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mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Nuclear warfare | Worry remains, however, in many circles that a relative decrease in the security of nuclear weapons has emerged in recent years, and that terrorists or others may attempt to exert control over (or use) nuclear weapons, militarily applicable technology, or nuclear materials and fuel.
Another possible nuclear terrorism threat are devices designed to disperse radioactive materials over a large area using conventional explosives, called dirty bombs. The detonation of a "dirty bomb" would not cause a nuclear explosion, nor would it release enough radiation to kill or injure a large number of people. However, it could cause severe disruption and require potentially very costly decontamination procedures and increased spending on security measures.
Radioactive materials can also be used for targeted assassinations. For example, the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko was described by medical professionals, as "an ominous landmark: the beginning of an era of nuclear terrorism."
Alternative conflict resolution: Alternatives to nuclear warfare include nuclear deterrence, nuclear disarmament and Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
History:
1940s:
Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: During the final stages of World War II in 1945, the United States conducted atomic raids on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the first on August 6, 1945, and the second on August 9, 1945. These two events were the only times nuclear weapons have been used in combat.
For six months before the atomic bombings, the U.S. 20th Air Force under General Curtis LeMay executed low-level incendiary raids against Japanese cities. The most destructive air raid to occur during the process was not the nuclear attacks, but the Operation Meetinghouse raid on Tokyo. On the night of March 9–10, 1945, Operation Meetinghouse commenced and 334 Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers took off to raid, with 279 of them dropping 1,665 tons of incendiaries and explosives on Tokyo. The bombing was meant to burn wooden buildings and indeed the bombing caused fire that created a 50 m/s wind, which is comparable to tornadoes. Each bomber carried 6 tons of bombs. A total of 381,300 bombs, which amount to 1,783 tons of bombs, were used in the bombing. Within a few hours of the raid, it had killed an estimated 100,000 people and destroyed 41 km2 (16 sq mi) of the city and 267,000 buildings in a single night — the deadliest bombing raid in military aviation history other than the atomic raids on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By early August 1945, an estimated 450,000 people had died as the U.S. had intensely firebombed a total of 67 Japanese cities.
In late June 1945, as the U.S. wrapped up the two-and-a-half-month Battle of Okinawa (which cost the lives of 260,000 people, including 150,000 civilians), it was faced with the prospect of invading the Japanese home islands in an operation codenamed Operation Downfall. Based on the U.S. casualties from the preceding island-hopping campaigns, American commanders estimated that between 50,000 and 500,000 U.S. troops would die and at least 600,000–1,000,000 others would be injured while invading the Japanese home islands. The U.S. manufacture of 500,000 Purple Hearts from the anticipated high level of casualties during the U.S. invasion of Japan gave a demonstration of how deadly and costly it would be. President Harry S. Truman realized he could not afford such a horrendous casualty rate, especially since over 400,000 American combatants had already died fighting in both the European and the Pacific theaters of the war.
On July 26, 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China issued a Potsdam Declaration that called for the unconditional surrender of Japan. It stated that if Japan did not surrender, it would face "prompt and utter destruction". The Japanese government ignored this ultimatum, sending a message that they were not going to surrender. In response to the rejection, President Truman authorized the dropping of the atomic bombs. At the time of its use, there were only two atomic bombs available, and despite the fact that more were in production back in mainland U.S., the third bomb wouldn't be available for combat until September.
On August 6, 1945, the uranium-type nuclear weapon codenamed "Little Boy" was detonated over the Japanese city of Hiroshima with an energy of about 15 kilotons of TNT (63,000 gigajoules), destroying nearly 50,000 buildings (including the headquarters of the 2nd General Army and Fifth Division) and killing approximately 70,000 people, including 20,000 Japanese combatants and 20,000 Korean slave laborers. Three days later, on August 9, a plutonium-type nuclear weapon codenamed "Fat Man" was used against the Japanese city of Nagasaki, with the explosion equivalent to about 20 kilotons of TNT (84,000 gigajoules), destroying 60% of the city and killing approximately 35,000 people, including 23,200–28,200 Japanese munitions workers, 2,000 Korean slave laborers, and 150 Japanese combatants. The industrial damage in Nagasaki was high, partly owing to the inadvertent targeting of the industrial zone, leaving 68–80 percent of the non-dock industrial production destroyed. The U.S., despite not having a third device ready to be dropped, gave Japan one last warning that there would be another bombing if they did not surrender, and the target would be Tokyo.
Six days after the detonation over Nagasaki, Japan announced its surrender to the Allied Powers on August 15, 1945, signing the Instrument of Surrender on September 2, 1945, officially ending the Pacific War and, therefore, World War II, as Germany had already signed its Instrument of Surrender on May 8, 1945, ending the war in Europe. The two atomic bombings led, in part, to post-war Japan's adopting of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which forbade the nation from developing nuclear armaments.
Immediately after the Japan bombings: After the successful Trinity nuclear test July 16, 1945, which was the very first nuclear detonation, the Manhattan project lead manager J. Robert Oppenheimer recalled:
We knew the world would not be the same. A few people laughed, a few people cried, and most people were silent. I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture the Bhagavad Gita. Vishnu is trying to persuade the prince that he should do his duty and to impress him takes on his multiarmed form and says, "Now, I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds." I suppose we all thought that one way or another.
Immediately after the atomic bombings of Japan, the status of atomic weapons in international and military relations was unclear. Presumably, the United States hoped atomic weapons could offset the Soviet Union's larger conventional ground forces in Eastern Europe, and possibly be used to pressure Soviet leader Joseph Stalin into making concessions. Under Stalin, the Soviet Union pursued its own atomic capabilities through a combination of scientific research and espionage directed against the American program. The Soviets believed that the Americans, with their limited nuclear arsenal, were unlikely to engage in any new world wars, while the Americans were not confident they could prevent a Soviet takeover of Europe, despite their atomic advantage.
Within the United States, the authority to produce and develop nuclear weapons was removed from military control and put instead under the civilian control of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. This decision reflected an understanding that nuclear weapons had unique risks and benefits that were separate from other military technology known at the time.
For several years after World War II, the United States developed and maintained a strategic force based on the Convair B-36 bomber that would be able to attack any potential enemy from bomber bases in the United States. It deployed atomic bombs around the world for potential use in conflicts. Over a period of a few years, many in the American defense community became increasingly convinced of the invincibility of the United States to a nuclear attack. Indeed, it became generally believed that the threat of nuclear war would deter any strike against the United States.
Many proposals were suggested to put all American nuclear weapons under international control (by the newly formed United Nations, for example) as an effort to deter both their usage and a nuclear arms race. However, no terms could be arrived at that would be agreed upon by both the United States and the Soviet Union.
On August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan (see also Soviet atomic bomb project). Scientists in the United States from the Manhattan Project had warned that, in time, the Soviet Union would certainly develop nuclear capabilities of its own. Nevertheless, the effect upon military thinking and planning in the United States was dramatic, primarily because American military strategists had not anticipated the Soviets would "catch up" so soon. However, at this time, they had not discovered that the Soviets had conducted significant nuclear espionage of the project from spies at Los Alamos National Laboratory, the most significant of which was done by the theoretical physicist Klaus Fuchs. The first Soviet bomb was more or less a deliberate copy of the Fat Man plutonium device. In the same year the first US-Soviet nuclear war plan was penned in the US with Operation Dropshot.
With the monopoly over nuclear technology broken, worldwide nuclear proliferation accelerated. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Nuclear warfare | Scientists in the United States from the Manhattan Project had warned that, in time, the Soviet Union would certainly develop nuclear capabilities of its own. Nevertheless, the effect upon military thinking and planning in the United States was dramatic, primarily because American military strategists had not anticipated the Soviets would "catch up" so soon. However, at this time, they had not discovered that the Soviets had conducted significant nuclear espionage of the project from spies at Los Alamos National Laboratory, the most significant of which was done by the theoretical physicist Klaus Fuchs. The first Soviet bomb was more or less a deliberate copy of the Fat Man plutonium device. In the same year the first US-Soviet nuclear war plan was penned in the US with Operation Dropshot.
With the monopoly over nuclear technology broken, worldwide nuclear proliferation accelerated. The United Kingdom tested its first independent atomic bomb in 1952, followed by France developing its first atomic bomb in 1960 and then China developing its first atomic bomb in 1964. While much smaller than the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, Western Europe's nuclear reserves were nevertheless a significant factor in strategic planning during the Cold War. A top-secret White paper, compiled by the Royal Air Force and produced for the British Government in 1959, estimated that British V bombers carrying nuclear weapons were capable of destroying key cities and military targets in the Soviet Union, with an estimated 16 million deaths in the Soviet Union (half of whom were estimated to be killed on impact and the rest fatally injured) before bomber aircraft from the U.S. Strategic Air Command reached their targets.
1950s: Although the Soviet Union had nuclear weapon capabilities at the beginning of the Cold War, the United States still had an advantage in terms of bombers and weapons. In any exchange of hostilities, the United States would have been capable of bombing the Soviet Union, whereas the Soviet Union would have more difficulty carrying out the reverse mission.
The widespread introduction of jet-powered interceptor aircraft upset this imbalance somewhat by reducing the effectiveness of the American bomber fleet. In 1949 Curtis LeMay was placed in command of the Strategic Air Command and instituted a program to update the bomber fleet to one that was all-jet. During the early 1950s the B-47 Stratojet and B-52 Stratofortress were introduced, providing the ability to bomb the Soviet Union more easily. Before the development of a capable strategic missile force in the Soviet Union, much of the war-fighting doctrine held by western nations revolved around using a large number of smaller nuclear weapons in a tactical role. It is debatable whether such use could be considered "limited" however because it was believed that the United States would use its own strategic weapons (mainly bombers at the time) should the Soviet Union deploy any kind of nuclear weapon against civilian targets. Douglas MacArthur, an American general, was fired by President Harry Truman, partially because he persistently requested permission to use his own discretion in deciding whether to utilize atomic weapons on the People's Republic of China in 1951 during the Korean War. Mao Zedong, China's communist leader, gave the impression that he would welcome a nuclear war with the capitalists because it would annihilate what he viewed as their imperialist system.
Let us imagine how many people would die if war breaks out. There are 2.7 billion people in the world, and a third could be lost. If it is a little higher it could be half ... I say that if the worst came to the worst and one-half dies, there will still be one-half left, but imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist. After a few years there would be 2.7 billion people again.
The concept of a "Fortress North America" emerged during the Second World War and persisted into the Cold War to refer to the option of defending Canada and the United States against their enemies if the rest of the world were lost to them. This option was rejected with the formation of NATO and the decision to permanently station troops in Europe.
In the summer of 1951, Project Vista started, in which project analysts such as Robert F. Christy looked at how to defend Western Europe from a Soviet invasion. The emerging development of tactical nuclear weapons was looked upon as a means to give Western forces a qualitative advantage over the Soviet numerical supremacy in conventional weapons.
Several scares about the increasing ability of the Soviet Union's strategic bomber forces surfaced during the 1950s. The defensive response by the United States was to deploy a fairly strong "layered defense" consisting of interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles, like the Nike, and guns, like the M51 Skysweeper, near larger cities. However, this was a small response compared to the construction of a huge fleet of nuclear bombers. The principal nuclear strategy was to massively penetrate the Soviet Union. Because such a large area could not be defended against this overwhelming attack in any credible way, the Soviet Union would lose any exchange.
This logic became ingrained in American nuclear doctrine and persisted for much of the duration of the Cold War. As long as the strategic American nuclear forces could overwhelm their Soviet counterparts, a Soviet pre-emptive strike could be averted. Moreover, the Soviet Union could not afford to build any reasonable counterforce, as the economic output of the United States was far larger than that of the Soviets, and they would be unable to achieve "nuclear parity".
Soviet nuclear doctrine, however, did not match American nuclear doctrine. Soviet military planners assumed they could win a nuclear war. Therefore, they expected a large-scale nuclear exchange, followed by a "conventional war" which itself would involve heavy use of tactical nuclear weapons. American doctrine rather assumed that Soviet doctrine was similar, with the mutual in mutually assured destruction necessarily requiring that the other side see things in much the same way, rather than believing—as the Soviets did—that they could fight a large-scale, "combined nuclear and conventional" war.
In accordance with their doctrine, the Soviet Union conducted large-scale military exercises to explore the possibility of defensive and offensive warfare during a nuclear war. The exercise, under the code name of "Snowball", involved the detonation of a nuclear bomb about twice as powerful as that which fell on Nagasaki and an army of approximately 45,000 soldiers on maneuvers through the hypocenter immediately after the blast. The exercise was conducted on September 14, 1954, under command of Marshal Georgy Zhukov to the north of Totskoye village in Orenburg Oblast, Russia.
A revolution in nuclear strategic thought occurred with the introduction of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which the Soviet Union first successfully tested in August 1957. In order to deliver a warhead to a target, a missile was much faster and more cost-effective than a bomber, and enjoyed a higher survivability due to the enormous difficulty of interception of the ICBMs (due to their high altitude and extreme speed). The Soviet Union could now afford to achieve nuclear parity with the United States in raw numbers, although for a time, they appeared to have chosen not to.
Photos of Soviet missile sites set off a wave of panic in the U.S. military, something the launch of Sputnik would do for the American public a few months later. Politicians, notably then-U.S. Senator John F. Kennedy suggested that a "missile gap" existed between the Soviet Union and the United States. The US military gave missile development programs the highest national priority, and several spy aircraft and reconnaissance satellites were designed and deployed to observe Soviet progress.
Early ICBMs and bombers were relatively inaccurate, which led to the concept of countervalue strikes — attacks directly on the enemy population, which would theoretically lead to a collapse of the enemy's will to fight. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union invested in extensive protected civilian infrastructure, such as large "nuclear-proof" bunkers and non-perishable food stores. By comparison, smaller scale civil defense programs were instituted in the United States starting in the 1950s, where schools and other public buildings had basements stocked with non-perishable food supplies, canned water, first aid, and dosimeter and Geiger counter radiation-measuring devices. Many of the locations were given "fallout shelter" designation signs. CONELRAD radio information systems were adopted, whereby the commercial radio sector (later supplemented by the National Emergency Alarm Repeaters) would broadcast on two AM radio frequencies in the event of a Civil Defense (CD) emergency. These two frequencies, 640 and 1240 kHz, were marked with small CD triangles on the tuning dial of radios of the period, as can still be seen on 1950s-vintage radios on online auction sites and museums. A few backyard fallout shelters were built by private individuals.
Henry Kissinger's view on tactical nuclear war in his controversial 1957 book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy was that any nuclear weapon exploded in air burst mode that was below 500 kilotons in yield and thus averting serious fallout, may be more decisive and less costly in human lives than a protracted conventional war.
A list of targets made by the United States was released sometime during December 2015 by the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. The language used to describe targets is "designated ground zeros". The list was released after a request was made during 2006 by William Burr who belongs to a research group at George Washington University, and belongs to a previously top-secret 800-page document. The list is entitled "Atomic Weapons Requirements Study for 1959" and was produced by U.S. Strategic Air Command during the year 1956. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Nuclear warfare | A few backyard fallout shelters were built by private individuals.
Henry Kissinger's view on tactical nuclear war in his controversial 1957 book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy was that any nuclear weapon exploded in air burst mode that was below 500 kilotons in yield and thus averting serious fallout, may be more decisive and less costly in human lives than a protracted conventional war.
A list of targets made by the United States was released sometime during December 2015 by the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. The language used to describe targets is "designated ground zeros". The list was released after a request was made during 2006 by William Burr who belongs to a research group at George Washington University, and belongs to a previously top-secret 800-page document. The list is entitled "Atomic Weapons Requirements Study for 1959" and was produced by U.S. Strategic Air Command during the year 1956.
1960s: In 1960, the United States developed its first Single Integrated Operational Plan, a range of targeting options, and described launch procedures and target sets against which nuclear weapons would be launched, variants of which were in use from 1961 to 2003. That year also saw the start of the Missile Defense Alarm System, an American system of 12 early-warning satellites that provided limited notice of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile launches between 1960 and 1966. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System was completed in 1964.
The most powerful atomic bomb ever made, the Tsar Bomba, was tested by the Soviets on October 30, 1961. It was 50 megatons, or equal to 50 million tons of regular explosives. A complex and worrisome situation developed in 1962, in what is called the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet Union placed medium-range ballistic missiles 90 miles (140 km) from the United States, possibly as a direct response to American Jupiter missiles placed in Turkey. After intense negotiations, the Soviets ended up removing the missiles from Cuba and decided to institute a massive weapons-building program of their own. In exchange, the United States dismantled its launch sites in Turkey, although this was done secretly and not publicly revealed for over two decades. First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev did not even reveal this part of the agreement when he came under fire by political opponents for mishandling the crisis. Communication delays during the crisis led to the establishment of the Moscow–Washington hotline to allow reliable, direct communications between the two nuclear powers.
By the late 1960s, the number of ICBMs and warheads was so high on both sides that it was believed that both the United States and the Soviet Union were capable of completely destroying the infrastructure and a large proportion of the population of the other country. Thus, by some western game theorists, a balance of power system known as mutually assured destruction (or MAD) came into being. It was thought that no full-scale exchange between the powers would result in an outright winner, with at best one side emerging the pyrrhic victor. Thus both sides were deterred from risking the initiation of a direct confrontation, instead being forced to engage in lower-intensity proxy wars.
During this decade the People's Republic of China began to build subterranean infrastructure such as the Underground Project 131 following the Sino-Soviet split.
One drawback of the MAD doctrine was the possibility of a nuclear war occurring without either side intentionally striking first. Early Warning Systems (EWS) were notoriously error-prone. For example, on 78 occasions in 1979 alone, a "missile display conference" was called to evaluate detections that were "potentially threatening to the North American continent". Some of these were trivial errors and were spotted quickly, but several went to more serious levels. On September 26, 1983, Stanislav Petrov received convincing indications of an American first strike launch against the Soviet Union, but positively identified the warning as a false alarm. Though it is unclear what role Petrov's actions played in preventing a nuclear war during this incident, he has been honored by the United Nations for his actions.
Similar incidents happened many times in the United States, due to failed computer chips, misidentifications of large flights of geese, test programs, and bureaucratic failures to notify early warning military personnel of legitimate launches of test or weather missiles. For many years, the U.S. Air Force's strategic bombers were kept airborne on a daily rotating basis "around the clock" (see Operation Chrome Dome), until the number and severity of accidents, the 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash in particular, persuaded policymakers it was not worthwhile.
1970s: Israel responded to the Arab Yom Kippur War attack on 6 October 1973 by assembling 13 nuclear weapons in a tunnel under the Negev desert when Syrian tanks were sweeping in across the Golan Heights. On 8 October 1973, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir authorized Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to activate the 13 Israeli nuclear warheads and distribute them to Israeli air force units, with the intent that they be used if Israel began to be overrun.
On 24 October 1973, as US President Richard Nixon was preoccupied with the Watergate scandal, Henry Kissinger ordered a DEFCON-3 alert preparing American B-52 nuclear bombers for war. Intelligence reports indicated that the USSR was preparing to defend Egypt in its Yom Kippur War with Israel. It had become apparent that if Israel had dropped nuclear weapons on Egypt or Syria, as it prepared to do, then the USSR would have retaliated against Israel, with the US then committed to providing Israeli assistance, possibly escalating to a general nuclear war.
By the late 1970s, people in both the United States and the Soviet Union, along with the rest of the world, had been living with the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) for about a decade, and it became deeply ingrained into the psyche and popular culture of those countries.
On May 18, 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test in the Pokhran test range. The name of the operation was Smiling Buddha, and India termed the test as a "peaceful nuclear explosion."
The Soviet Duga early warning over-the-horizon radar system was made operational in 1976. The extremely powerful radio transmissions needed for such a system led to much disruption of civilian shortwave broadcasts, earning it the nickname "Russian Woodpecker".
The idea that any nuclear conflict would eventually escalate was a challenge for military strategists. This challenge was particularly severe for the United States and its NATO allies. It was believed (until the 1970s) that a Soviet tank offensive into Western Europe would quickly overwhelm NATO conventional forces, leading to the necessity of the West escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, one of which was the W-70.
This strategy had one major (and possibly critical) flaw, which was soon realized by military analysts but highly underplayed by the U.S. military: conventional NATO forces in the European theatre of war were far outnumbered by similar Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, and it was assumed that in case of a major Soviet attack (commonly envisioned as the "Red tanks rolling towards the North Sea" scenario) that NATO—in the face of quick conventional defeat—would soon have no other choice but to resort to tactical nuclear strikes against these forces. Most analysts agreed that once the first nuclear exchange had occurred, escalation to global nuclear war would likely become inevitable. The Warsaw Pact's vision of an atomic war between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces was simulated in the top-secret exercise Seven Days to the River Rhine in 1979. The British government exercised their vision of a Soviet nuclear attack with Square Leg in early 1980.
Large hardened nuclear weapon storage areas were built across European countries in anticipation of local US and European forces falling back as the conventional NATO defense from the Soviet Union, named REFORGER, was believed to only be capable of stalling the Soviets for a short time.
1980s: In the late 1970s and, particularly, during the early 1980s under U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the United States renewed its commitment to a more powerful military, which required a large increase in spending on U.S. military programs. These programs, which were originally part of the defense budget of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, included spending on conventional and nuclear weapons systems. Under Reagan, defensive systems like the Strategic Defense Initiative were emphasized as well.
Another major shift in nuclear doctrine was the development and the improvement of the submarine-launched, nuclear-armed, ballistic missile, or SLBM. It was hailed by many military theorists as a weapon that would make nuclear war less likely. SLBMs—which can move with "stealth" (greatly lessened detectability) virtually anywhere in the world—give a nation a "second strike" capability (i.e., after absorbing a "first strike"). Before the advent of the SLBM, thinkers feared that a nation might be tempted to initiate a first strike if it felt confident that such a strike would incapacitate the nuclear arsenal of its enemy, making retaliation impossible. With the advent of SLBMs, no nation could be certain that a first strike would incapacitate its enemy's entire nuclear arsenal. To the contrary, it would have to fear a near-certain retaliatory second strike from SLBMs. Thus, a first strike was a much less feasible (or desirable) option, and a deliberately initiated nuclear war was thought to be less likely to start. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Nuclear warfare | It was hailed by many military theorists as a weapon that would make nuclear war less likely. SLBMs—which can move with "stealth" (greatly lessened detectability) virtually anywhere in the world—give a nation a "second strike" capability (i.e., after absorbing a "first strike"). Before the advent of the SLBM, thinkers feared that a nation might be tempted to initiate a first strike if it felt confident that such a strike would incapacitate the nuclear arsenal of its enemy, making retaliation impossible. With the advent of SLBMs, no nation could be certain that a first strike would incapacitate its enemy's entire nuclear arsenal. To the contrary, it would have to fear a near-certain retaliatory second strike from SLBMs. Thus, a first strike was a much less feasible (or desirable) option, and a deliberately initiated nuclear war was thought to be less likely to start.
However, it was soon realized that submarines could approach enemy coastlines undetected and decrease the warning time (the time between detection of the missile launch and the impact of the missile) from as much as half an hour to possibly under three minutes. This effect was especially significant to the United States, Britain and China, whose capitals of Washington D.C., London, and Beijing all lay within 100 miles (160 km) of their coasts. Moscow was much more secure from this type of threat, due to its considerable distance from the sea. This greatly increased the credibility of a "surprise first strike" by one faction and (theoretically) made it possible to knock out or disrupt the chain of command of a target nation before any counterstrike could be ordered (known as a "decapitation strike"). It strengthened the notion that a nuclear war could possibly be "won", resulting not only in greatly increased tensions and increasing calls for fail-deadly control systems, but also in a dramatic increase in military spending. The submarines and their missile systems were very expensive, and one fully equipped nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed missile submarine could cost more than the entire GNP of a developing country. It was also calculated, however, that the greatest cost came in the development of both sea- and land-based anti-submarine defenses and in improving and strengthening the "chain of command", and as a result, military spending skyrocketed.
South Africa developed a nuclear weapon capability during the 1970s and early 1980s. It was operational for a brief period before being dismantled in the early 1990s.
According to the 1980 United Nations report General and Complete Disarmament: Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General, it was estimated that there were a total of about 40,000 nuclear warheads in existence at that time, with a potential combined explosive yield of approximately 13,000 megatons. By comparison, the largest volcanic eruption in recorded history when the volcano Mount Tambora erupted in 1815—turning 1816 into the Year Without A Summer due to the levels of global dimming sulfate aerosols and ash expelled—it exploded with a force of roughly 33 billion tons of TNT or 33,000 megatons of TNT this is about 2.2 million Hiroshima Bombs, and ejected 175 km3 (42 cu mi) of mostly rock/tephra, that included 120 million tonnes of sulfur dioxide as an upper estimate. A larger eruption, approximately 74,000 years ago, in Mount Toba produced 2,800 km3 (670 cu mi) of tephra, forming lake Toba, and produced an estimated 6,000 million tonnes (6.6×109 short tons) of sulfur dioxide. The explosive energy of the eruption may have been as high as equivalent to 20,000,000 megatons (Mt) of TNT, while the asteroid created Chicxulub impact, that is connected with the extinction of the dinosaurs corresponds to at least 70,000,000 Mt of energy, which is roughly 7000 times the maximum arsenal of the US and Soviet Union.
However, comparisons with supervolcanoes are more misleading than helpful due to the different aerosols released, the likely air burst fuzing height of nuclear weapons and the globally scattered location of these potential nuclear detonations all being in contrast to the singular and subterranean nature of a supervolcanic eruption. Moreover, assuming the entire world stockpile of weapons were grouped together, it would be difficult, due to the nuclear fratricide effect, to ensure the individual weapons would go off all at once. Nonetheless, many people believe that a full-scale nuclear war would result, through the nuclear winter effect, in the human extinction, though not all analysts agree on the assumptions that underpin these nuclear winter models.
On 26 September 1983, a Soviet early warning station under the command of Stanislav Petrov falsely detected 5 inbound intercontinental ballistic missiles from the US. Petrov correctly assessed the situation as a false alarm, and hence did not report his finding to his superiors. It is quite possible that his actions prevented "World War III", as the Soviet policy at that time was immediate nuclear response upon discovering inbound ballistic missiles.
The world came unusually close to nuclear war in November 1983 when the Soviet Union thought that the NATO military exercise Able Archer 83 was a ruse or "cover-up" to begin a nuclear first strike. The Soviets responded by raising readiness and preparing their nuclear arsenal for immediate use. Soviet fears of an attack ceased once the exercise concluded without incident.
Post-Cold War: Although the dissolution of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War in 1991 and greatly reduced the political tensions between the United States and the Russian Federation, the Soviet Union's formal successor state, both countries remained in a "nuclear stand-off" due to the continuing presence of a very large number of deliverable nuclear warheads on both sides. Additionally, the end of the Cold War led the United States to become increasingly concerned with the development of nuclear technology by other nations outside of the former Soviet Union. In 1995, a branch of the U.S. Strategic Command produced an outline of forward-thinking strategies in the document "Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence".
In 1995, a Black Brant sounding rocket launched from the Andøya Space Center caused a high alert in Russia, known as the Norwegian Rocket Incident. The Russians thought it might be a nuclear missile launched from an American submarine.
In 1996, a Russian continuity of government facility, Kosvinsky Mountain, which is believed to be a counterpart to the US Cheyenne Mountain Complex, was completed. It was designed to resist US earth-penetrating nuclear warheads, and is believed to host the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces alternate command post, a post for the general staff built to compensate for the vulnerability of older Soviet era command posts in the Moscow region. In spite of this, the primary command posts for the Strategic Rocket Forces remains Kuntsevo in Moscow and the secondary is the Kosvinsky Mountain in the Ural Mountains. The timing of the Kosvinsky facilities completion date is regarded as one explanation for U.S. interest in a new nuclear "bunker buster" Earth-penetrating warhead and the declaration of the deployment of the B-61 mod 11 in 1997; Kosvinsky is protected by about 1000 feet of granite.
As a consequence of the September 11 attacks, American forces immediately increased their readiness to the highest level in 28 years, closing the blast doors of the NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center for the first time due to a non-exercise event. But unlike similar increases during the Cold War, Russia immediately decided to stand down a large military exercise in the Arctic region, in order to minimize the risk of incidents, rather than following suit.
The former chair of the United Nations disarmament committee stated that there are more than 16,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons ready for deployment and another 14,000 in storage, with the U.S. having nearly 7,000 ready for use and 3,000 in storage, and Russia having about 8,500 ready for use and 11,000 in storage. In addition, China is thought to possess about 400 nuclear weapons, Britain about 200, France about 350, India about 80–100, and Pakistan 100–110. North Korea is confirmed as having nuclear weapons, though it is not known how many, with most estimates between 1 and 10. Israel is also widely believed to possess usable nuclear weapons. NATO has stationed about 480 American nuclear weapons in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and Turkey, and several other nations are thought to be in pursuit of an arsenal of their own.
Pakistan's nuclear policy was significantly affected by the 1965 war with India. The 1971 war and India's nuclear program played a role in Pakistan's decision to go nuclear. India and Pakistan both decided not to participate in the NPT. Pakistan's nuclear policy became fixated on India because India refused to join the Non-proliferation Treaty and remained open to nuclear weapons. Impetus by Indian actions spurred Pakistan's nuclear research. After nuclear weapons construction was started by President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's command, the chair of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Usmani quit in objection. The 1999 war between Pakistan and India occurred after both acquired nuclear weapons. It is believed by some that nuclear weapons are the reason a big war has not broken out in the subcontinent. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Nuclear warfare | Pakistan's nuclear policy was significantly affected by the 1965 war with India. The 1971 war and India's nuclear program played a role in Pakistan's decision to go nuclear. India and Pakistan both decided not to participate in the NPT. Pakistan's nuclear policy became fixated on India because India refused to join the Non-proliferation Treaty and remained open to nuclear weapons. Impetus by Indian actions spurred Pakistan's nuclear research. After nuclear weapons construction was started by President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's command, the chair of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Usmani quit in objection. The 1999 war between Pakistan and India occurred after both acquired nuclear weapons. It is believed by some that nuclear weapons are the reason a big war has not broken out in the subcontinent. India and Pakistan still have a risk of nuclear conflict on the issue of war over Kashmir. Nuclear capability deliverable by sea were claimed by Pakistan in 2012. The aim was to achieve a "minimum credible deterrence". Pakistan's nuclear program culminated in the tests at Chagai. One of the aims of Pakistan's programs is fending off potential annexation and maintaining independence.
A key development in nuclear warfare throughout the 2000s and early 2010s is the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the developing world, with India and Pakistan both publicly testing several nuclear devices, and North Korea conducting an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006. The U.S. Geological Survey measured a 4.2 magnitude earthquake in the area where the North Korean test is said to have occurred. A further test was announced by the North Korean government on May 25, 2009. Iran, meanwhile, has embarked on a nuclear program which, while officially for civilian purposes, has come under close scrutiny by the United Nations and many individual states.
Recent studies undertaken by the CIA cite the enduring India-Pakistan conflict as the one "flash point" most likely to escalate into a nuclear war. During the Kargil War in 1999, Pakistan came close to using its nuclear weapons in case the conventional military situation underwent further deterioration. Pakistan's foreign minister had even warned that it would "use any weapon in our arsenal", hinting at a nuclear strike against India. The statement was condemned by the international community, with Pakistan denying it later on. This conflict remains the only war (of any sort) between two declared nuclear powers. The 2001-2002 India-Pakistan standoff again stoked fears of nuclear war between the two countries. Despite these very serious and relatively recent threats, relations between India and Pakistan have been improving somewhat over the last few years. However, with the November 26, 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, tensions again worsened.
Another potential geopolitical issue that is considered particularly worrisome by military analysts is a possible conflict between the United States and the People's Republic of China over Taiwan. Although economic forces are thought to have reduced the possibility of a military conflict, there remains concern about the increasing military buildup of China (China is rapidly increasing its naval capacity), and that any move toward Taiwan independence could potentially spin out of control.
Israel is thought to possess somewhere between one hundred and four hundred nuclear warheads. It has been asserted that the Dolphin-class submarines which Israel received from Germany have been adapted to carry nuclear-armed Popeye cruise missiles, so as to give Israel a second strike capability. Israel has been involved in wars with its neighbors in the Middle East (and with other "non-state actors" in Lebanon and Palestine) on numerous prior occasions, and its small geographic size and population could mean that, in the event of future wars, the Israel Defense Forces might have very little time to react to an invasion or other major threat. Such a situation could escalate to nuclear warfare very quickly in some scenarios.
On March 7, 2013, North Korea threatened the United States with a pre-emptive nuclear strike. On April 9, North Korea urged foreigners to leave South Korea, stating that both countries were on the verge of nuclear war. On April 12, North Korea stated that a nuclear war was unavoidable. The country declared Japan as its first target.
In 2014, when Russia-United States and Russia-NATO relations worsened over the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Russian state-owned television channel Russia 1 stated that "Russia is the only country in the world that is really capable of turning the USA into radioactive ash." U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter considered proposing deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe that could pre-emptively destroy Russian weapons.
In August 2017, North Korea warned that it might launch mid-range ballistic missiles into waters within 18 to 24 miles (29 to 39 km) of Guam, following an exchange of threats between the governments of North Korea and the United States. Escalating tensions between North Korea and the United States, including threats by both countries that they could use nuclear weapons against one another, prompted a heightened state of readiness in Hawaii. The perceived ballistic missile threat broadcast all over Hawaii on 13 January 2018 was a false missile alarm.
In October 2018, the former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev commented that U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is "not the work of a great mind" and that "a new arms race has been announced".
In early 2019, more than 90% of world's 13,865 nuclear weapons were owned by Russia and the United States.
In 2019, Vladimir Putin warned that Russia would deploy nuclear missiles in Europe if the United States deployed intermediate-range nuclear missiles there. Journalist Dmitry Kiselyov listed the targets in the United States, which includes The Pentagon, Camp David, Fort Ritchie, McClellan Air Force Base, and Jim Creek Naval Radio Station. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denies the existence of the target list.
On February 24, 2022, in a televised address preceding the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia "is today one of the most powerful nuclear powers in the world... No one should have any doubts that a direct attack on our country will lead to defeat and dire consequences for any potential aggressor." Later in the same speech, Putin stated: "Now a few important, very important words for those who may be tempted to intervene in ongoing events. Whoever tries to hinder us, and even more so to create threats for our country, for our people, should know that Russia's response will be immediate and will lead you to such consequences that you have never experienced in your history." On February 27, 2022, Putin publicly put his nuclear forces on alert, stating that NATO powers had made "aggressive statements". On April 14, The New York Times reported comments by CIA director William Burns, who said "potential desperation" could lead President Putin to order the use of tactical nuclear weapons. On September 21, 2022, days before declaring the annexation of additional parts of Ukraine, Putin claimed in a national television address that high NATO officials had made statements about the possibility of "using nuclear weapons of mass destruction against Russia", and stated "if the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people... It's not a bluff." NBC News characterized Putin's statements as a "thinly veiled" threat that Putin was willing to risk nuclear conflict if necessary to win the war with Ukraine. Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, stated that "if you start detonating nuclear weapons in the [battlefield] you potentially get radioactive fallout that you can't control — it could rain over your own troops as well, so it might not be an advantage to do that in the field."
According to a peer-reviewed study published in the journal Nature Food in August 2022, a full-scale nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia would kill 360 million people directly, with a further 5 billion people dying from starvation. More than 2 billion people would die from a smaller-scale nuclear war between India and Pakistan.
Survival: The predictions of the effects of a major countervalue nuclear exchange include millions of city dweller deaths within a short period of time. Some 1980s predictions had gone further and argued that a full-scale nuclear war could eventually bring about the human extinction. Such predictions, sometimes but not always based on total war with nuclear arsenals at Cold War highs, received contemporary criticism. On the other hand, some 1980s governmental predictions, such as FEMA's CRP-2B and NATO's Carte Blanche, have received criticism from groups such as the Federation of American Scientists for being overly optimistic. CRP-2B, for instance, infamously predicted that 80% of Americans would survive a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, a figure that neglected nuclear war's impacts on healthcare infrastructure, the food supply, and the ecosystem and assumed that all major cities could be successfully evacuated within 3–5 days. A number of Cold War publications advocated preparations that could purportedly enable a large proportion of civilians to survive even a total nuclear war. Among the most famous of these is Nuclear War Survival Skills.
To avoid injury and death from a nuclear weapon's heat flash and blast effects, the two most far-ranging prompt effects of nuclear weapons, schoolchildren were taught to duck and cover by the early Cold War film of the same name. Such advice is once again being given in case of nuclear terrorist attacks. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Nuclear warfare | CRP-2B, for instance, infamously predicted that 80% of Americans would survive a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, a figure that neglected nuclear war's impacts on healthcare infrastructure, the food supply, and the ecosystem and assumed that all major cities could be successfully evacuated within 3–5 days. A number of Cold War publications advocated preparations that could purportedly enable a large proportion of civilians to survive even a total nuclear war. Among the most famous of these is Nuclear War Survival Skills.
To avoid injury and death from a nuclear weapon's heat flash and blast effects, the two most far-ranging prompt effects of nuclear weapons, schoolchildren were taught to duck and cover by the early Cold War film of the same name. Such advice is once again being given in case of nuclear terrorist attacks.
Prussian blue, or "Radiogardase", is stockpiled in the US, along with potassium iodide and DPTA, as pharmaceuticals useful in treating internal exposure to harmful radioisotopes in fallout.
Publications on adapting to a changing diet and supplying nutritional food sources following a nuclear war, with particular focus on agricultural radioecology, include Nutrition in the postattack environment by the RAND corporation.
The British government developed a public alert system for use during a nuclear attack with the expectation of a four-minute warning before detonation. The United States expected a warning time of anywhere from half an hour (for land-based missiles) to less than three minutes (for submarine-based weapons). Many countries maintain plans for continuity of government following a nuclear attack or similar disasters. These range from a designated survivor, intended to ensure the survival of some form of government leadership, to the Soviet Dead Hand system, which allows for retaliation even if all Soviet leadership were destroyed. Nuclear submarines are given letters of last resort: orders on what action to take in the event that an enemy nuclear strike has destroyed the government.
A number of other countries around the world have taken significant efforts to maximize their survival prospects in the event of large calamities, both natural and manmade. For example, metro stations in Pyongyang, North Korea, were constructed 110 metres (360 ft) below ground, and were designed to serve as nuclear shelters in the event of war, with each station entrance built with thick steel blast doors. An example of privately funded fallout shelters is the Ark Two Shelter in Ontario, Canada, and autonomous shelters have been constructed with an emphasis on post-war networking and reconstruction.
In Switzerland, the majority of homes have an underground blast and fallout shelter. The country has an overcapacity of such shelters and can accommodate slightly more than the nation's population size.
While the nuclear fallout shelters described above are the ideal long-term protection methods against dangerous radiation exposure in the event of a nuclear catastrophe, it is also necessary to have mobile protection equipment for medical and security personnel to safely assist in containment, evacuation, and many other necessary public safety objectives which ensue as a result of nuclear detonation. There are many basic shielding strategies used to protect against the deposition of radioactive material from external radiation environments. Respirators that protect against internal deposition are used to prevent the inhalation and ingestion of radioactive material and dermal protective equipment which is used to protect against the deposition of material on external structures like skin, hair, and clothing. While these protection strategies do slightly reduce the exposure, they provide almost no protection from externally penetrating gamma radiation, which is the cause of acute radiation syndrome and can be extremely lethal in high dosages. Naturally, shielding the entire body from high-energy gamma radiation is optimal, but the required mass to provide adequate attenuation makes functional movement nearly impossible.
Recent scientific studies have shown the feasibility of partial body shielding as a viable protection strategy against externally penetrating gamma radiation. The concept is based in providing sufficient attenuation to only the most radio-sensitive organs and tissues in efforts to defer the onset of acute radiation syndrome, the most immediate threat to humans from high doses of gamma radiation. Acute radiation syndrome is a result of irreversible bone marrow damage from high-energy radiation exposure. Due to the regenerative property of hematopoietic stem cells found in bone marrow, it is only necessary to protect enough bone marrow to repopulate the exposed areas of the body with the shielded supply. Because 50% of the body's supply of bone marrow is stored in the pelvic region which is also in close proximity to other radio-sensitive organs in the abdomen, the lower torso is a logical choice as the primary target for protection.
In fiction: Nuclear warfare and weapons are staple elements of speculative fiction.
See also:
References:
Further reading: Louis Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics. The risks and consequences of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980. ISBN 9780226043609
Laura Grego and David Wright, "Broken Shield: Missiles designed to destroy incoming nuclear warheads fail frequently in tests and could increase global risk of mass destruction", Scientific American, vol. 320, no. no. 6 (June 2019), pp. 62–67. "Nuclear-armed missiles are a political problem that technology cannot solve.... Current U.S. missile defense plans are being driven largely by technology, politics and fear. Missile defenses will not allow us to escape our vulnerability to nuclear weapons. Instead large-scale developments will create barriers to taking real steps toward reducing nuclear risks—by blocking further cuts in nuclear arsenals and potentially spurring new deployments." (p. 67.)
Jessica T. Mathews, "The New Nuclear Threat", The New York Review of Books, vol. LXVII, no. 13 (20 August 2020), pp. 19–21. "[P]owerful reasons to doubt that there could be a limited nuclear war [include] those that emerge from any study of history, a knowledge of how humans act under pressure, or experience of government." (p. 20.)
"Possibility of Nuclear War in Asia: An Indian Perspective", a project of United Service Institution of India, USI, Discusses the possibility of a nuclear war in Asia from the Indian point of view.
Thomas Powers, "The Nuclear Worrier" (review of Daniel Ellsberg, The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner, New York, Bloomsbury, 2017, ISBN 9781608196708, 420 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol. LXV, no. 1 (18 January 2018), pp. 13–15.
"Presidency in the Nuclear Age", conference and forum at the JFK Library, Boston, October 12, 2009. Four panels: "The Race to Build the Bomb and the Decision to Use It", "Cuban Missile Crisis and the First Nuclear Test Ban Treaty", "The Cold War and the Nuclear Arms Race", and "Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and the Presidency".
Tom Stevenson, "A Tiny Sun" (review of Fred Kaplan, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War, Simon and Schuster, 2021, 384 pp.; and Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age, Cornell, 2020, 180 pp.), London Review of Books, vol. 44, no. 4 (24 February 2022), pp. 29–32. "Nuclear strategists systematically underestimate the chances of nuclear accident... [T]here have been too many close calls for accidental use to be discounted." (p. 32.)
External links:
Fallout: After a Nuclear Attack – slideshow by Life magazine
The Effects of Nuclear War Archived 2016-08-28 at the Wayback Machine (1979) — handbook produced by the United States Office of Technology Assessment (hosted by the Federation of American Scientists)
Nuclear Attack Planning Base – 1990 (1987) — assessment of the effects of a major Soviet attack on the United States produced by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (hosted by the Federation of American Scientists)
Nuclear War Survival Skills (1979/1987) — handbook produced by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (use menu at left to navigate)
Ground Zero: A Javascript simulation of the effects of a nuclear explosion in a city
British RAF manual on the effects of nuclear explosions dated 1955
20 Mishaps That Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War by Alan F. Philips, M.D.
Nuclear Files.org Archived 2013-03-29 at the Wayback Machine Interactive Timeline of the Nuclear Age
Annotated bibliography on nuclear warfare from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues
DeVolpi, Alexander, Vladimir E. Minkov, Vadim A. Simonenko, and George S. Stanford. 2004. Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from Cold War Weaponry, Vols. 1 and 2. Fidlar Doubleday.
Air Weapons for the Cold War Archived 2013-07-24 at the Wayback Machine An in depth history of American air weapons and nuclear bombs from the reference book American Combat Planes of the 20th Century by Ray Wagner
Nuclear Emergency and Radiation Resources
NUKEMAP3D – a 3D nuclear weapons effects simulator powered by Google Maps.
Return of Hitler, World War III |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Oblique order | Detail: In the oblique order attack, the commander of the army would intentionally weaken one portion of the line to concentrate their troops elsewhere. They would then create an angled or oblique formation, refuse the weakened flank and attack the strongest flank of the enemy with a concentration of force. Once the critical flank was secure, the commander would wheel the troops 90 degrees to roll up the enemy line, and the angled formation would continue to advance. The echelons not involved in the assault served the important function of holding the rival army in check by remaining defensive and threatening, thus offering protection to the attacking echelons by keeping the enemy force occupied. On occasion both commanders would attempt the same tactic (e.g.the Diadochi trying to replicate Alexander's tactics). The oblique order was a tactic particularly favored by King Frederick II of Prussia.
Requirements and disadvantages: Proper execution of Frederick's oblique order involved three main requirements. First, each officer needed to know exactly how to form a battalion from "line to column, maintain its place in the column, and then redeploy either normally, or en echelon for the final attack." The next two necessities were that the soldiers marched in close formation, and in step.: 109 Cadenced marching had not been used since the days of the Roman Empire; however, uncadenced marching, or 'route step', required loose marching order to ensure that the soldiers did not bump into each other, and the oblique order could not have been implemented in such unstructured formations.: 110 Lastly, for the oblique order to be successful the leaders of the opposing forces had to be unaware of the Frederician technique, which could be countered by a quick response from them; the attack required a confused enemy army incapable of a rapid change in their deployment.: 109 Frederick's oblique order was born of the desire to overwhelm a weak point in the enemy line, thus allowing a smaller Prussian force superiority on the battlefield.: 310
There were some dangers with attempting an oblique order in battle, namely the chance of opening up a fatal gap between the two wings, or that the two forces may completely lose contact.: 108 Moreover, the Frederician oblique order called for a long march, either through the night, or in the early hours of the morning of the assault, which meant that the advancing Prussian forces were almost always fatigued by the time they engaged their enemy.: 312 Another risky aspect of the oblique order was that it required total determination, as, once it was executed, the assaulting echelons would be deployed with no chance of being recalled.: 311
History:
Antiquity: The first recorded use of a tactic similar to the oblique order was in 371 BC at the Battle of Leuctra, when the Thebans under Epaminondas defeated the Spartans by reinforcing their left flank to fifty rows deep, rather than spreading their troops evenly across the front. This move might have had its origin in the previous Battle of Tegyra, where the Thebans under Pelopidas, a political ally to Epaminondas, placed their best troops in close array on the left flank. Philip of Macedon learned Epaminondas' technique while held prisoner at Thebes, and his successors, including Alexander the Great, used it in their campaigns.
Asclepiodotus mentions the so called oblique phalanx (Greek: λοξὴ φάλαγξ loxē phalanx) in his Tactica. Vegetius is known to have written about the tactic that became the oblique order of battle.: 107
Medieval: A variation of the formation known as the hammer and anvil was used with devastating effect by Khalid ibn al-Walid in the Battle of Yarmouk AD 636. He massed all his cavalry behind his right flank, and led a combined cavalry-infantry assault on the Byzantine left, while simultaneously ordering his centre and left to make minor holding attacks to tie down the enemy center and right. Thus the Byzantine left was completely destroyed and with Byzantine cavalry driven off the battlefield, the center was enveloped, leading to a resounding Arab victory.
Early modern era: Subsequent military commanders in the early modern world again employed such tactics once they rediscovered the writings of antiquity.: 309 In the Battle of Pavia, Imperial commander in chief Fernando d'Avalos advanced in oblique order. In the Battle of Breitenfeld, fellow Imperial general Johann Tserclaes von Tilly also made an oblique advance against the Swedish and Saxon forces of Gustavus Adolphus and was repulsed only due to the Swedes' superior combined arms tactics. Simon Goodenough wrote of Tilly's manoeuvre: "It was a manoeuvre worthy of Alexander the Great and Epaminondas and one that was to be repeated with startling success by Frederick the Great." Yet another imperial general, Raimondo Montecuccoli, who maintained that the best forces should always be positioned on the flanks with the more powerful wing initiating the attack, was the first of the more modern generals to employ tactics similar to the oblique order of battle, and Frederick II of Prussia was well aware of the texts of Montecuccoli.: 107
The Battle of Rossbach in 1757 shows the oblique order at its worst and at its best. The large marginally trained and poorly disciplined Allied army attempted an ill-conceived and badly executed oblique attack on the Prussian left. The far smaller but highly trained and superbly disciplined Prussian army countered with a well-conceived and perfectly executed oblique attack of their own on the advancing Allied right. The apparent Prussian retreat goaded the Allies on, further disorganizing their dense columns already in disarray from the march. Using intense musket and cannon fire from the front and a charge from hidden cavalry in the flank and rear, the Prussians quickly destroyed the Allied right and routed their Army.
Prussian generals under Frederick the Great used the tactic in their own manner. The Prussian attacking army sent a strong advance force of infantry directly towards the enemy. The frontline troops occupied the attention of the enemy and the rest of the troops would maneuver behind it. They could also exploit any locally available obstacle, using hindering terrain or the smoke of cannon and musket fire to mask maneuvers. The Prussian cavalry would be stationed so as to cover the flank of the main body. Frederick even instructed his senior officers that numerical inferiority was indeed an advantage when it came to implementing 'his oblique order', as they could merely weaken one wing while reinforcing the other.: 108
The main body of the army would then spread their forces to one side and deploy in an echelon (or the "oblique order"), spreading their firepower and attacking the stronger enemy flank with increasing pressure. The protective cavalry would then exploit any enemy collapse. Frederick first implemented his oblique order at the Battle of Hohenfriedberg, in 1745,: 83 with a subsequent major victory, despite numerical inferiority, at the Battle of Leuthen in 1757.: 128 It was in this decade, between the Silesian Wars and the Seven Years' War, that Frederick had his army perfect all the manoeuvres of the oblique order of battle.: 121
The theoretical seeds of Frederick's oblique order can be seen in two of the Seelowitz Instructions' ('Instruction für die Cavalleire', 17 March, Oeuvres, XXX, 33; 'Disposition für die sämmtlichen Regimenter Infanterie', 25 March Oeuvres, XXX, 75) in March 1742.: 309 Members of the German General Staff maintained that Frederick was only dedicated to the oblique order after the Second Silesian War, with full-hearted application of the tactic in the Seven Years' War; however, Otto Herrman disputed the Staff Historians' insubstantial definitions of oblique order and claimed that Frederick had sought to utilize oblique at Mollwitz and Chotusitz. The most likely and poignant arguments for the advent of Fredrician oblique order came from Rudolf Keibel, who held that Frederick had indeed been implementing it since Hohenfriedberg.: 309
Since the Austrians had been taught valuable lessons in the Wars for Silesia, Frederician tactics were, as Frederick knew from his informants, a subject of discussion in the Viennese cabinet, where Francis I, Holy Roman Emperor, remarked that 'Old Fritz' preferred a one-winged-attack style of warfare that burdened his troops heavily.: 312 Then, in 1760, official documents obtained in the capture of Major-General Gzettritz offered direct insight into Frederick's oblique tactics, meaning that Frederick could henceforth be engaged with a well-informed army capable of countering his tactics.: 312 Furthermore, the Prussian forces, being heavily fatigued by the time they reached their target, lacked the ability to repel a well-situated enemy, such as at Kunersdorf, or an enemy that made a sudden about-turn, such as at the Battle of Zorndorf or the Battle of Torgau.: 313
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Offensive (military) | Theatre offensive: A theatre offensive can be a war and a dominant feature of a national security policy, or one of several components of war if a country is involved in several theatres such as the United Kingdom in 1941. In general theatre, offensives require over 250,000 troops to be committed to combat operations, including combined planning for different arms and services of the armed forces, such as air defence troops integrated into the overall plan for ground operations.
Strategic offensive: A strategic offensive is often a campaign and would involve the use of over 100,000 troops as part of a general strategy of the conflict in a given theatre. For example, the Operation Barbarossa was a theatre offensive composed of three distinct and inter-related campaigns in the Southern, Central and Northern parts of USSR territory. Soviet strategic offensive operations during World War II often involved multi-front coordinated operations. Along with the Wehrmacht operations on the Eastern Front of World War II, these were the largest military operations of the twentieth century. Strategic operations of the Red Army in World War II provides a listing of large-scale Soviet operations.
A strategic offensive is the aggressive expression of war planning and the use of strategic forces as a whole, combining all resources available for achieving defined and definitive goals that would fundamentally alter the balance of power between belligerents. However, the planning and execution of strategic offensives are always based on theoretical considerations because it is impractical, uneconomic and difficult to hide a full-scale rehearsal of large-scale operations.
A strategic offensive consists of simultaneous, tandem or phased operational offensives that seek to achieve specific operational objectives that eventually lead to the achievement of a strategic goal, usually a complete defeat of the opposition, but also destruction of a significant enemy force or occupation of strategically significant territory, such as the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation.
Any given strategic offensive is a derivative of a combination of factors such as national military doctrine, past military experience, and analysis of socio-political, economic and military circumstances.
See also: The best defense is a good offense
Military operation
Charge (warfare)
References:
Sources: Glantz, David M., Soviet military operational art: in pursuit of deep battle, Frank Cass, London, 1991 ISBN 0-7146-4077-8
Glantz, David M., The Soviet strategic offensive in Manchuria, 1945: August storm, Frank Cass, London, 2003
Fulton, William B., Major General, VIETNAM STUDIES RIVERINE OPERATIONS 1966-1969, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, U.S. Government Printing Office, WASHINGTON, D. C., 1985
Longmate, Norman. The Bombers. Hutchins & Co, 1983. ISBN 0-09-151580-7.
Isby, David C., Weapons and tactics of the Soviet Army, Jane's Publishing Company Limited, London, 1981
External links: Tactical Reasons to Advance |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Open terrain | See also: Open Country
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Operational level of war | Background: During the 18th and early 19th centuries, the synonymous terms grand tactics (or, less frequently, maneuver tactics) was often used to describe the manoeuvres of troops not tactically engaged, while in the late 19th century to the First World War and throughout the Second World War, the term minor strategy was used by some military commentators. Confusion over terminology was exposed in professional military publications, that sought to identify "...slightly different shades of meaning, such as tactics, major tactics, minor tactics, grand strategy, major strategy, and minor strategy". The term operational art was not widely used in the United States or Britain before 1980–1981, when it became much discussed and started to enter military doctrines and officer combat training courses.
Application: Operational art comprises four essential elements: time, space, means and purpose. Each element is found in greater complexity at the operational level than at the tactical or strategic level. This is true partly because operational art must consider and incorporate more of the strategic and tactical levels than those levels must absorb from the operational level. Although much can be gained by examining the four elements independently, it is only when they are viewed together that operational art reveals its intricate fabric.
The challenge of operational art is to establish a four-element equilibrium that permits the optimal generation and application of military power in achieving the political goal. Viewing time, space, means and purpose as a whole requires great skill in organizing, weighing and envisioning masses of complex, often contradictory factors. These factors often exist for extended periods, over great distances and with shifting mixes of players, systems and beliefs, pursuing political goals which may or may not be clear, cogent or settled. Compounding factors, such as the opponent's actions, create further ambiguity.
Mission analysis: The operational-level strategist possesses numerous tools to frame and guide their thinking, but chief among these are mission analysis and end state. Mission analysis answers the question "What is to be accomplished?" Through mission analysis, the operational-level planner fuses political aims with military objectives. In so doing, the planner determines what application of military force will create military power to achieve the political purpose. Subordinate processes here include defining objectives and centers of gravity, but excessive dependence on analytical mechanisms can create false security. The final test rewards success, not the quality of the argument. Conversely, the planner cannot hope to "feel" a way to victory—complexity demands an integration of thought and effort.
End state: End state answers the question "What will constitute success?" The campaign end state is not merely a desired status quo of the military goal. It also establishes a touchstone for the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The end state manifests the intended results of military power and exposes any limitations. Indeed, an achievable end state may require the employment of nonmilitary elements of national power. As such, it recognizes that military power alone may not be capable of attaining political success.
Skills required: An operational-level strategy must continually identify and weigh time, space, means and purpose, extrapolating from them outcomes and likelihood. To accomplish this, practitioners need both skill and theory, experience and knowledge. At the operational level, skills and experience must usually be developed indirectly, through formal training, military history and real-world practice.
Success at the tactical level is no guarantee of success at the operational level since mastery of operational art demands strategic skills but not vice versa. Without a strong grounding in the theory and application of operational art, a successful tactician has little hope of making the demanding leap from tactics. The operational level strategist must see clearly and expansively from the foxhole into the corridors of national or coalition authority. They must be aware of the plausibility and coherence of strategic aims, national will and the players who decide them. Successful operational art charts a clear, unbroken path from the individual soldier's efforts to the state or coalition's goals.
Role in historiography: While the emerging corpus of operational art and the establishment of a specifically operational level of war are relatively new, in practice operational art has existed throughout recorded history. Peoples and commanders have long pursued political goals through military actions, and one can examine campaigns of any period from the existential perspective of operational art. Current schools of thought on the operational art share the fundamental view that military success can be measured only in the attainment of political-strategic aims, and thus historians can analyze any war in terms of operational art.
In the case of World War II analysis, the Wehrmacht did not use the operational level as a formal doctrinal concept during the campaigns of 1939–1945. While personnel within the German forces knew of operational art, awareness and practice was limited principally to general-staff trained officers. Nevertheless, the existential nature of operational art means that examining a campaign or an operation against political aims is valid irrespective of the doctrine or structures of the period. Thus the elements of operational art—time, space, means and purpose—can illuminate thoughts and actions of any era, regardless of the prevailing contemporary doctrine or structure.
See also: Grand strategy
Maskirovka
Military doctrine
Military strategy
Military tactics
Naval strategy
Principles of war
Strategy
References:
Notes:
Bibliography: Blythe, Wilson C. Jr. "A History of Operational Art", Military Review (November–December 2018): https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2018/Blythe-Operational-Art/
Blythe, Wilson C. Jr. "III Corps During the Surge: A Study in Operational Art", Military Review (September–October 2017): https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2017/Blythe-III-Corps-during-the-Surge/
Bundel, C. M., Col. FA, "What Is Strategy?", in Infantry Journal, v. 34, United States Infantry Association, 1929
Glantz, D. M., Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, Frank Cass, London, 1989
Jablonsky, David, Roots of Strategy: 4 Military Classics, Stackpole Books, 1999
National Research Council Staff, Reducing the Logistics Burden for the Army After Next: Doing More With Less, Committee to Perform a Technology Assessment Focused on Logistics Support Requirements for Future Army Combat Systems, National Research Council (U.S.), National Academies Press, 1999
Robinson, James R. (1997). "The Rommel Myth". Military Review Journal. Retrieved 8 February 2016. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
Rogers, Clifford J. (2006). "Strategy, Operational Design, and Tactics". In Bradford, James C. (ed.). International Encyclopedia of Military History. New York: Routledge.
Simpkin, Richard E., Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tuchachevskii, Brassey's Defence Publishers, London, 1987
Simpkin, Richard E., Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, Brassey's, 2000
Stone, John, The Tank Debate: Armour and the Anglo-American Military Tradition, Routledge, 2000
Whitman, J. E. A., How Wars Are Fought: The Principles of Strategy and Tactics, Oxford University Press, 1941 |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Operational manoeuvre group | Notes:
References: Simpkin, Richard E. Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare. Brassey's, 2000. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Operations research | Overview: Operational research (OR) encompasses the development and the use of a wide range of problem-solving techniques and methods applied in the pursuit of improved decision-making and efficiency, such as simulation, mathematical optimization, queueing theory and other stochastic-process models, Markov decision processes, econometric methods, data envelopment analysis, ordinal priority approach, neural networks, expert systems, decision analysis, and the analytic hierarchy process. Nearly all of these techniques involve the construction of mathematical models that attempt to describe the system. Because of the computational and statistical nature of most of these fields, OR also has strong ties to computer science and analytics. Operational researchers faced with a new problem must determine which of these techniques are most appropriate given the nature of the system, the goals for improvement, and constraints on time and computing power, or develop a new technique specific to the problem at hand (and, afterwards, to that type of problem).
The major sub-disciplines (but not limited to) in modern operational research, as identified by the journal Operations Research and The Journal of the Operational Research Society are:
Computing and information technologies
Financial engineering
Manufacturing, service sciences, and supply chain management
Policy modeling and public sector work
Revenue management
Simulation
Stochastic models
Transportation theory (mathematics)
Game theory for strategies
Linear programming
Nonlinear programming
Integer programming in NP-complete problem specially for 0-1 integer linear programming for binary
Dynamic programming in Aerospace engineering and Economics
Information theory used in Cryptography, Quantum computing
Quadratic programming for solutions of Quadratic equation and Quadratic function
History: In the decades after the two world wars, the tools of operations research were more widely applied to problems in business, industry, and society. Since that time, operational research has expanded into a field widely used in industries ranging from petrochemicals to airlines, finance, logistics, and government, moving to a focus on the development of mathematical models that can be used to analyse and optimize sometimes complex systems, and has become an area of active academic and industrial research.
Historical origins: In the 17th century, mathematicians Blaise Pascal and Christiaan Huygens solved problems involving sometimes complex decisions (problem of points) by using game-theoretic ideas and expected values; others, such as Pierre de Fermat and Jacob Bernoulli, solved these types of problems using combinatorial reasoning instead. Charles Babbage's research into the cost of transportation and sorting of mail led to England's universal "Penny Post" in 1840, and to studies into the dynamical behaviour of railway vehicles in defence of the GWR's broad gauge. Beginning in the 20th century, study of inventory management could be considered the origin of modern operations research with economic order quantity developed by Ford W. Harris in 1913. Operational research may have originated in the efforts of military planners during World War I (convoy theory and Lanchester's laws). Percy Bridgman brought operational research to bear on problems in physics in the 1920s and would later attempt to extend these to the social sciences.
Modern operational research originated at the Bawdsey Research Station in the UK in 1937 as the result of an initiative of the station's superintendent, A. P. Rowe and Robert Watson-Watt. Rowe conceived the idea as a means to analyse and improve the working of the UK's early-warning radar system, code-named "Chain Home" (CH). Initially, Rowe analysed the operating of the radar equipment and its communication networks, expanding later to include the operating personnel's behaviour. This revealed unappreciated limitations of the CH network and allowed remedial action to be taken.
Scientists in the United Kingdom (including Patrick Blackett (later Lord Blackett OM PRS), Cecil Gordon, Solly Zuckerman, (later Baron Zuckerman OM, KCB, FRS), C. H. Waddington, Owen Wansbrough-Jones, Frank Yates, Jacob Bronowski and Freeman Dyson), and in the United States (George Dantzig) looked for ways to make better decisions in such areas as logistics and training schedules.
Second World War: The modern field of operational research arose during World War II. In the World War II era, operational research was defined as "a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control". Other names for it included operational analysis (UK Ministry of Defence from 1962) and quantitative management.
During the Second World War close to 1,000 men and women in Britain were engaged in operational research. About 200 operational research scientists worked for the British Army.
Patrick Blackett worked for several different organizations during the war. Early in the war while working for the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) he set up a team known as the "Circus" which helped to reduce the number of anti-aircraft artillery rounds needed to shoot down an enemy aircraft from an average of over 20,000 at the start of the Battle of Britain to 4,000 in 1941.
In 1941, Blackett moved from the RAE to the Navy, after first working with RAF Coastal Command, in 1941 and then early in 1942 to the Admiralty. Blackett's team at Coastal Command's Operational Research Section (CC-ORS) included two future Nobel prize winners and many other people who went on to be pre-eminent in their fields. They undertook a number of crucial analyses that aided the war effort. Britain introduced the convoy system to reduce shipping losses, but while the principle of using warships to accompany merchant ships was generally accepted, it was unclear whether it was better for convoys to be small or large. Convoys travel at the speed of the slowest member, so small convoys can travel faster. It was also argued that small convoys would be harder for German U-boats to detect. On the other hand, large convoys could deploy more warships against an attacker. Blackett's staff showed that the losses suffered by convoys depended largely on the number of escort vessels present, rather than the size of the convoy. Their conclusion was that a few large convoys are more defensible than many small ones.
While performing an analysis of the methods used by RAF Coastal Command to hunt and destroy submarines, one of the analysts asked what colour the aircraft were. As most of them were from Bomber Command they were painted black for night-time operations. At the suggestion of CC-ORS a test was run to see if that was the best colour to camouflage the aircraft for daytime operations in the grey North Atlantic skies. Tests showed that aircraft painted white were on average not spotted until they were 20% closer than those painted black. This change indicated that 30% more submarines would be attacked and sunk for the same number of sightings. As a result of these findings Coastal Command changed their aircraft to using white undersurfaces.
Other work by the CC-ORS indicated that on average if the trigger depth of aerial-delivered depth charges were changed from 100 to 25 feet, the kill ratios would go up. The reason was that if a U-boat saw an aircraft only shortly before it arrived over the target then at 100 feet the charges would do no damage (because the U-boat wouldn't have had time to descend as far as 100 feet), and if it saw the aircraft a long way from the target it had time to alter course under water so the chances of it being within the 20-foot kill zone of the charges was small. It was more efficient to attack those submarines close to the surface when the targets' locations were better known than to attempt their destruction at greater depths when their positions could only be guessed. Before the change of settings from 100 to 25 feet, 1% of submerged U-boats were sunk and 14% damaged. After the change, 7% were sunk and 11% damaged; if submarines were caught on the surface but had time to submerge just before being attacked, the numbers rose to 11% sunk and 15% damaged. Blackett observed "there can be few cases where such a great operational gain had been obtained by such a small and simple change of tactics".
Bomber Command's Operational Research Section (BC-ORS), analyzed a report of a survey carried out by RAF Bomber Command. For the survey, Bomber Command inspected all bombers returning from bombing raids over Germany over a particular period. All damage inflicted by German air defenses was noted and the recommendation was given that armor be added in the most heavily damaged areas. This recommendation was not adopted because the fact that the aircraft were able to return with these areas damaged indicated the areas were not vital, and adding armor to non-vital areas where damage is acceptable reduces aircraft performance. Their suggestion to remove some of the crew so that an aircraft loss would result in fewer personnel losses, was also rejected by RAF command. Blackett's team made the logical recommendation that the armor be placed in the areas which were completely untouched by damage in the bombers who returned. They reasoned that the survey was biased, since it only included aircraft that returned to Britain. The areas untouched in returning aircraft were probably vital areas, which, if hit, would result in the loss of the aircraft. This story has been disputed, with a similar damage assessment study completed in the US by the Statistical Research Group at Columbia University, the result of work done by Abraham Wald. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Operations research | This recommendation was not adopted because the fact that the aircraft were able to return with these areas damaged indicated the areas were not vital, and adding armor to non-vital areas where damage is acceptable reduces aircraft performance. Their suggestion to remove some of the crew so that an aircraft loss would result in fewer personnel losses, was also rejected by RAF command. Blackett's team made the logical recommendation that the armor be placed in the areas which were completely untouched by damage in the bombers who returned. They reasoned that the survey was biased, since it only included aircraft that returned to Britain. The areas untouched in returning aircraft were probably vital areas, which, if hit, would result in the loss of the aircraft. This story has been disputed, with a similar damage assessment study completed in the US by the Statistical Research Group at Columbia University, the result of work done by Abraham Wald.
When Germany organized its air defences into the Kammhuber Line, it was realized by the British that if the RAF bombers were to fly in a bomber stream they could overwhelm the night fighters who flew in individual cells directed to their targets by ground controllers. It was then a matter of calculating the statistical loss from collisions against the statistical loss from night fighters to calculate how close the bombers should fly to minimize RAF losses.
The "exchange rate" ratio of output to input was a characteristic feature of operational research. By comparing the number of flying hours put in by Allied aircraft to the number of U-boat sightings in a given area, it was possible to redistribute aircraft to more productive patrol areas. Comparison of exchange rates established "effectiveness ratios" useful in planning. The ratio of 60 mines laid per ship sunk was common to several campaigns: German mines in British ports, British mines on German routes, and United States mines in Japanese routes.
Operational research doubled the on-target bomb rate of B-29s bombing Japan from the Marianas Islands by increasing the training ratio from 4 to 10 percent of flying hours; revealed that wolf-packs of three United States submarines were the most effective number to enable all members of the pack to engage targets discovered on their individual patrol stations; revealed that glossy enamel paint was more effective camouflage for night fighters than conventional dull camouflage paint finish, and a smooth paint finish increased airspeed by reducing skin friction.
On land, the operational research sections of the Army Operational Research Group (AORG) of the Ministry of Supply (MoS) were landed in Normandy in 1944, and they followed British forces in the advance across Europe. They analyzed, among other topics, the effectiveness of artillery, aerial bombing and anti-tank shooting.
After World War II: In 1947, under the auspices of the British Association, a symposium was organized in Dundee. In his opening address, Watson-Watt offered a definition of the aims of OR:
"To examine quantitatively whether the user organization is getting from the operation of its equipment the best attainable contribution to its overall objective."
With expanded techniques and growing awareness of the field at the close of the war, operational research was no longer limited to only operational, but was extended to encompass equipment procurement, training, logistics and infrastructure. Operations research also grew in many areas other than the military once scientists learned to apply its principles to the civilian sector. The development of the simplex algorithm for linear programming was in 1947.
In the 1950s, the term Operations Research was used to describe heterogeneous mathematical methods such as game theory, dynamic programming, linear programming, warehousing, spare parts theory, queue theory, simulation and production control, which were used primarily in civilian industry. Scientific societies and journals on the subject of operations research were founded in the 1950s, such as the Operation Research Society of America (ORSA) in 1952 and the Institute for Management Science (TIMS) in 1953. Philip Morse, the head of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group of the Pentagon, became the first president of ORSA and attracted the companies of the military-industrial complex to ORSA, which soon had more than 500 members. In the 1960s, ORSA reached 8000 members. Consulting companies also founded OR groups. In 1953, Abraham Charnes and William Cooper published the first textbook on Linear Programming.
In the 1950s and 1960s, chairs of operations research were established in the U.S. and United Kingdom (from 1964 in Lancaster) in the management faculties of universities. Further influences from the U.S. on the development of operations research in Western Europe can be traced here. The authoritative OR textbooks from the U.S. were published in Germany in German language and in France in French (but not in Italian), such as the book by George Dantzig "Linear Programming"(1963) and the book by C. West Churchman et al. "Introduction to Operations Research"(1957). The latter was also published in Spanish in 1973, opening at the same time Latin American readers to Operations Research. NATO gave important impulses for the spread of Operations Research in Western Europe; NATO headquarters (SHAPE) organised four conferences on OR in the 1950s – the one in 1956 with 120 participants – bringing OR to mainland Europe. Within NATO, OR was also known as "Scientific Advisory" (SA) and was grouped together in the Advisory Group of Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD). SHAPE and AGARD organized an OR conference in April 1957 in Paris. When France withdrew from the NATO military command structure, the transfer of NATO headquarters from France to Belgium led to the institutionalization of OR in Belgium, where Jacques Drèze founded CORE, the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics at the Catholic University of Leuven in 1966.
With the development of computers over the next three decades, Operations Research can now solve problems with hundreds of thousands of variables and constraints. Moreover, the large volumes of data required for such problems can be stored and manipulated very efficiently." Much of operations research (modernly known as 'analytics') relies upon stochastic variables and a therefore access to truly random numbers. Fortunately, the cybernetics field also required the same level of randomness. The development of increasingly better random number generators has been a boon to both disciplines. Modern applications of operations research includes city planning, football strategies, emergency planning, optimizing all facets of industry and economy, and undoubtedly with the likelihood of the inclusion of terrorist attack planning and definitely counterterrorist attack planning. More recently, the research approach of operations research, which dates back to the 1950s, has been criticized for being collections of mathematical models but lacking an empirical basis of data collection for applications. How to collect data is not presented in the textbooks. Because of the lack of data, there are also no computer applications in the textbooks.
Problems addressed: Critical path analysis or project planning: identifying those processes in a multiple-dependency project which affect the overall duration of the project
Floorplanning: designing the layout of equipment in a factory or components on a computer chip to reduce manufacturing time (therefore reducing cost)
Network optimization: for instance, setup of telecommunications or power system networks to maintain quality of service during outages
Resource allocation problems
Facility location
Assignment Problems:
Assignment problem
Generalized assignment problem
Quadratic assignment problem
Weapon target assignment problem
Bayesian search theory: looking for a target
Optimal search
Routing, such as determining the routes of buses so that as few buses are needed as possible
Supply chain management: managing the flow of raw materials and products based on uncertain demand for the finished products
Project production activities: managing the flow of work activities in a capital project in response to system variability through operations research tools for variability reduction and buffer allocation using a combination of allocation of capacity, inventory and time
Efficient messaging and customer response tactics
Automation: automating or integrating robotic systems in human-driven operations processes
Globalization: globalizing operations processes in order to take advantage of cheaper materials, labor, land or other productivity inputs
Transportation: managing freight transportation and delivery systems (Examples: LTL shipping, intermodal freight transport, travelling salesman problem, driver scheduling problem)
Scheduling:
Personnel staffing
Manufacturing steps
Project tasks
Network data traffic: these are known as queueing models or queueing systems.
Sports events and their television coverage
Blending of raw materials in oil refineries
Determining optimal prices, in many retail and B2B settings, within the disciplines of pricing science
Cutting stock problem: Cutting small items out of bigger ones.
Finding the optimal parameter (weights) setting of an algorithm that generates the realisation of a figured bass in Baroque compositions (classical music) by using weighted local cost and transition cost rules
Operational research is also used extensively in government where evidence-based policy is used.
Management science: In 1967, Stafford Beer characterized the field of management science as "the business use of operations research". Like operational research itself, management science (MS) is an interdisciplinary branch of applied mathematics devoted to optimal decision planning, with strong links with economics, business, engineering, and other sciences. It uses various scientific research-based principles, strategies, and analytical methods including mathematical modeling, statistics and numerical algorithms to improve an organization's ability to enact rational and meaningful management decisions by arriving at optimal or near-optimal solutions to sometimes complex decision problems. Management scientists help businesses to achieve their goals using the scientific methods of operational research.
The management scientist's mandate is to use rational, systematic, science-based techniques to inform and improve decisions of all kinds. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Operations research | Management science: In 1967, Stafford Beer characterized the field of management science as "the business use of operations research". Like operational research itself, management science (MS) is an interdisciplinary branch of applied mathematics devoted to optimal decision planning, with strong links with economics, business, engineering, and other sciences. It uses various scientific research-based principles, strategies, and analytical methods including mathematical modeling, statistics and numerical algorithms to improve an organization's ability to enact rational and meaningful management decisions by arriving at optimal or near-optimal solutions to sometimes complex decision problems. Management scientists help businesses to achieve their goals using the scientific methods of operational research.
The management scientist's mandate is to use rational, systematic, science-based techniques to inform and improve decisions of all kinds. Of course, the techniques of management science are not restricted to business applications but may be applied to military, medical, public administration, charitable groups, political groups or community groups.
Management science is concerned with developing and applying models and concepts that may prove useful in helping to illuminate management issues and solve managerial problems, as well as designing and developing new and better models of organizational excellence.
The application of these models within the corporate sector became known as management science.
Related fields: Some of the fields that have considerable overlap with Operations Research and Management Science include:
Applications: Applications are abundant such as in airlines, manufacturing companies, service organizations, military branches, and government. The range of problems and issues to which it has contributed insights and solutions is vast. It includes:
Scheduling (of airlines, trains, buses etc.)
Assignment (assigning crew to flights, trains or buses; employees to projects; commitment and dispatch of power generation facilities)
Facility location (deciding most appropriate location for new facilities such as warehouses; factories or fire station)
Hydraulics & Piping Engineering (managing flow of water from reservoirs)
Health Services (information and supply chain management)
Game Theory (identifying, understanding; developing strategies adopted by companies)
Urban Design
Computer Network Engineering (packet routing; timing; analysis)
Telecom & Data Communication Engineering (packet routing; timing; analysis)
Management is also concerned with so-called soft-operational analysis which concerns methods for strategic planning, strategic decision support, problem structuring methods.
In dealing with these sorts of challenges, mathematical modeling and simulation may not be appropriate or may not suffice. Therefore, during the past 30 years, a number of non-quantified modeling methods have been developed. These include:
stakeholder based approaches including metagame analysis and drama theory
morphological analysis and various forms of influence diagrams
cognitive mapping
strategic choice
robustness analysis
Societies and journals:
Societies: The International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS) is an umbrella organization for operational research societies worldwide, representing approximately 50 national societies including those in the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, India, Japan and South Africa. For the institutionalization of Operations Research, the foundation of the (IFORS) in 1960 was of decisive importance, which stimulated the foundation of national OR societies in Austria, Switzerland and Germany. IFORS held important international conferences every three years since 1957. The constituent members of IFORS form regional groups, such as that in Europe, the Association of European Operational Research Societies (EURO). Other important operational research organizations are Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) and Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation and Education Conference (I/ITSEC)
In 2004, the US-based organization INFORMS began an initiative to market the OR profession better, including a website entitled The Science of Better which provides an introduction to OR and examples of successful applications of OR to industrial problems. This initiative has been adopted by the Operational Research Society in the UK, including a website entitled Learn About OR.
Journals of INFORMS: The Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) publishes thirteen scholarly journals about operations research, including the top two journals in their class, according to 2005 Journal Citation Reports. They are:
Decision Analysis
Information Systems Research
INFORMS Journal on Computing
INFORMS Transactions on Education (an open access journal)
Interfaces
Management Science
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Marketing Science
Mathematics of Operations Research
Operations Research
Organization Science
Service Science
Transportation Science
Other journals: These are listed in alphabetical order of their titles.
4OR-A Quarterly Journal of Operations Research: jointly published the Belgian, French and Italian Operations Research Societies (Springer);
Decision Sciences published by Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of the Decision Sciences Institute
European Journal of Operational Research (EJOR): Founded in 1975 and is presently by far the largest operational research journal in the world, with its around 9,000 pages of published papers per year. In 2004, its total number of citations was the second largest amongst Operational Research and Management Science journals;
INFOR Journal: published and sponsored by the Canadian Operational Research Society;
Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation (JDMS): Applications, Methodology, Technology: a quarterly journal devoted to advancing the science of modeling and simulation as it relates to the military and defense.
Journal of the Operational Research Society (JORS): an official journal of The OR Society; this is the oldest continuously published journal of OR in the world, published by Taylor & Francis;
Military Operations Research (MOR): published by the Military Operations Research Society;
Omega - The International Journal of Management Science;
Operations Research Letters;
Opsearch: official journal of the Operational Research Society of India;
OR Insight: a quarterly journal of The OR Society published by Palgrave;
Pesquisa Operacional, the official journal of the Brazilian Operations Research Society
Production and Operations Management, the official journal of the Production and Operations Management Society
TOP: the official journal of the Spanish Statistics and Operations Research Society.
See also:
References:
Further reading:
Classic books and articles: R. E. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957
Abraham Charnes, William W. Cooper, Management Models and Industrial Applications of Linear Programming, Volumes I and II, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1961
Abraham Charnes, William W. Cooper, A. Henderson, An Introduction to Linear Programming, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1953
C. West Churchman, Russell L. Ackoff & E. L. Arnoff, Introduction to Operations Research, New York: J. Wiley and Sons, 1957
George B. Dantzig, Linear Programming and Extensions, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963
Lester K. Ford, Jr., D. Ray Fulkerson, Flows in Networks, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962
Jay W. Forrester, Industrial Dynamics, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1961
L. V. Kantorovich, "Mathematical Methods of Organizing and Planning Production" Management Science, 4, 1960, 266–422
Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1976
H. W. Kuhn, "The Hungarian Method for the Assignment Problem," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1–2, 1955, 83–97
H. W. Kuhn, A. W. Tucker, "Nonlinear Programming," pp. 481–492 in Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability
B. O. Koopman, Search and Screening: General Principles and Historical Applications, New York, Pergamon Press, 1980
Tjalling C. Koopmans, editor, Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1951
Charles C. Holt, Franco Modigliani, John F. Muth, Herbert A. Simon, Planning Production, Inventories, and Work Force, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1960
Philip M. Morse, George E. Kimball, Methods of Operations Research, New York, MIT Press and John Wiley & Sons, 1951
Robert O. Schlaifer, Howard Raiffa, Applied Statistical Decision Theory, Cambridge, Division of Research, Harvard Business School, 1961
Classic textbooks: Taha, Hamdy A., "Operations Research: An Introduction", Pearson, 10th Edition, 2016
Frederick S. Hillier & Gerald J. Lieberman, Introduction to Operations Research, McGraw-Hill: Boston MA; 10th Edition, 2014
Robert J. Thierauf & Richard A. Grosse, "Decision Making Through Operations Research", John Wiley & Sons, INC, 1970
Harvey M. Wagner, Principles of Operations Research, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1969
Wentzel (Ventsel), E. S. Introduction to Operations Research, Moscow: Soviet Radio Publishing House, 1964.
History: Saul I. Gass, Arjang A. Assad, An Annotated Timeline of Operations Research: An Informal History. New York, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005.
Saul I. Gass (Editor), Arjang A. Assad (Editor), Profiles in Operations Research: Pioneers and Innovators. Springer, 2011
Maurice W. Kirby (Operational Research Society (Great Britain)). Operational Research in War and Peace: The British Experience from the 1930s to 1970, Imperial College Press, 2003. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Operations research | History: Saul I. Gass, Arjang A. Assad, An Annotated Timeline of Operations Research: An Informal History. New York, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005.
Saul I. Gass (Editor), Arjang A. Assad (Editor), Profiles in Operations Research: Pioneers and Innovators. Springer, 2011
Maurice W. Kirby (Operational Research Society (Great Britain)). Operational Research in War and Peace: The British Experience from the 1930s to 1970, Imperial College Press, 2003. ISBN 1-86094-366-7, ISBN 978-1-86094-366-9
J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, A. Schrijver (editors) History of Mathematical Programming: A Collection of Personal Reminiscences, North-Holland, 1991
Charles W. McArthur, Operations Analysis in the U.S. Army Eighth Air Force in World War II, History of Mathematics, Vol. 4, Providence, American Mathematical Society, 1990
C. H. Waddington, O. R. in World War 2: Operational Research Against the U-boat, London, Elek Science, 1973.
Richard Vahrenkamp: Mathematical Management – Operations Research in the United States and Western Europe, 1945 – 1990, in: Management Revue – Socio-Economic Studies, vol. 34 (2023), issue 1, pp. 69–91.
External links:
What is Operations Research?
International Federation of Operational Research Societies
The Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Occupational Outlook Handbook, U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Outline of war | Types of war:
Types of warfare: Asymmetric warfare
Expeditionary warfare
Expeditionary maneuver warfare
Warfare by objective: Defensive warfare
Offensive warfare
Warfare by strategic doctrine:
Warfare by terrain:
Warfare by equipment or weapon type:
Warfare by era:
Warfare by stages:
Other: Champion warfare
History of war:
Warfare by era: See: Warfare by era
Wars:
Wars by death toll: List of wars by death toll
Wars by date:
Wars by region:
Wars by type of conflict:
Battles: Lists of battles
List of battles by casualties
List of orders of battle
List of sieges
Military theory: Military theory
Philosophy of war
Principles of war
War cycles
Military organization:
Operational level of war: Blitzkrieg
Soviet deep battle
Maneuver warfare
Operational manoeuvre group
Military operations: List of military operations
Military operation plan
Military operations other than war
Types of military operations: Types of military operations, by scope:
Theater – operation over a large, often continental area of operation and represents a strategic national commitment to the conflict such as Operation Barbarossa, with general goals that encompass areas of consideration outside of the military such as the economic and political impacts.
Campaign – subset of the theatre operation, or a more limited geographic and operational strategic commitment such as Battle of Britain, and need not represent total national commitment to a conflict, or have broader goals outside of the military impacts.
Battle – subset of a campaign that will have specific military goals and geographic objectives, as well as clearly defined use of forces such as the Battle of Gallipoli, which operationally was a combined arms operation originally known as the "Dardanelles landings" as part of the Dardanelles Campaign, where about 480,000 Allied troops took part.
Engagement – tactical combat event of contest for specific area or objective by actions of distinct units. For example, the Battle of Kursk, also known from its German designation as Operation Citadel, included many separate engagements, several of which were combined into the Battle of Prokhorovka. The "Battle of Kursk" in addition to describing the initial German offensive operation (or simply an offensive), also included two Soviet counter-offensive operations Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev.
Strike – single attack, upon a specified target. This often forms part of a broader engagement. Strikes have an explicit goal, such as, rendering facilities inoperable (e.g. airports), to assassinating enemy leaders, or to limit supply to enemy troops.
Military strategy: Attrition warfare
Battlespace
Military deception
Naval strategy
Offensive (military)
Strategic defence
Strategic goal (military)
Grand strategy: Containment
Economic warfare
Military science
Philosophy of war
Strategic studies
Total war
Military tactics:
Politics of war: Casus belli – Latin expression meaning the justification for acts of war. In theory, present international law allows only three situations as legal cause to go to war: out of self-defense, defense of an ally under a mutual defense pact, or sanctioned by the UN.
Declaration of war
Surrender
Capitulation an agreement in time of war for the surrender to a hostile armed force of a particular body of troops, a town or a territory.
Strategic surrender – surrender to avoid a last, chaotic round of fighting that would have the characteristics of a rout, allowing the victor to obtain his objective without paying the costs of a last battle.
Unconditional surrender – surrender without conditions, except for those provided by international law.
Victory
Debellatio – when a war ends because of the complete destruction of a belligerent state.
No quarter – when a victor shows no clemency or mercy and refuses to spare the life of the vanquished when they surrender at discretion. Under the laws of war "... it is especially forbidden ... to declare that no quarter will be given".
Pyrrhic victory – victory with such a devastating cost that it carries the implication that another such victory will ultimately lead to defeat.
War effort
War economy
Philosophy of war: Philosophy of war – examines war beyond the typical questions of weaponry and strategy, inquiring into such things as the meaning and etiology of war, the relationship between war and human nature, and the ethics of war.
Militarism – belief that war is not inherently bad but can be a beneficial aspect of society.
Realism – its core proposition is a skepticism as to whether moral concepts such as justice can be applied to the conduct of international affairs. Proponents of realism believe that moral concepts should never prescribe, nor circumscribe, a state's behaviour. Instead, a state should place an emphasis on state security and self-interest. One form of realism – descriptive realism – proposes that states cannot act morally, while another form – prescriptive realism – argues that the motivating factor for a state is self-interest. Just wars that violate Just Wars principles effectively constitute a branch of realism.
Revolution and Civil War – Just War Theory states that a just war must have just authority. To the extent that this is interpreted as a legitimate government, this leaves little room for revolutionary war or civil war, in which an illegitimate entity may declare war for reasons that fit the remaining criteria of Just War Theory. This is less of a problem if the "just authority" is widely interpreted as "the will of the people" or similar. Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions side-steps this issue by stating that if one of the parties to a civil war is a High Contracting Party (in practice, the state recognised by the international community,) both Parties to the conflict are bound "as a minimum, the following [humanitarian] provisions." Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention also makes clear that the treatment of prisoners of war is binding on both parties even when captured soldiers have an "allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power."
Consequentialism – moral theory most frequently summarized in the words "the end justifies the means," which tends to support the just war theory (unless the just war causes less beneficial means to become necessary, which further requires worst actions for self-defense with bad consequences).
Pacifism – belief that war of any kind is morally unacceptable or pragmatically not worth the cost. Pacifists extend humanitarian concern not just to enemy civilians but also to combatants, especially conscripts. For example, Ben Salmon believed all war to be unjust. He was sentenced to death during World War I (later commuted to 25 years hard labor) for desertion and spreading propaganda.
Right of self-defence – maintains (based on rational self-interest) that the use of retaliatory force is justified against repressive nations that break the zero aggression principle. In addition, if a free country is itself subject to foreign aggression, it is morally imperative for that nation to defend itself and its citizens by whatever means necessary. Thus, any means to achieve a swift and complete victory over the enemy is imperative. This view is prominently held by Objectivists.
Laws of war: Laws of war
War crimes
List of war crimes
Prisoners of war:
Effects of war: Casualties
Casualty
Casualty classifications
KIA – Killed In Action
DOW – Died Of Wounds
MIA – Missing In Action
WIA – Wounded in action
Assassination
List of genocides by death toll
War and culture:
War-related media:
War publications: The Art of War
On War
War films: List of war films and TV specials – lists movies and shows by the war depicted in them, the sections arranged chronologically
Persons influential in war: List of military writers
See also:
War:
Wars:
References: Charles Phillips and Alan Axelrod: Encyclopedia of Wars. Facts On File, Inc., 2005, ISBN 0-8160-2851-6. (With about 1,800 wars, this is probably the most complete overview in English language).
R. Ernest Dupuy, Trevor N. Dupuy: The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History. From 3500 B.C. to the Present. 4th Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, 1993, ISBN 978-0062700568. (With about 1,300 wars this is probably the second most complete overview in English language, with the added value to summarize about 4,500 battles).
Vittorio Ferretti: Weltchronik der Kriege und Demozide - Ein Abriss der Ursachen, Abläufe und Folgen von über 5.000 gewalttätig ausgetragenen Konflikten bis zum Jahr 2000. Amazon, 2014, ISBN 978-3000403538. (With over 5,000 conflicts, this German book is by far the most complete overview published in any language until now. Its added value is to include democides into its scope).
External links:
World History Database Listing of all wars
Newspaper by Martin John Callanan translated into different languages listing all wars
Correlates of War Project
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry
Complex Emergency Database (CE-DAT) – A database on the human impact of conflicts and other complex emergencies.
World War I primary source collection
International humanitarian law – International Committee of the Red Cross website
International humanitarian law database – Treaties and States Parties
Customary IHL Database
War zone safety travel guide from Wikivoyage |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Outpost (military) | Recent military use: Military outposts, most recently referred to as combat outposts (COPs), served as a cornerstone of counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan. These permanent or semi-permanent structures, often located in or near populated areas, enabled military forces to secure key lines of communication or infrastructure, secure and co-opt the populace, assist the government in restoring essential services, and force insurgents to operate elsewhere. Combat outposts were almost unanimously described in positive terms by defense analysts and military officers as a means through which to carry out its counterinsurgency efforts.
See also: Blockhouse
Border outpost
Forward operating base
Human outpost
Military base
Observation post
Satellite airfield
Screening (tactic)
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Overmatch | Definition: According to the US Army, the definition of overmatch is "the concept where my (insert lethality system here) can willfully and without prejudice or luck defeat your (insert your protective system here)."
According to Raytheon, overmatch is a verb which means "to defeat threats at every level – strategic, tactical and technological."
According to Ben Barry, "overmatch is a very polite, clinical way of saying could be defeated.”
Example — AI versus human pilots: AI agents are not subject to the physiological constraints of a human pilot, such as the danger of flying at low altitude, or the g-forces of the aircraft accelerations. Human pilots noted that the AI agents flew with fine motor control. In the 2020 AlphaDogfight Trials (see image to the right), the AI agents battled for the chance to dogfight an expert human pilot. The winning AI agent consistently defeated an expert human pilot. The technology will be installed in actual aircraft by 2024.
Note: DoD's Joint AI Center (JAIC) has convened 100 online participants from 13 countries to discuss how to use AI in a way that is consonant with their national ethical principles, termed the 'AI Partnership for Defense' in 2020.
One possible application is to elevate the role of human pilots to mission commanders, leaving AIs as wingmen to perform as high-skill operators of low-cost robotic craft.
History: From 2017, after the Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, and the dismissal of the need for counter-insurgency for a second time, the US Army emphasized overmatch in their modernization effort.
In 2017 a task force was formed to modernize the Army. Its recommendation was to form the Army Futures Command, to engage in systematic development of capabilities to overmatch its adversaries.
In 2021 the 40th Chief of Staff of the Army identified"Overmatch will belong to the side that can make decisions faster. To meet emerging challenges, the Army is transforming to provide the joint force with speed, range, and convergence of cutting edge technologies that will generate the decision dominance and overmatch required to win the next fight.”
Analysis: Overmatch has been criticized as unsustainable in the long term and requiring immense investments in the military and cutting-edge technologies.
See also: Air supremacy
Cauldron
Full-spectrum dominance
OODA loop
Overkill
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Overwatch (military tactic) | See also: List of established military terms
Combined arms
Bounding overwatch
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Pakfront | German tactic: During the large Soviet armoured attacks on the Eastern front in late 1941–1942, the Germans quickly realised that their anti-tank guns, operating individually or in small groups, and with no central commander, were quickly overwhelmed.
The pakfront was developed to counter this. A group of up to ten guns were placed under the command of one officer. He was responsible for designating targets and directing the fire of his guns. This allowed the Germans to spring particularly effective anti-tank ambushes, with all guns being assigned separate targets and then firing at once, maximizing surprise and minimizing the chance for return fire.
Soviet tactic: The tactic was found to be extremely effective, and soon the Soviets had copied it, often using multiple pakfronts in concert with minefields, anti-tank ditches, and other obstacles to channel the enemy armour into their fields of fire. The size and efficiency of such defenses was directly proportional to the amount of time granted to prepare them, with one report commenting it was not uncommon for the Red Army to lay 30,000 mines in a sector within two or three days. Since the 1930s, Soviet doctrine had been to employ large numbers of anti-tank guns in areas, but the German tactic enabled them to better exploit their numbers as well as Russian expertise in camouflage. A German tank commander commented that minefields and pakfronts could not be detected until the trap was sprung. Mines protecting pakfronts were particularly effective due to the Germans' lack of specialized mine clearing vehicles.
The Soviets also developed an extension of the ambush tactic in which all the guns would target one particularly valuable or heavily armored target and fire on command, the combined impacts essentially guaranteeing an instant kill. This technique was especially effective against German command tanks because it generally caused a catastrophic kill ("K-kill") that minimized any chance for the command team to escape, and heavy tanks like the Tiger I that might have otherwise needed dozens of separate hits to disable. To counter the effectiveness of the Soviet pakfront, the Germans developed the panzerkeil ("armoured wedge"), but this offensive tactic had limited effectiveness.
The Soviet method of employing pakfronts included establishing "anti-tank zones" (Russian: противотанковые районы protivotankovyje rajony) in staggered patterns with multiple pak-groups' ("anti-tank base-of-fire points", Russian: противотанковые опорные пункты protivotankovyje opornyje punkty) firing sectors intertwined, to amplify the effect of the tactic.
By 1943, Soviet doctrine was to protect any new gains with pakfronts to defeat the inevitable German counterattack as the Germans attempted to regain lost territory and initiative.
At the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, Soviet pakfronts slowed the German attack in the south and completely halted the northern German force. The panzerkeil was shown to be an inadequate countermeasure. The long preparation period afforded to the Red Army allowed for the salient to achieve unprecedented size and sophistication.
References:
External links: Soviet defensive positions, organised as anti-tank zones and strongpoints during the Battle of Kursk, 5 July 1943 |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Parthian shot | History: In addition to the Parthians and their successors, the Sasanians, this tactic was used by most nomads of the Eurasian Steppe, including the Scythians, Xiongnu, Huns, Turks, Magyars, Koreans, Mongols, as well as the Urartians and the Comanche.
The Parthians used the tactic to great effect in their victory over the Roman general Crassus in the Battle of Carrhae.
A tactic similar to the Parthian shot was attributed to the Phoenicians from Sidon by Silius Italicus.
The tactic was also used by Muslim conqueror Muhammad of Ghor in the Second Battle of Tarain in 1192 against Indian elephants, heavy cavalry and heavy infantry, by Alp Arslan in the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 against the Byzantines, and by Subutai in the Battle of Legnica in 1241 against Polish knights.
As metaphor: The term "Parthian shot" is also used as a metaphor to describe a barbed insult, delivered as the speaker departs.
With which Parthian shot he walked away, leaving the two rivals open-mouthed behind him.
His Parthian shot reached them as they closed the doors. 'Never mind darlings', they heard him say, 'we can all sleep soundly now Turner's here.'
You wound, like Parthians, while you fly,And kill with a retreating eye.
That last Parthian shot went home.
Leaving this Parthian shaft to rankle in Anne’s stormy bosom, Marilla descended to the kitchen, grievously troubled in mind and vexed in soul.
Gallery:
See also: Feint
Pyrrhic victory
Caracole, a similar cavalry maneuver
Cantabrian circle
L'esprit de l'escalier, also called staircase wit
References:
Further reading: Overtoom, Nikolaus (2020). Reign of Arrows: The Rise of the Parthian Empire in the Hellenistic Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780197680223.
Colburn, Henry P. (2021). "A Parthian Shot of Potential Arsacid Date" (PDF). Dabir. 8 (8). University of California, Irvine: Samuel Jordan Center for Persian Studies and Culture: 35–40. doi:10.1163/29497833-00801004. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Patrolling | Patrol types: A combat patrol is a group with sufficient size (usually platoon or company) and resources to raid or ambush a specific enemy. It primarily differs from an attack in that the aim is not to hold ground.
A clearing patrol is a brief patrol around a newly occupied defensive position in order to ensure that the immediate area is secure. Clearing patrols are often undertaken on the occupation of a location, and during stand to in the transition from night to day routine and vice versa.
A standing patrol is a static patrol, probably known as an OP/LP(Observation Post/Listening post) in US and NATO terminology. Standing patrols are usually small (half section/section) static patrols intended to provide early warning, security or to guard some geographical feature, such as dead ground.
A reconnaissance (recce) patrol is a patrol, usually small whose main mission is the gathering of information. Generally speaking recce patrols tend to avoid contact, although it is not unknown for recon patrols to "fight for information".
A screening patrol combines a number of patrols to 'screen' a large area. This type of patrol is used by armored formations in desert theaters, and also by ground troops operating in urban areas. A screen is generally composed of a number of static observation posts.
See also: List of military tactics
Observation post
Maritime patrol
References:
External links:
Patrolling magazine, 75th Ranger Regiment Association |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peace through strength | History: The phrase and the concept date to ancient times. Roman Emperor Hadrian (AD 76–138) is said to have sought "peace through strength or, failing that, peace through threat." Hadrian's Wall was a symbol of the policy.
United States: The first US president, George Washington, enunciated a policy of peace through strength in his fifth annual message to Congress, the 1793 State of the Union Address. He said:
There is a rank due to the United States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.
In Federalist No. 24, Alexander Hamilton argued for peace through strength by stating that strong garrisons in the west and a navy in the east would protect the Union from the threat of Britain and Spain.
Peace Through Strength is the motto of the Eighth Air Force, established in 1944.
Peace Through Strength (1952) is the title of a book about a defense plan by Bernard Baruch, a World War II adviser to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, published by Farrar, Straus and Young. For supporters of the MX missile in the 1970s, the missile symbolized "peace through strength."
Republican Party: During Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential campaign in the United States, the Republican Party spent about $5 million on TV ads promoting Goldwater's foreign policy position of "Peace through Strength." In 1980, Ronald Reagan, who had campaigned for Goldwater in 1964, used the phrase during his election challenge against Jimmy Carter by accusing the incumbent of weak, vacillating leadership that invited enemies to attack the United States and its allies. Reagan later considered it one of the mainstays of his foreign policy as president. In 1986, he explained it thus:
We know that peace is the condition under which mankind was meant to flourish. Yet peace does not exist of its own will. It depends on us, on our courage to build it and guard it and pass it on to future generations. George Washington's words may seem hard and cold today, but history has proven him right again and again. "To be prepared for war," he said, "is one of the most effective means of preserving peace." Well, to those who think strength provokes conflict, Will Rogers had his own answer. He said of the world heavyweight champion of his day: "I've never seen anyone insult Jack Dempsey."
The approach has been credited for forcing the Soviet Union to lose the arms race and end the Cold War. "Peace Through Strength" is the official motto of the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76).
"Peace Through Strength" has appeared in every party platform of the Republican Party since 1980.
On assuming office in January 2017, Donald Trump cited the idea of "Peace Through Strength" as central to his overall "America First" foreign policy. As such the introduction to US National Defense Strategy of 2018 states: The US force posture combined with the allies will "preserve peace through strength." The document proceeds to detail what "achieving peace through strength requires."
Criticism: For Andrew Bacevich, "belief in the efficacy of military power almost inevitably breeds the temptation to put that power to work. 'Peace through strength' easily enough becomes 'peace through war.'"
Jim George of Australian National University used the term to describe part of what he argued was the Straussian and neoconservative foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration.
The mock inversion "strength through peace" has been used on occasion to draw criticism to the militaristic system of diplomacy advocated by "peace through strength". Ohio Representative Dennis Kucinich adopted the slogan "Strength Through Peace" during his 2008 presidential run as part of his platform as a peace candidate against the Iraq War.
Trademark dispute: During Reagan's presidency, the non-profit American Security Council Foundation (ASCF) and its for-profit direct-mail provider, Communications Corporation of America, sought to influence United States foreign policy by promoting the idea, but after the Soviet collapse of 1991, ASCF fell into obscurity, and other organizations continued to promote the slogan. The Heritage Foundation and the Center for Security Policy (CSP) have also used the term in print. The ASCF registered a trademark for the phrase in April 2011. In September 2012, ASCF filed a trademark infringement lawsuit against CSP and Frank Gaffney, prompting the Washington City Paper to ridicule ASCF's Director of Operations, Gary James, for editing the online encyclopedia Wikipedia article titled 'Peace through strength' so that it was "drenched in ... ASCF references". Following a counterclaim by the CSP alleging that the trademark application had been fraudulent, in August 2013 the ACSF announced that it had settled the lawsuit with the CSP and would cancel its trademark claim.
See also: Big Stick ideology
Collective security
Demoralization (warfare)
Doublethink in the 1949 novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, which features the phrase "war is peace"
Gunboat diplomacy
Might makes right
Mutual assured destruction
Pax Americana
Reagan Doctrine
Si vis pacem, para bellum
Right of conquest
World peace
Security dilemma
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peacebuilding | Defining peacebuilding: The definition of peacebuilding varies depending on the actor, with some definitions specifying what activities fall within the scope of peacebuilding or restricting peacebuilding to post-conflict interventions. Even if peacebuilding has remained a largely amorphous concept without clear guidelines or goals, common to all definitions is the agreement that improving human security is the central task of peacebuilding. In this sense, peacebuilding includes a wide range of efforts by diverse actors in government and civil society at the community, national, and international levels to address the root causes of violence and ensure civilians have freedom from fear (negative peace), freedom from want (positive peace) and freedom from humiliation before, during, and after violent conflict.
Although many of peacebuilding's aims overlap with those of peacemaking, peacekeeping and conflict resolution, it is a distinct idea. Peacemaking involves stopping an ongoing conflict, whereas peacebuilding happens before a conflict starts or once it ends. Peacekeeping prevents the resumption of fighting following a conflict; it does not address the underlying causes of violence or work to create societal change, as peacebuilding does. Peacekeeping also differs from peacebuilding in that it only occurs after conflict ends, not before it begins. Conflict resolution does not include some components of peacebuilding, such as state building and socioeconomic development.
While some use the term to refer to only post-conflict or post-war contexts, most use the term more broadly to refer to any stage of conflict. Before conflict becomes violent, preventive peacebuilding efforts, such as diplomatic, economic development, social, educational, health, legal and security sector reform programs, address potential sources of instability and violence. This is also termed conflict prevention. Peacebuilding efforts aim to manage, mitigate, resolve and transform central aspects of the conflict through official diplomacy; as well as through civil society peace processes and informal dialogue, negotiation, and mediation. Peacebuilding addresses economic, social and political root causes of violence and fosters reconciliation to prevent the return of structural and direct violence. Peacebuilding efforts aim to change beliefs, attitudes and behaviors to transform the short and long term dynamics between individuals and groups toward a more stable, peaceful coexistence. Peacebuilding is an approach to an entire set of interrelated efforts that support peace.
Peace-building is a term of more recent origin that, as used in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000), defines "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. "
In 2007, the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee defined peacebuilding as follows: "Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and sustainable development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives."
Peacebuilding can apply knowledge and theories from peace and conflict studies.
History of peacebuilding: As World War II ended in the mid-1940s, international initiatives such as the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions and The Marshall Plan consisted of long-term postconflict intervention programs in Europe with which the United States and its allies aimed to rebuild the continent following the destruction of World War II. The focus of these initiatives revolved around a narrative of peacekeeping and peacemaking.
Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung coined the term "peacebuilding" in 1975, arguing that "peace has a structure different from, perhaps over and above, peacekeeping and ad hoc peacemaking... The mechanisms that peace is based on should be built into the structure and be present as a reservoir for the system itself to draw up. ... More specifically, structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur." Galtung's work emphasized a bottom-up approach that decentralized social and economic structures, amounting to a call for a societal shift from structures of coercion and violence to a culture of peace.
Then, as the Cold War and the various phenomena of its fizzling came to a close (e.g. civil wars between Third World countries, Reagonomics, "Bringing the State Back In"), American sociologist John Paul Lederach further refined the concept of peacebuilding through several 1990s publications that focus on engaging grassroots, local, NGO, international and other actors to create a sustainable peace process, especially with respect to cases of intractable deadly conflict where he was actively mediating between warring parties. From a political-institutional perspective, he does not advocate the same degree of structural change as Galtung. However, Lederach's influence in the conceptual evolution of peacebuilding still reflects Galtung's original vision for "positive peace" by detailing, categorizing, & expanding upon the sociocultural processes through which we address both direct and structural elements of violent conflict.
Peacebuilding has since expanded to include many different dimensions, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and rebuilding governmental, economic and civil society institutions. The concept was popularized in the international community through UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report An Agenda for Peace. The report defined post-conflict peacebuilding as an "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict". At the 2005 World Summit, the United Nations began creating a peacebuilding architecture based on Kofi Annan's proposals. The proposal called for three organizations: the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which was founded in 2005; the UN Peacebuilding Fund, founded in 2006; and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, which was created in 2005. These three organizations enable the Secretary-General to coordinate the UN's peacebuilding efforts. National governments' interest in the topic has also increased due to fears that failed states serve as breeding grounds for conflict and extremism and thus threaten international security. Some states have begun to view peacebuilding as a way to demonstrate their relevance. However, peacebuilding activities continue to account for small percentages of states' budgets.
Categorizing approaches to peacebuilding: In a very broad sense, there are three primary approaches to peacebuilding, which each correspond to three primary types of peace: (1) negative peace vs. (2) positive peace (Galtung) vs. (3) justpeace (Lederach, sometimes spelled "just peace"). In turn, these three types of peace correspond respectively to three primary types of violence: (1) direct violence vs. (2) structural violence vs. (3) cultural violence.
Negative peace: direct violence: Negative peace refers to the absence of direct, or "hot" violence, which refers to acts that impose immediate harm on a given subject or group. In this sense, negative peacebuilding (aimed at negative peace) intentionally focuses on addressing the direct factors driving harmful conflict. When applying the term "peacebuilding" to this work, there is an explicit attempt by those designing and planning a peacebuilding effort to reduce direct violence.
Positive peace: structural violence: Positive peace refers to the absence of both direct violence as well as structural violence. Structural violence refers to the ways that systems & institutions in society cause, reinforce, or perpetuate direct violence. In this sense, positive peacebuilding (aimed at positive peace) intentionally focuses on address the indirect factors driving or mitigating harmful conflict, with an emphasis on engaging institutions, policies, and political-economic conditions as they relate to exploitation and repression.
Justpeace: cultural violence: Justpeace (or "just peace") refers to the absence of all three types of violence enumerated above: direct, structural, & cultural. Cultural violence refers to aspects of culture that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence—the ways in which direct or structural violence look or feel "right" according to the moral fabric of society. In this sense, just peacebuilding (aimed at justpeace) intentionally combines the methods of "positive peacebuilding" (as described above) with a special focus on building and transforming sustainable relationships among conflicting sectors & cultures in such a way that promotes more alignment between each culture's mores (standards of "right" behavior or conditions) and the extent to which those mores are built/equipped to prevent, resolve, and heal patterns of direct and structural violence.
When Lederach first proposed the term in the late 1990s, he wrote:
Inspired by colleagues from the Justapaz Centre in Bogota, Colombia, I propose that by the year 2050 the word justpeace be accepted in everyday common language and appear as an entry in the Webster's Dictionary. It will read:Justpeace \ jest pés \ n, vi, (justpeace-building) 1: an adaptive process-structure of human relationships characterized by high justice and low violence 2: an infrastructure of organization or governance that responds to human conflict through nonviolent means as first and last resorts 3: a view of systems as responsive to the permanency and interdependence of relationships and change.
Institutionalising peacebuilding: Following periods of protracted violence, peacebuilding often takes shape in the form of constitutional agreements, laying out a path for co-operation and tolerance between former warring factions. A common method that has been applied in a variety of states is consociationalism. Initially set forth by political scientist Arend Lijphart, consociationalism calls for a power-sharing form of democracy. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peacebuilding | It will read:Justpeace \ jest pés \ n, vi, (justpeace-building) 1: an adaptive process-structure of human relationships characterized by high justice and low violence 2: an infrastructure of organization or governance that responds to human conflict through nonviolent means as first and last resorts 3: a view of systems as responsive to the permanency and interdependence of relationships and change.
Institutionalising peacebuilding: Following periods of protracted violence, peacebuilding often takes shape in the form of constitutional agreements, laying out a path for co-operation and tolerance between former warring factions. A common method that has been applied in a variety of states is consociationalism. Initially set forth by political scientist Arend Lijphart, consociationalism calls for a power-sharing form of democracy. Identified by four aspects: grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy; it aims to generate peace across societies that have been torn apart by their internal divisions. Ultimately, consociationalism aims to create a stable society that is able to outlast and overcome differences that may remerge. Examples of consociational agreements can be seen in Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Lebanon.
In an effort to de-emphasise the importance of ethnicity, critics of consociationalism such as Brian Barry, Donald L. Horowitz, and to a certain extent, Roland Paris, have developed their own brands of constitutional peacebuilding that rely on the existence of a moderate society.
Centripetalism as advocated by Horowitz, encourages political parties of divided societies to adopt a moderate campaign platform. Through the alternative vote and a distributive requirement, centripetalism aims to create a society that votes across ethnic or religious lines, allowing civic issues to take precedence.
Components of peacebuilding: The activities included in peacebuilding vary depending on the situation and the agent of peacebuilding. Successful peacebuilding activities create an environment supportive of self-sustaining, durable peace; reconcile opponents; prevent conflict from restarting; integrate civil society; create rule of law mechanisms; and address underlying structural and societal issues. To accomplish these goals, peacebuilding must address functional structures, emotional conditions and social psychology, social stability, rule of law and ethics, and cultural sensitivities.
Preconflict peacebuilding interventions aim to prevent the start of violent conflict. These strategies involve a variety of actors and sectors in order to transform the conflict. Even though the definition of peacebuilding includes preconflict interventions, in practice most peacebuilding interventions are postconflict. However, many peacebuilding scholars advocate an increased focus on preconflict peacebuilding in the future.
There are many different approaches to categorization of forms of peacebuilding among the peacebuilding field's many scholars.
Barnett et al. divide postconflict peacebuilding into three dimensions: stabilizing the post-conflict zone, restoring state institutions, and dealing with social and economic issues. Activities within the first dimension reinforce state stability post-conflict and discourage former combatants from returning to war (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, or DDR). Second dimension activities build state capacity to provide basic public goods and increase state legitimacy. Programs in the third dimension build a post-conflict society's ability to manage conflicts peacefully and promote socioeconomic development.
A mixture of locally and internationally focused components is key to building a long-term sustainable peace. Mac Ginty says that while different "indigenous" communities utilize different conflict resolution techniques, most of them share the common characteristics described in the table below. Since indigenous peacebuilding practices arise from local communities, they are tailored to local context and culture in a way that generalized international peacebuilding approaches are not.
The theorist I. William Zartman introduces the concept of a "ripe moment" for the commencement of peace negotiations in a conflict. Zartman's thesis outlines the necessary (but not sufficient) conditions that must be fulfilled before actors in a conflict will be willing to faithfully engage in peace negotiations. Institutions or countries looking to build peace must therefore "seize" upon these moments to begin the process of peace negotiations.
A mutually hurting stalemate (MHS):
All sides in a conflict must be engaged in a stalemate, such that none of the actors can successfully escalate the conflict to achieve victory.
The stalemate must also be "mutually hurting", such that the continuation of the conflict is n according to each sides' cost-benefit analyses.
A way out:
Peacebuilding and peace negotiating actors can provide the necessary security that enables peace negotiation to occur.
Approached in game-theoretical terms, Zartman argues that the presence of an MHS and a means of escaping the stalemate transform conflicts from a prisoner's dilemma to a chicken game.
Without these features, Zartman argues that belligerents will lack the necessary motivations to pursue peace. Therefore, the sides in a conflict will either not engage in peace negotiation, or any peace will be short-lived.
Peacebuilding and cultural heritage: In today's world, peacebuilding also means maintaining and protecting the economic and cultural foundations of a community and the population. The protection of culture and cultural assets is therefore becoming increasingly important nationally and internationally. United Nations, UNESCO and Blue Shield International deal with the protection of cultural heritage and therefore with peacebuilding. This also applies to the integration of United Nations peacekeeping.
In international law, the UN and UNESCO try to establish and enforce rules. It is not a question of protecting a person's property, but of preserving the cultural heritage of humanity, especially in the event of war and armed conflict. According to Karl von Habsburg, founding president of Blue Shield International, the destruction of cultural assets is also part of psychological warfare. The target is the opponent's identity, which is why symbolic cultural assets become a main target. It is also intended to address the particularly sensitive cultural memory, the growing cultural diversity and the economic basis (such as tourism) of a state, a region or a municipality.
Major organizations:
International organizations: The United Nations participates in many aspects of peacebuilding, both through the peacebuilding architecture established in 2005–2006 and through other agencies.
Peacebuilding architecture
UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC): intergovernmental advisory body that brings together key actors, gathers resources, advises on strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and highlights issues that might undermine peace.
UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF): supports peacebuilding activities that directly promote post-conflict stabilization and strengthen state and institutional capacity. PBF funding is either given for a maximum of two years immediately following conflict to jumpstart peacebuilding and recovery needs or given for up to three years to create a more structured peacebuilding process.
UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO): supports the Peacebuilding Commission with strategic advice and policy guidance, administers the Peacebuilding Fund and helps the Secretary-General coordinate UN agencies' peacebuilding efforts.
Other agencies
UN Department of Political Affairs: postconflict peacebuilding
UN Development Programme: conflict prevention, peacebuilding, postconflict recovery
UNESCO: through democracy, the promotion of human rights and global citizenship
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund focus on the economic and financial aspects of peacebuilding. The World Bank assists in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery by helping rebuild society's socioeconomic framework. The International Monetary Fund deals with post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding by acting to restore assets and production levels.
The EU's European Commission describes its peacebuilding activities as conflict prevention and management, and rehabilitation and reconstruction. Conflict prevention and management entails stopping the imminent outbreak of violence and encouraging a broad peace process. Rehabilitation and reconstruction deals with rebuilding the local economy and institutional capacity. The European Commission Conflict Prevention and Peace building 2001–2010 was subjected to a major external evaluation conducted by Aide a la Decisions Economique (ADE) with the European Centre for Development Policy Management which was presented in 2011. The European External Action Service created in 2010 also has a specific Division of Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation.
Governmental organizations:
France: French Ministry of Defence: operations include peacekeeping, political and constitutional processes, democratization, administrative state capacity, technical assistance for public finance and tax policy, and support for independent media
French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs: supports peace consolidation, including monitoring compliance with arms embargoes, deployment of peacekeeping troops, DDR, and deployment of police and gendarmerie in support of the rule of law
French Development Agency: focuses on crisis prevention through humanitarian action and development
Germany: German Federal Foreign Office: assists with conflict resolution and postconflict peacebuilding, including the establishment of stable state structures (rule of law, democracy, human rights, and security) and the creation of the potential for peace within civil society, the media, cultural affairs and education
German Federal Ministry of Defence: deals with the destruction of a country's infrastructure resulting from intrastate conflict, security forces reform, demobilization of combatants, rebuilding the justice system and government structures and preparations for elections
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development: addresses economic, social, ecological, and political conditions to help eliminate the structural causes of conflict and promote peaceful conflict management; issues addressed include poverty reduction, pro-poor sustainable economic growth, good governance and democracy
Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA): supports peacebuilding. In response to Minister Taro Aso's statement in his speech in 2007, the Ministry is conducting the project (平和構築人材育成事業) to train civilian specialists from Japan and other countries who can work in the field of peacebuilding. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peacebuilding | In response to Minister Taro Aso's statement in his speech in 2007, the Ministry is conducting the project (平和構築人材育成事業) to train civilian specialists from Japan and other countries who can work in the field of peacebuilding.
Switzerland: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA): following the bill passed by the Swiss Federal Parliament in 2004 which outlined various measures for civil peacebuilding and human rights strengthening, the Human Security Division (HSD) of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) has been responsible for implementing measures which serve to promote human security around the world. It is the competence centre for peace, human rights and humanitarian policy, and for Switzerland's migration foreign policy. To this end, the FDFA gets a line of credit to be renewed and approved by Parliament every four years (it was CHF 310 million for the 2012–2016 period.) Its main peacebuilding programmes focus on 1. the African Great Lakes region (Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo), 2. Sudan, South Sudan and the Horn of Africa, 3. West Africa and Sahel, 4. Middle East, 5. Nepal, 6. South Eastern Europe and 7. Colombia.
United Kingdom: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office: performs a range of reconstruction activities required in the immediate aftermath of conflict
UK Ministry of Defence: deals with long-term activities addressing the underlying causes of conflict and the needs of the people
UK Department for International Development: works on conflict prevention (short-term activities to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict) and peacebuilding (medium- and long-term actions to address the factors underlying violent conflict), including DDR programs; building the public institutions that provide security, transitional justice and reconciliation; and providing basic social services
United States: United States Department of State: aids postconflict states in establishing the basis for a lasting peace, good governance and sustainable development
United States Department of Defense: assists with reconstruction, including humanitarian assistance, public health, infrastructure, economic development, rule of law, civil administration and media; and stabilization, including security forces, communication skills, humanitarian capabilities and area expertise
United States Agency for International Development: performs immediate interventions to build momentum in support of the peace process including supporting peace negotiations; building citizen security; promoting reconciliation; and expanding democratic political processes
United States Institute of Peace:
Nongovernmental organizations: Catholic Relief Services: Baltimore-based Catholic humanitarian agency that provides emergency relief post-disaster or post-conflict and encourages long-term development through peacebuilding and other activities
Conscience: Taxes for Peace not War: Organisation in London that promotes peacebuilding as an alternative to military security via a Peace Tax Bill and reform of the £1 billion UK Conflict, Stability and Security Fund.
Conciliation Resources: London-based independent organisation working with people in conflict to prevent violence and build peace.
Crisis Management Initiative: Helsinki-based organization that works to resolve conflict and build sustainable peace by bringing international peacebuilding experts and local leaders together
Generations For Peace: An Amman-based global non-profit peace-building organization dedicated to sustainable conflict transformation at the grassroots with a focus on youth.
IIDA Women's Development Organisation is a Somali non-profit, politically independent, non-governmental organisation, created by women in order to work for peacebuilding and women's rights defence in Somalia.
Initiatives of Change: global organization dedicated to "building trust across the world's divides" (of culture, nationality, belief, and background), involved in peacebuilding and peace consolidation since 1946 and currently in the Great Lakes area of Africa, Sierra Leone and other areas of conflict.
Institute for Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding (ICP): Swiss based NGO specialised in peacebuilding, non-violent conflict transformation, mediation and training delivery.
International Alert: London-based charity that works with people affected by violent conflict to improve their prospects for peace and helps shape and strength peacebuilding policies and practices
International Crisis Group: Brussels-based nonprofit that gives advice to governments and intergovernmental organizations on the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict
Interpeace: Geneva-based nonprofit and strategic partner of the United Nations that works to build lasting peace by following five core principles that put people at the center of the peacebuilding process
Jewish-Palestinian Living Room Dialogue Group: Since 1992 models and supports relationships among adversaries, while creating how-to documentary films. From 2003 to 2007, with Camp Tawonga brought hundreds of adults and youth from 50 towns in Palestine and Israel to successfully live and communicate together at the Palestinian-Jewish Family Peacemakers Camp—Oseh Shalom – Sanea al-Salam
Karuna Center for Peacebuilding: U.S.-based international nonprofit organization that leads training and programs in post-conflict peacebuilding for government, development institutions, civil society organizations, and local communities
Nonviolent Peaceforce: Brussels-based nonprofit that promotes and implements unarmed civilian peacekeeping as a tool for reducing violence and protecting civilians in situations of violent conflict
Peace Direct: London-based charity that provides financial and administrative assistance to grassroots peacebuilding efforts and increases international awareness of both specific projects and grassroots peacebuilding in general;
Saferworld: UK-based independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives;
Search for Common Ground: international organization founded in 1982 and working in 35 countries that uses evidence-based approaches to transform the way communities deal with conflict towards cooperative solutions
Seeds of Peace: New York City-based nonprofit that works to empower youth from areas of conflict by inviting them to an international camp in Maine for leadership training and relationship building
Tuesday's Children: New York-based organization that brings together teens, ages 15–20, from the New York City area and around the world who share a "common bond"—the loss of a family member due to an act of terrorism. Launched in 2008, Project COMMON BOND has so far helped 308 teenagers from 15 countries and territories turn their experiences losing a loved one to terrorism into positive actions that can help others exposed to similar tragedy. Participants share the vision of the program to "Let Our Past Change the Future."
UNOY Peacebuilders (United Network of Young Peacebuilders): The Hague-based network of young leaders and youth organizations that facilitates affiliated organizations' peacebuilding efforts through networking, sharing information, research and fundraising
Research and academic institutes: Center for Justice and Peacebuilding: academic program at Eastern Mennonite University; promotes peacebuilding, creation care, experiential learning, and cross-cultural engagement; teachings are based on Mennonite Christianity
Center for Peacebuilding and Development: academic center at American University's School of International Service; promotes cross-cultural development of research and practices in peace education, civic engagement, nonviolent resistance, conflict resolution, religion and peace, and peacebuilding
Irish Peace Institute: promotes peace and reconciliation in Ireland and works to apply lessons from Ireland's conflict resolution to other conflicts
Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies: degree-granting institute at the University of Notre Dame; promotes research, education and outreach on the causes of violent conflict and the conditions for sustainable peace
United States Institute of Peace: non-partisan federal institution that works to prevent or end violent conflict around the world by sponsoring research and using it to inform actions
University for Peace: international institution of higher education located in Costa Rica; aims to promote peace by engaging in teaching, research, training and dissemination of knowledge necessary for building peace
swisspeace: a practice-oriented peace research institute that is associated with the University of Basel, Switzerland; analyzes the causes of violent conflicts and develops strategies for their peaceful transformation.
CDA Collaborative Learning Projects: an action research and advisory organization dedicated to improving the effectiveness and accountability of peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian efforts wherever communities experience conflict.
Role of women: Women have traditionally played a limited role in peacebuilding processes even though they often bear the responsibility for providing for their families' basic needs in the aftermath of violent conflict. They are especially likely to be unrepresented or underrepresented in negotiations, political decision-making, upper-level policymaking and senior judicial positions. Many societies' patriarchal cultures prevent them from recognizing the role women can play in peacebuilding. However, many peacebuilding academics and the United Nations have recognized that women play a vital role in securing the three pillars of sustainable peace: economic recovery and reconciliation, social cohesion and development and political legitimacy, security and governance.
In October 2000, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325) on women, peace, and security was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council, after recalling resolutions 1261 (1999), 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), and 1314 (2000). The resolution acknowledged the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women and girls. It calls for the adoption of a gender perspective to consider the special needs of women and girls during conflict, repatriation and resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration, and post-conflict reconstruction.
In 2010, at the request of the Security Council, the Secretary-General issued an updated report on women's participation in peacebuilding. The report outlines the challenges women continue to face in participating in recovery and peacebuilding process and the negative impact this exclusion has on them and societies more broadly. To respond to these challenges, it advocates a comprehensive 7-point action plan covering the seven commitment areas: mediation; post-conflict planning; financing; civilian capacity; post-conflict governance; rule of law; and economic recovery. The action plan aims to facilitate progress on the women, peace and security agenda. The monitoring and implementation of this action plan is now being led jointly by the Peacebuilding Support Office and UN Women. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peacebuilding | It calls for the adoption of a gender perspective to consider the special needs of women and girls during conflict, repatriation and resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration, and post-conflict reconstruction.
In 2010, at the request of the Security Council, the Secretary-General issued an updated report on women's participation in peacebuilding. The report outlines the challenges women continue to face in participating in recovery and peacebuilding process and the negative impact this exclusion has on them and societies more broadly. To respond to these challenges, it advocates a comprehensive 7-point action plan covering the seven commitment areas: mediation; post-conflict planning; financing; civilian capacity; post-conflict governance; rule of law; and economic recovery. The action plan aims to facilitate progress on the women, peace and security agenda. The monitoring and implementation of this action plan is now being led jointly by the Peacebuilding Support Office and UN Women. In April 2011, the two organizations convened a workshop to ensure that women are included in future post-disaster and post-conflict planning documents. In the same year, the PBF selected seven gender-sensitive peacebuilding projects to receive $5 million in funding.
Porter discusses the growing role of female leadership in countries prone to war and its impact on peacebuilding. When the book was written, seven countries prone to violent conflict had female heads of state. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia and Michelle Bachelet of Chile were the first female heads of state from their respective countries and President Johnson-Sirleaf was the first female head of state in Africa. Both women utilized their gender to harness "the power of maternal symbolism - the hope that a woman could best close wounds left on their societies by war and dictatorship."
Examples in early 21st century: The UN Peacebuilding Commission works in Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone and the UN Peacebuilding Fund funds projects in Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guatemala, Haiti, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Nepal, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Uganda. Other UN organizations are working in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Lebanon, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq.
The World Bank's International Development Association maintains the Trust Fund for East Timor in Timor-Leste. The TFET has assisted reconstruction, community empowerment and local governance in the country.
After it had carried out the War in Afghanistan and the War in Iraq, the United States followed its attacks on the two countries by investing $104 billion in reconstruction and relief efforts. The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund alone received $21 billion during FY2003 and FY2004. The money came from the United States Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development and the United States Department of Defense and included funding for security, health, education, social welfare, governance, economic growth and humanitarian issues.
Civil society organisations contribute to peacebuilding, as is the case in Kenya, according to the magazine D+C Development and Cooperation. After the election riots in Kenya in 2008, civil society organisations started programmes to avoid similar disasters in the future, such as the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) and peace meetings organised by the church. They supported the National Cohesion and Integration Commission.
Results: In 2010, the UNPBC conducted a review of its work with the first four countries on its agenda. An independent review by the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting also highlighted some of the PBC's early successes and challenges.
One comprehensive study finds that UN peacebuilding missions significantly increase the likelihood of democratization.
Criticisms: Jennifer Hazen contends there are two major debates relating to peacebuilding; the first centres on the role of the liberal democratic model in designing peacebuilding activities and measuring outcomes and the other one questions the role of third-party actors in peacebuliding.
Regarding the debate about the role of the liberal democratic model in peacebuilding, one side contends that liberal democracy is a viable end goal for peacebuilding activities in itself but that the activities implemented to achieve it need to be revised; a rushed transition to democratic elections and market economy can undermine stability and elections held or economic legislation enacted are an inappropriate yardstick for success. Institutional change is necessary and transitions need to be incremental.
Another side contends that liberal democracy might be an insufficient or even inappropriate goal for peacebuilding efforts and that the focus must be on a social transformation to develop non-violent mechanisms of conflict resolution regardless of their form.
With regards to the role of third-party actors, David Chandler contends that external support creates dependency and undermines local and domestic politics, thus undermining autonomy and the capacity for self-governance and leaving governments weak and dependent on foreign assistance once the third-party actors depart. Since the logic of peacebuilding relies on building and strengthening institutions to alter societal beliefs and behaviour, success relies on the populations' endorsement of these institutions. Any third party attempt at institution building without genuine domestic support will result in hollow institutions - this can lead to a situation in which democratic institutions are established before domestic politics have developed in a liberal, democratic fashion, and an unstable polity.
Séverine Autesserre offers a different approach, which focuses on the role of everyday practices in peacebuilding. She argue that the foreign peace builders' everyday practices, habits, and narratives strongly influence peacebuilding effectiveness. Autesserre stresses that international peacebuilders do not fully understand the conflicts they are trying to resolve because they rarely include local leaders in decision making, do not speak the local languages, and do not stay posted long enough to oversee effective change. This leaves decision makers out of touch with the key players in the peacebuilding process.
Jeremy Weinstein challenges the assumption that weak and failing states cannot rebuild themselves. He contends that through the process of autonomous recovery, international peacekeeping missions can be unnecessary for recovery because they assume that conflicts cannot be resolved by the country internally. He describes autonomous recovery as a "process through which countries achieve a lasting peace, a systematic reduction in violence, and postwar political and economic development in the absence of international intervention". Through peace and institutions generated by allowing war to run its natural course, autonomous recovery can be viewed as a success. He claims that war leads to peace by allowing the naturally stronger belligerent gain power, rather than a brokered peace deal that leaves two sides still capable of fighting. Secondly he claims that war provides a competition among providers of public goods until one can control a monopoly. He says that war can create an incentive to create institutions at all levels in order to consolidate power and extract resources from the citizens while also giving some power to the citizens depending upon how much the institutions rely on them for tax revenues.
Virginia Fortna of Columbia University, however, holds that peacekeeping interventions actually do substantively matter following the end of a civil war. She claims that selection bias, where opponents point only to failed peacekeeping interventions and do not compare these missions to those situations where interventions do not occur, is partly to blame for criticisms. Fortna says that peacekeeping missions rarely go into easily resolvable situations while they are sent into tougher, more risky post war situations where missions are more likely to fail, and peace agreements are unlikely to be committed to. When all factors of a certain peacekeeping case study are properly considered, Fortna shows that peacekeeping missions do in fact help increase the chances of sustained peace after a civil war.
The case of Timor-Leste can be seen as appeasement without addressing underlying conflict grievances.
Implementation: Michael N. Barnett et al. criticize peacebuilding organizations for undertaking supply-driven rather than demand-driven peacebuilding; they provide the peacebuilding services in which their organization specializes, not necessarily those that the recipient most needs. In addition, he argues that many of their actions are based on organizations precedent rather than empirical analysis of which interventions are and are not effective. More recently, Ben Hillman has criticized international donor efforts to strengthen local governments in the wake of conflict. He argues that international donors typically do not have the knowledge, skills or resources to bring meaningful change to the way post-conflict societies are governed.
Perpetuation of cultural hegemony: Many academics argue that peacebuilding is a manifestation of liberal internationalism and therefore imposes Western values and practices onto other cultures. Mac Ginty states that although peacebuilding does not project all aspects of Western culture on to the recipient states, it does transmit some of them, including concepts like neoliberalism that the West requires recipients of aid to follow more closely than most Western countries do. Barnett also comments that the promotion of liberalization and democratization may undermine the peacebuilding process if security and stable institutions are not pursued concurrently. Richmond has shown how 'liberal peacebuilding' represents a political encounter that may produce a post-liberal form of peace. Local and international actors, norms, institutions and interests engage with each other in various different contexts, according to their respective power relations and their different conceptions of legitimate authority structures. Knowles and Matisek adapt to the inherent problem of peacebuilding by arguing for a better vision of security force assistance (SFA) - donor states/actors trying to build effective host-nation security forces in a weak state - where they shift the focus from military effectiveness (a typical western hegemonic approach) to one that empowers local informal security actors to take ownership of their security and to be a part of the strategic vision of the state. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peacebuilding | Barnett also comments that the promotion of liberalization and democratization may undermine the peacebuilding process if security and stable institutions are not pursued concurrently. Richmond has shown how 'liberal peacebuilding' represents a political encounter that may produce a post-liberal form of peace. Local and international actors, norms, institutions and interests engage with each other in various different contexts, according to their respective power relations and their different conceptions of legitimate authority structures. Knowles and Matisek adapt to the inherent problem of peacebuilding by arguing for a better vision of security force assistance (SFA) - donor states/actors trying to build effective host-nation security forces in a weak state - where they shift the focus from military effectiveness (a typical western hegemonic approach) to one that empowers local informal security actors to take ownership of their security and to be a part of the strategic vision of the state. Such an approach attempts to bypass the inherent flaws of SFA imposing a Western security architecture on a state that does not have the institutions, resources, or civil-military relations to support this 'alien' form of security sector reform (SSR).
See also: Education for justice
Environmental peacebuilding
Religion and peacebuilding
Peace and conflict studies
Peacebuilding in Jammu and Kashmir
Nation-building
State-building
Structural-Peace with theatre and simulation
Notes:
References and further reading: Adhikari, Monalisa. "Peacebuilding with “Chinese characteristics”? Insights from China's engagement in Myanmar's peace process." International Studies Review 23.4 (2021): 1699-1726.
Andersson, Ruben; Weigand, Florian (2015). "Intervention at Risk: The Vicious Cycle of Distance and Danger in Mali and Afghanistan". Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding. 9 (4): 519–541. doi:10.1080/17502977.2015.1054655. S2CID 142711187.
Autesserre, Severine (2014). Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. UK: Cambridge University Press.
Barnett, Michael; Kim, Hunjoon; O'Donnell, Madalene; Sitea, Laura (2007). "Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?". Global Governance. 13: 35–58. doi:10.1163/19426720-01301004. S2CID 143099117.
Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. "International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis." American political science review 94.4 (2000): 779-801. online
Duffield, Mark R. (2010). "Risk-Management and the Fortified Aid Compound: Everyday Life in Post-Interventionary Society". Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding. 4 (4): 453–474. doi:10.1080/17502971003700993. S2CID 143968012.
Keating, Tom; Knight, W., eds. (2004). Building Sustainable Peace. Canada: United Nations University Press and The University of Alberta Press. ISBN 978-92-808-1101-8.
Kopelman, Shirli (February 2020). "Tit for tat and beyond: the legendary work of Anatol Rapoport". Negotiation and Conflict Management Research. 13 (1): 60–84. doi:10.1111/ncmr.12172. hdl:2027.42/153763.
Mac Ginty, Roger (2011). International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-27376-4.
Ndura-Ouédraogo and, Elavie; Amster, Randall, eds. (2009). Building Cultures of Peace: Transdisciplinary Voices of Hope and Action. Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. ISBN 9781443813297. OCLC 435734902.
"Peace, Peacebuilding, Peacemaking" (PDF). Berghof Glossary on Conflict Transformation. Berlin, Germany: Berghof Foundation. 2012. pp. 59–64. ISBN 978-3-941514-09-6. Retrieved 6 March 2015.
Porter, Elisabeth (2007). Peacebuilding: Women in International Perspective. Oxon, UK: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-39791-9.
Rae, James DeShaw. Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice in East Timor (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2022).
Richmond, Oliver (2011). A Post-Liberal Peace. UK: Routledge.
Sandole, Dennis (2010). Peacebuilding. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. ISBN 978-0-7456-4165-2.
Schirch, Lisa (2006). Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding. Little Books of Justice & Peacebuilding. Intercourse, PA: Good Books. ISBN 9781561484270. OCLC 56111659.
Schirch, Lisa (2013). Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning: Toward a Participatory Approach to Human Security. Boulder, Colo.: Kumarian Press. ISBN 9781565495784. OCLC 805831468.
Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna (2017). "Owning the Peace in International Interventions: a Delusion or a Possibility?". DataverseNL. doi:10.34894/JXQNOX. hdl:10411/20875. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
Tarnoff, Curt; Marian L. Lawson (2011). Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy (Technical report). Congressional Research Service. R40213.
Walters, Diana; Laven, Daniel; Davis, Peter (2017). Heritage & Peacebuilding. Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press. ISBN 9781783272167. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peaceful penetration | Description:
Development: In mid-1918, with the ending of the German spring offensive, the Australian troops started to conduct offensive patrols into no man's land. As the front lines after the Spring Offensive lacked fortifications and were non-continuous, it was discovered that the patrols could infiltrate the German outpost line and approach the outposts from behind. In this manner, the outposts could be taken quickly, and with minimal force. This tactic was first reported as being used on 5 April 1918 by the Australian 58th Battalion, 15th Brigade, 5th Division. However, within a few weeks all five of the Australian divisions were using the tactic, with some units using the tactic more than others (for example, the 3rd Division conducted the tactic on three out of every five days in April). In some units, it was treated as a competition, with companies of the 41st Battalion competing to see who could capture the most prisoners.
A similar tactic was used in Messines in 1917, referred to as "prospecting". Likewise, an earlier trench raid was made near Messines on 16 November 1915 by the Canadians.
Effect on German morale: The effect on German morale was quite pronounced, with the effect of peaceful penetration being noticed by both the Allies and Germans. The chief of staff of the German 2nd Army issued the following report on 13 July 1918:
During the last few days the Australians have succeeded in penetrating, or taking prisoner, single posts or piquets. They have gradually—sometimes even in daylight—succeeded in getting possession of a majority of the forward zone of a whole division. Troops must fight. They must not give way at every opportunity and seek to avoid fighting... The best way to make the enemy more careful in his attempt to drive us bit by bit out of the outpost line and forward zone is to do active reconnaissance... If the enemy can succeed in scoring a success without any special support by artillery or assistance from special troops, we must be in a position to do the same.
A captured German soldier is reported as saying:
You bloody Australians, when you are in the line you keep us on pins and needles; we never know when you are coming over.
General Herbert Plumer, commander of the British 2nd Army, stated:
At the same time I would like to tell you that there is no division, certainly in my army, perhaps in the whole British Army, which has done more to destroy the morale of the enemy than the 1st Australian Division.
Advancement of lines: As ground was continually being captured on an ongoing basis by the use of peaceful penetration, the front lines were constantly being advanced. After the Battle of Hamel, a second battle was ordered by Field Marshal Douglas Haig on 11 July to attack the Villers-Bretonneux Plateau. However, barely had the planning started, when it was realised that the area (a frontage of 4,500 yards (4,100 m), to a depth of 1,000 yards (910 m)) had already been captured by two brigades through peaceful penetration. In addition, the 3rd Division forced the German front line back a mile at Morlancourt.
Requirements: Peaceful penetration relied on the patrols infiltrating the German outposts, and approaching them from behind. As a result, one of the main requirements for successful peaceful penetration is that the terrain provide good cover (e.g. covered approaches such as ditches), or have enough ground cover (trees, grasses, etc.). As a result, it was only after the German Spring Offensive forced the Allies out of the previously fought over terrain into terrain that had not been damaged by artillery that peaceful penetration became feasible.
As peaceful penetration worked best when the patrols approached the outposts from behind, a lack of continuous fortifications (trenches and wire emplacements) was also required for successful peaceful penetration. As a result, this tactic was limited to areas where there was a lack of well established defences. The last requirement for successful peaceful penetration is that the patrolling troops needed to have an aggressive "spirit", or elan, to display large amounts of initiative (as the patrols would often have fewer than a dozen members) and possess great daring (as it was not uncommon for single Australian soldiers to attack, successfully, outposts containing half a dozen German soldiers). Similarly, the tactic worked best when the German soldiers were more likely to surrender than fight when attacked.
Example of peaceful penetration: An example of peaceful penetration is a series of patrols carried out on 11 July 1918 that were led by lieutenants CR Morley and GE Gaskell (each patrol totalling just four men). The patrol led by Lieutenant Gaskell captured 32 Germans and three machine guns. The patrol led by Lieutenant Morley captured 36 Germans and four machine guns. As a result of leading these patrols, both lieutenants Gaskell and Morley were awarded Military Crosses, and others on the patrols received Distinguished Conduct Medals. As noted in the 1st Battalion War Diary:
The patrols continued to operate during the morning and succeeded in capturing practically the whole outpost garrison of the enemy.
At 2 pm the commanding officer decided to exploit the success of the enterprise with the result that our line was advanced... an average depth of 200 yards.
Our total captives amounted to two officers, 98 o/ranks and eight machine guns.
Notes:
References:
External links: "Article describing the Australians in action, including Peaceful Penetration" (PDF). Times. London: AWM. 30 August 1918.
"Peaceful Penetration". Digger History.
"Narrative of Operations". 5th Australian Division. May 1918.
"A captured German letter that mentions the Australians and their actions". |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peacekeeping | Definitions and types of peacekeeping operations:
United Nations peacekeeping missions:
Chapter VI and Chapter VII mission types: There is a range of various types of operations encompassed in peacekeeping. In Page Fortna's book Does Peacekeeping Work?, for instance, she distinguishes four different types of peacekeeping operations. Importantly, these types of missions and how they are conducted are heavily influenced by the mandate in which they are authorized. Three of Fortna's four types are consent-based missions, i.e., so-called "Chapter VI" missions, with the fourth being a "Chapter VII" Mission.
Chapter VI missions are consent-based; therefore they require the consent of the belligerent factions involved in order to operate. Should they lose that consent, Peacekeepers would be compelled to withdraw. Chapter VII missions, by contrast, do not require consent, though they may have it. If consent is lost at any point, Chapter VII missions would not be required to withdraw.
Observation Missions which consist of small contingents of military or civilian observers tasked with monitoring cease-fires, troop withdrawals, or other conditions outlined in a ceasefire agreement. They are typically unarmed and are primarily tasked with observing and reporting on what is taking place. Thus, they do not possess the capability or mandate to intervene should either side renege on the agreement. Examples of observation missions include UNAVEM II in Angola in 1991 and MINURSO in the Western Sahara.
Interpositional Missions, also known as traditional peacekeeping, are larger contingents of lightly armed troops meant to serve as a buffer between belligerent factions in the aftermath of a conflict. Thus, they serve as a buffer zone between the two sides and can monitor and report on the compliance of either side with regard to parameters established in a given ceasefire agreement. Examples include UNAVEM III in Angola in 1994, and MINUGUA in Guatemala in 1996.
Multidimensional missions are carried out by military and police personnel in which they attempt to implement robust and comprehensive settlements. Not only do they act as observers or in an interpositional role, but they also participate in more multidimensional tasks—such as electoral supervision, police and security forces reform, institution building, economic development, and more. Examples include UNTAG in Namibia, ONUSAL in El Salvador, and ONUMOZ in Mozambique.
Peace enforcement Missions are Chapter VII missions and unlike the previous Chapter VI missions, they do not require the consent of the belligerent parties. These are multidimensional operations comprising both civilian and military personnel. The military force is substantial in size and fairly well-equipped by UN Peacekeeping standards. They are mandated to use force for purposes beyond just self-defence. Examples include ECOMOG and UNAMSIL in West Africa and Sierra Leone in 1999, as well as the NATO operations in Bosnia—IFOR and SFOR.
UN missions during and after the Cold War: During the Cold War, peacekeeping was primarily interpositional in nature—thus being referred to as traditional peacekeeping. UN Peacekeepers were deployed in the aftermath of interstate conflict in order to serve as a buffer between belligerent factions and ensure compliance with the terms of an established peace agreement. Missions were consent-based, and more often than not observers were unarmed—such was the case with UNTSO in the Middle East and UNCIP in India and Pakistan. Others were armed—such as UNEF-I, established during the Suez Crisis. They were largely successful in this role.
In the post-Cold War era, the United Nations has taken on a more nuanced, multidimensional approach to Peacekeeping. In 1992, in the aftermath of the Cold War, then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali put together a report detailing his ambitious concepts for the United Nations and Peacekeeping at large. The report, titled An Agenda for Peace, described a multi-faceted and interconnected set of measures he hoped would lead to effective use of the UN in its role in post-Cold War international politics. This included the use of preventative diplomacy, peace-enforcement, peace-making, peace-keeping and post-conflict reconstruction.
Broader aims of UN missions: In The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations, Michael Doyle and Nicolas Sambanis summarise Boutros Boutros' report as preventative diplomacy, confidence-building measures such as fact-finding missions, observer mandates, and the potential deployment of UN mandated forces as a preventative measure in order to diminish the potential for violence or the danger of violence occurring and thus increasing the prospect for lasting peace. Their definitions are as follows:
Peace-enforcement, meant to act with or without the consent of the belligerents in order to ensure any treaty or cease-fire mandated by the United Nations Security Council is maintained. This is done primarily under the auspices of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the forces are generally heavily armed as opposed to the unarmed, or lightly-armed personnel frequently deployed as observers.
Peace-making, meant to compel belligerents to seek a peaceful settlement for their differences via mediation and other forms of negotiation provided by the UN under the auspices of Chapter VI of the UN Charter.
Peace-keeping, deployment of a lightly-armed United Nations presence in the field with the consent of the belligerents involved in order to build confidence and monitor any agreements between concerned parties. Additionally, diplomats would continue to work toward comprehensive and lasting peace, or for the implementation of an agreed-upon peace.
Post-Conflict Reconstruction, intended to develop economic and social cooperation meant to mend relations between the belligerents. Social, political, and economic infrastructure would ideally prevent potential violence and conflict in the future and help to contribute to lasting and robust peace.
Peacekeeping also means working together with NGOs with a view to protecting cultural property. The UN peacekeeping commitment to the protection of cultural heritage dates back to 2012 and is being expanded. An outstanding mission was the deployment of the UN peace mission UNIFIL together with Blue Shield International in 2019 to protect the UNESCO World Heritage in Lebanon. Basically, the protection of cultural property (carried out by military and civil experts in cooperation with local people) forms the stable basis for the future peaceful and economic development of a city, region or country in many conflict areas. Whereby there is also a connection between cultural user disruption and the cause of flight, as President of Blue Shield International Karl von Habsburg explained during the United Nations peacekeeping and UNESCO mission in Lebanon in April 2019: "Cultural assets are part of the identity of the people who live in a certain place. If you destroy their culture, you also destroy their identity. Many people are uprooted, often have no prospects anymore and subsequently flee from their homeland".
Non-United Nations peacekeeping: Not all international peacekeeping forces have been directly controlled by the United Nations. In 1981, an agreement between Israel and Egypt formed the Multinational Force and Observers, which continues to monitor the Sinai Peninsula.
The African Union (AU) is working on building an African Peace and Security Architecture that fulfils the mandate to enforce peace and security on the continent. In cases of genocide or other serious human rights violations, an AU-mission could be launched even against the wishes of the government of the country concerned, as long as it is approved by the AU General Assembly. The establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which includes the African Standby Force (ASF) is planned earliest for 2015. On the regional level, the Economic Community of West African States has initiated several peacekeeping missions in some of its member states, and it has been described as "Africa's most advanced regional peace and security mechanism".
Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) are civilian personnel that carry out non-violent, non-interventionist and impartial set of tactics in order to protect civilians in conflict zones from violence in addition to supporting additional efforts to build a lasting peace. While the term UCP is not entirely ubiquitous among non-governmental agencies (NGOs) in the field: many utilize similar techniques and desire shared outcomes for peace; such as accompaniment, presence, rumour control, community security meetings, the securing of safe passage, and monitoring.
Brief history:
Creation and early years: United Nations Peacekeeping started in 1948 when the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of UN unarmed military observers to the Middle East in order to monitor the armistice agreement that was signed between Israel and its Arab neighbours in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War. This operation was called the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and is still in operation today. With the passage of resolution 73 (1949) by the Security Council in August 1949, UNTSO was given the task of fulfilling four Armistice Agreements between the state of Israel and the Arab states which had participated in the war. Thus, UNTSO's operations were spread through five states in the region—Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic.
Cold War peacekeeping: In the wake of independence in India and Pakistan in August 1947 and the subsequent bloodshed that followed the Security Council adopted resolution 39 (1948) in January 1948 in order to create the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), with the purpose of mediating the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the fighting related to it. This operation was non-interventionist in nature and was additionally tasked with supervision of a ceasefire signed by Pakistan and India in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peacekeeping | With the passage of resolution 73 (1949) by the Security Council in August 1949, UNTSO was given the task of fulfilling four Armistice Agreements between the state of Israel and the Arab states which had participated in the war. Thus, UNTSO's operations were spread through five states in the region—Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic.
Cold War peacekeeping: In the wake of independence in India and Pakistan in August 1947 and the subsequent bloodshed that followed the Security Council adopted resolution 39 (1948) in January 1948 in order to create the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), with the purpose of mediating the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the fighting related to it. This operation was non-interventionist in nature and was additionally tasked with supervision of a ceasefire signed by Pakistan and India in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. With the passage of the Karachi agreement in July 1949, UNCIP would supervise a ceasefire line that would be mutually overseen by UN unarmed military observers and local commanders from each side in the dispute. UNCIP's mission in the region continues to this day, now under the operational title of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).
Since then, sixty-nine peacekeeping operations have been authorised and have deployed to various countries all over the world. The great majority of these operations have begun in the post-Cold War world. Between 1988 and 1998 thirty-five UN operations had been established and deployed. This signified a substantial increase when compared with the periods between 1948 and 1978; which saw the creation and deployment of only thirteen UN Peacekeeping operations and zero between 1978 and 1988.
Armed intervention first came in the form of UN involvement in the wake of the Suez Crisis in 1956. United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF-1), which existed from November 1956 to June 1967 was essentially the first ever United Nations peacekeeping force. It was given the mandate of ensuring the cessation of hostilities between Egypt, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel in addition to overseeing the withdrawal of French, Israeli and British troops from Egyptian territory. Upon completion of said withdrawal, UNEF would serve as a buffer force between Egyptian and Israeli forces in order to supervise conditions of the ceasefire and contribute to a lasting peace.
Shortly thereafter, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), was deployed in 1960. This operation involved upwards of 20,000 military personnel at its peak, and resulted in the death of 250 UN personnel, including then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. ONUC was meant to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces in the Congo, who had reinserted themselves after Congolese independence in the wake of a revolt carried out by the Force Publique (FP), in order to protect Belgian citizens and economic interests. ONUC was also tasked with establishing and maintaining law and order (helping to end the FP revolt and ethnic violence) as well as provide technical assistance and training to Congolese security forces. An additional function was added to ONUC's mission, in which the force was tasked with maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo—resulting from the secession of the mineral-rich provinces of Katanga and South Kasai. The UN forces there, somewhat controversially, more or less became an arm of the Congolese government at the time and helped to forcefully end the secession of both provinces.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the UN created multiple short-term missions all over the world including the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), the UN Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF), the UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), in conjunction with more long-term operations such as the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II), the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
Since 1991: Experiences of peacekeeping during the Yugoslav Wars, especially failures such as the Srebrenica Massacre, led, in part, to the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, which works to implement stable peace through some of the same civic functions that peacekeepers also work on, such as elections. The Commission currently works with six countries, all in Africa. In 2013 the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2122, which among other things calls for stronger measures regarding women's participation in conflict and post-conflict processes such as peace talks, gender expertise in peacekeeping missions, improved information about the impact of armed conflict on women, and more direct briefing to the Council on progress in these areas. Also in 2013, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), a UN women's rights committee, said in a general recommendation that states that have ratified the UN Women's Rights Convention are obliged to uphold women's rights before, during, and after conflict when they are directly involved in fighting, and/or are providing peacekeeping troops or donor assistance for conflict prevention, humanitarian aid or post-conflict reconstruction.
The Committee also stated that ratifying states should exercise due diligence in ensuring that non-state actors, such as armed groups and private security contractors, be held accountable for crimes against women.
One of the findings of Page Fortna about where peacekeepers go is that "peacekeeping is a matter of supply and demand" From the supply side, she observes that there is unlikely a Peacekeeping mission in civil wars on countries close to one of the members of the Security Council. From the demand side, there is diverse evidence that peacekeeping missions are deployed in the countries who need it the most, this is where the risk of a recurring war is high.
Composition of peacekeeping forces:
Nations that participate in peacekeeping missions: The United Nations Charter stipulates that to assist in maintaining peace and security around the world, all member states of the UN should make available to the Security Council necessary armed forces and facilities. Since 1948, about 130 nations have contributed military and civilian police personnel to peace operations. While detailed records of all personnel who have served in peacekeeping missions since 1948 are not available, it is estimated that up to one million soldiers, police officers and civilians have served under the UN flag on its 71 missions. As of September 2021, 122 countries were contributing a total of around 76,000 military observers, police, and troops.
Despite the large number of contributors, the greatest burden continues to be borne by a core group of developing countries. The ten largest troop contributing countries (including police and military experts) to UN peacekeeping operations as of October 2021 were Bangladesh (6447), Nepal (5536), India (5481), Rwanda (5263), Ethiopia (4856), Pakistan (3949), Egypt (2818), Indonesia (2818), Ghana (2296), and China (2248). More than 14,000 civilian personnel serve in peacekeeping operations as legal or medical experts, educators, communication technology professionals, or administrators as of October 2021.
As of September 30, 2021, 4147 people from over 100 countries have been killed while serving on peacekeeping missions. India has the highest number of peacekeeper casualties with 174, followed by Bangladesh (159), Pakistan (159), Nigeria (157), Ghana (145), Ethiopia (138), Canada (123), France (115) and the United Kingdom (106). Since 1948, 56 peacekeepers have been killed each year on average, but recent decades have seen this number almost double, with 110 deaths per year since 2001. 30% of the fatalities in the first 55 years of UN peacekeeping occurred between 1993 and 1995.
There is a strong North-South divide in peacekeeping in that developing nations from the Global South provide the overwhelming majority of peacekeepers. Thomas G. Weiss and Giovanna Kuele argue that this is due to three factors: regional interests, prestige, and financial benefits. African countries are the largest contributors of peacekeepers, but the continent also has the highest number of peacekeeping missions, and most African peacekeepers serve on African missions. As an example, almost all 4800 Ethiopian peacekeepers are deployed in its neighboring countries of Sudan and South Sudan. Being a contributor to peacekeeping missions also provides some international prestige for developing countries, and can bolster countries' claims to be a great power as in the case of Brazil and India. Lastly, providing peacekeepers can have financial benefits for poorer countries. The monthly rate of reimbursement per peacekeeper includes $1,028 for pay and allowances; $303 supplementary pay for specialists; $68 for personal clothing, gear and equipment; and $5 for personal weaponry. Both the direct payments and the training and equipment provided by UN peacekeeping missions can be financially attractive to individual soldiers and developing nations. About 4.5% of the troops and civilian police deployed in UN peacekeeping missions come from the European Union and less than one percent from the United States.
With regard to mission leadership, Force Commanders often come from large troop contributors, while the Special Representatives of the Secretary General often come from developed countries. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peacekeeping | Being a contributor to peacekeeping missions also provides some international prestige for developing countries, and can bolster countries' claims to be a great power as in the case of Brazil and India. Lastly, providing peacekeepers can have financial benefits for poorer countries. The monthly rate of reimbursement per peacekeeper includes $1,028 for pay and allowances; $303 supplementary pay for specialists; $68 for personal clothing, gear and equipment; and $5 for personal weaponry. Both the direct payments and the training and equipment provided by UN peacekeeping missions can be financially attractive to individual soldiers and developing nations. About 4.5% of the troops and civilian police deployed in UN peacekeeping missions come from the European Union and less than one percent from the United States.
With regard to mission leadership, Force Commanders often come from large troop contributors, while the Special Representatives of the Secretary General often come from developed countries.
Women's participation in peacekeeping: Security Council Resolution 1325 was the first major step taken by the UN to include women as active and equal actors in “the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security”. A critique of this resolution is that UNSCR 1325 proposes the implementing gender mainstreaming, however the progress that has been accomplished in this area has focused on women, rather than on assessing the impacts of planned action on both men and women. In 2010, a comprehensive 10-year impact study was conducted to assess the success of this resolution and found that there was limited success with the implementation, particularly in the increasing women's participation in peace negotiations and peace agreements, and sexual and gender-based violence has continued to be prevalent, despite efforts to reduce it.
In 2013 the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2122, which among other things calls for stronger measures regarding women's participation in conflict and post-conflict processes such as peace talks, gender expertise in peacekeeping missions, improved information about the impact of armed conflict on women, and more direct briefing to the Council on progress in these areas. Also in 2013, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), a UN women's rights committee, said in a general recommendation that states that have ratified the UN Women's Rights Convention are obliged to uphold women's rights before, during, and after conflict when they are directly involved in fighting, and/or are providing peacekeeping troops or donor assistance for conflict prevention, humanitarian aid or post-conflict reconstruction The Committee also stated that ratifying states should exercise due diligence in ensuring that non-state actors, such as armed groups and private security contractors, be held accountable for crimes against women.
As of July 2016, women serve in every UN peacekeeping mission either as troops, police, or civilian staff. In 1993, women made up 1% of deployed uniformed personnel. In 2020, out of approximately 95,000 peacekeepers, women constituted 4.8% of military personnel, 10.9% of police personnel, and 34% of justice and corrections personnel in UN peacekeeping missions. As of September 2021, no state contributing more than 100 UN peacekeepers nominates more than 25% women; in absolute numbers, the largest female contingents are provided by Ethiopia (578 female peacekeepers, or 12% of its total forces), Rwanda (500/10%), and Ghana (389/17%). While there is no set target for the proportion of women among military personnel, the UN is requesting contributing states to nominate a minimum of 20% women for policer officer positions and 30% for justice and corrections personnel. In 2023, both the number and the proportion of women in the military personnel of UN peace operations increased. This trend has continued since the launch of the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy. In June 2023, women constituted 7.3% of the total military personnel deployed in UN peace operations, which was an increase of 0.6% compared with the previous year.
Theoretical basis for peacekeeping: While much has been written about peacekeeping and what peacekeepers do, very little empirical research has taken place in order to identify the manner in which peacekeepers can have an impact in a post-conflict environment. Columbia University Professor Virginia Page Fortna attempted to categorize four causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers have the opportunity to lay the groundwork for a lasting peace. Fortna's four mechanisms are as follows:
Change the incentives of recent belligerents, making peace more desirable or war more costly.
Reduce the uncertainty and fear that drives security dilemma spirals.
Prevent or control accidents or the actions of rogue groups that might otherwise escalate back to war.
Prevent political abuse by one side (generally the government) that might cause actors losing the peace to take up arms anew.
Fortna argues that peacekeepers have a positive impact on the peace process, despite often being sent to places where peace is most difficult to achieve. Peacekeeping is often looked at by detractors as ineffective, or unnecessary. Peace prevails when belligerents already have a vested interest in sustaining peace and therefore it could be argued that Peacekeepers play only a minor role in creating a strong foundation for enduring peace. Yet these causal reasons illustrate the important roles that Peacekeepers play in ensuring that peace lasts, especially when contrasted against situations in which belligerents are left to their own devices. These causal reasons thus illustrate the need for Peacekeeping and lay a foundation for the manner in which Peacekeeping operations can have a substantive impact on the post-conflict environment.
In order to change the incentives for war and make peace more appealing the UN can provide a military force by way of an enforcement mandate which provides deterrence to would-be spoilers. They can monitor the situation making the potential for surprise attack by one of the belligerents less likely to occur or by making it more difficult to carry out such an attack. A lightly-armed observer mission can also serve as an early-warning force or "tripwire" for the aforementioned enforcement mission. Aid and recognition provided to the belligerents by the international community should be made conditional and based on compliance with objectives laid out in the negotiating process. And lastly, peace dividends should be provided in the forms of jobs, public works and other benefits.
To reduce uncertainty and fear the UN Peacekeeping force can monitor the aforementioned compliance, facilitate communication between belligerents in order to ease security dilemma concerns thus reassuring belligerents that the other side will not renege, and allow for belligerents to signal their legitimate intentions for peace to the other side. That is to say, provide a meaningful pathway for communication between both sides to make their intentions known and credible.
Prevention and control of potential accidents that may derail the peace process can be achieved by the peacekeeping force by deterring rogue groups. Belligerent forces are often undisciplined without a strong central source of command and control, therefore while a peace is being negotiated there is potential for a rogue group on one side to renege and spoil the peace process. UN forces can serve to prevent this. Additionally, the UN force can serve as a moderator and make communication easy between both parties and bring in political moderates from either side. By providing law and order UN peacekeeping forces can temporarily replace a state's security forces and prevent a bias overreaction to an alleged violation by one side which could in turn result in escalation and a renewal in the violence.
Prevention of political abuse can be achieved through the reformation of institutions associated with the government. Training and monitoring the security forces (e.g. army or police) help to make them an unbiased protector of the people rather than a weapon of suppression for the ruling government. Hopefully this training can bring trust by the people for the security establishment. UN forces can also run and monitor elections in order to ensure a fair process. In other cases, the UN may provide a neutral interim government to administer the country during a transitional period wherein the associated government institutions are being retrained, reformed or better developed. Lastly, military groups such as armed rebels can be encouraged to put down their weapons and transformed into political organisations using appropriate non-violent means to mete out their grievances and compete in the election cycle. This is especially important as many of these groups serve as the chief opposition to a given government, but lack the means or know-how to operate effectively as political organisations.
Different peacekeeping missions take place as a result of different causal mechanisms. More military deterrence and enforcement are meant for those missions operating under the auspices of Chapter VII, while Chapter VI missions are meant to serve more as monitoring forces and interpositional operations are meant to target and prevent potential political abuse—these are primarily multidimensional missions and are heavily involved in the post-conflict political situation.
Effectiveness of peacekeeping missions: Reviews of the academic literature show considerable evidence that peacekeeping increases peace. According to Fortna, there is strong evidence that the presence of peacekeepers significantly reduces the risk of renewed warfare; more peacekeeping troops contribute to fewer battlefield deaths; and more peacekeeping troops contribute to fewer civilian deaths. A study by political scientists at Uppsala University and Peace Research Institute Oslo estimates that an ambitious UN peacekeeping policy with a doubled peacekeeping operation and strong mandates would "reduce the global incidence of armed conflict by two thirds relative to a no-PKO scenario." According to Fordham University political scientist Anjali Dayal, "Scholars have found that peacekeeping keeps wars from bleeding across borders. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peacekeeping | Effectiveness of peacekeeping missions: Reviews of the academic literature show considerable evidence that peacekeeping increases peace. According to Fortna, there is strong evidence that the presence of peacekeepers significantly reduces the risk of renewed warfare; more peacekeeping troops contribute to fewer battlefield deaths; and more peacekeeping troops contribute to fewer civilian deaths. A study by political scientists at Uppsala University and Peace Research Institute Oslo estimates that an ambitious UN peacekeeping policy with a doubled peacekeeping operation and strong mandates would "reduce the global incidence of armed conflict by two thirds relative to a no-PKO scenario." According to Fordham University political scientist Anjali Dayal, "Scholars have found that peacekeeping keeps wars from bleeding across borders. Having more peacekeepers on the ground also seems to correspond with fewer civilians targeted with violence. And peace operations at times have successfully served as transitional authorities, handing power back to local authorities, although this is decreasingly true." A 2018 study found that peacekeeping reduces the severity of civil war on its own, but when it is coupled with mediation, the impact is greater. There is also evidence that the promise to deploy peacekeepers can help international organizations bring combatants to the negotiation table and increase the likelihood that they will agree to a cease-fire.
By controlling for specific factors that affect where peacekeepers are deployed and what the potential chances for peace are, Page Fortna's statistical research shows that there is a statistically significant impact on lasting peace when peacekeepers are deployed. Despite the fact that peacekeepers are sent to locations where peace is least likely to succeed, Fortna finds that conservative estimates suggest that the presence of UN peacekeepers diminishes the risk for renewed violence by at least 55%-60%; with less conservative estimates upwards of 75%-85%. Additionally, her analysis concludes that there is little difference in the effectiveness between Chapter VI consent-based missions and Chapter VII enforcement missions. Indeed, enforcement missions only remain effective if the UN peacekeeping force can prove and sustain their credibility in the use of force. This stresses the importance of a UN mission maintaining the consent of the peacekept. Ultimately, Fortna finds that peacekeeping is an effective tool for ensuring a lasting peace; especially compared to situations in which belligerents' are left to their own devices. Utilising the previously mentioned causal mechanisms for peacekeeping, a UN peacekeeping force can have a substantial and substantive impact on sustaining a lasting peace. Having a relative consensus of the positive impact of peacekeeping for ensuring a lasting peace, Fortna and Howard suggest that the literature is moving towards the study of i) the effectiveness of the types of peace-keepers, ii) the transitional administrations, iii) the links between peacekeeping and democratisation, and iv) the perspectives of the "peacekept".
Doyle and Sambanis' analysis finds that lasting peace is more likely after non-ethnic wars in countries with a relatively high level of development in addition to whether or not UN peacekeeping forces and financial assistance are available. They conclude that in the short run lasting peace is more dependent on a robust UN deployment coupled with low levels of hostility between belligerents. They note that increased economic capacity can provide an incentive not to renew hostilities. In the long run, however, economic capacity matters far more whereas the degree of hostility between belligerents is less important. As successful as UN deployments can be, they have inadequately spurred independent economic development within the countries where they have intervened. Thus, the UN plays a strong, but indirect role and success in lasting peace is predicated on the development of institutions that support peace, rather than serving as a deterrent for renewed war.
Other scholarly analyses show varying success rates for peacekeeping missions, with estimate ranging from 31 percent to 85 percent.
According to a 2020 study, non-UN peacekeeping missions are as effective as UN peacekeeping missions. Another 2020 study found that peacekeeping successfully protected civilians.
A 2021 study in the American Journal of Political Science found that UN peacekeeping in South Sudan had a positive impact on the local economy.
Factors that impact lasting peace: There are many factors that can have a negative impact on lasting peace such as hidden information about the relative strength possessed by the belligerents; a rebel group's involvement in illicit financing through means such as through the export of diamonds and other minerals; participation in the trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings; whether or not military victory was achieved by one side; the length of the war as well as how costly it was; commitment problems and security dilemma spirals experienced by both sides; whether a cease-fire or treaty signed by the belligerents; lack of transparency in the motives and actions carried out by belligerents in the immediate aftermath of the conflict; extremist spoilers; participants in the conflict that may benefit from its continuation; indivisibility and more.
Perhaps one of the most statistically significant contributors to a lasting peace is whether or not military victory was achieved by one side. According to Fortna's research, civil wars in which one side wins, resulting in a cease-fire or truce, have an approximately 85–90% lower chance of renewed war. Moreover, peace treaties further reduce the risk by 60–70%.
If a group is funded by drugs, diamonds or other illicit trade then there is a substantial increase in the chance of renewed violence—100–250%—which is to say that in such circumstances war is two to three-and-a-half times more likely to begin again. While Fortna finds that wars which involve many factions are less likely to resume, Doyle and Sambanis find the opposite.
Costly wars and wars fought along identity lines both provide varied chances of the renewal of violence. While longer wars and peace established by treaty (especially those attained by military victory) can reduce the chances of another war.
Impacts of peacekeeping on participating forces:
Military normalisation: Some commentators have highlighted the potential to leverage peacekeeping operations as a mechanism for advancing military normalisation. Michael Edward Walsh and Jeremy Taylor have argued that Japan's peacekeeping operations in South Sudan provide those promoting Japan's military normalisation with "a unique opportunity to further erode the country's pacifist constitution." "Unable to accept the full weight of modern peacekeeping operations without fundamental political, legal, and social changes," they conclude that "Japan's peacekeepers remain ill-prepared to tackle many serious contingencies requiring use of deadly force." For this reason, they suggest that Japan's continued participation in UN peacekeeping operations might force policy changes that ultimately push the country toward "a tipping point from which the normalisation of Japan's military (will be) the only outcome."
Political impact on sending countries: Diana Muir Appelbaum has expressed concern that the creation of a military in Fiji for the purpose of serving in international peacekeeping missions, has produced a military powerful enough to stage four coups d'état (1987, 1999–2000, 2006, and 2009) and to rule Fiji as a military dictatorship for over two decades. However, a 2018 study published in the Journal of Peace Research found that countries where militaries are highly dependent on the funds they receive from UN peacekeeping were less likely to experience coups d'états than comparable countries less dependent on such funds.
Impacts on individual peacekeepers: Studies of peacekeeping soldiers show both positive and negative effects. A study of 951 US Army soldiers assigned to Bosnia revealed that 77% reported some positive consequences, 63% reported a negative consequence, and 47% reported both. The peacekeepers are exposed to danger caused by the warring parties and often in an unfamiliar climate. This gives rise to different mental health problems, suicide, and substance abuse as shown by the percentage of former peacekeepers with those problems. Having a parent in a mission abroad for an extended period is also stressful to the peacekeepers' families.
Another viewpoint raises the problem that the peacekeeping may soften the troops and erode their combat ability, as the mission profile of a peacekeeping contingent is totally different from the profile of a unit fighting an all-out war.
Criticism:
Peacekeeping, human trafficking, and forced prostitution: Since the 1990s, UN peacekeepers have been the subject of numerous accusations of abuse ranging from rape and sexual assault, to pedophilia and human trafficking. Complaints have arisen from Cambodia, East Timor and West Africa. In Bosnia-Herzegovina prostitution associated with trafficked women skyrocketed and often operated just beyond the gates of U.N. compounds. David Lamb, a regional human rights officer in Bosnia from 2000 to 2001 claimed "The sex slave trade in Bosnia largely exists because of the U.N. peacekeeping operation. Without the peacekeeping presence, there would have been little or no forced prostitution in Bosnia." In addition, hearing held by the U.S. House of Representatives in 2002 found that members of SFOR were frequenting Bosnian brothels and engaging in sex with trafficked women and underage girls.
Reporters witnessed a rapid increase in prostitution in Cambodia, Mozambique, Bosnia, and Kosovo after UN and, in the case of the latter two, NATO peacekeeping forces moved in. In the 1996 UN study called "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children", former first lady of Mozambique Graça Machel documented: "In 6 out of 12 country studies on sexual exploitation of children in situations of armed conflict prepared for the present report, the arrival of peacekeeping troops has been associated with a rapid rise in child prostitution".
Gita Sahgal spoke out in 2004 with regard to the fact that prostitution and sex abuse crops up wherever humanitarian intervention efforts are set up. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peacekeeping | In addition, hearing held by the U.S. House of Representatives in 2002 found that members of SFOR were frequenting Bosnian brothels and engaging in sex with trafficked women and underage girls.
Reporters witnessed a rapid increase in prostitution in Cambodia, Mozambique, Bosnia, and Kosovo after UN and, in the case of the latter two, NATO peacekeeping forces moved in. In the 1996 UN study called "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children", former first lady of Mozambique Graça Machel documented: "In 6 out of 12 country studies on sexual exploitation of children in situations of armed conflict prepared for the present report, the arrival of peacekeeping troops has been associated with a rapid rise in child prostitution".
Gita Sahgal spoke out in 2004 with regard to the fact that prostitution and sex abuse crops up wherever humanitarian intervention efforts are set up. She observed that the "issue with the UN is that peacekeeping operations unfortunately seem to be doing the same thing that other militaries do. Even the guardians have to be guarded".
An investigation by Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein, then Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations, in 2006 resulted in a comprehensive report which detailed some of this abuse in detail— particularly that which occurred in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Sexual exploitation frequently came in the form of prostitution, wherein some money (an average of $1-$3 per encounter) was exchanged for sex. In other instances food, or jobs were utilized to ply women for sex. Other young women reported of "rape disguised as prostitution", whereabouts peacekeepers would rape them and were then given some money or food in order to make the act seem consensual. Between May and September 2004, there were seventy-two allegations of sexual exploitation—68 against military and 4 against civilian personnel. By the end of 2004 there would be a total of 105 allegations. The majority of these allegations were in regards to sex with person under the age of 18 years (45 percent) and sex with adult prostitutes (31 percent). Rape and sexual assault made up approximately 13 and 5 percent respectively, with the remaining 6 percent of allegations relating to other forms of sexual exploitation. Most of the allegations were against peacekeepers from Pakistan, Uruguay, Morocco, Tunisia, South Africa, and Nepal.
Uruguayan President Jose Mujica apologized to Haitian President Michel Martelly over the alleged rape of an 18-year-old Haitian man by Uruguayan UN peacekeeping troops. Martelly said "a collective rape carried out against a young Haitian" would not go unpunished. Four soldiers suspected of being involved in the rape have been detained.
In July 2007 the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) confined an entire contingent of 734 Moroccans in the Ivory Coast in the wake of allegations that some had sexually abused underage girls. In the following years, there were 80 investigations carried out by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). In 2013, allegations were levelled on personnel from France, Gabon, and Burundi operating in the Central African Republic. These include accusations of sexual abuse and exploitation of at least 108 from Kemo Prefecture and that the vast majority of the cases involved minors. In 2016, more allegations of abuse were levelled on Peacekeepers operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo's eastern province of North Kivu. Tanzania and the UN opened a joint inquiry into the alleged abuse, which involved Tanzanian troops. There have been 18 reports of sexual abuse, eight of which involved minors. Sixteen Tanzanian soldiers, a Malawian and a South African are implicated in the accusations. The UN reported in March 2016 that there was a large increase in allegations; which involved troops from twenty one countries. Most of the allegations involved troops from African countries including: Cameroon, Congo, Tanzania, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ghana, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Togo.
Peacekeepers and the Haiti cholera crisis: Significant scientific evidence, first reported by the Associated Press, and later the New York Times, Al Jazeera, and ABC News has shown that Nepalese peacekeeping troops stationed at a remote base in Mirebalais, Haiti, triggered a deadly cholera epidemic that has ravaged the country since October 2010. Cholera is a waterborne disease that causes diarrhoea and vomiting, and it can kill in a matter of hours if patients do not receive rehydration intervention. As of July 2012, Haiti's cholera epidemic was the worst in the world: about 7,500 had died and about 585,000 Haitians (about 1 in every 20 Haitians) had become ill with the disease.
According to the UN-appointed Independent Panel of Experts on the Cholera Outbreak in Haiti, the conditions at the peacekeeping base were unsafe, and allowed contamination of Haiti's river systems in at least two ways: "The construction of the water pipes in the main toilet/showering area [was] haphazard, with significant potential for cross-contamination...especially from pipes that run over an open drainage ditch that runs throughout the camp and flows directly into the Meye Tributary System". Additionally, the panel reported that on a regular basis black water waste from the Mirebalais base and two other bases was deposited in an open, unfenced septic pit that was susceptible to flooding and would overflow into the Meye Tributary during rainfall.
In November 2011, over 5,000 victims of the cholera epidemic filed a claim with the UN's internal claims mechanism seeking redress in the form of clean water and sanitation infrastructure necessary to control the epidemic, compensation for individual losses, and an apology. In July 2012, 104 members of the United States Congress signed a letter affirming that the "actions of the UN" had brought cholera to Haiti and that the UN should "confront and ultimately eliminate cholera". In 2013 the UN rejected the claim and the victims' lawyers have pledged to sue the UN in court.
Cultural concerns related to contemporary peacekeeping: There is a notable intermingling of varied cultures when it comes to peacekeeping. From the vast number of troops, police and personnel that are brought together from various contributing countries to the oftentimes challenging ethnic regions which peacekeeping forces are often deployed. Because of these varied cultures, complicated cultural interactions take place which not only affect mission effectiveness, but can also lead to friction with the population the peacekeepers are meant to be assisting.
In most cases prior to 1988, specific countries often provided peacekeepers. At that point, only twenty six countries had sent personnel to participate in peacekeeping deployments. Today, that number has risen to more than eighty. This results in an extremely heterogeneous group. Thus, UN Peacekeeping deployments must not only contend with language complications, but also myriad cultural and social differences that can create operational difficulties that are hard to overcome. These differences can create problems with regard to interactions (whether personal or between institutions/units), misunderstandings, inadvertent offensive behaviour and prejudices that may be associated with a particular contingent from a given country.
In terms of operations, effectiveness can be hindered by the varying tactics, techniques and procedures employed by the military or police personnel that are a part of a given deployment. Because UN forces are cobbled together from so many different sources, there is a discrepancy in capabilities, training, equipment, standards and procedures. Moreover, substantial differences exist in the form of command and control between contributing members personnel. In addition, some nations may not wish to be subordinated to another, complicating unity of command. This can lead to deep-seated divisions between contingents within the UN force that results in a lack of mutual support between units in the field. This can be demonstrated in the experiences of UN peacekeeping forces deployed to East Timor, where the Australians engaged in a robust operation that maximised force protection in contrast to a pro-active heart and minds approach utilised by Great Britain's Ghurka personnel.
Maintaining the consent of the peacekept is an important facet of modern peacekeeping. Notably in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, fundamental principles of retaining that consent was ignored on the grounds of a humanitarian intervention—reflecting the nature of an Article VII intervention. Yet in order to stress and maintain the legitimacy of an intervention it is important that the UN's forces continue to enjoy the consent of the population and government of the country to which they were deployed. This means making the peacekept feel a part of the process in addition to important cultural knowledge of the area in which peacekeepers are operating, in order to reduce friction and provide for a successful operation.
There has been little study on the interaction of cultures that exist within a peacekeeping force and the population within which they operate. However, in 1976 Galtun and Hveem studied Norwegian personnel who participated in UNEF-1 (in Gaza) and ONUC (Congo). They posited that knowledge of the culture and an understanding of the inhabitants in a given country were not only necessary, but crucial for the success of the mission. They found that personnel from the Norwegian contingent wanted greater insight into the conflict and the culture in which they operated. They also wanted more robust training with regard to working with people from other countries. Yet the study revealed the troops received very little from briefings and that the majority of the information regarding the conflict was gained through the news, reading books or speaking with other UN personnel—rather than any established UN training program. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peacekeeping | There has been little study on the interaction of cultures that exist within a peacekeeping force and the population within which they operate. However, in 1976 Galtun and Hveem studied Norwegian personnel who participated in UNEF-1 (in Gaza) and ONUC (Congo). They posited that knowledge of the culture and an understanding of the inhabitants in a given country were not only necessary, but crucial for the success of the mission. They found that personnel from the Norwegian contingent wanted greater insight into the conflict and the culture in which they operated. They also wanted more robust training with regard to working with people from other countries. Yet the study revealed the troops received very little from briefings and that the majority of the information regarding the conflict was gained through the news, reading books or speaking with other UN personnel—rather than any established UN training program.
Similarly, a study conducted on the relations between members of UNIFIL and local population in Lebanon, carried out by Heiberg and Holst, all but confirmed the findings. In their example, they found that the countries that were able to integrate more fully with the population and show a depth of knowledge about the local culture were more successful, while those that were ambitious, but less integrated into the local scene found themselves far removed from the individuals with which they were supposed to be engaged and their success, or lack thereof, illustrated this.Only the Italian contingent of some 2,200 people operated as part of the local environment and became an active element in restoring normal living conditions. Its soldiers were provided with the training required to acquaint them with the cultural, political and social situation of the people among whom they worked. Operating in a sector that contained approximately 600,000 inhabitants, mostly Shi'ites, the Italians carefully nurtured contact with the ordinary citizens and the political leaders in their area... While the Americans thought they were becoming involved in Lebanese politics, they entered into Lebanese culture and history with little or no understanding of the way things worked—or didn't work... Most Americans did not understand the subtleties of short-term alliances, the length of memories and blood feuds, the strength of aln [kin] in Arab culture nor the nuances of religious differences.This illustrates the importance of understanding the significance that culture plays in the conduct of successful peacekeeping operations. However, despite the existence of a UN training manual that attempts to advise peacekeepers on necessary techniques, there is no unifying doctrine, or standardised procedure among peacekeeping contingents, which will ultimately hinder the potential for success.
Limitations on contemporary intervention and conflict resolution: Throughout the duration of the Cold War external intervention and mediation in civil conflicts took on a state-centric mechanism in which sovereignty was inviolable. Rarely did the international community intervene in internal conflicts involving a state's government and domestic belligerents that opposed it. Since the end of the Cold War, however, that has changed. Today, mediation by international actors in civil conflict rest on a standardised resolution mechanism that accords broadly equal standing to all factions within a conflict, and attempts to reach a settlement accepted by all.
The end of the Cold War presented an opportunity to reshape the international system. This opportunity was afforded to the Cold War's victors—that is to say, the United States and other western capitalist states governed by liberal-democratic values that put a premium on basic human rights and democratization. In the preceding decades the state was the only entity to receive special status. While there were exceptions, such as groups struggling against colonial powers, the state possessed the ultimate degree of legitimacy. As a result, the international community rarely meddled with the internal machinations of a given country. Sovereignty was not to be violated and this was a system which benefited both superpowers, their allies, as well as third world governments.
Now, however, with legitimacy being extended to non-state actors, as well as the opportunity for a minority to secede from a given state and form a new country there has been a dramatic shift in the international status quo. Moreover, the international community's model for conflict resolution is heavily influenced by academic thought developed in western countries. This model encourages intervening in civil wars in order to stop political violence and come to a negotiated settlement which often involves democratising efforts. Critics such as Christopher Clapham and David Shearer, argue that this intervention can provide mechanisms for continued conflict to the detriment of the civilian population. Clapham's argument is principally in relation to the situation in Rwanda leading up to the genocide, whereas Shearer focuses on the negative aspects of intervention, primarily regarding Sierra Leone, which prevents total victory by one side and results in the creation of asymmetries between belligerents which opens the door for continued bloodshed.
In Rwanda, third-party attempts at a negotiated settlement between the Hutu and Tutsi afforded an opportunity for Hutu extremists to prepare for the killing of Hutu moderates and the genocide of the Tutsi. The international community, led by regional states from the Organisation of African Unity, sought to negotiate a settlement and find a solution for the ongoing ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi via the Arusha Peace Process. This process lasted just over a year, included substantial international involvement, and incorporated many regional actors such as Tanzania (host of the process), Burundi, Uganda and Zaire.
While the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was a major beneficiary of the Arusha accords and was able to redress many of its grievances, many of the gains that it made could have been achieved through military action. Arusha, according to Clapham, affected the relative power of the participants in the two following ways: a ceasefire which froze the distribution of territorial control at a particular point and secondly the importance it ascribed to the participants of the negotiations. Meaning that it froze the conflict and prevented continued territorial gains being made by the RPF, in addition to designating the degree of importance with regard to the factions within the negotiations. A faction's importance was weighted not on their relative popularity or military strength, but on artificial weight assigned by the mediators. Thus, the entire process served to undermine the RPF's position while stalling their hitherto successful military campaign, while allowing Hutu extremists to prepare for a genocide.
Shearer argues that modern strategies that rely solely on consent-based negotiations are severely limited and that victory by military means should not be ignored. He states that a shift in battlefield fortunes can often bring one belligerent to the negotiation table and will likewise moderate their demands.
Consent is of great importance when it comes to negotiation and mediation. The current international system and the conflict resolution model which the international community has utilised most since the end of the Cold War puts a premium on consent. But Shearer asks that if a belligerent uses negotiations and cease-fires as a method of delay in order to allow them to reposition military forces and continue fighting, then should consent-based strategies still be pursued, regardless of the potential for lengthening a conflict and the associated human cost?
According to the empirical analysis cited by Shearer, past civil wars with negotiated settlements have had little success. He cites a study from John Stedman that notes between 1900 and 1980 85% of civil wars were solved by one side winning outright (this excludes colonial wars). 15% percent ended as a result of negotiation. Additionally, Roy Licklider's study supports these conclusions by noting the following:From 1945 to 1989, 58 out of a total of 93 civil conflicts, as he categorised them, were settled in some form, while the remainder continued. However, only 14 (or 24 percent) of those settled were solved by negotiation. The others (76 percent) ended with military victories. Additionally, fighting resumed in seven of the 14 conflict which were initially ended by negotiation. The overall success rate of negotiated settlements, therefore, was around 12 percent out of the internal wars that ended.In Sierra Leone the Revolutionary United Front, led by Foday Sankoh, fought an ongoing and bloody civil war with the government from 1991 to 1996. The conflict attracted little international attention, but managed to devastate the country and destroy its economy. Neither belligerent was willing to concede or compromise on their demands, despite multiple attempts at a negotiated settlement. Sankoh would come to the table after the intervention of the private military corporation Executive Outcomes and a reversal in the RUF's battlefield fortunes.
In the aftermath the RUF was a depleted threat, civilians were able to return from refugee camps and begin rebuilding their lives. But the peace was fragile and negotiations were ongoing. The RUF was reluctant to put down their arms, concerned over potential retribution at the hands of army units and civilian militias alike. There was a planned deployment of UN peacekeepers meant to ease these concerns and help with the transition to peace, but things began to unravel. International contributors began to shy away from further peacekeeping initiatives; such as an expensive and open-ended mission in a strategically unimportant country. As a result, the UN's intervention force was slow to come to fruition and then came to a halt completely when Sankoh argued the size of the contingent of 740 UN peacekeepers was too large.
The UN refused to engage without total consent from both parties, thus preventing the deployment of a peacekeeping force. This consent-based approach, Shearer argues, illustrates the limits the UN can play in the volatile and fragile state of affairs that exist during and after civil wars. "In Sierra Leone, it meant that an important component needed to shore up the peace-building process was absent. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peacekeeping | There was a planned deployment of UN peacekeepers meant to ease these concerns and help with the transition to peace, but things began to unravel. International contributors began to shy away from further peacekeeping initiatives; such as an expensive and open-ended mission in a strategically unimportant country. As a result, the UN's intervention force was slow to come to fruition and then came to a halt completely when Sankoh argued the size of the contingent of 740 UN peacekeepers was too large.
The UN refused to engage without total consent from both parties, thus preventing the deployment of a peacekeeping force. This consent-based approach, Shearer argues, illustrates the limits the UN can play in the volatile and fragile state of affairs that exist during and after civil wars. "In Sierra Leone, it meant that an important component needed to shore up the peace-building process was absent. It also meant that Sankoh was dictating terms." This consent-based approach effectively allowed the leadership of a brutal rebel group to hinder the potential for peace.
The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the newly elected President of Sierra Leone terminated the Executive Outcomes contract undermining his hard power advantage. Things were further inflamed when disaffected officers of the army overthrew the government in 1997. The war quickly renewed. A small UN force of monitors was deployed to observe the security situation. UNOMSIL, as it was called, was deployed between July 1998 and October 1999, but was forced to withdraw from the country when the RUF took the country's capitol.
UNAMSIL was eventually formed and deployed in 1999, authorised under a Chapter VII mandate, it was meant to enforce the Lome agreements. However, violence would continue. From the outset the RUF was beyond uncooperative and once the ECOMOG contingent withdrew, the RUF attacked UN forces, eventually taking hundreds hostage. This led to an unexpected backlash from the international community that the RUF did not anticipate. Its leadership had expected the international community to cut and run, as it had done in Somalia and earlier when UNOMSIL fled Freetown. Instead, with British support, an aggressive campaign was waged against the RUF. UNAMSIL's mandate was expanded and its manpower enlarged. By late 2000 and early 2001 the RUF's military strength had been severely depleted. Thus the Abuja agreements were signed and UNAMSIL fulfilled its mandate in December 2005. While Sierra Leone is at peace today and the UN's mission can be deemed a success, the way in which the situation developed illustrates Shearer's point: that a consent-based approach focused on negotiation that encompasses all belligerents' interest may not necessarily lead to success. As we see, fighting continued despite the presence of UNOMSIL. Indeed, even after UNOMSIL was replaced by a more robust force under a Chapter VII mandate in the form of UNAMSIL the violence continued. When the British intervened militarily and substantially degraded the RUF's capability to sustain the conflict, as Executive Outcomes had done years prior, the RUF finally come to the negotiating table and allowed for the establishment of peace.
Some authors question the idea of international interventions at all. In a 2005 working paper for the Center for Global Development, Jeremy Weinstein of Stanford University provides a theory of "autonomous recovery", in which states can achieve sustainable peace without international intervention. Using case studies of Uganda, Eritrea, and Somalia, Weinstein demonstrates how states can develop effective institutions out of warfare. This method has cost and benefits that must be weighed against the potential outcome of international intervention. External intervention can stop mass atrocities, but also stop institutional change. Autonomous recovery elevates the strongest leader, but also rewards the strongest fighters who may be less inclined to share power. Furthermore, intervention depends on external influence while autonomous recovery is based on internal factors. The conclusions of his argument could suggest intervention is not ideal policy, but Weinstein argues the international community's "responsibility to protect" doctrine has moral importance for intervention and the conditions for "autonomous recovery" are very rare. Weinstein argues the fundamental challenge is how to incentivise good governance and assistance to rebel groups without disrupting the connection of citizens to rulers in terms of revenue collection that enables accountability.
Mission creep: Although acknowledging a number of practical and moral reasons for peacekeeping operations, James Fearon and David Laitin assert that they have a tendency under some circumstances to become tangled with state-building efforts. In weak states facing successful guerrilla campaigns, peacekeepers face pressures to build state institutional and administrative capacity in order to achieve lasting peace. These pressures can lead to mission creep beyond the original purview of the peacekeeping operation; without engaging in state-building, the peacekeepers risk allowing the peacekept country to revert to violence following their exit. Thus, Fearon and Laitin advocate for the greater integration of state-building in peacekeeping efforts through a new framework of "neotrusteeship", which would see foreign powers exercising a great deal of control over a weak state's domestic affairs in order to ensure the prevention of future violence.
Lack of engagement with the populace: A growing critique of peacekeeping is the lack of engagement between the peacekeeping officials and the local populace. As Séverine Autesserre outlines in a 2015 Foreign Policy article, this creates an environment where the peacekeeping officials develop plans to 'keep' the peace, but they are disconnected from reality, having the opposite effect on the ground. Additionally, it creates a reinforcement mechanism for the peacekeeping officials, because the officials on the ground report that their plan was successfully implemented, but, in reality, it had adverse effects. If the situation on the ground turns into another outbreak of violence, the local populace will be blamed.
This criticism is similar to the critic levelled at development in developing countries by authors such as James C. Scott, James Ferguson, and L. Lohman. Although peacekeeping and development are two different things, the logic behind the criticism is the same. The third-party officials-whether they are peacekeepers or agents of development-are isolated from the general populace, believing they know what is best, and refusing to gather information from a ground level. This is not out of maliciousness or imperialism, but out of a legitimate belief that they, as educated officials with access to other experts and who are well versed in development and peacekeeping literature, know what is best.
Proposed reform:
Brahimi analysis: In response to criticism, particularly of the cases of sexual abuse by peacekeepers, the UN has taken steps toward reforming its operations. The Brahimi Report was the first of many steps to recap former peacekeeping missions, isolate flaws, and take steps to patch these mistakes to ensure the efficiency of future peacekeeping missions. The UN has vowed to continue to put these practices into effect when performing peacekeeping operations in the future. The technocratic aspects of the reform process have been continued and revitalised by the DPKO in its "Peace Operations 2010" reform agenda. This included an increase in personnel, the harmonisation of the conditions of service of field and headquarters staff, the development of guidelines and standard operating procedures, and improving the partnership arrangement between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), African Union, and European Union. A 2008 capstone doctrine entitled "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines" incorporates and builds on the Brahimi analysis.
One of the main issues that the Brahimi report identifies is the lack of coordination and planning of the Peacekeeping Operations. Also, the difference between the objectives of the Peacekeeping Operations and the resources destined to fund the missions. Therefore, the report asks the Security Council to make clear the goals and the resources to accomplish them. According to Fearon and Laitin, the Brahimi Report provides a political instrument for the secretary-general to negotiate with the Security Council the goals, the troops, and the resources need it to the operations. This instrument tries to avoid the cases of underfunding presented in Missions such as in Bosnia, Somalia, and Sierra Leone.
Christine Gray analyses the issues of implementing the recommendations of the Brahimi Report. She explains the difficulty in implementing these recommendations. In particular, in reducing the gap between the mandates of Security Council and the actual resources devoted to implementing them.
See also: Bangladesh UN Peacekeeping Force
Canadian peacekeeping
List of United Nations peacekeeping missions
List of countries by number of UN peacekeepers
List of countries where UN peacekeepers are currently deployed
List of non-UN peacekeeping missions
Multinational Force and Observers
Military operations other than war
Temporary International Presence in Hebron
Timeline of UN peacekeeping missions
References:
Further reading: Aoi, Chiyuki; Coning, Cedric de; Thakur, Ramesh (eds.) Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations. United Nations University, 2007.
Autesserre, Séverine. 2014. Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107632042
Barnett, Michael. 2002. Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda. Cornell University Press.
Bastaki, Basil; Staniland, Paul; Popoola, Bryan (2024). "Stabilizing Civil Wars without Peacekeeping: Evidence from South Asia". International Security. 49 (1): 133–170. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00489. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peacekeeping | Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations. United Nations University, 2007.
Autesserre, Séverine. 2014. Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107632042
Barnett, Michael. 2002. Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda. Cornell University Press.
Bastaki, Basil; Staniland, Paul; Popoola, Bryan (2024). "Stabilizing Civil Wars without Peacekeeping: Evidence from South Asia". International Security. 49 (1): 133–170. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00489. ISSN 0162-2889.
Bureš, Oldřich (June 2006). "Regional Peacekeeping Operations: Complementing or Undermining the United Nations Security Council?". Global Change, Peace & Security. 18 (2): 83–99. doi:10.1080/14781150600687775. S2CID 154982851.
Dandeker, Christopher; Gow, James (1997). "The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success". Armed Forces & Society. 23 (3): 327–347. doi:10.1177/0095327X9702300302. S2CID 145191919.
Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicholas. 2006. Making War and Building Peace. Princeton University Press
Evelegh, Robin (1978). Peace Keeping in a Democratic Society: The Lessons of Northern Ireland. Montréal, Québec: McGill-Queen's University Press. ISBN 0-7735-0502-4
Fortna, Virginia Page (2004). "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War" (PDF). International Studies Quarterly. 48 (2): 269–292. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.489.1831. doi:10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00301.x.
Fortna, Virginia Page; Lise Morjé, Howard (2008). "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Future". Annual Review of Political Science. 11: 283–301. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.041205.103022. S2CID 15740415.
Goulding, Marrack (July 1993). "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping". International Affairs. 69 (3): 451–64. doi:10.2307/2622309. JSTOR 2622309. S2CID 156682195.
Anja Jetschke and Bernd Schlipphak. 2019. MILINDA: A new dataset on United Nations-led and non-united Nations-led peace operations. Conflict Management and Peace Science.
Howard, Lise Morjé. 2008. UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. Cambridge University Press.
Marten, Kimberly. 2004. Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past. Columbia University Press
Paris, Roland. 2010. At War's End. Cambridge University Press
Pushkina, Darya (June 2006). "A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission". International Peacekeeping. 13 (2): 133–149. doi:10.1080/13533310500436508. S2CID 144299591.
Worboys, Katherine (2007). "The Traumatic Journey from Dictatorship to Democracy: Peacekeeping Operations and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, 1989-1999". Armed Forces & Society. 33 (2): 149–168. doi:10.1177/0095327X05283843. S2CID 144147291.
Reed, Brian; Segal, David (2000). "The Impact of Multiple Deployments on Soldiers' Peacekeeping Attitudes, Morale and Retention". Armed Forces & Society. 27 (1): 57–78. doi:10.1177/0095327X0002700105. S2CID 143556366.
Sion, Liora (2006). "'Too Sweet and Innocent for War'?: Dutch Peacekeepers and the Use of Violence". Armed Forces & Society. 32 (3): 454–474. doi:10.1177/0095327X05281453. S2CID 145272144.
Blocq, Daniel (2010). "Western Soldiers and the Protection of Local Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Is a Nationalist Orientation in the Armed Forces Hindering Our Preparedness to Fight?". Armed Forces & Society. 36 (2): 290–309. doi:10.1177/0095327X08330816. S2CID 146797513.
External links: Media related to Peacekeeping at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Peel (tactic) | Types of peel: A peel begins with an infantry element deciding to disengage from contact with an opposing force. The soldiers begin by using suppressing fire to delay the enemy's attack and advance. Upon issuance of the verbal command to initiate the peel, the infantryman closest to the enemy, in the opposite direction of the intended post-peel movement, ceases fire and works his way behind the element towards the other side, takes a position beyond from the farthest soldier on this side in the direction of disengagement, and resumes suppressing fire. Then, the process repeats until the party has safely disengaged the target. One specific type of peel is a center peel, in which the retreat is conducted in between two files of the squad in column formation, allowing for the squad to conduct effective suppressive fire to the flanks. The center peel is typically used when linear terrain features dictate that the element must move in column formation, or when the squad unexpectedly makes contact while in a column formation.
References in film and literature: The center peel tactic was demonstrated in the final gunfight of the 2003 movie, Tears of the Sun, where Lieutenant Waters (Bruce Willis) directs his men away from a significantly larger group of aggressive Nigerian troops.
This tactic was also shown in episode 6 of season 2 of the Amazon Prime show, Jack Ryan, where a small group of 3 soldiers were ambushed in a ravine.
The peel tactic can also be seen in the 1995 film Heat as the LAPD intercept the heist crew as they are leaving the bank.
See also: Fire and movement
Bounding overwatch
Overwatch (military tactic)
Siege
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Penal military unit | History: One of the earliest examples of penal military units was recorded in the Chinese annals Records of the Grand Historian and Book of Han. During the Han–Dayuan War, unhappy with the failure of General Li Guangli in an earlier expedition in 104 BC, Emperor Wu of Han promised amnesty and rewards to criminals, prisoners and bandits (赦囚徒捍寇盜) and dispatched a 60,000-strong army consisting of "bad boys" (惡少年) to attack the Greco-Bactrian kingdom of Dayuan in 102 BC.
Dedicated penal units were first envisioned during the Napoleonic era of warfare, as large armies formed of conscripts often suffered from disciplinary problems. Soldiers who refused to face the enemy were seen as detrimental to the cohesion of the army and as a disgrace to the nation. The formation of penal battalions was seen as a way of disciplining an army and keeping soldiers in line. In addition, many nations conscripted criminals into penal battalions in lieu of imprisoning or executing them during wartime to better utilize national manpower. Such military units were treated with little regard by the regular army and were often placed in compromising situations, such as being used in forlorn hope assaults. The French Empire in particular was notable for employing penal military units during the wars of the coalition, especially during the later years of the conflicts as manpower became limited. The Régiment pénal de l'Île de Ré, formed in 1811 and composed almost entirely of criminals and other societal undesirables, would see action during the later years of the Napoleonic Wars.
The disbandment of conscripted armies and end of large scale warfare following the Napoleonic era led to the decline of the penal battalion system in continental Europe. However, the system continued in overseas colonies, again with the French as the primary employers of penal battalions. The Battalions of Light Infantry of Africa (Bats d'Af) was formed by order of Louis Philippe I in 1832 for the purpose of expanding the French colonial empire. The Battalions fought in the French conquest of Algeria and during the Crimean War. The French also employed the compagnies d'exclus ("companies of the excluded"), military units which were stationed at Aîn-Sefra in Southern Algeria. In contrast to the Bats d'Af, the compagnies d'exclus were outright penal units consisting of convicts condemned to five years or more of hard labor and judged unworthy to carry weapons.
The various Italian unification conflicts saw the Redshirts recruiting convicts and revolutionaries from prisons into penal regiments known as Battaglioni degli imprigionati ("Battalions of the Imprisoned" or "Prisoners Battalion".)
Prior to the early 1900s, the Portuguese Empire relied largely on military convicts to augment the regular and indigenous troops employed to provide garrisons for its overseas colonies.
During World War I, the British Armed Forces were mobilized for military service. Courts offered defendants the option of enlisting to avoid imprisonment, while young offenders in borstals and adult prisoners were granted early release for their service. Though government officials publicly claimed criminals were unfit for service, and prisoners were viewed as lacking "the sense of duty that encouraged other men to enlist", the recruitment of prisoners was a military necessity, and prisoners were reportedly sought out for their violent nature and to ease the cost of the prison system in wartime.
The period of military rearmament preceding World War II caused renewed interest in the concept of penal military units. In May 1935 the German Wehrmacht instituted a new policy under German conscription law that stated soldiers who were deemed disruptive to military discipline but were otherwise "worthy of service" would be sent to military penal units. Criminals were also conscripted into penal units in exchange for lighter sentences or as a form of stay of execution. These units, referred to as "special departments" or the generic term Strafbataillon, were overseen by the German military police. Prior to World War II, there were nine Strafbataillone within the Wehrmacht. The primary role of a Strafbataillon was to provide front line support. As the war progressed, the size of Strafbataillon companies dramatically increased in size due to changes in German military policy. Under such policies, any soldier who had a death sentence (for retreat) commuted was automatically reassigned to penal units, greatly increasing the number of soldiers available to the Strafbataillon.
The effectiveness of Strafbataillone were mixed. The combination of criminals, political prisoners, and undisciplined soldiers that made up a Strafbataillon often required harsh measures to be imposed for unit cohesion to be maintained. Strafbataillone were often ordered to undertake high risk missions on the front line, with soldiers being coached to regain their lost honor by fighting. Certain penal military units, such as the 36th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS, gained a reputation as being brutal towards civilian populations and prisoners of war, and were employed as anti-partisan troops due to the fear they inspired. Other units, most notably the 999th Light Afrika Division, suffered from poor morale and saw soldiers desert the Wehrmacht to join resistance groups.
Following Operation Barbarossa and the entry of the Soviet Union into World War II, the Red Army began to seriously consider the implementation of penal military units. These efforts resulted in the creation of Shtrafbat, penal military units composed of sentenced soldiers, political prisoners, and others deemed to be expendable. A large number of Red Army soldiers who retreated without orders during the initial German invasion were reorganized into rudimentary penal units, the precursors to dedicated Shtrafbat. The Shtrafbat were greatly increased in number by Joseph Stalin in July 1942 via Order No. 227 (Директива Ставки ВГК №227). Order No. 227 was a desperate effort to re-instill discipline after the panicked routs of the first year of combat with Germany. The order—popularized as the "Not one step back!" (Ни шагу назад!, Ni shagu nazad!) Order—introduced severe punishments, including summary execution, for unauthorized retreats.
During the Chinese Civil War, between 1945 and 1949, the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) was known to have fielded penal battalions. Made up of deserters and those accused of cowardice, these penal battalions were given dangerous tasks such as scouting ahead of the main forces to check for ambushes, crossing rivers and torrents to see whether they were fordable, and traversing unmapped minefields.
In the United States, the United States Armed Forces historically fielded penal units and permitted the enlistment of prisoners. During the American Civil War, the Union permitted Galvanized Yankees, Confederate prisoners of war who swore allegiance to the Union, into their ranks in penal units from 1862 to around 1866. During World War II, prisoners were permitted to provide to the war effort, and in 1942, it was reported that several prisoners had offered to enlist in the military to fight in the war, with some even receiving training ahead of enlistment, though no penal units are known to have been formed in the U.S. military.
Well into the 20th century, U.S. courts offered defendants the choice between enlistment and prison, a practice that continued through both world wars and the Korean War until at least the Vietnam War; reportedly, this was how R. Lee Ermey, a U.S. Marine Corps staff sergeant and drill instructor known for his acting role in the 1987 film Full Metal Jacket, enlisted as a 17-year-old delinquent in 1961. However, convicts were not placed in separate penal units, and the practice was entirely up to the judge with the military having the option to reject the defendant. Presently, all branches of the U.S. military forbid the acceptance of convicts, both after sentencing and as an alternative to imprisonment (except the U.S. Navy, which does not have specific prohibitions but still strongly discourages it as a protocol), and do not maintain any penal formations, though ex-convicts with felony priors are still permitted with a proper felony waiver. In 2021, the Florida Legislature proposed a bill that would formally permit first-time offenders 25-years-old or younger to enlist instead of facing imprisonment, though it did not pass.
In the modern day, the practice of fielding penal military units has largely stopped, with most militaries discouraging or outright prohibiting the acceptance of convicts, though some militaries accept ex-convicts provided they fulfill certain requirements, such as having a proper waiver. For example, a U.S. military recruiter told The Daily Beast in 2018 that recruitment candidates can have "one non-violent felony as an adult", and that "some of the best and most capable candidates we get require a waiver". However, though rare, the practice of accepting convicts into armed forces has continued or been made permissible in some jurisdictions and situations. During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, for instance, the Armed Forces of Ukraine permitted the recruitment of Ukrainian prisoners with prior combat experience, and Russian private military company Wagner Group began hiring Russian inmates to fill their ranks. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Penal military unit | In the modern day, the practice of fielding penal military units has largely stopped, with most militaries discouraging or outright prohibiting the acceptance of convicts, though some militaries accept ex-convicts provided they fulfill certain requirements, such as having a proper waiver. For example, a U.S. military recruiter told The Daily Beast in 2018 that recruitment candidates can have "one non-violent felony as an adult", and that "some of the best and most capable candidates we get require a waiver". However, though rare, the practice of accepting convicts into armed forces has continued or been made permissible in some jurisdictions and situations. During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, for instance, the Armed Forces of Ukraine permitted the recruitment of Ukrainian prisoners with prior combat experience, and Russian private military company Wagner Group began hiring Russian inmates to fill their ranks.
By country:
Belgium: Special Forestry Platoon – A Belgian Army non-combat penal platoon composed of Flemish soldiers who had some relationship with the Flemish Movement during World War I. Formed in 1918, the unit conducted woodchopping in Orne, Normandy, France as a form of penal labour until several months after the end of the war.
Bolivia: 50th Infantry Regiment – A Bolivian Army penal regiment composed of convicted soldiers and police officers that served in the Chaco War.
Finland: Erillinen Pataljoona 21 ("Separate Battalion 21") – A Finnish Army penal battalion founded in August 1941, from volunteering prisoners and leftists in protective custody, that fought in the Continuation War. Commanded by Major Nikke Pärmi, the distinguishing mark of Er.P 21 was the black V sewn into the sleeve of their uniform; these gave them the nicknames of "Pärmi's Devils" and "Black Arrow".
France: Régiment pénal de l'Île de Ré ("French Penal Regiment of Île de Ré") – One of five regional penal units forming part of the French Army in the early 1810s. Formed in 1811, the unit was stationed on Île de Ré, and was disbanded in 1814 during the First Restoration.
Battalions of Light Infantry of Africa (Bataillons d'Infanterie Légère d'Afrique) – Penal battalions serving in French North Africa, composed of men with prison records who still had to complete their military service, and serving soldiers with serious disciplinary problems. Formed in 1832, this corps was disbanded in 1972.
Bataillon d'Infanterie légère d'Outre-Mer ("Overseas Light Infantry Battalion") – A penal battalion consisting of German prisoners of war and French collaborationists after World War II. Formed in 1948 for service in the French colonies, the unit attracted few members and was subject to a campaign by the French Communist Party before it was disbanded in 1949.
Disciplinary Company of the Foreign Regiments in the Far East (Compagnie disciplinaire en Extrême-Orient) – A penal company of the French Foreign Legion in the Far East, consisting of Legionnaires who had committed serious offenses. Formed in 1946 and attached to the 2nd Foreign Infantry Regiment, the company depended on the battalions implanted in French Indochina. After French Indochina's dissolution following the 1954 Geneva Conference, the company was disbanded in August 1954.
Germany: Strafbataillon ("Penal Battalion") – A generic term for penal units in the Wehrmacht, fielded between 1942 and 1945. These units were poorly armed and often undertook what were essentially suicide missions.
999th Light Afrika Division – A Wehrmacht penal division stationed in Tunisia, originating from the 999th Africa Brigade in 1942. The unit consisted of individuals who held, or were perceived to hold, anti-fascist beliefs. The unit suffered heavy casualties in the North African campaign, and members were reportedly so unwilling to fight for Germany that they quickly surrendered their positions to Allied troops when confronted. After the unit transferred to Axis-occupied Greece, several members defected or began conducting anti-Nazi activities. The unit was disbanded in 1943.
Dirlewanger Brigade – A Waffen-SS penal brigade consisting of convicted criminals who were not expected to survive their service. Formed in 1940 for counterinsurgency operations, it became notorious even among the Waffen-SS for the sheer depravity of its war crimes, being responsible for several mass murders in Eastern Europe.
Italy: Cacciatori Franchi ("Frankish Hunters") – The penal unit of the Royal Sardinian Army. Established around 1741, the unit existed until 1878, when disciplinary companies were established.
Battaglione di Rigore ("Penalty Battalion") – The penal unit of the Italian Social Republic military.
Battaglioni degli Imprigionati ("Battalions of the Imprisoned") – Penal battalions of the Redshirts in the Wars of Italian Unification, composed of prisoners and revolutionaries.
Paraguay: Macheteros de Jara - An auxiliary cavalry regiment that was created on 15 August 1932. Members of the regiment consisted of former outlaws.
Russia: Storm-Z – a group of penal military units established in April 2023, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Storm-V – a group of penal military units established in June 2023, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine
South Korea: Unit 684 – A black operations unit of the Republic of Korea Air Force, consisting largely of petty criminals. Formed in 1968 in response to the Blue House raid, wherein Unit 124 of the Korean People's Army Special Operation Force attempted to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung Hee, Unit 684 received extremely harsh training on the island of Silmido in anticipation for a retaliatory operation to assassinate North Korean General Secretary Kim Il Sung. However, warming relations by 1971 led to the mission's cancellation and the unit's dissolution; the members of Unit 684 promptly launched a violent escape attempt, culminating in a standoff that led to the deaths of most of the unit and the capture and execution of the remaining survivors.
Soviet Union: Shtrafbat – Penal battalions of the Red Army and NKVD, composed of sentenced soldiers, political prisoners, and others deemed to be expendable, fighting on the Eastern Front of World War II. Established in 1942 by Joseph Stalin in Order No. 227, over 422,000 prisoners were placed into shtrafbats until their disestablishment following victory in Europe in May 1945, by which point very few had survived.
Ukraine: Kharakternyky Battalion – Nicknamed "The Magicians" and "Characterniks" the battalion was formed after the Verkhovna Rada passed Registered draft law No. 11079 which allowed for the mobilization of convicts into the Ukrainian Army.
Shkval Battalion - Also known as the Wind Gust Battalion. It was formed after the Verkhovna Rada passed Registered draft law No. 11079 which allowed for the mobilization of convicts into the Ukrainian Army.
United States: Galvanized Yankees – A term used to refer to Confederate States Army and Confederate States Navy former personnel and prisoners of war who, after their capture, swore allegiance to the Union and enlisted in the Union Army and Union Navy during the American Civil War. The practice of enlisting Confederate prisoners to Union forces began around 1862 and lasted until 1866. A similar practice was conducted by the Confederate States of America, but not to the same extent.
In popular culture: The Dirty Dozen – A 1967 film about the titular fictional American penal unit, composed of military prisoners trained as commandos for a suicide mission ahead of the Normandy landings during World War II. The film was a commercial and critical success, and was followed by several television film sequels in the 1980s: The Dirty Dozen: Next Mission, The Dirty Dozen: The Deadly Mission, and The Dirty Dozen: The Fatal Mission.
Silmido – A 2003 film dramatizing the story of Unit 684. The film is credited with having increased public awareness of Unit 684's story, though some aspects of the film are fictionalized due to numerous details of the actual story remaining classified.
Ace Combat 7: Skies Unknown – A 2019 combat flight simulation video game, part of which follows "Spare Squadron", a penal squadron of the fictional Osean Federation's air force that is considered disposable and used to test enemy combat drone defenses, overseen by a prison warden serving as their commander and airborne early warning and control operator.
Suicide Squad – A fantastical version of the concept within the DC Comics universe.
References:
External links: Yefim Golbraikh memoirs, including his serving commander of a penal company (in Russian)
Soviet penal units in World War 2, from Voice of Russia
Report: Saudis sent death-row inmates to fight Syria, 21 January 2013 |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Perfidy | Geneva Conventions: Perfidy is specifically prohibited under the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, which states:
Article 37. – Prohibition of perfidy
1. It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are examples of perfidy:
(a) The feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender;
(b) The feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;
(c) The feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and
(d) The feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict.
2. Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts that are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law. The following are examples of such ruses: the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation.
Article 38. – Recognized emblems
1. It is prohibited to make improper use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other emblems, signs or signals provided for by the Conventions or by this Protocol. It is also prohibited to misuse deliberately in an armed conflict other internationally recognized protective emblems, signs or signals, including the flag of truce, and the protective emblem of cultural property.
2. It is prohibited to make use of the distinctive emblem of the United Nations, except as authorized by that Organization.
Article 39. – Emblems of nationality
1. It is prohibited to make use in an armed conflict of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict.
2. It is prohibited to make use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of adverse Parties while engaging in attacks or to shield, favour, protect or impede military operations.
3. Nothing in this Article or in Article 37, paragraph 1(d), shall affect the existing generally recognized rules of international law applicable to espionage or to the use of flags in the conduct of armed conflict at sea.
History: Disapproval of perfidy was part of the customary laws of war long before the prohibition of perfidy was included in Protocol I. For example, in the 1907 Hague Convention IV – The Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 23 includes:
In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden ... (b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army; ... (f) To make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag, or of the military insignia and military uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention; ...
The Kilmichael Ambush (1921), part of the Irish War of Independence, was the scene of a notorious act of alleged perfidy. 36 members of the Irish Republican Army ambushed a truck carrying 18 Auxiliary Division officers. IRA leader Tom Barry claimed in his memoirs, Guerrilla Days in Ireland, that some of the Auxiliaries shouted, "We surrender, we surrender;" when IRA men stood up from their positions, they were fired upon by other Auxiliaries. This led Barry to not believe the Auxiliaries when, later in the battle, they attempted to surrender: all 18 were shot and left for dead. One Auxiliary escaped but was later captured and killed; another, Frederick Henry Forde, survived with severe injuries and was rescued by British forces. However, some historians have claimed that Barry invented the story of the false surrender in order to justify the killing of the entire unit.
During the Pacific Theatre of World War II, the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces were reported to often disguise their installations and transportation with protective signs such as the red cross, booby-trap their dead and wounded and to fake surrenders or injuries to lure Allied troops into a trap then surprise-attack them. One example of supposed perfidy was the "Goettge Patrol" during the early days of the Guadalcanal Campaign in 1942. Confusion regarding a possible surrender of Japanese troops came about due to a sighting of what the Americans believed to be a "white flag" along with faulty intelligence from a captured, drunken Japanese officer. This resulted in more than 20 US combat deaths from the Japanese soldiers the Americans assumed would surrender. It has been asserted that the incident, along with many other perfidious actions of the Japanese throughout the Pacific War, led to an Allied tendency to shoot dead or wounded Japanese soldiers, those who were attempting to surrender and not to take POWs as readily as they might other enemy soldiers.
At the Dachau Trials, the issue of whether the donning of enemy uniforms to approach the enemy without drawing fire was within the laws of war was established under international humanitarian law at the trial in 1947 of the planner and commander of Operation Greif, Otto Skorzeny. He was found not guilty by a US military tribunal of a crime by ordering his men into action in US uniforms. He had passed on to his men the warning of German legal experts that if they fought in US uniforms, they would be breaking the laws of war. During the trial, a number of arguments were advanced to substantiate this position and that the German and US militaries seem to be in agreement on it. In its judgement, the tribunal noted that the case did not require that the tribunal make findings other than those of guilty or not guilty and so no safe conclusion could be drawn from the acquittal of all accused. The tribunal also emphasized the difference between using enemy uniforms in espionage versus combat.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian soldiers have been accused of perfidy on numerous occasions, including the Makiivka surrender incident.
Israeli forces have been accused of perfidy during the Israel-Hamas war by among others former executive director of Human Rights Watch Kenneth Roth and Dr. Aurel Sari, an associate professor of public international law at the University of Exeter and a fellow at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.
See also: Bad faith
False flag
Inherent bad faith model
Perfidious Albion
War Crimes Act of 1996 (incorporated into US law)
References:
External links:
UK's Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act 1995 which bans perfidy |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Perpetual war | Causes: Poor military planning is one of the major reasons that a forever war can occur. If the territory gained in a war is not occupied or controlled properly, this can allow a deadly insurgency to occur, potentially stretching out a conflict that never ends. Similarly, warfare that is fought irregularly, such as rebellions in Africa, do not have a set of military objectives in mind, usually because these rebel groups intend to commit war crimes against the civilian population. Thus, the lack of actual military goals can in itself be a reason that a forever war can occur. A very large defense budget may also be a factor in the transpiration of a forever war. As of 2018, the United States has an inflation-adjusted military budget that is greater than its budget for World War II, which enables it to fight continuously in Iraq and other countries.
Civil wars are prone to military stalemate which can prolong the war indefinitely. A lack of democracy is associated with an increased risk of civil war.
Forever wars can occur in order to keep money flowing into institutions, such as the military–industrial–congressional complex (MICC). Thus, forever wars can serve as domestic political engines, as policy makers promote policies of continuing and expanding wars.
Forever wars can be to the benefit of small armed groups, who may achieve political goals by wearing down a larger group or country. For example, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the beginning of the war on terror, Al-Qaeda aimed to involve the United States in a prolonged guerrilla war in Afghanistan, challenging its will to fight such a long war.
Wars between ethnic or ideological groups can become forever wars, as such wars are harder to end with a negotiated peace deal due to the different interests of the two sides. An additional barrier may arise in the case of religious wars if one or both parties believe that the other must be destroyed.
In current events: The concept of a perpetual war has been used since opposition to United States involvement in the Vietnam War. James Pinckney Harrison argues in The Endless War: Fifty Years of Struggle in Vietnam (1981) that the Vietnam War was "endless" due to the success of the communist revolution in nationalizing the people. The concept was used by Trần Văn Đôn, a general in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, in his book Our Endless War: Inside Vietnam (1978).
American historian James Chace argues in his book Endless War: How we got involved in Central America (1983) that US policy in Central America is based upon the assumption that US hegemony is threatened within the region. According to Chace, US involvement in Central America worked towards resisting the domino effect of the spread of a "communist take-over", largely through establishing the credibility of US military. Though these policies were meant to deter conflict, they themselves created the conditions for instability in the region, which furthered a US response. This resulted in a self-perpetuating, or "endless", loop. He additionally argues US investment in pursuing an expanding military presence in Central America reflects an endless preparation for war.
A key argument of Chace is that much of this military involvement stems from a logic of US paranoia in reaction to the Cuban Revolution. A similar argument is put forward by David Keen, political economist and Professor of Complex Emergencies at the London School of Economics. His book Endless War? Hidden Function of the 'War on Terror' (2006) argues that the United States' strategies and tactics in the war on terror use a "militaristic state-cased framework". This framework, though "counterproductive", has an "inner logic" and a "psychological function" of responding to the trauma of September 11 attacks.
Noam Chomsky posits that a state of perpetual war is an aid to (and is promoted by) the powerful members of dominant political and economic classes, helping maintain their positions of economic and political superiority.
British journalist Robert Fisk, a critic of Western policies in the Middle East, argues that recent Western conflicts against the Middle East, after the end of the Cold War, have been part of a new perpetual war. He suggests that former U.S. President George H. W. Bush launched attacks on Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan to distract the population from his domestic political problems. In addition, he claims that despite victorious claims after the first Gulf War that Saddam Hussein had been "defanged", he was again the target of Western attacks until his execution in 2006.
Similarly, Ted Koppel described the war on terror as "Our Children's Children's War". Critics of Western policies have used the term "perpetual war" in reference to non-military "wars", such as the "War on Drugs", "War on Poverty", "War on Cancer", Lou Dobbs's "War on the Middle Class", the "War on Terrorism", the "War on Women", or Bill O'Reilly's "War on Christmas".
In socioeconomics and politics: The economic make-up of the 5th century BC Athens-led Delian League also bears resemblance to the economic ramifications of preparing for perpetual war. Aspects of any given empire, such as the British Empire and its relation to its domestic businesses that were owned by a wealthy minority of individuals, such as the East India Company, the Hudson's Bay Company, and De Beers, manifest an observed relationship between a minority of individuals influencing Empire or State policy, such as the Child's War in India, the Anglo-Mysore Wars in India, the Anglo-French conflicts on Hudson Bay in Canada, and the Second Boer War in South Africa, follow a pattern where the Empire allocates resources pursuing and sustaining policies that financially profit the Empire's domestic business's owners.
Military–industrial complex: The concept of a military–industrial complex was first suggested by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the idea that military action can be seen as a form of market-creation goes back at least as far as speeches beginning in 1930 prior to the publication of War Is a Racket in 1935. On January 16, 1961, President Eisenhower delivered his farewell speech expressing great concern for the direction of the newfound armaments industry post-WWII. While recognizing the boom in economic growth after the war, he reminded the people of United States that this was a way of profiting off warfare and that if not regulated enough it could lead to the "grave" expansion of the armaments industry. For his warning of the thirst to profit from warfare through weapon production, Eisenhower coined the term "military industrial complex". He said, "The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist." Eisenhower feared that the military–industrial complex could lead to a state of perpetual war as the big armament industry will continue to profit from warfare. Additionally, NSC 68 can be used as a reference to understand U.S. President Harry S. Truman's reasoning for the continued build up the United States' nuclear arsenal and how this contributed to the Cold War. This concept is still present in today's policies as William D. Hartung states in his article "The Doctrine of Armed Exceptionalism".
War on terror: Traditionally, the term "war" referred to the physical and conventional act of engaging in armed conflict. However, the implications of what war entails has evolved over time. The war on terror has often been cited as a perpetual war, being a war with "no specific battlefield and the enemy isn’t an army." The war on terror has been directed at countless "enemies," as it has no clear target. Georgetown University Historian Bruce Hoffman describes traditional war as a war that "ends with the vanquishing of an opponent, with some form or armistice or truce- some kind of surrender instrument or document." In contrast, the war on terror continues with no end in sight.
The war on terror was declared in 2001 by President George W. Bush, following the September 11 attacks, but as early as 1996, Osama bin Laden of Al-Qaeda made a threat to the United States, by making a declaration of war. The growing tensions of the Middle East are suggested by Laurence Andrew Dobrot to be very wide cultural misunderstandings and faults the West for not making peace with the Middle East. As the deputy director for the Missile Defense Agency's Airborne Laser Program, Dobrot examines the hostility which has been continuous not only since 2001, but since the birth of Wahhabism.
Dobrot proposed that the U.S should recognize the cultural hostility of the tribal Arabs in order to make the first steps towards progression of making peace.
The Crusades arose as European expansion was growing at the peak of unified Islamic dominance. On September 16, 2001, in a speech, President Bush referred to the war on terror as a crusade. He said:
No one could have conceivably imagined suicide bombers burrowing into our society and then emerging all in the same day to fly their aircraft - fly U.S. aircraft into buildings full of innocent people - and show no remorse. This is a new kind of -- a new kind of evil. And we understand. And the American people are beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while. And the American people must be patient. I'm going to be patient.
Andrew Bacevich described Bush's naming of the war on terror as a crusade as something which does not make the war separate, rather something that shows that it is part of an "eternal war." |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Perpetual war | On September 16, 2001, in a speech, President Bush referred to the war on terror as a crusade. He said:
No one could have conceivably imagined suicide bombers burrowing into our society and then emerging all in the same day to fly their aircraft - fly U.S. aircraft into buildings full of innocent people - and show no remorse. This is a new kind of -- a new kind of evil. And we understand. And the American people are beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while. And the American people must be patient. I'm going to be patient.
Andrew Bacevich described Bush's naming of the war on terror as a crusade as something which does not make the war separate, rather something that shows that it is part of an "eternal war."
War memorials: With the advent of perpetual war, communities have begun to construct war memorials with names of the dead while the wars are ongoing. The Northwood Gratitude and Honor Memorial in Irvine, California was dedicated in 2010 to American troops who lost their lives in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, with space for 8,000 names (approximately 4,500 used at time of construction) and the intention to update it yearly.
Views of influential writers:
Sun Tzu: Ancient war advisor Sun Tzu expressed views in the 6th century BC about perpetual war. The following quotation from chapter 2, Waging War, of his book The Art of War suggests the negative impacts of prolonged war:
Sun Tzu said: ... When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men's weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength ... There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare ... In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
Alexis de Tocqueville: Historian Alexis de Tocqueville made predictions in 1840 concerning perpetual war in democratic countries. The following is from Volume 2, chapter 22, "Why Democratic Nations Naturally Desire Peace and Democratic Armies, War", 18th paragraph, in his book, Democracy in America:
No protracted war can fail to endanger the freedom of a democratic country. Not indeed that after every victory it is to be apprehended that the victorious generals will possess themselves by force of the supreme power, after the manner of Sulla and Caesar; the danger is of another kind. War does not always give over democratic communities to military government, but it must invariably and immeasurably increase the powers of civil government; it must almost compulsorily concentrate the direction of all men and the management of all things in the hands of the administration. If it does not lead to despotism by sudden violence, it prepares men for it more gently by their habits. All those who seek to destroy the liberties of a democratic nation ought to know that war is the surest and the shortest means to accomplish it. This is the first axiom of the science.
Fiction: In George Orwell's novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, the three superstates of the world, Eurasia, Oceania and Eastasia, are said to be in a perpetual state of war with each other. The attacks are in the form of rocket attacks (similar to the V2 Attacks on London in WW2) although it is implied in the book that the attacks could be launched by the home Government against their own people in order to perpetuate fear and hatred of the enemy. Therefore, perpetual war may in fact secretly be a strategy used by the state to continuously promote its own political agenda. However, the military attacks are limited to the non-aligned areas (North and Central Africa, India etc.), an example of this is The Malabar Front (India) where Oceania won a victory against Eurasia.
In the Doctor Who series Genesis of the Daleks, the Kaleds and the Thals are in a perpetual state of war and have been for 1000 years. This state of war finally results in both sides occupying one city each on either side of mountains, and leads to both sides supplies being so completely ravaged by the war that both sides have a collection of black powder weapons, modern and futuristic weapons and armour. It is out of this war that the Daleks are created by Davros.
Also in the Doctor Who series, the Sontarans and the Rutans have been in a perpetual state of war for over 50,000 years. There appears to be no end in sight, with each side continually attempting to completely obliterate the other. This has resulted in either side constantly gaining and losing territory (including the Milky Way galaxy, which is known in Doctor Who as the "Mutter's Spiral").
And again in Doctor Who in Destiny of the Daleks, the Daleks and the Movellans have basically been drawn into an Endless War, due to their battle computers both giving a logical set of orders, only to have one set countered by the other battle computer with an equally logical set of orders. As both sides are using logical instructions, neither side could win as both sides would be able to counter the advances of the other as both were using logic. The Daleks returned to Skaro to find Davros to see if he could give them an advantage. The Movellans tried to get the Doctor to give them the same advantage.
In the 2000AD series Rogue Trooper, the North (Norts) and South (Southers) of the Planet Nu-Earth, for hundreds of years, have been in a perpetual state of war against each other using conventional, biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. The length of the war as well as the weapons involved have turned the planet uninhabitable without protective suits. It was for this reason that the Southers created the GIs or Genetic Infantry which would be able to survive in the environment.
Joe Haldeman's The Forever War is about a war that is made perpetual due to the Einsteinian time dilation effects due to space travel. The novel is said to have been shaped by Haldeman's experience in the Vietnam War as the book contains references to the war paired up with sci-fi concepts. A quote by Haldeman shows great influence from Hobbes' concept of perpetual war, "Life begins in a bloody mess and sometimes it ends the same way, and only odd people seek out blood between those times, maybe crazy people."
In the original Star Trek episode "A Taste of Armageddon", the neighboring planets of Eminiar and Vendikar have been at war for 500 years. To avoid the physical devastation of an actual war, the belligerents agreed to conduct only computer-simulated attacks as long as the resulting "victims" voluntarily kill themselves in "disintegration stations".
The 2006 film Children of Men displays themes of perpetual war by exploring the wars on Terror and Poverty. The movie is set in a dystopia suffering universal infertility. The social and political world has become chaotic as few people exercise social power from their wealthy positions. Meanwhile, there is constant conflict all around the world, which specifically the oppressed group suffers. Manohla Dargis of The New York Times takes notice to the norm of bombs casually exploding in public places, such as a cafe. Dargis writes, "It imagines the unthinkable: What if instead of containing Iraq, the world has become Iraq, a universal battleground of military control, security zones, refugee camps and warring tribal identities?"
See also: Arab–Israeli conflict
Endemic warfare
Just war
List of ongoing armed conflicts
List of wars extended by diplomatic irregularity
Permanent war economy
Perpetual peace
Rogue state
Roman–Persian Wars, noted for being "never-ending" by classical authors
Si vis pacem, para bellum
Syrian civil war
The Report from Iron Mountain
War as metaphor
War Is a Racket
Notes:
References: Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, by Gore Vidal. Nation Books, 2002. ISBN 1-56025-405-X
Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, The Caxton Printers Ltd., 1953 - Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace
External links: Homeland Security: When The Phoenix Comes Home To Roost, by Douglas Valentine.
The Eternal War Parade, from Intervention Magazine.
The State, by Randolph Bourne – origin of the phrase, "war is the health of the state".
The War on Drugs as the Health of the State, by Bob Black.
The Doctrine of Armed Exceptionalism. by William Hartung. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Philosophy of war | Works about the philosophy of war: Perhaps the greatest and most influential work in the philosophy of war is Carl von Clausewitz's On War, published in 1832. It combines observations on strategy with questions about human nature and the purpose of war. Clausewitz especially examines the teleology of war: whether war is a means to an end outside itself or whether it can be an end in itself. He concludes that the latter cannot be so, and that war is "politics by different means"; i.e. that war must not exist only for its own sake. It must serve some purpose for the state.
Leo Tolstoy's 1869 novel War and Peace contains frequent philosophical digressions on the philosophy of war (and broader metaphysical speculations derived from Christianity and from Tolstoy's observations of the Napoleonic Wars). It was influential on later thought about war. Tolstoy's Christian-centered philosophy of war (especially his essays "A Letter to a Hindu" (1908) and "The Kingdom of God is Within You" (1894)) directly influenced Gandhi's Hinduism-centered non-violent resistance philosophy.
Writing in 1869, Genrikh Leer emphasized the favorable effects of war on nations: "[...] war emerges as a powerful tool in the matter of improving the internal, moral and material life of peoples [...]."
While Sun Tzu's The Art of War (5th century BCE), focuses mostly on weaponry and strategy instead of on philosophy, various commentators have broadened his observations into philosophies applied in situations extending well beyond war itself such as competition or management (see the main Wikipedia article on The Art of War for a discussion of the application of Sun Tzu's philosophy to areas other than war). In the early 16th century, parts of Niccolò Machiavelli's masterpiece The Prince (as well as his Discourses) and parts of Machiavelli's own work titled The Art of War discuss some philosophical points relating to war, though neither book could be said to be a work in the philosophy of war.
Just War Theory: The Indian Hindu epic, the Mahabharata, offers the first written discussions of a "just war" (dharma-yuddha or "righteous war"). In it, one of five ruling brothers (Pandavas) asks if the suffering caused by war can ever be justified. A long discussion then ensues between the siblings, establishing criteria like proportionality (chariots cannot attack cavalry, only other chariots; no attacking people in distress), just means (no poisoned or barbed arrows), just cause (no attacking out of rage), and fair treatment of captives and the wounded. The philosophy of just war theorizes what aspects of war are justifiable according to morally acceptable principles. Just war theory is based upon four core criteria to be followed by those determined to go to war. The four principles are as follows: just authority; just cause; right intention; last resort.
Just authority: The criterion of just authority refers to the determined legality of going to war, and whether the concept of war and the pursuit of it has been legally processed and justified.
Just cause: Just cause is a justifiable reason that war is the appropriate and necessary response. If war can be avoided, that must be determined first, according to the philosophy of just war theory.
Right intention: To go to war, one must determine if the intentions of doing so are right according to morality. Right intention criterion requires the determination of whether or not a war response is a measurable way to the conflict being acted upon.
Last resort: War is a last resort response, meaning that if there is a conflict between disagreeing parties, all solutions must be attempted before resorting to war.
Traditions of thought: Since the philosophy of war is often treated as a subset of another branch of philosophy (for example, political philosophy or the philosophy of law) it would be difficult to define any clear-cut schools of thought in the same sense that, e.g., Existentialism or Objectivism can be described as distinct movements. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy refers to Carl von Clausewitz as "the only (so-called) philosopher of war", implying that he is the only (major) philosophical writer who develops a philosophical system focusing exclusively on war. However, discernible traditions of thought on war have developed over time, so that some writers have been able to distinguish broad categories (if somewhat loosely).
Teleological categories: Anatol Rapoport's introduction to his edition of the J. J. Graham translation of Clausewitz's On War identifies three main teleological traditions in the philosophy of war: the cataclysmic, the eschatological, and the political. (On War, Rapoport's introduction, 13). These are not the only possible teleological philosophies of war, but only three of the most common. As Rapoport says,
The Cataclysmic school of thought, which was espoused by Leo Tolstoy in his epic novel War and Peace, sees war as a bane on humanity – whether avoidable or inevitable – which serves little purpose outside of causing destruction and suffering, and which may cause drastic change to society, but not in any teleological sense. Tolstoy's view may be placed under the subcategory of global cataclysmic philosophy of war. Another subcategory of the cataclysmic school of thought is the ethnocentric cataclysmic, in which this view is focused specifically on the plight of a specific ethnicity or nation, for example the view in Judaism of war as a punishment from God on the Israelites in certain books of the Tenakh (Old Testament). As the Tenakh (in certain books) sees war as an ineluctable act of God, so Tolstoy especially emphasizes war as something that befalls man and is in no way under the influence of man's "free will", but is instead the result of irresistible global forces. (On War, Rapoport's introduction 16)
The Eschatological school of thought sees all wars (or all major wars) as leading to some goal, and asserts that some final conflict will someday resolve the path followed by all wars and result in a massive upheaval of society and a subsequent new society free from war (in varying theories the resulting society may be either a utopia or a dystopia). There are two subsets of this view: the Messianic and the Global theory. The Marxist concept of a communist world ruled by the proletariat after a final worldwide revolution is an example of the global theory, and the Christian concept of an Armageddon war which will usher in the second coming of Christ and the final defeat of Satan is an example of a theory that could fall under Global or Messianic. (On War, Rapoport's introduction, 15) The messianic eschatological philosophy is derived from the Jewish-Christian concept of a Messiah, and sees wars as culminating in unification of humanity under a single faith or a single ruler. Crusades, Jihads, the Nazi concept of a Master Race and the 19th century American concept of Manifest Destiny may also fall under this heading. (On War, Rapoport's introduction, 15) (See main articles for more information: Christian eschatology, Jewish eschatology)
The Political school of thought, of which Clausewitz was a proponent, sees war as a tool of the state. On page 13 Rapoport says,
Clausewitz views war as a rational instrument of national policy. The three words "rational", "instrument" and "national" are the key concepts of his paradigm. In this view, the decision to wage war "ought" to be rational, in the sense that it ought to be based on estimated costs and gains of war. Next, war "ought" to be instrumental, in the sense that it ought to be waged in order to achieve some goal, never for its own sake; and also in the sense that strategy and tactics ought to be directed towards just one end, namely towards victory. Finally, war "ought" to be national, in the sense that its objective should be to advance the interests of a national state and that the entire effort of the nation ought to be mobilized in the service of the military objective.
He later characterizes the philosophy behind the Vietnam War and other Cold War conflicts as "Neo-Clausewitzian". Rapoport also includes Machiavelli as an early example of the political philosophy of war (On War, Rapoport's introduction, 13). Decades after his essay, the War on Terrorism and the Iraq War begun by the United States under President George W. Bush in 2001 and 2003 have often been justified under the doctrine of preemption, a political motivation stating that the United States must use war to prevent further attacks such as the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Ethical categories: Another possible system for categorizing different schools of thought on war can be found in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (see external links, below), based on ethics. The SEP describes three major divisions in the ethics of war: the realist, the pacifist, and the just war Theory. In a nutshell:
Realists will typically hold that systems of morals and ethics which guide individuals within societies cannot realistically be applied to societies as a whole to govern the way they, as societies, interact with other societies. Hence, a state's purposes in war is simply to preserve its national interest. This kind of thinking is similar to Machiavelli's philosophy, and Thucydides and Hobbes may also fall under this category. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Philosophy of war | Ethical categories: Another possible system for categorizing different schools of thought on war can be found in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (see external links, below), based on ethics. The SEP describes three major divisions in the ethics of war: the realist, the pacifist, and the just war Theory. In a nutshell:
Realists will typically hold that systems of morals and ethics which guide individuals within societies cannot realistically be applied to societies as a whole to govern the way they, as societies, interact with other societies. Hence, a state's purposes in war is simply to preserve its national interest. This kind of thinking is similar to Machiavelli's philosophy, and Thucydides and Hobbes may also fall under this category.
Pacifism however, maintains that a moral evaluation of war is possible, and that war is always found to be immoral. Generally, there are two kinds of modern secular pacifism to consider: (1) a more consequentialist form of pacifism (or CP), which maintains that the benefits accruing from war can never outweigh the costs of fighting it; and (2) a more deontological form of pacifism (or DP), which contends that the very activity of war is intrinsically wrong, since it violates foremost duties of justice, such as not killing human beings. Eugene Victor Debs and others were famous advocates of pacifistic diplomatic methods instead of war. In the late twentieth century social philosophers such as Robert L. Holmes also strove within the halls of academe to apply both theoretical forms of secular pacifism within the context of modern forms of warfare including nuclear war and terrorism.
Just war theory, along with pacifism, holds that morals do apply to war. However, unlike pacifism, according to just war theory it is possible for a war to be morally justified. The concept of a morally justified war underlies much of the concept international law, such as the Geneva Conventions. Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius are among the philosophers who have espoused some form of a just war philosophy. One common just war theory evaluation of war is that war is only justified if 1.) waged in a state or nation's self-defense, or 2.) waged in order to end gross violations of human rights. Political philosopher John Rawls advocated these criteria as justification for war.
See also:
References: Notes
Bibliography
Clausewitz, Carl von, On War. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1968. J. J. Graham translation, 1908. Anatol Rapoport, editor. Introduction and notes (c) Anatol Rapoport, 1968
Further reading
Chanakya, Arthashastra [1], especially Book X "Relating to War". Discusses war along with philosophical/religious observations about sacrifice derived from Vedic scripture.
Heindel, Max, The Rosicrucian Philosophy in Questions and Answers - Volume II (The Philosophy of War, World War I reference, ed. 1918), ISBN 0-911274-90-1. Describing a philosophy of war from the point of view of the Rosicrucian Fellowship.
Holmes, Robert L. On War and Morality (Princeton University Press, 1989) -A robust philosophical defense of Pacifism which analyzes the ethical limitations inherent in Just War theories.
Rawls, John, The Law of Peoples. A discussion of international law in the context of political liberalism which argues against the Clausewitzian conception of war between wholly autonomous states, seeking to replace it with a conception of a "fair and just" international society of peoples adhering to principles of international law.
External links: "War" entry by Seth Lazar in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Alexander Moseley. "The Philosophy of War". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Pike and shot | Origin: By the 16th century, late-medieval troop types that had proven most successful in the Hundred Years' War, Burgundian Wars and the late phase of the Reconquista, dominated European warfare, especially the heavily armoured gendarme (a professional version of the medieval knight), the Swiss, the Spanish Tercio and the Landsknecht mercenary pikemen. The emerging artillery corps of heavy cannons was a rapidly improving technology.
Emperor Maximilian I opposed the French armies in the War of the Burgundian Succession and the Italian wars and established the Landsknechte units. Many of their tactics were adapted from the Swiss mercenaries, but the use of firearms was added. The firearms, in conjunction with the pike formations, gave the Imperials a tactical edge over the French. Those pike and shot regiments were recruited in Germany, Austria, and Tyrol.
In 1495 at the Battle of Seminara, the hitherto successful Spanish army was trounced while opposing the French invasion of Naples by an army composed of armoured gendarme cavalry and Swiss mercenary infantry. The chastened Spanish undertook a thorough reorganization of their army and tactics under the great captain Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba ("El Gran Capitán"). Realizing that he could not match the sheer offensive power of the French gendarmes and Swiss pikes, he took advantage of the shooting power of firearms, an emerging technology at the time, with the defensive strength of the pike, and to employ them in a mutually-supporting formation, preferably in a strong defensive position. At first, this mixed infantry formation was referred to as a colunella ("colonelcy"), and was commanded by a colonel. It interspersed formations of men in close order armed with the pike and looser formations armed with the firearm, initially the arquebus. They reappeared during the conquest of Granada with "El Gran Capitán". The arquebusiers could shoot down their foes, and could then run to the nearby pikemen for shelter if enemy cavalry or pikes drew near. This was especially necessary because the firearms of the early 16th century were inaccurate, took a very long time to load and only had a short range, meaning the shooters were often only able to get off a few shots before the enemy was upon them.
This new tactic resulted in triumph for the Spanish and Fernández de Córdoba's colunellas at the Battle of Cerignola, one of the great victories of the Italian Wars, in which the heavily outnumbered Spanish pike-and-shot forces, in a strong defensive position, crushed the attacking gendarmes and Swiss mercenaries of the French army.
History:
Ratios: The proportion of melee weapons to shot varied depending on the state and era, as did the exact weapons used. In general, the later the date, the more prominent firearms were. Due to this, the role of the pike changed over time. In the late 15th century and the first half of the 16th, the pike was an offensive weapon; by the end of the 16th and into the 17th, its niche was primarily defensive, though this did not preclude fights between pikemen. The push of pike became rare and battles were increasingly resolved by shooting. Directly linked to this was halberds becoming less common, as their primary role in breaking the push became less relevant and their secondary role (repulsing cavalry) was better filled by more pikes: the French regulars abandoned the halberd in 1568 (aside from NCOs), and the Dutch not long after, while the Spanish army, as well as those of various Holy Roman Empire states, would continue to use the halberd in limited numbers into the mid-17th century (the English used the similar billhook). The predominance of shooting was not a universal advancement, however. For example, in the Wars of Religion of the 1560s and 1570s, 54% of wounds suffered by French soldiers were inflicted by swords, these being the most common weapons on the battlefield as pikemen, halberdiers, arquebusiers, musketeers, and cavalry all carried them as sidearms.
In 1471, the Burgundian State organized its army into 1,250 lances of nine men each, thus its forces were 2/8 heavy cavalry (men-at-arms and sergeants), 3/8 mounted archers (who also carried hand weapons and could fight dismounted), 1/8 pikemen, 1/8 crossbowmen, and 1/8 handgunners; the last man in each lance was a noncombatant page.
The Black Army of Hungary was one of the first forces to use the arquebus to a large degree. In its 1477 to 1488 wars, 25 percent of its soldiers had firearms (both arquebuses and more primitive handgonnes), an unusually high ratio for the time. The average in Europe by the end of the 15th century was that 10 percent of the infantry were equipped with firearms.
According to a Castilian ordinance for "people of war" of 1497, Spanish foot soldiers were divided into three categories. One-third of the infantry carried pikes; one-third had swords and shields; and the final one-third consisted of crossbowmen and gunmen. It is in this configuration that the Spanish army won the first Italian Wars. In preparation for the Third Italian War of 1502 to 1504, Spanish general Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba set his companies at 50% pikes, 33% swords and shields, and 17% arquebuses. This ratio was flexible and could be changed as tactics required. The Battle of Cerignola, which demonstrated the power of the arqebus, had the Spanish army roughly following this ratio, with the infantry being 25% arquebusiers.
Following its 1506 military reforms, Florence had an army armed 70% with pikes, 10% with muskets, and the remaining 20% with halberds, hog-spears, or other close-combat weapons.
In 1515 the Black Band's companies consisted of 70% pikes, 12% arquebuses, 12% two-handed swords, and 6% halberds. For landsknechts in general, the usual arrangement was that one Fähnlein, the standard unit, had 400 men, of whom 300 were pikemen (75%), 50 were arquebusiers (12.5%), and 50 were halberdiers or two-handed swordsmen (12.5%). Arquebusiers, halberdiers, and swordsmen all received double pay compared to pikemen.
The Spanish army standardized the tercio arrangement in 1534. At this time a tercio was 14 companies of two types. The first type, numbering twelve per tercio, had 219 pikemen and 20 musketeers. The second, comprising the remaining 2, had 224 arquebusiers and 15 musketeers. Thus, at full strength a tercio had 2,628 pikemen (77%), 448 arquebusiers (14%), and 300 musketeers (9%). However in practice, muster rolls showed that tercios averaged 1,500-strong and had a ratio of 31% shot to 69% pikes. The musketeers used a particularly heavy firearm which fired balls twice the size of an arquebus's.
In Venice the proportions were first fixed in 1548, at 10% halberds, 30% arquebuses, and 60% pikes. French contracts of 1562 simply specified 33% of arquebusiers. For the English 1571-2 campaign in France the recommended balance in newly formed companies was 6% halberds, 20% muskets, 34% arquebuses, and 40% pikes; this was adjusted in 1589 to 10% halberds, 30% pikes and 60% unspecified firearms. By 1600 France set a 1:1 ratio of pikes to firearms, and Spain 10% halberds, 30% pikes, 25% muskets, and 35% arquebuses. In 1560, following an order to increase the proportion of firearms, Spanish units in Italy became 54% pikes and 46% firearms. The Spanish average throughout the 16th century was 2 pikes for every 1 firearm.
In the 1570s the standard infantry company in Dutch service (whether they be Dutch or foreign hires such as Germans and English) had about 150 men, including 4 officers (a captain, lieutenant, quartermaster, and barber-surgeon), 5 NCOs (two sergeants and three corporals), 15 musketeers, 65 arquebusiers, 45 pikemen, 12 halberdiers and targeteers, and 3 musicians (two fifers and a drummer). A study of a selection of Dutch companies from 1587, standardized by William of Orange, showed 34% pikes, 9% halberds, 5% swords and bucklers, and 52% firearms. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Pike and shot | The Spanish average throughout the 16th century was 2 pikes for every 1 firearm.
In the 1570s the standard infantry company in Dutch service (whether they be Dutch or foreign hires such as Germans and English) had about 150 men, including 4 officers (a captain, lieutenant, quartermaster, and barber-surgeon), 5 NCOs (two sergeants and three corporals), 15 musketeers, 65 arquebusiers, 45 pikemen, 12 halberdiers and targeteers, and 3 musicians (two fifers and a drummer). A study of a selection of Dutch companies from 1587, standardized by William of Orange, showed 34% pikes, 9% halberds, 5% swords and bucklers, and 52% firearms. Bucklers disappeared from the ranks by the end of the 16th century, as did halberds except in the hands of NCOs and bodyguards.
In 1588, the English Trained Bands consisted of 36% arquebusiers, 6% musketeers, 16% bowmen, 26% pikemen, and 16% billmen. Lansdowne MS 56, attributed to Lord Burghley, states that ideally infantry formations should consist of 50% shot, 30% pikes, and 20% billhooks.
In 1571 the Ming Chinese general Qi Jiguang wrote a military manual outlining his ideal compositions for military formations. In regards to missile weapons, an infantry brigade of 2,699 men was to be equipped with 1,080 matchlock arquebuses and 216 bows (40% firearms). A cavalry brigade of 2,988 men was to be equipped with 1,152 bows, 432 arquebuses, and 60 "crouching tigers", miniature bombards loaded with one hundred pellets each, essentially 21.6 kg blunderbusses (20% firearms). A wagon brigade of 3,109 men was equipped with 145 wagons, 256 swivel guns manned by two men each, and 512 arquebuses (33% firearms), plus eight proper cannons. On paper these were roughly in line with contemporary European rates but it is not known if these proportions were ever reached in practice.
In 1601, Spanish regiments in the Low Countries were 44% pikes and 56% muskets and arquebuses. German ones had far fewer firearms, with 79% pikes to 21% arquebuses and muskets. Proportions changed, and by 1625 the field infantry of the German Catholic League were 58% muskets and arquebuses, 36% pikes, and 6% halberds; this changed again in 1627 to 65% muskets, 20% pikes, and 15% halberds. The ideal field ratio often deviated from the usual combat experience; skirmishes, sieges, and minor actions were far more common than large pitched battles, and pikes were not as useful in these engagements due to the pike's low value as a personal weapon (indeed, in the English Civil Wars, only 15% of battle deaths occurred in major battles, whereas nearly half occurred in battles with fewer than 250 total casualties). In 1632, the Spanish army standardized their infantry companies at 68% arquebuses and muskets and 32% pikes.
Contemporary Japanese units, while heavily focused on firearms by East Asian standards, had higher ratios of other weapons to arquebuses compared to late 16th to early 17th century European formations. When Japan invaded Korea in 1592, 30% of Japanese soldiers had firearms, and the rest were equipped with pikes, swords, and bows. Firearms usage declined after 1603.
In 1618–1629, the pike to shot ratio fluctuated between 1 and 2 muskets per pike for various Western European armies. 1631–1632 saw an increased proportion of firearms, with some formations being more than 80% gunmen. The standard in the Imperial Army of the Holy Roman Empire in 1641 was 66% muskets and 33% pikes. As pike-on-pike clashes became less common in field battles, so did armor. By 1660 body armor had mostly disappeared in pike and shot formations; the pikes themselves had also shortened, from 18 feet to 13 feet. During the English Civil Wars (1642–1651), both sides preferred 2 guns to 1 pike, though this ratio was flexible.
At the 1683 Battle of Vienna, the Imperial Army had set its infantry companies at 61% firearms, 33% pikes, and 6% shieldmen. The English army of the Nine Years War in the 1690s still had 2 muskets for every 1 pike. Meanwhile, by 1687, the French army's ratio was set at 75–80% muskets and 20–25% pikes.
At the start of the Great Northern War in 1700, Russian line infantry companies were 83% muskets and 17% pikes. The musketeers were initially equipped with sword-like plug bayonets; they did not fully switch to socket bayonets until 1709. A Swedish infantry company at the start of the war consisted of 66% muskets and 33% pikes. While they all carried swords, Swedish musketeers were not completely equipped with bayonets until 1704.
The rapidly rising percentage of firearms spurred by pike-and-shot battles, until reaching near-100% by the 18th century, was generally not mirrored in non-European countries that did not adopt such tactics. Nor was the proliferation of the flintlock; matchlocks remained the most common firearms in India, China, and Southeast Asia until about the mid-19th century due to being far less complicated to manufacture. For example, by the mid-17th century, only 10–13% of Javanese soldiers used firearms, and by the 1680s, 20% of Thai soldiers used firearms. By 1825, 50% of Burmese soldiers had firearms, and as late as 1858, only 15% of the Vietnamese soldiers summoned to fight the Cochinchina campaign had firearms. By the 1840s, only 30–40% of Chinese soldiers had firearms (all matchlocks), the rest being armed with spears, swords, and bows.
Spanish and Imperial developments: The armies of Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Spain, further developed the pike and shot formation. The front line of Charles' German Landsknechte consisted of doppelsöldner, renowned for their use of arquebus and zweihänder during the Italian wars. The Spanish colunellas continued to show valuable flexibility as the Italian Wars progressed, and the Spanish string of battlefield successes continued. The colunellas were eventually replaced by the tercios in the 1530s by order of Charles. The tercios were originally made up of one-third pikemen, one-third arquebusiers and one-third swordsmen. Tercios were administrative organizations and were in charge of up to 3000 soldiers. These were divided into ten companies that were deployed in battle. These companies were further subdivided into small units that could be deployed individually or brought together to form great battle formations that were sometimes called "Spanish squares".
As these squares matured in usage during the 16th century, they generally took on the appearance of a "bastioned square" – that is, a large square with smaller square "bastions" at each corner. The large square in the center was made up of the pikemen, 56 files across and 22 ranks deep. The outer edges of the central pike square were lined with a thin rank of arquebusiers totaling 250 men. At each corner of this great pike square were the smaller squares of arquebusiers, called mangas (sleeves), each 240 men strong. Finally, two groups in open order, each of 90 men and armed with the longer musket, were placed in front of, and to the sides of, the arquebusiers.
Normal attrition of combat units (including sickness and desertion) and the sheer lack of men usually led to the tercios being far smaller in practice than the numbers above suggest but the roughly 1:1 ratio of pikemen to shooters was generally maintained. The tercios for all armies were usually of 1,000 to 2,000 men, although even these numbers could be reduced by the conditions already mentioned. Tercio-type formations were also used by other powers, chiefly in the Germanic areas of the Holy Roman Empire.
To modern eyes the tercio square seems cumbersome and wasteful of men, many of the soldiers being positioned so that they could not bring their weapons to bear against the enemy. However, in a time when firearms were short-ranged and slow to load, it had its benefits. It offered great protection against cavalry – still the dominant fast-attack arm on the battlefield – and was extremely sturdy and difficult to defeat. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Pike and shot | Normal attrition of combat units (including sickness and desertion) and the sheer lack of men usually led to the tercios being far smaller in practice than the numbers above suggest but the roughly 1:1 ratio of pikemen to shooters was generally maintained. The tercios for all armies were usually of 1,000 to 2,000 men, although even these numbers could be reduced by the conditions already mentioned. Tercio-type formations were also used by other powers, chiefly in the Germanic areas of the Holy Roman Empire.
To modern eyes the tercio square seems cumbersome and wasteful of men, many of the soldiers being positioned so that they could not bring their weapons to bear against the enemy. However, in a time when firearms were short-ranged and slow to load, it had its benefits. It offered great protection against cavalry – still the dominant fast-attack arm on the battlefield – and was extremely sturdy and difficult to defeat. It was very hard to isolate or outflank and destroy a tercio by maneuver due to its great depth and distribution of firepower to all sides (as opposed to the maximization of combat power in the frontal arc as adopted by later formations). The individual units of pikemen and musketeers were not fixed and were re-ordered during battle to defend a wing or to bring greater fire power or pikes to bear in a certain direction. Finally, its depth meant that it could run over shallower formations in a close assault – that is, should the slow-moving tercio manage to strike the enemy line.
Armies using the tercio generally intended to field them in brigades of at least three tercios, with one in the front and two behind, the rearward formations echeloned off on either side so that all three resembled a stepped pyramid. The word tercio means "a third" (that is, one third of the whole brigade). This entire formation would be flanked by cavalry. The musketeers, and those arquebusiers whose shooting was not blocked by friendly forces, were supposed to keep up a continuous fire by rotation. This led to a fairly slow rate of advance, estimated by modern writers at roughly 60 meters a minute. Movement of such seemingly unwieldy groups of soldiers was difficult but well-trained and experienced tercios were able to move and manoeuvre with surprising facility and to great advantage over less-experienced opponents. They would be co-ordinated with each other in a way that often caught attacking infantry or cavalry with fire coming from different directions from two or more of these strong infantry squares.
The French failure to keep pace: The great rivals of the Spanish/Habsburg Empire, the Kings of France, had access to a smaller and poorly organized force of pike and shot. The French military establishment showed considerably less interest in shot as a native troop type than did the Spanish until the end of the sixteenth century, and continued to prefer close combat arms, particularly heavy cavalry, as the decisive force in their armies until the French Wars of Religion; this despite the desire of King Francis I to establish his own pike and shot contingents after the Battle of Pavia, in which he was defeated and captured. Francis had declared the establishment of the French "Legions" in the 1530s, large infantry formations of 6,000 men which were roughly composed of 60% pikemen, 30% arquebusiers and 10% Halberdiers. These legions were raised regionally, one in each of Normandy, Languedoc, Champagne and Picardy. Detachments of around 1,000 men could be sent off to separate duty, but in practice the Legions were initially little more than an ill-disciplined rabble and a failure as a battlefield force, and as such were soon relegated to garrison duty until they matured in the seventeenth century.
In practice, pike and shot formations that the French used on the sixteenth-century battlefield were often of an ad hoc nature, the large blocks of Swiss mercenary, Landsknecht, or, to a lesser extent, French pikemen being supported at times by bands of mercenary adventurer shot, largely Gascons and Italians. (The Swiss and Landsknechts also had their own small contingents of arquebusiers, usually comprising not more than 10–20% of their total force. The French were also late to adopt the musket, the first reference to their use being at the end of the 1560s—twenty years after its use by the Spanish, Germans and Italians.
This was essentially the condition of the French Royal infantry throughout the French Wars of Religion that occupied most of the latter sixteenth century, and when their Huguenot foes had to improvise a native infantry force, it was largely made up of arquebusiers with few if any pikes (other than the large blocks of Landsknechts they sometimes hired), rendering formal pike and shot tactics impossible.
In the one great battle fought in the sixteenth century between the French and their Imperial rivals after the Spanish and Imperial adoption of the tercio, the Battle of Ceresole, the Imperial pike and shot formations shot down attacking French gendarmes, defending themselves with the pike when surviving heavy cavalry got close. Although the battle was ultimately lost by the Spanish and Imperial forces, it demonstrated the self-sufficiency of the mixed pike and shot formations, something sorely lacking in the French armies of the day.
Dutch reforms: Foremost amongst the enemies of the Spanish Habsburg empire in the late 16th century were the Seven Provinces of the Netherlands (often retroactively known as the "Dutch"), who fought a long war of independence from Spanish control starting in 1568. After soldiering on for years with a polyglot army of foreign-supplied troops and mercenaries, the Dutch took steps to reform their armies starting in 1590 under their captain-general, Maurice of Nassau, who had read ancient military treatises extensively.
In addition to standardizing drill, weapon caliber, pike length, and so on, Maurice turned to his readings in classical military doctrine to establish smaller, more flexible combat formations than the ponderous regiments and tercios which then presided over open battle. Each Dutch battalion was to be 550 men strong, similar to the size of the ancient Roman legionary 480-man cohort described by Vegetius. Although inspired by the Romans, Maurice's soldiers carried the weapons of their day—250 were pikemen and the remaining 300 were arquebusiers and musketeers, 60 of the shot serving as a skirmish screen in front of the battalion, the rest forming up in two equal bodies, one on either side of the pikemen. Two or more of these battalions were to form the regiment, which was thus theoretically 1,100 men or stronger, but unlike the tercio, the regiment had the battalions as fully functional sub-units, each of mixed pike and shot which could, and generally did, operate independently, or could support each other closely.
These battalions were fielded much less deep than the infantry squares of the Spanish, the pikemen being generally described as five to ten ranks deep, the shot eight to twelve ranks. In this way, fewer musketeers were left inactive in the rear of the formation, as was the case with tercios which deployed in a bastioned-square.
Maurice called for a deployment of his battalions in three offset lines, each line giving the one in front of it close support by means of a checkerboard formation, another similarity to Roman military systems, in this case the Legion's Quincunx deployment.
In the end, Maurice's armies depended primarily on defensive siege warfare to wear down the Spanish attempting to wrest control of the heavily fortified towns of the Seven Provinces, rather than risking the loss of all through open battle. On the rare occasion that open battle occurred, this reformed army, as many reformed armies have done in the past, behaved variably, running from the Spanish tercios one day, fighting those same tercios only a few days later, at the Battle of Nieuwpoort, and crushing them. Maurice's reforms are more famous for the effect they had on others—taken up and perfected, and would be put to the test on the battlefields of the seventeenth century.
Swedish innovations: After bad experiences with the classic tercios formations in Poland, Gustav II Adolf decided to reorganize his battlefield formations, initially adopting the "Dutch formations", but then adding a number of innovations of his own.
He started by re-arranging the formations to be thinner, typically only four to six ranks deep, spreading them out horizontally into rectangles instead of squares. This further maximized the number of musketeers near the front of the formation. Additionally he introduced the practice of volley fire, where all of the gunners in the ranks would fire at the same time. This was intended to bring down as many members of the opposing force's front line as possible, causing ranks moving up behind them to trip and fall as they were forced forward by the ranks further back. Finally, he embedded four small "infantry guns" into each battalion, allowing them to move about independently and not suffer from a lack of cannon fire if they became detached.
Gustav also placed detached musketeers in small units among the cavalry. In traditional deployments the infantry would be deployed in the middle with cavalry on both sides, protecting the flanks. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Pike and shot | He started by re-arranging the formations to be thinner, typically only four to six ranks deep, spreading them out horizontally into rectangles instead of squares. This further maximized the number of musketeers near the front of the formation. Additionally he introduced the practice of volley fire, where all of the gunners in the ranks would fire at the same time. This was intended to bring down as many members of the opposing force's front line as possible, causing ranks moving up behind them to trip and fall as they were forced forward by the ranks further back. Finally, he embedded four small "infantry guns" into each battalion, allowing them to move about independently and not suffer from a lack of cannon fire if they became detached.
Gustav also placed detached musketeers in small units among the cavalry. In traditional deployments the infantry would be deployed in the middle with cavalry on both sides, protecting the flanks. Battles would often open with the cavalry attacking their counterparts in an effort to drive them off, thereby opening the infantry to a cavalry charge from the side. An attempt to do this against his new formations would be met with volley fire, perhaps not dangerous on its own, but giving the Swedish cavalry a real advantage before the two forces met. Under normal conditions detached musketeers without pikemen would be easy targets for the enemy cavalry, but if they did close to sabre range, the Swedish cavalry would be a more immediate concern.
The effect of these changes was profound. Gustav had been largely ignored by most of Europe after his mixed results in Poland, and when he arrived in Germany in 1630 he was not immediately challenged. He managed to build up a force of 24,000 regulars and was joined by a force of 18,000 Saxons of questionable quality under von Arnim. Battle was first joined in major form when Johann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly turned his undefeated 31,000-man veteran army to do battle, meeting Gustav at the Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631. Battle opened in traditional fashion, with Tilly's cavalry moving forward to attack the flanks. This drove off the Saxons on the one flank, but on the other Gustav's new combined cavalry/musket force drove off any attempt to charge. With one flank now open Tilly nevertheless had a major positional advantage, but Gustav's smaller and lighter units were able to easily re-align to face the formerly open flank, their light guns cutting into their ranks while the heavier guns on both sides continued to exchange fire elsewhere. Tilly was soon driven from the field, his forces in disarray.
Follow-up battles had similar outcomes, and Tilly was eventually mortally wounded during one of these. By the end of 1632 Gustav controlled much of Germany. His successes were short-lived however, as the opposing Imperial forces quickly adopted similar tactics. From this point on pike and shot formations gradually spread out into ever-wider rectangles to maximize firepower of the muskets. Formations became more flexible, with more firepower and independence of action.
Outside of Europe: Meanwhile in East Asia, the utility of pike and shot style formations were still being tested. The Japanese army in the Imjin War supported their gunmen (25–30% of their initial force) with spear and bow levies, but the pike was not as emphasized as it was in contemporary Europe due to the lack of a large cavalry threat in either Japan or Korea. At the 1619 Battle of Sarhū, the Koreans (drawing on lessons from 1592 to 1598) deployed an all-shot formation (10,000 arquebusiers and 3,000 archers) using volley fire against the cavalry-heavy Manchus. The arquebusiers inflicted many losses on the Manchus, but were routed. This prompted a revision of military tactics in Korea. After the defeat at Sarhū, the Joseon forces revised their doctrine to have spearmen supporting the arquebusiers to better withstand shock cavalry. The new Korean force was tested against the Manchus again in 1627 and 1636–1637. Both times, they were defeated, but their performance left a strong impression on the Manchus. The first emperor of the newly declared Qing dynasty later wrote: "The Koreans are incapable on horseback but do not transgress the principles of the military arts. They excel at infantry fighting."
Decline: After the mid-seventeenth century, armies that standardized the adoption of the flintlock musket began to abandon the pike altogether (flintlocks and proto-flintlocks, such as the miquelet lock, had been in use since the mid-16th century, but remained less common than matchlocks until the late 17th), or to greatly decrease their numbers. A bayonet could be affixed to the musket, turning it into a spear, and the musket's firepower was now so deadly that combat was often decided by shooting alone. Moreover, the flintlock could be loaded and fired approximately twice as fast as the matchlock, and misfired far less. The abandonment of the pike, together with the faster firing rate made possible by the standardization of the flintlock musket and paper cartridge, resulted in the abandonment of the deeper formations of troops more ideal for the melee-oriented pikemen. Military thinking switched to shallower lines that maximized the firepower of an infantry formation. By one calculation, a formation equipped entirely with mid-18th century flintlocks could output ten times as many shots in an equivalent period of time as a typical early 17th century pike and shot formation equipped with matchlocks (pike:shot ratio of 3:2), enormously changing the tactical calculus of the infantry's armament. From 1688 to 1696, 3 out of every 5 Austrian and British soldiers had a flintlock musket, the rest mostly had matchlocks.
After the Battle of Rocroi fought on 19 May 1643, the Spanish abandoned the Tercio system and adopted the line infantry doctrine used by the French. A common end date for the use of the pike in infantry formations is 1700, although some armies such as the Prussians had already abandoned the pike decades prior, whereas others such as the Swedish and Russians continued to use it for several decades afterward—the Swedes of King Charles XII in particular were using it to great effect until 1721. The Army of the Holy Roman Empire officially stopped using pikemen in 1699. It had been progressively phasing out both pikes and lances since the Thirty Years War. Following Montecuccoli's reforms in the 1660s, the paper strength of an Imperial infantry company was 48 pikemen, 88 musketeers, and 8 shieldmen. The Imperial Army used this configuration during the Great Turkish War, most famously at the Battle of Vienna, where flintlock muskets were outnumbered by matchlocks (the flintlock would not enter regular service until 1699). During the same conflict, the Polish-Lithuanian army also made extensive use of pikes. In 1703, the French army also discontinued the use of the pike, followed in 1704 by the British and in 1708 by the Dutch. Between 1699 and 1721, Peter I converted almost all Russian foot-regiments to line infantry.
Even later, the obsolete pike would still find a use in such countries as Ireland, Russia, and China, generally in the hands of desperate peasant rebels who did not have access to firearms. One attempt to resurrect the pike as a primary infantry weapon occurred during the American Civil War when the Confederate States of America planned to recruit twenty regiments of pikemen in 1862. In April 1862 it was authorized that every Confederate infantry regiment would include two companies of pikemen, a plan supported by Robert E. Lee. Many pikes were produced but were never used in battle and the plan to include pikemen in the army was abandoned.
External links: The Pike & Shot Society, a society devoted to study of the period
References:
Arfaioli, Maurizio. The Black Bands of Giovanni: Infantry and Diplomacy During the Italian Wars (1526–1528). Pisa: Pisa University Press, Edizioni Plus, 2005. ISBN 88-8492-231-3.
Baumgartner, Frederic J. The French Reluctance to Adopt Firearms Technology in the Early Modern Period, in The Heirs of Archimedes: Science and the Art of War Through the Age of Enlightenment, eds Brett D. Steele and Tamera Dorland. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005.
Baumgartner, Frederic J. France in the Sixteenth Century. New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.
Oman, Charles. A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century. London: Methuen & Co., 1937.
Jorgensen, Christer (et al.). Fighting Techniques of the Early Modern World: Equipment, Combat Skills, and Tactics. New York, New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2006.
Schürger, André. The Battle of Lützen: an examination of 17th century military material culture. University of Glasgow, 2015 [1]
Taylor, Frederick Lewis. The Art of War in Italy, 1494–1529. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Pike and shot | Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005.
Baumgartner, Frederic J. France in the Sixteenth Century. New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.
Oman, Charles. A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century. London: Methuen & Co., 1937.
Jorgensen, Christer (et al.). Fighting Techniques of the Early Modern World: Equipment, Combat Skills, and Tactics. New York, New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2006.
Schürger, André. The Battle of Lützen: an examination of 17th century military material culture. University of Glasgow, 2015 [1]
Taylor, Frederick Lewis. The Art of War in Italy, 1494–1529. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973. ISBN 0-8371-5025-6. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Pincer movement | Description: A full pincer movement leads to the attacking army facing the enemy in front, on both flanks, and in the rear. If attacking pincers link up in the enemy's rear, the enemy is encircled. Such battles often end in surrender or destruction of the enemy force, but the encircled force can try to break out. They can attack the encirclement from the inside to escape, or a friendly external force can attack from the outside to open an escape route.
History: The earliest mention of Pincer attack is in a related formation of Padmavyuha or Chakravyuha in the Indian Epic Mahabharata.
Sun Tzu, in The Art of War (traditionally dated to the 6th century BC), speculated on the maneuver but advised against trying it for fear that an army would likely run first before the move could be completed. He argued that it was best to allow the enemy a path to escape (or at least the appearance of one), as the target army would fight with more ferocity when surrounded. Still, it would lose formation and be more vulnerable to destruction if shown an avenue of escape.
The maneuver may have first been used at the Battle of Marathon in 490 BC. The historian Herodotus describes how the Athenian general Miltiades deployed 900 Plataean and 10,000 Athenian hoplites in a U-formation with the wings manned much more deeply than the center. His enemy outnumbered him heavily, and Miltiades chose to match the breadth of the Persian battle line by thinning out the center of his forces while reinforcing the wings. In the course of the battle, the weaker central formations retreated, allowing the wings to converge behind the Persian battle line and drive the more numerous but lightly armed Persians to retreat in panic.
The maneuver was used by Alexander the Great at the Battle of the Hydaspes in 326 BC. He launched his attack at the Indian left flank, and the Indian king Porus reacted by sending the cavalry on the right of his formation around in support. Alexander had positioned two cavalry units on the left of his formation, hidden from view, under the command of Coenus and Demitrius. The units were then able to follow Porus's cavalry around, trapping them in a classic pincer movement.
A famous example of its use was at the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC, when Hannibal executed the maneuver against the Romans. Military historians cite it as the first successful use of the pincer movement that was recorded in detail, by the Greek historian Polybius.
It was also later used by Khalid ibn al-Walid at the Battle of Walaja in 633, by Alp Arslan at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 (under the name crescent tactic) and by Saladin at the Battle of Hattin in 1187.
Genghis Khan used a rudimentary form known colloquially as the horns tactic. Two enveloping flanks of horsemen surrounded the enemy, but they usually remained unjoined, leaving the enemy an escape route to the rear. It was key to many of Genghis's early victories over other Mongolian tribes.
It was used at the Battle of Mohács by Süleyman the Magnificent in 1526 and by Field Marshal Carl Gustav Rehnskiöld at the Battle of Fraustadt in 1706.
Even in the horse-and-musket era, the maneuver was used across many military cultures. A double envelopment was deployed by the Iranian conqueror Nader Shah at the Battle of Kirkuk (1733) against the Ottomans; the Turco-Persian army, under Nader, flanked the Ottomans on both ends of their line and encircled their centre despite being numerically at a disadvantage. In another battle at Kars in 1745, Nader routed the Ottoman army and subsequently encircled their encampment. The Ottoman army soon after collapsed under the pressure of the encirclement. Also during the Battle of Karnal in 1739, Nader drew out the Mughal army which outnumbered his own force by over six to one, and managed to encircle and defeat a significant contingent of the Mughals in an ambush around Kunjpura village.
Daniel Morgan used it at the Battle of Cowpens in 1781 in South Carolina. Zulu impis used a version of the maneuver that they called the buffalo horn formation.
The maneuver was used in the blitzkrieg of the armed forces of Nazi Germany during World War II, developing into a complex, multidisciplinary endeavor. It involved fast movement by mechanized armor, artillery barrages, air force bombardment, and effective radio communications, with the primary objective of destroying enemy command and control chains, undermining enemy troop morale and disrupting supply lines. During the Battle of Kiev (1941) the Axis forces managed to encircle the largest number of soldiers in the history of warfare. Well over half-a-million Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner by the end of the operation.
See also: Encirclement
Flanking maneuver
Two-front war
References:
Further reading: U.S. Army training manual diagram Archived 2015-07-01 at the Wayback Machine of different modes of attack, including double envelopment.
GlobalSecurity.org essay with a section on envelopments.
Academic paper on military diagramming with diagram of a double envelopment.
Map of Georgy Zhukov's double envelopment at the battle of Stalingrad. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Political warfare | Tools:
Peaceful: Political warfare utilizes all instruments short of war available to a nation to achieve its national objectives. The best tool of political warfare is "effective policy forcefully explained", or more directly, "overt policy forcefully backed". But political warfare is used, as one leading thinker on the topic has explained, "when public relations statements and gentle, public diplomacy-style persuasion—the policies of 'soft power'—fail to win the needed sentiments and actions" around the world.
The major way political warfare is waged is through propaganda. The essence of these operations can be either overt or covert. White propaganda is maximally overt: there is attribution to a promoter; the attributed promoter and the actual promoter are one and the same; and no attempt is made to hide the fact that a viewpoint or "line" is being promoted. Most television advertisements are white propaganda turned to commercial ends. Grey propaganda ranges in overtness from maximal to a slightly lesser degree: as in white propaganda, there is honest attribution to a source; but it differs from white propaganda by being less forthright either about the link between the source and the line being promoted or about its status as propaganda in the first place. Grey propaganda has alternatively been defined as the "semiofficial amplification of a government's voice"; guerilla advertising uses the tools of grey propaganda to sell products and services, while in public service, examples include Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (established during Cold War I). Black propaganda is covert: this may be limited to the anonymous dissemination of internally consistent talking points (differing from white propaganda only in its lack of credited authorship), but it may also be the impersonation of a widely trusted organization (through the use of its branding, corporate style guide, distinctive turns of phrase, etc.) under a false flag, or a strategy as complex as the use of a botnet to inundate a social network with self-contradictory disinformation as if through a firehose of falsehood, amplifying the botnet's posts with so-called Likes and Retweets, and frustrating genuine users' bona fide searches for pertinent information by diminishing the signal-to-noise ratio. What unifies these disparate strategies implementing black propaganda is that, in all cases, it "appears to come from a disinterested source when in fact it does not".
There are channels which can be used to transmit propaganda. Sophisticated use of technology allows an organization to disseminate information to a vast number of people. The most basic channel is the spoken word. This can include live speeches or radio and television broadcasts. Overt or covert radio broadcasting can be an especially useful tool. The printed word is also very powerful, including pamphlets, leaflets, books, magazines, political cartoons, and planted newspaper articles (clandestine or otherwise). Subversion, agents of influence, spies, journalists, and "useful idiots" can all be used as powerful tools in political warfare.
Aggressive: Political warfare also includes aggressive activities by one actor to offensively gain relative advantage or control over another. Between nation states, it can end in the seizure of power or in the open assimilation of the victimized state into the political system or power complex of the aggressor. This aggressor-victim relationship has also been seen between rivals within a state and may involve tactics like assassination, paramilitary activity, sabotage, coup d'état, insurgency, revolution, guerrilla warfare, and civil war.
Foreign infiltration or liberation occurs when a government is overthrown by foreign military or diplomatic intervention, or through covert means. The campaign's ultimate purpose is to gain control over another nation's political and social structure. The campaign could be led by the aggressor's national forces or by a political faction favorable to the aggressor within the other state. Paul W. Blackstock describes three stages involved in the extension of control by the aggressor over the victim:
Penetration or infiltration: the deliberate infiltration of political and social groups within a victim state by the aggressor with the ultimate purpose of extending influence and control. The aggressor conceals its endgame, which goes beyond the normal influential nature of diplomacy and involves espionage.
Forced disintegration or atomization: "is the breakdown of the political and social structure of the victim until the fabric of national morale disintegrates and the state is unable to resist further intervention". The aggressor may exploit the inevitable internal tensions between political, class, ethnic, religious, racial, and other groups. This concept is a similar strategy to 'divide and conquer'.
Subversion and defection: Subversion is the "undermining or detachment of the loyalties of significant political and social groups within the victimized state, and their transference to the political or ideological causes of the aggressor". In lieu of total and direct transference, the aggressor may accept intermediate states that still meets its objectives, such as the favor of politically significant individuals. Furthermore, the formation of a counter-elite, made up of influential individuals and key leaders, within the victim state establishes the legitimacy and permanency of a new regime. Defection is the transference of allegiance of key individuals and leaders to the aggressor's camp. The individual could relocate or stay-in-place in the victim country, continually influencing local issues and events in the aggressor's favor. Defectors also provide insider information to the aggressor.
Coup d'état is the overthrowing of a government through the infiltration of the political, military, and social groups by a small segment of the state apparatus. The small segment exists within the state and targets the critical political levers of power within a government to neutralize opposition to the coup and post-coup governing force. Several pre-existing factors are necessary for a coup: political participation being limited to a small portion of the population, independence from foreign power influence and control, and power and decision-making authority concentrated within a political center and not diffused between regional authorities, businesses, or other groups.
A coup utilizes political resources to gain support within the existing state and neutralize or immobilize those who are capable of rallying against the coup. A successful coup occurs rapidly and after taking over the government, stabilizes the situation by controlling communications and mobility. Furthermore, a new government must gain acceptance from the public and military and administrative structures, by reducing the sense of insecurity. Ultimately, the new government will seek legitimacy in the eyes of its own people as well as seek foreign recognition. The coup d'état can be led by national forces or involve foreign influence, similar to foreign liberation or infiltration.
Paramilitary Operations: transitional political warfare ranging from small-scale use of violence with primitive organizational structure (e.g. sabotage) to full-scale conventional war. The transition and escalation includes a series of stages and depends on tactical and strategic objectives. Paramilitary activities include infiltration and subversion as well as small group operations, insurrection, and civil war.
Insurgency: an organized, protracted political warfare tool designed to weaken the control and eliminate the legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority. An insurgency is an internal conflict, and the primary struggle is to mobilize local populations for political control and gain popular support towards the insurgents' cause. Insurgencies include political and military objectives, with the end goal of establishing a legitimate, rival state structure. Insurgencies are unconventional military conflicts which incorporate a variety of methods, ranging from coercive tools like intimidation and assassination, to political tools like propaganda and social services. An insurgency's approaches and objectives could involve perpetual disorder and violence demonstrating the government's inability to provide security for the populace, weakening the government and killing or intimidating any effective opposition against the government, intimidating the population and discouraging its participation in – or support for – political or legal processes, controlling or intimidating police and military forces (which limits their ability to respond to insurgent attacks) or by creating government repression by provoking over-reactions by security or military forces.
In antiquity: The history of political warfare can be traced to antiquity. The Chinese general and strategist Sun Tzu captures its essence in the ancient Chinese military strategy book, The Art of War: "So to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; the highest excellence is to subdue the enemy's army without fighting at all...The expert in using the military subdues the enemy's forces without going to battle, takes the enemy's walled cities without launching an attack, and crushes the enemy's state without protracted war."
There are abundant examples of political warfare in antiquity. In ancient Greece, a famous example is that of the Trojan Horse, which used deception for tactical military objectives. Propaganda was commonly utilized, including Greek rhetoric and theatre which used words and images to influence populations throughout the Hellenic world. This practice has left a lasting legacy of speech as a mechanism of political power, greater than force in solving disputes and inducing submission. During this same period, Alexander the Great used coinage imprinted with his own image, indirectly forcing conquered nations to accept his legitimacy as national ruler and to unite disparate nations together under his dominion.
Ancient Rome utilized similar political warfare as the Greeks including rhetoric, as displayed by Cicero; and art, as seen in coinage, statues, architecture, engineering, and mosaics. All of these elements were intended to portray Rome's imperial dominance over its subject nations and the superior nature of Roman society. Following a religious vision, the emperor Constantine I in 330 CE bound the Roman state to the universal Christian Church. In doing so, he linked "religious commitment with imperial ambition" that proved to be quite successful and powerful. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Political warfare | This practice has left a lasting legacy of speech as a mechanism of political power, greater than force in solving disputes and inducing submission. During this same period, Alexander the Great used coinage imprinted with his own image, indirectly forcing conquered nations to accept his legitimacy as national ruler and to unite disparate nations together under his dominion.
Ancient Rome utilized similar political warfare as the Greeks including rhetoric, as displayed by Cicero; and art, as seen in coinage, statues, architecture, engineering, and mosaics. All of these elements were intended to portray Rome's imperial dominance over its subject nations and the superior nature of Roman society. Following a religious vision, the emperor Constantine I in 330 CE bound the Roman state to the universal Christian Church. In doing so, he linked "religious commitment with imperial ambition" that proved to be quite successful and powerful. One long-lasting symbol of this is the Chi Rho, which forms the first two letters of the Greeks' name for Christ. This symbol was used for over one thousand years by Constantine's successors as a symbol of "imperial majesty and divine authority" and still is a powerful symbol within Christianity.
By country:
China: China's political leaders during this century have had to first create a nation before they could proceed to contend with other national actors in the international arena. Consequently, insofar as both the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang subscribed to a political warfare concept during their formative years of struggle, the concept was as much concerned with creating national identity and defeating domestic adversaries as it was with China's ability to compete in the world. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949 they have centered much of their political warfare efforts within the United Front Work Department. The Chinese conception of political warfare includes the "three warfares" of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare, among others. Political warfare encompasses influence operations such as the doctrine of China's peaceful rise.
Taiwan remains a major target of PRC political warfare efforts. China's political warfare campaign aims to isolate Taiwan from the international community and interfere in Taiwan's democratic system and institutions. India has also become a target of increasing importance for PRC influence operations.
Soviet Union and Russia: Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union was committed to political warfare on classic totalitarian lines and continued to utilize propaganda towards internal and external audiences. "Active measures" (Russian: Активные мероприятия) was a Russian term to describe its political warfare activities both at home and abroad in support of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Soviet efforts took many forms, ranging from propaganda, forgeries, and general disinformation to assassinations. The measures aimed to damage the enemy's image, create confusion, mould public opinion, and to exploit existing strains in international relations. The Soviet Union dedicated vast resources and attention to these active measures, believing that "mass production of active measures would have a significant cumulative effect over a period of several decades". Soviet active measures were notorious for targeting intended audience's public attitudes, to include prejudices, beliefs, and suspicions deeply rooted in the local history. Soviet campaigns fed disinformation that was psychologically consistent with the audience. Examples of Soviet active measures include:
Operation Trust: was a counterintelligence operation conducted by Soviet intelligence against domestic and foreign adversaries. The operation, which ran from 1921 to 1929, set up a fake anti-Bolshevik underground organization, "Monarchist Union of Central Russia", MUCR (Монархическое объединение Центральной России, МОЦР), which claimed to plan a conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet government. The Trust aimed to create the view that communism was over in Russia and the Soviet Union would abandon its revolutionary ways. Western intelligence services supported the fake anti-Bolshevik dissidents who provided false intelligence reports. The operation's purpose was to identify real dissidents and anti-Bolsheviks, internally and abroad. The operation resulted in the arrests and executions of Russian exile leaders and the general demoralization of anti-Soviet efforts.
The "Rumor" Campaign: In October 1985, a Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta drew attention to a story in an obscure Indian paper, The Patriot, which alleged that the U.S. government engineered the AIDS virus during biological warfare research in the U.S., and that it was being spread throughout the world by U.S. servicemen who had been used as guinea pigs for the experiment. The story was broadcast by Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress in English and Turkish broadcasts to Asian countries, some of which had important U.S. military bases. The "Rumor" campaign was highly effective in the 1980s and continues to resurface today throughout the world.
Communist strategy and tactics continually focused on revolutionary objectives, "for them the real war is the political warfare waged daily under the guise of peace". the purpose of which is to "disorient and disarm the opposition...to induce the desire to surrender in opposing peoples...to corrode the entire moral, political, and economic infrastructure of a nation". Lenin's mastery of "politics and struggle", remained objectives for the Soviet Union and other global communist regimes, such as the People's Republic of China.
Soviet political warfare in Afghanistan: The Soviet Union remains a comprehensive example of an aggressive nation which expanded its empire through covert infiltration and direct military involvement. Following World War II, the Soviet Union believed European economies would disintegrate, leaving social and economic chaos and allowing for Soviet expansion into new territories. The Soviets quickly deployed organizational weapons such as non-political front groups, sponsored 'spontaneous' mass appeals, and puppet politicians. While many of these countries' political and social structures were in post-war disarray, the Soviet Union's proxy communist parties were well-organized and able to take control of these weak, newly formed Eastern European governments. Moreover, the clandestine operations of the Soviet intelligence services and the occupying forces of the Soviet military further infiltrated the political and social spheres of the new satellites. Conversely, in 1979, the Soviet Union was unable to successfully penetrate the Afghan society after supporting a coup which brought a new Marxist government to power. While Soviet units were already in Kabul, Afghanistan at the time of the coup, additional Soviet troops arrived to reinforce the units and seize important provincial cities, bringing the total of Soviet troops inside Afghanistan to 125,000–140,000. The Soviets were unprepared for the Afghan resistance which included classic guerrilla tactics with foreign support. In 1989, Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, having been unable to infiltrate the Afghan society or immobilize the resistance.
Taiwan: The Republic of China Government in Taiwan recognized that its Communist adversary astutely employed political warfare to capitalize upon Kuomintang weaknesses over the years since Sun Yat-sen first mounted his revolution in the 1920s, and Chiang Kai-shek's regime had come to embrace a political warfare philosophy as both a defensive necessity and as the best foundation for consolidating its power in hope of their optimistic goal of "retaking the mainland". Both the Nationalist and Communist Chinese political warfare doctrines stem from the same historical antecedents at the Whampoa Military Academy in 1924 under Soviet tutelage.
The Nationalist Chinese experience with political warfare can be treated in a much more tangible way than merely tracing doctrinal development. In the Taiwan of the 1970s, the concept was virtually synonymous with the General Political Warfare Department of the Ministry of National Defense, which authored political doctrine and was the culmination of a series of organizational manifestations of its application.
In the 21st century political warfare is primarily the responsibility of the Political Warfare Bureau.
United States:
Creation of political warfare capacity: American foreign policy demonstrates a tendency to move towards political warfare in times of tension and perceived threat, and toward public diplomacy in times of improved relations and peace. American use of political warfare depends on its central political vision of the world and its subsequent foreign policy objectives. After World War II, the threat of Soviet expansion brought two new aims for American political warfare:
To restore Western Europe through military, economic, and political support
To weaken the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe through propaganda
President Harry S. Truman established a government political warfare capability in the National Security Act of 1947. The act created the U.S. National Security Council, which became the infrastructure necessary to apply military power to political purposes.
Containment policy: The Truman Doctrine was the post-WWII basis for American political warfare operations on which the United States government went further to formulate an active, defensive strategy to contain the Soviet threat. On 4 May 1948, George F. Kennan, the father of the containment policy, wrote the Policy Planning Staff Memorandum titled "The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare". This National Security Council (NSC) memo established a directorate of political warfare operations, under the control of the NSC, known as the Consultative (or Evaluation) Board of the National Security Council. This directorate fell under the authority of the Secretary of State, while the Board had complete authority over covert political operations. It recognized political warfare as one instrument in the United States' grand strategy. Kennan defined 'political warfare' as "the employment of all means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such actions are both overt and covert. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Political warfare | On 4 May 1948, George F. Kennan, the father of the containment policy, wrote the Policy Planning Staff Memorandum titled "The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare". This National Security Council (NSC) memo established a directorate of political warfare operations, under the control of the NSC, known as the Consultative (or Evaluation) Board of the National Security Council. This directorate fell under the authority of the Secretary of State, while the Board had complete authority over covert political operations. It recognized political warfare as one instrument in the United States' grand strategy. Kennan defined 'political warfare' as "the employment of all means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such actions are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (such as ERP – the Marshall Plan), and 'white' propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of 'friendly' foreign elements, 'black' psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states."
The memo further defined four projects that were activated by the Board to combat growing Communist influence abroad, including:
Liberation Committees: to encourage the formation of a public American organization which will sponsor selected political refugee committees to give support and guidance to national movements gestating in the Soviet World;
Support of indigenous anti-communist elements: within threatened countries of the free world, to include covertly using private intermediaries;
Underground activities behind the Iron Curtain
Preventive direct action in free countries: only in cases of dire necessity. This covert operation involved: control over anti-sabotage activities in the Venezuelan oil fields, American sabotage of Near Eastern oil installations on the verge of Soviet capture, and designation of key individuals threatened by the Kremlin who should be protected or removed elsewhere.
Cold War era: The United States used gray and black propaganda research, broadcasting, and print media operations during the Cold War to achieve its political warfare goals. These operations were conducted against Eastern European targets from Western Europe by two public-private organizations supported partly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the NSC, and partly by private corporations. These organizations were Free Europe, which was launched in 1941 and targeted Eastern Europe, and the American Committee for Liberation (AmComLib) created in 1951 to broadcast information into Soviet Russia. Both were renamed shortly thereafter and combined as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). Many RFE/RL recruits came either from European emigrants families who were strongly anti-Communist or from US government agencies, most notably from CIA. Officially, "the US government denied any responsibility for the radios and took care to conceal the channels of funding, personnel recruitment, and policy influence. Obviously, the major support was American, but it was plausibly not official American and it could be excluded from diplomatic intercourse and international legal complication." RFE/RL was considered to be a gray operation until its existence was publicly acknowledged by "activists" in the United States during the late 1960s. The goal of the radios was to present the truth to suppressed peoples behind the Iron Curtain "to aid in rebuilding a lively and diversified intellectual life in Europe which could ... defeat Soviet ... incursions on their freedom".
In addition, Voice of America (VOA) started broadcasting to the Soviet citizens in 1947 under the pretext of countering "more harmful instances of Soviet propaganda directed against American leaders and policies" on the part of the internal Soviet Russian-language media. The Soviet Union responded by initiating electronic jamming of VOA broadcasts on April 24, 1949.
In the fall of 1950 a group of scholars including physicists, historians and psychologists from Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and RAND Corporation undertook a research study of psychological warfare for the Department of State. The Project Troy Report to the Secretary of State, presented to Secretary of State on 1 February 1951, made various proposals for political warfare, including possible methods of minimizing the effects of Soviet jamming on the Voice of America broadcasts. It can be assumed that the Truman administration tried to implement plans established by the Project Troy in the project Overload and Delay. The purpose of the latter was to break the Stalinist system by increasing the number of input points in the system and by creating complex and unpredictable situations requiring action.
An overt, non-governmental form of political warfare during the Cold War emerged after President Ronald Reagan's 8 June 1982 speech to the British Parliament. In his speech, Reagan appealed for a "global crusade for democracy" and as a result, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created in December 1983. The NED was a non-governmental organization (NGO) based on four fundamental foundations:
The National Democratic Institute
The National Republican Institute to dispense funds and training to politicians and political parties;
The Center for International Private Enterprise to provide training, funding and networking opportunities for business associations;
AFL–CIO to assist foreign trade unions.
The NED "funded programs in support of candidates acceptable to the US in elections in Grenada, Panama, El Salvador, and Guatemala throughout 1984 and 1985 in order to prevent communist victories, and create stable pro-US governments". It was also active in Europe, funding groups to carry promote pro-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) propaganda in Britain, as well as a "right wing French student organisation ... linked to fascist paramilitaries". Other notable efforts included anti-Sandinista propaganda and opposition efforts in Nicaragua as well as anti-Communist propaganda and opposition efforts in support of the Solidarity movement in Poland between 1984 and 1990. According to a 1991 interview in The Washington Post with one of the creators of the NED, Allen Weinstein, "a lot of what we (NED) do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA".
21st century: From 2010 to 2012, the United States operated a social media site similar to Twitter in an attempt to instigate uprisings against the Cuban government. The program was overseen by the United States Agency for International Development, but its involvement was concealed in order to ensure mission success. The plan was to draw in users with non-controversial content until a critical mass is reached, after which more political messaging would be introduced. At its peak, more than 40,000 unsuspecting Cubans interacted on the platform.
See also:
References:
Further reading:
Bernays, Edward. "Propaganda" (IG Publishing, 1928).
Lawrence W. Bielenson, "Power Through Subversion" (Public Affairs Press, 1972).
Ellul, Jacques. "Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes". Trans. Konrad Kellen & Jean Lerner. (Random House/Vintage, 1973).
Linebarger, Paul M. "Psychological Warfare". (International Propaganda and Communications, 1948).
Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett, eds., "Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the US Approach" (National Defense University Press and National Strategy Information Center, 1989).
Luttwak, Edward. "Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook" (Harvard University Press, 1968).
Janos Radvanyi, ed., "Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-term Strategic Planning" (Praeger, 1990).
Smith, Paul A., "On Political War" (National Defense University Press Publications, 1989). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Power projection | History: Early examples of power projection include Roman dominance of Europe and the wider Mediterranean basin: the ability to project power is tied to the ability to innovate and field such innovations. Roman engineering innovations such as machines (pile driver), concrete, aqueducts and modern roads provided the footing for an economic engine that powered a military that was unmatched in its day. Examples of Roman power projection include Julius Caesar constructing the Rhine bridge in 10 days to demonstrate the ability to march his 40,000 troops as he saw fit: the local inhabitants enjoyed the natural protection of the river and fled when this natural protection was overcome. Although Rome is far from the center of modern power, its influence can be seen in the architecture of modern capitols around the world (domes, arches, columns). The demonstration of an extraordinary innovative military capability will signal power and, when properly applied, terminate conflicts summarily.
During the Ming treasure voyages in the 15th century, the Chinese treasure fleet was heavily militarized to exercise power projection around the Indian Ocean and thereby promote its interests.
The modern ability to project power and exert influence on a global scale can be tied to innovations stemming from the Industrial Revolution and the associated modernizations in technology, communications, finance and bureaucracy; this finally allowed the state to create unprecedented amounts of wealth and to effectively marshal these resources to exert power over long distances.
As the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, Britain was the first to utilize its industrial-technological power advantage to dominate rivals and greatly expand its global Empire throughout the 19th century. As a maritime power, the Royal Navy played a central role in providing Britain the strength and ability to dominate world trade and project power globally to further its interests. A worldwide system of naval bases and coaling stations, a large logistical bureaucracy to oversee shipbuilding, the supply of coal, food, water, and sailors, and an industrial base for the manufacture and technological enhancement of the fleet were among the essential ingredients for this capability. During the First Opium War (1839–1842), it was this capacity that enabled a British expeditionary force of 15 barracks ships, 4 steam-powered gunboats and 25 smaller boats with 4,000 marines to successfully defend its interests 6,000 miles (9,700 km) from the fleet's home port.
The Anglo-French expeditionary force sent to shore up the Ottoman Empire against Russian aggression during the Crimean War (1853–1856) was one of the earliest modern examples of a planned expeditionary power-projection campaign. It was the first campaign to use modern technology, including steam-powered warships and telegraph communications.
Another illustrative example of industrial power projection, was the British Expedition to Abyssinia in 1868 as a retaliation against Emperor Tewodros II of Ethiopia's imprisonment of several missionaries and British government representatives. The expeditionary force sent was a tremendous logistical and technological challenge at the time. Commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier of the Bombay Army, military intelligence was used to estimate the required size of the army and the difficulties of traversing the inhospitable terrain.
A force of over 30,000 was shipped from British India to Zula on the Red Sea on a fleet of more than 280 steam ships, while an advance detachment of engineers built a large port with two piers, warehouses and a lighthouse, and constructed a 20-mile (32 km)-long railway towards the interior. A road was also built for the artillery to be moved along with the help of elephants. After three months of trekking, the British force repelled an Ethiopian attack and launched an artillery bombardment against the fortress of Magdala which led to its capitulation; Tewodros committed suicide.
In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, the Japanese destruction of the Imperial Russian Navy's Pacific Fleet demonstrated Imperial Russia's inability to project force in the East. This immediately diminished Russia's diplomatic sway in that region. At the same time, Russia's western armies became less credible, as mobilization exposed organizational flaws and threw the western armies into chaos. This led analysts in Europe, such as German chief of staff Count Alfred von Schlieffen, to conclude that Russia would prove inept at projecting force in Europe, thus demoting Russia in European diplomatic relations.
Many other actions can be considered projections of force. The 19th century is full of incidents such as the 1864 Shimonoseki campaign and the Boxer Rebellion. More recently, the Falklands War provided an example of the United Kingdom's ability to project force far from home. Other recent examples of power projection include the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. The ability of the U.S. Navy, the British Royal Navy, and the French Navy to deploy large numbers of ships for long periods of time away from home are notable projection abilities. See § Power projection capabilities.
The globalization of power projection was long avoided in the research with the subject of globalization mostly channeled to economic field, but in 2018 Historian Max Ostrovsky broke the path. In prehistory, he wrote, power was not projected behind entrance of a cave. In history, empires and colonies projected power ever farther, creating world system c. 1900. World Wars were expressions of power projected on global scale.
The potential of power projection can be estimated mathematically by calculating the speed of transportation and communication relatively to the extent of contemporary power projection. Roman troops moved 50 km per day; today Globemasters move troops 20,000 km per day. The speed of communication in the largest Empire in Americas (Inca) was 20 km per hour (running man); today it moves with the speed of light. Multiplying the range of power projection in those empires by increase in the speed of transportation or communication, Ostrovsky estimated the present power projection potential to exceed the size of Earth multiple times.
Elements: The U.S. Department of Defense defines power projection as the "ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power—political, economic, informational, or military—to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability".
As distance between a fighting force and its headquarters increases, command and control inevitably becomes more difficult. Modern-day power projection often employs high-tech communications and information technology to overcome these difficulties, a process sometimes described as the "Revolution in Military Affairs".
While a few long-range weapons such as the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and some unmanned combat aerial vehicles (drones) are capable of projecting deadly force in their own right, it is military logistics that is at the heart of power projection. The ability to integrate naval and air forces with land armies as part of joint warfare is a key aspect of effective power projection; airlift and sealift capabilities facilitate the deployment of soldiers and weapons to a distant theater of war.
The aircraft carrier strike group, strategic bomber, ballistic missile submarine, and strategic airlifter are all examples of power projection platforms. Military units designed to be light and mobile, such as airborne forces (paratroopers and air assault forces) and amphibious assault forces, are utilized in power projection. Forward basing is another method of power projection, which, by pre-positioning military units or stockpiles of arms at strategically located military bases outside a country's territory, reduces the time and distance needed to mobilize them.
Types: Scholars have disaggregated military power projection into nine different categories based on political goals and level of force. Four of these employ "soft" military power (securing sea lanes of communication, non-combatant evacuation, humanitarian response, and peacekeeping) and the rest are primarily concerned with "hard" military power (show the flag, compellence/deterrence, punishment, armed intervention, and conquest). There is a § continuum in these capabilities.
Soft power: Examples of soft power projection include:
Securing sea lanes of communication: the protection of shipping lanes from attack by hostile states or irregular threats.
Non-combatant evacuation operations: the evacuation of citizens or friendly third-country civilians from a foreign country when they are endangered by war or civil unrest.
Humanitarian response: the use of military forces abroad to assist in the aftermath of a natural disaster.
Peacekeeping: military operations designed to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement to an ongoing dispute.
Establishing trust, as the basis of cooperation among allies and partners
Gray zone competition: This section has been split from US Army Futures Command § Other armies
The gray zone between cooperation and conflict has expanded due to the competition in power projection capabilities of the world's armies, as well as in the competition for economic power among the world's nations.
The US, Russia, China, Britain, and France have renounced the use of nuclear weapons in 2022. However, in the face of threats of nuclear war (say from Russia, as threatened during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine), NATO keeps about 100 B61 nuclear bombs in storage in Europe.: 4:50, 5:55 Certain F-35As were certified to carry the B61 nuclear bomb on 12 October 2023.
The British Army is investigating innovations, such as robots and drones, including 70 technologies funded by the £800 million (US$1 billion) Defence Innovation Fund launched in 2016. Two hundred troops will engage in "surveillance, long-range, and precision targeting, enhanced mobility and the re-supply of forces, urban warfare and enhanced situational awareness". |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Power projection | The US, Russia, China, Britain, and France have renounced the use of nuclear weapons in 2022. However, in the face of threats of nuclear war (say from Russia, as threatened during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine), NATO keeps about 100 B61 nuclear bombs in storage in Europe.: 4:50, 5:55 Certain F-35As were certified to carry the B61 nuclear bomb on 12 October 2023.
The British Army is investigating innovations, such as robots and drones, including 70 technologies funded by the £800 million (US$1 billion) Defence Innovation Fund launched in 2016. Two hundred troops will engage in "surveillance, long-range, and precision targeting, enhanced mobility and the re-supply of forces, urban warfare and enhanced situational awareness". The British Army is reducing size by about 10,000 troops as well, by 2025. The British Army will have Integrated Operating Concept (MDI—like MDO) for "gray zone" operations across domains, using a synthetic operating environment, with repeatable hard and soft strike capability. The UK, Germany, and France respectively have established a joint command for space United Kingdom Space Command, a Space Situational Awareness Centre (Germany), and Commandement de l’espace (France). In light of the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine NATO members are implementing new stockpile guidelines for their arsenals.
"By 2020 the Army's programs for modernization were now framed as a decades-long process of cooperation with allies and partners, for competition with potential adversaries who historically have blurred the distinction between peace and war"—from: § Reorganization plan of the United States Army
In 2020, one measure of § military power projection ranks the competition between the armies of the world (after the US Army, which is ranked atop this list). The list of armies, a mixture of allies, partners, and competitors is estimated to be:
Russia jammed the GPS signal during NATO exercises in November 2018. In 2014 the DoD's research and engineering chief Alan Shaffer warned that the 'US lost dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum' (EMS), in part due to the US government selloff of EMS radio frequencies, and also due in part to the proliferation of digital technologies which allow for low-cost jammers. (See: meaconing) General Valery Gerasimov advocates hybrid warfare, a "blend of political, economic and military power to bear against adversaries". Russia took Crimea without firing a shot. In April 2020 Russia tested an anti-satellite system for low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites. On 15 November 2021, a Russian anti-satellite test destroyed its Kosmos 1408, endangering its own cosmonauts on the International Space Station, and other satellites in low earth orbit. Cyber attacks on the whole of the US government via Supply_chain_attack § Whole of government began in March 2020, but only reached the attention of the news media on 14 December 2020. Russia is mapping the undersea cables which bear the majority of the communications traffic between the US and Europe.
On 25 December 2021 President Putin disclosed that Russia would be unable to defend itself against missiles launched against Moscow from Ukraine; their flight times would be four to five minutes, according to him. However, Putin did not acknowledge that the West's Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania are for defense against ballistic missiles, and not the Tomahawk missiles which he named in his statement. See: A-135 anti-ballistic missile system, A-235 anti-ballistic missile system, S-400 missile system, S-500 missile system To prove that Aegis Ashore is defensive only, inspection of the sites in Poland and Romania have been offered to Russia.
Ukraine had a trench network on its border with Russia, in a standoff as of April 2021. A border exercise involving 110,000 Russian troops on the Ukraine border has pulled back; however hundreds of armored vehicles, including tanks are remaining 100 miles (160 km) from Donbas (colloquial for Donets basin) in spite of a partial armor pullback. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OCSE) drones which are monitoring the line between Ukrainian troops and the Donbas separatists are seeing jamming of their drone's dual GPS receivers, with tens of thousands of infantry troops remaining on the Ukrainian border. The OSCE has provided a map of the line dividing the Ukrainian forces and the Russian-backed forces. As of 18 February 2022 there were up to 190,000 troops along Ukraine's borders; after recognizing the separatist states of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, Moscow is moving troops over the border of Russia into the Donetsk and Luhansk areas, and establishing military bases there. This troop movement triggered sanctions on five Russian banks and three individuals, on 22 February 2022. (See 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine which began 24 February 2022)
Andrei Illarionov cites Pavel Felgengauer, who projects a scenario by which Russia can create a 'Novorossia' (see § CSIS figures 2a-2c) stretching across Southern Ukraine to Transnistria (Moldova) after a gas pipeline to the EU is completed (September 2021). If the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline were to be weaponized by holding the liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply to Western Europe hostage, the US is countering this threat with contingency plans to redirect LNG supplies from the rest of the world. Germany has agreed to safeguard Ukraine, as well. See 2022 Nord Stream pipeline sabotage —26 September 2022
Cyber attacks on Ukrainian government websites are occurring in January 2022. Frida Ghitis and Richard Galant point out that the muddy season that ends winter would bog down an armored invasion. US Army Lieutenant Colonel Alex Vershinen points out that if the Russian Army were to attempt a quick fait accompli and then dig in, its logistical capability would be insufficient to complete a large land grab, as its logistic capabilities are largely based on railroads, but not trucks. Russia's logistic capability without railroads is 90 miles (140 km), without replenishment; thus Sebastien Roblin suggests that a "short, victorious war" by Russia (as in the 12-day war with Georgia in 2008), with stipulations largely resembling its current diplomatic demands, namely installation of pro-Russian leadership, Ukraine's withdrawal from the path of joining NATO etc., coupled with the expedient of bypassing Russian control of Kyiv's population, might avoid Russia's getting bogged down in Ukraine. This calculation could get up-ended by a longer war, with determined resistance in Ukraine, via guerilla warfare, as in Afghanistan (1979-1989), which indirectly ended the Soviet Union. Within two months of the beginning of the First Chechen War, an antiwar movement arose in Russia.
On 22 February 2022 historian Sergey Radchenko recalled a vignette from September 1945, during the post World War II Potsdam Conference negotiations on the division of world power at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers, when Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov asked U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes whether he carried the atomic bomb in his side pocket, to which Byrnes threatened Molotov to stop stalling, or else Byrnes would pull the atomic bomb out of his pocket and use it on Molotov (laughter). Molotov was guided by Stalin's directive "It is clear that you must display complete obduracy". (See Proxy war)
Russia and Belarus began Zapad 2021, a 200,000-troop exercise held every four years. The Pripyat marshes would bog down an armored invasion through Belarus.: 2:22
In the opinion of James Stavridis, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is showing that Special Forces, unmanned systems, and Cyber will become far more important in the future.
In 2021 Russia spent 2.7 percent of its GDP on defense, a level which is expected to drop to 2.3 percent by 2023, as part of a mandate to boost domestic production.
Unmanned ground combat vehicles (UGCVs), among them Uran-6, Uran-9 (Уран-9), and Uran-14 are entering service in the Russian Army as of 2021. Uran-6 is a mine flail; Uran-14 is an unmanned firefighting vehicle. Uran-9s are semi-autonomous robotic combat vehicles; specialists can operate them using mobile control stations. Their first attempted service was in Syria. Analysts from BAE Systems (UK) assessed the Uran-9s in Syria as unreliable, with their radio-controls sometimes blocked by buildings; their sensors and guidance were unstabilized. An armed Uran-9 weighs 12 tons, and measures 5 meters long, which is a fifth of the weight and half the length of a T-90 tank. Each Uran-9 control system operates at ranges up to 1.8 miles (2.9 km) from the UGVs;: min 1:00 : minute 2:20 each control system currently (2021) guides 4 UGVs, in a leader-follower configuration. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Power projection | Uran-6 is a mine flail; Uran-14 is an unmanned firefighting vehicle. Uran-9s are semi-autonomous robotic combat vehicles; specialists can operate them using mobile control stations. Their first attempted service was in Syria. Analysts from BAE Systems (UK) assessed the Uran-9s in Syria as unreliable, with their radio-controls sometimes blocked by buildings; their sensors and guidance were unstabilized. An armed Uran-9 weighs 12 tons, and measures 5 meters long, which is a fifth of the weight and half the length of a T-90 tank. Each Uran-9 control system operates at ranges up to 1.8 miles (2.9 km) from the UGVs;: min 1:00 : minute 2:20 each control system currently (2021) guides 4 UGVs, in a leader-follower configuration. Uran-9 was used in the Vostok 2018 exercises in 2018. At least 20 Uran-9 UGCVs exist.
Russia's defense ministry has signed a contract to field the Tsirkon hypersonic missiles to its troops in 2025.
During the 2021 negotiations for defusing the Ukraine-Russia confrontation, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has warned that its 9M729 nuclear-capable cruise missile, which is already deployed in the European part of Russia, might be further employed there.
The hypersonic Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, and 3M22 Zircon (Tsirkon) are standoff strike weapons, for keeping adversaries at bay; they are land-based, and sea-based respectively.
On 1 September 2022 Russia, China, India, and 11 other nations began a scaled-down Vostok 2022 (East 2022). Vostok will exercise 50,000 troops, down from 300,000 in 2018. India is contributing 75 troops.
By 19 October 2022 NATO nations were providing winter equipment to Ukraine. By Spring 2023 the US industrial base can be providing 20,000 rounds of 155mm howitzer munitions per month to Ukraine.
Beginning 1 April 2023 400,000 contract servicemen are to replenish the Russian army.
In a meeting in Moscow, March 2023 the presidents of China and Russia agreed to cooperate over a wide range of business, and economic issues, such as payment in local currencies (viz., Yuan or Rubles).
China—RAND simulations show Blue losses. Six of the top 15 defense companies in the world are now Chinese, in 2019 for the first time. The competition with China was shaped in the decade 2010–2020, according to David Kriete. By 2023 China's defense companies were offering competitors to US Javelins, armed drones, and supersonic cruise missiles.
Secretary Mark Esper said that China is aiming to be the dominant military power in Asia by 2049. The 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) of China's ruling party, aims to accelerate the army's modernization and informationization, in order to improve national security for 2027 (100th anniversary of its ruling party), according to Dean Cheng. By 2023 China's working-age demographic (a shrinking labor force/ capital savings rate) will start to work against the Party's aspiration for 2027, which, according to Xi Jinping's plan, is for China's military to reach parity with the US military in 2027. As of June 2023 a diplomatic solution is being sought.
The International Federation of Robotics reports that China has been the world leader in implementing industrial robots for the past eight years; in 2020 China used almost half the world's industrial robots.
The takeover of a UK semiconductor fab by a Chinese-owned firm has been blocked on national security grounds.
In 2017 China adopted the National Intelligence Law which obligates Chinese companies to subordinate themselves to intelligence-gathering measures for the state. China is militarizing the South China Sea. In 2020 a match-up of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning (a rebuilt aircraft cruiser) versus the supercarrier USS Ronald Reagan is assessed to give the Ronald Reagan air superiority within one hour.
The 3rd generation GPS network of BeiDou satellites (BDS-3) was completed in July 2020 with the launch of the 30th BDS-3 satellite. The 30th BDS-3 satellite, meant to complete China's own global navigation satellite system, had been previously postponed. See Restrictions on geographic data in China
Satellite images of 4 June 2021 reveal an estimated 250 additional missile silos under construction near Yumen, China, warn specialists at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. By 2024 China had over 500 nuclear warheads.
The Defense Intelligence Agency projects that China will at least double its nuclear arsenal and that its production capability will be far expanded in the 2020s.
China controls 80% of world rare earth mineral production, and routinely floods this market when other nations attempt to ramp up their own rare earth production.
The tech leaders of China are being enlisted to aid 'Socialism with Chinese characteristics' by pledging part of their wealth to 'common prosperity'. The Cyberspace Administration of China is regulating algorithms on its financial reporting websites which republish foreign financial journalists.
Chinese cyber groups are attacking Russia, reports Ben Watson. China is accelerating its timeline to take Taiwan.
149 Chinese fighters and bombers swept over Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 1–4 October 2021. Taiwan has countered with Civil Air Patrol warnings.
China is implementing its plan for 2027: Office of Secretary of Defense (3 Nov 2021) "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China", Annual report to Congress China has been reverse-engineering its purchases of Russian materiel, and selling to Russia's defense customers.: 38:30
By November 2022 a strict zero-Covid lockdown policy instituted in 2020 had led to 2022 COVID-19 protests in China; China then allowed use of a locally-developed mRNA vaccine (2 December 2022), in lieu of lockdowns.
India: faces Pakistan; Pakistan can be supplied with Turkey's drones (such as the Bayraktar TB2), which were used with great effect by Azerbaijan against Armenian tanks and Armenian air defense during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. In 2010 China deployed 11,000 troops in Gilgit, near Kashmir.
Japan and India have agreed to enhance their bilateral defense cooperation (9 September 2022).
Japan: faces North Korea; Japan has expressed interest in developing its own F-X fighter program; Brian Burton notes that interoperable materiel is needed for allies and partners of the US, and that the US could constructively influence Japan's impending 20-year development effort with lessons learned from UAVs and air defense, for example. On 26 December 2019, at Putin's annual news conference with foreign media, Hirofumi Sugizaki, a Japanese journalist asked about the end of the INF Treaty and the cooperation of Russia and China on an anti-missile system. Putin characterized the anti-missile system as defensive, and the relation of US and Russia as a 'draw' (ヒキワケ—hikiwake). Japan will compensate companies for not disclosing patents with military applications. In a Joint test, Japan's Cooperative Engagement Capability allowed JS Maya to detect and track a ballistic missile; JS Haguro shot it down.
Applications of power projection: The Texas National Security Review projects five scenarios for the global economy:
Reglobalization as in the 1980s
Deglobalization away from the trends of the 2000s
Globalization with Chinese characteristics
Regional blocs with partially closed trading
Shared strategic interests and common political values, which Friedberg judges will be the choice of the Western bloc and its direction for power projection.
Hard power: Examples of hard power projection include:
Showing the flag: the symbolic deployment of military forces to a region for the purposes of demonstrating political interest, resolve, or willingness to take more forceful military action.
Compulsion/deterrence: the use of the threat of military force against another state to either induce it into or dissuade it from pursuing a given policy. In this form, power projection acts as a diplomatic tool, attempting to influence the decision-making process of foreign actors. See Power projection#Gray zone competition for context
Punishment: the punitive use of force against another state in response to their pursuit of a given policy.
Armed intervention: the movement of military forces into another nation's territory for the purposes of influencing the internal affairs of the target country short of outright conquest.
Conquest: the offensive use of military assets to forcibly occupy territory controlled or claimed by another state. In 2022 Michael Kofman projected that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would be eastward via Donbas, northward from Crimea, and up the Dnieper river to encircle Ukraine's capital Kyiv, with a political takeover of Ukraine a likely objective of Russian leadership. However, in lieu of a political takeover, a decapitation strike is a possible tactic. Alexander Vindman has projected a path for Ukraine to retake Crimea. By 5 April 2023 Ukraine signalled that it might entertain talks with Russia if the Ukrainian counteroffensive reached the border of Crimea. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Power projection | Armed intervention: the movement of military forces into another nation's territory for the purposes of influencing the internal affairs of the target country short of outright conquest.
Conquest: the offensive use of military assets to forcibly occupy territory controlled or claimed by another state. In 2022 Michael Kofman projected that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would be eastward via Donbas, northward from Crimea, and up the Dnieper river to encircle Ukraine's capital Kyiv, with a political takeover of Ukraine a likely objective of Russian leadership. However, in lieu of a political takeover, a decapitation strike is a possible tactic. Alexander Vindman has projected a path for Ukraine to retake Crimea. By 5 April 2023 Ukraine signalled that it might entertain talks with Russia if the Ukrainian counteroffensive reached the border of Crimea.
Power projection capabilities:
See also: Blue-water navy
Green-water navy
Exercise RIMPAC
Expeditionary maneuver warfare
Expeditionary warfare
Force concentration
Force multiplication
List of countries by military expenditures
List of countries with overseas military bases
Loss of Strength Gradient
Military budget of the United States
Military deployment
Military globalization
Military logistics
Overmatch
Over-the-beach capability
Seabasing
Sovereignty
Unsinkable aircraft carrier
Notes:
References:
External links:
US Army Field Manual 100-10 Chapter 1: Power Projection
US Army Field Manual 100-7 Chapter 6: Force Projection |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Prehistoric warfare | Paleolithic: According to cultural anthropologist and ethnographer Raymond C. Kelly, population density among the earliest hunter-gatherer societies of Homo erectus was probably low enough to avoid armed conflict. The development of the throwing-spear and ambush hunting techniques required cooperation, which made potential violence between hunting parties very costly. The need to prevent competition for resources by maintenance of low population densities may have accelerated the migration out of Africa of H. erectus some 1.8 million years ago as a natural consequence of conflict avoidance.
Hypotheses which suggest that genocidal violence may have caused the extinction of the Neanderthals have been offered by several authors, including Jared Diamond and Ronald Wright. The hypothesis that early humans violently replaced Neanderthals was first proposed by French paleontologist Marcellin Boule (the first person to publish an analysis of a Neanderthal) in 1912. However, several scholars have formed alternative theories as to why the Neanderthals died out, and there is no clear consensus as to what caused their extinction within the current scientific community.
Kelly believes that this period of "Paleolithic warlessness" persisted until well after the appearance of Homo sapiens some 315,000 years ago, ending only at the occurrence of economic and social shifts associated with sedentism, when new conditions incentivized organized raiding of settlements.
None of the many cave paintings of the Upper Paleolithic depicts people attacking other people explicitly,
but there are depictions of human beings pierced with arrows
both of the Aurignacian-Périgordian (roughly 30,000 years old) and the early Magdalenian (c. 17,000 years old), possibly representing "spontaneous confrontations over game resources" in which hostile trespassers were killed; however, other interpretations, including capital punishment, human sacrifice, assassination or systemic warfare cannot be ruled out.
It has also been suggested that lack of evidence of Paleolithic warfare is due to differences in archaeology resulting in less evidence being likely to survive to be analysed compared to other eras. Since Paleolithic humans lived in small, mobile bands, with low population densities and less durable structures, while also existing further back in history, this results in a lower probability of finding clear evidence as well as that evidence not decaying by the modern day. Furthermore, humans only began to bury their dead 150,000 years ago and not all cultures did so (some preferring to remove them by cremation or exposure), limiting remains that can be found. The absence of fortifications could also be due to the fact that fortifications would be inefficient to construct for society that is primarily nomadic and that only spends a short period of time in one place. Kissel et al. argue that while the general scarcity of evidence from the period suggests warfare may not have been common, it does not support the hypothesis that war was absent.
Epipaleolithic: The most ancient archaeological record of what could have been a prehistoric massacre is at the site of Jebel Sahaba, committed against a population associated with the Qadan culture of far northern Sudan.
The cemetery contains a large number of skeletons that are approximately 13,000 to 14,000 years old, with 24 out of 59 skeletons presenting arrowheads embedded in their skeletons, which indicates that they might have been the casualties of warfare. It has been noted that the violence, if dated correctly, likely occurred in the wake of a local ecological crisis. Initially, Jebel Seheba was believed to be the site of a singular battle. However re-examination of the remains has superseded this thesis. The co-occurrence of healed and unhealed lesions among 41 individuals was found to strongly support sporadic and recurrent violence between the social groups of the Nile valley.
At the site of Nataruk in Turkana, Kenya, numerous 10,000-year-old human remains were found with possible evidence of major traumatic injuries, including obsidian bladelets embedded in the skeletons, that should have been lethal. According to the original study, published in January 2016, the region was a "fertile lakeshore landscape sustaining a substantial population of hunter-gatherers" where pottery had been found, suggesting storage of food and sedentism. The initial report concluded that the bodies at Nataruk were not interred, but were preserved in the positions the individuals had died at the edge of a lagoon. However, evidence of blunt-force cranial trauma and lack of interment have been called into question, casting doubt upon the assertion that the site represents early intragroup violence.
The oldest rock art depicting acts of violence between hunter-gatherers in Northern Australia has been tentatively dated to 10,000 years ago.
The earliest, limited evidence for war in Mesolithic Europe likewise dates to ca. 10,000 years ago, and episodes of warfare appear to remain "localized and temporarily restricted" during the Late Mesolithic to Early Neolithic period in Europe. Iberian cave art of the Mesolithic shows explicit scenes of battle between groups of archers. A group of three archers encircled by a group of four is found in Cova del Roure, Morella la Vella, Castellón, Valencia. A depiction of a larger battle (which may, however, date to the early Neolithic), in which eleven archers are attacked by seventeen running archers, is found in Les Dogue, Ares del Maestrat, Castellón, Valencia. At Val del Charco del Agua Amarga, Alcañiz, Aragon, seven archers with plumes on their heads are fleeing a group of eight archers running in pursuit.
Early war was influenced by the development of bows, maces, and slings. The bow seems to have been the most important weapon in early warfare, in that it enabled attacks to be launched with far less risk to the attacker when compared to the risk involved in melee combat. While there are no cave paintings of battles between men armed with clubs, the development of the bow is concurrent with the first known depictions of organized warfare consisting of clear illustrations of two or more groups of men attacking each other. These figures are arrayed in lines and columns with a distinctly garbed leader at the front. Some paintings even portray still-recognizable tactics like flankings and envelopments. However, it has also been argued that these paintings should be interpreted with caution due to the fact that it is not self-evident that the cultures that made them intended to depict actual events or if they were intended to be symbolic or otherwise possess a different meaning.
Neolithic: Systemic warfare appears to have been a direct consequence of the sedentism as it developed in the wake of the Neolithic Revolution.
An important example is the massacre of Talheim Death Pit (near Heilbronn, Germany), dated right on the cusp of the beginning European Neolithic, at 5500 BC. Investigation of the Neolithic skeletons found in the Talheim Death pit in Germany suggests that prehistoric men from neighboring tribes were prepared to brutally fight and kill each other in order to capture and secure women. Researchers discovered that there were women among the immigrant skeletons, but within the local group of skeletons there were only men and children. They concluded that the absence of women among the local skeletons meant that they were regarded as somehow special, thus they were spared execution and captured instead. The capture of women may have indeed been the primary motive for the fierce conflict between the men.
Other speculations about the reasons for violence among Linear Pottery Culture settlements in Neolithic Europe include vengeance, conflicts over land and resources, and kidnapping of slaves. Some of these theories related to the lack of resources are supported by the discovery that various fortifications bordering indigenously inhabited areas appear to have not been in use for very long. Mass burial site at Schletz was also fortified, which serves as evidence of violent conflict among tribes and means that these fortifications were built as a form of defense against aggressors. The massacre of Schletz occurred at the same time as the massacre at Talheim and several other massacres. More than 200 Neolithic people were killed during the massacre in the Linear Pottery settlement area of Schletz 7000 years ago.
More recently, a similar site was discovered at Schöneck-Kilianstädten, with the remains of the victims showing "a pattern of intentional mutilation".
While the presence of such massacre sites in the context of Early Neolithic Europe is undisputed, diverging definitions of "warfare proper" (i.e. planned campaigns sanctioned by society as opposed to spontaneous massacres) has led to scholarly debate on the existence of warfare in the narrow sense prior to the development of city states in 20th-century archaeology. In the summary of Heath (2017), accumulating archaeology has made it "increasingly harder" to argue for the absence of organised warfare in Neolithic Europe.
Bioarchaeologists have found from the skeletal remains of more than 2,300 early farmers from 180 sites in northwestern Europe between 8,000 and 4,000 years ago that more than one in ten suffered weapon injuries.
During the period of expansion of hunter-gatherer groups associated with the Pitted Ware culture in southern Scandinavia, the Funnelbeaker farmers constructed a number of defensive palisades, which may mean that the two peoples were in conflict with each other. There is archaeological evidence of high levels of violence among the people of the Pitted Ware culture. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Prehistoric warfare | planned campaigns sanctioned by society as opposed to spontaneous massacres) has led to scholarly debate on the existence of warfare in the narrow sense prior to the development of city states in 20th-century archaeology. In the summary of Heath (2017), accumulating archaeology has made it "increasingly harder" to argue for the absence of organised warfare in Neolithic Europe.
Bioarchaeologists have found from the skeletal remains of more than 2,300 early farmers from 180 sites in northwestern Europe between 8,000 and 4,000 years ago that more than one in ten suffered weapon injuries.
During the period of expansion of hunter-gatherer groups associated with the Pitted Ware culture in southern Scandinavia, the Funnelbeaker farmers constructed a number of defensive palisades, which may mean that the two peoples were in conflict with each other. There is archaeological evidence of high levels of violence among the people of the Pitted Ware culture.
The 8500-year-old Kennewick Man, a prehistoric Paleoamerican man, and Ötzi, who lived and died in the European Alps some 5,200 years ago, were probably killed in warfare.
Warfare in pre-Columbian North America has served as an important comparandum in the archaeological study of the indirect evidence for warfare in the Neolithic. A notable example is the massacre at the Crow Creek Site in South Dakota (14th century).
Chalcolithic to Bronze Age: The onset of the Chalcolithic (Copper Age) saw the introduction of copper weapons. Organised warfare between early city states was in existence by the mid-5th millennium BC. Excavations at Mersin, Anatolia show the presence of fortifications and soldiers' quarters by 4300 BC.
Excavation work undertaken in 2005 and 2006 has shown that Hamoukar was destroyed by warfare by around 3500 BC-—probably the earliest urban warfare attested so far in the archaeological record of the Near East. Continued excavations in 2008 and 2010 expand on that.
Archaeological evidence suggests that Proto-Indo-Iranian-speaking Abashevo society was intensely warlike. Mass graves reveal that inter-tribal battles involved hundreds of warriors of both sides. Warfare appears to have been more frequent in the late Abashevo period, and it was in this turbulent environment in which the Sintashta culture emerged. The spread of spoke-wheeled chariots has been closely associated with early Indo-Iranian migrations. The earliest known chariots have been found in Sintashta culture burial sites, and the culture is considered a strong candidate for the origin of the technology, which spread throughout the Old World and played an important role in ancient warfare.
Military conquests expanded city states under Egyptian control. Babylonia and later Assyria built empires in Mesopotamia while the Hittite Empire ruled much of Anatolia.
Chariots appear in the 20th century BC, and become central to warfare in the Ancient Near East from the 17th century BC. The Hyksos and Kassite invasions mark the transition to the Late Bronze Age. Ahmose I defeated the Hyksos and re-established Egyptian control of Nubia and Canaan, territories again defended by Ramesses II at the Battle of Kadesh, the greatest chariot battle in history. The raids of the Sea Peoples and the renewed disintegration of Egypt in the Third Intermediate Period marks the end of the Bronze Age.
The Tollense valley battlefield is the oldest evidence of a large scale battle in Europe. More than 4,000 warriors from Central Europe fought in a battle on the site in the 13th century BC.
Mycenaean Greeks (c. 1600 – c. 1100 BC) invested in the development of military infrastructure, while military production and logistics were supervised directly from the palatial centers. The most identifiable piece of Mycenaean armor was the boar's tusk helmet. In general, most features of the later hoplite panoply of classical Greek antiquity, were already known to Mycenaean Greece.
The Late Bronze Age collapse was a time of widespread societal collapse during the 12th century BC, between c. 1200 and 1150. It was sudden, violent, and culturally disruptive for many Bronze Age civilizations, and it brought a sharp economic decline to regional powers, notably ushering in the Greek Dark Ages. Historian Robert Drews argues for the appearance of massed infantry, using newly developed weapons and armour, such as cast rather than forged spearheads and long swords, a revolutionizing cut-and-thrust weapon, and javelins. Such new weaponry, in the hands of large numbers of "running skirmishers", who could swarm and cut down a chariot army, would destabilize states that were based upon the use of chariots by the ruling class. That would precipitate an abrupt social collapse as raiders began to conquer, loot and burn cities.
The Bronze Age in China traverses the protohistoric and historic periods. Battles utilizing foot and chariot infantry took place regularly between powers in the North China Plain.
Iron Age: Early Iron Age events like the Dorian invasion, Greek colonialism and their interaction with Phoenician and Etruscan forces lie within the prehistoric period. Germanic warrior societies of the Migration period engaged in endemic warfare (see also Thorsberg moor and Illerup Ådal). Anglo-Saxon warfare lies on the edge of historicity, its study relying primarily on archaeology with the help of only fragmentary written accounts.
There are around 3,300 structures that can be classed as hillforts or similar "defended enclosures" within Britain. Hillforts in Britain are known from the Bronze Age, but the great period of hillfort construction was during the British Iron Age, between 700 BC and the Roman conquest of Britain in 43 AD. The reason for the emergence of hillforts in Britain, and their purpose, has been a subject of debate. It has been argued that they could have been military sites constructed in response to invasion from continental Europe, sites built by invaders, or a military reaction to social tensions caused by an increasing population and consequent pressure on agriculture.
Endemic warfare: In warlike cultures, war is often ritualized with a number of taboos and practices that limit the number of casualties and the duration of the conflict. This type of situation is known as endemic warfare. Among tribal societies engaging in endemic warfare, conflict may escalate to actual warfare occasionally for reasons such as conflict over resources or for no readily understandable reason.
Warfare is known to every tribal society, but some societies developed a particular emphasis on the formation of a warrior culture (such as the Nuer of South Sudan, the Māori of New Zealand, the Dugum Dani of Papua, the Yanomami (dubbed "the Fierce People") of the Amazon. The culture of inter-tribal warfare has long been present in New Guinea.
See also: Outline of prehistoric technology
Notes:
Bibliography: Fry, Douglas P., War, Peace, and Human Nature. Oxford University Press, 2013.
Karsten, Rafael, Blood revenge, war, and victory feasts among the Jibaro Indians of eastern Ecuador, 1923.
Kelly, Raymond C. Warless societies and the origin of war. Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2000.
LeBlanc, Steven A. Prehistoric Warfare in the American Southwest, University of Utah Press, 1999. ISBN 978-0874805819
Lee, Wayne E., Waging War: Conflict, Culture, and Innovation in World History, Oxford University Press, 2015.
Randsborg, Klavs. Hjortspring : Warfare and Sacrifice in Early Europe. Aarhus, Denmark; Oakville, Connecticut. : Aarhus University Press, 1995.
Roksandic, Mirjana (ed.), Violent interactions in the Mesolithic : evidence and meaning. Oxford, England : Archaeopress, 2004. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Princely rebellion | Terminology: Princely rebellions or revolts may also be described with ambiguous terms such as 'dynastic struggles/conflicts' or 'succession struggles/conflicts/disputes', but they aren't always synonymous. Although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably with wars of succession, princely rebellions are not (necessarily) caused by succession crises, but directed against well-established monarchs which are commonly recognised as legitimate. Scholars sometimes disagree which term fits a certain conflict best, for example the 1657–1661 Mughal dynastic conflict, which consisted of several subconflicts, phases, and factions. Both types of conflict could have the same causes, however, such as the creation of collateral dynastic branches, which stimulated wars of succession upon a monarch's death, as well as princely revolts by cadets and cousins while they were still alive.
Princely revolts are also to be distinguished from broader nobles' rebellions (such as The Fronde, the Second Barons' War, the Revolt of the Three Feudatories, or the 1626 rebellion by Mughal nobleman Mahabat Khan), which may involve participants from (only) other aristocratic families.
Africa:
Egypt: Ptolemaic war (132–124 BCE), between Cleopatra II and Ptolemy VIII Physcon over the rightful succession of Ptolemy VI Philometor.
Libya: 1817, 1826, and July 1832–1835: Mehmed Karamanli's rebellions against the bey Yusuf Karamanli of Tripoli. Yusuf abdicated in favour of his son Ali II Karamanli in August 1832. This transfer of power did not appease unrest, and Mehmed Karamanli continued to claim the throne for himself with support of various tribes who revolted due to Yusuf's recent tax increase.
Nigeria: 1845–1851: Lagos succession dispute. Kosoko against his nephew oba Akitoye of Lagos, who had been enthroned in 1841. It started with the Ogun Olomiro (Salt Water War) of July 1845, which brought Kosoko into power, and ended with the British-backed Akitoye returning with the Reduction of Lagos in 1851.
Asia:
Burmese Empire: February 1782: princely rebellion against king Singu Min of the Konbaung dynasty, in which Singu was killed, Phaungkaza Maung Maung seized the throne for seven days, before Bodawpaya killed him as well and replaced him.
Chinese Empire: Some examples include:
657–651 BCE: The Li Ji Unrest or Rebellion was a series of destabilising events in the ancient Chinese state of Jine, wrought by Duke Xian of Jin's concubine Li Ji, who sought (and briefly succeeded) in discrediting many princes of the ducal family, in order to put her own son Xiqi on the Jin throne.
635 BCE: Prince Dai of Eastern Zhou's rebellion against his brother, King Xiang of Zhou, who managed to keep his throne with the assistance of the state of Jin.
154 BCE: Rebellion of the Seven States by princes of the Western Han dynasty.
91 BCE: Rebellion of Liu Ju.
1510: Prince of Anhua rebellion by Zhu Zhifan.
1519: Prince of Ning rebellion by Zhu Chenhao.
Indonesia: 1619: Kuti rebellion against Jayanegara of Majapahit..
1674–1681: Trunajaya rebellion by the Madurese prince Trunajaya against Amangkurat I of the Mataram Sultanate. With the latter's ousting and death in 1677, it also became a war of succession between Amangkurat II and his brother Prince Puger (who became Trunajaya's co-belligerent).
Israelite kingdom: (historicity contested) c. 1000 BCE Absalom's revolt at Hebron according to 2 Samuel.
Mughal Empire:
Dynamics: In the Mughal Empire (1526–1857), an Islamic dynasty in the Indian subcontinent, princely rebellions revolved around the tensions between the expected solemn loyalty to the supposed absolute authority of the emperor and the imperial court on the one hand, which rejected the very idea of rebellion as unacceptable disobedience, and the alleged patrimonial rights violations, imperial malice and unfair dealings by the emperor towards the princes, against which efforts to justify and conduct princely revolts were made. According to Faruqui (2012), there were 'seven significant princely rebellions' from 1526 to 1707, five of which took place during 'the high period of Mughal rule (1585–1680s)'. From 1556 to 1606, these focused especially on the entitlement of princes to appanages (a province of the empire to govern personally as a semi-independent kingdom), and their right to rebel if the emperor broke his supposed promise of granting appanages to princes, as this was 'imperial encroachment on their territory'. However, the Mughal emperors managed to centralise and increase their powers by abolishing the system, and successfully crushed all princely rebellions (the last in 1606 by Khusrau Mirza against his father, emperor Jahangir) against its abolition. The focus of princely revolts thereafter shifted towards the princes' entitlement to an equal claim upon the imperial throne and the realm's entire territory after the monarch's death. This meant that the princes opposed the designation of an heir, let alone any fixation of the order of succession, and would wage war against the emperor whenever they felt that this entitlement was being undermined in some way.
Major princely rebellions: 1540–1552 rebellion: Kamran Mirza against his brother, emperor Humayun, over the imperial throne and Kamran's appanage of Kabul.
1561–1566 (and 1581–1582) rebellion: Mirza Muhammad Hakim against his brother, emperor Akbar, over the imperial throne and Hakim's appanage of Kabul.
1599–1604 rebellion: Salim (later Jahangir) against his father, emperor Akbar, over Salim's appanage of Allahabad.
1606 rebellion: Khusrau Mirza against his father, emperor Jahangir, for breaking his promise to grant Khusrau the governorship of Bengal.
1622–1627 rebellion: Khurram (later Shah Jahan) against his father, emperor Jahangir, over his right to imperial succession in the face of Shahryar Mirza possibly becoming the designated heir.
1659 rebellion: Muhammad Sultan against his father Aurangzeb.
1681 rebellion: Muhammad Akbar against his father, emperor Aurangzeb.
Although all Mughal emperors faced opposition by princes and often princely rebellions, none of the major rebellions succeeded, and no emperor was ever killed by a prince.
Historiography: According to Faruqui (2012), official court chroniclers showed a strong tendency to engage in what he termed 'post-rebellion apologetics', in an effort to downplay the seriousness of dynastic conflicts to the harmony within the royal family, the impact on the political and socio-economic stability of the empire, and to minimise or deflect the blame away from the main players in order to exonerate them. In attempts to restore the sense of quasi-infallibility of the emperor, and the princely loyalty to him, blame is placed on the bad or malicious influences of advisers and allies around the princes and the emperor. It was, after all, only ever other people who deceived and manipulated the 'young and impressionable' prince, led him astray, and forced him to reluctantly rebel against his own father, the wise and mighty emperor who represented the cosmic order. On the other hand, the ill advice of unfaithful courtiers are to be held responsible for the emperor's failure to prevent the rebellion, with the emperor's inexperience or 'simple nature' (in the case of Akbar) providing further mitigating circumstances.
Even linguistically, the official chronicles took care to avoid controversial words like fitna ("internal/civil war", "intra-Muslim war/strife"), preferring instead mukhalafat ("opposition"), fasad ("mischief/corruption"), and shorish ("rebellion/revolt"), and thus be lenient in their criticism of princely-imperial conflicts. No such care was taken when describing noble-led rebellions, however, such as the 1626 failed rebellion by nobleman Mahabat Khan, which is frequently labelled a fitna and other more incendiary and powerfully negative terms of condemnation in order to stress how completely unacceptable such heretical disobedience to the emperor supposedly was. By contrast, princely rebellions were tacitly permitted as a justifiable option of last resort in certain situations.
Empire of Trebizond: 1284–1285: rebellions against John II of Trebizond, whose early reign was unstable, having gained the throne after his brother emperor George of Trebizond was betrayed and overthrown in 1280, the 1281 Papadopoulos revolt against John II, and the Siege of Trebizond (1282) by David VI of Georgia while John was getting married in Constantinople.
1284: unsuccessful rebellion by John's brother, the former emperor George. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Princely rebellion | No such care was taken when describing noble-led rebellions, however, such as the 1626 failed rebellion by nobleman Mahabat Khan, which is frequently labelled a fitna and other more incendiary and powerfully negative terms of condemnation in order to stress how completely unacceptable such heretical disobedience to the emperor supposedly was. By contrast, princely rebellions were tacitly permitted as a justifiable option of last resort in certain situations.
Empire of Trebizond: 1284–1285: rebellions against John II of Trebizond, whose early reign was unstable, having gained the throne after his brother emperor George of Trebizond was betrayed and overthrown in 1280, the 1281 Papadopoulos revolt against John II, and the Siege of Trebizond (1282) by David VI of Georgia while John was getting married in Constantinople.
1284: unsuccessful rebellion by John's brother, the former emperor George.
1284–1285: successful rebellion by John's half-sister, Theodora of Trebizond (enthroned with the help of David VI of Georgia), who reigned as empress for several months, while John probably took refuge in Tripolis. John II managed to reassert his reign some time in 1285.
Europe:
Byzantine Empire: Byzantine civil war of 1373–1379, which began as a rebellion of crown prince Andronikos IV Palaiologos against his father emperor John V Palaiologos of the Byzantine Empire. Andronikos managed to capture and imprison his father and ascend to the throne (1376), but John managed to escape and re-establish his reign (1379).
England: Revolt of 1173–1174. Rebellion of princes Henry the Young King, Richard, Duke of Aquitaine and Geoffrey, Duke of Brittany with their mother, queen Eleanor of Aquitaine, against their father king Henry II of England
Despenser War (1321–22). A baronial revolt against Edward II of England led by the Marcher Lords Roger Mortimer and Humphrey de Bohun. The rebellion was fuelled by opposition to Hugh Despenser the Younger, the royal favourite.
Epiphany Rising (1400), a rebellion against king Henry IV of England by noblemen loyal to Richard II of England who had been deposed in June 1399.
Francia and Kingdom of France: c. 560: Chram against his father Chlothar I.
1465: War of the Public Weal, a rebellion of French princes against king Louis XI.
Holy Roman Empire: 1459, 1465–1468, 1471–1473: rebellion of Adolf, Duke of Guelders against his father Arnold, Duke of Guelders. The war ended with Arnold selling his ducal rights to duke Charles the Bold of Burgundy, who imprisoned Adolf and conquered Guelders in March 1473.
Kievan Rus': Rebellion of Mstislav of Chernigov (1024–1026). In the aftermath of the Kievan succession crisis of 1015–1019 following the death of Volodimer I of Kiev, Yaroslav the Wise gained the throne of Kiev and consolidated his power. A few years later, one of his other brothers, prince Mstislav of Chernigov, rebelled and tried to seize Kiev in Yaroslav's absence, but failed. Yaroslav then attacked, but was defeated at the Battle of Listven. Two years later, the brothers agreed to divide Kievan Rus' along the Dnipro.
Rebellion of Vseslav of Polotsk (1065–1069). This conflict began when prince Vseslav of Polotsk claimed agnatic seniority over grand prince Iziaslav Yaroslavich of Kiev. Due to the Kiev uprising of 1068, he briefly secured the throne.
Chernihiv internecine war (1226), between Michael of Chernihiv and Oleh of Kursk. Although the war was evidently about who would succeed Mstislav II Svyatoslavich (who was killed in the Battle of the Kalka River in 1223) as prince of Chernihiv, it took place three years after his death, suggesting that Michael was already well-established as prince before Oleh revolted against his rule. Oleh attempted to change the decisions made at the 1206 Chernihiv Congress.
Lithuania: Lithuanian Civil War (1381–1384): broke out when Algirdas' brother Kęstutis rebelled against Algirdas' son Jogaila and claimed the throne for himself while Jogaila was besieging Algirdas' other son Andrei at Polotsk. Jogaila and Andrei were half-brothers, already fighting a war over the succession of their father Algirdas since 1377; Kęstutis had initially recognised Jogaila, and had supported him in his conflict against Andrei.
Lithuanian Civil War (1389–1392): Kęstutis' son Vytautas rebelled against Jogaila and his son Skirgaila.
Portugal: 1640–1668: Portuguese Restoration War. Rebellion of the Forty Conspirators led by the Duke of Braganza, John IV, against Philip III of Portugal. John's grandfather João I, Duke of Braganza in 1565 married Catherine, granddaughter of Manuel I of Portugal. Philip III's grandfather was Philip II of Spain (Habsburg), grandson of Manuel I of Portugal. During the War of the Portuguese Succession (1580–1583), cousins Catherine and Philip II both claimed the Portuguese throne, and the latter won, acceding as "Philip I of Portugal". Thus the House of Habsburg became the ruling dynasty of Portugal. The Portuguese Restoration War essentially continued the dynastic conflict fought between the intertwined houses of Braganza and Habsburg two generations earlier, but this time Braganza won.
Serbia: 1331: Stefan Dušan's rebellion against his father, king Stefan Dečanski of medieval Serbia.
Sweden: 1304–1318: Civil disorder. Rebellions of Eric and Valdemar Magnusson and against their brother, king Birger of Sweden and his regent and protector Torkel Knutsson.
See also: List of Byzantine revolts and civil wars
List of Roman civil wars and revolts
Notes:
References:
Bibliography: Braumoeller, Bear F. (2019). Only the Dead: The Persistence of War in the Modern Age. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 288. ISBN 9780190849542.
Faruqui, Munis D. (2012). The Princes of the Mughal Empire, 1504–1719. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 181–234. ISBN 9781139536752. Retrieved 13 April 2022. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139135474.009
Flint, John E. (1975). The Cambridge History of Africa: Volume 5. From c. 1790 to c. 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521207010. Retrieved 4 August 2022.
Holsti, Kalevi (1991). Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648–1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 379. ISBN 9780521399296.
(Appendix) Kokkonen, Andrej; Sundell, Anders (September 2017). Online supplementary appendix for "The King is Dead: Political Succession and War in Europe, 1000–1799" (PDF). Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg. p. 40. Retrieved 22 March 2022.
Ooi, Keat Gin (2004). Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor. ABC-CLIO. p. 1791. ISBN 9781576077702. Retrieved 16 February 2022.
Martin, Janet (1995). Medieval Russia, 980–1584. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 450. ISBN 9780521368322. Retrieved 22 August 2022.
Martin, Janet (2007). Medieval Russia: 980–1584. Second Edition. E-book. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-511-36800-4.
Sandberg, Brian (2016). War and Conflict in the Early Modern World: 1500–1700. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 284. ISBN 9781509503025. Retrieved 7 April 2022. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Principles of war | Historical principles:
Arthashastra: Arthaśāstra is an ancient Indian Sanskrit treatise on statecraft and military strategy among other things.
Biblical: The Book of Deuteronomy prescribes how the Israelite army was to fight, including dealing with plunder, enslavement of the enemy women and children and forbidding the destruction of fruit-bearing trees.
Sun Tzu: Sun Tzu's The Art of War, written c. 400 BCE, listed five basic factors for a commander to consider:
The Moral Law, or discipline and unity of command
Heaven, or weather factors
Earth, or the terrain
The Commander;
Method and discipline, which included logistics and supply
However, Sun Tzu implied individual initiative as a principle of warfare, stating "According as circumstances are favorable, one should
modify one's plans."
Napoléon Bonaparte: Since the first appearance in English of the military maxims of Napoleon in 1831, all English translations have relied upon the extremely incomplete French edition of General Burnod published in 1827. This has contributed to the erroneous belief that Napoléon Bonaparte had pioneered the "Principles of War". Napoléon was a keen follower of famous military generals of the past, who influenced his thoughts greatly. Albeit, "The armies of today are based on the organization created by Napoleon [sic] for his Grand Army and it has been used ever since." (Weider, par. 12). Since the mid-19th century, due to the influence of the Prussian Army, they have become a guide for many military organizations to focus the thinking of military commanders and political leaders toward concepts and methods of successful prosecution of wars and smaller military operations. Although originally concerned with strategy, grand strategy and tactics, due to the changing nature of warfare and military technology, since the interwar period, the principles are largely applied to the strategic decision-making, and in some cases, to operational mobility of forces.
Carl von Clausewitz: The principles of war identified by Carl von Clausewitz in his essay Principles of War, and later enlarged in his book, On War have been influential in military thinking in the North Atlantic region.
The initial essay dealt with the tactics of combat, and suggested the following general principles:
discover how we may gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point
to calculate moral factors
make the best use of the few means at our disposal
never lack calmness and firmness...without this firm resolution, no great results can be achieved in the most successful war
always have the choice between the most audacious and the most careful solution...no military leader has ever become great without audacity
Based on the above, Clausewitz went on to suggest principles for tactics, the scale of combat that dominated European warfare at the time:
The Defence
The Offense
The Use of Troops
The Use Of Terrain
forces are more effective in a concentric rather than in a parallel attack; attack concentrically without having decisive superiority in an engagement
always seek to envelop that part of the enemy against which we direct our main attack
cut off the enemy from his line of retreat
Clausewitz also included in the essay general principles of strategy by saying that Warfare has three main objects:
(a) To conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy; always direct our principal operation against the main body of the enemy army or at least against an important portion of his forces
(b) To take possession of his material and other sources of strength, and to direct our operations against the places where most of these resources are concentrated
(c) To gain public opinion, won through great victories and the occupation of the enemy's capital
use our entire force with the utmost energy
the decisive point of attack
never to waste time
surprise plays a much greater role in tactics than in strategy
pursuit
forces concentrated at the main point
an attack on the lines of communication takes effect only very slowly, while victory on the field of battle bears fruit immediately
In strategy, therefore, the side that is surrounded by the enemy is better off than the side which surrounds its opponent, especially with equal or even weaker forces
To cut the enemy's line of retreat, however, strategic envelopment or a turning movement is very effective
be physically and morally superior
stores of supplies, on whose preservation operations absolutely depend
The provisioning of troops is a necessary condition of warfare and thus has great influence on the operations
independent action
Strategic Defense
Politically speaking defensive war is a war which we wage for our independence
Strategic Offense
The strategic offensive pursues the aim of the war directly, aiming straight at the destruction of the enemy's forces
Jomini: Antoine Henri Jomini in his book, Precis de l'Art de Guerre, published in 1838, also developed theories of warfare based on the concepts and methods used during the Napoleonic Wars.
Ardant du Picq: Colonel Ardant du Picq, a French infantry officer who was killed in the Franco-Prussian War, prepared drafts based on his observations of military history which became the book Battle Studies. In it two of Du Picq's observations stand out:
Combat is the object, the cause of being, and the supreme manifestation of an army and must be the focus of training, even in peacetime.
The human element is more important than theories. War is still more of an art than a science.
20th century theory: Applied to specific forms of warfare, such as naval warfare, Julian Corbett argued that maritime strategy should play a significant role in the principles of war. Admiral William S. Sims, who commanded the U.S. Navy's contribution to the British Grand Fleet in World War I, wrote of the U.S. Naval War College:
The college aims to supply principles, not rules, and by training, develop the habit of applying these principles logically, correctly, and rapidly to each situation that may arise.
This habit can be acquired only through considerable practice, hence the numerous problems in strategy and tactics.
National principles of war: Variations exist and differences are minor and semantic or reflect a cultural persuasion for a particular approach. A closer examination of the values and culture of origin reveals its war priorities.
UK: The UK uses 10 principles of war, as taught to all officers of the Royal Navy, British Army, and Royal Air Force:
The British Army's principles of war were first published after the First World War and based on the work of the British general and military theorist, J. F. C. Fuller. The definition of each principle has been refined over the following decades and adopted throughout the British armed forces. The tenth principle, added later, was originally called Administration. The first principle has always been stated as pre-eminent and the second is usually considered more important than the remainder, which are not listed in any order of importance.
The 2011 edition of British Defence Doctrine (BDD) states and explains the principles with the following preface: "Principles of War guide commanders and their staffs in the planning and conduct of warfare. They are enduring, but not immutable, absolute or prescriptive, and provide an appropriate foundation for all military activity. The relative importance of each may vary according to context; their application requires judgement, common sense and intelligent interpretation. Commanders also need to take into account the legitimacy of their actions, based on the legal, moral, political, diplomatic and ethical propriety of the conduct of military forces, once committed."
The ten principles as listed and defined in the 2011 edition, unchanged from the 2008 edition, of BDD (which also provides explanation) are:
Selection and Maintenance of the Aim – A single, unambiguous aim is the keystone of successful military operations. Selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the master principle of war.
Maintenance of Morale – Morale is a positive state of mind derived from inspired political and military leadership, a shared sense of purpose and values, well-being, perceptions of worth and group cohesion.
Offensive Action – Offensive action is the practical way in which a commander seeks to gain advantage, sustain momentum and seize the initiative.
Security – Security is the provision and maintenance of an operating environment that affords the necessary freedom of action, when and where required, to achieve objectives.
Surprise – Surprise is the consequence of shock and confusion induced by the deliberate or incidental introduction of the unexpected.
Concentration of Force – Concentration of force involves the decisive, synchronized application of superior fighting power (conceptual, physical, and moral) to realize intended effects, when and where required.
Economy of Effort – Economy of effort is the judicious exploitation of manpower, materiel and time in relation to the achievement of objectives.
Flexibility – the ability to change readily to meet new circumstances – comprises agility, responsiveness, resilience, acuity and adaptability.
Cooperation – Cooperation entails the incorporation of teamwork and a sharing of dangers, burdens, risks and opportunities in every aspect of warfare.
Sustainability – To sustain a force is to generate the means by which its fighting power and freedom of action are maintained.
These principles of war are commonly used by the armed forces of Commonwealth countries such as Australia.
Soviet Union and Russia: Soviet adoption of the principles of war is considered a part of military art, and is therefore a system of knowledge that is
the theory and practice of preparing and conducting military operations on the land, at sea, and in the air. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Principles of war | Economy of Effort – Economy of effort is the judicious exploitation of manpower, materiel and time in relation to the achievement of objectives.
Flexibility – the ability to change readily to meet new circumstances – comprises agility, responsiveness, resilience, acuity and adaptability.
Cooperation – Cooperation entails the incorporation of teamwork and a sharing of dangers, burdens, risks and opportunities in every aspect of warfare.
Sustainability – To sustain a force is to generate the means by which its fighting power and freedom of action are maintained.
These principles of war are commonly used by the armed forces of Commonwealth countries such as Australia.
Soviet Union and Russia: Soviet adoption of the principles of war is considered a part of military art, and is therefore a system of knowledge that is
the theory and practice of preparing and conducting military operations on the land, at sea, and in the air. As such it includes the following principles
High combat readiness
surprise, decisiveness and active seeking to secure the initiative
full use of all means of combat
coordination and interaction of all types and branches
decisive concentration
simultaneous attack in depth
full use of morale-political factor
firm and continuous command and control
inexorability and decisiveness during the mission
security of combat operations
timely restoration of troop combat readiness
The Soviet principles of military science, from Soviet AirLand Battle Tactics ISBN 0-89141-160-7. Similar principles continue to be followed in CIS countries.
Preparedness – The ability to fulfill missions under any conditions for starting or the conduct of war.
Initiative – Utilizing surprise, decisiveness, and aggressiveness to continuously strive to achieve and retain the initiative. Initiative, in this sense describes efforts to fulfill the plan in spite of difficulties. This is in contrast to the western usage of the term which means attacking (or threatening to attack) to force enemy reaction, thus denying his ability to act.
Capability – Full use of the various means and capabilities of battle to achieve victory.
Cooperation – Coordinated application of and close cooperation between major units of the armed forces.
Concentration – Decisive concentration of the essential force at the needed moment and in the most important direction to achieve the main mission.
Depth – Destruction of the enemy throughout the entire depth of their deployment.
Morale – Use of political and psychological factors to demoralize opponents and break their will to resist.
Obedience – Strict and uninterrupted obedience. Orders are to be followed exactly and without question. Commanders are expected to directly supervise subordinates in a detailed manner in order to ensure compliance.
Steadfastness – Subordinate commanders are to carry out the spirit and the letter of the plan.
Security – Security complements surprise. All aspects of security, from deception and secrecy, to severe discipline of subordinates who through action or inaction allow information to fall into the hands of ourselves are to be vigorously carried out.
Logistics – Restoration of reserves and restoration of combat capability is of paramount concern of the modern, fast paced battlefield.
Thus it can be seen that in Military art, the Soviet and Western systems are similar, but place their emphasis in wildly differing places. Western systems allow more control and decision-making at lower levels of command, and with this empowerment comes a consistent emphasis. Offensive, mass, and maneuver principles for the western commander all place a sense of personal responsibility and authority to ensure these principles are followed by appropriate action. In contrast the Soviet system stresses preparedness, initiative, and obedience. This places more responsibility at the better prepared and informed centers of command, and provide more overall control of the battle.
United States: (Refer to US Army Field Manual FM 3–0)
The United States Armed Forces use the following nine principles of war:
Objective – Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. The ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enemy's ability to fight and will to fight.
Offensive – Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined common objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. This is fundamentally true across all levels of war.
Mass – Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time. Synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to achieve mass. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure to enemy fire.
Economy of Force – Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. No part of the force should ever be left without purpose. The allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations is measured in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time on the battlefield.
Maneuver – Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects the force. It is used to exploit successes, to preserve freedom of action, and to reduce vulnerability. It continually poses new problems for the enemy by rendering his actions ineffective, eventually leading to defeat.
Unity of Command – For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort. At all levels of war, employment of military forces in a manner that masses combat power toward a common objective requires unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all the forces are under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose.
Security – Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by a commander to protect his forces. Knowledge and understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, doctrine, and staff planning improve the detailed planning of adequate security measures.
Surprise – Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power. By seeking surprise, forces can achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Surprise can be in tempo, size of force, direction or location of main effort, and timing. Deception can aid the probability of achieving surprise.
Simplicity – Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Everything in war is very simple, but the simple thing is difficult. To the uninitiated, military operations are not difficult. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors being equal, parsimony is to be preferred.
Officers in the U.S. Military sometimes use the acronyms "MOSS MOUSE", "MOOSE MUSS", "MOUSE MOSS", "MOM USE SOS", and "SUMO MOSES" to remember the first letters of these nine principles.
According to a United States Government document from 2010, the rule governing targeting in a non-international armed conflict is the international humanitarian law which is commonly known as the laws of war. The United States government stated in an undated Department of Justice White paper entitled "Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al Qa’ida or An Associated Force" that the four fundamental law-of-war principles governing the use of force are necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity i.e. the avoidance of unnecessary suffering.
There is a debate within the American military establishment to adopt flexibility as the tenth principle of war. Frost argues that the concept of flexibility should be integrated with America's warfighting doctrine. Americans soundly retort that flexibility is a given that pervades all aspects of each principle.
Many, however, hold that the principle of simplicity implicitly includes flexibility. One of the oldest dicta states that the simple plan is the flexible plan.
In 2007, Armed Forces Journal published a proposal by LCDR Chris van Avery, USN, 12 New Principles of War, to completely overhaul and expand the U.S. principles of war from nine to thirteen. The article was subsequently forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Air Force Chief of Staff General Moseley and an effort to overhaul current U.S. doctrine was initiated using Van Avery's framework.
In 2011, three new "principles of joint operations" were added to the cited nine principles of war. These principles are:
Restraint – to limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military operations, and the national strategic end state.
Perseverance – to ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives often is essential to success.
Legitimacy – to maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations. Legitimacy, which can be a decisive factor in operations, is based on the actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of the actions from the various perspectives of interested audiences.
Together, these 12 concepts form the Principles of Joint Operations. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Principles of war | These principles are:
Restraint – to limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military operations, and the national strategic end state.
Perseverance – to ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives often is essential to success.
Legitimacy – to maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations. Legitimacy, which can be a decisive factor in operations, is based on the actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of the actions from the various perspectives of interested audiences.
Together, these 12 concepts form the Principles of Joint Operations.
Canada: The Canadian Armed Forces principles of war/military science are defined by the Royal Military College of Canada or Canadian Forces College website to focus on principles of command, principles of war, operational art and campaign planning, and scientific principles.
principles of command – Lead By Example; Know Your subordinates And Promote Their Welfare; Develop Leadership Potential; Make Sound And Timely Decisions; Train subordinates As A Team; Communicate Ideas Clearly; Keep subordinates Informed Of All Activities And New Developments; Take Initiatives; Know Yourself And Pursue Self-Improvement; Treat subordinates As You Wish To Be Treated
principles of war – Selection and maintenance of the aim; maintenance of morale; offensive action; surprise; security; concentration of force; economy of effort; flexibility; co-operation; and administration. These principles are not listed in any order of importance.
operational art and campaign planning – the organization and synchronization of the planning process and maritime, land and air forces.
scientific principles – involved in military reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition in the context of military operations.
France: The French Army recognizes three principles to be applied to operation of land forces at the tactical level:
Freedom of action – "The ability of a commander to use his means at any time and to act despite the presence of the enemy and the various constraints imposed by both the environment and circumstances, in order to achieve the assigned goal. [...] Freedom of Action consists of maintaining the initiative with regards to the enemy in order to 'control upcoming action' and seize opportunities."
Unity of effort – "Convergence in space and time of actions and effects of the different operational functions. [...] Unity of Effort distinguishes itself from the concentration of forces through the need to combine actions and optimize effects in order to increase the effectiveness on the chosen objective." This principle includes the psychological effects of surprise and troop morale, in addition to the more conventional principle of concentration of forces.
Economy of means – "Proper distribution and use of assets in order to obtain the best ratio of capabilities vs. effects in order to achieve the assigned goal." The instruments for this principle are modularity, the "task organization" of the forces, and support.
According to French doctrine, new principles should be observed, primarily to protect the principle of "Freedom of Action":
Legitimacy – Among the local population, in national public opinion, and among international institutions.
Necessity – The appropriate amount of force is to be used for each desired objective.
Reversibility – The military actor should be prepared to quickly change its course of action depending on the opponent's attitude. Organize military actions to limit human losses and material damages. Remain open to opportunities for de-escalation, and prepare to "support the failure of the enemy" rather than needlessly seeking total destruction. "[Keep] the operation’s level of intensity as low as possible."
Israel: The principles of war according to Israeli doctrine are:
Maintenance of the aim;
Morale;
Initiative;
Stratagem;
Concentration of effort;
Security;
Optimal utilization of force;
Continuity;
Depth and reserve;
Simplicity.
People's Republic of China: The military principles of war of the People's Liberation Army were loosely based on those of the Soviet Union until the 1980s when a significant shift begun to be seen in a more regionally-aware, and geographically-specific strategic, operational and tactical thinking in all services. The PLA is currently influenced by three doctrinal schools which both conflict and complement each other: the People's war, the Regional war, and the Revolution in military affairs that led to substantial increase in the defence spending and rate of technological modernisation of the forces.
People's war – which is derived from the Maoist notion of warfare as a war in which the entire society is mobilized
Regional war – which envisions future wars to be limited in scope and confined to the Chinese border
Revolution in military affairs – which is a school of thought which believes that technology is transforming the basis of warfare and that these technological changes present both extreme dangers and possibilities for the Chinese military.
In recent years, 'Local war under high-tech conditions' has been promoted.
Other uses: These principles can be applied to non-military uses when Unity of command is separated into coordination and reality, Economy of Force is redefined as use of resources, Mass is separated into renewable and non-renewable resources, and relationships are separated from unity of command.
In 1913 Harrington Emerson proposed 12 principles of efficiency, the first three of which could be related to principles of war: Clearly defined ideals – Objective, Common sense – Simplicity, Competent counsel – Unity of Command.
Some of the twelve non-military principles of efficiency were formulated by Henry Ford at the turn of the 20th century, and are suggested to be: objective, coordination, action, reality, knowledge, locations (space and time),things, obtaining, using, protecting, and losing. Nine, ten, or twelve principles all provide a framework for efficient development of any objective.
Principles of War was also a book published in 1969 for the Japan Self-Defense Forces. It outlines the basic military principles and strategies by which the Japanese army was to operate. The book was used for most military exams in Japan. The book backs up all military principles with historical examples.
See also: Geneva Conventions
Grand strategy
Hague Conventions
Military doctrine
Military strategy
Military tactics
Naval strategy
Operational mobility
Principles of sustainment
Strategy
U.S. Army Strategist
Notes and citations:
References: von Clausewitz, Carl, The most important principles of waging war to complete my course of instruction for his Royal Highness the Crown Prince (German: Die wichtigsten Grundsätze des Kriegführens zur Ergänzung meines Unterrichts bei Sr. Königlichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen), 1812 Translated and edited by Hans W. Gatzke as "Principles of War, September 1942, The Military Service Publishing Company
Emerson, Harrington, Twelve Principles of Efficiency, Kessinger Publishing, 2003
Van Avery, Chris, LCDR, USN, 12 New Principles of War, Armed Force Journal, The Defense News Media Group, July 2007 [2].
West, Joseph, Dr., Principles of War: A Translation from the Japanese, U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS, 1969 [3]
Frost, Robert S., Lt.Col. (USAF), The growing imperative to adopt "flexibility" as an American Principle of War, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, October 15, 1999 [4]
Storper, Michael & Scott, Allen John, Pathways to industrialization and regional development, Routledge, 1992
Corbett, Julian Stafford, Sir, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, London, 1911, US Naval Institute Press, 1988 (The Project Gutenberg eBook [5])
Glantz, David, Soviet Military Operational Art: In pursuit of deep battle, Frank Cass, London, 1991 |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Proxy war | History: During classical antiquity and the Middle Ages, many non-state proxies were external parties that were introduced into an internal conflict and aligned themselves with a belligerent to gain influence and to further their own interests in the region. Proxies could be introduced by an external or local power and most commonly took the form of irregular armies which were used to achieve their sponsor's goals in a contested region. Some medieval states like the Byzantine Empire used proxy warfare as a foreign-policy tool by deliberately cultivating intrigue among hostile rivals and then backing them when they went to war with each other. Other states regarded proxy wars as merely a useful extension of a pre-existing conflict, such as France and England during the Hundred Years' War, both of which initiated a longstanding practice of supporting privateers, which targeted the other's merchant shipping. France used England's turmoil of the Wars of the Roses from their victory as a proxy, siding with the Lancastrians against the Yorkists who were backed by the Burgundian State. The Ottoman Empire likewise used the Barbary pirates as proxies to harass Western European powers in the Mediterranean Sea.
Frequent application of the term "proxy war" indicates its prominent place in academic research on international relations. Distinct implementations of soft power and hard power have proved to be unsuccessful in recent years. Accordingly, great failures in classic wars increased the tendency to use proxy wars. Since the early twentieth century, proxy wars have most commonly taken the form of states assuming the role of sponsors to non-state proxies and essentially using them as fifth columns to undermine adversarial powers. That type of proxy warfare includes external support for a faction engaged in a civil war, terrorists, national-liberation movements, and insurgent groups, or assistance to a national revolt against foreign occupation. For example, the British government partially organized and instigated the Arab Revolt to undermine the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. Many proxy wars began assuming a distinctive ideological dimension after the Spanish Civil War, which pitted the fascist political ideology of Italy and Nazi Germany against the communist ideology of the Soviet Union without involving these states in open warfare with each other. Sponsors of both sides also used the Spanish conflict as a proving ground for their own weapons and battlefield tactics.
During the Cold War, proxy warfare was motivated by fears that an armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union by conventional warfare would result in nuclear holocaust, which rendered the use of ideological proxies a safer way to conduct hostilities. The Soviet government found that supporting parties antagonistic to the U.S. and other Western nations was a cost-effective way to combat NATO's influence compared to direct military engagement. Additionally, the proliferation of televised media and its impact on public perception made the U.S. public especially susceptible to war-weariness and being skeptical of risking life abroad. That encouraged the American practice of arming insurgent forces, such as the funnelling of supplies to the mujahideen during the Soviet–Afghan War. Other examples of proxy war include the Korean War and the Vietnam War.
Abstract: The governments of some nations, particularly liberal democracies, may choose to engage in proxy warfare (despite their military superiority) if most of their citizens oppose declaring or entering a conventional war. That featured prominently in US strategy following the Vietnam War because of the so-called "Vietnam Syndrome" of extreme war weariness among the American population. That was also a significant factor in motivating the US to enter conflicts such as the Syrian Civil War by proxy actors after a series of costly drawn-out direct engagements in the Middle East spurred a recurrence of war weariness, the "War on Terror syndrome."
Nations may also resort to proxy warfare to avoid potential negative international reactions from allied nations, profitable trading partners, or intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations. That is especially significant when standing peace treaties, acts of the alliance or other international agreements ostensibly forbid direct warfare. Breaking such agreements could lead to a variety of negative consequences due to either negative international reaction (see above), punitive provisions listed in the prior agreement, or retaliatory action by the other parties and their allies.
In some cases, nations may be motivated to engage in proxy warfare because of financial concerns: supporting irregular troops, insurgents, non-state actors, or less-advanced allied militaries (often with obsolete or surplus equipment) can be significantly cheaper than deploying national armed forces, and the proxies usually bear the brunt of casualties and economic damage resulting from prolonged conflict.
Another common motivating factor is the existence of a security dilemma. A nation may use military intervention to install a more favorable government in a third-party state. Rival nations may perceive the intervention as a weakened position to their own security and may respond by attempting to undermine such efforts, often by backing parties favorable to their own interests (such as those directly or indirectly under their control, sympathetic to their cause, or ideologically aligned). In that case, if one or both rivals come to believe that their favored faction is at a disadvantage, they will often respond by escalating military and/or financial support. If their counterpart(s), perceiving a material threat or desiring to avoid the appearance of weakness or defeat, follow suit, a proxy war ensues between the two powers. That was a major factor in many of the proxy wars during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as in the ongoing series of conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran, especially in Yemen and Syria.
Effects: Proxy wars can have a huge impact, especially on the local area. A proxy war with significant effects occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. Operation Rolling Thunder, a U.S bombing campaign in North Vietnam destroyed significant amounts of infrastructure. Many bombs were also dropped on North Vietnamese supply routes in Cambodia and Laos. Equally, if not more, significant was the Soviet–Afghan War, which saw the U.S. fund the Afghan mujahideen against the invading Soviet forces (see Operation Cyclone). This war cost hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of dollars, bankrupting the Soviet Union and contributing to its collapse.
The conflict in the Middle East between Saudi Arabia and Iran is another example of the destructive impact of proxy wars. Since 2003, nearly 500,000 have died in the Iraqi conflict. Since 2011, more than 500,000 have died in the Syrian Civil War. Over 377,000 people had died in the Yemeni Civil War by early 2022. In the war in Afghanistan, more than 176,000 were killed between 2001 and 2021. In Pakistan, more than 57,000 have been killed since 2003.
In general, lengths, intensities, and scales of armed conflicts are often greatly increased if belligerents' capabilities are augmented by external support. Belligerents are often less likely to engage in diplomatic negotiations, peace talks are less likely to bear fruit, and damage to infrastructure can be many times greater.
See also: Arsenal of Democracy
Grey-zone (international relations)
China–North Korea relations
Russia–United States relations
Iran–Israel proxy conflict
Hybrid warfare
References:
Further reading: Tom Stevenson, "In the Grey Zone" (review of Eli Berman and David A. Lake, Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents, Cornell, 2019, ISBN 978 1 50173 306 2; Tyrone L. Groh, Proxy War: The Least Bad Option, Stanford, 2019, ISBN 978 1 5036 0818 4; Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli, Surrogate Warfare: The Transformation of War in the 21st Century, Georgetown, 2019, ISBN 978 1 62616 678 3), London Review of Books, vol. 42, no. 20 (22 October 2020), pp. 41–43. "Nuclear weapons – judged, for now at least, to be too powerful to be used – seem to preclude wars of destruction between major powers today." (p. 43.)
External links: Media related to Proxy wars at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Psychological warfare | History:
Early: Since prehistoric times, warlords and chiefs have recognized the importance of weakening the morale of their opponents. According to Polyaenus, in the Battle of Pelusium (525 BC) between the Persian Empire and ancient Egypt, the Persian forces used cats and other animals as a psychological tactic against the Egyptians, who avoided harming cats due to religious belief and superstitions.
Currying favor with supporters was the other side of psychological warfare, and an early practitioner of this was Alexander the Great, who successfully conquered large parts of Europe and the Middle East and held on to his territorial gains by co-opting local elites into the Greek administration and culture. Alexander left some of his men behind in each conquered city to introduce Greek culture and oppress dissident views. His soldiers were paid dowries to marry locals in an effort to encourage assimilation.
Genghis Khan, leader of the Mongolian Empire in the 13th century AD employed less subtle techniques. Defeating the will of the enemy before having to attack and reaching a consented settlement was preferable to facing his wrath. The Mongol generals demanded submission to the Khan and threatened the initially captured villages with complete destruction if they refused to surrender. If they had to fight to take the settlement, the Mongol generals fulfilled their threats and massacred the survivors. Tales of the encroaching horde spread to the next villages and created an aura of insecurity that undermined the possibility of future resistance.
Genghis Khan also employed tactics that made his numbers seem greater than they actually were. During night operations he ordered each soldier to light three torches at dusk to give the illusion of an overwhelming army and deceive and intimidate enemy scouts. He also sometimes had objects tied to the tails of his horses, so that riding on open and dry fields raised a cloud of dust that gave the enemy the impression of great numbers. His soldiers used arrows specially notched to whistle as they flew through the air, creating a terrifying noise.
Another tactic favored by the Mongols was catapulting severed human heads over city walls to frighten the inhabitants and spread disease in the besieged city's closed confines. This was especially used by the later Turko-Mongol chieftain.
The Muslim caliph Omar, in his battles against the Byzantine Empire, sent small reinforcements in the form of a continuous stream, giving the impression that a large force would accumulate eventually if not swiftly dealt with.
During the early Qin dynasty and late Eastern Zhou dynasty in 1st century AD China, the Empty Fort Strategy was used to trick the enemy into believing that an empty location was an ambush, in order to prevent them from attacking it using reverse psychology. This tactic also relied on luck, should the enemy believe that the location is a threat to them.
In the 6th century BCE Greek Bias of Priene successfully resisted the Lydian king Alyattes by fattening up a pair of mules and driving them out of the besieged city. When Alyattes' envoy was then sent to Priene, Bias had piles of sand covered with wheat to give the impression of plentiful resources.
This ruse appears to have been well known in medieval Europe: defenders in castles or towns under siege would throw food from the walls to show besiegers that provisions were plentiful. A famous example occurs in the 8th-century legend of Lady Carcas, who supposedly persuaded the Franks to abandon a five-year siege by this means and gave her name to Carcassonne as a result.
During the Granada War, Spanish captain Hernán Pérez del Pulgar routinely employed psychological tactics as part of his guerrilla actions against the Emirate of Granada. In 1490, infiltrating the city by night with a small retinue of soldiers, he nailed a letter of challenge on the main mosque and set fire to the alcaicería before withdrawing.
In 1574, having been informed about the pirate attacks previous to the Battle of Manila, Spanish captain Juan de Salcedo had his relief force return to the city by night while playing marching music and carrying torches in loose formations, so they would appear to be a much larger army to any nearby enemy. They reached the city unopposed.
During the Attack on Marstrand in 1719, Peter Tordenskjold carried out military deception against the Swedes. Although probably apocryphal, he apparently succeeded in making his small force appear larger and feed disinformation to his opponents, similar to the Operations Fortitude and Titanic in World War II.
World War I: The start of modern psychological operations in war is generally dated to World War I. By that point, Western societies were increasingly educated and urbanized, and mass media was available in the form of large circulation newspapers and posters. It was also possible to transmit propaganda to the enemy via the use of airborne leaflets or through explosive delivery systems like modified artillery or mortar rounds.
At the start of the war, the belligerents, especially the British and Germans, began distributing propaganda, both domestically and on the Western front. The British had several advantages that allowed them to succeed in the battle for world opinion; they had one of the world's most reputable news systems, with much experience in international and cross-cultural communication, and they controlled much of the undersea communications cable system then in operation. These capabilities were easily transitioned to the task of warfare.
The British also had a diplomatic service that maintained good relations with many nations around the world, in contrast to the reputation of the German services. While German attempts to foment revolution in parts of the British Empire, such as Ireland and India, were ineffective, extensive experience in the Middle East allowed the British to successfully induce the Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman Empire.
In August 1914, David Lloyd George appointed a Member of Parliament (MP), Charles Masterman, to head a Propaganda Agency at Wellington House. A distinguished body of literary talent was enlisted for the task, with its members including Arthur Conan Doyle, Ford Madox Ford, G. K. Chesterton, Thomas Hardy, Rudyard Kipling and H. G. Wells. Over 1,160 pamphlets were published during the war and distributed to neutral countries, and eventually, to Germany. One of the first significant publications, the Report on Alleged German Outrages of 1915, had a great effect on general opinion across the world. The pamphlet documented atrocities, both actual and alleged, committed by the German army against Belgian civilians. A Dutch illustrator, Louis Raemaekers, provided the highly emotional drawings which appeared in the pamphlet.
In 1917, the bureau was subsumed into the new Department of Information and branched out into telegraph communications, radio, newspapers, magazines and the cinema. In 1918, Viscount Northcliffe was appointed Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. The department was split between propaganda against Germany organized by H.G Wells, and propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Empire supervised by Wickham Steed and Robert William Seton-Watson; the attempts of the latter focused on the lack of ethnic cohesion in the Empire and stoked the grievances of minorities such as the Croats and Slovenes. It had a significant effect on the final collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Army at the Battle of Vittorio Veneto.
Aerial leaflets were dropped over German trenches containing postcards from prisoners of war detailing their humane conditions, surrender notices and general propaganda against the Kaiser and the German generals. By the end of the war, MI7b had distributed almost 26 million leaflets. The Germans began shooting the leaflet-dropping pilots, prompting the British to develop unmanned leaflet balloons that drifted across no-man's land. At least one in seven of these leaflets were not handed in by the soldiers to their superiors, despite severe penalties for that offence. Even General Hindenburg admitted that "Unsuspectingly, many thousands consumed the poison", and POWs admitted to being disillusioned by the propaganda leaflets that depicted the use of German troops as mere cannon fodder. In 1915, the British began airdropping a regular leaflet newspaper Le Courrier de l'Air for civilians in German-occupied France and Belgium.
At the start of the war, the French government took control of the media to suppress negative coverage. Only in 1916, with the establishment of the Maison de la Presse, did they begin to use similar tactics for the purpose of psychological warfare. One of its sections was the "Service de la Propagande aérienne" (Aerial Propaganda Service), headed by Professor Tonnelat and Jean-Jacques Waltz, an Alsatian artist code-named "Hansi". The French tended to distribute leaflets of images only, although the full publication of US President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, which had been heavily edited in the German newspapers, was distributed via airborne leaflets by the French.
The Central Powers were slow to use these techniques; however, at the start of the war the Germans succeeded in inducing the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire to declare 'holy war', or Jihad, against the Western infidels. They also attempted to foment rebellion against the British Empire in places as far afield as Ireland, Afghanistan, and India. The Germans' greatest success was in giving the Russian revolutionary, Lenin, free transit on a sealed train from Switzerland to Finland after the overthrow of the Tsar. This soon paid off when the Bolshevik Revolution took Russia out of the war.
World War II: Adolf Hitler was greatly influenced by the psychological tactics of warfare the British had employed during World War I, and attributed the defeat of Germany to the effects this propaganda had on the soldiers. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Psychological warfare | The Central Powers were slow to use these techniques; however, at the start of the war the Germans succeeded in inducing the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire to declare 'holy war', or Jihad, against the Western infidels. They also attempted to foment rebellion against the British Empire in places as far afield as Ireland, Afghanistan, and India. The Germans' greatest success was in giving the Russian revolutionary, Lenin, free transit on a sealed train from Switzerland to Finland after the overthrow of the Tsar. This soon paid off when the Bolshevik Revolution took Russia out of the war.
World War II: Adolf Hitler was greatly influenced by the psychological tactics of warfare the British had employed during World War I, and attributed the defeat of Germany to the effects this propaganda had on the soldiers. He became committed to the use of mass propaganda to influence the minds of the German population in the decades to come. By calling his movement The Third Reich, he was able to convince many civilians that his cause was not just a fad, but the way of their future. Joseph Goebbels was appointed as Propaganda Minister when Hitler came to power in 1933, and he portrayed Hitler as a messianic figure for the redemption of Germany. Hitler also coupled this with the resonating projections of his orations for effect.
Germany's Fall Grün plan of invasion of Czechoslovakia had a large part dealing with psychological warfare aimed both at the Czechoslovak civilians and government as well as, crucially, at Czechoslovakia's allies. It became successful to the point that Germany gained support of UK and France through appeasement to occupy Czechoslovakia without having to fight an all-out war, sustaining only minimum losses in covert war before the Munich Agreement.
At the start of the Second World War, the British set up the Political Warfare Executive to produce and distribute propaganda. Through the use of powerful transmitters, broadcasts could be made across Europe. Sefton Delmer managed a successful black propaganda campaign through several radio stations which were designed to be popular with German troops while at the same time introducing news material that would weaken their morale under a veneer of authenticity. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made use of radio broadcasts for propaganda against the Germans. Churchill favoured deception; he said "In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.".
During World War II, the British made extensive use of deception – developing many new techniques and theories. The main protagonists at this time were 'A' Force, set up in 1940 under Dudley Clarke, and the London Controlling Section, chartered in 1942 under the control of John Bevan. Clarke pioneered many of the strategies of military deception. His ideas for combining fictional orders of battle, visual deception and double agents helped define Allied deception strategy during the war, for which he has been referred to as "the greatest British deceiver of WW2".
During the lead-up to the Allied invasion of Normandy, many new tactics in psychological warfare were devised. The plan for Operation Bodyguard set out a general strategy to mislead German high command as to the date and location of the invasion, which was obviously going to happen. Planning began in 1943 under the auspices of the London Controlling Section (LCS). A draft strategy, referred to as Plan Jael, was presented to Allied high command at the Tehran Conference. Operation Fortitude was intended to convince the Germans of a greater Allied military strength than was the case, through fictional field armies, faked operations to prepare the ground for invasion and "leaked" misinformation about the Allied order of battle and war plans.
Elaborate naval deceptions (Operations Glimmer, Taxable and Big Drum) were undertaken in the English Channel. Small ships and aircraft simulated invasion fleets lying off Pas de Calais, Cap d'Antifer and the western flank of the real invasion force. At the same time Operation Titanic involved the RAF dropping fake paratroopers to the east and west of the Normandy landings.
The deceptions were implemented with the use of double agents, radio traffic and visual deception. The British "Double Cross" anti-espionage operation had proven very successful from the outset of the war, and the LCS was able to use double agents to send back misleading information about Allied invasion plans. The use of visual deception, including mock tanks and other military hardware had been developed during the North Africa campaign. Mock hardware was created for Bodyguard; in particular, dummy landing craft were stockpiled to give the impression that the invasion would take place near Calais.
The Operation was a strategic success and the Normandy landings caught German defences unaware. Continuing deception, portraying the landings as a diversion from a forthcoming main invasion in the Calais region, led Hitler into delaying transferring forces from Calais to the real battleground for nearly seven weeks.
Vietnam War: The United States ran an extensive program of psychological warfare during the Vietnam War. The Phoenix Program had the dual aim of assassinating National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF or Viet Cong) personnel and terrorizing any potential sympathizers or passive supporters. During the Phoenix Program, over 19,000 NLF supporters were killed. In Operation Wandering Soul, the United States also used tapes of distorted human sounds and played them during the night making the Vietnamese soldiers think that the dead were back for revenge.
The Vietcong and their forces also used a program of psychological warfare during this war. Trịnh Thị Ngọ, also known as Thu Hương and Hanoi Hannah, was a Vietnamese radio personality. She made English-language broadcasts for North Vietnam directed at United States troops. During the Vietnam War, Ngọ became famous among US soldiers for her propaganda broadcasts on Radio Hanoi. Her scripts were written by the North Vietnamese Army and were intended to frighten and shame the soldiers into leaving their posts. She made three broadcasts a day, reading a list of newly killed or imprisoned Americans, and playing popular US anti-war songs in an effort to incite feelings of nostalgia and homesickness, attempting to persuade US GIs that the US involvement in the Vietnam War was unjust and immoral. A typical broadcast began as follows:
How are you, GI Joe? It seems to me that most of you are poorly informed about the going of the war, to say nothing about a correct explanation of your presence over here. Nothing is more confused than to be ordered into a war to die or to be maimed for life without the faintest idea of what's going on.
21st century: The CIA made extensive use of Contra soldiers to destabilize the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The CIA used psychological warfare techniques against the Panamanians by delivering unlicensed TV broadcasts. The United States government has used propaganda broadcasts against the Cuban government through TV Marti, based in Miami, Florida. However, the Cuban government has been successful at jamming the signal of TV Marti.
In the Iraq War, the United States used the shock and awe campaign to psychologically maim and break the will of the Iraqi Army to fight.
In cyberspace, social media has enabled the use of disinformation on a wide scale. Analysts have found evidence of doctored or misleading photographs spread by social media in the Syrian Civil War and 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine, possibly with state involvement. Military and governments have engaged in psychological operations (PSYOP) and informational warfare (IW) on social networking platforms to regulate foreign propaganda, which includes countries like the US, Russia, and China.
In 2022, Meta and the Stanford Internet Observatory found that over five years people associated with the U.S. military, who tried to conceal their identities, created fake accounts on social media systems including Balatarin, Facebook, Instagram, Odnoklassniki, Telegram, Twitter, VKontakte and YouTube in an influence operation in Central Asia and the Middle East. Their posts, primarily in Arabic, Farsi and Russian, criticized Iran, China and Russia and gave pro-Western narratives. Data suggested the activity was a series of covert campaigns rather than a single operation.
In operations in the South and East China Seas, both the United States and China have been engaged in "cognitive warfare", which involves displays of force, staged photographs and sharing disinformation. The start of the public use of "cognitive warfare" as a clear movement occurred in 2013 with China's political rhetoric.
Methods: Most modern uses of the term psychological warfare refer to the following military methods:
Demoralization:
Distributing pamphlets that encourage desertion or supply instructions on how to surrender.
Shock and awe military strategy.
Projecting repetitive and disturbing noises and music for long periods at high volume towards groups under siege like during Operation Nifty Package.
Propaganda radio stations, such as Lord Haw-Haw in World War II on the "Germany calling" station.
False flag events.
Terrorism
The threat of chemical weapons.
Information warfare.
Most of these techniques were developed during World War II or earlier, and have been used to some degree in every conflict since. Daniel Lerner was in the OSS (the predecessor to the American CIA) and in his book, attempts to analyze how effective the various strategies were. He concludes that there is little evidence that any of them were dramatically successful, except perhaps surrender instructions over loudspeakers when victory was imminent. Measuring the success or failure of psychological warfare is very hard, as the conditions are very far from being a controlled experiment.
Lerner also divides psychological warfare operations into three categories:
White propaganda (omissions and emphasis): Truthful and not strongly biased, where the source of information is acknowledged. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Psychological warfare | Propaganda radio stations, such as Lord Haw-Haw in World War II on the "Germany calling" station.
False flag events.
Terrorism
The threat of chemical weapons.
Information warfare.
Most of these techniques were developed during World War II or earlier, and have been used to some degree in every conflict since. Daniel Lerner was in the OSS (the predecessor to the American CIA) and in his book, attempts to analyze how effective the various strategies were. He concludes that there is little evidence that any of them were dramatically successful, except perhaps surrender instructions over loudspeakers when victory was imminent. Measuring the success or failure of psychological warfare is very hard, as the conditions are very far from being a controlled experiment.
Lerner also divides psychological warfare operations into three categories:
White propaganda (omissions and emphasis): Truthful and not strongly biased, where the source of information is acknowledged.
Grey propaganda (omissions, emphasis and racial/ethnic/religious bias): Largely truthful, containing no information that can be proven wrong; the source is not identified.
Black propaganda (commissions of falsification): Inherently deceitful, information given in the product is attributed to a source that was not responsible for its creation.
Lerner says grey and black operations ultimately have a heavy cost, in that the target population sooner or later recognizes them as propaganda and discredits the source. He writes, "This is one of the few dogmas advanced by Sykewarriors that is likely to endure as an axiom of propaganda: Credibility is a condition of persuasion. Before you can make a man do as you say, you must make him believe what you say.": 28 Consistent with this idea, the Allied strategy in World War II was predominantly one of truth (with certain exceptions).
In Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes, Jacques Ellul discusses psychological warfare as a common peace policy practice between nations as a form of indirect aggression. This type of propaganda drains the public opinion of an opposing regime by stripping away its power on public opinion. This form of aggression is hard to defend against because no international court of justice is capable of protecting against psychological aggression since it cannot be legally adjudicated. "Here the propagandists is [sic] dealing with a foreign adversary whose morale he seeks to destroy by psychological means so that the opponent begins to doubt the validity of his beliefs and actions."
Terrorism: According to Boaz Ganor, terrorism weakens the sense of security and disturbs daily life, damaging the target country's capability to function. Terrorism is a strategy that aims to influence public opinion into pressuring leaders to give in to the terrorists' demands, and the population becomes a tool to advance the political agenda.
By country:
China: According to U.S. military analysts, attacking the enemy's mind is an important element of the People's Republic of China's military strategy. This type of warfare is rooted in the Chinese Stratagems outlined by Sun Tzu in The Art of War and Thirty-Six Stratagems. In its dealings with its rivals, China is expected to utilize Marxism to mobilize communist loyalists, as well as flex its economic and military muscle to persuade other nations to act in the Chinese government's interests. The Chinese government also tries to control the media to keep a tight hold on propaganda efforts for its people. The Chinese government also utilizes cognitive warfare against Taiwan.
France: The Centre interarmées des actions sur l'environnement is an organization made up of 300 soldiers whose mission is to assure to the four service arm of the French Armed Forces psychological warfare capacities. Deployed in particular to Mali and Afghanistan, its missions "consist in better explaining and accepting the action of French forces in operation with local actors and thus gaining their trust: direct aid to the populations, management of reconstruction sites, actions of communication of influence with the population, elites and local elected officials". The center has capacities for analysis, influence, expertise and instruction.
Germany: In the German Bundeswehr, the Zentrum Operative Kommunikation is responsible for PSYOP efforts. The center is subordinate to the Cyber and Information Domain Service branch alongside multiple IT and Electronic Warfare battalions and consists of around 1000 soldiers. One project of the German PSYOP forces is the radio station Stimme der Freiheit (Sada-e Azadi, Voice of Freedom), heard by thousands of Afghans. Another is the publication of various newspapers and magazines in Kosovo and Afghanistan, where German soldiers serve with NATO.
Iran: The Iranian government had an operation program to use the 2022 FIFA World Cup as a psyop against concurrent people's protests.
Israel: The Israeli government and its military make use of psychological warfare. In 2021, Israeli newspaper Haaretz revealed that "Abu Ali Express", a popular news page on Telegram and Twitter purportedly dedicated to "Arab affairs", was actually run by a Jewish Israeli paid consultant to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The IDF's psyops account had been the source of a number of noteworthy reports that were afterwards cited by the Israeli and international media.
Russia:
Soviet Union:
United Kingdom: The British were one of the first major military powers to use psychological warfare in the First and Second World Wars. In the current British Armed Forces, PsyOps are handled by the tri-service 15 Psychological Operations Group. (See also MI5 and Secret Intelligence Service). The Psychological Operations Group comprises over 150 personnel, approximately 75 from the regular Armed Services and 75 from the Reserves. The Group supports deployed commanders in the provision of psychological operations in operational and tactical environments.
The Group was established immediately after the 1991 Gulf War, has since grown significantly in size to meet operational requirements, and since 2015 has been one of the sub-units of the 77th Brigade, formerly called the Security Assistance Group.
In June 2015, NSA files published by Glenn Greenwald revealed details of the JTRIG group at British intelligence agency GCHQ covertly manipulating online communities. This is in line with JTRIG's goal: to "destroy, deny, degrade [and] disrupt" enemies by "discrediting" them, planting misinformation and shutting down their communications.
In March 2019, it emerged that the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) of the UK's Ministry of Defence (MoD) is tendering to arms companies and universities for £70M worth of assistance under a project to develop new methods of psychological warfare. The project is known as the human and social sciences research capability (HSSRC).
United States: The term psychological warfare is believed to have migrated from Germany to the United States in 1941. During World War II, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff defined psychological warfare broadly, stating "Psychological warfare employs any weapon to influence the mind of the enemy. The weapons are psychological only in the effect they produce and not because of the weapons themselves." The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) currently defines psychological warfare as:
"The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives."
This definition indicates that a critical element of the U.S. psychological operations capabilities includes propaganda and by extension counterpropaganda. Joint Publication 3–53 establishes specific policy to use public affairs mediums to counter propaganda from foreign origins.
The purpose of United States psychological operations is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to US objectives. The Special Activities Center (SAC) is a division of the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations, responsible for Covert Action and "Special Activities". These special activities include covert political influence (which includes psychological operations) and paramilitary operations. SAC's political influence group is the only US unit allowed to conduct these operations covertly and is considered the primary unit in this area.
Dedicated psychological operations units exist in the United States Army and United States Marine Corps. The United States Navy and the 193rd Special Operations Wing of the United States Air Force also plans and executes limited PSYOP missions. United States PSYOP units and soldiers of all branches of the military are prohibited by law from targeting U.S. citizens with PSYOP within the borders of the United States (Executive Order S-1233, DOD Directive S-3321.1, and National Security Decision Directive 130). While United States Army PSYOP units may offer non-PSYOP support to domestic military missions, they can only target foreign audiences.
A U.S. Army field manual released in January 2013 states that "Inform and Influence Activities" are critical for describing, directing, and leading military operations. Several Army Division leadership staff are assigned to “planning, integration and synchronization of designated information-related capabilities."
In September 2022, the DoD launched an audit of covert information warfare after social media companies identified a suspected U.S. military operation.
See also:
References:
Bibliography:
External links:
Movie: Psywar: The Real Battlefield is the Mind by Metanoia films
Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger. Psychological Warfare at Project Gutenberg
The history of psychological warfare
IWS Psychological Operations (PsyOps) / Influence Operations Archived 8 December 2010 at the Wayback Machine
"Pentagon psychological warfare operation", USA Today, 15 December 2005
"U.S. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Psychological warfare | A U.S. Army field manual released in January 2013 states that "Inform and Influence Activities" are critical for describing, directing, and leading military operations. Several Army Division leadership staff are assigned to “planning, integration and synchronization of designated information-related capabilities."
In September 2022, the DoD launched an audit of covert information warfare after social media companies identified a suspected U.S. military operation.
See also:
References:
Bibliography:
External links:
Movie: Psywar: The Real Battlefield is the Mind by Metanoia films
Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger. Psychological Warfare at Project Gutenberg
The history of psychological warfare
IWS Psychological Operations (PsyOps) / Influence Operations Archived 8 December 2010 at the Wayback Machine
"Pentagon psychological warfare operation", USA Today, 15 December 2005
"U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists", New York Times, 18 March 2008
US Army PSYOPS Info – Detailed information about the US Army Psychological Operation Soldiers
IWS — The Information Warfare Site Archived 8 December 2010 at the Wayback Machine
U.S. — PSYOP producing mid-eastern kids comic book
The Institute of Heraldry — Psychological Operations
Psychological warfare
The Nature of Psychological Warfare (CIA 1958) Original |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Radar | History:
First experiments: As early as 1886, German physicist Heinrich Hertz showed that radio waves could be reflected from solid objects. In 1895, Alexander Popov, a physics instructor at the Imperial Russian Navy school in Kronstadt, developed an apparatus using a coherer tube for detecting distant lightning strikes. The next year, he added a spark-gap transmitter. In 1897, while testing this equipment for communicating between two ships in the Baltic Sea, he took note of an interference beat caused by the passage of a third vessel. In his report, Popov wrote that this phenomenon might be used for detecting objects, but he did nothing more with this observation.
The German inventor Christian Hülsmeyer was the first to use radio waves to detect "the presence of distant metallic objects". In 1904, he demonstrated the feasibility of detecting a ship in dense fog, but not its distance from the transmitter. He obtained a patent for his detection device in April 1904 and later a patent for a related amendment for estimating the distance to the ship. He also obtained a British patent on 23 September 1904 for a full radar system, that he called a telemobiloscope. It operated on a 50 cm wavelength and the pulsed radar signal was created via a spark-gap. His system already used the classic antenna setup of horn antenna with parabolic reflector and was presented to German military officials in practical tests in Cologne and Rotterdam harbour but was rejected.
In 1915, Robert Watson-Watt used radio technology to provide advance warning of thunderstorms to airmen and during the 1920s went on to lead the U.K. research establishment to make many advances using radio techniques, including the probing of the ionosphere and the detection of lightning at long distances. Through his lightning experiments, Watson-Watt became an expert on the use of radio direction finding before turning his inquiry to shortwave transmission. Requiring a suitable receiver for such studies, he told the "new boy" Arnold Frederic Wilkins to conduct an extensive review of available shortwave units. Wilkins would select a General Post Office model after noting its manual's description of a "fading" effect (the common term for interference at the time) when aircraft flew overhead.
By placing a transmitter and receiver on opposite sides of the Potomac River in 1922, U.S. Navy researchers A. Hoyt Taylor and Leo C. Young discovered that ships passing through the beam path caused the received signal to fade in and out. Taylor submitted a report, suggesting that this phenomenon might be used to detect the presence of ships in low visibility, but the Navy did not immediately continue the work. Eight years later, Lawrence A. Hyland at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) observed similar fading effects from passing aircraft; this revelation led to a patent application as well as a proposal for further intensive research on radio-echo signals from moving targets to take place at NRL, where Taylor and Young were based at the time.
Similarly, in the UK, L. S. Alder took out a secret provisional patent for Naval radar in 1928. W.A.S. Butement and P. E. Pollard developed a breadboard test unit, operating at 50 cm (600 MHz) and using pulsed modulation which gave successful laboratory results. In January 1931, a writeup on the apparatus was entered in the Inventions Book maintained by the Royal Engineers. This is the first official record in Great Britain of the technology that was used in coastal defence and was incorporated into Chain Home as Chain Home (low).
Before World War II: Before the Second World War, researchers in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and the United States, independently and in great secrecy, developed technologies that led to the modern version of radar. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa followed prewar Great Britain's radar development, Hungary and Sweden generated its radar technology during the war.
In France in 1934, following systematic studies on the split-anode magnetron, the research branch of the Compagnie générale de la télégraphie sans fil (CSF) headed by Maurice Ponte with Henri Gutton, Sylvain Berline and M. Hugon, began developing an obstacle-locating radio apparatus, aspects of which were installed on the ocean liner Normandie in 1935.
During the same period, Soviet military engineer P.K. Oshchepkov, in collaboration with the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute, produced an experimental apparatus, RAPID, capable of detecting an aircraft within 3 km of a receiver. The Soviets produced their first mass production radars RUS-1 and RUS-2 Redut in 1939 but further development was slowed following the arrest of Oshchepkov and his subsequent gulag sentence. In total, only 607 Redut stations were produced during the war. The first Russian airborne radar, Gneiss-2, entered into service in June 1943 on Pe-2 dive bombers. More than 230 Gneiss-2 stations were produced by the end of 1944. The French and Soviet systems, however, featured continuous-wave operation that did not provide the full performance ultimately synonymous with modern radar systems.
Full radar evolved as a pulsed system, and the first such elementary apparatus was demonstrated in December 1934 by the American Robert M. Page, working at the Naval Research Laboratory. The following year, the United States Army successfully tested a primitive surface-to-surface radar to aim coastal battery searchlights at night. This design was followed by a pulsed system demonstrated in May 1935 by Rudolf Kühnhold and the firm GEMA in Germany and then another in June 1935 by an Air Ministry team led by Robert Watson-Watt in Great Britain.
In 1935, Watson-Watt was asked to judge recent reports of a German radio-based death ray and turned the request over to Wilkins. Wilkins returned a set of calculations demonstrating the system was basically impossible. When Watson-Watt then asked what such a system might do, Wilkins recalled the earlier report about aircraft causing radio interference. This revelation led to the Daventry Experiment of 26 February 1935, using a powerful BBC shortwave transmitter as the source and their GPO receiver setup in a field while a bomber flew around the site. When the plane was clearly detected, Hugh Dowding, the Air Member for Supply and Research, was very impressed with their system's potential and funds were immediately provided for further operational development. Watson-Watt's team patented the device in patent GB593017.
Development of radar greatly expanded on 1 September 1936, when Watson-Watt became superintendent of a new establishment under the British Air Ministry, Bawdsey Research Station located in Bawdsey Manor, near Felixstowe, Suffolk. Work there resulted in the design and installation of aircraft detection and tracking stations called "Chain Home" along the East and South coasts of England in time for the outbreak of World War II in 1939. This system provided the vital advance information that helped the Royal Air Force win the Battle of Britain; without it, significant numbers of fighter aircraft, which Great Britain did not have available, would always have needed to be in the air to respond quickly. The radar formed part of the "Dowding system" for collecting reports of enemy aircraft and coordinating the response.
Given all required funding and development support, the team produced working radar systems in 1935 and began deployment. By 1936, the first five Chain Home (CH) systems were operational and by 1940 stretched across the entire UK including Northern Ireland. Even by standards of the era, CH was crude; instead of broadcasting and receiving from an aimed antenna, CH broadcast a signal floodlighting the entire area in front of it, and then used one of Watson-Watt's own radio direction finders to determine the direction of the returned echoes. This fact meant CH transmitters had to be much more powerful and have better antennas than competing systems but allowed its rapid introduction using existing technologies.
During World War II: A key development was the cavity magnetron in the UK, which allowed the creation of relatively small systems with sub-meter resolution. Britain shared the technology with the U.S. during the 1940 Tizard Mission.
In April 1940, Popular Science showed an example of a radar unit using the Watson-Watt patent in an article on air defence. Also, in late 1941 Popular Mechanics had an article in which a U.S. scientist speculated about the British early warning system on the English east coast and came close to what it was and how it worked. Watson-Watt was sent to the U.S. in 1941 to advise on air defense after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. Alfred Lee Loomis organized the secret MIT Radiation Laboratory at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts which developed microwave radar technology in the years 1941–45. Later, in 1943, Page greatly improved radar with the monopulse technique that was used for many years in most radar applications.
The war precipitated research to find better resolution, more portability, and more features for radar, including small, lightweight sets to equip night fighters (aircraft interception radar) and maritime patrol aircraft (air-to-surface-vessel radar), and complementary navigation systems like Oboe used by the RAF's Pathfinder.
Applications: The information provided by radar includes the bearing and range (and therefore position) of the object from the radar scanner. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Radar | Watson-Watt was sent to the U.S. in 1941 to advise on air defense after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. Alfred Lee Loomis organized the secret MIT Radiation Laboratory at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts which developed microwave radar technology in the years 1941–45. Later, in 1943, Page greatly improved radar with the monopulse technique that was used for many years in most radar applications.
The war precipitated research to find better resolution, more portability, and more features for radar, including small, lightweight sets to equip night fighters (aircraft interception radar) and maritime patrol aircraft (air-to-surface-vessel radar), and complementary navigation systems like Oboe used by the RAF's Pathfinder.
Applications: The information provided by radar includes the bearing and range (and therefore position) of the object from the radar scanner. It is thus used in many different fields where the need for such positioning is crucial. The first use of radar was for military purposes: to locate air, ground and sea targets. This evolved in the civilian field into applications for aircraft, ships, and automobiles.
In aviation, aircraft can be equipped with radar devices that warn of aircraft or other obstacles in or approaching their path, display weather information, and give accurate altitude readings. The first commercial device fitted to aircraft was a 1938 Bell Lab unit on some United Air Lines aircraft. Aircraft can land in fog at airports equipped with radar-assisted ground-controlled approach systems in which the plane's position is observed on precision approach radar screens by operators who thereby give radio landing instructions to the pilot, maintaining the aircraft on a defined approach path to the runway. Military fighter aircraft are usually fitted with air-to-air targeting radars, to detect and target enemy aircraft. In addition, larger specialized military aircraft carry powerful airborne radars to observe air traffic over a wide region and direct fighter aircraft towards targets.
Marine radars are used to measure the bearing and distance of ships to prevent collision with other ships, to navigate, and to fix their position at sea when within range of shore or other fixed references such as islands, buoys, and lightships. In port or in harbour, vessel traffic service radar systems are used to monitor and regulate ship movements in busy waters.
Meteorologists use radar to monitor precipitation and wind. It has become the primary tool for short-term weather forecasting and watching for severe weather such as thunderstorms, tornadoes, winter storms, precipitation types, etc. Geologists use specialized ground-penetrating radars to map the composition of Earth's crust. Police forces use radar guns to monitor vehicle speeds on the roads. Automotive radars are used for adaptive cruise control and emergency breaking on vehicles by ignoring stationary roadside objects that could cause incorrect brake application and instead measuring moving objects to prevent collision with other vehicles. As part of Intelligent Transport Systems, fixed-position stopped vehicle detection (SVD) radars are mounted on the roadside to detect stranded vehicles, obstructions and debris by inverting the automotive radar approach and ignoring moving objects. Smaller radar systems are used to detect human movement. Examples are breathing pattern detection for sleep monitoring and hand and finger gesture detection for computer interaction. Automatic door opening, light activation and intruder sensing are also common.
Principles:
Radar signal: A radar system has a transmitter that emits radio waves known as radar signals in predetermined directions. When these signals contact an object they are usually reflected or scattered in many directions, although some of them will be absorbed and penetrate into the target. Radar signals are reflected especially well by materials of considerable electrical conductivity—such as most metals, seawater, and wet ground. This makes the use of radar altimeters possible in certain cases. The radar signals that are reflected back towards the radar receiver are the desirable ones that make radar detection work. If the object is moving either toward or away from the transmitter, there will be a slight change in the frequency of the radio waves due to the Doppler effect.
Radar receivers are usually, but not always, in the same location as the transmitter. The reflected radar signals captured by the receiving antenna are usually very weak. They can be strengthened by electronic amplifiers. More sophisticated methods of signal processing are also used in order to recover useful radar signals.
The weak absorption of radio waves by the medium through which they pass is what enables radar sets to detect objects at relatively long ranges—ranges at which other electromagnetic wavelengths, such as visible light, infrared light, and ultraviolet light, are too strongly attenuated. Weather phenomena, such as fog, clouds, rain, falling snow, and sleet, that block visible light are usually transparent to radio waves. Certain radio frequencies that are absorbed or scattered by water vapour, raindrops, or atmospheric gases (especially oxygen) are avoided when designing radars, except when their detection is intended.
Illumination: Radar relies on its own transmissions rather than light from the Sun or the Moon, or from electromagnetic waves emitted by the target objects themselves, such as infrared radiation (heat). This process of directing artificial radio waves towards objects is called illumination, although radio waves are invisible to the human eye as well as optical cameras.
Reflection: If electromagnetic waves travelling through one material meet another material, having a different dielectric constant or diamagnetic constant from the first,
the waves will reflect or scatter from the boundary between the materials. This means that a solid object in air or in a vacuum, or a significant change in atomic density between the object and what is surrounding it, will usually scatter radar (radio) waves from its surface. This is particularly true for electrically conductive materials such as metal and carbon fibre, making radar well-suited to the detection of aircraft and ships. Radar absorbing material, containing resistive and sometimes magnetic substances, is used on military vehicles to reduce radar reflection. This is the radio equivalent of painting something a dark colour so that it cannot be seen by the eye at night.
Radar waves scatter in a variety of ways depending on the size (wavelength) of the radio wave and the shape of the target. If the wavelength is much shorter than the target's size, the wave will bounce off in a way similar to the way light is reflected by a mirror. If the wavelength is much longer than the size of the target, the target may not be visible because of poor reflection. Low-frequency radar technology is dependent on resonances for detection, but not identification, of targets. This is described by Rayleigh scattering, an effect that creates Earth's blue sky and red sunsets. When the two length scales are comparable, there may be resonances. Early radars used very long wavelengths that were larger than the targets and thus received a vague signal, whereas many modern systems use shorter wavelengths (a few centimetres or less) that can image objects as small as a loaf of bread.
Short radio waves reflect from curves and corners in a way similar to glint from a rounded piece of glass. The most reflective targets for short wavelengths have 90° angles between the reflective surfaces. A corner reflector consists of three flat surfaces meeting like the inside corner of a cube. The structure will reflect waves entering its opening directly back to the source. They are commonly used as radar reflectors to make otherwise difficult-to-detect objects easier to detect. Corner reflectors on boats, for example, make them more detectable to avoid collision or during a rescue. For similar reasons, objects intended to avoid detection will not have inside corners or surfaces and edges perpendicular to likely detection directions, which leads to "odd" looking stealth aircraft. These precautions do not totally eliminate reflection because of diffraction, especially at longer wavelengths. Half wavelength long wires or strips of conducting material, such as chaff, are very reflective but do not direct the scattered energy back toward the source. The extent to which an object reflects or scatters radio waves is called its radar cross section.
Radar range equation: The power Pr returning to the receiving antenna is given by the equation:
P
r
=
P
t
G
t
A
r
σ
F
4
(
4
π
)
2
R
t
2
R
r
2
{\displaystyle P_{r}={\frac {P_{t}G_{t}A_{r}\sigma F^{4}}{{(4\pi )}^{2}R_{t}^{2}R_{r}^{2}}}}
where
Pt = transmitter power
Gt = gain of the transmitting antenna
Ar = effective aperture (area) of the receiving antenna; this can also be expressed as
G
r
λ
2
4
π
{\displaystyle {G_{r}\lambda ^{2}} \over {4\pi }}
, where
λ
{\displaystyle \lambda }
= transmitted wavelength
Gr = gain of receiving antenna
σ = radar cross section, or scattering coefficient, of the target
F = pattern propagation factor
Rt = distance from the transmitter to the target
Rr = distance from the target to the receiver. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Radar | In the common case where the transmitter and the receiver are at the same location, Rt = Rr and the term Rt² Rr² can be replaced by R4, where R is the range.
This yields:
P
r
=
P
t
G
t
A
r
σ
F
4
(
4
π
)
2
R
4
.
{\displaystyle P_{r}={{P_{t}G_{t}A_{r}\sigma F^{4}} \over {{(4\pi )}^{2}R^{4}}}.}
This shows that the received power declines as the fourth power of the range, which means that the received power from distant targets is relatively very small.
Additional filtering and pulse integration modifies the radar equation slightly for pulse-Doppler radar performance, which can be used to increase detection range and reduce transmit power.
The equation above with F = 1 is a simplification for transmission in a vacuum without interference. The propagation factor accounts for the effects of multipath and shadowing and depends on the details of the environment. In a real-world situation, pathloss effects are also considered.
Doppler effect: Frequency shift is caused by motion that changes the number of wavelengths between the reflector and the radar. This can degrade or enhance radar performance depending upon how it affects the detection process. As an example, moving target indication can interact with Doppler to produce signal cancellation at certain radial velocities, which degrades performance.
Sea-based radar systems, semi-active radar homing, active radar homing, weather radar, military aircraft, and radar astronomy rely on the Doppler effect to enhance performance. This produces information about target velocity during the detection process. This also allows small objects to be detected in an environment containing much larger nearby slow moving objects.
Doppler shift depends upon whether the radar configuration is active or passive. Active radar transmits a signal that is reflected back to the receiver. Passive radar depends upon the object sending a signal to the receiver.
The Doppler frequency shift for active radar is as follows, where
F
D
{\displaystyle F_{D}}
is Doppler frequency,
F
T
{\displaystyle F_{T}}
is transmit frequency,
V
R
{\displaystyle V_{R}}
is radial velocity, and
C
{\displaystyle C}
is the speed of light:
F
D
=
2
×
F
T
×
(
V
R
C
)
{\displaystyle F_{D}=2\times F_{T}\times \left({\frac {V_{R}}{C}}\right)}
.
Passive radar is applicable to electronic countermeasures and radio astronomy as follows:
F
D
=
F
T
×
(
V
R
C
)
{\displaystyle F_{D}=F_{T}\times \left({\frac {V_{R}}{C}}\right)}
.
Only the radial component of the velocity is relevant. When the reflector is moving at right angle to the radar beam, it has no relative velocity. Objects moving parallel to the radar beam produce the maximum Doppler frequency shift.
When the transmit frequency (
F
T
{\displaystyle F_{T}}
) is pulsed, using a pulse repeat frequency of
F
R
{\displaystyle F_{R}}
, the resulting frequency spectrum will contain harmonic frequencies above and below
F
T
{\displaystyle F_{T}}
with a distance of
F
R
{\displaystyle F_{R}}
. As a result, the Doppler measurement is only non-ambiguous if the Doppler frequency shift is less than half of
F
R
{\displaystyle F_{R}}
, called the Nyquist frequency, since the returned frequency otherwise cannot be distinguished from shifting of a harmonic frequency above or below, thus requiring:
|
F
D
|
<
F
R
2
{\displaystyle |F_{D}|<{\frac {F_{R}}{2}}}
Or when substituting with
F
D
{\displaystyle F_{D}}
:
|
V
R
|
<
F
R
×
C
F
T
4
{\displaystyle |V_{R}|<{\frac {F_{R}\times {\frac {C}{F_{T}}}}{4}}}
As an example, a Doppler weather radar with a pulse rate of 2 kHz and transmit frequency of 1 GHz can reliably measure weather speed up to at most 150 m/s (340 mph), thus cannot reliably determine radial velocity of aircraft moving 1,000 m/s (2,200 mph).
Polarization: In all electromagnetic radiation, the electric field is perpendicular to the direction of propagation, and the electric field direction is the polarization of the wave. For a transmitted radar signal, the polarization can be controlled to yield different effects. Radars use horizontal, vertical, linear, and circular polarization to detect different types of reflections. For example, circular polarization is used to minimize the interference caused by rain. Linear polarization returns usually indicate metal surfaces. Random polarization returns usually indicate a fractal surface, such as rocks or soil, and are used by navigation radars.
Limiting factors:
Beam path and range: A radar beam follows a linear path in vacuum but follows a somewhat curved path in atmosphere due to variation in the refractive index of air, which is called the radar horizon. Even when the beam is emitted parallel to the ground, the beam rises above the ground as the curvature of the Earth sinks below the horizon. Furthermore, the signal is attenuated by the medium the beam crosses, and the beam disperses.
The maximum range of conventional radar can be limited by a number of factors:
Line of sight, which depends on the height above the ground. Without a direct line of sight, the path of the beam is blocked.
The maximum non-ambiguous range, which is determined by the pulse repetition frequency. The maximum non-ambiguous range is the distance the pulse can travel to and return from before the next pulse is emitted.
Radar sensitivity and the power of the return signal as computed in the radar equation. This component includes factors such as the environmental conditions and the size (or radar cross section) of the target.
Noise: Signal noise is an internal source of random variations in the signal, which is generated by all electronic components.
Reflected signals decline rapidly as distance increases, so noise introduces a radar range limitation. The noise floor and signal-to-noise ratio are two different measures of performance that affect range performance. Reflectors that are too far away produce too little signal to exceed the noise floor and cannot be detected. Detection requires a signal that exceeds the noise floor by at least the signal-to-noise ratio.
Noise typically appears as random variations superimposed on the desired echo signal received in the radar receiver. The lower the power of the desired signal, the more difficult it is to discern it from the noise. The noise figure is a measure of the noise produced by a receiver compared to an ideal receiver, and this needs to be minimized.
Shot noise is produced by electrons in transit across a discontinuity, which occurs in all detectors. Shot noise is the dominant source in most receivers. There will also be flicker noise caused by electron transit through amplification devices, which is reduced using heterodyne amplification. Another reason for heterodyne processing is that for fixed fractional bandwidth, the instantaneous bandwidth increases linearly in frequency. This allows improved range resolution. The one notable exception to heterodyne (downconversion) radar systems is ultra-wideband radar. Here a single cycle, or transient wave, is used similar to UWB communications, see List of UWB channels.
Noise is also generated by external sources, most importantly the natural thermal radiation of the background surrounding the target of interest. In modern radar systems, the internal noise is typically about equal to or lower than the external noise. An exception is if the radar is aimed upwards at clear sky, where the scene is so "cold" that it generates very little thermal noise. The thermal noise is given by kB T B, where T is temperature, B is bandwidth (post matched filter) and kB is the Boltzmann constant. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Radar | Another reason for heterodyne processing is that for fixed fractional bandwidth, the instantaneous bandwidth increases linearly in frequency. This allows improved range resolution. The one notable exception to heterodyne (downconversion) radar systems is ultra-wideband radar. Here a single cycle, or transient wave, is used similar to UWB communications, see List of UWB channels.
Noise is also generated by external sources, most importantly the natural thermal radiation of the background surrounding the target of interest. In modern radar systems, the internal noise is typically about equal to or lower than the external noise. An exception is if the radar is aimed upwards at clear sky, where the scene is so "cold" that it generates very little thermal noise. The thermal noise is given by kB T B, where T is temperature, B is bandwidth (post matched filter) and kB is the Boltzmann constant. There is an appealing intuitive interpretation of this relationship in a radar. Matched filtering allows the entire energy received from a target to be compressed into a single bin (be it a range, Doppler, elevation, or azimuth bin). On the surface it appears that then within a fixed interval of time, perfect, error free, detection could be obtained. This is done by compressing all energy into an infinitesimal time slice. What limits this approach in the real world is that, while time is arbitrarily divisible, current is not. The quantum of electrical energy is an electron, and so the best that can be done is to match filter all energy into a single electron. Since the electron is moving at a certain temperature (Planck spectrum) this noise source cannot be further eroded. Ultimately, radar, like all macro-scale entities, is profoundly impacted by quantum theory.
Noise is random and target signals are not. Signal processing can take advantage of this phenomenon to reduce the noise floor using two strategies. The kind of signal integration used with moving target indication can improve noise up to
2
{\displaystyle {\sqrt {2}}}
for each stage. The signal can also be split among multiple filters for pulse-Doppler signal processing, which reduces the noise floor by the number of filters. These improvements depend upon coherence.
Interference: Radar systems must overcome unwanted signals in order to focus on the targets of interest. These unwanted signals may originate from internal and external sources, both passive and active. The ability of the radar system to overcome these unwanted signals defines its signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). SNR is defined as the ratio of the signal power to the noise power within the desired signal; it compares the level of a desired target signal to the level of background noise (atmospheric noise and noise generated within the receiver). The higher a system's SNR the better it is at discriminating actual targets from noise signals.
Clutter: Clutter refers to radio frequency (RF) echoes returned from targets which are uninteresting to radar operators. Such targets include man-made objects such as buildings and — intentionally — by radar countermeasures such as chaff. Such targets also include natural objects such as ground, sea, and — when not being tasked for meteorological purposes — precipitation, hail spike, dust storms, animals (especially birds), turbulence in the atmospheric circulation, and meteor trails. Radar clutter can also be caused by other atmospheric phenomena, such as disturbances in the ionosphere caused by geomagnetic storms or other space weather events. This phenomenon is especially apparent near the geomagnetic poles, where the action of the solar wind on the earth’s magnetosphere produces convection patterns in the ionospheric plasma. Radar clutter can degrade the ability of over-the-horizon radar to detect targets.
Some clutter may also be caused by a long radar waveguide between the radar transceiver and the antenna. In a typical plan position indicator (PPI) radar with a rotating antenna, this will usually be seen as a "sun" or "sunburst" in the center of the display as the receiver responds to echoes from dust particles and misguided RF in the waveguide. Adjusting the timing between when the transmitter sends a pulse and when the receiver stage is enabled will generally reduce the sunburst without affecting the accuracy of the range since most sunburst is caused by a diffused transmit pulse reflected before it leaves the antenna. Clutter is considered a passive interference source since it only appears in response to radar signals sent by the radar.
Clutter is detected and neutralized in several ways. Clutter tends to appear static between radar scans; on subsequent scan echoes, desirable targets will appear to move, and all stationary echoes can be eliminated. Sea clutter can be reduced by using horizontal polarization, while rain is reduced with circular polarization (meteorological radars wish for the opposite effect, and therefore use linear polarization to detect precipitation). Other methods attempt to increase the signal-to-clutter ratio.
Clutter moves with the wind or is stationary. Two common strategies to improve measures of performance in a clutter environment are:
Moving target indication, which integrates successive pulses
Doppler processing, which uses filters to separate clutter from desirable signals
The most effective clutter reduction technique is pulse-Doppler radar. Doppler separates clutter from aircraft and spacecraft using a frequency spectrum, so individual signals can be separated from multiple reflectors located in the same volume using velocity differences. This requires a coherent transmitter. Another technique uses a moving target indicator that subtracts the received signal from two successive pulses using phase to reduce signals from slow-moving objects. This can be adapted for systems that lack a coherent transmitter, such as time-domain pulse-amplitude radar.
Constant false alarm rate, a form of automatic gain control (AGC), is a method that relies on clutter returns far outnumbering echoes from targets of interest. The receiver's gain is automatically adjusted to maintain a constant level of overall visible clutter. While this does not help detect targets masked by stronger surrounding clutter, it does help to distinguish strong target sources. In the past, radar AGC was electronically controlled and affected the gain of the entire radar receiver. As radars evolved, AGC became computer-software-controlled and affected the gain with greater granularity in specific detection cells.
Clutter may also originate from multipath echoes from valid targets caused by ground reflection, atmospheric ducting or ionospheric reflection/refraction (e.g., anomalous propagation). This clutter type is especially bothersome since it appears to move and behave like other normal (point) targets of interest. In a typical scenario, an aircraft echo is reflected from the ground below, appearing to the receiver as an identical target below the correct one. The radar may try to unify the targets, reporting the target at an incorrect height, or eliminating it on the basis of jitter or a physical impossibility. Terrain bounce jamming exploits this response by amplifying the radar signal and directing it downward. These problems can be overcome by incorporating a ground map of the radar's surroundings and eliminating all echoes which appear to originate below ground or above a certain height. Monopulse can be improved by altering the elevation algorithm used at low elevation. In newer air traffic control radar equipment, algorithms are used to identify the false targets by comparing the current pulse returns to those adjacent, as well as calculating return improbabilities.
Jamming: Radar jamming refers to radio frequency signals originating from sources outside the radar, transmitting in the radar's frequency and thereby masking targets of interest. Jamming may be intentional, as with an electronic warfare tactic, or unintentional, as with friendly forces operating equipment that transmits using the same frequency range. Jamming is considered an active interference source, since it is initiated by elements outside the radar and in general unrelated to the radar signals.
Jamming is problematic to radar since the jamming signal only needs to travel one way (from the jammer to the radar receiver) whereas the radar echoes travel two ways (radar-target-radar) and are therefore significantly reduced in power by the time they return to the radar receiver in accordance with inverse-square law. Jammers therefore can be much less powerful than their jammed radars and still effectively mask targets along the line of sight from the jammer to the radar (mainlobe jamming). Jammers have an added effect of affecting radars along other lines of sight through the radar receiver's sidelobes (sidelobe jamming).
Mainlobe jamming can generally only be reduced by narrowing the mainlobe solid angle and cannot fully be eliminated when directly facing a jammer which uses the same frequency and polarization as the radar. Sidelobe jamming can be overcome by reducing receiving sidelobes in the radar antenna design and by using an omnidirectional antenna to detect and disregard non-mainlobe signals. Other anti-jamming techniques are frequency hopping and polarization.
Signal processing:
Distance measurement:
Transit time: One way to obtain a distance measurement (ranging) is based on the time-of-flight: transmit a short pulse of radio signal (electromagnetic radiation) and measure the time it takes for the reflection to return. The distance is one-half the round trip time multiplied by the speed of the signal. The factor of one-half comes from the fact that the signal has to travel to the object and back again. Since radio waves travel at the speed of light, accurate distance measurement requires high-speed electronics.
In most cases, the receiver does not detect the return while the signal is being transmitted. Through the use of a duplexer, the radar switches between transmitting and receiving at a predetermined rate.
A similar effect imposes a maximum range as well. In order to maximize range, longer times between pulses should be used, referred to as a pulse repetition time, or its reciprocal, pulse repetition frequency. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Radar | Signal processing:
Distance measurement:
Transit time: One way to obtain a distance measurement (ranging) is based on the time-of-flight: transmit a short pulse of radio signal (electromagnetic radiation) and measure the time it takes for the reflection to return. The distance is one-half the round trip time multiplied by the speed of the signal. The factor of one-half comes from the fact that the signal has to travel to the object and back again. Since radio waves travel at the speed of light, accurate distance measurement requires high-speed electronics.
In most cases, the receiver does not detect the return while the signal is being transmitted. Through the use of a duplexer, the radar switches between transmitting and receiving at a predetermined rate.
A similar effect imposes a maximum range as well. In order to maximize range, longer times between pulses should be used, referred to as a pulse repetition time, or its reciprocal, pulse repetition frequency.
These two effects tend to be at odds with each other, and it is not easy to combine both good short range and good long range in a single radar. This is because the short pulses needed for a good minimum range broadcast have less total energy, making the returns much smaller and the target harder to detect. This could be offset by using more pulses, but this would shorten the maximum range. So each radar uses a particular type of signal. Long-range radars tend to use long pulses with long delays between them, and short range radars use smaller pulses with less time between them. As electronics have improved many radars now can change their pulse repetition frequency, thereby changing their range. The newest radars fire two pulses during one cell, one for short range (about 10 km (6.2 mi)) and a separate signal for longer ranges (about 100 km (62 mi)).
Distance may also be measured as a function of time. The radar mile is the time it takes for a radar pulse to travel one nautical mile, reflect off a target, and return to the radar antenna. Since a nautical mile is defined as 1,852 m, then dividing this distance by the speed of light (299,792,458 m/s), and then multiplying the result by 2 yields a result of 12.36 μs in duration.
Frequency modulation: Another form of distance measuring radar is based on frequency modulation. In these systems, the frequency of the transmitted signal is changed over time. Since the signal takes a finite time to travel to and from the target, the received signal is a different frequency than what the transmitter is broadcasting at the time the reflected signal arrives back at the radar. By comparing the frequency of the two signals the difference can be easily measured. This is easily accomplished with very high accuracy even in 1940s electronics. A further advantage is that the radar can operate effectively at relatively low frequencies. This was important in the early development of this type when high-frequency signal generation was difficult or expensive.
This technique can be used in continuous wave radar and is often found in aircraft radar altimeters. In these systems a "carrier" radar signal is frequency modulated in a predictable way, typically varying up and down with a sine wave or sawtooth pattern at audio frequencies. The signal is then sent out from one antenna and received on another, typically located on the bottom of the aircraft, and the signal can be continuously compared using a simple beat frequency modulator that produces an audio frequency tone from the returned signal and a portion of the transmitted signal.
The modulation index riding on the receive signal is proportional to the time delay between the radar and the reflector. The frequency shift becomes greater with greater time delay. The frequency shift is directly proportional to the distance travelled. That distance can be displayed on an instrument, and it may also be available via the transponder. This signal processing is similar to that used in speed detecting Doppler radar. Example systems using this approach are AZUSA, MISTRAM, and UDOP.
Terrestrial radar uses low-power FM signals that cover a larger frequency range. The multiple reflections are analyzed mathematically for pattern changes with multiple passes creating a computerized synthetic image. Doppler effects are used which allows slow moving objects to be detected as well as largely eliminating "noise" from the surfaces of bodies of water.
Pulse compression: The two techniques outlined above both have their disadvantages. The pulse timing technique has an inherent tradeoff in that the accuracy of the distance measurement is inversely related to the length of the pulse, while the energy, and thus direction range, is directly related. Increasing power for longer range while maintaining accuracy demands extremely high peak power, with 1960s early warning radars often operating in the tens of megawatts. The continuous wave methods spread this energy out in time and thus require much lower peak power compared to pulse techniques, but requires some method of allowing the sent and received signals to operate at the same time, often demanding two separate antennas.
The introduction of new electronics in the 1960s allowed the two techniques to be combined. It starts with a longer pulse that is also frequency modulated. Spreading the broadcast energy out in time means lower peak energies can be used, with modern examples typically on the order of tens of kilowatts. On reception, the signal is sent into a system that delays different frequencies by different times. The resulting output is a much shorter pulse that is suitable for accurate distance measurement, while also compressing the received energy into a much higher energy peak and thus reducing the signal-to-noise ratio. The technique is largely universal on modern large radars.
Speed measurement: Speed is the change in distance to an object with respect to time. Thus the existing system for measuring distance, combined with a memory capacity to see where the target last was, is enough to measure speed. At one time the memory consisted of a user making grease pencil marks on the radar screen and then calculating the speed using a slide rule. Modern radar systems perform the equivalent operation faster and more accurately using computers.
If the transmitter's output is coherent (phase synchronized), there is another effect that can be used to make almost instant speed measurements (no memory is required), known as the Doppler effect. Most modern radar systems use this principle into Doppler radar and pulse-Doppler radar systems (weather radar, military radar). The Doppler effect is only able to determine the relative speed of the target along the line of sight from the radar to the target. Any component of target velocity perpendicular to the line of sight cannot be determined by using the Doppler effect alone, but it can be determined by tracking the target's azimuth over time.
It is possible to make a Doppler radar without any pulsing, known as a continuous-wave radar (CW radar), by sending out a very pure signal of a known frequency. CW radar is ideal for determining the radial component of a target's velocity. CW radar is typically used by traffic enforcement to measure vehicle speed quickly and accurately where the range is not important.
When using a pulsed radar, the variation between the phase of successive returns gives the distance the target has moved between pulses, and thus its speed can be calculated.
Other mathematical developments in radar signal processing include time-frequency analysis (Weyl Heisenberg or wavelet), as well as the chirplet transform which makes use of the change of frequency of returns from moving targets ("chirp").
Pulse-Doppler signal processing: Pulse-Doppler signal processing includes frequency filtering in the detection process. The space between each transmit pulse is divided into range cells or range gates. Each cell is filtered independently much like the process used by a spectrum analyzer to produce the display showing different frequencies. Each different distance produces a different spectrum. These spectra are used to perform the detection process. This is required to achieve acceptable performance in hostile environments involving weather, terrain, and electronic countermeasures.
The primary purpose is to measure both the amplitude and frequency of the aggregate reflected signal from multiple distances. This is used with weather radar to measure radial wind velocity and precipitation rate in each different volume of air. This is linked with computing systems to produce a real-time electronic weather map. Aircraft safety depends upon continuous access to accurate weather radar information that is used to prevent injuries and accidents. Weather radar uses a low PRF. Coherency requirements are not as strict as those for military systems because individual signals ordinarily do not need to be separated. Less sophisticated filtering is required, and range ambiguity processing is not normally needed with weather radar in comparison with military radar intended to track air vehicles.
The alternate purpose is "look-down/shoot-down" capability required to improve military air combat survivability. Pulse-Doppler is also used for ground based surveillance radar required to defend personnel and vehicles. Pulse-doppler signal processing increases the maximum detection distance using less radiation close to aircraft pilots, shipboard personnel, infantry, and artillery. Reflections from terrain, water, and weather produce signals much larger than aircraft and missiles, which allows fast moving vehicles to hide using nap-of-the-earth flying techniques and stealth technology to avoid detection until an attack vehicle is too close to destroy. Pulse-Doppler signal processing incorporates more sophisticated electronic filtering that safely eliminates this kind of weakness. This requires the use of medium pulse-repetition frequency with phase coherent hardware that has a large dynamic range. Military applications require medium PRF which prevents range from being determined directly, and range ambiguity resolution processing is required to identify the true range of all reflected signals. Radial movement is usually linked with Doppler frequency to produce a lock signal that cannot be produced by radar jamming signals. Pulse-Doppler signal processing also produces audible signals that can be used for threat identification. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Radar | Pulse-doppler signal processing increases the maximum detection distance using less radiation close to aircraft pilots, shipboard personnel, infantry, and artillery. Reflections from terrain, water, and weather produce signals much larger than aircraft and missiles, which allows fast moving vehicles to hide using nap-of-the-earth flying techniques and stealth technology to avoid detection until an attack vehicle is too close to destroy. Pulse-Doppler signal processing incorporates more sophisticated electronic filtering that safely eliminates this kind of weakness. This requires the use of medium pulse-repetition frequency with phase coherent hardware that has a large dynamic range. Military applications require medium PRF which prevents range from being determined directly, and range ambiguity resolution processing is required to identify the true range of all reflected signals. Radial movement is usually linked with Doppler frequency to produce a lock signal that cannot be produced by radar jamming signals. Pulse-Doppler signal processing also produces audible signals that can be used for threat identification.
Reduction of interference effects: Signal processing is employed in radar systems to reduce the radar interference effects. Signal processing techniques include moving target indication, Pulse-Doppler signal processing, moving target detection processors, correlation with secondary surveillance radar targets, space-time adaptive processing, and track-before-detect. Constant false alarm rate and digital terrain model processing are also used in clutter environments.
Plot and track extraction: A Track algorithm is a radar performance enhancement strategy. Tracking algorithms provide the ability to predict future position of multiple moving objects based on the history of the individual positions being reported by sensor systems.
Historical information is accumulated and used to predict future position for use with air traffic control, threat estimation, combat system doctrine, gun aiming, and missile guidance. Position data is accumulated by radar sensors over the span of a few minutes.
There are four common track algorithms.
Nearest neighbour algorithm
Probabilistic Data Association
Multiple Hypothesis Tracking
Interactive Multiple Model (IMM)
Radar video returns from aircraft can be subjected to a plot extraction process whereby spurious and interfering signals are discarded. A sequence of target returns can be monitored through a device known as a plot extractor.
The non-relevant real time returns can be removed from the displayed information and a single plot displayed. In some radar systems, or alternatively in the command and control system to which the radar is connected, a radar tracker is used to associate the sequence of plots belonging to individual targets and estimate the targets' headings and speeds.
Engineering: A radar's components are:
A transmitter that generates the radio signal with an oscillator such as a klystron or a magnetron and controls its duration by a modulator.
A waveguide that links the transmitter and the antenna.
A duplexer that serves as a switch between the antenna and the transmitter or the receiver for the signal when the antenna is used in both situations.
A receiver. Knowing the shape of the desired received signal (a pulse), an optimal receiver can be designed using a matched filter.
A display processor to produce signals for human readable output devices.
An electronic section that controls all those devices and the antenna to perform the radar scan ordered by software.
A link to end user devices and displays.
Antenna design: Radio signals broadcast from a single antenna will spread out in all directions, and likewise a single antenna will receive signals equally from all directions. This leaves the radar with the problem of deciding where the target object is located.
Early systems tended to use omnidirectional broadcast antennas, with directional receiver antennas which were pointed in various directions. For instance, the first system to be deployed, Chain Home, used two straight antennas at right angles for reception, each on a different display. The maximum return would be detected with an antenna at right angles to the target, and a minimum with the antenna pointed directly at it (end on). The operator could determine the direction to a target by rotating the antenna so one display showed a maximum while the other showed a minimum.
One serious limitation with this type of solution is that the broadcast is sent out in all directions, so the amount of energy in the direction being examined is a small part of that transmitted. To get a reasonable amount of power on the "target", the transmitting aerial should also be directional.
Parabolic reflector: More modern systems use a steerable parabolic "dish" to create a tight broadcast beam, typically using the same dish as the receiver. Such systems often combine two radar frequencies in the same antenna in order to allow automatic steering, or radar lock.
Parabolic reflectors can be either symmetric parabolas or spoiled parabolas:
Symmetric parabolic antennas produce a narrow "pencil" beam in both the X and Y dimensions and consequently have a higher gain. The NEXRAD Pulse-Doppler weather radar uses a symmetric antenna to perform detailed volumetric scans of the atmosphere. Spoiled parabolic antennas produce a narrow beam in one dimension and a relatively wide beam in the other. This feature is useful if target detection over a wide range of angles is more important than target location in three dimensions. Most 2D surveillance radars use a spoiled parabolic antenna with a narrow azimuthal beamwidth and wide vertical beamwidth. This beam configuration allows the radar operator to detect an aircraft at a specific azimuth but at an indeterminate height. Conversely, so-called "nodder" height finding radars use a dish with a narrow vertical beamwidth and wide azimuthal beamwidth to detect an aircraft at a specific height but with low azimuthal precision.
Types of scan: Primary Scan: A scanning technique where the main antenna aerial is moved to produce a scanning beam, examples include circular scan, sector scan, etc.
Secondary Scan: A scanning technique where the antenna feed is moved to produce a scanning beam, examples include conical scan, unidirectional sector scan, lobe switching, etc.
Palmer Scan: A scanning technique that produces a scanning beam by moving the main antenna and its feed. A Palmer Scan is a combination of a Primary Scan and a Secondary Scan.
Conical scanning: The radar beam is rotated in a small circle around the "boresight" axis, which is pointed at the target.
Slotted waveguide: Applied similarly to the parabolic reflector, the slotted waveguide is moved mechanically to scan and is particularly suitable for non-tracking surface scan systems, where the vertical pattern may remain constant. Owing to its lower cost and less wind exposure, shipboard, airport surface, and harbour surveillance radars now use this approach in preference to a parabolic antenna.
Phased array: Another method of steering is used in a phased array radar.
Phased array antennas are composed of evenly spaced similar antenna elements, such as aerials or rows of slotted waveguide. Each antenna element or group of antenna elements incorporates a discrete phase shift that produces a phase gradient across the array. For example, array elements producing a 5 degree phase shift for each wavelength across the array face will produce a beam pointed 5 degrees away from the centerline perpendicular to the array face. Signals travelling along that beam will be reinforced. Signals offset from that beam will be cancelled. The amount of reinforcement is antenna gain. The amount of cancellation is side-lobe suppression.
Phased array radars have been in use since the earliest years of radar in World War II (Mammut radar), but electronic device limitations led to poor performance. Phased array radars were originally used for missile defence (see for example Safeguard Program). They are the heart of the ship-borne Aegis Combat System and the Patriot Missile System. The massive redundancy associated with having a large number of array elements increases reliability at the expense of gradual performance degradation that occurs as individual phase elements fail. To a lesser extent, Phased array radars have been used in weather surveillance. As of 2017, NOAA plans to implement a national network of Multi-Function Phased array radars throughout the United States within 10 years, for meteorological studies and flight monitoring.
Phased array antennas can be built to conform to specific shapes, like missiles, infantry support vehicles, ships, and aircraft.
As the price of electronics has fallen, phased array radars have become more common. Almost all modern military radar systems are based on phased arrays, where the small additional cost is offset by the improved reliability of a system with no moving parts. Traditional moving-antenna designs are still widely used in roles where cost is a significant factor such as air traffic surveillance and similar systems.
Phased array radars are valued for use in aircraft since they can track multiple targets. The first aircraft to use a phased array radar was the B-1B Lancer. The first fighter aircraft to use phased array radar was the Mikoyan MiG-31. The MiG-31M's SBI-16 Zaslon Passive electronically scanned array radar was considered to be the world's most powerful fighter radar, until the AN/APG-77 Active electronically scanned array was introduced on the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor.
Phased-array interferometry or aperture synthesis techniques, using an array of separate dishes that are phased into a single effective aperture, are not typical for radar applications, although they are widely used in radio astronomy. Because of the thinned array curse, such multiple aperture arrays, when used in transmitters, result in narrow beams at the expense of reducing the total power transmitted to the target. In principle, such techniques could increase spatial resolution, but the lower power means that this is generally not effective.
Aperture synthesis by post-processing motion data from a single moving source, on the other hand, is widely used in space and airborne radar systems.
Frequency bands: Antennas generally have to be sized similar to the wavelength of the operational frequency, normally within an order of magnitude. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Radar | Phased-array interferometry or aperture synthesis techniques, using an array of separate dishes that are phased into a single effective aperture, are not typical for radar applications, although they are widely used in radio astronomy. Because of the thinned array curse, such multiple aperture arrays, when used in transmitters, result in narrow beams at the expense of reducing the total power transmitted to the target. In principle, such techniques could increase spatial resolution, but the lower power means that this is generally not effective.
Aperture synthesis by post-processing motion data from a single moving source, on the other hand, is widely used in space and airborne radar systems.
Frequency bands: Antennas generally have to be sized similar to the wavelength of the operational frequency, normally within an order of magnitude. This provides a strong incentive to use shorter wavelengths as this will result in smaller antennas. Shorter wavelengths also result in higher resolution due to diffraction, meaning the shaped reflector seen on most radars can also be made smaller for any desired beamwidth.
Opposing the move to smaller wavelengths are a number of practical issues. For one, the electronics needed to produce high power very short wavelengths were generally more complex and expensive than the electronics needed for longer wavelengths or didn't exist at all. Another issue is that the radar equation's effective aperture figure means that for any given antenna (or reflector) size will be more efficient at longer wavelengths. Additionally, shorter wavelengths may interact with molecules or raindrops in the air, scattering the signal. Very long wavelengths also have additional diffraction effects that make them suitable for over the horizon radars. For this reason, a wide variety of wavelengths are used in different roles.
The traditional band names originated as code-names during World War II and are still in military and aviation use throughout the world. They have been adopted in the United States by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and internationally by the International Telecommunication Union. Most countries have additional regulations to control which parts of each band are available for civilian or military use.
Other users of the radio spectrum, such as the broadcasting and electronic countermeasures industries, have replaced the traditional military designations with their own systems.
Modulators: Modulators act to provide the waveform of the RF-pulse. There are two different radar modulator designs:
High voltage switch for non-coherent keyed power-oscillators These modulators consist of a high voltage pulse generator formed from a high voltage supply, a pulse forming network, and a high voltage switch such as a thyratron. They generate short pulses of power to feed, e.g., the magnetron, a special type of vacuum tube that converts DC (usually pulsed) into microwaves. This technology is known as pulsed power. In this way, the transmitted pulse of RF radiation is kept to a defined and usually very short duration.
Hybrid mixers, fed by a waveform generator and an exciter for a complex but coherent waveform. This waveform can be generated by low power/low-voltage input signals. In this case the radar transmitter must be a power-amplifier, e.g., a klystron or a solid state transmitter. In this way, the transmitted pulse is intrapulse-modulated and the radar receiver must use pulse compression techniques.
Coolant: Coherent microwave amplifiers operating above 1,000 watts microwave output, like travelling wave tubes and klystrons, require liquid coolant. The electron beam must contain 5 to 10 times more power than the microwave output, which can produce enough heat to generate plasma. This plasma flows from the collector toward the cathode. The same magnetic focusing that guides the electron beam forces the plasma into the path of the electron beam but flowing in the opposite direction. This introduces FM modulation which degrades Doppler performance. To prevent this, liquid coolant with minimum pressure and flow rate is required, and deionized water is normally used in most high power surface radar systems that use Doppler processing.
Coolanol (silicate ester) was used in several military radars in the 1970s. However, it is hygroscopic, leading to hydrolysis and formation of highly flammable alcohol. The loss of a U.S. Navy aircraft in 1978 was attributed to a silicate ester fire. Coolanol is also expensive and toxic. The U.S. Navy has instituted a program named Pollution Prevention (P2) to eliminate or reduce the volume and toxicity of waste, air emissions, and effluent discharges. Because of this, Coolanol is used less often today.
Regulations: Radar (also: RADAR) is defined by article 1.100 of the International Telecommunication Union's (ITU) ITU Radio Regulations (RR) as:
A radiodetermination system based on the comparison of reference signals with radio signals reflected, or retransmitted, from the position to be determined. Each radiodetermination system shall be classified by the radiocommunication service in which it operates permanently or temporarily. Typical radar utilizations are primary radar and secondary radar, these might operate in the radiolocation service or the radiolocation-satellite service.
Configurations: Radar come in a variety of configurations in the emitter, the receiver, the antenna, wavelength, scan strategies, etc.
Bistatic radar
Continuous-wave radar
Doppler radar
Fm-cw radar
Monopulse radar
Passive radar
Planar array radar
Pulse-doppler
Synthetic-aperture radar
Synthetically thinned aperture radar
Over-the-horizon radar with Chirp transmitter
See also: Terrain-following radar
Radar imaging
Radar navigation
Inverse-square law
Wave radar
Radar signal characteristics
Pulse doppler radar
Mmwave sensing
Acronyms and abbreviations in avionics
Definitions
Amplitude-comparison monopulse
Constant false alarm rate
Sensitivity time control
Application
Proximity fuze
Hardware
Cavity magnetron
Crossed-field amplifier
Gallium arsenide
Klystron
Omniview technology
Radar engineering details
Radar tower
Radio
Travelling-wave tube
Similar detection and ranging methods
Acoustic location
Lidar
LORAN
Sonar
Historical radars
List of radars
Chain Home and Chain Home Low
Würzburg radar
Hohentwiel radar
H2S radar
SCR-270 radar
Notes and references:
Bibliography:
References: Barrett, Dick, "All you ever wanted to know about British air defence radar". The Radar Pages. (History and details of various British radar systems)
Buderi, "Telephone History: Radar History". Privateline.com. (Anecdotal account of the carriage of the world's first high power cavity magnetron from Britain to the US during WW2.)
Ekco Radar WW2 Shadow Factory Archived 12 December 2005 at the Wayback Machine The secret development of British radar.
ES310 "Introduction to Naval Weapons Engineering.". (Radar fundamentals section)
Hollmann, Martin, "Radar Family Tree". Radar World.
Penley, Bill, and Jonathan Penley, "Early Radar History—an Introduction". 2002.
Pub 1310 Radar Navigation and Maneuvering Board Manual, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Bethesda, MD 2001 (US govt publication '...intended to be used primarily as a manual of instruction in navigation schools and by naval and merchant marine personnel.')
Wesley Stout, 1946 "Radar – The Great Detective" Archived 28 July 2020 at the Wayback Machine Early development and production by Chrysler Corp. during WWII.
Swords, Seán S., "Technical History of the Beginnings of Radar", IEE History of Technology Series, Vol. 6, London: Peter Peregrinus, 1986
General: Reg Batt (1991). The radar army: winning the war of the airwaves. R. Hale. ISBN 978-0-7090-4508-3.
E.G. Bowen (1 January 1998). Radar Days. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-7503-0586-0.
Michael Bragg (1 May 2002). RDF1: The Location of Aircraft by Radio Methods 1935–1945. Twayne Publishers. ISBN 978-0-9531544-0-1.
Louis Brown (1999). A radar history of World War II: technical and military imperatives. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-7503-0659-1.
Robert Buderi (1996). The invention that changed the world: how a small group of radar pioneers won the Second World War and launched a technological revolution. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-684-81021-8.
Burch, David F., Radar For Mariners, McGraw Hill, 2005, ISBN 978-0-07-139867-1.
Ian Goult (2011). Secret Location: A witness to the Birth of Radar and its Postwar Influence. History Press. ISBN 978-0-7524-5776-5.
Peter S. Hall (March 1991). Radar. Potomac Books Inc. ISBN 978-0-08-037711-7.
Derek Howse; Naval Radar Trust (February 1993). Radar at sea: the royal Navy in World War 2. Naval Institute Press. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Radar | Robert Buderi (1996). The invention that changed the world: how a small group of radar pioneers won the Second World War and launched a technological revolution. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-684-81021-8.
Burch, David F., Radar For Mariners, McGraw Hill, 2005, ISBN 978-0-07-139867-1.
Ian Goult (2011). Secret Location: A witness to the Birth of Radar and its Postwar Influence. History Press. ISBN 978-0-7524-5776-5.
Peter S. Hall (March 1991). Radar. Potomac Books Inc. ISBN 978-0-08-037711-7.
Derek Howse; Naval Radar Trust (February 1993). Radar at sea: the royal Navy in World War 2. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-55750-704-4.
R.V. Jones (August 1998). Most Secret War. Wordsworth Editions Ltd. ISBN 978-1-85326-699-7.
Kaiser, Gerald, Chapter 10 in "A Friendly Guide to Wavelets", Birkhauser, Boston, 1994.
Colin Latham; Anne Stobbs (January 1997). Radar: A Wartime Miracle. Sutton Pub Ltd. ISBN 978-0-7509-1643-1.
François Le Chevalier (2002). Principles of radar and sonar signal processing. Artech House Publishers. ISBN 978-1-58053-338-6.
David Pritchard (August 1989). The radar war: Germany's pioneering achievement 1904-45. Harpercollins. ISBN 978-1-85260-246-8.
Merrill Ivan Skolnik (1 December 1980). Introduction to radar systems. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 978-0-07-066572-9.
Merrill Ivan Skolnik (1990). Radar handbook. McGraw-Hill Professional. ISBN 978-0-07-057913-2.
George W. Stimson (1998). Introduction to airborne radar. SciTech Publishing. ISBN 978-1-891121-01-2.
Younghusband, Eileen., Not an Ordinary Life. How Changing Times Brought Historical Events into my Life, Cardiff Centre for Lifelong Learning, Cardiff, 2009., ISBN 978-0-9561156-9-0 (Pages 36–67 contain the experiences of a WAAF radar plotter in WWII.)
Younghusband, Eileen. One Woman's War. Cardiff. Candy Jar Books. 2011. ISBN 978-0-9566826-2-8
David Zimmerman (February 2001). Britain's shield: radar and the defeat of the Luftwaffe. Sutton Pub Ltd. ISBN 978-0-7509-1799-5.
Technical reading: M I. Skolnik, ed. (1970). Radar Handbook (PDF). McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0-07-057913-X.
Nadav Levanon; Eli Mozeson (2004). Radar signals. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 9780471473787.
Hao He; Jian Li; Petre Stoica (2012). Waveform design for active sensing systems: a computational approach. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-01969-0.
Solomon W. Golomb; Guang Gong (2005). Signal design for good correlation: for wireless communication, cryptography, and radar. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521821049.
M. Soltanalian (2014). Signal Design for Active Sensing and Communications. Elanders Sverige AB. ISBN 978-91-554-9017-1. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
Fulvio Gini; Antonio De Maio; Lee Patton, eds. (2012). Waveform design and diversity for advanced radar systems. London: The Institution of Engineering and Technology. ISBN 978-1849192651.
E. Fishler; A. Haimovich; R. Blum; D. Chizhik; L. Cimini; R. Valenzuela (2004). MIMO radar: an idea whose time has come. IEEE Radar Conference.
Mark R. Bell (1993). "Information theory and radar waveform design". IEEE Transactions on Information Theory. 39 (5): 1578–1597. doi:10.1109/18.259642.
Robert Calderbank; S. Howard; Bill Moran (2009). "Waveform diversity in radar signal processing". IEEE Signal Processing Magazine. 26 (1): 32–41. Bibcode:2009ISPM...26...32C. doi:10.1109/MSP.2008.930414. S2CID 16437755.
Mark A. Richards; James A. Scheer; William A. Holm (2010). Principles of Modern Radar: Basic Principles. SciTech Publishing. ISBN 978-1891121-52-4.
External links:
MIT Video Course: Introduction to Radar Systems A set of 10 video lectures developed at Lincoln Laboratory to develop an understanding of radar systems and technologies.
A set of educational videos created for air traffic control (ATC) staff.
Glossary of radar terminology |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Radar jamming | Mechanical jamming: Mechanical jamming is caused by devices that reflect or re-reflect radar energy back to the radar to produce false target returns on the operator's scope. Mechanical jamming devices include chaff, corner reflectors, and decoys.
Chaff is made of different length metallic strips, which reflect different frequencies, to create a large area of false returns in which a real contact would be difficult to detect. Modern chaff is usually aluminum-coated glass fibers of various lengths. Their extremely low weight and small size allow them to form a dense, long-lasting cloud of interference. This cloud is only effective in the range cell that it occupies. The slow movement of the chaff (compared to a flying target) makes it easily discriminated, based on the lacking Doppler shift. Ships, on the other hand, can benefit greatly from a slow-moving chaff cloud. The cloud is released within the resolution cell of the ship and moves with the wind in one direction. The ship then escapes in another direction. The decoy (chaff cloud) should have a larger radar cross-section (RCS) than the target, so the radar tracks it.
Corner reflectors have the same effect as chaff but are physically very different. Corner reflectors are many-sided objects that re-radiate radar energy mostly back toward its source. An aircraft cannot carry as many corner reflectors as it can chaff.
Decoys are maneuverable flying objects that are intended to deceive a radar operator into believing that they are actually aircraft. They are especially dangerous because they can clutter up a radar with false targets making it easier for an attacker to get within weapons range and neutralize the radar. Corner reflectors can be fitted on decoys to make them appear larger than they are, thus furthering the illusion that a decoy is an actual aircraft. Some decoys have the capability to perform electronic jamming or drop chaff. Decoys also have a deliberately sacrificial purpose i.e. defenders may fire guided missiles at the decoys, thereby depleting limited stocks of expensive weaponry which might otherwise have been used against genuine targets.
Electronic jamming: Electronic jamming is a form of electronic warfare where jammers radiate interfering signals toward an enemy's radar, blocking the receiver with highly concentrated energy signals. The two main technique styles are noise techniques and repeater techniques. The three types of noise jamming are spot, sweep, and barrage.
Spot jamming or spot noise occurs when a jammer focuses all of its power on a single frequency. This overwhelms the reflection of the original radar signal off the targets, the "skin return" or "skin reflection", making it impossible to pick out the target on the radar display. This technique is only useful against radars that broadcast on a single frequency, and can be countered by changing the frequency or other operational parameters like the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) so the jammer is no longer broadcasting on the same frequency or at the right times. While multiple jammers could possibly jam a range of frequencies, this would consume many resources and be of little effect against modern frequency-agile radars that constantly change their broadcasts.
Sweep jamming is a modification of spot jamming where the jammer's full power is shifted from one frequency to another. While this has the advantage of being able to jam multiple frequencies in quick succession, it does not affect them all at the same time, and thus limits the effectiveness of this type of jamming. Although, depending on the error checking in the device this can render a wide range of devices effectively useless.
Barrage jamming is a further modification of sweep jamming in which the jammer changes frequencies so rapidly it appears to be a constant radiator across its entire bandwidth. The advantage is that multiple frequencies can be jammed essentially simultaneously. The first effective barrage jammer was introduced as the carcinotron in the early 1950s, and was so effective it was believed that all long-range radar systems might be rendered useless. However, the jamming effect can be limited because this requires the jammer to spread its full power between these frequencies—the effectiveness against each frequency decreases with the number of frequencies covered. The creation of extremely powerful multi-frequency radars like Blue Riband offset the effectiveness of the carcinotron.
Base jamming is a new type of barrage jamming whereby one radar is jammed effectively at its source at all frequencies. However, all other radars continue working normally.
Pulse jamming produces noise pulses with period depending on radar mast rotation speed thus creating blocked sectors from directions other than the jammer, making it harder to discover the jammer location.
Cover pulse jamming creates a short noise pulse when radar signal is received thus concealing any aircraft flying behind the jammer with a block of noise.
Digital radio frequency memory, or DRFM jamming, or Repeater jamming is a repeater technique that manipulates received radar energy and retransmits it to change the return the radar sees. This technique can change the range the radar detects by changing the delay in transmission of pulses, the velocity the radar detects by changing the Doppler shift of the transmitted signal, or the angle to the plane by using AM techniques to transmit into the sidelobes of the radar. Electronics, radio equipment, and antenna can cause DRFM jamming causing false targets, the signal must be timed after the received radar signal. By analysing received signal strength from side and backlobes and thus getting radar antennae radiation pattern, false targets can be created to directions other than one where the jammer is coming from. If each radar pulse is uniquely coded it is not possible to create targets in directions other than the direction of the jammer.
Deceptive jamming uses techniques like "range gate pull-off" to break a radar lock.
Blip enhancement deliberately makes some returns look larger on radar in order to hide their nature. This is used by escort ships to make them look as large as capital ships.
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{\displaystyle {\frac {J}{S}}={\frac {EIRP_{jam}}{EIRP_{radar}}}\times {\frac {4\pi R^{2}}{\sigma }}\times {\frac {BW_{radar}}{BW_{jam}}}}
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Radar burn-through: The burn-through range is the distance from the radar at which the jamming is ineffective. When a target is within this range, the radar receives an adequate target skin return to track it. The burn through range is a function of the target RCS (Radar cross-section), jamming ERP (Effective radiated power), the radars ERP and required J/S (for the jamming to be effective).
Inadvertent jamming: In some cases, jamming of either type may be caused by friendly sources. Inadvertent mechanical jamming is fairly common because it is indiscriminate and affects any nearby radars, hostile or not. Electronic jamming can also be inadvertently caused by friendly sources, usually powerful EW platforms operating within range of the affected radar.
Countermeasures: Constantly alternating the frequency that the radar operates on (frequency agility) over a spread-spectrum will limit the effectiveness of most jamming, making it easier to read through it. Modern jammers can track a predictable frequency change, so the more random the frequency change, the more likely it is to counter the jammer.
Cloaking the outgoing signal with random noise makes it more difficult for a jammer to figure out the frequency that a radar is operating on.
Limiting unsecure radio communication concerning the jamming and its effectiveness is also important. The jammer could be listening, and if they know that a certain technique is effective, they could direct more jamming assets to employ this method.
The most important method to counter radar jammers is operator training. Any system can be fooled with a jamming signal but a properly trained operator pays attention to the raw video signal and can detect abnormal patterns on the radar screen.
The best indicator of jamming effectiveness to the jammer is countermeasures taken by the operator. The jammer does not know if their jamming is effective before operator starts changing radar transmission settings.
Using EW countermeasures will give away radar capabilities thus on peacetime operations most military radars are used on fixed frequencies, at minimal power levels and with blocked Tx sectors toward possible listeners (country borders).
Mobile fire control radars are usually kept passive when military operations are not ongoing to keep radar locations secret.
Active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars are innately harder to jam and can operate in low probability of intercept (LPI) modes to reduce the chance that the radar is detected.
A quantum radar system would automatically detect attempts at deceptive jamming, which might otherwise go unnoticed.
Anti-radiation missile (ARM) also known as Home-On-Jam (HOJ) missiles: When a target is using self-protective jamming (SPJ), it essentially broadcasts its position. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Radar jamming | The jammer does not know if their jamming is effective before operator starts changing radar transmission settings.
Using EW countermeasures will give away radar capabilities thus on peacetime operations most military radars are used on fixed frequencies, at minimal power levels and with blocked Tx sectors toward possible listeners (country borders).
Mobile fire control radars are usually kept passive when military operations are not ongoing to keep radar locations secret.
Active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars are innately harder to jam and can operate in low probability of intercept (LPI) modes to reduce the chance that the radar is detected.
A quantum radar system would automatically detect attempts at deceptive jamming, which might otherwise go unnoticed.
Anti-radiation missile (ARM) also known as Home-On-Jam (HOJ) missiles: When a target is using self-protective jamming (SPJ), it essentially broadcasts its position. An ARM could be deployed and take out the jamming source. The missile utilizes passive RF homing which reduces its probability of detection. A countermeasure to ARM is not to use self-protective jamming (one could use stand-off jamming, assuming that the missiles has a range no longer than the radar), or have a decoy taking the missile (such as ADM-160 MALD and AN/ALE-55 Fiber-Optic Towed Decoy). By towing a decoy/jammer, the decoy maintains a realistic Doppler shift (which tricks the tracker) and lures an ARM away from the target.
Stealth: For protective jamming, a small radar cross section of the protected aircraft will improve the jamming efficiency (higher J/S). A lower RCS also reduces the "burn-through" range.
Stealth technologies like radiation-absorbent materials can be used to reduce the return of a target.
Interference: While not usually caused by the enemy, interference can greatly impede the ability of an operator to track. Interference occurs when two radars in relatively close proximity (how close they need to be depends on the power of the radars) are operating on the same frequency. This will cause "running rabbits", a visual phenomenon that can severely clutter up a radar display scope with useless data. Interference is not that common between ground radars, however, because they are not usually placed close enough together. It is more likely that some sort of airborne radar system is inadvertently causing the interference—especially when two or more countries are involved.
The interference between airborne radars referred to above can sometimes (usually) be eliminated by frequency-shifting transmitters.
The other interference often experienced is between the aircraft's own electronic transmitters, i.e. transponders, being picked up by its radar. This interference is eliminated by suppressing the radar's reception for the duration of the transponder's transmission. Instead of "bright-light" rabbits across the display, one would observe very small black dots. Because the external radar causing the transponder to respond is generally not synchronised with your own radar (i.e. different pulse-repetition frequencies), these black dots appear randomly across the display and the operator sees through and around them. The returning image may be much larger than the "dot" or "hole", as it has become known, anyway. Keeping the transponder's pulse widths very narrow and mode of operation (single pulse rather than multi-pulse) becomes a crucial factor.
The external radar could, in theory, come from an aircraft flying alongside your own, or from space. Another factor often overlooked is to reduce the sensitivity of one's own transponder to external radars; i.e., ensure that the transponder's threshold is high. In this way it will only respond to nearby radars—which, after all, should be friendly.
One should also reduce the power output of the transponder in like manner.
Jamming police radar: Jamming radar for the purpose of defeating police radar guns is more simple than military-grade radar jamming. The laws about jamming police radars vary by jurisdiction.
Jamming in nature: The jamming of bat sonar by certain tiger moth species has been confirmed. This can be seen as nature's equivalent of radar jamming. Similar to human ECCM techniques, bats are found to change their emission lengths to defeat jamming.
See also: 36th Bombardment Squadron – military unitPages displaying wikidata descriptions as a fallback
Active electronically scanned array – Type of phased array radar
AN/ALE-55 Fiber-Optic Towed Decoy – Countermeasure from radar guided missiles
Association of Old Crows – Electronic warfare professional organization
Echolocation jamming – Interference with animal sonar systems
Electronic attack – Electronic device for deceiving detection systemsPages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
Electronic warfare – Combat involving electronics and directed energy
Infrared countermeasure – Device designed to protect aircraft from infrared homing missiles
Low-probability-of-intercept radar – Radar technology that hides its activity from a detected target
No. 100 Group RAF – Former Royal Air Force operations group
Pelena-1 – Russian ground-based jamming system
Radio jamming – Interference with authorized wireless communications
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses – Military tactic
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Radio jamming | Distinction between "jamming" and "interference": Originally the terms were used interchangeably but nowadays most radio users use the term "jamming" to describe the deliberate use of radio noise or signals in an attempt to disrupt communications (or prevent listening to broadcasts) whereas the term "interference" is used to describe unintentional forms of disruption (which are far more common). However, the distinction is still not universally applied. For inadvertent disruptions, see electromagnetic compatibility.
Method: Intentional communications jamming is usually aimed at radio signals to disrupt control of a battle. A transmitter, tuned to the same frequency as the opponents' receiving equipment and with the same type of modulation, can, with enough power, override any signal at the receiver. Digital wireless jamming for signals such as Bluetooth and WiFi is possible with very low power.
The most common types of this form of signal jamming are random noise, random pulse, stepped tones, warbler, random keyed modulated CW, tone, rotary, pulse, spark, recorded sounds, gulls, and sweep-through. These can be divided into two groups: obvious and subtle.
Obvious jamming is easy to detect because it can be heard on the receiving equipment. It is usually some type of noise, such as stepped tones (bagpipes), random-keyed code, pulses, music (often distorted), erratically warbling tones, highly distorted speech, random noise (hiss), and recorded sounds. Various combinations of these methods may be used, often accompanied by regular Morse identification signals to enable individual transmitters to be identified in order to assess their effectiveness. For example, China, which did and does use jamming extensively, plays a loop of traditional Chinese music while it is jamming channels (cf. Attempted jamming of numbers stations).
The purpose of this type of jamming is to block reception of transmitted signals and to cause a nuisance to the receiving operator. One early Soviet attempt at jamming Western broadcasters used the noise from the diesel generator that was powering the jamming transmitter.
Subtle jamming is jamming during which no sound is heard on the receiving equipment. The radio does not receive incoming signals; yet everything seems superficially normal to the operator. These are often technical attacks on modern equipment, such as "squelch capture". Thanks to the FM capture effect, frequency modulated broadcasts may be jammed, unnoticed, by a simple unmodulated carrier. The receiver locks on to the larger carrier signal, and hence will ignore the FM signal that carries the information.
Digital signals use complex modulation techniques, such as QPSK. These signals are very robust in the presence of interfering signals. But the signal relies on hand shaking between the transmitter and receiver to identify and determine security settings and method of high-level transmission. If the jamming device sends initiation data packets, the receiver will begin its state machine to establish two-way data transmission. A jammer will loop back to the beginning instead of completing the handshake. This method jams the receiver in an infinite loop where it keeps trying to initiate a connection but never completes it, which effectively blocks all legitimate communication.
Bluetooth and other consumer radio protocols such as WiFi have built-in detectors, so that they transmit only when the channel is free. Simple continuous transmission on a given channel will continuously stop a transmitter transmitting, hence jamming the receiver from ever hearing from its intended transmitter. Other jammers work by analysing the packet headers and, depending on the source or destination, selectively transmitting over the end of the message, corrupting the packet.
Types of jammers: Portable jammers are phone-sized and low-powered devices. They can block data delivery at a distance up to 15 meters without barriers.
Stationary jammers are more expensive and powerful. They usually have a larger jamming radius and wider frequency band. Strong jammers can require additional cooling as they can overheat. Stationary jammers usually have a range of 100 meters and require a power supply of 230 V.
Self-made jammers are low-power devices that work over short ranges. However, the coverage can be extended using broadband amplifiers.
History: During World War II, ground radio operators would attempt to mislead pilots by false instructions in their own language, in what was more precisely a spoofing attack than jamming. Radar jamming is also important to disrupt use of radar used to guide an enemy's missiles or aircraft. Modern secure communication techniques use such methods as spread spectrum modulation to resist the deleterious effects of jamming.
Jamming of foreign radio broadcast stations has often been used in wartime (and during periods of tense international relations) to prevent or deter citizens from listening to broadcasts from enemy countries. However, such jamming is usually of limited effectiveness because the affected stations usually change frequencies, put on additional frequencies and/or increase transmission power.
Jamming has also occasionally been used by the governments of Germany (during World War II), Israel, Cuba, Iraq, Iran (during the Iran-Iraq War), China, North and South Korea and several Latin American countries, as well as by Ireland against pirate radio stations such as Radio Nova. The United Kingdom government used two coordinated, separately located transmitters to jam the offshore radio ship, Radio North Sea International off the coast of Britain in 1970.
World War II: In occupied Europe the Nazis attempted to jam broadcasts to the continent from the BBC and other allied stations. Along with increasing transmitter power and adding extra frequencies, attempts were made to counteract the jamming by dropping leaflets over cities instructing listeners to construct a directional loop aerial that would enable them to hear the stations through the jamming. In the Netherlands such aerials were nicknamed "moffenzeef" (English: "kraut sieve").
During the Continuation War, after discovering the fact that the mines that the retreating Soviet forces had scattered throughout the city of Viipuri were radio-triggered rather than timer- or pressure-triggered, the Finnish forces played Vesterinen's recording of Säkkijärven Polkka without any pauses from September 4, 1941 to February 2, 1942, as they, to demine the city, needed to block the Soviets from activating the mines through the correct radio wave. The Soviets tried to trigger the mines by changing frequency; the mines had been set up to be able to be triggered by three different frequencies. The Finns countered this by playing Säkkijärven Polkka on all frequencies. During the Battle of the Beams Britain jammed navigation signals used by German aircraft while the Soviets attempted to do likewise to American aircraft during the Berlin Airlift
Cold War era: Since the Soviet Union started jamming Western radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union in 1948 the primary targets have been the BBC External Broadcasting Services, Voice of America (VOA) and especially RFE/RL. Western nations had allowed jamming prior to World War II, but in the post-War era the Western view has been that jamming violates the freedom of information while the Soviet view has been that under the international law principle of national sovereignty jamming is an acceptable response to foreign radio broadcasts.
During much of the Cold War, Soviet (and Eastern Bloc) jamming of some Western broadcasters led to a "power race" in which broadcasters and jammers alike repeatedly increased their transmission power, utilised highly directional antennas and added extra frequencies (known as "barrage" or "frequency diversity" broadcasting) to the already heavily overcrowded shortwave bands to such an extent that many broadcasters not directly targeted by the jammers (including pro-Soviet stations) suffered from the rising levels of noise and interference.
There were also periods when China and the Soviet Union jammed each other's programmes. The Soviet Union also jammed Albanian programmes at times.
Some parts of the world were more impacted by these broadcasting practices than others
Eurasia (worst affected, including mediumwave frequencies particularly 720 kHz used by RFE)
North Asia, Americas and Sub-Saharan Africa (partly affected)
Australasia, South America (rarely affected)
Meanwhile, some listeners in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc devised ingenious methods (such as homemade directional loop antennas) to hear the Western stations through the noise. Because radio propagation on shortwave can be difficult to predict reliably, listeners sometimes found that there were days/times when the jamming was particularly ineffective because radio fading (due to atmospheric conditions) was affecting the jamming signals but favouring the broadcasts (a phenomenon sometimes dubbed "twilight immunity"). On other days of course the reverse was the case. There were also times when jamming transmitters were (temporarily) off air due to breakdowns or maintenance. The Soviets (and most of their Eastern bloc allies) used two types of jamming transmitter. Skywave jamming covered a large area but for the reasons described was of limited effectiveness. Groundwave jamming was more effective but only over a small area and was thus used only in/near major cities throughout the Eastern Bloc. Both types of jamming were less effective on higher shortwave frequencies (above 15 MHz); however, many radios sold on the domestic market in the Soviet Union didn't tune these higher bands. Skywave jamming was usually accompanied by morse signals in order to enable (coded) identification of the jamming station in order that Soviet monitoring posts could assess the effectiveness of each station.
In 1987 after decades of generally refusing to acknowledge that such jamming was even taking place the Soviets finally stopped jamming western broadcasts with the exception of RFE/RL which continued to be jammed for several months into 1988. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Radio jamming | The Soviets (and most of their Eastern bloc allies) used two types of jamming transmitter. Skywave jamming covered a large area but for the reasons described was of limited effectiveness. Groundwave jamming was more effective but only over a small area and was thus used only in/near major cities throughout the Eastern Bloc. Both types of jamming were less effective on higher shortwave frequencies (above 15 MHz); however, many radios sold on the domestic market in the Soviet Union didn't tune these higher bands. Skywave jamming was usually accompanied by morse signals in order to enable (coded) identification of the jamming station in order that Soviet monitoring posts could assess the effectiveness of each station.
In 1987 after decades of generally refusing to acknowledge that such jamming was even taking place the Soviets finally stopped jamming western broadcasts with the exception of RFE/RL which continued to be jammed for several months into 1988. Previously there had been periods when some individual Eastern bloc countries refrained from jamming Western broadcasts but this varied widely by time and country. In general outside of the Soviet Union itself Bulgaria was one of the most prolific operators of jamming transmitters in the Eastern bloc with East Germany and Yugoslavia the least.
While western governments may have occasionally considered jamming broadcasts from Eastern Bloc stations, it was generally accepted that doing so would be a pointless exercise. Ownership of shortwave radios was less common in western countries than in the Soviet Union where, due to the vast physical size of the country, many domestic stations were relayed on shortwave as it was the only practical way to cover remote areas. Additionally, western governments were generally less afraid of intellectual competition from the Eastern Bloc.
In Francoist Spain the dictatorship jammed for decades Radio España Independiente, the radio station of the Communist Party of Spain which broadcast from Moscow (1941–1955), Bucharest (1955–1977) and East Berlin. It was the most important clandestine broadcaster in Spain and the regime considered it a threat, since it allowed its citizens to skip the censorship of the local media. Broadcasts from East Germany to South Africa were also jammed.
In Latin America there were instances of communist radio stations such as Radio Venceremos being jammed, allegedly by the CIA, while there were short lived instances where Britain jammed some Egyptian (during the Suez Crisis), Greek (prior to Cyprus gaining independence) and Rhodesian stations. During the early years of the Northern Ireland troubles the British army regularly jammed broadcasts from both Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups.
Post Cold War (1989–present):
China: In 2002, China acquired standard short-wave radio-broadcasting equipment designed for general public radio-broadcasting and technical support from Thales Broadcast Multimedia, a former subsidiary of the French state-owned company Thales Group.
Thales jamming technology operates only at power levels below 500 kW (for its shortwave jamming products).
Adele Milna (BSEE) of Continental Electronics (in an audio file held at shortwave.org) claims that China has duplicated his company's 100 kW, 250 kW shortwave transmitters. It is unclear if these products were indeed duplicated or if broadcast jamming (as opposed to future product sales) were a reason for the duplication.
Iran: Debates have been raised in Iran regarding the possible health hazards of satellite jamming. Iranian officials including the health minister have claimed that jamming has no health risk for humans. However, the minister of communication has recently admitted that satellite jamming has 'serious effects' and has called for identification of jamming stations so they can put a stop to this practice. The government has generally denied any involvement in jamming and claimed they are sent from unknown sources. According to some sources, IRGC is the organization behind satellite jamming in Iran.
Russia: The Russian Armed Forces have, since the summer of 2015, begun using a multi-functional EW weapon system in Ukraine, known as Borisoglebsk 2. It is postulated that this system has defeated communications in parts of that country, including mobile telephony and GPS systems.
Other countries: Since the early 1960s, the practice of radio jamming has been very common in Cuba, blocking not only American government funded radio stations (such as Voice of America) but also Ham radio signals, and stations owned and/or operated by (or selling airtime to) Cuban exile groups transmitting from Miami, such as La Cubanisima, Radio Mambi, WWFE La Poderosa and Cadena Azul. The same practice has been applied to Radio y Televisión Martí, operated by the U.S. Information Agency since 1985.
North Korea and South Korea still regularly jam some of each other's radio (and sometimes television) stations.
Several Middle Eastern countries (particularly Iran) jam shortwave broadcasts (and even occasionally attempt to jam satellite TV signals) targeted at their countries.
Pakistan has contemplated jamming pirate radio stations operated by the Taliban in all jails across Pakistan. This decision has led to an outcry from Pakistani cellular operators, who state that most of the jails lie in urban areas with a resultant impact on the cellular service of all operators in the adjacent area of jails.
Ethiopia has jammed the DW and VOA transmissions as well as ESAT Ethiopian Satellite Television and Eritrean radio stations.
Vietnam jams the Vietnamese service of Radio Free Asia, Radio Đáp Lời Song Núi, some FEBC programs, mostly in Vietnamese Minority languages as well as Radio Sweden with a "siren" jammer and "bubble" jammer on FM Frequencies.
In Nigeria, the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission has claimed jamming signal of Radio Biafra.
In South Africa, the use of wireless signal jammers is illegal. There is a single exception to this rule. South Africa's State Security Cluster may, in certain instances, employ signal jammers.
In Singapore, a local Indonesian Batam Hang FM 106.0 MHz based Islamic radio station of Indonesia radio stations has jammed. Somewhat it transmits up to Singapore and Johor Bahru of Malaysia at 10 kW transmission power. Hang FM 106.0 MHz was accused by Singapore authorities for spreading extremists and terrorism propaganda, there were 4 Singaporeans detained by police under the Internal Security Act (ISA) when they attempted to move to Syria and join ISIS terrorist group. Radio Hang FM has denied this accusation. Station Manager of Hang FM Radio, Abu Yusuf, firmly rejects Hang FM Radio being linked as a media that triggers radicalism. According to him, the broadcast material is also in accordance with the understanding of Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah, which apart from rejecting radicalism, terrorism, especially ISIS, also rejects other ideas or actions that are contrary to the basic principles of the peace-loving Islamic religion. Meanwhile, Deputy Chair of the Riau Islands Regional Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPID), Suyono, said that while under KPID supervision, in its broadcasts Radio Hang FM actually rejected radicalism and terrorism. Hang FM must decrease its transmission power from 10 kW to 2 kW as its service area is only in Batam. In the future, after radio frequency jamming, Singapore may ban Hang FM website, this will cause listeners cannot access Hang FM via online, even mobile app in Singapore.
In fiction: Radio jamming (or "comm jamming") is a common plot element in the Star Wars franchise. In Star Wars: Episode VI - Return of the Jedi, when the Rebel fleet approaches the Galactic Empire's force, believing themselves to be launching a surprise attack, General Lando Calrissian realizes the Empire is jamming their signals, and therefore know they are approaching.
In the film Star Trek II, after receiving a distress call from the space station Regula I, Captain Kirk attempts to establish communications, but the Enterprise's comm officer Lt. Uhura reports that further transmissions are "jammed at the source".
See also:
References:
External links: extensive site on radio jamming
Article on recent jammers with audio samples Archived 2011-07-21 at the Wayback Machine
Audio sample of jamming (c1982) at start of BBC World service (Russian) programme Archived 2012-02-25 at the Wayback Machine includes jamming station morse ID
Ethiopia jams VOA (2010)
Ultra Fast Folloow Jammer Description (2007) Archived 2020-08-08 at the Wayback Machine
R. Pleikys, D. Vildžiūnas. Empire of Noise (video).
Aadu Jogiaas: Disturbing soviet transmissions in August 1991.
Portable jammer is illegal. Archived 2020-02-13 at the Wayback Machine
Words: Matt Bolton, Photographs: Matt Munro The Tallinn Cables, A Glimpse Into Tallainn's Secret History of Espionage Lonely Planet Magazine, December 2011 |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Radio silence | Amateur radio Wilderness Protocol: The Wilderness Protocol recommends that those stations able to do so should monitor the primary (and secondary, if possible) frequency every three hours starting at 7 AM, local time, for 5 minutes starting at the top of every hour, or even continuously.
The Wilderness Protocol is now included in both the ARRL ARES Field Resources Manual and the ARES Emergency Resources Manual. Per the manual, the protocol is:
The Wilderness protocol (see page 101, August 1995 QST) calls for hams in the wilderness to announce their presence on, and to monitor, the national calling frequencies for five minutes beginning at the top of the hour, every three hours from 7 AM to 7 PM while in the back country. A ham in a remote location may be able to relay emergency information through another wilderness ham who has better access to a repeater. National calling frequencies: 52.525, 146.52, 223.50, 446.00, 1294.50 MHz.
Priority transmissions should begin with the LITZ (Long Interval Tone Zero or Long Time Zero) DTMF signal for at least 5 seconds. CQ like calls (to see who is out there) should not take place until after 4 minutes after the hour.
Maritime mobile service:
Distress calls: Radio silence can be used in nautical and aeronautical communications to allow faint distress calls to be heard (see Mayday). In the latter case, the controlling station can order other stations to stop transmitting with the proword "Seelonce Seelonce Seelonce". (The word uses an approximation of the French pronunciation of the word silence, "See-LAWNCE."). Once the need for radio silence is finished, the controlling station lifts radio silence by the prowords "Seelonce FINI." Disobeying a Seelonce Mayday order constitutes a serious criminal offence in most countries. The aviation equivalent of Seelonce Mayday is the phrase or command "Stop Transmitting - Distress (or Mayday)". "Distress traffic ended" is the phrase used when the emergency is over. Again, disobeying such an order is extremely dangerous and is therefore a criminal offence in most countries.
Silent periods: Up until the procedure was replaced by the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (August 1, 2013 in the U.S.), maritime radio stations were required to observe radio silence on 500 kHz (radiotelegraph) for the three minutes between 15 and 18 minutes past the top of each hour, and for the three minutes between 45 and 48 minutes past the top of the hour; and were also required to observe radio silence on 2182 kHz (upper-sideband radiotelephony) for the first three minutes of each hour (H+00 to H+03) and for the three minutes following the bottom of the hour (H+30 to H+33).
For 2182 kHz, this is still a legal requirement, according to 47 CFR 80.304 - Watch requirement during silence periods.
Military: An order for Radio silence is generally issued by the military where any radio transmission may reveal troop positions, either audibly from the sound of talking, or by radio direction finding. In extreme scenarios Electronic Silence ('Emissions Control' or EMCON) may also be put into place as a defence against interception.
In the British Army, the imposition and lifting of radio silence will be given in orders or ordered by control using 'Battle Code' (BATCO). Control is the only authority to impose or lift radio silence either fully or selectively. The lifting of radio silence can only be ordered on the authority of the HQ that imposed it in the first place. During periods of radio silence a station may, with justifiable cause, transmit a message. This is known as Breaking Radio Silence. The necessary replies are permitted but radio silence is automatically re-imposed afterwards. The breaking station transmits its message using BATCO to break radio silence.
The command for imposing radio silence is:
Hello all stations, this is 0. Impose radio silence. Over.
Other countermeasures are also applied to protect secrets against enemy signals intelligence.
Electronic emissions can be used to plot a line of bearing to an intercepted signal, and if more than one receiver detects it, triangulation can estimate its location. Radio direction finding (RDF) was critically important during the Battle of Britain and reached a high state of maturity in early 1943 with the aid of United States institutions aiding British Research and Development under the pressures of the continuing Battle of the Atlantic during World War II when locating U-boats. One key breakthrough was marrying MIT/Raytheon developed CRT technology with pairs of RDF antennas giving a differentially derived instant bearing useful in tactical situations, enabling escorts to run down the bearing to an intercept. The U-boat command of Wolfpacks required a minimum once daily communications check-in, allowing new Hunter-Killer groups to localize U-boats tactically from April on, leading to dramatic swings in the fortunes of war in the battles between March, when the U-boats sank over 300 allied ships and "Black May" when the allies sank at least 44 U-boats—each without orders to exercise EMCON/radio silence.
Other uses: Radio silence can be maintained for other purposes, such as for highly sensitive radio astronomy. Radio silence can also occur for spacecraft whose antenna is temporarily pointed away from Earth in order to perform observations, or there is insufficient power to operate the radio transmitter, or during re-entry when the hot plasma surrounding the spacecraft blocks radio signals.
In the USA, CONELRAD and EBS (which are now discontinued), and EAS (which is currently active) are also ways of maintaining radio silence, mainly in broadcasting, in the event of an attack.
Examples of radio silence orders: Radio silencing helped hide the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in World War II. The attackers had used AM radio station KGU in Honolulu as a homing signal.
On June 2, 1942, during World War II, a nine-minute air-raid alert, including at 9:22 pm a radio silence order applied to all radio stations from Mexico to Canada.
In January 1965, Syrian Armed Forces observed a period of radio silence which successfully detected Mossad spy Eli Cohen who was transmitting espionage work to Israel.
See also: Dead air
Guard band
Mapimí Silent Zone
Radio quiet zone
CONELRAD
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Radiological warfare | Salted nuclear weapons: A salted bomb is a nuclear weapon that is equipped with a large quantity of radiologically inert salting material. The radiological warfare agents are produced through neutron capture by the salting materials of the neutron radiation emitted by the nuclear weapon. This avoids the problems of having to stockpile the highly radioactive material, as it is produced when the bomb explodes. The result is a more intense fallout than from regular nuclear weapons and can render an area uninhabitable for a long period.
The cobalt bomb is an example of a radiological warfare weapon, where cobalt-59 is converted to cobalt-60 by neutron capture. Initially, gamma radiation of the nuclear fission products from an equivalent sized "clean" fission-fusion-fission bomb (assuming the amount of radioactive dust particles generated are equal) are much more intense than cobalt-60: 15,000 times more intense at 1 hour; 35 times more intense at 1 week; 5 times more intense at 1 month; and about equal at 6 months. Thereafter fission drops off rapidly so that cobalt-60 fallout is 8 times more intense than fission at 1 year and 150 times more intense at 5 years. The very long-lived isotopes produced by fission would overtake the cobalt-60 again after about 75 years.
Other salted bomb variants that do not use cobalt have also been theorized. For example, salting with sodium-23, that transmutes to sodium-24, which because of its 15-hour half-life results in intense radiation.
Surface-burst nuclear weapons: An air burst is preferred if the effects of thermal radiation and blast wave is to be maximized for an area (i.e. area covered by direct line of sight and sufficient luminosity to cause burning, and formation of mach stem respectively). Both fission and fusion weapons will irradiate the detonation site with neutron radiation, causing neutron activation of the material there. Fission bombs will also contribute with the bomb-material residue. Air will not form isotopes useful for radiological warfare when neutron-activated. By detonating them at or near the surface instead, the ground will be vaporized, become radioactive, and when it cools down and condenses into particles cause significant fallout.
Dirty bombs: A far lower-tech radiological weapon than those discussed above is a "dirty bomb" or radiological dispersal device, whose purpose is to disperse radioactive dust over an area. The release of radioactive material may involve no special "weapon" or side forces like a blast explosion and include no direct killing of people from its radiation source, but rather could make whole areas or structures unusable or unfavorable for the support of human life. The radioactive material may be dispersed slowly over a large area, and it can be difficult for the victims to initially know that such a radiological attack is being carried out, especially if detectors for radioactivity are not installed beforehand.
Radiological warfare with dirty bombs could be used for nuclear terrorism, spreading or intensifying fear. In relation to these weapons, nation states can also spread rumor, disinformation and fear.
In July 2023, both Ukraine and Russia blamed each other for preparing to bomb the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine, in order to use the nuclear reactors as dirty bombs.
See also: Acute radiation syndrome
Area denial weapons
Depleted uranium
Neutron bomb
Nuclear detection
Nuclear warfare
Operation Peppermint
Scorched earth and "Salting the earth"
Yasser Arafat § Theories about the cause of death
Further reading: Kirby, R. (2020) Radiological Weapons: America's Cold War Experience.
References:
External links: Radiological Weapons as Means of Attack. Anthony H. Cordesman
Radiological-weapons threats: case studies from the extreme right. BreAnne K. Fleer, 2020; The Nonproliferation Review |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Raid (military) | Land:
Tribal societies: Among many tribal societies, raiding was the most common and lethal form of warfare. Taking place at night, the goal was to catch the enemy sleeping to avoid casualties to the raiding party.
Iron Age Ireland: Cattle raiding was a major feature of Irish society in the Iron Age and forms the central plot of the historical epic Táin Bó Cúailnge (English: Cattle Raid of Cooley).
Bedouin ghazzu: The traditional habit of Bedouin tribes of raiding other tribes, caravans, or settlements is known in Arabic as ghazzu. Such activity was still noticed by J. S. Buckingham in 1820s Palestine not only among nomadic Bedouin, but also among the nominally sedentary villagers of er-Riha (Jericho), who left the little land cultivation he observed to women and children, while men spent most of their time riding through the plains and engaging in "robbery and plunder", their main and most profitable activity.
Arabia during Muhammad's era: The Islamic prophet Muhammad made frequent use of raiding tactics. His first use of raids was during the caravan raids, and his first successful raid was the Nakhla raid. In January 624 Muhammad ordered this raid to attack a Quraysh caravan and gather information.
During the Invasion of Thi Amr he ordered a raid on the Banu Muharib and Banu Talabah tribes after he received intelligence that they were allegedly going to raid the outskirts of Medina. One person was captured by Muslims during this raid.
In August 627 he ordered the First Raid on Banu Thalabah, a tribe already aware of the impending attack. So they lay in wait for the Muslims, and when Muhammad ibn Maslamah arrived at the site, 100 men of the Banu Thalabah ambushed them, while the Muslims were making preparation to sleep, and after a brief resistance killed all of Muhammad ibn Maslamah's men. Muhammad ibn Maslamah pretended to be dead. A Muslim who happened to pass that way found him and assisted him to return to Medina. The raid was unsuccessful.
Medieval Europe: Small scale raiding warfare was common in Western European warfare of the Middle Ages. Much of a professional soldiers' time could be spent in "little war", carrying out raids or defending against them. Typical of this style of warfare was the mounted raid or chevauchée, popular during the Hundred Years War. Chevauchées varied in size from a few hundred men to armies of thousands, and could range in scope from attacks on nearby enemy areas to the devastation of whole regions, such as that carried out by the Black Prince in Southern France in 1355. This last is notable not just for its success and scope but the fact that the raiders deliberately captured records in order to carry out a post-operational analysis of the impact of the raid on the enemy economy.
Large scale raiding: The largest raids in history were the series undertaken during and following the Mongol invasion of Central Asia. Examples of lesser scale raids include those staged by the Cossacks of the Zaporizhian Sich, the Grande Armée, and cavalry raids that took place during the American Civil War such as Morgan's Raid, and numerous examples of small group raids behind enemy lines that have taken place throughout all periods of history.
In the operational level of war, raids were the precursors in the development of the Operational Manoeuvre Groups in the Soviet Army as early as the 1930s.
Seaborne: Raiding by sea was known at the time of the Pharaohs, when the shipborne forces of the Sea Peoples caused serious disruption to the economies of the eastern Mediterranean.
In pre-colonial thalassocracies in the islands of the Philippines, sea raids (mangayaw) and land wars (mangubat), were regular seasonal activities by warring polities, particularly among the Visayans. Participating in or defending against these raids were part of the duties of the noble (maginoo) and warrior castes (like the timawa and maharlika). The main purpose of the raids were to gain prestige in combat, to pillage, and to capture hostages. Participation and prowess in these raids were recorded in the widespread practice of full-body tattooing (batok). Raids were usually seaborne, and coastal communities had sentinels that watch for possible raids. When spotted, it was preferable for the defenders to meet the attackers at sea in ship-to-ship combat (bangga) rather than engage them on land. The raids had strict codes of conduct on the treatment of captives. People who surrendered were spared, to be ransomed or to work under temporary indentured servitude as alipin then set free. Anyone who kills a captive is required to pay their value, or risk becoming an alipin themselves. Higher-ranked captives were treated well and were usually ransomed by relatives.
The practice of seaborne raids also continued among the Austronesian ethnic groups in Island Southeast Asia that converted to Islam shortly before and during the Colonial Era. However, unlike pre-colonial raids, these raids were specifically to acquire slaves. Unlike the pre-colonial practices of indentured servitude (like in alipin) which was more a temporary form of punishment, captives from these more recent raids followed the Islamic practice of chattel slavery. They had little chances of returning to their home settlements, unless ransomed, and were instead sold on the slave markets. These kinds of raids were especially prevalent in the Sulu and Celebes Seas and has continued into modern-day piracy.
In the early Middle Ages, Viking raiders from Scandinavia attacked the British Isles, France and Spain, attacking coastal and riverside targets. Much Viking raiding was carried out as a private initiative with a few ships, usually to gain loot, but much larger fleets were also involved, often as intent on extorting protection money (English: Danegeld) as looting and pillaging. Raiding did not cease with the decline of the Viking threat in the 11th century. It remained a common element of the medieval naval warfare. Extensive naval raiding was carried out by all sides during the Hundred Years War, often involving privateers such as John Hawley of Dartmouth or the Castilian Pero Niño. In the Mediterranean, raiding using oared galleys was common throughout the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance and was particularly a feature of the wars between the Christian powers and the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century. Raiding formed a major component of English naval strategy in the Elizabethan era, with attacks on the Spanish possessions in the New World. A major raid on Cadiz to destroy shipping being assembled for the Spanish Armada was carried out by Sir Francis Drake in 1587. Similarly the Dutch executed the Raid on the Medway during the Second Anglo-Dutch War and the Dutch Raid on North America during the Third Anglo-Dutch War.
During the Second World War, the British set up the Combined Operations Headquarters to organise harassing raids against the Germans in Europe. The first operation conducted by a "commando" formation, known as Operation Ambassador, took place in July 1940, but it was a small-scale operation that resulted in negligible success. The next major raid was Operation Claymore, which was launched in March 1941 against the Lofoten Islands. Throughout the war there were many other operations of varied size, ranging from small scale operations like those undertaken by Z Special Unit against the Japanese in the Pacific, such as Project Opossum, to Operation Chariot – a raid on Saint-Nazaire – and the Dieppe Raid, which was a large scale raid employing about 6,000 soldiers, over 200 ships and 74 squadrons of aircraft intended to take and hold Dieppe sufficiently to cause sufficient destruction to the port.
Air:
Air landed: Paratroopers and glider-borne troops have been landed by aircraft on raids, including offensive counter-air missions such as those carried out by the Teishin Shudan and Giretsu Kuteitai commandos. In the modern era, the helicopter, allowing for both insertion and extraction, offers a superior method of raid transportation, although it comes at the cost of noise. During the Second World War, several air-landed raids were undertaken, including the German glider-borne raid on Fort Eben-Emal in Belgium in 1940, and the British Operation Colossus and Operation Biting, which were raids in Italy and France in 1941 and 1942.
Aerial bombardment: The Royal Air Force first used the term "raid" in the Second World War when referring to an air attack. It included those by one aircraft or many squadrons, against all manner of targets on the ground and the targets defending aircraft. "Raid" was different from "battle", which was used for land, sea, or amphibious conflict. An aircraft "raid" was always planned ahead of time. Aircraft patrols (against U-boats) and defensive launches of carrier aircraft (against recently detected enemy ships) are differentiated from raids.
See also: Marine Raiders
Chevauchée
Direct action (military)
Hit-and-run tactics
Infiltration tactics
Slave raiding
Trench raiding
List of expeditions of Muhammad
List of raids
References:
Sources: Black, Robert W. (2004). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Raid (military) | Aerial bombardment: The Royal Air Force first used the term "raid" in the Second World War when referring to an air attack. It included those by one aircraft or many squadrons, against all manner of targets on the ground and the targets defending aircraft. "Raid" was different from "battle", which was used for land, sea, or amphibious conflict. An aircraft "raid" was always planned ahead of time. Aircraft patrols (against U-boats) and defensive launches of carrier aircraft (against recently detected enemy ships) are differentiated from raids.
See also: Marine Raiders
Chevauchée
Direct action (military)
Hit-and-run tactics
Infiltration tactics
Slave raiding
Trench raiding
List of expeditions of Muhammad
List of raids
References:
Sources: Black, Robert W. (2004). Cavalry Raids of the Civil War. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books.
Chappell, Mike (1996). Army Commandos 1940–45. Elite Series # 64. London: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-85532-579-9.
Crowley, Roger (2008). Empires of the Sea. London: Faber & Faber. ISBN 978-0-571-23231-4.
Evans, Martin (2000). The Fall of France: Act With Daring. Botley, Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-85532-969-7.
Gat, Azar (2006). War in Human Civilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Griffith, Paddy (1995). The Viking Art of War. London: Greenhill Books. ISBN 1-85367-208-4.
Hanson, Neil (2003). The Confident Hope of a Miracle. London: Corgi. ISBN 0-552-14975-6.
Longmate, Norman (1990). Defending the Island. London: Grafton. ISBN 0-586-20845-3.
Rogers, Clifford (2000). War Cruel and Sharp. Woodbridge: Boydell Press. ISBN 0-85115-804-8.
Rogers, Clifford (2007). Soldiers Lives Through History: The Middle Ages. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. ISBN 978-0-313-33350-7.
Simpkin, Richard; Erickson, John (1987). Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers.
Smith, Kevin (2012). "Operation Opossum: The Raiding Party to Rescue the Sultan of Ternate, 1945". Sabretache. 53 (4, Dec): 48–54. ISSN 0048-8933.
Thompson, Leroy (1989). British Paratroops in Action. Combat Troops Number 9. Carrollton, Texas: Squadron/Signal Publications. ISBN 0-89747-233-0.
External links: Media related to Military raids at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Rapid deployment | Types:
Quick reaction force: A quick reaction force (QRF) is an armed military unit capable of rapidly responding to developing situations, usually to assist allied units in need of assistance. They are equipped to respond to any type of emergency within a short time frame, often only a few minutes, based on unit standard operating procedures (SOPs). Cavalry units are frequently postured as QRFs, with a main mission of security and reconnaissance.
A quick reaction force belongs directly to the commander of the unit it is created from and is typically held in the reserve.
Rapid deployment force: A rapid deployment force (RDF) is a military formation that is capable of fast deployment outside their country's borders. They typically consist of well-trained military units (special forces, paratroopers, marines, etc.) that can be deployed fairly quickly or on short notice, usually from other major assets and without requiring a large organized support force immediately.
List:
Rapid reaction force: The concept of a United Nations rapid reaction force was proposed in the mid-1990s by several commentators and officials, including Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The UN rapid reaction force would consist of personnel stationed in their home countries, but they would have the same training, equipment, and procedures, and would conduct joint exercises. The force would remain at high readiness at all times so as to quickly deploy them where necessary.
The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) is a NATO rapid reaction force, established in 1992. A successor to the British Army's I Corps, the ARRC is capable of rapidly deploying a NATO headquarters for operations and crisis response.
The European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR) is a European rapid reaction force under the European Union, established in 2006. An alliance of gendarmerie forces from Italy, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Spain, it serves as a unified intervention force of European militarized police.
The European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR) was a European rapid reaction force under the European Union and Western European Union, established in 1995 and composed of military units from Italy, France, Portugal, and Spain. EUROFOR was tasked with performing duties outlined in the Petersberg Tasks. EUROFOR deployed to Kosovo from 2000 to 2001, and North Macedonia as part of EUFOR Concordia in 2003. After being converted into an EU Battlegroup, EUROFOR was dissolved in 2012.
The European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) was the intended result of the Helsinki Headline Goal. Though many media reports suggested the ERRF would be a European Union army, the Helsinki Headline Goal was little more than headquarters arrangements and a list of theoretically available national forces for a rapid reaction force.
The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a NATO rapid reaction force, established in 2003. Distinct from the ARRC, the NRF comprises land, sea, air, and special forces units that can be deployed quickly.
Riot Police Units (RPU) are the rapid reaction forces of Japanese prefectural police. They combine riot police, police tactical units, and disaster response squads under one unit. Each prefectural police force operates RPUs, sometimes under different names.
Rapid Action Force of India
Army Deployment Force of Singapore
2nd Quick Response Division ROK Marine Corps Quick Maneuver Force
The Immediate Response Force (IRF) is an American rapid reaction force composed of units from the United States Army and United States Air Force. They are capable of responding to any location in the world within 18 hours of notice.
The Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) was a British Armed Forces capability concept created in 1999. The force was composed of units from all three branches of the British military, and was able to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world at short notice. However, the War in Afghanistan and 2003 invasion of Iraq siphoned British personnel and equipment, leaving the JRRF with insufficient forces. The JRRF was succeeded by the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force in 2010 and the Joint Expeditionary Force in 2014.
Rapid deployment force: Special forces of India
Special Operations Force of Singapore
Argentine Rapid Deployment Force
3rd Brigade
Rapid Deployment Force
Egyptian Rapid Deployment Forces
Finnish Rapid Deployment Force
/ Rapid Forces Division
Indonesian Air Force Quick Reaction Forces Command
Indonesian Army Strategic Command
Indonesian Marine Corps
NEDSA Corps
/ NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Italy
Central Readiness Regiment
ROKMC Quick Maneuver Force
10th Parachute Brigade
Netherlands Marine Corps
Norwegian Telemark Battalion
710th Special Operations Wing
Rapid Reaction Brigade
Guards
Air Mobile Brigade
The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) is divided into two types. The first is the airborne force responsible for the 31st Infantry Regiment, King Bhumibol's Guard. The second is infantry battalions designated as RDF, each Army Area has one RDF battalion including The 3rd Infantry Battalion, 19th Infantry Regiment of the 9th Infantry Division was designated the RDF of the First Army Area. • The 1st Infantry Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment of the 6th Infantry Division was designated the RDF of the Second Army Area. • The 1st Infantry Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division was designated the RDF of the Third Army Area. • The 2nd Infantry Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division was designated the RDF of the Fouth Army Area.
The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was a former United States Department of Defense joint task force. It was formed in 1979 as the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), envisioned as a mobile force that could quickly deploy U.S. forces to any location outside the usual American deployment areas of Western Europe and East Asia, soon coming to focus on the Middle East. It was inactivated in 1983 and reorganized as the United States Central Command.
Marine Expeditionary Unit
XVIII Airborne Corps
75th Ranger Regiment
/ Russian Airborne Forces
Separate Operational Purpose Division
EU Battlegroup
See also: Expeditionary warfare
Power projection
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Rapid dominance | Doctrine of rapid dominance: Rapid dominance is defined by its authors, Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, as attempting
to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary to fight or respond to our strategic policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe.
Further, rapid dominance will, according to Ullman and Wade,
impose this overwhelming level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on ... [to] seize control of the environment and paralyze or so overload an adversary's perceptions and understanding of events that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at the tactical and strategic levels.
Introducing the doctrine in a report to the United States' National Defense University in 1996, Ullman and Wade describe it as an attempt to develop a post-Cold War military doctrine for the United States. Rapid dominance and shock and awe, they write, may become a "revolutionary change" as the United States military is reduced in size and information technology is increasingly integrated into warfare. Subsequent U.S. military authors have written that rapid dominance exploits the "superior technology, precision engagement, and information dominance" of the United States.
Ullman and Wade identify four vital characteristics of rapid dominance:
near total or absolute knowledge and understanding of self, adversary, and environment;
rapidity and timeliness in application;
operational brilliance in execution; and
(near) total control and signature management of the entire operational environment.
The term "shock and awe" is most consistently used by Ullman and Wade as the effect that rapid dominance seeks to impose upon an adversary. It is the desired state of helplessness and lack of will. It can be induced, they write, by direct force applied to command and control centers, selective denial of information and dissemination of disinformation, overwhelming combat force, and rapidity of action.
The doctrine of rapid dominance has evolved from the concept of "decisive force". Ulman and Wade contrast the two concepts in terms of objective, use of force, force size, scope, speed, casualties, and technique.
Civilian casualties and destruction of infrastructure: Although Ullman and Wade claim that the need to "[m]inimize civilian casualties, loss of life, and collateral damage" is a "political sensitivity [which needs] to be understood up front", their doctrine of rapid dominance requires the capability to disrupt "means of communication, transportation, food production, water supply, and other aspects of infrastructure", and, in practice, "the appropriate balance of Shock and Awe must cause ... the threat and fear of action that may shut down all or part of the adversary's society or render his ability to fight useless short of complete physical destruction."
Using as an example a theoretical invasion of Iraq 20 years after Operation Desert Storm, the authors claimed, "Shutting the country down would entail both the physical destruction of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and control of the flow of all vital information and associated commerce so rapidly as to achieve a level of national shock akin to the effect that dropping nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese."
Reiterating the example in an interview with CBS News several months before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Ullman stated, "You're sitting in Baghdad and all of a sudden you're the general and 30 of your division headquarters have been wiped out. You also take the city down. By that I mean you get rid of their power, water. In 2, 3, 4, 5 days they are physically, emotionally and psychologically exhausted."
Historical applications: Ullman and Wade argue that there have been military applications that fall within some of the concepts of shock and awe. They enumerate nine examples:
Overwhelming force: The "application of massive or overwhelming force" to "disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties to ourselves and to noncombatants as possible."
Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The establishment of shock and awe through "instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and public, rather than targeting directly against military or strategic objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems."
Massive bombardment: Described as "precise destructive power largely against military targets and related sectors over time."
Blitzkrieg: The "intent was to apply precise, surgical amounts of tightly focused force to achieve maximum leverage but with total economies of scale."
Sun Tzu: The "selective, instant beheading of military or societal targets to achieve shock and awe."
Haitian example: This example (occasionally referred to as the Potemkin village example) refers to a martial parade staged in Haiti on behalf of the (then) colonial power France in the early 1800s in which the native Haitians marched a small number of battalions in a cyclical manner. This led the colonial power into the belief that the size of the native forces was large enough so as to make any military action infeasible.
The Roman legions: "Achieving shock and awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an adversary through the adversary's perception and fear of his vulnerability and our own invincibility."
Decay and default: "The imposition of societal breakdown over a lengthy period, but without the application of massive destruction."
First Chechen War: Russia's military strategy in the First Chechen War, and particularly the Battle of Grozny, was described as "shock and awe."
Iraq War:
Buildup: Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, United States armed forces officials described their plan as employing shock and awe. But, Tommy Franks, commanding general of the invading forces, "had never cared for the use of the term 'shock and awe' " and "had not seen that effect as the point of the air offensive."
Conflicting pre-war assessments: Before its implementation, there was dissent within the Bush administration as to whether the shock and awe plan would work. According to a CBS News report, "One senior official called it a bunch of bull, but confirmed it is the concept on which the war plan is based." CBS Correspondent David Martin noted that during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in the prior year, the U.S. forces were "badly surprised by the willingness of al Qaeda to fight to the death. If the Iraqis fight, the U.S. would have to throw in reinforcements and win the old fashioned way by crushing the Republican Guards, and that would mean more casualties on both sides."
Campaign: Continuous bombing began on March 19, 2003, as United States forces unsuccessfully attempted to kill Saddam Hussein with decapitation strikes. Attacks continued against a small number of targets until March 21, 2003, when, at 1700 UTC, the main bombing campaign of the US and their allies began. Its forces launched approximately 1,700 air sorties (504 using cruise missiles). Coalition ground forces had begun a "running start" offensive towards Baghdad on the previous day. Coalition ground forces seized Baghdad on April 5, and the United States declared victory on April 15. The term "shock and awe" is typically used to describe only the very beginning of the invasion of Iraq, not the larger war, nor the ensuing insurgency.
Conflicting post-war assessments: To what extent the United States fought a campaign of shock and awe is unclear as post-war assessments are contradictory. Within two weeks of the United States' victory declaration, on April 27, The Washington Post published an interview with Iraqi military personnel detailing demoralization and lack of command. According to the soldiers, Coalition bombing was surprisingly widespread and had a severely demoralizing effect. When United States tanks passed through the Iraqi military's Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units outside Baghdad to Saddam's presidential palaces, it caused a shock to troops inside Baghdad. Iraqi soldiers said there was no organization intact by the time the United States entered Baghdad and that resistance crumbled under the presumption that "it wasn't a war, it was suicide."
In contrast, in an October 2003 presentation to the United States House Committee on Armed Services, staff of the United States Army War College did not attribute their performance to rapid dominance. Rather, they cited technological superiority and "Iraqi ineptitude". The speed of the coalition's actions ("rapidity"), they said, did not affect Iraqi morale. Further, they said that Iraqi armed forces ceased resistance only after direct force-on-force combat within cities.
According to National Geographic researcher Bijal Trivedi, "Even after several days of bombing the Iraqis showed remarkable resilience. Many continued with their daily lives, working and shopping, as bombs continued to fall around them. According to some analysts, the military's attack was perhaps too precise. It did not trigger shock and awe in the Iraqis and, in the end, the city was only captured after close combat on the outskirts of Baghdad."
Criticism of execution: According to The Guardian correspondent Brian Whitaker in 2003, "To some in the Arab and Muslim countries, Shock and Awe is terrorism by another name; to others, a crime that compares unfavourably with September 11." Anti-war protesters in 2003 also claimed that "the shock and awe pummeling of Baghdad [was] a kind of terrorism."
Casualties: A dossier released by Iraq Body Count, a project of the U.K. non-governmental non-violent and disarmament organization Oxford Research Group, attributed approximately 6,616 civilian deaths to the actions of U.S.-led forces during the "invasion phase", including the shock-and-awe bombing campaign on Baghdad. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Rapid dominance | According to some analysts, the military's attack was perhaps too precise. It did not trigger shock and awe in the Iraqis and, in the end, the city was only captured after close combat on the outskirts of Baghdad."
Criticism of execution: According to The Guardian correspondent Brian Whitaker in 2003, "To some in the Arab and Muslim countries, Shock and Awe is terrorism by another name; to others, a crime that compares unfavourably with September 11." Anti-war protesters in 2003 also claimed that "the shock and awe pummeling of Baghdad [was] a kind of terrorism."
Casualties: A dossier released by Iraq Body Count, a project of the U.K. non-governmental non-violent and disarmament organization Oxford Research Group, attributed approximately 6,616 civilian deaths to the actions of U.S.-led forces during the "invasion phase", including the shock-and-awe bombing campaign on Baghdad.
These findings were disputed by both the U.S. military and the Iraqi government. Lieutenant Colonel Steve Boylan, the spokesman for the U.S. military in Baghdad, stated, "I don't know how they are doing their methodology and can't talk to how they calculate their numbers," as well as "we do everything we can to avoid civilian casualties in all of our operations." National Geographic researcher Bijal Trivedi stated, "Civilian casualties did occur, but the strikes, for the most part, were surgical."
In popular culture: Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US, the term "shock and awe" has been used for commercial purposes. The United States Patent and Trademark Office received at least 29 trademark applications in 2003 for exclusive use of the term. The first came from a fireworks company on the day the US started bombing Baghdad. Sony registered the trademark the day after the beginning of the operation for use in a video game title but later withdrew the application and described it as "an exercise of regrettable bad judgment."
In an interview, Harlan Ullman stated that he believed that using the term to try to sell products was "probably a mistake", and that "the marketing value will be somewhere between slim and none".
Shock and awe is the job of Jane Doe, most commonly known as The Soldier from Valve's 2007 multi-player FPS game Team Fortress 2.
In the 2009 theatrical movie Avatar, the genocide attack on the Na'vi is described as a "Shock and Awe" campaign by doctor Max Patel.
In the 2011 theatrical film Battle: Los Angeles, the invasion by the alien force is described as using "rapid dominance" along the world's coastlines, including indiscriminate use of heavy ordnance.
A mission entitled "Shock and Awe" in the video game Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare concludes with the detonation of a nuclear warhead.
In the 2008 video game Command & Conquer: Red Alert 3, one of the songs in the soundtrack of the game is titled "Shock and Awe".
In the 2016 video game Hearts of Iron IV, one doctrine the player can select is named “Shock and Awe”, focussing on overwhelming Artillery- and Air support. However, the game is set before Ullman and Wade’s explanation of the terminology.
See also: Demoralization (military)
Hearts and minds (Iraq)
Powell Doctrine
Psychological warfare
Rumsfeld Doctrine
Terror (politics)
London Blitz
Blitzkrieg
Notes:
Further reading: Blakesley, Paul J. "Shock and Awe: A Widely Misunderstood Effect". United States Army Command and General Staff College, June 17, 2004.
Branigin, William. "A Brief, Bitter War for Iraq's Military Officers". Washington Post, October 27, 2003.
Peterson, Scott. "US mulls air strategies in Iraq". Christian Science Monitor, January 30, 2003.
Ullman, Harlan K. and Wade, James P. Rapid Dominance: A Force for All Seasons. Royal United Services Institute in Defense Studies, 1998.
External links:
Shock and awe Archived 2007-03-12 at the Wayback Machine, from SourceWatch
Command and Control Research Program |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Rapid reaction force | Types:
Quick reaction force: A quick reaction force (QRF) is an armed military unit capable of rapidly responding to developing situations, usually to assist allied units in need of assistance. They are equipped to respond to any type of emergency within a short time frame, often only a few minutes, based on unit standard operating procedures (SOPs). Cavalry units are frequently postured as QRFs, with a main mission of security and reconnaissance.
A quick reaction force belongs directly to the commander of the unit it is created from and is typically held in the reserve.
Rapid deployment force: A rapid deployment force (RDF) is a military formation that is capable of fast deployment outside their country's borders. They typically consist of well-trained military units (special forces, paratroopers, marines, etc.) that can be deployed fairly quickly or on short notice, usually from other major assets and without requiring a large organized support force immediately.
List:
Rapid reaction force: The concept of a United Nations rapid reaction force was proposed in the mid-1990s by several commentators and officials, including Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The UN rapid reaction force would consist of personnel stationed in their home countries, but they would have the same training, equipment, and procedures, and would conduct joint exercises. The force would remain at high readiness at all times so as to quickly deploy them where necessary.
The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) is a NATO rapid reaction force, established in 1992. A successor to the British Army's I Corps, the ARRC is capable of rapidly deploying a NATO headquarters for operations and crisis response.
The European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR) is a European rapid reaction force under the European Union, established in 2006. An alliance of gendarmerie forces from Italy, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Spain, it serves as a unified intervention force of European militarized police.
The European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR) was a European rapid reaction force under the European Union and Western European Union, established in 1995 and composed of military units from Italy, France, Portugal, and Spain. EUROFOR was tasked with performing duties outlined in the Petersberg Tasks. EUROFOR deployed to Kosovo from 2000 to 2001, and North Macedonia as part of EUFOR Concordia in 2003. After being converted into an EU Battlegroup, EUROFOR was dissolved in 2012.
The European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) was the intended result of the Helsinki Headline Goal. Though many media reports suggested the ERRF would be a European Union army, the Helsinki Headline Goal was little more than headquarters arrangements and a list of theoretically available national forces for a rapid reaction force.
The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a NATO rapid reaction force, established in 2003. Distinct from the ARRC, the NRF comprises land, sea, air, and special forces units that can be deployed quickly.
Riot Police Units (RPU) are the rapid reaction forces of Japanese prefectural police. They combine riot police, police tactical units, and disaster response squads under one unit. Each prefectural police force operates RPUs, sometimes under different names.
Rapid Action Force of India
Army Deployment Force of Singapore
2nd Quick Response Division ROK Marine Corps Quick Maneuver Force
The Immediate Response Force (IRF) is an American rapid reaction force composed of units from the United States Army and United States Air Force. They are capable of responding to any location in the world within 18 hours of notice.
The Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) was a British Armed Forces capability concept created in 1999. The force was composed of units from all three branches of the British military, and was able to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world at short notice. However, the War in Afghanistan and 2003 invasion of Iraq siphoned British personnel and equipment, leaving the JRRF with insufficient forces. The JRRF was succeeded by the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force in 2010 and the Joint Expeditionary Force in 2014.
Rapid deployment force: Special forces of India
Special Operations Force of Singapore
Argentine Rapid Deployment Force
3rd Brigade
Rapid Deployment Force
Egyptian Rapid Deployment Forces
Finnish Rapid Deployment Force
/ Rapid Forces Division
Indonesian Air Force Quick Reaction Forces Command
Indonesian Army Strategic Command
Indonesian Marine Corps
NEDSA Corps
/ NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Italy
Central Readiness Regiment
ROKMC Quick Maneuver Force
10th Parachute Brigade
Netherlands Marine Corps
Norwegian Telemark Battalion
710th Special Operations Wing
Rapid Reaction Brigade
Guards
Air Mobile Brigade
The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) is divided into two types. The first is the airborne force responsible for the 31st Infantry Regiment, King Bhumibol's Guard. The second is infantry battalions designated as RDF, each Army Area has one RDF battalion including The 3rd Infantry Battalion, 19th Infantry Regiment of the 9th Infantry Division was designated the RDF of the First Army Area. • The 1st Infantry Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment of the 6th Infantry Division was designated the RDF of the Second Army Area. • The 1st Infantry Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division was designated the RDF of the Third Army Area. • The 2nd Infantry Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division was designated the RDF of the Fouth Army Area.
The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was a former United States Department of Defense joint task force. It was formed in 1979 as the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), envisioned as a mobile force that could quickly deploy U.S. forces to any location outside the usual American deployment areas of Western Europe and East Asia, soon coming to focus on the Middle East. It was inactivated in 1983 and reorganized as the United States Central Command.
Marine Expeditionary Unit
XVIII Airborne Corps
75th Ranger Regiment
/ Russian Airborne Forces
Separate Operational Purpose Division
EU Battlegroup
See also: Expeditionary warfare
Power projection
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Reconnaissance | Etymology: The word is derived from the Middle French word reconoissance.
Overview: Reconnaissance conducted by ground forces includes special reconnaissance, armored reconnaissance, amphibious reconnaissance and civil reconnaissance.
Aerial reconnaissance is reconnaissance carried out by aircraft (of all types including balloons and uncrewed aircraft). The purpose is to survey weather conditions, map terrain, and may include military purposes such as observing tangible structures, particular areas, and movement of enemy forces.
Naval forces use aerial and satellite reconnaissance to observe enemy forces. Navies also undertake hydrographic surveys and intelligence gathering.
Reconnaissance satellites provide military commanders with photographs of enemy forces and other intelligence. Military forces also use geographical and meteorological information from Earth observation satellites.
Discipline: Types of reconnaissance:
Terrain-oriented reconnaissance is a survey of the terrain (its features, weather, and other natural observations).
Force-oriented reconnaissance focuses on the enemy forces (number, equipment, activities, disposition etc.) and may include target acquisition.
Civil-oriented reconnaissance focuses on the civil dimension of the battlespace (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events abbreviated ASCOPE).
The techniques and objectives are not mutually exclusive; it is up to the commander whether they are carried out separately or by the same unit.
Reconnaissance-in-force: Reconnaissance-in-force (RIF) is a type of military operation or military tactic used specifically to probe an enemy's combat ability.
While typical reconnaissance forces are small and armed only for self-defense, RIF use considerable (but not decisive) force in order to elicit a strong reaction by the enemy that more accurately reveals its own strength, deployment, preparedness, determination, and other tactical data. The RIF units can then fall back and report this data, or expand the conflict into a full engagement if enemy weaknesses are revealed.
Other methods consist of hit-and-run tactics using rapid mobility, and in some cases light-armored vehicles for added fire superiority, as the need arises.
Maintaining active RIF can be used to limit, or even deny, enemy reconnaissance.
Nazi Germany's reconnaissance during World War II is described in the following way:
The purpose of reconnaissance and the types of units employed to obtain information are similar in the U.S. and the German Armies. German tactical principles of reconnaissance, however, diverge somewhat from those of the U.S. The Germans stress aggressiveness, attempt to obtain superiority in the area to be reconnoitered, and strive for continuous observation of the enemy. They believe in employing reconnaissance units in force as a rule. They expect and are prepared to fight to obtain the desired information. Often they assign supplementary tasks to their reconnaissance units, such as sabotage behind enemy lines, harassment, or counter-reconnaissance.Only enough reconnaissance troops are sent on a mission to assure superiority in the area to be reconnoitred. Reserves are kept on hand to be committed when the reconnaissance must be intensified, when the original force meets strong enemy opposition, or when the direction and area to be reconnoitred are changed. The Germans encourage aggressive action against enemy security forces. When their reconnaissance units meet superior enemy forces, they fight a delaying action while other units attempt to flank the enemy.
Reconnaissance-by-fire: Reconnaissance by fire (or speculative fire) is the act of firing at likely enemy positions to cause the enemy force to reveal their location by moving or by returning fire.
Reconnaissance-pull: Reconnaissance-pull is a tactic that is applied at the regiment to division level and defined as locating and rapidly exploiting enemy weaknesses. It is the ability to determine enemy positions and create exploitable gaps through which friendly forces can pass while avoiding obstacles and strong points.
A textbook example of reconnaissance-pull was documented during the Tinian landings of World War II, utilized by the United States Marine Corps's Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, from V Amphibious Corps. Aerial photography and the confirmation by the amphibious reconnaissance platoons determined that the Japanese defenders had largely ignored the northern beaches of the island, focusing most of their defensive effort on beaches in the south-west which were more favorable for an amphibious landing. American forces quickly changed their landing location to the northern beaches and planned a small and hasty "deception" operation off the southern beach, which resulted in a complete surprise for the Japanese forces. As a result, American forces were able to fight the Japanese force on land, where they had the advantage, leading to light losses and a relatively short battle that lasted only 9 days.
Types: When referring to reconnaissance, a commander's full intention is to have a vivid picture of his battlespace. The commander organizes the reconnaissance platoon based on:
mission,
enemy,
terrain,
troops and support available,
time available, and
civil considerations.
This analysis determines whether the platoon uses single or multiple elements to conduct the reconnaissance, whether it pertains to area, zone, or route reconnaissance, the following techniques may be used as long as the fundamentals of reconnaissance are applied.
Scouts may also have different tasks to perform for their commanders of higher echelons, for example: the engineer reconnaissance detachments will try to identify difficult terrain in the path of their formation, and attempt to reduce the time it takes to transit the terrain using specialist engineering equipment such as a pontoon bridge for crossing water obstacles. Sanitary epidemiological reconnaissance implies collection and transfer of all data available on sanitary and epidemiological situation of the area of possible deployment and action of armed forces, the same data for the neighboring and enemy armed forces. The aim for the reconnaissance is to clear up the reasons of the specific disease origin- sources of the infection in various extreme situations, including local wars and armed conflicts, the ways of the infection transfer and all factors promoting to the infestation.
After the armed forces have become stationary during wartime and emergency of peacetime the sanitary epidemiological reconnaissance turns into sanitary and epidemiological surveillance and medical control of vital and communal activity of the armed forces.
Area: Area reconnaissance refers to the observation, and information obtained, about a specified location and the area around it; it may be terrain-oriented and/or force-oriented. Ideally, a reconnaissance platoon, or team, would use surveillance or vantage (static) points around the objective to observe, and the surrounding area. This methodology focuses mainly prior to moving forces into or near a specified area; the military commander may utilize his reconnaissance assets to conduct an area reconnaissance to avoid being surprised by unsuitable terrain conditions, or most importantly, unexpected enemy forces. The area could be a town, ridge-line, woods, or another feature that friendly forces intend to occupy, pass through, or avoid.
Within an area of operation (AO), area reconnaissance can focus the reconnaissance on the specific area that is critical to the commander. This technique of focusing the reconnaissance also permits the mission to be accomplished more quickly. Area reconnaissance can thus be a stand-alone mission or a task to a section or the platoon. The commander analyzes the mission to determine whether the platoon will conduct these types of reconnaissance separately or in conjunction with each other.
Civil: Civil reconnaissance is the process of gathering a broad spectrum of civil information about a specific population in support of military operations. It is related to and often performed in conjunction with infrastructure reconnaissance (assessment and survey). Normally the focus of collection in the operational area for civil reconnaissance is collecting civil information relating to the daily interaction between civilians and military forces. Civil information encompasses relational, temporal, geospatial and behavioral information captured in a socio-cultural backdrop. It is information developed from data related to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events, within the civil component of the commander's operational environment that can be processed to increase situational awareness and understanding. The type of civil information that is needed in order to support military operations varies based on the environment and situation.
Route: Route reconnaissance is oriented on a given route (e.g., a road, a railway, a waterway; i.e., a narrow axis or a general direction of attack) to provide information on route conditions or activities along the route. A military commander relies on information about locations along his determined route: which of those that would provide best cover and concealment; bridge by construction type, dimensions, and classification; or for landing zones or pickup zones, if the need arises.
In many cases, the commander may act upon a force-oriented route reconnaissance by which the enemy could influence movement along that route. For the reconnaissance platoons, or squads, stealth and speed—in conjunction with detailed intelligence-reporting—are most important and crucial. The reconnaissance platoon must remain far enough ahead of the maneuver force to assist in early warning and to prevent the force from becoming surprised.
It is paramount to obtain information about the available space in which a force can maneuver without being forced to bunch up due to obstacles. Terrain-oriented route reconnaissance allows the commander to obtain information and capabilities about the adjacent terrain for maneuvering his forces, to include, any obstacles (minefields, barriers, steep ravines, marshy areas, or chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear contamination) that may obstruct vehicle movement—on routes to, and in, his assigned area of operations. This requirement includes the size of trees and the density of forests due to their effects on vehicle movement. Route reconnaissance also allows the observation for fields of fire along the route and adjacent terrain. This information assists planners as a supplement to map information.
Zone: Zone reconnaissance focuses on obtaining detailed information before maneuvering their forces through particular, designated locations. It can be terrain-oriented, force-oriented, or both, as it acquire this information by reconnoitering within—and by maintaining surveillance over—routes, obstacles (to include nuclear-radiological, biological, and chemical contamination), and resources within an assigned location. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Reconnaissance | Terrain-oriented route reconnaissance allows the commander to obtain information and capabilities about the adjacent terrain for maneuvering his forces, to include, any obstacles (minefields, barriers, steep ravines, marshy areas, or chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear contamination) that may obstruct vehicle movement—on routes to, and in, his assigned area of operations. This requirement includes the size of trees and the density of forests due to their effects on vehicle movement. Route reconnaissance also allows the observation for fields of fire along the route and adjacent terrain. This information assists planners as a supplement to map information.
Zone: Zone reconnaissance focuses on obtaining detailed information before maneuvering their forces through particular, designated locations. It can be terrain-oriented, force-oriented, or both, as it acquire this information by reconnoitering within—and by maintaining surveillance over—routes, obstacles (to include nuclear-radiological, biological, and chemical contamination), and resources within an assigned location.
Also, force-oriented zone reconnaissance is assigned to gain detailed information about enemy forces within the zone, or when the enemy situation is vague by which the information concerning cross-country traffic-ability is desired. The reconnaissance provides the commander with a detailed picture of how the enemy has occupied the zone, enabling him to choose the appropriate course-of-action.
As the platoon conducts this type of zone reconnaissance, its emphasis is on determining the enemy's locations, strengths, and weaknesses. This is the most thorough and complete reconnaissance mission and therefore is very time-intensive.
Psychology: A tracker needs to pay close attention to both the environment and the psychology of their enemy. Knowledge of human psychology, sociology, and cultural backgrounds is necessary to know the actions of the enemy and what they will do or where they will go next. Chief of Scouts Frederick Russell Burnham commented on reconnaissance and scouts, saying:
It is imperative that a scout should know the history, tradition, religion, social customs, and superstitions of whatever country or people he is called on to work in or among. This is almost as necessary as to know the physical character of the country, its climate and products. Certain people will do certain things almost without fail. Certain other things, perfectly feasible, they will not do. There is no danger of knowing too much of the mental habits of an enemy. One should neither underestimate the enemy nor credit him with superhuman powers. Fear and courage are latent in every human being, though roused into activity by very diverse means.
Gallery:
See also: Black reconnaissance
Exploration
Espionage
Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance
List of reconnaissance units
Pathfinder (military) – airborne pathfinders
Spatial reconnaissance
Special reconnaissance (recon team)
Surveillance aircraft
U.S. military doctrine for reconnaissance
References:
Further reading:
Halsall, Christine, Women of Intelligence: Winning the Second World War with Air Photos, The History Press, 2012. ISBN 978-0-7524-6477-0. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Reconnaissance aircraft | History: Prior to the 20th century, machines for powered and controllable flight were not available to military forces, but some attempts were made to use lighter than air craft. During the Napoleonic Wars and Franco-Prussian War, balloons were used for aerial reconnaissance by the French.
In World War I, aircraft were deployed during early phases of battle in reconnaissance roles as 'eyes of the army' to aid ground forces. Aerial reconnaissance from this time through 1945 was mostly carried out by adapted versions of standard fighters and bombers equipped with film cameras. Photography became the primary and best-known method of intelligence collection for reconnaissance aircraft by the end of World War II.
World War I also saw use of floatplanes to locate enemy warships. After the battle of Jutland demonstrated the limitations of seaplane tenders, provisions were made for capital ships to carry, launch, and recover observation seaplanes. These seaplanes could scout for enemy warships beyond the visual range of the ship's lookouts, and could spot the fall of shot during long range artillery engagements. Observation seaplanes were replaced by helicopters after World War II.
After World War II and during the Cold War the United States developed several dedicated reconnaissance aircraft designs, including the U-2 and SR-71, to monitor the nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union. Other types of reconnaissance aircraft were built for specialized roles in signals intelligence and electronic monitoring, such as the RB-47, RB-57, Boeing RC-135 and the Ryan Model 147 drones.
Since the Cold War much of the strategic reconnaissance aircraft role has passed over to satellites, and the tactical role to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This has been proven in successful uses by the United States in Desert Storm operations.
See also: Aerial reconnaissance
Surveillance aircraft
List of United States Air Force reconnaissance aircraft
Maritime patrol aircraft
Observation seaplane
References:
External links: Media related to Reconnaissance aircraft at Wikimedia Commons
spyflight
"A Tale of Two Airplanes" by Kingdon R. "King" Hawes, Lt Col, USAF (Ret.)
Bonnier Corporation (January 1919). "Popular Science". The Popular Science Monthly. Bonnier Corporation: 18–. ISSN 0161-7370.
Army-Lockheed YO-3A "Quiet Star" - Official History |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Reconnaissance by fire | World War II: Reconnaissance by fire was widely adopted by the Allies against the Axis in the European theater of World War II. Previously armored units would typically advance in column behind light armored scouting units. At the same time infantry would be present to provide support in the event of ambush by German panzerfaust teams. This method proved too slow to keep pressure on retiring enemy forces. Instead, US armored columns continued to advance at speed, training cannon and machine guns alternately to fire to cover both the left and the right of the axis of advance. The column would fire its weapons more or less continuously into any suspected enemy positions as they appeared, suppressing and distracting the aim of enemy gunners and antitank teams. Supply echelon convoys using trucks equipped with .50-cal. M2 Browning machine guns also used the tactic when traveling through areas not completely cleared of enemy forces.
Vietnam War: During the Battle of Ia Drang in the Vietnam War, Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore, a US Army battalion commander, observed that his men had a surplus of ammunition. He subsequently issued orders for his soldiers to simultaneously open fire on any suspicious targets. This coordinated barrage created the impression among a group of infiltrating enemy soldiers that they had been detected, prompting them to charge at the American forces. As a result, they were ultimately defeated.
See also: List of established military terms
List of military strategies and concepts
List of military tactics
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Recruit training | Major characteristics: Initial military training is an intensive residential programme commonly lasting several weeks or months, which aims to induct newly recruited military personnel into the social norms and essential tasks of the armed forces. Common features include foot drill, inspections, physical training, weapons training, and a graduation parade.
The training process resocializes recruits to the demands made of them by military life. Psychological conditioning techniques are used to shape attitudes and behaviours, so that recruits will obey all orders, face mortal danger, and kill their opponents in battle. According to an expert in United States military training methods, Dave Grossman, recruit training makes extensive use of four types of conditioning techniques: role modeling, classical conditioning, operant conditioning, and brutalization.
Inductees are required to partially submerge their individuality for the sake of their military unit, which enhances obedience to orders to perform actions normally absent from civilian life, including killing and prolonged exposure to danger.
The resocialization of recruit training operates in several ways, as follows:
Confinement and suppression: Once their training has begun, the right of recruits to leave the military estate (or to quit the armed forces) is denied or tightly restricted. By shaving the head, issuing uniforms, denying privacy, and prohibiting the use of first names, individuality is suppressed.
Control and conformity: Recruits' daily routine is highly controlled, in the manner of the 'total institution' described by the Canadian-American sociologist Erving Goffman. For example, the training regime determines how recruits must make their beds, polish boots, and stack their clothes; mistakes are punished.
Throughout their training, recruits are conditioned to conform to military norms and to work as a team. In particular, recruits are repeatedly instructed to stand, march, and respond to orders in a ritual known as foot drill, which is derived from 18th-century military practices and trains recruits to obey orders without hesitation or question. According to Finnish Army regulations, for example, foot drill is essential for the esprit de corps and cohesion, accustoms recruits to instinctive obedience, enables large units to be marched and moved in an orderly manner, and creates the basis for action in the battlefield.
Stress and punishment: The training process applies stressors continuously. Instructors may deprive recruits of sleep, food, or shelter; shout personal insults; use physical aggression; or give orders intended to humiliate. According to specialists in U.S. recruit training, the conditions of continuous stress deplete recruits' resistance to the demands made of them.
The intense workload and sleep restriction experienced by military recruits leaves them little attention capacity for processing the messages they receive about new norms… Therefore, recruits should be less likely to devote their remaining cognitive effort to judging the quality of persuasive messages and will be more likely to be persuaded by the messages…
Evidence from Canada, the UK, the U.S. and elsewhere shows that punishments are used routinely to condition group conformity and discourage poor performance. The role of group punishment in Canadian Army training, for example, has been described as follows:
Coming from civilian society that elevates the individual, recruits are now in a world where the institutional value of the group is supreme. One has to be a team player or risk ostracism. The military does things quite deliberately to intensify the power of group pressure within its ranks. The group is made responsible for each member... even though it may seem manifestly unfair to make the group suffer for the individual.
Bonding and the hierarchy of esteem: As a buffer against the stressful conditions of their training, the trainee group normally forms a strong bond of mutual loyalty. Researchers in the U.S. have described it as an intense "we-feeling", which can feel more powerful than the civilian bonds that recruits are familiar with. In 2006, an official report on Australian Defence Force training explained the importance of the group bond:
Willingness to apply lethal force requires… sufficient bonding within the team to override each individual’s natural human resistance to kill. The toughness and bonding required increases the closer the contact with the enemy.
Recruits are taught to be proud of their identity as professional military personnel, and of their unit in particular. Heroic regimental stories and symbols are used to ennoble the recruits' own unit above others, and above other branches of the armed forces (an aspect of Interservice rivalry), thereby establishing a hierarchy of esteem (also known as a hierarchy of respect); the same stories are used to draw a contrast with the purported inferior norms associated with civilian life. (Cf. Unit cohesion)
Aggression and objectification: Evidence from Australia, the UK and the U.S. shows that recruit training systematically stimulates aggression, particularly in those enlisted for ground close combat roles. Bayonet practice is an example, as the strong language of this instruction from a British army corporal illustrates:
I wanna see it in your eyes that you wanna kill these fuckers. Imagine these dummies are the fucking Taliban and they’ve just killed some of your mates. You wanna fuckin’ kill them. Show me your war face! [Recruits yell] You need some fucking more aggression, show me your war face.
Another example is milling, an exercise used for infantry training in which pairs of recruits wearing boxing gloves punch each other in the head as aggressively as possible.
To further enable recruits to kill on demand, they are taught to objectify (dehumanize) their opponent in battle as an ‘enemy target’ to ‘be engaged’, which will ‘fall when hit’.
Fieldcraft and fitness: Recruits are taught the basic skills of their profession, such as military tactics, first aid, managing their affairs in the field, and the use of weaponry and other equipment.
Throughout, the physical fitness of recruits is tested and developed, although evidence from Israel, Norway, South Africa, the UK and the U.S. has found that the heavy strain on the body also leads to a high rate of injury.
Graduation and drop-out: Recruits who complete their initial training normally take part in a graduation parade (also called passing-out or marching-out). The parade is observed by their family and friends, and senior military personnel. Recruits then pass to the next stage of their training, if applicable.
A large percentage of recruits drop out of training. For example, attrition among British infantry recruits has been found to be above 30% during the first 12 weeks. Reasons for this include dismissal for behavioural problems, poor performance, or injury, and furthermore, recruits who choose to leave if and when they have a legal right to do so. In the UK and U.S., recruits under the age of 20 are most likely to drop out in these ways.
Variations in recruit training: Recruit training varies by nation according to the national requirement and can be voluntary (volunteer military) or mandatory (conscription). Some nations operate both volunteer and conscription systems simultaneously.
Recruit training differs according to military branch:
Army and Marine Corps recruits are normally trained in basic marksmanship with individually assigned weapons, field maintenance of weapons, physical fitness training, first aid, and basic survival and infantry techniques.
Navy and Coast Guard training usually focuses on water survival training, physical fitness, basic seamanship, and such skills as shipboard firefighting, basic engineering, and signals.
Air Force and Space Force training usually includes physical fitness training, military and classroom instructions, basic airmanship/guardianship and field training in basic marksmanship and first aid.
Australia: Most of the recruit training in the Australian Army is currently held at Army Recruit Training Centre (ARTC) at Kapooka, near Wagga Wagga in New South Wales. Recruit training lasts 80 days for members of the Australian Regular Army and 35 days for members of the Australian Army Reserve. In basic training recruits are taught drill, weapons and workplace safety, basic equipment maintenance, marksmanship, fieldcraft, radio use and defensive/offensive operations.
Regional Force Surveillance Units: Training for recruits in the Regional Force Surveillance Units usually differs greatly from training in the rest of the Army. For instance, NORFORCE recruits attend a 2-week course at the Kangaroo Flats. Recruits from areas covered by the RFSUs often come from indigenous cultures radically different from that of the general Australian population, and as such many regular standards and methods of training are not as applicable in their case.
Royal Military College Duntroon: Recruit Training for officers in the Australian Army (known as ICT—Initial Cadet Training) takes place at Royal Military College, Duntroon (RMC). The ICT is conducted for approximately seven weeks after which staff cadets continue military instruction in skills such as weapons training, military history, leadership, strategic studies and other such skills at section, platoon and company levels. Trainees at RMC hold the rank of Staff Cadet and, if successful in completing the course are commissioned as Lieutenants (pronounced Left-tenant). The overall full-time officer training course at RMC is 18 months long.
Canada: Centralized recruit training in the Canadian Army did not exist until 1940, and until the creation of Basic Training Centres across Canada, recruit training had been done by individual units or depots.
In 1968 the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force were unified into one service, the Canadian Forces. The Canadian Forces Training System, a unified system for all the services, was devised and remains in place today.
Most non-commissioned CF recruits in the Regular Force (full-time) participate in the 8-week Basic Military Qualification (BMQ) at Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School at Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Recruit training | Trainees at RMC hold the rank of Staff Cadet and, if successful in completing the course are commissioned as Lieutenants (pronounced Left-tenant). The overall full-time officer training course at RMC is 18 months long.
Canada: Centralized recruit training in the Canadian Army did not exist until 1940, and until the creation of Basic Training Centres across Canada, recruit training had been done by individual units or depots.
In 1968 the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force were unified into one service, the Canadian Forces. The Canadian Forces Training System, a unified system for all the services, was devised and remains in place today.
Most non-commissioned CF recruits in the Regular Force (full-time) participate in the 8-week Basic Military Qualification (BMQ) at Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School at Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. Regular Force officers complete their 12-week Basic Military Officer Qualification (BMOQ) at CFLRS as well, before moving on to Second Language Training or their occupational training.
After basic training, personnel are trained in the specialty of their "environment". Members of the Royal Canadian Navy undergo a five-week sea environment training course; with members of the Canadian Army undergo a 20-day Soldier Qualification course, while officers go through a 12-week Common Army Phase (now renamed to Basic Military Officer Qualification-Army); while members from the Royal Canadian Air Force move on directly to their trade training, with the exception of Construction Engineer Officers, who also do BMOQ-A
Reservists, particularly the Army Reserve, may conduct basic and trades training part-time, generally alternating weekends with their own units. Due to increased integration of the Regular and Reserve Force, many reservists attend courses hosted by the Regular Force. Members of the Army Reserves complete an 8-week BMQ/SQ combined course (Basic Military Qualification and Soldier Qualification) during the summer. Formerly the Naval and Air Reserve jointly conduct BMQ for its recruits at the Naval Reserve Training Division Borden, Ontario equivalent to Regular Force BMQ, at Canadian Forces Base Borden. Now the Naval Reserve conducts the Basic Military Naval Qualification in CFB Valcartier by the Canadian Forces Fleet School Québec (a combination of recruit training and naval environmental training which leads to savings in the training). The Navy trains its personnel in seamanship, firefighting, damage control and other skills after BMQ, in the Naval Environmental Training Program (NETP) in either Esquimalt, British Columbia or Halifax, Nova Scotia.
The Royal Military College of Canada is the military academy of the Canadian Forces, and is a degree-granting university. The Royal Military College Saint-Jean is a Canadian military academy located on the site of Fort Saint-Jean (Quebec),
China:
Denmark: The Danish Army conducts the HBU (Hærens Basisuddannelse, Army Basic Training course) at 8 bases around the country. The course lasts four months, and has its focus on training skills used in connection with the Danish total defence, and on recruiting for the army's international missions, and for the NCO-schools. The recruits are technically conscripts, but during recession years, many young men and woman have volunteered for HBU.
Finland: Training lasts 5.5 to 11.5 months total, depending on an individual specialization. All Finnish conscripts undergo six weeks of basic training (peruskoulutuskausi), which is essentially the same for all servicemen. It includes assault rifle (RK-62/RK-95) marksman training, few other basic weapon training, battle training, short field medic training and camping skills. At the end of this training, all men are promoted to their first military rank. After this, specialized training is given depending on the person (5,5–11,5 months). The NCO trainees go to AUK (NCO school) and become corporals or sergeants, from which some are selected to RUK (Reserve officer school) and become second lieutenants. Leadership training (officer candidates and NCOs) always lasts 11.5 months.
France: In the French army, the "Formation Générale Initiale" (FGI) is a 12 weeks course which occurs in a Centre de Formation Initiale des Militaires du Rang (CFIM). There are 10 CFIM in the country. Prior to this course, new recruits are joining the regiment they are going to serve during 3 to 5 years for reception week where they get issued gear, complete administrative documents and a final medical exam before starting training => in France any enlisted soldier signs not only for a MOS but also a unit to serve.
After completing the 12 week FGI course, recruits are receiving the AFFIM certificate (say BCT graduation) and are considered as private 2nd class. After one week of leave, they go back to their regiment for the Formation de Spécialité Initiale (FSI) => MOS training.
After FGI+FSI, they can start training with their platoon for external deployment. Usually, Private 1st class rank is earned after 6 to 12 month of time in service.
For some units (mountain troops - airborne), there is also during first year a Formation d'Adaptation (FA) for basic mountain training (2 × 2 weeks) or parachute school (3 weeks)
Content of FGI is the following one:
Drills,
First aid and chemical warfare,
PT and obstacle course,
First weapon qualification (FAMAS, pistol and grenade),
Signals,
Basic field and infantry training (even if not MOS11B later on),
Presentation of French army, soldiers duties and reports.
Germany: The Allgemeine Grundausbildung (AGA) (i.e. general basic training) of the Bundeswehr covers the first three months of military service.
The contents of the "Allgemeine Grundausbildung" includes
Formal training (ranks, flags, orders and other fundamentals)
Weapon Drill and Basic Combat training for all soldiers (Rifle, Pistol and machine gun drills are mandatory for every soldier)
Theoretical Courses about Democracy and legal regulations
Sports: the Basic Fitness Test (BFT) and the German Sports Badge (DSA)
Guard duty training (ATB SichSdt)
First Aid
A notable peculiarity of German basic training is rooted in German military tradition that prefers initiative to obedience. Rather than "breaking" the personality of new recruits through intimidation and aggression, German basic training generally tries to "mold" a recruits personality in the hope of producing soldiers with stronger personalities and more own initiative.
Greece: While until 2000 the Greek Army was mainly conscript based, since then a large Professional Enlisted institution has been adopted, which combined with the reduction of conscript service will produce an approximate 1:1 ratio between conscript and professional enlisted. While initially training of the two institutions was shared, it has since then diverged, and conscript training has been reduced in length while professional enlisted training has been increased.
India: The Indian military services have established numerous and distinguished academies and staff colleges across India for the purpose of training professional soldiers in new generation military sciences, warfare command and strategy, and associated technologies.
Israel: The recruit training of the Israel Defense Forces (called tironut in Hebrew) varies depending on the unit: virtually every unusual unit completes a different training course. Recruits are certified as riflemen after the completion of the training, while most non-combat units train in all-army bases for the certification of Rifleman 02. Individuals who want to become officers must apply to be trained at a facility in the Negev desert called "Bahad One" (abbreviation of "Bsis Hadracha", Instruction Base).
Pakistan: The Pakistan Military Academy (or PMA) is a Military Academy of the Pakistan Army. It is located at Kakul in Abbottabad in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Pakistan Military Academy is analogous to Sandhurst, West Point or Tironut and undertakes training of the prospective officers of Pakistan Army. The academy has four training battalions and sixteen companies. A Cadet is trained and passed out as an officer of the Pakistan Army in 2 years.
Enlisted Men undertake training at the Regimental Center of their chosen regiment.
Russia:
Singapore: National Service (NS) in Singapore is obligatory for all able-bodied male citizens and second generation permanent residents who have reached the age of 18. Conscripts enlisted into the Singapore Armed Forces are required to attend Basic Military Training (BMT) at the beginning of their NS. They are known as Full-Time National Servicemen (NSFs).
Based on their Physical Employment Status (PES) grade determined by a pre-enlistment medical examination, NSFs may undergo either a standard, enhanced, modified, or obese BMT programme at the Basic Military Training Centre on the offshore island of Pulau Tekong or at the various military units that directly accept mono-intake PES A and B recruits. A similar 4-week BMT is conducted at Kranji School 5 for enlistees deemed unfit for combat roles.
Throughout their BMT, NSFs will acquire the basic soldiering skills by learning how to execute drills, undergoing physical training activities aimed at developing physical fitness and preparing them for the Individual Physical Proficiency Test (IPPT), learning how to handle the SAR 21 assault rifle and SFG 87 hand grenade, completing a Standard Obstacle Course and Battle Inoculation Course, and completing a five-day field camp, among other activities. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Recruit training | They are known as Full-Time National Servicemen (NSFs).
Based on their Physical Employment Status (PES) grade determined by a pre-enlistment medical examination, NSFs may undergo either a standard, enhanced, modified, or obese BMT programme at the Basic Military Training Centre on the offshore island of Pulau Tekong or at the various military units that directly accept mono-intake PES A and B recruits. A similar 4-week BMT is conducted at Kranji School 5 for enlistees deemed unfit for combat roles.
Throughout their BMT, NSFs will acquire the basic soldiering skills by learning how to execute drills, undergoing physical training activities aimed at developing physical fitness and preparing them for the Individual Physical Proficiency Test (IPPT), learning how to handle the SAR 21 assault rifle and SFG 87 hand grenade, completing a Standard Obstacle Course and Battle Inoculation Course, and completing a five-day field camp, among other activities.
Before passing out from BMT, NSFs have to complete a 24 km (14.91 mi) route march in Full Battle Order and attend the Passing Out Parade, which may be held at the Marina Bay Floating Platform.
After completing BMT, NSFs will receive their posting orders to their respective vocations, which are determined by their PES status, suitability for deployment, and manpower requirements, among other conditions. Some NSFs will be directly posted to a military unit while others may undergo vocational training at certain institutes before being posted to units.
NSFs who perform well during BMT may progress to either the Specialist Cadet School or Officer Cadet School for further training to become Specialists (non-commissioned officers) or Officers.
NSFs will serve the remaining part of their NS in their respective units until their Operationally-Ready Date (ORD), whereupon they will be known as Operationally-Ready National Serviceman (NSmen) or reservists. NSmen may still be required to take the IPPT every year and attend In-Camp Training of up to 40 days per year over a period of ten years, or until they are statutorily discharged from NS at the age of 40 (for Warrant Officers, Specialists and Enlistees) or 50 (for Officers).
Sri Lanka: In Sri Lanka, officer training is carried out at the General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University and at the respective Military Academies of each respective service.
Recruit training for enlisted personnel of the Sri Lanka Army is organised by the Army Training School and carried out at its premises and at several other locations. Following basic training specialized training would be carried out at Regimental Training Centres.
Basic training for new recruits of the Sri Lanka Navy which is approximately six months are conducted at Advanced Naval Training Center, SLNS 'Nipuna'; Naval Artificer Training Institute, SLNS 'Thakshila', Welisara; and at Naval Recruit Training Centres at several shore establishments . This basic training will be followed by on-the-job training on-board fleet units and at shore establishments. Combat Training School at SLNS 'Pandukabaya' conducts combat training for Naval Patrolmen.
Basic training for airmen of the Sri Lanka Air Force is handled by the Training Wing of the SLAF Diyatalawa. This is followed by secularized training at Advanced & Specialized Trade Training School.
Sweden: Since conscription ended in Sweden in 2010 (reintroduced in 2017), all recruits who seek employment within the Swedish Armed Forces have to go through Grundläggande Militär Utbildning (GMU) (Basic Military Training) for three months.
Since conscription was reintroduced in 2017, all recruits who seek employment in the Swedish Armed Forces have to go through Grundutbildning (GU) (Basic Training), which consists of two parts; Grundläggande Militär Utbildning (GMU) (Basic Military Training) that lasts for 3 months and aims to provide every recruit with the same foundation for continued military service, and Befattningsutbildning (Specialization Education) for between 1–11 months depending on specialization.
There is also a shorter volunteer training program for people who seek service within the Home Guard called GU-F. GU-F training takes only 14 days, but following a completed GU-F, a guardsman may go through additional training in order to specialize within the Home Guard.
Basic training as part of GU as well as GU-F usually takes place at any of the Swedish Army training units.
Switzerland: Switzerland has mandatory military service (German: Militärdienst; French: service militaire; Italian: servizio militare) in the Swiss Army for all able-bodied male citizens, who are conscripted when they reach the age of majority, though women may volunteer for any position. Conscripts make up the majority of the manpower in the Swiss Armed Forces.
At the age of 19, all male Swiss nationals must attend the two-day recruitment process in one of the six recruitment centres spread across Switzerland (Aarau, Payerne, Sumiswald, Monte Ceneri, Rüti, Mels). At the end of those two-days, if fit for service, recruits are assigned to a position in the Swiss Armed Forces.
A few months later, recruits start an 18-week (23-week for special forces) boot camp (German: Rekrutenschulen; French: école de recrues; Italian: scuola reclute) during which they are allowed to go home on week-ends. There are two boot camp start per year : January (Winter) and June (Summer). During the recruitment process, recruits can choose whether they would like to serve during summer or winter.
In the first seven weeks of boot camp, recruits receive "General Basic Instruction" (German: Allgemeine Grundausbildung; French: Instruction de base générale; Italian: Istruzione di base generale). During this period, recruits are instructed by their sergeants to military tactics, the use of weaponry (including SIG SG 550) and other equipment, marksmanship, self-defense skills, buddy- and self- aid, CBRN defense, basic survival skills, etc. Recruits are also educated to military life, including how to speak to their superiors, how to clean their weapons and combat shoes, how to clean the barracks, etc. During this period, recruits practice sport on a daily basis, including foot drill, running, team sports, push-ups, etc., and a few kilometers' march (up to 50 km) for some weeks.
The second phase of six weeks is devoted to function-specific basic instructions (German: Funktionsgrundausbildung; French: Instruction de base spécifique à la fonction; Italian: Istruzione di base alla funzione), where recruits learn skills specific to their job.
In the third phase, called "instruction in formation" (German: Verbandsausbildung; French: Instruction en formation; Italian: Istruzione di reparto), battlegroups and battalions are formed.
United Kingdom: British armed forces recruits train in two phases. The length of Phase 1 recruit training varies according to service and trade. The British Army Phase 1 training, for all enlisted units other than infantry, lasts 14 weeks. Infantry units of the British Army undergo a combined 28 weeks basic training, with the exception of the Parachute Regiment (30 weeks), Guards Regiments (30 weeks) and the Royal Gurkha Rifles (36 weeks).
The Royal Air Force provides 10 weeks of basic training for all enlisted recruits, regardless of trade, and is delivered at RAF Halton.
The Royal Navy provides 10 weeks of basic recruit training for all enlisted recruits, with the exception of the Royal Marines, delivered at HMS Raleigh. The Royal Marines (excluding the Royal Marines band), undertake 32 weeks of basic training, delivered at Commando Training Centre Royal Marines.
Phase One is initial recruit training designed to bring all recruits to a similar standard of basic military ability. Upon completion of Phase 1 training, recruits (with the exception of Army infantry roles, and the Royal Marine Commandos) will progress to their trade specific Phase Two training, which consists of courses of varying duration to prepare recruits for their assigned role.
Officer recruits into the UK Armed Forces undergo the following Basic training:
British Army - 44 weeks, delivered at Royal Military Academy (RMA) in Sandhurst.
Royal Air Force - 24 weeks, delivered at RAF College Cranwell (MIOTC).
Royal Navy - 30 weeks (split into two equal phases of 15 weeks each), delivered at Britannia Royal Naval College (BRNC) in Dartmouth.
Royal Marines - 15 months, delivered at Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, with 3 weeks towards the end of the course in the United States.
Upon completion of their Officer recruit training, cadets will then progress to their trade specific training of varying length.
The British Army, Royal Navy, Royal Marines and Royal Air Force manage their own Phase One and Phase Two training establishments.
United States: In the United States, recruit training in the U.S. Army is called Basic Combat Training (BCT); U.S. Army Combat Arms MOS (11 Series, 19 series, 13 series, 12 series) and Military Police MOS (31 series) undergo One Station Unit Training (OSUT) which involves BCT, Advanced Individual Training (AIT) and Specialized Training (such as Bradley, or Mortar School, or Gunnery) all in one. In the U.S. Air and Space Forces it is called Basic Military Training (BMT). In the U.S. Navy, U.S. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Recruit training | Upon completion of their Officer recruit training, cadets will then progress to their trade specific training of varying length.
The British Army, Royal Navy, Royal Marines and Royal Air Force manage their own Phase One and Phase Two training establishments.
United States: In the United States, recruit training in the U.S. Army is called Basic Combat Training (BCT); U.S. Army Combat Arms MOS (11 Series, 19 series, 13 series, 12 series) and Military Police MOS (31 series) undergo One Station Unit Training (OSUT) which involves BCT, Advanced Individual Training (AIT) and Specialized Training (such as Bradley, or Mortar School, or Gunnery) all in one. In the U.S. Air and Space Forces it is called Basic Military Training (BMT). In the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard it is called "Recruit Training" (commonly known as Boot Camp).
Some services present a badge or other award to denote completion of recruit training. The Army typically issues the Army Service Ribbon (issued after completion of Advanced Individual Training), and the Air Force presents the Air Force Training Ribbon and the Airman's Coin. The Marine Corps issue the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor once initial training is complete to signify that the recruits are now Marines. The Navy replaces the "RECRUIT" ball cap the recruits have worn throughout training with the "NAVY" ball cap upon successful completion of "Battle Stations". The United States Coast Guard's recruit training graduates place a Coast Guard Medallion on their ball cap.
For honor graduates of basic training, the Air Force, Coast Guard, and Navy present a Basic Training Honor Graduate Ribbon. The Navy and Marine Corps often meritoriously advance the top graduates of each division one pay-grade (up to a maximum of E-3).
U.S. Army: In the United States Army, recruits are sent to Basic Combat Training in a location designated according to the military Military Occupational Specialty, or MOS, which is selected upon enlistment.
Initial Entry Training (IET) is divided into two parts, which commonly take place at two different locations, depending on the chosen MOS:
Basic Combat Training, or BCT, is a ten-week training cycle. This period does not include "Reception Week" during which recruits are being slotted to their training companies (troops for cavalry). During reception, trainees get Sexual Harassment/Assault Response & Prevention training during IET, as of 30 July 2021.
Advanced Individual Training, or AIT, is where new soldiers receive specific training in their chosen MOS. The length of AIT training varies depending on the MOS and can last anywhere from four weeks to nearly one year.
Several MOSs (mainly combat arms) combine both basic training and AIT in a single combined course called One Station Unit Training (OSUT), which can last up to 22 weeks. The attitude and environment remain the same throughout the entire training cycle, including drill instructors. Essentially, OSUT is an extended version of Basic Training, especially for Infantry OSUT, which remains on the same basic soldiering tasks for the entire cycle, although in greater detail. Infantry OSUT is conducted at the United States Army Infantry School at Fort Moore, and is 22 weeks long.
The U.S. Army has four sites for BCT:
Fort Moore at Columbus, Georgia
Fort Jackson at Columbia, South Carolina
Fort Leonard Wood at St. Robert, Missouri
Fort Sill at Lawton, Oklahoma
During Basic Combat Training, Army recruits learn a variety of basic combat skills including: Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM), land navigation, patrolling, securing and defending a position, drill and ceremony, fireteam formations and assaults, communications and use of AN/PRC-119 radio, combat lifesaving skills, 9-line medevac, reporting intelligence, hand grenades, Claymore mines, M203/M320 grenade launcher, M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), M240B machine gun, M2 .50 caliber machine gun, MK-19, and AT-4 anti-tank weapon. Training also includes combat conditioning by running an obstacle course, the Confidence Course, conducting marches of varying distances up to 12 miles, physical training, and Modern Army Combatives Program (MACP), a martial arts program based on the combination of Brazilian jiu-jitsu, wrestling, judo, Muay Thai, boxing, and a number of others. Recruits are trained to adopt the Army "Warrior Ethos", and to memorize and live by the Soldier's Creed.
BCT is divided into three phases. During Phase I, (also known as "Red Phase") recruits are subject to "Total Control," meaning their every action is monitored and constantly corrected by drill sergeants. The first week of training is commonly referred to as "Hell Week," due to the intense period of adjustment required on the part of the new recruits. Marches are common throughout basic training. Recruits are sent to the "gas chamber" during Phase I, as part of training for defensive chemical warfare. They are also introduced to their standard-issue weapon, the M16A2 rifle, the M16A4 rifle, or M4 carbine.
In Phase II (also known as "White Phase") soldiers begin actually firing weapons, starting with the rifle or carbine (M4A1). Other weapons the recruit becomes familiarized with include various grenades (such as the M67 fragmentation grenade) and grenade launchers (such as the M203). Recruits are then familiarized with the bayonet, anti-tank/armor weaponry and other heavy weapons. The course also includes an obstacle course which the soldiers are expected to negotiate in a certain amount of time. Additionally, Phase II includes continual, intense PT, along with drill and ceremony training. At the conclusion of Phase II, Soldiers are to demonstrate proficiency with the various weaponry with which they trained.
Phase III or "Blue Phase," is the culmination and the most challenging of all the training phases. A final PT test is administered during the first week. Recruits who fail are frequently retested, often up until the morning of their cycle's graduation. If they do not pass, then they are recycled to another platoon that is in an earlier phase of the training cycle until they meet the fitness standards. The final PT Test is the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT). Usually, a soldier needs to score at least 60 points in each APFT category (pushups, planks, and 2 mile run) to pass, but in Basic Combat Training, only 50 points are required; the soldier will nevertheless take another APFT with a 60-point requirement at AIT. During Blue Phase, the recruits move on to such longer and more intensive "bivouac" and FTX (Field Training Exercises) as nighttime combat operations. Drill sergeants will make much of this an adversarial process by working against the recruits in many of the night operations and trying to foil plans, etc.
Upon completion of Basic Combat Training, a recruit is now a soldier, and has developed skills to operate in a combat environment, as a basic rifleman and to perform his or her MOS-specific duties under fire.
U.S. Marine Corps: The United States Marine Corps Recruit Depots are located at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina, and Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, California. Men and women go to either, depending on whether they were recruited east or west of the Mississippi River. Until 2021, women only trained at Parris Island. Marine Corps boot camp is the longest basic training, excluding Army One Station Unit Training (OSUT), in-processing & out-processing is included unlike the other branches as the other branches do not contain this in their Basic Training duration length. Formerly, recruits were referred to as either "(the) private(s)" or "(the) recruit(s)" from day one of Recruit Training. Since the 1990s, they are referred to as "(the) recruit(s)" alone until they earn the title of Marine.
Marine Corps Recruit Training (MCRT) is a 13-week program that is divided up into three four-week phases and further broken down into individual training days. While there are 69 individual training days, recruits also go through pre- and post-training processing where recruits are afforded relatively little freedom. Phase one mainly consists of learning recruit life protocol, physical training, MCMAP training, academic classes, initial drill, a series inspection, and the confidence course. West coast recruits also do swim qualification during this phase. Phase two is completely in the field at Camp Pendleton for west coast recruits, with the first two weeks being spent on marksmanship training and qualification with the M16A4 service rifle, and the last week in the field learning skills such as fireteam formations, land navigation, and hikes. For east coast recruits, phase two is swim qualification, rifle qualification, and Team Week, a week of maintenance duties for the island as a show of how to perform base support tasks while still keeping military bearing and attention to detail. Phase three brings the San Diego recruits back to the recruit depot where they finish up with final drill, final inspection, more PT and confidence courses, and graduation. During third phase, west coast recruits also go back into the field one last time to do the Crucible event. Parris Island recruits finish with field training, final drill and inspection, the Crucible, and graduation. Note that recruits going to either depot receive exactly the same training, if in a different order. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Recruit training | For east coast recruits, phase two is swim qualification, rifle qualification, and Team Week, a week of maintenance duties for the island as a show of how to perform base support tasks while still keeping military bearing and attention to detail. Phase three brings the San Diego recruits back to the recruit depot where they finish up with final drill, final inspection, more PT and confidence courses, and graduation. During third phase, west coast recruits also go back into the field one last time to do the Crucible event. Parris Island recruits finish with field training, final drill and inspection, the Crucible, and graduation. Note that recruits going to either depot receive exactly the same training, if in a different order. An important part of this process is training recruits to adopt and live by the motto, "Every Marine a rifleman".
Upon completion, recruits proceed to receive further training at the School of Infantry (SOI). All non-infantry MOS Marines are trained at the Marine Combat Training Battalion (MCT), while infantry MOS Marines are trained at the Infantry Training Battalion (ITB).
MCT and ITB training is conducted at one of two locations, SOI-East at Camp Lejeune in Jacksonville, North Carolina (for Parris Island graduates) and SOI-West at Camp Pendleton in San Diego, California (for San Diego graduates).
Marine Combat Training Battalion (MCT) is a 29-day course. Marines learn the basics of combat marksmanship, counter-improvised explosive device techniques, how to conduct the defense of a position, convoy operations, combat formations, fireteam assaults, patrolling, urban warfare, use of the AN/PRC-119 radio, reporting military intelligence, land navigation, and the use of hand grenades, the M203 grenade launcher, M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, and M240 machine gun. Training also includes combat conditioning by running an obstacle course, conducting marches, physical training, and Marine Corps Martial Arts Program. Upon completion of Marine Combat Training, the Marine is to have gained the knowledge and ability to operate in a combat environment as a basic rifleman and to perform his or her primary duties under fire. (The main contrast with Army recruit training is that nearly identical training is integrated into Basic Combat Training, so there is no follow-on school.) Upon completion, Marines proceed to their MOS-specific school.
In Infantry Training Battalion (ITB), infantry MOS (03XX) Marines receive 59 days of training in infantry skills, including advanced marksmanship, combat patrolling, land navigation, and a wide array of other infantry skills. Upon completion of ITB, newly qualified Marine infantrymen proceed to their assigned units.
U.S. Navy: The United States Navy currently operates boot camp at Recruit Training Command Great Lakes, located at Naval Station Great Lakes, near North Chicago, Illinois. Instead of having Drill Sergeants or Drill Instructors like other branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, the U.S. Navy has RDCs (Recruit Division Commanders) that are assigned to each division. Training lasts approximately eight weeks (although some recruits will spend as many as nine weeks in training due to the somewhat complicated processing cycle). Days are counted by a system that lists the week and day that they are on, for example, 7-3 for week 7 day 3. The first approximate week is counted P-1, P-2, etc. which denotes that it is a processing day and does not count as part of their 8-week training period. Recruits are instructed on military drill, watchstanding, basic seamanship, water survival skills, first aid, basic shipboard damage control, firefighting, shipboard communication, familiarization with the M9 pistol and Mossberg 500 shotgun (the Navy no longer gives instruction on the M16 in boot camp), pass the confidence chamber (tear-gas-filled chamber), PT, and the basic essentials on Navy life. Recruits also attend many classes throughout boot camp on subjects such as Equal Opportunity, Sexual Assault Victim Intervention, Uniform Code of Military Justice, recognition of naval aircraft and vessels, U.S. naval history, and more. In order for recruits to pass boot camp, they are physically and mentally tested on a 12-hour exercise called Battle Stations which consists of 12 different scenarios involving firefighting, navigating smoke filled compartments, first-aid knowledge, survival at sea, mass casualties, shipboard flood control, bomb detection, and many other skills that they have been learning in the previous 7 weeks. After completion of boot camp, freshly minted sailors are sent either to various "A" Schools located across the United States—where they begin training to receive their ratings (jobs)—or to apprenticeship training, where they then enter the fleet without a designation.
The Navy formerly operated Recruit Training Centers in San Diego, California; Orlando, Florida; Meridian, Mississippi; and Port Deposit (Bainbridge), Maryland. From 1942 to 1946—during and immediately following World War II—the Navy had two additional training sites: Naval Training Station (USNTS) Sampson (renamed Sampson Air Force Base in 1950), near Seneca Lake, New York, where over 400,000 recruits were trained, and Farragut Naval Training Station in Bayview, Idaho.
U.S. Air and Space Forces: The U.S. Air and Space Forces' Basic Military Training (BMT) is seven and a half weeks long, as they do not count the first week ("Week 0"). BMT is 63 calendar days long. It is conducted at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. Formerly, trainees were referred to as "airman" from day one of BMT. This has been changed; now, personnel are referred to as trainees until the Airman's Coin Ceremony in the eighth week of training, when they receive their Airman's Coin. Trainees receive military instruction (including the Air Force core values, flight and individual drill, and living area inspections), academic classes (covering topics such as Air Force history, dress and appearance, military customs and courtesies, ethics, security, and alcohol/drug abuse prevention and treatment), and field training (including protection against biological and chemical attack, basic marksmanship on the M4 carbine as well as self-aid buddy care). Following BMT, airmen/guardians go to a technical school (or 'tech school') where they learn the specifics of their Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC), which is equivalent to the MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) in the Army and Marines, the Navy's NEC (Naval Enlisted Classification) code, or the Coast Guard's ratings.
All non-prior-service enlistees are required to complete BMT, including those enlisting in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command. Reserve component enlistees receive the same training as their active-duty counterparts. Credit can be given on a case-by-case basis for enlistees with college credit. Eagle Scouts and service in the Civil Air Patrol qualify for promotion to E-2 (airman) or E-3 (airman first class) upon graduation from BMT. The stripes are not worn until graduation, though trainees are paid at the higher pay grade.
Lackland AFB has been associated with BMT for almost the Air Force's entire history. From 1950 to 1956, 300,000 airmen received BMT at Sampson Air Force Base in New York. In 1951, Parks Air Force Base in Dublin, California, became a BMT center, with training beginning in March 1952. BMT at Parks AFB ceased later in the decade and the installation was transferred to the U.S. Army in 1959. For a brief time between 1966 and 1968, the Air Force operated a second BMT at Amarillo Air Force Base in Amarillo, Texas.
Unlike the Army and Navy, but like the Marine Corps (throughout boot camp) and Coast Guard (during the first section of boot camp), trainees are required to refer to all airmen and guardians of all ranks as "sir" or "ma'am". Trainees are required to preface speaking to military training instructors with their reporting statement: "Sir/Ma'am, Trainee (the recruit's surname) reports as ordered".
An additional two weeks of BMT was added to the program on November 1, 2008, extending the duration of BMT from six and a half weeks to eight and a half weeks. BMT has been tailored to incorporate some of the additional warfighting skills to coincide with increased Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) rotations and more frequent support of its sister services during those rotations. In 2015, BMT was shortened once again to seven and a half weeks. Trainees still stay at Lackland for eight and half weeks, however, the eighth week following graduation they are moved to a more relaxed environment under a program called Airman's Week, which is designed to transition trainees to technical training.
U.S. Coast Guard: Recruit training for the U.S. Coast Guard is held at Coast Guard Training Center Cape May in Cape May, New Jersey. The Coast Guard base on Government Island (now known as Coast Guard Island) Alameda, California was also used as a second major recruit training center until it was closed in 1982. The official standard recruit training cycle lasts eight weeks. A limited number of recruits may face reversion to earlier weeks of training should they exhibit egregious deficiencies in attitude and/or aptitude. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Recruit training | In 2015, BMT was shortened once again to seven and a half weeks. Trainees still stay at Lackland for eight and half weeks, however, the eighth week following graduation they are moved to a more relaxed environment under a program called Airman's Week, which is designed to transition trainees to technical training.
U.S. Coast Guard: Recruit training for the U.S. Coast Guard is held at Coast Guard Training Center Cape May in Cape May, New Jersey. The Coast Guard base on Government Island (now known as Coast Guard Island) Alameda, California was also used as a second major recruit training center until it was closed in 1982. The official standard recruit training cycle lasts eight weeks. A limited number of recruits may face reversion to earlier weeks of training should they exhibit egregious deficiencies in attitude and/or aptitude.
As an alternate for those recruits possessing prior military service or civilian job skills, Coast Guard recruit basic training offers an abbreviated route to completion of basic training with the Direct Entry Petty Officer Training program (DEPOT) "The goal of the Direct Entry Petty Officer Training Course is to produce petty officers who on the basis of their civilian professions, prior military experience, or a combination of both" are otherwise duly qualified.
Coast Guard boot camp covers basic seamanship, drill, military bearing, and firefighting. The U.S. Coast Guard is unique among the armed services in that it fires the SIG Sauer P229R pistol as well as the M16 rifle during the training.
Although the Coast Guard is a part of the Department of Homeland Security, rather than the Department of Defense, it is by law and tradition a branch of the United States Armed Forces. As with all military personnel, coast guardsmen are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Due to the Coast Guard's unique mission set – including CONUS and OCONUS defense operations, search and rescue and maritime law enforcement – there are added requirements to maintain high physical fitness standards and military bearing. Due to its unusual, diverse and difficult mission, the U.S. Coast Guard is the most selective in recruiting and training standards. As an example, the Coast Guard Academy is the only service academy that uses competitive admissions for prospective officer candidates rather than congressional appointment.
During their time at Cape May, recruits are subjected to the usual "boot camp" atmosphere of direct instruction and intense motivation. Recruits must adhere to strict rules such as hygiene and uniform regulations and obey all lawful orders. The recruits are designated as seaman recruits (SR; E-1). Unique to the Coast Guard among the armed services, recruits successfully completing basic recruit training are advanced to the rank of seaman apprentice/fireman apprentice (SA/FA; E-2) or seaman/fireman (SN/FN; E-3) upon graduation—the difference generally based on the level of higher education the graduate possesses. Coast Guard drill instructors are called "company commanders" and hold a rank ranging from petty officer 2nd class (E-5) up to senior chief petty officer (E-8). Coast Guard companies have approximately two or three company commanders and anywhere from 20 to over 100 recruits.
After completing boot camp, recruits can select their rating and then attend an "A" school. Few graduates go straight to "A" school; most spend up to a year in the fleet as "non-rates". "A" school is a long-term technical school providing specific instruction about a rating. The "A" schools last two to six months and usually occur at TRACEN Yorktown, Yorktown, Virginia or TRACEN Petaluma, Petaluma, California. Aviation related ratings train at the Aviation Technical Training Center at Coast Guard Air Station Elizabeth City, North Carolina. Some ratings have an available on-the-job apprenticeship training option known as "striking" instead of attending an "A" school.
See also: Military education and training
Milling - military training exercise
Military Academy
Officer Candidate School
Resocialization
Psychological conditioning
Military recruitment
Military service
References:
External links: USAREC (2003). U.S. Army DEP Guide: Army Terminology Archived 2003-12-27 at the Wayback Machine. United States Army Recruiting Command. Fort Knox, KY (USA).
USMC Recruit Depot San Diego. Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego Archived 2007-04-13 at the Wayback Machine Headquarters Western Recruiting Region. MCRD San Diego, CA (USA)
Media:The Ultimate Basic Training Guidebook: Tips, Tricks, and Tactics for Surviving Boot Camp, by Sgt. Michael Volkin. Savas Beatie, 2005. ISBN 1-932714-11-1 |
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