instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.3k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
const unsigned char *data,
const unsigned char *limit,
int *al)
{
unsigned short type, size, len;
/* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
return 1;
if (data >= limit - 2)
return 1;
n2s(data, len);
if (data > limit - len)
return 1;
while (data <= limit - 4) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
if (data + size > limit)
return 1;
if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
return 0;
data += size;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
const unsigned char *data,
const unsigned char *limit,
int *al)
{
unsigned short type, size, len;
/* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
return 1;
if (limit - data <= 2)
return 1;
n2s(data, len);
if (limit - data < len)
return 1;
while (limit - data >= 4) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
if (limit - data < size)
return 1;
if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
return 0;
data += size;
}
return 1;
}
| 165,203
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DataReductionProxySettings::MaybeActivateDataReductionProxy(
bool at_startup) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
PrefService* prefs = GetOriginalProfilePrefs();
if (!prefs)
return;
if (spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.GetValue() && at_startup) {
int64_t last_enabled_time =
prefs->GetInt64(prefs::kDataReductionProxyLastEnabledTime);
if (last_enabled_time != 0) {
RecordDaysSinceEnabledMetric(
(clock_->Now() - base::Time::FromInternalValue(last_enabled_time))
.InDays());
}
int64_t last_savings_cleared_time = prefs->GetInt64(
prefs::kDataReductionProxySavingsClearedNegativeSystemClock);
if (last_savings_cleared_time != 0) {
int32_t days_since_savings_cleared =
(clock_->Now() -
base::Time::FromInternalValue(last_savings_cleared_time))
.InDays();
if (days_since_savings_cleared == 0)
days_since_savings_cleared = 1;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS(
"DataReductionProxy.DaysSinceSavingsCleared.NegativeSystemClock",
days_since_savings_cleared, 1, 365, 50);
}
}
if (spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.GetValue() &&
!prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kDataReductionProxyWasEnabledBefore)) {
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kDataReductionProxyWasEnabledBefore, true);
ResetDataReductionStatistics();
}
if (!at_startup) {
if (IsDataReductionProxyEnabled()) {
RecordSettingsEnabledState(DATA_REDUCTION_SETTINGS_ACTION_OFF_TO_ON);
prefs->SetInt64(prefs::kDataReductionProxyLastEnabledTime,
clock_->Now().ToInternalValue());
RecordDaysSinceEnabledMetric(0);
} else {
RecordSettingsEnabledState(DATA_REDUCTION_SETTINGS_ACTION_ON_TO_OFF);
}
}
if (at_startup && !data_reduction_proxy_service_->Initialized())
deferred_initialization_ = true;
else
UpdateIOData(at_startup);
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void DataReductionProxySettings::MaybeActivateDataReductionProxy(
bool at_startup) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
PrefService* prefs = GetOriginalProfilePrefs();
if (!prefs)
return;
bool enabled = IsDataSaverEnabledByUser(prefs);
if (enabled && at_startup) {
int64_t last_enabled_time =
prefs->GetInt64(prefs::kDataReductionProxyLastEnabledTime);
if (last_enabled_time != 0) {
RecordDaysSinceEnabledMetric(
(clock_->Now() - base::Time::FromInternalValue(last_enabled_time))
.InDays());
}
int64_t last_savings_cleared_time = prefs->GetInt64(
prefs::kDataReductionProxySavingsClearedNegativeSystemClock);
if (last_savings_cleared_time != 0) {
int32_t days_since_savings_cleared =
(clock_->Now() -
base::Time::FromInternalValue(last_savings_cleared_time))
.InDays();
if (days_since_savings_cleared == 0)
days_since_savings_cleared = 1;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS(
"DataReductionProxy.DaysSinceSavingsCleared.NegativeSystemClock",
days_since_savings_cleared, 1, 365, 50);
}
}
if (enabled &&
!prefs->GetBoolean(prefs::kDataReductionProxyWasEnabledBefore)) {
prefs->SetBoolean(prefs::kDataReductionProxyWasEnabledBefore, true);
ResetDataReductionStatistics();
}
if (!at_startup) {
if (IsDataReductionProxyEnabled()) {
RecordSettingsEnabledState(DATA_REDUCTION_SETTINGS_ACTION_OFF_TO_ON);
prefs->SetInt64(prefs::kDataReductionProxyLastEnabledTime,
clock_->Now().ToInternalValue());
RecordDaysSinceEnabledMetric(0);
} else {
RecordSettingsEnabledState(DATA_REDUCTION_SETTINGS_ACTION_ON_TO_OFF);
}
}
if (at_startup && !data_reduction_proxy_service_->Initialized())
deferred_initialization_ = true;
else
UpdateIOData(at_startup);
}
| 172,557
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: krb5_gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag,
qop_req, req_output_size, max_input_size)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
OM_uint32 req_output_size;
OM_uint32 *max_input_size;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
OM_uint32 data_size, conflen;
OM_uint32 ohlen;
int overhead;
/* only default qop is allowed */
if (qop_req != GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
if (ctx->proto == 1) {
/* No pseudo-ASN.1 wrapper overhead, so no sequence length and
OID. */
OM_uint32 sz = req_output_size;
/* Token header: 16 octets. */
if (conf_req_flag) {
krb5_key key;
krb5_enctype enctype;
key = ctx->have_acceptor_subkey ? ctx->acceptor_subkey
: ctx->subkey;
enctype = key->keyblock.enctype;
while (sz > 0 && krb5_encrypt_size(sz, enctype) + 16 > req_output_size)
sz--;
/* Allow for encrypted copy of header. */
if (sz > 16)
sz -= 16;
else
sz = 0;
#ifdef CFX_EXERCISE
/* Allow for EC padding. In the MIT implementation, only
added while testing. */
if (sz > 65535)
sz -= 65535;
else
sz = 0;
#endif
} else {
krb5_cksumtype cksumtype;
krb5_error_code err;
size_t cksumsize;
cksumtype = ctx->have_acceptor_subkey ? ctx->acceptor_subkey_cksumtype
: ctx->cksumtype;
err = krb5_c_checksum_length(ctx->k5_context, cksumtype, &cksumsize);
if (err) {
*minor_status = err;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
/* Allow for token header and checksum. */
if (sz < 16 + cksumsize)
sz = 0;
else
sz -= (16 + cksumsize);
}
*max_input_size = sz;
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
/* Calculate the token size and subtract that from the output size */
overhead = 7 + ctx->mech_used->length;
data_size = req_output_size;
conflen = kg_confounder_size(ctx->k5_context, ctx->enc->keyblock.enctype);
data_size = (conflen + data_size + 8) & (~(OM_uint32)7);
ohlen = g_token_size(ctx->mech_used,
(unsigned int) (data_size + ctx->cksum_size + 14))
- req_output_size;
if (ohlen+overhead < req_output_size)
/*
* Cannot have trailer length that will cause us to pad over our
* length.
*/
*max_input_size = (req_output_size - ohlen - overhead) & (~(OM_uint32)7);
else
*max_input_size = 0;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
|
krb5_gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag,
qop_req, req_output_size, max_input_size)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
OM_uint32 req_output_size;
OM_uint32 *max_input_size;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
OM_uint32 data_size, conflen;
OM_uint32 ohlen;
int overhead;
/* only default qop is allowed */
if (qop_req != GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
if (ctx->proto == 1) {
/* No pseudo-ASN.1 wrapper overhead, so no sequence length and
OID. */
OM_uint32 sz = req_output_size;
/* Token header: 16 octets. */
if (conf_req_flag) {
krb5_key key;
krb5_enctype enctype;
key = ctx->have_acceptor_subkey ? ctx->acceptor_subkey
: ctx->subkey;
enctype = key->keyblock.enctype;
while (sz > 0 && krb5_encrypt_size(sz, enctype) + 16 > req_output_size)
sz--;
/* Allow for encrypted copy of header. */
if (sz > 16)
sz -= 16;
else
sz = 0;
#ifdef CFX_EXERCISE
/* Allow for EC padding. In the MIT implementation, only
added while testing. */
if (sz > 65535)
sz -= 65535;
else
sz = 0;
#endif
} else {
krb5_cksumtype cksumtype;
krb5_error_code err;
size_t cksumsize;
cksumtype = ctx->have_acceptor_subkey ? ctx->acceptor_subkey_cksumtype
: ctx->cksumtype;
err = krb5_c_checksum_length(ctx->k5_context, cksumtype, &cksumsize);
if (err) {
*minor_status = err;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
/* Allow for token header and checksum. */
if (sz < 16 + cksumsize)
sz = 0;
else
sz -= (16 + cksumsize);
}
*max_input_size = sz;
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
/* Calculate the token size and subtract that from the output size */
overhead = 7 + ctx->mech_used->length;
data_size = req_output_size;
conflen = kg_confounder_size(ctx->k5_context, ctx->enc->keyblock.enctype);
data_size = (conflen + data_size + 8) & (~(OM_uint32)7);
ohlen = g_token_size(ctx->mech_used,
(unsigned int) (data_size + ctx->cksum_size + 14))
- req_output_size;
if (ohlen+overhead < req_output_size)
/*
* Cannot have trailer length that will cause us to pad over our
* length.
*/
*max_input_size = (req_output_size - ohlen - overhead) & (~(OM_uint32)7);
else
*max_input_size = 0;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
| 166,824
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: usage(const char *prog)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [OPTION...]\n", prog);
fprintf(stderr, " -f, --use-file=FILE Use the specified configuration file\n");
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -P, --vrrp Only run with VRRP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -C, --check Only run with Health-checker subsystem\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -B, --no_bfd Don't run BFD subsystem\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " --all Force all child processes to run, even if have no configuration\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -l, --log-console Log messages to local console\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -D, --log-detail Detailed log messages\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -S, --log-facility=[0-7] Set syslog facility to LOG_LOCAL[0-7]\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -g, --log-file=FILE Also log to FILE (default /tmp/keepalived.log)\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --flush-log-file Flush log file on write\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -G, --no-syslog Don't log via syslog\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -X, --release-vips Drop VIP on transition from signal.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -V, --dont-release-vrrp Don't remove VRRP VIPs and VROUTEs on daemon stop\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -I, --dont-release-ipvs Don't remove IPVS topology on daemon stop\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -R, --dont-respawn Don't respawn child processes\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -n, --dont-fork Don't fork the daemon process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -d, --dump-conf Dump the configuration data\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -p, --pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for parent process\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -r, --vrrp_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for VRRP child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -c, --checkers_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for checkers child process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -a, --address-monitoring Report all address additions/deletions notified via netlink\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -b, --bfd_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for BFD child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
fprintf(stderr, " -x, --snmp Enable SNMP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -A, --snmp-agent-socket=FILE Use the specified socket for master agent\n");
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
fprintf(stderr, " -s, --namespace=NAME Run in network namespace NAME (overrides config)\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -m, --core-dump Produce core dump if terminate abnormally\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -M, --core-dump-pattern=PATN Also set /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern to PATN (default 'core')\n");
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
fprintf(stderr, " -L, --mem-check-log Log malloc/frees to syslog\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -i, --config-id id Skip any configuration lines beginning '@' that don't match id\n"
" or any lines beginning @^ that do match.\n"
" The config-id defaults to the node name if option not used\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --signum=SIGFUNC Return signal number for STOP, RELOAD, DATA, STATS"
#ifdef _WITH_JSON_
", JSON"
#endif
"\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -t, --config-test[=LOG_FILE] Check the configuration for obvious errors, output to\n"
" stderr by default\n");
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
fprintf(stderr, " --perf[=PERF_TYPE] Collect perf data, PERF_TYPE=all, run(default) or end\n");
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
fprintf(stderr, " --debug[=...] Enable debug options. p, b, c, v specify parent, bfd, checker and vrrp processes\n");
#ifdef _TIMER_CHECK_
fprintf(stderr, " T - timer debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _SMTP_ALERT_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " M - email alert debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " E - epoll debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_THREAD_DUMP_
fprintf(stderr, " D - epoll thread dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _VRRP_FD_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, " F - vrrp fd dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _REGEX_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " R - regex debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_REGEX_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " X - regex timers\n");
#endif
#ifdef _TSM_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " S - TSM debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _NETLINK_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " N - netlink timer debug\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " Example --debug=TpMEvcp\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -v, --version Display the version number\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -h, --help Display this help message\n");
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
usage(const char *prog)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [OPTION...]\n", prog);
fprintf(stderr, " -f, --use-file=FILE Use the specified configuration file\n");
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -P, --vrrp Only run with VRRP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -C, --check Only run with Health-checker subsystem\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -B, --no_bfd Don't run BFD subsystem\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " --all Force all child processes to run, even if have no configuration\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -l, --log-console Log messages to local console\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -D, --log-detail Detailed log messages\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -S, --log-facility=[0-7] Set syslog facility to LOG_LOCAL[0-7]\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -g, --log-file=FILE Also log to FILE (default /tmp/keepalived.log)\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --flush-log-file Flush log file on write\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -G, --no-syslog Don't log via syslog\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -u, --umask=MASK umask for file creation (in numeric form)\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -X, --release-vips Drop VIP on transition from signal.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -V, --dont-release-vrrp Don't remove VRRP VIPs and VROUTEs on daemon stop\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -I, --dont-release-ipvs Don't remove IPVS topology on daemon stop\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -R, --dont-respawn Don't respawn child processes\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -n, --dont-fork Don't fork the daemon process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -d, --dump-conf Dump the configuration data\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -p, --pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for parent process\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -r, --vrrp_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for VRRP child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -c, --checkers_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for checkers child process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -a, --address-monitoring Report all address additions/deletions notified via netlink\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -b, --bfd_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for BFD child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
fprintf(stderr, " -x, --snmp Enable SNMP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -A, --snmp-agent-socket=FILE Use the specified socket for master agent\n");
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
fprintf(stderr, " -s, --namespace=NAME Run in network namespace NAME (overrides config)\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -m, --core-dump Produce core dump if terminate abnormally\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -M, --core-dump-pattern=PATN Also set /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern to PATN (default 'core')\n");
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
fprintf(stderr, " -L, --mem-check-log Log malloc/frees to syslog\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -i, --config-id id Skip any configuration lines beginning '@' that don't match id\n"
" or any lines beginning @^ that do match.\n"
" The config-id defaults to the node name if option not used\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --signum=SIGFUNC Return signal number for STOP, RELOAD, DATA, STATS"
#ifdef _WITH_JSON_
", JSON"
#endif
"\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -t, --config-test[=LOG_FILE] Check the configuration for obvious errors, output to\n"
" stderr by default\n");
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
fprintf(stderr, " --perf[=PERF_TYPE] Collect perf data, PERF_TYPE=all, run(default) or end\n");
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
fprintf(stderr, " --debug[=...] Enable debug options. p, b, c, v specify parent, bfd, checker and vrrp processes\n");
#ifdef _TIMER_CHECK_
fprintf(stderr, " T - timer debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _SMTP_ALERT_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " M - email alert debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " E - epoll debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_THREAD_DUMP_
fprintf(stderr, " D - epoll thread dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _VRRP_FD_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, " F - vrrp fd dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _REGEX_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " R - regex debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_REGEX_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " X - regex timers\n");
#endif
#ifdef _TSM_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " S - TSM debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _NETLINK_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " N - netlink timer debug\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " Example --debug=TpMEvcp\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -v, --version Display the version number\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -h, --help Display this help message\n");
}
| 168,984
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: InternalWebIntentsDispatcherTest() {
replied_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized member in ctor.
TBR=darin@chromium.org
R=jhawkins@chromium.org
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10377180
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137606 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
InternalWebIntentsDispatcherTest() {
InternalWebIntentsDispatcherTest()
: replied_(0),
notified_reply_type_(webkit_glue::WEB_INTENT_REPLY_INVALID) {
}
| 170,761
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(rt_sigqueueinfo, pid_t, pid, int, sig,
siginfo_t __user *, uinfo)
{
siginfo_t info;
if (copy_from_user(&info, uinfo, sizeof(siginfo_t)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
Nor can they impersonate a kill(), which adds source info. */
if (info.si_code >= 0)
return -EPERM;
info.si_signo = sig;
/* POSIX.1b doesn't mention process groups. */
return kill_proc_info(sig, &info, pid);
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(rt_sigqueueinfo, pid_t, pid, int, sig,
siginfo_t __user *, uinfo)
{
siginfo_t info;
if (copy_from_user(&info, uinfo, sizeof(siginfo_t)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
* Nor can they impersonate a kill()/tgkill(), which adds source info.
*/
if (info.si_code != SI_QUEUE) {
/* We used to allow any < 0 si_code */
WARN_ON_ONCE(info.si_code < 0);
return -EPERM;
}
info.si_signo = sig;
/* POSIX.1b doesn't mention process groups. */
return kill_proc_info(sig, &info, pid);
}
| 166,231
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static size_t ZSTD_encodeSequences(
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_MatchLength, BYTE const* mlCodeTable,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_OffsetBits, BYTE const* ofCodeTable,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_LitLength, BYTE const* llCodeTable,
seqDef const* sequences, size_t nbSeq, int longOffsets, int bmi2)
{
#if DYNAMIC_BMI2
if (bmi2) {
return ZSTD_encodeSequences_bmi2(dst, dstCapacity,
CTable_MatchLength, mlCodeTable,
CTable_OffsetBits, ofCodeTable,
CTable_LitLength, llCodeTable,
sequences, nbSeq, longOffsets);
}
#endif
(void)bmi2;
return ZSTD_encodeSequences_default(dst, dstCapacity,
CTable_MatchLength, mlCodeTable,
CTable_OffsetBits, ofCodeTable,
CTable_LitLength, llCodeTable,
sequences, nbSeq, longOffsets);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
static size_t ZSTD_encodeSequences(
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_MatchLength, BYTE const* mlCodeTable,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_OffsetBits, BYTE const* ofCodeTable,
FSE_CTable const* CTable_LitLength, BYTE const* llCodeTable,
seqDef const* sequences, size_t nbSeq, int longOffsets, int bmi2)
{
DEBUGLOG(5, "ZSTD_encodeSequences: dstCapacity = %u", (unsigned)dstCapacity);
#if DYNAMIC_BMI2
if (bmi2) {
return ZSTD_encodeSequences_bmi2(dst, dstCapacity,
CTable_MatchLength, mlCodeTable,
CTable_OffsetBits, ofCodeTable,
CTable_LitLength, llCodeTable,
sequences, nbSeq, longOffsets);
}
#endif
(void)bmi2;
return ZSTD_encodeSequences_default(dst, dstCapacity,
CTable_MatchLength, mlCodeTable,
CTable_OffsetBits, ofCodeTable,
CTable_LitLength, llCodeTable,
sequences, nbSeq, longOffsets);
}
| 169,673
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static SCSIRequest *scsi_new_request(SCSIDevice *d, uint32_t tag,
uint32_t lun, void *hba_private)
{
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, d);
SCSIRequest *req;
SCSIDiskReq *r;
req = scsi_req_alloc(&scsi_disk_reqops, &s->qdev, tag, lun, hba_private);
r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
r->iov.iov_base = qemu_blockalign(s->bs, SCSI_DMA_BUF_SIZE);
return req;
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static SCSIRequest *scsi_new_request(SCSIDevice *d, uint32_t tag,
uint32_t lun, void *hba_private)
{
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, d);
SCSIRequest *req;
req = scsi_req_alloc(&scsi_disk_reqops, &s->qdev, tag, lun, hba_private);
return req;
}
| 166,555
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xsltFreeTemplateHashes(xsltStylesheetPtr style) {
if (style->templatesHash != NULL)
xmlHashFree((xmlHashTablePtr) style->templatesHash,
(xmlHashDeallocator) xsltFreeCompMatchList);
if (style->rootMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->rootMatch);
if (style->keyMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->keyMatch);
if (style->elemMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->elemMatch);
if (style->attrMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->attrMatch);
if (style->parentMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->parentMatch);
if (style->textMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->textMatch);
if (style->piMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->piMatch);
if (style->commentMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->commentMatch);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
xsltFreeTemplateHashes(xsltStylesheetPtr style) {
if (style->templatesHash != NULL)
xmlHashFree((xmlHashTablePtr) style->templatesHash,
(xmlHashDeallocator) xsltFreeCompMatchList);
if (style->rootMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->rootMatch);
if (style->keyMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->keyMatch);
if (style->elemMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->elemMatch);
if (style->attrMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->attrMatch);
if (style->parentMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->parentMatch);
if (style->textMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->textMatch);
if (style->piMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->piMatch);
if (style->commentMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->commentMatch);
if (style->namedTemplates != NULL)
xmlHashFree(style->namedTemplates, NULL);
}
| 173,312
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: rdpsnddbg_process(STREAM s)
{
unsigned int pkglen;
static char *rest = NULL;
char *buf;
pkglen = s->end - s->p;
/* str_handle_lines requires null terminated strings */
buf = (char *) xmalloc(pkglen + 1);
STRNCPY(buf, (char *) s->p, pkglen + 1);
str_handle_lines(buf, &rest, rdpsnddbg_line_handler, NULL);
xfree(buf);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
rdpsnddbg_process(STREAM s)
{
unsigned int pkglen;
static char *rest = NULL;
char *buf;
if (!s_check(s))
{
rdp_protocol_error("rdpsnddbg_process(), stream is in unstable state", s);
}
pkglen = s->end - s->p;
/* str_handle_lines requires null terminated strings */
buf = (char *) xmalloc(pkglen + 1);
STRNCPY(buf, (char *) s->p, pkglen + 1);
str_handle_lines(buf, &rest, rdpsnddbg_line_handler, NULL);
xfree(buf);
}
| 169,807
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: WebContentsImpl::WebContentsImpl(BrowserContext* browser_context)
: delegate_(NULL),
controller_(this, browser_context),
render_view_host_delegate_view_(NULL),
created_with_opener_(false),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
accessible_parent_(NULL),
#endif
frame_tree_(new NavigatorImpl(&controller_, this),
this,
this,
this,
this),
is_loading_(false),
is_load_to_different_document_(false),
crashed_status_(base::TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING),
crashed_error_code_(0),
waiting_for_response_(false),
load_state_(net::LOAD_STATE_IDLE, base::string16()),
upload_size_(0),
upload_position_(0),
is_resume_pending_(false),
displayed_insecure_content_(false),
has_accessed_initial_document_(false),
theme_color_(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT),
last_sent_theme_color_(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT),
did_first_visually_non_empty_paint_(false),
capturer_count_(0),
should_normally_be_visible_(true),
is_being_destroyed_(false),
notify_disconnection_(false),
dialog_manager_(NULL),
is_showing_before_unload_dialog_(false),
last_active_time_(base::TimeTicks::Now()),
closed_by_user_gesture_(false),
minimum_zoom_percent_(static_cast<int>(kMinimumZoomFactor * 100)),
maximum_zoom_percent_(static_cast<int>(kMaximumZoomFactor * 100)),
zoom_scroll_remainder_(0),
render_view_message_source_(NULL),
render_frame_message_source_(NULL),
fullscreen_widget_routing_id_(MSG_ROUTING_NONE),
fullscreen_widget_had_focus_at_shutdown_(false),
is_subframe_(false),
force_disable_overscroll_content_(false),
last_dialog_suppressed_(false),
geolocation_service_context_(new GeolocationServiceContext()),
accessibility_mode_(
BrowserAccessibilityStateImpl::GetInstance()->accessibility_mode()),
audio_stream_monitor_(this),
virtual_keyboard_requested_(false),
page_scale_factor_is_one_(true),
loading_weak_factory_(this) {
frame_tree_.SetFrameRemoveListener(
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnFrameRemoved,
base::Unretained(this)));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
media_web_contents_observer_.reset(new MediaWebContentsObserverAndroid(this));
#else
media_web_contents_observer_.reset(new MediaWebContentsObserver(this));
#endif
loader_io_thread_notifier_.reset(new LoaderIOThreadNotifier(this));
wake_lock_service_context_.reset(new WakeLockServiceContext(this));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
|
WebContentsImpl::WebContentsImpl(BrowserContext* browser_context)
: delegate_(NULL),
controller_(this, browser_context),
render_view_host_delegate_view_(NULL),
created_with_opener_(false),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
accessible_parent_(NULL),
#endif
frame_tree_(new NavigatorImpl(&controller_, this),
this,
this,
this,
this),
is_loading_(false),
is_load_to_different_document_(false),
crashed_status_(base::TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING),
crashed_error_code_(0),
waiting_for_response_(false),
load_state_(net::LOAD_STATE_IDLE, base::string16()),
upload_size_(0),
upload_position_(0),
is_resume_pending_(false),
displayed_insecure_content_(false),
has_accessed_initial_document_(false),
theme_color_(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT),
last_sent_theme_color_(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT),
did_first_visually_non_empty_paint_(false),
capturer_count_(0),
should_normally_be_visible_(true),
is_being_destroyed_(false),
notify_disconnection_(false),
dialog_manager_(NULL),
is_showing_before_unload_dialog_(false),
last_active_time_(base::TimeTicks::Now()),
closed_by_user_gesture_(false),
minimum_zoom_percent_(static_cast<int>(kMinimumZoomFactor * 100)),
maximum_zoom_percent_(static_cast<int>(kMaximumZoomFactor * 100)),
zoom_scroll_remainder_(0),
render_view_message_source_(NULL),
render_frame_message_source_(NULL),
fullscreen_widget_routing_id_(MSG_ROUTING_NONE),
fullscreen_widget_had_focus_at_shutdown_(false),
is_subframe_(false),
force_disable_overscroll_content_(false),
last_dialog_suppressed_(false),
geolocation_service_context_(new GeolocationServiceContext()),
accessibility_mode_(
BrowserAccessibilityStateImpl::GetInstance()->accessibility_mode()),
audio_stream_monitor_(this),
virtual_keyboard_requested_(false),
page_scale_factor_is_one_(true),
loading_weak_factory_(this),
weak_factory_(this) {
frame_tree_.SetFrameRemoveListener(
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnFrameRemoved,
base::Unretained(this)));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
media_web_contents_observer_.reset(new MediaWebContentsObserverAndroid(this));
#else
media_web_contents_observer_.reset(new MediaWebContentsObserver(this));
#endif
loader_io_thread_notifier_.reset(new LoaderIOThreadNotifier(this));
wake_lock_service_context_.reset(new WakeLockServiceContext(this));
}
| 172,211
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool InputMethodController::FinishComposingText(
ConfirmCompositionBehavior confirm_behavior) {
if (!HasComposition())
return false;
const bool is_too_long = IsTextTooLongAt(composition_range_->StartPosition());
const String& composing = ComposingText();
if (confirm_behavior == kKeepSelection) {
const bool is_handle_visible = GetFrame().Selection().IsHandleVisible();
const PlainTextRange& old_offsets = GetSelectionOffsets();
Editor::RevealSelectionScope reveal_selection_scope(&GetEditor());
if (is_too_long) {
ReplaceComposition(ComposingText());
} else {
Clear();
DispatchCompositionEndEvent(GetFrame(), composing);
}
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& old_selection_range =
EphemeralRangeForOffsets(old_offsets);
if (old_selection_range.IsNull())
return false;
const SelectionInDOMTree& selection =
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(old_selection_range)
.SetIsHandleVisible(is_handle_visible)
.Build();
GetFrame().Selection().SetSelection(
selection,
SetSelectionData::Builder().SetShouldCloseTyping(true).Build());
return true;
}
Element* root_editable_element =
GetFrame()
.Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.RootEditableElement();
if (!root_editable_element)
return false;
PlainTextRange composition_range =
PlainTextRange::Create(*root_editable_element, *composition_range_);
if (composition_range.IsNull())
return false;
if (is_too_long) {
ReplaceComposition(ComposingText());
} else {
Clear();
}
if (!MoveCaret(composition_range.End()))
return false;
DispatchCompositionEndEvent(GetFrame(), composing);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool InputMethodController::FinishComposingText(
ConfirmCompositionBehavior confirm_behavior) {
if (!HasComposition())
return false;
const bool is_too_long = IsTextTooLongAt(composition_range_->StartPosition());
const String& composing = ComposingText();
if (confirm_behavior == kKeepSelection) {
const bool is_handle_visible = GetFrame().Selection().IsHandleVisible();
const PlainTextRange& old_offsets = GetSelectionOffsets();
Editor::RevealSelectionScope reveal_selection_scope(&GetEditor());
if (is_too_long) {
ReplaceComposition(ComposingText());
} else {
Clear();
DispatchCompositionEndEvent(GetFrame(), composing);
}
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const EphemeralRange& old_selection_range =
EphemeralRangeForOffsets(old_offsets);
if (old_selection_range.IsNull())
return false;
const SelectionInDOMTree& selection =
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(old_selection_range)
.Build();
GetFrame().Selection().SetSelection(
selection, SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldShowHandle(is_handle_visible)
.Build());
return true;
}
Element* root_editable_element =
GetFrame()
.Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.RootEditableElement();
if (!root_editable_element)
return false;
PlainTextRange composition_range =
PlainTextRange::Create(*root_editable_element, *composition_range_);
if (composition_range.IsNull())
return false;
if (is_too_long) {
ReplaceComposition(ComposingText());
} else {
Clear();
}
if (!MoveCaret(composition_range.End()))
return false;
DispatchCompositionEndEvent(GetFrame(), composing);
return true;
}
| 171,761
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ExtensionOptionsGuest::DidNavigateMainFrame(
const content::LoadCommittedDetails& details,
const content::FrameNavigateParams& params) {
if (attached()) {
auto guest_zoom_controller =
ui_zoom::ZoomController::FromWebContents(web_contents());
guest_zoom_controller->SetZoomMode(
ui_zoom::ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_ISOLATED);
SetGuestZoomLevelToMatchEmbedder();
if (params.url.GetOrigin() != options_page_.GetOrigin()) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost(),
bad_message::EOG_BAD_ORIGIN);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
void ExtensionOptionsGuest::DidNavigateMainFrame(
const content::LoadCommittedDetails& details,
const content::FrameNavigateParams& params) {
if (attached()) {
auto guest_zoom_controller =
ui_zoom::ZoomController::FromWebContents(web_contents());
guest_zoom_controller->SetZoomMode(
ui_zoom::ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_ISOLATED);
SetGuestZoomLevelToMatchEmbedder();
if (!url::IsSameOriginWith(params.url, options_page_)) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost(),
bad_message::EOG_BAD_ORIGIN);
}
}
}
| 172,282
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int svc_rdma_init(void)
{
dprintk("SVCRDMA Module Init, register RPC RDMA transport\n");
dprintk("\tsvcrdma_ord : %d\n", svcrdma_ord);
dprintk("\tmax_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_requests);
dprintk("\tsq_depth : %u\n",
svcrdma_max_requests * RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT);
dprintk("\tmax_bc_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_bc_requests);
dprintk("\tmax_inline : %d\n", svcrdma_max_req_size);
svc_rdma_wq = alloc_workqueue("svc_rdma", 0, 0);
if (!svc_rdma_wq)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!svcrdma_table_header)
svcrdma_table_header =
register_sysctl_table(svcrdma_root_table);
/* Register RDMA with the SVC transport switch */
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_class);
#if defined(CONFIG_SUNRPC_BACKCHANNEL)
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_bc_class);
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
int svc_rdma_init(void)
{
dprintk("SVCRDMA Module Init, register RPC RDMA transport\n");
dprintk("\tsvcrdma_ord : %d\n", svcrdma_ord);
dprintk("\tmax_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_requests);
dprintk("\tmax_bc_requests : %u\n", svcrdma_max_bc_requests);
dprintk("\tmax_inline : %d\n", svcrdma_max_req_size);
svc_rdma_wq = alloc_workqueue("svc_rdma", 0, 0);
if (!svc_rdma_wq)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!svcrdma_table_header)
svcrdma_table_header =
register_sysctl_table(svcrdma_root_table);
/* Register RDMA with the SVC transport switch */
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_class);
#if defined(CONFIG_SUNRPC_BACKCHANNEL)
svc_reg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_bc_class);
#endif
return 0;
}
| 168,156
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, getFilename)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
int path_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_filesystem_object_get_path(intern, &path_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (path_len && path_len < intern->file_name_len) {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name + path_len + 1, intern->file_name_len - (path_len + 1), 1);
} else {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, getFilename)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
int path_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_filesystem_object_get_path(intern, &path_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (path_len && path_len < intern->file_name_len) {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name + path_len + 1, intern->file_name_len - (path_len + 1), 1);
} else {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
}
| 167,032
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static enum entity_charset determine_charset(char *charset_hint TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i;
enum entity_charset charset = cs_utf_8;
int len = 0;
const zend_encoding *zenc;
/* Default is now UTF-8 */
if (charset_hint == NULL)
return cs_utf_8;
if ((len = strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
zenc = zend_multibyte_get_internal_encoding(TSRMLS_C);
if (zenc != NULL) {
charset_hint = (char *)zend_multibyte_get_encoding_name(zenc);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
if ((len == 4) /* sizeof (none|auto|pass) */ &&
(!memcmp("pass", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4))) {
charset_hint = NULL;
len = 0;
} else {
goto det_charset;
}
}
}
charset_hint = SG(default_charset);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
/* try to detect the charset for the locale */
#if HAVE_NL_LANGINFO && HAVE_LOCALE_H && defined(CODESET)
charset_hint = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
#endif
#if HAVE_LOCALE_H
/* try to figure out the charset from the locale */
{
char *localename;
char *dot, *at;
/* lang[_territory][.codeset][@modifier] */
localename = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, NULL);
dot = strchr(localename, '.');
if (dot) {
dot++;
/* locale specifies a codeset */
at = strchr(dot, '@');
if (at)
len = at - dot;
else
len = strlen(dot);
charset_hint = dot;
} else {
/* no explicit name; see if the name itself
* is the charset */
charset_hint = localename;
len = strlen(charset_hint);
}
}
#endif
det_charset:
if (charset_hint) {
int found = 0;
/* now walk the charset map and look for the codeset */
for (i = 0; charset_map[i].codeset; i++) {
if (len == strlen(charset_map[i].codeset) && strncasecmp(charset_hint, charset_map[i].codeset, len) == 0) {
charset = charset_map[i].charset;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "charset `%s' not supported, assuming utf-8",
charset_hint);
}
}
return charset;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static enum entity_charset determine_charset(char *charset_hint TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i;
enum entity_charset charset = cs_utf_8;
int len = 0;
const zend_encoding *zenc;
/* Default is now UTF-8 */
if (charset_hint == NULL)
return cs_utf_8;
if ((len = strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
zenc = zend_multibyte_get_internal_encoding(TSRMLS_C);
if (zenc != NULL) {
charset_hint = (char *)zend_multibyte_get_encoding_name(zenc);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
if ((len == 4) /* sizeof (none|auto|pass) */ &&
(!memcmp("pass", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4))) {
charset_hint = NULL;
len = 0;
} else {
goto det_charset;
}
}
}
charset_hint = SG(default_charset);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
/* try to detect the charset for the locale */
#if HAVE_NL_LANGINFO && HAVE_LOCALE_H && defined(CODESET)
charset_hint = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
#endif
#if HAVE_LOCALE_H
/* try to figure out the charset from the locale */
{
char *localename;
char *dot, *at;
/* lang[_territory][.codeset][@modifier] */
localename = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, NULL);
dot = strchr(localename, '.');
if (dot) {
dot++;
/* locale specifies a codeset */
at = strchr(dot, '@');
if (at)
len = at - dot;
else
len = strlen(dot);
charset_hint = dot;
} else {
/* no explicit name; see if the name itself
* is the charset */
charset_hint = localename;
len = strlen(charset_hint);
}
}
#endif
det_charset:
if (charset_hint) {
int found = 0;
/* now walk the charset map and look for the codeset */
for (i = 0; charset_map[i].codeset; i++) {
if (len == strlen(charset_map[i].codeset) && strncasecmp(charset_hint, charset_map[i].codeset, len) == 0) {
charset = charset_map[i].charset;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "charset `%s' not supported, assuming utf-8",
charset_hint);
}
}
return charset;
}
| 167,169
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetLoginLibrary(
LoginLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->login_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetLoginLibrary(
| 170,640
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ztype(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
ref tnref;
int code = array_get(imemory, op, (long)r_btype(op - 1), &tnref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (!r_has_type(&tnref, t_name)) {
/* Must be either a stack underflow or a t_[a]struct. */
check_op(2);
{ /* Get the type name from the structure. */
if (op[-1].value.pstruct != 0x00) {
const char *sname =
gs_struct_type_name_string(gs_object_type(imemory,
op[-1].value.pstruct));
int code = name_ref(imemory, (const byte *)sname, strlen(sname),
(ref *) (op - 1), 0);
if (code < 0)
return code;
} else
return_error(gs_error_stackunderflow);
}
r_set_attrs(op - 1, a_executable);
} else {
ref_assign(op - 1, &tnref);
}
pop(1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
|
ztype(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
ref tnref;
int code = array_get(imemory, op, (long)r_btype(op - 1), &tnref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (!r_has_type(&tnref, t_name)) {
/* Must be either a stack underflow or a t_[a]struct. */
check_op(2);
{ /* Get the type name from the structure. */
if ((r_has_type(&op[-1], t_struct) || r_has_type(&op[-1], t_astruct)) && op[-1].value.pstruct != 0x00) {
const char *sname =
gs_struct_type_name_string(gs_object_type(imemory,
op[-1].value.pstruct));
int code = name_ref(imemory, (const byte *)sname, strlen(sname),
(ref *) (op - 1), 0);
if (code < 0)
return code;
} else
return_error(gs_error_stackunderflow);
}
r_set_attrs(op - 1, a_executable);
} else {
ref_assign(op - 1, &tnref);
}
pop(1);
return 0;
}
| 164,698
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static __u8 *kye_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
switch (hdev->product) {
case USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_ERGO_525V:
/* the fixups that need to be done:
* - change led usage page to button for extra buttons
* - report size 8 count 1 must be size 1 count 8 for button
* bitfield
* - change the button usage range to 4-7 for the extra
* buttons
*/
if (*rsize >= 74 &&
rdesc[61] == 0x05 && rdesc[62] == 0x08 &&
rdesc[63] == 0x19 && rdesc[64] == 0x08 &&
rdesc[65] == 0x29 && rdesc[66] == 0x0f &&
rdesc[71] == 0x75 && rdesc[72] == 0x08 &&
rdesc[73] == 0x95 && rdesc[74] == 0x01) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Kye/Genius Ergo Mouse "
"report descriptor\n");
rdesc[62] = 0x09;
rdesc[64] = 0x04;
rdesc[66] = 0x07;
rdesc[72] = 0x01;
rdesc[74] = 0x08;
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_EASYPEN_I405X:
if (*rsize == EASYPEN_I405X_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
rdesc = easypen_i405x_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(easypen_i405x_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_MOUSEPEN_I608X:
if (*rsize == MOUSEPEN_I608X_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
rdesc = mousepen_i608x_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(mousepen_i608x_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_EASYPEN_M610X:
if (*rsize == EASYPEN_M610X_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
rdesc = easypen_m610x_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(easypen_m610x_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_GENIUS_GILA_GAMING_MOUSE:
rdesc = kye_consumer_control_fixup(hdev, rdesc, rsize, 104,
"Genius Gila Gaming Mouse");
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_GENIUS_GX_IMPERATOR:
rdesc = kye_consumer_control_fixup(hdev, rdesc, rsize, 83,
"Genius Gx Imperator Keyboard");
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_GENIUS_MANTICORE:
rdesc = kye_consumer_control_fixup(hdev, rdesc, rsize, 104,
"Genius Manticore Keyboard");
break;
}
return rdesc;
}
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static __u8 *kye_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
switch (hdev->product) {
case USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_ERGO_525V:
/* the fixups that need to be done:
* - change led usage page to button for extra buttons
* - report size 8 count 1 must be size 1 count 8 for button
* bitfield
* - change the button usage range to 4-7 for the extra
* buttons
*/
if (*rsize >= 75 &&
rdesc[61] == 0x05 && rdesc[62] == 0x08 &&
rdesc[63] == 0x19 && rdesc[64] == 0x08 &&
rdesc[65] == 0x29 && rdesc[66] == 0x0f &&
rdesc[71] == 0x75 && rdesc[72] == 0x08 &&
rdesc[73] == 0x95 && rdesc[74] == 0x01) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Kye/Genius Ergo Mouse "
"report descriptor\n");
rdesc[62] = 0x09;
rdesc[64] = 0x04;
rdesc[66] = 0x07;
rdesc[72] = 0x01;
rdesc[74] = 0x08;
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_EASYPEN_I405X:
if (*rsize == EASYPEN_I405X_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
rdesc = easypen_i405x_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(easypen_i405x_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_MOUSEPEN_I608X:
if (*rsize == MOUSEPEN_I608X_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
rdesc = mousepen_i608x_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(mousepen_i608x_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_EASYPEN_M610X:
if (*rsize == EASYPEN_M610X_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
rdesc = easypen_m610x_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(easypen_m610x_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_GENIUS_GILA_GAMING_MOUSE:
rdesc = kye_consumer_control_fixup(hdev, rdesc, rsize, 104,
"Genius Gila Gaming Mouse");
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_GENIUS_GX_IMPERATOR:
rdesc = kye_consumer_control_fixup(hdev, rdesc, rsize, 83,
"Genius Gx Imperator Keyboard");
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_GENIUS_MANTICORE:
rdesc = kye_consumer_control_fixup(hdev, rdesc, rsize, 104,
"Genius Manticore Keyboard");
break;
}
return rdesc;
}
| 166,371
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DecoderTest::RunLoop(CompressedVideoSource *video) {
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t dec_cfg = {0};
Decoder* const decoder = codec_->CreateDecoder(dec_cfg, 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(decoder != NULL);
for (video->Begin(); video->cxdata(); video->Next()) {
PreDecodeFrameHook(*video, decoder);
vpx_codec_err_t res_dec = decoder->DecodeFrame(video->cxdata(),
video->frame_size());
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res_dec) << decoder->DecodeError();
DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder->GetDxData();
const vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
while ((img = dec_iter.Next()))
DecompressedFrameHook(*img, video->frame_number());
}
delete decoder;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void DecoderTest::RunLoop(CompressedVideoSource *video) {
bool Decoder::IsVP8() const {
const char *codec_name = GetDecoderName();
return strncmp(kVP8Name, codec_name, sizeof(kVP8Name) - 1) == 0;
}
void DecoderTest::HandlePeekResult(Decoder *const decoder,
CompressedVideoSource *video,
const vpx_codec_err_t res_peek) {
const bool is_vp8 = decoder->IsVP8();
if (is_vp8) {
/* Vp8's implementation of PeekStream returns an error if the frame you
* pass it is not a keyframe, so we only expect VPX_CODEC_OK on the first
* frame, which must be a keyframe. */
if (video->frame_number() == 0)
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res_peek) << "Peek return failed: "
<< vpx_codec_err_to_string(res_peek);
} else {
/* The Vp9 implementation of PeekStream returns an error only if the
* data passed to it isn't a valid Vp9 chunk. */
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res_peek) << "Peek return failed: "
<< vpx_codec_err_to_string(res_peek);
}
}
void DecoderTest::RunLoop(CompressedVideoSource *video,
const vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t &dec_cfg) {
Decoder* const decoder = codec_->CreateDecoder(dec_cfg, flags_, 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(decoder != NULL);
bool end_of_file = false;
for (video->Begin(); !::testing::Test::HasFailure() && !end_of_file;
video->Next()) {
PreDecodeFrameHook(*video, decoder);
vpx_codec_stream_info_t stream_info;
stream_info.sz = sizeof(stream_info);
if (video->cxdata() != NULL) {
const vpx_codec_err_t res_peek = decoder->PeekStream(video->cxdata(),
video->frame_size(),
&stream_info);
HandlePeekResult(decoder, video, res_peek);
ASSERT_FALSE(::testing::Test::HasFailure());
vpx_codec_err_t res_dec = decoder->DecodeFrame(video->cxdata(),
video->frame_size());
if (!HandleDecodeResult(res_dec, *video, decoder))
break;
} else {
// Signal end of the file to the decoder.
const vpx_codec_err_t res_dec = decoder->DecodeFrame(NULL, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res_dec) << decoder->DecodeError();
end_of_file = true;
}
DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder->GetDxData();
const vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
while ((img = dec_iter.Next()))
DecompressedFrameHook(*img, video->frame_number());
}
delete decoder;
}
| 174,535
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshcomp *comp;
int r, mode;
debug("%s: called", __func__);
/* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */
ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
if (ssh->state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
continue;
comp = &ssh->state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (comp && comp->enabled &&
(r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
debug("%s: called", __func__);
/* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */
ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
if ((r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
| 168,655
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnHandleSqliteError(
const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name,
int error) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
db_tracker_->HandleSqliteError(origin_identifier, database_name, error);
}
Commit Message: WebDatabase: check path traversal in origin_identifier
BUG=172264
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12212091
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@183141 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22
|
void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnHandleSqliteError(
const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name,
int error) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
if (!DatabaseUtil::IsValidOriginIdentifier(origin_identifier)) {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BadMessageTerminate_DBMF"));
BadMessageReceived();
return;
}
db_tracker_->HandleSqliteError(origin_identifier, database_name, error);
}
| 171,478
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void IBusBusGlobalEngineChangedCallback(
IBusBus* bus, const gchar* engine_name, gpointer user_data) {
DCHECK(engine_name);
DLOG(INFO) << "Global engine is changed to " << engine_name;
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->UpdateUI(engine_name);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void IBusBusGlobalEngineChangedCallback(
void IBusBusGlobalEngineChanged(IBusBus* bus, const gchar* engine_name) {
DCHECK(engine_name);
VLOG(1) << "Global engine is changed to " << engine_name;
UpdateUI(engine_name);
}
| 170,538
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(int selected_index) {
if (external_popup_menu_ == NULL)
return;
blink::WebScopedUserGesture gesture(frame_);
external_popup_menu_->DidSelectItem(selected_index);
external_popup_menu_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(int selected_index) {
if (external_popup_menu_ == NULL)
return;
blink::WebScopedUserGesture gesture(frame_);
// We need to reset |external_popup_menu_| before calling DidSelectItem(),
// which might delete |this|.
// See ExternalPopupMenuRemoveTest.RemoveFrameOnChange
std::unique_ptr<ExternalPopupMenu> popup;
popup.swap(external_popup_menu_);
popup->DidSelectItem(selected_index);
}
| 173,072
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ManifestChangeNotifier::DidChangeManifest() {
if (weak_factory_.HasWeakPtrs())
return;
if (!render_frame()->GetWebFrame()->IsLoading()) {
render_frame()
->GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kUnspecedLoading)
->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&ManifestChangeNotifier::ReportManifestChange,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
return;
}
ReportManifestChange();
}
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
CWE ID:
|
void ManifestChangeNotifier::DidChangeManifest() {
// Manifests are not considered when the current page has a unique origin.
if (!ManifestManager::CanFetchManifest(render_frame()))
return;
if (weak_factory_.HasWeakPtrs())
return;
if (!render_frame()->GetWebFrame()->IsLoading()) {
render_frame()
->GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kUnspecedLoading)
->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&ManifestChangeNotifier::ReportManifestChange,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
return;
}
ReportManifestChange();
}
| 172,920
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SecureProxyChecker::CheckIfSecureProxyIsAllowed(
SecureProxyCheckerCallback fetcher_callback) {
net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag traffic_annotation =
net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation(
"data_reduction_proxy_secure_proxy_check", R"(
semantics {
sender: "Data Reduction Proxy"
description:
"Sends a request to the Data Reduction Proxy server. Proceeds "
"with using a secure connection to the proxy only if the "
"response is not blocked or modified by an intermediary."
trigger:
"A request can be sent whenever the browser is determining how "
"to configure its connection to the data reduction proxy. This "
"happens on startup and network changes."
data: "A specific URL, not related to user data."
destination: GOOGLE_OWNED_SERVICE
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: NO
setting:
"Users can control Data Saver on Android via the 'Data Saver' "
"setting. Data Saver is not available on iOS, and on desktop "
"it is enabled by installing the Data Saver extension."
policy_exception_justification: "Not implemented."
})");
auto resource_request = std::make_unique<network::ResourceRequest>();
resource_request->url = params::GetSecureProxyCheckURL();
resource_request->load_flags =
net::LOAD_DISABLE_CACHE | net::LOAD_BYPASS_PROXY;
resource_request->allow_credentials = false;
url_loader_ = network::SimpleURLLoader::Create(std::move(resource_request),
traffic_annotation);
static const int kMaxRetries = 5;
url_loader_->SetRetryOptions(
kMaxRetries, network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_NETWORK_CHANGE |
network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_5XX);
url_loader_->SetOnRedirectCallback(base::BindRepeating(
&SecureProxyChecker::OnURLLoaderRedirect, base::Unretained(this)));
fetcher_callback_ = fetcher_callback;
secure_proxy_check_start_time_ = base::Time::Now();
url_loader_->DownloadToStringOfUnboundedSizeUntilCrashAndDie(
url_loader_factory_.get(),
base::BindOnce(&SecureProxyChecker::OnURLLoadComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void SecureProxyChecker::CheckIfSecureProxyIsAllowed(
SecureProxyCheckerCallback fetcher_callback) {
DCHECK(!params::IsIncludedInHoldbackFieldTrial());
net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag traffic_annotation =
net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation(
"data_reduction_proxy_secure_proxy_check", R"(
semantics {
sender: "Data Reduction Proxy"
description:
"Sends a request to the Data Reduction Proxy server. Proceeds "
"with using a secure connection to the proxy only if the "
"response is not blocked or modified by an intermediary."
trigger:
"A request can be sent whenever the browser is determining how "
"to configure its connection to the data reduction proxy. This "
"happens on startup and network changes."
data: "A specific URL, not related to user data."
destination: GOOGLE_OWNED_SERVICE
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: NO
setting:
"Users can control Data Saver on Android via the 'Data Saver' "
"setting. Data Saver is not available on iOS, and on desktop "
"it is enabled by installing the Data Saver extension."
policy_exception_justification: "Not implemented."
})");
auto resource_request = std::make_unique<network::ResourceRequest>();
resource_request->url = params::GetSecureProxyCheckURL();
resource_request->load_flags =
net::LOAD_DISABLE_CACHE | net::LOAD_BYPASS_PROXY;
resource_request->allow_credentials = false;
url_loader_ = network::SimpleURLLoader::Create(std::move(resource_request),
traffic_annotation);
static const int kMaxRetries = 5;
url_loader_->SetRetryOptions(
kMaxRetries, network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_NETWORK_CHANGE |
network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_5XX);
url_loader_->SetOnRedirectCallback(base::BindRepeating(
&SecureProxyChecker::OnURLLoaderRedirect, base::Unretained(this)));
fetcher_callback_ = fetcher_callback;
secure_proxy_check_start_time_ = base::Time::Now();
url_loader_->DownloadToStringOfUnboundedSizeUntilCrashAndDie(
url_loader_factory_.get(),
base::BindOnce(&SecureProxyChecker::OnURLLoadComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,422
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: exsltDateCreateDate (exsltDateType type)
{
exsltDateValPtr ret;
ret = (exsltDateValPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(exsltDateVal));
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"exsltDateCreateDate: out of memory\n");
return (NULL);
}
memset (ret, 0, sizeof(exsltDateVal));
if (type != EXSLT_UNKNOWN)
ret->type = type;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
exsltDateCreateDate (exsltDateType type)
{
exsltDateValPtr ret;
ret = (exsltDateValPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(exsltDateVal));
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"exsltDateCreateDate: out of memory\n");
return (NULL);
}
memset (ret, 0, sizeof(exsltDateVal));
if (type != XS_DURATION) {
ret->value.date.mon = 1;
ret->value.date.day = 1;
}
if (type != EXSLT_UNKNOWN)
ret->type = type;
return ret;
}
| 173,291
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ImageBitmapFactories::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(pending_loaders_);
Supplement<LocalDOMWindow>::Trace(visitor);
Supplement<WorkerGlobalScope>::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAP in ImageBitmapLoader/FileReaderLoader
FileReaderLoader stores its client as a raw pointer, so in cases like
ImageBitmapLoader where the FileReaderLoaderClient really is garbage
collected we have to make sure to destroy the FileReaderLoader when
the ExecutionContext that owns it is destroyed.
Bug: 913970
Change-Id: I40b02115367cf7bf5bbbbb8e9b57874d2510f861
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374511
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616342}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void ImageBitmapFactories::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::~ImageBitmapLoader() {
DCHECK(!loader_);
}
| 173,070
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xmlParseNameAndCompare(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar const *other) {
register const xmlChar *cmp = other;
register const xmlChar *in;
const xmlChar *ret;
GROW;
in = ctxt->input->cur;
while (*in != 0 && *in == *cmp) {
++in;
++cmp;
ctxt->input->col++;
}
if (*cmp == 0 && (*in == '>' || IS_BLANK_CH (*in))) {
/* success */
ctxt->input->cur = in;
return (const xmlChar*) 1;
}
/* failure (or end of input buffer), check with full function */
ret = xmlParseName (ctxt);
/* strings coming from the dictionnary direct compare possible */
if (ret == other) {
return (const xmlChar*) 1;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
xmlParseNameAndCompare(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar const *other) {
register const xmlChar *cmp = other;
register const xmlChar *in;
const xmlChar *ret;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
in = ctxt->input->cur;
while (*in != 0 && *in == *cmp) {
++in;
++cmp;
ctxt->input->col++;
}
if (*cmp == 0 && (*in == '>' || IS_BLANK_CH (*in))) {
/* success */
ctxt->input->cur = in;
return (const xmlChar*) 1;
}
/* failure (or end of input buffer), check with full function */
ret = xmlParseName (ctxt);
/* strings coming from the dictionnary direct compare possible */
if (ret == other) {
return (const xmlChar*) 1;
}
return ret;
}
| 171,296
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: juniper_mlppp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_MLPPP;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
/* suppress Bundle-ID if frame was captured on a child-link
* best indicator if the cookie looks like a proto */
if (ndo->ndo_eflag &&
EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info.cookie) != PPP_OSI &&
EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info.cookie) != (PPP_ADDRESS << 8 | PPP_CONTROL))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bundle-ID %u: ", l2info.bundle));
p+=l2info.header_len;
/* first try the LSQ protos */
switch(l2info.proto) {
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_IPV4:
/* IP traffic going to the RE would not have a cookie
* -> this must be incoming IS-IS over PPP
*/
if (l2info.cookie[4] == (JUNIPER_LSQ_COOKIE_RE|JUNIPER_LSQ_COOKIE_DIR))
ppp_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
else
ip_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p,l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MPLS:
mpls_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_ISO:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen);
return l2info.header_len;
default:
break;
}
/* zero length cookie ? */
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info.cookie)) {
case PPP_OSI:
ppp_print(ndo, p - 2, l2info.length + 2);
break;
case (PPP_ADDRESS << 8 | PPP_CONTROL): /* fall through */
default:
ppp_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
break;
}
return l2info.header_len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
juniper_mlppp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_MLPPP;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
/* suppress Bundle-ID if frame was captured on a child-link
* best indicator if the cookie looks like a proto */
if (ndo->ndo_eflag &&
EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info.cookie) != PPP_OSI &&
EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info.cookie) != (PPP_ADDRESS << 8 | PPP_CONTROL))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bundle-ID %u: ", l2info.bundle));
p+=l2info.header_len;
/* first try the LSQ protos */
switch(l2info.proto) {
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_IPV4:
/* IP traffic going to the RE would not have a cookie
* -> this must be incoming IS-IS over PPP
*/
if (l2info.cookie[4] == (JUNIPER_LSQ_COOKIE_RE|JUNIPER_LSQ_COOKIE_DIR))
ppp_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
else
ip_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p,l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MPLS:
mpls_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_ISO:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
default:
break;
}
/* zero length cookie ? */
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info.cookie)) {
case PPP_OSI:
ppp_print(ndo, p - 2, l2info.length + 2);
break;
case (PPP_ADDRESS << 8 | PPP_CONTROL): /* fall through */
default:
ppp_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
break;
}
return l2info.header_len;
}
| 167,952
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void QuitMessageLoop() {
base::RunLoop::QuitCurrentWhenIdleDeprecated();
}
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
CWE ID: CWE-94
|
static void QuitMessageLoop() {
base::Unretained(this), on_launched));
}
| 172,054
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::createShadowSubtree()
{
ASSERT(element()->shadow());
Document* document = element()->document();
ContainerNode* container = element()->userAgentShadowRoot();
RefPtr<DateTimeEditElement> dateTimeEditElement(DateTimeEditElement::create(document, *this));
m_dateTimeEditElement = dateTimeEditElement.get();
container->appendChild(m_dateTimeEditElement);
updateInnerTextValue();
RefPtr<ClearButtonElement> clearButton = ClearButtonElement::create(document, *this);
m_clearButton = clearButton.get();
container->appendChild(clearButton);
RefPtr<SpinButtonElement> spinButton = SpinButtonElement::create(document, *this);
m_spinButtonElement = spinButton.get();
container->appendChild(spinButton);
bool shouldAddPickerIndicator = false;
if (InputType::themeSupportsDataListUI(this))
shouldAddPickerIndicator = true;
RefPtr<RenderTheme> theme = document->page() ? document->page()->theme() : RenderTheme::defaultTheme();
if (theme->supportsCalendarPicker(formControlType())) {
shouldAddPickerIndicator = true;
m_pickerIndicatorIsAlwaysVisible = true;
}
if (shouldAddPickerIndicator) {
RefPtr<PickerIndicatorElement> pickerElement = PickerIndicatorElement::create(document, *this);
m_pickerIndicatorElement = pickerElement.get();
container->appendChild(m_pickerIndicatorElement);
m_pickerIndicatorIsVisible = true;
updatePickerIndicatorVisibility();
}
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::createShadowSubtree()
{
ASSERT(element()->shadow());
// Element must not be attached here, because if it was attached
// DateTimeEditElement::customStyleForRenderer() is called in appendChild()
// before the field wrapper element is created.
ASSERT(!element()->attached());
Document* document = element()->document();
ContainerNode* container = element()->userAgentShadowRoot();
RefPtr<DateTimeEditElement> dateTimeEditElement(DateTimeEditElement::create(document, *this));
m_dateTimeEditElement = dateTimeEditElement.get();
container->appendChild(m_dateTimeEditElement);
updateInnerTextValue();
RefPtr<ClearButtonElement> clearButton = ClearButtonElement::create(document, *this);
m_clearButton = clearButton.get();
container->appendChild(clearButton);
RefPtr<SpinButtonElement> spinButton = SpinButtonElement::create(document, *this);
m_spinButtonElement = spinButton.get();
container->appendChild(spinButton);
bool shouldAddPickerIndicator = false;
if (InputType::themeSupportsDataListUI(this))
shouldAddPickerIndicator = true;
RefPtr<RenderTheme> theme = document->page() ? document->page()->theme() : RenderTheme::defaultTheme();
if (theme->supportsCalendarPicker(formControlType())) {
shouldAddPickerIndicator = true;
m_pickerIndicatorIsAlwaysVisible = true;
}
if (shouldAddPickerIndicator) {
RefPtr<PickerIndicatorElement> pickerElement = PickerIndicatorElement::create(document, *this);
m_pickerIndicatorElement = pickerElement.get();
container->appendChild(m_pickerIndicatorElement);
m_pickerIndicatorIsVisible = true;
updatePickerIndicatorVisibility();
}
}
| 171,264
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentRendererClient::ShouldFork(WebFrame* frame,
const GURL& url,
bool is_initial_navigation,
bool* send_referrer) {
DCHECK(!frame->parent());
if (prerender_dispatcher_.get() && prerender_dispatcher_->IsPrerenderURL(url))
return true;
const ExtensionSet* extensions = extension_dispatcher_->extensions();
const Extension* new_url_extension = extensions::GetNonBookmarkAppExtension(
*extensions, ExtensionURLInfo(url));
bool is_extension_url = !!new_url_extension;
if (CrossesExtensionExtents(frame, url, *extensions, is_extension_url,
is_initial_navigation)) {
*send_referrer = true;
const Extension* extension =
extension_dispatcher_->extensions()->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
ExtensionURLInfo(url));
if (extension && extension->is_app()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
extension_misc::kAppLaunchHistogram,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_CONTENT_NAVIGATION,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_BUCKET_BOUNDARY);
}
return true;
}
if (frame->top()->document().url() == url) {
if (is_extension_url != extension_dispatcher_->is_extension_process())
return true;
}
if (url.SchemeIs(kChromeUIScheme))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
bool ChromeContentRendererClient::ShouldFork(WebFrame* frame,
const GURL& url,
bool is_initial_navigation,
bool* send_referrer) {
DCHECK(!frame->parent());
if (prerender_dispatcher_.get() && prerender_dispatcher_->IsPrerenderURL(url))
return true;
const ExtensionSet* extensions = extension_dispatcher_->extensions();
const Extension* new_url_extension = extensions::GetNonBookmarkAppExtension(
*extensions, ExtensionURLInfo(url));
bool is_extension_url = !!new_url_extension;
if (CrossesExtensionExtents(frame, url, *extensions, is_extension_url,
is_initial_navigation)) {
*send_referrer = true;
const Extension* extension =
extension_dispatcher_->extensions()->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
ExtensionURLInfo(url));
if (extension && extension->is_app()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
extension_misc::kAppLaunchHistogram,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_CONTENT_NAVIGATION,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_BUCKET_BOUNDARY);
}
return true;
}
if (frame->top()->document().url() == url) {
if (is_extension_url != extension_dispatcher_->is_extension_process())
return true;
}
return false;
}
| 171,009
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: zend_object_iterator *spl_filesystem_dir_get_iterator(zend_class_entry *ce, zval *object, int by_ref TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator;
spl_filesystem_object *dir_object;
if (by_ref) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "An iterator cannot be used with foreach by reference");
}
dir_object = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
iterator = spl_filesystem_object_to_iterator(dir_object);
/* initialize iterator if it wasn't gotten before */
if (iterator->intern.data == NULL) {
iterator->intern.data = object;
iterator->intern.funcs = &spl_filesystem_dir_it_funcs;
/* ->current must be initialized; rewind doesn't set it and valid
* doesn't check whether it's set */
iterator->current = object;
}
zval_add_ref(&object);
return (zend_object_iterator*)iterator;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
zend_object_iterator *spl_filesystem_dir_get_iterator(zend_class_entry *ce, zval *object, int by_ref TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator;
spl_filesystem_object *dir_object;
if (by_ref) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "An iterator cannot be used with foreach by reference");
}
dir_object = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
iterator = spl_filesystem_object_to_iterator(dir_object);
/* initialize iterator if it wasn't gotten before */
if (iterator->intern.data == NULL) {
iterator->intern.data = object;
iterator->intern.funcs = &spl_filesystem_dir_it_funcs;
/* ->current must be initialized; rewind doesn't set it and valid
* doesn't check whether it's set */
iterator->current = object;
}
zval_add_ref(&object);
return (zend_object_iterator*)iterator;
}
| 167,069
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_default_ini(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that)
{
this->next->ini(this->next, that);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_default_ini(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
extern void image_transform_default_ini(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that); /* silence GCC warnings */
void /* private, but almost always needed */
image_transform_default_ini(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that)
{
this->next->ini(this->next, that);
}
| 173,621
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void scsi_write_complete(void * opaque, int ret)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = (SCSIDiskReq *)opaque;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
uint32_t len;
uint32_t n;
if (r->req.aiocb != NULL) {
r->req.aiocb = NULL;
bdrv_acct_done(s->bs, &r->acct);
}
if (ret) {
if (scsi_handle_rw_error(r, -ret, SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_WRITE)) {
return;
}
}
n = r->iov.iov_len / 512;
r->sector += n;
r->sector_count -= n;
if (r->sector_count == 0) {
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
} else {
len = r->sector_count * 512;
if (len > SCSI_DMA_BUF_SIZE) {
len = SCSI_DMA_BUF_SIZE;
}
r->iov.iov_len = len;
DPRINTF("Write complete tag=0x%x more=%d\n", r->req.tag, len);
scsi_req_data(&r->req, len);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: commonize iovec creation between reads and writes
Also, consistently use qiov.size instead of iov.iov_len.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void scsi_write_complete(void * opaque, int ret)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = (SCSIDiskReq *)opaque;
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
uint32_t n;
if (r->req.aiocb != NULL) {
r->req.aiocb = NULL;
bdrv_acct_done(s->bs, &r->acct);
}
if (ret) {
if (scsi_handle_rw_error(r, -ret, SCSI_REQ_STATUS_RETRY_WRITE)) {
return;
}
}
n = r->qiov.size / 512;
r->sector += n;
r->sector_count -= n;
if (r->sector_count == 0) {
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
} else {
scsi_init_iovec(r);
DPRINTF("Write complete tag=0x%x more=%d\n", r->req.tag, r->qiov.size);
scsi_req_data(&r->req, r->qiov.size);
}
}
| 169,922
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void perform_gamma_transform_tests(png_modifier *pm)
{
png_byte colour_type = 0;
png_byte bit_depth = 0;
unsigned int palette_number = 0;
while (next_format(&colour_type, &bit_depth, &palette_number, 1/*gamma*/))
{
unsigned int i, j;
for (i=0; i<pm->ngamma_tests; ++i) for (j=0; j<pm->ngamma_tests; ++j)
if (i != j)
{
gamma_transform_test(pm, colour_type, bit_depth, palette_number,
pm->interlace_type, 1/pm->gammas[i], pm->gammas[j], 0/*sBIT*/,
pm->use_input_precision, 0 /*do not scale16*/);
if (fail(pm))
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
static void perform_gamma_transform_tests(png_modifier *pm)
{
png_byte colour_type = 0;
png_byte bit_depth = 0;
unsigned int palette_number = 0;
while (next_format(&colour_type, &bit_depth, &palette_number,
pm->test_lbg_gamma_transform, pm->test_tRNS))
{
unsigned int i, j;
for (i=0; i<pm->ngamma_tests; ++i) for (j=0; j<pm->ngamma_tests; ++j)
if (i != j)
{
gamma_transform_test(pm, colour_type, bit_depth, palette_number,
pm->interlace_type, 1/pm->gammas[i], pm->gammas[j], 0/*sBIT*/,
pm->use_input_precision, 0 /*do not scale16*/);
if (fail(pm))
return;
}
}
}
| 173,683
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: struct edid *drm_load_edid_firmware(struct drm_connector *connector)
{
const char *connector_name = connector->name;
char *edidname, *last, *colon, *fwstr, *edidstr, *fallback = NULL;
struct edid *edid;
if (edid_firmware[0] == '\0')
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
/*
* If there are multiple edid files specified and separated
* by commas, search through the list looking for one that
* matches the connector.
*
* If there's one or more that doesn't specify a connector, keep
* the last one found one as a fallback.
*/
fwstr = kstrdup(edid_firmware, GFP_KERNEL);
edidstr = fwstr;
while ((edidname = strsep(&edidstr, ","))) {
if (strncmp(connector_name, edidname, colon - edidname))
continue;
edidname = colon + 1;
break;
}
if (*edidname != '\0') /* corner case: multiple ',' */
fallback = edidname;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
struct edid *drm_load_edid_firmware(struct drm_connector *connector)
{
const char *connector_name = connector->name;
char *edidname, *last, *colon, *fwstr, *edidstr, *fallback = NULL;
struct edid *edid;
if (edid_firmware[0] == '\0')
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
/*
* If there are multiple edid files specified and separated
* by commas, search through the list looking for one that
* matches the connector.
*
* If there's one or more that doesn't specify a connector, keep
* the last one found one as a fallback.
*/
fwstr = kstrdup(edid_firmware, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fwstr)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
edidstr = fwstr;
while ((edidname = strsep(&edidstr, ","))) {
if (strncmp(connector_name, edidname, colon - edidname))
continue;
edidname = colon + 1;
break;
}
if (*edidname != '\0') /* corner case: multiple ',' */
fallback = edidname;
}
| 164,709
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void QuicTransportHost::Initialize(
IceTransportHost* ice_transport_host,
quic::Perspective perspective,
const std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate>>& certificates) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(ice_transport_host);
DCHECK(!ice_transport_host_);
ice_transport_host_ = ice_transport_host;
P2PQuicTransportConfig config(
this, ice_transport_host->ConnectConsumer(this)->packet_transport(),
certificates);
config.is_server = (perspective == quic::Perspective::IS_SERVER);
quic_transport_ =
quic_transport_factory_->CreateQuicTransport(std::move(config));
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
void QuicTransportHost::Initialize(
IceTransportHost* ice_transport_host,
quic::Perspective perspective,
const std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate>>& certificates) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(ice_transport_host);
DCHECK(!ice_transport_host_);
ice_transport_host_ = ice_transport_host;
// TODO(https://crbug.com/874296): Pass through values for read and write
// stream buffer sizes in the P2PQuicTransportConfig. Currently this is just
// set to the same size as the QUIC receive window size (24 MB).
uint32_t stream_buffer_size = 24 * 1024 * 1024;
P2PQuicTransportConfig config(
this, ice_transport_host->ConnectConsumer(this)->packet_transport(),
certificates, stream_buffer_size);
config.is_server = (perspective == quic::Perspective::IS_SERVER);
quic_transport_ =
quic_transport_factory_->CreateQuicTransport(std::move(config));
}
| 172,270
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: print_ccp_config_options(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
int len, opt;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
len = p[1];
opt = p[0];
if (length < len)
return 0;
if (len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u (length bogus, should be >= 2)",
tok2str(ccpconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
opt,
len));
return 0;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u",
tok2str(ccpconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
opt,
len));
switch (opt) {
case CCPOPT_BSDCOMP:
if (len < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 3)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Version: %u, Dictionary Bits: %u",
p[2] >> 5, p[2] & 0x1f));
break;
case CCPOPT_MVRCA:
if (len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 4)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Features: %u, PxP: %s, History: %u, #CTX-ID: %u",
(p[2] & 0xc0) >> 6,
(p[2] & 0x20) ? "Enabled" : "Disabled",
p[2] & 0x1f, p[3]));
break;
case CCPOPT_DEFLATE:
if (len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 4)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Window: %uK, Method: %s (0x%x), MBZ: %u, CHK: %u",
(p[2] & 0xf0) >> 4,
((p[2] & 0x0f) == 8) ? "zlib" : "unknown",
p[2] & 0x0f, (p[3] & 0xfc) >> 2, p[3] & 0x03));
break;
/* XXX: to be supported */
#if 0
case CCPOPT_OUI:
case CCPOPT_PRED1:
case CCPOPT_PRED2:
case CCPOPT_PJUMP:
case CCPOPT_HPPPC:
case CCPOPT_STACLZS:
case CCPOPT_MPPC:
case CCPOPT_GFZA:
case CCPOPT_V42BIS:
case CCPOPT_LZSDCP:
case CCPOPT_DEC:
case CCPOPT_RESV:
break;
#endif
default:
/*
* Unknown option; dump it as raw bytes now if we're
* not going to do so below.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2); /* exclude TLV header */
return len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ccp]"));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13029/PPP: Fix a bounds check, and clean up other bounds checks.
For configuration protocol options, use ND_TCHECK() and
ND_TCHECK_nBITS() macros, passing them the appropriate pointer argument.
This fixes one case where the ND_TCHECK2() call they replace was not
checking enough bytes.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
print_ccp_config_options(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
int len, opt;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
len = p[1];
opt = p[0];
if (length < len)
return 0;
if (len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u (length bogus, should be >= 2)",
tok2str(ccpconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
opt,
len));
return 0;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u",
tok2str(ccpconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
opt,
len));
switch (opt) {
case CCPOPT_BSDCOMP:
if (len < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 3)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK(p[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Version: %u, Dictionary Bits: %u",
p[2] >> 5, p[2] & 0x1f));
break;
case CCPOPT_MVRCA:
if (len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 4)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK(p[3]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Features: %u, PxP: %s, History: %u, #CTX-ID: %u",
(p[2] & 0xc0) >> 6,
(p[2] & 0x20) ? "Enabled" : "Disabled",
p[2] & 0x1f, p[3]));
break;
case CCPOPT_DEFLATE:
if (len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 4)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK(p[3]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Window: %uK, Method: %s (0x%x), MBZ: %u, CHK: %u",
(p[2] & 0xf0) >> 4,
((p[2] & 0x0f) == 8) ? "zlib" : "unknown",
p[2] & 0x0f, (p[3] & 0xfc) >> 2, p[3] & 0x03));
break;
/* XXX: to be supported */
#if 0
case CCPOPT_OUI:
case CCPOPT_PRED1:
case CCPOPT_PRED2:
case CCPOPT_PJUMP:
case CCPOPT_HPPPC:
case CCPOPT_STACLZS:
case CCPOPT_MPPC:
case CCPOPT_GFZA:
case CCPOPT_V42BIS:
case CCPOPT_LZSDCP:
case CCPOPT_DEC:
case CCPOPT_RESV:
break;
#endif
default:
/*
* Unknown option; dump it as raw bytes now if we're
* not going to do so below.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2); /* exclude TLV header */
return len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ccp]"));
return 0;
}
| 167,860
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::NetworkThrottleManagerImpl()
: lifetime_median_estimate_(PercentileEstimator::kMedianPercentile,
kInitialMedianInMs),
outstanding_recomputation_timer_(
base::MakeUnique<base::Timer>(false /* retain_user_task */,
false /* is_repeating */)),
tick_clock_(new base::DefaultTickClock()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311
|
NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::NetworkThrottleManagerImpl()
: lifetime_median_estimate_(PercentileEstimator::kMedianPercentile,
kInitialMedianInMs),
outstanding_recomputation_timer_(
std::make_unique<base::Timer>(false /* retain_user_task */,
false /* is_repeating */)),
tick_clock_(new base::DefaultTickClock()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
| 173,266
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(icu::UnicodeString("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
transliterator_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d; ӏ > l; [кĸκ] > k; п > n;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Add a few more confusable map entries
1. Map Malaylam U+0D1F to 's'.
2. Map 'small-cap-like' Cyrillic letters to "look-alike" Latin lowercase
letters.
The characters in new confusable map entries are replaced by their Latin
"look-alike" characters before the skeleton is calculated to compare with
top domain names.
Bug: 784761,773930
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDNToUni*
Change-Id: Ib26664e21ac5eb290e4a2993b01cbf0edaade0ee
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/805214
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#521648}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(icu::UnicodeString("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
// removal; NFC".
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
// Supplement the Unicode confusable list by the following mapping.
// - U+04CF (ӏ) => l
// - {U+043A (к), U+0138(ĸ), U+03BA(κ)} => k
// - U+043F(п) => n
// - {U+0185 (ƅ), U+044C (ь)} => b
// - U+0432 (в) => b
// - U+043C (м) => m
// - U+043D (н) => h
// - U+0442 (т) => t
// - {U+0448 (ш), U+0449 (щ)} => w
// - U+0D1F (ട) => s
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString(
"ӏ > l; [кĸκ] > k; п > n; [ƅь] > b; в > b; м > m; н > h; "
"т > t; [шщ] > w; ട > s;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
| 172,685
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void LauncherView::OnBoundsAnimatorProgressed(views::BoundsAnimator* animator) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(LauncherIconObserver, observers_,
OnLauncherIconPositionsChanged());
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void LauncherView::OnBoundsAnimatorProgressed(views::BoundsAnimator* animator) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(LauncherIconObserver, observers_,
OnLauncherIconPositionsChanged());
PreferredSizeChanged();
}
| 170,893
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: isis_print_mt_port_cap_subtlv(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *tptr, int len)
{
int stlv_type, stlv_len;
const struct isis_subtlv_spb_mcid *subtlv_spb_mcid;
int i;
while (len > 2)
{
stlv_type = *(tptr++);
stlv_len = *(tptr++);
/* first lets see if we know the subTLVs name*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s subTLV #%u, length: %u",
tok2str(isis_mt_port_cap_subtlv_values, "unknown", stlv_type),
stlv_type,
stlv_len));
/*len -= TLV_TYPE_LEN_OFFSET;*/
len = len -2;
switch (stlv_type)
{
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_MCID:
{
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN);
subtlv_spb_mcid = (const struct isis_subtlv_spb_mcid *)tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MCID: "));
isis_print_mcid(ndo, &(subtlv_spb_mcid->mcid));
/*tptr += SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN;
len -= SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN; */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AUX-MCID: "));
isis_print_mcid(ndo, &(subtlv_spb_mcid->aux_mcid));
/*tptr += SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN;
len -= SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN; */
tptr = tptr + sizeof(struct isis_subtlv_spb_mcid);
len = len - sizeof(struct isis_subtlv_spb_mcid);
break;
}
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_DIGEST:
{
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_DIGEST_MIN_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d V: %d A: %d D: %d",
(*(tptr) >> 5), (((*tptr)>> 4) & 0x01),
((*(tptr) >> 2) & 0x03), ((*tptr) & 0x03)));
tptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Digest: "));
for(i=1;i<=8; i++)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%08x ", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
if (i%4 == 0 && i != 8)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
tptr = tptr + 4;
}
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_DIGEST_MIN_LEN;
break;
}
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_BVID:
{
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), stlv_len);
while (len >= ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_BVID_MIN_LEN)
{
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_BVID_MIN_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t ECT: %08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BVID: %d, U:%01x M:%01x ",
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) >> 4) ,
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) >> 3) & 0x01,
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) >> 2) & 0x01));
tptr = tptr + 2;
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_BVID_MIN_LEN;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13026/IS-IS: Clean up processing of subTLVs.
Add bounds checks, do a common check to make sure we captured the entire
subTLV, add checks to make sure the subTLV fits within the TLV.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture files won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update existing tests for changes to IS-IS dissector.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
isis_print_mt_port_cap_subtlv(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *tptr, int len)
{
int stlv_type, stlv_len;
const struct isis_subtlv_spb_mcid *subtlv_spb_mcid;
int i;
while (len > 2)
{
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 2);
stlv_type = *(tptr++);
stlv_len = *(tptr++);
/* first lets see if we know the subTLVs name*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s subTLV #%u, length: %u",
tok2str(isis_mt_port_cap_subtlv_values, "unknown", stlv_type),
stlv_type,
stlv_len));
/*len -= TLV_TYPE_LEN_OFFSET;*/
len = len -2;
/* Make sure the subTLV fits within the space left */
if (len < stlv_len)
goto trunc;
/* Make sure the entire subTLV is in the captured data */
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), stlv_len);
switch (stlv_type)
{
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_MCID:
{
if (stlv_len < ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN)
goto trunc;
subtlv_spb_mcid = (const struct isis_subtlv_spb_mcid *)tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MCID: "));
isis_print_mcid(ndo, &(subtlv_spb_mcid->mcid));
/*tptr += SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN;
len -= SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN; */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AUX-MCID: "));
isis_print_mcid(ndo, &(subtlv_spb_mcid->aux_mcid));
/*tptr += SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN;
len -= SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN; */
tptr = tptr + ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN;
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN;
stlv_len = stlv_len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_MCID_MIN_LEN;
break;
}
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_DIGEST:
{
if (stlv_len < ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_DIGEST_MIN_LEN)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d V: %d A: %d D: %d",
(*(tptr) >> 5), (((*tptr)>> 4) & 0x01),
((*(tptr) >> 2) & 0x03), ((*tptr) & 0x03)));
tptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Digest: "));
for(i=1;i<=8; i++)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%08x ", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
if (i%4 == 0 && i != 8)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
tptr = tptr + 4;
}
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_DIGEST_MIN_LEN;
stlv_len = stlv_len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_DIGEST_MIN_LEN;
break;
}
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_BVID:
{
while (stlv_len >= ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_BVID_MIN_LEN)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t ECT: %08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BVID: %d, U:%01x M:%01x ",
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) >> 4) ,
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) >> 3) & 0x01,
(EXTRACT_16BITS (tptr) >> 2) & 0x01));
tptr = tptr + 2;
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_BVID_MIN_LEN;
stlv_len = stlv_len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_BVID_MIN_LEN;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
tptr += stlv_len;
len -= stlv_len;
}
return 0;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(1);
}
| 167,865
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BrowserCommandController::TabReplacedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContents* old_contents,
TabContents* new_contents,
int index) {
RemoveInterstitialObservers(old_contents);
AddInterstitialObservers(new_contents->web_contents());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void BrowserCommandController::TabReplacedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContents* old_contents,
TabContents* new_contents,
int index) {
RemoveInterstitialObservers(old_contents->web_contents());
AddInterstitialObservers(new_contents->web_contents());
}
| 171,512
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: allocate(struct file *file, int allocate_idat)
{
struct control *control = png_voidcast(struct control*, file->alloc_ptr);
if (allocate_idat)
{
assert(file->idat == NULL);
IDAT_init(&control->idat, file);
}
else /* chunk */
{
assert(file->chunk == NULL);
chunk_init(&control->chunk, file);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
allocate(struct file *file, int allocate_idat)
{
struct control *control = voidcast(struct control*, file->alloc_ptr);
if (allocate_idat)
{
assert(file->idat == NULL);
IDAT_init(&control->idat, file);
}
else /* chunk */
{
assert(file->chunk == NULL);
chunk_init(&control->chunk, file);
}
}
| 173,729
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: NotificationsNativeHandler::NotificationsNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetNotificationImageSizes",
base::Bind(&NotificationsNativeHandler::GetNotificationImageSizes,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
|
NotificationsNativeHandler::NotificationsNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetNotificationImageSizes", "notifications",
base::Bind(&NotificationsNativeHandler::GetNotificationImageSizes,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 173,276
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: IndexedDBDispatcher::~IndexedDBDispatcher() {
g_idb_dispatcher_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
IndexedDBDispatcher::~IndexedDBDispatcher() {
g_idb_dispatcher_tls.Pointer()->Set(HAS_BEEN_DELETED);
}
| 171,040
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: const extensions::Extension* GetExtension(Profile* profile,
const std::string& extension_id) {
const ExtensionService* service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->extension_service();
const extensions::Extension* extension =
service->GetInstalledExtension(extension_id);
return extension;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
|
const extensions::Extension* GetExtension(Profile* profile,
const std::string& extension_id) {
const ExtensionRegistry* registry = ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
registry->GetInstalledExtension(extension_id);
return extension;
}
| 171,720
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: jbig2_image_resize(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Image *image, int width, int height)
{
if (width == image->width) {
/* check for integer multiplication overflow */
int64_t check = ((int64_t) image->stride) * ((int64_t) height);
if (check != (int)check) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "integer multiplication overflow during resize stride(%d)*height(%d)", image->stride, height);
return NULL;
}
/* use the same stride, just change the length */
image->data = jbig2_renew(ctx, image->data, uint8_t, (int)check);
if (image->data == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "could not resize image buffer!");
return NULL;
}
if (height > image->height) {
memset(image->data + image->height * image->stride, 0, (height - image->height) * image->stride);
}
image->height = height;
} else {
/* we must allocate a new image buffer and copy */
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, -1, "jbig2_image_resize called with a different width (NYI)");
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
jbig2_image_resize(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Image *image, int width, int height)
jbig2_image_resize(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Image *image, uint32_t width, uint32_t height)
{
if (width == image->width) {
/* check for integer multiplication overflow */
int64_t check = ((int64_t) image->stride) * ((int64_t) height);
if (check != (int)check) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "integer multiplication overflow during resize stride(%d)*height(%d)", image->stride, height);
return NULL;
}
/* use the same stride, just change the length */
image->data = jbig2_renew(ctx, image->data, uint8_t, (int)check);
if (image->data == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "could not resize image buffer!");
return NULL;
}
if (height > image->height) {
memset(image->data + image->height * image->stride, 0, (height - image->height) * image->stride);
}
image->height = height;
} else {
/* we must allocate a new image buffer and copy */
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, -1, "jbig2_image_resize called with a different width (NYI)");
}
return NULL;
}
| 165,492
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Chapters::~Chapters() {
while (m_editions_count > 0) {
Edition& e = m_editions[--m_editions_count];
e.Clear();
}
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
Chapters::~Chapters() {
while (m_editions_count > 0) {
Edition& e = m_editions[--m_editions_count];
e.Clear();
}
delete[] m_editions;
}
| 173,869
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int ib_update_cm_av(struct ib_cm_id *id, const u8 *smac, const u8 *alt_smac)
{
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv;
cm_id_priv = container_of(id, struct cm_id_private, id);
if (smac != NULL)
memcpy(cm_id_priv->av.smac, smac, sizeof(cm_id_priv->av.smac));
if (alt_smac != NULL)
memcpy(cm_id_priv->alt_av.smac, alt_smac,
sizeof(cm_id_priv->alt_av.smac));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
int ib_update_cm_av(struct ib_cm_id *id, const u8 *smac, const u8 *alt_smac)
| 166,389
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_mod_end(PNG_CONST image_transform *this, image_pixel *that,
png_const_structp pp, PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int scale = (1U<<that->sample_depth)-1;
UNUSED(this)
UNUSED(pp)
UNUSED(display)
/* At the end recalculate the digitized red green and blue values according
* to the current sample_depth of the pixel.
*
* The sample value is simply scaled to the maximum, checking for over
* and underflow (which can both happen for some image transforms,
* including simple size scaling, though libpng doesn't do that at present.
*/
that->red = sample_scale(that->redf, scale);
/* The error value is increased, at the end, according to the lowest sBIT
* value seen. Common sense tells us that the intermediate integer
* representations are no more accurate than +/- 0.5 in the integral values,
* the sBIT allows the implementation to be worse than this. In addition the
* PNG specification actually permits any error within the range (-1..+1),
* but that is ignored here. Instead the final digitized value is compared,
* below to the digitized value of the error limits - this has the net effect
* of allowing (almost) +/-1 in the output value. It's difficult to see how
* any algorithm that digitizes intermediate results can be more accurate.
*/
that->rede += 1./(2*((1U<<that->red_sBIT)-1));
if (that->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
{
that->green = sample_scale(that->greenf, scale);
that->blue = sample_scale(that->bluef, scale);
that->greene += 1./(2*((1U<<that->green_sBIT)-1));
that->bluee += 1./(2*((1U<<that->blue_sBIT)-1));
}
else
{
that->blue = that->green = that->red;
that->bluef = that->greenf = that->redf;
that->bluee = that->greene = that->rede;
}
if ((that->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) ||
that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
that->alpha = sample_scale(that->alphaf, scale);
that->alphae += 1./(2*((1U<<that->alpha_sBIT)-1));
}
else
{
that->alpha = scale; /* opaque */
that->alpha = 1; /* Override this. */
that->alphae = 0; /* It's exact ;-) */
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_mod_end(PNG_CONST image_transform *this, image_pixel *that,
image_transform_mod_end(const image_transform *this, image_pixel *that,
png_const_structp pp, const transform_display *display)
{
const unsigned int scale = (1U<<that->sample_depth)-1;
const int sig_bits = that->sig_bits;
UNUSED(this)
UNUSED(pp)
UNUSED(display)
/* At the end recalculate the digitized red green and blue values according
* to the current sample_depth of the pixel.
*
* The sample value is simply scaled to the maximum, checking for over
* and underflow (which can both happen for some image transforms,
* including simple size scaling, though libpng doesn't do that at present.
*/
that->red = sample_scale(that->redf, scale);
/* This is a bit bogus; really the above calculation should use the red_sBIT
* value, not sample_depth, but because libpng does png_set_shift by just
* shifting the bits we get errors if we don't do it the same way.
*/
if (sig_bits && that->red_sBIT < that->sample_depth)
that->red >>= that->sample_depth - that->red_sBIT;
/* The error value is increased, at the end, according to the lowest sBIT
* value seen. Common sense tells us that the intermediate integer
* representations are no more accurate than +/- 0.5 in the integral values,
* the sBIT allows the implementation to be worse than this. In addition the
* PNG specification actually permits any error within the range (-1..+1),
* but that is ignored here. Instead the final digitized value is compared,
* below to the digitized value of the error limits - this has the net effect
* of allowing (almost) +/-1 in the output value. It's difficult to see how
* any algorithm that digitizes intermediate results can be more accurate.
*/
that->rede += 1./(2*((1U<<that->red_sBIT)-1));
if (that->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
{
that->green = sample_scale(that->greenf, scale);
if (sig_bits && that->green_sBIT < that->sample_depth)
that->green >>= that->sample_depth - that->green_sBIT;
that->blue = sample_scale(that->bluef, scale);
if (sig_bits && that->blue_sBIT < that->sample_depth)
that->blue >>= that->sample_depth - that->blue_sBIT;
that->greene += 1./(2*((1U<<that->green_sBIT)-1));
that->bluee += 1./(2*((1U<<that->blue_sBIT)-1));
}
else
{
that->blue = that->green = that->red;
that->bluef = that->greenf = that->redf;
that->bluee = that->greene = that->rede;
}
if ((that->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) ||
that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
that->alpha = sample_scale(that->alphaf, scale);
that->alphae += 1./(2*((1U<<that->alpha_sBIT)-1));
}
else
{
that->alpha = scale; /* opaque */
that->alphaf = 1; /* Override this. */
that->alphae = 0; /* It's exact ;-) */
}
if (sig_bits && that->alpha_sBIT < that->sample_depth)
that->alpha >>= that->sample_depth - that->alpha_sBIT;
}
| 173,623
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterXWDImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("XWD","XWD","X Windows system window dump (color)");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_X11_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadXWDImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteXWDImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsXWD;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1553
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
ModuleExport size_t RegisterXWDImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("XWD","XWD","X Windows system window dump (color)");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_X11_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadXWDImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteXWDImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsXWD;
entry->flags|=CoderDecoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
| 169,557
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: DefragTimeoutTest(void)
{
int i;
int ret = 0;
/* Setup a small numberr of trackers. */
if (ConfSet("defrag.trackers", "16") != 1) {
printf("ConfSet failed: ");
goto end;
}
DefragInit();
/* Load in 16 packets. */
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
Packet *p = BuildTestPacket(i, 0, 1, 'A' + i, 16);
if (p == NULL)
goto end;
Packet *tp = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p, NULL);
SCFree(p);
if (tp != NULL) {
SCFree(tp);
goto end;
}
}
/* Build a new packet but push the timestamp out by our timeout.
* This should force our previous fragments to be timed out. */
Packet *p = BuildTestPacket(99, 0, 1, 'A' + i, 16);
if (p == NULL)
goto end;
p->ts.tv_sec += (defrag_context->timeout + 1);
Packet *tp = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p, NULL);
if (tp != NULL) {
SCFree(tp);
goto end;
}
DefragTracker *tracker = DefragLookupTrackerFromHash(p);
if (tracker == NULL)
goto end;
if (tracker->id != 99)
goto end;
SCFree(p);
ret = 1;
end:
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
|
DefragTimeoutTest(void)
{
int i;
int ret = 0;
/* Setup a small numberr of trackers. */
if (ConfSet("defrag.trackers", "16") != 1) {
printf("ConfSet failed: ");
goto end;
}
DefragInit();
/* Load in 16 packets. */
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
Packet *p = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP,i, 0, 1, 'A' + i, 16);
if (p == NULL)
goto end;
Packet *tp = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p, NULL);
SCFree(p);
if (tp != NULL) {
SCFree(tp);
goto end;
}
}
/* Build a new packet but push the timestamp out by our timeout.
* This should force our previous fragments to be timed out. */
Packet *p = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, 99, 0, 1, 'A' + i, 16);
if (p == NULL)
goto end;
p->ts.tv_sec += (defrag_context->timeout + 1);
Packet *tp = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p, NULL);
if (tp != NULL) {
SCFree(tp);
goto end;
}
DefragTracker *tracker = DefragLookupTrackerFromHash(p);
if (tracker == NULL)
goto end;
if (tracker->id != 99)
goto end;
SCFree(p);
ret = 1;
end:
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
| 168,303
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cisco_autorp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len)
{
int type;
int numrps;
int hold;
ND_TCHECK(bp[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " auto-rp "));
type = bp[0];
switch (type) {
case 0x11:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "candidate-advert"));
break;
case 0x12:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "mapping"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "type-0x%02x", type));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK(bp[1]);
numrps = bp[1];
ND_TCHECK2(bp[2], 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Hold "));
hold = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
if (hold)
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FOREVER"));
/* Next 4 bytes are reserved. */
bp += 8; len -= 8;
/*XXX skip unless -v? */
/*
* Rest of packet:
* numrps entries of the form:
* 32 bits: RP
* 6 bits: reserved
* 2 bits: PIM version supported, bit 0 is "supports v1", 1 is "v2".
* 8 bits: # of entries for this RP
* each entry: 7 bits: reserved, 1 bit: negative,
* 8 bits: mask 32 bits: source
* lather, rinse, repeat.
*/
while (numrps--) {
int nentries;
char s;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
ND_TCHECK(bp[4]);
switch (bp[4] & 0x3) {
case 0: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv?"));
break;
case 1: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv1"));
break;
case 2: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv2"));
break;
case 3: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv1+2"));
break;
}
if (bp[4] & 0xfc)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [rsvd=0x%02x]", bp[4] & 0xfc));
ND_TCHECK(bp[5]);
nentries = bp[5];
bp += 6; len -= 6;
s = ' ';
for (; nentries; nentries--) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s%s/%d", s, bp[0] & 1 ? "!" : "",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[2]), bp[1]));
if (bp[0] & 0x02) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " bidir"));
}
if (bp[0] & 0xfc) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[rsvd=0x%02x]", bp[0] & 0xfc));
}
s = ',';
bp += 6; len -= 6;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|autorp]"));
return;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13030/PIM: Redo bounds checks and add length checks.
Use ND_TCHECK macros to do bounds checking, and add length checks before
the bounds checks.
Add a bounds check that the review process found was missing.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update one test output file to reflect the changes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
cisco_autorp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len)
{
int type;
int numrps;
int hold;
if (len < 8)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " auto-rp "));
type = bp[0];
switch (type) {
case 0x11:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "candidate-advert"));
break;
case 0x12:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "mapping"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "type-0x%02x", type));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK(bp[1]);
numrps = bp[1];
ND_TCHECK2(bp[2], 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Hold "));
hold = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
if (hold)
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FOREVER"));
/* Next 4 bytes are reserved. */
bp += 8; len -= 8;
/*XXX skip unless -v? */
/*
* Rest of packet:
* numrps entries of the form:
* 32 bits: RP
* 6 bits: reserved
* 2 bits: PIM version supported, bit 0 is "supports v1", 1 is "v2".
* 8 bits: # of entries for this RP
* each entry: 7 bits: reserved, 1 bit: negative,
* 8 bits: mask 32 bits: source
* lather, rinse, repeat.
*/
while (numrps--) {
int nentries;
char s;
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
bp += 4;
len -= 4;
if (len < 1)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[0]);
switch (bp[0] & 0x3) {
case 0: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv?"));
break;
case 1: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv1"));
break;
case 2: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv2"));
break;
case 3: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv1+2"));
break;
}
if (bp[0] & 0xfc)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [rsvd=0x%02x]", bp[0] & 0xfc));
bp += 1;
len -= 1;
if (len < 1)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[0]);
nentries = bp[0];
bp += 1;
len -= 1;
s = ' ';
for (; nentries; nentries--) {
if (len < 6)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s%s/%d", s, bp[0] & 1 ? "!" : "",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[2]), bp[1]));
if (bp[0] & 0x02) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " bidir"));
}
if (bp[0] & 0xfc) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[rsvd=0x%02x]", bp[0] & 0xfc));
}
s = ',';
bp += 6; len -= 6;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|autorp]"));
return;
}
| 167,853
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static RList *relocs(RBinFile *arch) {
struct r_bin_bflt_obj *obj = (struct r_bin_bflt_obj*)arch->o->bin_obj;
RList *list = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free);
int i, len, n_got, amount;
if (!list || !obj) {
r_list_free (list);
return NULL;
}
if (obj->hdr->flags & FLAT_FLAG_GOTPIC) {
n_got = get_ngot_entries (obj);
if (n_got) {
amount = n_got * sizeof (ut32);
if (amount < n_got || amount > UT32_MAX) {
goto out_error;
}
struct reloc_struct_t *got_table = calloc (1, n_got * sizeof (ut32));
if (got_table) {
ut32 offset = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_got ; offset += 4, i++) {
ut32 got_entry;
if (obj->hdr->data_start + offset + 4 > obj->size ||
obj->hdr->data_start + offset + 4 < offset) {
break;
}
len = r_buf_read_at (obj->b, obj->hdr->data_start + offset,
(ut8 *)&got_entry, sizeof (ut32));
if (!VALID_GOT_ENTRY (got_entry) || len != sizeof (ut32)) {
break;
}
got_table[i].addr_to_patch = got_entry;
got_table[i].data_offset = got_entry + BFLT_HDR_SIZE;
}
obj->n_got = n_got;
obj->got_table = got_table;
}
}
}
if (obj->hdr->reloc_count > 0) {
int n_reloc = obj->hdr->reloc_count;
amount = n_reloc * sizeof (struct reloc_struct_t);
if (amount < n_reloc || amount > UT32_MAX) {
goto out_error;
}
struct reloc_struct_t *reloc_table = calloc (1, amount + 1);
if (!reloc_table) {
goto out_error;
}
amount = n_reloc * sizeof (ut32);
if (amount < n_reloc || amount > UT32_MAX) {
free (reloc_table);
goto out_error;
}
ut32 *reloc_pointer_table = calloc (1, amount + 1);
if (!reloc_pointer_table) {
free (reloc_table);
goto out_error;
}
if (obj->hdr->reloc_start + amount > obj->size ||
obj->hdr->reloc_start + amount < amount) {
free (reloc_table);
free (reloc_pointer_table);
goto out_error;
}
len = r_buf_read_at (obj->b, obj->hdr->reloc_start,
(ut8 *)reloc_pointer_table, amount);
if (len != amount) {
free (reloc_table);
free (reloc_pointer_table);
goto out_error;
}
for (i = 0; i < obj->hdr->reloc_count; i++) {
ut32 reloc_offset =
r_swap_ut32 (reloc_pointer_table[i]) +
BFLT_HDR_SIZE;
if (reloc_offset < obj->hdr->bss_end && reloc_offset < obj->size) {
ut32 reloc_fixed, reloc_data_offset;
if (reloc_offset + sizeof (ut32) > obj->size ||
reloc_offset + sizeof (ut32) < reloc_offset) {
free (reloc_table);
free (reloc_pointer_table);
goto out_error;
}
len = r_buf_read_at (obj->b, reloc_offset,
(ut8 *)&reloc_fixed,
sizeof (ut32));
if (len != sizeof (ut32)) {
eprintf ("problem while reading relocation entries\n");
free (reloc_table);
free (reloc_pointer_table);
goto out_error;
}
reloc_data_offset = r_swap_ut32 (reloc_fixed) + BFLT_HDR_SIZE;
reloc_table[i].addr_to_patch = reloc_offset;
reloc_table[i].data_offset = reloc_data_offset;
RBinReloc *reloc = R_NEW0 (RBinReloc);
if (reloc) {
reloc->type = R_BIN_RELOC_32;
reloc->paddr = reloc_table[i].addr_to_patch;
reloc->vaddr = reloc->paddr;
r_list_append (list, reloc);
}
}
}
free (reloc_pointer_table);
obj->reloc_table = reloc_table;
}
return list;
out_error:
r_list_free (list);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #6829 oob write because of using wrong struct
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static RList *relocs(RBinFile *arch) {
struct r_bin_bflt_obj *obj = (struct r_bin_bflt_obj*)arch->o->bin_obj;
RList *list = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free);
int i, len, n_got, amount;
if (!list || !obj) {
r_list_free (list);
return NULL;
}
if (obj->hdr->flags & FLAT_FLAG_GOTPIC) {
n_got = get_ngot_entries (obj);
if (n_got) {
amount = n_got * sizeof (ut32);
if (amount < n_got || amount > UT32_MAX) {
goto out_error;
}
struct reloc_struct_t *got_table = calloc (
1, n_got * sizeof (struct reloc_struct_t));
if (got_table) {
ut32 offset = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_got ; offset += 4, i++) {
ut32 got_entry;
if (obj->hdr->data_start + offset + 4 > obj->size ||
obj->hdr->data_start + offset + 4 < offset) {
break;
}
len = r_buf_read_at (obj->b, obj->hdr->data_start + offset,
(ut8 *)&got_entry, sizeof (ut32));
if (!VALID_GOT_ENTRY (got_entry) || len != sizeof (ut32)) {
break;
}
got_table[i].addr_to_patch = got_entry;
got_table[i].data_offset = got_entry + BFLT_HDR_SIZE;
}
obj->n_got = n_got;
obj->got_table = got_table;
}
}
}
if (obj->hdr->reloc_count > 0) {
int n_reloc = obj->hdr->reloc_count;
amount = n_reloc * sizeof (struct reloc_struct_t);
if (amount < n_reloc || amount > UT32_MAX) {
goto out_error;
}
struct reloc_struct_t *reloc_table = calloc (1, amount + 1);
if (!reloc_table) {
goto out_error;
}
amount = n_reloc * sizeof (ut32);
if (amount < n_reloc || amount > UT32_MAX) {
free (reloc_table);
goto out_error;
}
ut32 *reloc_pointer_table = calloc (1, amount + 1);
if (!reloc_pointer_table) {
free (reloc_table);
goto out_error;
}
if (obj->hdr->reloc_start + amount > obj->size ||
obj->hdr->reloc_start + amount < amount) {
free (reloc_table);
free (reloc_pointer_table);
goto out_error;
}
len = r_buf_read_at (obj->b, obj->hdr->reloc_start,
(ut8 *)reloc_pointer_table, amount);
if (len != amount) {
free (reloc_table);
free (reloc_pointer_table);
goto out_error;
}
for (i = 0; i < obj->hdr->reloc_count; i++) {
ut32 reloc_offset =
r_swap_ut32 (reloc_pointer_table[i]) +
BFLT_HDR_SIZE;
if (reloc_offset < obj->hdr->bss_end && reloc_offset < obj->size) {
ut32 reloc_fixed, reloc_data_offset;
if (reloc_offset + sizeof (ut32) > obj->size ||
reloc_offset + sizeof (ut32) < reloc_offset) {
free (reloc_table);
free (reloc_pointer_table);
goto out_error;
}
len = r_buf_read_at (obj->b, reloc_offset,
(ut8 *)&reloc_fixed,
sizeof (ut32));
if (len != sizeof (ut32)) {
eprintf ("problem while reading relocation entries\n");
free (reloc_table);
free (reloc_pointer_table);
goto out_error;
}
reloc_data_offset = r_swap_ut32 (reloc_fixed) + BFLT_HDR_SIZE;
reloc_table[i].addr_to_patch = reloc_offset;
reloc_table[i].data_offset = reloc_data_offset;
RBinReloc *reloc = R_NEW0 (RBinReloc);
if (reloc) {
reloc->type = R_BIN_RELOC_32;
reloc->paddr = reloc_table[i].addr_to_patch;
reloc->vaddr = reloc->paddr;
r_list_append (list, reloc);
}
}
}
free (reloc_pointer_table);
obj->reloc_table = reloc_table;
}
return list;
out_error:
r_list_free (list);
return NULL;
}
| 168,364
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_venc::component_deinit(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp)
{
(void) hComp;
OMX_U32 i = 0;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("omx_venc(): Inside component_deinit()");
if (OMX_StateLoaded != m_state) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("WARNING:Rxd DeInit,OMX not in LOADED state %d",\
m_state);
}
if (m_out_mem_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing the Output Memory");
for (i=0; i< m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++ ) {
free_output_buffer (&m_out_mem_ptr[i]);
}
free(m_out_mem_ptr);
m_out_mem_ptr = NULL;
}
/*Check if the input buffers have to be cleaned up*/
if (m_inp_mem_ptr
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
&& !meta_mode_enable
#endif
) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing the Input Memory");
for (i=0; i<m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++ ) {
free_input_buffer (&m_inp_mem_ptr[i]);
}
free(m_inp_mem_ptr);
m_inp_mem_ptr = NULL;
}
m_ftb_q.m_size=0;
m_cmd_q.m_size=0;
m_etb_q.m_size=0;
m_ftb_q.m_read = m_ftb_q.m_write =0;
m_cmd_q.m_read = m_cmd_q.m_write =0;
m_etb_q.m_read = m_etb_q.m_write =0;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Calling m_heap_ptr.clear()");
m_heap_ptr.clear();
#endif // _ANDROID_
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Calling venc_close()");
if (handle) {
handle->venc_close();
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Deleting HANDLE[%p]", handle);
delete (handle);
handle = NULL;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_INFO("Component Deinit");
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Heap Overflow and Possible Local Privilege Escalation in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem)
Bug: 27532497
Change-Id: I31e576ef9dc542df73aa6b0ea113d72724b50fc6
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_venc::component_deinit(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp)
{
(void) hComp;
OMX_U32 i = 0;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("omx_venc(): Inside component_deinit()");
if (OMX_StateLoaded != m_state) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("WARNING:Rxd DeInit,OMX not in LOADED state %d",\
m_state);
}
if (m_out_mem_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing the Output Memory");
for (i=0; i< m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++ ) {
if (BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_out_bm_count, i)) {
BITMASK_CLEAR(&m_out_bm_count, i);
free_output_buffer (&m_out_mem_ptr[i]);
}
if (release_output_done()) {
break;
}
}
free(m_out_mem_ptr);
m_out_mem_ptr = NULL;
}
/*Check if the input buffers have to be cleaned up*/
if (m_inp_mem_ptr
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
&& !meta_mode_enable
#endif
) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing the Input Memory");
for (i=0; i<m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++ ) {
if (BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_inp_bm_count, i)) {
BITMASK_CLEAR(&m_inp_bm_count, i);
free_input_buffer (&m_inp_mem_ptr[i]);
}
if (release_input_done()) {
break;
}
}
free(m_inp_mem_ptr);
m_inp_mem_ptr = NULL;
}
m_ftb_q.m_size=0;
m_cmd_q.m_size=0;
m_etb_q.m_size=0;
m_ftb_q.m_read = m_ftb_q.m_write =0;
m_cmd_q.m_read = m_cmd_q.m_write =0;
m_etb_q.m_read = m_etb_q.m_write =0;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Calling m_heap_ptr.clear()");
m_heap_ptr.clear();
#endif // _ANDROID_
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Calling venc_close()");
if (handle) {
handle->venc_close();
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Deleting HANDLE[%p]", handle);
delete (handle);
handle = NULL;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_INFO("Component Deinit");
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
| 173,782
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<SiteCharacteristicsDataReader> GetReaderForOrigin(
Profile* profile,
const url::Origin& origin) {
SiteCharacteristicsDataStore* data_store =
LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataStoreFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
EXPECT_TRUE(data_store);
std::unique_ptr<SiteCharacteristicsDataReader> reader =
data_store->GetReaderForOrigin(origin);
internal::LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataImpl* impl =
static_cast<LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataReader*>(reader.get())
->impl_for_testing()
.get();
while (!impl->site_characteristics_for_testing().IsInitialized())
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
return reader;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
|
std::unique_ptr<SiteCharacteristicsDataReader> GetReaderForOrigin(
Profile* profile,
const url::Origin& origin) {
SiteCharacteristicsDataStore* data_store =
LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataStoreFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
EXPECT_TRUE(data_store);
std::unique_ptr<SiteCharacteristicsDataReader> reader =
data_store->GetReaderForOrigin(origin);
const internal::LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataImpl* impl =
static_cast<LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataReader*>(reader.get())
->impl_for_testing();
while (!impl->site_characteristics_for_testing().IsInitialized())
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
return reader;
}
| 172,215
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: check_mountpoint(const char *progname, char *mountpoint)
{
int err;
struct stat statbuf;
/* does mountpoint exist and is it a directory? */
err = stat(mountpoint, &statbuf);
if (err) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed to stat %s: %s\n", progname,
mountpoint, strerror(errno));
return EX_USAGE;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s is not a directory!", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
#if CIFS_LEGACY_SETUID_CHECK
/* do extra checks on mountpoint for legacy setuid behavior */
if (!getuid() || geteuid())
return 0;
if (statbuf.st_uid != getuid()) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s is not owned by user\n", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IRWXU) != S_IRWXU) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid permissions on %s\n", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
#endif /* CIFS_LEGACY_SETUID_CHECK */
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-59
|
check_mountpoint(const char *progname, char *mountpoint)
{
int err;
struct stat statbuf;
/* does mountpoint exist and is it a directory? */
err = stat(".", &statbuf);
if (err) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed to stat %s: %s\n", progname,
mountpoint, strerror(errno));
return EX_USAGE;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s is not a directory!", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
#if CIFS_LEGACY_SETUID_CHECK
/* do extra checks on mountpoint for legacy setuid behavior */
if (!getuid() || geteuid())
return 0;
if (statbuf.st_uid != getuid()) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s is not owned by user\n", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IRWXU) != S_IRWXU) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid permissions on %s\n", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
#endif /* CIFS_LEGACY_SETUID_CHECK */
return 0;
}
| 165,168
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Segment::~Segment() {
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** i = m_clusters;
Cluster** j = m_clusters + count;
while (i != j) {
Cluster* const p = *i++;
assert(p);
delete p;
}
delete[] m_clusters;
delete m_pTracks;
delete m_pInfo;
delete m_pCues;
delete m_pChapters;
delete m_pSeekHead;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
Segment::~Segment() {
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** i = m_clusters;
Cluster** j = m_clusters + count;
while (i != j) {
Cluster* const p = *i++;
delete p;
}
delete[] m_clusters;
delete m_pTracks;
delete m_pInfo;
delete m_pCues;
delete m_pChapters;
delete m_pTags;
delete m_pSeekHead;
}
| 173,870
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: header_put_be_int (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 4)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
} ;
} /* header_put_be_int */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
header_put_be_int (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = x ;
} /* header_put_be_int */
| 170,051
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: sp<IMemory> MetadataRetrieverClient::getFrameAtTime(int64_t timeUs, int option)
{
ALOGV("getFrameAtTime: time(%lld us) option(%d)", timeUs, option);
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
Mutex::Autolock glock(sLock);
mThumbnail.clear();
if (mRetriever == NULL) {
ALOGE("retriever is not initialized");
return NULL;
}
VideoFrame *frame = mRetriever->getFrameAtTime(timeUs, option);
if (frame == NULL) {
ALOGE("failed to capture a video frame");
return NULL;
}
size_t size = sizeof(VideoFrame) + frame->mSize;
sp<MemoryHeapBase> heap = new MemoryHeapBase(size, 0, "MetadataRetrieverClient");
if (heap == NULL) {
ALOGE("failed to create MemoryDealer");
delete frame;
return NULL;
}
mThumbnail = new MemoryBase(heap, 0, size);
if (mThumbnail == NULL) {
ALOGE("not enough memory for VideoFrame size=%u", size);
delete frame;
return NULL;
}
VideoFrame *frameCopy = static_cast<VideoFrame *>(mThumbnail->pointer());
frameCopy->mWidth = frame->mWidth;
frameCopy->mHeight = frame->mHeight;
frameCopy->mDisplayWidth = frame->mDisplayWidth;
frameCopy->mDisplayHeight = frame->mDisplayHeight;
frameCopy->mSize = frame->mSize;
frameCopy->mRotationAngle = frame->mRotationAngle;
ALOGV("rotation: %d", frameCopy->mRotationAngle);
frameCopy->mData = (uint8_t *)frameCopy + sizeof(VideoFrame);
memcpy(frameCopy->mData, frame->mData, frame->mSize);
delete frame; // Fix memory leakage
return mThumbnail;
}
Commit Message: Clear unused pointer field when sending across binder
Bug: 28377502
Change-Id: Iad5ebfb0a9ef89f09755bb332579dbd3534f9c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
sp<IMemory> MetadataRetrieverClient::getFrameAtTime(int64_t timeUs, int option)
{
ALOGV("getFrameAtTime: time(%lld us) option(%d)", timeUs, option);
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
Mutex::Autolock glock(sLock);
mThumbnail.clear();
if (mRetriever == NULL) {
ALOGE("retriever is not initialized");
return NULL;
}
VideoFrame *frame = mRetriever->getFrameAtTime(timeUs, option);
if (frame == NULL) {
ALOGE("failed to capture a video frame");
return NULL;
}
size_t size = sizeof(VideoFrame) + frame->mSize;
sp<MemoryHeapBase> heap = new MemoryHeapBase(size, 0, "MetadataRetrieverClient");
if (heap == NULL) {
ALOGE("failed to create MemoryDealer");
delete frame;
return NULL;
}
mThumbnail = new MemoryBase(heap, 0, size);
if (mThumbnail == NULL) {
ALOGE("not enough memory for VideoFrame size=%u", size);
delete frame;
return NULL;
}
VideoFrame *frameCopy = static_cast<VideoFrame *>(mThumbnail->pointer());
frameCopy->mWidth = frame->mWidth;
frameCopy->mHeight = frame->mHeight;
frameCopy->mDisplayWidth = frame->mDisplayWidth;
frameCopy->mDisplayHeight = frame->mDisplayHeight;
frameCopy->mSize = frame->mSize;
frameCopy->mRotationAngle = frame->mRotationAngle;
ALOGV("rotation: %d", frameCopy->mRotationAngle);
frameCopy->mData = (uint8_t *)frameCopy + sizeof(VideoFrame);
memcpy(frameCopy->mData, frame->mData, frame->mSize);
frameCopy->mData = 0;
delete frame; // Fix memory leakage
return mThumbnail;
}
| 173,550
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: NetworkLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetNetworkLibrary() {
return network_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
NetworkLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetNetworkLibrary() {
| 170,627
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PrintPreviewMessageHandler::PrintPreviewMessageHandler(
WebContents* web_contents)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents) {
DCHECK(web_contents);
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
PrintPreviewMessageHandler::PrintPreviewMessageHandler(
WebContents* web_contents)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents), weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(web_contents);
}
| 171,891
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::StopAllLoaders() {
if (frame_->GetDocument()->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() !=
Document::kNoDismissal)
return;
if (in_stop_all_loaders_)
return;
in_stop_all_loaders_ = true;
for (Frame* child = frame_->Tree().FirstChild(); child;
child = child->Tree().NextSibling()) {
if (child->IsLocalFrame())
ToLocalFrame(child)->Loader().StopAllLoaders();
}
frame_->GetDocument()->CancelParsing();
if (document_loader_)
document_loader_->Fetcher()->StopFetching();
if (!protect_provisional_loader_)
DetachDocumentLoader(provisional_document_loader_);
frame_->GetNavigationScheduler().Cancel();
if (document_loader_ && !document_loader_->SentDidFinishLoad()) {
document_loader_->LoadFailed(
ResourceError::CancelledError(document_loader_->Url()));
}
in_stop_all_loaders_ = false;
TakeObjectSnapshot();
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void FrameLoader::StopAllLoaders() {
if (frame_->GetDocument()->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() !=
Document::kNoDismissal)
return;
if (in_stop_all_loaders_)
return;
AutoReset<bool> in_stop_all_loaders(&in_stop_all_loaders_, true);
for (Frame* child = frame_->Tree().FirstChild(); child;
child = child->Tree().NextSibling()) {
if (child->IsLocalFrame())
ToLocalFrame(child)->Loader().StopAllLoaders();
}
frame_->GetDocument()->CancelParsing();
if (document_loader_)
document_loader_->StopLoading();
if (!protect_provisional_loader_)
DetachDocumentLoader(provisional_document_loader_);
frame_->GetNavigationScheduler().Cancel();
DidFinishNavigation();
TakeObjectSnapshot();
}
| 171,852
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AutofillDialogViews::SectionContainer::SetActive(bool active) {
bool is_active = active && proxy_button_->visible();
if (is_active == !!background())
return;
set_background(is_active ?
views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kShadingColor) :
NULL);
SchedulePaint();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void AutofillDialogViews::SectionContainer::SetActive(bool active) {
bool is_active = active && proxy_button_->visible();
if (is_active == !!background())
return;
set_background(
is_active ? views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kLightShadingColor)
: NULL);
SchedulePaint();
}
| 171,140
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: stf_status ikev2parent_inI2outR2(struct msg_digest *md)
{
struct state *st = md->st;
/* struct connection *c = st->st_connection; */
/*
* the initiator sent us an encrypted payload. We need to calculate
* our g^xy, and skeyseed values, and then decrypt the payload.
*/
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log(
"ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2"));
/* verify that there is in fact an encrypted payload */
if (!md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2E]) {
libreswan_log("R2 state should receive an encrypted payload");
reset_globals();
return STF_FATAL;
}
/* now. we need to go calculate the g^xy */
{
struct dh_continuation *dh = alloc_thing(
struct dh_continuation,
"ikev2_inI2outR2 KE");
stf_status e;
dh->md = md;
set_suspended(st, dh->md);
pcrc_init(&dh->dh_pcrc);
dh->dh_pcrc.pcrc_func = ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue;
e = start_dh_v2(&dh->dh_pcrc, st, st->st_import, RESPONDER,
st->st_oakley.groupnum);
if (e != STF_SUSPEND && e != STF_INLINE) {
loglog(RC_CRYPTOFAILED, "system too busy");
delete_state(st);
}
reset_globals();
return e;
}
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
stf_status ikev2parent_inI2outR2(struct msg_digest *md)
{
struct state *st = md->st;
/* struct connection *c = st->st_connection; */
/*
* the initiator sent us an encrypted payload. We need to calculate
* our g^xy, and skeyseed values, and then decrypt the payload.
*/
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log(
"ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2"));
/* verify that there is in fact an encrypted payload */
if (!md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2E]) {
libreswan_log("R2 state should receive an encrypted payload");
reset_globals(); /* XXX suspicious - why was this deemed neccessary? */
return STF_FATAL;
}
/* now. we need to go calculate the g^xy */
{
struct dh_continuation *dh = alloc_thing(
struct dh_continuation,
"ikev2_inI2outR2 KE");
stf_status e;
dh->md = md;
set_suspended(st, dh->md);
pcrc_init(&dh->dh_pcrc);
dh->dh_pcrc.pcrc_func = ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue;
e = start_dh_v2(&dh->dh_pcrc, st, st->st_import, RESPONDER,
st->st_oakley.groupnum);
if (e != STF_SUSPEND && e != STF_INLINE) {
loglog(RC_CRYPTOFAILED, "system too busy");
delete_state(st);
}
reset_globals();
return e;
}
}
| 166,475
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ptaReadStream(FILE *fp)
{
char typestr[128];
l_int32 i, n, ix, iy, type, version;
l_float32 x, y;
PTA *pta;
PROCNAME("ptaReadStream");
if (!fp)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("stream not defined", procName, NULL);
if (fscanf(fp, "\n Pta Version %d\n", &version) != 1)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("not a pta file", procName, NULL);
if (version != PTA_VERSION_NUMBER)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("invalid pta version", procName, NULL);
if (fscanf(fp, " Number of pts = %d; format = %s\n", &n, typestr) != 2)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("not a pta file", procName, NULL);
if (!strcmp(typestr, "float"))
type = 0;
else /* typestr is "integer" */
type = 1;
if ((pta = ptaCreate(n)) == NULL)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("pta not made", procName, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (type == 0) { /* data is float */
if (fscanf(fp, " (%f, %f)\n", &x, &y) != 2) {
ptaDestroy(&pta);
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("error reading floats", procName, NULL);
}
ptaAddPt(pta, x, y);
} else { /* data is integer */
if (fscanf(fp, " (%d, %d)\n", &ix, &iy) != 2) {
ptaDestroy(&pta);
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("error reading ints", procName, NULL);
}
ptaAddPt(pta, ix, iy);
}
}
return pta;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ptaReadStream(FILE *fp)
{
char typestr[128]; /* hardcoded below in fscanf */
l_int32 i, n, ix, iy, type, version;
l_float32 x, y;
PTA *pta;
PROCNAME("ptaReadStream");
if (!fp)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("stream not defined", procName, NULL);
if (fscanf(fp, "\n Pta Version %d\n", &version) != 1)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("not a pta file", procName, NULL);
if (version != PTA_VERSION_NUMBER)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("invalid pta version", procName, NULL);
if (fscanf(fp, " Number of pts = %d; format = %127s\n", &n, typestr) != 2)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("not a pta file", procName, NULL);
if (!strcmp(typestr, "float"))
type = 0;
else /* typestr is "integer" */
type = 1;
if ((pta = ptaCreate(n)) == NULL)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("pta not made", procName, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (type == 0) { /* data is float */
if (fscanf(fp, " (%f, %f)\n", &x, &y) != 2) {
ptaDestroy(&pta);
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("error reading floats", procName, NULL);
}
ptaAddPt(pta, x, y);
} else { /* data is integer */
if (fscanf(fp, " (%d, %d)\n", &ix, &iy) != 2) {
ptaDestroy(&pta);
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("error reading ints", procName, NULL);
}
ptaAddPt(pta, ix, iy);
}
}
return pta;
}
| 169,328
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_generic)
{
zval *mcryptind;
char *data;
int data_len;
php_mcrypt *pm;
unsigned char* data_s;
int block_size, data_size;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs", &mcryptind, &data, &data_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pm, php_mcrypt *, &mcryptind, -1, "MCrypt", le_mcrypt);
PHP_MCRYPT_INIT_CHECK
if (data_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "An empty string was passed");
RETURN_FALSE
}
/* Check blocksize */
if (mcrypt_enc_is_block_mode(pm->td) == 1) { /* It's a block algorithm */
block_size = mcrypt_enc_get_block_size(pm->td);
data_size = (((data_len - 1) / block_size) + 1) * block_size;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
} else { /* It's not a block algorithm */
data_size = data_len;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
}
mcrypt_generic(pm->td, data_s, data_size);
data_s[data_size] = '\0';
RETVAL_STRINGL(data_s, data_size, 1);
efree(data_s);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_generic)
{
zval *mcryptind;
char *data;
int data_len;
php_mcrypt *pm;
unsigned char* data_s;
int block_size, data_size;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs", &mcryptind, &data, &data_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pm, php_mcrypt *, &mcryptind, -1, "MCrypt", le_mcrypt);
PHP_MCRYPT_INIT_CHECK
if (data_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "An empty string was passed");
RETURN_FALSE
}
/* Check blocksize */
if (mcrypt_enc_is_block_mode(pm->td) == 1) { /* It's a block algorithm */
block_size = mcrypt_enc_get_block_size(pm->td);
data_size = (((data_len - 1) / block_size) + 1) * block_size;
if (data_size <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Integer overflow in data size");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
} else { /* It's not a block algorithm */
data_size = data_len;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
}
mcrypt_generic(pm->td, data_s, data_size);
data_s[data_size] = '\0';
RETVAL_STRINGL(data_s, data_size, 1);
efree(data_s);
}
| 167,091
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: sparse_dump_region (struct tar_sparse_file *file, size_t i)
{
union block *blk;
off_t bytes_left = file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].numbytes;
if (!lseek_or_error (file, file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].offset))
return false;
while (bytes_left > 0)
{
size_t bufsize = (bytes_left > BLOCKSIZE) ? BLOCKSIZE : bytes_left;
size_t bytes_read;
blk = find_next_block ();
bytes_read = safe_read (file->fd, blk->buffer, bufsize);
if (bytes_read == SAFE_READ_ERROR)
{
read_diag_details (file->stat_info->orig_file_name,
(file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].offset
+ file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].numbytes
- bytes_left),
bufsize);
return false;
}
memset (blk->buffer + bytes_read, 0, BLOCKSIZE - bytes_read);
bytes_left -= bytes_read;
{
size_t count;
size_t wrbytes = (write_size > BLOCKSIZE) ? BLOCKSIZE : write_size;
union block *blk = find_next_block ();
if (!blk)
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("Unexpected EOF in archive")));
return false;
}
set_next_block_after (blk);
count = blocking_write (file->fd, blk->buffer, wrbytes);
write_size -= count;
file->dumped_size += count;
mv_size_left (file->stat_info->archive_file_size - file->dumped_size);
file->offset += count;
if (count != wrbytes)
{
write_error_details (file->stat_info->orig_file_name,
count, wrbytes);
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
/* Interface functions */
enum dump_status
sparse_dump_file (int fd, struct tar_stat_info *st)
{
return false;
}
set_next_block_after (blk);
count = blocking_write (file->fd, blk->buffer, wrbytes);
write_size -= count;
file->dumped_size += count;
mv_size_left (file->stat_info->archive_file_size - file->dumped_size);
file->offset += count;
if (count != wrbytes)
rc = sparse_scan_file (&file);
if (rc && file.optab->dump_region)
{
tar_sparse_dump_header (&file);
if (fd >= 0)
{
size_t i;
mv_begin_write (file.stat_info->file_name,
file.stat_info->stat.st_size,
file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size);
for (i = 0; rc && i < file.stat_info->sparse_map_avail; i++)
rc = tar_sparse_dump_region (&file, i);
}
}
pad_archive (file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size);
return (tar_sparse_done (&file) && rc) ? dump_status_ok : dump_status_short;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
|
sparse_dump_region (struct tar_sparse_file *file, size_t i)
{
union block *blk;
off_t bytes_left = file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].numbytes;
if (!lseek_or_error (file, file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].offset))
return false;
while (bytes_left > 0)
{
size_t bufsize = (bytes_left > BLOCKSIZE) ? BLOCKSIZE : bytes_left;
size_t bytes_read;
blk = find_next_block ();
bytes_read = safe_read (file->fd, blk->buffer, bufsize);
if (bytes_read == SAFE_READ_ERROR)
{
read_diag_details (file->stat_info->orig_file_name,
(file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].offset
+ file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].numbytes
- bytes_left),
bufsize);
return false;
}
else if (bytes_read == 0)
{
char buf[UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND];
struct stat st;
size_t n;
if (fstat (file->fd, &st) == 0)
n = file->stat_info->stat.st_size - st.st_size;
else
n = file->stat_info->stat.st_size
- (file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].offset
+ file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].numbytes
- bytes_left);
WARNOPT (WARN_FILE_SHRANK,
(0, 0,
ngettext ("%s: File shrank by %s byte; padding with zeros",
"%s: File shrank by %s bytes; padding with zeros",
n),
quotearg_colon (file->stat_info->orig_file_name),
STRINGIFY_BIGINT (n, buf)));
if (! ignore_failed_read_option)
set_exit_status (TAREXIT_DIFFERS);
return false;
}
memset (blk->buffer + bytes_read, 0, BLOCKSIZE - bytes_read);
bytes_left -= bytes_read;
{
size_t count;
size_t wrbytes = (write_size > BLOCKSIZE) ? BLOCKSIZE : write_size;
union block *blk = find_next_block ();
if (!blk)
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("Unexpected EOF in archive")));
return false;
}
set_next_block_after (blk);
count = blocking_write (file->fd, blk->buffer, wrbytes);
write_size -= count;
file->dumped_size += count;
mv_size_left (file->stat_info->archive_file_size - file->dumped_size);
file->offset += count;
if (count != wrbytes)
{
write_error_details (file->stat_info->orig_file_name,
count, wrbytes);
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
/* Interface functions */
enum dump_status
sparse_dump_file (int fd, struct tar_stat_info *st)
{
return false;
}
set_next_block_after (blk);
file->dumped_size += BLOCKSIZE;
count = blocking_write (file->fd, blk->buffer, wrbytes);
write_size -= count;
mv_size_left (file->stat_info->archive_file_size - file->dumped_size);
file->offset += count;
if (count != wrbytes)
rc = sparse_scan_file (&file);
if (rc && file.optab->dump_region)
{
tar_sparse_dump_header (&file);
if (fd >= 0)
{
size_t i;
mv_begin_write (file.stat_info->file_name,
file.stat_info->stat.st_size,
file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size);
for (i = 0; rc && i < file.stat_info->sparse_map_avail; i++)
rc = tar_sparse_dump_region (&file, i);
}
}
pad_archive (file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size);
return (tar_sparse_done (&file) && rc) ? dump_status_ok : dump_status_short;
}
| 164,596
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ApiTestEnvironment::RegisterModules() {
v8_schema_registry_.reset(new V8SchemaRegistry);
const std::vector<std::pair<std::string, int> > resources =
Dispatcher::GetJsResources();
for (std::vector<std::pair<std::string, int> >::const_iterator resource =
resources.begin();
resource != resources.end();
++resource) {
if (resource->first != "test_environment_specific_bindings")
env()->RegisterModule(resource->first, resource->second);
}
Dispatcher::RegisterNativeHandlers(env()->module_system(),
env()->context(),
NULL,
NULL,
v8_schema_registry_.get());
env()->module_system()->RegisterNativeHandler(
"process",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new ProcessInfoNativeHandler(
env()->context(),
env()->context()->GetExtensionID(),
env()->context()->GetContextTypeDescription(),
false,
false,
2,
false)));
env()->RegisterTestFile("test_environment_specific_bindings",
"unit_test_environment_specific_bindings.js");
env()->OverrideNativeHandler("activityLogger",
"exports.LogAPICall = function() {};");
env()->OverrideNativeHandler(
"apiDefinitions",
"exports.GetExtensionAPIDefinitionsForTest = function() { return [] };");
env()->OverrideNativeHandler(
"event_natives",
"exports.AttachEvent = function() {};"
"exports.DetachEvent = function() {};"
"exports.AttachFilteredEvent = function() {};"
"exports.AttachFilteredEvent = function() {};"
"exports.MatchAgainstEventFilter = function() { return [] };");
gin::ModuleRegistry::From(env()->context()->v8_context())
->AddBuiltinModule(env()->isolate(),
mojo::js::Core::kModuleName,
mojo::js::Core::GetModule(env()->isolate()));
gin::ModuleRegistry::From(env()->context()->v8_context())
->AddBuiltinModule(env()->isolate(),
mojo::js::Support::kModuleName,
mojo::js::Support::GetModule(env()->isolate()));
gin::Handle<TestServiceProvider> service_provider =
TestServiceProvider::Create(env()->isolate());
service_provider_ = service_provider.get();
gin::ModuleRegistry::From(env()->context()->v8_context())
->AddBuiltinModule(env()->isolate(),
"content/public/renderer/service_provider",
service_provider.ToV8());
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void ApiTestEnvironment::RegisterModules() {
v8_schema_registry_.reset(new V8SchemaRegistry);
const std::vector<std::pair<std::string, int> > resources =
Dispatcher::GetJsResources();
for (std::vector<std::pair<std::string, int> >::const_iterator resource =
resources.begin();
resource != resources.end();
++resource) {
if (resource->first != "test_environment_specific_bindings")
env()->RegisterModule(resource->first, resource->second);
}
Dispatcher::RegisterNativeHandlers(env()->module_system(),
env()->context(),
NULL,
NULL,
v8_schema_registry_.get());
env()->module_system()->RegisterNativeHandler(
"process",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new ProcessInfoNativeHandler(
env()->context(),
env()->context()->GetExtensionID(),
env()->context()->GetContextTypeDescription(),
false,
false,
2,
false)));
env()->RegisterTestFile("test_environment_specific_bindings",
"unit_test_environment_specific_bindings.js");
env()->OverrideNativeHandler("activityLogger",
"exports.$set('LogAPICall', function() {});");
env()->OverrideNativeHandler(
"apiDefinitions",
"exports.$set('GetExtensionAPIDefinitionsForTest',"
"function() { return [] });");
env()->OverrideNativeHandler(
"event_natives",
"exports.$set('AttachEvent', function() {});"
"exports.$set('DetachEvent', function() {});"
"exports.$set('AttachFilteredEvent', function() {});"
"exports.$set('AttachFilteredEvent', function() {});"
"exports.$set('MatchAgainstEventFilter', function() { return [] });");
gin::ModuleRegistry::From(env()->context()->v8_context())
->AddBuiltinModule(env()->isolate(),
mojo::js::Core::kModuleName,
mojo::js::Core::GetModule(env()->isolate()));
gin::ModuleRegistry::From(env()->context()->v8_context())
->AddBuiltinModule(env()->isolate(),
mojo::js::Support::kModuleName,
mojo::js::Support::GetModule(env()->isolate()));
gin::Handle<TestServiceProvider> service_provider =
TestServiceProvider::Create(env()->isolate());
service_provider_ = service_provider.get();
gin::ModuleRegistry::From(env()->context()->v8_context())
->AddBuiltinModule(env()->isolate(),
"content/public/renderer/service_provider",
service_provider.ToV8());
}
| 172,286
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long ContentEncoding::ParseContentEncAESSettingsEntry(
long long start,
long long size,
IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentEncAESSettings* aes) {
assert(pReader);
assert(aes);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x7E8) {
aes->cipher_mode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (aes->cipher_mode != 1)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long ContentEncoding::ParseContentEncAESSettingsEntry(
long long start, long long size, IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentEncAESSettings* aes) {
assert(pReader);
assert(aes);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x7E8) {
aes->cipher_mode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (aes->cipher_mode != 1)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
return 0;
}
| 174,418
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: AriaCurrentState AXNodeObject::ariaCurrentState() const {
const AtomicString& attributeValue =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kCurrent);
if (attributeValue.isNull())
return AriaCurrentStateUndefined;
if (attributeValue.isEmpty() || equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "false"))
return AriaCurrentStateFalse;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "true"))
return AriaCurrentStateTrue;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "page"))
return AriaCurrentStatePage;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "step"))
return AriaCurrentStateStep;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "location"))
return AriaCurrentStateLocation;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "date"))
return AriaCurrentStateDate;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "time"))
return AriaCurrentStateTime;
if (!attributeValue.isEmpty())
return AriaCurrentStateTrue;
return AXObject::ariaCurrentState();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
AriaCurrentState AXNodeObject::ariaCurrentState() const {
const AtomicString& attributeValue =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kCurrent);
if (attributeValue.isNull())
return AriaCurrentStateUndefined;
if (attributeValue.isEmpty() ||
equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "false"))
return AriaCurrentStateFalse;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "true"))
return AriaCurrentStateTrue;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "page"))
return AriaCurrentStatePage;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "step"))
return AriaCurrentStateStep;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "location"))
return AriaCurrentStateLocation;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "date"))
return AriaCurrentStateDate;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "time"))
return AriaCurrentStateTime;
if (!attributeValue.isEmpty())
return AriaCurrentStateTrue;
return AXObject::ariaCurrentState();
}
| 171,908
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto)
{
if (upto)
{
BIO *tbio;
do
{
tbio = BIO_pop(f);
BIO_free(f);
f = tbio;
}
while (f != upto);
}
else
BIO_free_all(f);
}
Commit Message: Canonicalise input in CMS_verify.
If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto)
{
if (upto)
{
BIO *tbio;
do
{
tbio = BIO_pop(f);
BIO_free(f);
f = tbio;
}
while (f && f != upto);
}
else
BIO_free_all(f);
}
| 166,690
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Chapters::Edition::ShallowCopy(Edition& rhs) const
{
rhs.m_atoms = m_atoms;
rhs.m_atoms_size = m_atoms_size;
rhs.m_atoms_count = m_atoms_count;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void Chapters::Edition::ShallowCopy(Edition& rhs) const
rhs.m_displays = m_displays;
rhs.m_displays_size = m_displays_size;
rhs.m_displays_count = m_displays_count;
}
| 174,441
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void TestBlinkPlatformSupport::cryptographicallyRandomValues(
unsigned char* buffer,
size_t length) {
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310
|
void TestBlinkPlatformSupport::cryptographicallyRandomValues(
unsigned char* buffer,
size_t length) {
base::RandBytes(buffer, length);
}
| 172,238
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static HB_Error Lookup_MarkMarkPos( GPOS_Instance* gpi,
HB_GPOS_SubTable* st,
HB_Buffer buffer,
HB_UShort flags,
HB_UShort context_length,
int nesting_level )
{
HB_UShort i, j, mark1_index, mark2_index, property, class;
HB_Fixed x_mark1_value, y_mark1_value,
x_mark2_value, y_mark2_value;
HB_Error error;
HB_GPOSHeader* gpos = gpi->gpos;
HB_MarkMarkPos* mmp = &st->markmark;
HB_MarkArray* ma1;
HB_Mark2Array* ma2;
HB_Mark2Record* m2r;
HB_Anchor* mark1_anchor;
HB_Anchor* mark2_anchor;
HB_Position o;
HB_UNUSED(nesting_level);
if ( context_length != 0xFFFF && context_length < 1 )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
if ( flags & HB_LOOKUP_FLAG_IGNORE_MARKS )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
if ( CHECK_Property( gpos->gdef, IN_CURITEM(),
flags, &property ) )
return error;
error = _HB_OPEN_Coverage_Index( &mmp->Mark1Coverage, IN_CURGLYPH(),
&mark1_index );
if ( error )
return error;
/* now we search backwards for a suitable mark glyph until a non-mark
glyph */
if ( buffer->in_pos == 0 )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
i = 1;
j = buffer->in_pos - 1;
while ( i <= buffer->in_pos )
{
error = HB_GDEF_Get_Glyph_Property( gpos->gdef, IN_GLYPH( j ),
&property );
if ( error )
return error;
if ( !( property == HB_GDEF_MARK || property & HB_LOOKUP_FLAG_IGNORE_SPECIAL_MARKS ) )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
if ( flags & HB_LOOKUP_FLAG_IGNORE_SPECIAL_MARKS )
{
if ( property == (flags & 0xFF00) )
break;
}
else
break;
i++;
j--;
}
error = _HB_OPEN_Coverage_Index( &mmp->Mark2Coverage, IN_GLYPH( j ),
&mark2_index );
if ( error )
if ( mark1_index >= ma1->MarkCount )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable);
class = ma1->MarkRecord[mark1_index].Class;
mark1_anchor = &ma1->MarkRecord[mark1_index].MarkAnchor;
if ( class >= mmp->ClassCount )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable);
ma2 = &mmp->Mark2Array;
if ( mark2_index >= ma2->Mark2Count )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable);
m2r = &ma2->Mark2Record[mark2_index];
mark2_anchor = &m2r->Mark2Anchor[class];
error = Get_Anchor( gpi, mark1_anchor, IN_CURGLYPH(),
&x_mark1_value, &y_mark1_value );
if ( error )
return error;
error = Get_Anchor( gpi, mark2_anchor, IN_GLYPH( j ),
&x_mark2_value, &y_mark2_value );
if ( error )
return error;
/* anchor points are not cumulative */
o = POSITION( buffer->in_pos );
o->x_pos = x_mark2_value - x_mark1_value;
o->y_pos = y_mark2_value - y_mark1_value;
o->x_advance = 0;
o->y_advance = 0;
o->back = 1;
(buffer->in_pos)++;
return HB_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static HB_Error Lookup_MarkMarkPos( GPOS_Instance* gpi,
HB_GPOS_SubTable* st,
HB_Buffer buffer,
HB_UShort flags,
HB_UShort context_length,
int nesting_level )
{
HB_UShort i, j, mark1_index, mark2_index, property, class;
HB_Fixed x_mark1_value, y_mark1_value,
x_mark2_value, y_mark2_value;
HB_Error error;
HB_GPOSHeader* gpos = gpi->gpos;
HB_MarkMarkPos* mmp = &st->markmark;
HB_MarkArray* ma1;
HB_Mark2Array* ma2;
HB_Mark2Record* m2r;
HB_Anchor* mark1_anchor;
HB_Anchor* mark2_anchor;
HB_Position o;
HB_UNUSED(nesting_level);
if ( context_length != 0xFFFF && context_length < 1 )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
if ( flags & HB_LOOKUP_FLAG_IGNORE_MARKS )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
if ( CHECK_Property( gpos->gdef, IN_CURITEM(),
flags, &property ) )
return error;
error = _HB_OPEN_Coverage_Index( &mmp->Mark1Coverage, IN_CURGLYPH(),
&mark1_index );
if ( error )
return error;
/* now we search backwards for a suitable mark glyph until a non-mark
glyph */
if ( buffer->in_pos == 0 )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
i = 1;
j = buffer->in_pos - 1;
while ( i <= buffer->in_pos )
{
error = HB_GDEF_Get_Glyph_Property( gpos->gdef, IN_GLYPH( j ),
&property );
if ( error )
return error;
if ( !( property == HB_GDEF_MARK || property & HB_LOOKUP_FLAG_IGNORE_SPECIAL_MARKS ) )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
if ( flags & HB_LOOKUP_FLAG_IGNORE_SPECIAL_MARKS )
{
if ( property == (flags & 0xFF00) )
break;
}
else
break;
i++;
j--;
}
if ( i > buffer->in_pos )
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
error = _HB_OPEN_Coverage_Index( &mmp->Mark2Coverage, IN_GLYPH( j ),
&mark2_index );
if ( error )
if ( mark1_index >= ma1->MarkCount )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable);
class = ma1->MarkRecord[mark1_index].Class;
mark1_anchor = &ma1->MarkRecord[mark1_index].MarkAnchor;
if ( class >= mmp->ClassCount )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable);
ma2 = &mmp->Mark2Array;
if ( mark2_index >= ma2->Mark2Count )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable);
m2r = &ma2->Mark2Record[mark2_index];
mark2_anchor = &m2r->Mark2Anchor[class];
error = Get_Anchor( gpi, mark1_anchor, IN_CURGLYPH(),
&x_mark1_value, &y_mark1_value );
if ( error )
return error;
error = Get_Anchor( gpi, mark2_anchor, IN_GLYPH( j ),
&x_mark2_value, &y_mark2_value );
if ( error )
return error;
/* anchor points are not cumulative */
o = POSITION( buffer->in_pos );
o->x_pos = x_mark2_value - x_mark1_value;
o->y_pos = y_mark2_value - y_mark1_value;
o->x_advance = 0;
o->y_advance = 0;
o->back = 1;
(buffer->in_pos)++;
return HB_Err_Ok;
}
| 165,246
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void fht4x4_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht4x4_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void fht4x4_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
void fht4x4_ref(const int16_t *in, tran_low_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fht4x4_c(in, out, stride, tx_type);
}
| 174,558
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PreconnectRequest::PreconnectRequest(
const GURL& origin,
int num_sockets,
const net::NetworkIsolationKey& network_isolation_key)
: origin(origin),
num_sockets(num_sockets),
network_isolation_key(network_isolation_key) {
DCHECK_GE(num_sockets, 0);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
PreconnectRequest::PreconnectRequest(
const url::Origin& origin,
int num_sockets,
const net::NetworkIsolationKey& network_isolation_key)
: origin(origin),
num_sockets(num_sockets),
network_isolation_key(network_isolation_key) {
DCHECK_GE(num_sockets, 0);
}
| 172,381
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: _PUBLIC_ size_t strlen_m_ext_handle(struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
const char *s, charset_t src_charset, charset_t dst_charset)
{
size_t count = 0;
#ifdef DEVELOPER
switch (dst_charset) {
case CH_DOS:
case CH_UNIX:
smb_panic("cannot call strlen_m_ext() with a variable dest charset (must be UTF16* or UTF8)");
default:
break;
}
switch (src_charset) {
case CH_UTF16LE:
case CH_UTF16BE:
smb_panic("cannot call strlen_m_ext() with a UTF16 src charset (must be DOS, UNIX, DISPLAY or UTF8)");
default:
break;
}
#endif
if (!s) {
return 0;
}
while (*s && !(((uint8_t)*s) & 0x80)) {
s++;
count++;
}
if (!*s) {
return count;
}
while (*s) {
size_t c_size;
codepoint_t c = next_codepoint_handle_ext(ic, s, src_charset, &c_size);
s += c_size;
switch (dst_charset) {
case CH_UTF16BE:
case CH_UTF16MUNGED:
if (c < 0x10000) {
/* Unicode char fits into 16 bits. */
count += 1;
} else {
/* Double-width unicode char - 32 bits. */
count += 2;
}
break;
case CH_UTF8:
/*
* this only checks ranges, and does not
* check for invalid codepoints
*/
if (c < 0x80) {
count += 1;
} else if (c < 0x800) {
count += 2;
} else if (c < 0x10000) {
count += 3;
} else {
count += 4;
}
break;
default:
/*
* non-unicode encoding:
* assume that each codepoint fits into
* one unit in the destination encoding.
*/
count += 1;
}
}
return count;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
_PUBLIC_ size_t strlen_m_ext_handle(struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
const char *s, charset_t src_charset, charset_t dst_charset)
{
size_t count = 0;
#ifdef DEVELOPER
switch (dst_charset) {
case CH_DOS:
case CH_UNIX:
smb_panic("cannot call strlen_m_ext() with a variable dest charset (must be UTF16* or UTF8)");
default:
break;
}
switch (src_charset) {
case CH_UTF16LE:
case CH_UTF16BE:
smb_panic("cannot call strlen_m_ext() with a UTF16 src charset (must be DOS, UNIX, DISPLAY or UTF8)");
default:
break;
}
#endif
if (!s) {
return 0;
}
while (*s && !(((uint8_t)*s) & 0x80)) {
s++;
count++;
}
if (!*s) {
return count;
}
while (*s) {
size_t c_size;
codepoint_t c = next_codepoint_handle_ext(ic, s, strnlen(s, 5),
src_charset, &c_size);
s += c_size;
switch (dst_charset) {
case CH_UTF16BE:
case CH_UTF16MUNGED:
if (c < 0x10000) {
/* Unicode char fits into 16 bits. */
count += 1;
} else {
/* Double-width unicode char - 32 bits. */
count += 2;
}
break;
case CH_UTF8:
/*
* this only checks ranges, and does not
* check for invalid codepoints
*/
if (c < 0x80) {
count += 1;
} else if (c < 0x800) {
count += 2;
} else if (c < 0x10000) {
count += 3;
} else {
count += 4;
}
break;
default:
/*
* non-unicode encoding:
* assume that each codepoint fits into
* one unit in the destination encoding.
*/
count += 1;
}
}
return count;
}
| 164,671
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: CURLcode Curl_urldecode(struct SessionHandle *data,
const char *string, size_t length,
char **ostring, size_t *olen,
bool reject_ctrl)
{
size_t alloc = (length?length:strlen(string))+1;
char *ns = malloc(alloc);
unsigned char in;
size_t strindex=0;
unsigned long hex;
CURLcode res;
if(!ns)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
while(--alloc > 0) {
in = *string;
if(('%' == in) && ISXDIGIT(string[1]) && ISXDIGIT(string[2])) {
/* this is two hexadecimal digits following a '%' */
char hexstr[3];
char *ptr;
hexstr[0] = string[1];
hexstr[1] = string[2];
hexstr[2] = 0;
hex = strtoul(hexstr, &ptr, 16);
in = curlx_ultouc(hex); /* this long is never bigger than 255 anyway */
res = Curl_convert_from_network(data, &in, 1);
if(res) {
/* Curl_convert_from_network calls failf if unsuccessful */
free(ns);
return res;
}
string+=2;
alloc-=2;
}
if(reject_ctrl && (in < 0x20)) {
free(ns);
return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT;
}
ns[strindex++] = in;
string++;
}
ns[strindex]=0; /* terminate it */
if(olen)
/* store output size */
*olen = strindex;
if(ostring)
/* store output string */
*ostring = ns;
return CURLE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Curl_urldecode: no peeking beyond end of input buffer
Security problem: CVE-2013-2174
If a program would give a string like "%FF" to curl_easy_unescape() but
ask for it to decode only the first byte, it would still parse and
decode the full hex sequence. The function then not only read beyond the
allowed buffer but it would also deduct the *unsigned* counter variable
for how many more bytes there's left to read in the buffer by two,
making the counter wrap. Continuing this, the function would go on
reading beyond the buffer and soon writing beyond the allocated target
buffer...
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130622.html
Reported-by: Timo Sirainen
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
CURLcode Curl_urldecode(struct SessionHandle *data,
const char *string, size_t length,
char **ostring, size_t *olen,
bool reject_ctrl)
{
size_t alloc = (length?length:strlen(string))+1;
char *ns = malloc(alloc);
unsigned char in;
size_t strindex=0;
unsigned long hex;
CURLcode res;
if(!ns)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
while(--alloc > 0) {
in = *string;
if(('%' == in) && (alloc > 2) &&
ISXDIGIT(string[1]) && ISXDIGIT(string[2])) {
/* this is two hexadecimal digits following a '%' */
char hexstr[3];
char *ptr;
hexstr[0] = string[1];
hexstr[1] = string[2];
hexstr[2] = 0;
hex = strtoul(hexstr, &ptr, 16);
in = curlx_ultouc(hex); /* this long is never bigger than 255 anyway */
res = Curl_convert_from_network(data, &in, 1);
if(res) {
/* Curl_convert_from_network calls failf if unsuccessful */
free(ns);
return res;
}
string+=2;
alloc-=2;
}
if(reject_ctrl && (in < 0x20)) {
free(ns);
return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT;
}
ns[strindex++] = in;
string++;
}
ns[strindex]=0; /* terminate it */
if(olen)
/* store output size */
*olen = strindex;
if(ostring)
/* store output string */
*ostring = ns;
return CURLE_OK;
}
| 166,080
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: hash_foreach_prepend_string (gpointer key, gpointer val, gpointer user_data)
{
HashAndString *data = (HashAndString*) user_data;
gchar *in = (gchar*) val;
g_hash_table_insert (data->hash, g_strdup ((gchar*) key),
g_strjoin (" ", data->string, in, NULL));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
hash_foreach_prepend_string (gpointer key, gpointer val, gpointer user_data)
| 165,086
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Label::SizeToFit(int max_width) {
DCHECK(is_multi_line_);
std::vector<std::wstring> lines;
base::SplitString(UTF16ToWideHack(text_), L'\n', &lines);
int label_width = 0;
for (std::vector<std::wstring>::const_iterator iter = lines.begin();
iter != lines.end(); ++iter) {
label_width = std::max(label_width,
font_.GetStringWidth(WideToUTF16Hack(*iter)));
}
label_width += GetInsets().width();
if (max_width > 0)
label_width = std::min(label_width, max_width);
SetBounds(x(), y(), label_width, 0);
SizeToPreferredSize();
}
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void Label::SizeToFit(int max_width) {
DCHECK(is_multi_line_);
std::vector<string16> lines;
base::SplitString(text_, '\n', &lines);
int label_width = 0;
for (std::vector<string16>::const_iterator iter = lines.begin();
iter != lines.end(); ++iter) {
label_width = std::max(label_width, font_.GetStringWidth(*iter));
}
label_width += GetInsets().width();
if (max_width > 0)
label_width = std::min(label_width, max_width);
SetBounds(x(), y(), label_width, 0);
SizeToPreferredSize();
}
| 170,556
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int vrend_decode_create_ve(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, uint32_t handle, uint16_t length)
{
struct pipe_vertex_element *ve = NULL;
int num_elements;
int i;
int ret;
if (length < 1)
return EINVAL;
if ((length - 1) % 4)
return EINVAL;
num_elements = (length - 1) / 4;
if (num_elements) {
ve = calloc(num_elements, sizeof(struct pipe_vertex_element));
if (!ve)
return ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < num_elements; i++) {
ve[i].src_offset = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_SRC_OFFSET(i));
ve[i].instance_divisor = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_INSTANCE_DIVISOR(i));
ve[i].vertex_buffer_index = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_VERTEX_BUFFER_INDEX(i));
ve[i].src_format = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_SRC_FORMAT(i));
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static int vrend_decode_create_ve(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, uint32_t handle, uint16_t length)
{
struct pipe_vertex_element *ve = NULL;
int num_elements;
int i;
int ret;
if (length < 1)
return EINVAL;
if ((length - 1) % 4)
return EINVAL;
num_elements = (length - 1) / 4;
if (num_elements) {
ve = calloc(num_elements, sizeof(struct pipe_vertex_element));
if (!ve)
return ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < num_elements; i++) {
ve[i].src_offset = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_SRC_OFFSET(i));
ve[i].instance_divisor = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_INSTANCE_DIVISOR(i));
ve[i].vertex_buffer_index = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_VERTEX_BUFFER_INDEX(i));
if (ve[i].vertex_buffer_index >= PIPE_MAX_ATTRIBS)
return EINVAL;
ve[i].src_format = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_SRC_FORMAT(i));
}
}
return ret;
}
| 164,957
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(move_uploaded_file)
{
char *path, *new_path;
int path_len, new_path_len;
zend_bool successful = 0;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
int oldmask; int ret;
#endif
if (!SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss", &path, &path_len, &new_path, &new_path_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!zend_hash_exists(SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files), path, path_len + 1)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(new_path TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (VCWD_RENAME(path, new_path) == 0) {
successful = 1;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
oldmask = umask(077);
umask(oldmask);
ret = VCWD_CHMOD(new_path, 0666 & ~oldmask);
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
}
#endif
} else if (php_copy_file_ex(path, new_path, STREAM_DISABLE_OPEN_BASEDIR TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
VCWD_UNLINK(path);
successful = 1;
}
if (successful) {
zend_hash_del(SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files), path, path_len + 1);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to move '%s' to '%s'", path, new_path);
}
RETURN_BOOL(successful);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
PHP_FUNCTION(move_uploaded_file)
{
char *path, *new_path;
int path_len, new_path_len;
zend_bool successful = 0;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
int oldmask; int ret;
#endif
if (!SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sp", &path, &path_len, &new_path, &new_path_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!zend_hash_exists(SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files), path, path_len + 1)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(new_path TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (VCWD_RENAME(path, new_path) == 0) {
successful = 1;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
oldmask = umask(077);
umask(oldmask);
ret = VCWD_CHMOD(new_path, 0666 & ~oldmask);
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
}
#endif
} else if (php_copy_file_ex(path, new_path, STREAM_DISABLE_OPEN_BASEDIR TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
VCWD_UNLINK(path);
successful = 1;
}
if (successful) {
zend_hash_del(SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files), path, path_len + 1);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to move '%s' to '%s'", path, new_path);
}
RETURN_BOOL(successful);
}
| 164,751
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static Element* siblingWithAriaRole(String role, Node* node) {
Node* parent = node->parentNode();
if (!parent)
return 0;
for (Element* sibling = ElementTraversal::firstChild(*parent); sibling;
sibling = ElementTraversal::nextSibling(*sibling)) {
const AtomicString& siblingAriaRole =
AccessibleNode::getProperty(sibling, AOMStringProperty::kRole);
if (equalIgnoringCase(siblingAriaRole, role))
return sibling;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
static Element* siblingWithAriaRole(String role, Node* node) {
Node* parent = node->parentNode();
if (!parent)
return 0;
for (Element* sibling = ElementTraversal::firstChild(*parent); sibling;
sibling = ElementTraversal::nextSibling(*sibling)) {
const AtomicString& siblingAriaRole =
AccessibleNode::getProperty(sibling, AOMStringProperty::kRole);
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(siblingAriaRole, role))
return sibling;
}
return 0;
}
| 171,921
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_16_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
/* Expect expand_16 to expand everything to 16 bits as a result of also
* causing 'expand' to happen.
*/
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
if (that->have_tRNS)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this);
if (that->bit_depth < 16)
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 16;
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_png_set_expand_16_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_expand_16_mod(const image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
const transform_display *display)
{
/* Expect expand_16 to expand everything to 16 bits as a result of also
* causing 'expand' to happen.
*/
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
if (that->have_tRNS)
image_pixel_add_alpha(that, &display->this, 0/*!for background*/);
if (that->bit_depth < 16)
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 16;
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
| 173,627
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetFileSystem",
base::Bind(&FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::GetFileSystem,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
|
FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction("GetFileSystem", "fileManagerPrivate",
base::Bind(&FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::GetFileSystem,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"GetExternalFileEntry", "fileManagerPrivate",
base::Bind(&FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::GetExternalFileEntry,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetEntryURL", "fileManagerPrivate",
base::Bind(&FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::GetEntryURL,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 173,274
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost::OnLockRequest(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
blink::WebScreenOrientationLockType orientation,
int request_id) {
if (current_lock_) {
NotifyLockError(current_lock_->request_id,
blink::WebLockOrientationErrorCanceled);
}
current_lock_ = new LockInformation(request_id,
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID());
if (!provider_) {
NotifyLockError(request_id,
blink::WebLockOrientationErrorNotAvailable);
return;
}
provider_->LockOrientation(request_id, orientation);
}
Commit Message: Cleanups in ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost.
BUG=None
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/408213003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost::OnLockRequest(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
blink::WebScreenOrientationLockType orientation,
int request_id) {
if (current_lock_) {
NotifyLockError(current_lock_->request_id,
blink::WebLockOrientationErrorCanceled);
}
if (!provider_) {
NotifyLockError(request_id,
blink::WebLockOrientationErrorNotAvailable);
return;
}
current_lock_ = new LockInformation(request_id,
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_frame_host->GetRoutingID());
provider_->LockOrientation(request_id, orientation);
}
| 171,177
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int ReturnFrameBuffer(vpx_codec_frame_buffer_t *fb) {
EXPECT_TRUE(fb != NULL);
ExternalFrameBuffer *const ext_fb =
reinterpret_cast<ExternalFrameBuffer*>(fb->priv);
EXPECT_TRUE(ext_fb != NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(1, ext_fb->in_use);
ext_fb->in_use = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
int ReturnFrameBuffer(vpx_codec_frame_buffer_t *fb) {
if (fb == NULL) {
EXPECT_TRUE(fb != NULL);
return -1;
}
ExternalFrameBuffer *const ext_fb =
reinterpret_cast<ExternalFrameBuffer*>(fb->priv);
if (ext_fb == NULL) {
EXPECT_TRUE(ext_fb != NULL);
return -1;
}
EXPECT_EQ(1, ext_fb->in_use);
ext_fb->in_use = 0;
return 0;
}
| 174,545
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int interface_get_command(QXLInstance *sin, struct QXLCommandExt *ext)
{
SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd = container_of(sin, SimpleSpiceDisplay, qxl);
info->num_memslots = NUM_MEMSLOTS;
info->num_memslots_groups = NUM_MEMSLOTS_GROUPS;
info->internal_groupslot_id = 0;
info->qxl_ram_size = ssd->bufsize;
info->n_surfaces = ssd->num_surfaces;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static int interface_get_command(QXLInstance *sin, struct QXLCommandExt *ext)
{
SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd = container_of(sin, SimpleSpiceDisplay, qxl);
info->num_memslots = NUM_MEMSLOTS;
info->num_memslots_groups = NUM_MEMSLOTS_GROUPS;
info->internal_groupslot_id = 0;
info->qxl_ram_size = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
info->n_surfaces = ssd->num_surfaces;
}
| 165,150
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_get_iv_size)
{
char *cipher;
char *module;
int cipher_len, module_len;
char *cipher_dir_string;
char *module_dir_string;
MCRYPT td;
MCRYPT_GET_INI
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss",
&cipher, &cipher_len, &module, &module_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
td = mcrypt_module_open(cipher, cipher_dir_string, module, module_dir_string);
if (td != MCRYPT_FAILED) {
RETVAL_LONG(mcrypt_enc_get_iv_size(td));
mcrypt_module_close(td);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, MCRYPT_OPEN_MODULE_FAILED);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_get_iv_size)
{
char *cipher;
char *module;
int cipher_len, module_len;
char *cipher_dir_string;
char *module_dir_string;
MCRYPT td;
MCRYPT_GET_INI
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss",
&cipher, &cipher_len, &module, &module_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
td = mcrypt_module_open(cipher, cipher_dir_string, module, module_dir_string);
if (td != MCRYPT_FAILED) {
RETVAL_LONG(mcrypt_enc_get_iv_size(td));
mcrypt_module_close(td);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, MCRYPT_OPEN_MODULE_FAILED);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| 167,105
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void EncoderTest::MismatchHook(const vpx_image_t *img1,
const vpx_image_t *img2) {
ASSERT_TRUE(0) << "Encode/Decode mismatch found";
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void EncoderTest::MismatchHook(const vpx_image_t *img1,
void EncoderTest::MismatchHook(const vpx_image_t* /*img1*/,
const vpx_image_t* /*img2*/) {
ASSERT_TRUE(0) << "Encode/Decode mismatch found";
}
| 174,539
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method() const {
if (current_input_method_.id.empty()) {
return input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor();
}
return current_input_method_;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
virtual InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method() const {
virtual input_method::InputMethodDescriptor current_input_method() const {
if (current_input_method_.id.empty()) {
return input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor();
}
return current_input_method_;
}
| 170,512
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline unsigned short ReadPropertyUnsignedShort(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
unsigned short
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned short) ((buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[0]);
return((unsigned short) (value & 0xffff));
}
value=(unsigned short) ((((unsigned char *) buffer)[0] << 8) |
((unsigned char *) buffer)[1]);
return((unsigned short) (value & 0xffff));
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static inline unsigned short ReadPropertyUnsignedShort(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
unsigned short
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned short) buffer[1] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[0];
return(value & 0xffff);
}
value=(unsigned short) buffer[0] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[1];
return(value & 0xffff);
}
| 169,957
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnScriptedPrint(
const PrintHostMsg_ScriptedPrint_Params& params,
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params* settings) {
if (print_dialog_user_response_ && printer_.get()) {
printer_->ScriptedPrint(params.cookie,
params.expected_pages_count,
params.has_selection,
settings);
}
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnScriptedPrint(
const PrintHostMsg_ScriptedPrint_Params& params,
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params* settings) {
if (print_dialog_user_response_) {
printer_->ScriptedPrint(params.cookie,
params.expected_pages_count,
params.has_selection,
settings);
}
}
| 170,853
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::SimulateAttrib0(
const char* function_name, GLuint max_vertex_accessed, bool* simulated) {
DCHECK(simulated);
*simulated = false;
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2)
return true;
const VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_->GetVertexAttribInfo(0);
bool attrib_0_used = current_program_->GetAttribInfoByLocation(0) != NULL;
if (info->enabled() && attrib_0_used) {
return true;
}
typedef VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo::Vec4 Vec4;
GLuint num_vertices = max_vertex_accessed + 1;
GLuint size_needed = 0;
if (num_vertices == 0 ||
!SafeMultiply(num_vertices, static_cast<GLuint>(sizeof(Vec4)),
&size_needed) ||
size_needed > 0x7FFFFFFFU) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
PerformanceWarning(
"Attribute 0 is disabled. This has signficant performance penalty");
CopyRealGLErrorsToWrapper();
glBindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, attrib_0_buffer_id_);
bool new_buffer = static_cast<GLsizei>(size_needed) > attrib_0_size_;
if (new_buffer) {
glBufferData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, size_needed, NULL, GL_DYNAMIC_DRAW);
GLenum error = glGetError();
if (error != GL_NO_ERROR) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
}
if (new_buffer ||
(attrib_0_used &&
(!attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ ||
(info->value().v[0] != attrib_0_value_.v[0] ||
info->value().v[1] != attrib_0_value_.v[1] ||
info->value().v[2] != attrib_0_value_.v[2] ||
info->value().v[3] != attrib_0_value_.v[3])))) {
std::vector<Vec4> temp(num_vertices, info->value());
glBufferSubData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0, size_needed, &temp[0].v[0]);
attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ = true;
attrib_0_value_ = info->value();
attrib_0_size_ = size_needed;
}
glVertexAttribPointer(0, 4, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, NULL);
if (info->divisor())
glVertexAttribDivisorANGLE(0, 0);
*simulated = true;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::SimulateAttrib0(
const char* function_name, GLuint max_vertex_accessed, bool* simulated) {
DCHECK(simulated);
*simulated = false;
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2)
return true;
const VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_->GetVertexAttribInfo(0);
bool attrib_0_used = current_program_->GetAttribInfoByLocation(0) != NULL;
if (info->enabled() && attrib_0_used) {
return true;
}
typedef VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo::Vec4 Vec4;
GLuint num_vertices = max_vertex_accessed + 1;
uint32 size_needed = 0;
if (num_vertices == 0 ||
!SafeMultiplyUint32(num_vertices, sizeof(Vec4), &size_needed) ||
size_needed > 0x7FFFFFFFU) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
PerformanceWarning(
"Attribute 0 is disabled. This has signficant performance penalty");
CopyRealGLErrorsToWrapper();
glBindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, attrib_0_buffer_id_);
bool new_buffer = static_cast<GLsizei>(size_needed) > attrib_0_size_;
if (new_buffer) {
glBufferData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, size_needed, NULL, GL_DYNAMIC_DRAW);
GLenum error = glGetError();
if (error != GL_NO_ERROR) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
}
if (new_buffer ||
(attrib_0_used &&
(!attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ ||
(info->value().v[0] != attrib_0_value_.v[0] ||
info->value().v[1] != attrib_0_value_.v[1] ||
info->value().v[2] != attrib_0_value_.v[2] ||
info->value().v[3] != attrib_0_value_.v[3])))) {
std::vector<Vec4> temp(num_vertices, info->value());
glBufferSubData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0, size_needed, &temp[0].v[0]);
attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ = true;
attrib_0_value_ = info->value();
attrib_0_size_ = size_needed;
}
glVertexAttribPointer(0, 4, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, NULL);
if (info->divisor())
glVertexAttribDivisorANGLE(0, 0);
*simulated = true;
return true;
}
| 170,750
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int udf_get_filename(struct super_block *sb, uint8_t *sname, uint8_t *dname,
int flen)
{
struct ustr *filename, *unifilename;
int len = 0;
filename = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ustr), GFP_NOFS);
if (!filename)
return 0;
unifilename = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ustr), GFP_NOFS);
if (!unifilename)
goto out1;
if (udf_build_ustr_exact(unifilename, sname, flen))
goto out2;
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_UTF8)) {
if (!udf_CS0toUTF8(filename, unifilename)) {
udf_debug("Failed in udf_get_filename: sname = %s\n",
sname);
goto out2;
}
} else if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_NLS_MAP)) {
if (!udf_CS0toNLS(UDF_SB(sb)->s_nls_map, filename,
unifilename)) {
udf_debug("Failed in udf_get_filename: sname = %s\n",
sname);
goto out2;
}
} else
goto out2;
len = udf_translate_to_linux(dname, filename->u_name, filename->u_len,
unifilename->u_name, unifilename->u_len);
out2:
kfree(unifilename);
out1:
kfree(filename);
return len;
}
Commit Message: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-17
|
int udf_get_filename(struct super_block *sb, uint8_t *sname, uint8_t *dname,
int udf_get_filename(struct super_block *sb, uint8_t *sname, int slen,
uint8_t *dname, int dlen)
{
struct ustr *filename, *unifilename;
int len = 0;
filename = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ustr), GFP_NOFS);
if (!filename)
return 0;
unifilename = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ustr), GFP_NOFS);
if (!unifilename)
goto out1;
if (udf_build_ustr_exact(unifilename, sname, slen))
goto out2;
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_UTF8)) {
if (!udf_CS0toUTF8(filename, unifilename)) {
udf_debug("Failed in udf_get_filename: sname = %s\n",
sname);
goto out2;
}
} else if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_NLS_MAP)) {
if (!udf_CS0toNLS(UDF_SB(sb)->s_nls_map, filename,
unifilename)) {
udf_debug("Failed in udf_get_filename: sname = %s\n",
sname);
goto out2;
}
} else
goto out2;
len = udf_translate_to_linux(dname, dlen,
filename->u_name, filename->u_len,
unifilename->u_name, unifilename->u_len);
out2:
kfree(unifilename);
out1:
kfree(filename);
return len;
}
| 166,759
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ikev2_auth_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct ikev2_auth a;
const char *v2_auth[]={ "invalid", "rsasig",
"shared-secret", "dsssig" };
const u_char *authdata = (const u_char*)ext + sizeof(a);
unsigned int len;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&a, ext, sizeof(a));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), a.h.critical);
len = ntohs(a.h.len);
/*
* Our caller has ensured that the length is >= 4.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%u method=%s", len-4,
STR_OR_ID(a.auth_method, v2_auth)));
if (len > 4) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " authdata=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)authdata, len - sizeof(a)))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ") "));
} else if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, authdata, ep))
goto trunc;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
ikev2_auth_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct ikev2_auth a;
const char *v2_auth[]={ "invalid", "rsasig",
"shared-secret", "dsssig" };
const u_char *authdata = (const u_char*)ext + sizeof(a);
unsigned int len;
ND_TCHECK2(*ext, sizeof(a));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&a, ext, sizeof(a));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), a.h.critical);
len = ntohs(a.h.len);
/*
* Our caller has ensured that the length is >= 4.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%u method=%s", len-4,
STR_OR_ID(a.auth_method, v2_auth)));
if (len > 4) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " authdata=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)authdata, len - sizeof(a)))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ") "));
} else if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, authdata, ep))
goto trunc;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,797
|
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