instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.3k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::IsDangerousFile(
const DownloadItem& download,
const FilePath& suggested_path,
bool visited_referrer_before) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (download.GetTransitionType() & content::PAGE_TRANSITION_FROM_ADDRESS_BAR)
return false;
if (extensions::FeatureSwitch::easy_off_store_install()->IsEnabled() &&
download_crx_util::IsExtensionDownload(download) &&
!extensions::WebstoreInstaller::GetAssociatedApproval(download)) {
return true;
}
if (ShouldOpenFileBasedOnExtension(suggested_path) &&
download.HasUserGesture())
return false;
download_util::DownloadDangerLevel danger_level =
download_util::GetFileDangerLevel(suggested_path.BaseName());
if (danger_level == download_util::AllowOnUserGesture)
return !download.HasUserGesture() || !visited_referrer_before;
return danger_level == download_util::Dangerous;
}
Commit Message: For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
bool ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::IsDangerousFile(
const DownloadItem& download,
const FilePath& suggested_path,
bool visited_referrer_before) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (extensions::FeatureSwitch::easy_off_store_install()->IsEnabled() &&
download_crx_util::IsExtensionDownload(download) &&
!extensions::WebstoreInstaller::GetAssociatedApproval(download)) {
return true;
}
if (ShouldOpenFileBasedOnExtension(suggested_path) &&
download.HasUserGesture())
return false;
download_util::DownloadDangerLevel danger_level =
download_util::GetFileDangerLevel(suggested_path.BaseName());
if (danger_level == download_util::AllowOnUserGesture) {
if (download.GetTransitionType() &
content::PAGE_TRANSITION_FROM_ADDRESS_BAR) {
return false;
}
return !download.HasUserGesture() || !visited_referrer_before;
}
return danger_level == download_util::Dangerous;
}
| 171,393
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: gnutls_session_get_data (gnutls_session_t session,
void *session_data, size_t * session_data_size)
{
gnutls_datum_t psession;
int ret;
if (session->internals.resumable == RESUME_FALSE)
return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION;
psession.data = session_data;
ret = _gnutls_session_pack (session, &psession);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
if (psession.size > *session_data_size)
{
ret = GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER;
goto error;
}
if (session_data != NULL)
memcpy (session_data, psession.data, psession.size);
ret = 0;
error:
_gnutls_free_datum (&psession);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
gnutls_session_get_data (gnutls_session_t session,
void *session_data, size_t * session_data_size)
{
gnutls_datum_t psession;
int ret;
if (session->internals.resumable == RESUME_FALSE)
return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION;
psession.data = session_data;
ret = _gnutls_session_pack (session, &psession);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
if (psession.size > *session_data_size)
{
*session_data_size = psession.size;
ret = GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER;
goto error;
}
if (session_data != NULL)
memcpy (session_data, psession.data, psession.size);
ret = 0;
error:
_gnutls_free_datum (&psession);
return ret;
}
| 164,570
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void die_codec(vpx_codec_ctx_t *ctx, const char *s) {
const char *detail = vpx_codec_error_detail(ctx);
printf("%s: %s\n", s, vpx_codec_error(ctx));
if(detail)
printf(" %s\n",detail);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void die_codec(vpx_codec_ctx_t *ctx, const char *s) {
| 174,496
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_is_block_mode)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(modes_dir)
if (mcrypt_module_is_block_mode(module, dir) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_is_block_mode)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(modes_dir)
if (mcrypt_module_is_block_mode(module, dir) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| 167,098
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cmsSEQ* CMSEXPORT cmsAllocProfileSequenceDescription(cmsContext ContextID, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
cmsSEQ* Seq;
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (n == 0) return NULL;
if (n > 255) return NULL;
Seq = (cmsSEQ*) _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(cmsSEQ));
if (Seq == NULL) return NULL;
Seq -> ContextID = ContextID;
Seq -> seq = (cmsPSEQDESC*) _cmsCalloc(ContextID, n, sizeof(cmsPSEQDESC));
Seq -> n = n;
for (i=0; i < n; i++) {
Seq -> seq[i].Manufacturer = NULL;
Seq -> seq[i].Model = NULL;
Seq -> seq[i].Description = NULL;
}
return Seq;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
|
cmsSEQ* CMSEXPORT cmsAllocProfileSequenceDescription(cmsContext ContextID, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
cmsSEQ* Seq;
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (n == 0) return NULL;
if (n > 255) return NULL;
Seq = (cmsSEQ*) _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(cmsSEQ));
if (Seq == NULL) return NULL;
Seq -> ContextID = ContextID;
Seq -> seq = (cmsPSEQDESC*) _cmsCalloc(ContextID, n, sizeof(cmsPSEQDESC));
Seq -> n = n;
if (Seq -> seq == NULL) {
_cmsFree(ContextID, Seq);
return NULL;
}
for (i=0; i < n; i++) {
Seq -> seq[i].Manufacturer = NULL;
Seq -> seq[i].Model = NULL;
Seq -> seq[i].Description = NULL;
}
return Seq;
}
| 166,542
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: rs_filter_graph(RSFilter *filter)
{
g_return_if_fail(RS_IS_FILTER(filter));
GString *str = g_string_new("digraph G {\n");
rs_filter_graph_helper(str, filter);
g_string_append_printf(str, "}\n");
g_file_set_contents("/tmp/rs-filter-graph", str->str, str->len, NULL);
if (0 != system("dot -Tpng >/tmp/rs-filter-graph.png </tmp/rs-filter-graph"))
g_warning("Calling dot failed");
if (0 != system("gnome-open /tmp/rs-filter-graph.png"))
g_warning("Calling gnome-open failed.");
g_string_free(str, TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Fixes insecure use of temporary file (CVE-2014-4978).
CWE ID: CWE-59
|
rs_filter_graph(RSFilter *filter)
{
g_return_if_fail(RS_IS_FILTER(filter));
gchar *dot_filename;
gchar *png_filename;
gchar *command_line;
GString *str = g_string_new("digraph G {\n");
rs_filter_graph_helper(str, filter);
g_string_append_printf(str, "}\n");
/* Here we would like to use g_mkdtemp(), but due to a bug in upstream, that's impossible */
dot_filename = g_strdup_printf("/tmp/rs-filter-graph.%u", g_random_int());
png_filename = g_strdup_printf("%s.%u.png", dot_filename, g_random_int());
g_file_set_contents(dot_filename, str->str, str->len, NULL);
command_line = g_strdup_printf("dot -Tpng >%s <%s", png_filename, dot_filename);
if (0 != system(command_line))
g_warning("Calling dot failed");
g_free(command_line);
command_line = g_strdup_printf("gnome-open %s", png_filename);
if (0 != system(command_line))
g_warning("Calling gnome-open failed.");
g_free(command_line);
g_free(dot_filename);
g_free(png_filename);
g_string_free(str, TRUE);
}
| 168,914
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
InitializeConfig();
SetMode(GET_PARAM(1));
set_cpu_used_ = GET_PARAM(2);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
virtual void SetUp() {
InitializeConfig();
SetMode(encoding_mode_);
if (encoding_mode_ != ::libvpx_test::kRealTime) {
cfg_.g_lag_in_frames = 25;
cfg_.rc_end_usage = VPX_VBR;
} else {
cfg_.g_lag_in_frames = 0;
cfg_.rc_end_usage = VPX_CBR;
}
}
virtual void BeginPassHook(unsigned int /*pass*/) {
min_psnr_ = kMaxPSNR;
}
| 174,514
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: UseCounterPageLoadMetricsObserver::GetAllowedUkmFeatures() {
static base::NoDestructor<UseCounterPageLoadMetricsObserver::UkmFeatureList>
opt_in_features(std::initializer_list<WebFeature>({
WebFeature::kNavigatorVibrate,
WebFeature::kNavigatorVibrateSubFrame,
WebFeature::kTouchEventPreventedNoTouchAction,
WebFeature::kTouchEventPreventedForcedDocumentPassiveNoTouchAction,
WebFeature::kDataUriHasOctothorpe,
WebFeature::kApplicationCacheManifestSelectInsecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kApplicationCacheManifestSelectSecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kMixedContentAudio,
WebFeature::kMixedContentImage,
WebFeature::kMixedContentVideo,
WebFeature::kMixedContentPlugin,
WebFeature::kOpenerNavigationWithoutGesture,
WebFeature::kUsbRequestDevice,
WebFeature::kXMLHttpRequestSynchronous,
WebFeature::kPaymentHandler,
WebFeature::kPaymentRequestShowWithoutGesture,
WebFeature::kHTMLImports,
WebFeature::kHTMLImportsHasStyleSheets,
WebFeature::kElementCreateShadowRoot,
WebFeature::kDocumentRegisterElement,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerCreatePublicKeyCredential,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerGetPublicKeyCredential,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerMakePublicKeyCredentialSuccess,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerGetPublicKeyCredentialSuccess,
WebFeature::kV8AudioContext_Constructor,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadow,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadowOpen,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadowClosed,
WebFeature::kCustomElementRegistryDefine,
WebFeature::kTextToSpeech_Speak,
WebFeature::kTextToSpeech_SpeakDisallowedByAutoplay,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetTop,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetLeft,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetRight,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetBottom,
WebFeature::kMediaControlsDisplayCutoutGesture,
WebFeature::kPolymerV1Detected,
WebFeature::kPolymerV2Detected,
WebFeature::kFullscreenSecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kFullscreenInsecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoEnterFullscreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoExitFullscreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoEnterFullScreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoExitFullScreen,
WebFeature::kDocumentLevelPassiveDefaultEventListenerPreventedWheel,
WebFeature::kDocumentDomainBlockedCrossOriginAccess,
WebFeature::kDocumentDomainEnabledCrossOriginAccess,
WebFeature::kSuppressHistoryEntryWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kCursorImageGT32x32,
WebFeature::kCursorImageLE32x32,
WebFeature::kHistoryPushState,
WebFeature::kHistoryReplaceState,
WebFeature::kCursorImageGT64x64,
WebFeature::kAdClick,
WebFeature::kUpdateWithoutShippingOptionOnShippingAddressChange,
WebFeature::kUpdateWithoutShippingOptionOnShippingOptionChange,
WebFeature::kSignedExchangeInnerResponseInMainFrame,
WebFeature::kSignedExchangeInnerResponseInSubFrame,
WebFeature::kWebShareShare,
WebFeature::kHTMLAnchorElementDownloadInSandboxWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kHTMLAnchorElementDownloadInSandboxWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kNavigationDownloadInSandboxWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kNavigationDownloadInSandboxWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kDownloadInAdFrameWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kDownloadInAdFrameWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kOpenWebDatabase,
WebFeature::kV8MediaCapabilities_DecodingInfo_Method,
}));
return *opt_in_features;
}
Commit Message: Add kOpenerNavigationDownloadCrossOriginNoGesture to UKM whitelist
Bug: 632514
Change-Id: Ibd09c4d8635873e02f9b484ec720b71ae6e3588f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1399521
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Harrison <csharrison@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#620513}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
UseCounterPageLoadMetricsObserver::GetAllowedUkmFeatures() {
static base::NoDestructor<UseCounterPageLoadMetricsObserver::UkmFeatureList>
opt_in_features(std::initializer_list<WebFeature>({
WebFeature::kNavigatorVibrate,
WebFeature::kNavigatorVibrateSubFrame,
WebFeature::kTouchEventPreventedNoTouchAction,
WebFeature::kTouchEventPreventedForcedDocumentPassiveNoTouchAction,
WebFeature::kDataUriHasOctothorpe,
WebFeature::kApplicationCacheManifestSelectInsecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kApplicationCacheManifestSelectSecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kMixedContentAudio,
WebFeature::kMixedContentImage,
WebFeature::kMixedContentVideo,
WebFeature::kMixedContentPlugin,
WebFeature::kOpenerNavigationWithoutGesture,
WebFeature::kUsbRequestDevice,
WebFeature::kXMLHttpRequestSynchronous,
WebFeature::kPaymentHandler,
WebFeature::kPaymentRequestShowWithoutGesture,
WebFeature::kHTMLImports,
WebFeature::kHTMLImportsHasStyleSheets,
WebFeature::kElementCreateShadowRoot,
WebFeature::kDocumentRegisterElement,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerCreatePublicKeyCredential,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerGetPublicKeyCredential,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerMakePublicKeyCredentialSuccess,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerGetPublicKeyCredentialSuccess,
WebFeature::kV8AudioContext_Constructor,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadow,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadowOpen,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadowClosed,
WebFeature::kCustomElementRegistryDefine,
WebFeature::kTextToSpeech_Speak,
WebFeature::kTextToSpeech_SpeakDisallowedByAutoplay,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetTop,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetLeft,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetRight,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetBottom,
WebFeature::kMediaControlsDisplayCutoutGesture,
WebFeature::kPolymerV1Detected,
WebFeature::kPolymerV2Detected,
WebFeature::kFullscreenSecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kFullscreenInsecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoEnterFullscreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoExitFullscreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoEnterFullScreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoExitFullScreen,
WebFeature::kDocumentLevelPassiveDefaultEventListenerPreventedWheel,
WebFeature::kDocumentDomainBlockedCrossOriginAccess,
WebFeature::kDocumentDomainEnabledCrossOriginAccess,
WebFeature::kSuppressHistoryEntryWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kCursorImageGT32x32,
WebFeature::kCursorImageLE32x32,
WebFeature::kHistoryPushState,
WebFeature::kHistoryReplaceState,
WebFeature::kCursorImageGT64x64,
WebFeature::kAdClick,
WebFeature::kUpdateWithoutShippingOptionOnShippingAddressChange,
WebFeature::kUpdateWithoutShippingOptionOnShippingOptionChange,
WebFeature::kSignedExchangeInnerResponseInMainFrame,
WebFeature::kSignedExchangeInnerResponseInSubFrame,
WebFeature::kWebShareShare,
WebFeature::kHTMLAnchorElementDownloadInSandboxWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kHTMLAnchorElementDownloadInSandboxWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kNavigationDownloadInSandboxWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kNavigationDownloadInSandboxWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kDownloadInAdFrameWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kDownloadInAdFrameWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kOpenWebDatabase,
WebFeature::kV8MediaCapabilities_DecodingInfo_Method,
WebFeature::kOpenerNavigationDownloadCrossOriginNoGesture,
}));
return *opt_in_features;
}
| 173,060
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ChromeOSCancelHandwriting(InputMethodStatusConnection* connection,
int n_strokes) {
g_return_if_fail(connection);
connection->CancelHandwriting(n_strokes);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void ChromeOSCancelHandwriting(InputMethodStatusConnection* connection,
IBusController::~IBusController() {
}
| 170,520
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal() {
if (pending_entry_index_ == -1)
delete pending_entry_;
pending_entry_ = NULL;
pending_entry_index_ = -1;
DiscardTransientEntry();
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal() {
DiscardPendingEntry();
DiscardTransientEntry();
}
void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardPendingEntry() {
if (pending_entry_index_ == -1)
delete pending_entry_;
pending_entry_ = NULL;
pending_entry_index_ = -1;
}
| 171,188
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
{
CERT *c = s->cert;
c->mask_a = 0;
c->mask_k = 0;
/* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
else
c->mask_ssl = 0;
ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
/* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
* signature algorithms.
*/
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (!s->psk_client_callback)
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
c->valid = 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
{
CERT *c = s->cert;
c->mask_a = 0;
c->mask_k = 0;
/* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
else
c->mask_ssl = 0;
ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
/* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
* signature algorithms.
*/
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (!s->psk_client_callback)
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
{
c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
}
#endif
c->valid = 1;
}
| 165,023
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnMsgOpenChannelToExtension(
int routing_id, const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& target_extension_id,
const std::string& channel_name, int* port_id) {
*port_id = 0;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnMsgOpenChannelToExtension(
int routing_id,
const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& target_extension_id,
const std::string& channel_name,
int* port_id) {
*port_id = 0;
}
| 170,852
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *CloneImage(const Image *image,const size_t columns,
const size_t rows,const MagickBooleanType detach,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*clone_image;
double
scale;
size_t
length;
/*
Clone the image.
*/
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"NegativeOrZeroImageSize","`%s'",image->filename);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
clone_image=(Image *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*clone_image));
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowImageException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(clone_image,0,sizeof(*clone_image));
clone_image->signature=MagickCoreSignature;
clone_image->storage_class=image->storage_class;
clone_image->number_channels=image->number_channels;
clone_image->number_meta_channels=image->number_meta_channels;
clone_image->metacontent_extent=image->metacontent_extent;
clone_image->colorspace=image->colorspace;
clone_image->read_mask=image->read_mask;
clone_image->write_mask=image->write_mask;
clone_image->alpha_trait=image->alpha_trait;
clone_image->columns=image->columns;
clone_image->rows=image->rows;
clone_image->dither=image->dither;
if (image->colormap != (PixelInfo *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate and copy the image colormap.
*/
clone_image->colors=image->colors;
length=(size_t) image->colors;
clone_image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,
sizeof(*clone_image->colormap));
if (clone_image->colormap == (PixelInfo *) NULL)
ThrowImageException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) CopyMagickMemory(clone_image->colormap,image->colormap,length*
sizeof(*clone_image->colormap));
}
clone_image->image_info=CloneImageInfo(image->image_info);
(void) CloneImageProfiles(clone_image,image);
(void) CloneImageProperties(clone_image,image);
(void) CloneImageArtifacts(clone_image,image);
GetTimerInfo(&clone_image->timer);
if (image->ascii85 != (void *) NULL)
Ascii85Initialize(clone_image);
clone_image->magick_columns=image->magick_columns;
clone_image->magick_rows=image->magick_rows;
clone_image->type=image->type;
clone_image->channel_mask=image->channel_mask;
clone_image->channel_map=ClonePixelChannelMap(image->channel_map);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->magick_filename,image->magick_filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->magick,image->magick,MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->filename,image->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
clone_image->progress_monitor=image->progress_monitor;
clone_image->client_data=image->client_data;
clone_image->reference_count=1;
clone_image->next=image->next;
clone_image->previous=image->previous;
clone_image->list=NewImageList();
if (detach == MagickFalse)
clone_image->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
else
{
clone_image->next=NewImageList();
clone_image->previous=NewImageList();
clone_image->blob=CloneBlobInfo((BlobInfo *) NULL);
}
clone_image->ping=image->ping;
clone_image->debug=IsEventLogging();
clone_image->semaphore=AcquireSemaphoreInfo();
if ((columns == 0) || (rows == 0))
{
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_image->montage,image->montage);
if (image->directory != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_image->directory,image->directory);
clone_image->cache=ReferencePixelCache(image->cache);
return(clone_image);
}
scale=1.0;
if (image->columns != 0)
scale=(double) columns/(double) image->columns;
clone_image->page.width=(size_t) floor(scale*image->page.width+0.5);
clone_image->page.x=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->page.x-0.5);
clone_image->tile_offset.x=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->tile_offset.x-0.5);
scale=1.0;
if (image->rows != 0)
scale=(double) rows/(double) image->rows;
clone_image->page.height=(size_t) floor(scale*image->page.height+0.5);
clone_image->page.y=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->page.y-0.5);
clone_image->tile_offset.y=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->tile_offset.y-0.5);
clone_image->columns=columns;
clone_image->rows=rows;
clone_image->cache=ClonePixelCache(image->cache);
return(clone_image);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
MagickExport Image *CloneImage(const Image *image,const size_t columns,
const size_t rows,const MagickBooleanType detach,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*clone_image;
double
scale;
size_t
length;
/*
Clone the image.
*/
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"NegativeOrZeroImageSize","`%s'",image->filename);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
clone_image=(Image *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*clone_image));
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowImageException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(clone_image,0,sizeof(*clone_image));
clone_image->signature=MagickCoreSignature;
clone_image->storage_class=image->storage_class;
clone_image->number_channels=image->number_channels;
clone_image->number_meta_channels=image->number_meta_channels;
clone_image->metacontent_extent=image->metacontent_extent;
clone_image->colorspace=image->colorspace;
clone_image->read_mask=image->read_mask;
clone_image->write_mask=image->write_mask;
clone_image->alpha_trait=image->alpha_trait;
clone_image->columns=image->columns;
clone_image->rows=image->rows;
clone_image->dither=image->dither;
if (image->colormap != (PixelInfo *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate and copy the image colormap.
*/
clone_image->colors=image->colors;
length=(size_t) image->colors;
clone_image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,
sizeof(*clone_image->colormap));
if (clone_image->colormap == (PixelInfo *) NULL)
{
clone_image=DestroyImage(clone_image);
ThrowImageException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
(void) CopyMagickMemory(clone_image->colormap,image->colormap,length*
sizeof(*clone_image->colormap));
}
clone_image->image_info=CloneImageInfo(image->image_info);
(void) CloneImageProfiles(clone_image,image);
(void) CloneImageProperties(clone_image,image);
(void) CloneImageArtifacts(clone_image,image);
GetTimerInfo(&clone_image->timer);
if (image->ascii85 != (void *) NULL)
Ascii85Initialize(clone_image);
clone_image->magick_columns=image->magick_columns;
clone_image->magick_rows=image->magick_rows;
clone_image->type=image->type;
clone_image->channel_mask=image->channel_mask;
clone_image->channel_map=ClonePixelChannelMap(image->channel_map);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->magick_filename,image->magick_filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->magick,image->magick,MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->filename,image->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
clone_image->progress_monitor=image->progress_monitor;
clone_image->client_data=image->client_data;
clone_image->reference_count=1;
clone_image->next=image->next;
clone_image->previous=image->previous;
clone_image->list=NewImageList();
if (detach == MagickFalse)
clone_image->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
else
{
clone_image->next=NewImageList();
clone_image->previous=NewImageList();
clone_image->blob=CloneBlobInfo((BlobInfo *) NULL);
}
clone_image->ping=image->ping;
clone_image->debug=IsEventLogging();
clone_image->semaphore=AcquireSemaphoreInfo();
if ((columns == 0) || (rows == 0))
{
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_image->montage,image->montage);
if (image->directory != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_image->directory,image->directory);
clone_image->cache=ReferencePixelCache(image->cache);
return(clone_image);
}
scale=1.0;
if (image->columns != 0)
scale=(double) columns/(double) image->columns;
clone_image->page.width=(size_t) floor(scale*image->page.width+0.5);
clone_image->page.x=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->page.x-0.5);
clone_image->tile_offset.x=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->tile_offset.x-0.5);
scale=1.0;
if (image->rows != 0)
scale=(double) rows/(double) image->rows;
clone_image->page.height=(size_t) floor(scale*image->page.height+0.5);
clone_image->page.y=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->page.y-0.5);
clone_image->tile_offset.y=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->tile_offset.y-0.5);
clone_image->columns=columns;
clone_image->rows=rows;
clone_image->cache=ClonePixelCache(image->cache);
return(clone_image);
}
| 169,960
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() {
chromeos::InputMethodDescriptors* result =
new chromeos::InputMethodDescriptors;
for (size_t i = 0; i < active_input_method_ids_.size(); ++i) {
const std::string& input_method_id = active_input_method_ids_[i];
const InputMethodDescriptor* descriptor =
chromeos::input_method::GetInputMethodDescriptorFromId(
input_method_id);
if (descriptor) {
result->push_back(*descriptor);
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Descriptor is not found for: " << input_method_id;
}
}
if (result->empty()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No active input methods found.";
result->push_back(input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor());
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() {
virtual input_method::InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() {
input_method::InputMethodDescriptors* result =
new input_method::InputMethodDescriptors;
for (size_t i = 0; i < active_input_method_ids_.size(); ++i) {
const std::string& input_method_id = active_input_method_ids_[i];
const input_method::InputMethodDescriptor* descriptor =
input_method::GetInputMethodDescriptorFromId(
input_method_id);
if (descriptor) {
result->push_back(*descriptor);
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Descriptor is not found for: " << input_method_id;
}
}
if (result->empty()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No active input methods found.";
result->push_back(input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor());
}
return result;
}
| 170,486
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DevToolsSession::ReceivedBadMessage() {
MojoConnectionDestroyed();
if (process_) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
process_, bad_message::RFH_INCONSISTENT_DEVTOOLS_MESSAGE);
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void DevToolsSession::ReceivedBadMessage() {
MojoConnectionDestroyed();
RenderProcessHost* process = RenderProcessHost::FromID(process_host_id_);
if (process) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
process, bad_message::RFH_INCONSISTENT_DEVTOOLS_MESSAGE);
}
}
| 172,742
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
struct nameidata *nd, const struct open_flags *op, int flags)
{
struct file *file;
struct path path;
int opened = 0;
int error;
file = get_empty_filp();
if (IS_ERR(file))
return file;
file->f_flags = op->open_flag;
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & __O_TMPFILE)) {
error = do_tmpfile(dfd, pathname, nd, flags, op, file, &opened);
goto out;
}
error = path_init(dfd, pathname, flags, nd);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out;
error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname);
while (unlikely(error > 0)) { /* trailing symlink */
struct path link = path;
void *cookie;
if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW)) {
path_put_conditional(&path, nd);
path_put(&nd->path);
error = -ELOOP;
break;
}
error = may_follow_link(&link, nd);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd->flags &= ~(LOOKUP_OPEN|LOOKUP_CREATE|LOOKUP_EXCL);
error = follow_link(&link, nd, &cookie);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname);
put_link(nd, &link, cookie);
}
out:
path_cleanup(nd);
if (!(opened & FILE_OPENED)) {
BUG_ON(!error);
put_filp(file);
}
if (unlikely(error)) {
if (error == -EOPENSTALE) {
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
error = -ECHILD;
else
error = -ESTALE;
}
file = ERR_PTR(error);
}
return file;
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID:
|
static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
struct nameidata *nd, const struct open_flags *op, int flags)
{
struct file *file;
struct path path;
int opened = 0;
int error;
file = get_empty_filp();
if (IS_ERR(file))
return file;
file->f_flags = op->open_flag;
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & __O_TMPFILE)) {
error = do_tmpfile(dfd, pathname, nd, flags, op, file, &opened);
goto out2;
}
error = path_init(dfd, pathname, flags, nd);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out;
error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname);
while (unlikely(error > 0)) { /* trailing symlink */
struct path link = path;
void *cookie;
if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW)) {
path_put_conditional(&path, nd);
path_put(&nd->path);
error = -ELOOP;
break;
}
error = may_follow_link(&link, nd);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd->flags &= ~(LOOKUP_OPEN|LOOKUP_CREATE|LOOKUP_EXCL);
error = follow_link(&link, nd, &cookie);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname);
put_link(nd, &link, cookie);
}
out:
path_cleanup(nd);
out2:
if (!(opened & FILE_OPENED)) {
BUG_ON(!error);
put_filp(file);
}
if (unlikely(error)) {
if (error == -EOPENSTALE) {
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
error = -ECHILD;
else
error = -ESTALE;
}
file = ERR_PTR(error);
}
return file;
}
| 166,594
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BOOL license_read_scope_list(wStream* s, SCOPE_LIST* scopeList)
{
UINT32 i;
UINT32 scopeCount;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 4)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, scopeCount); /* ScopeCount (4 bytes) */
scopeList->count = scopeCount;
scopeList->array = (LICENSE_BLOB*) malloc(sizeof(LICENSE_BLOB) * scopeCount);
/* ScopeArray */
for (i = 0; i < scopeCount; i++)
{
scopeList->array[i].type = BB_SCOPE_BLOB;
if (!license_read_binary_blob(s, &scopeList->array[i]))
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible integer overflow in license_read_scope_list()
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
BOOL license_read_scope_list(wStream* s, SCOPE_LIST* scopeList)
{
UINT32 i;
UINT32 scopeCount;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 4)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, scopeCount); /* ScopeCount (4 bytes) */
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) / sizeof(LICENSE_BLOB) < scopeCount)
return FALSE; /* Avoid overflow in malloc */
scopeList->count = scopeCount;
scopeList->array = (LICENSE_BLOB*) malloc(sizeof(LICENSE_BLOB) * scopeCount);
/* ScopeArray */
for (i = 0; i < scopeCount; i++)
{
scopeList->array[i].type = BB_SCOPE_BLOB;
if (!license_read_binary_blob(s, &scopeList->array[i]))
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 166,440
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ContentEncoding::ContentEncoding()
: compression_entries_(NULL),
compression_entries_end_(NULL),
encryption_entries_(NULL),
encryption_entries_end_(NULL),
encoding_order_(0),
encoding_scope_(1),
encoding_type_(0) {
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
ContentEncoding::ContentEncoding()
: compression_entries_(NULL),
compression_entries_end_(NULL),
encryption_entries_(NULL),
encryption_entries_end_(NULL),
encoding_order_(0),
encoding_scope_(1),
| 174,251
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool NuMediaExtractor::getTotalBitrate(int64_t *bitrate) const {
if (mTotalBitrate >= 0) {
*bitrate = mTotalBitrate;
return true;
}
off64_t size;
if (mDurationUs >= 0 && mDataSource->getSize(&size) == OK) {
*bitrate = size * 8000000ll / mDurationUs; // in bits/sec
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
bool NuMediaExtractor::getTotalBitrate(int64_t *bitrate) const {
if (mTotalBitrate >= 0) {
*bitrate = mTotalBitrate;
return true;
}
off64_t size;
if (mDurationUs > 0 && mDataSource->getSize(&size) == OK) {
*bitrate = size * 8000000ll / mDurationUs; // in bits/sec
return true;
}
return false;
}
| 174,003
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Chapters::Atom::~Atom()
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
Chapters::Atom::~Atom()
const char* SegmentInfo::GetMuxingAppAsUTF8() const {
return m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8;
}
| 174,454
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host,
ContentViewCoreImpl* content_view_core)
: host_(widget_host),
is_layer_attached_(true),
content_view_core_(NULL),
ime_adapter_android_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
cached_background_color_(SK_ColorWHITE),
texture_id_in_layer_(0) {
if (CompositorImpl::UsesDirectGL()) {
surface_texture_transport_.reset(new SurfaceTextureTransportClient());
layer_ = surface_texture_transport_->Initialize();
} else {
texture_layer_ = cc::TextureLayer::create(0);
layer_ = texture_layer_;
}
layer_->setContentsOpaque(true);
layer_->setIsDrawable(true);
host_->SetView(this);
SetContentViewCore(content_view_core);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host,
ContentViewCoreImpl* content_view_core)
: host_(widget_host),
is_layer_attached_(true),
content_view_core_(NULL),
ime_adapter_android_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
cached_background_color_(SK_ColorWHITE),
texture_id_in_layer_(0),
current_buffer_id_(0) {
if (CompositorImpl::UsesDirectGL()) {
surface_texture_transport_.reset(new SurfaceTextureTransportClient());
layer_ = surface_texture_transport_->Initialize();
} else {
texture_layer_ = cc::TextureLayer::create(0);
layer_ = texture_layer_;
}
layer_->setContentsOpaque(true);
layer_->setIsDrawable(true);
host_->SetView(this);
SetContentViewCore(content_view_core);
}
| 171,370
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ExtensionFunction* ExtensionFunctionDispatcher::CreateExtensionFunction(
const ExtensionHostMsg_Request_Params& params,
const Extension* extension,
int requesting_process_id,
const extensions::ProcessMap& process_map,
extensions::ExtensionAPI* api,
void* profile,
IPC::Sender* ipc_sender,
RenderViewHost* render_view_host,
int routing_id) {
if (!extension) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Specified extension does not exist.";
SendAccessDenied(ipc_sender, routing_id, params.request_id);
return NULL;
}
if (api->IsPrivileged(params.name) &&
!process_map.Contains(extension->id(), requesting_process_id)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Extension API called from incorrect process "
<< requesting_process_id
<< " from URL " << params.source_url.spec();
SendAccessDenied(ipc_sender, routing_id, params.request_id);
return NULL;
}
ExtensionFunction* function =
ExtensionFunctionRegistry::GetInstance()->NewFunction(params.name);
function->SetArgs(¶ms.arguments);
function->set_source_url(params.source_url);
function->set_request_id(params.request_id);
function->set_has_callback(params.has_callback);
function->set_user_gesture(params.user_gesture);
function->set_extension(extension);
function->set_profile_id(profile);
UIThreadExtensionFunction* function_ui =
function->AsUIThreadExtensionFunction();
if (function_ui) {
function_ui->SetRenderViewHost(render_view_host);
}
return function;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
ExtensionFunction* ExtensionFunctionDispatcher::CreateExtensionFunction(
const ExtensionHostMsg_Request_Params& params,
const Extension* extension,
int requesting_process_id,
const extensions::ProcessMap& process_map,
extensions::ExtensionAPI* api,
void* profile,
IPC::Sender* ipc_sender,
RenderViewHost* render_view_host,
int routing_id) {
if (!extension) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Specified extension does not exist.";
SendAccessDenied(ipc_sender, routing_id, params.request_id);
return NULL;
}
// Most hosted apps can't call APIs.
bool allowed = true;
if (extension->is_hosted_app())
allowed = AllowHostedAppAPICall(*extension, params.source_url,
params.name);
// Privileged APIs can only be called from the process the extension
// is running in.
if (allowed && api->IsPrivileged(params.name))
allowed = process_map.Contains(extension->id(), requesting_process_id);
if (!allowed) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Extension API call disallowed - name:" << params.name
<< " pid:" << requesting_process_id
<< " from URL " << params.source_url.spec();
SendAccessDenied(ipc_sender, routing_id, params.request_id);
return NULL;
}
ExtensionFunction* function =
ExtensionFunctionRegistry::GetInstance()->NewFunction(params.name);
function->SetArgs(¶ms.arguments);
function->set_source_url(params.source_url);
function->set_request_id(params.request_id);
function->set_has_callback(params.has_callback);
function->set_user_gesture(params.user_gesture);
function->set_extension(extension);
function->set_profile_id(profile);
UIThreadExtensionFunction* function_ui =
function->AsUIThreadExtensionFunction();
if (function_ui) {
function_ui->SetRenderViewHost(render_view_host);
}
return function;
}
| 171,350
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ExprResolveLhs(struct xkb_context *ctx, const ExprDef *expr,
const char **elem_rtrn, const char **field_rtrn,
ExprDef **index_rtrn)
{
switch (expr->expr.op) {
case EXPR_IDENT:
*elem_rtrn = NULL;
*field_rtrn = xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->ident.ident);
*index_rtrn = NULL;
return true;
case EXPR_FIELD_REF:
*elem_rtrn = xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->field_ref.element);
*field_rtrn = xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->field_ref.field);
*index_rtrn = NULL;
return true;
case EXPR_ARRAY_REF:
*elem_rtrn = xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->array_ref.element);
*field_rtrn = xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->array_ref.field);
*index_rtrn = expr->array_ref.entry;
return true;
default:
break;
}
log_wsgo(ctx, "Unexpected operator %d in ResolveLhs\n", expr->expr.op);
return false;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't falsely promise from ExprResolveLhs
Every user of ExprReturnLhs goes on to unconditionally dereference the
field return, which can be NULL if xkb_intern_atom fails. Return false
if this is the case, so we fail safely.
testcase: splice geometry data into interp
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
ExprResolveLhs(struct xkb_context *ctx, const ExprDef *expr,
const char **elem_rtrn, const char **field_rtrn,
ExprDef **index_rtrn)
{
switch (expr->expr.op) {
case EXPR_IDENT:
*elem_rtrn = NULL;
*field_rtrn = xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->ident.ident);
*index_rtrn = NULL;
return (*field_rtrn != NULL);
case EXPR_FIELD_REF:
*elem_rtrn = xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->field_ref.element);
*field_rtrn = xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->field_ref.field);
*index_rtrn = NULL;
return true;
case EXPR_ARRAY_REF:
*elem_rtrn = xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->array_ref.element);
*field_rtrn = xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->array_ref.field);
*index_rtrn = expr->array_ref.entry;
return true;
default:
break;
}
log_wsgo(ctx, "Unexpected operator %d in ResolveLhs\n", expr->expr.op);
return false;
}
| 169,090
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; ғ > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; ട > s; ၂ > j"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Add a few more entries to the confusables list for IDN
U+04CA (ӊ) => h
U+0E1F (ฟ) => w
U+0E23 (ร) => s
Bug: 813925, 813814
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: If81ea9bf1c1729f1b6ffc71d718dc5950ac825b5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927741
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538159}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
// U+04C8 (ӈ), U+04CA (ӊ), U+0527 (ԧ), U+0529 (ԩ)} => h
// - {U+03C9 (ω), U+0448 (ш), U+0449 (щ), U+0E1F (ฟ)} => w
// - {U+0D1F (ട), U+0E23 (ร)} => s
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщฟ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; ғ > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടร] > s; ၂ > j"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
| 172,733
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int nr_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int er;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
release_sock(sk);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL) {
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
er = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (er < 0) {
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
if (sax != NULL) {
sax->sax25_family = AF_NETROM;
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, 7, sax->sax25_call.ax25_call,
AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sax);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
}
Commit Message: netrom: fix info leak via msg_name in nr_recvmsg()
In case msg_name is set the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of
struct sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Also
the sax25_ndigis member does not get assigned, leaking four more
bytes.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static int nr_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int er;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
release_sock(sk);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL) {
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
er = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (er < 0) {
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
if (sax != NULL) {
memset(sax, 0, sizeof(sax));
sax->sax25_family = AF_NETROM;
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, 7, sax->sax25_call.ax25_call,
AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sax);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
}
| 166,035
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void iwjpeg_scan_exif_ifd(struct iwjpegrcontext *rctx,
struct iw_exif_state *e, iw_uint32 ifd)
{
unsigned int tag_count;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int tag_pos;
unsigned int tag_id;
unsigned int v;
double v_dbl;
if(ifd<8 || ifd>e->d_len-18) return;
tag_count = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[ifd],e->endian);
if(tag_count>1000) return; // Sanity check.
for(i=0;i<tag_count;i++) {
tag_pos = ifd+2+i*12;
if(tag_pos+12 > e->d_len) return; // Avoid overruns.
tag_id = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos],e->endian);
switch(tag_id) {
case 274: // 274 = Orientation
if(get_exif_tag_int_value(e,tag_pos,&v)) {
rctx->exif_orientation = v;
}
break;
case 296: // 296 = ResolutionUnit
if(get_exif_tag_int_value(e,tag_pos,&v)) {
rctx->exif_density_unit = v;
}
break;
case 282: // 282 = XResolution
if(get_exif_tag_dbl_value(e,tag_pos,&v_dbl)) {
rctx->exif_density_x = v_dbl;
}
break;
case 283: // 283 = YResolution
if(get_exif_tag_dbl_value(e,tag_pos,&v_dbl)) {
rctx->exif_density_y = v_dbl;
}
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed invalid memory access bugs when decoding JPEG Exif data
Fixes issues #22, #23, #24, #25
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static void iwjpeg_scan_exif_ifd(struct iwjpegrcontext *rctx,
struct iw_exif_state *e, iw_uint32 ifd)
{
unsigned int tag_count;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int tag_pos;
unsigned int tag_id;
unsigned int v;
double v_dbl;
if(ifd<8 || e->d_len<18 || ifd>e->d_len-18) return;
tag_count = get_exif_ui16(e, ifd);
if(tag_count>1000) return; // Sanity check.
for(i=0;i<tag_count;i++) {
tag_pos = ifd+2+i*12;
if(tag_pos+12 > e->d_len) return; // Avoid overruns.
tag_id = get_exif_ui16(e, tag_pos);
switch(tag_id) {
case 274: // 274 = Orientation
if(get_exif_tag_int_value(e,tag_pos,&v)) {
rctx->exif_orientation = v;
}
break;
case 296: // 296 = ResolutionUnit
if(get_exif_tag_int_value(e,tag_pos,&v)) {
rctx->exif_density_unit = v;
}
break;
case 282: // 282 = XResolution
if(get_exif_tag_dbl_value(e,tag_pos,&v_dbl)) {
rctx->exif_density_x = v_dbl;
}
break;
case 283: // 283 = YResolution
if(get_exif_tag_dbl_value(e,tag_pos,&v_dbl)) {
rctx->exif_density_y = v_dbl;
}
break;
}
}
}
| 168,116
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void br_mdb_notify(struct net_device *dev, struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct br_ip *group, int type)
{
struct br_mdb_entry entry;
entry.ifindex = port->dev->ifindex;
entry.addr.proto = group->proto;
entry.addr.u.ip4 = group->u.ip4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
entry.addr.u.ip6 = group->u.ip6;
#endif
__br_mdb_notify(dev, &entry, type);
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix mdb info leaks
The bridging code discloses heap and stack bytes via the RTM_GETMDB
netlink interface and via the notify messages send to group RTNLGRP_MDB
afer a successful add/del.
Fix both cases by initializing all unset members/padding bytes with
memset(0).
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void br_mdb_notify(struct net_device *dev, struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct br_ip *group, int type)
{
struct br_mdb_entry entry;
memset(&entry, 0, sizeof(entry));
entry.ifindex = port->dev->ifindex;
entry.addr.proto = group->proto;
entry.addr.u.ip4 = group->u.ip4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
entry.addr.u.ip6 = group->u.ip6;
#endif
__br_mdb_notify(dev, &entry, type);
}
| 166,054
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int append_multiple_key_values(smart_str* loc_name, HashTable* hash_arr, char* key_name TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval** ele_value = NULL;
int i = 0;
int isFirstSubtag = 0;
int max_value = 0;
/* Variant/ Extlang/Private etc. */
if( zend_hash_find( hash_arr , key_name , strlen(key_name) + 1 ,(void **)&ele_value ) == SUCCESS ) {
if( Z_TYPE_PP(ele_value) == IS_STRING ){
add_prefix( loc_name , key_name);
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, SEPARATOR , sizeof(SEPARATOR)-1);
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, Z_STRVAL_PP(ele_value) , Z_STRLEN_PP(ele_value));
return SUCCESS;
} else if(Z_TYPE_PP(ele_value) == IS_ARRAY ) {
HashPosition pos;
HashTable *arr = HASH_OF(*ele_value);
zval **data = NULL;
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(arr, &pos);
while(zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(arr, (void **)&data, &pos) != FAILURE) {
if(Z_TYPE_PP(data) != IS_STRING) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (isFirstSubtag++ == 0){
add_prefix(loc_name , key_name);
}
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, SEPARATOR , sizeof(SEPARATOR)-1);
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, Z_STRVAL_PP(data) , Z_STRLEN_PP(data));
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(arr, &pos);
}
return SUCCESS;
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
} else {
char cur_key_name[31];
/* Decide the max_value: the max. no. of elements allowed */
if( strcmp(key_name , LOC_VARIANT_TAG) ==0 ){
max_value = MAX_NO_VARIANT;
}
if( strcmp(key_name , LOC_EXTLANG_TAG) ==0 ){
max_value = MAX_NO_EXTLANG;
}
if( strcmp(key_name , LOC_PRIVATE_TAG) ==0 ){
max_value = MAX_NO_PRIVATE;
}
/* Multiple variant values as variant0, variant1 ,variant2 */
isFirstSubtag = 0;
for( i=0 ; i< max_value; i++ ){
snprintf( cur_key_name , 30, "%s%d", key_name , i);
if( zend_hash_find( hash_arr , cur_key_name , strlen(cur_key_name) + 1,(void **)&ele_value ) == SUCCESS ){
if( Z_TYPE_PP(ele_value)!= IS_STRING ){
/* variant is not a string */
return FAILURE;
}
/* Add the contents */
if (isFirstSubtag++ == 0){
add_prefix(loc_name , cur_key_name);
}
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, SEPARATOR , sizeof(SEPARATOR)-1);
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, Z_STRVAL_PP(ele_value) , Z_STRLEN_PP(ele_value));
}
} /* end of for */
} /* end of else */
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static int append_multiple_key_values(smart_str* loc_name, HashTable* hash_arr, char* key_name TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval** ele_value = NULL;
int i = 0;
int isFirstSubtag = 0;
int max_value = 0;
/* Variant/ Extlang/Private etc. */
if( zend_hash_find( hash_arr , key_name , strlen(key_name) + 1 ,(void **)&ele_value ) == SUCCESS ) {
if( Z_TYPE_PP(ele_value) == IS_STRING ){
add_prefix( loc_name , key_name);
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, SEPARATOR , sizeof(SEPARATOR)-1);
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, Z_STRVAL_PP(ele_value) , Z_STRLEN_PP(ele_value));
return SUCCESS;
} else if(Z_TYPE_PP(ele_value) == IS_ARRAY ) {
HashPosition pos;
HashTable *arr = HASH_OF(*ele_value);
zval **data = NULL;
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(arr, &pos);
while(zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(arr, (void **)&data, &pos) != FAILURE) {
if(Z_TYPE_PP(data) != IS_STRING) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (isFirstSubtag++ == 0){
add_prefix(loc_name , key_name);
}
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, SEPARATOR , sizeof(SEPARATOR)-1);
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, Z_STRVAL_PP(data) , Z_STRLEN_PP(data));
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(arr, &pos);
}
return SUCCESS;
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
} else {
char cur_key_name[31];
/* Decide the max_value: the max. no. of elements allowed */
if( strcmp(key_name , LOC_VARIANT_TAG) ==0 ){
max_value = MAX_NO_VARIANT;
}
if( strcmp(key_name , LOC_EXTLANG_TAG) ==0 ){
max_value = MAX_NO_EXTLANG;
}
if( strcmp(key_name , LOC_PRIVATE_TAG) ==0 ){
max_value = MAX_NO_PRIVATE;
}
/* Multiple variant values as variant0, variant1 ,variant2 */
isFirstSubtag = 0;
for( i=0 ; i< max_value; i++ ){
snprintf( cur_key_name , 30, "%s%d", key_name , i);
if( zend_hash_find( hash_arr , cur_key_name , strlen(cur_key_name) + 1,(void **)&ele_value ) == SUCCESS ){
if( Z_TYPE_PP(ele_value)!= IS_STRING ){
/* variant is not a string */
return FAILURE;
}
/* Add the contents */
if (isFirstSubtag++ == 0){
add_prefix(loc_name , cur_key_name);
}
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, SEPARATOR , sizeof(SEPARATOR)-1);
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, Z_STRVAL_PP(ele_value) , Z_STRLEN_PP(ele_value));
}
} /* end of for */
} /* end of else */
return SUCCESS;
}
| 167,199
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderLayerCompositor::frameViewDidScroll()
{
FrameView* frameView = m_renderView->frameView();
IntPoint scrollPosition = frameView->scrollPosition();
if (!m_scrollLayer)
return;
bool scrollingCoordinatorHandlesOffset = false;
if (ScrollingCoordinator* scrollingCoordinator = this->scrollingCoordinator()) {
if (Settings* settings = m_renderView->document().settings()) {
if (isMainFrame() || settings->compositedScrollingForFramesEnabled())
scrollingCoordinatorHandlesOffset = scrollingCoordinator->scrollableAreaScrollLayerDidChange(frameView);
}
}
if (scrollingCoordinatorHandlesOffset)
m_scrollLayer->setPosition(-frameView->minimumScrollPosition());
else
m_scrollLayer->setPosition(-scrollPosition);
blink::Platform::current()->histogramEnumeration("Renderer.AcceleratedFixedRootBackground",
ScrolledMainFrameBucket,
AcceleratedFixedRootBackgroundHistogramMax);
if (!m_renderView->rootBackgroundIsEntirelyFixed())
return;
blink::Platform::current()->histogramEnumeration("Renderer.AcceleratedFixedRootBackground",
!!fixedRootBackgroundLayer()
? ScrolledMainFrameWithAcceleratedFixedRootBackground
: ScrolledMainFrameWithUnacceleratedFixedRootBackground,
AcceleratedFixedRootBackgroundHistogramMax);
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void RenderLayerCompositor::frameViewDidScroll()
{
FrameView* frameView = m_renderView->frameView();
IntPoint scrollPosition = frameView->scrollPosition();
if (!m_scrollLayer)
return;
bool scrollingCoordinatorHandlesOffset = false;
if (ScrollingCoordinator* scrollingCoordinator = this->scrollingCoordinator()) {
if (Settings* settings = m_renderView->document().settings()) {
if (isMainFrame() || settings->compositedScrollingForFramesEnabled())
scrollingCoordinatorHandlesOffset = scrollingCoordinator->scrollableAreaScrollLayerDidChange(frameView);
}
}
if (scrollingCoordinatorHandlesOffset)
m_scrollLayer->setPosition(-frameView->minimumScrollPosition());
else
m_scrollLayer->setPosition(-scrollPosition);
blink::Platform::current()->histogramEnumeration("Renderer.AcceleratedFixedRootBackground",
ScrolledMainFrameBucket,
AcceleratedFixedRootBackgroundHistogramMax);
if (!m_renderView->rootBackgroundIsEntirelyFixed())
return;
// FIXME: fixedRootBackgroundLayer calls compositingState, which is not necessarily up to date here on mac.
// See crbug.com/343179.
DisableCompositingQueryAsserts disabler;
blink::Platform::current()->histogramEnumeration("Renderer.AcceleratedFixedRootBackground",
!!fixedRootBackgroundLayer()
? ScrolledMainFrameWithAcceleratedFixedRootBackground
: ScrolledMainFrameWithUnacceleratedFixedRootBackground,
AcceleratedFixedRootBackgroundHistogramMax);
}
| 171,342
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <width> <height> <infile> <outfile> <frame>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void usage_exit() {
void usage_exit(void) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <width> <height> <infile> <outfile> <frame>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
| 174,499
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_lookup)
{
char* fallback_loc = NULL;
int fallback_loc_len = 0;
const char* loc_range = NULL;
int loc_range_len = 0;
zval* arr = NULL;
HashTable* hash_arr = NULL;
zend_bool boolCanonical = 0;
char* result =NULL;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "as|bs", &arr, &loc_range, &loc_range_len,
&boolCanonical, &fallback_loc, &fallback_loc_len) == FAILURE) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "locale_lookup: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_range_len == 0) {
loc_range = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
hash_arr = HASH_OF(arr);
if( !hash_arr || zend_hash_num_elements( hash_arr ) == 0 ) {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
result = lookup_loc_range(loc_range, hash_arr, boolCanonical TSRMLS_CC);
if(result == NULL || result[0] == '\0') {
if( fallback_loc ) {
result = estrndup(fallback_loc, fallback_loc_len);
} else {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
}
RETVAL_STRINGL(result, strlen(result), 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
PHP_FUNCTION(locale_lookup)
{
char* fallback_loc = NULL;
int fallback_loc_len = 0;
const char* loc_range = NULL;
int loc_range_len = 0;
zval* arr = NULL;
HashTable* hash_arr = NULL;
zend_bool boolCanonical = 0;
char* result =NULL;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "as|bs", &arr, &loc_range, &loc_range_len,
&boolCanonical, &fallback_loc, &fallback_loc_len) == FAILURE) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "locale_lookup: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_range_len == 0) {
loc_range = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
hash_arr = HASH_OF(arr);
if( !hash_arr || zend_hash_num_elements( hash_arr ) == 0 ) {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
result = lookup_loc_range(loc_range, hash_arr, boolCanonical TSRMLS_CC);
if(result == NULL || result[0] == '\0') {
if( fallback_loc ) {
result = estrndup(fallback_loc, fallback_loc_len);
} else {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
}
RETVAL_STRINGL(result, strlen(result), 0);
}
| 167,194
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static bool dump_fd_info(const char *dest_filename, char *source_filename, int source_base_ofs)
{
FILE *fp = fopen(dest_filename, "w");
if (!fp)
return false;
unsigned fd = 0;
while (fd <= 99999) /* paranoia check */
{
sprintf(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fd/%u", fd);
char *name = malloc_readlink(source_filename);
if (!name)
break;
fprintf(fp, "%u:%s\n", fd, name);
free(name);
sprintf(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fdinfo/%u", fd);
fd++;
FILE *in = fopen(source_filename, "r");
if (!in)
continue;
char buf[128];
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, in))
{
/* in case the line is not terminated, terminate it */
char *eol = strchrnul(buf, '\n');
eol[0] = '\n';
eol[1] = '\0';
fputs(buf, fp);
}
fclose(in);
}
fclose(fp);
return true;
}
Commit Message: ccpp: fix symlink race conditions
Fix copy & chown race conditions
Related: #1211835
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
|
static bool dump_fd_info(const char *dest_filename, char *source_filename, int source_base_ofs)
static bool dump_fd_info(const char *dest_filename, char *source_filename, int source_base_ofs, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
FILE *fp = fopen(dest_filename, "w");
if (!fp)
return false;
unsigned fd = 0;
while (fd <= 99999) /* paranoia check */
{
sprintf(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fd/%u", fd);
char *name = malloc_readlink(source_filename);
if (!name)
break;
fprintf(fp, "%u:%s\n", fd, name);
free(name);
sprintf(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fdinfo/%u", fd);
fd++;
FILE *in = fopen(source_filename, "r");
if (!in)
continue;
char buf[128];
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, in))
{
/* in case the line is not terminated, terminate it */
char *eol = strchrnul(buf, '\n');
eol[0] = '\n';
eol[1] = '\0';
fputs(buf, fp);
}
fclose(in);
}
const int dest_fd = fileno(fp);
if (fchown(dest_fd, uid, gid) < 0)
{
perror_msg("Can't change '%s' ownership to %lu:%lu", dest_filename, (long)uid, (long)gid);
fclose(fp);
unlink(dest_filename);
return false;
}
fclose(fp);
return true;
}
| 170,136
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void FakeBluetoothAgentManagerClient::UnregisterAgent(
const dbus::ObjectPath& agent_path,
const base::Closure& callback,
const ErrorCallback& error_callback) {
VLOG(1) << "UnregisterAgent: " << agent_path.value();
if (service_provider_ != NULL) {
error_callback.Run(bluetooth_agent_manager::kErrorInvalidArguments,
"Agent still registered");
} else {
callback.Run();
}
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void FakeBluetoothAgentManagerClient::UnregisterAgent(
const dbus::ObjectPath& agent_path,
const base::Closure& callback,
const ErrorCallback& error_callback) {
VLOG(1) << "UnregisterAgent: " << agent_path.value();
if (service_provider_ == NULL) {
error_callback.Run(bluetooth_agent_manager::kErrorDoesNotExist,
"No agent registered");
} else if (service_provider_->object_path_ != agent_path) {
error_callback.Run(bluetooth_agent_manager::kErrorDoesNotExist,
"Agent still registered");
} else {
callback.Run();
}
}
| 171,213
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DevToolsDownloadManagerDelegate::OnDownloadPathGenerated(
uint32_t download_id,
const content::DownloadTargetCallback& callback,
const base::FilePath& suggested_path) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
callback.Run(suggested_path,
content::DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_OVERWRITE,
download::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_NOT_DANGEROUS,
suggested_path.AddExtension(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".crdownload")),
content::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE);
}
Commit Message: Always mark content downloaded by devtools delegate as potentially dangerous
Bug: 805445
Change-Id: I7051f519205e178db57e23320ab979f8fa9ce38b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894782
Commit-Queue: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533215}
CWE ID:
|
void DevToolsDownloadManagerDelegate::OnDownloadPathGenerated(
uint32_t download_id,
const content::DownloadTargetCallback& callback,
const base::FilePath& suggested_path) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
callback.Run(suggested_path,
content::DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_OVERWRITE,
download::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_MAYBE_DANGEROUS_CONTENT,
suggested_path.AddExtension(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(".crdownload")),
content::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE);
}
| 173,170
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void *Sys_LoadDll(const char *name, qboolean useSystemLib)
{
void *dllhandle;
if(useSystemLib)
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\"...\n", name);
if(!useSystemLib || !(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(name)))
{
const char *topDir;
char libPath[MAX_OSPATH];
topDir = Sys_BinaryPath();
if(!*topDir)
topDir = ".";
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, topDir);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", topDir, PATH_SEP, name);
if(!(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath)))
{
const char *basePath = Cvar_VariableString("fs_basepath");
if(!basePath || !*basePath)
basePath = ".";
if(FS_FilenameCompare(topDir, basePath))
{
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, basePath);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", basePath, PATH_SEP, name);
dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath);
}
if(!dllhandle)
Com_Printf("Loading \"%s\" failed\n", name);
}
}
return dllhandle;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
|
void *Sys_LoadDll(const char *name, qboolean useSystemLib)
{
void *dllhandle;
// Don't load any DLLs that end with the pk3 extension
if (COM_CompareExtension(name, ".pk3"))
{
Com_Printf("Rejecting DLL named \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
}
if(useSystemLib)
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\"...\n", name);
if(!useSystemLib || !(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(name)))
{
const char *topDir;
char libPath[MAX_OSPATH];
topDir = Sys_BinaryPath();
if(!*topDir)
topDir = ".";
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, topDir);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", topDir, PATH_SEP, name);
if(!(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath)))
{
const char *basePath = Cvar_VariableString("fs_basepath");
if(!basePath || !*basePath)
basePath = ".";
if(FS_FilenameCompare(topDir, basePath))
{
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, basePath);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", basePath, PATH_SEP, name);
dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath);
}
if(!dllhandle)
Com_Printf("Loading \"%s\" failed\n", name);
}
}
return dllhandle;
}
| 170,084
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *buf)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FPSContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
int64_t delta;
int i, ret;
s->frames_in++;
/* discard frames until we get the first timestamp */
if (s->pts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
if (buf->pts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (s->start_time != DBL_MAX && s->start_time != AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
double first_pts = s->start_time * AV_TIME_BASE;
first_pts = FFMIN(FFMAX(first_pts, INT64_MIN), INT64_MAX);
s->first_pts = s->pts = av_rescale_q(first_pts, AV_TIME_BASE_Q,
inlink->time_base);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Set first pts to (in:%"PRId64" out:%"PRId64")\n",
s->first_pts, av_rescale_q(first_pts, AV_TIME_BASE_Q,
outlink->time_base));
} else {
s->first_pts = s->pts = buf->pts;
}
} else {
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Discarding initial frame(s) with no "
"timestamp.\n");
av_frame_free(&buf);
s->drop++;
}
return 0;
}
/* now wait for the next timestamp */
if (buf->pts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
return write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
}
/* number of output frames */
delta = av_rescale_q_rnd(buf->pts - s->pts, inlink->time_base,
outlink->time_base, s->rounding);
if (delta < 1) {
/* drop the frame and everything buffered except the first */
AVFrame *tmp;
int drop = av_fifo_size(s->fifo)/sizeof(AVFrame*);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Dropping %d frame(s).\n", drop);
s->drop += drop;
av_fifo_generic_read(s->fifo, &tmp, sizeof(tmp), NULL);
flush_fifo(s->fifo);
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, tmp);
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
/* can output >= 1 frames */
for (i = 0; i < delta; i++) {
AVFrame *buf_out;
av_fifo_generic_read(s->fifo, &buf_out, sizeof(buf_out), NULL);
/* duplicate the frame if needed */
if (!av_fifo_size(s->fifo) && i < delta - 1) {
AVFrame *dup = av_frame_clone(buf_out);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Duplicating frame.\n");
if (dup)
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, dup);
else
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (ret < 0) {
av_frame_free(&buf_out);
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
s->dup++;
}
buf_out->pts = av_rescale_q(s->first_pts, inlink->time_base,
outlink->time_base) + s->frames_out;
if ((ret = ff_filter_frame(outlink, buf_out)) < 0) {
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
s->frames_out++;
}
flush_fifo(s->fifo);
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
s->pts = s->first_pts + av_rescale_q(s->frames_out, outlink->time_base, inlink->time_base);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avfilter/vf_fps: make sure the fifo is not empty before using it
Fixes Ticket2905
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *buf)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FPSContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
int64_t delta;
int i, ret;
s->frames_in++;
/* discard frames until we get the first timestamp */
if (s->pts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
if (buf->pts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (s->start_time != DBL_MAX && s->start_time != AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
double first_pts = s->start_time * AV_TIME_BASE;
first_pts = FFMIN(FFMAX(first_pts, INT64_MIN), INT64_MAX);
s->first_pts = s->pts = av_rescale_q(first_pts, AV_TIME_BASE_Q,
inlink->time_base);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Set first pts to (in:%"PRId64" out:%"PRId64")\n",
s->first_pts, av_rescale_q(first_pts, AV_TIME_BASE_Q,
outlink->time_base));
} else {
s->first_pts = s->pts = buf->pts;
}
} else {
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Discarding initial frame(s) with no "
"timestamp.\n");
av_frame_free(&buf);
s->drop++;
}
return 0;
}
/* now wait for the next timestamp */
if (buf->pts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE || av_fifo_size(s->fifo) <= 0) {
return write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
}
/* number of output frames */
delta = av_rescale_q_rnd(buf->pts - s->pts, inlink->time_base,
outlink->time_base, s->rounding);
if (delta < 1) {
/* drop the frame and everything buffered except the first */
AVFrame *tmp;
int drop = av_fifo_size(s->fifo)/sizeof(AVFrame*);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Dropping %d frame(s).\n", drop);
s->drop += drop;
av_fifo_generic_read(s->fifo, &tmp, sizeof(tmp), NULL);
flush_fifo(s->fifo);
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, tmp);
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
/* can output >= 1 frames */
for (i = 0; i < delta; i++) {
AVFrame *buf_out;
av_fifo_generic_read(s->fifo, &buf_out, sizeof(buf_out), NULL);
/* duplicate the frame if needed */
if (!av_fifo_size(s->fifo) && i < delta - 1) {
AVFrame *dup = av_frame_clone(buf_out);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Duplicating frame.\n");
if (dup)
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, dup);
else
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (ret < 0) {
av_frame_free(&buf_out);
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
s->dup++;
}
buf_out->pts = av_rescale_q(s->first_pts, inlink->time_base,
outlink->time_base) + s->frames_out;
if ((ret = ff_filter_frame(outlink, buf_out)) < 0) {
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
s->frames_out++;
}
flush_fifo(s->fifo);
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
s->pts = s->first_pts + av_rescale_q(s->frames_out, outlink->time_base, inlink->time_base);
return ret;
}
| 165,916
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void edge_sparse_csr_reader_double( const char* i_csr_file_in,
unsigned int** o_row_idx,
unsigned int** o_column_idx,
double** o_values,
unsigned int* o_row_count,
unsigned int* o_column_count,
unsigned int* o_element_count ) {
FILE *l_csr_file_handle;
const unsigned int l_line_length = 512;
char l_line[512/*l_line_length*/+1];
unsigned int l_header_read = 0;
unsigned int* l_row_idx_id = NULL;
unsigned int l_i = 0;
l_csr_file_handle = fopen( i_csr_file_in, "r" );
if ( l_csr_file_handle == NULL ) {
fprintf( stderr, "cannot open CSR file!\n" );
return;
}
while (fgets(l_line, l_line_length, l_csr_file_handle) != NULL) {
if ( strlen(l_line) == l_line_length ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not read file length!\n" );
return;
}
/* check if we are still reading comments header */
if ( l_line[0] == '%' ) {
continue;
} else {
/* if we are the first line after comment header, we allocate our data structures */
if ( l_header_read == 0 ) {
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %u", o_row_count, o_column_count, o_element_count) == 3 ) {
/* allocate CSC datastructure matching mtx file */
*o_column_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
*o_row_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count + 1));
*o_values = (double*) malloc(sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
l_row_idx_id = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count));
/* check if mallocs were successful */
if ( ( *o_row_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_column_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_values == NULL ) ||
( l_row_idx_id == NULL ) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not allocate sp data!\n" );
return;
}
/* set everything to zero for init */
memset(*o_row_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_row_count + 1));
memset(*o_column_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_element_count));
memset(*o_values, 0, sizeof(double)*(*o_element_count));
memset(l_row_idx_id, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_row_count));
/* init column idx */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count + 1); l_i++)
(*o_row_idx)[l_i] = (*o_element_count);
/* init */
(*o_row_idx)[0] = 0;
l_i = 0;
l_header_read = 1;
} else {
fprintf( stderr, "could not csr description!\n" );
return;
}
/* now we read the actual content */
} else {
unsigned int l_row, l_column;
double l_value;
/* read a line of content */
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %lf", &l_row, &l_column, &l_value) != 3 ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not read element!\n" );
return;
}
/* adjust numbers to zero termination */
l_row--;
l_column--;
/* add these values to row and value structure */
(*o_column_idx)[l_i] = l_column;
(*o_values)[l_i] = l_value;
l_i++;
/* handle columns, set id to own for this column, yeah we need to handle empty columns */
l_row_idx_id[l_row] = 1;
(*o_row_idx)[l_row+1] = l_i;
}
}
}
/* close mtx file */
fclose( l_csr_file_handle );
/* check if we read a file which was consistent */
if ( l_i != (*o_element_count) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "we were not able to read all elements!\n" );
return;
}
/* let's handle empty rows */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count); l_i++) {
if ( l_row_idx_id[l_i] == 0 ) {
(*o_row_idx)[l_i+1] = (*o_row_idx)[l_i];
}
}
/* free helper data structure */
if ( l_row_idx_id != NULL ) {
free( l_row_idx_id );
}
}
Commit Message: Issue #287: made CSR/CSC readers more robust against invalid input (case #1).
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void edge_sparse_csr_reader_double( const char* i_csr_file_in,
unsigned int** o_row_idx,
unsigned int** o_column_idx,
double** o_values,
unsigned int* o_row_count,
unsigned int* o_column_count,
unsigned int* o_element_count ) {
FILE *l_csr_file_handle;
const unsigned int l_line_length = 512;
char l_line[512/*l_line_length*/+1];
unsigned int l_header_read = 0;
unsigned int* l_row_idx_id = NULL;
unsigned int l_i = 0;
l_csr_file_handle = fopen( i_csr_file_in, "r" );
if ( l_csr_file_handle == NULL ) {
fprintf( stderr, "cannot open CSR file!\n" );
return;
}
while (fgets(l_line, l_line_length, l_csr_file_handle) != NULL) {
if ( strlen(l_line) == l_line_length ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not read file length!\n" );
return;
}
/* check if we are still reading comments header */
if ( l_line[0] == '%' ) {
continue;
} else {
/* if we are the first line after comment header, we allocate our data structures */
if ( l_header_read == 0 ) {
if (3 == sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %u", o_row_count, o_column_count, o_element_count) &&
0 != *o_row_count && 0 != *o_column_count && 0 != *o_element_count)
{
/* allocate CSC datastructure matching mtx file */
*o_column_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
*o_row_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count + 1));
*o_values = (double*) malloc(sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
l_row_idx_id = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count));
/* check if mallocs were successful */
if ( ( *o_row_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_column_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_values == NULL ) ||
( l_row_idx_id == NULL ) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not allocate sp data!\n" );
return;
}
/* set everything to zero for init */
memset(*o_row_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_row_count + 1));
memset(*o_column_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_element_count));
memset(*o_values, 0, sizeof(double)*(*o_element_count));
memset(l_row_idx_id, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_row_count));
/* init column idx */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count + 1); l_i++)
(*o_row_idx)[l_i] = (*o_element_count);
/* init */
(*o_row_idx)[0] = 0;
l_i = 0;
l_header_read = 1;
} else {
fprintf( stderr, "could not csr description!\n" );
return;
}
/* now we read the actual content */
} else {
unsigned int l_row, l_column;
double l_value;
/* read a line of content */
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %lf", &l_row, &l_column, &l_value) != 3 ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not read element!\n" );
return;
}
/* adjust numbers to zero termination */
l_row--;
l_column--;
/* add these values to row and value structure */
(*o_column_idx)[l_i] = l_column;
(*o_values)[l_i] = l_value;
l_i++;
/* handle columns, set id to own for this column, yeah we need to handle empty columns */
l_row_idx_id[l_row] = 1;
(*o_row_idx)[l_row+1] = l_i;
}
}
}
/* close mtx file */
fclose( l_csr_file_handle );
/* check if we read a file which was consistent */
if ( l_i != (*o_element_count) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "we were not able to read all elements!\n" );
return;
}
/* let's handle empty rows */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count); l_i++) {
if ( l_row_idx_id[l_i] == 0 ) {
(*o_row_idx)[l_i+1] = (*o_row_idx)[l_i];
}
}
/* free helper data structure */
if ( l_row_idx_id != NULL ) {
free( l_row_idx_id );
}
}
| 168,948
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnSSLCertificateError(
net::URLRequest* request,
const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info,
bool is_hsts_host) {
DCHECK(request);
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(request);
DCHECK(info);
GlobalRequestID request_id(info->GetChildID(), info->GetRequestID());
int render_process_id;
int render_view_id;
if(!info->GetAssociatedRenderView(&render_process_id, &render_view_id))
NOTREACHED();
SSLManager::OnSSLCertificateError(ssl_delegate_weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
request_id, info->GetResourceType(), request->url(), render_process_id,
render_view_id, ssl_info, is_hsts_host);
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnSSLCertificateError(
net::URLRequest* request,
const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info,
bool is_hsts_host) {
DCHECK(request);
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(request);
DCHECK(info);
GlobalRequestID request_id(info->GetChildID(), info->GetRequestID());
int render_process_id;
int render_view_id;
if(!info->GetAssociatedRenderView(&render_process_id, &render_view_id))
NOTREACHED();
SSLManager::OnSSLCertificateError(
AsWeakPtr(), request_id, info->GetResourceType(), request->url(),
render_process_id, render_view_id, ssl_info, is_hsts_host);
}
| 170,989
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: isoent_gen_joliet_identifier(struct archive_write *a, struct isoent *isoent,
struct idr *idr)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660;
struct isoent *np;
unsigned char *p;
size_t l;
int r;
int ffmax, parent_len;
static const struct archive_rb_tree_ops rb_ops = {
isoent_cmp_node_joliet, isoent_cmp_key_joliet
};
if (isoent->children.cnt == 0)
return (0);
iso9660 = a->format_data;
if (iso9660->opt.joliet == OPT_JOLIET_LONGNAME)
ffmax = 206;
else
ffmax = 128;
r = idr_start(a, idr, isoent->children.cnt, ffmax, 6, 2, &rb_ops);
if (r < 0)
return (r);
parent_len = 1;
for (np = isoent; np->parent != np; np = np->parent)
parent_len += np->mb_len + 1;
for (np = isoent->children.first; np != NULL; np = np->chnext) {
unsigned char *dot;
int ext_off, noff, weight;
size_t lt;
if ((int)(l = np->file->basename_utf16.length) > ffmax)
l = ffmax;
p = malloc((l+1)*2);
if (p == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
memcpy(p, np->file->basename_utf16.s, l);
p[l] = 0;
p[l+1] = 0;
np->identifier = (char *)p;
lt = l;
dot = p + l;
weight = 0;
while (lt > 0) {
if (!joliet_allowed_char(p[0], p[1]))
archive_be16enc(p, 0x005F); /* '_' */
else if (p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0x2E) /* '.' */
dot = p;
p += 2;
lt -= 2;
}
ext_off = (int)(dot - (unsigned char *)np->identifier);
np->ext_off = ext_off;
np->ext_len = (int)l - ext_off;
np->id_len = (int)l;
/*
* Get a length of MBS of a full-pathname.
*/
if ((int)np->file->basename_utf16.length > ffmax) {
if (archive_strncpy_l(&iso9660->mbs,
(const char *)np->identifier, l,
iso9660->sconv_from_utf16be) != 0 &&
errno == ENOMEM) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"No memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
np->mb_len = (int)iso9660->mbs.length;
if (np->mb_len != (int)np->file->basename.length)
weight = np->mb_len;
} else
np->mb_len = (int)np->file->basename.length;
/* If a length of full-pathname is longer than 240 bytes,
* it violates Joliet extensions regulation. */
if (parent_len + np->mb_len > 240) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"The regulation of Joliet extensions;"
" A length of a full-pathname of `%s' is "
"longer than 240 bytes, (p=%d, b=%d)",
archive_entry_pathname(np->file->entry),
(int)parent_len, (int)np->mb_len);
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Make an offset of the number which is used to be set
* hexadecimal number to avoid duplicate identifier. */
if ((int)l == ffmax)
noff = ext_off - 6;
else if ((int)l == ffmax-2)
noff = ext_off - 4;
else if ((int)l == ffmax-4)
noff = ext_off - 2;
else
noff = ext_off;
/* Register entry to the identifier resolver. */
idr_register(idr, np, weight, noff);
}
/* Resolve duplicate identifier with Joliet Volume. */
idr_resolve(idr, idr_set_num_beutf16);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
isoent_gen_joliet_identifier(struct archive_write *a, struct isoent *isoent,
struct idr *idr)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660;
struct isoent *np;
unsigned char *p;
size_t l;
int r;
size_t ffmax, parent_len;
static const struct archive_rb_tree_ops rb_ops = {
isoent_cmp_node_joliet, isoent_cmp_key_joliet
};
if (isoent->children.cnt == 0)
return (0);
iso9660 = a->format_data;
if (iso9660->opt.joliet == OPT_JOLIET_LONGNAME)
ffmax = 206;
else
ffmax = 128;
r = idr_start(a, idr, isoent->children.cnt, (int)ffmax, 6, 2, &rb_ops);
if (r < 0)
return (r);
parent_len = 1;
for (np = isoent; np->parent != np; np = np->parent)
parent_len += np->mb_len + 1;
for (np = isoent->children.first; np != NULL; np = np->chnext) {
unsigned char *dot;
int ext_off, noff, weight;
size_t lt;
if ((l = np->file->basename_utf16.length) > ffmax)
l = ffmax;
p = malloc((l+1)*2);
if (p == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
memcpy(p, np->file->basename_utf16.s, l);
p[l] = 0;
p[l+1] = 0;
np->identifier = (char *)p;
lt = l;
dot = p + l;
weight = 0;
while (lt > 0) {
if (!joliet_allowed_char(p[0], p[1]))
archive_be16enc(p, 0x005F); /* '_' */
else if (p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0x2E) /* '.' */
dot = p;
p += 2;
lt -= 2;
}
ext_off = (int)(dot - (unsigned char *)np->identifier);
np->ext_off = ext_off;
np->ext_len = (int)l - ext_off;
np->id_len = (int)l;
/*
* Get a length of MBS of a full-pathname.
*/
if (np->file->basename_utf16.length > ffmax) {
if (archive_strncpy_l(&iso9660->mbs,
(const char *)np->identifier, l,
iso9660->sconv_from_utf16be) != 0 &&
errno == ENOMEM) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"No memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
np->mb_len = (int)iso9660->mbs.length;
if (np->mb_len != (int)np->file->basename.length)
weight = np->mb_len;
} else
np->mb_len = (int)np->file->basename.length;
/* If a length of full-pathname is longer than 240 bytes,
* it violates Joliet extensions regulation. */
if (parent_len > 240
|| np->mb_len > 240
|| parent_len + np->mb_len > 240) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"The regulation of Joliet extensions;"
" A length of a full-pathname of `%s' is "
"longer than 240 bytes, (p=%d, b=%d)",
archive_entry_pathname(np->file->entry),
(int)parent_len, (int)np->mb_len);
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Make an offset of the number which is used to be set
* hexadecimal number to avoid duplicate identifier. */
if (l == ffmax)
noff = ext_off - 6;
else if (l == ffmax-2)
noff = ext_off - 4;
else if (l == ffmax-4)
noff = ext_off - 2;
else
noff = ext_off;
/* Register entry to the identifier resolver. */
idr_register(idr, np, weight, noff);
}
/* Resolve duplicate identifier with Joliet Volume. */
idr_resolve(idr, idr_set_num_beutf16);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
| 167,003
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: explicit ConsoleCallbackFilter(
base::Callback<void(const base::string16&)> callback)
: callback_(callback) {}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
explicit ConsoleCallbackFilter(
| 172,489
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: tt_cmap14_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p;
FT_ULong length;
FT_ULong num_selectors;
if ( table + 2 + 4 + 4 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
p = table + 2;
length = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
num_selectors = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( length > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - table ) ||
/* length < 10 + 11 * num_selectors ? */
length < 10 ||
( length - 10 ) / 11 < num_selectors )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check selectors, they must be in increasing order */
{
/* we start lastVarSel at 1 because a variant selector value of 0
* isn't valid.
*/
FT_ULong n, lastVarSel = 1;
for ( n = 0; n < num_selectors; n++ )
{
FT_ULong varSel = TT_NEXT_UINT24( p );
FT_ULong defOff = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
FT_ULong nondefOff = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( defOff >= length || nondefOff >= length )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
if ( varSel < lastVarSel )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
lastVarSel = varSel + 1;
/* check the default table (these glyphs should be reached */
/* through the normal Unicode cmap, no GIDs, just check order) */
if ( defOff != 0 )
{
FT_Byte* defp = table + defOff;
FT_ULong numRanges = TT_NEXT_ULONG( defp );
FT_ULong i;
FT_ULong lastBase = 0;
/* defp + numRanges * 4 > valid->limit ? */
if ( numRanges > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - defp ) / 4 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
if ( base + cnt >= 0x110000UL ) /* end of Unicode */
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( base < lastBase )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
lastBase = base + cnt + 1U;
}
}
/* and the non-default table (these glyphs are specified here) */
if ( nondefOff != 0 )
{
FT_Byte* ndp = table + nondefOff;
FT_ULong numMappings = TT_NEXT_ULONG( ndp );
/* and the non-default table (these glyphs are specified here) */
if ( nondefOff != 0 )
{
FT_Byte* ndp = table + nondefOff;
FT_ULong numMappings = TT_NEXT_ULONG( ndp );
FT_ULong i, lastUni = 0;
/* numMappings * 4 > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - ndp ) ? */
if ( numMappings > ( (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - ndp ) ) / 4 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
for ( i = 0; i < numMappings; ++i )
lastUni = uni + 1U;
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT &&
gid >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
tt_cmap14_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p;
FT_ULong length;
FT_ULong num_selectors;
if ( table + 2 + 4 + 4 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
p = table + 2;
length = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
num_selectors = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( length > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - table ) ||
/* length < 10 + 11 * num_selectors ? */
length < 10 ||
( length - 10 ) / 11 < num_selectors )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check selectors, they must be in increasing order */
{
/* we start lastVarSel at 1 because a variant selector value of 0
* isn't valid.
*/
FT_ULong n, lastVarSel = 1;
for ( n = 0; n < num_selectors; n++ )
{
FT_ULong varSel = TT_NEXT_UINT24( p );
FT_ULong defOff = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
FT_ULong nondefOff = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( defOff >= length || nondefOff >= length )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
if ( varSel < lastVarSel )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
lastVarSel = varSel + 1;
/* check the default table (these glyphs should be reached */
/* through the normal Unicode cmap, no GIDs, just check order) */
if ( defOff != 0 )
{
FT_Byte* defp = table + defOff;
FT_ULong numRanges;
FT_ULong i;
FT_ULong lastBase = 0;
if ( defp + 4 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
numRanges = TT_NEXT_ULONG( defp );
/* defp + numRanges * 4 > valid->limit ? */
if ( numRanges > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - defp ) / 4 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
if ( base + cnt >= 0x110000UL ) /* end of Unicode */
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( base < lastBase )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
lastBase = base + cnt + 1U;
}
}
/* and the non-default table (these glyphs are specified here) */
if ( nondefOff != 0 )
{
FT_Byte* ndp = table + nondefOff;
FT_ULong numMappings = TT_NEXT_ULONG( ndp );
/* and the non-default table (these glyphs are specified here) */
if ( nondefOff != 0 )
{
FT_Byte* ndp = table + nondefOff;
FT_ULong numMappings;
FT_ULong i, lastUni = 0;
if ( ndp + 4 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
numMappings = TT_NEXT_ULONG( ndp );
/* numMappings * 5 > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - ndp ) ? */
if ( numMappings > ( (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - ndp ) ) / 5 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
for ( i = 0; i < numMappings; ++i )
lastUni = uni + 1U;
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT &&
gid >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
}
}
}
}
| 165,426
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_slice(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
UWORD32 u4_slice_vertical_position;
UWORD32 u4_slice_vertical_position_extension;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* All the profiles supported require restricted slice structure. Hence */
/* there is no need to store slice_vertical_position. Note that max */
/* height supported does not exceed 2800 and scalablity is not supported */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Remove the slice start code */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN);
u4_slice_vertical_position = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream, 8);
if(u4_slice_vertical_position > 2800)
{
u4_slice_vertical_position_extension = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream, 3);
u4_slice_vertical_position += (u4_slice_vertical_position_extension << 7);
}
if((u4_slice_vertical_position > ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb) ||
(u4_slice_vertical_position == 0))
{
return IMPEG2D_INVALID_VERT_SIZE;
}
u4_slice_vertical_position--;
if (ps_dec->u2_mb_y != u4_slice_vertical_position)
{
ps_dec->u2_mb_y = u4_slice_vertical_position;
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 1;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quant scale code decoding */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
UWORD16 u2_quant_scale_code;
u2_quant_scale_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,5);
ps_dec->u1_quant_scale = (ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type) ?
gau1_impeg2_non_linear_quant_scale[u2_quant_scale_code] : (u2_quant_scale_code << 1);
}
if (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,9);
/* Flush extra bit information */
while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,9);
}
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
/* Reset the DC predictors to reset values given in Table 7.2 at the start*/
/* of slice data */
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* dec->DecMBsinSlice() implements the following psuedo code from standard*/
/* do */
/* { */
/* macroblock() */
/* } while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt() != '000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000') */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
e_error = ps_dec->pf_decode_slice(ps_dec);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
/* Check for the MBy index instead of number of MBs left, because the
* number of MBs left in case of multi-thread decode is the number of MBs
* in that row only
*/
if(ps_dec->u2_mb_y < ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb)
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_slice(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
UWORD32 u4_slice_vertical_position;
UWORD32 u4_slice_vertical_position_extension;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* All the profiles supported require restricted slice structure. Hence */
/* there is no need to store slice_vertical_position. Note that max */
/* height supported does not exceed 2800 and scalablity is not supported */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Remove the slice start code */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN);
u4_slice_vertical_position = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream, 8);
if(u4_slice_vertical_position > 2800)
{
u4_slice_vertical_position_extension = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream, 3);
u4_slice_vertical_position += (u4_slice_vertical_position_extension << 7);
}
if((u4_slice_vertical_position > ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb) ||
(u4_slice_vertical_position == 0))
{
return IMPEG2D_INVALID_VERT_SIZE;
}
u4_slice_vertical_position--;
if (ps_dec->u2_mb_y != u4_slice_vertical_position)
{
ps_dec->u2_mb_y = u4_slice_vertical_position;
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 1;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quant scale code decoding */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
UWORD16 u2_quant_scale_code;
u2_quant_scale_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,5);
ps_dec->u1_quant_scale = (ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type) ?
gau1_impeg2_non_linear_quant_scale[u2_quant_scale_code] : (u2_quant_scale_code << 1);
}
if (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,9);
/* Flush extra bit information */
while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1 &&
ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,9);
}
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
/* Reset the DC predictors to reset values given in Table 7.2 at the start*/
/* of slice data */
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* dec->DecMBsinSlice() implements the following psuedo code from standard*/
/* do */
/* { */
/* macroblock() */
/* } while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt() != '000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000') */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
e_error = ps_dec->pf_decode_slice(ps_dec);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
/* Check for the MBy index instead of number of MBs left, because the
* number of MBs left in case of multi-thread decode is the number of MBs
* in that row only
*/
if(ps_dec->u2_mb_y < ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb)
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
| 173,947
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::sendCommand(
OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd, OMX_S32 param) {
const sp<GraphicBufferSource>& bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && cmd == OMX_CommandStateSet) {
if (param == OMX_StateIdle) {
bufferSource->omxIdle();
} else if (param == OMX_StateLoaded) {
bufferSource->omxLoaded();
setGraphicBufferSource(NULL);
}
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
bumpDebugLevel_l(2 /* numInputBuffers */, 2 /* numOutputBuffers */);
}
const char *paramString =
cmd == OMX_CommandStateSet ? asString((OMX_STATETYPE)param) : portString(param);
CLOG_STATE(sendCommand, "%s(%d), %s(%d)", asString(cmd), cmd, paramString, param);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_SendCommand(mHandle, cmd, param, NULL);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(sendCommand, err, "%s(%d), %s(%d)", asString(cmd), cmd, paramString, param);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::sendCommand(
OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd, OMX_S32 param) {
if (cmd == OMX_CommandStateSet) {
// We do not support returning from unloaded state, so there are no configurations past
// first StateSet command.
mSailed = true;
}
const sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && cmd == OMX_CommandStateSet) {
if (param == OMX_StateIdle) {
bufferSource->omxIdle();
} else if (param == OMX_StateLoaded) {
bufferSource->omxLoaded();
setGraphicBufferSource(NULL);
}
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
bumpDebugLevel_l(2 /* numInputBuffers */, 2 /* numOutputBuffers */);
}
const char *paramString =
cmd == OMX_CommandStateSet ? asString((OMX_STATETYPE)param) : portString(param);
CLOG_STATE(sendCommand, "%s(%d), %s(%d)", asString(cmd), cmd, paramString, param);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_SendCommand(mHandle, cmd, param, NULL);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(sendCommand, err, "%s(%d), %s(%d)", asString(cmd), cmd, paramString, param);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
| 174,137
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parse3GPPMetaData(off64_t offset, size_t size, int depth) {
if (size < 4 || size == SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + 1];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
offset, buffer, size) != (ssize_t)size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t metadataKey = 0;
switch (mPath[depth]) {
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyTitle;
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyArtist;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyWriter;
break;
}
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyGenre;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
{
if (buffer[size - 1] != '\0') {
char tmp[4];
sprintf(tmp, "%u", buffer[size - 1]);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyCDTrackNumber, tmp);
}
metadataKey = kKeyAlbum;
break;
}
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
char tmp[5];
uint16_t year = U16_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (year < 10000) {
sprintf(tmp, "%u", year);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyYear, tmp);
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (metadataKey > 0) {
bool isUTF8 = true; // Common case
char16_t *framedata = NULL;
int len16 = 0; // Number of UTF-16 characters
if (size - 6 >= 4) {
len16 = ((size - 6) / 2) - 1; // don't include 0x0000 terminator
framedata = (char16_t *)(buffer + 6);
if (0xfffe == *framedata) {
for (int i = 0; i < len16; i++) {
framedata[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
}
if (0xfeff == *framedata) {
framedata++;
len16--;
isUTF8 = false;
}
}
if (isUTF8) {
buffer[size] = 0;
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, (const char *)buffer + 6);
} else {
String8 tmpUTF8str(framedata, len16);
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, tmpUTF8str.string());
}
}
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Prevent integer underflow if size is below 6
When processing 3GPP metadata, a subtraction operation may underflow and
lead to a rather large linear byteswap operation in the subsequent
framedata decoding code. Bound the 'size' value to prevent this from
occurring.
Bug: 20923261
Change-Id: I35dfbc8878c6b65cfe8b8adb7351a77ad4d604e5
(cherry picked from commit 9458e715d391ee8fe455fc31f07ff35ce12e0531)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
status_t MPEG4Extractor::parse3GPPMetaData(off64_t offset, size_t size, int depth) {
if (size < 4 || size == SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + 1];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
offset, buffer, size) != (ssize_t)size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t metadataKey = 0;
switch (mPath[depth]) {
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyTitle;
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyArtist;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyWriter;
break;
}
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
{
metadataKey = kKeyGenre;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
{
if (buffer[size - 1] != '\0') {
char tmp[4];
sprintf(tmp, "%u", buffer[size - 1]);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyCDTrackNumber, tmp);
}
metadataKey = kKeyAlbum;
break;
}
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
char tmp[5];
uint16_t year = U16_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (year < 10000) {
sprintf(tmp, "%u", year);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyYear, tmp);
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (metadataKey > 0) {
bool isUTF8 = true; // Common case
char16_t *framedata = NULL;
int len16 = 0; // Number of UTF-16 characters
if (size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size - 6 >= 4) {
len16 = ((size - 6) / 2) - 1; // don't include 0x0000 terminator
framedata = (char16_t *)(buffer + 6);
if (0xfffe == *framedata) {
for (int i = 0; i < len16; i++) {
framedata[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
}
if (0xfeff == *framedata) {
framedata++;
len16--;
isUTF8 = false;
}
}
if (isUTF8) {
buffer[size] = 0;
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, (const char *)buffer + 6);
} else {
String8 tmpUTF8str(framedata, len16);
mFileMetaData->setCString(metadataKey, tmpUTF8str.string());
}
}
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
| 173,367
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: QuotaTask::QuotaTask(QuotaTaskObserver* observer)
: observer_(observer),
original_task_runner_(base::MessageLoopProxy::current()) {
}
Commit Message: Quota double-delete fix
BUG=142310
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10832407
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152532 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
QuotaTask::QuotaTask(QuotaTaskObserver* observer)
: observer_(observer),
original_task_runner_(base::MessageLoopProxy::current()),
delete_scheduled_(false) {
}
| 170,804
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int handle_packet(unsigned char *data, int data_len) {
struct mt_mactelnet_hdr pkthdr;
/* Minimal size checks (pings are not supported here) */
if (data_len < MT_HEADER_LEN){
return -1;
}
parse_packet(data, &pkthdr);
/* We only care about packets with correct sessionkey */
if (pkthdr.seskey != sessionkey) {
return -1;
}
/* Handle data packets */
if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_DATA) {
struct mt_packet odata;
struct mt_mactelnet_control_hdr cpkt;
int success = 0;
/* Always transmit ACKNOWLEDGE packets in response to DATA packets */
init_packet(&odata, MT_PTYPE_ACK, srcmac, dstmac, sessionkey, pkthdr.counter + (data_len - MT_HEADER_LEN));
send_udp(&odata, 0);
/* Accept first packet, and all packets greater than incounter, and if counter has
wrapped around. */
if (pkthdr.counter > incounter || (incounter - pkthdr.counter) > 65535) {
incounter = pkthdr.counter;
} else {
/* Ignore double or old packets */
return -1;
}
/* Parse controlpacket data */
success = parse_control_packet(data + MT_HEADER_LEN, data_len - MT_HEADER_LEN, &cpkt);
while (success) {
/* If we receive pass_salt, transmit auth data back */
if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PASSSALT) {
memcpy(pass_salt, cpkt.data, cpkt.length);
send_auth(username, password);
}
/* If the (remaining) data did not have a control-packet magic byte sequence,
the data is raw terminal data to be outputted to the terminal. */
else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PLAINDATA) {
fwrite((const void *)cpkt.data, 1, cpkt.length, stdout);
}
/* END_AUTH means that the user/password negotiation is done, and after this point
terminal data may arrive, so we set up the terminal to raw mode. */
else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_END_AUTH) {
/* we have entered "terminal mode" */
terminal_mode = 1;
if (is_a_tty) {
/* stop input buffering at all levels. Give full control of terminal to RouterOS */
raw_term();
setvbuf(stdin, (char*)NULL, _IONBF, 0);
/* Add resize signal handler */
signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
}
}
/* Parse next controlpacket */
success = parse_control_packet(NULL, 0, &cpkt);
}
}
else if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_ACK) {
/* Handled elsewhere */
}
/* The server wants to terminate the connection, we have to oblige */
else if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_END) {
struct mt_packet odata;
/* Acknowledge the disconnection by sending a END packet in return */
init_packet(&odata, MT_PTYPE_END, srcmac, dstmac, pkthdr.seskey, 0);
send_udp(&odata, 0);
if (!quiet_mode) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Connection closed.\n"));
}
/* exit */
running = 0;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, _("Unhandeled packet type: %d received from server %s\n"), pkthdr.ptype, ether_ntoa((struct ether_addr *)dstmac));
return -1;
}
return pkthdr.ptype;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int handle_packet(unsigned char *data, int data_len) {
struct mt_mactelnet_hdr pkthdr;
/* Minimal size checks (pings are not supported here) */
if (data_len < MT_HEADER_LEN){
return -1;
}
parse_packet(data, &pkthdr);
/* We only care about packets with correct sessionkey */
if (pkthdr.seskey != sessionkey) {
return -1;
}
/* Handle data packets */
if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_DATA) {
struct mt_packet odata;
struct mt_mactelnet_control_hdr cpkt;
int success = 0;
/* Always transmit ACKNOWLEDGE packets in response to DATA packets */
init_packet(&odata, MT_PTYPE_ACK, srcmac, dstmac, sessionkey, pkthdr.counter + (data_len - MT_HEADER_LEN));
send_udp(&odata, 0);
/* Accept first packet, and all packets greater than incounter, and if counter has
wrapped around. */
if (pkthdr.counter > incounter || (incounter - pkthdr.counter) > 65535) {
incounter = pkthdr.counter;
} else {
/* Ignore double or old packets */
return -1;
}
/* Parse controlpacket data */
success = parse_control_packet(data + MT_HEADER_LEN, data_len - MT_HEADER_LEN, &cpkt);
while (success) {
/* If we receive pass_salt, transmit auth data back */
if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PASSSALT) {
/* check validity, server sends exactly 16 bytes */
if (cpkt.length != 16) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Invalid salt length: %d (instead of 16) received from server %s\n"), cpkt.length, ether_ntoa((struct ether_addr *)dstmac));
}
memcpy(pass_salt, cpkt.data, 16);
send_auth(username, password);
}
/* If the (remaining) data did not have a control-packet magic byte sequence,
the data is raw terminal data to be outputted to the terminal. */
else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_PLAINDATA) {
fwrite((const void *)cpkt.data, 1, cpkt.length, stdout);
}
/* END_AUTH means that the user/password negotiation is done, and after this point
terminal data may arrive, so we set up the terminal to raw mode. */
else if (cpkt.cptype == MT_CPTYPE_END_AUTH) {
/* we have entered "terminal mode" */
terminal_mode = 1;
if (is_a_tty) {
/* stop input buffering at all levels. Give full control of terminal to RouterOS */
raw_term();
setvbuf(stdin, (char*)NULL, _IONBF, 0);
/* Add resize signal handler */
signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
}
}
/* Parse next controlpacket */
success = parse_control_packet(NULL, 0, &cpkt);
}
}
else if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_ACK) {
/* Handled elsewhere */
}
/* The server wants to terminate the connection, we have to oblige */
else if (pkthdr.ptype == MT_PTYPE_END) {
struct mt_packet odata;
/* Acknowledge the disconnection by sending a END packet in return */
init_packet(&odata, MT_PTYPE_END, srcmac, dstmac, pkthdr.seskey, 0);
send_udp(&odata, 0);
if (!quiet_mode) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Connection closed.\n"));
}
/* exit */
running = 0;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, _("Unhandeled packet type: %d received from server %s\n"), pkthdr.ptype, ether_ntoa((struct ether_addr *)dstmac));
return -1;
}
return pkthdr.ptype;
}
| 166,962
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline const unsigned char *ReadResourceShort(const unsigned char *p,
unsigned short *quantum)
{
*quantum=(unsigned short) (*p++ << 8);
*quantum|=(unsigned short) (*p++ << 0);
return(p);
}static inline void WriteResourceLong(unsigned char *p,
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static inline const unsigned char *ReadResourceShort(const unsigned char *p,
unsigned short *quantum)
{
*quantum=(unsigned short) (*p++) << 8;
*quantum|=(unsigned short) (*p++);
return(p);
| 169,948
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: decrypt_response(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t * out_len)
{
size_t in_len;
size_t i;
unsigned char iv[16] = { 0 };
unsigned char plaintext[4096] = { 0 };
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
/* no cipher */
if (in[0] == 0x99)
return 0;
/* parse cipher length */
if (0x01 == in[2] && 0x82 != in[1]) {
in_len = in[1];
i = 3;
}
else if (0x01 == in[3] && 0x81 == in[1]) {
in_len = in[2];
i = 4;
}
else if (0x01 == in[4] && 0x82 == in[1]) {
in_len = in[2] * 0x100;
in_len += in[3];
i = 5;
}
else {
return -1;
}
/* decrypt */
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == exdata->smtype)
aes128_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], in_len - 1, plaintext);
else
des3_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], in_len - 1, plaintext);
/* unpadding */
while (0x80 != plaintext[in_len - 2] && (in_len - 2 > 0))
in_len--;
if (2 == in_len)
return -1;
memcpy(out, plaintext, in_len - 2);
*out_len = in_len - 2;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
decrypt_response(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t * out_len)
decrypt_response(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, unsigned char *out, size_t * out_len)
{
size_t cipher_len;
size_t i;
unsigned char iv[16] = { 0 };
unsigned char plaintext[4096] = { 0 };
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
/* no cipher */
if (in[0] == 0x99)
return 0;
/* parse cipher length */
if (0x01 == in[2] && 0x82 != in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[1];
i = 3;
}
else if (0x01 == in[3] && 0x81 == in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[2];
i = 4;
}
else if (0x01 == in[4] && 0x82 == in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[2] * 0x100;
cipher_len += in[3];
i = 5;
}
else {
return -1;
}
if (cipher_len < 2 || i+cipher_len > inlen || cipher_len > sizeof plaintext)
return -1;
/* decrypt */
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == exdata->smtype)
aes128_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], cipher_len - 1, plaintext);
else
des3_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], cipher_len - 1, plaintext);
/* unpadding */
while (0x80 != plaintext[cipher_len - 2] && (cipher_len - 2 > 0))
cipher_len--;
if (2 == cipher_len)
return -1;
memcpy(out, plaintext, cipher_len - 2);
*out_len = cipher_len - 2;
return 0;
}
| 169,054
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int snd_compr_allocate_buffer(struct snd_compr_stream *stream,
struct snd_compr_params *params)
{
unsigned int buffer_size;
void *buffer;
buffer_size = params->buffer.fragment_size * params->buffer.fragments;
if (stream->ops->copy) {
buffer = NULL;
/* if copy is defined the driver will be required to copy
* the data from core
*/
} else {
buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
}
stream->runtime->fragment_size = params->buffer.fragment_size;
stream->runtime->fragments = params->buffer.fragments;
stream->runtime->buffer = buffer;
stream->runtime->buffer_size = buffer_size;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()
These are 32 bit values that come from the user, we need to check for
integer overflows or we could end up allocating a smaller buffer than
expected.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
|
static int snd_compr_allocate_buffer(struct snd_compr_stream *stream,
struct snd_compr_params *params)
{
unsigned int buffer_size;
void *buffer;
if (params->buffer.fragment_size == 0 ||
params->buffer.fragments > SIZE_MAX / params->buffer.fragment_size)
return -EINVAL;
buffer_size = params->buffer.fragment_size * params->buffer.fragments;
if (stream->ops->copy) {
buffer = NULL;
/* if copy is defined the driver will be required to copy
* the data from core
*/
} else {
buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
}
stream->runtime->fragment_size = params->buffer.fragment_size;
stream->runtime->fragments = params->buffer.fragments;
stream->runtime->buffer = buffer;
stream->runtime->buffer_size = buffer_size;
return 0;
}
| 167,610
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRegisterTransferBuffer(
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer,
size_t size,
int32 id_request,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRegisterTransferBuffer");
base::SharedMemory shared_memory(transfer_buffer, false);
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
int32 id = command_buffer_->RegisterTransferBuffer(&shared_memory,
size,
id_request);
GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRegisterTransferBuffer(
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer,
uint32 size,
int32 id_request,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRegisterTransferBuffer");
base::SharedMemory shared_memory(transfer_buffer, false);
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
int32 id = command_buffer_->RegisterTransferBuffer(&shared_memory,
size,
id_request);
GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
| 171,406
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static char *escape_pathname(const char *inp)
{
const unsigned char *s;
char *escaped, *d;
if (!inp) {
return NULL;
}
escaped = malloc (4 * strlen(inp) + 1);
if (!escaped) {
perror("malloc");
return NULL;
}
for (d = escaped, s = (const unsigned char *)inp; *s; s++) {
if (needs_escape (*s)) {
snprintf (d, 5, "\\x%02x", *s);
d += strlen (d);
} else {
*d++ = *s;
}
}
*d++ = '\0';
return escaped;
}
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix
CWE ID:
|
static char *escape_pathname(const char *inp)
{
const unsigned char *s;
char *escaped, *d;
if (!inp) {
return NULL;
}
escaped = malloc (4 * strlen(inp) + 1);
if (!escaped) {
perror("malloc");
return NULL;
}
for (d = escaped, s = (const unsigned char *)inp; *s; s++) {
if (needs_escape (*s)) {
snprintf (d, 5, "\\x%02x", *s);
d += strlen (d);
} else {
*d++ = *s;
}
}
*d++ = '\0';
return escaped;
}
| 169,757
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void diff_bytes_c(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src1, const uint8_t *src2, int w){
long i;
#if !HAVE_FAST_UNALIGNED
if((long)src2 & (sizeof(long)-1)){
for(i=0; i+7<w; i+=8){
dst[i+0] = src1[i+0]-src2[i+0];
dst[i+1] = src1[i+1]-src2[i+1];
dst[i+2] = src1[i+2]-src2[i+2];
dst[i+3] = src1[i+3]-src2[i+3];
dst[i+4] = src1[i+4]-src2[i+4];
dst[i+5] = src1[i+5]-src2[i+5];
dst[i+6] = src1[i+6]-src2[i+6];
dst[i+7] = src1[i+7]-src2[i+7];
}
}else
#endif
for(i=0; i<=w-sizeof(long); i+=sizeof(long)){
long a = *(long*)(src1+i);
long b = *(long*)(src2+i);
*(long*)(dst+i) = ((a|pb_80) - (b&pb_7f)) ^ ((a^b^pb_80)&pb_80);
}
for(; i<w; i++)
dst[i+0] = src1[i+0]-src2[i+0];
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
static void diff_bytes_c(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src1, const uint8_t *src2, int w){
long i;
#if !HAVE_FAST_UNALIGNED
if((long)src2 & (sizeof(long)-1)){
for(i=0; i+7<w; i+=8){
dst[i+0] = src1[i+0]-src2[i+0];
dst[i+1] = src1[i+1]-src2[i+1];
dst[i+2] = src1[i+2]-src2[i+2];
dst[i+3] = src1[i+3]-src2[i+3];
dst[i+4] = src1[i+4]-src2[i+4];
dst[i+5] = src1[i+5]-src2[i+5];
dst[i+6] = src1[i+6]-src2[i+6];
dst[i+7] = src1[i+7]-src2[i+7];
}
}else
#endif
for(i=0; i<=w-(int)sizeof(long); i+=sizeof(long)){
long a = *(long*)(src1+i);
long b = *(long*)(src2+i);
*(long*)(dst+i) = ((a|pb_80) - (b&pb_7f)) ^ ((a^b^pb_80)&pb_80);
}
for(; i<w; i++)
dst[i+0] = src1[i+0]-src2[i+0];
}
| 165,930
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void HostCache::clear() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
RecordEraseAll(ERASE_CLEAR, base::TimeTicks::Now());
entries_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
CWE ID:
|
void HostCache::clear() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
RecordEraseAll(ERASE_CLEAR, base::TimeTicks::Now());
// Don't bother scheduling a write if there's nothing to clear.
if (size() == 0)
return;
entries_.clear();
if (delegate_)
delegate_->ScheduleWrite();
}
| 172,010
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadUncompressedRGBA(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
alphaBits,
x,
y;
unsigned short
color;
alphaBits=0;
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 16)
{
if (IsBitMask(dds_info->pixelformat,0x7c00,0x03e0,0x001f,0x8000))
alphaBits=1;
else if (IsBitMask(dds_info->pixelformat,0x00ff,0x00ff,0x00ff,0xff00))
{
alphaBits=2;
(void) SetImageType(image,GrayscaleMatteType);
}
else if (IsBitMask(dds_info->pixelformat,0x0f00,0x00f0,0x000f,0xf000))
alphaBits=4;
else
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImageTypeNotSupported",
image->filename);
}
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y++)
{
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, 0, y, dds_info->width, 1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x++)
{
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 16)
{
color=ReadBlobShort(image);
if (alphaBits == 1)
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,(color & (1 << 15)) ? QuantumRange : 0);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 1) >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 6) >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 11) >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
}
else if (alphaBits == 2)
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(color >> 8)));
SetPixelGray(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)color));
}
else
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(((color >> 12)/15.0)*255)));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 4) >> 12)/15.0)*255)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 8) >> 12)/15.0)*255)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 12) >> 12)/15.0)*255)));
}
}
else
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
SkipRGBMipmaps(image, dds_info, 4);
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static MagickBooleanType ReadUncompressedRGBA(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
alphaBits,
x,
y;
unsigned short
color;
alphaBits=0;
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 16)
{
if (IsBitMask(dds_info->pixelformat,0x7c00,0x03e0,0x001f,0x8000))
alphaBits=1;
else if (IsBitMask(dds_info->pixelformat,0x00ff,0x00ff,0x00ff,0xff00))
{
alphaBits=2;
(void) SetImageType(image,GrayscaleMatteType);
}
else if (IsBitMask(dds_info->pixelformat,0x0f00,0x00f0,0x000f,0xf000))
alphaBits=4;
else
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImageTypeNotSupported",
image->filename);
}
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y++)
{
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, 0, y, dds_info->width, 1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x++)
{
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 16)
{
color=ReadBlobShort(image);
if (alphaBits == 1)
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,(color & (1 << 15)) ? QuantumRange : 0);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 1) >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 6) >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 11) >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
}
else if (alphaBits == 2)
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(color >> 8)));
SetPixelGray(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)color));
}
else
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(((color >> 12)/15.0)*255)));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 4) >> 12)/15.0)*255)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 8) >> 12)/15.0)*255)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 12) >> 12)/15.0)*255)));
}
}
else
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
return(SkipRGBMipmaps(image,dds_info,4,exception));
}
| 168,903
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptor previous_input_method() const {
return previous_input_method_;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
virtual InputMethodDescriptor previous_input_method() const {
virtual input_method::InputMethodDescriptor previous_input_method() const {
return previous_input_method_;
}
| 170,515
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: lockd(void *vrqstp)
{
int err = 0;
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = vrqstp;
/* try_to_freeze() is called from svc_recv() */
set_freezable();
/* Allow SIGKILL to tell lockd to drop all of its locks */
allow_signal(SIGKILL);
dprintk("NFS locking service started (ver " LOCKD_VERSION ").\n");
/*
* The main request loop. We don't terminate until the last
* NFS mount or NFS daemon has gone away.
*/
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
long timeout = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
RPC_IFDEBUG(char buf[RPC_MAX_ADDRBUFLEN]);
/* update sv_maxconn if it has changed */
rqstp->rq_server->sv_maxconn = nlm_max_connections;
if (signalled()) {
flush_signals(current);
restart_grace();
continue;
}
timeout = nlmsvc_retry_blocked();
/*
* Find a socket with data available and call its
* recvfrom routine.
*/
err = svc_recv(rqstp, timeout);
if (err == -EAGAIN || err == -EINTR)
continue;
dprintk("lockd: request from %s\n",
svc_print_addr(rqstp, buf, sizeof(buf)));
svc_process(rqstp);
}
flush_signals(current);
if (nlmsvc_ops)
nlmsvc_invalidate_all();
nlm_shutdown_hosts();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
lockd(void *vrqstp)
{
int err = 0;
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = vrqstp;
struct net *net = &init_net;
struct lockd_net *ln = net_generic(net, lockd_net_id);
/* try_to_freeze() is called from svc_recv() */
set_freezable();
/* Allow SIGKILL to tell lockd to drop all of its locks */
allow_signal(SIGKILL);
dprintk("NFS locking service started (ver " LOCKD_VERSION ").\n");
/*
* The main request loop. We don't terminate until the last
* NFS mount or NFS daemon has gone away.
*/
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
long timeout = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
RPC_IFDEBUG(char buf[RPC_MAX_ADDRBUFLEN]);
/* update sv_maxconn if it has changed */
rqstp->rq_server->sv_maxconn = nlm_max_connections;
if (signalled()) {
flush_signals(current);
restart_grace();
continue;
}
timeout = nlmsvc_retry_blocked();
/*
* Find a socket with data available and call its
* recvfrom routine.
*/
err = svc_recv(rqstp, timeout);
if (err == -EAGAIN || err == -EINTR)
continue;
dprintk("lockd: request from %s\n",
svc_print_addr(rqstp, buf, sizeof(buf)));
svc_process(rqstp);
}
flush_signals(current);
if (nlmsvc_ops)
nlmsvc_invalidate_all();
nlm_shutdown_hosts();
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ln->grace_period_end);
locks_end_grace(&ln->lockd_manager);
return 0;
}
| 168,134
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::RegisterForDevicePolicy(
const std::string& token,
policy::BrowserPolicyConnector::TokenType token_type) {
policy::BrowserPolicyConnector* connector =
g_browser_process->browser_policy_connector();
if (!connector->device_cloud_policy_subsystem()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Cloud policy subsystem not initialized.";
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentOtherFailed,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
if (is_showing_)
actor_->ShowFatalEnrollmentError();
return;
}
connector->ScheduleServiceInitialization(0);
registrar_.reset(new policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::ObserverRegistrar(
connector->device_cloud_policy_subsystem(), this));
connector->SetDeviceCredentials(user_, token, token_type);
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::RegisterForDevicePolicy(
const std::string& token,
policy::BrowserPolicyConnector::TokenType token_type) {
policy::BrowserPolicyConnector* connector =
g_browser_process->browser_policy_connector();
if (!connector->device_cloud_policy_subsystem()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Cloud policy subsystem not initialized.";
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentOtherFailed,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
if (is_showing_)
actor_->ShowFatalEnrollmentError();
return;
}
connector->ScheduleServiceInitialization(0);
registrar_.reset(new policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::ObserverRegistrar(
connector->device_cloud_policy_subsystem(), this));
connector->RegisterForDevicePolicy(user_, token, token_type);
}
| 170,278
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: char *curl_easy_unescape(CURL *handle, const char *string, int length,
int *olen)
{
int alloc = (length?length:(int)strlen(string))+1;
char *ns = malloc(alloc);
unsigned char in;
int strindex=0;
unsigned long hex;
CURLcode res;
if(!ns)
return NULL;
while(--alloc > 0) {
in = *string;
if(('%' == in) && ISXDIGIT(string[1]) && ISXDIGIT(string[2])) {
/* this is two hexadecimal digits following a '%' */
char hexstr[3];
char *ptr;
hexstr[0] = string[1];
hexstr[1] = string[2];
hexstr[2] = 0;
hex = strtoul(hexstr, &ptr, 16);
in = curlx_ultouc(hex); /* this long is never bigger than 255 anyway */
res = Curl_convert_from_network(handle, &in, 1);
if(res) {
/* Curl_convert_from_network calls failf if unsuccessful */
free(ns);
return NULL;
}
string+=2;
alloc-=2;
}
ns[strindex++] = in;
string++;
}
ns[strindex]=0; /* terminate it */
if(olen)
/* store output size */
*olen = strindex;
return ns;
}
Commit Message: URL sanitize: reject URLs containing bad data
Protocols (IMAP, POP3 and SMTP) that use the path part of a URL in a
decoded manner now use the new Curl_urldecode() function to reject URLs
with embedded control codes (anything that is or decodes to a byte value
less than 32).
URLs containing such codes could easily otherwise be used to do harm and
allow users to do unintended actions with otherwise innocent tools and
applications. Like for example using a URL like
pop3://pop3.example.com/1%0d%0aDELE%201 when the app wants a URL to get
a mail and instead this would delete one.
This flaw is considered a security vulnerability: CVE-2012-0036
Security advisory at: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20120124.html
Reported by: Dan Fandrich
CWE ID: CWE-89
|
char *curl_easy_unescape(CURL *handle, const char *string, int length,
CURLcode Curl_urldecode(struct SessionHandle *data,
const char *string, size_t length,
char **ostring, size_t *olen,
bool reject_ctrl)
{
size_t alloc = (length?length:strlen(string))+1;
char *ns = malloc(alloc);
unsigned char in;
size_t strindex=0;
unsigned long hex;
CURLcode res;
if(!ns)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
while(--alloc > 0) {
in = *string;
if(('%' == in) && ISXDIGIT(string[1]) && ISXDIGIT(string[2])) {
/* this is two hexadecimal digits following a '%' */
char hexstr[3];
char *ptr;
hexstr[0] = string[1];
hexstr[1] = string[2];
hexstr[2] = 0;
hex = strtoul(hexstr, &ptr, 16);
in = curlx_ultouc(hex); /* this long is never bigger than 255 anyway */
res = Curl_convert_from_network(data, &in, 1);
if(res) {
/* Curl_convert_from_network calls failf if unsuccessful */
free(ns);
return res;
}
string+=2;
alloc-=2;
}
if(reject_ctrl && (in < 0x20)) {
free(ns);
return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT;
}
ns[strindex++] = in;
string++;
}
ns[strindex]=0; /* terminate it */
if(olen)
/* store output size */
*olen = strindex;
if(ostring)
/* store output string */
*ostring = ns;
return CURLE_OK;
}
/*
* Unescapes the given URL escaped string of given length. Returns a
* pointer to a malloced string with length given in *olen.
* If length == 0, the length is assumed to be strlen(string).
* If olen == NULL, no output length is stored.
*/
char *curl_easy_unescape(CURL *handle, const char *string, int length,
int *olen)
{
char *str = NULL;
size_t inputlen = length;
size_t outputlen;
CURLcode res = Curl_urldecode(handle, string, inputlen, &str, &outputlen,
FALSE);
if(res)
return NULL;
if(olen)
*olen = curlx_uztosi(outputlen);
return str;
}
| 165,665
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::didCommitProvisionalLoad(WebFrame* frame,
bool is_new_navigation) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->dataSource());
NavigationState* navigation_state = document_state->navigation_state();
if (document_state->commit_load_time().is_null())
document_state->set_commit_load_time(Time::Now());
if (is_new_navigation) {
UpdateSessionHistory(frame);
page_id_ = next_page_id_++;
if (GetLoadingUrl(frame) != GURL("about:swappedout")) {
history_list_offset_++;
if (history_list_offset_ >= content::kMaxSessionHistoryEntries)
history_list_offset_ = content::kMaxSessionHistoryEntries - 1;
history_list_length_ = history_list_offset_ + 1;
history_page_ids_.resize(history_list_length_, -1);
history_page_ids_[history_list_offset_] = page_id_;
}
} else {
if (navigation_state->pending_page_id() != -1 &&
navigation_state->pending_page_id() != page_id_ &&
!navigation_state->request_committed()) {
UpdateSessionHistory(frame);
page_id_ = navigation_state->pending_page_id();
history_list_offset_ = navigation_state->pending_history_list_offset();
DCHECK(history_list_length_ <= 0 ||
history_list_offset_ < 0 ||
history_list_offset_ >= history_list_length_ ||
history_page_ids_[history_list_offset_] == page_id_);
}
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_,
DidCommitProvisionalLoad(frame, is_new_navigation));
navigation_state->set_request_committed(true);
UpdateURL(frame);
completed_client_redirect_src_ = Referrer();
UpdateEncoding(frame, frame->view()->pageEncoding().utf8());
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void RenderViewImpl::didCommitProvisionalLoad(WebFrame* frame,
bool is_new_navigation) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->dataSource());
NavigationState* navigation_state = document_state->navigation_state();
if (document_state->commit_load_time().is_null())
document_state->set_commit_load_time(Time::Now());
if (is_new_navigation) {
UpdateSessionHistory(frame);
page_id_ = next_page_id_++;
// Don't update history_page_ids_ (etc) for chrome::kSwappedOutURL, since
// we don't want to forget the entry that was there, and since we will
// never come back to chrome::kSwappedOutURL. Note that we have to call
if (GetLoadingUrl(frame) != GURL(chrome::kSwappedOutURL)) {
history_list_offset_++;
if (history_list_offset_ >= content::kMaxSessionHistoryEntries)
history_list_offset_ = content::kMaxSessionHistoryEntries - 1;
history_list_length_ = history_list_offset_ + 1;
history_page_ids_.resize(history_list_length_, -1);
history_page_ids_[history_list_offset_] = page_id_;
}
} else {
if (navigation_state->pending_page_id() != -1 &&
navigation_state->pending_page_id() != page_id_ &&
!navigation_state->request_committed()) {
UpdateSessionHistory(frame);
page_id_ = navigation_state->pending_page_id();
history_list_offset_ = navigation_state->pending_history_list_offset();
DCHECK(history_list_length_ <= 0 ||
history_list_offset_ < 0 ||
history_list_offset_ >= history_list_length_ ||
history_page_ids_[history_list_offset_] == page_id_);
}
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_,
DidCommitProvisionalLoad(frame, is_new_navigation));
navigation_state->set_request_committed(true);
UpdateURL(frame);
completed_client_redirect_src_ = Referrer();
UpdateEncoding(frame, frame->view()->pageEncoding().utf8());
}
| 171,033
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WT_Interpolate (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
const EAS_SAMPLE *loopEnd;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
loopEnd = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
/*lint -e{713} truncation is OK */
phaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* check for loop end */
acc0 = (EAS_I32) (pSamples - loopEnd);
if (acc0 >= 0)
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopStart + acc0;
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void WT_Interpolate (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
const EAS_SAMPLE *loopEnd;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
loopEnd = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
/*lint -e{713} truncation is OK */
phaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* check for loop end */
acc0 = (EAS_I32) (pSamples - loopEnd);
if (acc0 >= 0)
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopStart + acc0;
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
| 174,601
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void usage(char *progname) {
printf("Usage:\n");
printf("%s <input_yuv> <width>x<height> <target_width>x<target_height> ",
progname);
printf("<output_yuv> [<frames>]\n");
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void usage(char *progname) {
static const char *exec_name = NULL;
static void usage() {
printf("Usage:\n");
printf("%s <input_yuv> <width>x<height> <target_width>x<target_height> ",
exec_name);
printf("<output_yuv> [<frames>]\n");
}
| 174,480
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ssize_t NuPlayer::NuPlayerStreamListener::read(
void *data, size_t size, sp<AMessage> *extra) {
CHECK_GT(size, 0u);
extra->clear();
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (mEOS) {
return 0;
}
if (mQueue.empty()) {
mSendDataNotification = true;
return -EWOULDBLOCK;
}
QueueEntry *entry = &*mQueue.begin();
if (entry->mIsCommand) {
switch (entry->mCommand) {
case EOS:
{
mQueue.erase(mQueue.begin());
entry = NULL;
mEOS = true;
return 0;
}
case DISCONTINUITY:
{
*extra = entry->mExtra;
mQueue.erase(mQueue.begin());
entry = NULL;
return INFO_DISCONTINUITY;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
break;
}
}
size_t copy = entry->mSize;
if (copy > size) {
copy = size;
}
memcpy(data,
(const uint8_t *)mBuffers.editItemAt(entry->mIndex)->pointer()
+ entry->mOffset,
copy);
entry->mOffset += copy;
entry->mSize -= copy;
if (entry->mSize == 0) {
mSource->onBufferAvailable(entry->mIndex);
mQueue.erase(mQueue.begin());
entry = NULL;
}
return copy;
}
Commit Message: NuPlayerStreamListener: NULL and bounds check before memcpy
Bug: 27533704
Change-Id: I992a7709b92b1cbc3114c97bec48a3fc5b22ba6e
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
ssize_t NuPlayer::NuPlayerStreamListener::read(
void *data, size_t size, sp<AMessage> *extra) {
CHECK_GT(size, 0u);
extra->clear();
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (mEOS) {
return 0;
}
if (mQueue.empty()) {
mSendDataNotification = true;
return -EWOULDBLOCK;
}
QueueEntry *entry = &*mQueue.begin();
if (entry->mIsCommand) {
switch (entry->mCommand) {
case EOS:
{
mQueue.erase(mQueue.begin());
entry = NULL;
mEOS = true;
return 0;
}
case DISCONTINUITY:
{
*extra = entry->mExtra;
mQueue.erase(mQueue.begin());
entry = NULL;
return INFO_DISCONTINUITY;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
break;
}
}
size_t copy = entry->mSize;
if (copy > size) {
copy = size;
}
if (entry->mIndex >= mBuffers.size()) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
sp<IMemory> mem = mBuffers.editItemAt(entry->mIndex);
if (mem == NULL || mem->size() < copy || mem->size() - copy < entry->mOffset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memcpy(data,
(const uint8_t *)mem->pointer()
+ entry->mOffset,
copy);
entry->mOffset += copy;
entry->mSize -= copy;
if (entry->mSize == 0) {
mSource->onBufferAvailable(entry->mIndex);
mQueue.erase(mQueue.begin());
entry = NULL;
}
return copy;
}
| 173,884
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouter::OnDangerousDeepScanningResult(
const GURL& url,
const std::string& file_name,
const std::string& download_digest_sha256) {
if (client_) {
base::Value event(base::Value::Type::DICTIONARY);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyUrl, url.spec());
event.SetStringKey(kKeyFileName, file_name);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyDownloadDigestSha256, download_digest_sha256);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyProfileUserName, GetProfileUserName());
ReportRealtimeEvent(kKeyDangerousDownloadEvent, std::move(event));
}
}
Commit Message: Add reporting for DLP deep scanning
For each triggered rule in the DLP response, we report the download as
violating that rule.
This also implements the UnsafeReportingEnabled enterprise policy, which
controls whether or not we do any reporting.
Bug: 980777
Change-Id: I48100cfb4dd5aa92ed80da1f34e64a6e393be2fa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1772381
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691371}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouter::OnDangerousDeepScanningResult(
const GURL& url,
const std::string& file_name,
const std::string& download_digest_sha256) {
if (client_) {
// Create a real-time event dictionary from the arguments and report it.
base::Value event(base::Value::Type::DICTIONARY);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyUrl, url.spec());
event.SetStringKey(kKeyFileName, file_name);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyDownloadDigestSha256, download_digest_sha256);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyProfileUserName, GetProfileUserName());
ReportRealtimeEvent(kKeyDangerousDownloadEvent, std::move(event));
}
}
| 172,412
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: swabHorAcc32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong(wp, wc);
horAcc32(tif, cp0, cc);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
swabHorAcc32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong(wp, wc);
return horAcc32(tif, cp0, cc);
}
| 166,889
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
OPJ_UINT32 index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1u << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1u << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : opj_uint_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : opj_uint_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dy - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dy))) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dx - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dx))) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < opj_uint_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 levelno;
OPJ_INT32 trx0, try0;
OPJ_INT32 trx1, try1;
OPJ_UINT32 rpx, rpy;
OPJ_INT32 prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
trx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->x,
(OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(trx0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx);
prcj = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->y,
(OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(try0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy);
pi->precno = (OPJ_UINT32)(prci + prcj * (OPJ_INT32)res->pw);
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Avoid division by zero in opj_pi_next_rpcl, opj_pi_next_pcrl and opj_pi_next_cprl (#938)
Fixes issues with id:000026,sig:08,src:002419,op:int32,pos:60,val:+32 and
id:000019,sig:08,src:001098,op:flip1,pos:49
CWE ID: CWE-369
|
static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
OPJ_UINT32 index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1u << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1u << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : opj_uint_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : opj_uint_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dy - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dy))) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dx - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dx))) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < opj_uint_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 levelno;
OPJ_INT32 trx0, try0;
OPJ_INT32 trx1, try1;
OPJ_UINT32 rpx, rpy;
OPJ_INT32 prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
trx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
/* in below tests */
/* Relates to id:000019,sig:08,src:001098,op:flip1,pos:49 */
/* of https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/938 */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
/* See ISO-15441. B.12.1.4 Position-component-resolution level-layer progression */
if (!((pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->x,
(OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(trx0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx);
prcj = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->y,
(OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(try0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy);
pi->precno = (OPJ_UINT32)(prci + prcj * (OPJ_INT32)res->pw);
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 168,456
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, set_cpu_used_);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ENABLEAUTOALTREF, 1);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_MAXFRAMES, 7);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_STRENGTH, 5);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_TYPE, 3);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, set_cpu_used_);
if (encoding_mode_ != ::libvpx_test::kRealTime) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ENABLEAUTOALTREF, 1);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_MAXFRAMES, 7);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_STRENGTH, 5);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_TYPE, 3);
}
}
}
| 174,513
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: fgetwln(FILE *stream, size_t *lenp)
{
struct filewbuf *fb;
wint_t wc;
size_t wused = 0;
/* Try to diminish the possibility of several fgetwln() calls being
* used on different streams, by using a pool of buffers per file. */
fb = &fb_pool[fb_pool_cur];
if (fb->fp != stream && fb->fp != NULL) {
fb_pool_cur++;
fb_pool_cur %= FILEWBUF_POOL_ITEMS;
fb = &fb_pool[fb_pool_cur];
}
fb->fp = stream;
while ((wc = fgetwc(stream)) != WEOF) {
if (!fb->len || wused > fb->len) {
wchar_t *wp;
if (fb->len)
fb->len *= 2;
else
fb->len = FILEWBUF_INIT_LEN;
wp = reallocarray(fb->wbuf, fb->len, sizeof(wchar_t));
if (wp == NULL) {
wused = 0;
break;
}
fb->wbuf = wp;
}
fb->wbuf[wused++] = wc;
if (wc == L'\n')
break;
}
*lenp = wused;
return wused ? fb->wbuf : NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
fgetwln(FILE *stream, size_t *lenp)
{
struct filewbuf *fb;
wint_t wc;
size_t wused = 0;
/* Try to diminish the possibility of several fgetwln() calls being
* used on different streams, by using a pool of buffers per file. */
fb = &fb_pool[fb_pool_cur];
if (fb->fp != stream && fb->fp != NULL) {
fb_pool_cur++;
fb_pool_cur %= FILEWBUF_POOL_ITEMS;
fb = &fb_pool[fb_pool_cur];
}
fb->fp = stream;
while ((wc = fgetwc(stream)) != WEOF) {
if (!fb->len || wused >= fb->len) {
wchar_t *wp;
if (fb->len)
fb->len *= 2;
else
fb->len = FILEWBUF_INIT_LEN;
wp = reallocarray(fb->wbuf, fb->len, sizeof(wchar_t));
if (wp == NULL) {
wused = 0;
break;
}
fb->wbuf = wp;
}
fb->wbuf[wused++] = wc;
if (wc == L'\n')
break;
}
*lenp = wused;
return wused ? fb->wbuf : NULL;
}
| 165,350
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static u32 __ipv6_select_ident(struct net *net, u32 hashrnd,
const struct in6_addr *dst,
const struct in6_addr *src)
{
u32 hash, id;
hash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(dst, hashrnd);
hash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(src, hash);
hash ^= net_hash_mix(net);
/* Treat id of 0 as unset and if we get 0 back from ip_idents_reserve,
* set the hight order instead thus minimizing possible future
* collisions.
*/
id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, 1);
if (unlikely(!id))
id = 1 << 31;
return id;
}
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static u32 __ipv6_select_ident(struct net *net, u32 hashrnd,
static u32 __ipv6_select_ident(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *dst,
const struct in6_addr *src)
{
const struct {
struct in6_addr dst;
struct in6_addr src;
} __aligned(SIPHASH_ALIGNMENT) combined = {
.dst = *dst,
.src = *src,
};
u32 hash, id;
/* Note the following code is not safe, but this is okay. */
if (unlikely(siphash_key_is_zero(&net->ipv4.ip_id_key)))
get_random_bytes(&net->ipv4.ip_id_key,
sizeof(net->ipv4.ip_id_key));
hash = siphash(&combined, sizeof(combined), &net->ipv4.ip_id_key);
/* Treat id of 0 as unset and if we get 0 back from ip_idents_reserve,
* set the hight order instead thus minimizing possible future
* collisions.
*/
id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, 1);
if (unlikely(!id))
id = 1 << 31;
return id;
}
| 169,717
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: print_bacp_config_options(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
int len, opt;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
len = p[1];
opt = p[0];
if (length < len)
return 0;
if (len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u (length bogus, should be >= 2)",
tok2str(bacconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
opt,
len));
return 0;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u",
tok2str(bacconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
opt,
len));
switch (opt) {
case BACPOPT_FPEER:
if (len != 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be = 6)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Magic-Num 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(p + 2)));
break;
default:
/*
* Unknown option; dump it as raw bytes now if we're
* not going to do so below.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2); /* exclude TLV header */
return len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|bacp]"));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13029/PPP: Fix a bounds check, and clean up other bounds checks.
For configuration protocol options, use ND_TCHECK() and
ND_TCHECK_nBITS() macros, passing them the appropriate pointer argument.
This fixes one case where the ND_TCHECK2() call they replace was not
checking enough bytes.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
print_bacp_config_options(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
int len, opt;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
len = p[1];
opt = p[0];
if (length < len)
return 0;
if (len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u (length bogus, should be >= 2)",
tok2str(bacconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
opt,
len));
return 0;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u",
tok2str(bacconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
opt,
len));
switch (opt) {
case BACPOPT_FPEER:
if (len != 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be = 6)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(p + 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Magic-Num 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(p + 2)));
break;
default:
/*
* Unknown option; dump it as raw bytes now if we're
* not going to do so below.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2); /* exclude TLV header */
return len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|bacp]"));
return 0;
}
| 167,859
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static const char *parse_string(cJSON *item,const char *str,const char **ep)
{
const char *ptr=str+1,*end_ptr=str+1;char *ptr2;char *out;int len=0;unsigned uc,uc2;
if (*str!='\"') {*ep=str;return 0;} /* not a string! */
while (*end_ptr!='\"' && *end_ptr && ++len) if (*end_ptr++ == '\\') end_ptr++; /* Skip escaped quotes. */
out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(len+1); /* This is how long we need for the string, roughly. */
if (!out) return 0;
item->valuestring=out; /* assign here so out will be deleted during cJSON_Delete() later */
item->type=cJSON_String;
ptr=str+1;ptr2=out;
while (ptr < end_ptr)
{
if (*ptr!='\\') *ptr2++=*ptr++;
else
{
ptr++;
switch (*ptr)
{
case 'b': *ptr2++='\b'; break;
case 'f': *ptr2++='\f'; break;
case 'n': *ptr2++='\n'; break;
case 'r': *ptr2++='\r'; break;
case 't': *ptr2++='\t'; break;
case 'u': /* transcode utf16 to utf8. */
uc=parse_hex4(ptr+1);ptr+=4; /* get the unicode char. */
if (ptr >= end_ptr) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid */
if ((uc>=0xDC00 && uc<=0xDFFF) || uc==0) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* check for invalid. */
if (uc>=0xD800 && uc<=0xDBFF) /* UTF16 surrogate pairs. */
{
if (ptr+6 > end_ptr) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid */
if (ptr[1]!='\\' || ptr[2]!='u') {*ep=str;return 0;} /* missing second-half of surrogate. */
uc2=parse_hex4(ptr+3);ptr+=6;
if (uc2<0xDC00 || uc2>0xDFFF) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid second-half of surrogate. */
uc=0x10000 + (((uc&0x3FF)<<10) | (uc2&0x3FF));
}
len=4;if (uc<0x80) len=1;else if (uc<0x800) len=2;else if (uc<0x10000) len=3; ptr2+=len;
switch (len) {
case 4: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 3: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 2: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 1: *--ptr2 =(uc | firstByteMark[len]);
}
ptr2+=len;
break;
default: *ptr2++=*ptr; break;
}
ptr++;
}
}
*ptr2=0;
if (*ptr=='\"') ptr++;
return ptr;
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static const char *parse_string(cJSON *item,const char *str,const char **ep)
{
const char *ptr=str+1,*end_ptr=str+1;char *ptr2;char *out;int len=0;unsigned uc,uc2;
if (*str!='\"') {*ep=str;return 0;} /* not a string! */
while (*end_ptr!='\"' && *end_ptr && ++len)
{
if (*end_ptr++ == '\\')
{
if (*end_ptr == '\0')
{
/* prevent buffer overflow when last input character is a backslash */
return 0;
}
end_ptr++; /* Skip escaped quotes. */
}
}
out=(char*)cJSON_malloc(len+1); /* This is how long we need for the string, roughly. */
if (!out) return 0;
item->valuestring=out; /* assign here so out will be deleted during cJSON_Delete() later */
item->type=cJSON_String;
ptr=str+1;ptr2=out;
while (ptr < end_ptr)
{
if (*ptr!='\\') *ptr2++=*ptr++;
else
{
ptr++;
switch (*ptr)
{
case 'b': *ptr2++='\b'; break;
case 'f': *ptr2++='\f'; break;
case 'n': *ptr2++='\n'; break;
case 'r': *ptr2++='\r'; break;
case 't': *ptr2++='\t'; break;
case 'u': /* transcode utf16 to utf8. */
uc=parse_hex4(ptr+1);ptr+=4; /* get the unicode char. */
if (ptr >= end_ptr) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid */
if ((uc>=0xDC00 && uc<=0xDFFF) || uc==0) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* check for invalid. */
if (uc>=0xD800 && uc<=0xDBFF) /* UTF16 surrogate pairs. */
{
if (ptr+6 > end_ptr) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid */
if (ptr[1]!='\\' || ptr[2]!='u') {*ep=str;return 0;} /* missing second-half of surrogate. */
uc2=parse_hex4(ptr+3);ptr+=6;
if (uc2<0xDC00 || uc2>0xDFFF) {*ep=str;return 0;} /* invalid second-half of surrogate. */
uc=0x10000 + (((uc&0x3FF)<<10) | (uc2&0x3FF));
}
len=4;if (uc<0x80) len=1;else if (uc<0x800) len=2;else if (uc<0x10000) len=3; ptr2+=len;
switch (len) {
case 4: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 3: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 2: *--ptr2 =((uc | 0x80) & 0xBF); uc >>= 6;
case 1: *--ptr2 =(uc | firstByteMark[len]);
}
ptr2+=len;
break;
default: *ptr2++=*ptr; break;
}
ptr++;
}
}
*ptr2=0;
if (*ptr=='\"') ptr++;
return ptr;
}
| 169,862
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void Sp_replace_regexp(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *source, *s, *r;
js_Buffer *sb = NULL;
int n, x;
Resub m;
source = checkstring(J, 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, 1);
if (js_regexec(re->prog, source, &m, 0)) {
js_copy(J, 0);
return;
}
re->last = 0;
loop:
s = m.sub[0].sp;
n = m.sub[0].ep - m.sub[0].sp;
if (js_iscallable(J, 2)) {
js_copy(J, 2);
js_pushundefined(J);
for (x = 0; m.sub[x].sp; ++x) /* arg 0..x: substring and subexps that matched */
js_pushlstring(J, m.sub[x].sp, m.sub[x].ep - m.sub[x].sp);
js_pushnumber(J, s - source); /* arg x+2: offset within search string */
js_copy(J, 0); /* arg x+3: search string */
js_call(J, 2 + x);
r = js_tostring(J, -1);
js_putm(J, &sb, source, s);
js_puts(J, &sb, r);
js_pop(J, 1);
} else {
r = js_tostring(J, 2);
js_putm(J, &sb, source, s);
while (*r) {
if (*r == '$') {
switch (*(++r)) {
case 0: --r; /* end of string; back up */
/* fallthrough */
case '$': js_putc(J, &sb, '$'); break;
case '`': js_putm(J, &sb, source, s); break;
case '\'': js_puts(J, &sb, s + n); break;
case '&':
js_putm(J, &sb, s, s + n);
break;
case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3': case '4':
case '5': case '6': case '7': case '8': case '9':
x = *r - '0';
if (r[1] >= '0' && r[1] <= '9')
x = x * 10 + *(++r) - '0';
if (x > 0 && x < m.nsub) {
js_putm(J, &sb, m.sub[x].sp, m.sub[x].ep);
} else {
js_putc(J, &sb, '$');
if (x > 10) {
js_putc(J, &sb, '0' + x / 10);
js_putc(J, &sb, '0' + x % 10);
} else {
js_putc(J, &sb, '0' + x);
}
}
break;
default:
js_putc(J, &sb, '$');
js_putc(J, &sb, *r);
break;
}
++r;
} else {
js_putc(J, &sb, *r++);
}
}
}
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G) {
source = m.sub[0].ep;
if (n == 0) {
if (*source)
js_putc(J, &sb, *source++);
else
goto end;
}
if (!js_regexec(re->prog, source, &m, REG_NOTBOL))
goto loop;
}
end:
js_puts(J, &sb, s + n);
js_putc(J, &sb, 0);
if (js_try(J)) {
js_free(J, sb);
js_throw(J);
}
js_pushstring(J, sb ? sb->s : "");
js_endtry(J);
js_free(J, sb);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400
|
static void Sp_replace_regexp(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *source, *s, *r;
js_Buffer *sb = NULL;
int n, x;
Resub m;
source = checkstring(J, 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, 1);
if (js_doregexec(J, re->prog, source, &m, 0)) {
js_copy(J, 0);
return;
}
re->last = 0;
loop:
s = m.sub[0].sp;
n = m.sub[0].ep - m.sub[0].sp;
if (js_iscallable(J, 2)) {
js_copy(J, 2);
js_pushundefined(J);
for (x = 0; m.sub[x].sp; ++x) /* arg 0..x: substring and subexps that matched */
js_pushlstring(J, m.sub[x].sp, m.sub[x].ep - m.sub[x].sp);
js_pushnumber(J, s - source); /* arg x+2: offset within search string */
js_copy(J, 0); /* arg x+3: search string */
js_call(J, 2 + x);
r = js_tostring(J, -1);
js_putm(J, &sb, source, s);
js_puts(J, &sb, r);
js_pop(J, 1);
} else {
r = js_tostring(J, 2);
js_putm(J, &sb, source, s);
while (*r) {
if (*r == '$') {
switch (*(++r)) {
case 0: --r; /* end of string; back up */
/* fallthrough */
case '$': js_putc(J, &sb, '$'); break;
case '`': js_putm(J, &sb, source, s); break;
case '\'': js_puts(J, &sb, s + n); break;
case '&':
js_putm(J, &sb, s, s + n);
break;
case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3': case '4':
case '5': case '6': case '7': case '8': case '9':
x = *r - '0';
if (r[1] >= '0' && r[1] <= '9')
x = x * 10 + *(++r) - '0';
if (x > 0 && x < m.nsub) {
js_putm(J, &sb, m.sub[x].sp, m.sub[x].ep);
} else {
js_putc(J, &sb, '$');
if (x > 10) {
js_putc(J, &sb, '0' + x / 10);
js_putc(J, &sb, '0' + x % 10);
} else {
js_putc(J, &sb, '0' + x);
}
}
break;
default:
js_putc(J, &sb, '$');
js_putc(J, &sb, *r);
break;
}
++r;
} else {
js_putc(J, &sb, *r++);
}
}
}
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G) {
source = m.sub[0].ep;
if (n == 0) {
if (*source)
js_putc(J, &sb, *source++);
else
goto end;
}
if (!js_doregexec(J, re->prog, source, &m, REG_NOTBOL))
goto loop;
}
end:
js_puts(J, &sb, s + n);
js_putc(J, &sb, 0);
if (js_try(J)) {
js_free(J, sb);
js_throw(J);
}
js_pushstring(J, sb ? sb->s : "");
js_endtry(J);
js_free(J, sb);
}
| 169,699
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
const char *section_name = "";
const char *link_section_name = "";
char *end = NULL;
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
ut8 dfs[sizeof (Elf_(Verdef))] = {0};
Sdb *sdb;
int cnt, i;
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return false;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if (shdr->sh_size < 1) {
return false;
}
Elf_(Verdef) *defs = calloc (shdr->sh_size, sizeof (char));
if (!defs) {
return false;
}
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (link_shdr && bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!defs) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory (Check Elf_(Verdef))\n");
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
end = (char *)defs + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
for (cnt = 0, i = 0; cnt < shdr->sh_info && ((char *)defs + i < end); ++cnt) {
Sdb *sdb_verdef = sdb_new0 ();
char *vstart = ((char*)defs) + i;
char key[32] = {0};
Elf_(Verdef) *verdef = (Elf_(Verdef)*)vstart;
Elf_(Verdaux) aux = {0};
int j = 0;
int isum = 0;
r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset + i, dfs, sizeof (Elf_(Verdef)));
verdef->vd_version = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_flags = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_ndx = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_cnt = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_hash = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_aux = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_next = READ32 (dfs, j)
vstart += verdef->vd_aux;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
j = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, j)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
isum = i + verdef->vd_aux;
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "idx", i, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_version", verdef->vd_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_ndx", verdef->vd_ndx, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_cnt", verdef->vd_cnt, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "flags", get_ver_flags (verdef->vd_flags), 0);
for (j = 1; j < verdef->vd_cnt; ++j) {
int k;
Sdb *sdb_parent = sdb_new0 ();
isum += aux.vda_next;
vstart += aux.vda_next;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof(Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
k = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "idx", isum, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "parent", j, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_parent, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "parent%d", j - 1);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_verdef, key, sdb_parent);
}
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "verdef%d", cnt);
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_verdef);
if (!verdef->vd_next) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
i += verdef->vd_next;
}
free (defs);
return sdb;
out_error:
free (defs);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8685 - Crash in ELF version parsing
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
const char *section_name = "";
const char *link_section_name = "";
char *end = NULL;
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
ut8 dfs[sizeof (Elf_(Verdef))] = {0};
Sdb *sdb;
int cnt, i;
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return false;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if (shdr->sh_size < 1) {
return false;
}
Elf_(Verdef) *defs = calloc (shdr->sh_size, sizeof (char));
if (!defs) {
return false;
}
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (link_shdr && bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!defs) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory (Check Elf_(Verdef))\n");
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
end = (char *)defs + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
for (cnt = 0, i = 0; i >= 0 && cnt < shdr->sh_info && ((char *)defs + i < end); ++cnt) {
Sdb *sdb_verdef = sdb_new0 ();
char *vstart = ((char*)defs) + i;
char key[32] = {0};
Elf_(Verdef) *verdef = (Elf_(Verdef)*)vstart;
Elf_(Verdaux) aux = {0};
int j = 0;
int isum = 0;
r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset + i, dfs, sizeof (Elf_(Verdef)));
verdef->vd_version = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_flags = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_ndx = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_cnt = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_hash = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_aux = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_next = READ32 (dfs, j)
vstart += verdef->vd_aux;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
j = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, j)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
isum = i + verdef->vd_aux;
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "idx", i, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_version", verdef->vd_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_ndx", verdef->vd_ndx, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_cnt", verdef->vd_cnt, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "flags", get_ver_flags (verdef->vd_flags), 0);
for (j = 1; j < verdef->vd_cnt; ++j) {
int k;
Sdb *sdb_parent = sdb_new0 ();
isum += aux.vda_next;
vstart += aux.vda_next;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof(Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
k = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "idx", isum, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "parent", j, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_parent, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "parent%d", j - 1);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_verdef, key, sdb_parent);
}
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "verdef%d", cnt);
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_verdef);
if (!verdef->vd_next) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
if ((st32)verdef->vd_next < 1) {
eprintf ("Warning: Invalid vd_next in the ELF version\n");
break;
}
i += verdef->vd_next;
}
free (defs);
return sdb;
out_error:
free (defs);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
| 167,720
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: pcf_read_TOC( FT_Stream stream,
PCF_Face face )
{
FT_Error error;
PCF_Toc toc = &face->toc;
PCF_Table tables;
FT_Memory memory = FT_FACE( face )->memory;
FT_UInt n;
if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK ( 0 ) ||
FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS ( pcf_toc_header, toc ) )
return FT_THROW( Cannot_Open_Resource );
if ( toc->version != PCF_FILE_VERSION ||
toc->count > FT_ARRAY_MAX( face->toc.tables ) ||
toc->count == 0 )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( face->toc.tables, toc->count ) )
return FT_THROW( Out_Of_Memory );
tables = face->toc.tables;
for ( n = 0; n < toc->count; n++ )
{
if ( FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS( pcf_table_header, tables ) )
goto Exit;
tables++;
}
/* Sort tables and check for overlaps. Because they are almost */
/* always ordered already, an in-place bubble sort with simultaneous */
/* boundary checking seems appropriate. */
tables = face->toc.tables;
for ( n = 0; n < toc->count - 1; n++ )
{
FT_UInt i, have_change;
have_change = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < toc->count - 1 - n; i++ )
{
PCF_TableRec tmp;
if ( tables[i].offset > tables[i + 1].offset )
{
tmp = tables[i];
tables[i] = tables[i + 1];
tables[i + 1] = tmp;
have_change = 1;
}
if ( ( tables[i].size > tables[i + 1].offset ) ||
( tables[i].offset > tables[i + 1].offset - tables[i].size ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Offset );
goto Exit;
}
}
if ( !have_change )
break;
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
{
FT_TRACE4(( " %d: type=%s, format=0x%X, "
"size=%ld (0x%lX), offset=%ld (0x%lX)\n",
i, name,
tables[i].format,
tables[i].size, tables[i].size,
tables[i].offset, tables[i].offset ));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
pcf_read_TOC( FT_Stream stream,
PCF_Face face )
{
FT_Error error;
PCF_Toc toc = &face->toc;
PCF_Table tables;
FT_Memory memory = FT_FACE( face )->memory;
FT_UInt n;
if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK ( 0 ) ||
FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS ( pcf_toc_header, toc ) )
return FT_THROW( Cannot_Open_Resource );
if ( toc->version != PCF_FILE_VERSION ||
toc->count > FT_ARRAY_MAX( face->toc.tables ) ||
toc->count == 0 )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( face->toc.tables, toc->count ) )
return FT_THROW( Out_Of_Memory );
tables = face->toc.tables;
for ( n = 0; n < toc->count; n++ )
{
if ( FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS( pcf_table_header, tables ) )
goto Exit;
tables++;
}
/* Sort tables and check for overlaps. Because they are almost */
/* always ordered already, an in-place bubble sort with simultaneous */
/* boundary checking seems appropriate. */
tables = face->toc.tables;
for ( n = 0; n < toc->count - 1; n++ )
{
FT_UInt i, have_change;
have_change = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < toc->count - 1 - n; i++ )
{
PCF_TableRec tmp;
if ( tables[i].offset > tables[i + 1].offset )
{
tmp = tables[i];
tables[i] = tables[i + 1];
tables[i + 1] = tmp;
have_change = 1;
}
if ( ( tables[i].size > tables[i + 1].offset ) ||
( tables[i].offset > tables[i + 1].offset - tables[i].size ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Offset );
goto Exit;
}
}
if ( !have_change )
break;
}
/* we now check whether the `size' and `offset' values are reasonable: */
/* `offset' + `size' must not exceed the stream size */
tables = face->toc.tables;
for ( n = 0; n < toc->count; n++ )
{
/* we need two checks to avoid overflow */
if ( ( tables->size > stream->size ) ||
( tables->offset > stream->size - tables->size ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Table );
goto Exit;
}
tables++;
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
{
FT_TRACE4(( " %d: type=%s, format=0x%X, "
"size=%ld (0x%lX), offset=%ld (0x%lX)\n",
i, name,
tables[i].format,
tables[i].size, tables[i].size,
tables[i].offset, tables[i].offset ));
}
}
| 164,843
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case REQUEST_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferIdx = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer;
int result = requestBuffer(bufferIdx, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(buffer != 0);
if (buffer != 0) {
reply->write(*buffer);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferCount = data.readInt32();
int result = setBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DEQUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool async = data.readInt32();
uint32_t w = data.readInt32();
uint32_t h = data.readInt32();
uint32_t format = data.readInt32();
uint32_t usage = data.readInt32();
int buf = 0;
sp<Fence> fence;
int result = dequeueBuffer(&buf, &fence, async, w, h, format, usage);
reply->writeInt32(buf);
reply->writeInt32(fence != NULL);
if (fence != NULL) {
reply->write(*fence);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case QUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferInput input(data);
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t result = queueBuffer(buf, input, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CANCEL_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
sp<Fence> fence = new Fence();
data.read(*fence.get());
cancelBuffer(buf, fence);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case QUERY: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int value = 0;
int what = data.readInt32();
int res = query(what, &value);
reply->writeInt32(value);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<IBinder> token = data.readStrongBinder();
int api = data.readInt32();
bool producerControlledByApp = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t res = connect(token, api, producerControlledByApp, output);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int api = data.readInt32();
status_t res = disconnect(api);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
Commit Message: IGraphicBufferProducer: fix QUEUE_BUFFER info leak
Bug: 26338109
Change-Id: I8a979469bfe1e317ebdefa43685e19f9302baea8
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
status_t BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case REQUEST_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferIdx = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer;
int result = requestBuffer(bufferIdx, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(buffer != 0);
if (buffer != 0) {
reply->write(*buffer);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferCount = data.readInt32();
int result = setBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DEQUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool async = data.readInt32();
uint32_t w = data.readInt32();
uint32_t h = data.readInt32();
uint32_t format = data.readInt32();
uint32_t usage = data.readInt32();
int buf = 0;
sp<Fence> fence;
int result = dequeueBuffer(&buf, &fence, async, w, h, format, usage);
reply->writeInt32(buf);
reply->writeInt32(fence != NULL);
if (fence != NULL) {
reply->write(*fence);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case QUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferInput input(data);
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
memset(output, 0, sizeof(QueueBufferOutput));
status_t result = queueBuffer(buf, input, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CANCEL_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
sp<Fence> fence = new Fence();
data.read(*fence.get());
cancelBuffer(buf, fence);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case QUERY: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int value = 0;
int what = data.readInt32();
int res = query(what, &value);
reply->writeInt32(value);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<IBinder> token = data.readStrongBinder();
int api = data.readInt32();
bool producerControlledByApp = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t res = connect(token, api, producerControlledByApp, output);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int api = data.readInt32();
status_t res = disconnect(api);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
| 173,932
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void xen_netbk_idx_release(struct xen_netbk *netbk, u16 pending_idx)
{
struct xenvif *vif;
struct pending_tx_info *pending_tx_info;
pending_ring_idx_t index;
/* Already complete? */
if (netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx] == NULL)
return;
pending_tx_info = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx];
vif = pending_tx_info->vif;
make_tx_response(vif, &pending_tx_info->req, XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY);
index = pending_index(netbk->pending_prod++);
netbk->pending_ring[index] = pending_idx;
xenvif_put(vif);
netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx]->mapping = 0;
put_page(netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx]);
netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx] = NULL;
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void xen_netbk_idx_release(struct xen_netbk *netbk, u16 pending_idx)
static void xen_netbk_idx_release(struct xen_netbk *netbk, u16 pending_idx,
u8 status)
{
struct xenvif *vif;
struct pending_tx_info *pending_tx_info;
pending_ring_idx_t index;
/* Already complete? */
if (netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx] == NULL)
return;
pending_tx_info = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx];
vif = pending_tx_info->vif;
make_tx_response(vif, &pending_tx_info->req, status);
index = pending_index(netbk->pending_prod++);
netbk->pending_ring[index] = pending_idx;
xenvif_put(vif);
netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx]->mapping = 0;
put_page(netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx]);
netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx] = NULL;
}
| 166,168
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateSecureBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, size_t size, OMX::buffer_id *buffer,
void **buffer_data, sp<NativeHandle> *native_handle) {
if (buffer == NULL || buffer_data == NULL || native_handle == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(size, portIndex);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, size);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBuffer, err, BUFFER_FMT(portIndex, "%zu@", size));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle) {
*buffer_data = NULL;
*native_handle = NativeHandle::create(
(native_handle_t *)header->pBuffer, false /* ownsHandle */);
} else {
*buffer_data = header->pBuffer;
*native_handle = NULL;
}
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateSecureBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p:%p", size, *buffer_data,
*native_handle == NULL ? NULL : (*native_handle)->handle()));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: OMXNodeInstance: sanity check portIndex.
Bug: 31385713
Change-Id: Ib91d00eb5cc8c51c84d37f5d36d6b7ca594d201f
(cherry picked from commit f80a1f5075a7c6e1982d37c68bfed7c9a611bb20)
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateSecureBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, size_t size, OMX::buffer_id *buffer,
void **buffer_data, sp<NativeHandle> *native_handle) {
if (buffer == NULL || buffer_data == NULL || native_handle == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (portIndex >= NELEM(mSecureBufferType)) {
ALOGE("b/31385713, portIndex(%u)", portIndex);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "31385713");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(size, portIndex);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, size);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBuffer, err, BUFFER_FMT(portIndex, "%zu@", size));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
if (mSecureBufferType[portIndex] == kSecureBufferTypeNativeHandle) {
*buffer_data = NULL;
*native_handle = NativeHandle::create(
(native_handle_t *)header->pBuffer, false /* ownsHandle */);
} else {
*buffer_data = header->pBuffer;
*native_handle = NULL;
}
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateSecureBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p:%p", size, *buffer_data,
*native_handle == NULL ? NULL : (*native_handle)->handle()));
return OK;
}
| 173,384
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT3(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
ssize_t
j,
y;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
unsigned char
alpha;
size_t
a0,
a1,
bits,
code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, Min(4, dds_info->width - x),
Min(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read alpha values (8 bytes) */
a0 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
a1 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickTrue);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (bits >> ((4*j+i)*2)) & 0x3;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
/*
Extract alpha value: multiply 0..15 by 17 to get range 0..255
*/
if (j < 2)
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a0 >> (4*(4*j+i))) & 0xf);
else
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a1 >> (4*(4*(j-2)+i))) & 0xf);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
alpha));
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
SkipDXTMipmaps(image, dds_info, 16);
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT3(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
ssize_t
j,
y;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
unsigned char
alpha;
size_t
a0,
a1,
bits,
code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, MagickMin(4, dds_info->width - x),
MagickMin(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read alpha values (8 bytes) */
a0 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
a1 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickTrue);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (bits >> ((4*j+i)*2)) & 0x3;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
/*
Extract alpha value: multiply 0..15 by 17 to get range 0..255
*/
if (j < 2)
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a0 >> (4*(4*j+i))) & 0xf);
else
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a1 >> (4*(4*(j-2)+i))) & 0xf);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
alpha));
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
return(SkipDXTMipmaps(image,dds_info,16,exception));
}
| 168,900
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void locationWithExceptionAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithException());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHrefThrows(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void locationWithExceptionAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<TestNode> imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithException());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHrefThrows(cppValue);
}
| 171,688
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DiscardTest(DiscardReason reason) {
const base::TimeTicks kDummyLastActiveTime =
base::TimeTicks() + kShortDelay;
LifecycleUnit* background_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* foreground_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &background_lifecycle_unit,
&foreground_lifecycle_unit);
content::WebContents* initial_web_contents =
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0);
content::WebContentsTester::For(initial_web_contents)
->SetLastActiveTime(kDummyLastActiveTime);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, true));
background_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_NE(initial_web_contents, tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0));
EXPECT_FALSE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
EXPECT_EQ(kDummyLastActiveTime,
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetLastActiveTime());
source_->SetFocusedTabStripModelForTesting(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
|
void DiscardTest(DiscardReason reason) {
const base::TimeTicks kDummyLastActiveTime =
base::TimeTicks() + kShortDelay;
LifecycleUnit* background_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* foreground_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &background_lifecycle_unit,
&foreground_lifecycle_unit);
content::WebContents* initial_web_contents =
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0);
content::WebContentsTester::For(initial_web_contents)
->SetLastActiveTime(kDummyLastActiveTime);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(::testing::_, true));
background_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
::testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_NE(initial_web_contents, tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0));
EXPECT_FALSE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
EXPECT_EQ(kDummyLastActiveTime,
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetLastActiveTime());
source_->SetFocusedTabStripModelForTesting(nullptr);
}
| 172,226
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: mobility_opt_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const unsigned len)
{
unsigned i, optlen;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += optlen) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i]);
if (bp[i] == IP6MOPT_PAD1)
optlen = 1;
else {
if (i + 1 < len) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + 1]);
optlen = bp[i + 1] + 2;
}
else
goto trunc;
}
if (i + optlen > len)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + optlen]);
switch (bp[i]) {
case IP6MOPT_PAD1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(pad1)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_PADN:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_REFRESH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_REFRESH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: %u)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]) << 2));
break;
case IP6MOPT_ALTCOA:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_ALTCOA_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(altcoa: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(alt-CoA: %s)", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[i+2])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_NONCEID:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_NONCEID_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: ho=0x%04x co=0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+4])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_AUTH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_AUTH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth)"));
break;
default:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(sopt_type %u: trunc)", bp[i]));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(type-0x%02x: len=%u)", bp[i], bp[i + 1]));
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13025/IPv6 mobility: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't cause 'tcpdump: pcap_loop: truncated dump file'
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
mobility_opt_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const unsigned len)
{
unsigned i, optlen;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += optlen) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i]);
if (bp[i] == IP6MOPT_PAD1)
optlen = 1;
else {
if (i + 1 < len) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + 1]);
optlen = bp[i + 1] + 2;
}
else
goto trunc;
}
if (i + optlen > len)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + optlen]);
switch (bp[i]) {
case IP6MOPT_PAD1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(pad1)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_PADN:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_REFRESH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_REFRESH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: %u)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]) << 2));
break;
case IP6MOPT_ALTCOA:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_ALTCOA_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(altcoa: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_TCHECK_128BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(alt-CoA: %s)", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[i+2])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_NONCEID:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_NONCEID_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: ho=0x%04x co=0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+4])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_AUTH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_AUTH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth)"));
break;
default:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(sopt_type %u: trunc)", bp[i]));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(type-0x%02x: len=%u)", bp[i], bp[i + 1]));
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
return 1;
}
| 167,866
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Browser::TabReplacedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContents* old_contents,
TabContents* new_contents,
int index) {
TabDetachedAtImpl(old_contents, index, DETACH_TYPE_REPLACE);
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
if (session_service)
session_service->TabClosing(old_contents->web_contents());
TabInsertedAt(new_contents->web_contents(), index, (index == active_index()));
int entry_count =
new_contents->web_contents()->GetController().GetEntryCount();
if (entry_count > 0) {
new_contents->web_contents()->GetController().NotifyEntryChanged(
new_contents->web_contents()->GetController().GetEntryAtIndex(
entry_count - 1),
entry_count - 1);
}
if (session_service) {
session_service->TabRestored(new_contents,
tab_strip_model_->IsTabPinned(index));
}
content::DevToolsManager::GetInstance()->ContentsReplaced(
old_contents->web_contents(), new_contents->web_contents());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void Browser::TabReplacedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContents* old_contents,
TabContents* new_contents,
int index) {
TabDetachedAtImpl(old_contents->web_contents(), index, DETACH_TYPE_REPLACE);
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
if (session_service)
session_service->TabClosing(old_contents->web_contents());
TabInsertedAt(new_contents->web_contents(), index, (index == active_index()));
int entry_count =
new_contents->web_contents()->GetController().GetEntryCount();
if (entry_count > 0) {
new_contents->web_contents()->GetController().NotifyEntryChanged(
new_contents->web_contents()->GetController().GetEntryAtIndex(
entry_count - 1),
entry_count - 1);
}
if (session_service) {
session_service->TabRestored(new_contents,
tab_strip_model_->IsTabPinned(index));
}
content::DevToolsManager::GetInstance()->ContentsReplaced(
old_contents->web_contents(), new_contents->web_contents());
}
| 171,509
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void GetLoadTimes(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
WebLocalFrame* frame = WebLocalFrame::frameForCurrentContext();
if (!frame) {
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
return;
}
WebDataSource* data_source = frame->dataSource();
if (!data_source) {
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
return;
}
DocumentState* document_state = DocumentState::FromDataSource(data_source);
if (!document_state) {
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
return;
}
double request_time = document_state->request_time().ToDoubleT();
double start_load_time = document_state->start_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double commit_load_time = document_state->commit_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double finish_document_load_time =
document_state->finish_document_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double finish_load_time = document_state->finish_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double first_paint_time = document_state->first_paint_time().ToDoubleT();
double first_paint_after_load_time =
document_state->first_paint_after_load_time().ToDoubleT();
std::string navigation_type =
GetNavigationType(data_source->navigationType());
bool was_fetched_via_spdy = document_state->was_fetched_via_spdy();
bool was_npn_negotiated = document_state->was_npn_negotiated();
std::string npn_negotiated_protocol =
document_state->npn_negotiated_protocol();
bool was_alternate_protocol_available =
document_state->was_alternate_protocol_available();
std::string connection_info = net::HttpResponseInfo::ConnectionInfoToString(
document_state->connection_info());
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> load_times = v8::Object::New(isolate);
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "requestTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, request_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "startLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, start_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "commitLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, commit_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "finishDocumentLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, finish_document_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "finishLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, finish_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "firstPaintTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, first_paint_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "firstPaintAfterLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate, first_paint_after_load_time));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "navigationType"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, navigation_type.c_str()));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasFetchedViaSpdy"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, was_fetched_via_spdy));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasNpnNegotiated"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, was_npn_negotiated));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "npnNegotiatedProtocol"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, npn_negotiated_protocol.c_str()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasAlternateProtocolAvailable"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, was_alternate_protocol_available));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "connectionInfo"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, connection_info.c_str()));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(load_times);
}
Commit Message: Cache csi info before passing it to JS setters.
JS setters invalidate the pointers frame, data_source and document_state.
BUG=590455
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1751553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#379047}
CWE ID:
|
static void GetLoadTimes(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
WebLocalFrame* frame = WebLocalFrame::frameForCurrentContext();
if (!frame) {
return;
}
WebDataSource* data_source = frame->dataSource();
if (!data_source) {
return;
}
DocumentState* document_state = DocumentState::FromDataSource(data_source);
if (!document_state) {
return;
}
double request_time = document_state->request_time().ToDoubleT();
double start_load_time = document_state->start_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double commit_load_time = document_state->commit_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double finish_document_load_time =
document_state->finish_document_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double finish_load_time = document_state->finish_load_time().ToDoubleT();
double first_paint_time = document_state->first_paint_time().ToDoubleT();
double first_paint_after_load_time =
document_state->first_paint_after_load_time().ToDoubleT();
std::string navigation_type =
GetNavigationType(data_source->navigationType());
bool was_fetched_via_spdy = document_state->was_fetched_via_spdy();
bool was_npn_negotiated = document_state->was_npn_negotiated();
std::string npn_negotiated_protocol =
document_state->npn_negotiated_protocol();
bool was_alternate_protocol_available =
document_state->was_alternate_protocol_available();
std::string connection_info = net::HttpResponseInfo::ConnectionInfoToString(
document_state->connection_info());
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
v8::Local<v8::Context> ctx = isolate->GetCurrentContext();
v8::Local<v8::Object> load_times = v8::Object::New(isolate);
if (!load_times
->Set(ctx, v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "requestTime",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::Number::New(isolate, request_time))
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!load_times
->Set(ctx, v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "startLoadTime",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::Number::New(isolate, start_load_time))
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!load_times
->Set(ctx, v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "commitLoadTime",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::Number::New(isolate, commit_load_time))
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!load_times
->Set(ctx,
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "finishDocumentLoadTime",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::Number::New(isolate, finish_document_load_time))
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!load_times
->Set(ctx, v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "finishLoadTime",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::Number::New(isolate, finish_load_time))
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!load_times
->Set(ctx, v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "firstPaintTime",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::Number::New(isolate, first_paint_time))
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!load_times
->Set(ctx,
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "firstPaintAfterLoadTime",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::Number::New(isolate, first_paint_after_load_time))
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!load_times
->Set(ctx, v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "navigationType",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, navigation_type.c_str(),
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked())
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!load_times
->Set(ctx, v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasFetchedViaSpdy",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, was_fetched_via_spdy))
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!load_times
->Set(ctx, v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasNpnNegotiated",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, was_npn_negotiated))
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!load_times
->Set(ctx,
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "npnNegotiatedProtocol",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate,
npn_negotiated_protocol.c_str(),
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked())
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!load_times
->Set(ctx, v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate,
"wasAlternateProtocolAvailable",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, was_alternate_protocol_available))
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
if (!load_times
->Set(ctx, v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "connectionInfo",
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked(),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, connection_info.c_str(),
v8::NewStringType::kNormal)
.ToLocalChecked())
.FromMaybe(false)) {
return;
}
args.GetReturnValue().Set(load_times);
}
| 172,118
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static gboolean irssi_ssl_verify(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
{
if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) != X509_V_OK) {
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int n;
char *str;
g_warning("Could not verify SSL servers certificate:");
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), 0, 0)) == NULL)
g_warning(" Could not get subject-name from peer certificate");
else {
g_warning(" Subject : %s", str);
free(str);
}
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), 0, 0)) == NULL)
g_warning(" Could not get issuer-name from peer certificate");
else {
g_warning(" Issuer : %s", str);
free(str);
}
if (! X509_digest(cert, EVP_md5(), md, &n))
g_warning(" Could not get fingerprint from peer certificate");
else {
char hex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
char fp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*3];
if (n < sizeof(fp)) {
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
fp[i*3+0] = hex[(md[i] >> 4) & 0xF];
fp[i*3+1] = hex[(md[i] >> 0) & 0xF];
fp[i*3+2] = i == n - 1 ? '\0' : ':';
}
g_warning(" MD5 Fingerprint : %s", fp);
}
}
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static gboolean irssi_ssl_verify(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
/* Checks if the given string has internal NUL characters. */
static gboolean has_internal_nul(const char* str, int len) {
/* Remove trailing nul characters. They would give false alarms */
while (len > 0 && str[len-1] == 0)
len--;
return strlen(str) != len;
}
/* tls_dns_name - Extract valid DNS name from subjectAltName value */
static const char *tls_dns_name(const GENERAL_NAME * gn)
{
const char *dnsname;
/* We expect the OpenSSL library to construct GEN_DNS extension objects as
ASN1_IA5STRING values. Check we got the right union member. */
if (ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
g_warning("Invalid ASN1 value type in subjectAltName");
return NULL;
}
/* Safe to treat as an ASCII string possibly holding a DNS name */
dnsname = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5);
if (has_internal_nul(dnsname, ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5))) {
g_warning("Internal NUL in subjectAltName");
return NULL;
}
return dnsname;
}
/* tls_text_name - extract certificate property value by name */
static char *tls_text_name(X509_NAME *name, int nid)
{
int pos;
X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
ASN1_STRING *entry_str;
int utf8_length;
unsigned char *utf8_value;
char *result;
if (name == 0 || (pos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, -1)) < 0) {
return NULL;
}
entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, pos);
g_return_val_if_fail(entry != NULL, NULL);
entry_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
g_return_val_if_fail(entry_str != NULL, NULL);
/* Convert everything into UTF-8. It's up to OpenSSL to do something
reasonable when converting ASCII formats that contain non-ASCII
content. */
if ((utf8_length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8_value, entry_str)) < 0) {
g_warning("Error decoding ASN.1 type=%d", ASN1_STRING_type(entry_str));
return NULL;
}
if (has_internal_nul((char *)utf8_value, utf8_length)) {
g_warning("NUL character in hostname in certificate");
OPENSSL_free(utf8_value);
return NULL;
}
result = g_strdup((char *) utf8_value);
OPENSSL_free(utf8_value);
return result;
}
/** check if a hostname in the certificate matches the hostname we used for the connection */
static gboolean match_hostname(const char *cert_hostname, const char *hostname)
{
const char *hostname_left;
if (!strcasecmp(cert_hostname, hostname)) { /* exact match */
return TRUE;
} else if (cert_hostname[0] == '*' && cert_hostname[1] == '.' && cert_hostname[2] != 0) { /* wildcard match */
/* The initial '*' matches exactly one hostname component */
hostname_left = strchr(hostname, '.');
if (hostname_left != NULL && ! strcasecmp(hostname_left + 1, cert_hostname + 2)) {
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
/* based on verify_extract_name from tls_client.c in postfix */
static gboolean irssi_ssl_verify_hostname(X509 *cert, const char *hostname)
{
int gen_index, gen_count;
gboolean matched = FALSE, has_dns_name = FALSE;
const char *cert_dns_name;
char *cert_subject_cn;
const GENERAL_NAME *gn;
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) * gens;
/* Verify the dNSName(s) in the peer certificate against the hostname. */
gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, 0, 0);
if (gens) {
gen_count = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens);
for (gen_index = 0; gen_index < gen_count && !matched; ++gen_index) {
gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, gen_index);
if (gn->type != GEN_DNS)
continue;
/* Even if we have an invalid DNS name, we still ultimately
ignore the CommonName, because subjectAltName:DNS is
present (though malformed). */
has_dns_name = TRUE;
cert_dns_name = tls_dns_name(gn);
if (cert_dns_name && *cert_dns_name) {
matched = match_hostname(cert_dns_name, hostname);
}
}
/* Free stack *and* member GENERAL_NAME objects */
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free);
}
if (has_dns_name) {
if (! matched) {
/* The CommonName in the issuer DN is obsolete when SubjectAltName is available. */
g_warning("None of the Subject Alt Names in the certificate match hostname '%s'", hostname);
}
return matched;
} else { /* No subjectAltNames, look at CommonName */
cert_subject_cn = tls_text_name(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NID_commonName);
if (cert_subject_cn && *cert_subject_cn) {
matched = match_hostname(cert_subject_cn, hostname);
if (! matched) {
g_warning("SSL certificate common name '%s' doesn't match host name '%s'", cert_subject_cn, hostname);
}
} else {
g_warning("No subjectAltNames and no valid common name in certificate");
}
free(cert_subject_cn);
}
return matched;
}
static gboolean irssi_ssl_verify(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx, const char* hostname, X509 *cert)
{
if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) != X509_V_OK) {
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int n;
char *str;
g_warning("Could not verify SSL servers certificate:");
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), 0, 0)) == NULL)
g_warning(" Could not get subject-name from peer certificate");
else {
g_warning(" Subject : %s", str);
free(str);
}
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), 0, 0)) == NULL)
g_warning(" Could not get issuer-name from peer certificate");
else {
g_warning(" Issuer : %s", str);
free(str);
}
if (! X509_digest(cert, EVP_md5(), md, &n))
g_warning(" Could not get fingerprint from peer certificate");
else {
char hex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
char fp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*3];
if (n < sizeof(fp)) {
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
fp[i*3+0] = hex[(md[i] >> 4) & 0xF];
fp[i*3+1] = hex[(md[i] >> 0) & 0xF];
fp[i*3+2] = i == n - 1 ? '\0' : ':';
}
g_warning(" MD5 Fingerprint : %s", fp);
}
}
return FALSE;
} else if (! irssi_ssl_verify_hostname(cert, hostname)){
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 165,518
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void ConvertLoopSequence(ModSample &smp, STPLoopList &loopList)
{
if(!smp.HasSampleData() || loopList.size() < 2) return;
ModSample newSmp = smp;
newSmp.nLength = 0;
newSmp.pSample = nullptr;
size_t numLoops = loopList.size();
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
if((newSmp.nLength + info.loopLength > MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH) ||
(info.loopLength > MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH) ||
(info.loopStart + info.loopLength > smp.nLength))
{
numLoops = i;
break;
}
newSmp.nLength += info.loopLength;
}
if(!newSmp.AllocateSample())
{
return;
}
SmpLength start = 0;
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
memcpy(newSmp.pSample8 + start, smp.pSample8 + info.loopStart, info.loopLength);
info.loopStart = start;
if(i > 0 && i <= mpt::size(newSmp.cues))
{
newSmp.cues[i - 1] = start;
}
start += info.loopLength;
}
smp.FreeSample();
smp = newSmp;
smp.nLoopStart = 0;
smp.nLoopEnd = smp.nLength;
smp.uFlags.set(CHN_LOOP);
}
Commit Message: [Fix] STP: Possible out-of-bounds memory read with malformed STP files (caught with afl-fuzz).
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@9567 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static void ConvertLoopSequence(ModSample &smp, STPLoopList &loopList)
{
if(!smp.HasSampleData() || loopList.size() < 2) return;
ModSample newSmp = smp;
newSmp.nLength = 0;
newSmp.pSample = nullptr;
size_t numLoops = loopList.size();
// Get the total length of the sample after combining all looped sections
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
// If adding this loop would cause the sample length to exceed maximum,
if(info.loopStart >= smp.nLength
|| smp.nLength - info.loopStart < info.loopLength
|| newSmp.nLength > MAX_SAMPLE_LENGTH - info.loopLength)
{
numLoops = i;
break;
}
newSmp.nLength += info.loopLength;
}
if(!newSmp.AllocateSample())
{
return;
}
SmpLength start = 0;
for(size_t i = 0; i < numLoops; i++)
{
STPLoopInfo &info = loopList[i];
memcpy(newSmp.pSample8 + start, smp.pSample8 + info.loopStart, info.loopLength);
info.loopStart = start;
if(i > 0 && i <= mpt::size(newSmp.cues))
{
newSmp.cues[i - 1] = start;
}
start += info.loopLength;
}
smp.FreeSample();
smp = newSmp;
smp.nLoopStart = 0;
smp.nLoopEnd = smp.nLength;
smp.uFlags.set(CHN_LOOP);
}
| 169,337
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: modifier_total_encodings(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm)
{
return 1 + /* (1) nothing */
pm->ngammas + /* (2) gamma values to test */
pm->nencodings + /* (3) total number of encodings */
/* The following test only works after the first time through the
* png_modifier code because 'bit_depth' is set when the IHDR is read.
* modifier_reset, below, preserves the setting until after it has called
* the iterate function (also below.)
*
* For this reason do not rely on this function outside a call to
* modifier_reset.
*/
((pm->bit_depth == 16 || pm->assume_16_bit_calculations) ?
pm->nencodings : 0); /* (4) encodings with gamma == 1.0 */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
modifier_total_encodings(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm)
modifier_total_encodings(const png_modifier *pm)
{
return 1 + /* (1) nothing */
pm->ngammas + /* (2) gamma values to test */
pm->nencodings + /* (3) total number of encodings */
/* The following test only works after the first time through the
* png_modifier code because 'bit_depth' is set when the IHDR is read.
* modifier_reset, below, preserves the setting until after it has called
* the iterate function (also below.)
*
* For this reason do not rely on this function outside a call to
* modifier_reset.
*/
((pm->bit_depth == 16 || pm->assume_16_bit_calculations) ?
pm->nencodings : 0); /* (4) encodings with gamma == 1.0 */
}
| 173,671
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: struct svc_rdma_req_map *svc_rdma_get_req_map(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt)
{
struct svc_rdma_req_map *map = NULL;
spin_lock(&xprt->sc_map_lock);
if (list_empty(&xprt->sc_maps))
goto out_empty;
map = list_first_entry(&xprt->sc_maps,
struct svc_rdma_req_map, free);
list_del_init(&map->free);
spin_unlock(&xprt->sc_map_lock);
out:
map->count = 0;
return map;
out_empty:
spin_unlock(&xprt->sc_map_lock);
/* Pre-allocation amount was incorrect */
map = alloc_req_map(GFP_NOIO);
if (map)
goto out;
WARN_ONCE(1, "svcrdma: empty request map list?\n");
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
struct svc_rdma_req_map *svc_rdma_get_req_map(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt)
| 168,181
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: NodeIterator::~NodeIterator()
{
root()->document().detachNodeIterator(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix detached Attr nodes interaction with NodeIterator
- Don't register NodeIterator to document when attaching to Attr node.
-- NodeIterator is registered to its document to receive updateForNodeRemoval notifications.
-- However it wouldn't make sense on Attr nodes, as they never have children.
BUG=572537
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1577213003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#369687}
CWE ID:
|
NodeIterator::~NodeIterator()
{
if (!root()->isAttributeNode())
root()->document().detachNodeIterator(this);
}
| 172,143
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SplashOutputDev::drawImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
int *maskColors, GBool inlineImg) {
double *ctm;
SplashCoord mat[6];
SplashOutImageData imgData;
SplashColorMode srcMode;
SplashImageSource src;
GfxGray gray;
GfxRGB rgb;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
GfxCMYK cmyk;
#endif
Guchar pix;
int n, i;
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
imgData.imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgData.imgStr->reset();
imgData.colorMap = colorMap;
imgData.maskColors = maskColors;
imgData.colorMode = colorMode;
imgData.width = width;
imgData.height = height;
imgData.y = 0;
imgData.lookup = NULL;
if (colorMap->getNumPixelComps() == 1) {
n = 1 << colorMap->getBits();
switch (colorMode) {
case splashModeMono1:
case splashModeMono8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getGray(&pix, &gray);
imgData.lookup[i] = colToByte(gray);
}
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 3);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[3*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[3*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[3*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
}
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 3);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = 255;
}
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 4);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getCMYK(&pix, &cmyk);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(cmyk.c);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(cmyk.m);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(cmyk.y);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = colToByte(cmyk.k);
}
break;
#endif
break;
}
}
if (colorMode == splashModeMono1) {
srcMode = splashModeMono8;
} else {
srcMode = colorMode;
}
src = maskColors ? &alphaImageSrc : &imageSrc;
splash->drawImage(src, &imgData, srcMode, maskColors ? gTrue : gFalse,
width, height, mat);
if (inlineImg) {
while (imgData.y < height) {
imgData.imgStr->getLine();
++imgData.y;
}
}
gfree(imgData.lookup);
delete imgData.imgStr;
str->close();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
void SplashOutputDev::drawImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
int *maskColors, GBool inlineImg) {
double *ctm;
SplashCoord mat[6];
SplashOutImageData imgData;
SplashColorMode srcMode;
SplashImageSource src;
GfxGray gray;
GfxRGB rgb;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
GfxCMYK cmyk;
#endif
Guchar pix;
int n, i;
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
imgData.imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgData.imgStr->reset();
imgData.colorMap = colorMap;
imgData.maskColors = maskColors;
imgData.colorMode = colorMode;
imgData.width = width;
imgData.height = height;
imgData.y = 0;
imgData.lookup = NULL;
if (colorMap->getNumPixelComps() == 1) {
n = 1 << colorMap->getBits();
switch (colorMode) {
case splashModeMono1:
case splashModeMono8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getGray(&pix, &gray);
imgData.lookup[i] = colToByte(gray);
}
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 3);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[3*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[3*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[3*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
}
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 4);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = 255;
}
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 4);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getCMYK(&pix, &cmyk);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(cmyk.c);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(cmyk.m);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(cmyk.y);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = colToByte(cmyk.k);
}
break;
#endif
break;
}
}
if (colorMode == splashModeMono1) {
srcMode = splashModeMono8;
} else {
srcMode = colorMode;
}
src = maskColors ? &alphaImageSrc : &imageSrc;
splash->drawImage(src, &imgData, srcMode, maskColors ? gTrue : gFalse,
width, height, mat);
if (inlineImg) {
while (imgData.y < height) {
imgData.imgStr->getLine();
++imgData.y;
}
}
gfree(imgData.lookup);
delete imgData.imgStr;
str->close();
}
| 164,602
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xid_map_enter(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct sunrpc_msg *rp, const u_char *bp)
{
const struct ip *ip = NULL;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL;
struct xid_map_entry *xmep;
if (!ND_TTEST(rp->rm_call.cb_vers))
return (0);
switch (IP_V((const struct ip *)bp)) {
case 4:
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
break;
case 6:
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp;
break;
default:
return (1);
}
xmep = &xid_map[xid_map_next];
if (++xid_map_next >= XIDMAPSIZE)
xid_map_next = 0;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->xid, &rp->rm_xid, sizeof(xmep->xid));
if (ip) {
xmep->ipver = 4;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(ip->ip_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(ip->ip_dst));
}
else if (ip6) {
xmep->ipver = 6;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip6->ip6_src, sizeof(ip6->ip6_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip6->ip6_dst, sizeof(ip6->ip6_dst));
}
xmep->proc = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_proc);
xmep->vers = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_vers);
return (1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13005/NFS: Add two bounds checks before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
xid_map_enter(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct sunrpc_msg *rp, const u_char *bp)
{
const struct ip *ip = NULL;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL;
struct xid_map_entry *xmep;
if (!ND_TTEST(rp->rm_call.cb_vers))
return (0);
switch (IP_V((const struct ip *)bp)) {
case 4:
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
break;
case 6:
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp;
break;
default:
return (1);
}
xmep = &xid_map[xid_map_next];
if (++xid_map_next >= XIDMAPSIZE)
xid_map_next = 0;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->xid, &rp->rm_xid, sizeof(xmep->xid));
if (ip) {
xmep->ipver = 4;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(ip->ip_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(ip->ip_dst));
}
else if (ip6) {
xmep->ipver = 6;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip6->ip6_src, sizeof(ip6->ip6_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip6->ip6_dst, sizeof(ip6->ip6_dst));
}
if (!ND_TTEST(rp->rm_call.cb_proc))
return (0);
xmep->proc = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_proc);
if (!ND_TTEST(rp->rm_call.cb_vers))
return (0);
xmep->vers = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_vers);
return (1);
}
| 167,903
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void net_checksum_calculate(uint8_t *data, int length)
{
int hlen, plen, proto, csum_offset;
uint16_t csum;
if ((data[14] & 0xf0) != 0x40)
return; /* not IPv4 */
hlen = (data[14] & 0x0f) * 4;
csum_offset = 16;
break;
case PROTO_UDP:
csum_offset = 6;
break;
default:
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void net_checksum_calculate(uint8_t *data, int length)
{
int hlen, plen, proto, csum_offset;
uint16_t csum;
/* Ensure data has complete L2 & L3 headers. */
if (length < 14 + 20) {
return;
}
if ((data[14] & 0xf0) != 0x40)
return; /* not IPv4 */
hlen = (data[14] & 0x0f) * 4;
csum_offset = 16;
break;
case PROTO_UDP:
csum_offset = 6;
break;
default:
return;
}
| 165,182
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WT_InterpolateMono (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_I32 *pMixBuffer;
const EAS_I8 *pLoopEnd;
const EAS_I8 *pCurrentPhaseInt;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
EAS_I32 gain;
EAS_I32 gainIncrement;
EAS_I32 currentPhaseFrac;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 tmp2;
EAS_I8 *pLoopStart;
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pMixBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pMixBuffer;
/* calculate gain increment */
gainIncrement = (pWTIntFrame->gainTarget - pWTIntFrame->prevGain) << (16 - SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
if (gainIncrement < 0)
gainIncrement++;
gain = pWTIntFrame->prevGain << 16;
pCurrentPhaseInt = pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum;
currentPhaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->phaseIncrement;
pLoopStart = pWTVoice->pLoopStart;
pLoopEnd = pWTVoice->pLoopEnd + 1;
InterpolationLoop:
tmp0 = (EAS_I32)(pCurrentPhaseInt - pLoopEnd);
if (tmp0 >= 0)
pCurrentPhaseInt = pLoopStart + tmp0;
tmp0 = *pCurrentPhaseInt;
tmp1 = *(pCurrentPhaseInt + 1);
tmp2 = phaseInc + currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp1 - tmp0;
tmp1 = tmp1 * currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp0 + (tmp1 >> NUM_EG1_FRAC_BITS);
pCurrentPhaseInt += (tmp2 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
currentPhaseFrac = tmp2 & PHASE_FRAC_MASK;
gain += gainIncrement;
tmp2 = (gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
tmp0 = *pMixBuffer;
tmp2 = tmp1 * tmp2;
tmp2 = (tmp2 >> 9);
tmp0 = tmp2 + tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp0;
numSamples--;
if (numSamples > 0)
goto InterpolationLoop;
pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum = pCurrentPhaseInt;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = currentPhaseFrac;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide>*/
pWTVoice->gain = (EAS_I16)(gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void WT_InterpolateMono (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_I32 *pMixBuffer;
const EAS_I8 *pLoopEnd;
const EAS_I8 *pCurrentPhaseInt;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
EAS_I32 gain;
EAS_I32 gainIncrement;
EAS_I32 currentPhaseFrac;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 tmp2;
EAS_I8 *pLoopStart;
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26366256");
return;
}
pMixBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pMixBuffer;
/* calculate gain increment */
gainIncrement = (pWTIntFrame->gainTarget - pWTIntFrame->prevGain) << (16 - SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
if (gainIncrement < 0)
gainIncrement++;
gain = pWTIntFrame->prevGain << 16;
pCurrentPhaseInt = pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum;
currentPhaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->phaseIncrement;
pLoopStart = pWTVoice->pLoopStart;
pLoopEnd = pWTVoice->pLoopEnd + 1;
InterpolationLoop:
tmp0 = (EAS_I32)(pCurrentPhaseInt - pLoopEnd);
if (tmp0 >= 0)
pCurrentPhaseInt = pLoopStart + tmp0;
tmp0 = *pCurrentPhaseInt;
tmp1 = *(pCurrentPhaseInt + 1);
tmp2 = phaseInc + currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp1 - tmp0;
tmp1 = tmp1 * currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp0 + (tmp1 >> NUM_EG1_FRAC_BITS);
pCurrentPhaseInt += (tmp2 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
currentPhaseFrac = tmp2 & PHASE_FRAC_MASK;
gain += gainIncrement;
tmp2 = (gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
tmp0 = *pMixBuffer;
tmp2 = tmp1 * tmp2;
tmp2 = (tmp2 >> 9);
tmp0 = tmp2 + tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp0;
numSamples--;
if (numSamples > 0)
goto InterpolationLoop;
pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum = pCurrentPhaseInt;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = currentPhaseFrac;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide>*/
pWTVoice->gain = (EAS_I16)(gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
}
| 174,602
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (session->restricted() && !IsFrameHostAllowedForRestrictedSessions())
return false;
session->SetRenderer(frame_host_ ? frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetID()
: ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID,
frame_host_);
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(false /* browser_only */)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TracingHandler(
protocol::TracingHandler::Renderer,
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id() : 0,
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (EnsureAgent())
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kVizDisplayCompositor) &&
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kUseVideoCaptureApiForDevToolsSnapshots)) {
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
}
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not create target handler for restricted sessions
Bug: 805224
Change-Id: I08528e44e79d0a097cfe72ab4949dda538efd098
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/988695
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547496}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (session->restricted() && !IsFrameHostAllowedForRestrictedSessions())
return false;
session->SetRenderer(frame_host_ ? frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetID()
: ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID,
frame_host_);
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
if (!session->restricted()) {
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(
new protocol::TargetHandler(false /* browser_only */)));
}
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TracingHandler(
protocol::TracingHandler::Renderer,
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id() : 0,
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (EnsureAgent())
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kVizDisplayCompositor) &&
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kUseVideoCaptureApiForDevToolsSnapshots)) {
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
}
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
| 173,235
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: LoadWatcher(ScriptContext* context,
content::RenderFrame* frame,
v8::Local<v8::Function> cb)
: content::RenderFrameObserver(frame),
context_(context),
callback_(context->isolate(), cb) {
if (ExtensionFrameHelper::Get(frame)->
did_create_current_document_element()) {
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&LoadWatcher::CallbackAndDie, base::Unretained(this),
true));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix re-entrancy and lifetime issue in RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated
BUG=585268,568130
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1684953002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374758}
CWE ID:
|
LoadWatcher(ScriptContext* context,
LoadWatcher(content::RenderFrame* frame,
const base::Callback<void(bool)>& callback)
: content::RenderFrameObserver(frame), callback_(callback) {}
void DidCreateDocumentElement() override {
// The callback must be run as soon as the root element is available.
// Running the callback may trigger DidCreateDocumentElement or
// DidFailProvisionalLoad, so delete this before running the callback.
base::Callback<void(bool)> callback = callback_;
delete this;
callback.Run(true);
}
| 172,145
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void nfs4_xdr_enc_getacl(struct rpc_rqst *req, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs_getaclargs *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
uint32_t replen;
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->fh, &hdr);
replen = hdr.replen + op_decode_hdr_maxsz + nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz + 1;
encode_getattr_two(xdr, FATTR4_WORD0_ACL, 0, &hdr);
xdr_inline_pages(&req->rq_rcv_buf, replen << 2,
args->acl_pages, args->acl_pgbase, args->acl_len);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
static void nfs4_xdr_enc_getacl(struct rpc_rqst *req, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs_getaclargs *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
uint32_t replen;
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->fh, &hdr);
replen = hdr.replen + op_decode_hdr_maxsz + 1;
encode_getattr_two(xdr, FATTR4_WORD0_ACL, 0, &hdr);
xdr_inline_pages(&req->rq_rcv_buf, replen << 2,
args->acl_pages, args->acl_pgbase, args->acl_len);
xdr_set_scratch_buffer(xdr, page_address(args->acl_scratch), PAGE_SIZE);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
| 165,721
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BrowserPluginGuest::SetCompositingBufferData(int gpu_process_id,
uint32 client_id,
uint32 context_id,
uint32 texture_id_0,
uint32 texture_id_1,
uint32 sync_point) {
if (texture_id_0 == 0) {
DCHECK(texture_id_1 == 0);
return;
}
DCHECK(texture_id_1 != 0);
DCHECK(texture_id_0 != texture_id_1);
surface_handle_ = gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(gfx::kNullPluginWindow, true);
surface_handle_.parent_gpu_process_id = gpu_process_id;
surface_handle_.parent_client_id = client_id;
surface_handle_.parent_context_id = context_id;
surface_handle_.parent_texture_id[0] = texture_id_0;
surface_handle_.parent_texture_id[1] = texture_id_1;
surface_handle_.sync_point = sync_point;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void BrowserPluginGuest::SetCompositingBufferData(int gpu_process_id,
uint32 client_id,
uint32 context_id,
uint32 texture_id_0,
uint32 texture_id_1,
uint32 sync_point) {
if (texture_id_0 == 0) {
DCHECK(texture_id_1 == 0);
return;
}
DCHECK(texture_id_1 != 0);
DCHECK(texture_id_0 != texture_id_1);
surface_handle_ = gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(gfx::kNullPluginWindow, true);
surface_handle_.parent_gpu_process_id = gpu_process_id;
surface_handle_.parent_client_id = client_id;
}
| 171,352
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: BufferMeta(const sp<IMemory> &mem, bool is_backup = false)
: mMem(mem),
mIsBackup(is_backup) {
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
BufferMeta(const sp<IMemory> &mem, bool is_backup = false)
BufferMeta(const sp<IMemory> &mem, OMX_U32 portIndex, bool is_backup = false)
: mMem(mem),
mIsBackup(is_backup),
mPortIndex(portIndex) {
}
| 173,521
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static bool access_pmu_evcntr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct sys_reg_params *p,
const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
{
u64 idx;
if (!kvm_arm_pmu_v3_ready(vcpu))
return trap_raz_wi(vcpu, p, r);
if (r->CRn == 9 && r->CRm == 13) {
if (r->Op2 == 2) {
/* PMXEVCNTR_EL0 */
if (pmu_access_event_counter_el0_disabled(vcpu))
return false;
idx = vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, PMSELR_EL0)
& ARMV8_PMU_COUNTER_MASK;
} else if (r->Op2 == 0) {
/* PMCCNTR_EL0 */
if (pmu_access_cycle_counter_el0_disabled(vcpu))
return false;
idx = ARMV8_PMU_CYCLE_IDX;
} else {
BUG();
}
} else if (r->CRn == 14 && (r->CRm & 12) == 8) {
/* PMEVCNTRn_EL0 */
if (pmu_access_event_counter_el0_disabled(vcpu))
return false;
idx = ((r->CRm & 3) << 3) | (r->Op2 & 7);
} else {
BUG();
}
if (!pmu_counter_idx_valid(vcpu, idx))
return false;
if (p->is_write) {
if (pmu_access_el0_disabled(vcpu))
return false;
kvm_pmu_set_counter_value(vcpu, idx, p->regval);
} else {
p->regval = kvm_pmu_get_counter_value(vcpu, idx);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
|
static bool access_pmu_evcntr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct sys_reg_params *p,
const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
{
u64 idx;
if (!kvm_arm_pmu_v3_ready(vcpu))
return trap_raz_wi(vcpu, p, r);
if (r->CRn == 9 && r->CRm == 13) {
if (r->Op2 == 2) {
/* PMXEVCNTR_EL0 */
if (pmu_access_event_counter_el0_disabled(vcpu))
return false;
idx = vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, PMSELR_EL0)
& ARMV8_PMU_COUNTER_MASK;
} else if (r->Op2 == 0) {
/* PMCCNTR_EL0 */
if (pmu_access_cycle_counter_el0_disabled(vcpu))
return false;
idx = ARMV8_PMU_CYCLE_IDX;
} else {
return false;
}
} else if (r->CRn == 0 && r->CRm == 9) {
/* PMCCNTR */
if (pmu_access_event_counter_el0_disabled(vcpu))
return false;
idx = ARMV8_PMU_CYCLE_IDX;
} else if (r->CRn == 14 && (r->CRm & 12) == 8) {
/* PMEVCNTRn_EL0 */
if (pmu_access_event_counter_el0_disabled(vcpu))
return false;
idx = ((r->CRm & 3) << 3) | (r->Op2 & 7);
} else {
return false;
}
if (!pmu_counter_idx_valid(vcpu, idx))
return false;
if (p->is_write) {
if (pmu_access_el0_disabled(vcpu))
return false;
kvm_pmu_set_counter_value(vcpu, idx, p->regval);
} else {
p->regval = kvm_pmu_get_counter_value(vcpu, idx);
}
return true;
}
| 167,989
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: CURLcode Curl_close(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
struct Curl_multi *m;
if(!data)
return CURLE_OK;
Curl_expire_clear(data); /* shut off timers */
m = data->multi;
if(m)
/* This handle is still part of a multi handle, take care of this first
and detach this handle from there. */
curl_multi_remove_handle(data->multi, data);
if(data->multi_easy)
/* when curl_easy_perform() is used, it creates its own multi handle to
use and this is the one */
curl_multi_cleanup(data->multi_easy);
/* Destroy the timeout list that is held in the easy handle. It is
/normally/ done by curl_multi_remove_handle() but this is "just in
case" */
Curl_llist_destroy(&data->state.timeoutlist, NULL);
data->magic = 0; /* force a clear AFTER the possibly enforced removal from
the multi handle, since that function uses the magic
field! */
if(data->state.rangestringalloc)
free(data->state.range);
/* freed here just in case DONE wasn't called */
Curl_free_request_state(data);
/* Close down all open SSL info and sessions */
Curl_ssl_close_all(data);
Curl_safefree(data->state.first_host);
Curl_safefree(data->state.scratch);
Curl_ssl_free_certinfo(data);
/* Cleanup possible redirect junk */
free(data->req.newurl);
data->req.newurl = NULL;
if(data->change.referer_alloc) {
Curl_safefree(data->change.referer);
data->change.referer_alloc = FALSE;
}
data->change.referer = NULL;
Curl_up_free(data);
Curl_safefree(data->state.buffer);
Curl_safefree(data->state.headerbuff);
Curl_safefree(data->state.ulbuf);
Curl_flush_cookies(data, 1);
Curl_digest_cleanup(data);
Curl_safefree(data->info.contenttype);
Curl_safefree(data->info.wouldredirect);
/* this destroys the channel and we cannot use it anymore after this */
Curl_resolver_cleanup(data->state.resolver);
Curl_http2_cleanup_dependencies(data);
Curl_convert_close(data);
/* No longer a dirty share, if it exists */
if(data->share) {
Curl_share_lock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_SHARE, CURL_LOCK_ACCESS_SINGLE);
data->share->dirty--;
Curl_share_unlock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_SHARE);
}
/* destruct wildcard structures if it is needed */
Curl_wildcard_dtor(&data->wildcard);
Curl_freeset(data);
free(data);
return CURLE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
CURLcode Curl_close(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
struct Curl_multi *m;
if(!data)
return CURLE_OK;
Curl_expire_clear(data); /* shut off timers */
m = data->multi;
if(m)
/* This handle is still part of a multi handle, take care of this first
and detach this handle from there. */
curl_multi_remove_handle(data->multi, data);
if(data->multi_easy) {
/* when curl_easy_perform() is used, it creates its own multi handle to
use and this is the one */
curl_multi_cleanup(data->multi_easy);
data->multi_easy = NULL;
}
/* Destroy the timeout list that is held in the easy handle. It is
/normally/ done by curl_multi_remove_handle() but this is "just in
case" */
Curl_llist_destroy(&data->state.timeoutlist, NULL);
data->magic = 0; /* force a clear AFTER the possibly enforced removal from
the multi handle, since that function uses the magic
field! */
if(data->state.rangestringalloc)
free(data->state.range);
/* freed here just in case DONE wasn't called */
Curl_free_request_state(data);
/* Close down all open SSL info and sessions */
Curl_ssl_close_all(data);
Curl_safefree(data->state.first_host);
Curl_safefree(data->state.scratch);
Curl_ssl_free_certinfo(data);
/* Cleanup possible redirect junk */
free(data->req.newurl);
data->req.newurl = NULL;
if(data->change.referer_alloc) {
Curl_safefree(data->change.referer);
data->change.referer_alloc = FALSE;
}
data->change.referer = NULL;
Curl_up_free(data);
Curl_safefree(data->state.buffer);
Curl_safefree(data->state.headerbuff);
Curl_safefree(data->state.ulbuf);
Curl_flush_cookies(data, 1);
Curl_digest_cleanup(data);
Curl_safefree(data->info.contenttype);
Curl_safefree(data->info.wouldredirect);
/* this destroys the channel and we cannot use it anymore after this */
Curl_resolver_cleanup(data->state.resolver);
Curl_http2_cleanup_dependencies(data);
Curl_convert_close(data);
/* No longer a dirty share, if it exists */
if(data->share) {
Curl_share_lock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_SHARE, CURL_LOCK_ACCESS_SINGLE);
data->share->dirty--;
Curl_share_unlock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_SHARE);
}
/* destruct wildcard structures if it is needed */
Curl_wildcard_dtor(&data->wildcard);
Curl_freeset(data);
free(data);
return CURLE_OK;
}
| 169,030
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: WebGLRenderingContextBase::WebGLRenderingContextBase(
CanvasRenderingContextHost* host,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner,
std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider,
bool using_gpu_compositing,
const CanvasContextCreationAttributesCore& requested_attributes,
Platform::ContextType context_type)
: CanvasRenderingContext(host, requested_attributes),
context_group_(MakeGarbageCollected<WebGLContextGroup>()),
dispatch_context_lost_event_timer_(
task_runner,
this,
&WebGLRenderingContextBase::DispatchContextLostEvent),
restore_timer_(task_runner,
this,
&WebGLRenderingContextBase::MaybeRestoreContext),
task_runner_(task_runner),
num_gl_errors_to_console_allowed_(kMaxGLErrorsAllowedToConsole),
context_type_(context_type) {
DCHECK(context_provider);
xr_compatible_ = requested_attributes.xr_compatible;
context_group_->AddContext(this);
max_viewport_dims_[0] = max_viewport_dims_[1] = 0;
context_provider->ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VIEWPORT_DIMS,
max_viewport_dims_);
InitializeWebGLContextLimits(context_provider.get());
scoped_refptr<DrawingBuffer> buffer;
buffer =
CreateDrawingBuffer(std::move(context_provider), using_gpu_compositing);
if (!buffer) {
context_lost_mode_ = kSyntheticLostContext;
return;
}
drawing_buffer_ = std::move(buffer);
GetDrawingBuffer()->Bind(GL_FRAMEBUFFER);
SetupFlags();
String disabled_webgl_extensions(GetDrawingBuffer()
->ContextProvider()
->GetGpuFeatureInfo()
.disabled_webgl_extensions.c_str());
Vector<String> disabled_extension_list;
disabled_webgl_extensions.Split(' ', disabled_extension_list);
for (const auto& entry : disabled_extension_list) {
disabled_extensions_.insert(entry);
}
#define ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(set, values) \
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(values); ++i) { \
set.insert(values[i]); \
}
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_internal_formats_,
kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_copy_tex_image_,
kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_types_, kSupportedTypesES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_types_, kSupportedTypesES2);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
WebGLRenderingContextBase::WebGLRenderingContextBase(
CanvasRenderingContextHost* host,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner,
std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider,
bool using_gpu_compositing,
const CanvasContextCreationAttributesCore& requested_attributes,
Platform::ContextType context_type)
: CanvasRenderingContext(host, requested_attributes),
context_group_(MakeGarbageCollected<WebGLContextGroup>()),
dispatch_context_lost_event_timer_(
task_runner,
this,
&WebGLRenderingContextBase::DispatchContextLostEvent),
restore_timer_(task_runner,
this,
&WebGLRenderingContextBase::MaybeRestoreContext),
task_runner_(task_runner),
num_gl_errors_to_console_allowed_(kMaxGLErrorsAllowedToConsole),
context_type_(context_type),
program_completion_queries_(
base::MRUCache<WebGLProgram*, GLuint>::NO_AUTO_EVICT) {
DCHECK(context_provider);
xr_compatible_ = requested_attributes.xr_compatible;
context_group_->AddContext(this);
max_viewport_dims_[0] = max_viewport_dims_[1] = 0;
context_provider->ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VIEWPORT_DIMS,
max_viewport_dims_);
InitializeWebGLContextLimits(context_provider.get());
scoped_refptr<DrawingBuffer> buffer;
buffer =
CreateDrawingBuffer(std::move(context_provider), using_gpu_compositing);
if (!buffer) {
context_lost_mode_ = kSyntheticLostContext;
return;
}
drawing_buffer_ = std::move(buffer);
GetDrawingBuffer()->Bind(GL_FRAMEBUFFER);
SetupFlags();
String disabled_webgl_extensions(GetDrawingBuffer()
->ContextProvider()
->GetGpuFeatureInfo()
.disabled_webgl_extensions.c_str());
Vector<String> disabled_extension_list;
disabled_webgl_extensions.Split(' ', disabled_extension_list);
for (const auto& entry : disabled_extension_list) {
disabled_extensions_.insert(entry);
}
#define ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(set, values) \
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(values); ++i) { \
set.insert(values[i]); \
}
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_internal_formats_,
kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_copy_tex_image_,
kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_types_, kSupportedTypesES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_types_, kSupportedTypesES2);
}
| 172,535
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
session->SetRenderer(frame_host_ ? frame_host_->GetProcess() : nullptr,
frame_host_);
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TracingHandler(
protocol::TracingHandler::Renderer,
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id() : 0,
GetIOContext())));
if (frame_tree_node_ && !frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
}
if (EnsureAgent())
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
session->SetRenderer(frame_host_ ? frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetID()
: ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID,
frame_host_);
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TracingHandler(
protocol::TracingHandler::Renderer,
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id() : 0,
GetIOContext())));
if (frame_tree_node_ && !frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
}
if (EnsureAgent())
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
}
| 172,781
|
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