instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.3k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int main( int /*argc*/, char ** argv)
{
InitializeMagick(*argv);
int failures=0;
try {
string srcdir("");
if(getenv("SRCDIR") != 0)
srcdir = getenv("SRCDIR");
list<Image> imageList;
readImages( &imageList, srcdir + "test_image_anim.miff" );
Image appended;
appendImages( &appended, imageList.begin(), imageList.end() );
if (( appended.signature() != "3a90bb0bb8f69f6788ab99e9e25598a0d6c5cdbbb797f77ad68011e0a8b1689d" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "c15fcd1e739b73638dc4e36837bdb53f7087359544664caf7b1763928129f3c7" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "229ff72f812e5f536245dc3b4502a0bc2ab2363f67c545863a85ab91ebfbfb83" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "b98c42c55fc4e661cb3684154256809c03c0c6b53da2738b6ce8066e1b6ddef0" ))
{
++failures;
cout << "Line: " << __LINE__
<< " Horizontal append failed, signature = "
<< appended.signature() << endl;
appended.write("appendImages_horizontal_out.miff");
}
appendImages( &appended, imageList.begin(), imageList.end(), true );
if (( appended.signature() != "d73d25ccd6011936d08b6d0d89183b7a61790544c2195269aff4db2f782ffc08" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "0909f7ffa7c6ea410fb2ebfdbcb19d61b19c4bd271851ce3bd51662519dc2b58" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "11b97ba6ac1664aa1c2faed4c86195472ae9cce2ed75402d975bb4ffcf1de751" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "cae4815eeb3cb689e73b94d897a9957d3414d1d4f513e8b5e52579b05d164bfe" ))
{
++failures;
cout << "Line: " << __LINE__
<< " Vertical append failed, signature = "
<< appended.signature() << endl;
appended.write("appendImages_vertical_out.miff");
}
}
catch( Exception &error_ )
{
cout << "Caught exception: " << error_.what() << endl;
return 1;
}
catch( exception &error_ )
{
cout << "Caught exception: " << error_.what() << endl;
return 1;
}
if ( failures )
{
cout << failures << " failures" << endl;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix signature mismatch
CWE ID: CWE-369
|
int main( int /*argc*/, char ** argv)
{
InitializeMagick(*argv);
int failures=0;
try {
string srcdir("");
if(getenv("SRCDIR") != 0)
srcdir = getenv("SRCDIR");
list<Image> imageList;
readImages( &imageList, srcdir + "test_image_anim.miff" );
Image appended;
appendImages( &appended, imageList.begin(), imageList.end() );
if (( appended.signature() != "3a90bb0bb8f69f6788ab99e9e25598a0d6c5cdbbb797f77ad68011e0a8b1689d" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "c15fcd1e739b73638dc4e36837bdb53f7087359544664caf7b1763928129f3c7" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "229ff72f812e5f536245dc3b4502a0bc2ab2363f67c545863a85ab91ebfbfb83" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "b98c42c55fc4e661cb3684154256809c03c0c6b53da2738b6ce8066e1b6ddef0" ))
{
++failures;
cout << "Line: " << __LINE__
<< " Horizontal append failed, signature = "
<< appended.signature() << endl;
appended.write("appendImages_horizontal_out.miff");
}
appendImages( &appended, imageList.begin(), imageList.end(), true );
if (( appended.signature() != "d73d25ccd6011936d08b6d0d89183b7a61790544c2195269aff4db2f782ffc08" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "f3590c183018757da798613a23505ab9600b35935988eee12f096cb6219f2bc3" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "11b97ba6ac1664aa1c2faed4c86195472ae9cce2ed75402d975bb4ffcf1de751" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "cae4815eeb3cb689e73b94d897a9957d3414d1d4f513e8b5e52579b05d164bfe" ))
{
++failures;
cout << "Line: " << __LINE__
<< " Vertical append failed, signature = "
<< appended.signature() << endl;
appended.write("appendImages_vertical_out.miff");
}
}
catch( Exception &error_ )
{
cout << "Caught exception: " << error_.what() << endl;
return 1;
}
catch( exception &error_ )
{
cout << "Caught exception: " << error_.what() << endl;
return 1;
}
if ( failures )
{
cout << failures << " failures" << endl;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 170,112
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_pixel_add_alpha(image_pixel *this, PNG_CONST standard_display *display)
{
if (this->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(this);
if ((this->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) == 0)
{
if (this->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
if (this->bit_depth < 8)
this->bit_depth = 8;
if (this->have_tRNS)
{
this->have_tRNS = 0;
/* Check the input, original, channel value here against the
* original tRNS gray chunk valie.
*/
if (this->red == display->transparent.red)
this->alphaf = 0;
else
this->alphaf = 1;
}
else
this->alphaf = 1;
this->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA;
}
else if (this->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
{
if (this->have_tRNS)
{
this->have_tRNS = 0;
/* Again, check the exact input values, not the current transformed
* value!
*/
if (this->red == display->transparent.red &&
this->green == display->transparent.green &&
this->blue == display->transparent.blue)
this->alphaf = 0;
else
this->alphaf = 1;
this->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA;
}
}
/* The error in the alpha is zero and the sBIT value comes from the
* original sBIT data (actually it will always be the original bit depth).
*/
this->alphae = 0;
this->alpha_sBIT = display->alpha_sBIT;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_pixel_add_alpha(image_pixel *this, PNG_CONST standard_display *display)
image_pixel_add_alpha(image_pixel *this, const standard_display *display,
int for_background)
{
if (this->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(this);
if ((this->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) == 0)
{
if (this->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700
if (!for_background && this->bit_depth < 8)
this->bit_depth = this->sample_depth = 8;
# endif
if (this->have_tRNS)
{
/* After 1.7 the expansion of bit depth only happens if there is a
* tRNS chunk to expand at this point.
*/
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10700
if (!for_background && this->bit_depth < 8)
this->bit_depth = this->sample_depth = 8;
# endif
this->have_tRNS = 0;
/* Check the input, original, channel value here against the
* original tRNS gray chunk valie.
*/
if (this->red == display->transparent.red)
this->alphaf = 0;
else
this->alphaf = 1;
}
else
this->alphaf = 1;
this->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA;
}
else if (this->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
{
if (this->have_tRNS)
{
this->have_tRNS = 0;
/* Again, check the exact input values, not the current transformed
* value!
*/
if (this->red == display->transparent.red &&
this->green == display->transparent.green &&
this->blue == display->transparent.blue)
this->alphaf = 0;
else
this->alphaf = 1;
}
else
this->alphaf = 1;
this->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA;
}
/* The error in the alpha is zero and the sBIT value comes from the
* original sBIT data (actually it will always be the original bit depth).
*/
this->alphae = 0;
this->alpha_sBIT = display->alpha_sBIT;
}
}
| 173,616
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void impeg2d_dec_user_data(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
UWORD32 u4_start_code;
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while(u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN) != START_CODE_PREFIX)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,8);
}
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
void impeg2d_dec_user_data(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
UWORD32 u4_start_code;
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while(u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while((impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN) != START_CODE_PREFIX) &&
(ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset))
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,8);
}
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
}
}
| 173,948
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: DynamicMetadataProvider::DynamicMetadataProvider(const DOMElement* e)
: saml2md::DynamicMetadataProvider(e),
m_verifyHost(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, true, verifyHost)),
m_ignoreTransport(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, ignoreTransport)),
m_encoded(true), m_trust(nullptr)
{
const DOMElement* child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, Subst);
if (child && child->hasChildNodes()) {
auto_ptr_char s(child->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue());
if (s.get() && *s.get()) {
m_subst = s.get();
m_encoded = XMLHelper::getAttrBool(child, true, encoded);
m_hashed = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, hashed);
}
}
if (m_subst.empty()) {
child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, Regex);
if (child && child->hasChildNodes() && child->hasAttributeNS(nullptr, match)) {
m_match = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, match);
auto_ptr_char repl(child->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue());
if (repl.get() && *repl.get())
m_regex = repl.get();
}
}
if (!m_ignoreTransport) {
child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, _TrustEngine);
string t = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, _type);
if (!t.empty()) {
TrustEngine* trust = XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().TrustEngineManager.newPlugin(t.c_str(), child);
if (!dynamic_cast<X509TrustEngine*>(trust)) {
delete trust;
throw ConfigurationException("DynamicMetadataProvider requires an X509TrustEngine plugin.");
}
m_trust.reset(dynamic_cast<X509TrustEngine*>(trust));
m_dummyCR.reset(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().CredentialResolverManager.newPlugin(DUMMY_CREDENTIAL_RESOLVER, nullptr));
}
if (!m_trust.get() || !m_dummyCR.get())
throw ConfigurationException("DynamicMetadataProvider requires an X509TrustEngine plugin unless ignoreTransport is true.");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-347
|
DynamicMetadataProvider::DynamicMetadataProvider(const DOMElement* e)
: saml2md::DynamicMetadataProvider(e), MetadataProvider(e),
m_verifyHost(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, true, verifyHost)),
m_ignoreTransport(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, ignoreTransport)),
m_encoded(true), m_trust(nullptr)
{
const DOMElement* child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, Subst);
if (child && child->hasChildNodes()) {
auto_ptr_char s(child->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue());
if (s.get() && *s.get()) {
m_subst = s.get();
m_encoded = XMLHelper::getAttrBool(child, true, encoded);
m_hashed = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, hashed);
}
}
if (m_subst.empty()) {
child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, Regex);
if (child && child->hasChildNodes() && child->hasAttributeNS(nullptr, match)) {
m_match = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, match);
auto_ptr_char repl(child->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue());
if (repl.get() && *repl.get())
m_regex = repl.get();
}
}
if (!m_ignoreTransport) {
child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, _TrustEngine);
string t = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, _type);
if (!t.empty()) {
TrustEngine* trust = XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().TrustEngineManager.newPlugin(t.c_str(), child);
if (!dynamic_cast<X509TrustEngine*>(trust)) {
delete trust;
throw ConfigurationException("DynamicMetadataProvider requires an X509TrustEngine plugin.");
}
m_trust.reset(dynamic_cast<X509TrustEngine*>(trust));
m_dummyCR.reset(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().CredentialResolverManager.newPlugin(DUMMY_CREDENTIAL_RESOLVER, nullptr));
}
if (!m_trust.get() || !m_dummyCR.get())
throw ConfigurationException("DynamicMetadataProvider requires an X509TrustEngine plugin unless ignoreTransport is true.");
}
}
| 164,623
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void addArgumentToVtab(Parse *pParse){
if( pParse->sArg.z && pParse->pNewTable ){
const char *z = (const char*)pParse->sArg.z;
int n = pParse->sArg.n;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
addModuleArgument(db, pParse->pNewTable, sqlite3DbStrNDup(db, z, n));
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static void addArgumentToVtab(Parse *pParse){
if( pParse->sArg.z && pParse->pNewTable ){
const char *z = (const char*)pParse->sArg.z;
int n = pParse->sArg.n;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
addModuleArgument(pParse, pParse->pNewTable, sqlite3DbStrNDup(db, z, n));
}
}
| 173,013
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool SerializeNotificationDatabaseData(const NotificationDatabaseData& input,
std::string* output) {
DCHECK(output);
scoped_ptr<NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData> payload(
new NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData());
const PlatformNotificationData& notification_data = input.notification_data;
payload->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.title));
switch (notification_data.direction) {
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_LEFT_TO_RIGHT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::LEFT_TO_RIGHT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_RIGHT_TO_LEFT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::RIGHT_TO_LEFT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_AUTO:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::AUTO);
break;
}
payload->set_lang(notification_data.lang);
payload->set_body(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.body));
payload->set_tag(notification_data.tag);
payload->set_icon(notification_data.icon.spec());
for (size_t i = 0; i < notification_data.vibration_pattern.size(); ++i)
payload->add_vibration_pattern(notification_data.vibration_pattern[i]);
payload->set_timestamp(notification_data.timestamp.ToInternalValue());
payload->set_silent(notification_data.silent);
payload->set_require_interaction(notification_data.require_interaction);
if (notification_data.data.size()) {
payload->set_data(¬ification_data.data.front(),
notification_data.data.size());
}
for (const PlatformNotificationAction& action : notification_data.actions) {
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationAction* payload_action =
payload->add_actions();
payload_action->set_action(action.action);
payload_action->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(action.title));
}
NotificationDatabaseDataProto message;
message.set_notification_id(input.notification_id);
message.set_origin(input.origin.spec());
message.set_service_worker_registration_id(
input.service_worker_registration_id);
message.set_allocated_notification_data(payload.release());
return message.SerializeToString(output);
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID:
|
bool SerializeNotificationDatabaseData(const NotificationDatabaseData& input,
std::string* output) {
DCHECK(output);
scoped_ptr<NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData> payload(
new NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData());
const PlatformNotificationData& notification_data = input.notification_data;
payload->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.title));
switch (notification_data.direction) {
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_LEFT_TO_RIGHT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::LEFT_TO_RIGHT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_RIGHT_TO_LEFT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::RIGHT_TO_LEFT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_AUTO:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::AUTO);
break;
}
payload->set_lang(notification_data.lang);
payload->set_body(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.body));
payload->set_tag(notification_data.tag);
payload->set_icon(notification_data.icon.spec());
for (size_t i = 0; i < notification_data.vibration_pattern.size(); ++i)
payload->add_vibration_pattern(notification_data.vibration_pattern[i]);
payload->set_timestamp(notification_data.timestamp.ToInternalValue());
payload->set_silent(notification_data.silent);
payload->set_require_interaction(notification_data.require_interaction);
if (notification_data.data.size()) {
payload->set_data(¬ification_data.data.front(),
notification_data.data.size());
}
for (const PlatformNotificationAction& action : notification_data.actions) {
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationAction* payload_action =
payload->add_actions();
payload_action->set_action(action.action);
payload_action->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(action.title));
payload_action->set_icon(action.icon.spec());
}
NotificationDatabaseDataProto message;
message.set_notification_id(input.notification_id);
message.set_origin(input.origin.spec());
message.set_service_worker_registration_id(
input.service_worker_registration_id);
message.set_allocated_notification_data(payload.release());
return message.SerializeToString(output);
}
| 171,630
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AudioOutputDevice::OnStreamCreated(
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle,
base::SyncSocket::Handle socket_handle,
int length) {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(handle);
DCHECK(socket_handle);
#else
DCHECK_GE(handle.fd, 0);
DCHECK_GE(socket_handle, 0);
#endif
DCHECK(stream_id_);
if (!audio_thread_.get())
return;
DCHECK(audio_thread_->IsStopped());
audio_callback_.reset(new AudioOutputDevice::AudioThreadCallback(
audio_parameters_, input_channels_, handle, length, callback_));
audio_thread_->Start(
audio_callback_.get(), socket_handle, "AudioOutputDevice");
is_started_ = true;
if (play_on_start_)
PlayOnIOThread();
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void AudioOutputDevice::OnStreamCreated(
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle,
base::SyncSocket::Handle socket_handle,
int length) {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(handle);
DCHECK(socket_handle);
#else
DCHECK_GE(handle.fd, 0);
DCHECK_GE(socket_handle, 0);
#endif
DCHECK(stream_id_);
DCHECK(audio_thread_.IsStopped());
audio_callback_.reset(new AudioOutputDevice::AudioThreadCallback(
audio_parameters_, input_channels_, handle, length, callback_));
audio_thread_.Start(audio_callback_.get(), socket_handle,
"AudioOutputDevice");
is_started_ = true;
if (play_on_start_)
PlayOnIOThread();
}
| 170,705
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ExtensionInstallDialogView::ExtensionInstallDialogView(
Profile* profile,
content::PageNavigator* navigator,
const ExtensionInstallPrompt::DoneCallback& done_callback,
std::unique_ptr<ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt> prompt)
: profile_(profile),
navigator_(navigator),
done_callback_(done_callback),
prompt_(std::move(prompt)),
container_(NULL),
scroll_view_(NULL),
handled_result_(false) {
InitView();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions UI] Initially disabled OK button for extension install prompts and enable them after a 500 ms time period.
BUG=394518
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2716353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461933}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
ExtensionInstallDialogView::ExtensionInstallDialogView(
Profile* profile,
content::PageNavigator* navigator,
const ExtensionInstallPrompt::DoneCallback& done_callback,
std::unique_ptr<ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt> prompt)
: profile_(profile),
navigator_(navigator),
done_callback_(done_callback),
prompt_(std::move(prompt)),
container_(NULL),
scroll_view_(NULL),
handled_result_(false),
install_button_enabled_(false) {
InitView();
}
| 173,159
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bootp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register const struct bootp *bp;
static const u_char vm_cmu[4] = VM_CMU;
static const u_char vm_rfc1048[4] = VM_RFC1048;
bp = (const struct bootp *)cp;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_op);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BOOTP/DHCP, %s",
tok2str(bootp_op_values, "unknown (0x%02x)", bp->bp_op)));
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_hlen);
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6 && bp->bp_op == BOOTPREQUEST) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " from %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_secs);
/* The usual hardware address type is 1 (10Mb Ethernet) */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", htype %d", bp->bp_htype));
/* The usual length for 10Mb Ethernet address is 6 bytes */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1 || bp->bp_hlen != 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hlen %d", bp->bp_hlen));
/* Only print interesting fields */
if (bp->bp_hops)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hops %d", bp->bp_hops));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", xid 0x%x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid)));
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", secs %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(bootp_flag_values, "none", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags))));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (0x%04x)", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags)));
/* Client's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_ciaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_ciaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_ciaddr)));
/* 'your' ip address (bootp client) */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_yiaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_yiaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Your-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_yiaddr)));
/* Server's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_siaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_siaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Server-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_siaddr)));
/* Gateway's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_giaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_giaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Gateway-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_giaddr)));
/* Client's Ethernet address */
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-Ethernet-Address %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_sname[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_sname) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t sname \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_sname, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_sname,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_file[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_file) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t file \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_file, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_file,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
/* Decode the vendor buffer */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_vend[0]);
if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_rfc1048,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
rfc1048_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_cmu,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
cmu_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else {
uint32_t ul;
ul = EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_vend);
if (ul != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor-#0x%x", ul));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13028/BOOTP: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't cause 'tcpdump: pcap_loop: truncated dump file'
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
bootp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register const struct bootp *bp;
static const u_char vm_cmu[4] = VM_CMU;
static const u_char vm_rfc1048[4] = VM_RFC1048;
bp = (const struct bootp *)cp;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_op);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BOOTP/DHCP, %s",
tok2str(bootp_op_values, "unknown (0x%02x)", bp->bp_op)));
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_hlen);
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6 && bp->bp_op == BOOTPREQUEST) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " from %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_secs);
/* The usual hardware address type is 1 (10Mb Ethernet) */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", htype %d", bp->bp_htype));
/* The usual length for 10Mb Ethernet address is 6 bytes */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1 || bp->bp_hlen != 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hlen %d", bp->bp_hlen));
/* Only print interesting fields */
if (bp->bp_hops)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hops %d", bp->bp_hops));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", xid 0x%x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid)));
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", secs %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs)));
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_flags);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(bootp_flag_values, "none", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags))));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (0x%04x)", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags)));
/* Client's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_ciaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_ciaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_ciaddr)));
/* 'your' ip address (bootp client) */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_yiaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_yiaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Your-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_yiaddr)));
/* Server's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_siaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_siaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Server-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_siaddr)));
/* Gateway's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_giaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_giaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Gateway-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_giaddr)));
/* Client's Ethernet address */
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-Ethernet-Address %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_sname[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_sname) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t sname \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_sname, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_sname,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_file[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_file) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t file \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_file, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_file,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
/* Decode the vendor buffer */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_vend[0]);
if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_rfc1048,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
rfc1048_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_cmu,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
cmu_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else {
uint32_t ul;
ul = EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_vend);
if (ul != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor-#0x%x", ul));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
| 170,027
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void UserSelectionScreen::FillUserMojoStruct(
const user_manager::User* user,
bool is_owner,
bool is_signin_to_add,
proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType auth_type,
const std::vector<std::string>* public_session_recommended_locales,
ash::mojom::LoginUserInfo* user_info) {
user_info->basic_user_info = ash::mojom::UserInfo::New();
user_info->basic_user_info->type = user->GetType();
user_info->basic_user_info->account_id = user->GetAccountId();
user_info->basic_user_info->display_name =
base::UTF16ToUTF8(user->GetDisplayName());
user_info->basic_user_info->display_email = user->display_email();
user_info->basic_user_info->avatar = BuildMojoUserAvatarForUser(user);
user_info->auth_type = auth_type;
user_info->is_signed_in = user->is_logged_in();
user_info->is_device_owner = is_owner;
user_info->can_remove = CanRemoveUser(user);
user_info->allow_fingerprint_unlock = AllowFingerprintForUser(user);
if (!is_signin_to_add) {
user_info->is_multiprofile_allowed = true;
} else {
GetMultiProfilePolicy(user, &user_info->is_multiprofile_allowed,
&user_info->multiprofile_policy);
}
if (user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT) {
user_info->public_account_info = ash::mojom::PublicAccountInfo::New();
std::string domain;
if (GetEnterpriseDomain(&domain))
user_info->public_account_info->enterprise_domain = domain;
std::string selected_locale;
bool has_multiple_locales;
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> available_locales =
GetPublicSessionLocales(public_session_recommended_locales,
&selected_locale, &has_multiple_locales);
DCHECK(available_locales);
user_info->public_account_info->available_locales =
lock_screen_utils::FromListValueToLocaleItem(
std::move(available_locales));
user_info->public_account_info->default_locale = selected_locale;
user_info->public_account_info->show_advanced_view = has_multiple_locales;
}
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
|
void UserSelectionScreen::FillUserMojoStruct(
| 172,201
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ssize_t v9fs_list_xattr(FsContext *ctx, const char *path,
void *value, size_t vsize)
{
ssize_t size = 0;
void *ovalue = value;
XattrOperations *xops;
char *orig_value, *orig_value_start;
ssize_t xattr_len, parsed_len = 0, attr_len;
char *dirpath, *name;
int dirfd;
/* Get the actual len */
dirpath = g_path_get_dirname(path);
dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(ctx, dirpath);
g_free(dirpath);
if (dirfd == -1) {
return -1;
}
name = g_path_get_basename(path);
xattr_len = flistxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, name, value, 0);
if (xattr_len <= 0) {
g_free(name);
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
return xattr_len;
}
/* Now fetch the xattr and find the actual size */
orig_value = g_malloc(xattr_len);
xattr_len = flistxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, name, orig_value, xattr_len);
g_free(name);
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
if (xattr_len < 0) {
return -1;
}
orig_value_start = orig_value;
while (xattr_len > parsed_len) {
xops = get_xattr_operations(ctx->xops, orig_value);
if (!xops) {
goto next_entry;
}
if (!value) {
size += xops->listxattr(ctx, path, orig_value, value, vsize);
} else {
size = xops->listxattr(ctx, path, orig_value, value, vsize);
if (size < 0) {
goto err_out;
}
value += size;
vsize -= size;
}
next_entry:
/* Got the next entry */
attr_len = strlen(orig_value) + 1;
parsed_len += attr_len;
orig_value += attr_len;
}
if (value) {
size = value - ovalue;
}
err_out:
g_free(orig_value_start);
return size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
|
ssize_t v9fs_list_xattr(FsContext *ctx, const char *path,
void *value, size_t vsize)
{
ssize_t size = 0;
void *ovalue = value;
XattrOperations *xops;
char *orig_value, *orig_value_start;
ssize_t xattr_len, parsed_len = 0, attr_len;
char *dirpath, *name;
int dirfd;
/* Get the actual len */
dirpath = g_path_get_dirname(path);
dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(ctx, dirpath);
g_free(dirpath);
if (dirfd == -1) {
return -1;
}
name = g_path_get_basename(path);
xattr_len = flistxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, name, value, 0);
if (xattr_len <= 0) {
g_free(name);
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
return xattr_len;
}
/* Now fetch the xattr and find the actual size */
orig_value = g_malloc(xattr_len);
xattr_len = flistxattrat_nofollow(dirfd, name, orig_value, xattr_len);
g_free(name);
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
if (xattr_len < 0) {
g_free(orig_value);
return -1;
}
orig_value_start = orig_value;
while (xattr_len > parsed_len) {
xops = get_xattr_operations(ctx->xops, orig_value);
if (!xops) {
goto next_entry;
}
if (!value) {
size += xops->listxattr(ctx, path, orig_value, value, vsize);
} else {
size = xops->listxattr(ctx, path, orig_value, value, vsize);
if (size < 0) {
goto err_out;
}
value += size;
vsize -= size;
}
next_entry:
/* Got the next entry */
attr_len = strlen(orig_value) + 1;
parsed_len += attr_len;
orig_value += attr_len;
}
if (value) {
size = value - ovalue;
}
err_out:
g_free(orig_value_start);
return size;
}
| 164,885
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: chunk_grow(chunk_t *chunk, size_t sz)
{
off_t offset;
size_t memlen_orig = chunk->memlen;
tor_assert(sz > chunk->memlen);
offset = chunk->data - chunk->mem;
chunk = tor_realloc(chunk, CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz));
chunk->memlen = sz;
chunk->data = chunk->mem + offset;
#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC
tor_assert(chunk->DBG_alloc == CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen_orig));
chunk->DBG_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz);
#endif
total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks +=
CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz) - CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen_orig);
return chunk;
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
chunk_grow(chunk_t *chunk, size_t sz)
{
off_t offset;
const size_t memlen_orig = chunk->memlen;
const size_t orig_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen_orig);
const size_t new_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz);
tor_assert(sz > chunk->memlen);
offset = chunk->data - chunk->mem;
chunk = tor_realloc(chunk, new_alloc);
chunk->memlen = sz;
chunk->data = chunk->mem + offset;
#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC
tor_assert(chunk->DBG_alloc == orig_alloc);
chunk->DBG_alloc = new_alloc;
#endif
total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks += new_alloc - orig_alloc;
CHUNK_SET_SENTINEL(chunk, new_alloc);
return chunk;
}
| 168,757
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual bool SetImeConfig(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList) {
active_input_method_ids_ = value.string_list_value;
}
MaybeStartInputMethodDaemon(section, config_name, value);
const ConfigKeyType key = std::make_pair(section, config_name);
current_config_values_[key] = value;
if (ime_connected_) {
pending_config_requests_[key] = value;
FlushImeConfig();
}
MaybeStopInputMethodDaemon(section, config_name, value);
MaybeChangeCurrentKeyboardLayout(section, config_name, value);
return pending_config_requests_.empty();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
virtual bool SetImeConfig(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const input_method::ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
value.type == input_method::ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList) {
active_input_method_ids_ = value.string_list_value;
}
MaybeStartInputMethodDaemon(section, config_name, value);
const ConfigKeyType key = std::make_pair(section, config_name);
current_config_values_[key] = value;
if (ime_connected_) {
pending_config_requests_[key] = value;
FlushImeConfig();
}
MaybeStopInputMethodDaemon(section, config_name, value);
MaybeChangeCurrentKeyboardLayout(section, config_name, value);
return pending_config_requests_.empty();
}
| 170,505
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref)
{
atomic_inc(&map->refcnt);
if (uref)
atomic_inc(&map->usercnt);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
|
void bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref)
/* prog's and map's refcnt limit */
#define BPF_MAX_REFCNT 32768
struct bpf_map *bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref)
{
if (atomic_inc_return(&map->refcnt) > BPF_MAX_REFCNT) {
atomic_dec(&map->refcnt);
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
}
if (uref)
atomic_inc(&map->usercnt);
return map;
}
| 167,253
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: kdc_process_for_user(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_pa_for_user *for_user;
krb5_data req_data;
req_data.length = pa_data->length;
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_for_user(&req_data, &for_user);
if (code)
return code;
code = verify_for_user_checksum(kdc_context, tgs_session, for_user);
if (code) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return code;
}
*s4u_x509_user = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user));
if (*s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return ENOMEM;
}
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user = for_user->user;
for_user->user = NULL;
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-617
|
kdc_process_for_user(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_pa_for_user *for_user;
krb5_data req_data;
req_data.length = pa_data->length;
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_for_user(&req_data, &for_user);
if (code) {
*status = "DECODE_PA_FOR_USER";
return code;
}
code = verify_for_user_checksum(kdc_context, tgs_session, for_user);
if (code) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return code;
}
*s4u_x509_user = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user));
if (*s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return ENOMEM;
}
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user = for_user->user;
for_user->user = NULL;
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return 0;
}
| 168,041
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void LogoService::GetLogo(LogoCallbacks callbacks) {
if (!template_url_service_) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const TemplateURL* template_url =
template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
if (!template_url) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const base::CommandLine* command_line =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
GURL logo_url;
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kSearchProviderLogoURL)) {
logo_url = GURL(
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSearchProviderLogoURL));
} else {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
logo_url = template_url->logo_url();
#endif
}
GURL base_url;
GURL doodle_url;
const bool is_google = template_url->url_ref().HasGoogleBaseURLs(
template_url_service_->search_terms_data());
if (is_google) {
base_url =
GURL(template_url_service_->search_terms_data().GoogleBaseURLValue());
doodle_url = search_provider_logos::GetGoogleDoodleURL(base_url);
} else if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kThirdPartyDoodles)) {
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kThirdPartyDoodleURL)) {
doodle_url = GURL(
command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kThirdPartyDoodleURL));
} else {
std::string override_url = base::GetFieldTrialParamValueByFeature(
features::kThirdPartyDoodles,
features::kThirdPartyDoodlesOverrideUrlParam);
if (!override_url.empty()) {
doodle_url = GURL(override_url);
} else {
doodle_url = template_url->doodle_url();
}
}
base_url = doodle_url.GetOrigin();
}
if (!logo_url.is_valid() && !doodle_url.is_valid()) {
RunCallbacksWithDisabled(std::move(callbacks));
return;
}
const bool use_fixed_logo = !doodle_url.is_valid();
if (!logo_tracker_) {
std::unique_ptr<LogoCache> logo_cache = std::move(logo_cache_for_test_);
if (!logo_cache) {
logo_cache = std::make_unique<LogoCache>(cache_directory_);
}
std::unique_ptr<base::Clock> clock = std::move(clock_for_test_);
if (!clock) {
clock = std::make_unique<base::DefaultClock>();
}
logo_tracker_ = std::make_unique<LogoTracker>(
request_context_getter_,
std::make_unique<LogoDelegateImpl>(std::move(image_decoder_)),
std::move(logo_cache), std::move(clock));
}
if (use_fixed_logo) {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
logo_url, base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::ParseFixedLogoResponse),
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::UseFixedLogoUrl));
} else if (is_google) {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
doodle_url,
search_provider_logos::GetGoogleParseLogoResponseCallback(base_url),
search_provider_logos::GetGoogleAppendQueryparamsCallback(
use_gray_background_));
} else {
logo_tracker_->SetServerAPI(
doodle_url,
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::GoogleNewParseLogoResponse,
base_url),
base::Bind(&search_provider_logos::GoogleNewAppendQueryparamsToLogoURL,
use_gray_background_));
}
logo_tracker_->GetLogo(std::move(callbacks));
}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void LogoService::GetLogo(LogoCallbacks callbacks) {
| 171,952
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static unsigned int variance_ref(const uint8_t *ref, const uint8_t *src,
int l2w, int l2h, unsigned int *sse_ptr) {
int se = 0;
unsigned int sse = 0;
const int w = 1 << l2w, h = 1 << l2h;
for (int y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (int x = 0; x < w; x++) {
int diff = ref[w * y + x] - src[w * y + x];
se += diff;
sse += diff * diff;
}
//// Truncate high bit depth results by downshifting (with rounding) by:
//// 2 * (bit_depth - 8) for sse
//// (bit_depth - 8) for se
}
*sse_ptr = sse;
return sse - (((int64_t) se * se) >> (l2w + l2h));
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static unsigned int variance_ref(const uint8_t *ref, const uint8_t *src,
//// Truncate high bit depth results by downshifting (with rounding) by:
//// 2 * (bit_depth - 8) for sse
//// (bit_depth - 8) for se
static void RoundHighBitDepth(int bit_depth, int64_t *se, uint64_t *sse) {
switch (bit_depth) {
case VPX_BITS_12:
*sse = (*sse + 128) >> 8;
*se = (*se + 8) >> 4;
break;
case VPX_BITS_10:
*sse = (*sse + 8) >> 4;
*se = (*se + 2) >> 2;
break;
case VPX_BITS_8:
default:
break;
}
}
| 174,596
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: z2grestore(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
if (!restore_page_device(igs, gs_gstate_saved(igs)))
return gs_grestore(igs);
return push_callout(i_ctx_p, "%grestorepagedevice");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
z2grestore(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
int code = restore_page_device(i_ctx_p, igs, gs_gstate_saved(igs));
if (code < 0) return code;
if (code == 0)
return gs_grestore(igs);
return push_callout(i_ctx_p, "%grestorepagedevice");
}
| 164,691
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static InputMethodStatusConnection* GetInstance() {
return Singleton<InputMethodStatusConnection,
LeakySingletonTraits<InputMethodStatusConnection> >::get();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static InputMethodStatusConnection* GetInstance() {
virtual void Connect() {
MaybeRestoreConnections();
}
| 170,535
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void TypingCommand::insertText(Document& document,
const String& text,
Options options,
TextCompositionType composition,
const bool isIncrementalInsertion) {
LocalFrame* frame = document.frame();
DCHECK(frame);
if (!text.isEmpty())
document.frame()->spellChecker().updateMarkersForWordsAffectedByEditing(
isSpaceOrNewline(text[0]));
insertText(document, text,
frame->selection().computeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated(),
options, composition, isIncrementalInsertion);
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID:
|
void TypingCommand::insertText(Document& document,
const String& text,
Options options,
TextCompositionType composition,
const bool isIncrementalInsertion) {
LocalFrame* frame = document.frame();
DCHECK(frame);
if (!text.isEmpty())
document.frame()->spellChecker().updateMarkersForWordsAffectedByEditing(
isSpaceOrNewline(text[0]));
insertText(document, text, frame->selection().selectionInDOMTree(), options,
composition, isIncrementalInsertion);
}
| 172,031
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_ofb)
{
zval **mode;
char *cipher, *key, *data, *iv = NULL;
int cipher_len, key_len, data_len, iv_len = 0;
MCRYPT_GET_CRYPT_ARGS
convert_to_long_ex(mode);
php_mcrypt_do_crypt(cipher, key, key_len, data, data_len, "ofb", iv, iv_len, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), Z_LVAL_PP(mode), return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_ofb)
{
zval **mode;
char *cipher, *key, *data, *iv = NULL;
int cipher_len, key_len, data_len, iv_len = 0;
MCRYPT_GET_CRYPT_ARGS
convert_to_long_ex(mode);
php_mcrypt_do_crypt(cipher, key, key_len, data, data_len, "ofb", iv, iv_len, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), Z_LVAL_PP(mode), return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
| 167,110
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void btif_config_save(void) {
assert(alarm_timer != NULL);
assert(config != NULL);
alarm_set(alarm_timer, CONFIG_SETTLE_PERIOD_MS, timer_config_save, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes with lots of discovered LE devices
When loads of devices are discovered a config file which is too large
can be written out, which causes the BT daemon to crash on startup.
This limits the number of config entries for unpaired devices which
are initialized, and prevents a large number from being saved to the
filesystem.
Bug: 26071376
Change-Id: I4a74094f57a82b17f94e99a819974b8bc8082184
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void btif_config_save(void) {
assert(alarm_timer != NULL);
assert(config != NULL);
alarm_set(alarm_timer, CONFIG_SETTLE_PERIOD_MS, timer_config_save_cb, NULL);
}
| 173,929
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void TearDown() {
vpx_svc_release(&svc_);
delete(decoder_);
if (codec_initialized_) vpx_codec_destroy(&codec_);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
virtual void TearDown() {
ReleaseEncoder();
delete(decoder_);
}
void InitializeEncoder() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res =
vpx_svc_init(&svc_, &codec_, vpx_codec_vp9_cx(), &codec_enc_);
EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
vpx_codec_control(&codec_, VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, 4); // Make the test faster
vpx_codec_control(&codec_, VP9E_SET_TILE_COLUMNS, tile_columns_);
vpx_codec_control(&codec_, VP9E_SET_TILE_ROWS, tile_rows_);
codec_initialized_ = true;
}
void ReleaseEncoder() {
vpx_svc_release(&svc_);
if (codec_initialized_) vpx_codec_destroy(&codec_);
codec_initialized_ = false;
}
void GetStatsData(std::string *const stats_buf) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *cx_pkt;
while ((cx_pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(&codec_, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (cx_pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_STATS_PKT) {
EXPECT_GT(cx_pkt->data.twopass_stats.sz, 0U);
ASSERT_TRUE(cx_pkt->data.twopass_stats.buf != NULL);
stats_buf->append(static_cast<char*>(cx_pkt->data.twopass_stats.buf),
cx_pkt->data.twopass_stats.sz);
}
}
}
void Pass1EncodeNFrames(const int n, const int layers,
std::string *const stats_buf) {
vpx_codec_err_t res;
ASSERT_GT(n, 0);
ASSERT_GT(layers, 0);
svc_.spatial_layers = layers;
codec_enc_.g_pass = VPX_RC_FIRST_PASS;
InitializeEncoder();
libvpx_test::I420VideoSource video(test_file_name_,
codec_enc_.g_w, codec_enc_.g_h,
codec_enc_.g_timebase.den,
codec_enc_.g_timebase.num, 0, 30);
video.Begin();
for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
res = vpx_svc_encode(&svc_, &codec_, video.img(), video.pts(),
video.duration(), VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
GetStatsData(stats_buf);
video.Next();
}
// Flush encoder and test EOS packet.
res = vpx_svc_encode(&svc_, &codec_, NULL, video.pts(),
video.duration(), VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
GetStatsData(stats_buf);
ReleaseEncoder();
}
void StoreFrames(const size_t max_frame_received,
struct vpx_fixed_buf *const outputs,
size_t *const frame_received) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *cx_pkt;
while ((cx_pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(&codec_, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (cx_pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
const size_t frame_size = cx_pkt->data.frame.sz;
EXPECT_GT(frame_size, 0U);
ASSERT_TRUE(cx_pkt->data.frame.buf != NULL);
ASSERT_LT(*frame_received, max_frame_received);
if (*frame_received == 0)
EXPECT_EQ(1, !!(cx_pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY));
outputs[*frame_received].buf = malloc(frame_size + 16);
ASSERT_TRUE(outputs[*frame_received].buf != NULL);
memcpy(outputs[*frame_received].buf, cx_pkt->data.frame.buf,
frame_size);
outputs[*frame_received].sz = frame_size;
++(*frame_received);
}
}
}
void Pass2EncodeNFrames(std::string *const stats_buf,
const int n, const int layers,
struct vpx_fixed_buf *const outputs) {
vpx_codec_err_t res;
size_t frame_received = 0;
ASSERT_TRUE(outputs != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(n, 0);
ASSERT_GT(layers, 0);
svc_.spatial_layers = layers;
codec_enc_.rc_target_bitrate = 500;
if (codec_enc_.g_pass == VPX_RC_LAST_PASS) {
ASSERT_TRUE(stats_buf != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(stats_buf->size(), 0U);
codec_enc_.rc_twopass_stats_in.buf = &(*stats_buf)[0];
codec_enc_.rc_twopass_stats_in.sz = stats_buf->size();
}
InitializeEncoder();
libvpx_test::I420VideoSource video(test_file_name_,
codec_enc_.g_w, codec_enc_.g_h,
codec_enc_.g_timebase.den,
codec_enc_.g_timebase.num, 0, 30);
video.Begin();
for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
res = vpx_svc_encode(&svc_, &codec_, video.img(), video.pts(),
video.duration(), VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
StoreFrames(n, outputs, &frame_received);
video.Next();
}
// Flush encoder.
res = vpx_svc_encode(&svc_, &codec_, NULL, 0,
video.duration(), VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
StoreFrames(n, outputs, &frame_received);
EXPECT_EQ(frame_received, static_cast<size_t>(n));
ReleaseEncoder();
}
void DecodeNFrames(const struct vpx_fixed_buf *const inputs, const int n) {
int decoded_frames = 0;
int received_frames = 0;
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(n, 0);
for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs[i].buf != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(inputs[i].sz, 0U);
const vpx_codec_err_t res_dec =
decoder_->DecodeFrame(static_cast<const uint8_t *>(inputs[i].buf),
inputs[i].sz);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res_dec) << decoder_->DecodeError();
++decoded_frames;
DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder_->GetDxData();
while (dec_iter.Next() != NULL) {
++received_frames;
}
}
EXPECT_EQ(decoded_frames, n);
EXPECT_EQ(received_frames, n);
}
void DropEnhancementLayers(struct vpx_fixed_buf *const inputs,
const int num_super_frames,
const int remained_spatial_layers) {
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(num_super_frames, 0);
ASSERT_GT(remained_spatial_layers, 0);
for (int i = 0; i < num_super_frames; ++i) {
uint32_t frame_sizes[8] = {0};
int frame_count = 0;
int frames_found = 0;
int frame;
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs[i].buf != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(inputs[i].sz, 0U);
vpx_codec_err_t res =
vp9_parse_superframe_index(static_cast<const uint8_t*>(inputs[i].buf),
inputs[i].sz, frame_sizes, &frame_count,
NULL, NULL);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
if (frame_count == 0) {
// There's no super frame but only a single frame.
ASSERT_EQ(1, remained_spatial_layers);
} else {
// Found a super frame.
uint8_t *frame_data = static_cast<uint8_t*>(inputs[i].buf);
uint8_t *frame_start = frame_data;
for (frame = 0; frame < frame_count; ++frame) {
// Looking for a visible frame.
if (frame_data[0] & 0x02) {
++frames_found;
if (frames_found == remained_spatial_layers)
break;
}
frame_data += frame_sizes[frame];
}
ASSERT_LT(frame, frame_count) << "Couldn't find a visible frame. "
<< "remained_spatial_layers: " << remained_spatial_layers
<< " super_frame: " << i;
if (frame == frame_count - 1)
continue;
frame_data += frame_sizes[frame];
// We need to add one more frame for multiple frame contexts.
uint8_t marker =
static_cast<const uint8_t*>(inputs[i].buf)[inputs[i].sz - 1];
const uint32_t mag = ((marker >> 3) & 0x3) + 1;
const size_t index_sz = 2 + mag * frame_count;
const size_t new_index_sz = 2 + mag * (frame + 1);
marker &= 0x0f8;
marker |= frame;
// Copy existing frame sizes.
memmove(frame_data + 1, frame_start + inputs[i].sz - index_sz + 1,
new_index_sz - 2);
// New marker.
frame_data[0] = marker;
frame_data += (mag * (frame + 1) + 1);
*frame_data++ = marker;
inputs[i].sz = frame_data - frame_start;
}
}
}
void FreeBitstreamBuffers(struct vpx_fixed_buf *const inputs, const int n) {
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(n, 0);
for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
free(inputs[i].buf);
inputs[i].buf = NULL;
inputs[i].sz = 0;
}
}
| 174,582
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ProcXFixesCopyRegion(ClientPtr client)
{
RegionPtr pSource, pDestination;
REQUEST(xXFixesCopyRegionReq);
VERIFY_REGION(pSource, stuff->source, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_REGION(pDestination, stuff->destination, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (!RegionCopy(pDestination, pSource))
return BadAlloc;
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
ProcXFixesCopyRegion(ClientPtr client)
{
RegionPtr pSource, pDestination;
REQUEST(xXFixesCopyRegionReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXFixesCopyRegionReq);
VERIFY_REGION(pSource, stuff->source, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_REGION(pDestination, stuff->destination, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (!RegionCopy(pDestination, pSource))
return BadAlloc;
return Success;
}
| 165,442
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ExtensionTtsController::SpeakNextUtterance() {
while (!utterance_queue_.empty() && !current_utterance_) {
Utterance* utterance = utterance_queue_.front();
utterance_queue_.pop();
SpeakNow(utterance);
}
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void ExtensionTtsController::SpeakNextUtterance() {
| 170,387
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsAppendNamedColor(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* NamedColorList,
const char* Name,
cmsUInt16Number PCS[3], cmsUInt16Number Colorant[cmsMAXCHANNELS])
{
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (NamedColorList == NULL) return FALSE;
if (NamedColorList ->nColors + 1 > NamedColorList ->Allocated) {
if (!GrowNamedColorList(NamedColorList)) return FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i < NamedColorList ->ColorantCount; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].DeviceColorant[i] = Colorant == NULL? 0 : Colorant[i];
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].PCS[i] = PCS == NULL ? 0 : PCS[i];
if (Name != NULL) {
strncpy(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name, Name,
sizeof(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name));
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[cmsMAX_PATH-1] = 0;
}
else
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[0] = 0;
NamedColorList ->nColors++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
|
cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsAppendNamedColor(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* NamedColorList,
const char* Name,
cmsUInt16Number PCS[3], cmsUInt16Number Colorant[cmsMAXCHANNELS])
{
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (NamedColorList == NULL) return FALSE;
if (NamedColorList ->nColors + 1 > NamedColorList ->Allocated) {
if (!GrowNamedColorList(NamedColorList)) return FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i < NamedColorList ->ColorantCount; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].DeviceColorant[i] = Colorant == NULL? 0 : Colorant[i];
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].PCS[i] = PCS == NULL ? 0 : PCS[i];
if (Name != NULL) {
strncpy(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name, Name, cmsMAX_PATH-1);
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[cmsMAX_PATH-1] = 0;
}
else
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[0] = 0;
NamedColorList ->nColors++;
return TRUE;
}
| 166,543
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
PadContext *s = inlink->dst->priv;
AVFrame *out;
int needs_copy = frame_needs_copy(s, in);
if (needs_copy) {
av_log(inlink->dst, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Direct padding impossible allocating new frame\n");
out = ff_get_video_buffer(inlink->dst->outputs[0],
FFMAX(inlink->w, s->w),
FFMAX(inlink->h, s->h));
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
} else {
int i;
out = in;
for (i = 0; i < 4 && out->data[i]; i++) {
int hsub = s->draw.hsub[i];
int vsub = s->draw.vsub[i];
out->data[i] -= (s->x >> hsub) * s->draw.pixelstep[i] +
(s->y >> vsub) * out->linesize[i];
}
}
/* top bar */
if (s->y) {
ff_fill_rectangle(&s->draw, &s->color,
out->data, out->linesize,
0, 0, s->w, s->y);
}
/* bottom bar */
if (s->h > s->y + s->in_h) {
ff_fill_rectangle(&s->draw, &s->color,
out->data, out->linesize,
0, s->y + s->in_h, s->w, s->h - s->y - s->in_h);
}
/* left border */
ff_fill_rectangle(&s->draw, &s->color, out->data, out->linesize,
0, s->y, s->x, in->height);
if (needs_copy) {
ff_copy_rectangle2(&s->draw,
out->data, out->linesize, in->data, in->linesize,
s->x, s->y, 0, 0, in->width, in->height);
}
/* right border */
ff_fill_rectangle(&s->draw, &s->color, out->data, out->linesize,
s->x + s->in_w, s->y, s->w - s->x - s->in_w,
in->height);
out->width = s->w;
out->height = s->h;
if (in != out)
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(inlink->dst->outputs[0], out);
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
PadContext *s = inlink->dst->priv;
AVFrame *out;
int needs_copy = frame_needs_copy(s, in);
if (needs_copy) {
av_log(inlink->dst, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Direct padding impossible allocating new frame\n");
out = ff_get_video_buffer(inlink->dst->outputs[0],
FFMAX(inlink->w, s->w),
FFMAX(inlink->h, s->h));
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
} else {
int i;
out = in;
for (i = 0; i < 4 && out->data[i] && out->linesize[i]; i++) {
int hsub = s->draw.hsub[i];
int vsub = s->draw.vsub[i];
out->data[i] -= (s->x >> hsub) * s->draw.pixelstep[i] +
(s->y >> vsub) * out->linesize[i];
}
}
/* top bar */
if (s->y) {
ff_fill_rectangle(&s->draw, &s->color,
out->data, out->linesize,
0, 0, s->w, s->y);
}
/* bottom bar */
if (s->h > s->y + s->in_h) {
ff_fill_rectangle(&s->draw, &s->color,
out->data, out->linesize,
0, s->y + s->in_h, s->w, s->h - s->y - s->in_h);
}
/* left border */
ff_fill_rectangle(&s->draw, &s->color, out->data, out->linesize,
0, s->y, s->x, in->height);
if (needs_copy) {
ff_copy_rectangle2(&s->draw,
out->data, out->linesize, in->data, in->linesize,
s->x, s->y, 0, 0, in->width, in->height);
}
/* right border */
ff_fill_rectangle(&s->draw, &s->color, out->data, out->linesize,
s->x + s->in_w, s->y, s->w - s->x - s->in_w,
in->height);
out->width = s->w;
out->height = s->h;
if (in != out)
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(inlink->dst->outputs[0], out);
}
| 166,005
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static Maybe<int64_t> IndexOfValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> receiver,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *receiver));
Handle<SeededNumberDictionary> dictionary(
SeededNumberDictionary::cast(receiver->elements()), isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
int entry = dictionary->FindEntry(isolate, k);
if (entry == SeededNumberDictionary::kNotFound) {
continue;
}
PropertyDetails details = GetDetailsImpl(*dictionary, entry);
switch (details.kind()) {
case kData: {
Object* element_k = dictionary->ValueAt(entry);
if (value->StrictEquals(element_k)) {
return Just<int64_t>(k);
}
break;
}
case kAccessor: {
LookupIterator it(isolate, receiver, k,
LookupIterator::OWN_SKIP_INTERCEPTOR);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
Handle<Object> element_k;
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(
isolate, element_k, JSObject::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<int64_t>());
if (value->StrictEquals(*element_k)) return Just<int64_t>(k);
if (!JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *receiver)) {
return IndexOfValueSlowPath(isolate, receiver, value, k + 1,
length);
}
if (*dictionary == receiver->elements()) continue;
if (receiver->GetElementsKind() != DICTIONARY_ELEMENTS) {
return IndexOfValueSlowPath(isolate, receiver, value, k + 1,
length);
}
dictionary = handle(
SeededNumberDictionary::cast(receiver->elements()), isolate);
break;
}
}
}
return Just<int64_t>(-1);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
|
static Maybe<int64_t> IndexOfValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> receiver,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *receiver));
Handle<Map> original_map(receiver->map(), isolate);
Handle<SeededNumberDictionary> dictionary(
SeededNumberDictionary::cast(receiver->elements()), isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
DCHECK_EQ(receiver->map(), *original_map);
int entry = dictionary->FindEntry(isolate, k);
if (entry == SeededNumberDictionary::kNotFound) {
continue;
}
PropertyDetails details = GetDetailsImpl(*dictionary, entry);
switch (details.kind()) {
case kData: {
Object* element_k = dictionary->ValueAt(entry);
if (value->StrictEquals(element_k)) {
return Just<int64_t>(k);
}
break;
}
case kAccessor: {
LookupIterator it(isolate, receiver, k,
LookupIterator::OWN_SKIP_INTERCEPTOR);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
Handle<Object> element_k;
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(
isolate, element_k, JSObject::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<int64_t>());
if (value->StrictEquals(*element_k)) return Just<int64_t>(k);
if (!JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *receiver)) {
return IndexOfValueSlowPath(isolate, receiver, value, k + 1,
length);
}
if (*dictionary == receiver->elements()) continue;
if (receiver->GetElementsKind() != DICTIONARY_ELEMENTS) {
return IndexOfValueSlowPath(isolate, receiver, value, k + 1,
length);
}
dictionary = handle(
SeededNumberDictionary::cast(receiver->elements()), isolate);
break;
}
}
}
return Just<int64_t>(-1);
}
| 174,098
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool AXTableCell::isRowHeaderCell() const {
const AtomicString& scope = getAttribute(scopeAttr);
return equalIgnoringCase(scope, "row") ||
equalIgnoringCase(scope, "rowgroup");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
bool AXTableCell::isRowHeaderCell() const {
const AtomicString& scope = getAttribute(scopeAttr);
return equalIgnoringASCIICase(scope, "row") ||
equalIgnoringASCIICase(scope, "rowgroup");
}
| 171,933
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Chapters::Atom::ShallowCopy(Atom& rhs) const
{
rhs.m_string_uid = m_string_uid;
rhs.m_uid = m_uid;
rhs.m_start_timecode = m_start_timecode;
rhs.m_stop_timecode = m_stop_timecode;
rhs.m_displays = m_displays;
rhs.m_displays_size = m_displays_size;
rhs.m_displays_count = m_displays_count;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void Chapters::Atom::ShallowCopy(Atom& rhs) const
| 174,442
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: DynamicMetadataProvider::DynamicMetadataProvider(const DOMElement* e)
: AbstractMetadataProvider(e),
m_validate(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, validate)),
m_id(XMLHelper::getAttrString(e, "Dynamic", id)),
m_lock(RWLock::create()),
m_refreshDelayFactor(0.75),
m_minCacheDuration(XMLHelper::getAttrInt(e, 600, minCacheDuration)),
m_maxCacheDuration(XMLHelper::getAttrInt(e, 28800, maxCacheDuration)),
m_shutdown(false),
m_cleanupInterval(XMLHelper::getAttrInt(e, 1800, cleanupInterval)),
m_cleanupTimeout(XMLHelper::getAttrInt(e, 1800, cleanupTimeout)),
m_cleanup_wait(nullptr), m_cleanup_thread(nullptr)
{
if (m_minCacheDuration > m_maxCacheDuration) {
Category::getInstance(SAML_LOGCAT ".MetadataProvider.Dynamic").error(
"minCacheDuration setting exceeds maxCacheDuration setting, lowering to match it"
);
m_minCacheDuration = m_maxCacheDuration;
}
const XMLCh* delay = e ? e->getAttributeNS(nullptr, refreshDelayFactor) : nullptr;
if (delay && *delay) {
auto_ptr_char temp(delay);
m_refreshDelayFactor = atof(temp.get());
if (m_refreshDelayFactor <= 0.0 || m_refreshDelayFactor >= 1.0) {
Category::getInstance(SAML_LOGCAT ".MetadataProvider.Dynamic").error(
"invalid refreshDelayFactor setting, using default"
);
m_refreshDelayFactor = 0.75;
}
}
if (m_cleanupInterval > 0) {
if (m_cleanupTimeout < 0)
m_cleanupTimeout = 0;
m_cleanup_wait = CondWait::create();
m_cleanup_thread = Thread::create(&cleanup_fn, this);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-347
|
DynamicMetadataProvider::DynamicMetadataProvider(const DOMElement* e)
: AbstractMetadataProvider(e), MetadataProvider(e),
m_validate(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, validate)),
m_id(XMLHelper::getAttrString(e, "Dynamic", id)),
m_lock(RWLock::create()),
m_refreshDelayFactor(0.75),
m_minCacheDuration(XMLHelper::getAttrInt(e, 600, minCacheDuration)),
m_maxCacheDuration(XMLHelper::getAttrInt(e, 28800, maxCacheDuration)),
m_shutdown(false),
m_cleanupInterval(XMLHelper::getAttrInt(e, 1800, cleanupInterval)),
m_cleanupTimeout(XMLHelper::getAttrInt(e, 1800, cleanupTimeout)),
m_cleanup_wait(nullptr), m_cleanup_thread(nullptr)
{
if (m_minCacheDuration > m_maxCacheDuration) {
Category::getInstance(SAML_LOGCAT ".Metadata.Dynamic").error(
"minCacheDuration setting exceeds maxCacheDuration setting, lowering to match it"
);
m_minCacheDuration = m_maxCacheDuration;
}
const XMLCh* delay = e ? e->getAttributeNS(nullptr, refreshDelayFactor) : nullptr;
if (delay && *delay) {
auto_ptr_char temp(delay);
m_refreshDelayFactor = atof(temp.get());
if (m_refreshDelayFactor <= 0.0 || m_refreshDelayFactor >= 1.0) {
Category::getInstance(SAML_LOGCAT ".MetadataProvider.Dynamic").error(
"invalid refreshDelayFactor setting, using default"
);
m_refreshDelayFactor = 0.75;
}
}
if (m_cleanupInterval > 0) {
if (m_cleanupTimeout < 0)
m_cleanupTimeout = 0;
m_cleanup_wait = CondWait::create();
m_cleanup_thread = Thread::create(&cleanup_fn, this);
}
}
| 164,622
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool PlatformFontSkia::InitDefaultFont() {
if (g_default_font.Get())
return true;
bool success = false;
std::string family = kFallbackFontFamilyName;
int size_pixels = 12;
int style = Font::NORMAL;
Font::Weight weight = Font::Weight::NORMAL;
FontRenderParams params;
const SkiaFontDelegate* delegate = SkiaFontDelegate::instance();
if (delegate) {
delegate->GetDefaultFontDescription(&family, &size_pixels, &style, &weight,
¶ms);
} else if (default_font_description_) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
FontRenderParamsQuery query;
CHECK(FontList::ParseDescription(*default_font_description_,
&query.families, &query.style,
&query.pixel_size, &query.weight))
<< "Failed to parse font description " << *default_font_description_;
params = gfx::GetFontRenderParams(query, &family);
size_pixels = query.pixel_size;
style = query.style;
weight = query.weight;
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif
}
sk_sp<SkTypeface> typeface =
CreateSkTypeface(style & Font::ITALIC, weight, &family, &success);
if (!success)
return false;
g_default_font.Get() = new PlatformFontSkia(
std::move(typeface), family, size_pixels, style, weight, params);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Take default system font size from PlatformFont
The default font returned by Skia should take the initial size from the
default value kDefaultBaseFontSize specified in PlatformFont.
R=robliao@chromium.org, asvitkine@chromium.org
CC=benck@google.com
Bug: 944227
Change-Id: I6b230b80c349abbe5968edb3cebdd6e89db4c4a6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1642738
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Etienne Bergeron <etienneb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#666299}
CWE ID: CWE-862
|
bool PlatformFontSkia::InitDefaultFont() {
if (g_default_font.Get())
return true;
bool success = false;
std::string family = kFallbackFontFamilyName;
int size_pixels = PlatformFont::kDefaultBaseFontSize;
int style = Font::NORMAL;
Font::Weight weight = Font::Weight::NORMAL;
FontRenderParams params;
const SkiaFontDelegate* delegate = SkiaFontDelegate::instance();
if (delegate) {
delegate->GetDefaultFontDescription(&family, &size_pixels, &style, &weight,
¶ms);
} else if (default_font_description_) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
FontRenderParamsQuery query;
CHECK(FontList::ParseDescription(*default_font_description_,
&query.families, &query.style,
&query.pixel_size, &query.weight))
<< "Failed to parse font description " << *default_font_description_;
params = gfx::GetFontRenderParams(query, &family);
size_pixels = query.pixel_size;
style = query.style;
weight = query.weight;
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif
}
sk_sp<SkTypeface> typeface =
CreateSkTypeface(style & Font::ITALIC, weight, &family, &success);
if (!success)
return false;
g_default_font.Get() = new PlatformFontSkia(
std::move(typeface), family, size_pixels, style, weight, params);
return true;
}
| 173,209
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_init_video_state(dec_state_t *ps_dec, e_video_type_t e_video_type)
{
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Bit Stream that conforms to MPEG-1 <ISO/IEC 11172-2> standard */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(e_video_type == MPEG_1_VIDEO)
{
ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 = 0;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* force MPEG-1 parameters for proper decoder behavior */
/* see ISO/IEC 13818-2 section D.9.14 */
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_progressive_sequence = 1;
ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision = 0;
ps_dec->u2_picture_structure = FRAME_PICTURE;
ps_dec->u2_frame_pred_frame_dct = 1;
ps_dec->u2_concealment_motion_vectors = 0;
ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type = 0;
ps_dec->u2_intra_vlc_format = 0;
ps_dec->u2_alternate_scan = 0;
ps_dec->u2_repeat_first_field = 0;
ps_dec->u2_progressive_frame = 1;
ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_n = 0;
ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_d = 0;
ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant = impeg2d_vld_inv_quant_mpeg1;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Setting of parameters other than those mentioned in MPEG2 standard*/
/* but used in decoding process. */
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Bit Stream that conforms to MPEG-2 */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
else
{
ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 = 1;
ps_dec->u2_full_pel_forw_vector = 0;
ps_dec->u2_forw_f_code = 7;
ps_dec->u2_full_pel_back_vector = 0;
ps_dec->u2_back_f_code = 7;
ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant = impeg2d_vld_inv_quant_mpeg2;
}
impeg2d_init_function_ptr(ps_dec);
/* Set the frame Width and frame Height */
ps_dec->u2_frame_height = ALIGN16(ps_dec->u2_vertical_size);
ps_dec->u2_frame_width = ALIGN16(ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size);
ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb = (ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size + 15) >> 4;
if (ps_dec->u2_frame_height > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height || ps_dec->u2_frame_width > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
{
return IMPEG2D_PIC_SIZE_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
ps_dec->u2_num_flds_decoded = 0;
/* Calculate the frame period */
{
UWORD32 numer;
UWORD32 denom;
numer = (UWORD32)gau2_impeg2_frm_rate_code[ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code][1] *
(UWORD32)(ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_d + 1);
denom = (UWORD32)gau2_impeg2_frm_rate_code[ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code][0] *
(UWORD32)(ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_n + 1);
ps_dec->u2_framePeriod = (numer * 1000 * 100) / denom;
}
if(VERTICAL_SCAN == ps_dec->u2_alternate_scan)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_vertical;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag;
}
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Adding Error Check for f_code Parameters
In MPEG1, the valid range for the forward and backward f_code parameters
is [1, 7]. Adding a check to enforce this. Without the check, the value
could be 0. We read (f_code - 1) bits from the stream and reading a
negative number of bits from the stream is undefined.
Bug: 64550583
Test: monitored temp ALOGD() output
Change-Id: Ia452cd43a28e9d566401f515947164635361782f
(cherry picked from commit 71d734b83d72e8a59f73f1230982da97615d2689)
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_init_video_state(dec_state_t *ps_dec, e_video_type_t e_video_type)
{
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Bit Stream that conforms to MPEG-1 <ISO/IEC 11172-2> standard */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(e_video_type == MPEG_1_VIDEO)
{
ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 = 0;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* force MPEG-1 parameters for proper decoder behavior */
/* see ISO/IEC 13818-2 section D.9.14 */
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_progressive_sequence = 1;
ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision = 0;
ps_dec->u2_picture_structure = FRAME_PICTURE;
ps_dec->u2_frame_pred_frame_dct = 1;
ps_dec->u2_concealment_motion_vectors = 0;
ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type = 0;
ps_dec->u2_intra_vlc_format = 0;
ps_dec->u2_alternate_scan = 0;
ps_dec->u2_repeat_first_field = 0;
ps_dec->u2_progressive_frame = 1;
ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_n = 0;
ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_d = 0;
ps_dec->u2_forw_f_code = 7;
ps_dec->u2_back_f_code = 7;
ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant = impeg2d_vld_inv_quant_mpeg1;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Setting of parameters other than those mentioned in MPEG2 standard*/
/* but used in decoding process. */
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Bit Stream that conforms to MPEG-2 */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
else
{
ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 = 1;
ps_dec->u2_full_pel_forw_vector = 0;
ps_dec->u2_forw_f_code = 7;
ps_dec->u2_full_pel_back_vector = 0;
ps_dec->u2_back_f_code = 7;
ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant = impeg2d_vld_inv_quant_mpeg2;
}
impeg2d_init_function_ptr(ps_dec);
/* Set the frame Width and frame Height */
ps_dec->u2_frame_height = ALIGN16(ps_dec->u2_vertical_size);
ps_dec->u2_frame_width = ALIGN16(ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size);
ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb = (ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size + 15) >> 4;
if (ps_dec->u2_frame_height > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height || ps_dec->u2_frame_width > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
{
return IMPEG2D_PIC_SIZE_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
ps_dec->u2_num_flds_decoded = 0;
/* Calculate the frame period */
{
UWORD32 numer;
UWORD32 denom;
numer = (UWORD32)gau2_impeg2_frm_rate_code[ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code][1] *
(UWORD32)(ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_d + 1);
denom = (UWORD32)gau2_impeg2_frm_rate_code[ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code][0] *
(UWORD32)(ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_extension_n + 1);
ps_dec->u2_framePeriod = (numer * 1000 * 100) / denom;
}
if(VERTICAL_SCAN == ps_dec->u2_alternate_scan)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_vertical;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag;
}
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
| 174,104
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool WebRequestPermissions::CanExtensionAccessURL(
const extensions::InfoMap* extension_info_map,
const std::string& extension_id,
const GURL& url,
bool crosses_incognito,
HostPermissionsCheck host_permissions_check) {
if (!extension_info_map)
return true;
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extension_info_map->extensions().GetByID(extension_id);
if (!extension)
return false;
if (crosses_incognito && !extension_info_map->CanCrossIncognito(extension))
return false;
switch (host_permissions_check) {
case DO_NOT_CHECK_HOST:
break;
case REQUIRE_HOST_PERMISSION:
if (!((url.SchemeIs(url::kAboutScheme) ||
extension->permissions_data()->HasHostPermission(url) ||
url.GetOrigin() == extension->url()))) {
return false;
}
break;
case REQUIRE_ALL_URLS:
if (!extension->permissions_data()->HasEffectiveAccessToAllHosts())
return false;
break;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
bool WebRequestPermissions::CanExtensionAccessURL(
const extensions::InfoMap* extension_info_map,
const std::string& extension_id,
const GURL& url,
bool crosses_incognito,
HostPermissionsCheck host_permissions_check) {
if (!extension_info_map)
return true;
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extension_info_map->extensions().GetByID(extension_id);
if (!extension)
return false;
if (crosses_incognito && !extension_info_map->CanCrossIncognito(extension))
return false;
switch (host_permissions_check) {
case DO_NOT_CHECK_HOST:
break;
case REQUIRE_HOST_PERMISSION:
if (!url.SchemeIs(url::kAboutScheme) &&
!extension->permissions_data()->HasHostPermission(url) &&
!url::IsSameOriginWith(url, extension->url())) {
return false;
}
break;
case REQUIRE_ALL_URLS:
if (!extension->permissions_data()->HasEffectiveAccessToAllHosts())
return false;
break;
}
return true;
}
| 172,281
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: char* dexOptGenerateCacheFileName(const char* fileName, const char* subFileName)
{
char nameBuf[512];
char absoluteFile[sizeof(nameBuf)];
const size_t kBufLen = sizeof(nameBuf) - 1;
const char* dataRoot;
char* cp;
/*
* Get the absolute path of the Jar or DEX file.
*/
absoluteFile[0] = '\0';
if (fileName[0] != '/') {
/*
* Generate the absolute path. This doesn't do everything it
* should, e.g. if filename is "./out/whatever" it doesn't crunch
* the leading "./" out, but it'll do.
*/
if (getcwd(absoluteFile, kBufLen) == NULL) {
ALOGE("Can't get CWD while opening jar file");
return NULL;
}
strncat(absoluteFile, "/", kBufLen);
}
strncat(absoluteFile, fileName, kBufLen);
/*
* Append the name of the Jar file entry, if any. This is not currently
* required, but will be if we start putting more than one DEX file
* in a Jar.
*/
if (subFileName != NULL) {
strncat(absoluteFile, "/", kBufLen);
strncat(absoluteFile, subFileName, kBufLen);
}
/* Turn the path into a flat filename by replacing
* any slashes after the first one with '@' characters.
*/
cp = absoluteFile + 1;
while (*cp != '\0') {
if (*cp == '/') {
*cp = '@';
}
cp++;
}
/* Build the name of the cache directory.
*/
dataRoot = getenv("ANDROID_DATA");
if (dataRoot == NULL)
dataRoot = "/data";
snprintf(nameBuf, kBufLen, "%s/%s", dataRoot, kCacheDirectoryName);
if (strcmp(dataRoot, "/data") != 0) {
int result = dexOptMkdir(nameBuf, 0700);
if (result != 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
ALOGE("Failed to create dalvik-cache directory %s: %s", nameBuf, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
}
snprintf(nameBuf, kBufLen, "%s/%s/%s", dataRoot, kCacheDirectoryName, kInstructionSet);
if (strcmp(dataRoot, "/data") != 0) {
int result = dexOptMkdir(nameBuf, 0700);
if (result != 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
ALOGE("Failed to create dalvik-cache directory %s: %s", nameBuf, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
}
/* Tack on the file name for the actual cache file path.
*/
strncat(nameBuf, absoluteFile, kBufLen);
ALOGV("Cache file for '%s' '%s' is '%s'", fileName, subFileName, nameBuf);
return strdup(nameBuf);
}
Commit Message: Fix potential buffer overrun.
BUG=27840771
Change-Id: I240f188b2e8f4b45d90138cfb3b14869cf506452
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
char* dexOptGenerateCacheFileName(const char* fileName, const char* subFileName)
{
char nameBuf[512];
char absoluteFile[sizeof(nameBuf)];
const size_t kBufLen = sizeof(nameBuf) - 1;
const char* dataRoot;
char* cp;
/*
* Get the absolute path of the Jar or DEX file.
*/
absoluteFile[0] = '\0';
if (fileName[0] != '/') {
/*
* Generate the absolute path. This doesn't do everything it
* should, e.g. if filename is "./out/whatever" it doesn't crunch
* the leading "./" out, but it'll do.
*/
if (getcwd(absoluteFile, kBufLen) == NULL) {
ALOGE("Can't get CWD while opening jar file");
return NULL;
}
strncat(absoluteFile, "/", kBufLen - strlen(absoluteFile));
}
strncat(absoluteFile, fileName, kBufLen - strlen(absoluteFile));
/*
* Append the name of the Jar file entry, if any. This is not currently
* required, but will be if we start putting more than one DEX file
* in a Jar.
*/
if (subFileName != NULL) {
strncat(absoluteFile, "/", kBufLen - strlen(absoluteFile));
strncat(absoluteFile, subFileName, kBufLen - strlen(absoluteFile));
}
/* Turn the path into a flat filename by replacing
* any slashes after the first one with '@' characters.
*/
cp = absoluteFile + 1;
while (*cp != '\0') {
if (*cp == '/') {
*cp = '@';
}
cp++;
}
/* Build the name of the cache directory.
*/
dataRoot = getenv("ANDROID_DATA");
if (dataRoot == NULL)
dataRoot = "/data";
snprintf(nameBuf, kBufLen, "%s/%s", dataRoot, kCacheDirectoryName);
if (strcmp(dataRoot, "/data") != 0) {
int result = dexOptMkdir(nameBuf, 0700);
if (result != 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
ALOGE("Failed to create dalvik-cache directory %s: %s", nameBuf, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
}
snprintf(nameBuf, kBufLen, "%s/%s/%s", dataRoot, kCacheDirectoryName, kInstructionSet);
if (strcmp(dataRoot, "/data") != 0) {
int result = dexOptMkdir(nameBuf, 0700);
if (result != 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
ALOGE("Failed to create dalvik-cache directory %s: %s", nameBuf, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
}
/* Tack on the file name for the actual cache file path.
*/
strncat(nameBuf, absoluteFile, kBufLen - strlen(nameBuf));
ALOGV("Cache file for '%s' '%s' is '%s'", fileName, subFileName, nameBuf);
return strdup(nameBuf);
}
| 173,559
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: FT_Stream_EnterFrame( FT_Stream stream,
FT_ULong count )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_ULong read_bytes;
/* check for nested frame access */
FT_ASSERT( stream && stream->cursor == 0 );
if ( stream->read )
{
/* allocate the frame in memory */
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
/* simple sanity check */
if ( count > stream->size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" frame size (%lu) larger than stream size (%lu)\n",
count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_MEMORY
/* assume _ft_debug_file and _ft_debug_lineno are already set */
stream->base = (unsigned char*)ft_mem_qalloc( memory, count, &error );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
#else
if ( FT_QALLOC( stream->base, count ) )
goto Exit;
#endif
/* read it */
read_bytes = stream->read( stream, stream->pos,
stream->base, count );
if ( read_bytes < count )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid read; expected %lu bytes, got %lu\n",
count, read_bytes ));
FT_FREE( stream->base );
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
}
stream->cursor = stream->base;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += read_bytes;
}
else
{
/* check current and new position */
if ( stream->pos >= stream->size ||
stream->pos + count > stream->size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid i/o; pos = 0x%lx, count = %lu, size = 0x%lx\n",
stream->pos, count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
/* set cursor */
stream->cursor = stream->base + stream->pos;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += count;
}
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
FT_Stream_EnterFrame( FT_Stream stream,
FT_ULong count )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_ULong read_bytes;
/* check for nested frame access */
FT_ASSERT( stream && stream->cursor == 0 );
if ( stream->read )
{
/* allocate the frame in memory */
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
/* simple sanity check */
if ( count > stream->size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" frame size (%lu) larger than stream size (%lu)\n",
count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_MEMORY
/* assume _ft_debug_file and _ft_debug_lineno are already set */
stream->base = (unsigned char*)ft_mem_qalloc( memory, count, &error );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
#else
if ( FT_QALLOC( stream->base, count ) )
goto Exit;
#endif
/* read it */
read_bytes = stream->read( stream, stream->pos,
stream->base, count );
if ( read_bytes < count )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid read; expected %lu bytes, got %lu\n",
count, read_bytes ));
FT_FREE( stream->base );
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
}
stream->cursor = stream->base;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += read_bytes;
}
else
{
/* check current and new position */
if ( stream->pos >= stream->size ||
stream->size - stream->pos < count )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid i/o; pos = 0x%lx, count = %lu, size = 0x%lx\n",
stream->pos, count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
/* set cursor */
stream->cursor = stream->base + stream->pos;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += count;
}
Exit:
return error;
}
| 164,986
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
#if ARCH_X86 || ARCH_X86_64
const int simd_caps = x86_simd_caps();
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_MMX))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":MMX/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE2))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE2/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE3))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE3/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSSE3))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSSE3/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE4_1))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE4_1/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_AVX))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":AVX/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_AVX2))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":AVX2/*");
#endif
#if !CONFIG_SHARED
#if CONFIG_VP8
vp8_rtcd();
#endif
#if CONFIG_VP9
vp9_rtcd();
#endif
#endif
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
#if ARCH_X86 || ARCH_X86_64
const int simd_caps = x86_simd_caps();
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_MMX))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":MMX.*:MMX/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE.*:SSE/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE2))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE2.*:SSE2/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE3))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE3.*:SSE3/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSSE3))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSSE3.*:SSSE3/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_SSE4_1))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":SSE4_1.*:SSE4_1/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_AVX))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":AVX.*:AVX/*");
if (!(simd_caps & HAS_AVX2))
append_negative_gtest_filter(":AVX2.*:AVX2/*");
#endif
#if !CONFIG_SHARED
#if CONFIG_VP8
vp8_rtcd();
#endif // CONFIG_VP8
#if CONFIG_VP9
vp9_rtcd();
#endif // CONFIG_VP9
vpx_dsp_rtcd();
vpx_scale_rtcd();
#endif // !CONFIG_SHARED
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
}
| 174,583
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ext4_xattr_cache_find(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_xattr_header *header,
struct mb_cache_entry **pce)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(header->h_hash);
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
struct mb_cache *ext4_mb_cache = EXT4_GET_MB_CACHE(inode);
if (!header->h_hash)
return NULL; /* never share */
ea_idebug(inode, "looking for cached blocks [%x]", (int)hash);
again:
ce = mb_cache_entry_find_first(ext4_mb_cache, inode->i_sb->s_bdev,
hash);
while (ce) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
if (IS_ERR(ce)) {
if (PTR_ERR(ce) == -EAGAIN)
goto again;
break;
}
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, ce->e_block);
if (!bh) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "block %lu read error",
(unsigned long) ce->e_block);
} else if (le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount) >=
EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX) {
ea_idebug(inode, "block %lu refcount %d>=%d",
(unsigned long) ce->e_block,
le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount),
EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX);
} else if (ext4_xattr_cmp(header, BHDR(bh)) == 0) {
*pce = ce;
return bh;
}
brelse(bh);
ce = mb_cache_entry_find_next(ce, inode->i_sb->s_bdev, hash);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19
|
ext4_xattr_cache_find(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_xattr_header *header,
struct mb2_cache_entry **pce)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(header->h_hash);
struct mb2_cache_entry *ce;
struct mb2_cache *ext4_mb_cache = EXT4_GET_MB_CACHE(inode);
if (!header->h_hash)
return NULL; /* never share */
ea_idebug(inode, "looking for cached blocks [%x]", (int)hash);
ce = mb2_cache_entry_find_first(ext4_mb_cache, hash);
while (ce) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, ce->e_block);
if (!bh) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "block %lu read error",
(unsigned long) ce->e_block);
} else if (le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount) >=
EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX) {
ea_idebug(inode, "block %lu refcount %d>=%d",
(unsigned long) ce->e_block,
le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount),
EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX);
} else if (ext4_xattr_cmp(header, BHDR(bh)) == 0) {
*pce = ce;
return bh;
}
brelse(bh);
ce = mb2_cache_entry_find_next(ext4_mb_cache, ce);
}
return NULL;
}
| 169,991
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: validate_T(void)
/* Validate the above table - this just builds the above values */
{
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<TTABLE_SIZE; ++i)
{
if (transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_R)
read_transforms |= transform_info[i].transform;
if (transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_W)
write_transforms |= transform_info[i].transform;
}
/* Reversible transforms are those which are supported on both read and
* write.
*/
rw_transforms = read_transforms & write_transforms;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
validate_T(void)
/* Validate the above table - this just builds the above values */
{
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<TTABLE_SIZE; ++i) if (transform_info[i].name != NULL)
{
if (transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_R)
read_transforms |= transform_info[i].transform;
if (transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_W)
write_transforms |= transform_info[i].transform;
}
/* Reversible transforms are those which are supported on both read and
* write.
*/
rw_transforms = read_transforms & write_transforms;
}
| 173,592
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ExtensionTtsController::CheckSpeechStatus() {
if (!current_utterance_)
return;
if (!current_utterance_->extension_id().empty())
return;
if (GetPlatformImpl()->IsSpeaking() == false) {
FinishCurrentUtterance();
SpeakNextUtterance();
}
if (current_utterance_ && current_utterance_->extension_id().empty()) {
MessageLoop::current()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE, method_factory_.NewRunnableMethod(
&ExtensionTtsController::CheckSpeechStatus),
kSpeechCheckDelayIntervalMs);
}
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void ExtensionTtsController::CheckSpeechStatus() {
std::set<std::string> desired_event_types;
if (options->HasKey(constants::kDesiredEventTypesKey)) {
ListValue* list;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetList(constants::kDesiredEventTypesKey, &list));
for (size_t i = 0; i < list->GetSize(); i++) {
std::string event_type;
if (!list->GetString(i, &event_type))
desired_event_types.insert(event_type);
}
}
std::string voice_extension_id;
if (options->HasKey(constants::kExtensionIdKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetString(constants::kExtensionIdKey, &voice_extension_id));
}
| 170,374
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void virtqueue_map_desc(unsigned int *p_num_sg, hwaddr *addr, struct iovec *iov,
unsigned int max_num_sg, bool is_write,
hwaddr pa, size_t sz)
{
unsigned num_sg = *p_num_sg;
assert(num_sg <= max_num_sg);
while (sz) {
hwaddr len = sz;
iov[num_sg].iov_base = cpu_physical_memory_map(pa, &len, is_write);
iov[num_sg].iov_len = len;
addr[num_sg] = pa;
sz -= len;
pa += len;
num_sg++;
}
*p_num_sg = num_sg;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static void virtqueue_map_desc(unsigned int *p_num_sg, hwaddr *addr, struct iovec *iov,
unsigned int max_num_sg, bool is_write,
hwaddr pa, size_t sz)
{
unsigned num_sg = *p_num_sg;
assert(num_sg <= max_num_sg);
if (!sz) {
error_report("virtio: zero sized buffers are not allowed");
exit(1);
}
while (sz) {
hwaddr len = sz;
iov[num_sg].iov_base = cpu_physical_memory_map(pa, &len, is_write);
iov[num_sg].iov_len = len;
addr[num_sg] = pa;
sz -= len;
pa += len;
num_sg++;
}
*p_num_sg = num_sg;
}
| 164,956
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MagickExport void *DetachBlob(BlobInfo *blob_info)
{
void
*data;
assert(blob_info != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
if (blob_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
if (blob_info->mapped != MagickFalse)
{
(void) UnmapBlob(blob_info->data,blob_info->length);
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,blob_info->length);
}
blob_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
blob_info->length=0;
blob_info->offset=0;
blob_info->eof=MagickFalse;
blob_info->error=0;
blob_info->exempt=MagickFalse;
blob_info->type=UndefinedStream;
blob_info->file_info.file=(FILE *) NULL;
data=blob_info->data;
blob_info->data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
blob_info->stream=(StreamHandler) NULL;
blob_info->custom_stream=(CustomStreamInfo *) NULL;
return(data);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
MagickExport void *DetachBlob(BlobInfo *blob_info)
{
void
*data;
assert(blob_info != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
if (blob_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
if (blob_info->mapped != MagickFalse)
{
(void) UnmapBlob(blob_info->data,blob_info->length);
blob_info->data=NULL;
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,blob_info->length);
}
blob_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
blob_info->length=0;
blob_info->offset=0;
blob_info->eof=MagickFalse;
blob_info->error=0;
blob_info->exempt=MagickFalse;
blob_info->type=UndefinedStream;
blob_info->file_info.file=(FILE *) NULL;
data=blob_info->data;
blob_info->data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
blob_info->stream=(StreamHandler) NULL;
blob_info->custom_stream=(CustomStreamInfo *) NULL;
return(data);
}
| 170,190
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: QString IRCView::closeToTagString(TextHtmlData* data, const QString& _tag)
{
QString ret;
QString tag;
int i = data->openHtmlTags.count() - 1;
for ( ; i >= 0 ; --i)
{
tag = data->openHtmlTags.at(i);
ret += QLatin1String("</") + tag + QLatin1Char('>');
if (tag == _tag)
{
data->openHtmlTags.removeAt(i);
break;
}
}
ret += openTags(data, i);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
|
QString IRCView::closeToTagString(TextHtmlData* data, const QString& _tag)
{
QString ret;
QString tag;
int i = data->openHtmlTags.count() - 1;
for ( ; i >= 0 ; --i)
{
tag = data->openHtmlTags.at(i);
ret += QLatin1String("</") + tag + QLatin1Char('>');
if (tag == _tag)
{
data->openHtmlTags.removeAt(i);
break;
}
}
if (i > -1)
ret += openTags(data, i);
return ret;
}
| 164,648
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void RunCoeffCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 5000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_ref_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_block, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() - rnd.Rand8();
fwd_txfm_ref(input_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_block, output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void RunCoeffCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 5000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, int16_t, input_block[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, output_ref_block[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, output_block[kNumCoeffs]);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
// Initialize a test block with input range [-mask_, mask_].
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_block[j] = (rnd.Rand16() & mask_) - (rnd.Rand16() & mask_);
fwd_txfm_ref(input_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_block, output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
}
}
| 174,548
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, offsetSet)
{
char *fname, *cont_str = NULL;
size_t fname_len, cont_len;
zval *zresource;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Write operations disabled by the php.ini setting phar.readonly");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "sr", &fname, &fname_len, &zresource) == FAILURE
&& zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ss", &fname, &fname_len, &cont_str, &cont_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot set stub \".phar/stub.php\" directly in phar \"%s\", use setStub", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot set alias \".phar/alias.txt\" directly in phar \"%s\", use setAlias", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot set any files or directories in magic \".phar\" directory", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
phar_add_file(&(phar_obj->archive), fname, fname_len, cont_str, cont_len, zresource);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
PHP_METHOD(Phar, offsetSet)
{
char *fname, *cont_str = NULL;
size_t fname_len, cont_len;
zval *zresource;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Write operations disabled by the php.ini setting phar.readonly");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "pr", &fname, &fname_len, &zresource) == FAILURE
&& zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ps", &fname, &fname_len, &cont_str, &cont_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot set stub \".phar/stub.php\" directly in phar \"%s\", use setStub", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot set alias \".phar/alias.txt\" directly in phar \"%s\", use setAlias", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot set any files or directories in magic \".phar\" directory", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
phar_add_file(&(phar_obj->archive), fname, fname_len, cont_str, cont_len, zresource);
}
| 165,067
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: zlib_init(struct zlib *zlib, struct IDAT *idat, struct chunk *chunk,
int window_bits, png_uint_32 offset)
/* Initialize a zlib_control; the result is true/false */
{
CLEAR(*zlib);
zlib->idat = idat;
zlib->chunk = chunk;
zlib->file = chunk->file;
zlib->global = chunk->global;
zlib->rewrite_offset = offset; /* never changed for this zlib */
/* *_out does not need to be set: */
zlib->z.next_in = Z_NULL;
zlib->z.avail_in = 0;
zlib->z.zalloc = Z_NULL;
zlib->z.zfree = Z_NULL;
zlib->z.opaque = Z_NULL;
zlib->state = -1;
zlib->window_bits = window_bits;
zlib->compressed_digits = 0;
zlib->uncompressed_digits = 0;
/* These values are sticky across reset (in addition to the stuff in the
* first block, which is actually constant.)
*/
zlib->file_bits = 16;
zlib->ok_bits = 16; /* unset */
zlib->cksum = 0; /* set when a checksum error is detected */
/* '0' means use the header; inflateInit2 should always succeed because it
* does nothing apart from allocating the internal zstate.
*/
zlib->rc = inflateInit2(&zlib->z, 0);
if (zlib->rc != Z_OK)
{
zlib_message(zlib, 1/*unexpected*/);
return 0;
}
else
{
zlib->state = 0; /* initialized */
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
zlib_init(struct zlib *zlib, struct IDAT *idat, struct chunk *chunk,
int window_bits, png_uint_32 offset)
/* Initialize a zlib_control; the result is true/false */
{
CLEAR(*zlib);
zlib->idat = idat;
zlib->chunk = chunk;
zlib->file = chunk->file;
zlib->global = chunk->global;
zlib->rewrite_offset = offset; /* never changed for this zlib */
/* *_out does not need to be set: */
zlib->z.next_in = Z_NULL;
zlib->z.avail_in = 0;
zlib->z.zalloc = Z_NULL;
zlib->z.zfree = Z_NULL;
zlib->z.opaque = Z_NULL;
zlib->state = -1;
zlib->window_bits = window_bits;
zlib->compressed_digits = 0;
zlib->uncompressed_digits = 0;
/* These values are sticky across reset (in addition to the stuff in the
* first block, which is actually constant.)
*/
zlib->file_bits = 24;
zlib->ok_bits = 16; /* unset */
zlib->cksum = 0; /* set when a checksum error is detected */
/* '0' means use the header; inflateInit2 should always succeed because it
* does nothing apart from allocating the internal zstate.
*/
zlib->rc = inflateInit2(&zlib->z, 0);
if (zlib->rc != Z_OK)
{
zlib_message(zlib, 1/*unexpected*/);
return 0;
}
else
{
zlib->state = 0; /* initialized */
return 1;
}
}
| 173,742
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DownloadUIAdapterDelegate::OpenItem(const OfflineItem& item,
int64_t offline_id) {
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
Java_OfflinePageDownloadBridge_openItem(
env, ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, item.page_url.spec()), offline_id);
}
Commit Message: Open Offline Pages in CCT from Downloads Home.
When the respective feature flag is enabled, offline pages opened from
the Downloads Home will use CCT instead of normal tabs.
Bug: 824807
Change-Id: I6d968b8b0c51aaeb7f26332c7ada9f927e151a65
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/977321
Commit-Queue: Carlos Knippschild <carlosk@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ted Choc <tedchoc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernhard Bauer <bauerb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#546545}
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void DownloadUIAdapterDelegate::OpenItem(const OfflineItem& item,
int64_t offline_id) {
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
Java_OfflinePageDownloadBridge_openItem(
env, ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, item.page_url.spec()), offline_id,
offline_pages::ShouldOfflinePagesInDownloadHomeOpenInCct());
}
| 171,751
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int sysMapBlockFile(FILE* mapf, MemMapping* pMap)
{
char block_dev[PATH_MAX+1];
size_t size;
unsigned int blksize;
unsigned int blocks;
unsigned int range_count;
unsigned int i;
if (fgets(block_dev, sizeof(block_dev), mapf) == NULL) {
LOGW("failed to read block device from header\n");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(block_dev); ++i) {
if (block_dev[i] == '\n') {
block_dev[i] = 0;
break;
}
}
if (fscanf(mapf, "%zu %u\n%u\n", &size, &blksize, &range_count) != 3) {
LOGW("failed to parse block map header\n");
return -1;
}
blocks = ((size-1) / blksize) + 1;
pMap->range_count = range_count;
pMap->ranges = malloc(range_count * sizeof(MappedRange));
memset(pMap->ranges, 0, range_count * sizeof(MappedRange));
unsigned char* reserve;
reserve = mmap64(NULL, blocks * blksize, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
if (reserve == MAP_FAILED) {
LOGW("failed to reserve address space: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
pMap->ranges[range_count-1].addr = reserve;
pMap->ranges[range_count-1].length = blocks * blksize;
int fd = open(block_dev, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
LOGW("failed to open block device %s: %s\n", block_dev, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
unsigned char* next = reserve;
for (i = 0; i < range_count; ++i) {
int start, end;
if (fscanf(mapf, "%d %d\n", &start, &end) != 2) {
LOGW("failed to parse range %d in block map\n", i);
return -1;
}
void* addr = mmap64(next, (end-start)*blksize, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, fd, ((off64_t)start)*blksize);
if (addr == MAP_FAILED) {
LOGW("failed to map block %d: %s\n", i, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
pMap->ranges[i].addr = addr;
pMap->ranges[i].length = (end-start)*blksize;
next += pMap->ranges[i].length;
}
pMap->addr = reserve;
pMap->length = size;
LOGI("mmapped %d ranges\n", range_count);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows in recovery procedure.
Bug: 26960931
Change-Id: Ieae45caccfb4728fcf514f0d920976585d8e6caf
(cherry picked from commit 4f2df162c6ab4a71ca86e4b38735b681729c353b)
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
static int sysMapBlockFile(FILE* mapf, MemMapping* pMap)
{
char block_dev[PATH_MAX+1];
size_t size;
unsigned int blksize;
size_t blocks;
unsigned int range_count;
unsigned int i;
if (fgets(block_dev, sizeof(block_dev), mapf) == NULL) {
LOGW("failed to read block device from header\n");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(block_dev); ++i) {
if (block_dev[i] == '\n') {
block_dev[i] = 0;
break;
}
}
if (fscanf(mapf, "%zu %u\n%u\n", &size, &blksize, &range_count) != 3) {
LOGW("failed to parse block map header\n");
return -1;
}
if (blksize != 0) {
blocks = ((size-1) / blksize) + 1;
}
if (size == 0 || blksize == 0 || blocks > SIZE_MAX / blksize || range_count == 0) {
LOGE("invalid data in block map file: size %zu, blksize %u, range_count %u\n",
size, blksize, range_count);
return -1;
}
pMap->range_count = range_count;
pMap->ranges = calloc(range_count, sizeof(MappedRange));
if (pMap->ranges == NULL) {
LOGE("calloc(%u, %zu) failed: %s\n", range_count, sizeof(MappedRange), strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
unsigned char* reserve;
reserve = mmap64(NULL, blocks * blksize, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
if (reserve == MAP_FAILED) {
LOGW("failed to reserve address space: %s\n", strerror(errno));
free(pMap->ranges);
return -1;
}
int fd = open(block_dev, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
LOGW("failed to open block device %s: %s\n", block_dev, strerror(errno));
munmap(reserve, blocks * blksize);
free(pMap->ranges);
return -1;
}
unsigned char* next = reserve;
size_t remaining_size = blocks * blksize;
bool success = true;
for (i = 0; i < range_count; ++i) {
size_t start, end;
if (fscanf(mapf, "%zu %zu\n", &start, &end) != 2) {
LOGW("failed to parse range %d in block map\n", i);
success = false;
break;
}
size_t length = (end - start) * blksize;
if (end <= start || (end - start) > SIZE_MAX / blksize || length > remaining_size) {
LOGE("unexpected range in block map: %zu %zu\n", start, end);
success = false;
break;
}
void* addr = mmap64(next, length, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, fd, ((off64_t)start)*blksize);
if (addr == MAP_FAILED) {
LOGW("failed to map block %d: %s\n", i, strerror(errno));
success = false;
break;
}
pMap->ranges[i].addr = addr;
pMap->ranges[i].length = length;
next += length;
remaining_size -= length;
}
if (success && remaining_size != 0) {
LOGE("ranges in block map are invalid: remaining_size = %zu\n", remaining_size);
success = false;
}
if (!success) {
close(fd);
munmap(reserve, blocks * blksize);
free(pMap->ranges);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
pMap->addr = reserve;
pMap->length = size;
LOGI("mmapped %d ranges\n", range_count);
return 0;
}
| 173,903
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: updateDevice(const struct header * headers, time_t t)
{
struct device ** pp = &devlist;
struct device * p = *pp; /* = devlist; */
while(p)
{
if( p->headers[HEADER_NT].l == headers[HEADER_NT].l
&& (0==memcmp(p->headers[HEADER_NT].p, headers[HEADER_NT].p, headers[HEADER_NT].l))
&& p->headers[HEADER_USN].l == headers[HEADER_USN].l
&& (0==memcmp(p->headers[HEADER_USN].p, headers[HEADER_USN].p, headers[HEADER_USN].l)) )
{
/*printf("found! %d\n", (int)(t - p->t));*/
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "device updated : %.*s", headers[HEADER_USN].l, headers[HEADER_USN].p);
p->t = t;
/* update Location ! */
if(headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l > p->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l)
{
struct device * tmp;
tmp = realloc(p, sizeof(struct device)
+ headers[0].l+headers[1].l+headers[2].l);
if(!tmp) /* allocation error */
{
syslog(LOG_ERR, "updateDevice() : memory allocation error");
free(p);
return 0;
}
p = tmp;
*pp = p;
}
memcpy(p->data + p->headers[0].l + p->headers[1].l,
headers[2].p, headers[2].l);
/* TODO : check p->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l */
return 0;
}
pp = &p->next;
p = *pp; /* p = p->next; */
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "new device discovered : %.*s",
headers[HEADER_USN].l, headers[HEADER_USN].p);
/* add */
{
char * pc;
int i;
p = malloc( sizeof(struct device)
+ headers[0].l+headers[1].l+headers[2].l );
if(!p) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "updateDevice(): cannot allocate memory");
return -1;
}
p->next = devlist;
p->t = t;
pc = p->data;
for(i = 0; i < 3; i++)
{
p->headers[i].p = pc;
p->headers[i].l = headers[i].l;
memcpy(pc, headers[i].p, headers[i].l);
pc += headers[i].l;
}
devlist = p;
sendNotifications(NOTIF_NEW, p, NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: updateDevice() remove element from the list when realloc fails
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
updateDevice(const struct header * headers, time_t t)
{
struct device ** pp = &devlist;
struct device * p = *pp; /* = devlist; */
while(p)
{
if( p->headers[HEADER_NT].l == headers[HEADER_NT].l
&& (0==memcmp(p->headers[HEADER_NT].p, headers[HEADER_NT].p, headers[HEADER_NT].l))
&& p->headers[HEADER_USN].l == headers[HEADER_USN].l
&& (0==memcmp(p->headers[HEADER_USN].p, headers[HEADER_USN].p, headers[HEADER_USN].l)) )
{
/*printf("found! %d\n", (int)(t - p->t));*/
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "device updated : %.*s", headers[HEADER_USN].l, headers[HEADER_USN].p);
p->t = t;
/* update Location ! */
if(headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l > p->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l)
{
struct device * tmp;
tmp = realloc(p, sizeof(struct device)
+ headers[0].l+headers[1].l+headers[2].l);
if(!tmp) /* allocation error */
{
syslog(LOG_ERR, "updateDevice() : memory allocation error");
*pp = p->next; /* remove "p" from the list */
free(p);
return 0;
}
p = tmp;
*pp = p;
}
memcpy(p->data + p->headers[0].l + p->headers[1].l,
headers[2].p, headers[2].l);
/* TODO : check p->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l */
return 0;
}
pp = &p->next;
p = *pp; /* p = p->next; */
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "new device discovered : %.*s",
headers[HEADER_USN].l, headers[HEADER_USN].p);
/* add */
{
char * pc;
int i;
p = malloc( sizeof(struct device)
+ headers[0].l+headers[1].l+headers[2].l );
if(!p) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "updateDevice(): cannot allocate memory");
return -1;
}
p->next = devlist;
p->t = t;
pc = p->data;
for(i = 0; i < 3; i++)
{
p->headers[i].p = pc;
p->headers[i].l = headers[i].l;
memcpy(pc, headers[i].p, headers[i].l);
pc += headers[i].l;
}
devlist = p;
sendNotifications(NOTIF_NEW, p, NULL);
}
return 1;
}
| 169,669
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SchedulerObject::setAttribute(std::string key,
std::string name,
std::string value,
std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster < 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "SetAttribute: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
if (isSubmissionChange(name.c_str())) {
text = "Changes to submission name not allowed";
return false;
}
if (isKeyword(name.c_str())) {
text = "Attribute name is reserved: " + name;
return false;
}
if (!isValidAttributeName(name,text)) {
return false;
}
if (::SetAttribute(id.cluster,
id.proc,
name.c_str(),
value.c_str())) {
text = "Failed to set attribute " + name + " to " + value;
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
SchedulerObject::setAttribute(std::string key,
std::string name,
std::string value,
std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster <= 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "SetAttribute: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
if (isSubmissionChange(name.c_str())) {
text = "Changes to submission name not allowed";
return false;
}
if (isKeyword(name.c_str())) {
text = "Attribute name is reserved: " + name;
return false;
}
if (!isValidAttributeName(name,text)) {
return false;
}
if (::SetAttribute(id.cluster,
id.proc,
name.c_str(),
value.c_str())) {
text = "Failed to set attribute " + name + " to " + value;
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 164,835
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int find_source_vc(char **ret_path, unsigned *ret_idx) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
int r, err = 0;
unsigned i;
path = new(char, sizeof("/dev/tty63"));
if (!path)
return log_oom();
for (i = 1; i <= 63; i++) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
r = verify_vc_allocation(i);
if (r < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -r;
continue;
}
sprintf(path, "/dev/tty%u", i);
fd = open_terminal(path, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -fd;
continue;
}
r = verify_vc_kbmode(fd);
if (r < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -r;
continue;
}
/* all checks passed, return this one as a source console */
*ret_idx = i;
*ret_path = TAKE_PTR(path);
return TAKE_FD(fd);
}
return log_error_errno(err, "No usable source console found: %m");
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255
|
static int find_source_vc(char **ret_path, unsigned *ret_idx) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
int r, err = 0;
unsigned i;
path = new(char, sizeof("/dev/tty63"));
if (!path)
return log_oom();
for (i = 1; i <= 63; i++) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
r = verify_vc_allocation(i);
if (r < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -r;
continue;
}
sprintf(path, "/dev/tty%u", i);
fd = open_terminal(path, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -fd;
continue;
}
r = vt_verify_kbmode(fd);
if (r < 0) {
if (!err)
err = -r;
continue;
}
/* all checks passed, return this one as a source console */
*ret_idx = i;
*ret_path = TAKE_PTR(path);
return TAKE_FD(fd);
}
return log_error_errno(err, "No usable source console found: %m");
}
| 169,777
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Initialize(bool can_respond_to_crypto_handshake = true) {
clock_.AdvanceTime(quic::QuicTime::Delta::FromMilliseconds(1000));
runner_ = new net::test::TestTaskRunner(&clock_);
net::QuicChromiumAlarmFactory* alarm_factory =
new net::QuicChromiumAlarmFactory(runner_.get(), &clock_);
quic_transport_factory_ = std::make_unique<P2PQuicTransportFactoryImpl>(
&clock_, std::unique_ptr<net::QuicChromiumAlarmFactory>(alarm_factory));
auto client_packet_transport =
std::make_unique<FakePacketTransport>(alarm_factory, &clock_);
auto server_packet_transport =
std::make_unique<FakePacketTransport>(alarm_factory, &clock_);
client_packet_transport->ConnectPeerTransport(
server_packet_transport.get());
server_packet_transport->ConnectPeerTransport(
client_packet_transport.get());
rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate> client_cert =
CreateTestCertificate();
auto client_quic_transport_delegate =
std::make_unique<MockP2PQuicTransportDelegate>();
std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate>> client_certificates;
client_certificates.push_back(client_cert);
P2PQuicTransportConfig client_config(client_quic_transport_delegate.get(),
client_packet_transport.get(),
client_certificates);
client_config.is_server = false;
client_config.can_respond_to_crypto_handshake =
can_respond_to_crypto_handshake;
P2PQuicTransportImpl* client_quic_transport_ptr =
static_cast<P2PQuicTransportImpl*>(
quic_transport_factory_
->CreateQuicTransport(std::move(client_config))
.release());
std::unique_ptr<P2PQuicTransportImpl> client_quic_transport =
std::unique_ptr<P2PQuicTransportImpl>(client_quic_transport_ptr);
client_peer_ = std::make_unique<QuicPeerForTest>(
std::move(client_packet_transport),
std::move(client_quic_transport_delegate),
std::move(client_quic_transport), client_cert);
auto server_quic_transport_delegate =
std::make_unique<MockP2PQuicTransportDelegate>();
rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate> server_cert =
CreateTestCertificate();
std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate>> server_certificates;
server_certificates.push_back(server_cert);
P2PQuicTransportConfig server_config(server_quic_transport_delegate.get(),
server_packet_transport.get(),
server_certificates);
server_config.is_server = true;
server_config.can_respond_to_crypto_handshake =
can_respond_to_crypto_handshake;
P2PQuicTransportImpl* server_quic_transport_ptr =
static_cast<P2PQuicTransportImpl*>(
quic_transport_factory_
->CreateQuicTransport(std::move(server_config))
.release());
std::unique_ptr<P2PQuicTransportImpl> server_quic_transport =
std::unique_ptr<P2PQuicTransportImpl>(server_quic_transport_ptr);
server_peer_ = std::make_unique<QuicPeerForTest>(
std::move(server_packet_transport),
std::move(server_quic_transport_delegate),
std::move(server_quic_transport), server_cert);
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
void Initialize(bool can_respond_to_crypto_handshake = true) {
clock_.AdvanceTime(quic::QuicTime::Delta::FromMilliseconds(1000));
runner_ = new net::test::TestTaskRunner(&clock_);
net::QuicChromiumAlarmFactory* alarm_factory =
new net::QuicChromiumAlarmFactory(runner_.get(), &clock_);
quic_transport_factory_ = std::make_unique<P2PQuicTransportFactoryImpl>(
&clock_, std::unique_ptr<net::QuicChromiumAlarmFactory>(alarm_factory));
auto client_packet_transport =
std::make_unique<FakePacketTransport>(alarm_factory, &clock_);
auto server_packet_transport =
std::make_unique<FakePacketTransport>(alarm_factory, &clock_);
client_packet_transport->ConnectPeerTransport(
server_packet_transport.get());
server_packet_transport->ConnectPeerTransport(
client_packet_transport.get());
rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate> client_cert =
CreateTestCertificate();
auto client_quic_transport_delegate =
std::make_unique<MockP2PQuicTransportDelegate>();
std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate>> client_certificates;
client_certificates.push_back(client_cert);
P2PQuicTransportConfig client_config(client_quic_transport_delegate.get(),
client_packet_transport.get(),
client_certificates, kWriteBufferSize);
client_config.is_server = false;
client_config.can_respond_to_crypto_handshake =
can_respond_to_crypto_handshake;
P2PQuicTransportImpl* client_quic_transport_ptr =
static_cast<P2PQuicTransportImpl*>(
quic_transport_factory_
->CreateQuicTransport(std::move(client_config))
.release());
std::unique_ptr<P2PQuicTransportImpl> client_quic_transport =
std::unique_ptr<P2PQuicTransportImpl>(client_quic_transport_ptr);
client_peer_ = std::make_unique<QuicPeerForTest>(
std::move(client_packet_transport),
std::move(client_quic_transport_delegate),
std::move(client_quic_transport), client_cert);
auto server_quic_transport_delegate =
std::make_unique<MockP2PQuicTransportDelegate>();
rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate> server_cert =
CreateTestCertificate();
std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate>> server_certificates;
server_certificates.push_back(server_cert);
P2PQuicTransportConfig server_config(server_quic_transport_delegate.get(),
server_packet_transport.get(),
server_certificates, kWriteBufferSize);
server_config.is_server = true;
server_config.can_respond_to_crypto_handshake =
can_respond_to_crypto_handshake;
P2PQuicTransportImpl* server_quic_transport_ptr =
static_cast<P2PQuicTransportImpl*>(
quic_transport_factory_
->CreateQuicTransport(std::move(server_config))
.release());
std::unique_ptr<P2PQuicTransportImpl> server_quic_transport =
std::unique_ptr<P2PQuicTransportImpl>(server_quic_transport_ptr);
server_peer_ = std::make_unique<QuicPeerForTest>(
std::move(server_packet_transport),
std::move(server_quic_transport_delegate),
std::move(server_quic_transport), server_cert);
}
| 172,267
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool asn1_write_DATA_BLOB_LDAPString(struct asn1_data *data, const DATA_BLOB *s)
{
asn1_write(data, s->data, s->length);
return !data->has_error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
bool asn1_write_DATA_BLOB_LDAPString(struct asn1_data *data, const DATA_BLOB *s)
{
return asn1_write(data, s->data, s->length);
}
| 164,588
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ProxyChannelDelegate::~ProxyChannelDelegate() {
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
ProxyChannelDelegate::~ProxyChannelDelegate() {
| 170,740
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CaptivePortalDetector::DetectCaptivePortal(
const GURL& url,
const DetectionCallback& detection_callback) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(!FetchingURL());
DCHECK(detection_callback_.is_null());
detection_callback_ = detection_callback;
url_fetcher_ = net::URLFetcher::Create(0, url, net::URLFetcher::GET, this);
url_fetcher_->SetAutomaticallyRetryOn5xx(false);
url_fetcher_->SetRequestContext(request_context_.get());
url_fetcher_->SetLoadFlags(
net::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SAVE_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_AUTH_DATA);
url_fetcher_->Start();
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
void CaptivePortalDetector::DetectCaptivePortal(
const GURL& url,
const DetectionCallback& detection_callback) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(!FetchingURL());
DCHECK(detection_callback_.is_null());
detection_callback_ = detection_callback;
url_fetcher_ = net::URLFetcher::Create(0, url, net::URLFetcher::GET, this);
url_fetcher_->SetAutomaticallyRetryOn5xx(false);
url_fetcher_->SetRequestContext(request_context_.get());
data_use_measurement::DataUseUserData::AttachToFetcher(
url_fetcher_.get(),
data_use_measurement::DataUseUserData::CAPTIVE_PORTAL);
url_fetcher_->SetLoadFlags(
net::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SAVE_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_AUTH_DATA);
url_fetcher_->Start();
}
| 172,017
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool LocalFrame::ShouldReuseDefaultView(const KURL& url) const {
if (!Loader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument())
return false;
return GetDocument()->IsSecureTransitionTo(url);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285
|
bool LocalFrame::ShouldReuseDefaultView(const KURL& url) const {
bool LocalFrame::ShouldReuseDefaultView(
const KURL& url,
const ContentSecurityPolicy* csp) const {
if (!Loader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument())
return false;
// The Window object should only be re-used if it is same-origin.
// Since sandboxing turns the origin into an opaque origin it needs to also
// be considered when deciding whether to reuse it.
// Spec:
// https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsing-the-web.html#initialise-the-document-object
if (csp &&
SecurityContext::IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin, csp->GetSandboxMask())) {
return false;
}
return GetDocument()->IsSecureTransitionTo(url);
}
| 173,196
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: pdf_t *pdf_new(const char *name)
{
const char *n;
pdf_t *pdf;
pdf = calloc(1, sizeof(pdf_t));
if (name)
{
/* Just get the file name (not path) */
if ((n = strrchr(name, '/')))
++n;
else
n = name;
pdf->name = malloc(strlen(n) + 1);
strcpy(pdf->name, n);
}
else /* !name */
{
pdf->name = malloc(strlen("Unknown") + 1);
strcpy(pdf->name, "Unknown");
}
return pdf;
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
pdf_t *pdf_new(const char *name)
{
const char *n;
pdf_t *pdf;
pdf = safe_calloc(sizeof(pdf_t));
if (name)
{
/* Just get the file name (not path) */
if ((n = strrchr(name, '/')))
++n;
else
n = name;
pdf->name = safe_calloc(strlen(n) + 1);
strcpy(pdf->name, n);
}
else /* !name */
{
pdf->name = safe_calloc(strlen("Unknown") + 1);
strcpy(pdf->name, "Unknown");
}
return pdf;
}
| 169,573
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int generate(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen)
{
return crypto_old_rng_alg(tfm)->rng_make_random(tfm, dst, dlen);
}
Commit Message: crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
static int generate(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
| 167,733
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int bmpr_read_rle(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx)
{
int retval = 0;
if(!(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RLE8 && rctx->bitcount==8) &&
!(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RLE4 && rctx->bitcount==4))
{
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Compression type incompatible with image type");
}
if(rctx->topdown) {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Compression not allowed with top-down images");
}
rctx->img->imgtype = IW_IMGTYPE_RGBA;
rctx->img->bit_depth = 8;
rctx->img->bpr = iw_calc_bytesperrow(rctx->width,32);
rctx->img->pixels = (iw_byte*)iw_malloc_large(rctx->ctx,rctx->img->bpr,rctx->img->height);
if(!rctx->img->pixels) goto done;
if(!bmpr_read_rle_internal(rctx)) goto done;
if(!bmpr_has_transparency(rctx->img)) {
bmpr_strip_alpha(rctx->img);
}
retval = 1;
done:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
static int bmpr_read_rle(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx)
{
int retval = 0;
if(!(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RLE8 && rctx->bitcount==8) &&
!(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RLE4 && rctx->bitcount==4))
{
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Compression type incompatible with image type");
goto done;
}
if(rctx->topdown) {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Compression not allowed with top-down images");
goto done;
}
rctx->img->imgtype = IW_IMGTYPE_RGBA;
rctx->img->bit_depth = 8;
rctx->img->bpr = iw_calc_bytesperrow(rctx->width,32);
rctx->img->pixels = (iw_byte*)iw_malloc_large(rctx->ctx,rctx->img->bpr,rctx->img->height);
if(!rctx->img->pixels) goto done;
if(!bmpr_read_rle_internal(rctx)) goto done;
if(!bmpr_has_transparency(rctx->img)) {
bmpr_strip_alpha(rctx->img);
}
retval = 1;
done:
return retval;
}
| 168,117
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CNB::SetupLSO(virtio_net_hdr_basic *VirtioHeader, PVOID IpHeader, ULONG EthPayloadLength) const
{
PopulateIPLength(reinterpret_cast<IPv4Header*>(IpHeader), static_cast<USHORT>(EthPayloadLength));
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult packetReview;
packetReview = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerifyFlat(reinterpret_cast<IPv4Header*>(IpHeader), EthPayloadLength,
pcrIpChecksum | pcrFixIPChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrFixPHChecksum,
__FUNCTION__);
if (packetReview.xxpCheckSum == ppresPCSOK || packetReview.fixedXxpCS)
{
auto IpHeaderOffset = m_Context->Offload.ipHeaderOffset;
auto VHeader = static_cast<virtio_net_hdr_basic*>(VirtioHeader);
auto PriorityHdrLen = (m_ParentNBL->TCI() != 0) ? ETH_PRIORITY_HEADER_SIZE : 0;
VHeader->flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
VHeader->gso_type = packetReview.ipStatus == ppresIPV4 ? VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 : VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
VHeader->hdr_len = (USHORT)(packetReview.XxpIpHeaderSize + IpHeaderOffset + PriorityHdrLen);
VHeader->gso_size = (USHORT)m_ParentNBL->MSS();
VHeader->csum_start = (USHORT)(m_ParentNBL->TCPHeaderOffset() + PriorityHdrLen);
VHeader->csum_offset = TCP_CHECKSUM_OFFSET;
}
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void CNB::SetupLSO(virtio_net_hdr_basic *VirtioHeader, PVOID IpHeader, ULONG EthPayloadLength) const
{
PopulateIPLength(reinterpret_cast<IPv4Header*>(IpHeader), static_cast<USHORT>(EthPayloadLength));
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult packetReview;
packetReview = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerifyFlat(reinterpret_cast<IPv4Header*>(IpHeader), EthPayloadLength,
pcrIpChecksum | pcrFixIPChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrFixPHChecksum,
FALSE,
__FUNCTION__);
if (packetReview.xxpCheckSum == ppresPCSOK || packetReview.fixedXxpCS)
{
auto IpHeaderOffset = m_Context->Offload.ipHeaderOffset;
auto VHeader = static_cast<virtio_net_hdr_basic*>(VirtioHeader);
auto PriorityHdrLen = (m_ParentNBL->TCI() != 0) ? ETH_PRIORITY_HEADER_SIZE : 0;
VHeader->flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
VHeader->gso_type = packetReview.ipStatus == ppresIPV4 ? VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 : VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
VHeader->hdr_len = (USHORT)(packetReview.XxpIpHeaderSize + IpHeaderOffset + PriorityHdrLen);
VHeader->gso_size = (USHORT)m_ParentNBL->MSS();
VHeader->csum_start = (USHORT)(m_ParentNBL->TCPHeaderOffset() + PriorityHdrLen);
VHeader->csum_offset = TCP_CHECKSUM_OFFSET;
}
}
| 170,142
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static future_t *init(void) {
pthread_mutex_init(&lock, NULL);
config = config_new(CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
LOG_WARN(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to load config file; attempting to transcode legacy file.", __func__);
config = btif_config_transcode(LEGACY_CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
LOG_WARN(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to transcode legacy file, starting unconfigured.", __func__);
config = config_new_empty();
if (!config) {
LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to allocate a config object.", __func__);
goto error;
}
}
if (config_save(config, CONFIG_FILE_PATH))
unlink(LEGACY_CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
}
alarm_timer = alarm_new();
if (!alarm_timer) {
LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to create alarm.", __func__);
goto error;
}
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_SUCCESS);
error:;
alarm_free(alarm_timer);
config_free(config);
pthread_mutex_destroy(&lock);
alarm_timer = NULL;
config = NULL;
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_FAIL);
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes with lots of discovered LE devices
When loads of devices are discovered a config file which is too large
can be written out, which causes the BT daemon to crash on startup.
This limits the number of config entries for unpaired devices which
are initialized, and prevents a large number from being saved to the
filesystem.
Bug: 26071376
Change-Id: I4a74094f57a82b17f94e99a819974b8bc8082184
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static future_t *init(void) {
pthread_mutex_init(&lock, NULL);
config = config_new(CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
LOG_WARN(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to load config file; attempting to transcode legacy file.", __func__);
config = btif_config_transcode(LEGACY_CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
LOG_WARN(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to transcode legacy file, starting unconfigured.", __func__);
config = config_new_empty();
if (!config) {
LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to allocate a config object.", __func__);
goto error;
}
}
if (config_save(config, CONFIG_FILE_PATH))
unlink(LEGACY_CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
}
btif_config_devcache_cleanup();
alarm_timer = alarm_new();
if (!alarm_timer) {
LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "%s unable to create alarm.", __func__);
goto error;
}
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_SUCCESS);
error:;
alarm_free(alarm_timer);
config_free(config);
pthread_mutex_destroy(&lock);
alarm_timer = NULL;
config = NULL;
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_FAIL);
}
| 173,930
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static Image *ReadHRZImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
ssize_t
count,
y;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Convert HRZ raster image to pixel packets.
*/
image->columns=256;
image->rows=240;
image->depth=8;
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,3*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
length=(size_t) (3*image->columns);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if ((size_t) count != length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
p=pixels;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,y,image->rows) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static Image *ReadHRZImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
ssize_t
count,
y;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Convert HRZ raster image to pixel packets.
*/
image->columns=256;
image->rows=240;
image->depth=8;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,3*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
length=(size_t) (3*image->columns);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if ((size_t) count != length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
p=pixels;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,y,image->rows) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,571
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MountLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetMountLibrary() {
return mount_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
MountLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetMountLibrary() {
| 170,626
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: swabHorDiff16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
horDiff16(tif, cp0, cc);
TIFFSwabArrayOfShort(wp, wc);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
swabHorDiff16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
if( !horDiff16(tif, cp0, cc) )
return 0;
TIFFSwabArrayOfShort(wp, wc);
return 1;
}
| 166,890
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void FaviconSource::StartDataRequest(const std::string& path,
bool is_incognito,
int request_id) {
FaviconService* favicon_service =
profile_->GetFaviconService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (favicon_service) {
FaviconService::Handle handle;
if (path.empty()) {
SendDefaultResponse(request_id);
return;
}
if (path.size() > 8 && path.substr(0, 8) == "iconurl/") {
handle = favicon_service->GetFavicon(
GURL(path.substr(8)),
history::FAVICON,
&cancelable_consumer_,
NewCallback(this, &FaviconSource::OnFaviconDataAvailable));
} else {
handle = favicon_service->GetFaviconForURL(
GURL(path),
icon_types_,
&cancelable_consumer_,
NewCallback(this, &FaviconSource::OnFaviconDataAvailable));
}
cancelable_consumer_.SetClientData(favicon_service, handle, request_id);
} else {
SendResponse(request_id, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: ntp4: show larger favicons in most visited page
extend favicon source to provide larger icons. For now, larger means at most 32x32. Also, the only icon we actually support at this resolution is the default (globe).
BUG=none
TEST=manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7300017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91517 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void FaviconSource::StartDataRequest(const std::string& path,
bool is_incognito,
int request_id) {
FaviconService* favicon_service =
profile_->GetFaviconService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (favicon_service) {
if (path.empty()) {
SendDefaultResponse(request_id);
return;
}
FaviconService::Handle handle;
if (path.size() > 8 && path.substr(0, 8) == "iconurl/") {
handle = favicon_service->GetFavicon(
GURL(path.substr(8)),
history::FAVICON,
&cancelable_consumer_,
NewCallback(this, &FaviconSource::OnFaviconDataAvailable));
} else {
GURL url;
if (path.size() > 5 && path.substr(0, 5) == "size/") {
size_t slash = path.find("/", 5);
std::string size = path.substr(5, slash - 5);
int pixel_size = atoi(size.c_str());
CHECK(pixel_size == 32 || pixel_size == 16) <<
"only 32x32 and 16x16 icons are supported";
request_size_map_[request_id] = pixel_size;
url = GURL(path.substr(slash + 1));
} else {
request_size_map_[request_id] = 16;
url = GURL(path);
}
// TODO(estade): fetch the requested size.
handle = favicon_service->GetFaviconForURL(
url,
icon_types_,
&cancelable_consumer_,
NewCallback(this, &FaviconSource::OnFaviconDataAvailable));
}
cancelable_consumer_.SetClientData(favicon_service, handle, request_id);
} else {
SendResponse(request_id, NULL);
}
}
| 170,368
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: local unsigned long crc32_big(crc, buf, len)
unsigned long crc;
const unsigned char FAR *buf;
unsigned len;
{
register z_crc_t c;
register const z_crc_t FAR *buf4;
c = ZSWAP32((z_crc_t)crc);
c = ~c;
while (len && ((ptrdiff_t)buf & 3)) {
c = crc_table[4][(c >> 24) ^ *buf++] ^ (c << 8);
len--;
}
buf4 = (const z_crc_t FAR *)(const void FAR *)buf;
buf4--;
while (len >= 32) {
DOBIG32;
len -= 32;
}
while (len >= 4) {
DOBIG4;
len -= 4;
}
buf4++;
buf = (const unsigned char FAR *)buf4;
if (len) do {
c = crc_table[4][(c >> 24) ^ *buf++] ^ (c << 8);
} while (--len);
c = ~c;
return (unsigned long)(ZSWAP32(c));
}
Commit Message: Avoid pre-decrement of pointer in big-endian CRC calculation.
There was a small optimization for PowerPCs to pre-increment a
pointer when accessing a word, instead of post-incrementing. This
required prefacing the loop with a decrement of the pointer,
possibly pointing before the object passed. This is not compliant
with the C standard, for which decrementing a pointer before its
allocated memory is undefined. When tested on a modern PowerPC
with a modern compiler, the optimization no longer has any effect.
Due to all that, and per the recommendation of a security audit of
the zlib code by Trail of Bits and TrustInSoft, in support of the
Mozilla Foundation, this "optimization" was removed, in order to
avoid the possibility of undefined behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
local unsigned long crc32_big(crc, buf, len)
unsigned long crc;
const unsigned char FAR *buf;
unsigned len;
{
register z_crc_t c;
register const z_crc_t FAR *buf4;
c = ZSWAP32((z_crc_t)crc);
c = ~c;
while (len && ((ptrdiff_t)buf & 3)) {
c = crc_table[4][(c >> 24) ^ *buf++] ^ (c << 8);
len--;
}
buf4 = (const z_crc_t FAR *)(const void FAR *)buf;
while (len >= 32) {
DOBIG32;
len -= 32;
}
while (len >= 4) {
DOBIG4;
len -= 4;
}
buf = (const unsigned char FAR *)buf4;
if (len) do {
c = crc_table[4][(c >> 24) ^ *buf++] ^ (c << 8);
} while (--len);
c = ~c;
return (unsigned long)(ZSWAP32(c));
}
| 168,672
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: mrb_io_initialize_copy(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value copy)
{
mrb_value orig;
mrb_value buf;
struct mrb_io *fptr_copy;
struct mrb_io *fptr_orig;
mrb_bool failed = TRUE;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "o", &orig);
fptr_copy = (struct mrb_io *)DATA_PTR(copy);
if (fptr_copy != NULL) {
fptr_finalize(mrb, fptr_copy, FALSE);
mrb_free(mrb, fptr_copy);
}
fptr_copy = (struct mrb_io *)mrb_io_alloc(mrb);
fptr_orig = io_get_open_fptr(mrb, orig);
DATA_TYPE(copy) = &mrb_io_type;
DATA_PTR(copy) = fptr_copy;
buf = mrb_iv_get(mrb, orig, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"));
mrb_iv_set(mrb, copy, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"), buf);
fptr_copy->fd = mrb_dup(mrb, fptr_orig->fd, &failed);
if (failed) {
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, 0);
}
mrb_fd_cloexec(mrb, fptr_copy->fd);
if (fptr_orig->fd2 != -1) {
fptr_copy->fd2 = mrb_dup(mrb, fptr_orig->fd2, &failed);
if (failed) {
close(fptr_copy->fd);
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, 0);
}
mrb_fd_cloexec(mrb, fptr_copy->fd2);
}
fptr_copy->pid = fptr_orig->pid;
fptr_copy->readable = fptr_orig->readable;
fptr_copy->writable = fptr_orig->writable;
fptr_copy->sync = fptr_orig->sync;
fptr_copy->is_socket = fptr_orig->is_socket;
return copy;
}
Commit Message: Fix `use after free in File#initilialize_copy`; fix #4001
The bug and the fix were reported by https://hackerone.com/pnoltof
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
mrb_io_initialize_copy(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value copy)
{
mrb_value orig;
mrb_value buf;
struct mrb_io *fptr_copy;
struct mrb_io *fptr_orig;
mrb_bool failed = TRUE;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "o", &orig);
fptr_orig = io_get_open_fptr(mrb, orig);
fptr_copy = (struct mrb_io *)DATA_PTR(copy);
if (fptr_copy != NULL) {
fptr_finalize(mrb, fptr_copy, FALSE);
mrb_free(mrb, fptr_copy);
}
fptr_copy = (struct mrb_io *)mrb_io_alloc(mrb);
DATA_TYPE(copy) = &mrb_io_type;
DATA_PTR(copy) = fptr_copy;
buf = mrb_iv_get(mrb, orig, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"));
mrb_iv_set(mrb, copy, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "@buf"), buf);
fptr_copy->fd = mrb_dup(mrb, fptr_orig->fd, &failed);
if (failed) {
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, 0);
}
mrb_fd_cloexec(mrb, fptr_copy->fd);
if (fptr_orig->fd2 != -1) {
fptr_copy->fd2 = mrb_dup(mrb, fptr_orig->fd2, &failed);
if (failed) {
close(fptr_copy->fd);
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, 0);
}
mrb_fd_cloexec(mrb, fptr_copy->fd2);
}
fptr_copy->pid = fptr_orig->pid;
fptr_copy->readable = fptr_orig->readable;
fptr_copy->writable = fptr_orig->writable;
fptr_copy->sync = fptr_orig->sync;
fptr_copy->is_socket = fptr_orig->is_socket;
return copy;
}
| 169,255
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void fslib_copy_libs(const char *full_path) {
assert(full_path);
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf(" fslib_copy_libs %s\n", full_path);
if (access(full_path, R_OK)) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf("cannot find %s for private-lib, skipping...\n", full_path);
return;
}
unlink(RUN_LIB_FILE); // in case is there
create_empty_file_as_root(RUN_LIB_FILE, 0644);
if (chown(RUN_LIB_FILE, getuid(), getgid()))
errExit("chown");
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf(" running fldd %s\n", full_path);
sbox_run(SBOX_USER | SBOX_SECCOMP | SBOX_CAPS_NONE, 3, PATH_FLDD, full_path, RUN_LIB_FILE);
FILE *fp = fopen(RUN_LIB_FILE, "r");
if (!fp)
errExit("fopen");
char buf[MAXBUF];
while (fgets(buf, MAXBUF, fp)) {
char *ptr = strchr(buf, '\n');
if (ptr)
*ptr = '\0';
fslib_duplicate(buf);
}
fclose(fp);
}
Commit Message: mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
void fslib_copy_libs(const char *full_path) {
assert(full_path);
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf(" fslib_copy_libs %s\n", full_path);
if (access(full_path, R_OK)) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf("cannot find %s for private-lib, skipping...\n", full_path);
return;
}
unlink(RUN_LIB_FILE); // in case is there
create_empty_file_as_root(RUN_LIB_FILE, 0644);
if (chown(RUN_LIB_FILE, getuid(), getgid()))
errExit("chown");
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf(" running fldd %s\n", full_path);
sbox_run(SBOX_USER | SBOX_SECCOMP | SBOX_CAPS_NONE, 3, PATH_FLDD, full_path, RUN_LIB_FILE);
FILE *fp = fopen(RUN_LIB_FILE, "r");
if (!fp)
errExit("fopen");
char buf[MAXBUF];
while (fgets(buf, MAXBUF, fp)) {
char *ptr = strchr(buf, '\n');
if (ptr)
*ptr = '\0';
fslib_duplicate(buf);
}
fclose(fp);
unlink(RUN_LIB_FILE);
}
| 169,657
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: Block::~Block()
{
delete[] m_frames;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
Block::~Block()
| 174,455
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void array_cleanup( char* arr[] , int arr_size)
{
int i=0;
for( i=0; i< arr_size; i++ ){
if( arr[i*2] ){
efree( arr[i*2]);
}
}
efree(arr);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static void array_cleanup( char* arr[] , int arr_size)
{
int i=0;
for( i=0; i< arr_size; i++ ){
if( arr[i*2] ){
efree( arr[i*2]);
}
}
efree(arr);
}
| 167,200
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void opj_get_encoding_parameters(const opj_image_t *p_image,
const opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_tileno,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx1,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty1,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dx_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dy_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_prec,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_res)
{
/* loop */
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* pointers */
const opj_tcp_t *l_tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t * l_tccp = 00;
const opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
/* position in x and y of tile */
OPJ_UINT32 p, q;
/* preconditions */
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(p_tileno < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations */
l_tcp = &p_cp->tcps [p_tileno];
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
/* here calculation of tx0, tx1, ty0, ty1, maxprec, dx and dy */
p = p_tileno % p_cp->tw;
q = p_tileno / p_cp->tw;
/* find extent of tile */
*p_tx0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->tx0 + p * p_cp->tdx),
(OPJ_INT32)p_image->x0);
*p_tx1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->tx0 + (p + 1) * p_cp->tdx),
(OPJ_INT32)p_image->x1);
*p_ty0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->ty0 + q * p_cp->tdy),
(OPJ_INT32)p_image->y0);
*p_ty1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->ty0 + (q + 1) * p_cp->tdy),
(OPJ_INT32)p_image->y1);
/* max precision is 0 (can only grow) */
*p_max_prec = 0;
*p_max_res = 0;
/* take the largest value for dx_min and dy_min */
*p_dx_min = 0x7fffffff;
*p_dy_min = 0x7fffffff;
for (compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno) {
/* arithmetic variables to calculate */
OPJ_UINT32 l_level_no;
OPJ_INT32 l_rx0, l_ry0, l_rx1, l_ry1;
OPJ_INT32 l_px0, l_py0, l_px1, py1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pdx, l_pdy;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pw, l_ph;
OPJ_UINT32 l_product;
OPJ_INT32 l_tcx0, l_tcy0, l_tcx1, l_tcy1;
l_tcx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
l_tcx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
if (l_tccp->numresolutions > *p_max_res) {
*p_max_res = l_tccp->numresolutions;
}
/* use custom size for precincts */
for (resno = 0; resno < l_tccp->numresolutions; ++resno) {
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx, l_dy;
/* precinct width and height */
l_pdx = l_tccp->prcw[resno];
l_pdy = l_tccp->prch[resno];
l_dx = l_img_comp->dx * (1u << (l_pdx + l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
l_dy = l_img_comp->dy * (1u << (l_pdy + l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
/* take the minimum size for dx for each comp and resolution */
*p_dx_min = opj_uint_min(*p_dx_min, l_dx);
*p_dy_min = opj_uint_min(*p_dy_min, l_dy);
/* various calculations of extents */
l_level_no = l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno;
l_rx0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_rx1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_px0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_rx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_py0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_ry0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_px1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_rx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
py1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_ry1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_pw = (l_rx0 == l_rx1) ? 0 : (OPJ_UINT32)((l_px1 - l_px0) >> l_pdx);
l_ph = (l_ry0 == l_ry1) ? 0 : (OPJ_UINT32)((py1 - l_py0) >> l_pdy);
l_product = l_pw * l_ph;
/* update precision */
if (l_product > *p_max_prec) {
*p_max_prec = l_product;
}
}
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
}
Commit Message: [OPENJP2] change the way to compute *p_tx0, *p_tx1, *p_ty0, *p_ty1 in function
opj_get_encoding_parameters
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
static void opj_get_encoding_parameters(const opj_image_t *p_image,
const opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_tileno,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx1,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty1,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dx_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dy_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_prec,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_res)
{
/* loop */
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* pointers */
const opj_tcp_t *l_tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t * l_tccp = 00;
const opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
/* position in x and y of tile */
OPJ_UINT32 p, q;
/* non-corrected (in regard to image offset) tile offset */
OPJ_UINT32 l_tx0, l_ty0;
/* preconditions */
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(p_tileno < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations */
l_tcp = &p_cp->tcps [p_tileno];
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
/* here calculation of tx0, tx1, ty0, ty1, maxprec, dx and dy */
p = p_tileno % p_cp->tw;
q = p_tileno / p_cp->tw;
/* find extent of tile */
l_tx0 = p_cp->tx0 + p *
p_cp->tdx; /* can't be greater than p_image->x1 so won't overflow */
*p_tx0 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_max(l_tx0, p_image->x0);
*p_tx1 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_min(opj_uint_adds(l_tx0, p_cp->tdx), p_image->x1);
l_ty0 = p_cp->ty0 + q *
p_cp->tdy; /* can't be greater than p_image->y1 so won't overflow */
*p_ty0 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_max(l_ty0, p_image->y0);
*p_ty1 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_min(opj_uint_adds(l_ty0, p_cp->tdy), p_image->y1);
/* max precision is 0 (can only grow) */
*p_max_prec = 0;
*p_max_res = 0;
/* take the largest value for dx_min and dy_min */
*p_dx_min = 0x7fffffff;
*p_dy_min = 0x7fffffff;
for (compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno) {
/* arithmetic variables to calculate */
OPJ_UINT32 l_level_no;
OPJ_INT32 l_rx0, l_ry0, l_rx1, l_ry1;
OPJ_INT32 l_px0, l_py0, l_px1, py1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pdx, l_pdy;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pw, l_ph;
OPJ_UINT32 l_product;
OPJ_INT32 l_tcx0, l_tcy0, l_tcx1, l_tcy1;
l_tcx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
l_tcx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
if (l_tccp->numresolutions > *p_max_res) {
*p_max_res = l_tccp->numresolutions;
}
/* use custom size for precincts */
for (resno = 0; resno < l_tccp->numresolutions; ++resno) {
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx, l_dy;
/* precinct width and height */
l_pdx = l_tccp->prcw[resno];
l_pdy = l_tccp->prch[resno];
l_dx = l_img_comp->dx * (1u << (l_pdx + l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
l_dy = l_img_comp->dy * (1u << (l_pdy + l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
/* take the minimum size for dx for each comp and resolution */
*p_dx_min = opj_uint_min(*p_dx_min, l_dx);
*p_dy_min = opj_uint_min(*p_dy_min, l_dy);
/* various calculations of extents */
l_level_no = l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno;
l_rx0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_rx1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_px0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_rx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_py0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_ry0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_px1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_rx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
py1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_ry1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_pw = (l_rx0 == l_rx1) ? 0 : (OPJ_UINT32)((l_px1 - l_px0) >> l_pdx);
l_ph = (l_ry0 == l_ry1) ? 0 : (OPJ_UINT32)((py1 - l_py0) >> l_pdy);
l_product = l_pw * l_ph;
/* update precision */
if (l_product > *p_max_prec) {
*p_max_prec = l_product;
}
}
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
}
| 169,766
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: setup_server_realm(krb5_principal sprinc)
{
krb5_error_code kret;
kdc_realm_t *newrealm;
kret = 0;
if (kdc_numrealms > 1) {
if (!(newrealm = find_realm_data(sprinc->realm.data,
(krb5_ui_4) sprinc->realm.length)))
kret = ENOENT;
else
kdc_active_realm = newrealm;
}
else
kdc_active_realm = kdc_realmlist[0];
return(kret);
}
Commit Message: Multi-realm KDC null deref [CVE-2013-1418]
If a KDC serves multiple realms, certain requests can cause
setup_server_realm() to dereference a null pointer, crashing the KDC.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
A related but more minor vulnerability requires authentication to
exploit, and is only present if a third-party KDC database module can
dereference a null pointer under certain conditions.
(back ported from commit 5d2d9a1abe46a2c1a8614d4672d08d9d30a5f8bf)
ticket: 7757 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.7
status: resolved
CWE ID:
|
setup_server_realm(krb5_principal sprinc)
{
krb5_error_code kret;
kdc_realm_t *newrealm;
kret = 0;
if (sprinc == NULL)
return NULL;
if (kdc_numrealms > 1) {
if (!(newrealm = find_realm_data(sprinc->realm.data,
(krb5_ui_4) sprinc->realm.length)))
kret = ENOENT;
else
kdc_active_realm = newrealm;
}
else
kdc_active_realm = kdc_realmlist[0];
return(kret);
}
| 165,933
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: rpl_dio_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
const struct nd_rpl_dio *dio = (const struct nd_rpl_dio *)bp;
const char *dagid_str;
ND_TCHECK(*dio);
dagid_str = ip6addr_string (ndo, dio->rpl_dagid);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [dagid:%s,seq:%u,instance:%u,rank:%u,%smop:%s,prf:%u]",
dagid_str,
dio->rpl_dtsn,
dio->rpl_instanceid,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dio->rpl_dagrank),
RPL_DIO_GROUNDED(dio->rpl_mopprf) ? "grounded,":"",
tok2str(rpl_mop_values, "mop%u", RPL_DIO_MOP(dio->rpl_mopprf)),
RPL_DIO_PRF(dio->rpl_mopprf)));
if(ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const struct rpl_dio_genoption *opt = (const struct rpl_dio_genoption *)&dio[1];
rpl_dio_printopt(ndo, opt, length);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|truncated]"));
return;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
rpl_dio_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
const struct nd_rpl_dio *dio = (const struct nd_rpl_dio *)bp;
const char *dagid_str;
ND_TCHECK(*dio);
dagid_str = ip6addr_string (ndo, dio->rpl_dagid);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [dagid:%s,seq:%u,instance:%u,rank:%u,%smop:%s,prf:%u]",
dagid_str,
dio->rpl_dtsn,
dio->rpl_instanceid,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dio->rpl_dagrank),
RPL_DIO_GROUNDED(dio->rpl_mopprf) ? "grounded,":"",
tok2str(rpl_mop_values, "mop%u", RPL_DIO_MOP(dio->rpl_mopprf)),
RPL_DIO_PRF(dio->rpl_mopprf)));
if(ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const struct rpl_dio_genoption *opt = (const struct rpl_dio_genoption *)&dio[1];
rpl_dio_printopt(ndo, opt, length);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", rpl_tstr));
return;
}
| 169,830
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: iperf_json_printf(const char *format, ...)
{
cJSON* o;
va_list argp;
const char *cp;
char name[100];
char* np;
cJSON* j;
o = cJSON_CreateObject();
if (o == NULL)
return NULL;
va_start(argp, format);
np = name;
for (cp = format; *cp != '\0'; ++cp) {
switch (*cp) {
case ' ':
break;
case ':':
*np = '\0';
break;
case '%':
++cp;
switch (*cp) {
case 'b':
j = cJSON_CreateBool(va_arg(argp, int));
break;
case 'd':
j = cJSON_CreateInt(va_arg(argp, int64_t));
break;
case 'f':
j = cJSON_CreateFloat(va_arg(argp, double));
break;
case 's':
j = cJSON_CreateString(va_arg(argp, char *));
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
if (j == NULL)
return NULL;
cJSON_AddItemToObject(o, name, j);
np = name;
break;
default:
*np++ = *cp;
break;
}
}
va_end(argp);
return o;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
iperf_json_printf(const char *format, ...)
{
cJSON* o;
va_list argp;
const char *cp;
char name[100];
char* np;
cJSON* j;
o = cJSON_CreateObject();
if (o == NULL)
return NULL;
va_start(argp, format);
np = name;
for (cp = format; *cp != '\0'; ++cp) {
switch (*cp) {
case ' ':
break;
case ':':
*np = '\0';
break;
case '%':
++cp;
switch (*cp) {
case 'b':
j = cJSON_CreateBool(va_arg(argp, int));
break;
case 'd':
j = cJSON_CreateNumber(va_arg(argp, int64_t));
break;
case 'f':
j = cJSON_CreateNumber(va_arg(argp, double));
break;
case 's':
j = cJSON_CreateString(va_arg(argp, char *));
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
if (j == NULL)
return NULL;
cJSON_AddItemToObject(o, name, j);
np = name;
break;
default:
*np++ = *cp;
break;
}
}
va_end(argp);
return o;
}
| 167,318
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: nfs3svc_decode_readargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readargs *args)
{
unsigned int len;
int v;
u32 max_blocksize = svc_max_payload(rqstp);
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &args->offset);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
len = min(args->count, max_blocksize);
/* set up the kvec */
v=0;
while (len > 0) {
struct page *p = *(rqstp->rq_next_page++);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = page_address(p);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = min_t(unsigned int, len, PAGE_SIZE);
len -= rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len;
v++;
}
args->vlen = v;
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
nfs3svc_decode_readargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readargs *args)
{
unsigned int len;
int v;
u32 max_blocksize = svc_max_payload(rqstp);
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &args->offset);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
if (!xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p))
return 0;
len = min(args->count, max_blocksize);
/* set up the kvec */
v=0;
while (len > 0) {
struct page *p = *(rqstp->rq_next_page++);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = page_address(p);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = min_t(unsigned int, len, PAGE_SIZE);
len -= rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len;
v++;
}
args->vlen = v;
return 1;
}
| 168,140
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: isis_print_id(const uint8_t *cp, int id_len)
{
int i;
static char id[sizeof("xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.yy-zz")];
char *pos = id;
for (i = 1; i <= SYSTEM_ID_LEN; i++) {
snprintf(pos, sizeof(id) - (pos - id), "%02x", *cp++);
pos += strlen(pos);
if (i == 2 || i == 4)
*pos++ = '.';
}
if (id_len >= NODE_ID_LEN) {
snprintf(pos, sizeof(id) - (pos - id), ".%02x", *cp++);
pos += strlen(pos);
}
if (id_len == LSP_ID_LEN)
snprintf(pos, sizeof(id) - (pos - id), "-%02x", *cp);
return (id);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13035/Properly handle IS-IS IDs shorter than a system ID (MAC address).
Some of them are variable-length, with a field giving the total length,
and therefore they can be shorter than 6 octets. If one is, don't run
past the end.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
isis_print_id(const uint8_t *cp, int id_len)
{
int i;
static char id[sizeof("xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.yy-zz")];
char *pos = id;
int sysid_len;
sysid_len = SYSTEM_ID_LEN;
if (sysid_len > id_len)
sysid_len = id_len;
for (i = 1; i <= sysid_len; i++) {
snprintf(pos, sizeof(id) - (pos - id), "%02x", *cp++);
pos += strlen(pos);
if (i == 2 || i == 4)
*pos++ = '.';
}
if (id_len >= NODE_ID_LEN) {
snprintf(pos, sizeof(id) - (pos - id), ".%02x", *cp++);
pos += strlen(pos);
}
if (id_len == LSP_ID_LEN)
snprintf(pos, sizeof(id) - (pos - id), "-%02x", *cp);
return (id);
}
| 167,848
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: externalParEntProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
const char *next = s;
int tok;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
if (tok <= 0) {
if (! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer && tok != XML_TOK_INVALID) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case XML_TOK_NONE: /* start == end */
default:
break;
}
}
/* This would cause the next stage, i.e. doProlog to be passed XML_TOK_BOM.
However, when parsing an external subset, doProlog will not accept a BOM
as valid, and report a syntax error, so we have to skip the BOM
*/
else if (tok == XML_TOK_BOM) {
s = next;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
}
parser->m_processor = prologProcessor;
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
|
externalParEntProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
const char *next = s;
int tok;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
if (tok <= 0) {
if (! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer && tok != XML_TOK_INVALID) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case XML_TOK_NONE: /* start == end */
default:
break;
}
}
/* This would cause the next stage, i.e. doProlog to be passed XML_TOK_BOM.
However, when parsing an external subset, doProlog will not accept a BOM
as valid, and report a syntax error, so we have to skip the BOM
*/
else if (tok == XML_TOK_BOM) {
s = next;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
}
parser->m_processor = prologProcessor;
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer, XML_TRUE);
}
| 169,530
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void utf32_to_utf8(const char32_t* src, size_t src_len, char* dst)
{
if (src == NULL || src_len == 0 || dst == NULL) {
return;
}
const char32_t *cur_utf32 = src;
const char32_t *end_utf32 = src + src_len;
char *cur = dst;
while (cur_utf32 < end_utf32) {
size_t len = utf32_codepoint_utf8_length(*cur_utf32);
utf32_codepoint_to_utf8((uint8_t *)cur, *cur_utf32++, len);
cur += len;
}
*cur = '\0';
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void utf32_to_utf8(const char32_t* src, size_t src_len, char* dst)
void utf32_to_utf8(const char32_t* src, size_t src_len, char* dst, size_t dst_len)
{
if (src == NULL || src_len == 0 || dst == NULL) {
return;
}
const char32_t *cur_utf32 = src;
const char32_t *end_utf32 = src + src_len;
char *cur = dst;
while (cur_utf32 < end_utf32) {
size_t len = utf32_codepoint_utf8_length(*cur_utf32);
LOG_ALWAYS_FATAL_IF(dst_len < len, "%zu < %zu", dst_len, len);
utf32_codepoint_to_utf8((uint8_t *)cur, *cur_utf32++, len);
cur += len;
dst_len -= len;
}
LOG_ALWAYS_FATAL_IF(dst_len < 1, "dst_len < 1: %zu < 1", dst_len);
*cur = '\0';
}
| 173,421
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void *skcipher_bind(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
return crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, type, mask);
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif_skcipher - Require setkey before accept(2)
Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them
without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that
the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been
done on the socket yet.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
static void *skcipher_bind(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
struct skcipher_tfm *tfm;
struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher;
tfm = kzalloc(sizeof(*tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tfm)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
skcipher = crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, type, mask);
if (IS_ERR(skcipher)) {
kfree(tfm);
return ERR_CAST(skcipher);
}
tfm->skcipher = skcipher;
return tfm;
}
| 167,455
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool SyncManager::SyncInternal::Init(
const FilePath& database_location,
const WeakHandle<JsEventHandler>& event_handler,
const std::string& sync_server_and_path,
int port,
bool use_ssl,
const scoped_refptr<base::TaskRunner>& blocking_task_runner,
HttpPostProviderFactory* post_factory,
ModelSafeWorkerRegistrar* model_safe_worker_registrar,
browser_sync::ExtensionsActivityMonitor* extensions_activity_monitor,
ChangeDelegate* change_delegate,
const std::string& user_agent,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
bool enable_sync_tabs_for_other_clients,
sync_notifier::SyncNotifier* sync_notifier,
const std::string& restored_key_for_bootstrapping,
TestingMode testing_mode,
Encryptor* encryptor,
UnrecoverableErrorHandler* unrecoverable_error_handler,
ReportUnrecoverableErrorFunction report_unrecoverable_error_function) {
CHECK(!initialized_);
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DVLOG(1) << "Starting SyncInternal initialization.";
weak_handle_this_ = MakeWeakHandle(weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
blocking_task_runner_ = blocking_task_runner;
registrar_ = model_safe_worker_registrar;
change_delegate_ = change_delegate;
testing_mode_ = testing_mode;
enable_sync_tabs_for_other_clients_ = enable_sync_tabs_for_other_clients;
sync_notifier_.reset(sync_notifier);
AddObserver(&js_sync_manager_observer_);
SetJsEventHandler(event_handler);
AddObserver(&debug_info_event_listener_);
database_path_ = database_location.Append(
syncable::Directory::kSyncDatabaseFilename);
encryptor_ = encryptor;
unrecoverable_error_handler_ = unrecoverable_error_handler;
report_unrecoverable_error_function_ = report_unrecoverable_error_function;
share_.directory.reset(
new syncable::Directory(encryptor_,
unrecoverable_error_handler_,
report_unrecoverable_error_function_));
connection_manager_.reset(new SyncAPIServerConnectionManager(
sync_server_and_path, port, use_ssl, user_agent, post_factory));
net::NetworkChangeNotifier::AddIPAddressObserver(this);
observing_ip_address_changes_ = true;
connection_manager()->AddListener(this);
if (testing_mode_ == NON_TEST) {
DVLOG(1) << "Sync is bringing up SyncSessionContext.";
std::vector<SyncEngineEventListener*> listeners;
listeners.push_back(&allstatus_);
listeners.push_back(this);
SyncSessionContext* context = new SyncSessionContext(
connection_manager_.get(),
directory(),
model_safe_worker_registrar,
extensions_activity_monitor,
listeners,
&debug_info_event_listener_,
&traffic_recorder_);
context->set_account_name(credentials.email);
scheduler_.reset(new SyncScheduler(name_, context, new Syncer()));
}
bool signed_in = SignIn(credentials);
if (signed_in) {
if (scheduler()) {
scheduler()->Start(
browser_sync::SyncScheduler::CONFIGURATION_MODE, base::Closure());
}
initialized_ = true;
ReadTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
trans.GetCryptographer()->Bootstrap(restored_key_for_bootstrapping);
trans.GetCryptographer()->AddObserver(this);
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(SyncManager::Observer, observers_,
OnInitializationComplete(
MakeWeakHandle(weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
signed_in));
if (!signed_in && testing_mode_ == NON_TEST)
return false;
sync_notifier_->AddObserver(this);
return signed_in;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
bool SyncManager::SyncInternal::Init(
const FilePath& database_location,
const WeakHandle<JsEventHandler>& event_handler,
const std::string& sync_server_and_path,
int port,
bool use_ssl,
const scoped_refptr<base::TaskRunner>& blocking_task_runner,
HttpPostProviderFactory* post_factory,
ModelSafeWorkerRegistrar* model_safe_worker_registrar,
browser_sync::ExtensionsActivityMonitor* extensions_activity_monitor,
ChangeDelegate* change_delegate,
const std::string& user_agent,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
sync_notifier::SyncNotifier* sync_notifier,
const std::string& restored_key_for_bootstrapping,
TestingMode testing_mode,
Encryptor* encryptor,
UnrecoverableErrorHandler* unrecoverable_error_handler,
ReportUnrecoverableErrorFunction report_unrecoverable_error_function) {
CHECK(!initialized_);
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DVLOG(1) << "Starting SyncInternal initialization.";
weak_handle_this_ = MakeWeakHandle(weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
blocking_task_runner_ = blocking_task_runner;
registrar_ = model_safe_worker_registrar;
change_delegate_ = change_delegate;
testing_mode_ = testing_mode;
sync_notifier_.reset(sync_notifier);
AddObserver(&js_sync_manager_observer_);
SetJsEventHandler(event_handler);
AddObserver(&debug_info_event_listener_);
database_path_ = database_location.Append(
syncable::Directory::kSyncDatabaseFilename);
encryptor_ = encryptor;
unrecoverable_error_handler_ = unrecoverable_error_handler;
report_unrecoverable_error_function_ = report_unrecoverable_error_function;
share_.directory.reset(
new syncable::Directory(encryptor_,
unrecoverable_error_handler_,
report_unrecoverable_error_function_));
connection_manager_.reset(new SyncAPIServerConnectionManager(
sync_server_and_path, port, use_ssl, user_agent, post_factory));
net::NetworkChangeNotifier::AddIPAddressObserver(this);
observing_ip_address_changes_ = true;
connection_manager()->AddListener(this);
if (testing_mode_ == NON_TEST) {
DVLOG(1) << "Sync is bringing up SyncSessionContext.";
std::vector<SyncEngineEventListener*> listeners;
listeners.push_back(&allstatus_);
listeners.push_back(this);
SyncSessionContext* context = new SyncSessionContext(
connection_manager_.get(),
directory(),
model_safe_worker_registrar,
extensions_activity_monitor,
listeners,
&debug_info_event_listener_,
&traffic_recorder_);
context->set_account_name(credentials.email);
scheduler_.reset(new SyncScheduler(name_, context, new Syncer()));
}
bool signed_in = SignIn(credentials);
if (signed_in) {
if (scheduler()) {
scheduler()->Start(
browser_sync::SyncScheduler::CONFIGURATION_MODE, base::Closure());
}
initialized_ = true;
ReadTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
trans.GetCryptographer()->Bootstrap(restored_key_for_bootstrapping);
trans.GetCryptographer()->AddObserver(this);
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(SyncManager::Observer, observers_,
OnInitializationComplete(
MakeWeakHandle(weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
signed_in));
if (!signed_in && testing_mode_ == NON_TEST)
return false;
sync_notifier_->AddObserver(this);
return signed_in;
}
| 170,793
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DisconnectWindowLinux::Hide() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Initial implementation of DisconnectWindow on Linux.
BUG=None
TEST=Manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88889 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void DisconnectWindowLinux::Hide() {
DCHECK(disconnect_window_);
gtk_widget_hide(disconnect_window_);
}
gboolean DisconnectWindowLinux::OnWindowDelete(GtkWidget* widget,
GdkEvent* event) {
// Don't allow the window to be closed.
return TRUE;
}
void DisconnectWindowLinux::OnDisconnectClicked(GtkButton* sender) {
DCHECK(host_);
host_->Shutdown();
}
| 170,473
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_16_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_expand_16(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_png_set_expand_16_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_expand_16_set(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_expand_16(pp);
/* NOTE: prior to 1.7 libpng does SET_EXPAND as well, so tRNS is expanded. */
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700
if (that->this.has_tRNS)
that->this.is_transparent = 1;
# endif
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
| 173,628
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: my_object_emit_frobnicate (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
{
g_signal_emit (obj, signals[FROBNICATE], 0, 42);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
my_object_emit_frobnicate (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
| 165,094
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int socket_accept(int fd, uint16_t port)
{
#ifdef WIN32
int addr_len;
#else
socklen_t addr_len;
#endif
int result;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
addr.sin_port = htons(port);
addr_len = sizeof(addr);
result = accept(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, &addr_len);
return result;
}
Commit Message: common: [security fix] Make sure sockets only listen locally
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
int socket_accept(int fd, uint16_t port)
{
#ifdef WIN32
int addr_len;
#else
socklen_t addr_len;
#endif
int result;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
addr.sin_port = htons(port);
addr_len = sizeof(addr);
result = accept(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, &addr_len);
return result;
}
| 167,165
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: HarfBuzzShaperBase::HarfBuzzShaperBase(const Font* font, const TextRun& run)
: m_font(font)
, m_run(run)
, m_wordSpacingAdjustment(font->wordSpacing())
, m_letterSpacing(font->letterSpacing())
{
}
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized variables in HarfBuzzShaperBase
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=79546
Reviewed by Dirk Pranke.
These were introduced in r108733.
* platform/graphics/harfbuzz/HarfBuzzShaperBase.cpp:
(WebCore::HarfBuzzShaperBase::HarfBuzzShaperBase):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@108871 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
HarfBuzzShaperBase::HarfBuzzShaperBase(const Font* font, const TextRun& run)
: m_font(font)
, m_normalizedBufferLength(0)
, m_run(run)
, m_wordSpacingAdjustment(font->wordSpacing())
, m_padding(0)
, m_padPerWordBreak(0)
, m_padError(0)
, m_letterSpacing(font->letterSpacing())
{
}
| 170,964
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int send_full_color_rect(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
{
int stream = 0;
ssize_t bytes;
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_PNG
if (tight_can_send_png_rect(vs, w, h)) {
return send_png_rect(vs, x, y, w, h, NULL);
}
#endif
tight_pack24(vs, vs->tight.tight.buffer, w * h, &vs->tight.tight.offset);
bytes = 3;
} else {
bytes = vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
static int send_full_color_rect(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
{
int stream = 0;
ssize_t bytes;
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_PNG
if (tight_can_send_png_rect(vs, w, h)) {
return send_png_rect(vs, x, y, w, h, NULL);
}
#endif
tight_pack24(vs, vs->tight.tight.buffer, w * h, &vs->tight.tight.offset);
bytes = 3;
} else {
bytes = vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel;
}
| 165,461
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: main(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngfix does not work without read support\n");
return 77;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
main(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngfix does not work without read deinterlace support\n");
return 77;
}
| 173,735
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: authentic_process_fci(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_file *file,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
size_t taglen;
int rv;
unsigned ii;
const unsigned char *tag = NULL;
unsigned char ops_DF[8] = {
SC_AC_OP_CREATE, SC_AC_OP_DELETE, SC_AC_OP_CRYPTO, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
unsigned char ops_EF[8] = {
SC_AC_OP_READ, SC_AC_OP_DELETE, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE, SC_AC_OP_RESIZE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, buf, buflen, 0x6F, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL) {
sc_log(ctx, " FCP length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", taglen);
buf = tag;
buflen = taglen;
}
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, buf, buflen, 0x62, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL) {
sc_log(ctx, " FCP length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", taglen);
buf = tag;
buflen = taglen;
}
rv = iso_ops->process_fci(card, file, buf, buflen);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "ISO parse FCI failed");
if (!file->sec_attr_len) {
sc_log_hex(ctx, "ACLs not found in data", buf, buflen);
sc_log(ctx, "Path:%s; Type:%X; PathType:%X", sc_print_path(&file->path), file->type, file->path.type);
if (file->path.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME || file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF) {
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
}
else {
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, "ACLs tag missing");
}
}
sc_log_hex(ctx, "ACL data", file->sec_attr, file->sec_attr_len);
for (ii = 0; ii < file->sec_attr_len / 2; ii++) {
unsigned char op = file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF ? ops_DF[ii] : ops_EF[ii];
unsigned char acl = *(file->sec_attr + ii*2);
unsigned char cred_id = *(file->sec_attr + ii*2 + 1);
unsigned sc = acl * 0x100 + cred_id;
sc_log(ctx, "ACL(%i) op 0x%X, acl %X:%X", ii, op, acl, cred_id);
if (op == 0xFF)
;
else if (!acl && !cred_id)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NONE, 0);
else if (acl == 0xFF)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NEVER, 0);
else if (acl & AUTHENTIC_AC_SM_MASK)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_SCB, sc);
else if (cred_id)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_CHV, cred_id);
else
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NEVER, 0);
}
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, 0);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
authentic_process_fci(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_file *file,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
size_t taglen;
int rv;
unsigned ii;
const unsigned char *tag = NULL;
unsigned char ops_DF[8] = {
SC_AC_OP_CREATE, SC_AC_OP_DELETE, SC_AC_OP_CRYPTO, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
unsigned char ops_EF[8] = {
SC_AC_OP_READ, SC_AC_OP_DELETE, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE, SC_AC_OP_RESIZE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, buf, buflen, 0x6F, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL) {
sc_log(ctx, " FCP length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", taglen);
buf = tag;
buflen = taglen;
}
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, buf, buflen, 0x62, &taglen);
if (tag != NULL) {
sc_log(ctx, " FCP length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", taglen);
buf = tag;
buflen = taglen;
}
rv = iso_ops->process_fci(card, file, buf, buflen);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "ISO parse FCI failed");
if (!file->sec_attr_len) {
sc_log_hex(ctx, "ACLs not found in data", buf, buflen);
sc_log(ctx, "Path:%s; Type:%X; PathType:%X", sc_print_path(&file->path), file->type, file->path.type);
if (file->path.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME || file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF) {
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
}
else {
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, "ACLs tag missing");
}
}
sc_log_hex(ctx, "ACL data", file->sec_attr, file->sec_attr_len);
for (ii = 0; ii < file->sec_attr_len / 2 && ii < sizeof ops_DF; ii++) {
unsigned char op = file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF ? ops_DF[ii] : ops_EF[ii];
unsigned char acl = *(file->sec_attr + ii*2);
unsigned char cred_id = *(file->sec_attr + ii*2 + 1);
unsigned sc = acl * 0x100 + cred_id;
sc_log(ctx, "ACL(%i) op 0x%X, acl %X:%X", ii, op, acl, cred_id);
if (op == 0xFF)
;
else if (!acl && !cred_id)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NONE, 0);
else if (acl == 0xFF)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NEVER, 0);
else if (acl & AUTHENTIC_AC_SM_MASK)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_SCB, sc);
else if (cred_id)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_CHV, cred_id);
else
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NEVER, 0);
}
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, 0);
}
| 169,048
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int parse_report(transport_smart *transport, git_push *push)
{
git_pkt *pkt = NULL;
const char *line_end = NULL;
gitno_buffer *buf = &transport->buffer;
int error, recvd;
git_buf data_pkt_buf = GIT_BUF_INIT;
for (;;) {
if (buf->offset > 0)
error = git_pkt_parse_line(&pkt, buf->data,
&line_end, buf->offset);
else
error = GIT_EBUFS;
if (error < 0 && error != GIT_EBUFS) {
error = -1;
goto done;
}
if (error == GIT_EBUFS) {
if ((recvd = gitno_recv(buf)) < 0) {
error = recvd;
goto done;
}
if (recvd == 0) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "early EOF");
error = GIT_EEOF;
goto done;
}
continue;
}
gitno_consume(buf, line_end);
error = 0;
if (pkt == NULL)
continue;
switch (pkt->type) {
case GIT_PKT_DATA:
/* This is a sideband packet which contains other packets */
error = add_push_report_sideband_pkt(push, (git_pkt_data *)pkt, &data_pkt_buf);
break;
case GIT_PKT_ERR:
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "report-status: Error reported: %s",
((git_pkt_err *)pkt)->error);
error = -1;
break;
case GIT_PKT_PROGRESS:
if (transport->progress_cb) {
git_pkt_progress *p = (git_pkt_progress *) pkt;
error = transport->progress_cb(p->data, p->len, transport->message_cb_payload);
}
break;
default:
error = add_push_report_pkt(push, pkt);
break;
}
git_pkt_free(pkt);
/* add_push_report_pkt returns GIT_ITEROVER when it receives a flush */
if (error == GIT_ITEROVER) {
error = 0;
if (data_pkt_buf.size > 0) {
/* If there was data remaining in the pack data buffer,
* then the server sent a partial pkt-line */
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "Incomplete pack data pkt-line");
error = GIT_ERROR;
}
goto done;
}
if (error < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
done:
git_buf_free(&data_pkt_buf);
return error;
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
static int parse_report(transport_smart *transport, git_push *push)
{
git_pkt *pkt = NULL;
const char *line_end = NULL;
gitno_buffer *buf = &transport->buffer;
int error, recvd;
git_buf data_pkt_buf = GIT_BUF_INIT;
for (;;) {
if (buf->offset > 0)
error = git_pkt_parse_line(&pkt, buf->data,
&line_end, buf->offset);
else
error = GIT_EBUFS;
if (error < 0 && error != GIT_EBUFS) {
error = -1;
goto done;
}
if (error == GIT_EBUFS) {
if ((recvd = gitno_recv(buf)) < 0) {
error = recvd;
goto done;
}
if (recvd == 0) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "early EOF");
error = GIT_EEOF;
goto done;
}
continue;
}
gitno_consume(buf, line_end);
error = 0;
switch (pkt->type) {
case GIT_PKT_DATA:
/* This is a sideband packet which contains other packets */
error = add_push_report_sideband_pkt(push, (git_pkt_data *)pkt, &data_pkt_buf);
break;
case GIT_PKT_ERR:
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "report-status: Error reported: %s",
((git_pkt_err *)pkt)->error);
error = -1;
break;
case GIT_PKT_PROGRESS:
if (transport->progress_cb) {
git_pkt_progress *p = (git_pkt_progress *) pkt;
error = transport->progress_cb(p->data, p->len, transport->message_cb_payload);
}
break;
default:
error = add_push_report_pkt(push, pkt);
break;
}
git_pkt_free(pkt);
/* add_push_report_pkt returns GIT_ITEROVER when it receives a flush */
if (error == GIT_ITEROVER) {
error = 0;
if (data_pkt_buf.size > 0) {
/* If there was data remaining in the pack data buffer,
* then the server sent a partial pkt-line */
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "Incomplete pack data pkt-line");
error = GIT_ERROR;
}
goto done;
}
if (error < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
done:
git_buf_free(&data_pkt_buf);
return error;
}
| 168,529
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void DetectRunCleanup(DetectEngineThreadCtx *det_ctx,
Packet *p, Flow * const pflow)
{
PACKET_PROFILING_DETECT_START(p, PROF_DETECT_CLEANUP);
/* cleanup pkt specific part of the patternmatcher */
PacketPatternCleanup(det_ctx);
if (pflow != NULL) {
/* update inspected tracker for raw reassembly */
if (p->proto == IPPROTO_TCP && pflow->protoctx != NULL) {
StreamReassembleRawUpdateProgress(pflow->protoctx, p,
det_ctx->raw_stream_progress);
DetectEngineCleanHCBDBuffers(det_ctx);
}
}
PACKET_PROFILING_DETECT_END(p, PROF_DETECT_CLEANUP);
SCReturn;
}
Commit Message: stream: fix false negative on bad RST
If a bad RST was received the stream inspection would not happen
for that packet, but it would still move the 'raw progress' tracker
forward. Following good packets would then fail to detect anything
before the 'raw progress' position.
Bug #2770
Reported-by: Alexey Vishnyakov
CWE ID: CWE-347
|
static void DetectRunCleanup(DetectEngineThreadCtx *det_ctx,
Packet *p, Flow * const pflow)
{
PACKET_PROFILING_DETECT_START(p, PROF_DETECT_CLEANUP);
/* cleanup pkt specific part of the patternmatcher */
PacketPatternCleanup(det_ctx);
if (pflow != NULL) {
/* update inspected tracker for raw reassembly */
if (p->proto == IPPROTO_TCP && pflow->protoctx != NULL &&
(p->flags & PKT_STREAM_EST))
{
StreamReassembleRawUpdateProgress(pflow->protoctx, p,
det_ctx->raw_stream_progress);
DetectEngineCleanHCBDBuffers(det_ctx);
}
}
PACKET_PROFILING_DETECT_END(p, PROF_DETECT_CLEANUP);
SCReturn;
}
| 169,475
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: m_authenticate(struct Client *client_p, struct Client *source_p,
int parc, const char *parv[])
{
struct Client *agent_p = NULL;
struct Client *saslserv_p = NULL;
/* They really should use CAP for their own sake. */
if(!IsCapable(source_p, CLICAP_SASL))
return 0;
if (strlen(client_p->id) == 3)
{
exit_client(client_p, client_p, client_p, "Mixing client and server protocol");
return 0;
}
saslserv_p = find_named_client(ConfigFileEntry.sasl_service);
if (saslserv_p == NULL || !IsService(saslserv_p))
{
sendto_one(source_p, form_str(ERR_SASLABORTED), me.name, EmptyString(source_p->name) ? "*" : source_p->name);
return 0;
}
if(source_p->localClient->sasl_complete)
{
*source_p->localClient->sasl_agent = '\0';
source_p->localClient->sasl_complete = 0;
}
if(strlen(parv[1]) > 400)
{
sendto_one(source_p, form_str(ERR_SASLTOOLONG), me.name, EmptyString(source_p->name) ? "*" : source_p->name);
return 0;
}
if(!*source_p->id)
{
/* Allocate a UID. */
strcpy(source_p->id, generate_uid());
add_to_id_hash(source_p->id, source_p);
}
if(*source_p->localClient->sasl_agent)
agent_p = find_id(source_p->localClient->sasl_agent);
if(agent_p == NULL)
{
sendto_one(saslserv_p, ":%s ENCAP %s SASL %s %s H %s %s",
me.id, saslserv_p->servptr->name, source_p->id, saslserv_p->id,
source_p->host, source_p->sockhost);
if (!strcmp(parv[1], "EXTERNAL") && source_p->certfp != NULL)
sendto_one(saslserv_p, ":%s ENCAP %s SASL %s %s S %s %s",
me.id, saslserv_p->servptr->name, source_p->id, saslserv_p->id,
parv[1], source_p->certfp);
else
sendto_one(saslserv_p, ":%s ENCAP %s SASL %s %s S %s",
me.id, saslserv_p->servptr->name, source_p->id, saslserv_p->id,
parv[1]);
rb_strlcpy(source_p->localClient->sasl_agent, saslserv_p->id, IDLEN);
}
else
sendto_one(agent_p, ":%s ENCAP %s SASL %s %s C %s",
me.id, agent_p->servptr->name, source_p->id, agent_p->id,
parv[1]);
source_p->localClient->sasl_out++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: SASL: Disallow beginning : and space anywhere in AUTHENTICATE parameter
This is a FIX FOR A SECURITY VULNERABILITY. All Charybdis users must
apply this fix if you support SASL on your servers, or unload m_sasl.so
in the meantime.
CWE ID: CWE-285
|
m_authenticate(struct Client *client_p, struct Client *source_p,
int parc, const char *parv[])
{
struct Client *agent_p = NULL;
struct Client *saslserv_p = NULL;
/* They really should use CAP for their own sake. */
if(!IsCapable(source_p, CLICAP_SASL))
return 0;
if (strlen(client_p->id) == 3)
{
exit_client(client_p, client_p, client_p, "Mixing client and server protocol");
return 0;
}
if (*parv[1] == ':' || strchr(parv[1], ' '))
{
exit_client(client_p, client_p, client_p, "Malformed AUTHENTICATE");
return 0;
}
saslserv_p = find_named_client(ConfigFileEntry.sasl_service);
if (saslserv_p == NULL || !IsService(saslserv_p))
{
sendto_one(source_p, form_str(ERR_SASLABORTED), me.name, EmptyString(source_p->name) ? "*" : source_p->name);
return 0;
}
if(source_p->localClient->sasl_complete)
{
*source_p->localClient->sasl_agent = '\0';
source_p->localClient->sasl_complete = 0;
}
if(strlen(parv[1]) > 400)
{
sendto_one(source_p, form_str(ERR_SASLTOOLONG), me.name, EmptyString(source_p->name) ? "*" : source_p->name);
return 0;
}
if(!*source_p->id)
{
/* Allocate a UID. */
strcpy(source_p->id, generate_uid());
add_to_id_hash(source_p->id, source_p);
}
if(*source_p->localClient->sasl_agent)
agent_p = find_id(source_p->localClient->sasl_agent);
if(agent_p == NULL)
{
sendto_one(saslserv_p, ":%s ENCAP %s SASL %s %s H %s %s",
me.id, saslserv_p->servptr->name, source_p->id, saslserv_p->id,
source_p->host, source_p->sockhost);
if (!strcmp(parv[1], "EXTERNAL") && source_p->certfp != NULL)
sendto_one(saslserv_p, ":%s ENCAP %s SASL %s %s S %s %s",
me.id, saslserv_p->servptr->name, source_p->id, saslserv_p->id,
parv[1], source_p->certfp);
else
sendto_one(saslserv_p, ":%s ENCAP %s SASL %s %s S %s",
me.id, saslserv_p->servptr->name, source_p->id, saslserv_p->id,
parv[1]);
rb_strlcpy(source_p->localClient->sasl_agent, saslserv_p->id, IDLEN);
}
else
sendto_one(agent_p, ":%s ENCAP %s SASL %s %s C %s",
me.id, agent_p->servptr->name, source_p->id, agent_p->id,
parv[1]);
source_p->localClient->sasl_out++;
return 0;
}
| 166,944
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DOMHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
host_ = frame_host;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void DOMHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
void DOMHandler::SetRenderer(int process_host_id,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
host_ = frame_host;
}
| 172,745
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t *
p_code_block)
{
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_size;
/* The +1 is needed for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/835 */
l_data_size = 1 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) *
(p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) {
if (p_code_block->data) {
/* We refer to data - 1 since below we incremented it */
opj_free(p_code_block->data - 1);
}
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(l_data_size + 1);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data_size = 0U;
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_size = l_data_size;
/* We reserve the initial byte as a fake byte to a non-FF value */
/* and increment the data pointer, so that opj_mqc_init_enc() */
/* can do bp = data - 1, and opj_mqc_byteout() can safely dereference */
/* it. */
p_code_block->data[0] = 0;
p_code_block->data += 1; /*why +1 ?*/
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Encoder: grow buffer size in opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() to avoid write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_flush (#982)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t *
p_code_block)
{
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_size;
/* +1 is needed for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/835 */
/* and actually +2 required for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/982 */
/* TODO: is there a theoretical upper-bound for the compressed code */
/* block size ? */
l_data_size = 2 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) *
(p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) {
if (p_code_block->data) {
/* We refer to data - 1 since below we incremented it */
opj_free(p_code_block->data - 1);
}
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(l_data_size + 1);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data_size = 0U;
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_size = l_data_size;
/* We reserve the initial byte as a fake byte to a non-FF value */
/* and increment the data pointer, so that opj_mqc_init_enc() */
/* can do bp = data - 1, and opj_mqc_byteout() can safely dereference */
/* it. */
p_code_block->data[0] = 0;
p_code_block->data += 1; /*why +1 ?*/
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
| 167,769
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct ipt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct ipt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
| 167,212
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static ssize_t oz_cdev_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *fpos)
{
struct oz_pd *pd;
struct oz_elt_buf *eb;
struct oz_elt_info *ei;
struct oz_elt *elt;
struct oz_app_hdr *app_hdr;
struct oz_serial_ctx *ctx;
spin_lock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
pd = g_cdev.active_pd;
if (pd)
oz_pd_get(pd);
spin_unlock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
if (pd == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
if (!(pd->state & OZ_PD_S_CONNECTED))
return -EAGAIN;
eb = &pd->elt_buff;
ei = oz_elt_info_alloc(eb);
if (ei == NULL) {
count = 0;
goto out;
}
elt = (struct oz_elt *)ei->data;
app_hdr = (struct oz_app_hdr *)(elt+1);
elt->length = sizeof(struct oz_app_hdr) + count;
elt->type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA;
ei->app_id = OZ_APPID_SERIAL;
ei->length = elt->length + sizeof(struct oz_elt);
app_hdr->app_id = OZ_APPID_SERIAL;
if (copy_from_user(app_hdr+1, buf, count))
goto out;
spin_lock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB-1]);
ctx = (struct oz_serial_ctx *)pd->app_ctx[OZ_APPID_SERIAL-1];
if (ctx) {
app_hdr->elt_seq_num = ctx->tx_seq_num++;
if (ctx->tx_seq_num == 0)
ctx->tx_seq_num = 1;
spin_lock(&eb->lock);
if (oz_queue_elt_info(eb, 0, 0, ei) == 0)
ei = NULL;
spin_unlock(&eb->lock);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB-1]);
out:
if (ei) {
count = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&eb->lock);
oz_elt_info_free(eb, ei);
spin_unlock_bh(&eb->lock);
}
oz_pd_put(pd);
return count;
}
Commit Message: staging: ozwpan: prevent overflow in oz_cdev_write()
We need to check "count" so we don't overflow the ei->data buffer.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static ssize_t oz_cdev_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *fpos)
{
struct oz_pd *pd;
struct oz_elt_buf *eb;
struct oz_elt_info *ei;
struct oz_elt *elt;
struct oz_app_hdr *app_hdr;
struct oz_serial_ctx *ctx;
if (count > sizeof(ei->data) - sizeof(*elt) - sizeof(*app_hdr))
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
pd = g_cdev.active_pd;
if (pd)
oz_pd_get(pd);
spin_unlock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
if (pd == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
if (!(pd->state & OZ_PD_S_CONNECTED))
return -EAGAIN;
eb = &pd->elt_buff;
ei = oz_elt_info_alloc(eb);
if (ei == NULL) {
count = 0;
goto out;
}
elt = (struct oz_elt *)ei->data;
app_hdr = (struct oz_app_hdr *)(elt+1);
elt->length = sizeof(struct oz_app_hdr) + count;
elt->type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA;
ei->app_id = OZ_APPID_SERIAL;
ei->length = elt->length + sizeof(struct oz_elt);
app_hdr->app_id = OZ_APPID_SERIAL;
if (copy_from_user(app_hdr+1, buf, count))
goto out;
spin_lock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB-1]);
ctx = (struct oz_serial_ctx *)pd->app_ctx[OZ_APPID_SERIAL-1];
if (ctx) {
app_hdr->elt_seq_num = ctx->tx_seq_num++;
if (ctx->tx_seq_num == 0)
ctx->tx_seq_num = 1;
spin_lock(&eb->lock);
if (oz_queue_elt_info(eb, 0, 0, ei) == 0)
ei = NULL;
spin_unlock(&eb->lock);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB-1]);
out:
if (ei) {
count = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&eb->lock);
oz_elt_info_free(eb, ei);
spin_unlock_bh(&eb->lock);
}
oz_pd_put(pd);
return count;
}
| 165,965
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int store_asoundrc(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid .asoundrc file\n");
exit(1);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .asoundrc in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
if (chown(dest, getuid(), getgid()) == -1)
errExit("fchown");
if (chmod(dest, 0644) == -1)
errExit("fchmod");
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269
|
static int store_asoundrc(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE;
// create an empty file as root, and change ownership to user
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
// make sure the real path of the file is inside the home directory
/* coverity[toctou] */
char* rp = realpath(src, NULL);
if (!rp) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Cannot access %s\n", src);
exit(1);
}
if (strncmp(rp, cfg.homedir, strlen(cfg.homedir)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: .asoundrc is a symbolic link pointing to a file outside home directory\n");
exit(1);
}
free(rp);
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0644); // regular user
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
| 170,099
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void rng_egd_request_entropy(RngBackend *b, size_t size,
EntropyReceiveFunc *receive_entropy,
void *opaque)
{
RngEgd *s = RNG_EGD(b);
RngRequest *req;
req = g_malloc(sizeof(*req));
req->offset = 0;
req->size = size;
req->receive_entropy = receive_entropy;
req->opaque = opaque;
req->data = g_malloc(req->size);
while (size > 0) {
uint8_t header[2];
req = g_malloc(sizeof(*req));
req->offset = 0;
req->size = size;
req->receive_entropy = receive_entropy;
req->opaque = opaque;
req->data = g_malloc(req->size);
size -= len;
}
s->parent.requests = g_slist_append(s->parent.requests, req);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void rng_egd_request_entropy(RngBackend *b, size_t size,
static void rng_egd_request_entropy(RngBackend *b, RngRequest *req)
{
RngEgd *s = RNG_EGD(b);
size_t size = req->size;
while (size > 0) {
uint8_t header[2];
req = g_malloc(sizeof(*req));
req->offset = 0;
req->size = size;
req->receive_entropy = receive_entropy;
req->opaque = opaque;
req->data = g_malloc(req->size);
size -= len;
}
}
| 165,180
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int nfc_genl_deactivate_target(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct genl_info *info)
{
struct nfc_dev *dev;
u32 device_idx, target_idx;
int rc;
if (!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX])
return -EINVAL;
device_idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX]);
dev = nfc_get_device(device_idx);
if (!dev)
return -ENODEV;
target_idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX]);
rc = nfc_deactivate_target(dev, target_idx, NFC_TARGET_MODE_SLEEP);
nfc_put_device(dev);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
static int nfc_genl_deactivate_target(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct genl_info *info)
{
struct nfc_dev *dev;
u32 device_idx, target_idx;
int rc;
if (!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX] ||
!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX])
return -EINVAL;
device_idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX]);
dev = nfc_get_device(device_idx);
if (!dev)
return -ENODEV;
target_idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX]);
rc = nfc_deactivate_target(dev, target_idx, NFC_TARGET_MODE_SLEEP);
nfc_put_device(dev);
return rc;
}
| 169,645
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Encoder::EncodeFrameInternal(const VideoSource &video,
const unsigned long frame_flags) {
vpx_codec_err_t res;
const vpx_image_t *img = video.img();
if (!encoder_.priv) {
cfg_.g_w = img->d_w;
cfg_.g_h = img->d_h;
cfg_.g_timebase = video.timebase();
cfg_.rc_twopass_stats_in = stats_->buf();
res = vpx_codec_enc_init(&encoder_, CodecInterface(), &cfg_,
init_flags_);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
if (cfg_.g_w != img->d_w || cfg_.g_h != img->d_h) {
cfg_.g_w = img->d_w;
cfg_.g_h = img->d_h;
res = vpx_codec_enc_config_set(&encoder_, &cfg_);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
res = vpx_codec_encode(&encoder_,
video.img(), video.pts(), video.duration(),
frame_flags, deadline_));
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void Encoder::EncodeFrameInternal(const VideoSource &video,
const unsigned long frame_flags) {
vpx_codec_err_t res;
const vpx_image_t *img = video.img();
if (cfg_.g_w != img->d_w || cfg_.g_h != img->d_h) {
cfg_.g_w = img->d_w;
cfg_.g_h = img->d_h;
res = vpx_codec_enc_config_set(&encoder_, &cfg_);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
API_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
res = vpx_codec_encode(&encoder_, img, video.pts(), video.duration(),
frame_flags, deadline_));
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res) << EncoderError();
}
| 174,536
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::SetPasskey(uint32 passkey) {
if (!agent_.get() || passkey_callback_.is_null())
return;
passkey_callback_.Run(SUCCESS, passkey);
passkey_callback_.Reset();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::SetPasskey(uint32 passkey) {
if (!pairing_context_.get())
return;
pairing_context_->SetPasskey(passkey);
}
| 171,239
|
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