithms(lib_dir, &count);
if (count == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "No algorithms found in module dir");
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
add_index_string(return_value, i, modules[i], 1);
}
mcrypt_free_p(modules, count);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_list_algorithms)
{
char **modules;
char *lib_dir = MCG(algorithms_dir);
int lib_dir_len;
int i, count;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|s",
&lib_dir, &lib_dir_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
modules = mcrypt_list_algorithms(lib_dir, &count);
if (count == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "No algorithms found in module dir");
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
add_index_string(return_value, i, modules[i], 1);
}
mcrypt_free_p(modules, count);
}
| 167,102
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WT_VoiceFilter (S_FILTER_CONTROL *pFilter, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pAudioBuffer;
EAS_I32 k;
EAS_I32 b1;
EAS_I32 b2;
EAS_I32 z1;
EAS_I32 z2;
EAS_I32 acc0;
EAS_I32 acc1;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
pAudioBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
z1 = pFilter->z1;
z2 = pFilter->z2;
b1 = -pWTIntFrame->frame.b1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
b2 = -pWTIntFrame->frame.b2 >> 1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
k = pWTIntFrame->frame.k >> 1;
while (numSamples--)
{
/* do filter calculations */
acc0 = *pAudioBuffer;
acc1 = z1 * b1;
acc1 += z2 * b2;
acc0 = acc1 + k * acc0;
z2 = z1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
z1 = acc0 >> 14;
*pAudioBuffer++ = (EAS_I16) z1;
}
/* save delay values */
pFilter->z1 = (EAS_I16) z1;
pFilter->z2 = (EAS_I16) z2;
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void WT_VoiceFilter (S_FILTER_CONTROL *pFilter, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pAudioBuffer;
EAS_I32 k;
EAS_I32 b1;
EAS_I32 b2;
EAS_I32 z1;
EAS_I32 z2;
EAS_I32 acc0;
EAS_I32 acc1;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pAudioBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
z1 = pFilter->z1;
z2 = pFilter->z2;
b1 = -pWTIntFrame->frame.b1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
b2 = -pWTIntFrame->frame.b2 >> 1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
k = pWTIntFrame->frame.k >> 1;
while (numSamples--)
{
/* do filter calculations */
acc0 = *pAudioBuffer;
acc1 = z1 * b1;
acc1 += z2 * b2;
acc0 = acc1 + k * acc0;
z2 = z1;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide> */
z1 = acc0 >> 14;
*pAudioBuffer++ = (EAS_I16) z1;
}
/* save delay values */
pFilter->z1 = (EAS_I16) z1;
pFilter->z2 = (EAS_I16) z2;
}
| 173,921
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ip_printroute(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register u_int ptr;
register u_int len;
if (length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", length));
return;
}
if ((length + 1) & 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", length));
ptr = cp[2] - 1;
if (ptr < 3 || ((ptr + 1) & 3) || ptr > length + 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad ptr %u]", cp[2]));
for (len = 3; len < length; len += 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &cp[len])));
if (ptr > len)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13022/IP: Add bounds checks to ip_printroute().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
ip_printroute(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register u_int ptr;
register u_int len;
if (length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", length));
return (0);
}
if ((length + 1) & 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", length));
ND_TCHECK(cp[2]);
ptr = cp[2] - 1;
if (ptr < 3 || ((ptr + 1) & 3) || ptr > length + 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad ptr %u]", cp[2]));
for (len = 3; len < length; len += 4) {
ND_TCHECK2(cp[len], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &cp[len])));
if (ptr > len)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
}
return (0);
trunc:
return (-1);
}
| 167,870
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PresentationConnectionProxy::OnClose() {
DCHECK(target_connection_ptr_);
source_connection_->didChangeState(
blink::WebPresentationConnectionState::Closed);
target_connection_ptr_->DidChangeState(
content::PRESENTATION_CONNECTION_STATE_CLOSED);
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID:
|
void PresentationConnectionProxy::OnClose() {
DCHECK(target_connection_ptr_);
source_connection_->didClose();
target_connection_ptr_->DidChangeState(
content::PRESENTATION_CONNECTION_STATE_CLOSED);
}
| 172,045
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void FocusFirstNameField() {
LOG(WARNING) << "Clicking on the tab.";
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(ui_test_utils::ClickOnView(browser(),
VIEW_ID_TAB_CONTAINER));
ASSERT_TRUE(ui_test_utils::IsViewFocused(browser(),
VIEW_ID_TAB_CONTAINER));
LOG(WARNING) << "Focusing the first name field.";
bool result = false;
ASSERT_TRUE(ui_test_utils::ExecuteJavaScriptAndExtractBool(
render_view_host(), L"",
L"if (document.readyState === 'complete')"
L" document.getElementById('firstname').focus();"
L"else"
L" domAutomationController.send(false);",
&result));
ASSERT_TRUE(result);
}
Commit Message: Convert the autofill interactive browser test to a normal browser_test. I added testing methods to fake input events that don't depend on the OS and being at the front.
BUG=121574
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10368010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135432 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void FocusFirstNameField() {
LOG(WARNING) << "Clicking on the tab.";
ui_test_utils::SimulateMouseClick(browser()->GetSelectedWebContents());
LOG(WARNING) << "Focusing the first name field.";
bool result = false;
ASSERT_TRUE(ui_test_utils::ExecuteJavaScriptAndExtractBool(
render_view_host(), L"",
L"if (document.readyState === 'complete')"
L" document.getElementById('firstname').focus();"
L"else"
L" domAutomationController.send(false);",
&result));
ASSERT_TRUE(result);
}
| 170,721
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static OPCODE_DESC* avr_op_analyze(RAnal *anal, RAnalOp *op, ut64 addr, const ut8 *buf, int len, CPU_MODEL *cpu) {
OPCODE_DESC *opcode_desc;
ut16 ins = (buf[1] << 8) | buf[0];
int fail;
char *t;
memset (op, 0, sizeof (RAnalOp));
op->ptr = UT64_MAX;
op->val = UT64_MAX;
op->jump = UT64_MAX;
r_strbuf_init (&op->esil);
for (opcode_desc = opcodes; opcode_desc->handler; opcode_desc++) {
if ((ins & opcode_desc->mask) == opcode_desc->selector) {
fail = 0;
op->cycles = opcode_desc->cycles;
op->size = opcode_desc->size;
op->type = opcode_desc->type;
op->jump = UT64_MAX;
op->fail = UT64_MAX;
op->addr = addr;
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "");
opcode_desc->handler (anal, op, buf, len, &fail, cpu);
if (fail) {
goto INVALID_OP;
}
if (op->cycles <= 0) {
opcode_desc->cycles = 2;
}
op->nopcode = (op->type == R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK);
t = r_strbuf_get (&op->esil);
if (t && strlen (t) > 1) {
t += strlen (t) - 1;
if (*t == ',') {
*t = '\0';
}
}
return opcode_desc;
}
}
if ((ins & 0xff00) == 0xff00 && (ins & 0xf) > 7) {
goto INVALID_OP;
}
INVALID_OP:
op->family = R_ANAL_OP_FAMILY_UNKNOWN;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK;
op->addr = addr;
op->fail = UT64_MAX;
op->jump = UT64_MAX;
op->ptr = UT64_MAX;
op->val = UT64_MAX;
op->nopcode = 1;
op->cycles = 1;
op->size = 2;
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "1,$");
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix oobread in avr
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static OPCODE_DESC* avr_op_analyze(RAnal *anal, RAnalOp *op, ut64 addr, const ut8 *buf, int len, CPU_MODEL *cpu) {
OPCODE_DESC *opcode_desc;
if (len < 2) {
return NULL;
}
ut16 ins = (buf[1] << 8) | buf[0];
int fail;
char *t;
memset (op, 0, sizeof (RAnalOp));
op->ptr = UT64_MAX;
op->val = UT64_MAX;
op->jump = UT64_MAX;
r_strbuf_init (&op->esil);
for (opcode_desc = opcodes; opcode_desc->handler; opcode_desc++) {
if ((ins & opcode_desc->mask) == opcode_desc->selector) {
fail = 0;
op->cycles = opcode_desc->cycles;
op->size = opcode_desc->size;
op->type = opcode_desc->type;
op->jump = UT64_MAX;
op->fail = UT64_MAX;
op->addr = addr;
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "");
opcode_desc->handler (anal, op, buf, len, &fail, cpu);
if (fail) {
goto INVALID_OP;
}
if (op->cycles <= 0) {
opcode_desc->cycles = 2;
}
op->nopcode = (op->type == R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK);
t = r_strbuf_get (&op->esil);
if (t && strlen (t) > 1) {
t += strlen (t) - 1;
if (*t == ',') {
*t = '\0';
}
}
return opcode_desc;
}
}
if ((ins & 0xff00) == 0xff00 && (ins & 0xf) > 7) {
goto INVALID_OP;
}
INVALID_OP:
op->family = R_ANAL_OP_FAMILY_UNKNOWN;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK;
op->addr = addr;
op->fail = UT64_MAX;
op->jump = UT64_MAX;
op->ptr = UT64_MAX;
op->val = UT64_MAX;
op->nopcode = 1;
op->cycles = 1;
op->size = 2;
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "1,$");
return NULL;
}
| 170,162
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ChromeDownloadDelegate::RequestHTTPGetDownload(
const std::string& url,
const std::string& user_agent,
const std::string& content_disposition,
const std::string& mime_type,
const std::string& cookie,
const std::string& referer,
const base::string16& file_name,
int64_t content_length,
bool has_user_gesture,
bool must_download) {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jurl =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, url);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> juser_agent =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, user_agent);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jcontent_disposition =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, content_disposition);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jmime_type =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, mime_type);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jcookie =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, cookie);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jreferer =
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, referer);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jfilename =
base::android::ConvertUTF16ToJavaString(env, file_name);
Java_ChromeDownloadDelegate_requestHttpGetDownload(
env, java_ref_, jurl, juser_agent, jcontent_disposition, jmime_type,
jcookie, jreferer, has_user_gesture, jfilename, content_length,
must_download);
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
void ChromeDownloadDelegate::RequestHTTPGetDownload(
| 171,880
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc)
{
XcursorChunkHeader chunkHeader;
XcursorImage head;
XcursorImage *image;
int n;
XcursorPixel *p;
if (!file || !fileHeader)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorFileReadChunkHeader (file, fileHeader, toc, &chunkHeader))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.width))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.height))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.xhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.yhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
return NULL;
if (head.width == 0 || head.height == 0)
return NULL;
return NULL;
if (chunkHeader.version < image->version)
image->version = chunkHeader.version;
image->size = chunkHeader.subtype;
image->xhot = head.xhot;
image->yhot = head.yhot;
image->delay = head.delay;
n = image->width * image->height;
p = image->pixels;
while (n--)
{
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, p))
{
XcursorImageDestroy (image);
return NULL;
}
p++;
}
return image;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
_XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc)
{
XcursorChunkHeader chunkHeader;
XcursorImage head;
XcursorImage *image;
int n;
XcursorPixel *p;
if (!file || !fileHeader)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorFileReadChunkHeader (file, fileHeader, toc, &chunkHeader))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.width))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.height))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.xhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.yhot))
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
return NULL;
/* sanity check data */
if (head.width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE ||
head.height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE)
return NULL;
if (head.width == 0 || head.height == 0)
return NULL;
return NULL;
if (chunkHeader.version < image->version)
image->version = chunkHeader.version;
image->size = chunkHeader.subtype;
image->xhot = head.xhot;
image->yhot = head.yhot;
image->delay = head.delay;
n = image->width * image->height;
p = image->pixels;
while (n--)
{
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, p))
{
XcursorImageDestroy (image);
return NULL;
}
p++;
}
return image;
}
| 164,627
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::GpuChannelEstablishedOnIO(
EstablishRequest* request,
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle,
base::ProcessHandle gpu_process_handle,
const GPUInfo& gpu_info) {
request->channel_handle = channel_handle;
request->gpu_process_handle = gpu_process_handle;
request->gpu_info = gpu_info;
request->event.Signal();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::GpuChannelEstablishedOnIO(
EstablishRequest* request,
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle,
const GPUInfo& gpu_info) {
request->channel_handle = channel_handle;
request->gpu_info = gpu_info;
request->event.Signal();
}
| 170,919
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ext2_xattr_get(struct inode *inode, int name_index, const char *name,
void *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct ext2_xattr_entry *entry;
size_t name_len, size;
char *end;
int error;
ea_idebug(inode, "name=%d.%s, buffer=%p, buffer_size=%ld",
name_index, name, buffer, (long)buffer_size);
if (name == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
name_len = strlen(name);
if (name_len > 255)
return -ERANGE;
down_read(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
error = -ENODATA;
if (!EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
ea_idebug(inode, "reading block %d", EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
if (!bh)
goto cleanup;
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d, refcount=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)), le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount));
end = bh->b_data + bh->b_size;
if (HDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
HDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
bad_block: ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_get",
"inode %ld: bad block %d", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
/* find named attribute */
entry = FIRST_ENTRY(bh);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry)) {
struct ext2_xattr_entry *next =
EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(entry);
if ((char *)next >= end)
goto bad_block;
if (name_index == entry->e_name_index &&
name_len == entry->e_name_len &&
memcmp(name, entry->e_name, name_len) == 0)
goto found;
entry = next;
}
if (ext2_xattr_cache_insert(bh))
ea_idebug(inode, "cache insert failed");
error = -ENODATA;
goto cleanup;
found:
/* check the buffer size */
if (entry->e_value_block != 0)
goto bad_block;
size = le32_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size);
if (size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize ||
le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs) + size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize)
goto bad_block;
if (ext2_xattr_cache_insert(bh))
ea_idebug(inode, "cache insert failed");
if (buffer) {
error = -ERANGE;
if (size > buffer_size)
goto cleanup;
/* return value of attribute */
memcpy(buffer, bh->b_data + le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs),
size);
}
error = size;
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
up_read(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19
|
ext2_xattr_get(struct inode *inode, int name_index, const char *name,
void *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct ext2_xattr_entry *entry;
size_t name_len, size;
char *end;
int error;
struct mb2_cache *ext2_mb_cache = EXT2_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_mb_cache;
ea_idebug(inode, "name=%d.%s, buffer=%p, buffer_size=%ld",
name_index, name, buffer, (long)buffer_size);
if (name == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
name_len = strlen(name);
if (name_len > 255)
return -ERANGE;
down_read(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
error = -ENODATA;
if (!EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
ea_idebug(inode, "reading block %d", EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
if (!bh)
goto cleanup;
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d, refcount=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)), le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount));
end = bh->b_data + bh->b_size;
if (HDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
HDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
bad_block: ext2_error(inode->i_sb, "ext2_xattr_get",
"inode %ld: bad block %d", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
/* find named attribute */
entry = FIRST_ENTRY(bh);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry)) {
struct ext2_xattr_entry *next =
EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(entry);
if ((char *)next >= end)
goto bad_block;
if (name_index == entry->e_name_index &&
name_len == entry->e_name_len &&
memcmp(name, entry->e_name, name_len) == 0)
goto found;
entry = next;
}
if (ext2_xattr_cache_insert(ext2_mb_cache, bh))
ea_idebug(inode, "cache insert failed");
error = -ENODATA;
goto cleanup;
found:
/* check the buffer size */
if (entry->e_value_block != 0)
goto bad_block;
size = le32_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size);
if (size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize ||
le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs) + size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize)
goto bad_block;
if (ext2_xattr_cache_insert(ext2_mb_cache, bh))
ea_idebug(inode, "cache insert failed");
if (buffer) {
error = -ERANGE;
if (size > buffer_size)
goto cleanup;
/* return value of attribute */
memcpy(buffer, bh->b_data + le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs),
size);
}
error = size;
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
up_read(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
return error;
}
| 169,980
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: my_object_str_hash_len (MyObject *obj, GHashTable *table, guint *len, GError **error)
{
*len = 0;
g_hash_table_foreach (table, hash_foreach, len);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
my_object_str_hash_len (MyObject *obj, GHashTable *table, guint *len, GError **error)
| 165,121
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: http_DissectRequest(struct sess *sp)
{
struct http_conn *htc;
struct http *hp;
uint16_t retval;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(sp, SESS_MAGIC);
htc = sp->htc;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(htc, HTTP_CONN_MAGIC);
hp = sp->http;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(hp, HTTP_MAGIC);
hp->logtag = HTTP_Rx;
retval = http_splitline(sp->wrk, sp->fd, hp, htc,
HTTP_HDR_REQ, HTTP_HDR_URL, HTTP_HDR_PROTO);
if (retval != 0) {
WSPR(sp, SLT_HttpGarbage, htc->rxbuf);
return (retval);
}
http_ProtoVer(hp);
retval = htc_request_check_host_hdr(hp);
if (retval != 0) {
WSP(sp, SLT_Error, "Duplicated Host header");
return (retval);
}
return (retval);
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID:
|
http_DissectRequest(struct sess *sp)
{
struct http_conn *htc;
struct http *hp;
uint16_t retval;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(sp, SESS_MAGIC);
htc = sp->htc;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(htc, HTTP_CONN_MAGIC);
hp = sp->http;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(hp, HTTP_MAGIC);
hp->logtag = HTTP_Rx;
retval = http_splitline(sp->wrk, sp->fd, hp, htc,
HTTP_HDR_REQ, HTTP_HDR_URL, HTTP_HDR_PROTO);
if (retval != 0) {
WSPR(sp, SLT_HttpGarbage, htc->rxbuf);
return (retval);
}
http_ProtoVer(hp);
retval = htc_request_check_hdrs(sp, hp);
return (retval);
}
| 167,479
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: _TIFFmalloc(tmsize_t s)
{
return (malloc((size_t) s));
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369
|
_TIFFmalloc(tmsize_t s)
{
if (s == 0)
return ((void *) NULL);
return (malloc((size_t) s));
}
| 169,459
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static long __media_device_enum_links(struct media_device *mdev,
struct media_links_enum *links)
{
struct media_entity *entity;
entity = find_entity(mdev, links->entity);
if (entity == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
if (links->pads) {
unsigned int p;
for (p = 0; p < entity->num_pads; p++) {
struct media_pad_desc pad;
media_device_kpad_to_upad(&entity->pads[p], &pad);
if (copy_to_user(&links->pads[p], &pad, sizeof(pad)))
return -EFAULT;
}
}
if (links->links) {
struct media_link_desc __user *ulink;
unsigned int l;
for (l = 0, ulink = links->links; l < entity->num_links; l++) {
struct media_link_desc link;
/* Ignore backlinks. */
if (entity->links[l].source->entity != entity)
continue;
media_device_kpad_to_upad(entity->links[l].source,
&link.source);
media_device_kpad_to_upad(entity->links[l].sink,
&link.sink);
link.flags = entity->links[l].flags;
if (copy_to_user(ulink, &link, sizeof(*ulink)))
return -EFAULT;
ulink++;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] media: info leak in __media_device_enum_links()
These structs have holes and reserved struct members which aren't
cleared. I've added a memset() so we don't leak stack information.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static long __media_device_enum_links(struct media_device *mdev,
struct media_links_enum *links)
{
struct media_entity *entity;
entity = find_entity(mdev, links->entity);
if (entity == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
if (links->pads) {
unsigned int p;
for (p = 0; p < entity->num_pads; p++) {
struct media_pad_desc pad;
memset(&pad, 0, sizeof(pad));
media_device_kpad_to_upad(&entity->pads[p], &pad);
if (copy_to_user(&links->pads[p], &pad, sizeof(pad)))
return -EFAULT;
}
}
if (links->links) {
struct media_link_desc __user *ulink;
unsigned int l;
for (l = 0, ulink = links->links; l < entity->num_links; l++) {
struct media_link_desc link;
/* Ignore backlinks. */
if (entity->links[l].source->entity != entity)
continue;
memset(&link, 0, sizeof(link));
media_device_kpad_to_upad(entity->links[l].source,
&link.source);
media_device_kpad_to_upad(entity->links[l].sink,
&link.sink);
link.flags = entity->links[l].flags;
if (copy_to_user(ulink, &link, sizeof(*ulink)))
return -EFAULT;
ulink++;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 167,576
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static sent_status_t send_data_to_app(int fd, BT_HDR *p_buf) {
if (p_buf->len == 0)
return SENT_ALL;
ssize_t sent = send(fd, p_buf->data + p_buf->offset, p_buf->len, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (sent == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)
return SENT_NONE;
LOG_ERROR("%s error writing RFCOMM data back to app: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return SENT_FAILED;
}
if (sent == 0)
return SENT_FAILED;
if (sent == p_buf->len)
return SENT_ALL;
p_buf->offset += sent;
p_buf->len -= sent;
return SENT_PARTIAL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
static sent_status_t send_data_to_app(int fd, BT_HDR *p_buf) {
if (p_buf->len == 0)
return SENT_ALL;
ssize_t sent = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(fd, p_buf->data + p_buf->offset, p_buf->len, MSG_DONTWAIT));
if (sent == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)
return SENT_NONE;
LOG_ERROR("%s error writing RFCOMM data back to app: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return SENT_FAILED;
}
if (sent == 0)
return SENT_FAILED;
if (sent == p_buf->len)
return SENT_ALL;
p_buf->offset += sent;
p_buf->len -= sent;
return SENT_PARTIAL;
}
| 173,458
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ssize_t socket_read(const socket_t *socket, void *buf, size_t count) {
assert(socket != NULL);
assert(buf != NULL);
return recv(socket->fd, buf, count, MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
ssize_t socket_read(const socket_t *socket, void *buf, size_t count) {
assert(socket != NULL);
assert(buf != NULL);
return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recv(socket->fd, buf, count, MSG_DONTWAIT));
}
| 173,486
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const char* Chapters::Display::GetString() const
{
return m_string;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const char* Chapters::Display::GetString() const
| 174,359
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cib_timeout_handler(gpointer data)
{
struct timer_rec_s *timer = data;
timer_expired = TRUE;
crm_err("Call %d timed out after %ds", timer->call_id, timer->timeout);
/* Always return TRUE, never remove the handler
* We do that after the while-loop in cib_native_perform_op()
*/
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
cib_timeout_handler(gpointer data)
| 166,154
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: RenderFrameObserverNatives::RenderFrameObserverNatives(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"OnDocumentElementCreated",
base::Bind(&RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Fix re-entrancy and lifetime issue in RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated
BUG=585268,568130
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1684953002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374758}
CWE ID:
|
RenderFrameObserverNatives::RenderFrameObserverNatives(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context), weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction(
"OnDocumentElementCreated",
base::Bind(&RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,147
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void HTMLImportsController::Dispose() {
for (const auto& loader : loaders_)
loader->Dispose();
loaders_.clear();
if (root_) {
root_->Dispose();
root_.Clear();
}
}
Commit Message: Speculative fix for crashes in HTMLImportsController::Dispose().
Copy the loaders_ vector before iterating it.
This CL has no tests because we don't know stable reproduction.
Bug: 843151
Change-Id: I3d5e184657cbce56dcfca0c717d7a0c464e20efe
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245017
Reviewed-by: Keishi Hattori <keishi@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594226}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void HTMLImportsController::Dispose() {
// TODO(tkent): We copy loaders_ before iteration to avoid crashes.
// This copy should be unnecessary. loaders_ is not modified during
// the iteration. Also, null-check for |loader| should be
// unnecessary. crbug.com/843151.
LoaderList list;
list.swap(loaders_);
for (const auto& loader : list) {
if (loader)
loader->Dispose();
}
if (root_) {
root_->Dispose();
root_.Clear();
}
}
| 172,663
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long AudioTrack::Parse(
Segment* pSegment,
const Info& info,
long long element_start,
long long element_size,
AudioTrack*& pResult)
{
if (pResult)
return -1;
if (info.type != Track::kAudio)
return -1;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
double rate = 8000.0; // MKV default
long long channels = 1;
long long bit_depth = 0;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x35) //Sample Rate
{
status = UnserializeFloat(pReader, pos, size, rate);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (rate <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x1F) //Channel Count
{
channels = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (channels <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x2264) //Bit Depth
{
bit_depth = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (bit_depth <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
AudioTrack* const pTrack = new (std::nothrow) AudioTrack(pSegment,
element_start,
element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; //generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status)
{
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pTrack->m_rate = rate;
pTrack->m_channels = channels;
pTrack->m_bitDepth = bit_depth;
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; //success
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long AudioTrack::Parse(
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x2E) // TrackEntry ID
++count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
if (count <= 0)
return 0; // success
m_trackEntries = new (std::nothrow) Track* [count];
if (m_trackEntries == NULL)
return -1;
m_trackEntriesEnd = m_trackEntries;
pos = m_start;
while (pos < stop) {
const long long element_start = pos;
long long id, payload_size;
const long status =
ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, payload_size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (payload_size == 0) // weird
continue;
const long long payload_stop = pos + payload_size;
assert(payload_stop <= stop); // checked in ParseElement
const long long element_size = payload_stop - element_start;
if (id == 0x2E) { // TrackEntry ID
Track*& pTrack = *m_trackEntriesEnd;
pTrack = NULL;
const long status = ParseTrackEntry(pos, payload_size, element_start,
element_size, pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
if (pTrack)
++m_trackEntriesEnd;
}
pos = payload_stop;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0; // success
}
unsigned long Tracks::GetTracksCount() const {
const ptrdiff_t result = m_trackEntriesEnd - m_trackEntries;
assert(result >= 0);
return static_cast<unsigned long>(result);
}
long Tracks::ParseTrackEntry(long long track_start, long long track_size,
long long element_start, long long element_size,
Track*& pResult) const {
if (pResult)
return -1;
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = track_start;
const long long track_stop = track_start + track_size;
Track::Info info;
info.type = 0;
info.number = 0;
info.uid = 0;
info.defaultDuration = 0;
Track::Settings v;
v.start = -1;
v.size = -1;
Track::Settings a;
a.start = -1;
a.size = -1;
Track::Settings e; // content_encodings_settings;
e.start = -1;
e.size = -1;
long long lacing = 1; // default is true
while (pos < track_stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, track_stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long long start = pos;
if (id == 0x60) { // VideoSettings ID
v.start = start;
v.size = size;
} else if (id == 0x61) { // AudioSettings ID
a.start = start;
a.size = size;
} else if (id == 0x2D80) { // ContentEncodings ID
e.start = start;
e.size = size;
} else if (id == 0x33C5) { // Track UID
if (size > 8)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.uid = 0;
long long pos_ = start;
const long long pos_end = start + size;
while (pos_ != pos_end) {
unsigned char b;
const int status = pReader->Read(pos_, 1, &b);
if (status)
return status;
info.uid <<= 8;
info.uid |= b;
++pos_;
}
} else if (id == 0x57) { // Track Number
const long long num = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if ((num <= 0) || (num > 127))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.number = static_cast<long>(num);
} else if (id == 0x03) { // Track Type
const long long type = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if ((type <= 0) || (type > 254))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.type = static_cast<long>(type);
} else if (id == 0x136E) { // Track Name
const long status =
UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, info.nameAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x02B59C) { // Track Language
const long status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, info.language);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x03E383) { // Default Duration
const long long duration = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (duration < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.defaultDuration = static_cast<unsigned long long>(duration);
} else if (id == 0x06) { // CodecID
const long status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, info.codecId);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x1C) { // lacing
lacing = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if ((lacing < 0) || (lacing > 1))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x23A2) { // Codec Private
delete[] info.codecPrivate;
info.codecPrivate = NULL;
info.codecPrivateSize = 0;
const size_t buflen = static_cast<size_t>(size);
if (buflen) {
typedef unsigned char* buf_t;
const buf_t buf = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[buflen];
if (buf == NULL)
return -1;
const int status = pReader->Read(pos, static_cast<long>(buflen), buf);
if (status) {
delete[] buf;
return status;
}
info.codecPrivate = buf;
info.codecPrivateSize = buflen;
}
} else if (id == 0x058688) { // Codec Name
const long status =
UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, info.codecNameAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x16AA) { // Codec Delay
info.codecDelay = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
} else if (id == 0x16BB) { // Seek Pre Roll
info.seekPreRoll = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= track_stop);
}
assert(pos == track_stop);
if (info.number <= 0) // not specified
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (GetTrackByNumber(info.number))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (info.type <= 0) // not specified
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.lacing = (lacing > 0) ? true : false;
if (info.type == Track::kVideo) {
if (v.start < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (a.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.settings = v;
VideoTrack* pTrack = NULL;
const long status = VideoTrack::Parse(m_pSegment, info, element_start,
element_size, pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
pResult = pTrack;
assert(pResult);
if (e.start >= 0)
pResult->ParseContentEncodingsEntry(e.start, e.size);
} else if (info.type == Track::kAudio) {
if (a.start < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (v.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.settings = a;
AudioTrack* pTrack = NULL;
const long status = AudioTrack::Parse(m_pSegment, info, element_start,
element_size, pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
pResult = pTrack;
assert(pResult);
if (e.start >= 0)
pResult->ParseContentEncodingsEntry(e.start, e.size);
} else {
// neither video nor audio - probably metadata or subtitles
if (a.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (v.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (e.start >= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
info.settings.start = -1;
info.settings.size = 0;
Track* pTrack = NULL;
const long status =
Track::Create(m_pSegment, info, element_start, element_size, pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
pResult = pTrack;
assert(pResult);
}
return 0; // success
}
| 174,407
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: tt_sbit_decoder_init( TT_SBitDecoder decoder,
TT_Face face,
FT_ULong strike_index,
TT_SBit_MetricsRec* metrics )
{
FT_Error error;
FT_Stream stream = face->root.stream;
FT_ULong ebdt_size;
error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_CBDT, stream, &ebdt_size );
if ( error )
error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_EBDT, stream, &ebdt_size );
if ( error )
error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_bdat, stream, &ebdt_size );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
decoder->face = face;
decoder->stream = stream;
decoder->bitmap = &face->root.glyph->bitmap;
decoder->metrics = metrics;
decoder->metrics_loaded = 0;
decoder->bitmap_allocated = 0;
decoder->ebdt_start = FT_STREAM_POS();
decoder->ebdt_size = ebdt_size;
decoder->eblc_base = face->sbit_table;
decoder->eblc_limit = face->sbit_table + face->sbit_table_size;
/* now find the strike corresponding to the index */
{
FT_Byte* p;
if ( 8 + 48 * strike_index + 3 * 4 + 34 + 1 > face->sbit_table_size )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
p = decoder->eblc_base + 8 + 48 * strike_index;
decoder->strike_index_array = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
p += 4;
decoder->strike_index_count = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
p += 34;
decoder->bit_depth = *p;
if ( decoder->strike_index_array > face->sbit_table_size ||
decoder->strike_index_array + 8 * decoder->strike_index_count >
face->sbit_table_size )
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
tt_sbit_decoder_init( TT_SBitDecoder decoder,
TT_Face face,
FT_ULong strike_index,
TT_SBit_MetricsRec* metrics )
{
FT_Error error;
FT_Stream stream = face->root.stream;
FT_ULong ebdt_size;
error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_CBDT, stream, &ebdt_size );
if ( error )
error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_EBDT, stream, &ebdt_size );
if ( error )
error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_bdat, stream, &ebdt_size );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
decoder->face = face;
decoder->stream = stream;
decoder->bitmap = &face->root.glyph->bitmap;
decoder->metrics = metrics;
decoder->metrics_loaded = 0;
decoder->bitmap_allocated = 0;
decoder->ebdt_start = FT_STREAM_POS();
decoder->ebdt_size = ebdt_size;
decoder->eblc_base = face->sbit_table;
decoder->eblc_limit = face->sbit_table + face->sbit_table_size;
/* now find the strike corresponding to the index */
{
FT_Byte* p;
if ( 8 + 48 * strike_index + 3 * 4 + 34 + 1 > face->sbit_table_size )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
p = decoder->eblc_base + 8 + 48 * strike_index;
decoder->strike_index_array = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
p += 4;
decoder->strike_index_count = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
p += 34;
decoder->bit_depth = *p;
/* decoder->strike_index_array + */
/* 8 * decoder->strike_index_count > face->sbit_table_size ? */
if ( decoder->strike_index_array > face->sbit_table_size ||
decoder->strike_index_count >
( face->sbit_table_size - decoder->strike_index_array ) / 8 )
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
}
| 164,846
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static opj_bool pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [MJ2] To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-369
|
static opj_bool pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 169,773
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool AXObject::isHiddenForTextAlternativeCalculation() const {
if (equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false"))
return false;
if (getLayoutObject())
return getLayoutObject()->style()->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
Document* document = getDocument();
if (!document || !document->frame())
return false;
if (Node* node = getNode()) {
if (node->isConnected() && node->isElementNode()) {
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> style =
document->ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(toElement(node));
return style->display() == EDisplay::kNone ||
style->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
bool AXObject::isHiddenForTextAlternativeCalculation() const {
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false"))
return false;
if (getLayoutObject())
return getLayoutObject()->style()->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
Document* document = getDocument();
if (!document || !document->frame())
return false;
if (Node* node = getNode()) {
if (node->isConnected() && node->isElementNode()) {
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> style =
document->ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(toElement(node));
return style->display() == EDisplay::kNone ||
style->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
}
}
return false;
}
| 171,926
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool AXObject::isMultiline() const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!node)
return false;
if (isHTMLTextAreaElement(*node))
return true;
if (hasEditableStyle(*node))
return true;
if (!isNativeTextControl() && !isNonNativeTextControl())
return false;
return equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_multilineAttr), "true");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
bool AXObject::isMultiline() const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!node)
return false;
if (isHTMLTextAreaElement(*node))
return true;
if (hasEditableStyle(*node))
return true;
if (!isNativeTextControl() && !isNonNativeTextControl())
return false;
return equalIgnoringASCIICase(getAttribute(aria_multilineAttr), "true");
}
| 171,928
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: get_html_data (MAPI_Attr *a)
{
VarLenData **body = XCALLOC(VarLenData*, a->num_values + 1);
int j;
for (j = 0; j < a->num_values; j++)
{
body[j] = XMALLOC(VarLenData, 1);
body[j]->len = a->values[j].len;
body[j]->data = CHECKED_XCALLOC(unsigned char, a->values[j].len);
memmove (body[j]->data, a->values[j].data.buf, body[j]->len);
}
return body;
}
Commit Message: Check types to avoid invalid reads/writes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
get_html_data (MAPI_Attr *a)
{
VarLenData **body = XCALLOC(VarLenData*, a->num_values + 1);
int j;
for (j = 0; j < a->num_values; j++)
{
if (a->type == szMAPI_BINARY) {
body[j] = XMALLOC(VarLenData, 1);
body[j]->len = a->values[j].len;
body[j]->data = CHECKED_XCALLOC(unsigned char, a->values[j].len);
memmove (body[j]->data, a->values[j].data.buf, body[j]->len);
}
}
return body;
}
| 168,352
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ProfilingService::DumpProcessesForTracing(
bool keep_small_allocations,
bool strip_path_from_mapped_files,
DumpProcessesForTracingCallback callback) {
memory_instrumentation::MemoryInstrumentation::GetInstance()
->GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(base::Bind(
&ProfilingService::OnGetVmRegionsCompleteForDumpProcessesForTracing,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), keep_small_allocations,
strip_path_from_mapped_files, base::Passed(&callback)));
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
|
void ProfilingService::DumpProcessesForTracing(
bool keep_small_allocations,
bool strip_path_from_mapped_files,
DumpProcessesForTracingCallback callback) {
if (!helper_) {
context()->connector()->BindInterface(
resource_coordinator::mojom::kServiceName, &helper_);
}
helper_->GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(base::Bind(
&ProfilingService::OnGetVmRegionsCompleteForDumpProcessesForTracing,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), keep_small_allocations,
strip_path_from_mapped_files, base::Passed(&callback)));
}
| 172,913
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
int err;
struct sock_diag_req *req = nlmsg_data(nlh);
const struct sock_diag_handler *hndl;
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT;
else
err = hndl->dump(skb, nlh);
sock_diag_unlock_handler(hndl);
return err;
}
Commit Message: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
int err;
struct sock_diag_req *req = nlmsg_data(nlh);
const struct sock_diag_handler *hndl;
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;
if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT;
else
err = hndl->dump(skb, nlh);
sock_diag_unlock_handler(hndl);
return err;
}
| 166,128
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ImageFetched(const ContentSuggestion::ID& id,
const GURL& url,
const base::string16& title,
const base::string16& text,
base::Time timeout_at,
const gfx::Image& image) {
if (!ShouldNotifyInState(app_status_listener_.GetState())) {
return; // Became foreground while we were fetching the image; forget it.
}
DVLOG(1) << "Fetched " << image.Size().width() << "x"
<< image.Size().height() << " image for " << url.spec();
if (ContentSuggestionsNotificationHelper::SendNotification(
id, url, title, text, CropSquare(image), timeout_at)) {
RecordContentSuggestionsNotificationImpression(
id.category().IsKnownCategory(KnownCategories::ARTICLES)
? CONTENT_SUGGESTIONS_ARTICLE
: CONTENT_SUGGESTIONS_NONARTICLE);
}
}
Commit Message: NTP: cap number of notifications/day
1 by default; Finch-configurable.
BUG=689465
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2691023002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450389}
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void ImageFetched(const ContentSuggestion::ID& id,
const GURL& url,
const base::string16& title,
const base::string16& text,
base::Time timeout_at,
const gfx::Image& image) {
if (!ShouldNotifyInState(app_status_listener_.GetState())) {
return; // Became foreground while we were fetching the image; forget it.
}
DVLOG(1) << "Fetched " << image.Size().width() << "x"
<< image.Size().height() << " image for " << url.spec();
ConsumeQuota(profile_->GetPrefs());
if (ContentSuggestionsNotificationHelper::SendNotification(
id, url, title, text, CropSquare(image), timeout_at)) {
RecordContentSuggestionsNotificationImpression(
id.category().IsKnownCategory(KnownCategories::ARTICLES)
? CONTENT_SUGGESTIONS_ARTICLE
: CONTENT_SUGGESTIONS_NONARTICLE);
}
}
| 172,037
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int mp_unpack_full(lua_State *L, int limit, int offset) {
size_t len;
const char *s;
mp_cur c;
int cnt; /* Number of objects unpacked */
int decode_all = (!limit && !offset);
s = luaL_checklstring(L,1,&len); /* if no match, exits */
if (offset < 0 || limit < 0) /* requesting negative off or lim is invalid */
return luaL_error(L,
"Invalid request to unpack with offset of %d and limit of %d.",
offset, len);
else if (offset > len)
return luaL_error(L,
"Start offset %d greater than input length %d.", offset, len);
if (decode_all) limit = INT_MAX;
mp_cur_init(&c,(const unsigned char *)s+offset,len-offset);
/* We loop over the decode because this could be a stream
* of multiple top-level values serialized together */
for(cnt = 0; c.left > 0 && cnt < limit; cnt++) {
mp_decode_to_lua_type(L,&c);
if (c.err == MP_CUR_ERROR_EOF) {
return luaL_error(L,"Missing bytes in input.");
} else if (c.err == MP_CUR_ERROR_BADFMT) {
return luaL_error(L,"Bad data format in input.");
}
}
if (!decode_all) {
/* c->left is the remaining size of the input buffer.
* subtract the entire buffer size from the unprocessed size
* to get our next start offset */
int offset = len - c.left;
/* Return offset -1 when we have have processed the entire buffer. */
lua_pushinteger(L, c.left == 0 ? -1 : offset);
/* Results are returned with the arg elements still
* in place. Lua takes care of only returning
* elements above the args for us.
* In this case, we have one arg on the stack
* for this function, so we insert our first return
* value at position 2. */
lua_insert(L, 2);
cnt += 1; /* increase return count by one to make room for offset */
}
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
int mp_unpack_full(lua_State *L, int limit, int offset) {
size_t len;
const char *s;
mp_cur c;
int cnt; /* Number of objects unpacked */
int decode_all = (!limit && !offset);
s = luaL_checklstring(L,1,&len); /* if no match, exits */
if (offset < 0 || limit < 0) /* requesting negative off or lim is invalid */
return luaL_error(L,
"Invalid request to unpack with offset of %d and limit of %d.",
offset, len);
else if (offset > len)
return luaL_error(L,
"Start offset %d greater than input length %d.", offset, len);
if (decode_all) limit = INT_MAX;
mp_cur_init(&c,(const unsigned char *)s+offset,len-offset);
/* We loop over the decode because this could be a stream
* of multiple top-level values serialized together */
for(cnt = 0; c.left > 0 && cnt < limit; cnt++) {
mp_decode_to_lua_type(L,&c);
if (c.err == MP_CUR_ERROR_EOF) {
return luaL_error(L,"Missing bytes in input.");
} else if (c.err == MP_CUR_ERROR_BADFMT) {
return luaL_error(L,"Bad data format in input.");
}
}
if (!decode_all) {
/* c->left is the remaining size of the input buffer.
* subtract the entire buffer size from the unprocessed size
* to get our next start offset */
int offset = len - c.left;
luaL_checkstack(L, 1, "in function mp_unpack_full");
/* Return offset -1 when we have have processed the entire buffer. */
lua_pushinteger(L, c.left == 0 ? -1 : offset);
/* Results are returned with the arg elements still
* in place. Lua takes care of only returning
* elements above the args for us.
* In this case, we have one arg on the stack
* for this function, so we insert our first return
* value at position 2. */
lua_insert(L, 2);
cnt += 1; /* increase return count by one to make room for offset */
}
return cnt;
}
| 169,242
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: XcursorImageCreate (int width, int height)
{
XcursorImage *image;
image = malloc (sizeof (XcursorImage) +
width * height * sizeof (XcursorPixel));
if (!image)
image->height = height;
image->delay = 0;
return image;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
XcursorImageCreate (int width, int height)
{
XcursorImage *image;
if (width < 0 || height < 0)
return NULL;
if (width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE || height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE)
return NULL;
image = malloc (sizeof (XcursorImage) +
width * height * sizeof (XcursorPixel));
if (!image)
image->height = height;
image->delay = 0;
return image;
}
| 164,626
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long Chapters::Parse()
{
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start; // payload start
const long long stop = pos + m_size; // payload stop
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05B9) // EditionEntry ID
{
status = ParseEdition(pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long Chapters::Parse()
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
| 174,400
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: is_link_trusted (NautilusFile *file,
gboolean is_launcher)
{
GFile *location;
gboolean res;
if (!is_launcher)
{
return TRUE;
}
if (nautilus_file_can_execute (file))
{
return TRUE;
}
res = FALSE;
if (nautilus_file_is_local (file))
{
location = nautilus_file_get_location (file);
res = nautilus_is_in_system_dir (location);
g_object_unref (location);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
is_link_trusted (NautilusFile *file,
gboolean is_launcher)
{
GFile *location;
gboolean res;
g_autofree gchar* trusted = NULL;
if (!is_launcher)
{
return TRUE;
}
trusted = nautilus_file_get_metadata (file,
NAUTILUS_METADATA_KEY_DESKTOP_FILE_TRUSTED,
NULL);
if (nautilus_file_can_execute (file) && trusted != NULL)
{
return TRUE;
}
res = FALSE;
if (nautilus_file_is_local (file))
{
location = nautilus_file_get_location (file);
res = nautilus_is_in_system_dir (location);
g_object_unref (location);
}
return res;
}
| 167,746
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: GpuChannelHost* BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishGpuChannelSync(
CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
if (gpu_channel_.get()) {
if (gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kLost)
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
else
return gpu_channel_.get();
}
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance();
EstablishRequest request;
GetIOLoopProxy()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishGpuChannelOnIO,
base::Unretained(this),
&request,
cause_for_gpu_launch));
request.event.Wait();
if (request.channel_handle.name.empty() ||
request.gpu_process_handle == base::kNullProcessHandle)
return NULL;
base::ProcessHandle browser_process_for_gpu;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
DuplicateHandle(base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(),
base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(),
request.gpu_process_handle,
&browser_process_for_gpu,
PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE,
FALSE,
0);
#else
browser_process_for_gpu = base::GetCurrentProcessHandle();
#endif
gpu_channel_ = new GpuChannelHost(this, gpu_host_id_, gpu_client_id_);
gpu_channel_->set_gpu_info(request.gpu_info);
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(request.gpu_info);
gpu_channel_->Connect(request.channel_handle, browser_process_for_gpu);
return gpu_channel_.get();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
GpuChannelHost* BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishGpuChannelSync(
CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
if (gpu_channel_.get()) {
if (gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kLost)
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
else
return gpu_channel_.get();
}
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance();
EstablishRequest request;
GetIOLoopProxy()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishGpuChannelOnIO,
base::Unretained(this),
&request,
cause_for_gpu_launch));
request.event.Wait();
if (request.channel_handle.name.empty())
return NULL;
gpu_channel_ = new GpuChannelHost(this, gpu_host_id_, gpu_client_id_);
gpu_channel_->set_gpu_info(request.gpu_info);
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(request.gpu_info);
gpu_channel_->Connect(request.channel_handle);
return gpu_channel_.get();
}
| 170,917
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool HeapAllocator::backingExpand(void* address, size_t newSize) {
if (!address)
return false;
ThreadState* state = ThreadState::current();
if (state->sweepForbidden())
return false;
ASSERT(!state->isInGC());
ASSERT(state->isAllocationAllowed());
DCHECK_EQ(&state->heap(), &ThreadState::fromObject(address)->heap());
BasePage* page = pageFromObject(address);
if (page->isLargeObjectPage() || page->arena()->getThreadState() != state)
return false;
HeapObjectHeader* header = HeapObjectHeader::fromPayload(address);
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
NormalPageArena* arena = static_cast<NormalPage*>(page)->arenaForNormalPage();
bool succeed = arena->expandObject(header, newSize);
if (succeed)
state->allocationPointAdjusted(arena->arenaIndex());
return succeed;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool HeapAllocator::backingExpand(void* address, size_t newSize) {
if (!address)
return false;
ThreadState* state = ThreadState::current();
if (state->sweepForbidden())
return false;
ASSERT(!state->isInGC());
ASSERT(state->isAllocationAllowed());
DCHECK_EQ(&state->heap(), &ThreadState::fromObject(address)->heap());
BasePage* page = pageFromObject(address);
if (page->isLargeObjectPage() || page->arena()->getThreadState() != state)
return false;
HeapObjectHeader* header = HeapObjectHeader::fromPayload(address);
header->checkHeader();
NormalPageArena* arena = static_cast<NormalPage*>(page)->arenaForNormalPage();
bool succeed = arena->expandObject(header, newSize);
if (succeed)
state->allocationPointAdjusted(arena->arenaIndex());
return succeed;
}
| 172,705
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void Rp_test(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
int opts;
Resub m;
re = js_toregexp(J, 0);
text = js_tostring(J, 1);
opts = 0;
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G) {
if (re->last > strlen(text)) {
re->last = 0;
js_pushboolean(J, 0);
return;
}
if (re->last > 0) {
text += re->last;
opts |= REG_NOTBOL;
}
}
if (!js_regexec(re->prog, text, &m, opts)) {
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)
re->last = re->last + (m.sub[0].ep - text);
js_pushboolean(J, 1);
return;
}
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)
re->last = 0;
js_pushboolean(J, 0);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400
|
static void Rp_test(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
int result;
int opts;
Resub m;
re = js_toregexp(J, 0);
text = js_tostring(J, 1);
opts = 0;
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G) {
if (re->last > strlen(text)) {
re->last = 0;
js_pushboolean(J, 0);
return;
}
if (re->last > 0) {
text += re->last;
opts |= REG_NOTBOL;
}
}
result = js_regexec(re->prog, text, &m, opts);
if (result < 0)
js_error(J, "regexec failed");
if (result == 0) {
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)
re->last = re->last + (m.sub[0].ep - text);
js_pushboolean(J, 1);
return;
}
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)
re->last = 0;
js_pushboolean(J, 0);
}
| 169,696
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_pic_hdr(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
/* Flush temporal reference */
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,10);
/* Picture type */
ps_dec->e_pic_type = (e_pic_type_t)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,3);
if((ps_dec->e_pic_type < I_PIC) || (ps_dec->e_pic_type > D_PIC))
{
impeg2d_next_code(ps_dec, PICTURE_START_CODE);
return IMPEG2D_INVALID_PIC_TYPE;
}
/* Flush vbv_delay */
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,16);
if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == P_PIC || ps_dec->e_pic_type == B_PIC)
{
ps_dec->u2_full_pel_forw_vector = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_forw_f_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,3);
}
if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == B_PIC)
{
ps_dec->u2_full_pel_back_vector = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_back_f_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,3);
}
if(ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 == 0)
{
ps_dec->au2_f_code[0][0] = ps_dec->au2_f_code[0][1] = ps_dec->u2_forw_f_code;
ps_dec->au2_f_code[1][0] = ps_dec->au2_f_code[1][1] = ps_dec->u2_back_f_code;
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the extra bit value */
/* */
/* while(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt() == '1') */
/* { */
/* extra_bit_picture 1 */
/* extra_information_picture 8 */
/* } */
/* extra_bit_picture 1 */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,9);
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_pic_hdr(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
/* Flush temporal reference */
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,10);
/* Picture type */
ps_dec->e_pic_type = (e_pic_type_t)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,3);
if((ps_dec->e_pic_type < I_PIC) || (ps_dec->e_pic_type > D_PIC))
{
impeg2d_next_code(ps_dec, PICTURE_START_CODE);
return IMPEG2D_INVALID_PIC_TYPE;
}
/* Flush vbv_delay */
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,16);
if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == P_PIC || ps_dec->e_pic_type == B_PIC)
{
ps_dec->u2_full_pel_forw_vector = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_forw_f_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,3);
}
if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == B_PIC)
{
ps_dec->u2_full_pel_back_vector = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_back_f_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,3);
}
if(ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 == 0)
{
ps_dec->au2_f_code[0][0] = ps_dec->au2_f_code[0][1] = ps_dec->u2_forw_f_code;
ps_dec->au2_f_code[1][0] = ps_dec->au2_f_code[1][1] = ps_dec->u2_back_f_code;
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the extra bit value */
/* */
/* while(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt() == '1') */
/* { */
/* extra_bit_picture 1 */
/* extra_information_picture 8 */
/* } */
/* extra_bit_picture 1 */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1 &&
ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,9);
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
| 173,945
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnPrintPreviewRequest(int request_id) {
g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Set(preview_ui_addr_str_, request_id);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void PrintPreviewUI::OnPrintPreviewRequest(int request_id) {
g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Set(id_, request_id);
}
| 170,839
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::Core(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> caller_task_runner,
scoped_ptr<WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate> launcher_delegate,
WorkerProcessIpcDelegate* worker_delegate)
: caller_task_runner_(caller_task_runner),
launcher_delegate_(launcher_delegate.Pass()),
worker_delegate_(worker_delegate),
ipc_enabled_(false),
launch_backoff_(&kDefaultBackoffPolicy),
stopping_(false) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
ipc_error_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_success_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::Core(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> caller_task_runner,
scoped_ptr<WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate> launcher_delegate,
WorkerProcessIpcDelegate* worker_delegate)
: caller_task_runner_(caller_task_runner),
launcher_delegate_(launcher_delegate.Pass()),
worker_delegate_(worker_delegate),
get_named_pipe_client_pid_(NULL),
ipc_enabled_(false),
launch_backoff_(&kDefaultBackoffPolicy),
stopping_(false) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
ipc_error_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_success_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
launch_timer_.reset(new base::OneShotTimer<Core>());
}
| 171,547
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: begin_softmask(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, softmask_save *save)
{
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
pdf_xobject *softmask = gstate->softmask;
fz_rect mask_bbox;
fz_matrix tos_save[2], save_ctm;
fz_matrix mask_matrix;
fz_colorspace *mask_colorspace;
save->softmask = softmask;
if (softmask == NULL)
return gstate;
save->page_resources = gstate->softmask_resources;
save->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
save_ctm = gstate->ctm;
pdf_xobject_bbox(ctx, softmask, &mask_bbox);
pdf_xobject_matrix(ctx, softmask, &mask_matrix);
pdf_tos_save(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
if (gstate->luminosity)
mask_bbox = fz_infinite_rect;
else
{
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &mask_matrix);
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &gstate->softmask_ctm);
}
gstate->softmask = NULL;
gstate->softmask_resources = NULL;
gstate->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
mask_colorspace = pdf_xobject_colorspace(ctx, softmask);
if (gstate->luminosity && !mask_colorspace)
mask_colorspace = fz_device_gray(ctx);
fz_try(ctx)
{
fz_begin_mask(ctx, pr->dev, &mask_bbox, gstate->luminosity, mask_colorspace, gstate->softmask_bc, &gstate->fill.color_params);
pdf_run_xobject(ctx, pr, softmask, save->page_resources, &fz_identity, 1);
}
fz_always(ctx)
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, mask_colorspace);
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
/* FIXME: Ignore error - nasty, but if we throw from
* here the clip stack would be messed up. */
/* TODO: pass cookie here to increase the cookie error count */
}
fz_end_mask(ctx, pr->dev);
pdf_tos_restore(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
gstate->ctm = save_ctm;
return gstate;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
begin_softmask(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, softmask_save *save)
{
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
pdf_xobject *softmask = gstate->softmask;
fz_rect mask_bbox;
fz_matrix tos_save[2], save_ctm;
fz_matrix mask_matrix;
fz_colorspace *mask_colorspace;
save->softmask = softmask;
if (softmask == NULL)
return gstate;
save->page_resources = gstate->softmask_resources;
save->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
save_ctm = gstate->ctm;
pdf_xobject_bbox(ctx, softmask, &mask_bbox);
pdf_xobject_matrix(ctx, softmask, &mask_matrix);
pdf_tos_save(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
if (gstate->luminosity)
mask_bbox = fz_infinite_rect;
else
{
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &mask_matrix);
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &gstate->softmask_ctm);
}
gstate->softmask = NULL;
gstate->softmask_resources = NULL;
gstate->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
mask_colorspace = pdf_xobject_colorspace(ctx, softmask);
if (gstate->luminosity && !mask_colorspace)
mask_colorspace = fz_keep_colorspace(ctx, fz_device_gray(ctx));
fz_try(ctx)
{
fz_begin_mask(ctx, pr->dev, &mask_bbox, gstate->luminosity, mask_colorspace, gstate->softmask_bc, &gstate->fill.color_params);
pdf_run_xobject(ctx, pr, softmask, save->page_resources, &fz_identity, 1);
}
fz_always(ctx)
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, mask_colorspace);
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
/* FIXME: Ignore error - nasty, but if we throw from
* here the clip stack would be messed up. */
/* TODO: pass cookie here to increase the cookie error count */
}
fz_end_mask(ctx, pr->dev);
pdf_tos_restore(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
gstate->ctm = save_ctm;
return gstate;
}
| 164,578
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int gup_huge_pmd(pmd_t orig, pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
struct page *head, *page;
int refs;
if (!pmd_access_permitted(orig, write))
return 0;
if (pmd_devmap(orig))
return __gup_device_huge_pmd(orig, pmdp, addr, end, pages, nr);
refs = 0;
page = pmd_page(orig) + ((addr & ~PMD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
do {
pages[*nr] = page;
(*nr)++;
page++;
refs++;
} while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
head = compound_head(pmd_page(orig));
if (!page_cache_add_speculative(head, refs)) {
*nr -= refs;
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(pmd_val(orig) != pmd_val(*pmdp))) {
*nr -= refs;
while (refs--)
put_page(head);
return 0;
}
SetPageReferenced(head);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
static int gup_huge_pmd(pmd_t orig, pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
struct page *head, *page;
int refs;
if (!pmd_access_permitted(orig, write))
return 0;
if (pmd_devmap(orig))
return __gup_device_huge_pmd(orig, pmdp, addr, end, pages, nr);
refs = 0;
page = pmd_page(orig) + ((addr & ~PMD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
do {
pages[*nr] = page;
(*nr)++;
page++;
refs++;
} while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
head = try_get_compound_head(pmd_page(orig), refs);
if (!head) {
*nr -= refs;
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(pmd_val(orig) != pmd_val(*pmdp))) {
*nr -= refs;
while (refs--)
put_page(head);
return 0;
}
SetPageReferenced(head);
return 1;
}
| 170,226
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int uio_mmap_physical(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct uio_device *idev = vma->vm_private_data;
int mi = uio_find_mem_index(vma);
if (mi < 0)
return -EINVAL;
vma->vm_ops = &uio_physical_vm_ops;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
return remap_pfn_range(vma,
vma->vm_start,
idev->info->mem[mi].addr >> PAGE_SHIFT,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start,
vma->vm_page_prot);
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int uio_mmap_physical(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct uio_device *idev = vma->vm_private_data;
int mi = uio_find_mem_index(vma);
struct uio_mem *mem;
if (mi < 0)
return -EINVAL;
mem = idev->info->mem + mi;
if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start > mem->size)
return -EINVAL;
vma->vm_ops = &uio_physical_vm_ops;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
/*
* We cannot use the vm_iomap_memory() helper here,
* because vma->vm_pgoff is the map index we looked
* up above in uio_find_mem_index(), rather than an
* actual page offset into the mmap.
*
* So we just do the physical mmap without a page
* offset.
*/
return remap_pfn_range(vma,
vma->vm_start,
mem->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start,
vma->vm_page_prot);
}
| 165,934
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const Tracks* Segment::GetTracks() const
{
return m_pTracks;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
const Tracks* Segment::GetTracks() const
const SegmentInfo* Segment::GetInfo() const { return m_pInfo; }
const Cues* Segment::GetCues() const { return m_pCues; }
const Chapters* Segment::GetChapters() const { return m_pChapters; }
const SeekHead* Segment::GetSeekHead() const { return m_pSeekHead; }
long long Segment::GetDuration() const {
assert(m_pInfo);
return m_pInfo->GetDuration();
}
| 174,373
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ResourceHostMsg_Request CreateXHRRequestWithOrigin(const char* origin) {
ResourceHostMsg_Request request;
request.method = "GET";
request.url = GURL("http://bar.com/simple_page.html");
request.first_party_for_cookies = GURL(origin);
request.referrer_policy = blink::WebReferrerPolicyDefault;
request.headers = base::StringPrintf("Origin: %s\r\n", origin);
request.load_flags = 0;
request.origin_pid = 0;
request.resource_type = RESOURCE_TYPE_XHR;
request.request_context = 0;
request.appcache_host_id = kAppCacheNoHostId;
request.download_to_file = false;
request.should_reset_appcache = false;
request.is_main_frame = true;
request.parent_is_main_frame = false;
request.parent_render_frame_id = -1;
request.transition_type = ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK;
request.allow_download = true;
return request;
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
ResourceHostMsg_Request CreateXHRRequestWithOrigin(const char* origin) {
ResourceHostMsg_Request CreateXHRRequest(const char* url) {
ResourceHostMsg_Request request;
request.method = "GET";
request.url = GURL(url);
request.referrer_policy = blink::WebReferrerPolicyDefault;
request.load_flags = 0;
request.origin_pid = 0;
request.resource_type = RESOURCE_TYPE_XHR;
request.request_context = 0;
request.appcache_host_id = kAppCacheNoHostId;
request.download_to_file = false;
request.should_reset_appcache = false;
request.is_main_frame = true;
request.parent_is_main_frame = false;
request.parent_render_frame_id = -1;
request.transition_type = ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK;
request.allow_download = true;
return request;
}
| 172,272
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *defParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
if (defParams->nPortIndex >= mPorts.size()) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (defParams->nSize != sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE)) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
PortInfo *port =
&mPorts.editItemAt(defParams->nPortIndex);
if (defParams->nBufferSize > port->mDef.nBufferSize) {
port->mDef.nBufferSize = defParams->nBufferSize;
}
if (defParams->nBufferCountActual < port->mDef.nBufferCountMin) {
ALOGW("component requires at least %u buffers (%u requested)",
port->mDef.nBufferCountMin, defParams->nBufferCountActual);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
port->mDef.nBufferCountActual = defParams->nBufferCountActual;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *defParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(defParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (defParams->nPortIndex >= mPorts.size()) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (defParams->nSize != sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE)) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
PortInfo *port =
&mPorts.editItemAt(defParams->nPortIndex);
if (defParams->nBufferSize > port->mDef.nBufferSize) {
port->mDef.nBufferSize = defParams->nBufferSize;
}
if (defParams->nBufferCountActual < port->mDef.nBufferCountMin) {
ALOGW("component requires at least %u buffers (%u requested)",
port->mDef.nBufferCountMin, defParams->nBufferCountActual);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
port->mDef.nBufferCountActual = defParams->nBufferCountActual;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
| 174,223
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(const KURL& url)
{
if (BlobURL::getOrigin(url) == "null")
originMap()->remove(url.string());
if (isMainThread())
blobRegistry().unregisterBlobURL(url);
else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url));
callOnMainThread(&unregisterBlobURLTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
|
void ThreadableBlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(const KURL& url)
void BlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(const KURL& url)
{
if (BlobURL::getOrigin(url) == "null")
originMap()->remove(url.string());
if (isMainThread()) {
if (WebBlobRegistry* registry = blobRegistry())
registry->unregisterBlobURL(url);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url));
callOnMainThread(&unregisterBlobURLTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
| 170,690
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnWriteObjectsAsync(
const ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap& objects) {
scoped_ptr<ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap> sanitized_objects(
new ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap(objects));
sanitized_objects->erase(ui::Clipboard::CBF_SMBITMAP);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&WriteObjectsOnUIThread, base::Owned(sanitized_objects.release())));
#else
GetClipboard()->WriteObjects(
ui::CLIPBOARD_TYPE_COPY_PASTE, *sanitized_objects.get());
#endif
}
Commit Message: Refactor ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap sanitization in ClipboardMsgFilter.
BUG=352395
R=tony@chromium.org
TBR=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/200523004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@257164 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnWriteObjectsAsync(
const ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap& objects) {
scoped_ptr<ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap> sanitized_objects(
new ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap(objects));
SanitizeObjectMap(sanitized_objects.get(), kFilterBitmap);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&WriteObjectsOnUIThread, base::Owned(sanitized_objects.release())));
#else
GetClipboard()->WriteObjects(
ui::CLIPBOARD_TYPE_COPY_PASTE, *sanitized_objects.get());
#endif
}
| 171,691
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool asn1_read_BOOLEAN(struct asn1_data *data, bool *v)
{
uint8_t tmp = 0;
asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_BOOLEAN);
asn1_read_uint8(data, &tmp);
if (tmp == 0xFF) {
*v = true;
} else {
*v = false;
}
asn1_end_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool asn1_read_BOOLEAN(struct asn1_data *data, bool *v)
{
uint8_t tmp = 0;
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_BOOLEAN)) return false;
*v = false;
if (!asn1_read_uint8(data, &tmp)) return false;
if (tmp == 0xFF) {
*v = true;
}
return asn1_end_tag(data);
}
| 164,583
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ContextualSearchParams()
: version(-1),
start(base::string16::npos),
end(base::string16::npos),
now_on_tap_version(0) {}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
|
ContextualSearchParams()
: version(-1),
start(base::string16::npos),
end(base::string16::npos),
| 171,645
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: rx_cache_insert(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const struct ip *ip, int dport)
{
struct rx_cache_entry *rxent;
const struct rx_header *rxh = (const struct rx_header *) bp;
if (ndo->ndo_snapend - bp + 1 <= (int)(sizeof(struct rx_header) + sizeof(int32_t)))
return;
rxent = &rx_cache[rx_cache_next];
if (++rx_cache_next >= RX_CACHE_SIZE)
rx_cache_next = 0;
rxent->callnum = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rxh->callNumber);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&rxent->client, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(uint32_t));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&rxent->server, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(uint32_t));
rxent->dport = dport;
rxent->serviceId = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rxh->serviceId);
rxent->opcode = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp + sizeof(struct rx_header));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14466/Rx: fix an over-read bug
In rx_cache_insert() and rx_cache_find() properly read the serviceId
field of the rx_header structure as a 16-bit integer. When those
functions tried to read 32 bits the extra 16 bits could be outside of
the bounds checked in rx_print() for the rx_header structure, as
serviceId is the last field in that structure.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
rx_cache_insert(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const struct ip *ip, int dport)
{
struct rx_cache_entry *rxent;
const struct rx_header *rxh = (const struct rx_header *) bp;
if (ndo->ndo_snapend - bp + 1 <= (int)(sizeof(struct rx_header) + sizeof(int32_t)))
return;
rxent = &rx_cache[rx_cache_next];
if (++rx_cache_next >= RX_CACHE_SIZE)
rx_cache_next = 0;
rxent->callnum = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rxh->callNumber);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&rxent->client, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(uint32_t));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&rxent->server, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(uint32_t));
rxent->dport = dport;
rxent->serviceId = EXTRACT_16BITS(&rxh->serviceId);
rxent->opcode = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp + sizeof(struct rx_header));
}
| 169,846
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: read_png(FILE *fp)
{
png_structp png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,0,0,0);
png_infop info_ptr = NULL;
png_bytep row = NULL, display = NULL;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return 0;
if (setjmp(png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
{
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
if (row != NULL) free(row);
if (display != NULL) free(display);
return 0;
}
png_init_io(png_ptr, fp);
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (info_ptr == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating info structure");
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_ptr, PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_ALWAYS, NULL, 0);
png_read_info(png_ptr, info_ptr);
{
png_size_t rowbytes = png_get_rowbytes(png_ptr, info_ptr);
row = malloc(rowbytes);
display = malloc(rowbytes);
if (row == NULL || display == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating row buffers");
{
png_uint_32 height = png_get_image_height(png_ptr, info_ptr);
int passes = png_set_interlace_handling(png_ptr);
int pass;
png_start_read_image(png_ptr);
for (pass = 0; pass < passes; ++pass)
{
png_uint_32 y = height;
/* NOTE: this trashes the row each time; interlace handling won't
* work, but this avoids memory thrashing for speed testing.
*/
while (y-- > 0)
png_read_row(png_ptr, row, display);
}
}
}
/* Make sure to read to the end of the file: */
png_read_end(png_ptr, info_ptr);
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
free(row);
free(display);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
read_png(FILE *fp)
{
png_structp png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,0,0,0);
png_infop info_ptr = NULL;
png_bytep row = NULL, display = NULL;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return 0;
if (setjmp(png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
{
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
if (row != NULL) free(row);
if (display != NULL) free(display);
return 0;
}
png_init_io(png_ptr, fp);
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (info_ptr == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating info structure");
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_ptr, PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_ALWAYS, NULL, 0);
png_read_info(png_ptr, info_ptr);
{
png_size_t rowbytes = png_get_rowbytes(png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* Failure to initialize these is harmless */
row = malloc(rowbytes);
display = malloc(rowbytes);
if (row == NULL || display == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating row buffers");
{
png_uint_32 height = png_get_image_height(png_ptr, info_ptr);
# ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
int passes = png_set_interlace_handling(png_ptr);
# else /* !READ_INTERLACING */
int passes = png_get_interlace_type(png_ptr, info_ptr) ==
PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7 ? PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7_PASSES : 1;
# endif /* !READ_INTERLACING */
int pass;
png_start_read_image(png_ptr);
for (pass = 0; pass < passes; ++pass)
{
png_uint_32 y = height;
# ifndef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
if (passes == PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7_PASSES)
y = PNG_PASS_ROWS(y, pass);
# endif /* READ_INTERLACING */
/* NOTE: this trashes the row each time; interlace handling won't
* work, but this avoids memory thrashing for speed testing.
*/
while (y-- > 0)
png_read_row(png_ptr, row, display);
}
}
}
/* Make sure to read to the end of the file: */
png_read_end(png_ptr, info_ptr);
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
free(row);
free(display);
return 1;
}
| 173,719
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: checked_xmalloc (size_t size)
{
alloc_limit_assert ("checked_xmalloc", size);
return xmalloc (size);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows and harden memory allocator.
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
checked_xmalloc (size_t size)
checked_xmalloc (size_t num, size_t size)
{
size_t res;
if (check_mul_overflow(num, size, &res))
abort();
alloc_limit_assert ("checked_xmalloc", res);
return xmalloc (num, size);
}
| 168,357
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void close_all_sockets(atransport* t) {
asocket* s;
/* this is a little gross, but since s->close() *will* modify
** the list out from under you, your options are limited.
*/
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
restart:
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->transport == t || (s->peer && s->peer->transport == t)) {
local_socket_close(s);
goto restart;
}
}
}
Commit Message: adb: use asocket's close function when closing.
close_all_sockets was assuming that all registered local sockets used
local_socket_close as their close function. However, this is not true
for JDWP sockets.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I40a1174845cd33f15f30ce70828a7081cd5a087e
(cherry picked from commit 53eb31d87cb84a4212f4850bf745646e1fb12814)
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void close_all_sockets(atransport* t) {
asocket* s;
/* this is a little gross, but since s->close() *will* modify
** the list out from under you, your options are limited.
*/
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
restart:
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->transport == t || (s->peer && s->peer->transport == t)) {
s->close(s);
goto restart;
}
}
}
| 173,405
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ContextualSearchFieldTrial::IsNowOnTapBarIntegrationEnabled() {
return GetBooleanParam(
switches::kEnableContextualSearchNowOnTapBarIntegration,
&is_now_on_tap_bar_integration_enabled_cached_,
&is_now_on_tap_bar_integration_enabled_);
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
|
bool ContextualSearchFieldTrial::IsNowOnTapBarIntegrationEnabled() {
bool ContextualSearchFieldTrial::IsContextualCardsBarIntegrationEnabled() {
return GetBooleanParam(
switches::kEnableContextualSearchContextualCardsBarIntegration,
&is_contextual_cards_bar_integration_enabled_cached_,
&is_contextual_cards_bar_integration_enabled_);
}
| 171,644
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PromoResourceService::PromoResourceStateChange() {
web_resource_update_scheduled_ = false;
content::NotificationService* service =
content::NotificationService::current();
service->Notify(chrome::NOTIFICATION_PROMO_RESOURCE_STATE_CHANGED,
content::Source<WebResourceService>(this),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
Commit Message: Refresh promo notifications as they're fetched
The "guard" existed for notification scheduling was preventing
"turn-off a promo" and "update a promo" scenarios.
Yet I do not believe it was adding any actual safety: if things
on a server backend go wrong, the clients will be affected one
way or the other, and it is better to have an option to shut
the malformed promo down "as quickly as possible" (~in 12-24 hours).
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10696204
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void PromoResourceService::PromoResourceStateChange() {
content::NotificationService* service =
content::NotificationService::current();
service->Notify(chrome::NOTIFICATION_PROMO_RESOURCE_STATE_CHANGED,
content::Source<WebResourceService>(this),
content::NotificationService::NoDetails());
}
| 170,783
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::Connect(
BluetoothDevice::PairingDelegate* pairing_delegate,
const base::Closure& callback,
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback) {
if (num_connecting_calls_++ == 0)
adapter_->NotifyDeviceChanged(this);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Connecting, " << num_connecting_calls_
<< " in progress";
if (IsPaired() || !pairing_delegate || !IsPairable()) {
ConnectInternal(false, callback, error_callback);
} else {
DCHECK(!pairing_delegate_);
DCHECK(agent_.get() == NULL);
pairing_delegate_ = pairing_delegate;
pairing_delegate_used_ = false;
dbus::Bus* system_bus = DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetSystemBus();
agent_.reset(BluetoothAgentServiceProvider::Create(
system_bus, dbus::ObjectPath(kAgentPath), this));
DCHECK(agent_.get());
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Registering agent for pairing";
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAgentManagerClient()->
RegisterAgent(
dbus::ObjectPath(kAgentPath),
bluetooth_agent_manager::kKeyboardDisplayCapability,
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnRegisterAgent,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
callback,
error_callback),
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnRegisterAgentError,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
error_callback));
}
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::Connect(
BluetoothDevice::PairingDelegate* pairing_delegate,
const base::Closure& callback,
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback) {
if (num_connecting_calls_++ == 0)
adapter_->NotifyDeviceChanged(this);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Connecting, " << num_connecting_calls_
<< " in progress";
if (IsPaired() || !pairing_delegate || !IsPairable()) {
ConnectInternal(false, callback, error_callback);
} else {
DCHECK(!pairing_context_);
pairing_context_.reset(
new BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::PairingContext(pairing_delegate));
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->
Pair(object_path_,
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPair,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
callback, error_callback),
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPairError,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
error_callback));
}
}
| 171,221
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(MPTSASState *s,
MPIMsgSCSIIORequest *scsi_io,
hwaddr addr)
{
MPTSASRequest *req;
MPIMsgSCSIIOReply reply;
SCSIDevice *sdev;
int status;
mptsas_fix_scsi_io_endianness(scsi_io);
trace_mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(s, scsi_io->Bus, scsi_io->TargetID,
scsi_io->LUN[1], scsi_io->DataLength);
status = mptsas_scsi_device_find(s, scsi_io->Bus, scsi_io->TargetID,
scsi_io->LUN, &sdev);
if (status) {
goto bad;
}
req = g_new(MPTSASRequest, 1);
QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&s->pending, req, next);
req->scsi_io = *scsi_io;
req->dev = s;
status = mptsas_build_sgl(s, req, addr);
if (status) {
goto free_bad;
}
if (req->qsg.size < scsi_io->DataLength) {
trace_mptsas_sgl_overflow(s, scsi_io->MsgContext, scsi_io->DataLength,
req->qsg.size);
status = MPI_IOCSTATUS_INVALID_SGL;
goto free_bad;
}
req->sreq = scsi_req_new(sdev, scsi_io->MsgContext,
scsi_io->LUN[1], scsi_io->CDB, req);
if (req->sreq->cmd.xfer > scsi_io->DataLength) {
goto overrun;
}
switch (scsi_io->Control & MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_DATADIRECTION_MASK) {
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_NODATATRANSFER:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_NONE) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_WRITE:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_READ:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_FROM_DEV) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
}
if (scsi_req_enqueue(req->sreq)) {
scsi_req_continue(req->sreq);
}
return 0;
overrun:
trace_mptsas_scsi_overflow(s, scsi_io->MsgContext, req->sreq->cmd.xfer,
scsi_io->DataLength);
status = MPI_IOCSTATUS_SCSI_DATA_OVERRUN;
free_bad:
mptsas_free_request(req);
bad:
memset(&reply, 0, sizeof(reply));
reply.TargetID = scsi_io->TargetID;
reply.Bus = scsi_io->Bus;
reply.MsgLength = sizeof(reply) / 4;
reply.Function = scsi_io->Function;
reply.CDBLength = scsi_io->CDBLength;
reply.SenseBufferLength = scsi_io->SenseBufferLength;
reply.MsgContext = scsi_io->MsgContext;
reply.SCSIState = MPI_SCSI_STATE_NO_SCSI_STATUS;
reply.IOCStatus = status;
mptsas_fix_scsi_io_reply_endianness(&reply);
mptsas_reply(s, (MPIDefaultReply *)&reply);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
static int mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(MPTSASState *s,
MPIMsgSCSIIORequest *scsi_io,
hwaddr addr)
{
MPTSASRequest *req;
MPIMsgSCSIIOReply reply;
SCSIDevice *sdev;
int status;
mptsas_fix_scsi_io_endianness(scsi_io);
trace_mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(s, scsi_io->Bus, scsi_io->TargetID,
scsi_io->LUN[1], scsi_io->DataLength);
status = mptsas_scsi_device_find(s, scsi_io->Bus, scsi_io->TargetID,
scsi_io->LUN, &sdev);
if (status) {
goto bad;
}
req = g_new0(MPTSASRequest, 1);
QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&s->pending, req, next);
req->scsi_io = *scsi_io;
req->dev = s;
status = mptsas_build_sgl(s, req, addr);
if (status) {
goto free_bad;
}
if (req->qsg.size < scsi_io->DataLength) {
trace_mptsas_sgl_overflow(s, scsi_io->MsgContext, scsi_io->DataLength,
req->qsg.size);
status = MPI_IOCSTATUS_INVALID_SGL;
goto free_bad;
}
req->sreq = scsi_req_new(sdev, scsi_io->MsgContext,
scsi_io->LUN[1], scsi_io->CDB, req);
if (req->sreq->cmd.xfer > scsi_io->DataLength) {
goto overrun;
}
switch (scsi_io->Control & MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_DATADIRECTION_MASK) {
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_NODATATRANSFER:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_NONE) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_WRITE:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_READ:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_FROM_DEV) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
}
if (scsi_req_enqueue(req->sreq)) {
scsi_req_continue(req->sreq);
}
return 0;
overrun:
trace_mptsas_scsi_overflow(s, scsi_io->MsgContext, req->sreq->cmd.xfer,
scsi_io->DataLength);
status = MPI_IOCSTATUS_SCSI_DATA_OVERRUN;
free_bad:
mptsas_free_request(req);
bad:
memset(&reply, 0, sizeof(reply));
reply.TargetID = scsi_io->TargetID;
reply.Bus = scsi_io->Bus;
reply.MsgLength = sizeof(reply) / 4;
reply.Function = scsi_io->Function;
reply.CDBLength = scsi_io->CDBLength;
reply.SenseBufferLength = scsi_io->SenseBufferLength;
reply.MsgContext = scsi_io->MsgContext;
reply.SCSIState = MPI_SCSI_STATE_NO_SCSI_STATUS;
reply.IOCStatus = status;
mptsas_fix_scsi_io_reply_endianness(&reply);
mptsas_reply(s, (MPIDefaultReply *)&reply);
return 0;
}
| 164,928
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_rgb_to_gray_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) != 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_png_set_rgb_to_gray_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) != 0;
}
| 173,641
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SandboxIPCHandler::HandleLocaltime(
int fd,
base::PickleIterator iter,
const std::vector<base::ScopedFD>& fds) {
std::string time_string;
if (!iter.ReadString(&time_string) || time_string.size() != sizeof(time_t))
return;
time_t time;
memcpy(&time, time_string.data(), sizeof(time));
const struct tm* expanded_time = localtime(&time);
std::string result_string;
const char* time_zone_string = "";
if (expanded_time) {
result_string = std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(expanded_time),
sizeof(struct tm));
time_zone_string = expanded_time->tm_zone;
}
base::Pickle reply;
reply.WriteString(result_string);
reply.WriteString(time_zone_string);
SendRendererReply(fds, reply, -1);
}
Commit Message: Serialize struct tm in a safe way.
BUG=765512
Change-Id: If235b8677eb527be2ac0fe621fc210e4116a7566
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/679441
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void SandboxIPCHandler::HandleLocaltime(
int fd,
base::PickleIterator iter,
const std::vector<base::ScopedFD>& fds) {
// The other side of this call is in |ProxyLocaltimeCallToBrowser|, in
// zygote_main_linux.cc.
std::string time_string;
if (!iter.ReadString(&time_string) || time_string.size() != sizeof(time_t))
return;
time_t time;
memcpy(&time, time_string.data(), sizeof(time));
// We use |localtime| here because we need the |tm_zone| field to be filled
const struct tm* expanded_time = localtime(&time);
base::Pickle reply;
if (expanded_time) {
WriteTimeStruct(&reply, expanded_time);
} else {
// The {} constructor ensures the struct is 0-initialized.
struct tm zeroed_time = {};
WriteTimeStruct(&reply, &zeroed_time);
}
SendRendererReply(fds, reply, -1);
}
| 172,925
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: exsltCryptoRc4DecryptFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int key_len = 0, key_size = 0;
int str_len = 0, bin_len = 0, ret_len = 0;
xmlChar *key = NULL, *str = NULL, *padkey = NULL, *bin =
NULL, *ret = NULL;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt = NULL;
if (nargs != 2) {
xmlXPathSetArityError (ctxt);
return;
}
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
key = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
key_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (key);
if (key_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (key);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
padkey = xmlMallocAtomic (RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if (padkey == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate padkey\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memset(padkey, 0, RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
key_size = xmlUTF8Strsize (key, key_len);
if ((key_size > RC4_KEY_LENGTH) || (key_size < 0)) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: key size too long or key broken\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memcpy (padkey, key, key_size);
/* decode hex to binary */
bin_len = str_len;
bin = xmlMallocAtomic (bin_len);
if (bin == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate string\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
ret_len = exsltCryptoHex2Bin (str, str_len, bin, bin_len);
/* decrypt the binary blob */
ret = xmlMallocAtomic (ret_len + 1);
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate result\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
PLATFORM_RC4_DECRYPT (ctxt, padkey, bin, ret_len, ret, ret_len);
ret[ret_len] = 0;
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, ret);
done:
if (key != NULL)
xmlFree (key);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree (str);
if (padkey != NULL)
xmlFree (padkey);
if (bin != NULL)
xmlFree (bin);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
exsltCryptoRc4DecryptFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int key_len = 0;
int str_len = 0, bin_len = 0, ret_len = 0;
xmlChar *key = NULL, *str = NULL, *padkey = NULL, *bin =
NULL, *ret = NULL;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt = NULL;
if (nargs != 2) {
xmlXPathSetArityError (ctxt);
return;
}
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
str_len = xmlStrlen (str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
key = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
key_len = xmlStrlen (key);
if (key_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (key);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
padkey = xmlMallocAtomic (RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if (padkey == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate padkey\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memset(padkey, 0, RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if ((key_len > RC4_KEY_LENGTH) || (key_len < 0)) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: key size too long or key broken\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memcpy (padkey, key, key_len);
/* decode hex to binary */
bin_len = str_len;
bin = xmlMallocAtomic (bin_len);
if (bin == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate string\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
ret_len = exsltCryptoHex2Bin (str, str_len, bin, bin_len);
/* decrypt the binary blob */
ret = xmlMallocAtomic (ret_len + 1);
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate result\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
PLATFORM_RC4_DECRYPT (ctxt, padkey, bin, ret_len, ret, ret_len);
ret[ret_len] = 0;
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, ret);
done:
if (key != NULL)
xmlFree (key);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree (str);
if (padkey != NULL)
xmlFree (padkey);
if (bin != NULL)
xmlFree (bin);
}
| 173,287
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int asf_read_marker(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t size)
{
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int i, count, name_len, ret;
char name[1024];
avio_rl64(pb); // reserved 16 bytes
avio_rl64(pb); // ...
count = avio_rl32(pb); // markers count
avio_rl16(pb); // reserved 2 bytes
name_len = avio_rl16(pb); // name length
for (i = 0; i < name_len; i++)
avio_r8(pb); // skip the name
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
int64_t pres_time;
int name_len;
avio_rl64(pb); // offset, 8 bytes
pres_time = avio_rl64(pb); // presentation time
pres_time -= asf->hdr.preroll * 10000;
avio_rl16(pb); // entry length
avio_rl32(pb); // send time
avio_rl32(pb); // flags
name_len = avio_rl32(pb); // name length
if ((ret = avio_get_str16le(pb, name_len * 2, name,
sizeof(name))) < name_len)
avio_skip(pb, name_len - ret);
avpriv_new_chapter(s, i, (AVRational) { 1, 10000000 }, pres_time,
AV_NOPTS_VALUE, name);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.asf
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
|
static int asf_read_marker(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t size)
{
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int i, count, name_len, ret;
char name[1024];
avio_rl64(pb); // reserved 16 bytes
avio_rl64(pb); // ...
count = avio_rl32(pb); // markers count
avio_rl16(pb); // reserved 2 bytes
name_len = avio_rl16(pb); // name length
avio_skip(pb, name_len);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
int64_t pres_time;
int name_len;
if (avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_rl64(pb); // offset, 8 bytes
pres_time = avio_rl64(pb); // presentation time
pres_time -= asf->hdr.preroll * 10000;
avio_rl16(pb); // entry length
avio_rl32(pb); // send time
avio_rl32(pb); // flags
name_len = avio_rl32(pb); // name length
if ((ret = avio_get_str16le(pb, name_len * 2, name,
sizeof(name))) < name_len)
avio_skip(pb, name_len - ret);
avpriv_new_chapter(s, i, (AVRational) { 1, 10000000 }, pres_time,
AV_NOPTS_VALUE, name);
}
return 0;
}
| 167,775
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteMAPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
depth,
packet_size;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*colormap,
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Allocate colormap.
*/
if (IsPaletteImage(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteType);
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickTrue);
packet_size=(size_t) (depth/8);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,packet_size*
sizeof(*pixels));
packet_size=(size_t) (image->colors > 256 ? 6UL : 3UL);
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,packet_size*
sizeof(*colormap));
if ((pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Write colormap to file.
*/
q=colormap;
if (image->depth <= 8)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].red;
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].green;
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].blue;
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) ((size_t) image->colormap[i].red >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].red;
*q++=(unsigned char) ((size_t) image->colormap[i].green >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].green;
*q++=(unsigned char) ((size_t) image->colormap[i].blue >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].blue;
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,colormap);
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
/*
Write image pixels to file.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->colors > 256)
*q++=(unsigned char) ((size_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x) >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (q-pixels),pixels);
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in SIXEL, PDB, MAP, and CALS coders (bug report from Donghai Zhu)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static MagickBooleanType WriteMAPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
depth,
packet_size;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*colormap,
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Allocate colormap.
*/
if (IsPaletteImage(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteType);
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickTrue);
packet_size=(size_t) (depth/8);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,packet_size*
sizeof(*pixels));
packet_size=(size_t) (image->colors > 256 ? 6UL : 3UL);
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,packet_size*
sizeof(*colormap));
if ((pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Write colormap to file.
*/
q=colormap;
q=colormap;
if (image->colors <= 256)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red);
*q++=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green);
*q++=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue);
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].red) >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) (ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].red) & 0xff);
*q++=(unsigned char) (ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].green) >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) (ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].green) & 0xff);;
*q++=(unsigned char) (ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].blue) >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) (ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].blue) & 0xff);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,colormap);
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
/*
Write image pixels to file.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->colors > 256)
*q++=(unsigned char) ((size_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x) >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (q-pixels),pixels);
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
| 168,632
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PageFormAnalyserLogger::Flush() {
std::string text;
for (ConsoleLevel level : {kError, kWarning, kVerbose}) {
for (LogEntry& entry : node_buffer_[level]) {
text.clear();
text += "[DOM] ";
text += entry.message;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < entry.nodes.size(); ++i)
text += " %o";
blink::WebConsoleMessage message(level, blink::WebString::FromUTF8(text));
message.nodes = std::move(entry.nodes); // avoids copying node vectors.
frame_->AddMessageToConsole(message);
}
}
node_buffer_.clear();
}
Commit Message: [AF] Prevent Logging Password Values to Console
Before sending over to be logged by DevTools, filter out DOM nodes that
have a type attribute equal to "password", and that are not empty.
Bug: 934609
Change-Id: I147ad0c2bad13cc50394f4b5ff2f4bfb7293114b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1506498
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Lalancette <seblalancette@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#638615}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void PageFormAnalyserLogger::Flush() {
std::string text;
for (ConsoleLevel level : {kError, kWarning, kVerbose}) {
for (LogEntry& entry : node_buffer_[level]) {
text.clear();
text += "[DOM] ";
text += entry.message;
std::vector<blink::WebNode> nodesToLog;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < entry.nodes.size(); ++i) {
if (entry.nodes[i].IsElementNode()) {
const blink::WebElement element =
entry.nodes[i].ToConst<blink::WebElement>();
const blink::WebInputElement* webInputElement =
blink::ToWebInputElement(&element);
// Filter out password inputs with values from being logged, as their
// values are also logged.
const bool shouldObfuscate =
webInputElement &&
webInputElement->IsPasswordFieldForAutofill() &&
!webInputElement->Value().IsEmpty();
if (!shouldObfuscate) {
text += " %o";
nodesToLog.push_back(element);
}
}
}
blink::WebConsoleMessage message(level, blink::WebString::FromUTF8(text));
message.nodes = std::move(nodesToLog); // avoids copying node vectors.
frame_->AddMessageToConsole(message);
}
}
node_buffer_.clear();
}
| 172,078
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: gplotMakeOutput(GPLOT *gplot)
{
char buf[L_BUF_SIZE];
char *cmdname;
l_int32 ignore;
PROCNAME("gplotMakeOutput");
if (!gplot)
return ERROR_INT("gplot not defined", procName, 1);
gplotGenCommandFile(gplot);
gplotGenDataFiles(gplot);
cmdname = genPathname(gplot->cmdname, NULL);
#ifndef _WIN32
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "gnuplot %s", cmdname);
#else
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "wgnuplot %s", cmdname);
#endif /* _WIN32 */
#ifndef OS_IOS /* iOS 11 does not support system() */
ignore = system(buf); /* gnuplot || wgnuplot */
#endif /* !OS_IOS */
LEPT_FREE(cmdname);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
gplotMakeOutput(GPLOT *gplot)
{
char buf[L_BUFSIZE];
char *cmdname;
l_int32 ignore;
PROCNAME("gplotMakeOutput");
if (!gplot)
return ERROR_INT("gplot not defined", procName, 1);
gplotGenCommandFile(gplot);
gplotGenDataFiles(gplot);
cmdname = genPathname(gplot->cmdname, NULL);
#ifndef _WIN32
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "gnuplot %s", cmdname);
#else
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "wgnuplot %s", cmdname);
#endif /* _WIN32 */
#ifndef OS_IOS /* iOS 11 does not support system() */
ignore = system(buf); /* gnuplot || wgnuplot */
#endif /* !OS_IOS */
LEPT_FREE(cmdname);
return 0;
}
| 169,326
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void LaunchServiceProcessControl(bool wait) {
ServiceProcessControl::GetInstance()->Launch(
base::Bind(&ServiceProcessControlBrowserTest::ProcessControlLaunched,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::Bind(
&ServiceProcessControlBrowserTest::ProcessControlLaunchFailed,
base::Unretained(this)));
if (wait)
content::RunMessageLoop();
}
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
CWE ID: CWE-94
|
void LaunchServiceProcessControl(bool wait) {
void LaunchServiceProcessControl(base::RepeatingClosure on_launched) {
ServiceProcessControl::GetInstance()->Launch(
base::BindOnce(
&ServiceProcessControlBrowserTest::ProcessControlLaunched,
base::Unretained(this), on_launched),
base::BindOnce(
&ServiceProcessControlBrowserTest::ProcessControlLaunchFailed,
| 172,051
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ApiDefinitionsNatives::ApiDefinitionsNatives(Dispatcher* dispatcher,
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context), dispatcher_(dispatcher) {
RouteFunction(
"GetExtensionAPIDefinitionsForTest",
base::Bind(&ApiDefinitionsNatives::GetExtensionAPIDefinitionsForTest,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
ApiDefinitionsNatives::ApiDefinitionsNatives(Dispatcher* dispatcher,
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context), dispatcher_(dispatcher) {
RouteFunction(
"GetExtensionAPIDefinitionsForTest", "test",
base::Bind(&ApiDefinitionsNatives::GetExtensionAPIDefinitionsForTest,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,246
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: grub_fshelp_read_file (grub_disk_t disk, grub_fshelp_node_t node,
void (*read_hook) (grub_disk_addr_t sector,
unsigned offset,
unsigned length,
void *closure),
void *closure, int flags,
grub_off_t pos, grub_size_t len, char *buf,
grub_disk_addr_t (*get_block) (grub_fshelp_node_t node,
grub_disk_addr_t block),
grub_off_t filesize, int log2blocksize)
{
grub_disk_addr_t i, blockcnt;
int blocksize = 1 << (log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS);
/* Adjust LEN so it we can't read past the end of the file. */
if (pos + len > filesize)
len = filesize - pos;
blockcnt = ((len + pos) + blocksize - 1) >>
(log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS);
for (i = pos >> (log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS); i < blockcnt; i++)
{
grub_disk_addr_t blknr;
int blockoff = pos & (blocksize - 1);
int blockend = blocksize;
int skipfirst = 0;
blknr = get_block (node, i);
if (grub_errno)
return -1;
blknr = blknr << log2blocksize;
/* Last block. */
if (i == blockcnt - 1)
{
blockend = (len + pos) & (blocksize - 1);
/* The last portion is exactly blocksize. */
if (! blockend)
blockend = blocksize;
}
/* First block. */
if (i == (pos >> (log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS)))
{
skipfirst = blockoff;
blockend -= skipfirst;
}
/* If the block number is 0 this block is not stored on disk but
is zero filled instead. */
if (blknr)
{
disk->read_hook = read_hook;
disk->closure = closure;
grub_hack_lastoff = blknr * 512;
grub_disk_read_ex (disk, blknr, skipfirst, blockend, buf, flags);
disk->read_hook = 0;
if (grub_errno)
return -1;
}
else if (buf)
grub_memset (buf, 0, blockend);
if (buf)
buf += blocksize - skipfirst;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
grub_fshelp_read_file (grub_disk_t disk, grub_fshelp_node_t node,
void (*read_hook) (grub_disk_addr_t sector,
unsigned offset,
unsigned length,
void *closure),
void *closure, int flags,
grub_off_t pos, grub_size_t len, char *buf,
grub_disk_addr_t (*get_block) (grub_fshelp_node_t node,
grub_disk_addr_t block),
grub_off_t filesize, int log2blocksize)
{
grub_disk_addr_t i, blockcnt;
int blocksize = 1 << (log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS);
/* Adjust LEN so it we can't read past the end of the file. */
if (pos + len > filesize)
len = filesize - pos;
if (len < 1 || len == 0xffffffff) {
return -1;
}
blockcnt = ((len + pos) + blocksize - 1) >>
(log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS);
for (i = pos >> (log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS); i < blockcnt; i++)
{
grub_disk_addr_t blknr;
int blockoff = pos & (blocksize - 1);
int blockend = blocksize;
int skipfirst = 0;
blknr = get_block (node, i);
if (grub_errno)
return -1;
blknr = blknr << log2blocksize;
/* Last block. */
if (i == blockcnt - 1)
{
blockend = (len + pos) & (blocksize - 1);
/* The last portion is exactly blocksize. */
if (! blockend)
blockend = blocksize;
}
/* First block. */
if (i == (pos >> (log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS)))
{
skipfirst = blockoff;
blockend -= skipfirst;
}
/* If the block number is 0 this block is not stored on disk but
is zero filled instead. */
if (blknr)
{
disk->read_hook = read_hook;
disk->closure = closure;
grub_hack_lastoff = blknr * 512;
grub_disk_read_ex (disk, blknr, skipfirst, blockend, buf, flags);
disk->read_hook = 0;
if (grub_errno)
return -1;
}
else if (buf)
grub_memset (buf, 0, blockend);
if (buf)
buf += blocksize - skipfirst;
}
return len;
}
| 168,084
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ContentUtilityClient* ShellMainDelegate::CreateContentUtilityClient() {
utility_client_.reset(new ShellContentUtilityClient);
return utility_client_.get();
}
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <jcivelli@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
ContentUtilityClient* ShellMainDelegate::CreateContentUtilityClient() {
utility_client_.reset(new ShellContentUtilityClient(is_browsertest_));
return utility_client_.get();
}
| 172,120
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void NetworkHandler::GetResponseBodyForInterception(
const String& interception_id,
std::unique_ptr<GetResponseBodyForInterceptionCallback> callback) {
DevToolsInterceptorController* interceptor =
DevToolsInterceptorController::FromBrowserContext(
process_->GetBrowserContext());
if (!interceptor) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
interceptor->GetResponseBody(interception_id, std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void NetworkHandler::GetResponseBodyForInterception(
const String& interception_id,
std::unique_ptr<GetResponseBodyForInterceptionCallback> callback) {
DevToolsInterceptorController* interceptor =
DevToolsInterceptorController::FromBrowserContext(browser_context_);
if (!interceptor) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
interceptor->GetResponseBody(interception_id, std::move(callback));
}
| 172,758
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void parse_input(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn)
{
size_t http2_max_concurrent_requests_per_connection = conn->super.ctx->globalconf->http2.max_concurrent_requests_per_connection;
int perform_early_exit = 0;
if (conn->num_streams.pull.half_closed + conn->num_streams.push.half_closed != http2_max_concurrent_requests_per_connection)
perform_early_exit = 1;
/* handle the input */
while (conn->state < H2O_HTTP2_CONN_STATE_IS_CLOSING && conn->sock->input->size != 0) {
if (perform_early_exit == 1 &&
conn->num_streams.pull.half_closed + conn->num_streams.push.half_closed == http2_max_concurrent_requests_per_connection)
goto EarlyExit;
/* process a frame */
const char *err_desc = NULL;
ssize_t ret = conn->_read_expect(conn, (uint8_t *)conn->sock->input->bytes, conn->sock->input->size, &err_desc);
if (ret == H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_INCOMPLETE) {
break;
} else if (ret < 0) {
if (ret != H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_PROTOCOL_CLOSE_IMMEDIATELY) {
enqueue_goaway(conn, (int)ret,
err_desc != NULL ? (h2o_iovec_t){(char *)err_desc, strlen(err_desc)} : (h2o_iovec_t){});
}
close_connection(conn);
return;
}
/* advance to the next frame */
h2o_buffer_consume(&conn->sock->input, ret);
}
if (!h2o_socket_is_reading(conn->sock))
h2o_socket_read_start(conn->sock, on_read);
return;
EarlyExit:
if (h2o_socket_is_reading(conn->sock))
h2o_socket_read_stop(conn->sock);
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID:
|
static void parse_input(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn)
static int parse_input(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn)
{
size_t http2_max_concurrent_requests_per_connection = conn->super.ctx->globalconf->http2.max_concurrent_requests_per_connection;
int perform_early_exit = 0;
if (conn->num_streams.pull.half_closed + conn->num_streams.push.half_closed != http2_max_concurrent_requests_per_connection)
perform_early_exit = 1;
/* handle the input */
while (conn->state < H2O_HTTP2_CONN_STATE_IS_CLOSING && conn->sock->input->size != 0) {
if (perform_early_exit == 1 &&
conn->num_streams.pull.half_closed + conn->num_streams.push.half_closed == http2_max_concurrent_requests_per_connection)
goto EarlyExit;
/* process a frame */
const char *err_desc = NULL;
ssize_t ret = conn->_read_expect(conn, (uint8_t *)conn->sock->input->bytes, conn->sock->input->size, &err_desc);
if (ret == H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_INCOMPLETE) {
break;
} else if (ret < 0) {
if (ret != H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_PROTOCOL_CLOSE_IMMEDIATELY) {
enqueue_goaway(conn, (int)ret,
err_desc != NULL ? (h2o_iovec_t){(char *)err_desc, strlen(err_desc)} : (h2o_iovec_t){});
}
return close_connection(conn);
}
/* advance to the next frame */
h2o_buffer_consume(&conn->sock->input, ret);
}
if (!h2o_socket_is_reading(conn->sock))
h2o_socket_read_start(conn->sock, on_read);
return 0;
EarlyExit:
if (h2o_socket_is_reading(conn->sock))
h2o_socket_read_stop(conn->sock);
return 0;
}
| 167,227
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool TextureManager::TextureInfo::ValidForTexture(
GLint face,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLenum type) const {
size_t face_index = GLTargetToFaceIndex(face);
if (level >= 0 && face_index < level_infos_.size() &&
static_cast<size_t>(level) < level_infos_[face_index].size()) {
const LevelInfo& info = level_infos_[GLTargetToFaceIndex(face)][level];
GLint right;
GLint top;
return SafeAdd(xoffset, width, &right) &&
SafeAdd(yoffset, height, &top) &&
xoffset >= 0 &&
yoffset >= 0 &&
right <= info.width &&
top <= info.height &&
format == info.internal_format &&
type == info.type;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
bool TextureManager::TextureInfo::ValidForTexture(
GLint face,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLenum type) const {
size_t face_index = GLTargetToFaceIndex(face);
if (level >= 0 && face_index < level_infos_.size() &&
static_cast<size_t>(level) < level_infos_[face_index].size()) {
const LevelInfo& info = level_infos_[GLTargetToFaceIndex(face)][level];
int32 right;
int32 top;
return SafeAddInt32(xoffset, width, &right) &&
SafeAddInt32(yoffset, height, &top) &&
xoffset >= 0 &&
yoffset >= 0 &&
right <= info.width &&
top <= info.height &&
format == info.internal_format &&
type == info.type;
}
return false;
}
| 170,752
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::OnPolicyStateChanged(
policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::PolicySubsystemState state,
policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::ErrorDetails error_details) {
if (is_showing_) {
switch (state) {
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::UNENROLLED:
return;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::BAD_GAIA_TOKEN:
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::LOCAL_ERROR:
actor_->ShowFatalEnrollmentError();
break;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::UNMANAGED:
actor_->ShowAccountError();
break;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR:
actor_->ShowNetworkEnrollmentError();
break;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::TOKEN_FETCHED:
WriteInstallAttributesData();
return;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::SUCCESS:
registrar_.reset();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentOK,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
actor_->ShowConfirmationScreen();
return;
}
if (state == policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::UNMANAGED) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentNotSupported,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
} else {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentPolicyFailed,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
}
LOG(WARNING) << "Policy subsystem error during enrollment: " << state
<< " details: " << error_details;
}
registrar_.reset();
g_browser_process->browser_policy_connector()->DeviceStopAutoRetry();
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::OnPolicyStateChanged(
policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::PolicySubsystemState state,
policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::ErrorDetails error_details) {
if (is_showing_) {
switch (state) {
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::UNENROLLED:
return;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::BAD_GAIA_TOKEN:
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::LOCAL_ERROR:
actor_->ShowFatalEnrollmentError();
break;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::UNMANAGED:
actor_->ShowAccountError();
break;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::NETWORK_ERROR:
actor_->ShowNetworkEnrollmentError();
break;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::TOKEN_FETCHED:
WriteInstallAttributesData();
return;
case policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::SUCCESS:
registrar_.reset();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentOK,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
actor_->ShowConfirmationScreen();
return;
}
if (state == policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::UNMANAGED) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentNotSupported,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
} else {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentPolicyFailed,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
}
LOG(WARNING) << "Policy subsystem error during enrollment: " << state
<< " details: " << error_details;
}
registrar_.reset();
g_browser_process->browser_policy_connector()->ResetDevicePolicy();
}
| 170,277
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int init_nss_hash(struct crypto_instance *instance)
{
PK11SlotInfo* hash_slot = NULL;
SECItem hash_param;
if (!hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type]) {
return 0;
}
hash_param.type = siBuffer;
hash_param.data = 0;
hash_param.len = 0;
hash_slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type], NULL);
if (hash_slot == NULL) {
log_printf(instance->log_level_security, "Unable to find security slot (err %d)",
PR_GetError());
return -1;
}
instance->nss_sym_key_sign = PK11_ImportSymKey(hash_slot,
hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type],
PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_SIGN,
&hash_param, NULL);
if (instance->nss_sym_key_sign == NULL) {
log_printf(instance->log_level_security, "Failure to import key into NSS (err %d)",
PR_GetError());
return -1;
}
PK11_FreeSlot(hash_slot);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: totemcrypto: fix hmac key initialization
Signed-off-by: Fabio M. Di Nitto <fdinitto@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
|
static int init_nss_hash(struct crypto_instance *instance)
{
PK11SlotInfo* hash_slot = NULL;
SECItem hash_param;
if (!hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type]) {
return 0;
}
hash_param.type = siBuffer;
hash_param.data = instance->private_key;
hash_param.len = instance->private_key_len;
hash_slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type], NULL);
if (hash_slot == NULL) {
log_printf(instance->log_level_security, "Unable to find security slot (err %d)",
PR_GetError());
return -1;
}
instance->nss_sym_key_sign = PK11_ImportSymKey(hash_slot,
hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type],
PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_SIGN,
&hash_param, NULL);
if (instance->nss_sym_key_sign == NULL) {
log_printf(instance->log_level_security, "Failure to import key into NSS (err %d)",
PR_GetError());
return -1;
}
PK11_FreeSlot(hash_slot);
return 0;
}
| 166,546
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int off, i, slot, spi;
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
register_is_null(regs[regno]))
return 0;
verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
return -EACCES;
}
/* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
if (!tnum_is_const(regs[regno].var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off);
verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
regno, tn_buf);
}
off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
meta->access_size = access_size;
meta->regno = regno;
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
slot = -(off + i) - 1;
spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (state->allocated_stack <= slot ||
state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
STACK_MISC) {
verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix missing error return in check_stack_boundary()
Prevent indirect stack accesses at non-constant addresses, which would
permit reading and corrupting spilled pointers.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int off, i, slot, spi;
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
register_is_null(regs[regno]))
return 0;
verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
return -EACCES;
}
/* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
if (!tnum_is_const(regs[regno].var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off);
verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
regno, tn_buf);
return -EACCES;
}
off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
meta->access_size = access_size;
meta->regno = regno;
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
slot = -(off + i) - 1;
spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (state->allocated_stack <= slot ||
state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
STACK_MISC) {
verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 167,640
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void __init acpi_initrd_override(void *data, size_t size)
{
int sig, no, table_nr = 0, total_offset = 0;
long offset = 0;
struct acpi_table_header *table;
char cpio_path[32] = "kernel/firmware/acpi/";
struct cpio_data file;
if (data == NULL || size == 0)
return;
for (no = 0; no < ACPI_OVERRIDE_TABLES; no++) {
file = find_cpio_data(cpio_path, data, size, &offset);
if (!file.data)
break;
data += offset;
size -= offset;
if (file.size < sizeof(struct acpi_table_header)) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: Table smaller than ACPI header [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
table = file.data;
for (sig = 0; table_sigs[sig]; sig++)
if (!memcmp(table->signature, table_sigs[sig], 4))
break;
if (!table_sigs[sig]) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: Unknown signature [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
if (file.size != table->length) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: File length does not match table length [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
if (acpi_table_checksum(file.data, table->length)) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: Bad table checksum [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
pr_info("%4.4s ACPI table found in initrd [%s%s][0x%x]\n",
table->signature, cpio_path, file.name, table->length);
all_tables_size += table->length;
acpi_initrd_files[table_nr].data = file.data;
acpi_initrd_files[table_nr].size = file.size;
table_nr++;
}
if (table_nr == 0)
return;
acpi_tables_addr =
memblock_find_in_range(0, max_low_pfn_mapped << PAGE_SHIFT,
all_tables_size, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!acpi_tables_addr) {
WARN_ON(1);
return;
}
/*
* Only calling e820_add_reserve does not work and the
* tables are invalid (memory got used) later.
* memblock_reserve works as expected and the tables won't get modified.
* But it's not enough on X86 because ioremap will
* complain later (used by acpi_os_map_memory) that the pages
* that should get mapped are not marked "reserved".
* Both memblock_reserve and e820_add_region (via arch_reserve_mem_area)
* works fine.
*/
memblock_reserve(acpi_tables_addr, all_tables_size);
arch_reserve_mem_area(acpi_tables_addr, all_tables_size);
/*
* early_ioremap only can remap 256k one time. If we map all
* tables one time, we will hit the limit. Need to map chunks
* one by one during copying the same as that in relocate_initrd().
*/
for (no = 0; no < table_nr; no++) {
unsigned char *src_p = acpi_initrd_files[no].data;
phys_addr_t size = acpi_initrd_files[no].size;
phys_addr_t dest_addr = acpi_tables_addr + total_offset;
phys_addr_t slop, clen;
char *dest_p;
total_offset += size;
while (size) {
slop = dest_addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
clen = size;
if (clen > MAP_CHUNK_SIZE - slop)
clen = MAP_CHUNK_SIZE - slop;
dest_p = early_ioremap(dest_addr & PAGE_MASK,
clen + slop);
memcpy(dest_p + slop, src_p, clen);
early_iounmap(dest_p, clen + slop);
src_p += clen;
dest_addr += clen;
size -= clen;
}
}
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void __init acpi_initrd_override(void *data, size_t size)
{
int sig, no, table_nr = 0, total_offset = 0;
long offset = 0;
struct acpi_table_header *table;
char cpio_path[32] = "kernel/firmware/acpi/";
struct cpio_data file;
if (data == NULL || size == 0)
return;
for (no = 0; no < ACPI_OVERRIDE_TABLES; no++) {
file = find_cpio_data(cpio_path, data, size, &offset);
if (!file.data)
break;
data += offset;
size -= offset;
if (file.size < sizeof(struct acpi_table_header)) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: Table smaller than ACPI header [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
table = file.data;
for (sig = 0; table_sigs[sig]; sig++)
if (!memcmp(table->signature, table_sigs[sig], 4))
break;
if (!table_sigs[sig]) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: Unknown signature [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
if (file.size != table->length) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: File length does not match table length [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
if (acpi_table_checksum(file.data, table->length)) {
pr_err("ACPI OVERRIDE: Bad table checksum [%s%s]\n",
cpio_path, file.name);
continue;
}
pr_info("%4.4s ACPI table found in initrd [%s%s][0x%x]\n",
table->signature, cpio_path, file.name, table->length);
all_tables_size += table->length;
acpi_initrd_files[table_nr].data = file.data;
acpi_initrd_files[table_nr].size = file.size;
table_nr++;
}
if (table_nr == 0)
return;
if (get_securelevel() > 0) {
pr_notice(PREFIX
"securelevel enabled, ignoring table override\n");
return;
}
acpi_tables_addr =
memblock_find_in_range(0, max_low_pfn_mapped << PAGE_SHIFT,
all_tables_size, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!acpi_tables_addr) {
WARN_ON(1);
return;
}
/*
* Only calling e820_add_reserve does not work and the
* tables are invalid (memory got used) later.
* memblock_reserve works as expected and the tables won't get modified.
* But it's not enough on X86 because ioremap will
* complain later (used by acpi_os_map_memory) that the pages
* that should get mapped are not marked "reserved".
* Both memblock_reserve and e820_add_region (via arch_reserve_mem_area)
* works fine.
*/
memblock_reserve(acpi_tables_addr, all_tables_size);
arch_reserve_mem_area(acpi_tables_addr, all_tables_size);
/*
* early_ioremap only can remap 256k one time. If we map all
* tables one time, we will hit the limit. Need to map chunks
* one by one during copying the same as that in relocate_initrd().
*/
for (no = 0; no < table_nr; no++) {
unsigned char *src_p = acpi_initrd_files[no].data;
phys_addr_t size = acpi_initrd_files[no].size;
phys_addr_t dest_addr = acpi_tables_addr + total_offset;
phys_addr_t slop, clen;
char *dest_p;
total_offset += size;
while (size) {
slop = dest_addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
clen = size;
if (clen > MAP_CHUNK_SIZE - slop)
clen = MAP_CHUNK_SIZE - slop;
dest_p = early_ioremap(dest_addr & PAGE_MASK,
clen + slop);
memcpy(dest_p + slop, src_p, clen);
early_iounmap(dest_p, clen + slop);
src_p += clen;
dest_addr += clen;
size -= clen;
}
}
}
| 167,347
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int v9fs_device_realize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
{
V9fsVirtioState *v = container_of(s, V9fsVirtioState, state);
int i, len;
struct stat stat;
FsDriverEntry *fse;
V9fsPath path;
int rc = 1;
/* initialize pdu allocator */
QLIST_INIT(&s->free_list);
QLIST_INIT(&s->active_list);
for (i = 0; i < (MAX_REQ - 1); i++) {
QLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&s->free_list, &v->pdus[i], next);
v->pdus[i].s = s;
v->pdus[i].idx = i;
}
v9fs_path_init(&path);
fse = get_fsdev_fsentry(s->fsconf.fsdev_id);
if (!fse) {
/* We don't have a fsdev identified by fsdev_id */
error_setg(errp, "9pfs device couldn't find fsdev with the "
"id = %s",
s->fsconf.fsdev_id ? s->fsconf.fsdev_id : "NULL");
goto out;
}
if (!s->fsconf.tag) {
/* we haven't specified a mount_tag */
error_setg(errp, "fsdev with id %s needs mount_tag arguments",
s->fsconf.fsdev_id);
goto out;
}
s->ctx.export_flags = fse->export_flags;
s->ctx.fs_root = g_strdup(fse->path);
s->ctx.exops.get_st_gen = NULL;
len = strlen(s->fsconf.tag);
if (len > MAX_TAG_LEN - 1) {
error_setg(errp, "mount tag '%s' (%d bytes) is longer than "
"maximum (%d bytes)", s->fsconf.tag, len, MAX_TAG_LEN - 1);
goto out;
}
s->tag = g_strdup(s->fsconf.tag);
s->ctx.uid = -1;
s->ops = fse->ops;
s->fid_list = NULL;
qemu_co_rwlock_init(&s->rename_lock);
if (s->ops->init(&s->ctx) < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "9pfs Failed to initialize fs-driver with id:%s"
" and export path:%s", s->fsconf.fsdev_id, s->ctx.fs_root);
goto out;
}
/*
* Check details of export path, We need to use fs driver
* call back to do that. Since we are in the init path, we don't
* use co-routines here.
*/
if (s->ops->name_to_path(&s->ctx, NULL, "/", &path) < 0) {
error_setg(errp,
"error in converting name to path %s", strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (s->ops->lstat(&s->ctx, &path, &stat)) {
error_setg(errp, "share path %s does not exist", fse->path);
goto out;
} else if (!S_ISDIR(stat.st_mode)) {
error_setg(errp, "share path %s is not a directory", fse->path);
goto out;
}
v9fs_path_free(&path);
rc = 0;
out:
if (rc) {
g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
g_free(s->tag);
v9fs_path_free(&path);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
|
int v9fs_device_realize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
{
V9fsVirtioState *v = container_of(s, V9fsVirtioState, state);
int i, len;
struct stat stat;
FsDriverEntry *fse;
V9fsPath path;
int rc = 1;
/* initialize pdu allocator */
QLIST_INIT(&s->free_list);
QLIST_INIT(&s->active_list);
for (i = 0; i < (MAX_REQ - 1); i++) {
QLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&s->free_list, &v->pdus[i], next);
v->pdus[i].s = s;
v->pdus[i].idx = i;
}
v9fs_path_init(&path);
fse = get_fsdev_fsentry(s->fsconf.fsdev_id);
if (!fse) {
/* We don't have a fsdev identified by fsdev_id */
error_setg(errp, "9pfs device couldn't find fsdev with the "
"id = %s",
s->fsconf.fsdev_id ? s->fsconf.fsdev_id : "NULL");
goto out;
}
if (!s->fsconf.tag) {
/* we haven't specified a mount_tag */
error_setg(errp, "fsdev with id %s needs mount_tag arguments",
s->fsconf.fsdev_id);
goto out;
}
s->ctx.export_flags = fse->export_flags;
s->ctx.fs_root = g_strdup(fse->path);
s->ctx.exops.get_st_gen = NULL;
len = strlen(s->fsconf.tag);
if (len > MAX_TAG_LEN - 1) {
error_setg(errp, "mount tag '%s' (%d bytes) is longer than "
"maximum (%d bytes)", s->fsconf.tag, len, MAX_TAG_LEN - 1);
goto out;
}
s->tag = g_strdup(s->fsconf.tag);
s->ctx.uid = -1;
s->ops = fse->ops;
s->fid_list = NULL;
qemu_co_rwlock_init(&s->rename_lock);
if (s->ops->init(&s->ctx) < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "9pfs Failed to initialize fs-driver with id:%s"
" and export path:%s", s->fsconf.fsdev_id, s->ctx.fs_root);
goto out;
}
/*
* Check details of export path, We need to use fs driver
* call back to do that. Since we are in the init path, we don't
* use co-routines here.
*/
if (s->ops->name_to_path(&s->ctx, NULL, "/", &path) < 0) {
error_setg(errp,
"error in converting name to path %s", strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (s->ops->lstat(&s->ctx, &path, &stat)) {
error_setg(errp, "share path %s does not exist", fse->path);
goto out;
} else if (!S_ISDIR(stat.st_mode)) {
error_setg(errp, "share path %s is not a directory", fse->path);
goto out;
}
v9fs_path_free(&path);
rc = 0;
out:
if (rc) {
g_free(s->tag);
g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
v9fs_path_free(&path);
}
return rc;
}
| 164,895
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: WebContents* PrintPreviewDialogController::CreatePrintPreviewDialog(
WebContents* initiator) {
base::AutoReset<bool> auto_reset(&is_creating_print_preview_dialog_, true);
ConstrainedWebDialogDelegate* web_dialog_delegate =
ShowConstrainedWebDialog(initiator->GetBrowserContext(),
new PrintPreviewDialogDelegate(initiator),
initiator);
WebContents* preview_dialog = web_dialog_delegate->GetWebContents();
GURL print_url(chrome::kChromeUIPrintURL);
content::HostZoomMap::Get(preview_dialog->GetSiteInstance())
->SetZoomLevelForHostAndScheme(print_url.scheme(), print_url.host(), 0);
PrintViewManager::CreateForWebContents(preview_dialog);
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::CreateForWebContents(
preview_dialog);
preview_dialog_map_[preview_dialog] = initiator;
waiting_for_new_preview_page_ = true;
task_manager::WebContentsTags::CreateForPrintingContents(preview_dialog);
AddObservers(initiator);
AddObservers(preview_dialog);
return preview_dialog;
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
WebContents* PrintPreviewDialogController::CreatePrintPreviewDialog(
WebContents* initiator) {
base::AutoReset<bool> auto_reset(&is_creating_print_preview_dialog_, true);
ConstrainedWebDialogDelegate* web_dialog_delegate =
ShowConstrainedWebDialog(initiator->GetBrowserContext(),
new PrintPreviewDialogDelegate(initiator),
initiator);
WebContents* preview_dialog = web_dialog_delegate->GetWebContents();
GURL print_url(chrome::kChromeUIPrintURL);
content::HostZoomMap::Get(preview_dialog->GetSiteInstance())
->SetZoomLevelForHostAndScheme(print_url.scheme(), print_url.host(), 0);
PrintViewManager::CreateForWebContents(preview_dialog);
CreateCompositeClientIfNeeded(preview_dialog, true /* for_preview */);
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::CreateForWebContents(
preview_dialog);
preview_dialog_map_[preview_dialog] = initiator;
waiting_for_new_preview_page_ = true;
task_manager::WebContentsTags::CreateForPrintingContents(preview_dialog);
AddObservers(initiator);
AddObservers(preview_dialog);
return preview_dialog;
}
| 171,887
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: store_message(png_store *ps, png_const_structp pp, char *buffer, size_t bufsize,
size_t pos, PNG_CONST char *msg)
{
if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pread)
{
/* Reading a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "read: ");
if (ps->current != NULL)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->current->name);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
}
else if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pwrite)
{
/* Writing a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "write: ");
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->wname);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
else
{
/* Neither reading nor writing (or a memory error in struct delete) */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "pngvalid: ");
}
if (ps->test[0] != 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->test);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, msg);
return pos;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
store_message(png_store *ps, png_const_structp pp, char *buffer, size_t bufsize,
size_t pos, const char *msg)
{
if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pread)
{
/* Reading a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "read: ");
if (ps->current != NULL)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->current->name);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
}
else if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pwrite)
{
/* Writing a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "write: ");
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->wname);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
else
{
/* Neither reading nor writing (or a memory error in struct delete) */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "pngvalid: ");
}
if (ps->test[0] != 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->test);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, msg);
return pos;
}
| 173,706
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session,
TargetRegistry* registry) {
if (!ShouldAllowSession(session))
return false;
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(
GetId(),
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->devtools_frame_token()
: base::UnguessableToken(),
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(
session->client()->MayDiscoverTargets()
? protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kRegular
: protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kAutoAttachOnly,
GetId(), registry)));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (!frame_tree_node_ || !frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(
new protocol::TracingHandler(frame_tree_node_, GetIOContext())));
}
if (sessions().empty()) {
bool use_video_capture_api = true;
#ifdef OS_ANDROID
if (!CompositorImpl::IsInitialized())
use_video_capture_api = false;
#endif
if (!use_video_capture_api)
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session,
TargetRegistry* registry) {
if (!ShouldAllowSession(session))
return false;
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(
GetId(),
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->devtools_frame_token()
: base::UnguessableToken(),
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(
session->client()->MayDiscoverTargets()
? protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kRegular
: protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kAutoAttachOnly,
GetId(), registry)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(
emulation_handler, session->client()->MayAffectLocalFiles())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (!frame_tree_node_ || !frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(
new protocol::TracingHandler(frame_tree_node_, GetIOContext())));
}
if (sessions().empty()) {
bool use_video_capture_api = true;
#ifdef OS_ANDROID
if (!CompositorImpl::IsInitialized())
use_video_capture_api = false;
#endif
if (!use_video_capture_api)
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
| 172,609
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static PassRefPtr<StaticBitmapImage> cropImage(
Image* image,
const ParsedOptions& parsedOptions,
AlphaDisposition imageFormat = PremultiplyAlpha,
ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceOption colorSpaceOp =
ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceApplied) {
ASSERT(image);
IntRect imgRect(IntPoint(), IntSize(image->width(), image->height()));
const IntRect srcRect = intersection(imgRect, parsedOptions.cropRect);
if (srcRect.isEmpty() && !parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha) {
SkImageInfo info =
SkImageInfo::Make(parsedOptions.resizeWidth, parsedOptions.resizeHeight,
kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer = ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(
static_cast<size_t>(info.width()) * info.height(),
info.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
return StaticBitmapImage::create(newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<size_t>(info.width()) * info.bytesPerPixel()));
}
sk_sp<SkImage> skiaImage = image->imageForCurrentFrame();
if ((((!parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha && !skiaImage->isOpaque()) ||
!skiaImage) &&
image->data() && imageFormat == PremultiplyAlpha) ||
colorSpaceOp == ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceIgnored) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageDecoder> decoder(ImageDecoder::create(
image->data(), true,
parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha ? ImageDecoder::AlphaPremultiplied
: ImageDecoder::AlphaNotPremultiplied,
colorSpaceOp));
if (!decoder)
return nullptr;
skiaImage = ImageBitmap::getSkImageFromDecoder(std::move(decoder));
if (!skiaImage)
return nullptr;
}
if (parsedOptions.cropRect == srcRect && !parsedOptions.shouldScaleInput) {
sk_sp<SkImage> croppedSkImage = skiaImage->makeSubset(srcRect);
if (parsedOptions.flipY)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(flipSkImageVertically(
croppedSkImage.get(), parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha
? PremultiplyAlpha
: DontPremultiplyAlpha));
if (parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha && imageFormat == DontPremultiplyAlpha)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(
unPremulSkImageToPremul(croppedSkImage.get()));
croppedSkImage->preroll();
return StaticBitmapImage::create(std::move(croppedSkImage));
}
sk_sp<SkSurface> surface = SkSurface::MakeRasterN32Premul(
parsedOptions.resizeWidth, parsedOptions.resizeHeight);
if (!surface)
return nullptr;
if (srcRect.isEmpty())
return StaticBitmapImage::create(surface->makeImageSnapshot());
SkScalar dstLeft = std::min(0, -parsedOptions.cropRect.x());
SkScalar dstTop = std::min(0, -parsedOptions.cropRect.y());
if (parsedOptions.cropRect.x() < 0)
dstLeft = -parsedOptions.cropRect.x();
if (parsedOptions.cropRect.y() < 0)
dstTop = -parsedOptions.cropRect.y();
if (parsedOptions.flipY) {
surface->getCanvas()->translate(0, surface->height());
surface->getCanvas()->scale(1, -1);
}
if (parsedOptions.shouldScaleInput) {
SkRect drawSrcRect = SkRect::MakeXYWH(
parsedOptions.cropRect.x(), parsedOptions.cropRect.y(),
parsedOptions.cropRect.width(), parsedOptions.cropRect.height());
SkRect drawDstRect = SkRect::MakeXYWH(0, 0, parsedOptions.resizeWidth,
parsedOptions.resizeHeight);
SkPaint paint;
paint.setFilterQuality(parsedOptions.resizeQuality);
surface->getCanvas()->drawImageRect(skiaImage, drawSrcRect, drawDstRect,
&paint);
} else {
surface->getCanvas()->drawImage(skiaImage, dstLeft, dstTop);
}
skiaImage = surface->makeImageSnapshot();
if (parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha) {
if (imageFormat == DontPremultiplyAlpha)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(
unPremulSkImageToPremul(skiaImage.get()));
return StaticBitmapImage::create(std::move(skiaImage));
}
return StaticBitmapImage::create(premulSkImageToUnPremul(skiaImage.get()));
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
static PassRefPtr<StaticBitmapImage> cropImage(
Image* image,
const ParsedOptions& parsedOptions,
AlphaDisposition imageFormat = PremultiplyAlpha,
ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceOption colorSpaceOp =
ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceApplied) {
ASSERT(image);
IntRect imgRect(IntPoint(), IntSize(image->width(), image->height()));
const IntRect srcRect = intersection(imgRect, parsedOptions.cropRect);
if (srcRect.isEmpty() && !parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha) {
SkImageInfo info =
SkImageInfo::Make(parsedOptions.resizeWidth, parsedOptions.resizeHeight,
kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer = ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(
static_cast<unsigned>(info.width()) * info.height(),
info.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
return StaticBitmapImage::create(newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<unsigned>(info.width()) * info.bytesPerPixel()));
}
sk_sp<SkImage> skiaImage = image->imageForCurrentFrame();
if ((((!parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha && !skiaImage->isOpaque()) ||
!skiaImage) &&
image->data() && imageFormat == PremultiplyAlpha) ||
colorSpaceOp == ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceIgnored) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageDecoder> decoder(ImageDecoder::create(
image->data(), true,
parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha ? ImageDecoder::AlphaPremultiplied
: ImageDecoder::AlphaNotPremultiplied,
colorSpaceOp));
if (!decoder)
return nullptr;
skiaImage = ImageBitmap::getSkImageFromDecoder(std::move(decoder));
if (!skiaImage)
return nullptr;
}
if (parsedOptions.cropRect == srcRect && !parsedOptions.shouldScaleInput) {
sk_sp<SkImage> croppedSkImage = skiaImage->makeSubset(srcRect);
if (parsedOptions.flipY)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(flipSkImageVertically(
croppedSkImage.get(), parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha
? PremultiplyAlpha
: DontPremultiplyAlpha));
if (parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha && imageFormat == DontPremultiplyAlpha)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(
unPremulSkImageToPremul(croppedSkImage.get()));
croppedSkImage->preroll();
return StaticBitmapImage::create(std::move(croppedSkImage));
}
sk_sp<SkSurface> surface = SkSurface::MakeRasterN32Premul(
parsedOptions.resizeWidth, parsedOptions.resizeHeight);
if (!surface)
return nullptr;
if (srcRect.isEmpty())
return StaticBitmapImage::create(surface->makeImageSnapshot());
SkScalar dstLeft = std::min(0, -parsedOptions.cropRect.x());
SkScalar dstTop = std::min(0, -parsedOptions.cropRect.y());
if (parsedOptions.cropRect.x() < 0)
dstLeft = -parsedOptions.cropRect.x();
if (parsedOptions.cropRect.y() < 0)
dstTop = -parsedOptions.cropRect.y();
if (parsedOptions.flipY) {
surface->getCanvas()->translate(0, surface->height());
surface->getCanvas()->scale(1, -1);
}
if (parsedOptions.shouldScaleInput) {
SkRect drawSrcRect = SkRect::MakeXYWH(
parsedOptions.cropRect.x(), parsedOptions.cropRect.y(),
parsedOptions.cropRect.width(), parsedOptions.cropRect.height());
SkRect drawDstRect = SkRect::MakeXYWH(0, 0, parsedOptions.resizeWidth,
parsedOptions.resizeHeight);
SkPaint paint;
paint.setFilterQuality(parsedOptions.resizeQuality);
surface->getCanvas()->drawImageRect(skiaImage, drawSrcRect, drawDstRect,
&paint);
} else {
surface->getCanvas()->drawImage(skiaImage, dstLeft, dstTop);
}
skiaImage = surface->makeImageSnapshot();
if (parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha) {
if (imageFormat == DontPremultiplyAlpha)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(
unPremulSkImageToPremul(skiaImage.get()));
return StaticBitmapImage::create(std::move(skiaImage));
}
return StaticBitmapImage::create(premulSkImageToUnPremul(skiaImage.get()));
}
| 172,500
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BinaryUploadService::IsAuthorized(AuthorizationCallback callback) {
if (!timer_.IsRunning()) {
timer_.Start(FROM_HERE, base::TimeDelta::FromHours(24), this,
&BinaryUploadService::ResetAuthorizationData);
}
if (!can_upload_data_.has_value()) {
if (!pending_validate_data_upload_request_) {
std::string dm_token = GetDMToken();
if (dm_token.empty()) {
std::move(callback).Run(false);
return;
}
pending_validate_data_upload_request_ = true;
auto request = std::make_unique<ValidateDataUploadRequest>(base::BindOnce(
&BinaryUploadService::ValidateDataUploadRequestCallback,
weakptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
request->set_dm_token(dm_token);
UploadForDeepScanning(std::move(request));
}
authorization_callbacks_.push_back(std::move(callback));
return;
}
std::move(callback).Run(can_upload_data_.value());
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void BinaryUploadService::IsAuthorized(AuthorizationCallback callback) {
if (!timer_.IsRunning()) {
timer_.Start(FROM_HERE, base::TimeDelta::FromHours(24), this,
&BinaryUploadService::ResetAuthorizationData);
}
if (!can_upload_data_.has_value()) {
if (!pending_validate_data_upload_request_) {
auto dm_token = GetDMToken();
if (!dm_token.is_valid()) {
std::move(callback).Run(false);
return;
}
pending_validate_data_upload_request_ = true;
auto request = std::make_unique<ValidateDataUploadRequest>(base::BindOnce(
&BinaryUploadService::ValidateDataUploadRequestCallback,
weakptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
request->set_dm_token(dm_token.value());
UploadForDeepScanning(std::move(request));
}
authorization_callbacks_.push_back(std::move(callback));
return;
}
std::move(callback).Run(can_upload_data_.value());
}
| 172,355
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SoftG711::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > kMaxNumSamplesPerFrame) {
ALOGE("input buffer too large (%d).", inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
const uint8_t *inputptr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
if (mIsMLaw) {
DecodeMLaw(
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
} else {
DecodeALaw(
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = inHeader->nFilledLen * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (gsm|g711)dec
Bug: 27793163
Bug: 27793367
Change-Id: Iec3de8a237ee2379d87a8371c13e543878c6652c
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void SoftG711::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > kMaxNumSamplesPerFrame) {
ALOGE("input buffer too large (%d).", inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen * sizeof(int16_t) > outHeader->nAllocLen) {
ALOGE("output buffer too small (%d).", outHeader->nAllocLen);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27793163");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
const uint8_t *inputptr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
if (mIsMLaw) {
DecodeMLaw(
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
} else {
DecodeALaw(
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = inHeader->nFilledLen * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
| 173,778
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t HevcParameterSets::addNalUnit(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
uint8_t nalUnitType = (data[0] >> 1) & 0x3f;
status_t err = OK;
switch (nalUnitType) {
case 32: // VPS
err = parseVps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 33: // SPS
err = parseSps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 34: // PPS
err = parsePps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 39: // Prefix SEI
case 40: // Suffix SEI
break;
default:
ALOGE("Unrecognized NAL unit type.");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = ABuffer::CreateAsCopy(data, size);
buffer->setInt32Data(nalUnitType);
mNalUnits.push(buffer);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Validate lengths in HEVC metadata parsing
Add code to validate the size parameter passed to
HecvParameterSets::addNalUnit(). Previously vulnerable
to decrementing an unsigned past 0, yielding a huge result value.
Bug: 35467107
Test: ran POC, no crash, emitted new "bad length" log entry
Change-Id: Ia169b9edc1e0f7c5302e3c68aa90a54e8863d79e
(cherry picked from commit e0dcf097cc029d056926029a29419e1650cbdf1b)
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
status_t HevcParameterSets::addNalUnit(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
if (size < 1) {
ALOGE("empty NAL b/35467107");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t nalUnitType = (data[0] >> 1) & 0x3f;
status_t err = OK;
switch (nalUnitType) {
case 32: // VPS
if (size < 2) {
ALOGE("invalid NAL/VPS size b/35467107");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
err = parseVps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 33: // SPS
if (size < 2) {
ALOGE("invalid NAL/SPS size b/35467107");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
err = parseSps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 34: // PPS
if (size < 2) {
ALOGE("invalid NAL/PPS size b/35467107");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
err = parsePps(data + 2, size - 2);
break;
case 39: // Prefix SEI
case 40: // Suffix SEI
break;
default:
ALOGE("Unrecognized NAL unit type.");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = ABuffer::CreateAsCopy(data, size);
buffer->setInt32Data(nalUnitType);
mNalUnits.push(buffer);
return OK;
}
| 174,001
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AppCacheHost::SelectCacheForWorker(int parent_process_id,
int parent_host_id) {
DCHECK(pending_start_update_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_swap_cache_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_get_status_callback_.is_null() &&
!is_selection_pending() && !was_select_cache_called_);
was_select_cache_called_ = true;
parent_process_id_ = parent_process_id;
parent_host_id_ = parent_host_id;
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID:
|
void AppCacheHost::SelectCacheForWorker(int parent_process_id,
bool AppCacheHost::SelectCacheForWorker(int parent_process_id,
int parent_host_id) {
if (was_select_cache_called_)
return false;
DCHECK(pending_start_update_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_swap_cache_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_get_status_callback_.is_null() &&
!is_selection_pending());
was_select_cache_called_ = true;
parent_process_id_ = parent_process_id;
parent_host_id_ = parent_host_id;
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
return true;
}
| 171,742
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static SECStatus SelectClientCert(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock,
struct CERTDistNamesStr *caNames,
struct CERTCertificateStr **pRetCert,
struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr **pRetKey)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = (struct ssl_connect_data *)arg;
struct Curl_easy *data = connssl->data;
const char *nickname = connssl->client_nickname;
if(connssl->obj_clicert) {
/* use the cert/key provided by PEM reader */
static const char pem_slotname[] = "PEM Token #1";
SECItem cert_der = { 0, NULL, 0 };
void *proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock);
struct CERTCertificateStr *cert;
struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr *key;
PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(pem_slotname);
if(NULL == slot) {
failf(data, "NSS: PK11 slot not found: %s", pem_slotname);
return SECFailure;
}
if(PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypeGeneric, connssl->obj_clicert, CKA_VALUE,
&cert_der) != SECSuccess) {
failf(data, "NSS: CKA_VALUE not found in PK11 generic object");
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
return SECFailure;
}
cert = PK11_FindCertFromDERCertItem(slot, &cert_der, proto_win);
SECITEM_FreeItem(&cert_der, PR_FALSE);
if(NULL == cert) {
failf(data, "NSS: client certificate from file not found");
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
return SECFailure;
}
key = PK11_FindPrivateKeyFromCert(slot, cert, NULL);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
if(NULL == key) {
failf(data, "NSS: private key from file not found");
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
return SECFailure;
}
infof(data, "NSS: client certificate from file\n");
display_cert_info(data, cert);
*pRetCert = cert;
*pRetKey = key;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* use the default NSS hook */
if(SECSuccess != NSS_GetClientAuthData((void *)nickname, sock, caNames,
pRetCert, pRetKey)
|| NULL == *pRetCert) {
if(NULL == nickname)
failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found (nickname not "
"specified)");
else
failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found: %s", nickname);
return SECFailure;
}
/* get certificate nickname if any */
nickname = (*pRetCert)->nickname;
if(NULL == nickname)
nickname = "[unknown]";
if(NULL == *pRetKey) {
failf(data, "NSS: private key not found for certificate: %s", nickname);
return SECFailure;
}
infof(data, "NSS: using client certificate: %s\n", nickname);
display_cert_info(data, *pRetCert);
return SECSuccess;
}
Commit Message: nss: refuse previously loaded certificate from file
... when we are not asked to use a certificate from file
CWE ID: CWE-287
|
static SECStatus SelectClientCert(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock,
struct CERTDistNamesStr *caNames,
struct CERTCertificateStr **pRetCert,
struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr **pRetKey)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = (struct ssl_connect_data *)arg;
struct Curl_easy *data = connssl->data;
const char *nickname = connssl->client_nickname;
static const char pem_slotname[] = "PEM Token #1";
if(connssl->obj_clicert) {
/* use the cert/key provided by PEM reader */
SECItem cert_der = { 0, NULL, 0 };
void *proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock);
struct CERTCertificateStr *cert;
struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr *key;
PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(pem_slotname);
if(NULL == slot) {
failf(data, "NSS: PK11 slot not found: %s", pem_slotname);
return SECFailure;
}
if(PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypeGeneric, connssl->obj_clicert, CKA_VALUE,
&cert_der) != SECSuccess) {
failf(data, "NSS: CKA_VALUE not found in PK11 generic object");
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
return SECFailure;
}
cert = PK11_FindCertFromDERCertItem(slot, &cert_der, proto_win);
SECITEM_FreeItem(&cert_der, PR_FALSE);
if(NULL == cert) {
failf(data, "NSS: client certificate from file not found");
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
return SECFailure;
}
key = PK11_FindPrivateKeyFromCert(slot, cert, NULL);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
if(NULL == key) {
failf(data, "NSS: private key from file not found");
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
return SECFailure;
}
infof(data, "NSS: client certificate from file\n");
display_cert_info(data, cert);
*pRetCert = cert;
*pRetKey = key;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* use the default NSS hook */
if(SECSuccess != NSS_GetClientAuthData((void *)nickname, sock, caNames,
pRetCert, pRetKey)
|| NULL == *pRetCert) {
if(NULL == nickname)
failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found (nickname not "
"specified)");
else
failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found: %s", nickname);
return SECFailure;
}
/* get certificate nickname if any */
nickname = (*pRetCert)->nickname;
if(NULL == nickname)
nickname = "[unknown]";
if(!strncmp(nickname, pem_slotname, sizeof(pem_slotname) - 1U)) {
failf(data, "NSS: refusing previously loaded certificate from file: %s",
nickname);
return SECFailure;
}
if(NULL == *pRetKey) {
failf(data, "NSS: private key not found for certificate: %s", nickname);
return SECFailure;
}
infof(data, "NSS: using client certificate: %s\n", nickname);
display_cert_info(data, *pRetCert);
return SECSuccess;
}
| 166,945
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> CloneVideoFrameWithLayout(
const VideoFrame* const src_frame,
const VideoFrameLayout& dst_layout) {
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->IsMappable());
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->format() == dst_layout.format());
auto dst_frame = VideoFrame::CreateFrameWithLayout(
dst_layout, src_frame->visible_rect(), src_frame->natural_size(),
src_frame->timestamp(), false /* zero_initialize_memory*/);
if (!dst_frame) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create VideoFrame";
return nullptr;
}
const size_t num_planes = VideoFrame::NumPlanes(dst_layout.format());
LOG_ASSERT(dst_layout.planes().size() == num_planes);
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->layout().planes().size() == num_planes);
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_planes; ++i) {
libyuv::CopyPlane(
src_frame->data(i), src_frame->layout().planes()[i].stride,
dst_frame->data(i), dst_frame->layout().planes()[i].stride,
VideoFrame::Columns(i, dst_frame->format(),
dst_frame->natural_size().width()),
VideoFrame::Rows(i, dst_frame->format(),
dst_frame->natural_size().height()));
}
return dst_frame;
}
Commit Message: media/gpu/test: ImageProcessorClient: Use bytes for width and height in libyuv::CopyPlane()
|width| is in bytes in libyuv::CopyPlane(). We formerly pass width in pixels.
This should matter when a pixel format is used whose pixel is composed of
more than one bytes.
Bug: None
Test: image_processor_test
Change-Id: I98e90be70c8d0128319172d4d19f3a8017b65d78
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1553129
Commit-Queue: Hirokazu Honda <hiroh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#648117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> CloneVideoFrameWithLayout(
const VideoFrame* const src_frame,
const VideoFrameLayout& dst_layout) {
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->IsMappable());
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->format() == dst_layout.format());
auto dst_frame = VideoFrame::CreateFrameWithLayout(
dst_layout, src_frame->visible_rect(), src_frame->natural_size(),
src_frame->timestamp(), false /* zero_initialize_memory*/);
if (!dst_frame) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create VideoFrame";
return nullptr;
}
const size_t num_planes = VideoFrame::NumPlanes(dst_layout.format());
LOG_ASSERT(dst_layout.planes().size() == num_planes);
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->layout().planes().size() == num_planes);
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_planes; ++i) {
// |width| in libyuv::CopyPlane() is in bytes, not pixels.
gfx::Size plane_size = VideoFrame::PlaneSize(dst_frame->format(), i,
dst_frame->natural_size());
libyuv::CopyPlane(
src_frame->data(i), src_frame->layout().planes()[i].stride,
dst_frame->data(i), dst_frame->layout().planes()[i].stride,
plane_size.width(), plane_size.height());
}
return dst_frame;
}
| 172,397
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: header_put_byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 1)
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
} /* header_put_byte */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
header_put_byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char x)
{ psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = x ;
} /* header_put_byte */
| 170,053
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: InputMethodStatusConnection* ChromeOSMonitorInputMethodStatus(
void* language_library,
LanguageCurrentInputMethodMonitorFunction current_input_method_changed,
LanguageRegisterImePropertiesFunction register_ime_properties,
LanguageUpdateImePropertyFunction update_ime_property,
LanguageConnectionChangeMonitorFunction connection_changed) {
DLOG(INFO) << "MonitorInputMethodStatus";
return InputMethodStatusConnection::GetConnection(
language_library,
current_input_method_changed,
register_ime_properties,
update_ime_property,
connection_changed);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
InputMethodStatusConnection* ChromeOSMonitorInputMethodStatus(
| 170,524
|
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